Evolutionary Criminology: Towards a Comprehensive Explanation of Crime

Evolutionary Criminology

Towards a Comprehensive Explanation of Crime

Russil Durrant

School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

Tony Ward

School of Psychology Victoria University of Wellington Wellington, New Zealand

Table of Contents

Cover image

Title page

Copyright

Preface

Acknowledgments

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1. Criminology and Evolutionary Theory

Introduction

The Subject Matter of Criminology

Evolutionary Explanations in Criminology

Why Do Criminologists Largely Ignore Evolutionary Theory and Why Should This Change?

An Overview of the Book

Part I. The Evolutionary Framework

Chapter 2. Evolutionary Theory and Human Evolution

Introduction

Natural and Sexual Selection

The Modern Synthesis and Middle-Level Evolutionary Theories

The Extended Synthesis in Evolutionary Biology

Summary

Human Evolution

Summary

Chapter 3. Evolutionary Behavioral Science

Introduction

Applying Evolutionary Theory to Human Behavior

The Critical Literature

Evaluation and Integration: Toward an Evolutionary Behavioral Science

Summary

Chapter 4. Levels of Analysis and Explanations in Criminology

Introduction

The State of Criminological Theory

Levels of Analysis and Levels of Organization

Integration and Isolation

Summary

Part II. Explaining Crime

Chapter 5. The Evolution of Altruism, Cooperation, and Punishment

Introduction

The Underlying Assumptions of Criminological Theories

Punishment

The Evolutionary Origins of Cooperation and Punishment

Proximate Mechanisms and Processes

Implications for Criminology and Criminal Justice

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 6. Distal Explanations: Adaptations and Phylogeny

Introduction

Key Explanatory Targets

The Evolution of Human Mating and Social Structure

The Evolutionary Origins of Crime

Aggression and Violence

Sexual Offending

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 7. Development

Introduction

Explanatory Targets for Developmental Criminology

Approaches to Explaining Developmental Patterns in Offending

Evolutionary Approaches

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 8. Proximate Explanations: Individuals, Situations, and Social Processes

Introduction

Dynamic Risk Factors, Protective Factors, and Desistance

Agency Model of Risk

Research Implications

Conclusions

Chapter 9. Social-Structural and Cultural Explanations

Introduction

Historical Trends

Ecological Variations in Crime

Theoretical Explanations for Ecological and Historical Variations in Crime

An Evolutionary Perspective

Summary

Part III. Responding to Crime

Chapter 10. Punishment, Public Policy, and Prevention

Introduction

Applied Evolutionary Criminology

Social and Situational Crime Prevention

Punishment and Restorative Justice

Wider Policy Implications

Chapter 11. The Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Offenders

What Is Offender Rehabilitation?

Evolutionary Explanatory Framework and Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation Implications

Example of Empathy and Altruism

Conclusions

Chapter 12. Looking Forward from the Perspective of the Past

Integrative Pluralism: A Deeper Ontology

Embodiment

Emotion

Distributed Cognition

Conclusions

References

Index

Copyright

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Preface

Our overall argument in this book is straightforward: we aim to make the case that we can significantly advance our understanding of criminal behavior and the way we respond to crime by drawing on the explanatory resources of evolutionary theory. Evolutionary explanations have become increasingly prominent in many academic fields in the social and behavioral sciences, but they have been largely ignored by criminologists. We think that this neglect is unwarranted. Although an evolutionary approach will not replace existing criminological theories—indeed, we argue that it can be fruitfully integrated with extant approaches—it can substantially enrich our understanding of criminological phenomena, open up new lines of inquiry, and offer guidance on the most effective ways of responding to crime. In short, we think that the arguments and materials presented in this book will be of significant interest to criminologists, forensic psychologists, practitioners, and anyone interested in understanding and managing criminal behavior.

Our overall aim may be straightforward, but providing satisfactory explanations for any human behavior—including the subject matter of this book, criminal behavior—entails rather more complexity. Humans are the product of evolutionary processes and understanding those processes and how they have shaped our psychological and behavioral characteristics over millions of years is an essential part of the explanatory story. In this respect we are much like any other species. However, we—unlike other animals—also have a cultural history that has led to substantial changes in the way that we live and the nature of our interactions with others, and understanding this history and how it shapes our behavior is also crucial. Humans also have a developmental history: our behavior, including our propensity to commit crime, is influenced by the complex interplay of genetic, epigenetic, and environmental processes that we experience across the life course. Finally, we are embodied organisms with thoughts, emotions, awareness, and a capacity for agency that allows us to make choices that both shape and are shaped by the ecological, social, and cultural environment in which we are embedded. Understanding the interplay of these various types of explanation, we argue, is a crucial task for all social and behavioral scientists, and is essential for the development of criminological theories.

In order to make sense of this complexity, we need to be armed with a clear understanding of evolutionary theory, and how evolutionary explanations relate to other types of explanations in criminology. This is the primary task we tackle in the first part of this book. Inevitably some of this material will be familiar to readers well versed in evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology, but we think it is important to provide a clear overview of the key ideas and concepts. Moreover, there is a growing recognition of the importance of nongenetic inheritance in evolutionary processes and, more specifically, the role of culture and gene–culture coevolutionary processes in human evolution. These ideas are central to the arguments that are developed in this book, but may be less familiar to many readers. In Chapter 4, we provide a framework, drawing in part from Tinbergen’s (1963) idea that there are four types of explanations (those that focus on evolutionary history, evolutionary function, development, and proximate processes) that play complementary roles in explaining behavior, that can help us to understand how evolutionary explanations fit in with other types of explanations in criminology. With this evolutionary framework in place, in Part II of the book we turn our attention to explanations of crime. In the five chapters that form the second part of the book, we begin with an overview of evolutionary altruism and cooperation, and then focus on each level of explanation in turn. In Part III of the book we discuss how the approach that we have developed can provide guidance in our efforts to manage crime by looking at punishment, prevention, and rehabilitation.

Understanding why individuals commit crime and how the propensity to engage in crime varies across time and space is an important task, for criminal behavior is responsible for a significant amount of harm in society. Our responses to crime can also be the source of significant harm and the overarching pragmatic goal of criminology and criminal justice is to manage crime in ways that reduce the adverse effects associated with it. In order to do this, we must be armed with the best explanatory accounts that are available because attempts to intervene based on an incorrect or incomplete understanding of the phenomena of interest are likely to be ineffective. In recent years, biosocial criminologists have made a persuasive case that criminology has neglected biological explanations to its detriment and that the future of criminological theorizing will need to recognize the complex interplay of biological and social processes in the etiology of crime. The arguments that we advance in this book are very much in the spirit of this claim. Although evolutionary explanations barely feature in the education of criminologists, and this book, to the best of our knowledge, is only the second authored monograph dedicated to the topic of evolution and crime in the last decade, we believe that evolutionary criminology holds much promise for advancing our explanations of crime and how best to manage it.

Russil Durrant

Tony Ward

October, 2014

Acknowledgments

We would first like to thank the editors at Academic Press for their (patient) help and support with this book.

Russil Durrant would like to give special thanks to Carolina and Zoe for their support and encouragement (with extra thanks to Zoe for all your help on the references); Tony Ward for his unflagging enthusiasm for this project and his stimulating academic support over the years. Thanks also to my colleagues at the Institute of Criminology, and to Leo, Bea, and Mavis for being there.

Tony Ward would like to thank Carolyn Wilshire and Alex Ward for many stimulating conversations on theoretical issues and human behavior. Thanks so much to Roxy Heffernan for helping me develop the Agency Model of Risk. I would like to acknowledge the intellectual input from Tony Beech and Richard Siegert over the years on evolutionary ideas. Russil Durrant has been amazing to work with, a true scholar. Finally, thanks to Leo (the very fluffy dog) for helping me unwind when I most needed it!

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Phylogeny of primates from 25 million years ago (mya) 34

Figure 3.1 An evolutionary taxonomy of within-group differences 62

Figure 3.2 An evolutionary taxonomy of between-group differences 62

Figure 4.1 The explanatory domain of criminology 71

Figure 4.2 A conceptual framework for organizing theoretical explanations The explanatory domain of criminology 74

Figure 4.3 Levels of organization and levels of analysis for selected criminological theories 79

Figure 5.1 The evolutionary outcomes of social behavior 102

Figure 5.2 The gene–culture coevolution of altruism, cooperation, and punishment 105

Figure 5.3 Offending behavior in relation to our evolved capacity for altruism, cooperation, and punishment 112

Figure 6.1 An evolutionary taxonomy of criminal behavior in relation to adaptive design 128

Figure 7.1 Evolutionary developmental models for understanding individual differences in antisocial and prosocial behavior: The role of genetics and environment 174

Figure 7.2 Evolutionary developmental models for understanding individual differences in antisocial and prosocial behavior: Adaptive phenotypic plasticity 175

Figure 8.1 The agency model of risk (AMR) 193

Figure 8.2 Using the AMR to explain intimacy deficits 201

Figure 9.1 Mean homicide rates in European regions between 1200 and 2012 (excluding Corsica and Sardinia) 207

Figure 9.2 The ratio of male to female homicide perpetrators and victims in London from 1300 to 1909 208

Figure 9.3 Homicide rates for selected countries (2012 or latest available) 212

List of Tables

Table 1.1 The Representation of Evolutionary Theory and Other Theoretical Approaches in Criminology Journals from 2000 to 2014 (Number of Articles) 8

Table 3.1 Criteria for Evaluating the Explanatory Value of Adaptation Explanations 60

Table 4.1 Levels of Organization in the Social and Behavioral Sciences 75

Table 5.1 The Underlying Assumptions about Human Nature and Their Roles in Criminological Theories 93

Table 5.2 The Nature of Punishment: What Needs to Be Explained? 96

Table 5.3 The Evolutionary Origins of Moral Foundations 106

Table 6.1 Key Explanatory Targets for the Distal Level of Explanation 120

Table 6.2 Reproductive and Social Traits of Hominids 122

Table 7.1 Key Explanatory Targets for the Developmental Level of Explanation 155

Table 7.2 Risk Factors for Offending and Factors Relating to Desistance 158

Table 7.3 Life History Stages and Periods of Development in Humans (and Chimpanzees) 171

Table 7.4 Faster and Slower Life Histories 176

Table 9.1 The Key Factors Identified by Eisner, Roth, and Pinker That Can Account for Historical Changes in Violence 209

Table 9.2 Key Evolutionary Processes That Can Account for Historical and Ecological Variation in Crime 222

Chapter 1

Criminology and Evolutionary Theory

Abstract

Criminology has been a recognized field of scholarly inquiry for more than a century. Even so, our understanding of crime and its causes could be enhanced by consideration of the more distal causes of criminal behavior, an analysis that remains largely unrealized to date. One approach that has been almost completely ignored is the evolutionary approach to criminology and the understanding of criminal behavior. In this chapter, we argue for greater inclusion of evolutionary theory in the interdisciplinary approach that has come to characterize criminology. In recognizing that mainstream criminology has largely neglected evolutionary explanations for criminal behavior, we consider several possible reasons for this neglect, and suggest ways for integrating evolutionary approaches within criminology. In the remainder of the book, we elaborate on and illustrate how this can be accomplished.

Keywords

Anthropology; Crime research; Criminal law; Criminology; Evolutionary theory; Evolutionary theory of crime; History of crime; Interdisciplinary approaches; Political science; Psychology; Sociology

Introduction

Depending on exactly when one wants to let off the starting gun, criminology as an organized field of scholarly inquiry is no more than about 140  years old (Godfrey, Lawrence, & Williams, 2008). The phenomenon of crime is, of course, much older. How much older? The first codified laws of which we have any detailed knowledge come from Babylonia around 1760 BCE, so the origin of crime as lawbreaking dates from this period. All human groups, however, set norms that prescribe acceptable behavior and mete out punishment to those individuals who violate these norms (Boehm, 2012), and the phenomena that are the primary foci of criminologists—violence, rape, punishment, and the appropriation of resources from others—are part of the deep history (Shryock & Smail, 2011) of humankind. In their efforts to provide explanations for criminal behavior, criminologists, forensic psychologists, and others largely focus on proximate factors such as the psychological characteristics of offenders, their developmental history, and the social structure in which they are embedded. These types of explanations are clearly important. They have proven valuable in the development of theories and models of offending that have had some success in both accounting for crime and guiding approaches to effectively managing criminal behavior. We suggest, however, that our understanding of crime and the way that we respond to it can be significantly enriched through a consideration of the more distal causes of criminal behavior—those that reside in the evolutionary history of our species. Moreover, a more comprehensive approach to understanding crime and responding to criminal behavior, we claim, can be achieved through the integration of evolutionary approaches with those that focus on more proximal causal factors.

In this book we make one—longish—argument for this approach. Our aim in this opening chapter is more modest. We first clarify what we take as the core subject matter of criminology. Then we make the empirical case that—despite the interdisciplinary aspirations of many criminologists—mainstream criminology has almost completely neglected evolutionary explanations in its attempts to understand the nature of crime and our responses to it. We consider several possible reasons for this neglect and suggest that the time is ripe for a careful consideration of how evolutionary approaches can be integrated within criminology. In the remainder of the book we elaborate on and illustrate how this can be accomplished.

The Subject Matter of Criminology

Not all criminologists are in complete agreement about exactly what discipline they are part of, and some argue that criminology should not be considered an academic discipline at all (Garland, 2011). We suggest, however, that criminology can reasonably be described as an applied social and behavioral science. As such, criminology is organized around a particular set of phenomena—very roughly, crime and our responses to crime—rather than a specific level of analysis like sociology or psychology (Agnew, 2011a). In this respect, criminology is somewhat like medicine—an applied area of study undergirded by a number of basic sciences or academic disciplines. For criminology, the key areas of inquiry include—but are not limited to—sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, history, and law. As we note below, some of these disciplines—notably sociology—feature more prominently than others, and one of the main aims of this book is to argue for a more thoroughgoing inclusion of evolutionary biology into the field of criminology.

Even if we accept that criminology can be reasonably considered a discipline in its own right, there remains some disagreement regarding the scope of its domain, and criminologists have devoted a considerable amount of energy to the task of defining just what constitutes crime. The most straightforward approach, paraded in every introductory textbook, is to define crime in legal terms: criminal acts are those that violate the criminal law and are therefore subject to sanction by the state. The major objection to this definition is that by defining crime in purely legal terms, the subject matter of criminology becomes a moving target, as what constitutes a criminal act varies both historically and cross-culturally. Many also argue that this definition of crime is both too narrow and too broad: it excludes many harmful acts while including many that result in relatively little or no harm (Agnew, 2011a). In response to these objections (and others), many criminologists prefer a definition of crime that is not yoked exclusively to what is currently proscribed by the law, while others have suggested that the focus on crime sensu stricto is a mistake and urge the acceptance of a crime-free criminology (Gottfredson, 2011). Agnew (2011a, p. 187) argues for a more inclusive definition of crime that can be defined as acts that cause blameworthy harm, are condemned by the public, and/or are sanctioned by the state. We think that there is much merit in Agnew’s analysis. A much simpler solution, however, is to accept that crime should be defined in purely legal terms, but the subject matter of criminology includes more than just crime. How much more? We suggest, largely consistent with Agnew’s (2011a) approach, that criminologists should be concerned with three overlapping kinds of phenomena:

1. Intentionally harmful acts;

2. Acts that violate consensually held social norms and are subject to sanctions by group members; and

3. Acts that violate codified laws and are subject to punishment by the state.

Most criminologists accept that harmful acts form a central component of the subject matter of their discipline. Agnew suggests that the focus should be on blameworthy harms, with harm defined as acts that violate fundamental human rights. We think there is much value in this more inclusive perspective on harm, but—consistent with our overall evolutionary approach—suggest that intentionally harmful acts are those carried out voluntarily that negatively affect the biological fitness of others. Murder is the ultimate in intentionally harmful acts, because it entails the elimination of any further opportunities to promote reproductive success by the victim. Many other acts also negatively affect biological fitness in lesser ways. Bullying, verbal derogation, and sexual harassment, for instance, may all reduce or limit the survival or reproductive opportunities of others (e.g., through a reduction in status or reputation). This broad definition also encompasses the many harmful acts that have been the focus of critical criminologists such as state-sponsored collective violence, discrimination, corporate maleficence, and the failure to provide health care to those in need. Acts that harm the environment or other species can also be included here, as they have an impact on the biological fitness of other species. Of course, some of these acts are going to be of more enduring interest to criminologists than others (state-sponsored genocide understandably attracts more attention than the use of pesticides to eradicate insect populations), and defining intentional harm in this way does not necessarily imply that these acts are either morally wrong or that they should be subject to sanctions by the state.

The second set of overlapping phenomena that we suggest should form the subject matter of criminology concerns those acts that violate consensually held social norms. These acts are largely those that Agnew refers to in his definition as condemned by the public. There are two key aspects to these acts. First, they violate consensually held social norms. The importance of social norms for group cohesion and collective action is a recurring theme in this book and features prominently in evolutionary approaches to understanding the nature of human cooperation (e.g., Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; see Chapter 5). All human groups have norms that are typically explicitly articulated and that prescribe the domain of appropriate behavior. Many of these norms clearly relate to intentionally harmful acts, but norms also regulate a wide class of behaviors such as what food can be eaten and when, who is an appropriate marriage partner, and how individuals of different standing should address one another. Second, these acts are subject to some form of sanction by group members—from verbal admonishments to social exclusion and physical punishment.

The final set of acts that we suggest should form the subject matter of criminology are those that violate the criminal law and are subject to punishment by the state—in short, criminal acts.

Much of the subject matter of criminology concerns behaviors that are intentionally harmful, violate consensually held norms, and break the law. There are, however, important acts that fall into only one or two of these classes of behavior and that, arguably, should also be of interest to criminologists. The three sets of phenomena, when viewed through the lens of evolutionary theory, also have a relatively clear history. Intentionally harmful acts are clearly the oldest class of behaviors in evolutionary terms and reflect the relentless logic of natural and sexual selection (see Chapter 2), as organisms that manage to advance their own survival and reproductive success at the expense of others are more likely to be represented in subsequent generations. As such, intentionally harmful acts predate the origin of our species and—given suitable license to the term intentional—must have been present in the earliest organisms. The second set of behaviors that form the subject matter of criminology are, however, much more recent. Although some have argued that chimpanzees have something like a sense of social justice, and a number of species may police in-group behavior that threatens group functioning (see Brosnan & de Waal, 2012; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995), the existence of consciously articulated social norms is unique to our lineage, probably emerging sometime around two million years ago (see Chapter 2). The final set of acts is more recent still, because it relies on the emergence of both writing (criminal acts are codified) and the state.

In sum, we suggest that the subject matter of criminology is largely concerned with: (1) acts that are intentionally harmful, that violate consensually held social norms, and/or violate codified laws and are subject to sanction by the state; (2) the consequences of these acts for others (victims); and (3) responses to these acts in terms of punishment, prevention, and rehabilitation. We appreciate that there are many criminologists who would not be entirely satisfied with how we construe the field of criminology. Brisman (2012), for instance, contends that criminology is more than the study of crime (even broadly construed) and responses to crime, and suggests that we should also study—among other topics—"what crime means to people" (p. 60) and what crime (and responses to crime) can tell us about cultural values and social structures. Similarly, many criminologists are interested in how crime and responses to crime are represented, with a particular focus on the presentation and consumption of crime in the media and what that can tell us about the nature of society. Inevitably, like most academic disciplines, there will be no sharp lines that perfectly describe the domain of criminology; inevitably there will also be topics of central and more peripheral interest. Criminology may be more than the study of crime (and harms and violations of norms) and our responses to crime (and how that information can be deployed in real world contexts), but few would deny—we think—that this is its central mission.

Evolutionary Explanations in Criminology

Many—perhaps most—criminologists are willing to accept that criminology is, in principle, an interdisciplinary subject. McLaughlin and Newburn (2010a, p. 2), for instance, assert that criminology is a field of inquiry where people from a variety of intellectual and scholarly backgrounds come together to engage in research and deliberation. Not all would agree that this is the case in practice, despite the fairly widespread existence of integrative approaches. Many criminologists, for instance, note that criminological theory tends to be dominated by sociological approaches (e.g., DeKeseredy, 2012). Some have noted the relative neglect and misrepresentation of psychological theories and approaches in criminology (e.g., McGuire, 2004; Webber, 2010), and we think it is fair to say that criminology has not made as thorough use of contemporary psychological science in its theorizing as it might have. Others draw attention to the failure of criminology to fully incorporate biological approaches and argue that the adoption of biosocial criminology will lead to a paradigm shift in criminology with revolutionary consequences (Wright & Cullen, 2012). Although we think that a paradigm shift in the strict Kuhnian sense is unlikely in the near future, we are certainly in agreement that (1) criminology as a discipline has neglected biological approaches, and (2) that the inclusion of these approaches would significantly enrich our study of crime.

It is not uncommon for academics with a particular research interest or theoretical orientation to lament the lack of interest in their favored area of research, and there is always a temptation to overstate this neglect. We think, however, that a fairly sound case can be made for the near invisibility of evolutionary theory in mainstream criminology. We make this case using three main sources of data: surveys of members of the American Society of Criminology, textbook coverage of evolutionary approaches, and coverage of evolutionary approaches in leading criminology journals. Evolutionary approaches have not been completely neglected, however, and we follow the foregoing analysis with a brief historical overview of evolutionary ideas in criminology.

In the following section we discuss reasons why evolutionary approaches are relatively neglected and make the case that the time is ripe for this oversight to be corrected.

The Neglect of Evolutionary Explanations in Criminology

In a study by Walsh & Ellis (2004), attendees at the 1997 American Society of Criminology conference were sent a questionnaire that tapped into their views concerning their favored criminological theory and the most important causes of crime, along with a number of other questions. The 147 respondents generated a list of 23 different theories with social-control, self-control, and differential association the three most favored approaches. Only one respondent selected an evolutionary approach (neo-Darwinism). Respondents were also asked to rate a list of 24 possible causes of serious and persistent criminal behavior in terms of their importance on a scale ranging from 0 (of no importance) to 9 (extremely important). Topping the list of causes were unfair economic system (M  =  6.29), lack of empathy (M  =  6.14), and lack of educational opportunities (M  =  6.08). Evolutionary factors were rated the least important of the 23 causes (M  =  1.37). In a replication of this study, Cooper, Walsh, and Ellis (2010) sent questionnaires asking similar questions to all members of the American Society of Criminology having an e-mail address in 2007. The 1218 respondents provided a roughly similar pattern of results as in the first study—at least with respect to their views on evolutionary theory. No participant chose evolutionary theory as the favored criminological theory (although it is notable that 21 did select biosocial theory), and evolutionary factors (natural selection) were again viewed as the least important in explaining criminal behavior (M  =  1.64). In sum, the results of these two studies suggest that American criminologists place almost no value on evolutionary approaches to understanding criminal behavior, a result that is largely consistent with the perceived importance of evolutionary approaches in the social sciences more generally (e.g., Perry & Mace, 2010).

Another way of exploring the importance accorded evolutionary approaches in criminology is to sample coverage of evolution and evolutionary theory in criminology textbooks. Although textbooks necessarily offer condensed and sometimes superficial coverage of topic areas, their attention to particular theories and approaches is a useful indication of what criminologists view as most important. Criminology is also blessed with a relatively large number of textbooks, readers, and the like devoted to criminological theory, and in principle these may provide the clearest indication of the importance accorded by criminologists to different theoretical perspectives. In order to examine the coverage of evolutionary theory in criminological textbooks, we took all introductory criminology textbooks and textbooks, readers, and encyclopedias on criminological theory published between 2000 and 2012 and held in the Victoria University of Wellington library as our sample. We then tabulated the number of indexed pages that referred to evolution, evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, and related subjects—e.g., evolutionary neuroandrogenic theory and sociobiology—along with the actual amount of text (in pages) devoted to these approaches. The final sample comprised 21 introductory criminology textbooks and 14 books devoted to criminological theory (including the Encyclopedia of Criminological Theory).

The results revealed that a total of 21 books had some indexed reference to evolutionary approaches. In other words, 37 percent of all introductory criminology textbooks and criminological theory books published since 2000 and held in the Victoria University of Wellington library had no indexed reference to evolutionary approaches at all. Overall, an average of just under two pages a book were devoted to evolutionary approaches, representing 0.39 percent of the total pages in all of the books analyzed. If we restrict our analysis to those books that did mention evolutionary approaches, we find that on average just over three pages were devoted to evolutionary approaches, representing 0.6 percent of the total pages in those books. Only two books in the total sampled—Walsh & Ellis (2006) and Marsh (2011)—devoted 10 or more pages to evolutionary approaches.

The results of this study are fairly clear: introductory textbooks on criminology and criminological theory largely ignore evolutionary approaches. Coverage of evolutionary theory does, however, vary quite a bit among the textbooks sampled. However, the fact that 37 percent of the books had no indexed reference to evolutionary approaches suggests that many criminologists believe that evolution simply has no place in criminology. To put these results in perspective, it would be a major oversight if an introductory criminology or criminological theory textbook had no coverage of, say, strain or social-control theory. Two recent books on criminological theory provide good examples of the relative neglect of evolutionary approaches. Akers & Sellers (2009) provide a 401-word overview of criminological theories. The book includes the usual range of theoretical approaches, including individual chapters devoted to conflict theory Marxism and critical theory, and feminist theory; one chapter is provided on biological approaches, with just under two pages allocated to evolutionary theory. McLaughlin & Newburn (2010b) also provide a detailed overview of major criminological theories (featuring chapters by some of the key architects of criminological theory), and despite including 13 chapters devoted to new approaches, there is no indexed reference to evolutionary approaches at all. The main point of this exercise—we hasten to add—is not to chastise the writers of criminological textbooks, as their task is to reflect the state of play, not necessarily to set the agenda. However, it is clear that evolutionary theory does not feature prominently in the kind of information that criminologists believe is important for students to learn. Given that our sample is one of convenience, we also need to note that the results of our analysis may not be representative of criminology textbooks in general.

A third way of exploring the coverage of evolutionary approaches in criminology is to look at the representation of evolutionary ideas in leading criminology journals. To this end we examined all references to evolutionary theory and evolutionary psychology (exact phrases) anywhere in the text of articles published between 2000 and 2014 in three leading criminology journals—Criminology, British Journal of Criminology, and Theoretical Criminology. For comparison purposes, we also examined references to other theoretical approaches in criminology, including strain theory, control theory, rational choice theory, cultural criminology, and critical criminology (exact phrases). As can been seen in Table 1.1, the results of this analysis are fairly clear and largely support the idea that evolutionary approaches have had a relatively limited role to play in criminology as a discipline. Indeed, when the results of the three journals are combined, we see that criminologists are 12 times more likely to refer to either control theory or critical criminology than they are to evolutionary theory.

To summarize, criminology as an academic discipline has neglected the role of evolution in the development of explanations for criminal behavior. We have perhaps belabored this point a little, and in our focus on mainstream criminology we have neglected a rich vein of theoretical and empirical work that has employed evolutionary theory to understand crime and our responses to it. This book provides a detailed exploration of this research, but it is worth pausing at this point to highlight some of this work.

Table 1.1

The Representation of Evolutionary Theory and Other Theoretical Approaches in Criminology Journals from 2000 to 2014 (Number of Articles)

Evolutionary Explanations in Criminology

Many introductory criminology textbooks begin and end their coverage of evolutionary approaches with the work of Cesare Lombroso. Evolutionary theories of crime were prominent in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and Lombroso’s work is certainly the best known of these perspectives. Although Lombroso recognized that a number of factors played a role in the etiology of criminal behavior, he is chiefly remembered for his view that criminals were evolutionary throwbacks to an earlier, more primitive stage in human evolution (Rafter, 2008). Other scholars that drew on the concept of evolution in their theories of crime include Henry Maudsley, Richard Dugdale, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and Francis Galton (Rafter, 2008), and their work exemplified a strong interest in the biological origins of criminal behavior in nineteenth-century criminology.

Although biological approaches to crime still featured in the first half of the twentieth century, they made very little explicit use of evolutionary theory, instead focusing on various genetic, bodily, and constitutional factors as epitomized in the work of William Sheldon (Rafter, 2008). Moreover, the rise of sociological approaches to understanding crime in the first half of the twentieth century significantly shifted attention to the social and ecological context in which criminal behavior occurs. Indeed, from the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, biological approaches in general, and evolutionary approaches in particular, declined across the various social and behavioral sciences, as behaviorism became the dominant paradigm in (North American) psychology, and anthropologists largely shifted their attention to the role of culture in explaining human behavior (Degler, 1991; Plotkin, 2004). The revival of evolutionary theory in the social sciences began in the 1960s and 1970s, and was felt most prominently in anthropology and psychology, although evolutionary approaches in psychology did not really gain anything like mainstream acceptance until the early part of the twenty-first century. As Barkow (2005) notes, some social sciences let this Darwinian revival almost completely pass them by—sociology is the most notable example, but, as we argued above, criminology has also failed to incorporate evolutionary approaches in any meaningful way.

There are a few exceptions, however. One example is the evolutionary ecological theory of criminal behavior developed by Cohen and Machalek (1988) and extended by Vila and colleagues (Savage & Vila, 2002; Vila, 1994, 1997). This approach draws strongly from both behavioral ecology and the idea of cultural evolution (see Chapter 3) in advancing the idea that criminality is the outcome of developmental processes shaped by both biological and sociocultural factors. In short, due to their specific biological characteristics and sociocultural environment, some individuals are more likely to acquire strategic styles that lead to criminal behavior, given relevant opportunities. Another example is provided by Ellis’s (2005) evolutionary neuroandrogenic theory of criminal behavior. Ellis draws on the theory of sexual selection (see Chapter 2) to argue that aggressive and acquisitive criminal behaviour evolved as an aspect of human reproduction, especially among males (Ellis, 2005, p. 288). At a proximate level, Ellis maintains, the sex hormone testosterone (which is present at much higher levels in men compared with those in women) plays an important role in competitive and victimizing behavior, particularly when coupled with low intelligence and impaired cognitive functioning. Ideas drawn specifically from evolutionary psychology (see Chapter 3) have also had some—relatively limited—coverage in mainstream criminological and sociological journals (e.g., Armit, 2011; Brannigan, 1997; Kanazawa & Still, 2000; Savage & Kanazawa, 2002; Wood, 2011), and evolutionary ideas form one component of the newly emerging paradigm of biosocial criminology that has been showcased in several recent books (Walsh, 2009; Walsh & Beaver, 2009;