From Civil Strife to Peace Building: Examining Private Sector Involvement in West African Reconstruction

efforts.

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Cote d’Ivoire

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From Linas-Marcoussis to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement

The Tortuous and Open-Ended Peace Process in Côte d’Ivoire

Gilles Yabi and Andrew Goodwin

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Introduction

In the two and a half decades following independence from France in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire was considered a bastion of stability and prosperity in an often volatile region of the world. However, it was also an undemocratic country ruled by a talented but autocratic president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The death of the Father of the Nation in 1993 led to a period of unprecedented political instability, which took a turn for the worse when a 2002 coup attempt thrust Côte d’Ivoire into a spiral of violence from which it has yet to emerge convincingly.

Several attempts by the international community to mediate an end to the crisis—including international mediation and UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions—have halted the civil war but failed to gain peace. The most recent attempt to find peace led to the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord (APO)² on March 4, 2007. While this agreement holds much promise, its implementation has proceeded very slowly and a successful outcome is still far from sight. Crucial issues such as the identification of the population and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants have yet to begin. A political tug-of-war has characterized each step of the implementation process as divergent interests vie for control. Underlying the process are the political strategies of the players involved. Laurent Gbagbo’s bottom line is to retain the presidency; Guillaume Soro has had to walk a fine line between acting as an ex-rebel leader and serving as a presumably neutral prime minister. The APO serves as the basis from which peace can emerge; but it remains to be seen whether the actors involved will be able to set aside their differences and respect democratic standards and the rule of law.

A History of Peace Attempts

The peace accords of 2003 followed ten years that saw Côte d’Ivoire slide steadily toward civil war. The death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 sparked a battle for succession that was won by the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié. Bédié maintained Houphouët’s autocratic style, refused to make electoral reforms, and prevented one of his adversaries, former prime minister Alassane Ouattara,³ from running for president on the grounds that he was not Ivorian.⁴ In 1999, growing political tensions⁵ and army discontent⁶ led to Côte d’Ivoire’s first ever military coup, which saw Bédié replaced by General Robert Gueï. The military leader had planned to transfer power back to a civilian government but soon decided to run for president himself. Backed by the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), which was led by Gbagbo and his own opportunistic supporters, Gueï ensured that both Ouattara and Bédié would be barred from contesting the presidency.⁷ Both Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR) and Bédié’s Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI-RDA) called for an election boycott, and only 37 percent of the registered electorate voted.⁸ Gueï declared himself the winner of the 2000 elections despite preliminary results indicating a Gbagbo victory. After FPI street demonstrations and a bloody confrontation with the presidential guard, Gueï fled and Gbagbo declared himself president. Tensions remained high, however, especially in the northern half of the country and in the main city of Abidjan, following the chaotic elections. Ouattara demanded that new elections be called, and street violence ensued, with RDR supporters on one side battling FPI supporters and pro-Gbagbo security forces on the other. In response, the government targeted those thought to support the RDR, especially immigrants and northerners, which deepened divisions among Ivorians. Growing tensions along ethnic, regional, and political lines were mirrored in the military, where those thought to be sympathetic to Gueï or Ouattara were removed or demoted to provide space for Gbagbo’s political base.

In December 2002, Côte d’Ivoire exploded into outright civil war following an attempted coup against President Gbagbo. The coup was led by former soldiers, most of them northerners who had gone into exile—mainly in Burkina Faso—before and after Gbagbo gained power. They tried to take Abidjan but were forced back toward to north. The rebel forces subsequently took Bouaké in the centre in addition to the northern towns; meanwhile, the military loyal to the government maintained control of the south, effectively dividing the country in two.

France now found itself in an awkward position. The former colonial power had a close relationship with Côte d’Ivoire during Houphouët-Boigny’s rule. By this point it had a permanent military base in Abidjan as well as defence accords with the government. The French felt that the crisis was internal and political in nature and that it required a negotiated settlement, not the military solution favoured by Gbagbo, whose personal relationship with then French president Jacques Chirac was not particularly cordial. Consequently, France opted for a limited engagement, strengthening its forces to protect the expatriate population while at the same time providing logistic aid to the Ivorian military. Gbagbo later accused France of ambivalence, while the rebels accused French troops of preventing their conquest of Abidjan. Finally, in an effort to avoid a full-blown civil war while maintaining its political influence, France offered to broker a peace deal.

After initial regional mediation efforts by West African heads of state, the first international attempt to launch a comprehensive peace process was made in the Parisian suburb of Linas–Marcoussis between January 15 and 23, 2003. The peace talks were followed by a summit of heads of state, including Gbagbo and Chirac, in Paris to endorse its conclusions. The conference was tasked with reaching a compromise between President Gbagbo, who insisted that any action had to be taken within the constitutional framework, and the rebel coalition led by Guillaume Soro, who was demanding Gbagbo’s immediate resignation. The compromises that resulted included, above all, a government of reconciliation with full executive powers to be established immediately; this would require the devolution of essential powers from the presidency to the office of the prime minister. Other compromises involved land reform,⁹ the drafting of an electoral timetable culminating in elections in 2005, the revision of conditions of eligibility for the presidency,¹⁰ and the reform of nationality laws.¹¹ The consensus government, led by a new prime minister, Seydou Diarra,¹² was mandated to implement the recommendations of the Linas–Marcoussis Accord (LMA) and to organize credible presidential elections at the end of Gbagbo’s constitutional term in October 2005.

The political situation that resulted from the LMA left many in Côte d’Ivoire unsatisfied. The granting of powers to a new consensus government implied the weakening of the position of President Gbagbo. His political program was jeopardized, and he had to contend with a government that included those who had tried to overthrow him. For the rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN),¹³ inclusion in the consensus government meant the acquisition of new powers and some recognition of their cause. Nevertheless, they remained suspicious of Gbagbo’s desire to share real power. Consequently, despite the official endorsement of the agreement by all sides, its implementation was constantly blocked by the parties involved.¹⁴ The resulting political impasse was not the optimal circumstance for those involved; it was, however, comfortable, and it helped ensure that the new reconciliation government would continue to be a lame duck.¹⁵ The belligerents—especially the government forces, which were eager to regain the territories they had lost to the rebellion—used this period to refurbish their arms stocks.

The slight progress made during 2003 and 2004 toward implementing the LMA was further impeded by a rapidly deteriorating security situation.¹⁶ After a blatant violation of the ceasefire by government forces on November 4, 2004,¹⁷ and the bombing of a French military camp in Bouaké on November 6,¹⁸ South African president Thabo Mbeki, backed by the African Union (AU), offered to mediate a new agreement.¹⁹

Mbeki invited President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Diarra, PDCI leader Henri Konan Bédié, RDR²⁰ leader Alassane Ouattara, and the FN’s secretary-general, Guillaume Soro, to Pretoria. The Pretoria Accord (PA), reached on April 6, 2005, was strong on paper, touching on all the major aspects of the conflict. It called for the immediate demobilization and disarmament of militias, the reinforcement of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to ensure free and fair elections, the participation of the UN in the electoral process, and a new session of the National Assembly to amend legislation that did not conform to provisions set out in the LMA, such as laws on nationality and identification.

Though the PA was in principle a strong agreement, in practice it was only a partial success, owing largely to a lack of trust and political will among the signatories. First of all, Gbagbo’s resort to Article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution²¹ to allow all parties that signed the LMA to run in the presidential elections was welcomed and seen as a step forward; nonetheless, concerns were raised regarding that article’s potential for abuse. Second, the calendar for disarmament was quickly shelved when the FN made it known that the disarmament and demobilization of its troops would be contingent on the passing of several contentious pieces of legislation related to identification and nationality, as well as the demobilization of militias close to the president, as required by the agreement.

On June 28, 2005, Mbeki stepped in again to mediate a return to the PA. On July 15, 2005, in the absence of any movement on key pieces of legislation by the National Assembly, which had failed to reach consensus, Gbagbo resorted to Article 48 to make decisions on six sensitive bills.²² The FN complained to Mbeki about these unilateral decisions; Mbeki responded by blaming the rebels for blocking peace. The FN then accused Mbeki of siding with Gbagbo and refused the regroupment of its troops. This effectively killed the PA.²³

Faced with severe political instability, which was amplified by the end of the presidential mandate on October 30, the UN intervened with UNSC Resolution 1633 on October 21. The resolution extended Gbagbo’s mandate for a further twelve months and called for the appointment of a new prime minister, who was extended increased power over the entire peace process. Yet a year later, the two sides were no closer to holding elections. On November 1, 2006, the UNSC passed Resolution 1721, which built on the directives contained in Resolution 1633 and extended President Gbagbo’s mandate for a final twelve months, until presidential elections could be organized.²⁴

From the moment UNSC Resolution 1721 was signed, President Gbagbo made it clear that he would not abide by it, declaring that he would not implement aspects of the resolution that infringed on fundamental Ivorian law, including the prime minister’s new authority to sign ordinances. Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny’s²⁵ efforts to counter President Gbagbo and carry out his mandate under Resolution 1721 were neutralized by Gbagbo.²⁶ The UNSC, which had given the impression of being totally committed to Resolution 1721, did little in response to the neutralization of the Banny government.²⁷

Both sides in the conflict were undermining international agreements, yet both—the presidential camp and the rebels—were aware that the four-year political stalemate threatened their own interests. Regional and international fatigue was growing, as was the possibility of a popular revolt that could result in both factions being rejected. Rather than risk this, President Gbagbo announced on December 19 that he had drafted a made-in-Côte d’Ivoire plan to solve the crisis. This would entail direct dialogue with the FN rebels to negotiate disarmament and reunification of the country, to be facilitated by the President of Burkina Faso and the Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Blaise