So History Doesn't Forget:: Alliances Behavior in Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,1979-1990

So History Doesn’t Forget:

Alliances Behavior in Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979-1990.

Dr. Abdulrhman A Hussein

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First published by AuthorHouse 01/18/2012

ISBN: 978-1-4678-8353-5 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4678-8354-2 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4678-8355-9 (ebk)

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CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgments

Abstract

Glossary

Chapter One

Introduction: Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Conceptual and Framework

Methodology

Questions

Chapter Two

Structure of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy

The cradle of Islamic civilization

Oil Reserves and Production

Geo-strategic Location

Geographic Considerations

Political History

Society and Political Culture

Political Structure And Government

The Constitution

The Royal Family

The Government Institutions

(The Council of Ministers)

The National Security Council

The Consultative Council

Political Interest Groups

Foreign Policy Decision-Making

The Economy

Global Relations

Regional Relations

Sub-Regional Relations

International Law And Organizations

International Media Instrument

Economic Instrument

Foreign Aids

Military Instrument

Chapter Three

Foreign Policy Orientation: Determinants of Saudi Arabia’s Alliances Behavior

Domestic Determinants of Saudi Arabia’s

Foreign Policy Orientations

External Determinants of Saudi Arabia’s

Foreign Policy Orientations

Regional Dynamic

Systemic Influence

Foreign Policy Objectives

Chapter Four

Case Study I: Saudi Arabia’s Alliances Policy

And The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988.

The Gulf Political Environment

before the Iran-Iraq War

Origins and Causes of the Iran-Iraq War

The Saudi Reaction toward the Iran-Iraq War

The Saudi-Iraqi Alliance

The Saudi Alliance with the Gulf Arab States

The Formation of GCC

Saudi-Pakistani Military Cooperation

Saudi-US Military Cooperation

Chapter Five

Case Study II: Saudi Arabia’s Alliance Policy and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 1990-1991.

Pre-Crisis Environment

The Origins of the Gulf Crisis

The Remote Causes of the Crisis

The Proximate Causes of the Gulf Crisis

Escalation of the Crisis and the Saudi Diplomacy

The Saudi Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Deterring the Iraqi Threat:

The Formation of the Gulf Multinational Coalition

The Structure, Nature, and Function of the Gulf

Multinational Coalition

Coalition Objectives and Ideology

Commitments and Interests of Coalition’s Allies

Coalition Strategies and Integration of Forces

Coalition Cohesion and Strains

Analysis of the Saudi Decisions during the Gulf Crisis

Saudi Alignment Orientation after the Gulf Crisis

Saudi-Regional Orientation

Saudi-Western Orientation after the Gulf crisis

Chapter Six

Assessment and Conclusion

Appendixes

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

Bibliography

Public Documents

Books

Doctoral Dissertations and Researches

Articles and Periodicals

Internet Sites

For

My Country

&

My parents, my wife, my daughter,

my sons, and my brothersTable of Content

*     *     *

Preface

Alliances and coalition building are major instruments of a nation’s foreign policy. A foreign policy reflects a country’s strategy of communicating with, adapting to, and interacting with the international system. Such a strategy does not emerge in a vacuum. It is the result of complex interrelated factors that arise ultimately as the components that prescribe a country’s national interest and the framework of its foreign policy objectives.

Since its establishment in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was able to use a balance of power alliance to preserve the security of its national interests and independence. Domestic, regional, and international factors forced the kingdom to follow such a policy. The kingdom’s strategic location demanded that the Saudis maintain open and diversified relations. Islam, pan-Arabism, and communism became the major ideological elements that justified Saudi alignment behavior at the Arab and Islamic level. On the other hand, economic, military, and security interests became the major determinants of Saudi-Western alliances. Regional threats such as the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war, brought Saudi Arabia and the West into close cooperation. During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia entered into extensive military relationships with major Western countries, especially the United States. This cooperation had a significant impact on improving Saudi defense capabilities and enabled the kingdom to build a modern military infrastructure.

Foreign aid was a major factor that attracted Arab and Muslim states to align with Saudi Arabia. This instrument has a mix record in serving the Saudi national interest. It had negative consequences on alliances with regional powers involved in the protection of Saudi security. For example, during the 1980s, the kingdom provided generous financial and economic assistance to sustain Iraq against the ideological revolutionary threats of Iran. Although foreign aid enabled the Saudis to contain the Iranian threat, it had the effect of increasing the military power of Iraq. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein used that power and surprised Saudi Arabia with his invasion of Kuwait and the massing of Iraqi troops along the Saudi border. Limited by its military capabilities compared with Iraq, and the Arab reaction to Iraq’s action, Saudi Arabia resorted to a balance of power alliance, but this time against Iraq. Helped with changes in the international structure of power, Saudi Arabia and the United States formed an unprecedented multinational coalition that was able to liberate Kuwait and eliminate the threat of Iraqi military power against the kingdom.

The purpose of this book is to examine the alignment behavior of Saudi foreign policy, and the impact of this behavior on the kingdom’s national security. The study first presents a comprehensive overview of the domestic and external elements of Saudi foreign policy. The focus of this study will rely on two case studies: the Saudi alliance against the Iranian threat during the 1980s and the Saudi-American-led multinational coalition against Iraq during the Gulf crisis. The first case study examines Saudi alignment behavior with regional powers, while the second primarily focuses on the Saudi alignment behavior with the great powers. In both cases, the major aspect of alliance politics (objectives, commitment, influence, ideology, cohesion, constraints) will be carefully addressed. The conclusion of this study is derived from contrasting the impact of those outcomes on Saudi Arabia’s national security.

*     *     *

Acknowledgments

I thank God for his assistance in the completion of this book, which has been a dream of my family. I wish to acknowledge my special thanks to Professor Bernard Reich, whose experience and guidance constituted a major contribution to the completion of this study. In addition to his remarkable attention to this book, his support throughout my years of study at the George Washington University gave me confidence and strength to overcome difficulties, and deserves special gratitude.

My special thanks go to professor Burton Sapin, who always offered me encouragement and motivation. His assistance was remarkable and greatly appreciated. I also wish to acknowledge my appreciation to professor William Lewis whose insight was significant in bringing meaningful order to this study. My exceptional thanks go to Professor James Piscatori, Dr. David Long, and Dr. Marius Deeb, and Dr. Edmond Gareb. Their final recommendations were significant to the completion of this study.

Finally, there is my great indebtedness to all the Saudi officials who provided me with unlimited support, without whom this book would never have been completed.

*     *     *

Abstract

International alliances and coalition building are two forms of a nation’s foreign policy orientation. Although there exists some studies concerned with the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, this is the first comprehensive study that analyzes Saudi foreign policy from an alliance behavior perspective.

This study illustrates that the perception of an external threat to the security of Saudi Arabia’s national interests is the major factor behind Saudi external alliances. Given its limited national capabilities, the existence of expansionist and revolutionary regimes in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, and the nature of Middle East politics, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has little choice but to adopt a balance of power policy by building alliances with regional and great powers. The study shows the extent to which pan-Arabism, communism, and Islam have been used by Saudi Arabia to justify its regional and international alliances. It also focuses on the costs and benefits of Saudi security-related alliances. This makes it possible to examine the effectiveness of Saudi foreign aid as instrument to sustain the objectives of its alliances.

The study concludes that Saudi alliances with great powers can protect the national interest of the Kingdom more than regional alliances do. Due to the nature of the Middle East’s ideological rivalries, Saudi alliances with regional powers were inconsistent and involved conflicting interests. The outcomes of the Saudi-Iraqi alliance during the 1980s exemplified that using foreign aid as an instrument to build regional alliances may create inverse consequences for a nation’s national security. On the other hand, Saudi-Western alliances were more stable because they encompassed more realistic and common strategic interests.

*     *     *

Glossary

Chapter One

Introduction: Conceptual Framework

and Methodology

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy have assumed strategic importance in recent years. One of the principal foreign policy focuses of the kingdom is security. Hostile relations with Iran, and then Iraq, have dictated certain orientations in Saudi foreign policy behavior. This orientation converged around building external regional and international alliances and coalitions. These alliances and coalitions formed as a reaction to a specific situation in which conflict, or the threat of conflict, existed.

For example, the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini to the top of a revolutionary regime in Iran in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war were significant causes of apprehension for Saudi Arabia. Fearing threats from the unrest caused by those developments on domestic security and on oil exports, the kingdom established a security alliance that led to the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. After forming this alliance, Saudi Arabia aligned with Iraq and provided significant economic, financial, and technical assistance to support Iraq. This support was a decisive factor in forcing Iran to end the war.

The conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war created a sense of stability in the Gulf region. The war ended in 1988 with an inconclusive but stable cease-fire. The threats from Iran had been moderated after the death of Khomeini in 1989. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and its unexpected subsequent threats against Saudi Arabia shattered any illusion that the Gulf region had become stable. In a rapidly escalating crisis, the Iraqi regime formally annexed Kuwait, dropped all pretenses of military pullout, explicitly threatened the GCC states by calling for the overthrow of the Emirs of Oil, and proclaimed Iraq as the leader of a campaign to redistribute Arab wealth from the GCC states to the Arab, non-oil producing states. The kingdom resorted at that time to building an international military coalition, but this time against the threat of Iraq’s Saudi-financed military power.

The kingdom considered the threat from the Iraqi army, the largest in the Arab world, to be greater than the damage from the presence of foreign militaries on Saudi soil. Therefore, upon the Saudi request for international support to deter Iraq’s aggression, and with the American leadership, the United States and Saudi Arabia were successfully able to build an unprecedented multinational military coalition to defend, not only the national security interests of the kingdom, but the interests of a world dependent on oil. By liberating Kuwait, the threat of Iraq’s military power to Saudi security was eliminated.

The effect of the Gulf crisis has changed the structure, but not the objective, of Saudi regional alignment politics and made it clearer. On March 10, 1991, Saudi Arabia and the other states of the GCC, Egypt, and Syria endorsed a plan under which the eight countries would form a security alliance called the Damascus Pact. The pact was a mutual defense agreement that called for the formation of a military force consisting of troops from the eight countries. This force planned to be backed by the US naval deployment in the Gulf. The alliance’s stated purpose was the creation of an Arab bloc for security cooperation by combining the financial strength of the GCC states with the population and military strength of Egypt and Syria.

The primary purpose of this book is to scrutinize the determining factors of security alignment behavior in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy orientation and the impact of this policy on the kingdom’s strategic interests by contrasting Saudi alignment policies during the Iran-Iraq war, and during and after the Gulf crisis. Therefore, the analytical framework of this book will make use of the theory of alliance and coalition building to analyze the Saudi foreign policy orientation. This includes the objectives, interests, ideology, cost and benefits, cohesion and strains, and capabilities and instruments involved in Saudi Arabia’s alliances and coalitions as a result of the immediate threat of the Iranian revolution and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

*     *     *

Conceptual and Framework

There is substantial academic literature that has examined the political phenomenon of building regional and international alliances and coalitions. To understand the Saudi international and regional alignment behavior, we will review the major relevant academic writings. Most of the literature on alliances and coalitions focuses on the relationship between alliance formation and the likelihood of war and the causes and origins of alliances. Some of this literature examines the distribution of burdens and the role of ideology in alliance formation, while others study alliance cohesion and strains and the interaction between weak states and great powers in building alliances and coalitions. Scholars of alliances and coalitions, such as George Liska, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and William Olson, have relied on historical evidence to support their findings on alliances behavior.[1] Robert Rothstein and William Riker studied alliances within a game theory framework, relying on case studies of small-great power alliances in Europe.[2] Kenneth Waltz used systems theory to examine alliance behavior within the dynamic of world politics.[3] Other scholars, such as Stephen Walt, have focused on the concept of threat to explain the dynamic of alliance behavior in the Middle East region.[4] Finally, scholars like K. J. Holsti see alliance behavior as one component of a nation’s foreign policy output. For Holsti, a nation’s foreign policy orientation of alliances building and coalition formation are determined by the nature, structure, and objectives of its foreign policy output.[5]

The term alliance refers to a formal pact, union or confederation between nations. It is a continuous relationship of common interests. Coalition, on the other hand, refers to an alliance or union to achieve a special or temporary objective, which could be a political, economic, or military one. Alliances are designed to facilitate the attainment of policy goals by introducing into the situation a specific commitment to pursue them. It legitimizes that pursuit by inscribing it in a treaty.[6] According to these definitions, Saudi Arabia formed three types of military and security alliances and coalitions since 1980; the multinational military coalition during the Gulf crisis, the Saudi security alliance with Iraq and the GCC states before the crisis, and with Egypt and Syria after the crisis.

But what factors led Saudi Arabia to enter those regional and international alliances and coalitions during this period? The formation of alliances is one of the other techniques Saudi Arabia used to maintain the regional balance of power. The functional objectives of a balance of power policy are to: 1) prevent the establishment of a universal hegemony; 2) preserve the constituent elements of the system and the system itself; 3) insure the stability and mutual security of the international system; and, 4) strengthen and prolong peace by deterring war, and by confronting an aggressor with the likelihood that a policy of expansion would meet with the formation of a counter coalition.[7]

According to William Olson, alliances and coalitions not only reflect the identity and permanence of interest but also reflect the distribution of power and ambition among great and regional powers. An alliance exists either to change or to defend the status quo. It may take the form of a treaty (NATO), or may be simply an understanding (US commitments to the security of the state of Israel).[8] Olson explains that the insecurity and unpredictability that prevails among states are the causes of alliance formation. By entering into alliances, states increase their strength and thereby improve their capability by deterring threats against their security. However, because alliances arise out of conflict and insecurity, they may have the effect of increasing hostility and tension. While they may eliminate insecurity, alliances do not eliminate or reduce the occurrence of conflict and war. An alliance whose members share an identical security interest is the strongest type of alliance, while an alliance in which members pursue miscellaneous ends is the weakest type.[9]

In making an alliance work, unity and confidence among its members must be established, and economic and military strategies must be coordinated. Although there is no guarantee that the interest of all members will remain identical, a common ideology may reinforce and facilitate the working of an alliance. For example, given the ideological role of Islam and pan-Arabism in the Middle East, the regional alliances of Saudi Arabia were often reinforced by its members sharing a common religious and cultural background. Such ideological factors had a clear impact on the Saudi alliance with Iraq and the Gulf Arab states against Iran between 1980 and 1988. On the other hand, an alliance often involves an unequal sharing of costs and benefits. In this sense, an alliance may be a collective good—an alliance system in which all members share equally in its benefits, but all members may not be obliged to contribute equally to its costs.[10] In this case, non alliance states (like the position of the state of Israel during the Gulf crisis) may benefit from the collective good in that their security is protected by the multinational coalition’s collective action against the threat of Iraq’s military power.

Alliances perform a regulatory function in the balancing process in the international system insofar as each alliance member competes for reciprocity with fellow allies.[11] Upon what calculation did Saudi Arabia and its alliance partners base their alignment judgment? According to George Liska, nations join alliances for security, stability, and status. A decision to join an alliance is based upon a perception of rewards in excess of costs. Each country weighs the marginal utility from the alliance membership, as contrasted with its unilateral action. Burdens and gains, as well as the potential for status enhancement or possible losses in capacity for independent action, must be heeded. The gains and liabilities associated with alignment, concerning security, can be grouped into: protection, which is derived from a particular alliance system, and provocation, which may produce counter action and counter-alliances.[12] For Liska, the development of an alliance ideology is a primary prerequisite for alliance cohesion. The function of ideology is to provide a rationalization for the alliance. Periodic consultations between the leading member and its allies, both on procedural and substantive issues, contribute to the development and preservation of alliance ideology and thus alliance cohesion.[13]

William R. Riker used game theory to examine the optimal size of n-person alliances.[14] He developed a theory of alliances similar to Liska’s theory in many respects. In his theoretical framework, Riker says that actors join alliances or coalitions for several reasons: to receive payments of one kind or another, to obtain promises about future policy or decisions that may affect the actor’s national interest, and the fear from the threat of retaliation if they refuse to align themselves.

Riker emphasizes the size principle according to which participants will form a coalition no larger than necessary to achieve their shared objective.[15] The formation of one coalition contributes to the formation of an opposing coalition. After victory, alliances or coalitions are crucial to attaining a balance of power, and the size of the original alliances or coalitions must be reduced if additional gains are to accrue to the remaining participants.

According to Riker’s framework, neutral actors often join the weaker of the coalitions when one coalition is on the verge of victory to prevent the stronger from attaining hegemony. When the gains of a victory cannot be divided, one of the essential participants may offer various side payments to purchase the support of the coalition partners. Side payments may come out of the profits of the expected victory (changes in bills or treaty, commitments to future policies, contracts, or concessions), or may come out of working capital(the present time commitments involved in other decisions, beyond the immediate victory aimed at), or out of fixed assets (the credibility of a leader’s threat, positive prestige, or the influence of his personality).[16] The cumulative value of these payments may become higher than the content of the victory is worth, as side payments to prospective allies go up. The result is that alliance leaders inevitably tend to overspend, and eventually weaken themselves and build up their overpaid allies.[17]

Glenn Snyder also used two-person game theory to explain the trade-off that states face in seeking the support of allies with minimal costs.[18] He introduced five fundamental factors as the determinants of the choices of whom to align with and of how long to stay in any given alliance. These factors are: 1) the degree of general dependence or need for the prospective ally; 2) the degree of strategic interest in the partnership; 3) the degree of desired clarity in the proposed alliance agreement; 4) the degree to which the prospective allies conflict with the power-or powers-against whom the alliance is formed; and, 5) the record of the prospective ally qua ally or how faithful the latter has been as a partner to other powers in the international or regional system. Snyder reached conclusions similar to those of Riker. If the neutral members do not align themselves with the weaker side, some members of the leading coalition must shift to the weaker side of the two coalitions if the balance of power is to be preserved in the system.[19]

Alliances usually encompass small powers as well as great powers. Small states join alliances because they must rely upon other states. Great powers, on the other side, seek alignment with small states for military, economic, and political gains afforded, or to restrain the latter from certain actions. Though the record of the Saudi foreign policy orientation indicates that it has long-standing informal alliances with Western powers, the kingdom often prefers to align itself formally with a less powerful regional state or with a combination of lesser states, rather than with a great power. This fact leads us to an important question concerning the nature of Saudi alliances: What are the structural peculiarities and the effectiveness of the Saudi alliances?

According to Michael Handel, there are three types of formal alliances made between weak states and great powers: unequal bilateral alliance (formed between a weak state and a more powerful state, usually a great power), an equal bilateral alliance (include states of approximately equal strength), and the mixed multilateral alliance (include weak states as well as a great power or powers).[20] All of these types of alliances involve a relationship of influence between weak states and great powers.

Influence implies the ability of A to make B change, continue, or discontinue a course of action or policy that is in the interest of A.[21] Political actors (weak states as well as great powers) in exercising their act of influence, may use six different tactics, including the acts of persuasion, the offer of rewards, the granting of rewards, the threat of punishment, the infliction of nonviolent punishment, and the use of force. These tactics can shape and reflect four patterns of influence relationships in an international or regional situation involving coalition and alliance formation: relations of consensus, relations of overt manipulation, relations of coercion, and relations of force.[22]

Meanwhile, there are four types of policies through which weak states commit the other power to support their interests. The first type is signing a formal defense treaty with a great power, or securing unambiguous promises of support in case of military threat. A second policy is penetrating the domestic system to appeal to public opinion in the strong state. A third way is persuading a great power to station its troops and maintain bases in the territories of the weak state to guarantee the automatic intervention of the great power should the weak state be attacked. Finally, a weak state can strengthen the commitment of a great power by establishing symbolic values, such as a bastion of democracy, a model of a harmonious alliance, or resister of aggression.[23]

Handel also explains that alliances between weak states and great powers may offer many advantages. However, unequal alliances usually mean accepting some dangers and benefits for both weak states and great powers. Dangers seem to be greater on the side of the weak state because great powers may seek a permanent presence in the weak state’s territories. Moreover, in seeking the protection of one great power, a weak state may find itself involved in the conflicts of the great power, or it may find itself in confrontation with regional or great powers caused by its alliance with great powers. Another risk for the weak state is the danger of threat to the integrity of the cultural and social traditions of the weak state posed by the presence of a large number of foreign troops in its land.[24]

Coalition making and alliance construction are one form of a nation’s foreign policy orientation, the others are isolation and non alignment.[25] K. J. Holsti notes four conditions or variables that can help this study account for Saudi Arabia’s selection of alliances and coalitions making up its strategic orientation: 1) the structure of the international and regional systems concerning the patterns of dominance, subordination and leadership; 2) the nature of the state’s domestic attitudes and social and economic needs; 3) the degree of a perceived threat to the state’s core values and interests; and 4) the state’s geographical location and endowment in natural resources.[26]

Prevailing attitudes of insecurity are the major sources of a military alliance. States construct military alliances against external military threats to their security and interests. According to Holsti, military alliances can be classified according to four main criteria: the nature of the casus foederis (the situation in which mutual commitments are to become operational), the type of commitment undertaken, the degree of military integration of forces of the alliance partners, and the geographical scope of the alliance treaty.[27]

Military alliances also have a deterrence function. In this case, the purpose of the alliance is not only to fight a war, but also to prevent a crisis, and to increase diplomatic influence by creating a factor of caution among decision makers with aggressive tendencies. Faced with an overwhelming coalition against it, a potential aggressor presumably will not risk the destruction of war with the foreknowledge of certain defeat. However, although deterrence through military alliance may increase the costs to the aggressor, it does not necessarily prevent the occurrence of war because decision makers do not always behave rationally during crisis situations.[28]

There are several factors that can cause strains in a military alliance impairing its effectiveness as a deterrent and offensive organization. In this context, the effectiveness of a coalition or an alliance can be measured by the ideological cohesiveness of its members, their shared objectives, and actions. Besides poor military coordination, one reason that alliances may fail to deter an aggressor is the lack of political agreement between its members on the major objectives to be achieved. Objectives of two or more parties begin to diverge when the potential enemy of one alliance member is not the enemy of the others, so that the other members do not perceive the same threat. Discord of the major social and political values of allying states is a second factor that may lead to strains in the military alliance.

For Hans Morgenthau, the permanency and the strength of an alliance are determined by four factors. The first factor concerns the character of the interests it serves. In this context, three types of alliances can be distinguished: 1) alliances serving identical interests and policies such as the Anglo-American alliance; 2) alliances serving complementary interests, such as US alliances with third world countries to contain communism during the cold war; and, 3) alliances serving ideological interests, such as the Arab League treaty.[29] The second factor is the degree of agreement among its members. For an alliance to be effective, its members must have common interests and collective agreement on the coordination of general policies, measures, and objectives. Common interests are of two types: positive common interests, such as economic, military, and political interests, and negative common interests concerning the threat from other states.

Differences between an alliance’s members occur when positive interests are at issue. Since the interests of the members and their assumptions to secure them are never identical, alliance strategies are always the product of compromise.[30] According to Morgenthau, a nation’s objective in joining alliances against other nations is to protect its national interest. Defined in terms of national security, the national interest of a nation refers to defending the integrity of its national territory, its independence, and its political, economic, and social institutions. According to this definition, military security will be the dominant goal of the state’s national interests. Other issues will be important only when they seem to have an effect on security. Security and power are synonymous. Therefore, the agenda for a security policy will be influenced by the overall balance of power.[31] Wartime alliances comprise the aggregate common interests of the contracting members. Seen from this perspective, an alliance can function as a collective security organization based on the respect of certain moral and legal obligations. The mechanism of such organization will automatically operate defensively or offensively once one of its members is threatened by an attack.

A third factor is the ideological foundation of its formation. Although ideology is not an important factor in creating alliances, ideological factors would operate to reduce alliance cohesion in situations where lack of common enemy or low level of threat perception exists.[32] Ideology can lend strength to an alliance’s cohesion if the emotional and moral basis of its content was grounded. A common ideology may reinforce and facilitate the working of an alliance under the condition that the members share not only common, but identical interests. However, there is no guarantee that the security interests of a nation will continue without change. Furthermore, ideology may also limit and obscure the range of common interests, and raise expectations, which may reduce the degree of the alliance’s cohesion.[33]

Finally, the fourth factor affecting the strength of an alliance is the distribution of influence and benefits. The correlation between benefits and the power of influence is likely to reflect the structure of power between capability-weak states and great powers within an alliance. However, such a correlation is not always inevitable. A small state may possess valuable assets, strong enough to influence a great power, which may give the weak state a leverage to manipulate the great power in the direction of its interests. Morgenthau concludes that, because they are dependent upon political considerations of the individual nations, alliances within a balance of power system may be uncertain and fail in actual operation.[34]

However, Henry Kissinger argues that alliances and coalition building, serving in a sense as substitutes for physical conflict, could be used for exerting pressure or marshaling support as long as no nation is strong enough to eliminate another. For example, to forestall the ascendancy of the stronger and to support the weaker of two protagonists, the United States tilted toward Pakistan in its war with India of 1971.[35] Meanwhile, Kissinger postulates for an alliance to be effective, it must meet four conditions: 1) a common objective, usually defense against a common danger; 2) a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the casus belli; 3) some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon; and, 4) a penalty for non cooperation, that is, the possibility of removing assistance must exist, otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down.[36]

Defining an alliance and alignment as a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states, Stephen Walt proposes five hypothetical explanations for the formation of alliances in the Middle East; balancing, bandwagoning, ideological solidarity, transnational penetration, and foreign aid.[37] Calling his theory Balance of Threat, Walt uses these hypotheses to conclude that states in the Middle East enter into strategic alliances to balance the threat, but not the power possessed by other states, as the theorists of power theory believe. He distinguishes between power and threat concepts according to the intention of aggression of any state. Since the nature of an alliance formation is influenced by its response to an expected threat, the types of threats determine the nation’s response to them, which differ from one nation to another according to their capabilities.[38]

In this context, Walt introduces four variables believed to have an influence on a nation’s interpretation of an expected threat to its national security. These variables are: 1) the aggregate sources of power possessed by the nation, such as the size of population, level of industrialization, level of national income, and the nation’s military capabilities; 2) geographic proximity, since a nearby state poses a greater threat than those far away and nations are more likely to form alliances with other nations at a distance; 3) the level of a nation’s offensive military power; and, 4) the nation’s aggressive intentions.[39]

In Walt’s view, regional states with an aggressive intention represent more of a threat to small regional states than international powers represent. Briefly, Walt modifies balance-of-power theories to emphasis balancing behavior