Biden's War Against the Peace

Biden's War Against the Peace

Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Copyright © October 24, 2020 Jean-Marc LeBouquin

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Table of Contents

Biden's War Against the Peace

Chapter 1 – A Myth-Maker's Hand me down Protocol

Chapter 2 – GCC Concerns over Clouded Conditions

Chapter 3 – Procedural Overconfidence

Chapter 4 – Does Dean of Studies Object?

Chapter 5 – Not a World Government

Chapter 6 – Not Without Rules

Chapter 7 – Adlai Rebukes Nikita – 25 October 1962

Chapter 8 – Trump's Perishable Omissions

Chapter 9 – Charlatan Subcommittee Schmear Seminar

Chapter 10 – Biden's War Against the Peace

Chapter 11 – Epilogue: Policy Consult

Chapter 12 – Appendix 1 – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

Chapter 13 – Appendix 2 – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a

Chapter 14 – Appendix 3 – Excerpt of inventory listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

Chapter 15 – Appendix 4 – The Procurement Working Group and its mandate to expedite Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

Chapter 16 – Appendix 5 – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

Chapter 17 – Appendix 6 – Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories –

Chapter 18 – Appendix 7 – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device

Chapter 19 – Appendix 8 – Permission to Cast or Form Weapons Grade Enriched Uranium of Plutonium; Prohibiting IAEA Inspection of Such Activity

* * * * *

– Chapter 1 –

A Myth-Maker's Hand me down Protocol

It could have seemed incredible what they'd managed to achieve over the last five years.

President Barack Obama had promised in his July 14th 2015 broadcast pledge from the East Room of the White House:

And over the course of the next decade, Iran must abide by the deal before additional sanctions are lifted, including five years for restrictions related to arms and eight years for restrictions related to ballistic missiles.

BARACK OBAMA THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY; Statement by the President on Iran; July 14, 2015 (For Immediate Release); This file has been archived, find it on google at: whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/14/statement-president-iran

The guy or gal on the street might have thought that meant Iran would be prohibited from buying or selling ballistic missiles; or engaging in transfers of ballistic missile associated goods, technologies or support services – for eight years. It might have meant something like that; and it could have seemed a reasonable conclusion to jump to because in the same speech Obama had also stressed:

… we will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program and its human rights violations.

It all sounded pretty good and to be sure, no one could have reasonably expected Obama to give a full detailed accounting of all tidbit minutiae concerning the arrangement he had painstakingly worked on over the previous two years in only that one early declaration. So it seemed pretty reasonable to assume what the President generally meant was what a reasonable person might guess his speech appeared to profess.

Whatever President Barack Obama desired the Citizen to understand him as having said; his actual intentions are testified to in the text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); which – along with associated documents – is the official entire recognized agreement worked out between Team Obama and the Ministers of the Government of Iran. It is the working instrument which the international community refers to when discussing issues pertaining to Obama's Iran nuclear deal.

The legacy of the misnomer – the use of the misnomer JCPOA, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when referring to said arrangement worked out primarily between the Obama administration and the Ministers of the of the Government of Iran – is in part a political courtesy granted in deference to the entire body of United States politicians famously housed in the 114th Congress (many if not most of whom are still in office now in 2020); not one of whom, as is documented fact, had bothered throughout the duration of the 114th Congress to publicly discuss or even publicly acknowledge having looked at the Iran nuclear deal instrument denoted by the United Nations Security Council as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 – nor have any of them ever since.

The 114th Congress made a big stink at the time about how badly everyone in the Legislature desperately needed to see and to vote on whatever it was that Obama had been working on with the Iranian Ministers over the two years previous. Consequentially Obama had been required by an Act; which he himself had laughingly signed into law; to transmit United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress for review within five calendar days of its having been voted on in the Security Council. Obama never did transmit the Security Council resolution to the 114th Congress – and not one obsequious member of either Party in either House of the 114th Congress complained about that or about the popular president's mockery of the law he personally had ratified, or had bothered to pull down the desired Security Council resolution in question from the Security Council website where it is available for all the world, including people like you and me, to download and review for free and no charge at all or strings attached or credit card required.

When the moment came to actually look at the thing; having was obviously not felt to be near so glamorous as wanting and the visionary prospect of finally having and taking the opportunity to get around to serious performance on the prophesized due diligence exercise had turned immediately to mush and all gushing members of the 114th Congress suddenly forgot how to order their harried secretary's to go and download that thing everybody the whole wide world over has been talking about – you know; that Obama Iran nuclear deal they just voted on over there in New York up at the Security Council over there – you'll see about downloading that from the internet and why don't you go on and make yourself useful around the office pretty snappy with that Mr. or Ms. My Secretary please;

All members of the 114th Congress had evidently neglected to do that because had anyone done so they would have immediately noticed that the thing called the JCPOA which Barack Obama had transmitted to the Congress did not match up with the Obama nuclear deal voted on in the Security Council at the 7488th meeting of the Security Council in New York on 20 July 2015;

And had any member of the 114th bothered to look it up they should have immediately noted that Iran wasn't going to have to wait any eight years before being permitted to acquire the latest in intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems associated goods, technologies and support services from the United States, Europe, Russia or China;

In fact (as we shall examine) – Iran was permitted to acquire these within about six months from Obama's East Room address of 14 July 2015;

And Iran would be getting a great deal more in the weapons exchange department than merely that.

Had any member of the 114th Congress bothered to check up on what had been voted on in the Security Council – to check up on what Obama hadn't transmitted to the Congress; and had gone back and reported the omission to the Congress or to their constituencies – the whole political dynamic and climate in the U.S. would have been changed incalculably for the better.

Unfortunately however, not one could be found among the members soiling their seats in the 114th Congress, who was willing to make or carry out such a reasonable and average measure…

BUT PRESIDENT OBAMA'S erstwhile Secretary of State Hillary Clinton certainly knew very well as she ran for the office of the President in 2016; that the two items sent weren't the same. And she knew very well about the multiple other weapons trading aspects to the deal – the weapons trade concessions Obama proffered Iran as both a sure fire way to get U.S. arms dealing interests into a newly established U.N. Security Council sponsored Iranian weapons market – and to entice the Ministers of Iran to play ball and sign on to a deal so sweet they'd be crazy to pass up joining in with the insidious publicity stunt Obama was about to pull on the United States Citizen to his own self-aggrandizing personal benefit and to the detriment of world peace.

AND VICE PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN knew all about it very well when he ran himself as candidates bent on deceiving the constituencies in his bids to gain the 2020 White House. Good ole fiber eating Joe Biden knew very well about Obama's deception. He had been standing there the whole time as an accessory and accomplice, watching the whole thing go down and cheering it on.

And now in 2020 it was time for the pay-off and he would profit in his complicity.

AS THOMAS PAINE observed in the very first paragraph of his introduction to "Common Sense:"

"…a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right…"

This matter of using the JCPOA misnomer as substitute for United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 is more than a mere question of semantics.

As noted– Iran (as we shall examine in further detail) was permitted to acquire these among the other things within about six months from Obama's East Room address of 14 July 2015. That's not in the JCPOA portion of Obama's Iran nuclear deal – that and many other things are in other parts of the deal not transmitted to the 114th Congress but nevertheless voted on in the Security Council while the entire membership of the 114th Congress preoccupied itself with not being bothered to take enough of an interest to look into the matter.

I maintain as prelude to this writing; that use of the term JCPOA as reference to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 denotes a political bias stating the position that it is just fine for every member of Congress to ignore their responsibilities to the public – and that the term JCPOA is consistently used as a courtesy to, and in deference to, political opportunism and betrayal of public trust by those of every strata actively promoting, or keeping silent about, the blatant direct sales of nuclear weapons capacity to a non-nuclear-weapons-State which are provided for in the entire Obama Iran nuclear deal which our most successful popular politicians do not deign to discuss.

* * * * *

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S administration had managed to suppress public knowledge of his surreptitious arms for hostages trade deal with the Islamic Republic for a substantial amount of time as well. It was a good thing too; because in the end the Reagan administration did not manage to meet its objectives in securing the freedom of most of the hostages being held by the Iranian Government's terrorist proxy accomplices projecting political influence and coercive force from secured safe houses stationed in Lebanon.

When all's said and done, there is a general stigma attached to possible news media outlet exposé revelations of the potentially embarrassing sort of undercover operation such as the one which was to become known as the Iran-Contra affair. The political discomfiture resulting from discovery of such fiascos is worrisome to on the ground operatives and elected officials alike. Indirect negotiations which the Reagan administration had undertaken with hostage takers in Lebanon could be made to appear foolish had these been exposed prematurely; or they may have found some degree of redemption if the risks taken had yielded positive results – anticipated political embarrassment can be somewhat mitigated by success.

I do not mean to suggest that the attempt to free hostages made off with by Lebanese terrorists was an action entered into in the hopes of reaping political accolades on the one hand; being cynically weighed against the risks posed to President Reagan's popular standing should the details of the course of action undertaken become prematurely public.

It's clear from reading the record that President Reagan wasn't looking for anything like that. He was sincerely deeply distressed over the plight and fate of these hostages who were, for the most part, abducted as soft target non-combatants with many of them being attached to charitable or altruistic agencies, or educational institutions; and none of them or anyone else was deserving of the treatment Reagan anticipated they must be suffering at the hands of their faceless kidnappers.

That's not to say Reagan didn't get carried away in his and his Agents' handling of the affair. The details of it are something that wants having another look at in due course – but just in outline for now:

As to Reagan's ministerial minions; – Gosh; you know it's been so long and time really does sometimes like to take the edge off things. Jacking up the price on weapons surreptitiously sold under the counter to Iran; then using the difference to buy other weapons to feed the needs of un-vetted insurgent anti-government guerilla commando units biding time for the opportunity to overthrow the newly in control current Nicaraguan commie regime now taking up residence in official Government Palatial Estates; those having earlier been constructed under the guidance of the previous appalling Somoza family generational dynasty dictatorship this latest group had just recently so smartly ousted from power;

Reagan's ministerial minions were using the profits from weapons sales to Iran to subsequently feed the needs of the banditti insurgent counter-revolutionaries hanging out on the nether outskirts of Nicaragua – inside the borders of El Salvador and Guatemala waiting for foreign material aid to materialize.

The U.S. Ministers were building up the expectations of those loitering un-vetted banditti insurgents who were whiling away their meantime poaching jungle resources or trouble haunting the local campesinos rusticos – the innocent locals who would have been going about their bucolic existence and business unmolested just inside the borders of their neutral homelands; El Salvador or Guatemala were it some high minded desk jockey policy-maker back in the States been thoughtful enough to have conditioned US weapons aid on a US declared hands off demand; a demand that the Contras, as the collective Nicaraguan insurgent units came to be called, would treat with local rustics or village dwellers in a friendly manner kept at a respectful distance.

No such demand evidently was ever thought to have been made.

Meanwhile In the concurrent Middle East theater of field operations: what if the at some point in time finally comes when Iranian Government Ministers get around to figuring out exactly how inflated was the pricing on those weapons the Americans sold them in the first place? – That obviously has the potential of becoming quite a sore spot – so that is something to be worked on at the highest levels and we'll let you know what's been decided sooner or later if you need to know …

Looking at it a little closely one can appreciate there is much to work out and worry over in this business of motivating Iranian proxy accomplices in Lebanon, through indirect means, to release abductees they had taken in the name of raising their own dedicated funds in furtherance of carrying on in the fulfillment of whatever were their own respective peculiar local customary intrigues they'd like to pursue back home;

ONE CANNOT help but be impressed, upon historical review of the project, with the effort and stamina that went into these robust late 20th Century United States efforts at international market globalization – we must look into the matter in greater detail further on in the writing. But just to outline for now…

As means of rescue, and seeking the hostages' release; plenty of weapons were transferred to Iran throughout the course of the endeavor – not so many hostages were returned in exchange. There had been much in the way of apparent mix up misunderstandings between moderates in Iran who were thought to have been arranging things with the terrorists on behalf of Reagan administration interests. Bearing that in mind, President Reagan still held on sincerely (as records strongly suggest) hoping for the best and the enterprise had to be kept alive as the priority was to get our people out of there.

But then it was kind of weird. The longer negotiations dragged on – and with the relatively inexperienced Iranian moderates acting as middle-men expeditors; and being as those moderating expeditors probably weren't really that familiar with those nuances of courteously sophisticated diplomatic intercourse which Westerners are more accustomed to; misunderstandings tended easily to arise and the actual getting down to the business of organizing and carrying out a physical exchange of goods could take some time dragging on;

There were many layers of people to negotiate in order to even reach these liberal moderates in Iran who were guaranteed to take an interest and see what they could do. So you had to be patient because it's understood there are these many layers of people to go through and everyone's risking being exposed by hard-liner snitches for even talking to the Americans; which is what's to be expected because this is, after all, a surreptitious arrangement being worked out and the mainstream of the Iranian Government can't be clued in to the slightest hint of what is on underfoot as the liberal moderates successfully by all means keep to their cover of complete anonymity.

But still, there was this really weirdly unfortunate aspect. The longer things were dragged out – the more hostages kept getting picked up by these terrorist group accomplices working out of Lebanon. Irregardless, it was essential to soldier on and be patient with the Iranian liberal moderates because these unseen people back in Iran had the way in liaison connections with loose affiliations in Lebanon and now there were more hostages to secure releases on so further cooperation was essential lest the equation become even more complicated than it already has.

* * * * *

THE VOTE on the instrument set to become United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 was to take place first thing Monday morning of 20 July 2015 – at the convened 7488th meeting of the Security Council in New York. Obama had his Diplomatic Mission to the U.N. deposit the United States draft resolution on the Friday before – on 17 July 2015. Facsimile of the original transmission is presented below:

The web address finding the original United States of America: draft resolution is:

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F2015%2F547&Lang=E

The Security Council later reissued the original instrument unchanged except for replacing the original date of submission with the date of the vote:

The reissued version with the altered date is found at:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015).

ON THURSDAY, 16 July 2017; U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Powers requested of acting Security Council President Mr. Murray McCully of New Zealand that the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex be circulated as a U.N. document – facsimile next:

U.S. AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER: Letter dated 16 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. (United Nations document number S/2015/546): Available on the internet at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/6d9eec6cdd36149b85257ddc006cd868/e7551f39803265f285257e92005b6a0c/$FILE/S%202015%20546.pdf [last accessed: August 22, 2016.]

The acting Security Council President obliged the U.S. Ambassador – naturally. Why shouldn't he?

This seemingly obscure request to have the well-known, well-established Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex circulated as a Security Council document had the effect of affixing a Security Council document number as reference to the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex instrument.

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME – Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is a general lexicon of 21st century weaponry, focusing on all aspects of ballistic missiles and delivery systems; and with other weapons technologies associated with ballistic missiles. This list was developed by the International Missile Technology Control Regime association.

The Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex may be found at:

http://www.mtcr.info/english/The Missile Technology Control Regime; or, possibly better, http://www.mtcr.info/.

The Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was assembled as a list of weapons inventory the M.T.C.R. association considers should be sensitive and controlled. The objective of the list is to indicate specific areas ballistic missile related materiel, technologies and support service assets (those listed on the roster) which should be distributed with caution and are essentially to be kept out of the hands of terrorists and non-nuclear-weapons-State governments supportive of foreign terror organizations or suspected of seeking to surreptitiously achieve nuclear weapons capability in violation of treaty.

Referring to the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex by a United Nations Security Council document number was evidently deemed essential and would turn out to be a very effective tool in keeping the public off balance and uninformed as to what was being referred to in the Obama Iran nuclear deal; and what kind of activities and operations the deal promulgates and perpetuates.

The Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, appears only once in the text of Barack Obama's Iran nuclear deal. Or rather, it is the United Nations Security Council document S/2015/546 that is ostensibly referred to. And it is referred to in the context of Security Council Resolution 2231 provisions which entitle Iran to acquire ballistic missile delivery systems associated goods, technologies and support services under the auspices of a Procurement Channel established under Resolution 2231, theoretically as early as JCPOA Implementation Day; which would turn out to be 16 January 2016. However, it was not until October of 2016 that the first sales proposals involving these assets could have been submitted for sale to Iran due to logistical issues which took some time to resolve.

The code word S/2015/546 replacement for the actual document title of the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex appears in this following provision found in Annex B: Statement of Security Council Resolution 2231:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B. - Statement

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and

The above declares some of what Iran may acquire through the Resolution 2231. Iran may acquire "all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in…:" S/2015/546, which stands for, as noted, The Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

And extensive excerpt of assets listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is presented in Chapter 14 – Appendix 3: Excerpt of inventory listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex [01]

In the above the Security Council resolution also declares that even if the State itself determines that assets transferable "…could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems…;" the Security Council asserts it has the authority (not found anywhere in the Charter of the United Nations) to grant preferred States a Security Council style Papal Dispensation to engage in egregious violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – naturally only on a case by case basis exclusively decided upon by unexplained determinations made by the Resolution 2231 Procurement Channel.

This is problematic as the dispensation could be construed as violating Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has already stipulated:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons goes on to stipulate:

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

RESOLUTION 2231 ESTABLISHES a Procurement Channel Joint Commission bureaucracy responsible for expediting sales to Iran of goods, technologies and support services associated with Iran's nuclear program. The Joint Commission delegates essential functions to sub-bureaucracy known as the Procurement Working Group. The mandate and activities of the Procurement Working Group will come up frequently in this writing – but briefly for now…

Resolution 2231 introduces the Procurement Working Group bureaucracy as follows:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

The Procurement Working Group mandate entails a number of activities. The Procurement Working Group expedites and approves Iranian acquisitions of assets associated with its nuclear energy program; and also advertises for vendors world-wide to submit proposals for sales to Iran of ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services by themselves or in conjunction with nuclear weapons associated