Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Political Science

HANNAH ARENDT ON THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY: Philosophy and Politics in the Post-Totalitarian World

a dissertation

by JAKUB FRANK

submitted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2007

 copyright by JAKUB FRANK 2007

Dissertation Abstract

Hannah Arendt on The Crisis of Modernity:

Philosophy and Politics in the Post-Totalitarian World
by Jakub Frank Supervised by Christopher Kelly

Hannah Arendt is widely recognized as one of the most prominent political philosophers of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Arendts interpreters frequently express doubts about the political relevance of her thought. Arendt is often regarded as an anti-modernist and antidemocratic admirer of the Greek polis, whose thought has only little, if any, relevance for contemporary democratic politics or for understanding the problems of todays world. In my dissertation, I challenge such conventional interpretation of Arendts work, arguing that Arendts thought is motivated not by nostalgia for the lost glory of ancient Greece, but by urgent concern for the present situation and the uncertain future of the world. The main subject of Arendts political philosophy, according to my interpretation, is the current crisis of modernity, which is at the same time a crisis of the entire Western civilization. This crisis, according to Arendt, emerged together with totalitarianism and totalitarianism also reveals its essence. The interpretation of Arendts work should therefore proceed from The Origins of Totalitarianism, rather that from The Human Condition, which is usually regarded as the most systematic statement of Arendts political philosophy. This approach puts Arendts thought in a completely different light than the traditional interpretation, leading to radically different conclusions about her philosophic and political commitments. I dispute frequent

characterization of Arendt as an anti-modernist thinker, arguing that her thought should be rather described as radically modern. Moreover, I maintain that Arendts critique of liberal democracy is more nuanced than her interpreters usually assume, arguing that her thought constitutes a powerful defense of democratic politics. I argue that Arendts critique of the crisis of modernity, which evolved from her reflections on totalitarianism, remains highly relevant even today, as it helps to elucidate such recent phenomena, as the economic globalization, the decline of the nation state, the perils and possibilities of European integration, or the problems related to the post-Cold War American hegemony.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Jana Frakov and Ji Frank, and to my wife, Maria Lebedeva.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and extend my gratitude to a number of individuals and organizations, without whom this dissertation could not have been written. First and foremost, I am grateful to Professors Christopher Kelly and Susan Shell of the Political Science Department and Professor James Bernauer of the Philosophy Department at Boston College for their invaluable support and assistance. Further, I am indebted to the Institute for Social Sciences in Vienna for hosting and facilitating my research during my stay as a Junior Visiting Fellow. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and of the Nadn Josefa, Marie a Zdeky Hlvkovch Foundation. I would have never been able to finish my dissertation without the support and encouragement from my family and friends. I am grateful to my parents for bringing me up the way they did and for never losing their trust in my ability to finish this work. My sister Ruth provided invaluable moral support during the writing of this dissertation. Special thanks go to Charles Bonner for his encouragement and for many stimulating conversations that helped me in formulating my ideas. Monicka Patterson-Tutschka, who is currently finishing her PhD in political theory, helped me endure the often-frustrating experience of writing a dissertation. Most importantly, I would like to thank to my wife Maria for her patience, love and encouragement, as well as for proofreading the draft of my dissertation.

ii

List of Abbreviations

BPF CR EJ EP EU HAHA HC JP KL KMTWPT LMI LMII MDT MH80 OT OTI PP RF RJ RV

Between Past and Future Crises of the Republic Eichmann in Jerusalem What is Existenz Philosophy? Essays in Understanding Hannah Arendt on Hannah Arendt The Human Condition The Jew as Pariah Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political Thought The Life of the Mind Vol. I: Thinking The Life of the Mind Vol. II: Willing Men in Dark Times Martin Heidegger at Eighty The Origins of Totalitarianism (New edition with added prefaces) The Origins of Totalitarianism (1st edition) Philosophy and Politics Revolution and Freedom Responsibility and Judgment Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess

iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction Chapter 1: Totalitarianism and the Crisis of Modernity
Totalitarianism as the Sign of the Times Philosophy and Politics Modernity and the Collapse of the Tradition

ii iii 1 11
11 33 47

Chapter 2: Capitalism as the Matrix

Human Nature and the Unnatural Character of Politics The Rise of the Social Capitalism and Biopower World Alienation Science and Earth Alienation Technology and the World of Machines

59
63 70 82 85 92 102

Chapter 3: Nationalism and Identity Politics

Nationalism and Nation-State Emotions and Subjectivity The Jewish Question Nationalism and the Future of European Integration

115
116 127 134 144

Chapter 4: Arendts Critical Thinking: Between Kant and Heidegger

Arendt and Heidegger Arendts Criticism of Heidegger Arendt and Kant Kants Destruction of Metaphysics Enlightenment and Critical Thinking

151
153 162 173 177 181

Chapter 5: What to Do? Arendts Republicanism

Political Principles American Revolution Imperialism and the Crisis of the Republic Political Power vs. Social Domination Power and Violence Civil Society

195
195 200 209 224 232 239

Conclusion Bibliography
Works by Arendt Secondary Literature

251 274
274 275

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Introduction

Hannah Arendt is widely recognized as one of the most important political thinkers of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, most of Arendts interpreters express doubts about the political relevance of her thought. According to what Seyla Benhabib calls the standard interpretation,1 Arendt is an anti-modernist thinker, whose political philosophy is animated by nostalgia for the lost glory of the Greek polis. Arendt allegedly regards modernity simply as a gradual decline of the public realm of politics and her political philosophy therefore has only little, if any, relevance for contemporary democratic politics and for understanding the problems of todays world.2 The objection to Arendts alleged Grecophilia and anti-modernism is raised even by the most sympathetic of Arendts readers. For instance Seyla Benhabib, who acknowledges the relevance of at least some aspects of Arendts thought for contemporary politics, as well as Arendts commitment to many decisively modern political values, characterizes Arendt as a reluctant modernist and tries to separate the modernist strand of her thought, of which she approves, from the anti-modernist, Grecophile strand, which she criticizes.3 The prevailing interpretation of Arendt as an anti-modernist admirer of the Greek polis is due to a widespread methodological assumption, according to which The Human Condition constitutes the most systematic statement of Arendts political theory. The account of the Greek polis, as it is presented in The Human Condition, is then interpreted as Arendts normative ideal of politics, as her description of the ideal regime. The assumption about the central position of The Human Condition in Arendts work has been challenged by Margaret Canovan and Bernard Crick, who have argued that this position belongs rather to The Origins of Totalitarianism.4 This is not to suggest that The Origins would contain foundations of Arendts political theory. As Canovan points out, Arendts thought is notably a-systematic and Arendt did not create any systematic political theory, as we know it 1

from Hobbes, Rousseau or for instance Rawls. The Origins occupy a central position in Arendts work rather because in her first book on politics Arendt for the first time encountered many of the topics that she later further developed in her subsequent works. To make sense of Arendts work as a whole, to understand how the diverse and seemingly unrelated topics she treats in her books fit together, we must therefore turn to Arendts first book on politics.5 The importance of The Origins for interpretation of Arendts work is also related to the historical significance Arendt ascribes to the rise of totalitarianism. Arendt argues that the rise of totalitarianism is the central event of our world and to understand totalitarianism therefore means to reconcile ourselves to a world in which such things are possible at all. (EU, 308) The emergence of totalitarianism, according to Arendt, marks the onset of an ongoing crisis of modernity, which is at the same time a crisis of the entire Western civilization. Totalitarianism also reveals with unparalleled clarity the essence of the present crisis. (OT, viii) If we start reading Arendt from The Origins, rather than from The Human Condition, her entire work appears in a different light. First of all, it becomes clear that her thought is not driven by nostalgia for the lost glory of the Greek polis, but by urgent concern for the present historical situation and for the uncertain future of the Western civilization and of the world. It also becomes clear that Arendts political philosophy is primarily critical, as opposed to normative. Arendt does not construe rules for political action, but aims to achieve understanding of politics and of the present historical situation. According to Arendt, thinking is a specifically human way of responding to reality; (EU, 308) her political thought therefore responds to the present reality, to the predicament of our times. Such thinking, as she puts it in the Preface to the first edition of The Origins, consists of unpremeditated, attentive facing up to and resisting of reality whatever it may be. (OT, viii; emphasis added)

It is my contention that the crisis of modernity, which Arendt identified in her first book on politics, constitutes the main subject of her political philosophy. In her subsequent works, Arendt turns her attention on the one hand to the present, post-totalitarian stage of this crisis and, on the other hand, to its historical origins, which she traces to modern social, political and intellectual developments. My dissertation explores Arendts understanding of the present crisis of modernity. Taking clue from Arendts claim that totalitarianism reveals the essence of the present crisis, I interpret Arendts later works in the light of her analysis of totalitarianism. The goals of my dissertation are twofold. First, I want to offer a consistent interpretation of what I consider the main subject of Arendts political philosophy. I hope to persuade the reader that my interpretation provides a plausible explanation of some of the issues that have been hotly contested and, as I argue, frequently misunderstood by Arendts critics such as the distinction between the social and the political, Arendts critique of nationalism and of the nation state, or her reinterpretation of Kants political philosophy. Second, I want to demonstrate that Arendts political philosophy, which evolved from her reflections on totalitarianism and was written against the background of the Cold War, remains highly relevant even today, as it helps to elucidate such recent phenomena as economic

globalization, the decline of the nation state, the perils and possibilities of European integration, or the problems related to the post-Cold War American hegemony. I dispute Benhabibs characterization of Arendt as a reluctant modernist and argue that Arendts thought should rather be characterized as radically modern. Arendts intention is not to
undermine or reverse the project of modernity but, on the contrary, to rescue it from its current impasse. In the remainder of this Introduction, I briefly outline the main arguments of my thesis.

Arendt argues that totalitarianism is not simply a modern form of tyranny, but an entirely new type of political regime, which is based on ideology and terror. Totalitarian ideology, as Arendt defines it, is a pseudo-scientific and at the same time pseudo-philosophical system of thought that claims to be capable of explaining all phenomena past, present and future by deduction from the initial premise, which supposedly provides an insight into the internal logic of historical development. Totalitarian regime uses terror to realize the ideological predictions in practice, in other words to transform reality according to ideological precepts. According to Arendt, totalitarianism, however, does not aim at realizing the eschatological goal posited by the ideology (i.e. the Communist utopia or the Thousand Year Reich). Its goal is rather perpetual acceleration of the historical movement through terror, which is not a means to any end but the very essence of totalitarian regime. The ultimate aim of totalitarianism is total domination of the total population of the earth [and] elimination of every competing non-totalitarian reality. (OT, 392) Arendt argues that total domination would in practice require complete elimination of human spontaneity, which is the source of freedom and of the contingency of history; it would amount to nothing less than transformation of human nature itself. (458) Totalitarianism dehumanizes its subjects, reducing them to the biological level of their existence and turning them into conditioned animals that can be controlled at will but that have no will of their own. It aims to transform the entire mankind into a single organism controlled by the omnipotent will of the totalitarian leader. Nevertheless, the totalitarian leader, in marked contrast to traditional tyrants, regards himself as a mere agent of superhuman forces of history. Totalitarianism thus combines the hubristic belief in human omnipotence with a complete denial of human freedom and of the meaning of human life. Arendts analysis reveals the essence of totalitarianism and of the broader crisis of modernity as modern nihilism. Totalitarianism, however, transforms the nihilistic denial of moral limits to human action into an affirmative principle of human omnipotence. In Arendts 4

words it transcend[s] the nihilistic principle that everything is permitted replacing it with a principle, according to which everything is possible. (440) This brand of nihilism did not disappear with the demise of totalitarianism. On the contrary, Arendt suggests that it assumes its authentic form only in the present post-totalitarian world.

Arendt explores the current, post-totalitarian stage of the crisis of modernity in her later works, especially in The Human Condition. The Preface to the book, in which Arendt reflects upon the launch of Sputnik and other recent scientific and technological developments, indicates the central role of science and technology in the present stage of the crisis of modernity. The posttotalitarian modern world, which was born with the first nuclear explosions, (HC, 6) is shaped by the advancement of science and technology, rather than by political mobilization of masses through ideology and terror. Nevertheless, the comparison of Arendts analysis of totalitarianism in The Origins with her analysis of modern science and technology in The Human Condition reveals many similarities between totalitarianism and modern science and technology. Arendt suggests that contemporary science and technology, which try to transform the fundamental conditions of human existence, are driven by the same nihilistic resentment of modern man against everything given as totalitarianism. (OT1, 438; HC, 2) Like totalitarianism, science and technology aim at total control of reality and in particular at control of the life process of the human species. The development of modern science and technology also resembles totalitarianism by combining hubris and fatalism, omnipotence and powerlessness. Contemporary science and technology give man tremendous, almost god-like powers: they allow him to conquer space, create artificial elements, or to manipulate the life process itself at its most elemental level. The most obvious proof of the Promethean powers of contemporary science is of course the existence of nuclear weapons, which gives man the power to wipe out the entire mankind. Nevertheless, the development of science and technology, which to a great extent shapes our 5

world, is under nobodys control. Arendt is concerned especially about this automatism of scientific and technological progress, which continuously transforms our world and which threatens to turn us into thoughtless slaves of our know how, of our own technological rationality. (HC, 3) The development of science and technology is closely interconnected with the development of modern capitalist economy. According to Arendt, capitalism at its present stage develops into a system of structural domination, which operates analogously to total domination. Similarly to total domination, it reduces human beings to the biological level of their existence and exploits their life-energy or biopwer. Like total domination, the present system of structural or social domination dehumanizes its subjects, destroying their spontaneity and turning them into conditioned and behaving animal[s]. (45) I argue that Arendts understanding of the present system of social domination closely resembles Foucaults notion of biopower.

Arendt describes the emergence of the present crisis of modernity as the end of the modern age (i.e. of modernity) and the birth of a new modern world. This event, according to Arendt, constitutes a rupture in historical continuity a break in history (BPF, 26) or a break with all our traditions. (EU, 310) It entails the disintegration of traditional social structures and the emergence of atomized mass society, as well as the loss of legitimacy of the traditional foundations of moral and political order and the collapse of our philosophical tradition. Understanding of the present crisis, according to Arendt, therefore requires radical reconsideration of the relationship between philosophy and politics, between thought and action. Our philosophical tradition has construed this relationship in terms of mutual opposition of action and thought, which was to be resolved by subordination of politics to philosophy. Traditional political philosophy, as Arendt points out, has been essentially a derivative teaching of metaphysics. The task of political philosophy, as it was founded by Plato, is to reveal absolute 6

standards of truth and justice. These standards are absolute and eternal and therefore external to the world of politics and of everyday experience. According to Arendt, traditional political philosophy regarded politics as a practical problem, as a source of threat that must be contained, rather than as a theoretical problem that could become a subject of philosophic reflection. Arendt argues that the present crisis of modernity requires reconsideration of this dismissive attitude of philosophy towards politics and the world of everyday experience. According to Arendt, metaphysics collapsed because the world had been invaded by new problems that could not be explained in terms of traditional philosophical categories. Modern transformations of the world, which rendered traditional philosophical categories obsolete, were caused by human action. This, according to Arendt, implies that politics is no longer a source of anxiety for the philosophers; it became, together with history, a genuine philosophical problem. (KL, 29) To put it in other words, overcoming the impasse caused by the collapse of metaphysics requires that the philosophers turn their attention away from the ideal world of metaphysics towards the world of politics and everyday experience. The starting point of the new genuinely political philosophy must be philosophical wonder (thaumadzein) not at the unity of Being but at the plurality of men. (PP, 103) Arendts reflections about philosophy and politics were strongly influenced by the work of her teacher Martin Heidegger, as well as by the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, whom she greatly admired and considered her philosophical predecessor. I explore Arendts critical adaptation of Heideggers ideas, as well as her idiosyncratic re-interpretation of Kants political philosophy. I argue that Arendt in her thinking about philosophy and politics and their fate in modernity moves between Kant and Heidegger, critically adopting their ideas and using them in ways they themselves might not approve of. Although Heideggers influence on Arendt is more immediate and pronounced, Arendts concern with politics and freedom suggests that the spirit of her thought is closer to Kant than to Heidegger. 7

Arendt herself described the relationship between thought and action as the central problem of her project of genuinely political philosophy. (EU, 445) Nevertheless, she apparently did not consider it to be the most urgent problem. While she addressed it briefly already in her lectures from the 1950s,6 she returned to treat it at greater length only towards the end of her life in The Life of the Mind. That is no coincidence. Arendts political thought is not concerned primarily with abstract philosophical questions or with the fate of philosophy in the modern world, but with political questions and with the fate of the world itself. As I already argued, Arendt in her works reacts to the current historical situation, to the current crisis of modernity. Like Kant, she addresses her writings not to her fellow philosophers or political scientists, but to the broad reading public. Her intention is to challenge her readers to think what we are doing (HC, 5), to use their own understanding and stop acting like thoughtless slaves of technological rationality. Arendts thought is hence critical, rather than normative. Arendt diagnoses the present crisis of modernity, but she does not suggests any solution of this crisis. As she explains in the Prologue to The Human Condition, such solution can arise only from political action, it can never lie in theoretical considerations or the opinion of one person, as though we dealt here with problems for which only one solution is possible. (5) The obvious question is wherefrom can such political action arise, and what form can it take in a society, which according to Arendts own account lacks any genuine political realm and renders political action virtually impossible. As is well known, Arendt criticizes contemporary representative democracy for its failure to provide a genuine public space that would enable ordinary citizens to directly participate in politics. Moreover, Arendt argues that the present system of social domination colonizes the political institutions of representative democracies and renders them helpless. This criticism of representative democracy also contributed to Arendts reputation as an anti-liberal and antidemocratic thinker, whose thought has only little relevance for contemporary politics.7 8

As I argue in this dissertation, Arendts critique of representative democracy is much more nuanced than her critics often assume. While she criticizes contemporary representative democracy and its liberal ideology, Arendt is also a staunch defender of such liberal principles as the rule of law, equality of citizens or personal freedom. Arendt does not simply dismiss the liberal negative conception of freedom as misguided or irrelevant. On the contrary, she regards it as an indispensable aspect of political freedom and as a necessary precondition of political freedom in the positive sense. More importantly for the present discussion, Arendts reflections on the 1960s Civil Rights, anti-war and radical student movements suggest that the constitutional structures of contemporary representative democracies (i.e. both the system of the division of power and constitutional guarantees of civil liberties) do protect at least potential public realm, which can be actualized by political action of concerned citizens. Such public realm is located in the civil society (in the sense in which the term has been used by Vclav Havel and other opponents of former Communist regimes), which consists of the free press, various civic associations, as well as of the ad hoc political movements. Civil society also appears to be the only possible source of political opposition against the current system of social domination. Such opposition, however, is not likely to lead to any revolutionary overthrow of this system. Although Arendt occasionally discussed a hypothetical possibility of a future revolution, she was rather skeptical about its likelihood.8 More importantly, Arendts analysis of the present system of social domination suggests that abolishing this system through revolutionary action is all but impossible. The present situation requires rather sustained political resistance against the system of social domination and against the anonymous forces of market and technology that sustain this system.

Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2003), xx, xxxix. 2 See for example Richard Wolin, Hannah Arendt: Kultur, Thoughtlessness, and Polis Envy, in Heideggers Children (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); George Kateb: Hannah Arendt (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin: Justice: On Relating Private and Public, Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1981). 3 Seyla Benhabib, op. cit. 4 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Bernard Crick, On Rereading The Origins of Totalitarianism, in Hannah Arendt, ed. Melvyn A. Hill (New York: St Martins Press, 1979), 49-66. 5 Canovan, 6-7. 6 Philosophy and Politics and Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought (both 1954). 7 George Kateb for instance argues that Arendt never says or suggests that representative democracy is a genuinely distinctive political system with special moral claims. This according to him proves the lack of political relevance of Arendts thought, because representative democracy is, along with dictatorship, one of the two main forms of existing government. (Op. cit., 115) 8 See for example Thoughts on Politics and Revolution, in CR.

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Chapter 1: Totalitarianism and the Crisis of Modernity

Arendts political thought, as Margaret Canovan puts it, is rooted in her response to totalitarianism.1 As I argue in this chapter, Arendt turned to political theory in reaction to the rise of totalitarianism. More importantly, Arendts analysis of totalitarianism plays a central role in her entire work. As Canovan points out, Arendts reflections on diverse and seemingly unrelated topics, which are developed in her later works, can be traced back to The Origins of Totalitarianism. To understand how these various topics are related to each other, we must therefore turn to Arendts first book on politics.2 The decisive role of The Origins for the development of Arendts thought is related to the historical significance she ascribes to the emergence of totalitarianism. The emergence of totalitarianism, according to Arendt, marks the beginning of an ongoing crisis of modernity, which is at the same time a crisis of entire Western civilization. The essence of this crisis is modern nihilism. The present crisis of modernity is related to the collapse of traditional philosophy and resolving this crisis therefore requires radical reconsideration of the relationship between philosophy and politics.

Totalitarianism as the Sign of the Times According to her own account, Arendt in her youth was interested neither in politics nor in history. Her interests were of a more abstruse sort. She studied philosophy with minors in theology and Greek and wrote her dissertation (under direction of Karl Jaspers) on the concept of love in Saint Augustine. In the 1964 interview with Gnter Gaus Arendt explains that she was awoken from her political slumber by the emergence of Nazism. Indifference [to politics] was no longer possible in 1933. It was no longer possible even before that. (EU, 4) With the rise of the Nazis to power politics suddenly became for Arendt, as a Jew, a matter of existential concern. Arendt dates her turn to the political to the burning of Reichstag on February 27, 1933 and the 11

ensuing illegal arrests. This was an immediate shock to me, and from that moment I felt responsible. (EU, 5) Even a greater shock, at least on the personal level, was the complicity of German intellectuals, including Arendts friends, with Nazism. [A]mong intellectuals, Gleichschaltung was the rule, so to speak. But not among the others. And I never forgot that. I left Germany dominated by an idea of course somewhat exaggerated: Never again! I shall never again get involved in any kind of intellectual business. (EU, 11) Arendt came to believe that the intellectuals concern with ideas insulates him from the world of politics and factual reality. She decided to leave the insulated world of academia and get involved in politics. Arendts disappointment with German intellectuals eventually led to her reflections on the relationship between philosophy and politics. Nevertheless, her decision to abandon philosophy and get engaged in politics was motivated primarily by ethical concerns. Arendt explains that after the burning of Reichstag she began to feel responsible she could no longer be a bystander or an innocent victim of Nazi persecution. (5) She had to respond to the situation and do something. During the war, Arendt got engaged in practical work for Zionist organizations, first in Germany and later on in France and in the United States. Nevertheless, her rejection of theoretical pursuits did not last forever. In spite of her misgivings about professional thinkers, Arendt was an intellectual by nature. From her childhood she felt a strong need to understand. (8) Although she remained preoccupied by politics for the rest of her life, it was primarily as an intellectual and a political theorist. At the same time, however, Arendt remained aware of the danger of becoming entrapped in the ivory tower of ideas. She refused to be called a philosopher and described her field as political theory, as opposed to political philosophy. Arendt argues that political philosophy since Plato has been marked by the philosophers indifference and hostility to politics. Traditional political philosophy perceives and assesses politics from metaphysical perspective, that is to say from a vantage point, which transcends

12

politics and the whole realm of human affairs. Its task is primarily normative; it aims to subordinate politics to absolute and eternal standards of justice, which are derived from philosophical contemplation. Arendt, on the other hand, wants to look at politics, so to speak, with eyes unclouded by philosophy, (2) to reflect political phenomena as they appear in this world. Arendts political theory is primarily critical, as opposed to normative. It does not construe rules for political action, but aims to achieve understanding of politics, to reveal the meaning of what goes on in the political realm. Since it lacks the transcendental vantage point and the absolute standards of traditional political philosophy, Arendts political theory is concerned primarily with political events in their singularity. Understanding, or thinking,3 is, according to Arendt, a specifically human way of responding to reality, a specifically human way of being alive, (EU, 308) which aims at reconciliation with reality. Political theory, or thinking about politics, is for Arendt therefore another way besides action of responding to reality. * * ** As I argue above, Arendt turned to politics, and away from philosophy, in response to the rise of Nazism. When, after a brief period of practical work on behalf of Jewish organizations, she embarked on political theory, it was to respond to this event theoretically. Arendt originally planned her first book on politics, The Origins of Totalitarianism, as a work on Nazism. She decided to include in it the discussion about Stalinism only some two years into writing (in 1947) after she had become acquainted with the newly available accounts of the Nazi and Soviet concentration camps and became aware of the striking similarities between the two regimes.4 The fact that Nazism and Stalinism, which emerged under diametrically different circumstances, developed in many respects identical and historically unprecedented structures of domination confirmed Arendt in her opinion that totalitarianism is a new type of political regime, the emergence of which cannot be explained by peculiarities of German or Russian historical 13

development.5 (E U , 347) Arendts aim in The Origins is to make the phenomenon of totalitarianism comprehensible. (OT, viii) The novelty of totalitarianism makes this task both urgent and particularly daunting. Arendt argues that totalitarianism is not just a modern version of tyranny, but a completely new type of political regime, which cannot be conceptually grasped by existing categories of political thought. The unprecedented crimes of totalitarianism, crimes not foreseen by the Ten Commandments (OT1, 434) likewise cannot be adequately grasped by traditional standards of moral judgment. In other words, the very event, the phenomenon, which we try and must try to understand has deprived us of our traditional tools of understanding. (EU, 310) The rise of totalitarianism and the ensuing world war, according to Arendt, shattered beyond repair traditional foundations of moral and political order, as well as the existing social and political structures, and transformed the world we live in. The rise of totalitarianism is in other words an event of world-historical importance, which must be analyzed within the worldhistorical context. The first two parts of The Origins of Totalitarianism therefore consist of description and analysis of what Arendt calls the subterranean stream of Western history of historical developments that preceded and prepared the ground for the rise of totalitarianism. The third and last part of the work consists of a phenomenological analysis of Nazism and Stalinism, the aim of which is to distill the nature or essence of totalitarianism. Although the bulk of it consists of analysis of historical developments, The Origins of Totalitarianism cannot be classified as a strictly speaking historical work. The quotation from Jaspers Arendt used as an epigraph for her book suggests that in writing it she was concerned primarily with the impact of totalitarianism on the present situation and with the uncertain future of the post-totalitarian world: Weder der Vergnagenen anheimfallen noch dem Zuknftigen. Es kommt darauf au, ganz gegenwrtig zu sein. (To give in neither to the past nor to the future. What matters is to be entirely present.) (OT, vii)6 As Young-Bruehl points out,7 the title under 14

which the book appeared in the first British edition, The Burden of Our Time,8 is therefore more appropriate than the one, under which it was published in all other editions. Totalitarianism, even after it became a matter of past, remains the burden of our time, the sign of our present predicament.

Totalitarianism, according to Arendt, is a new type of political regime, which develops in a new type of society. The rise of totalitarianism in both Germany and Russia was more or less concomitant with the emergence of mass society. Atomized mass society, characterized by the lack of any stabilizing social structures, emerged as a consequence of disintegration of the class system, which had been the backbone of social and political order of European nation states. The rise of Nazism in Germany was preceded and facilitated by a sudden and violent breakdown of the existing social order in the aftermath of World War I. Hyperinflation and mass unemployment of the post-war economic crisis deprived millions of individuals of their property and means of subsistence. These masses of socially isolated and alienated individuals then became the political base of the Nazi movement. In Russia, Stalin purposefully liquidated the nascent social classes that had emerged after the Revolution in the process of his transformation of the revolutionary dictatorship of the Bolshevik party into a full-fledged totalitarian regime. (OT, 320) Once in power, both totalitarian regimes proceeded with further atomization of society. In contrast to traditional tyrannies, totalitarian regimes command and rest upon mass support. (306) Totalitarianism, in other words, demands from its subjects not just blind obedience, but active support and participation. Totalitarianism mobilizes masses through ideology and terror. While tyrannies have always relied on terror as means of domination, in totalitarianism terror becomes the very essence of the regime. Totalitarian terror is not aimed against enemies of the regime, but against entirely harmless and innocent individuals and entire groups of population (Jews, Roma, homosexuals, 15

bourgeoisie), who have been declared objective enemies of the regime. Totalitarian terror is not directed by ordinary strategic rationality, but by totalitarian ideology. We should note that Arendt uses the term ideology in a special sense, which is much narrower than ordinary usage. Ideology, as Arendt defines it, is a pseudo-scientific and simultaneously pseudo-philosophical system of thought that claims to be capable of explaining everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise. (OT, 468) The premise, or the foundational idea of totalitarian ideology the struggle of classes, in case of Communism, or races, in case of Nazism supposedly provides insight into the Law of History or Nature and enables to predict and control historical or natural development. Before it seizes power, totalitarian movement uses ideology as a tool of political mobilization. The lying world of consistency [of totalitarian ideology] which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself (353) appealed to the alienated masses by providing some sense of order in the world that had been turned upside down. In this respect, ideology may appear as a substitute for religion. Arendt nevertheless rejects the notion of totalitarian ideologies as secular religions as misleading.9 More important than certain functional analogies are, from her perspective, substantial differences that set ideologies apart from religion, as well as from traditional, i.e. metaphysical, philosophy. In contrast to religion or metaphysics, ideologies are not concerned with being, but with becoming. They do not provide an account of a stable ontological order of the universe, but an insight into a law that determines the movement of history. Totalitarian ideologies are strictly secular and materialistic; Nazism, as well as Communism, according to Arendt, in effect collapse the distinction between history and nature.10 History, according to both ideologies, is driven by natural forces and nature is in turn following Darwin understood historically as a developing process: the movement of history and the movement of nature are [thus] one and the same. (463) By collapsing the distinction between nature and 16

history, totalitarian ideologies in effect collapse also the distinction between natural and positive law. The law of nature conceived as a law of movement obviously cannot play the traditional role of natural (or divine) law namely to provide immutable standards of justice against which all human laws are measured. Totalitarian ideology, which assumes the status of natural law, on the contrary becomes an instrument of utter lawlessness, which parades as realization of absolute justice. Totalitarian regime, which turns ideology into a principle of action, pretends to execute the superhuman law of Nature directly, without translating it into standards of right and wrong for individual behavior. It applies the law directly without bothering with individual men. (462) Totalitarian ideology offers a remedy for pathological existential conditions of mass society. This remedy, however, cures only the symptoms, rather than the condition itself. Arendt describes ideologies as tranquilizers that protect mans soul against the shocking impact of reality. (BPF, 135) The characteristic existential experience in the atomized mass society is loneliness, i.e. the experience of not belonging to the world at all. (OT, 475) The loneliness of mass man is the existential foundation of modern nihilism; it implies the loss of meaning both of ones own existence and of the world itself. Ideology cures this loneliness, or rather makes it bearable, by shielding its adherents from the impact of reality. Totalitarian ideology answered the frustration of millions of lonely individuals, who had been torn out of their place in society and thrown into a world that had lost its meaning, by providing an explanation of the hidden logic of the forces that had turned the world upside down. The sheer consistency of ideological thinking, which explains everything as a consequence of its initial premise and which is therefore itself emancipated from reality, provides a refuge from the chaotic world. The ice-cold reasoning and the mighty tentacle of dialectics which seizes you as in a vise appears like a last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied upon. (478) Nevertheless, the consistency of ideological thinking alone cannot explain the mass appeal of totalitarian ideologies (which, as Arendt underlines, was by no means limited to totalitarian 17

countries). Arendt argues that communism and racism (as the ideological basis of Nazism) are in themselves no more totalitarian than other nineteenth century ideologies.11 Communism and racism won the competitive struggle of persuasion with other ideologies and became foundations for totalitarian movements because their content appealed to either experiences or desires, in other words to immediate political needs of the masses. (159) While the assumption that the entire course of human history is objectively determined by a single principle of either economic struggle of classes or natural fight of races (159) is plainly ridiculous, (457) the founding ideas of both ideologies reflect an insight into decisive political forces of the contemporary world: the struggle between the races for world domination, and the struggle between the classes for political power in the respective countries.12 (470; Cf. 159) Ideologies are primarily political weapons rather than theoretical doctrines. (159) Their main purpose, in other words, is not interpretation but transformation of reality. Totalitarian movements provide their members with an opportunity to regain the lost meaning of their lives by actively participating in the historical struggle described by the ideology. More precisely, we should say that it provides a substitute for the lost meaning of ones existence. Just as ideology, which acts as an anesthetic against world-alienation and meaninglessness of the world by shielding its adherents from reality, participation in the movement acts as an anesthetic against self-alienation and loss of meaning of ones existence. Identification with the movement enables its members to lose their selves completely, to compensate the feelings of personal impotence and meaninglessness of ones own existence by participating in the super-human historical struggle, by becoming a conscious carrier of the inevitable historical process.

Once the totalitarian movement seizes power, it elevates ideology to the position of official state doctrine and, more importantly, turns it into a principle of action. Instead of just interpreting (or covering up) reality by ideology, it starts transforming reality in accordance with ideological 18

precepts. Totalitarian regime executes the law of Nature or History, which is revealed by the ideology, using terror to accelerate the ostensibly automatic and inevitable development. If for instance ideology declares certain races as unfit to live or certain classes as bound to die out, totalitarian terror accelerates the inevitable historical process by liquidating the concerned groups of population. Totalitarianism thus transforms ideological content, which defines the struggle of classes or races as the engine of history, into living reality. (EU, 351) Its goal is to transform all reality according to ideological principles, to realize in practice the lying world of consistency of the ideology. According to Arendt, totalitarianismhowever does not aim at realizing the eschatological goal posited by the ideology (i.e. the Communist utopia or the Thousand Years Reich). Its goal is rather perpetual acceleration of the historical movement through terror, which is not a means to any end but the very essence of totalitarian regime. The ultimate aim of totalitarianism is total domination of the total population of the earth [and] elimination of every competing non-totalitarian reality. (O T, 392) Totalitarianism is, according to Arendt, inherently expansionistic because the ideal of total domination can be reached only under the conditions of global rule. The very existence of other independent countries, the very existence of non-totalitarian reality represents an intolerable challenge to totalitarian ideology. Total domination, i.e. permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life,13 would in practice require complete annihilation of human spontaneity, which is the source of freedom and of the contingency of history; it would amount to nothing less than transformation of human nature itself. (458) Total domination in effect strives to transform the entire mankind into a single organism directed by the omnipotent will of the totalitarian leader. The totalitarian leader, in distinction from ordinary despots and tyrants, however does not believe that he is a free agent with the power to execute his arbitrary will, but instead the executioner of laws higher than himself. (EU,

19

346) Totalitarianism thus combines the hubristic belief in human omnipotence with complete negation of human freedom. Totalitarian regimes experimented with total domination in the concentration camps, which served as laboratories in which the fundamental belief of totalitarianism that everything is possible is being verified. (OT, 437) Arendt argues that the camps are the true central institutions of totalitarian organizational power and the guiding social ideal of total domination in general. (438) As Arendt underlines, the camps were used neither to intimidate opposition nor to provide cheap slave labor; from a utilitarian, and indeed from a common-sense perspective they were completely useless. (456) (The Nazi preference to use logistical and other resources that were painfully needed on the front for the purposes of the final solution is probably the best example of totalitarian defiance of the common sense.) Nevertheless, in a totalitarian regime the camps are more essential to the preservation of the regimes power than any other institution. (456) The camps keep in motion the terror, which is the very essence of total domination. They serve as a proof of the omnipotence of the regime and of the truth of its ideology by liquidating those, whom the ideology designated as unfit to live. Their practical purpose is on the one hand to maintain the entire population in the state of fear and apathy and, on the other hand, to inspire fanaticism of the regimes elite formations. Without the camps, [t]he dominating and the dominated would only too quickly sink back into the old bourgeois routine (456) and the totalitarian state would degenerate into a mere tyranny. The camps were not just death factories, they were also laboratories, in which totalitarian regime conducted its experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled conditions, spontaneity itself. (438) Before the inmates were killed, they were to be transformed into ghastly marionettes with human faces, which all behave like the dog in Pavlovs experiments, which all react with perfect predictability even when going to their death, and which do nothing but react. (439) Total domination transforms human nature by transforming unique individuals 20

into mere specimens of human species. By destroying spontaneity and uniqueness of its subjects, total domination robs them of their specifically human qualities and reduces them to the biological level of their existence. It turns men not just into animals but into perverted animals, who have lost even the instinct of self-preservation, into bundles of reactions that can always be liquidated and replaced by other bundles of reactions. (OT, 456) Totalitarian transformation of human nature, according to Arendt, requires three essential steps. The first step on the road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in man. (447) The camps operated outside of normal penal system and their inmates were striped of their legal rights. Certain groups of population, for instance Jews, lost their legal rights prior to the beginning of deportations. The second step consists in the murder of the moral person in man. (451) Total domination destroys the moral capacity of its subjects chiefly by making their death irrelevant. The camps were completely sealed off from the outside world; they were holes of oblivion whose inmates ceased to exist for the outside world even before their death. Anonymous death of a concentration camp inmate merely set a seal on the fact that he had never really existed. (452) By making death itself irrelevant, concentration camps made not just effective resistance but even martyrdom impossible. The victims of concentration camps were also forced to participate in the administration of the camps and running of the death factories and put into positions in which they had to chose not between good and evil but between murder and murder. (452) The point was to blur the distinction between good and evil, between the victims and their murderers, to create conditions under which moral judgment becomes completely irrelevant and moral action impossible. (453) The last step necessary to destroy all traces of spontaneity in human beings consists in the destruction of their identity as unique individuals. This is performed by various methods of humiliation and systematic torture.

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Concentration camps as the guiding social ideal of total domination in general (438) reveal the essence of totalitarianism as nihilism. The hubristic attempt at a total control of reality implies negation of meaning of an individual human life and ultimately of the meaning of life and Being as such. Totalitarian ideology regards Being as an automatic process that follows the inevitable law of nature or history. This process is in effect the life process itself. Individual human life is then in itself entirely worthless instance of the life process. Total domination realizes this nihilistic credo in practice by transforming unique human beings into superfluous specimens of human species, into bundles of reactions that can be controlled at will and that have no will of their own. Total domination, according to Arendt, can be fully realized only in secluded space of the concentration camps, because human spontaneity is connected with life itself. (438) Total domination, which denies the meaning of individual life, inevitably negates and destroys life; it can lead to nothing else than to insane fabrication of death. Totalitarianism so to say transforms the nihilistic denial of moral limits to human action into an affirmative principle of human omnipotence. It transcends, as Arendt puts it, the nihilistic conviction that everything is permitted and replaces it with a principle that everything is possible. (440) Totalitarianism, which arises from modern mans nihilistic resentment against everything given,14 could be described as a nihilistic revolt against nihilism, as a hopeless attempt of modern man to assume the position of God whom he had killed. This attempt cannot but confirm the nihilism from which it arises and against which it revolts. Totalitarian regimes failed to establish the Paradise on Earth their ideologies promised, but succeeded in imitating Hell in the concentration camps. In a hubristic attempt to assume Gods position, modern man succeeded in imitating Satan. **** So far, we have been concerned with Arendts answer to the question What is totalitarianism?. As I already mentioned, Arendt does not get to address this question directly until the third and 22

last part of The Origins. The first two parts consist in her analysis of the historical developments that preceded and prepared the ground for the rise of totalitarianism. The aim of this analysis is to explain how totalitarianism could occur. For while totalitarianism constitutes a negation of all values of European civilization and a true reversal of the project of the Enlightenment, totalitarian movements were obviously not imported from the moon but have sprung up in the nontotalitarian world ([from] crystallizing elements found in that world). (EU, 310) As I argue above, Arendt rejects the attempts to explain the origins of totalitarianism by some peculiarities of German or Russian historical development. Totalitarianism is according to her a phenomenon not of German or Russian but of European and world history and a product of modernity. Arendt nevertheless at the same time rejects the notion that totalitarianism constitutes an inevitable outcome of modern historical development. She denies that totalitarianism would be a logical outcome of the dialectic of the Enlightenment, as Horkheim and Adorno claim,15 or a consequence of modern rejection of Christian and metaphysical tradition, as Voegelin suggests.16 Arendt rejects such explanations for two reasons. First of all, she rejects the notion of historical necessity as incompatible with human freedom. Apart from that, she refuses to reduce modernity to those political pathologies, which enabled the rise of totalitarianism. The first two parts of The Origins are therefore not concerned with historical causes of Nazism and Stalinism, but rather with historical developments that made the rise of totalitarianism possible. As Arendt explains in her reply to Voegelins review of The Origins: I did not write a history of totalitarianism but an analysis in terms of history. The book therefore does not really deal with the origins of totalitarianism as its title unfortunately claims but gives a historical account of the elements which crystallized into totalitarianism, this account is followed by an analysis of the elemental structure of totalitarian movements and domination itself.17 The elements of totalitarianism are various political pathologies that emerged in Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Arendt argues that these political pathologies, for instance antiSemitism, tribal nationalism or imperialism, are distinctly modern and hence cannot be explained 23

by analogies with similar phenomena in the past. For example anti-Semitism is, according to her, a nineteenth century racist ideology, which must be distinguished from traditional religious antiJudaism.18 These elements did not directly cause totalitarianism, but rather made its rise possible by preparing political ground for totalitarian movements and by being readily available for use by these movements. Nazi ideology for instance incorporated and utilized the existing virulent antiSemitism and German tribal nationalism, as well as the expansionism of the 19th century PanGerman movement. The quest for total domination at a global scale was similarly prefigured in the imperialist quest for endless expansion. Nevertheless, the elements of totalitarianism in themselves were not totalitarian and their pathological or proto-totalitarian nature became fully apparent only once they crystallized into totalitarianism. Arendt, as she puts it, did not write a history of totalitarianism, but rather its analysis in terms of history. The first two parts of the book therefore consist of a multifaceted description and analysis19 of individual elements of totalitarianism, rather than of a sustained historical narrative describing the road towards totalitarianism. Nevertheless, Arendts account of individual elements of totalitarianism is organized roughly chronologically around two central themes, or historical trends, that outline the development of the subterranean stream of Western history. (OT, ix) One of these thematic lines concerns the development of capitalism and rise of the political power of the bourgeoisie what Arendt calls the nineteenth century struggle between the bourgeois and citoyen. (336) The other one concerns the rise and decline of modern nation state what Arendt describes as the secret conflict between state and nation. (230) The two historical trends converge in the rise of late nineteenth century imperialism, which, according to Arendt, in many ways prefigured totalitarianism.20 Although these two historical developments are interrelated, neither of them can be reduced to the other.21

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Arendt avoids the reductionism of much Marxist theory that sees the state as an instrument for administering the interests of the capitalist class alone.22 The nation state, which started developing under the tutelage of absolute monarchs according to Arendt evolved as an impartial institution which almost by definition ruled above and beyond a class divided society. (OT, 123) Once the absolute monarchy was replaced by a republic or a constitutional monarchy, the nation replaced the king as a symbol of the unity of the country and as the source of the power and authority of the state. In other words, the sovereign will of the people, i.e. of the nation, replaced the sovereign will of the absolute monarch. Arendt argues that the principle of popular sovereignty is inherently in tension with the notion of a state as a legal institution based on the principles of equality and rule of law. Coupled with the notion of the nation as an organic community, it threatens to transform the state into an instrument of arbitrary will of the nation, or rather of its self-styled representatives. Nationalism is essentially the expression of this perversion of the state into an instrument of the nation and the identification of the citizen of the state with the member of the nation. (231) Nevertheless, in the nation states of Western Europe, nationalism played largely a positive role. West-European nationalism developed into a form of democratic patriotism, which functioned as a precious cement that held together the class ridden society and legitimized representative government. Legitimacy of the government in a nation state relies on the consent of the governed, which in turn requires ethnically homogenous population. The existence of strong nation-states therefore provided basis for the existence of stable and peaceful international order in 19th century Europe for the European system of nations. The destructive tendencies of nationalism became obvious only when the ideas of nationalism and nation state were transplanted into the ethnically mixed areas of Central and Eastern Europe. In these areas nationalism developed into an inherently racist and chauvinistic form of tribal nationalism. The attempt to re-organize the ethnically mixed areas of Central and Eastern Europe 25

on the basis of principle of national self-determination after World War I then clearly revealed the limitations of the nation state. The newly established nation-states inevitably contained numerous national minorities, which felt excluded from the body politic of the states they inhabited. The situation of national minorities during the inter-war period was a source of constant tension and instability on both national and international level; this problem also contributed to the rise of Nazism and to the outbreak of World War II.23

The nation state according to Arendt developed as an impartial institution standing above the society and not associated with any of the social classes at least in part because of the reluctance of the bourgeoisie to accept political power and the responsibility that comes with it. Bourgeoisie, according to her, was the first class in history to achieve economic pre-eminence without aspiring to political rule. Even when the bourgeoisie had already established itself as the ruling class, it had left all political decisions to the state. (123) Its position of a ruling class was based mostly on its economic power and social pre-eminence. Bourgeoisie entered into politics only towards the end of nineteenth century in connection with the rise of imperialism. Imperialism must be [therefore] considered the first stage in the political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism.24 (138) Imperialism emerged initially as a response to the crisis of over-accumulation of capital. The boundaries of the nation state became too tight for economic expansion and the only way to keep the capitalist economy in motion was to export the capital. Imperialism in effect consists of the expansion of the capitalist economic system into areas in which pre-capitalist production relations still predominate. While the imperialist expansion started first as private venture of joint-stock companies, it soon became obvious that the export of private capital requires the export of the state power. Only the material power of the state could guarantee the security of investments in distant and politically void

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territories. The bourgeoisie thus pushed the nation states against the better judgment of many political leaders into the oversees adventure of imperialism. According to Arendt, modern imperialism is qualitatively different from earlier models of territorial expansion, such as empire-building or colonialism. Its objectives are primarily economic, rather than political. The goal of imperialist expansion is neither expansion of an existing body politic, nor establishment of new polities, but perpetuation of territorial expansion for the sake of expansion of capital. Nevertheless, while imperialism originally started as a response to the crisis of over-accumulation of capital, it rapidly loosened its ties with economic rationality and developed into a political principle in its own right.25 Proponents of imperialism in effect transformed the economic principle of perpetual growth of wealth into political principle of perpetual territorial expansion and perpetual accumulation of power. They were the first, who as a class, and supported by their everyday experience, would claim that power is the essence of every political structure. (OT, 137) This new political outlook, which is in complete accord with Hobbes political philosophy,26 revealed the hidden desires and secret convictions of the bourgeoisie, for whom the state has always been only a well organized police force. (138) Imperialism, as the first stage of the political rule of the bourgeoisie was a decisive step in the development that Arendt describes as the nineteenth century struggle between the bourgeois and the citoyen. Imperialist epoch is also a decisive stage of the other historical trend that marks the road to totalitarianism of the the secret conflict between state and nation. Its development was accompanied by the rise of chauvinistic nationalism. The imperialists in all countries preached and boasted of their being beyond the parties, and the only ones to speak for the nation as a whole. (OT, 153) This tactic later became the hallmark of totalitarian movements. In Germany and Russia, that is in the countries with no or little oversea possessions, the imperialist epoch provided a new impetus for the pan-Germanic and pan-Slav movements with their program of continental imperialism. These movements were, according to Arendt, direct predecessors of 27

Nazism and Bolshevism.27 Most importantly, the scramble for Africa and the encounter between Europeans and the uncivilized central-African tribes contributed decisively to the development of European racism. The reality of white domination in Africa provided much stronger argument for the Nazis than previous racist theories. Arendts argument about the decisive role of imperialism in the genesis of totalitarianism may seem dubious. After all, totalitarianism evolved in the countries that played only minor role in the Great Game of the nineteenth century imperialism. On the other hand, the most important imperial powers, and especially Britain, proved immune to its lure. Nevertheless, if we consider that Arendt does not claim that imperialism would be a direct cause of totalitarianism, her argument turns out to be quite plausible. Imperialism led to the rivalry between European powers, which destabilized the European system of nation states. It was one of the main causes of the First World War, which not only brought the final collapse of the system of nation states, but which was also instrumental for the rise of totalitarian movements. Besides that, imperialism gave rise to various elements of totalitarianism, such as racism, administrative rule, concentration camps, or, on a more general level, expansion for expansions sake as a political principal or subordination of politics to an extra-political principle, which has a character of automatic movement. Lying under anybodys nose were many of the elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the basis of racism. (OT, 221) **** As I argue above, Arendt was in writing The Origins of Totalitarianism concerned primarily not with the history of totalitarianism, but with its impact on the present world. She calls the rise of totalitarianism the central event of our world and argues that to understand totalitarianism means to reconcile ourselves to a world in which such things are possible at all. (EU, 308) Totalitarianism, even after it became a matter of the past, remains the burden of our time, the sign of our present predicament. Arendts analysis of totalitarianism reveals the present situation as a 28

crisis of the modernity, which is at the same time crisis of the whole Western civilization. The rise of totalitarianism marks the onset of this crisis and totalitarianism also reveals its essence: [W]ithout the fictitious world of totalitarian movements, in which with unparalleled clarity the essential uncertainties of our time have been spelled out, we might have been driven to our doom without ever becoming aware of what has been happening. (OT, viii) If it is true that the elements of totalitarianism can be found by retracing the history and analyzing the political implications of what we usually call the crisis of our century, then the conclusion is unavoidable that this crisis is no mere threat from the outside, no mere result of some aggressive foreign policy of either Germany or Russia, and that it will no more disappear with the death of Stalin than it disappeared with the fall of Nazi Germany. It may even be that the true predicaments of our time will assume their authentic form though not necessarily the cruelest only when totalitarianism has become a thing of the past. (OT, 460) The rise of totalitarianism is, according to Arendt, a major breaking point in history, which marks the end of the modern age and the birth of the modern world. (BPF, 26-27) What Arendt calls modern age could be called simply modernity. It started with the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century reaching its political climax in the revolutions of the eighteenth, and unfolding its general implications after the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth. (27) Modernity can be, at least from hindsight, described as a project of liberation and emancipation of man and mankind, as to use Kants definition of the Enlightenment mans emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.28 The scientific revolution promised to liberate man from superstitions and turn him into a master of nature. The political revolutions of eighteenth century promised to liberate men from the traditional authorities and turn them into masters of their own affairs. Last but not least, the Industrial Revolution promised to liberate men from the drudgery of labor and to thus provide them with the necessary material conditions and time for the practice of political freedom. Modern world as the practical outcome of modernity hardly represents achievement of this goal. The revolutionary modern age succeeded in dramatically transforming the world, but it failed to deliver the promised liberation. While it succeeded in defeating the traditional

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authorities, it also gave rise to new, extremely efficient and powerful forms of domination. The concentration camp, which is the guiding social ideal of total domination in general (OT, 438) should be regarded as an emblematic institution not only of totalitarianism, but of the whole modern world. While the Industrial Revolution liberated mankind or at least the part of mankind living in the economically developed countries from hunger and from the drudgery of physical labor, it simultaneously subjected it to the automatism of economic progress. And while modernity overthrew traditional authoritative opinions, it did not really lead to emancipation of reason. Modern science gave man tremendous, almost god-like powers, but it did not turn him into a master of nature, nor did it help him understand the world or orient himself in it. To help man understand the world and orient himself in it has been traditionally task of philosophy and religion, rather than of science. The problem is that modern science, which itself grew out of philosophy and until recently was known as natural philosophy, contributed to the collapse of traditional philosophy, as well as of religion. The revolutionary modern age led to what Nietzsche calls the death of God, by which he means just the collapse of traditional religion but also of metaphysics. The present crisis, which broke out with the rise of totalitarianism, is therefore a crisis not just of modernity, but of the entire Western civilization. The essence of this crisis is nihilism.

Nihilism is for Arendt by no means a purely philosophic or theoretical problem; it is primarily an existential and a political problem. (BPF, 26; LM, 212) In other words, the death of God is not the cause but rather a symptom of modern nihilism. Furthermore, modern nihilism does not consist simply of the denial of moral limits to human action. As discussed above, totalitarianism in effect transformed nihilism into an affirmative principle of human omnipotence. Totalitarian attempt at total control of reality leads to theoretical denial and practical destruction of human freedom and spontaneity and of the meaning of human existence. Totalitarian ideology 30

regards individual human beings as intrinsically worthless carriers of automatic historical qua natural process. Total domination, which attempts to realize this ideology in practice, then reduces human beings to the biological level of their existence, transforming them not just into animals but into perverted animals that can be manipulated at will and used to carry further the inevitable process of history, but which have no will of their own. This form of nihilism did not disappear with the demise of totalitarianism. On the contrary, Arendts claim that the predicaments of our time will assume their authentic form . only when totalitarianism has become a thing of the past (OT, 460) implies that modern nihilism assumes its authentic form only in the post-totalitarian mass society. Arendt turns to the predicaments of post-totalitarian mass society in her later works, most importantly in The Human Condition. In this book, she dates the birth of modern world not to the rise of totalitarianism, but to the first nuclear explosions. This shift suggests that the decisive force that shapes the modern world in its authentic post-totalitarian stage is not political organization of masses through ideology and terror, but the advancement of science and technology. Totalitarianism, according to Arendt, aims at total control of reality understood as a historical and at the same time natural process. Science and technology also aim to achieve total control of (physical) reality. The most important and fastest developing modern science is biology, which attempts to manipulate life which is conceived as a self-developing process at its most basic level. The destructive potential of nuclear weapons demonstrates that science and technology are no less threatening to humanity than the techniques of total domination: the victory of the concentration camps system would mean the same inexorable doom for human beings as the use of the hydrogen bomb would mean the doom of the human race. (443) Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear holocaust is not the only danger Arendt perceives behind the fast advancement of modern science and technology. She is most concerned about the fact that the scientific and technological development proceeds as an automatic, self-perpetuating process, which threatens 31

to turn us into helpless slaves, not so much of our machines as of our know how, thoughtless creatures at the mercy of every gadget which is technologically possible, no matter how murderous it is.29 (HC, 3) The development of science and technology is inexorably interrelated with the progress of capitalist economy. As I argue in the next chapter, capitalism in its present stage, according to Arendt, develops into a system of structural domination, which operates analogously to total domination. Similarly to total domination, it reduces human beings to the biological level of their existence and exploits their life-energy or biopower, integrating them ever more tightly into the economic system as laborers and consumers. Like total domination, it also destroys worldlyreality, replacing it not with ideology, but with an image or simulacrum of reality. Arendt underlines that capitalist economy operates as a quasi-natural, self-perpetuating process, which has to keep continuously expanding or else it would collapse. The continuous economic growth requires increasingly efficient exploitation of the bio-power of laborers and consumers. As I argue above, modern world hardly represents a triumph of the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, it could be argued that contemporary modern world, which is shaped by science and technology, is a logical outcome of the Age of Reason. And insofar as modern science is an offspring of philosophy, it could be argued that contemporary modern world is a product not just of the Enlightenment but of the entire Western tradition of rationality. Moreover, totalitarian attempt to subordinate politics to ideology could be interpreted as an attempt to realize in practice the traditional claim of political philosophy about the supremacy of theory over practice. The nihilism of modern world therefore cannot be described simply as a revolt against the tradition, but rather as its implosion or collapse upon itself.

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Philosophy and Politics The Origins of Totalitarianism was, as its critics pointed out, a somewhat lop-sided book.30 Although it intended to address both varieties of totalitarianism, it discussed Nazism much more thoroughly than Stalinism. Moreover, while Nazism could be conceivably explained as a product of the subterranean currents in Western history which had no connection with the great political and philosophical traditions of the West,31 Stalinism is clearly related to these traditions via its Marxist ideology. Arendt herself was aware of these shortcomings. Upon finishing The Origins, she therefore proposed a project to the Guggenheim foundation on The Totalitarian Elements in Marxism, in which would address them. Arendt never finished her book on Marx, because the work on it led her far afield from the originally proposed topic. She came to believe that she could not adequately address Marxs thought without taking into consideration the entire tradition of Western political philosophy. For while Arendt regards Marx as a conscious rebel against the philosophical tradition, she maintains that he failed to break free of the traditional conceptual framework and that his thought therefore remains rooted in the tradition. Moreover, Arendt implies that Marxs thought could have become the foundation of a totalitarian ideology because it remained grounded in the traditional philosophy, which, as she came to believe, has been since its very beginning marked by profound hostility to freedom and politics. Therefore, to accuse Marx of totalitarianism amounts to accusing the Western tradition itself of necessarily ending in the monstrosity of this novel form of government. (KMTWPT, 276) Arendt does not mean (as she explains in her letter to Jaspers) that Hitler [or Stalin] had anything to do with Plato.32 She rather means that it would be senseless to hold Marx responsible for the Gulag or to summarily reject his philosophy because it proved useful to Bolsheviks.

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The greatness of Marxs thought, according to Arendt, lies in the precision with which he grasped the transformation the world around him was undergoing. (282) Marx knew that the incompatibility between classical political thought and modern political conditions lay in the accomplished fact of the French and Industrial Revolutions, which together had raised labor, traditionally the most despised of all human activities, to the highest rank of productivity and pretended to be able to assert the time-honored ideal of freedom under unheard-of conditions of universal equality. (BPF, 32) Marxs solution of this problem, according to Arendt, consists in reversing the traditional hierarchy of thought and action, of contemplation and labor, and of philosophy and politics. (BPF, 18) Marx wanted to liberate thinking from the traditional categories, which he recognized to be inadequate in the new situation, in order to liberate mankind. Nevertheless, he ended up subjecting both action and thought to the inexorable despotism of necessity, to the iron law of productive forces in society. (32) Marxs thought, according to Arendt, contains some unique insights into the two central problems of modern age: the problems of labor and history. (KMTWPT, 278) Nevertheless, since Marx ultimately failed to resolve the problems he confronted, these insights often take the form of paradoxes. Arendt follows the lead of these paradoxes in order to resolve the problems with which Marx struggled, thinking, so to say, with Marx against Marx. Arendts own answers to these problems will be discussed throughout this study. At this point, I would like to outline her diagnosis of the flaws of Marxs solution. The main flaw of Marxs thought that pertains to the problem of history lies in his notion of history as a pre-determined necessary process, which can be theoretically grasped and practically mastered by men. By interpreting what for Hegel was the meaning of history namely the progressive unfolding and actualization of the idea of Freedom as its yet unattained end, Marx in effect interprets political action as making of history, which is supposed to be free and at the same time is subject to historical necessity. (BPF, 78) Understanding of political action as (violent) making of history in accordance with the iron law of necessity obviously lends itself to 34

totalitarian ideology. Furthermore, the subject (and at the same time object) of the historical process is for Marx mankind or human species. Marxs notion of mankind as a unitary subject and his understanding of man as a species-being, according to Arendt, prefigures the totalitarian contempt for individual human life, which totalitarian ideology regards as mere material of the historical process. The main flaw of Marxs thought related to the problem of labor consists in his conflation of work as creative, world-building activity, and labor as mans metabolism with nature. This conflation is according to Arendt at least partially responsible for Marxs optimistic belief that the increase of productivity of labor would lead to its self-abolishment and to final liberation of mankind. Arendt maintains that the reality of contemporary economically developed societies proves that Marxs optimism was unfounded. The enormous productivity of modern economy did not lead to actualization of freedom, but to collective enslavement to the endless cycle of labor and consumption.

The main paradox of Marxs thought, according to Arendt, consists of the fundamental contradiction between the glorification of labor and action (as against contemplation and thought) and of a stateless, that is, actionless and (almost) laborless society. (24) What will happen to labor, which is for Marx the most human and most productive of mans capacities, after the revolution when labor is abolished? What will happen to action the most dignified of human activities? How will man be able to act at all in a meaningful, authentic way? Finally, when philosophy has been both realized and abolished in the future society, what kind of thought will be left? (24) These questions are by no means purely theoretical. Arendt argues that Marx himself regarded his so-called utopia as a simple prediction (20) and suggests that this prediction has been largely realized in contemporary mass society. The only problem is that Marxs noble 35

dream has changed into something closely resembling a nightmare. (RJ, 262) Contemporary mass societies are, according to Arendt, egalitarian and virtually classless.33 While the state did not wither completely, political action has been to a great extent replaced by bureaucratic administration of national economy. While contemporary developed economies are definitely not laborless, people undeniable do enjoy much more free time than in the nineteenth century. More importantly, contemporary economically developed societies are invariably societies of laborers or job-holders. In our society virtually every activity is conceived as labor and virtually everyone works for living. Even presidents, kings, and prime ministers think of their offices in terms of a job necessary for the life of society. (HC, 5) While labor has become under current conditions a nearly universal ordeal, creative work has almost completely disappeared. So did action, which Arendt, just like Marx, regards as the most dignified human activity. The developments Marx correctly predicted did not lead to liberation of mankind, but to its subjection to the pseudo-natural process of Progress, which is driven by the logic of capitalist economy by the collective life-process of society and by no less automatic advancement of science and technology. While the emergence of the present modern world cannot be described as realization of philosophy in practice, thinking in the form of instrumental scientific rationality did become subjected to action (which, however, has lost its free character). As I argue in the next chapter, Arendt adopts some of Marxs insights for her own critique of contemporary mass society. At the same time, she tries to resolve the paradoxes in which Marxs thought got entrapped paradoxes which have since become embodied in the very reality of modern world. Marxs greatest failure from Arendts perspective consists of his fundamental misunderstanding of the problem of freedom. This failure is a consequence of the influence of the philosophical tradition, against which Marx rebelled but which he failed to overcome. Western tradition of political philosophy, as Arendt realized when she started working on her never 36

finished book on Marx, has been from its very beginning marked by fundamental hostility to freedom and politics. The reflections on Marx the philosopher with whom our tradition of political thought came to its end therefore led her to turn attention to Plato as the founder of this tradition. **** Arendt traces the beginning of our tradition of political philosophy to a concrete historical event to the trial and condemnation of Socrates, which as she puts it in the history of political thought plays the same role of a turning point as the trial and condemnation of Jesus plays in the history of religion. (PP, 73) Our tradition of political philosophy started with Platos reaction to this event. The unjust death of his teacher made Plato doubt the basic principles of the Greek politics. According to Arendt, political action in Athens consisted of free competition of opinions (doxai) by the means of persuasion (peithein). Such a political process relies on the equality of all participants of the deliberation, i.e. on equality of all citizens, and on exclusion of violence, or threat of violence, from politics. The Athenians were proud that they, in distinction to the barbarians, conducted their political affairs in the form of speech and without compulsion. (74) Socrates failure to persuade his judges about his innocence made Plato doubt the merits of the politics based on persuasion and competition of opinions. Plato concluded that politics needs some absolute standards of justice and truth, which would ensure that truth and not mere opinion would prevail, and which would replace or at lest curb persuasion, which, as he came to believe, is not the opposite of rule by violence but merely another form of it. (79) In The Republic, Plato claims to have discovered such eternal standards of truth and justice in the ideas, eternal images or forms not only of beings but also of virtues, the most important of which is said to be the idea of the good. Since the ideas are accessible only through philosophic contemplation, the philosophers should become the rulers.

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The juxtaposition of truth and opinion, according to Arendt, was the most anti-Socratic conclusion that Plato drew from Socrates trial. (75) For Socrates, opinion or doxa, is not an inherently deficient mode of truth a mere opinion but a formulation in speech of what dokei moi, that is of what appears to me. The opinions are necessarily subjective and can be deceiving because the world opens up differently to every man, according to his position in it. (80) Nevertheless, it is the same world and the same objects that appear to us. The only way humans can overcome the limitations of opinions is by examining them and comparing them with the opinions of others. In contrast to Plato, Arendts Socrates does not believe that men could ever attain absolute truth. The task of philosophy, according to him, is not to replace the plurality of opinions by a single authoritative truth, but rather to reveal the truth inherent in various opinions by cross-examining them. Thinking itself consists of such an examination of opinions, of an endless internal dialogue between me and myself. According to Arendt, Socrates performed his dialectics publicly for political reasons. He was aware of the potentially destructive consequences of the agonal spirit of the Athenian democracy, which was marked by a constant contest of the citizens and their opinions. Arendt argues that Socrates wanted to remind his fellow Athenians that the truth inherent in their various opinions can be revealed only through dialectical cross-examination. He wanted to make philosophy relevant to politics not by offering some expert advice, but by engaging his fellow citizens in a philosophical dialogue, by infecting them with philosophy. Dialectics, as a philosophical mode of speech, which requires mutual respect and which is driven by common concern for truth, is the very opposite of rhetoric, the aim of which is to persuade others about the truth of ones own opinion. In contrast to rhetoric, which implies competitive struggle and engenders envy, dialectics implies and engenders friendship. Friendship to a larger extent, indeed, consists of this kind of talking about something that the friends have in common. (82) Friendship obviously does not require that friends agree on 38

everything (in such a case they would have nothing to talk about). Rather, it requires understanding not directly of the other partner, but of how and in what specific articulateness the common world appears to the other, who as a person is forever unequal or different. This kind of understanding seeing the world from the other persons perspective is according to Arendt political insight par excellence. (82) Arendt therefore agrees with Aristotle, who argues34 against Plato (and, according to Arendt, in agreement with Socrates) that it is friendship, rather than justice what constitutes the bond of communities.35 Socrates, according to Arendt, wanted to make friends of Athenian citizenry, to remind them that the polis is not or should not be just an arena of constant struggle in which each citizen strives to outdo everyone else, to prove his own greatness, but a community in which they partake, a matter of common concern and care. Socrates seems to have believed that the political function of the philosopher was to help establish this kind of common world, built on the understanding of friendship, in which no rulership is needed. (84) The Athenians did not show much understanding for Socrates effort to turn them into better citizens by teaching them dialectics. They accused him of introducing new gods to the city and of corrupting the youth. While the first of these charges was obviously unfounded (since Socrates did not teach any truths, least about gods) the second was not, as Arendt notes, without grounds. (KL, 38) By introducing the Athenians to the art of dialectics, Socrates did not want only to teach them to respect the opinions of others, to train them in a constructive public discourse. By casting doubt on all unexamined opinions, he also wanted to teach them to think critically and independently. The problem is that Socrates dialectics does not lead to any positive results. As Arendt points out, Platos Socratic dialogues are all aporetic. (LM, 169) While Socrates succeeds in cleansing his interlocutors of their previously held opinions, he does not provide them with any true opinions. This aspect of Socratic thinking is indeed subversive, as it undermines all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil and may therefore engender license 39

and cynicism. Nevertheless, Arendt concludes that non-thinking, that is unquestioning acceptance of publicly accepted opinions and values, is even more dangerous. One of the lessons of totalitarianism, according to her, is that people who are not used to critical thinking law abiding citizens who respect the publicly accepted values do with particular ease adapt to a new set of values even if the new values represent a complete reversal of the old ones.

Arendt argues that Plato, in contrast to Socrates, was not genuinely interested in politics. He did not write his political teaching because he wanted to make the polis more just, but because he wanted to make it safer for the philosophers. Plato describes the philosophers esteem of politics in the parable of the cave. The cave represents the polis and the whole realm of everyday experience, which from the philosophers perspective appears as the world of shadows and false images that is ruled by false opinions. Platos cave, as Arendt points out, closely resembles Homers description of Hades. Plato in effect reverses Homers position, indicating that: Not the life of bodyless souls, but the life of the bodies takes place in an underworld;compared to the sky and the sun, the earth is like Hades; images and shadows are the objects of bodily senses, not the surroundings of bodyless souls; the true and the real is not the world in which we move and live and which we have to part from in death, but the ideas seen and grasped by the eyes of the mind. (BPF, 37) The philosopher has no interest in participating in the game of shadows that constitutes the political life. He is interested in contemplating the ideas and if he could, he would leave the cave, i.e. the polis, altogether. The parable of the cave is obviously an allegory. The philosopher does not physically leave the polis and the world of everyday experience; he rather withdraws from it in philosophical contemplation into an internal world of mind. His body inevitably remains in this world, which is also why the philosopher in Platos parable must return to the cave. Nevertheless, being used to the brightness of ideas, the philosopher no longer feels at home in the cave and cannot orient himself in the world of common sense. When he tries to share his experience with the many, he in the best case becomes a laughing-stock (as did Thales, when he fell in the well) 40

and in the worst case he becomes a victim of the hostility of the many and pays with his life. This is what happened to Socrates and what prompted Plato to write his political teaching. Because he wants to persuade the many about the political relevance of philosophy and to make the case that the philosophers should become rulers, Plato depicts the ideas as eternal standards of truth and justice, as measures of human affairs, and describes the highest idea as the idea of the good. The Greeks, as Arendt points out, did not have a notion of goodness in an absolute sense. Good in Greek means good for or fit. (BPF, 113) By depicting the highest idea as the idea of the good, Plato therefore asserted the practical usefulness of philosophy. At the same time, however, he created, or laid foundation for, the notion of absolute goodness. Since he realized that the many might not be persuaded by his arguments, he also crafted his myths of hereafter, the purpose of which is to frighten the many into submission. Arendt argues that not just these myths but Platos entire political teaching is a noble lie. In order to make it suitable for political purposes, Plato had to substantially modify the originally strictly philosophical doctrine of ideas. In its original meaning, the doctrine of ideas describes the experience of contemplation and the quest for the true being of things. The original function of ideas is not to rule or otherwise determine the chaos of human affairs, but, in shining brightness, to illuminate their darkness. (113) The distinction between the original philosophical meaning of the doctrine of ideas and its later distortion for political purposes is, according to Arendt, apparent in Platos two different accounts of the highest idea. While in Symposion Plato describes the highest idea as the idea of the beautiful, in the political context of The Republic he claims that the highest idea is the idea of the good. Nevertheless, it was precisely in its distorted, political form that the doctrine of ideas influenced decisively the later philosophical tradition. Platos dualism with its dichotomies between the ideal and the sensory world and between body and soul, which originated in his political teaching, became the

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foundation of both the Western tradition of political philosophy and of metaphysics. In Arendts interpretation the two traditions appear to be just two sides of the same coin.

Plato himself, according to Arendt, bears at least some responsibility for the later metaphysical distortion of his philosophy. He so to say laid ground for metaphysical dualism by absolutizing the conflict between philosophy and politics. As discussed above, the conflict between philosophy and politics, according to Arendt, broke out historically with the trial and condemnation of Socrates. Nevertheless, the primary cause of this conflict lies at a deeper level. Thinking is an inherently solitary activity; when we think we inevitably withdraw from the company of others. Thinking also dissolves all opinions and as such is dangerous to politics. At the same time, however, thinking and acting or philosophy and politics are both human activities, which both depend on human capacity of speech and on the human condition of plurality. According to Arendt, Plato obliterated this fundamental link between thought and action, when he conceived of philosophical thinking as speechless contemplation of truth. The notion of philosophy as contemplation of truth is, according to Arendt, based on the experience of speechless wonder (thaumadzein), which Plato in Theaetetus describes as the starting point of all philosophizing. The speechless wonder at that which is at it is (PP, 97 at Being itself, according to Arendt, is the starting point of philosophy. And this speechless wonder really is in a certain sense contradictory to the political condition of man. It strikes man in his singularity and it dissolves all opinions on which man relies in his everyday existence; it does not replace these opinions with any new opinion on the contrary, the pathos of wonder can be experienced as acute sense of hopeless inadequacy of all opinions in face of the awareness of Being itself. Nevertheless, the speechless wonder is, only the starting point of thinking. Thinking itself is an active process, an internal dialogue that reflects human condition of plurality.

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By conceiving philosophy as a way of life that consists in contemplation of truth, Plato, according to Arendt, tried to prolong indefinitely this wonder, which can last only for a fleeting moment. Philosophical wonder is the wonder of the unity of Being and the attempt to prolong this wonder indefinitely, to contemplate Being in its entirety and eternity, leads to philosophers hostility against politics, which is characterized by plurality of erring opinions and contingency of action. Preoccupation with the eternal and necessary makes the philosopher hostile not only towards politics, but towards the entire realm of becoming and ultimately towards life as such. While Plato did not manage to turn philosophers into rulers, his philosophy, which became the foundation of the Western traditions of political thought and metaphysics, gained tremendous influence over the development of both philosophy and politics. Philosophical ideas did become absolute standards that served as yardsticks against which the justice of human laws could be measured and which enabled human mind to at least attempt to understand what was going on in the realm of human affairs. (102) Platos philosophy, according to Arendt, could have achieved such long-lasting effects, only because it became preserved and at the same time transformed by the binding force of tradition. **** Arendt described the beginning of the contemporary crisis of modernity as a break in our history or end of tradition. (BPF, 26) According to Arendt, tradition is a specific, originally Roman way of relating to the past. It is the bond that connects us with our forbearers, or, rather, that used to connect our forbearers with the previous generations because tradition itself is a matter of past. The end of tradition does not mean only the end of a specific tradition of the tradition of Western civilization but also the end of the tradition itself as a specific way of relating to ones past. Tradition, which is derived from tradere (to hand over), consists of the memories handed over by one generation to another. It is not comprised simply of a record of the past events; 43

rather, it is a thread that safely guides us through the vast realms of the past, (94) a matrix that imposes authoritative order on the phenomena retained in our collective memory. Tradition is like a testament, which selects and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates where the treasures are and what their worth is. (5) It tells us what is the correct version or the right interpretation of history. The Romans, who gave birth to the concept of tradition, used to trace all events back to the foundation of Rome. Tradition is closely connected with two other originally Roman political institutions with authority and religion. Authority, according to Arendt, is not simply power to issue orders. It is a source of legitimate power, which is based on its bearers superior position in some hierarchical relationship. Arendt distinguishes authority from persuasion on the one hand and violence on the other hand. (If a person nominally in the position of authority needs to recourse to either persuasion or to violence in order to enforce obedience, it means that his authority has failed.) (93) The source of authority lies in the past and authority is transmitted and thus connected with its source by the means of tradition. Authority is derived from the Latin auctoritas, which Arendt traces to augere in the sense of to augment to augment the foundation of the city, to continue in the undertaking that was started by the founding of Rome. The sacred act of foundation was the source of all political authority. The seat of authority (auctoritas) was the Senate, while power (potestas) was held by the Roman people or, later, by the emperor. The senators were the elders and their authority was derived from being older, from being closer to the founders of the city. Religion is closely related to both tradition and authority. Arendt emphasizes the political character of Roman religion and, following Cicero, traces its etymology to re-ligare to be tied back to be tied back to ancestors, to the past, to the event of the founding of Rome. Thus religious and political activity could be considered as almost identical The binding power of the foundation was itself religious, for the city also offered the gods of the a permanent home. (121). 44

Christianization of Roman Empire led to substantial transformation of the trinity of authority, tradition and religion. Constantines elevation of Christianity into the position of the official religion not only Christianized Rome but also Romanized the Church. The originally apolitical Church was turned into a political institution and, in a long run, became the heir of the Empire. Membership in the Church became a substitute for citizenship and the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, as historical events, became the founding moment of the new tradition. The politicization of the Church transformed Christianity and turned it into religion in the Roman sense. The popes so to say inherited the authority of the Senate, leaving the power (potestas) to the temporal princes. (127) Platos and into lesser extent Aristotles political philosophy constitute the third and last source that influenced the development of the trinity of authority, tradition and religion. Platos political philosophy can be interpreted, according to Arendt, as an attempt to introduce something akin to authority into the public life of the Greek polis. (104) The source of authority in Platos political philosophy is located not in history, but above and beyond of this world in the realm of ideas. The Romans, who regarded the Greeks as their cultural and spiritual forebears in effect turned Plato and Aristotle into philosophical authorities, into the founders of the philosophical tradition. Platos political philosophy then influenced Roman understanding of authority. Nevertheless, Platos political philosophy proved its political effectiveness and helped to further transform the whole trinity of authority, tradition and religion only after it got absorbed by Christian theology. (127) Platos political philosophy, according to Arendt, facilitated the reception of Christianity by the Romans as well as the Romanization of the Church, its transformation into a secular and political institution. Christian revelation was interpreted in terms of Platos doctrine of ideas and Gods commandments were interpreted as a confirmation of Platos spiritual yardsticks. 45

Nevertheless, Arendt argues that the single most important element of Platos political philosophy that affected Christianity and facilitated transformation of the Church into a political institution, was the teaching about the punishments in hereafter. The adaptation of Platos doctrine of hell immensely strengthened the authority of the Church but only at a price of corrupting the original spirit of Christianity by deeply perverse morality: How high this price actually was might be gauged by the more than embarrassing fact that men of unquestionable stature among them Tertullian and even Thomas Aquinas could be convinced that one of the joys in heaven would be the privilege of watching the spectacle of unspeakable sufferings in hell. Nothing perhaps in the whole development of Christianity throughout the centuries is farther removed from and more alien to the letter and spirit of the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth than the elaborate catalogue of future punishments and the enormous power of coercion through fear which only in the last stages of the modern age have lost their public, political significance. (BPF, 133) One could say that Platos philosophy, was turned into Platonism and Christianity became Platonism for masses only with the amalgamation of the Platonic, Roman and Christian elements. This amalgamation transformed the Roman trinity of authority, tradition and religion and forged its elements together. According to Arendt, it is this trinity and not simply religion or metaphysics or tradition that used to provide our world with permanence and security, that functioned as scaffolding or groundwork of the world. Metaphysical religion served as the highest authority and as a source of all political authority. Tradition then provided religion, as well as all secular authority with stability in time. The interdependence of authority, tradition and religion implies that it is impossible to regain the lost ideal world of metaphysics. Once the tradition is interrupted, the traditional, unquestioning relation to the past cannot be regained. And since the tradition has been the source of the stability of both religion and authority, its end means also the end of this stability. The present crisis therefore cannot be solved by return to the old certainties, by restoration of Christianity or Platonism.

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Modernity and the Collapse of the Tradition As I suggested above, Platos true world of ideas, which was preserved and transformed by the bounding force of tradition, played two distinct, albeit interrelated roles. In their political role, the ideas served as absolute standards against which the justice of all human laws was to be judged. In their philosophical role, the ideas served as signposts, providing a stable framework for philosophical speculation. The ideas could have played this role because the ideal world has been both distinct from and related to the sensory world. According to Arendt, philosophy in the platonic tradition has traditionally ignored politics and the whole realm of human affairs. If it paid any attention to politics at all, it was because of the potential threat politics posed to philosophers; politics, in other words was considered as a practical problem, as a source of threat that must be contained, rather than as a theoretical problem that could become a subject of theoretical reflection. Philosophy has developed this dismissive attitude towards politics and towards the realm of human affairs because it has been traditionally concerned with the absolutes with matters that lie beyond the world of senseperception, with matters that our senses can never answer. Nevertheless these questions, which ultimately concern the meaning of human existence and the meaning of Being, obviously arise from ordinary pre-philosophical experience of living in this world, of living with and among others. The ideal world of metaphysics could provide a stable framework for thinking about the philosophical questions only because of the implied correspondence between the ideal and the sensory worlds. The political role of the metaphysical realm of ideas has been always secondary or derivative. The ideal world of metaphysics or, rather, of metaphysical religion could serve as the foundation of political authority, and the ideas could serve as absolute standards of human justice only insofar as the correspondence between the two worlds remained intact. Modern loss of faith, which is a consequence of scepticism inherent in the modern scientific outlook, (BPF, 31) 47

inevitably undermines the traditional role of Divine Law as the source of secular authority and absolute standard of justice. Modern transformation of the Divine Law into Natural Law cannot solve this problem, because Natural Law depends on an account human nature, which is part and parcel of an objectively existing natural order of the universe.36 Modern science, however, denies the existence of any such stable order, as it perceives nature in terms of self-developing processes. (Darwins understanding of life as a self-evolving process is the archetypical example of modern historicizing of nature.) (HC, 116) More importantly, totalitarian experiment with transforming human nature, according to Arendt, proves that we can no longer rely on any account of human nature as a foundation of moral and political values. The metaphysical realm of ideas could fulfil its philosophical and especially political role only insofar as it remained not only related to, but also distinct from the sensory world. To assume that the ideas exist independently of the sensory world and in the same way as beings existing in the sensory world, to regard them as answers to philosophical questions rather than guideposts that provide framework for thinking about these questions (which cannot arrive at any definite answers to such questions) means to slide to metaphysical dogmatism. More importantly for the present discussion, the ideal world could play its political role serving as the foundation of secular authority and providing eternal standards of justice of human laws only thanks to the separation of power and authority, which became institutionalized in the independence of Pope and hence Church on the secular princes. This institutional division corresponds to the distinction between the Divine or Natural law and human laws. When Marx turned not just Hegel but the whole Platonic tradition upside down, he in effect collapsed the distinction between the ideal and the sensory worlds and between the Natural and positive law, subjecting both thinking and acting to the law of historical necessity.

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Marx, as well as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard (whom Arendt regards as the other two nineteenth century philosophical rebels against the tradition), turned against the philosophical tradition because they recognized that their world had been invaded by new problems and perplexities with which our tradition of thought was unable to cope with. (BPF, 27) In other words, they realized that the correspondence between the ideal and the sensory worlds collapsed because of the transformative effects of modernization on the world and on human comportment to the world. Our tradition of political thought began when Plato discovered that it is somehow inherent in the philosophical experience to turn away from the common world of human affairs; it ended when nothing was left of this experience but the opposition of thinking and acting, which, depriving thought of reality and action of sense, makes both meaningless. (BPF, 25) But while philosophers (or, at least, some of them) had been aware of the breakdown of traditional philosophy since the nineteenth century, the trinity of authority, tradition and religion continued as if by sheer momentum to play its political role. The break in history and the collapse of the trinity was caused by the rise of totalitarianism. Totalitarian domination as an established fact, which in its unprecedentedness cannot be comprehended through the usual categories of political thought, and whose crimes cannot be judged by traditional moral standards or punished within the legal framework of our civilization, has broken the continuity of Occidental tradition. The break in our tradition is now an accomplished fact. It is neither the result of anyones deliberate choice nor subject to further decision. (BPF, 26) Modern transformations of the world, which rendered the traditional philosophical categories obsolete, as well as the radical evil of totalitarianism, which brought the ultimate breakdown not just of the Western philosophical tradition, but of common sense itself, were of course caused by human action. This, according to Arendt, implies that human affairs pose authentic philosophic problems and that politics is a domain in which genuine philosophic questions arise, and not merely a sphere of life which ought to be ruled by precepts that owe their origin to altogether

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different experiences. (EU, 430) Politics, in other words, ceased to be merely a problem for the philosophers and became a genuine philosophical problem.

In her 1954 lectures Philosophy and Politics and Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought Arendt suggests that the present situation, in which thought and action have become equally meaningless, requires a new political philosophy. She argues that the new true (PP, 103) or authentic (EU, 445) political philosophy which she presents as a task for the future, while in fact she has already been working on it will have to reconsider the philosophers attitude towards political realm, the connection between man as a philosophical and as a political being and the relationship between thought and action. (445) The starting point of the new political philosophy must be philosophical wonder (thaumadzein) not at the unity of Being but at the plurality of man. (PP, 103; Cf. EU, 445) The new philosophy obviously cannot take the form of traditional political philosophy; it cannot be a mere derivative teaching of ontology. Arendts authentic or true political philosophy is rather supposed to replace ontology. As outlined above, thinking, just as acting, according to Arendt, depends on speech and stems from human condition of plurality. Being, as it appears to us what Arendt calls worldly reality gets constituted in the public, or political realm, which is at the same time a stage for political action and condition of free, i.e. fully human existence. Arendt therefore, following Japsers and Kant suspends the question of Being and replaces it with the question of freedom.37 (EP, 53) Her genuinely political philosophy is concerned primarily with the existential structures that constitute the public realm and especially with modern transformations of these structures and with the ensuing demise of the public realm in modernity. Arendts understanding of the public realm and of worldly reality is strongly influenced by Heideggers notion of world, as it is developed in Being and Time. As I argue in

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Chapter 4, Arendt however does not simply adopt Heideggers analysis, but subjects it to a substantial revision. The task that Arendt in her 1954 lectures described as central to her project of genuinely political philosophy namely reconsideration of the relationship between philosophy and politics, between thinking and acting is therefore not the top priority of Arendts political thought. The starting point of Arendts political thought is not speechless wonder at the plurality of human existence, but speechless horror at the radical evil of totalitarianism and at even more horrible eventualities of the future (presumably the nuclear holocaust) at what man may do and what the world may become. (EU, 445) Arendt is not concerned primarily with abstract philosophical questions or with the fate of philosophy in modern world, but with the fate of the world and of mankind. Thinking, according to Arendt, is a specifically human way of responding to reality and the primary task of her political thought consists in responding to the present reality, to the predicament of our times. Such thinking, as she puts it in the Preface to the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism, consists of unpremeditated, attentive facing up to and resisting of reality whatever it may be. (OT, viii; emphasis added) It is therefore no coincidence that Arendt directly addressed the question of the relationship between thinking and acting only towards the end of her life in The Life of the Mind. In Philosophy and Politics Arendt implies, although she does not claim so explicitly, that her political philosophy reverses Platos turn away from politics and returns philosophy back to the polis and to its Socratic roots. Arendt, like Socrates, so to say practiced philosophy publicly (her books and articles were not addressed to academical philosophers or political scientists but to broad reading public) for political reasons. Like Socrates, she wants to make philosophy relevant to politics not by offering some expert advice but by publicly addressing matters of public concern and by urging others to think critically. Like Socrates, she on the one hand reminds her readers about their common responsibility for the world and, on the other hand, challenges 51

currently accepted public dogmas, most importantly the blind faith in Progress and the doctrinaire individualistic liberalism with its narrow conception of freedom. Arendt has been criticised for being a reactionary, anti-liberal, anti-democratic and antimodernist thinker.38 This criticism, as I argue in Chapter 5, appears to be unfounded. While she is critical of doctrinaire liberalism, Arendt is at the same time a staunch defender of such liberal principles as the rule of law, political equality, or personal freedom. And while she warns against the blind faith in Progress, she definitely does not want to undo or revert the consequences of modernity, to revive the securities of the traditional religion and metaphysics. Such enterprise would be from her perspective both impossible and undesirable. Arendts intention on the contrary is to save the project of the Enlightenment from its present crisis. In the Concluding Remarks to the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt suggests that the enormous crimes of totalitarianism prove that the goal of Enlightenment, which was defined by Kant as mans emergence from his self-incurred immaturity, has been already achieved albeit only partially and so to say negatively. The reality of radical evil of totalitarianism proves that modern man has liberated himself from all traditional authorities. The criminal attempt to change human nature proves that no nature, not even the nature of man, can any longer be considered the measure of all things. It proves that man has finally come of age and from now on he must be the creator of his own laws and the only possible maker of his own history. (OT1, 434, 437) The enormous crimes of totalitarianism, in particular the Holocaust, prove that man is capable of sins greater than murder, of crimes not foreseen by the Ten Commandments. (434) Mankind could have discovered these crimes, and therefore its common responsibility, as well as the extent of its freedom, only by committing them. This makes the crimes of totalitarianism analogous to the original sin. Adam and Eve had to sin to acquire the knowledge of good and evil and hence freedom and conscience.39

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To achieve the positive goal of Enlightenment, men have to find courage to use their own understanding, to think what [they] are doing (HC, 5) and take active responsibility for their common affairs. In the present situation, they can no longer rely on Divine or Natural Law or any other transcendental or extra-political source of authority and guarantee of freedom and justice. Such guarantee must be grounded in the political realm itself. As I argue in Chapter 5, Arendt regards the success of American Revolution as a proof of the possibility of such enterprise. The American Revolution and the ensuing development of the American Republic, according to Arendt, returned the notion of authority to its original Roman meaning. The source of political authority in the United States is not transcendental Divine or Natural Law but the act of founding itself. The United States as a decentralized federal republic with strong constitutional tradition, according to Arendt, represents a successful model of a modern political body that provides a viable alternative to a defunct model of European nation state.

Since Arendts goal is not to undermine or reverse the project of modernity, but rather to preserve it from its current impasse, she should be described as a radically modern, rather than an anti-modern thinker. Insofar as she regards the emergence of the modern world as an irreversible break of the tradition, she could be also described as a postmodern thinker. Still, it could be argued that Arendts thought contains also a conservative streak. Not only because of her criticism of the blind faith in Progress, but also and more importantly because of the role of remembrance in her thought. The break of tradition leads to forgetfulness, to ignorance of our history and of our intellectual heritage. While Arendt does not regret the loss of tradition, which used to impose an authoritative interpretation on the past events and ideas, she is concerned with the ensuing forgetfulness. (BPF, 6) Ignorance of the past, of our history and our intellectual tradition prevents us from understanding our present situation. Arendt therefore turns to the past philosophers, historians and poets in order to recover the hidden meaning of their ideas. She 53

wants to discover the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from them anew their original spirit. (5) She also turns to the past historical events in order to recover their meaning. In order to recover the original meaning of politics, of political action and freedom, Arendt turns to the Greek historians and construes her image of polis as a certain archetype of political space. It is this reliance on remembrance, and especially Arendts preoccupation with the Greek polis that led various critics to argue that Arendt is an anti-modern, romantic and Grecophile thinker. Even Seyla Benhabib, who acknowledges that Arendt is in many respects a modern thinker, is disturbed by her apparent lack of commitment to some modern values and by her reliance on remembrance. Arendts remembrance, according to Benhabib is not always free from aspects of an Ursprungphilosophie that posits an originary state, in the phenomenological sense of the word, as being the privileged one.40 She describes Arendt as a reluctant modernist and argues that her thought combines a modernist and an anti-modernist strand, attributing the latter to Heideggers influence. Arendt, the student of Martin Heidegger, is the antimodernist Grecophile theorist of the polis and of an originary experience of praxis.41 Benhabibs description of Arendt as a reluctant modernists strikes me as misleading. Arendt does not suffer from any nostalgic Grecophilia. In Willing she explains that she did not want to cross the rainbow bridge of concepts of German idealism perhaps because I am not homesick enough, in any even because I do not believe in a world, be it a past world or a future world in which mans mind could or should ever be comfortably at home. (LMII, 158) Arendt construes her image of the polis as a conceptual model that allows her to illuminate the problems our world is facing, to illuminate our present situation. She is not looking for some timeless ideal model of politics we should try to emulate or at least approximate. Similarly, when she dismantles the metaphysical tradition, she is not trying to discover what the past thinkers really meant as opposed to how the traditional interpretation presents their thoughts. She rather interprets their texts in a way that would recover their meaning, that would make them 54

meaningful for us and help us understand our present situation. Such a deconstructive reading goes often not only against the grain of tradition, but in some cases particularly in her reinterpretation of Kants political philosophy42 consciously distorts the way, in which the past authors themselves understood their ideas. The radical nature of Arendts deconstructive reading of the texts of past thinkers is apparent also in her interpretation on Platos dialogues in particular in the distinction she makes between Socrates and Platos positions. While Arendt in her thinking moves between past and future, she is concerned primarily with our present situation, with what we are doing.43 (HC, 5)

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1 2

Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2. Canovan, 6-7, 12. Bernard Crick raises the same argument in his interpretation of The Origins of Totalitarianism: On Rereading The Origins of Totalitarianism, in Hannah Arendt, ed. Melvyn A. Hill (New York: St Martins Press, 1979), 49-66. 3 Arendt uses the terms understanding and thinking interchangeably. To put it more precisely, what she describes as understanding in the 1954 paper Understanding and Politics, she calls in her later texts (e.g. The Human Condition, Thinking and Moral Considerations, The Life of the Mind) thinking. 4 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 204. 5 Arendt, however, at the same time maintains that totalitarianism fully developed only in the Nazi Germany and in the Stalinist Soviet Union. 6 Translation by Bernard Crick, 27. 7 Young-Bruehl, 200. 8 London: Secker and Warburg, 1951. 9 Religion and Politics, Confluence Vol. 2, No. 4 (1953). Reprinted in EU. 10 The natural law of the survival of the fittest is just as much a historical law and could be used as such by racism as Marxs law of the survival of the most progressive class. Marxs class struggle, on the other hand, as the driving force of history is only the outward expression of the development of productive forces which in turn have their origin in the labor-power of men. Labor, according to Marx, is not a historical but a natural-biological force released through mans metabolism with nature by which he conserves his individual life and reproduces the species. (OT, 463-4) 11 According to Arendt, all ideologies are latently or potentially totalitarian because the fundamental assumption of totalitarian thinking, according to which the entire course of human history is objectively determined by a single principle, denies human freedom. Nevertheless an ideology becomes fully totalitarian only once it is adopted by a totalitarian movement, which transforms the universal principle of interpretation of history into a universal principle of action. (EU, 350) 12 Arendt herself, as I argue later in this chapter, identifies the development of capitalism and the struggle of the bourgeoisie for political power on the one hand, and the struggle for racial domination in the form of tribal nationalism and imperialism on the other hand, as the decisive historical trends that led to the rise of totalitarianism. 13 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Book I, chapter ix, as quoted by Arendt: OT, 326. 14 For the first disastrous result of the mans coming of age is that modern man has come to resent everything given, even his own existence to resent the very fact that he is not the creator of the universe and himself. In this fundamental resentment he refuses to see rhyme and reason in the given world. In his resentment of all laws merely given to him, he proclaims openly that everything is permitted and believes secretly that everything is possible. And since he knows that he is a law creating being, and that his task, according to all standards of past history, is superhuman, he resents even his nihilistic convictions, as though they were forced upon him by some cruel joke of the devil. (OT1, 438) 15 As Canovan points out. (Canovan, 21). 16 See Voegelins review of The Origins of Totalitarianism and Arendts Reply, The Review of Politics Vol. 15, No. 1 (January, 1953): 68-85. 17 Reply, 78. 56

18 19

Arendts account of anti-Semitism is discussed in chapter 3. Arendts descriptive analysis of the elements of totalitarianism consists of analyses of general historical trends (such as anti-Semitism or imperialism), detailed accounts of significant episodes (for instance Dreyfus affair), portraits of key characters (for example of Benjamin Disraeli or Lord Cromer), as well as literary references (for example to Joseph Konrad, Rudyard Kipling, or Marcel Proust). 20 In the first outlines of the book (prior to the decision to include discussion of Stalinism) Arendt called Nazism racial imperialism. (Young-Bruehl, 202) 21 This point gets lost on Kateb who argues that The story of the bourgeoisie is the story of modern Europe, for Arendt no less than for the Marxists. (George Kateb: Hannah Arendt (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 66.) He then accuses Arendt for her failure to explain the enormous differences the bourgeoisie shows from country to country, especially the differences between the English bourgeoisie and all others, and the lesser but still important differences between the French bourgeoisie and that of Central Europe (67) implying that Arendt fails to account for the differences of political development in the various countries. Arendt in fact does discuss differences in the development of capitalism in various European countries. More importantly, contra the Marxists, she does not believe that political system would be simply a superstructure of the economic system. Arendts explanation of the differences in the development of various European countries is contained in her analysis of various types of nationalism (French civic nationalism v. Central-European tribal nationalism). (Cf. OT, 227 243) According to Arendt, the chief difference between Britain and continental countries lies in the different political system. (Cf. OT, 250-266) Arendt argues that Britain is not a nation state in the strict sense; both the notion of a state and of a nation as an organic community are foreign to British tradition. For a detailed discussion of Arendts analysis of nationalism and nation state see chapters 3 and 5. 22 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2003), 79. 23 Arendts criticism of nationalism and of the model of nation state is discussed in chapters 3 and 5. 24 Arendt is referring to Lenins work Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. 25 Canovan, 30. The logic of imperialistic expansion never became completely detached from the capitalist logic. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of the scramble for Africa territorial expansion came to be seen as a political imperative regardless of economic gains. 26 It is significant that modern believers in power are in complete accord with the philosophy of the only great thinker who ever attempted to derive public good from private interest and who, for the sake of private good, conceived and outlined a Commonwealth whose basis and ultimate end is accumulation of power. (OT, 139) 27 As Benhabib points out, this claim appears to be historically dubious. (Benhabib, 76) 28 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, Kant Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991), 54. 29 Arendts analysis of the development of modern science and technology is discussed in Chapter 2. 30 Canovan, 63. 31 Arendt, Project: Totalitarian Elements of Marxism, undated, ca. Winter 1952, to Guggenheim Foundation, Library of Congress, as quoted by Young-Bruehl, 276. 32 Arendt to Jaspers, March 4, 1951, in Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers: Correspondence, 19291969, ed. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992), 166. 57

33

Social stratification obviously did not disappear completely. Nevertheless, the social classes as they existed in 19th century Europe are a matter of past. 34 EN, 1155 a 20-30 35 Arendts understanding of the political nature and role of friendship sharply contrasts with her understanding of love. Love is a fundamentally unworldly and therefore a-political phenomenon. While friendship consists of sharing something the friends have in common (and which belongs to the world), in love, we relate directly to the beloved and withdraw from the world. In contrast to friendship, which preserves the distance between the friends, love destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates us from others. (H C, 242) Attempts to use love (or some feeling analogous to love for genuine love is possible only between two human beings) as a bond of political community, for instance romantic nationalism, are, according to Arendt, destructive of human plurality and of freedom. (See discussion of nationalism in chapter 3.) 36 [T]he model itself [i.e. the model of Divine Law] did not change when in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries natural law stepped into the place of divinity into the place, that is, which once had been held by the Hebrew God who was a lawmaker because he was the Maker of the Universe. (OR, 189-190) 37 See Chapter 5. 38 Richard Wolin, Hannah Arendt: Kultur, Thoughtlessness, and Polis Envy, in Heideggers Children (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 39 As Arendt points out, the common responsibility of mankind has been recognized by the creation of a new category of crimes crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trial. (OTI, 436). It is also noteworthy that public denial of Holocaust is considered a criminal offence in several European countries, as well as in Israel. This suggests that the historical truth of Holocaust has to some extent replaced traditional, especially religious sources of morality. The offense of denial of Holocaust is in effect a modern equivalent of blasphemous libel. 40 Benhabib, 95. Benhabib distinguishes between what she calls fragmentary approach to the past, in which Arendt was supposedly influenced by Benjamin and between the recovery of the original meanings of concepts, in which she was influenced by Heidegger. It is this latter, Heidegerrian approach that she finds disturbing. Such distinction seems unwarranted. Arendt herself does not distinguish between the two modes of remembrance and points out similarities between Benjamins and Heideggers approach to past. (MDT, 201) 41 Benhabib, 118. 42 See Chapter 4. 43 As Nancy Fraser puts it: Arendts analysis was an exemplary effort to grasp her time in thought. Focussed on the most terrible and disturbing phenomena of the time, she sought to comprehend what was new and unprecedented in them, hence what could not be reduced to past horrors. She herself was explicit about this orientation. Seeking to inhabit the space between past and future, she herself consciously cultivated a way of thinking that was both historicizing and present focussed. (Hannah Arendt in the 21st Century, in Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 3 (2004): 254.)

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Chapter 2: Capitalism as the Matrix

Totalitarianism, according to Arendt, reveals with unparalleled clarity (OT, viii) the predicaments of the present modern world. These predicaments, however, assume their authentic form only in the post-totalitarian modern world and in the post-totalitarian mass society. Arendts criticism of the post-totalitarian mass society, which is the subject of her later works, most importantly of The Human Condition and of the essays collected in Between Past and Future, should be therefore interpreted against the background of her analysis of totalitarianism. This approach may help to clarify some ambiguous aspects of Arendts work, in particular the notoriously complex account of the rise of the social from The Human Condition. Arendt uses this phrase to refer to the development of modern society and, more importantly, to the development of a system of structural domination characteristic of modern society. Interpretation of Arendts analysis of the modern system of social domination, especially of its fully developed form characteristic of the current post-totalitarian mass society, should be guided by her understanding of total domination, as it is explicated in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Analogously to total domination, the present system of social domination reduces its subjects to the biological level of their existence, exploiting their biopower in their roles of laborers and consumers. Like total domination, social domination strives to eliminate spontaneity, transforming human beings into perverted animals that behave in a predictable way but that are incapable of any spontaneous action. (HC, 40-43) Social domination also destroys worldly reality, displacing it not with ideology, but with an image or a simulacrum of reality. (RJ, 265) Total domination aims to direct and accelerate the quasi-natural and ostentatiously inevitable process of historical development. The present system of social domination analogously serves the quasi-natural force of Progress.

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While the present system of social domination is analogous to total domination, it is not identical to it. Most obviously, it is infinitely less cruel than total domination. It does not rely on terror, but on hidden persuasion, (265) manipulating individuals by arousing desire and pleasure, rather than by inflicting fear and pain. Another important difference between the two systems of domination is that the present system of social domination was not consciously created by some political movement, but developed organically. In contrast to total domination, which concentrates all power in the hands of the totalitarian leader, it is so to say centre-less. Social domination, as Arendt understands it, is strictly structural and cannot be interpreted as the rule of one group of people over another. In society, there is no distinction between the rulers and the ruled; society is ruled by nobody. (HC, 40) The dominating agency is apparently society itself. Arendts tendency to describe society itself as the dominating agency was criticized by Hannah Pitkin in her monograph The Attack of the Blob. Pitkin argues that Arendt fails to explain who or what is the source of domination in modern society. Furthermore, by describing society as a living, autonomous agent determined to dominate human beings, absorb them and render them helpless,1 Arendt supposedly undermines the main purpose of her work, which is to remind her readers about our common responsibility for the world. According to Pitkin, Arendts notion of society resembles some evil monster from outer space that controls humans turning them into robots that mechanically serve its purpose. The title of Pitkins book is derived from the title of a 1950s science fiction film The Blob [which] concerned a monstrous, jelly-like substance from outer space, which has a predilection for coating and then consuming human beings and grows with each meal.2 Society, as Arendt describes it, according to Pitkin resembles the Blob. While her book offers many valuable insights into Arendts work, Pitkins criticism of Arendt and the Blob imagery she uses are misleading. The apparent contradiction between Arendts claim that contemporary society excludes the very possibility of political action and her appeal to 60

the members of this society to take active responsibility for the world is not as deep or inexplicable as Pitkin implies. While Arendt maintains that the current system of social domination precludes the very possibility of political action within the framework of social structures, she does not exclude the possibility of resistance against these structures. Indeed, she argues that revolutions, acts of civil disobedience or political movements such as the workers movement or the 1960s Civil Rights movement are the only examples of genuinely free political action in modernity. And while it is true that Arendt does not offer any clear-cut definition of her concept of society, she succeeds in painting a plastic and multifaceted portrait of the phenomenon behind this concept. After all, Pitkin herself traces Arendts exploration of various aspects of society and shows how they are interconnected. Last but not least, Arendt does not describe modern society as some evil monster from outer space. Society is obviously composed of individuals and sustained by human activities. In The Human Condition Arendt describes not just various aspects of modern society, but also its historical development. The current system of social domination did not emerge out of nowhere, but evolved as a consequence of the transformative effects of modernity on the world and on human comportment to the world.

Pitkins argument, according to which Arendts notion of society resembles the Blob is not convincing and the Blob simile fails to shed light on Arendts understanding of modern society. (After all, the analogy is supposed to highlight the alleged shortcomings of Arendts argument.) Nevertheless, Arendts description of the current system of social domination is reminiscent of a more recent science fiction film The Matrix (1999). The film depicts a future world ruled by intelligent machines, who have enslaved humans and use them as sources of energy. Humans are born artificially and spend their lives sleeping in individual pods connected to tubes and wires, which supply them with nutrition and drain the energy produced by their bodies. The electrodes connected to their brains provide the human batteries with an illusion of leading a normal life 61

some time around the year 2000. The plot of the film evolves around a rebellion of a small group of humans who liberate themselves and fight against the machines. Pitkin suggests that catastrophic science fiction films like The Blob became so popular in the 1950s because they depicted displaced or projected versions of more realistic anxieties characteristic of that epoch anxieties of the impending threat of nuclear holocaust and of fragmentation, helplessness and dehumanization of modern society.3 Arendt herself similarly argues that the highly non-respectable genre of science fiction should be taken seriously as a vehicle of mass sentiments and mass desires. (HC, 2) The world of machines described in The Matrix should be, in my opinion, also interpreted as a projected version of more realistic anxieties characteristic of the current epoch. Members of contemporary economically developed societies live in a world that is increasingly devoid of reality and spend more and more of their time in the virtual reality of cyberspace. Their lives lack substance, being controlled and drained away by the same force or system that makes the world appear unreal. They would like to gain control over their lives and gain access to the real world, if they only knew what is the matrix that controls their lives and their perception of reality. We could say that Arendts analysis of the present system of social domination provides an answer to the question what is the matrix. According to Arendt, the matrix is shaped on the one hand by modern capitalist economy, which exploits the bio-power of human beings and, on the other hand, by modern science and technology, which displaces the human world by a pseudo world of machines (152) and which is turning humans into helpless slaves, not so much of our machines, as of our know how, thoughtless creatures at the mercy of every gadget which is technologically possible, no matter how murderous it is. (3)

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Human Nature and the Unnatural Character of Politics In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt argues that the ultimate aim of totalitarianism is the transformation of human nature itself. (OT, 458) By destroying human spontaneity, which is the precondition and the source of freedom, total domination strives to fabricate something that does not exist, namely, a kind of human species resembling other animal species whose only freedom would consists in preserving the species. (438) To transform unique individuals into superfluous specimens of human species, who can be manipulated at will but who have no will of their own, according to Arendt, means to rob them of their specifically human qualities, to dehumanize them. Since Arendt argues that complete destruction of freedom is tantamount to the transformation of human nature, it appears that for her it is freedom that makes us human, in other words, that she defines human nature as freedom. As it turns out, the matter is somewhat more complicated. Actually, the experience of the concentration camps does show that human beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal, and that mans nature is only human insofar as it opens up to man the possibility of becoming something highly unnatural, that is, man. (OT, 455) Arendt returns to the problem of human nature at the beginning of The Human Condition where she argues that nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things. (HC, 10) To define human nature is impossible because it would require jumping over our own shadows, because it would require assuming a position above and beyond this world. In other words, if we have a nature or essence, then surely only a god could know it and define it. (HC, 10; emphasis added) Only a god, more precisely only the god who created man, that is Abrahamic God, could know and define human nature because only God could speak about a who as though it were a what, (10) in other words, could perceive man as an object rather than a subject. Moreover, only God, who stands not only above and beyond

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this world, but outside of temporality, could know all potentialities of man, could know what man can become. Human beings do not have nature or essence in the same sense as other beings do because they are free. What, or, rather, who they are is not determined by their nature, but depends to a great extent on themselves. Human nature, as Arendt indicates by the quotation marks, is therefore not nature or essence in the strict sense. It does not determine what a man is; rather, it exists as an open possibility or a challenge that makes it possible and invites humans to transcend merely biological dimension of their existence, to transcend the natural givenness and become someone, a distinct individual. Human beings are unnatural also because they can fully realize their potential and lead fully human life only under certain man-made conditions. To become fully human, they must first step out of the nature and create a specifically human world.4

Arendts understanding of the world is strongly influenced by Heideggers analysis of beingin-the-world, as it is developed in Being and Time. For Heidegger, the world denotes more than physical environment in which humans occur. The world is rather a part of Daseins existential structure. Dasein is always in the world and being-in-the-world is an important and indispensable aspect of Daseins existence. Arendt similarly argues that fully human existence is possible only in the world. Nevertheless, there are some important differences betweens Arendts and Heideggers analysis of the world and of being-in-the-world. Heidegger regards being-in-theworld and Being-with-others as inherently deficient and inauthentic modes of Being. Dasein can be authentically only in solitary anticipation of death. For Arendt, on the other hand, fully human, that is free existence is possible only among others, in a shared, common world.5 Apart from that, Heideggers notion of the world, as it is developed in Being and Time, is a precisely but rather formalistically defined concept that forms a part of his analysis of Daseins existence. The existence of the world itself, on the other hand, is not questioned. Arendt, on the other hand, is 64

interested primarily in the concrete historical world that was created by the humans and that could also be destroyed by them. She is not interested in some theoretical, timeless model of world, but in modern transformations of human world and of human comportment to the world.

The world, as Arendt understands it, is primarily the physical world of buildings and other man-made things. The main characteristic of the world is its relative stability and durability. The man-made things that make up the world buildings, furniture, tools or works of art stand out from the nature because they are not subject to the natural process of growth and decay. The artificial and therefore durable and stable world of things provides a home for human beings; the things, so to say, lend some of their stability to human lives. Only against the background of objects can an individual human life gain objective reality. The object, in German Gegenstand, stands against, and thus provides support, to the becoming of human live. The world consists not only of physical objects, but also of human institutions, relationships, shared interests and beliefs. Like the physical world of things, this web of human relationships (183) extends both in space and time and thus connects contemporaries both among themselves and with previous and future generations. The physical world of things, as well as the web or human relationships, form a spatial and temporal matrix that provides stability and orientation to human existence. The world enables human communities to escape the cyclical time of nature and to live in the rectilinear historical time. It enables individual human beings to escape the futility of life and to overcome, at least in certain sense, their mortality. A human being can overcome his or her mortality by becoming someone, by becoming a distinct and distinguished individual, by leaving ones mark in history. Humans become distinct individuals and leave their mark in history by inserting themselves into the web of human relationships, by participating in public, that is political life. **** 65

Arendt argues that the practice of freedom, which consists in shaping oneself into a distinct individual through participation in the care for public matters, is the raison dtre of politics. (BPF, 146; HC, 41) This claim seems at first somewhat implausible. The first task of any political community must be the satisfaction of material needs of its members. Arendt, however, maintains that the care for material necessities is a pre-political task, which does not belong to political realm. (HC, 24) Human beings, like all other social animals, are born into families and always live in some form of larger community. Arendt, however, makes a sharp distinction between natural communities, such as a family, a clan or a tribe, and political communities.6 The primary function of natural communities, which are based on kinship, is to ensure survival of their members, that is to say, the survival and spreading of their genes. Humans, like other animals, live in groups in order to obtain food and to reproduce to bear and raise children. Raising children entails not only the care for their bodily needs, but also their upbringing, which on the most crude level means integration into and identification with the family and the broader community something we could call cultural and social reproduction. Natural communities, like families, clans or tribes also protect their members against competing human communities. Political communities serve an entirely different purpose. The sole purpose of their existence, as political communities, is to enable their citizens to practice freedom, to shape and express themselves as unique individuals through political action. Such definition of political community is of course very restrictive. Arendt maintains that most historical forms of what we normally call political communities, for example an empire or a modern nation state, are not political communities in the strict sense of the word. In some ways, they rather resemble natural communities.

The archetype of a truly political community, according to Arendt, is the Greek polis. Arendt argues that polis was the community which first discovered the essence and the realm of the 66

political. Furthermore, only the ancient political communities7 were founded for the express purpose of serving the free [citizens]. (BPF, 154) Since Arendts intention is to discover the real origins of traditional concepts to distil from them anew their original spirit which so sadly evaporated from the very key words of political language, (BPF, 15) she turns to the polis as the fist truly political community to recover the forgotten meaning of politics and freedom. Arendt, however, does not want to reveal how the Greeks themselves understood politics. To distill anew the original spirit of freedom and politics for her rather means to make these concepts meaningful again, to interpret them in a way that helps us understand our present situation. Arendts account of the polis is based primarily on her interpretation of the texts of Greek poets, historians and philosophers and can be identified as an idealized description of Athens. Nevertheless, since Arendts intention is to make the concepts of freedom and politics meaningful to us, her account of the polis differs significantly not only from the historical Athenian city state, but also from the Greek understanding of politics. Most obviously, Arendt ignores the importance of warfare and of military virtue for the Greek understanding of politics, suggesting that defense (together with administration and jurisdiction) was for the Greeks a burdensome task, which they were willing to undertake for the sake of political life. (HC, 41) Arendts polis is clearly an ideal model, rather than a historically accurate description of the Greek city-state. Nevertheless, it should not be interpreted as her account of an ideal political regime, but rather as an analytical model of political community, which allows her to recover the meaning of politics and freedom and to illuminate the predicaments of the present modern world.8 Arendt argues that polis is qualitatively different from the pre-political communities, from which it arises. According to Aristotle, the polis is a perfect community in which humans can fully develop their nature. It comes to existence for the sake of life, but continues existing for the sake of good life.9

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The good life, as Aristotle called the life of the citizen, therefore was not merely better, more free or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether different quality. It was good to the extent that by having mastered life necessities of sheer life, by being freedom from labor and work, any overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process. (HC, 37; emphasis added) The political life, which allows men to exercise freedom and hence to fully develop their human nature bios, is, according to Arendt, qualitatively distinct from mere biological life zo. Arendt actually criticizes Aristotle for not distinguish sharply enough between the polis and pre-political communities.10 According to Arendt, polis already comes into existence for the sake of good life. It can be established only at the expense of, and in certain tension with, the preexisting natural communities. In Athens, such emancipation of the political realm occurred when Solon abolished the old tribal units. (HC, 29 n) Establishment of a new political community requires as its prerequisite abolishment or at least weakening of loyalty to pre-existing natural communities. Not only because this loyalty is to be replaced by loyalty to the new political association, but also, and more importantly, in order to enable individuals to step out of their families and tribes as free men. Natural communities, such as families, clans, or tribes exist for the sake of life, for the sake of survival of the ethnic group. These communities therefore demand absolute subordination of individual members interests to the interest of the community and require absolute loyalty. Political community, on the other hand, exists for the sake of its members. The very purpose of its existence is to enable its citizens to shape their lives through participation in the public life. Political community also demands allegiance, but it is allegiance of a different kind. It is not based on self-abrogation or identification with the community, but rather on participation in the same project, on the loyalty to political principles upon which the political community is founded. Arendts criticism of Aristotles materialism and her insistence that politics is never for the sake of life (HC, 37) may seem somewhat far-fetched. As we know from Aristotles Politics,

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material concerns, in the form of the conflict between the poor and the rich, played central role in Athenian political life. More importantly, the polis performed one important function of a natural (as opposed to political) community that Arendt hardly ever mentions: it competed militarily and otherwise with other political communities. Arendt, however, would argue that insofar as the historical polis performed these functions, it was a natural, rather than a political community. Any real political community must perform certain roles of a natural community and accommodate contradictory principles of natural and political association.

One of the aspects of polis that allow Arendt to use it as an analytical model of political community is the clear distinction the Greeks used to make between the public and the private realms. The public or political realm was reserved for the practice of freedom for what Aristotle calls the good life. The private realm of household (oikia), on the other hand, was reserved for activities related to the care for the necessities of life. Such clear-cut separation of public and private realms was made possible by the institutions of slavery and subjection of women, in other words, by domestic despotism. Women and slaves spent their lives in the private realm of household (oikia) taking care of the necessities of life, of what we would call economic matters. Arendt describes the household as a sphere of necessity and darkness. Its members the wife, the children and the slaves were subjected to the absolute power of the head of the household of the despotes. In spite of his nearly unlimited power, the master of the household was not, within its confines, free. To be free for the Greeks meant neither to rule nor to be ruled. (HC, 32) The master of the household could, however, leave its darkness and step out into the shining brightness of the public realm to practice his freedom by participating in politics.

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The Rise of the Social The rise of modernity was accompanied by blurring of the boundary between the public and the private realms. The activities pertaining to the care for life in modernity become public. This leads to the emergence of modern society and of the social realm, which eclipses the public or political realm. Arendts use of the term society is as restrictive as her use of politics. By society she does not mean any human community, but specifically modern society. Society, according to her, is not older than the modern age. (BPF, 199) Arendt describes society as a curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public significance. (HC, 35) Modern society is first and foremost a bourgeois or civil society. It is the sphere, in which the bourgeois conduct their business and engage in commerce. Liberal political theorists regard civil society as the sphere of freedom. The task of government is to protect society and politics thus becomes viewed as a function of society. (HC, 31) Arendt argues that liberal political thinkers who define freedom in negative terms as freedom from coercion and locate it in the civil society, mistakenly identify freedom with security. (BPF, 149) That is understandable, given the fact that their immediate enemy was absolutist despotism. Nevertheless, the negative liberal understanding of freedom is from Arendts perspective flawed. According to Arendt, the liberals do not realize that freedom requires not only liberation from domination, but also liberation from the care for the necessities of life. Civil society is most importantly an arena for pursuing private economic interests. Members of civil society are bourgeois rather than citoyn; they pursue their private economic interests rather then participating in the political life. Their acts can be hardly described as free, since they are dictated by the logic of the market.

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Development of modern capitalist economy is just one aspect of the rise of the social. Society stifles initiative not only by the invisible hand of the market but also by the conformism it demands: It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to normalize its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement. (HC, 40) Arendt argues against Tocqueville that conformism is not a specifically democratic phenomenon. (HC, 39) The conformist society was originally the high or good society, the roots of which can be traced to the court of Louis XIV. (BPF, 199) Nonetheless, the larger and more egalitarian the society is, the stronger is the pressure towards conformism as well as the scope of the conformist society. While the high society originally included only a narrow class of courtiers, contemporary mass society encompasses the entire population. Mass society also transforms the social pressure towards conformity, which operates on the plain of manners, into normalizing pressure, which operates on the plain of normalcy, as defined by social sciences. Arendts exploration of the rise of the social evolves around two distinct lines of argumentation, which explore two different aspects of society: the economic aspect on the one hand and the conformist or cultural aspect on the other. Arendt, however, does not explain the relationship between these two strands of her account of the rise of social. As Margaret Canovan puts it, Arendt has plausibly developed both lines of her argument related to the rise of the social, but has not managed to achieve a synthesis between them.11 Nevertheless, although Arendt does not explicitly discuss the relation between the two lines of her argument and between the two meanings of society, she does at least implicitly indicate how they are related. Arendt describes the emergence of society as the rise of the housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of 71

the public sphere. (HC, 38) As discussed above, the household is the location of activities pertaining to the biological dimension of human existence to production as well as reproduction. The rise of the social therefore entails socialization of activities pertaining to both production and reproduction.12 Society, or nation is perceived as one super-human family, (HC, 38) which not only takes care of the material needs of its members, but also educates them and disciplines them as children. Society does not expect its members to act independently, but to behave themselves, to obey the rules and do exactly what is expected of them. The two aspects of Arendts notion of society correspond to the two types of domestic activities: economic aspect of society is related primarily to production, while the conformist aspect is related primarily to reproduction. **** Arendt explores the rise of modern society and the development of modern system of social domination in The Human Condition. As she explains in the Prologue, the book is concerned exclusively with those activities that were traditionally considered as belonging to vita activa, to active, as opposed to contemplative or philosophical life. Thinking, the highest and purest activity of which men are capable, on the other hand, is left out of present considerations. (HC, 5) This seems to suggest that the book is concerned exclusively with practical, as opposed to theoretical comportment towards the world, with what we do rather than what we think. As it turns out, the matter is somewhat more complicated. Although Arendt in The Human Condition does not discuss thinking in the narrow sense of the term (i.e. philosophical thinking), she does discuss our theoretical comportment towards the world. This is in a way necessary because our theoretical comportment towards the world is intrinsically related to our practical comportment towards it. What we think and how we theorize about the world affects what we do in the world, which in turn affects the world itself.

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Arendt divides vita activa into three fundamental activities labor, work, and action. She calls these activities fundamentalbecause each of them corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth was given to man. (7) Labor is the activity that corresponds to the biological aspect of human existence, to the biological process of human body. It involves activities necessary for the sustenance of an individual life, like production of food, as well as activities necessary for the sustenance of the life of the species reproduction and childbearing. Labor is cyclical, repetitive and futile like life itself. Just as life is characterized by the cyclical process of growth and decay, labor is characterized by the cycle of production and consumption. Labor is the least fulfilling and at the same time the only indispensable human activity. The human condition of labor is life itself. (7) Work corresponds to the unnatural and worldly aspect of human existence. It produces the more or less permanent things that make up the human world. Work is more fulfilling than labor because its products are lasting; they can and often do outlive their producer. Work therefore represents mans triumph over the futility of life. In work, men rise above the biological aspect of their existence, step out of nature and create a lasting human world. The human condition of work is worldliness. (7) Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. (7) Plurality, which is the human condition of both action and speech, has twofold character of equality and distinction. (175) Men can communicate and act together because they are in a certain fundamental sense equal, because they are all human. At the same time, however, each man is completely unique and distinct from any other man that has ever lived or will live. Plurality in the double sense of sameness and distinctness is not exclusively a human quality; humans have it in common with other higher animal species. (HC, 76; LMI, 21) Unlike other animals, humans can, however, express their 73

distinctness, communicate not something (for instance fear or hunger) but communicate themselves in their uniqueness. Humans alone can deliberately express their unique individuality, make themselves appear in a certain light, thanks to their ability of speech.13 Human faculties of action and speech are, according to Arendt, closely interrelated. Without speech, action would lose its revelatory power and be reduced to mute violence. (HC, 179) Political action in the strict sense of the word, that is to say, political action as it was practiced in the Greek polis, relies exclusively on speech and excluded violence. To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence. (26) Therefore, when Aristotle defined man as zoon politikon and zoon logon ekhon, he only formulated the current opinion of the polis about man and the political way of life,14 according to which everybody outside of the polis slaves and barbarians was aneu logou, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other. (27) The ability of speech is therefore not just a prerequisite of political action; it is rather what makes humans political beings. That means not only that without speech political action would not be possible, but also that unless they engage in politics as free citizens, humans do not act fully as animals endowed with speech and reason (logos). According to Arendt, the primary purpose of speech is self-disclosure that takes place in action, rather than communication or exchange of information, for which speech is extremely useful, but which could just as well be carried out by a sign language. (179) Action, which enables humans to experience freedom and to express their uniqueness by participating in the political life, is, according to Arendt, the highest and most noble of the three fundamental activities that belong to vita activa.

Arendts division of vita activa into three fundamental activities (labor, work and action) may seem somewhat artificial. Many particular activities cannot be unambiguously subsumed under 74

either of these labels. Margaret Canovan brings up an example of the periodical maintenance of a cathedral, which itself does not create anything, but without which the cathedral a product of work would not survive centuries. The repetitive and in itself fruitless maintenance of the cathedral has all attributes of labor; nevertheless, it does not serve the life process, but keeps alive the cathedral.15 On the other hand, the same particular activity can be under different circumstances classified differently. As Seyla Benhabib puts it: writing a poem may appear as a case of a pure work in Arendtian terms, or as expressive activity in Habbermasian terms; but if you are writing a poem as your weekly addition to the comic strip that you despise, for from being satisfying work, this activity may bear all the marks of drudgery of alienated, industrial wage labor.16 Arendts three fundamental activities therefore cannot be meaningfully interpreted as basic categories, under which all particular human activities could be classified. The three fundamental activities should be rather interpreted as ideal types of human comportment towards the world. Whether a particular activity should be classified as labor, work, or action then depends on the context and circumstances, but most importantly on how the actor through his activity relates to the world and to others. The three categories, however, are not purely subjective outlook or mentalits, as Pitkin puts it.17 Whether a particular activity is labor, work or action depends not only on the attitude and aim of the actor, but also, and more importantly, on the effects of the given activity on the surrounding world. Labor, work, and action are ideal types of human comportment toward the world in yet another sense. Arendt uses them to describe not only particular activities, but also the prevailing or privileged activities in various stages of the development of the Western civilization. While the Greeks regarded action as the highest human activity and defined man as zoon politikon, modernity comes to regard first work and then labor as the most distinctly human activity and defines man first as homo faber and later as animal laborans. Arendt uses the three categories to describe both practical and

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theoretical comportment to the world. Modern science, according to Arendt, resembles work and, in its later stage, action, rather than contemplation. **** As I suggested above, Arendts concept of the world is influenced by Heideggers analysis of Being-in-the-world in Being and Time. Jacques Taminiaux argues that Arendts division of vita activa into three fundamental activities was also inspired by Heidegger, more precisely by Heideggers discovery of Aristotles distinction between praxis and poiesis.18 While I agree with Taminiaux that the distinction between work and action can be traced via Heidegger to Aristotle, the distinction between work and labor, which Arendt regarded as her original contribution to political theory, must be in my opinion interpreted in the context of her dialogue with Marx, rather than with Heidegger.19 As discussed in the previous chapter, Arendt praises Marx for having discerned the implications of the French and Industrial Revolutions and argues that Marxs predictions were to a great extent realized in contemporary mass society. Arendt argues that the egalitarian mass society is not just virtually classless but also increasingly stateless or apolitical. Since nearly all [of its] members consider whatever they do primarily as a way to sustain their own lives and those of their families, it can also be considered to be a society of laborers or jobholders. The problem is that the practical realization of Marxs noble dream closely resembles a nightmare. (RJ, 262) The development of capitalist economy and technological progress did not lead, as Marx expected, to liberation of mankind, but to its collective enslavement to the life process of society. The obvious question is what went wrong, why did the development that was supposed to lead to liberation of mankind in reality bring its subjection to a new form of domination. Arendt suggests that the answer to this question is contained in the fundamental contradiction which runs like a red thread through the whole of Marxs thought (104) in the contradiction between 76

his glorification of labor as the supreme world building capacity of man and his hope in eventual liberation of mankind from labor. (101) This contradiction, according to Arendt, indicates that Marx conflated labor and work. (102) Creative work, through which men create distinctly human world, she reasons, is fundamentally different from the productive labor, which is the source of the previously unheard of wealth of modern societies. The productive labor, in which Marx (and before him Smith and Locke) recognized the source of wealth of modern society, is notably uncreative. Labor, as Marx himself puts it, is nothing else than a metabolism between man and nature, (BPF, 39) that is exhaustion of bodily power in exchange for physical subsistence. The source of ever-increasing productivity of modern economy is the division of labor. The division of labor, as Arendt points out, has nothing in common with the specialization of work; on the contrary, it consists of the division of the work-process into meaningless menial operations that require no specialization at all. The division of labor, in other words, amounts to displacement of work by labor.

Arendts distinction between work and labor cannot fully resolve the contradiction between Marxs glorification of the productivity of labor and his hope in eventual liberation of mankind from labor and hence from necessity. The growth of productivity of labor, coupled with technological advancement, could in principle lead if not to complete abolishment of labor, then at least to a considerable decrease of the amount of labor needed for the sustenance of material needs of society. Emancipation from labor, in Marxs own terms, is emancipation from necessity, and this would ultimately mean emancipation from consumption as well. (HC, 131) Marxs assumption was that the free time gained by the increased productivity of labor would be devoted to other, higher activities. (133) According to Arendt, the reality of contemporary mass society proves that this assumption was wrong. The spare time of the animal laborans is never

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spent in anything but consumption, and the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his appetites. (133) Members of contemporary societies are not prevented from pursuing any higher activities by their slavish nature, but rather by the impossibility of any such activities in a society that is organized around and exists for the sake of the pursuit of wealth. Apart from that, the growth of consumption is an economic necessity. Production and consumption are two parts of the same cycle and the ever-increasing growth of productivity, which is indispensable for the survival of the economic system, must be balanced by a corresponding growth of consumption. [T]o stop going, to stop wasting, to stop consuming more and more, quicker and quicker, to say at any given moment enough is enough, would spell immediate doom. (RJ, 265) The activities of animal laborans are limited to labor and consumption because these are the only activities readily available in modern society, because laboring and consuming is what people do, because it is expected from them and rewarded by social recognition. Mass society transforms even art and culture into entertainment, which is an object of consumption. Capitalism, according to Arendt, emancipated labor, which came to be regarded not just as the highest, but as the only serious activity. Whatever we do, we are supposed to do for the sake of making a living. The only exception society is willing to grant is the artist, who, strictly speaking, is the only worker left in the society. (HC, 127) Society recognizes as serious or publicly significant only activities that contribute directly or indirectly to the development of national economy. Even presidents, kings, and prime ministers think of their offices in terms of jobs necessary for the life of society, and among intellectuals, only solitary individuals are left who consider what they are doing in terms of work and not in terms of making a living. (5) All activities that cannot be classified as labor are subsumed under the category of playfulness and perceived as un-serious and inconsequential personal diversions. **** 78

Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance. (HC, 46; emphasis added) Protection of society and administration of national economy then become the main, if not the only, function of the government. That politics is nothing but a function of society, that action, speech, and thought are primarily superstructures upon social interest, is not a discovery of Karl Marx but on the contrary is among the axiomatic assumptions Marx accepted uncritically from the political economists of the modern age. (HC, 33) It was John Locke who defined the protection of private property as the only legitimate task of government.20 While in the early stages of development of capitalist development the government protected mostly the interests of the large property owners, later on its task became the maintenance and management of the economic system as a whole. The same development also led to a gradual displacement of political government by bureaucratic administration and to subordination of more and more activities to its regulation. Continuous expansion of the economic system, which keeps absorbing new activities, leads to subordination of these activities to administrative regulation. The increasing efficiency of the system, which leads to its centralization and integration, then requires the growth of both the scope and the degree of such regulation. While it may seem paradoxical that a system created for the protection of private property and freedom of trade should have an intrinsic propensity for administrative regulation of economic activities, we should recall that the rise o capitalism was accompanies by a creation of a system of forced labor. After all, John Locke wrote not only Second Treatise on Government, but also the Essay on the Poor Law. To put it in Arendts terms, once the activities that used to be protected by the privacy of household become public, they become a public concern and a subject of social regulation. Moreover, Arendt maintains that modern nation state has been since its very inception concerned with accumulation and reproduction of common, or social wealth rather than with protection of private property. The commonwealth largely existed for the common wealth.21

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(22) As Arendt points out, the communist fiction, according to which the society as a whole has one common interest which with an invisible hand guides the behavior of men and produces the harmony of their conflicting interests, is an axiomatic assumption of classical economics.22 (44) The term communist fiction, however, turns to be misleading. As Arendt herself explains, the assumption about a common interest of a society as a whole has a solid foundation in the reality of capitalist economy, namely in the tendency of capitalism to transform private property into social wealth. The development of modern capitalist economy, according to Arendt, started by expropriation of peasants, which was an unintended consequence of the expropriation of the Church property during the Reformation. (66) The expropriation of peasants created a new class of laborers that became available to the newly rising capitalist economy. The development of capitalism then led to transformation of nearly all property into fungible wealth, into capital. [T]he enormous and still proceeding accumulation of wealth in modern society, which has started by expropriation has never shown much consideration for private property, but has sacrificed it whenever it came into conflict with the accumulation of wealth.23 (66-67) Contemporary capitalist societies, according to Arendt, are very wealthy and at the same time essentially propertyless, because the wealth of any single individual consists of his share in the annual income of society as a whole. (61)

The development of capitalist economy also leads to ever-tighter integration of individuals into the life process of society in the roles of laborers and consumers. The socialization of man is tantamount to the effacement of individuality and to displacement of free action by behavior as the foremost mode of human relationship. (41) Mass society provides no opportunity for spontaneous action; it expects and conditions its members to behave in a predictable way, to perform their respective social functions. This displacement of action by behavior is, so to say, 80

conscious; it is affirmed by modern mans theoretical self-understanding. As Arendt explains, [t]he scientific thought that corresponds to the rise of the social is no longer political science in the classical normative sense, but first economics and later on behavioral social sciences. (28,45) Economics, which is the science of society in its early stages, explains human behavior in the economic sphere. Behavioral sciences, which correspond to the later stages of the development of society, then aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal. (45) Since Arendt maintains that it is our capacity for spontaneous action that makes us human, she obviously rejects the claim of social sciences to describe man as a whole in terms of behavior. That, however, is not the most important point of her criticism of social sciences. The trouble with the modern theories of behaviorism is not that they are wrong but that they could become true, that they actually are the best possible conceptualization of certain obvious trends in modern society. (HC, 322) Statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific ideal; it is the no longer secret political ideal of a society which, entirely submerged in the routine of everyday living, is at peace with the scientific outlook inherent in its very existence. (HC, 43) According to Arendt, society always excludes action and requires that its members behave in a certain way. (40) Conformism was characteristic of the eighteenth century high society, which was criticized by Rousseau, as well as of the nineteenth century bourgeois society. Nonetheless, the scope and intensity of conformism in contemporary mass society is unprecedented. The high or polite society of previous centuries included only certain strata of population and demanded conformism only in certain areas of life. Contemporary mass society, on the other hand, encompasses the entire population and social behavior [in it] has become the standard for all regions of life. (45) Furthermore, while the high or polite society used to define socially acceptable behavior in terms of manners, mass society defines it in terms of normalcy. Those, who do not comply with the social rules of behavior are not deemed impolite but branded

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as asocial or abnormal. (42) What constitutes normal behavior is then defined by social sciences. Arendts analysis demonstrates that social sciences, in spite of their claim of being purely descriptive and value-neutral, do in fact perform normative or, rather, normalizing role. Social sciences do not simply describe society but also affect the way society operates. According to Arendt, social sciences can never reach the objectivity of natural sciences, whose form they imitate. Human behavior is never as uniform and regular as natural processes; even the regular patterns of social behavior keep constantly evolving. Nonetheless, social sciences do resemble natural sciences insofar as the knowledge they produce has the character of technological knowhow that can be used to organize and manage society.24

Capitalism and Biopower One of the hallmarks of capitalist economy is its constant growth and expansion. The constant growth is built into the very logic of the economic system, which could not survive without constantly increasing its productivity. The perpetual automatic growth of capitalist economy is also the main force behind the continuous expansion of the social realm, which, in Arendts words, devour[s] the older realms of the political and private. (45) As discussed above, the development of capitalist economy, which started by expropriation of the peasants, has led to a gradual transformation of all private property into social wealth. This process was accompanied by the decline of the importance of family as the basic socio-economic unit and to subordination of activities, that used to belong to the private realm, to social control. The expansion of the social realm also led to the gradual displacement of political government by bureaucratic administration of national economy. The current process of globalization, which Arendt discerned already in the 1950s,25 can be described as emancipation of capitalism from the tutelage of the nation state, under which it was raised. Globalization, which consists in the transformation of the system of 82

international trade between discreet national economies into a trans-national economic system further decreases the very possibility of political control of the automatic economic system.26 The constant growth of capitalist economy and of the social realm, according to Arendt, derives its strength from the fact that through society it is the life process itself which in one form or another has been channeled into the public realm. (HC, 45) Following Marx, Arendt compares the productivity of capitalist economy to the natural fertility of the life process and argues that capitalist economy organizes and channels, (45-6) in other words exploits and controls, the life process of human populations and ultimately of human species. Theoreticians of capitalism from Locke through Smith to Marx have argued that the main source of wealth in capitalist economy is labor, that is the natural power of human bodies. Marx, in his consistent naturalism, as Arendt puts it, discovered labor power as the specifically human mode of the life force which is as capable of creating surplus as the life itself. (HC, 108) Capitalism, according to Arendt exploits human life-force or biopower by investing and multiplying this surplus and converting it into wealth.27 While in its early stages capitalism exploited primarily the bodily power of laborers, in the current consumer driven economy it exploits primarily the human capacity or desire to consume. The two stages through which the ever-recurrent cycle of biological life must pass, the stages of labor and consumption, may change their proportion even to the point where nearly all human labor power is spent in consuming, with the concomitant serious social problem of leisure, that is, essentially the problem of how to provide enough opportunity of daily exhaustion to keep the capacity for consumption intact. (HC, 131)

Arendts understanding of the modern system of social domination as control of the life process of the human species closely resembles Foucaults notion of biopower.28 Biopower, according to Foucault, is a specifically modern form of domination that exerts a positive influence on life [i.e. on biological life, on what Arendt calls life process], that endeavors to administer, optimize and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive 83

regulations. Similarly to Arendt, Foucault underlines that this modern preoccupation with the life process sharply contrasts with the traditional assessment of biological life and especially with Aristotles distinction between bios and zo. [W]hat may be called a societys threshold of modernity has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.29 Foucault, like Arendt, explains the rise of the new form of domination in the context of the development of capitalist society and the rise of modern nation state. Since the main source of wealth in capitalist economy is labor of human bodies, rather than fertility of land, the rise of capitalist economy requires integration of the bodies into machinery of production. (141) The scope of biopower, however, is not limited to economic activities and its development cannot be explained simply as a function of the development of capitalism. In modern nation states, the collective life-force of population is the source not only of the national wealth, but also of the material and political power of the state. New methods of administration and warfare give rise to new disciplinary techniques that dominate directly individuals and their bodies, integrating them into the collective body of society and into the body politic of the nation state. The importance of the collective body of the population as the main source of power also leads to the development of various scientific discourses and administrative techniques that attempt to control the quality and quantity of population. Foucaults notion of disciplinary society and the role he ascribes to the sciences of man closely correspond to Arendts notion of normalizing society and to the normalizing role she ascribes to social sciences. Similarly to Arendt, Foucault also underlines the decentralized and non-sovereign character of the modern form of domination, which cannot be explained in terms of opposition between the rulers and the ruled. (94) Obviously, there are also some important differences between Arendts and Foucaults analyses of modern forms of domination. Foucault explores the genesis and functioning of 84

biopower on the local level, analyzing the development of specific disciplinary practices and of specific sciences of man. Arendts account of the rise of the social, on the other hand, explores the development and functioning of the system of social domination at a more general level, analyzing such broad historical trends as the development of capitalism, rise and fall of modern nation state, or the development of modern science and technology. More importantly, while Arendt is concerned primarily with the effects of modernization on the public realm and on the world, Foucault is focused rather on its effects on the dominated subject.

World Alienation Mass society, according to Arendt, consists of masses of lonely and unhappy individuals whose lives are devoid of meaning. Capitalist economy reduces human beings to the biological level of their existence and prevents them from leading a fully human, that is free, life, from asserting themselves as distinct and unique individuals. As is the case with other aspects of her critique of capitalism, Arendts analysis of the dehumanizing effects of capitalist economy is strongly influenced by the work of Karl Marx. Nevertheless, in contrast to Marx, Arendt describes this phenomenon as world alienation, rather than self alienation. (254) The difference is substantial, rather than just terminological. Arendt argues that Marx misunderstood the nature of modern mans alienation because his thought remained firmly rooted in modern extreme subjectivism. In his ideal society, where men will produce as human beings, world alienation is even more present than it was before; for then they will be able to objectify (vergegenstndlichen) their individuality, their peculiarity, to confirm and actualize their true being. (254) Arendts criticism of Marxs subjectivism is, at least at a first glance, surprising, given the similarity of Marxs position to her own. Arendt herself criticizes modern society, and especially contemporary mass society, for preventing its members from expressing themselves as unique individuals. Arendt of course differs from Marx, insofar as she argues that we can express who 85

we are only through political action, rather than through creative work. This, however, does not explain her criticism of Marxs subjectivism. Since Arendt argues that political action is so valuable because it allows us to express ourselves as distinct and unique individuals, her position appears to be as subjectivist as Marxs. Apart from that, Arendt, like Marx, criticizes the replacement of creative work by meaningless industrial labor and argues that the creativity of work, especially of artistic work, is an expression of human freedom. (BPF, 169) The point is that political action, as Arendt understands it, is by definition concerned with common, political matters, with the fate of the political community and of the world. Although Arendt regards self-disclosure and hence expression of human plurality as the highest achievement30 of political action, such self-disclosure should not be the goal and cannot be the objective of political action. While Arendt argues that the ancient Greeks regarded action primarily as a quest for immortal glory, she also maintains that the agonal spirit of Athenian politics, which was marked by a constant strife of citizens eager to prove their own greatness, led to the downfall of Athens.31 (PP, 82) Moreover, even if the achievement of immortal glory is the subjective motive of political action, it cannot be its object. To achieve immortal fame, the Greeks had to contribute to the glory of the polis and show that they care for their city more than for their own life. Whoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a love for life obstructed freedom, as a sure sign of slavishness. (HC, 36)32 Political action, as Arendt understands it, allows individuals not to express, but rather to attain identity as unique individuals. We attain our individual life with its unique story by participating in the political life, by inserting our life into the web of human relationships that constitutes the immaterial dimension of the human world. Political action allows us to achieve something more permanent than life itself, (58) because it enables us to leave a mark in history. That is also why Arendt maintains that we can attain specifically human life with its unique story only through political action. As Seyla Benhabib points out, we in fact can, and for the most part 86

do, attain the unique story of our life in the private sphere of everyday living. Such actions, of which the story of our lives is composed, are usually remembered only by those closest to us, with whom we share the trivial and not so trivial intimacies and repetitions of everyday life.33 Arendt acknowledges that in modernity the private or the intimate realm becomes such a substitute of the public realm. Nevertheless, she maintains that an entirely private life can never fully replace political life, because only political action can attain public significance and worldly reality. (HC, 59) What goes on in the private realm is without public significance and a life spent exclusively in the privacy of household is therefore literally dead to the world. (176) Political action, as Arendt understands it, is defined as a certain mode of objective comportment to the world and to others, rather than as a subjective attitude. It is not a vehicle of existential self-affirmation, a means for expressing ones authentic self.34 Rather, it gives us an opportunity to make our lives meaningful and to become unique individuals by transcending the concern for ourselves, by participating in the care for the public matters. Creative work, as Arendt understands it, is another mode of objective comportment to the world. What makes work meaningful and, indeed, creative, is that it creates objects that, so to say, fit into the world and which become part of the world. Even works of art, which are entirely useless, attain their meaning by the virtue of fitting into the world, by being accepted as meaningful and beautiful by others. [T]he very originality of the artists (or the very novelty of the actor) depends on his making himself understood by those who are not artists (or actors). (KL, 63) Like action, work allows us to express (albeit only indirectly) our freedom, to achieve something more permanent than life by leaving a tangible trace in the world. Work, according to Arendt, cannot be understood as self-expressive activity, which would allow us to objectify our individuality, to confirm and actualize our true being.35 Rather, just like action, it allows us to lead a meaningful existence by assuming an objective (HC, 58) and meaningful relationship to the world and to others. 87

Action and work are distinctly human activities that allow us to express our freedom by relating in a meaningful and objective way to the world and to others. Labor, which is the least free and least human of the three fundamental activities, on the contrary isolates us from the world and from others. Through labor, we take care not of the world, but of ourselves, of our own lives. [I]n labor and consumption man is utterly thrown back on himself. (EU, 21) Modern society, and especially contemporary mass society, in which labor and consumption are the only possible activities, prevents us from assuming a meaningful and objective relationship with the world and with others. This is the main source of loneliness and unhappiness of modern man. Therefore, World alienation, and not self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the modern age. (HC, 254) **** World alienation can be also described as disappearance of the public realm, which is in its broadest sense more or less identical with the web of human relationships that constitutes the immaterial dimension of human world. The public realm, according to Arendt, provides the stage for political action, which enables the citizens to become unique individuals and to attain worldly reality for their own existence. Apart from being such a stage for political action, public realm constitutes the space in which worldly reality can appear. The displacement of the public realm therefore strips the world itself, as well as the lives of its inhabitants, of worldly reality. Worldly reality, according to Arendt, can appear only in the public space of the common human world. The term public, as Arendt puts it, signifies two closely interrelated but not altogether identical phenomena. It means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us, appearance something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves constitutes reality Second, the term public signifies the world itself, insofar as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. (HC, 50, 52)

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Appearance, as something that can be seen and heard not just by myself but also by others, according to Arendt, constitutes reality. I can be sure that the objects I perceive are not just products of my fancy because others can also see them. Reality is constituted not only by the public realm, in which it appears to multiple observers, but also by the functional context of the world in which it appears. The reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by its worldly context, which includes others who perceive as I do, on the one hand, and by the working together of my five senses on the other. (LMI, 50) Arendt calls the sixth sense with which we perceive something as real, a common sense or sensus communis to indicate that it relies on the existence of the common world and common public realm and that it perceives common or worldly reality as opposed to subjective sensations. The common sense is a sixth sense that fits the sensations of my strictly private five senses so private that the sensations in their mere sensational quality and intensity are incommunicable into a common world shared by others. (LMI, 50) Worldly reality is therefore guaranteed on the one hand by the objective existence of durable man-made objects and, on the other hand, by the inter-subjective nature of the world that is made possible by the public space. Reality is not constituted simply by subjective appearance, which can be a false appearance; neither is it constituted simply by the virtue of appearing to a plurality of observers. For the reality to appear, it is decisive that these observers communicate to each other how reality appears to them. The public space in which reality appears is a communicative space that can exist thanks to the human gift of speech. The importance of communication for the constitution of reality becomes apparent if we consider that a same thing may appear differently to various people, depending on the perspective from which it is perceived. Especially when such a thing is not a tangible object, but rather one of the less tangible things or matters that go on between people, that constitute public affairs.36

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And it is exactly this multiplicity of perspectives, which leads to the multiplicity of opinions that constitutes reality. Only when things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear. (HC, 57) When the plurality of perspectives disappears, or when people cannot communicate their various opinions, the worldly reality and the common world itself disappear. This can happen under conditions of radical isolation of individuals that is characteristic of tyrannies, but also under conditions of mass society or mass hysteria, where we see all people as thought the were members of one family, each multiplying and prolonging the perspective of their neighbor The end of common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (58) Members of the mass society are not related to each other by a common world, but merely by the common care for their private interests, that is to say by the life process of society. Society has only one interest, namely the growth of national economy, and considers everything from only one economic perspective. Apart from that, mass society is characterized by extreme conformism and crowd mentality of its members, in other words by their lack of ability to see the world from different perspectives.37

Capitalist economy, according to Arendt, destroys not just the public realm and the web of human relationships that constitutes the immaterial dimension of human world. It transforms and destroys also the physical world of man-made objects. As discussed above, the main characteristic of the physical world of objects is its stability and durability. The more or less durable objects lend stability and objective reality to the world and, indirectly, to the lives of the people who inhabit the world. Modern economy, which replaces durable things with consumer goods of ever-shorter life span, according to Arendt, destroys the stability and the very reality of 90

the world. The perpetually transforming modern world, which is shaped by the quasi-natural force of capitalist economy, lacks the stability and durability characteristic of human world. Rather than human world, it resembles a quasi-natural environment, which can sustain the lifeprocess of human species, but which cannot provide a home for men. [O]ur whole economy has become a waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end. But if the ideal were already in existence and we were truly nothing but members of a consumers society, we would not longer live in a world at all but simply be driven by a process in whose ever-recurring cycles things appear and disappear, manifest themselves and vanish, never to last long enough to surround the life-process in their midst. (HC, 134) An excellent illustration of the destructive effects of modern economy on the stability and on the very reality of the world is provided by the quintessentially American phenomenon of suburbanization. The streets, squares, marketplaces and parks of traditional cities constitute public space that has always served not only for economic interaction, but also for various political and other public gatherings. Apart from that and more obviously, the public space of traditional cities is a common space in which the denizens of the city lead their lives, meet each other and make friends. It is because of this public space that they can consider their city, rather than just their private residence, their home, their place in the world. The suburbs, on the other hand, lack any genuinely public space. Commercial activities in the suburban landscape are concentrated in the strip-malls and plazas, that is to say in exclusively commercial areas. The suburbanites live lives of self-imposed confinement to their private residences, from which they commute, alone in their cars, to work. The suburban lifestyle provides almost no opportunity for non-commercial interaction with other human beings apart from ones immediate family, which may be one of the reasons why Americans have fewer and fewer friends. The monotonous suburban landscape is utterly uprooted and dehumanized. While traditional cities and towns are rooted in a certain place and have history of their own, the suburbs lack any organic connection with their particular physical setting. Standard family houses are scattered 91

along a highway and supplemented with shopping malls and plazas in familiar patterns that are nearly identical all around the country. The very purpose of the retail and restaurant chains is to render the physical location of a particular establishment irrelevant, to offer the same consumer experience anywhere in the country. The suburbs themselves resemble standardized consumer products, which can be assembled at any given location, rather than cities or towns. They can provide their inhabitants with a place to live in, but they cannot provide them with a home in the sense of a concrete place in the world. The landscape of suburbs, shopping malls, industrial parks and glass air-conditioned office buildings appears to be not only utterly uprooted and dehumanized, but literally unreal.

Science and Earth Alienation The modern world is shaped not only by capitalist economy, but also, and more obviously, by modern science and technology. Modern age, according to Arendt, started with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and its general implications unfolded during the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. (BPF, 27) Scientific and technological development also made possible or, rather, brought about, the event which marks the end of the modern age and the birth of the contemporary modern world the first nuclear explosions. (HC, 7) The development of science and technology has played an important role in the modern transformation of human comportment to the world. Science has transformed our understanding of the world and technology has transformed our comportment to the world on practical level. Arendt traces the origins of modern science to the invention of the telescope and to the ensuing Galileos discoveries, which proved that the earth rotates around the sun, rather than the other way round. Galileo, as Arendt points out, was not the first one to conceive a heliocentric system. He was preceded by Nicolas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno, who had proposed the heliocentric hypothesis as a philosophical speculation and, more importantly, by Copernicus and 92

Kepler who had construed a mathematical model of the heliocentric system. (252) However, neither the speculations of philosophers not the imaginings of astronomers have ever constituted an event. (259) What, according to Arendt, distinguishes Galileo from his predecessors and what makes his discoveries the starting point of modern science, is that he proved the heliocentric hypothesis with the certainty of sense-perceptionBy conforming his predecessors, Galileo [thus] established a demonstrable fact where before him were mere speculations. (260) Modern science has been since its very inception closely tied with technology. Galileos discoveries would not have been possible without a prior invention of the telescope. The telescope, a man-made instrument designed to augment the human sense of vision, somewhat paradoxically enabled Galileo to prove with the certainty of sense perception that our senses deceive us. Distrust of reality as it is perceived by human senses and reliance on instruments has become a hallmark of modern science. Nevertheless, the relationship between science and technology is not purely instrumental. Science itself becomes technological insofar as it assumes character of work, rather than contemplation. Modern science does not observe nature as it naturally appears to us, but rather construes a mathematical model of nature, which it then tests in experiments.

Modern science, according to Arendt, leads to earth alienation. Just as world alienation determined the course and the development of modern society, earth alienation became and has remained the hallmark of modern science. (264) Modern science leads to earth alienation because it perceives nature and the earth itself from a universal, rather than from a terrestrial perspective. The telescope enabled Galileo to observe or, rather, to project the movement of the earth from a hypothetical Archimedean point in the universe. Even more importantly, Galileo proved that the same force causes the fall of terrestrial and the movement of heavenly bodies. (Newton then transformed this discovery into a universal law of gravitation.) (258) Arendt 93

underlines that not just astronomy and physics, but all modern science perceives nature from a universal perspective, exploring natural phenomena that are not limited to the earth and formulating universally valid natural laws. What Arendt calls earth alienation could be also described as alienation of modern man from nature. Modern science so to say denaturalizes and objectifies nature. Instead of observing natural phenomena as they were given to him [the scientist] placed nature under the conditions of his own mind, that is under the conditions won from a universal, astrophysical viewpoint, a cosmic standpoint outside nature itself. (265) Modern technology then enables man to master nature, making him less and less dependent on the naturally given conditions of life. The phenomena of earth alienation and world alienation are closely interrelated. Some of Arendts formulations actually suggest that earth alienation is one aspect of a broader phenomenon of world alienation. In the Prologue to The Human Condition she describes modern world alienation as a twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self. (6) As discussed above, modern society alienates men from the world and throws them onto themselves by displacing world-related activities of work and action by self-related activities of labor and consumption. Skepticism inherent in modern science leads to a similar flight from the world into the rational self into Cartesian cogito.

Arendt describes Descartes philosophy, which started the development of specifically modern philosophic thought, as a philosophic response to Galileos scientific discoveries. The principle of universal doubt emerged originally as a conceptualization of skepticism inherent in these discoveries. Descartes solution of universal doubt then consists in turning the focus of philosophic inquiry away from worldly reality to the thinking subject and to the content of his consciousness. This subjectivism, as well as the spirit of doubt from which it arose, then remained

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characteristic of all modern philosophy, which continued reacting to the development of modern science.38 (272) For Descartes, introspection, that is the sheer cognitive concern of consciousness with its own content, guarantees beyond doubt the reality of ones own existence, as well as the reality of sensations and reasoning, that is the reality of processes that go on in the mind. (280) Cartesian method of securing reality against universal doubt, as Arendt points out, corresponded most precisely to the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the new physical science: though one cannot know the truth as something given and disclosed, man can at least know what he makes himself. (282) For Descartes, human reason conceived as reckoning with consequences39 construes reality. The highest form of knowledge is therefore mathematics, a purely formal science that is produced by human mind. The structure of human mind, rather than the common world, also guarantees that reality appears in the same way to everybody. (283) We should note that Arendt regards Descartes solution of the skepticism inherent in modern science, which consists of mov[ing] the Archimedean point into man himself, (284) as inherently flawed. Thinking itself cannot guarantee reality of anything not even of my own existence, let alone of the external world. (LMI, 49) The import of Descartes philosophy, according to Arendt, consists solely of thinking through the perplexities inherent in the new standpoint of man with which the scientists were too busy to bother until, on our own time, they began to appear in their own work and to interfere with their own discoveries. (HC, 273)

The main perplexity of modern scientific worldview elucidated by Descartes philosophy is that while modern science may increase mans power of making and acting, even of creating world, [it] unfortunately puts man back into the prison of his own mind, into the limitations of patterns he himself created. (288) While scientific theories allow us to manipulate natural processes, they can never reach the physical reality itself. Scientific theories are creations of 95

human mind and the experiments designed to test their validity can prove only that they work, that they allow us to manipulate natural phenomena in a certain way. Nevertheless, they cannot prove that the theory truly and objectively represents the given natural phenomenon. In other words, the experiment being a question put before nature (Galileo), the answers of science will always remain replies to questions asked by men. (BPF, 49) This paradox has been inherently present in the modern scientific worldview since its very inception. The scientists themselves, however, have started becoming aware of it only recently, when it was confirmed by the results of their own work. Arendt quotes Heisenberg, according to whom the most important new result of nuclear physics was the recognition of the possibility of applying quite different types of natural laws, without contradiction, to one and the same physical event.40 (The classical example is the dual explanation of light by particle and wave theories.) Heisenberg concludes that in the scientific quest for objective reality man always confronts himself alone.41 Contemporary science, in other words, has been forced by the evidence of its own results to realize that it can never reach the objective reality of the natural world. Contemporary science, in particular nuclear physics, can reach the object of its study only indirectly, by means of technology. It relies completely on scientific instruments, which replace, rather than augment human senses. As Arendt puts it, the phenomena studied by contemporary physics are not strictly speaking phenomena, that is appearances, because we know of their presence only because they affect our measuring instruments in certain way. And this effect, in the telling image of Edington, may have as much resemblance to what they are as a telephone number has to a subscriber. (BPF, 266) The findings reached by these instruments can be expressed only in symbolic mathematical language, which cannot be translated back to human speech, or represented visually. The universe, as it is conceived by contemporary science, is therefore not just unimaginable, but literally unthinkable. (HC, 288)

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The perplexities faced by contemporary science, according to Arendt, indicate that Cartesian universal doubt has now reached the heart of physical science itself. At the same time, however, they prove the fallacy of Descartes solution of this doubt for the escape into the mind of man himself is closed if it turns out that the modern physical universe is not only beyond presentation, but is inconceivable, unthinkable in terms of pure reasoning as well. (HC, 289) Descartes himself was able to escape the universal doubt and save the reality only by assuming a fundamental accord between the laws of nature and the laws of mathematic. (LMI, 7) This assumption, as Arendt points out, in turn hinges on the assumption of the goodness of God, which Descartes in the Meditations introduces as a deux ex machina to save his philosophic system from the abyss of nihilism. (HC, 296) Arendts point is that Descartes could save reality only by such an illegitimate argument, because the assumption of a pre-established harmony between the mind (res cogitans) and nature (res extensa) is simply incompatible with the principle of universal doubt.

In spite of being inherently incompatible with the modern scientific worldview, the assumption of harmony between the laws of nature and the laws of mathematics was until recently a working assumption of modern science. Early modern science, epitomized by Newtons physics conceived of nature as a God-created mechanism. To distinguish contemporary science, which was forced to give up the ideal of full objective understanding of nature, Arendt calls it universal, as opposed to natural science. Contemporary universal science, which is exemplified by Einsteins theory or relativity or Planks quantum mechanics, fully develops the principle of relativism, contained already in Newtons mechanics, which studied relations between bodies. Contemporary science becomes truly universal precisely because it abandons the notion of an Archimedean point as a fixed vantage point that would make it possible to observe the world objectively. 97

Contemporary universal science abandons the mechanistic worldview of earlier natural science and conceives nature as a system of interrelated dynamic processes. The notion of a dynamic, developing and hence historical process is central to virtually all scientific disciplines. Biology studies the functioning and the evolution of the life process, geology studies the development of the earth, cosmology studies the development of the universe, etc. (296) Although the notion of progress assumed its central role in science already in the nineteenth century, only contemporary universal science regards nature as a whole as a process or a system of interconnected processes, rather than as a mechanism. Even more importantly, contemporary universal science makes it possible to interfere with natural processes. Nuclear physics makes it possible to start a nuclear fission or to create artificial chemical elements. Modern biology similarly enables men to manipulate the life process itself by manipulating its control mechanism its genetic program. In Arendts terms, universal science allows us to act into nature, (BPF, 61) and therefore should be understood in terms of action, rather than work.

Contemporary science does not merely resemble action by acting into nature just as political action acts into the web of human relationships. In the modern world, which was born with the first atomic explosions, science is a mode of action. Modern world is shaped by science and technology and science and technology also determine the course of its development. Scientific and technological development has become a major, if not the most important, source of national power, as well as a point of national pride and a hallmark of human greatness.42 In the modern world action has therefore become an exclusive prerogative of the scientists.43 Nevertheless, the action of the scientists, since it acts into nature rather than into the web of human relationships, lacks the revelatory power of action as well as the ability to produce stories and become historical, which together form the very source, from which meaningfulness springs into human existence. (HC, 324) Apart from that, the action of the scientists cannot be 98

considered to be really free. The development of scientific disciplines is determined by their internal logic, rather than by the scientist. Contemporary science, which regards nature as an evolving process, itself assumes a character of an automatic, self-evolving process. In other words, while science determines the development of modern world, the development of science itself is apparently under nobodys control. The development of modern science and technology is closely interrelated with the development of modern economy. On the other hand, scientific and technological development is the single most important factor driving the economic progress. On the other hand, the relative speed of progress of individual scientific disciplines and the course of their development, are to a great extent determined by economic factors by their economic usefulness. The applied or applicable sciences, such as biology, are therefore developing much faster than so called pure sciences, such as theoretical physics. The overwhelming majority of all researchers today, as Arendt puts it, are in effect technicians rather than scientists in the strict sense. (BPF, 273) **** Science determines the development of the modern world and drives forward the progress of mankind. The development of science itself, however, is at the same time determined by the quasi-natural automatic process of Progress. Insofar as Progress consists of increasingly efficient organization of the life process of human species, we could say that science enables mankind as a species to organize and control its life process. Science, or, to put it more generally, scientific and technological instrumental rationality, can be therefore descried as a function of the life process of human species. The quasi-natural process of Progress can be then described as a continuation of the biological evolution of human species. The paradoxical relationship between science and Progress, whereas science determines the movement of Progress while being at the same time controlled by this movement, resembles the relationship between totalitarian ideology and History. As discussed in the previous chapter, 99

totalitarian ideology, as Arendt understands it, strives to control and accelerate the development of History. Ideology at the same time asserts that the historical development follows its own logic, that it is governed by the same kind of necessity as natural processes. Historical development, as construed by totalitarian ideology, is a natural process, a continuation of the natural evolution of the human species. The notion of Progress is obviously not identical with the notion of History as construed by totalitarian ideology. The most obvious difference between the two concepts is that Progress is a completely a-political category. Its movement is determined by the development of science and technology, rather than by political struggle between antagonistic classes or races. The notion of Progress also lacks the eschatological and pseudo-metaphysical dimension characteristic of totalitarian ideology and its understanding of History. Progress is a perpetual and endless process, which does not have any ultimate goal comparable to the communist utopia or the Thousand Year Reich. We could say that while totalitarianism attempts to control the development of history through ideology and terror, post-totalitarian mass society surrenders to automatism of scientific and technological progress. That seems to suggest that the scientific worldview that shapes the post-totalitarian modern world is free of the characteristic hubris of totalitarian ideology.

Arendt nevertheless argues that contemporary science is characterized by the same combination of nihilism and hubris as totalitarianism. In contrast to earlier natural science, contemporary universal science perceives the universe not as a purposefully organized mechanism, but as a chaotic and ultimately meaningless process. Man then, is not a thinking being created by God in his image, but a product of a haphazard process of biological evolution. Modern science obviously acknowledges that humans are distinguished from lower animal species by their faculty of reason. Nevertheless, it reduces reason to instrumental rationality and regards it as nothing else than an evolutionary advantage of human species, as a mere function 100

of the life process. (HC, 172) Here the old definition of man as an animal rationale acquires a terrible precision: human beings are indeed no more than animals who are able to reason, to reckon with consequences. (284) By giving up the mechanistic worldview, contemporary universal science has abandoned not only the notion of God as the Creator of nature, but also the ideal of human mastery over nature. At the same time, however, contemporary science gives man tremendous, almost god-like powers, and enables him to imitate God by acting into nature. If one wished to draw a distinctive line between the modern age and the modern world we have come to live in, he may well find it in the difference between a science which looks upon nature from a universal standpoint and thus acquires complete mastery over her, on one hand, and a truly universal science, which imports cosmic processes into nature even at the obvious risk of destroying her and, with her, mans mastership over her. (HC, 268) The existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear holocaust provide a prime example of the Promethean powers of modern science and its destructive potential. Arendt, however, warns also against seemingly more benign scientific endeavors, which attest to the creative, rather than destructive powers of science. The most spectacular of these endeavors is the conquest of space, which, according to Arendt, symbolizes modern mans desire to escape from the imprisonment to the earth, to transform the naturally given conditions of human existence. (2) The same rebellion against human existence as it has been given [to us], (2) according to Arendt, motivates also the development of biology. Contemporary biology develops techniques that enable men to manipulate life process itself. Its aim, as Arendt puts it, is to cut the last tie through which even man [who lives in the artificial world as opposed to the wilderness of nature] belongs among the children of nature by making life artificial, that is by submitting it under human control. (2) Its practical goals are on the one hand to create or re-create the miracle of life (269) and, on the other hand, to artificially prolong human life span or otherwise improve

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biological characteristics of human beings, in other words, to manipulate the biological evolution of the human species. The rebellion of modern science against naturally given conditions of human existence stems from the same resentment of modern man against everything given as totalitarianism. Similarly to totalitarianism, contemporary science strives for total control or domination of reality and of the life process itself. In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt argues that the ultimate aim of totalitarianism is transformation of human nature itself. (OT, 458) In The Human Condition she then suggests that contemporary science likewise aims at a transformation of human nature. Transformation of human nature on a biological level or a similarly radical transformation of naturally given conditions of human existence, such as emigration of men from the earth to some other planet, (HC, 10) are still only hypothetical (albeit not unrealistic) possibilities. Science, nevertheless, already now shapes the modern world and continuously transforms the conditions of human existence. Although science has not yet started altering the biological properties of human organism, contemporary scientific and technological civilization has, similarly to totalitarianism, succeeded in transforming human nature by turning men into conditioned and behaving animals. (45) A mass society of laborers consists of wordless specimens of the species mankind. (118)

Technology and the World of Machines Science transforms the world and therefore also the conditions of human existence through technology. Technological development has played a decisive role in the overall development of modern society at least since the Industrial Revolution. Nevertheless, the role technology has come to play in the present modern world, is unprecedented. The modern world, which was born with the first nuclear explosion, is wholly shaped by science and technology; it is literally a world of machines. (152) For a society of laborers, the world of machines has become a 102

substitute for the real world. (152) The perpetually evolving technological pseudo world however lacks the stability characteristic of specifically human world. The development of modern technology therefore directly contributes to modern mans world alienation. The role of technology in the present modern world, as Arendt underlines, cannot be interpreted in purely instrumental terms. In contrast to the tools of workmanship they have replaced, modern machines cannot be considered simply as instruments, as means that enable humans to achieve certain ends. Arendt argues that in the consumer economy where production consists primarily in preparation for consumption, the very distinction between means and end simply does not make sense. (145) We could say that modern technology serves the life process of society, the ever-intensifying cycle of production and consumption. The perpetual economic growth at the same time depends on the continuous development of technology. Therefore, it has become as senseless to describe this world of machines in terms of means and ends as it has always been senseless to ask nature if she produced the seed to produce a tree or the tree to produce the seed. (152) The quasi-natural process of industrial production, as Arendt puts it, feeds on (153) the life process of human species. Technology, like science, enables the life process of human species to control and organize itself. Modern technology becomes part of human condition and humans get adjusted to, and depended on the machines. Unlike the tools of workmanship, which at every given moment in the work process remain the servants of the hand, the machines demand that the laborer serve them, that he adjust the natural rhythm of his body to their mechanical movement. (147) In the modern world, technology permeates not just production but all areas of life. Members of technologically developed mass societies are becoming increasingly dependent on technology in their everyday lives and technology is therefore loosing its independent worldly character becoming instead related to the biological process itself. (153) Technological

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development therefore resembles artificial continuation of the biological evolution of the human species. Seen from a sufficient distance, the cars in which we travel and which we know we built ourselves will look as though they were, as Heisenberg once put it, as inescapable a part of ourselves as the snails shell is to its occupant. [T]he whole technology, seen from this point, in fact no longer appears as the result of conscious human effort to extent mans material powers, but rather as a large-scale biological process. (BPF, 279) The problem is that the quasi-natural process of technological evolution is dehumanizing us, turning us into helpless slaves, not so much of our machines, as of our know-how. (HC, 3) Although the technological modern world may guarantee the survival of the species on a world-wide scale it does at the same time threaten humanity with extinction. (46; emphasis added) Similarly to totalitarianism, the present scientific and technological civilization reduces individual human beings to instances of a collective life-process of human species, into raw material of the economic process. The quasi-natural process of technological evolution at the same time destroys the world as human artifice (152) and with it the worldly, objective reality. Without a world between men and nature, there is eternal movement, but no objectivity. (137) **** At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that Arendts understanding of the present system of social domination is reminiscent of recent science fiction film The Matrix. I argued that the vision of the future world of intelligent machines that use human bodies as a source of energy while generating a false image of reality should be interpreted as a hyperbolic expression of more realistic frustrations and anxieties characteristic of the current mass society. Moreover, I have argued that these frustrations and anxieties arise in response to the same phenomena Arendt analyzes in terms of world alienation and technological domination of the life process. Nevertheless, while The Matrix arguably reflects anxieties arising from the general development of contemporary scientific and technological civilization, it is concerned specifically with recent

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technological developments that Arendt could not have predicted with the role of computers and the Internet and with the related phenomenon of virtual reality. Although Arendt could not have predicted their future development, she was aware of the importance of the emergence of electronic computers. And while she could not have predicted the phenomenon of the virtual reality of the cyberspace, she was aware of the tendency of contemporary society to displace reality by an image or simulacrum of reality. Apart from that, the impact of the development of information technology on society can be interpreted in terms of Arendts analysis of modern technology and of the system of social domination. In The Human Condition, Arendt describes the advancement of automation as one of the hallmarks of the modern world. Arendt is concerned that automation could eventually completely replace human labor, making human beings qua laborers superfluous. Given Arendts views on labor, we might expect that she should welcome the perspective of its abolishment. Freedom from labor, after all, used to be the privilege of the few and the precondition of political freedom. (4) The problem is that in the present society, labor is the only productive activity left. What we are confronted with is the prospect of a society of laborers without labor, that is, without the only activity left to them. Surely, nothing could be worse. (5) [E]ven now, laboring is too lofty, too ambitious word for what we are doing, or think we are doing, in the world we have come to live in. The last stage of the laboring society, the society of jobholders, demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning, as thought individual life had actually been submerged in the over-all life process of the species and the only active decision still required of the individual were to let go, so to speak, to abandon his individuality, the still individually sensed pain and trouble of living, and acquiesce in a dazed, tranquilized, functional type of behavior. (HC, 322) As we know, the advancement of automation did not bring a complete abolishment of labor. Nevertheless, it has led, at least in economically developed countries, to a decline of employment in blue-collar profession and to increase of employment in services and in various administrative positions. We could hence say that the advancement of automation led to decline of labor in the

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traditional sense of arduous, physically exhausting activity and to its displacement by effortless but at least equally stupefying activities related to the administration of economic process. The impact of the development of information and communication technology has not been limited to the automation of industrial production. At least as important has been its impact on business administration. The consequences of the introduction of computers into business administration were analogical to the consequences of the introduction of machinery into the production process. Computers, like all other machines, demand that their users serve them, that they adjust the rhythm and style of their work in accordance with the design and speed of the machine. Even more importantly, the development of information and communication technology influences methods and techniques of administration. The advancement of this technology has vastly increased the efficiency of business administration; in particular, it enabled control of production and other economic processes in real time. Economic administration today not only relies on information technology, but actually assumes the form of cybernetics. It perceives the operation of economic organization in terms of a system of interrelated processes that can be formalized and depicted in the form of flowcharts. The use of these methods in business administration together with the advancement of information and communication technology then enables increasingly more efficient self-regulation of the globalizing economic system. We should note that cybernetics affects also contemporary biology, which studies the functioning and evolution of the controlling mechanisms of the life process, most notably of its genetic program.

Information technology, in particular the Internet, together with television and mass-media in general contribute to world-alienation also by creating an image or simulacrum of reality, which in the modern world displaces the worldly reality. Events in the mass society assume public significance and reality only once they are reflected by the media, only once they appear on the television screen.44 We could say that in mass society, the television and other media replace the 106

public space and the common world and the media-created image of reality replaces the worldly reality itself. The problem is that the image of reality presented by television and other media is largely distorted or simply false. Most television programming, after all, consists of advertisements and entertainment, rather than news. In Home to Roost45 Arendt suggests that the role of advertisement and public relations in the post-totalitarian mass society is analogical to the role of ideology in totalitarianism. Similarly to ideology, advertisement creates a false account of worldly reality and aims to manipulate individuals in order to change this reality. While ideology creates a pseudoscientific strictly consistent account of reality and claims to be capable of predicting historically inevitable course of events, advertisement creates a persuasive image of reality. It manipulates individuals by hidden persuasion, (RJ, 265) which appeals to their desires. The aim of advertisement is to persuade the consumers that they want to buy the advertised product. Advertisement creates a fleeting image of an ideal world full of successful, happy and satisfied people and persuades the permanently unhappy members of mass society that they can also live in such an ideal world if only they buy and consume the advertised product. Nevertheless, it is in the very nature of consumption that it cannot bring lasting satisfaction but only craving for more consumption. The endless quest for happiness through consumption only contributes to the permanent unhappiness of the animal laborans. The image or simulacrum or reality, which in the post-totalitarian mass society displaces the worldly reality, is created not only by advertisement, but also by entertainment. Entertainment, which in mass society replaces culture and art, is not supposed to reveal the beauty of the world or the meaning of human existence. Unlike art, entertainment also does not create any lasting artifacts. Entertainment, like all other products of mass society, is an object of consumption. Its purpose is to entertain, to provide diversion, to fill the spare time of animal laborans.46 Entertainment fills the void in the empty and eventless lives of the members of mass society and 107

provides them with the illusion of normalcy and satisfaction. It diverts their attention from the grim reality of the world and prevents them from thinking or, for that matter, from communicating or interacting in some unmediated way with each other.47 The image or simulacrum of reality generated by advertisement and entertainment-based mass culture is an indispensable part of the system of social domination characteristic of the current post-totalitarian mass society. It not only evokes an illusion of normalcy and prevents the members of mass society from thinking about their predicament, but also enables the system of social domination to control the individuals, to condition or program their behavior. Since the globalizing economic system increasingly resembles an automatic and self-evolving computer system, we could describe the false image of reality as a graphical user interface, through which the economic system, or matrix, controls its organic components that is to say, human beings. * *** Throughout this chapter, I have used images from the science fiction film The Matrix to illustrate Arendts analysis of the present system of social domination. The image of the economic system as a giant computer or matrix that exploits the biopower of human bodies and controls individuals through a false image of reality is obviously an exaggerated fantasy that cannot be taken literally. The globalizing economic system is obviously not a giant self-evolving computer. Functioning of the economic system, as well as the automatic process of scientific and technological progress, is sustained by human activity. In Arendts terms, we are becoming thoughtless slaves not of our machines, but of our know-how, that is to say of out scientific and technological rationality. (HC, 5; emphasis added.) While people in contemporary mass society increasingly resemble conditioned and behaving animals, this does not mean that modern man has lost his capacities or is on the point of losing them. (323) Human beings still possess the capacities of thought and action, and therefore still are, at least potentially, free and thinking beings. The problem is that in the modern world they have come to 108

use their capacities of thought and action in a way that robs them of their intrinsic meaning. Although Arendt does not use the phrase, we could say that modern development according to her analysis led to a collapse of the distinction between thought and action. Thinking was turned into a handmaiden of doing, (292) in other words, reduced to scientific and technological instrumental rationality. Action has in the meanwhile become an exclusive prerogative of the scientists. (302) The action of the scientists however lacks the revelatory power, as well as the free character of political action. It does not allow men to reveal themselves as unique and distinct individual by taking part in the care for public matters and for the world, but on the contrary, perpetuates a quasi-natural process of Progress that turns humans into conditioned and behaving animals, into thoughtless slaves of their own know-how. Arendts goal in The Human Condition is to remind her readers about the true meaning of the human faculties of thought and action and about the perversion of these faculties in the modern world. Her intention is to provoke her readers, to wake them up from the dazed, tranquilized type of behavior (322) characteristic of the present mass society and make them think about the perils of the modern world: What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing. (HC, 5) Thinking about what we are doing can prevent us as individuals from becoming thoughtless slaves of scientific and technological rationality. Nevertheless, thinking alone cannot change our predicament and save the world from the destructive onslaught of the automatic process of Progress. In order to change our situation we would have to do something, we would have to actively resist the current system of social domination through political action. I will address the questions of what, according to Arendt, could be the form and the objectives of such political action and where could such an action arise from in a society that lacks any genuine public realm in the last chapter of this study.

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Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 3. 2 Pitkin, 4. 3 Pitkin, 5. 4 In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt suggests that the tribal people living in the midst of nature are not fully human. She argues that the native Africans, who were enslaved and massacred by the white colonists, in fact were difference from other human beings, not because of the color of their skin, but because they behaved like a part of nature [because] they had not created a human world, a human reality They were, as it were, natural human beings who lacked the specifically human reality, so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder. (OT, 192) I should note that Arendt by no means wants to apologize the atrocities committed by the Europeans. As Canovan puts it: The point of this startling observation is that the Europeans in question had committed murder, but that it is something extraordinarily easy to do to victims who are not clothed in the protective garments of man-made citizenship. There is an intimation here of the plight of the victims of Nazism, who were stripped of the attributes of civilization until nothing but the natural human being was left something which their fellow Europeans evidently had no difficulty in killing. Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38. 5 Arendts reception of Heideggers thought is discussed in Chapter 4. 6 The natural, merely social companionship of the human species was considered [by the Greeks] to be a limitation imposed upon us by the needs of biological life, which are the same for the human animal as for other forms of animal life. (HC, 24) 7 By the ancient political communities Arendt means not only the Greek city states, but also the Roman Republic, which she regards as another exemplary political community. 8 Mary Dietz suggests that Arendts account of the Greek polis should be interpreted as the grand optimistic illusion, as a powerful imaginistic symbol, which Arendt construes as a compelling counter-memory to the persistent specter of the Holocaust. (Mary G. Dietz, Arendt and the Holocaust, in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 102.) According to Dietz, the purpose of Arendts healing illusion is primarily therapeutic. (99) Arendts optimistic, yet illusory image of the Greek polis is supposed to illuminate the forgotten greatness of political realm and of political action that had been destroyed by totalitarianism, to help to heal the historical trauma of the Holocaust by illuminating a way back from Auschwitzs empty space. (102) While I agree with Dietz that Arendts image of Athens is an illusion rather than an accurate historical description, I believe that the primary role of Arendts image of Athens is analytical, rather than therapeutic. In The Human Condition, Arendt is concerned primarily with the predicaments of the post-totalitarian mass society, rather than with overcoming of the trauma of the Holocaust. The primary purpose of Arendts image of the polis is not to provide recreative escape from the reality of modern world, but to remind us about the disappearance of authentic public realm from the modern world. 9 Aristotle, Politics, 1252b29. 10 Arendt attributes Aristotles materialism, i.e. his argument that polis originally comes into existence for the sake of life, to Platos influence. (HC, 37) 11 Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 108. 110

12

This interpretation is suggested also by Pitkin, who underlines that, according to Arendt, all matters formerly pertaining to the private sphere of the household, i.e. both production and the family life become public. (Pitkin, 13) 13 When Margaret Canovan claims that if sheep could talk, they would be able to use the words to express their feelings and to report information, but they would not be able to discuss anything because they would all have the same point of view because, according to Arendt, only human beings can express their distinctness, she misses the point. (Canovan 1992, 111) If sheep were endowed with speech, they would be, according to Arendt, thinking and political animals, just like humans. According to Arendt, all higher animals have a desire to display themselves, to make themselves appear. What distinguishes humans is their ability of speech. (LMI, 21) 14 We should note that Arendt disregards Aristotles own argument about the connection between the human faculties of speech and action. According to Aristotle, human beings are distinguished from other political (or, as Arendt would say, social) animals, such as bees, by their ability to distinguish good and bad. This ability is given to humans with speech. (Pol. 1253 a10) 15 Canovan (1992), 124. 16 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2003), 131. 17 Pitkin, 111. 18 Jacques Taminiaux, Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), Chapter 1. 19 Seyla Benhabib also traces Arendts distinction between work and labor to her critical dialogue with Marx. (Benhabib, 130) 20 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter IX. 21 Arendt is quoting from R.W.K Hinton, Was Charles I a Tyrant?, Review of Politics Vol. 18 (January, 1956). 22 Arendt took over the notion of the communist fiction, as well as the characterization of political economy as a nation wide housekeeping from Gunnar Myrdals The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory. 23 This preference for social wealth over private property is illustrated by a recent decision of the US Supreme Court, which authorizes the use of eminent domain for seizure of private houses in order to enable construction of a (privately owned) shopping mall, which is supposed to increase the wealth of the whole community. (Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).) 24 Arendt specifically mentions the role of applied social sciences in the management of national economy, marketing, advertisement, electoral politics and even foreign relations. (See especially Crises of the Republic.) 25 Just as family and its property were replaced by class membership and national territory, so mankind now begins to replace nationally bound societies, and the earth replaces the limited state territory. (HC, 257) 26 William I. Robinson, Social theory and globalisation: The rise of a transnational state, Theory and Society Vol. 30 (2001). 27 What was liberated in the early stages of the first free laboring class in history was the force inherent in labor-power, that is the sheer natural abundance of the biological process, which like all natural forces of procreation no less than of laboring provides for a generous surplus over and beyond the reproduction of young to balance the old. (H C, 255) Arendts analysis of capitalism as a system of domination which exploits human bio-power is reminiscent of Batailles notion of general economy. See George Bataille, The Accursed Share (New York: Zone Books, 1988-1991) 111

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Villa explores some of the parallels between Arendts and Foucaults understanding of specifically modern form of domination in his essay Postmodernism and the Public Sphere (in American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, September 1992; pp. 712-721.) Analogously to the present interpretation, Villa underlines that for both Arendt and Foucault the object of modern domination is the states most precious resource, its populace and suggests that there is a direct line to be drawn form Arendts conception of the state as national household to Foucaults notion of biopower. (718) Nonetheless, Villa in my opinion obscures the distinction between Arendts focus on the care for the world and Foucaults emphasis on the care for the self, when he concludes that for Arendt action is a vehicle of spontaneity and agonistic subjectivity and that the Foucauldian concept of resistance can be [therefore] seen as a successor concept to Arendts notion of political action. (718) Agamben also interprets Arendts analysis of modern social domination, as it is presented in The Human Condition in terms of bio-politics. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with his claim that Arendt establishes no connection between her research in The Human Condition, and the penetrating analysis she had previously devoted to totalitarian power (in which a biopolitical perspective is altogether lacking). Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 3. 29 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 137. 30 Villa, 712. 31 See Chapter 1. 32 This is one of the few instances in which Arendt acknowledged the importance of the military virtue for the Greek understanding of politics. Although her interpretation of polis is based on Pericles Funeral Oration, which is concerned primarily with the imperial glory of Athens, in The Human Condition Arendt largely ignores this aspect of Pericles speech. As Canovan points out, Arendt reiterated her interpretation of the polis as organized remembrance in her 1969 lecture Philosophy and Politics: What is Political Philosophy? This time, she acknowledged that the desire to distinguish oneself was related to the imperial aspirations of Athens. Interestingly, Arendt contrasts Pericles outlook with a different Athenian understanding of politics, that of Solon the lawgiver, who specifically insisted that no city could escape retribution for evil-doing. The difference between Pericles and Solon was, she says, the difference between striving for excellence at any price or putting this within limits. Canovan (1992), 194. 33 Benhabib, 130. 34 Commenting on one of her Chicago students papers, [Arendt] took her stance clearly: At the end of your paper your finally define your notion of politics, and you say that it is a mode of self-expression. I dont doubt that many people agree with this definition, especially among young; I certainly dont. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 406. For Arendts critique of political existentialism see Chapter 4. 35 The artists, whether painter or sculptor or poet or musician, produces worldly objects, and his reification has nothing in common with the highly questionable and, at any rate, wholly unartistic practice of expression. Expressionist art, but not abstract art, is a contradiction in terms. (HC, 323) 36 For instance the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia after World War II was from the Czech perspective perceived as a just punishment of a minority that had acted as a fifth column of the Nazis and contributed to the breakdown of the first Czechoslovak Republic and as a measure necessary to prevent similar balkanization of Czechoslovakia in the future. From the 112

German point of view, it was an unjust act of collective punishment of people who had lived on the territory of the Czech kingdom for centuries and who had turned against the Czechoslovak government primarily because they had been treated as second class citizens. 37 Conflict of interests of various economic groups, which represents the substance of political life of contemporary democracies, is not the same thing as an encounter of various opinions because the conflicting interests share the same economic perspective. Conflicts between various economic interests are typically resolved by bargaining, rather than by free political discussion that can reveal worldly reality. For further discussion of Arendts criticism of contemporary representative democracies see Chapter 5. 38 After Descartes based his own philosophy upon the discoveries of Galileo, philosophy has seemed condemned to be always one step behind the scientists and their ever more amazing discoveries, whose principle it has strived arduously to discover ex post facto and to fit into some over-all interpretation of the human knowledge. (HC, 294) 39 The author of this formulation is Hobbes. Arendt however maintains that this definition is equally valid also for Descartes understanding of reason. (HC, 283) 40 Werner Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science (New York: Pantheon, 1952), 73. As quoted by Arendt, BPF, 277. 41 Werner Heisenberg, The Physicists Conception of Nature (New York: Hutchinson, 1958), 24. As quoted by Arendt, BPF, 277. 42 Political relevance of modern science is attested by the Cold War competition in scientific and technological development, most notably by the space race. The role of the space race, which started as an offshoot of the nuclear arms race, was largely symbolic. Its purpose was to demonstrate ones technological and potentially military superiority. Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of the conquest of the space transcends the framework of the Cold War and of power politics in general. The launch of Sputnik, which Arendt regards as one of the defining moments of the modern world, was greeted with enthusiasm by people around the world as a sign of the progress of mankind. 43 We should note that Arendt later qualifies this statement. Genuinely political action is still possible, although it is extremely rare an experience for the privileged few. (HC, 324) Arendts reflections on the possibility of political action in the modern world are discussed in Chapter 5. 44 Understood in its totality, the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production. It is not something added to the real world - not a decorative element, so to speak. On the contrary, it is the very heart of the societys unreal reality. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, (New York: Zone Books, 1995), 13. 45 Home to Roost was originally a speech delivered on the occasion of the bicentennial anniversary of American Independence. It was published in The New York Review of Books Vol. 22, No. 11 (June 26, 1975) and reprinted in RJ. Arendt discusses the role of advertisement and public relations also in Lying in Politics, The New York Review of Books Vol. 17, No. 8 (November 18, 1971), reprinted in CR. 46 The products needed for entertainment serve the life process of society, even though they may not be as necessary for this life as bread and meat. They serve, as the phrase is, to while away time, and the vacant time which is whiled away is not leisure time, strictly speaking time, that is, in which we are free from all cares and activities necessitated by the life process and therefore free for the world and its culture it is rather left-over time, which still is biological in nature, left over after labor and sleep have received their due. Vacant time, which entertainment is supposed to fill is a hiatus in the biologically conditioned cycle of labor in the metabolism of man with 113

nature, as Marx used to say. (BPF, 205) 47 The reigning economic system is founded on isolation; at the same time it is a circular process designed to produce isolation. Isolation underpins technology, and technology isolates in its turn; all goods propose by the spectacular system, from cars to televisions, also serve as weapons for that system as it strives to reinforce the isolation of the lonely crowd. (Debord, 22)

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Chapter 3: Nationalism and Identity Politics

As discussed above, Arendt uses the terms social and society in two distinct, albeit interrelated, meanings. On the one hand, she criticizes societys exclusive preoccupation with economic matters. On the other hand, she criticizes its conformity. I have argued that both the economic and the social aspect of society must be interpreted in light of Arendts characterization of the emergence of society as the rise of inherently private activities into the public sphere. Society in the economic sense, i.e. bourgeois or capitalist society, turns into public concern activities related to production. The conformist society, which originated as the good or high society at the courts of European absolute monarchs, most notably Versailles of Louis XIV, turns into public concern activities related to reproduction courtship, flirtation and intimate relations in general. The previous chapter was concerned primarily with the economic aspect of society. In this chapter, I would like to turn attention to the conformist or cultural aspect of society.

The high society is intrinsically hypocritical. It demands cultivation and adherence to highly sophisticated manners, which are valued exclusively for the external appearance of virtue. The society does not demand that the people actually be virtuous; it tacitly expects them to be selfish and morally corrupt and demands only external appearance of virtue. The hypocrisy of the high society was described and criticized by Rousseau in his Discourse on Arts and Sciences. Arendt criticizes Rousseaus rebellion against society as inherently a-political. By withdrawing to the intimacy of heart, Rousseau or modern man in general escapes the world and transforms the conflict between himself and society into an internal, emotional drama. Such escape from the world, according to Arendt, in effect perpetuates the conflict between individual and society and solidifies the social domination that provoked it. Modern individual can exist only in constant

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rebellion against society and society can effectively control only individuals preoccupied with their emotions, with their inner self.1 In his later political writings,2 Rousseau proposed also a political solution to the corruption of modern society. He would resolve the conflict between individual and society by voluntary subordinating the interests and wills of individuals to the common interest and will of the community. The subordination or, rather, identification of personal interest with the national interest, and the voluntary subjugation to the general will is based on emotional identification of oneself with ones nation. While Arendt agrees with Rousseaus diagnosis of the corruption and hypocrisy of modern society, she criticizes his solution of this problem. Arendt argues that Rousseaus turn to the emotional subject, just like Descartes turn to the rational subject, constitutes a turn away from the world. The flight into the intimacy of heart, according to her, contributes to modern mans world alienation. Rousseaus political solution, which requires voluntary submission to the general will and relies on emotional bonds between individual and community, is antithetical to Arendts understanding of politics. As I argued in the previous chapter, the demand of absolute loyalty and self-abrogation is typical for natural, as opposed to political, communities. According to Arendt, modern nation, as a sentimental community based on common origin, is a quasi-natural community, which is construed on the model of natural community par excellence of the family. (HC, 28) In the following pages, I will discuss Arendts criticism of both nationalism and of the modern turn to intimacy and emotions. Nationalism and Nation-State In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt distinguishes between civic3 nationalism, which developed in the nation-states of Western Europe, and tribal nationalism, which developed in ethnically mixed areas of Central and Eastern Europe. Arendt is clearly highly critical of the tribal nationalism, which she regards as destructive, essentially anti-political movement and a precursor 116

to totalitarianism. Her discussion of West-European civic nationalism and of the nation state, on the other hand, is cast in a much more positive light. Civic nationalism is essentially a form of modern, democratic patriotism, which provides the foundation for legitimacy of representative government. The notion of nation, as a self-aware culturally homogenous group united by common language, culture, history and political allegiance, provides basis for the unity of the body politic and helps to mitigate conflicts between social classes. It hence appears that Arendt regards civic nationalism as essentially positive phenomenon, as the opposite of the pathological tribal nationalism. (Or perhaps we should rather say that the pathological tribal nationalism is a perversion of the inherently positive civic nationalism.) Arendt also presents modern nation state, i.e. the political form that gave rise to, and was legitimized by, civic nationalism, in mostly positive light. Modern nation state, according to her, embodies the Enlightenments principles of equality and of the rule of law. Since the legitimacy of its government is based on the consent of citizens, nation state is ill suited for territorial expansion. The existence of strong nation-states therefore provided basis for stable and peaceful international order in 19th century Europe for the European system of nations, as Arendt calls it. The decline of the nation state and of the European system of nations, according to Arendt, coincided with the rise of totalitarianism. All of this seems to suggest that Arendt regards nation state and civic nationalism as essentially positive phenomena. As Margaret Canovan puts it, nation state is for Arendt an essentially humanist institution, a civilized structure providing a legal order and guaranteeing rights.4 As I shall argue, Arendts criticism of nationalism and of nation state is in fact much more thorough that Canovan suggests. While it is true that she discusses civic nationalism in much more positive terms than tribal nationalism, Arendt ultimately rejects nationalism in all forms. Similarly, while she recognizes that nation state played in some respects positive historical role,

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Arendts judgment of the nation state as a political form that embodies the principle of popular sovereignty is ultimately negative.

Arendts criticism of nationalism and of the nation state, as it is presented in The Origins of Totalitarianism, can be divided into three steps. First and most obviously, the model of the nation state is unsuitable for ethnically mixed areas. Second, tribal nationalism that developed in the ethnically mixed areas of Central and Eastern Europe is qualitatively different from WestEuropean civic nationalism. Third, the nation state has from its inception contained certain inherent tensions, which fully surfaced only after the whole European system of nation states had been shaken by World War I. It is in this third stage, that Arendts criticism of nationalism reaches the most fundamental level.5 The limitations of the nation state as a modern political form were first revealed in the aftermath of World War I, when the Habsburg, Ottoman and to a lesser extent Russian Empires were partitioned into new nation states. The attempt to organize ethnically mixed areas of Central and Eastern Europe according to the principle of national self-determination ended up quite predictably as a disaster. In spite of being ostentatiously organized on the principle of national self-determination, the newly established nation states inevitably contained numerous national minorities. The minorities, which in contrast to the state peoples of the new nation states did not attain statehood (e.g. Slovaks in Czechoslovakia or Croats and Slovenians in Yugoslavia) or ended up living in a different country than in their national homeland (e.g. Germans in Czechoslovakia or Poland) felt wronged and excluded from the body politic of the states they inhabited. Although members of the national minorities formally enjoyed full civil and political rights, they were treated as an alien element in the body politic of the nation. On the other hand, members of national minorities were often not loyal to their government and pursued secessionist policies. The newly established states could not have possibly functioned as nation 118

states; all of them, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, developed into authoritarian or semifascist regimes. The existence of national minorities was a constant source of tension and instability on the international level and contributed to the rise of Nazism in Germany and to the outbreak of World War II.

The ethnically mixed character of Central and Eastern Europe, which prevented successful development of nation states, gave also rise to a new type of nationalism to tribal nationalism. This new type of tribal nationalism, more or less characteristic of all Central and Eastern European nations and nationalities, was quite different in content and significance thought not in violence form Western nationalist excesses. (OT, 226) The key difference between the West-European civic nationalism and Central- and East-European tribal nationalism, is that the former is extroverted, concerned with visible spiritual and material achievements of the nation, while the latter is introverted, [and] concentrates on the individuals own soul which is considered as the embodiment of general national qualities. (227) West-European, in particular French nationalism developed as a form of democratic patriotism. Members of the nation were bound together by their common culture and history and, most importantly, by loyalty to the nation state, the formation of which preceded the rise of the national consciousness. Tribal nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe developed under radically different political conditions. It could not develop as a form of patriotism for the simple reason that it developed among peoples who did not live in a nation state. They inhabited either several different states (as Italians), lived in a multi-national state (as most nations within the Habsburg Empire), or as in the case of Germans or Poles belonged under both of these categories. Nationalism of these nations therefore did not develop a form of attachment to a body politic, but as attachment to the national community, which was defined primarily by kinship and language.

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Tribal nationalism defines nationality as a personal attribute rather than as membership in body politic. It construes nationality as innate identity, as an innate quality of the soul or body. While civic nationalism is based on the nations past achievements, on the common history, tribal nationalism is based on the notion of national destiny, on the projects that are to be completed by the nation in the future. Tribal nationalism typically develops the notion of exclusivity of ones own nation, which is perceived to be surrounded by the world of enemies. (227) Notions of exclusivity of ones own nation and of the national destiny lend tribal nationalism certain messianic quality. Pan-Slavism and to a lesser extent pan-Germanism then developed explicit religious theories about the divine chosenness of their nation. These pseudo-religious theories, as Arendt observes, contradict the Jewish-Christian faith in the divine origin of Man and especially the Christian belief in the equality of men in the eyes of their Creator. Man, according to these theories, has divine value only as long as he belongs to the people singled out for divine origin. (223) Tribal nationalisms conviction about the exceptionality of ones own people found its expression not only in the form of quasi-religious theories about divine chosenness of Slavs or Germans but also in racist theories, which attribute the special national qualities to bodies, rather than souls of the members of the chosen nation. The conviction about exceptionality of ones own nation contradicts not just the JudeoChristian teaching about the divine origin of man, but also the liberal principle of intrinsic dignity and equality of all human beings. This is no coincidence, as tribal nationalism developed in opposition to liberal individualism and egalitarianism. West-European civic nationalism, which developed as a form of democratic patriotism, played a positive stabilizing role in both domestic and international politics. On the other hand tribal nationalism, which developed in ethnically mixed areas of Central and Eastern Europe, is inherently destabilizing. It demands creation of new states on the basis of national self-determination. Creation of such new states would inevitably require breaking up of existing political entities, their merging, or both. In ethnically 120

mixed areas, such demands for national self-determination inevitably engender inter-ethnic conflicts.

Arendts distinction between civic and tribal nationalism helps to elucidate some peculiarities of the national development in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, Arendt tends to overemphasize the differences between the two types of nationalism, obscuring what they have in common. Indeed, practically all nationalisms she classifies as tribal bear some characteristics of civic nationalism. West European nationalisms, on the other hand, possess attributes of tribal nationalism. Central and East-European nationalisms did not develop in pre-existing nation states and therefore could not have evolved into patriotism. Nevertheless, they legitimized the struggle for the creation of new nation states or for some other form of national emancipation (for example in the form of cultural and political autonomy). While it is true that one form of nationalism played primarily stabilizing and the other destabilizing political role, both developed as ideologies legitimizing the nation sate. Both forms of nationalism also perceive the nation as a community of people united not only by the existence of, or desire for, the nation state, but also by common language, culture and history. Arendts claim that the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe did not have common culture and therefore could be united only by a common language or by the nebulous national soul (231) makes no sense in the case of German or Italian nationalisms. Even the smaller peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, who in contrast with Germans or Italians might not had developed high culture, had distinct popular culture and aspired to develop high culture of their own. The differences between West-European nationalisms and nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe were caused mainly by the different historical circumstances under which these nationalisms evolved. West European nationalism could have developed as a form of patriotism only because the existence of the nation state preceded the formation of the nation. The French 121

had constituted a political community long before they started thinking about themselves as a people or a nation in the modern sense. France existed in more or less stable boundaries for centuries and its inhabitants of all estates gradually developed loyalty to the king and to the country. The long and continuous existence of France within stable boundaries also led to cultural and linguistic homogenization. Both processes were accelerated by the creation of modern centralized state under absolute monarchy, which thus prepared ground not only for the creation of the nation state, but also for the emancipation of the nation. Central- and East-European nationalisms developed under different historical conditions. The nations (or peoples) in Central, Eastern, but also Southern Europe did not develop in the pre-existing political communities for the simple reason that their territorial boundaries did not coincide with the political boundaries. This is a consequence of the different historical development of Holy Roman Empire and adjacent areas most notably of the absence of large and powerful monarchies and constantly shifting borders. The Habsburg Empire was originally a collection of various kingdoms, principalities and other domains, which were united only by the ruling dynasty. (The Habsburgs for instance ruled in the Czech Kingdom as Czech kings, in Hungary as kings of Hungary, etc.) It was only during the eighteenth century when the Habsburgs started transforming their empire into a unified absolutist monarchy. The Habsburg Empire, however, could not develop into a nation state, because it lacked a linguistically and culturally homogenized population.6 **** Central- and Eastern- European nationalisms invariably contained a political, or civic, dimension. More importantly for the present discussion, West-European civic nationalisms contained a tribal dimension. In the third stage of her critique of nationalism, Arendt argues that every nationalism has a tribal core. In the last and most fundamental stage of her critique of nationalism, Arendt turns to the origins of modern nationalism and modern nation state. She argues that both modern nation state and modern nationalism originated in the French Revolution. After the Revolution, 122

the nation in effect replaced the monarch as a symbol of the unity and common interest of the country. The only remaining bond between the citizens of a nation-state without a monarch to symbolize their essential community, seemed to be national, that is, common origin. So that in a century when every class and section in population was dominated by class or group interest, the interest of the nation as a whole was supposedly guaranteed in a common origin, which sentimentally expressed itself in nationalism. (OT, 230) Nationalism was hence born as a sentimental unity of people who were connected by their common origin, that is by common blood. The sentimental nature of nationalism as well as the construction of nation as an organic community of people united by common blood suggests that nationalism is as a quasi-natural, rather than political community. Apart from that, the notion of the popular sovereignty is incompatible with truly political community, as Arendt understands it. Political community, according to Arendt, is a community of free and equal citizens, which excludes the division between the rulers and the ruled, as well as the very notion of rule or domination. The French Revolution, according to Arendt, deposed the king but failed to transform the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, between government and the nation. (OR, 74) It did not establish a government of the people or by the people, but at best for the people, and at a worst a usurpation of sovereign power by self-styled representatives of the people. (74) The notion of popular sovereignty, according to Arendt, emerged as a substitute of the non-existent common interest of the people and its self-styled representatives. During the first stage of the Revolution, the interests of the people and of its self-styled representatives, that is of the leaders of the Revolution, were united by the common cause by the struggle against absolutism. The unity of interests between the people and its representatives according to Arendt disappeared during the second stage of the Revolution, which started when the poor, driven by the need of their bodies, burst on the scene of the French Revolution. (59) During the second stage, the Revolution became concerned with social as opposed to political objectives. The welfare of the 123

people replaced political freedom as the ultimate aim of the Revolution. Arendt argues that during this second stage of Revolution, the common interest between people and its representatives came to be replaced by a kind of political virtue. The notion of the sovereign will of the people, which after the Revolution replaced the sovereign will of the absolutist monarch as the source of both political power and of all laws, (156) according to Arendt emerged as a substitute of the common interest of the people and of their self-styled representatives. This virtue, however, was not Roman, it did not aim at the res publica and had nothing to do with freedom. Virtue meant to have the welfare of the people in mind, to identify ones own will with the will of the people il faut une volont UNE and this effort was directed primarily by the happiness of many. (OR, 75) Rousseaus notion of the general will, according to Arendt, proved to be ingenious instrument that enabled the Revolution to preserve the relationship between the government and the people. The general will in effect replaced the will of the absolutist sovereign as the source of both political power and of all laws. (157) The principle of popular sovereignty, according to Arendt, prevailed only after the Girondins had failed to produce a constitution and to establish a republican government. The Jacobins, under the leadership of Robespierre were moved by compassion for the people, and believed in the people rather than in the republic. Robespierre, as Arendt points out, insisted that under the new constitution, the laws were to be promulgated in the name of the French people, instead of the French Republic. (OR, 75) Promulgation of the principle of popular sovereignty by the Jacobins prevented the formation of republic or of any lawful government and opened the doors to Terror. Arendt argues that the source of legitimacy in republican government is the consent of the citizens. The Revolution, according to her replaced the notion of consent with its overtones of deliberate choice and considered opinion with the notion of general will, which essentially excludes all processes of exchange of opinions and an eventual agreement between them. (76) While the notion of 124

consent presupposes plurality of citizens, the notion of general will presupposes unity of the people or the nation. Needles to say, the very notion of the people as a single entity endowed with will, denies the plurality of citizens, which is according to Arendt the very foundation of freedom and politics. The notion of national unity and the requirement that the nation be guided by a single will, according to Arendt, originated in the area of international relations. Only in the presence of the enemy can such a thing as la nation une et indivisible, the ideal of French and of all other nationalisms, come to pass. (OR, 77) Rousseau, according to Arendt, wanted to discover a unifying principle within the nation itself that would be valid for domestic politics as well. (OR, 78) To do so, he had to discover or invent a common national enemy within the nation itself. Rousseau discovered such common enemy not just within the nation, but within each individual citizen. The common enemy of the nation and its single interest and will is nothing else than the particular will and interest of each and every citizen. Rousseau and Robespierre (who in the French Revolution attempted to apply Rousseaus political thought to practice), according to Arendt, in effect transformed political conflict with a common national enemy into an internal, essentially moral conflict between selflessness and selfishness. If only each particular man rises against himself in his particularity, he will be able to arouse in himself his own antagonist, the general will, and thus he will become a true citizen of the national body politic. . To partake in the body politic of the nation, each national must rise and remain in constant rebellion against himself. (OR, 79) **** Arendt argues that Rousseaus transformation of a political conflict into an internal, moral conflict was strongly influenced by the Christian tradition. The foundation of Rousseaus and Robespierres republican virtue is the passion of compassion, which is related to the Christian principle of active goodness.7 Arendt regards active goodness as the central principle of the authentic teaching of Jesus of Nazareth as opposed to Christian religion into which it was

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transformed by St. Paul. Arendt is a great admirer of Jesus and regards Christian faith, which becomes manifest in good deeds, as a form of human freedom.8 Nevertheless, she maintains that Christian goodness cannot become a principle of political action. Goodness as a consistent way of life, is not only impossible within the confines of the public realm, it is even destructive of it. (H C, 77) The principle of active goodness, according to her, is inherently anti-political because of its absolute nature.9 Active goodness is absolute and unconditional and as such transcends secular justice, which is necessarily imperfect, as it relies on human institutions. During the French Revolution, the compassion with the immense suffering of the poor led the Jacobins to demand absolute justice, and to disregard the rule of law. The quasi-religious passion of the Jacobins, which led to the demands for absolute justice and consequently to the reign of terror, was also inspired by the originally Christian concept of free will. Free will was, according to Arendt, discovered by St. Paul and did not form part of the original teaching of Jesus. Nonetheless, it became one of the founding stones of the Christian religion, as it was founded by St. Paul. Freedom of the free will is internal freedom, which is, according to Arendt, the very opposite of political freedom. (BPF, 146) Arendt explains that St. Paul discovered this internal freedom in the conflict between the law of God in his inmost self and the law of his members that tells him to do what in his inmost self he hates. (LMII, 68) This internal conflict, according to Arendt, differs from the conflict between the reason and the passions, which had been well known to the ancient philosophers. While the ancients regarded the conflict between reason and passions as a conflict between two distinct faculties, for Paul or Augustine, the conflict takes place within the faculty of will. What was unknown to antiquity was not that there is a possible I-know-but-I will-not, but that I-will and I-can are not the same noc hoc est velle, quod posse. (BPF, 159) The will, as Paul discovered, is always divided. It wills and nills at the same time. The object of the free will is will itself; to be free in this context means to will what one knows to be good. 126

While Jesus emphasized active goodness, that is performing good deeds, Paul shifted the emphasis from doing to believing and from external compliance with the law to the internalization of the law. The Old Law said though shalt do; the New Law says: though shalt will. (LMII, 68) Rousseau, according to Arendt, transformed the originally religious notion of free will into politics by defining civil freedom as voluntary submission to the general will. [T]he nation has usurped the traditional place of God and religion.10 General will in Rousseaus scheme in effect replaced Pauls divine law as a commandment that must not only be obeyed but also internalized and willed. The question of political loyalty was thus transformed into a moral question concerning not only ones acts, but ones will and even ones identity. The terror of the Jacobins was aimed against the vices of selfishness and hypocrisy. Jacobins were concerned not only with the overt acts but also with the motivations of the alleged traitors. The problem is that the innermost motives of our actions remain by definition hidden; according to Arendt, they are hidden not only from others, but often even from the agent himself. (OR, 98) The innermost motivations stem from darkness of heart and the actor himself is aware of them as passions or emotions. Passions and emotions, however, can be communicated only indirectly, and whenever they are communicated, they are transformed into mere appearances behind which again other, ulterior motives, may lurk, such as hypocrisy and deceit. (96) The hunt for hypocrisy, which demands that everyone reveal the motives of their actions, therefore begets both actual and suspected hypocrisy.

Emotions and Subjectivity While Rousseaus understanding of freedom is heavily influenced by the Christian tradition, his philosophy as a whole is distinctly modern. Rousseau identifies passions, in particular the passion 127

of compassion, as the source of natural goodness of man and the foundation of political virtue. On the other hand, he identifies reason as the source of human selfishness. Rousseaus turn from reason to passions, which is at the same time a turn from society to individual and from civilization to nature, must be interpreted as a part of the modern rebellion against the authority of tradition. Since the notion of natural goodness of man contradicts the Christian doctrine of the original sin, Rousseaus rebellion against reason is aimed not just against the tradition of Greek philosophy, but also against the Christian tradition. Arendt argues that Rousseaus turn towards passions and especially his foundation of political virtue on the passion of compassion had detrimental political consequences. Compassion, that is the feeling of co-suffering aroused by someone elses suffering, abolishes the distance between individuals and in effect collapses the worldly space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located. (OR, 86) Whenever compassion becomes a spring of action, it lends its voice to the suffering itself, which must claim for swift and violent action, that is for action with the means of violence. (OR, 87) The immediacy of the suffering, which demands immediate relief by any means necessary, also leads to insensitivity towards worldly reality. The boundlessness of his emotions, which were aroused by the boundlessness of the suffering of the masses, turned Robespierre insensitive to reality in general and to the reality of persons in particular.11 (90)

Although emotions can become a spring of a blind and violent action, they are inherently apolitical, because they make us blind to the worldly reality. When we get involved with our emotions, we become absorbed in ourselves and the common world ceases to exist for us. Indeed, one could say that the sphere of intimacy and emotions provides us with a refuge from the public world. Arendt, however, argues that the modern turn to emotions and intimacy is already a reaction to the loss of an authentic public world. 128

The decisive historical fact is that modern privacy in its most relevant function, to shelter the intimate, was discovered as the opposite not of the political sphere but of the social, to which it is therefore most closely and authentically related. (HC, 38) The sphere of emotions and intimacy was discovered by Rousseau in the course of his rebellion against societys unbearable perversion of the human heart, its intrusion upon an innermost region in man which until then had needed no special protection. (HC, 39) As discussed above, Rousseau rebelled against conformity and hypocrisy of the good or high society, which originated in the courts of absolute monarchs. In Arendts words conformist society intrudes upon mans innermost region and corrupts the human heart because it turns intimate relations in the form of courtship and flirtation into a public concern, into a tool of social advancement. Arendt agrees with Rousseaus criticism of the hypocrisy and conformism of society, which, as she puts it, leads to unbearable perversion of the human heart. (39) Nevertheless, she maintains that the withdrawal to the heart and to intimacy, which is a turn away from the world, confirms and further intensifies modern world alienation. If we put it in Foucaults terms, we could say that the turn towards intimacy, which originated as the modern individuals revolt against society, becomes integrated into the very power mechanism against which it revolts. According to Arendt, the modern individual was born in this rebellion of the heart (39) against conformist society and his existence, qua modern individual, presupposes the existence of society against which he rebels. Conversely, modern society with its system of domination presupposes the existence of modern individuals. Conformist society can effectively control only individuals preoccupied with their emotions, with their internal self. Arendt points out that to Rousseau the social and the intimate were subjective and we could also say mutually complementary modes of human existence. (39) Arendt rejects Rousseaus assumption that the internal, emotional self, represents some authentic, true and unique self. She argues that the emotional self, which is created, rather than 129

discovered by introspection by observing of and lingering in ones own emotions is utterly amorphous and fluid and lacks any connection with worldly reality. Introspection isolates individual from reality and gives him the dubious freedom of shaping and reshaping his emotional self in whatever way he may fancy. Worldly reality real events and other people are for such introspection just insignificant details that provide setting for the drama of ones emotions. In his Confessions, which are the greatest example of such introspection, Rousseau creates his emotional self by recounting not the story of his life, but his past emotions. His own life acquires reality only in the course of confessing it, only in recollections of emotions which he had at some time. Not the emotion, but narrated emotions can alone convince and overwhelm the hypochondriac. (RV, 98) Arendt argues that by recounting his emotional memories, Rousseau secures power and autonomy of [his] soul, however he secures them only at the price of truth. for without reality shared with other human beings, truth loses all meaning. Introspection and its hybrids engender mendacity.12 (91) Rousseau, according to Arendt, correctly identified certain political detrimental tendencies of modern society; nevertheless, he misinterpreted them as signs of self-alienation, while they were in fact signs of world-alienation. (BPF, 199) He located the alienated or lost authentic self in the heart and searched for his own self by introspection. Doing so, he only further strengthened his alienation from the world and lost the sense of reality of both the world, and the self. For Arendt, our sense of reality of both the external world and of ourselves arises out of common, political space, in which we interact and communicate with others. We become what we are not through introspection, but through action in the public realm. Resistance against social domination, according to Arendt, must be political resistance aimed at recovery of the public, political world. The problem of modern man is not self-alienation, as Rousseau and Marx believed, but world-alienation. To regain our selves, to return meaning to our lives, we must first regain the public, political world. The struggle against social domination 130

must be motivated not by the concern for our innermost selves or our personal or group identity, but by concern for the common world, for the common political realm. **** Arendts rejection of the modern turn towards emotions and her claim that we can become unique individuals only through political action seem to suggest that Arendts understanding of human existence is exceedingly narrow and one-dimensional. One could also dispute her assertion that the Greeks banished all activities pertaining to the biological dimension of human existence to the privacy of the household. This claim simply ignores the existence and political importance of homosexual love in ancient Greece. Indeed it seems that Arendt, who would banish intimacy to the darkness of the household and who likens our feelings, passions and emotions to our internal organs (LMI, 31), to the biological substratum of our life that is inherently repulsive, ugly and unworthy of daily light, embraces a kind of dualism, which is reminiscent of Platonic dualism of body and soul. It appears that biological life, or zo, is for Arendt a mere substratum of the truly human life, or bios. Nevertheless, Arendt does not flatly deny the significance of passions, feelings and emotions. On the contrary, she argues that feelings, passions and emotions are along with the physical sensations as hunger or pain the most acute and intimate manifestations of our life itself. The heart has been traditionally described as the seat not only of our emotions, but also of our soul, of the very essence of our being. In accordance with this tradition, Arendt interprets passions, feelings and emotions as movements or indeed expressions of our soul, as manifestations of the reality of our life itself.13 Nevertheless, we should note that the reality of life, which asserts itself through feelings, passions and emotions, pertains to life on the biological level, to zoe, rather than bios. The reality of bios, of our life as unique persons, is constituted as worldly reality by our appearance in the public world.

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Following Aristotle, Arendt distinguishes between soul and mind. As she explains in The Life of the Mind, Aristotle associated soul, but not mind, with body and bodily life. According to Aristotle there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without the body, e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. [To be active without involving the body] seems rather a property of the mind [noein].14 According to Aristotle, the soul, comes to being in embryo without prior existing outside of it, but mind (nous) enters the soul from outside and has no connection with the body.15 Arendt agrees with Aristotle and argues (quoting MarleauPonty) that the soul is anchored in the body. (LMI, 33) Mind, on the other hand, originates outside of the body. Thinking always take place in speech and speech originates in inter-personal communication. The mind is for Arendt essentially inter-subjective and as such transcends the subjectivity of the bodily life. Inter-subjectivity of speech is also a precondition of political freedom and of the existence of the public realm. By identifying the soul, that is the very essence of life, with the bodily life, Arendt indicates that bodily life is more significant than the above outlined dualistic scheme suggests. While she maintains that passions and emotions are not fit for public display and should remain hidden, she also argues that they are the innermost motivations of our actions. The heroes we admire would not have committed their heroic deeds, had they not been motivated by passions.16 Passions and emotions are indispensable not only for active life, but also for the life of the mind. In her tribute to Heideggers eightieth birthday, Arendt recalls that Heidegger taught her how to think passionately. (MH80) We could add that Arendts own political thought, which stems from her love of the world, is also highly passionate.

In spite of lamenting primarily the disappearance of the political realm in modernity, Arendt does recognize the importance of passions and emotions and consequently also the value of the private and intimate life. The darkness of household in ancient Greece performed an 132

indispensable positive function by protecting a sphere of privacy from the intrusive light of the public realm. Arendt seems to agree with the Romans who, unlike the Greeks, never sacrificed the private to the public, but on the contrary understood that these two realms can exist only in the form of coexistence. (HC, 59) A life spent entirely in the public, in the presence of others, would become, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense. (HC, 71) According to Arendt, both public and private realms are necessary preconditions of freedom. We could say that each of the two realms gives rise to a different aspect of political freedom. Within the public realm, the citizens can take part in public affairs by acting among their equals. The private sphere of the household, on the other hand, provides them with not only economic, but also personal independence. It shelters the private sphere, within which they are their own masters and can do as they please without having to give account for their actions to anybody. Arendts notion of privacy, which reminds of an English Common Law notion of privacy, provides an important correlative to her understanding of public or active aspect of political freedom. According to Arendt, modern society, which turns private activities into a matter of public concern, encroaches upon this right of privacy and destroys the personal independence, which is an important aspect of freedom. Arendts acknowledgement of the importance of privacy and of the internal, emotional life contrasts sharply with her steadfast refusal to elaborate upon the subject she deemed unsuitable for public discussion. Arendts silence on the subject of passions and emotions must be interpreted in the light of her criticism of the modern turn towards subjectivity. While she regards the nearly complete destruction of privacy under the conditions of mass society, which leads to the mass phenomenon of loneliness, (HC, 59) as one of the gravest and most dehumanizing consequences of world alienation, she believes that to focus primarily on these consequences of

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world-alienation would be counterproductive. Resistance against world-alienation, according to Arendt, must be driven by concern for the common world, not for private happiness. While she shared many views and goals with the New Left, Arendt criticized its focus on the private happiness as counter-productive. Arendt maintains that private happiness, which is rooted in the biological dimension of human life, is fundamentally a-political. Politicizing private happiness is not only counter-productive, but also potentially dangerous. It leads to sentimentalization of politics and1 to construing of political community as a quasi-natural, sentimental community. Such sentimentalization of politics, which is also the basis of nationalism, in effect effaces the plurality of actors, which is the condition of political freedom.

The Jewish Question Our discussion of Arendts criticism of nationalism would be incomplete without considering her understanding of anti-Semitism and of the Jewish question in general. For Arendt, the Jewish question was at once a political and a personal question. We could also say that Arendt became interested in politics at the moment when the Jewish question became indisputably political with the rise of the Nazis to power. It is because she was Jewish that Arendt, after 1933, could no longer remain indifferent to politics. Arendts turn to politics was, at least initially, a turn away from philosophy and from theoretical life in general. Appalled by the willingness of German intellectuals to co-ordinate themselves with the Nazi regime, Arendt decided to never again get involved in any kind of intellectual business (EU, 11) and became engaged in practical, political matters. As she explains in an interview with Gnter Gaus, she also realized that [i]f one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as a world citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man. (12) This conclusion may seem, in the light of the preceding discussion of Arendts views on ethnicity and politics, as somewhat surprising. In spite of her criticism of nationalism, Arendt does 134

acknowledge that ones naturally given ethnic identity may have political significance and cannot be simply dissolved in the name of strictly political citizenship. When she made her decision to abandon the world of intellectuals, Arendt decided to get actively engaged in specifically Jewish politics. Before she left Germany, she worked for a short time as a researcher for a Zionist organization and after her emigration she continued in practical work for Jewish and Zionist organizations in Geneva and later in Paris.17 Arendts resolve not to get involved in any kind of intellectual business did not last for very long. While she remained interested in politics for the rest of her life, her interest became primarily theoretical. But even after her active engagement in politics was replaced by theorizing about politics, Arendt remained preoccupied also with the Jewish question.

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt describes anti-Semitism as one of the constitutive elements of totalitarianism. She argues that just as totalitarianism is a completely new type of political regime, rather than a modern version of tyranny, anti-Semitism as a secular nineteenthcentury ideology (OT, xi) is a new, typically modern political pathology, rather than a modern version of traditional religious anti-Judaism. The genesis of anti-Semitism, according to Arendt, is closely related to the development of modern nation state. The nation state, which was based on the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, granted full civil and political rights to the Jews. Legally speaking, the Jews ceased to exists as a special group within the body politic. The legal and political emancipation of the Jews was however not matched by their social integration. The Jews did not become integrated into any of the existing social classes, nor were they accepted as a class of their own. Within the nation state, they existed as a special group that was never fully integrated into the society. Arendt explains the failure of the Jews to achieve social emancipation or integration by a confluence of two factors. On the one hand, the state had a vested interest in the continued 135

existence of Jews as a separate group. On the other hand, the Jewish elite itself opposed emancipation. The state relied on the Jewish bankers, who provided it with much needed financial services. The choice of the Jewish financiers was determined not only by the fact that the Jews had been traditionally engaged in money lending, but also by the reluctance of the bourgeoisie to finance the state. The special relationship between the Jews and the state at first concerned only a very narrow group of court Jews who financed the absolute monarchs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The court Jews were granted various privileges and enjoyed notable political influence. This situation changed after the French Revolution. The growing financial needs of the governments could no longer be satisfied by individual court Jews but only by combined wealth of the wealthier strata of Western and Central European Jewry, which they entrusted to some prominent Jewish bankers for such purpose. (15) The privileges that had been previously granted only to the court Jews, were consequently extended to all wealthy Jews and eventually replaced by emancipation edicts. This new development affected the situation of the Jews of Western and Central Europe as a people. It led to their civil and political emancipation, which however was not accompanied by social emancipation or assimilation. It also led to internationalization of Jewish financial operations and to the establishment of European Jewry as a trans-national people. The new position of the Jews was symbolized by the House of Rothschilds, who established themselves in five different countries and, to some extent, monopolized the issuance of government loans. The Jews occupied a special position not only within individual nation states, but as the only non-national people also within the European system of nation states. Their existence as a transnational people was, until a certain moment, useful both for the individual national governments and for the stability of international order. European governments made use not only of the intraEuropean resources of Jewish bankers, but also used Jews with their international connections as diplomatic middlemen and advisors. The special position of the Jews, however, made them 136

vulnerable and became a source of anti-Semitism. The Jews were the only group within the nation state, which was not defined by its relations with other groups or classes but by its relations with the state. Consequently, they became to some extent identified with the state and each class of the society that came into conflict with the state turned its rage against the Jews. (25) The fact that the Jews formed a transnational group, which was symbolized by the Rotschilds, fed anti-Semitic theories about international Jewish conspiracy. Needless to say, no such conspiracy existed. More than two thousand years of life in the Diaspora shaped Jews into a decisively a-political nation. The Jews, who had always looked up to the rulers for protection, served the European governments obligingly as bankers or advisors without having any political ambitions of their own. While the special position of Jews within the nation state ultimately became the source of anti-Semitism, it also provided certain protection against it. Insofar as the state needed Jews, it was willing to protect them. Anti-Semitism was also held in check by the legal institutions of the nation state. By the time the Jews lost their privileged position within the state, the rule of law was being challenged by the same forces, which gave rise to virulent anti-Semitism. The rise of anti-Semitism, as well as the decline of the nation state and destabilization of international order, were, according to Arendt, caused by the rise of imperialism. As discussed above, Arendt maintains that imperialism was caused by the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie.18 Political emancipation of the bourgeoisie also ended the Jewish monopoly for the issuance of government loans and led to the decline of influence and power of the Jewish bankers. The rise of the most virulent anti-Semitism with its theories about international Jewish conspiracy thus coincided with the decline of Jewish power and influence. (OT, 4)

The emergence of virulent racial anti-Semitism, which eventually became the cornerstone of Nazi ideology, would not have been possible without social anti-Semitism, which prevented the 137

social emancipation or assimilation of the Jews. According to Arendt, social discrimination against the Jews was a direct consequence of their legal and political emancipation: political discrimination developed because the Jews were a separate body, while social discrimination arose because of the growing equality of Jews with all other groups. (54) Arendt argues that political equality, that is the equality of citizens as citizens, is a necessary pre-requisite of justice and political freedom. Nevertheless, under modern conditions the principle of political equality gets easily perverted into the requirement of actual equality or normalcy of every individual. Society regards with suspicion any diversion from the perceived standard of normalcy and classifies those who in some respect differ from the majority as abnormal. (OT, 54; Cf. HC, 42) Political emancipation of the Jews was therefore accompanied by the growth of anti-Jewish social discrimination. Even the advocates of Jewish emancipation called at the same time for their assimilation, which they considered either a preliminary condition to Jewish emancipation or its automatic consequence. (OT, 56) In order to gain equal rights, the Jews were supposed to become educated, to get rid of their otherness, that is to say of their Jewishness. That, however, proved practically impossible. The Jews could not simply renounce their Jewish identity and become normal members of the society. No matter what they did, society identified them as Jews. Even baptized or secularized Jews, who had cut themselves completely from the Jewish religion, community, and culture, continued to be identified as Jews. Jewish otherness was not only a source of resentment but also of certain attraction. It was perceived not only as hostile, but also as interesting and exotic. Nineteenth century Romanticism perceived the Jews as an exotic nation, as new specimens of humanity. While society discriminated against the Jews in general, it was willing to accept certain exceptional Jews. In order to gain social acceptance, the Jews were supposed to become educated, to adapt the standards of the Gentile society and differentiate themselves from the uneducated Jewish 138

masses. At the same time, however, they were supposed to remain Jewish, to retain their exotic otherness, which after all was the only reason they were being accepted into society. While the perplexing demand to be and yet not to be Jews (OT, 56) was addressed only to the minority of Jews who actually strived to be accepted by the high society, in the long run it affected the situation of Jews in general. It affected the behavior pattern of Jewish elites and the cohesion of the Jews as a people, but it also led to the construction of new Jewish stereotypes and autostereotypes, to a new construction of Jewishness. The demand to be and yet not to be Jews was both perplexing and demoralizing. The parvenus, as Arendt calls the Jews who strived for social acceptance, were supposed to dissociate themselves from the Jewish people and at the same time to play the role of exemplary Jews, of representatives of an interesting, yet exotic, and hence essentially alien, tribe. They had to demonstrate their Jewishness, which came to be construed as an inherent, hereditary psychological trait, as a matter of personal identity. The parvenus and the Jews in general, according to Arendt, internalized this notion of Jewishness as a racially determined personal identity. This development was linked to the disintegration of traditional Jewish communities, which used to be held together not only by religion, but also by cultural, economic, and quasipolitical ties. One could say that the real Jewish community was in effect replaced by a fictional community of blood, in other words by race. This development secularized the religious conception of Jews as the chosen people and transformed it into a racial notion of Jews as a chosen race. Perhaps the most successful of all Jewish parvenus, Benjamin Disraeli, actually persuaded himself that Jews secretly rule the world and created a full-blown racist theory about the supremacy of the Jewish race. This development gave rise to Jewish chauvinism which bears almost all the traits of Central and Eastern-European tribal nationalism. Construction of Jewishness as an inherent, racially determined personal identity, according to Arendt, distinguishes modern anti-Semitism from traditional religious anti-Judaism. Arendt 139

argues that modern anti-Semitism, transformed the crime of Judaism into the vice of Jewishness. This transformation proved to be fatal. Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness [as a hereditary vice] there was no escape. A crime, moreover, is met with punishment; a vice can only be exterminated. (OT, 87) Modern anti-Semitism defines Jewishness as a biologically determined psychological trait, which does not depend on ones voluntary acts or beliefs and that cannot be changed. Anti-Semites hate Jews not for what they do or what they believe in but for what they are namely Jews. Since Jewishness is a racially given identity, it can be exterminated only by exterminating the Jews.

Arendts interpretation of anti-Semitism evolves around two central themes. On one hand, she argues that modern anti-Semitism is radically different from traditional religious antiSemitism. On the other hand, she argues that the Jews were in part responsible for their fate. Arendt blames the nineteenth century Jewish elites for their utter lack of political responsibility, which not only failed to prevent or counter the rise of anti-Semitism, but inadvertently contributed to its development. While political ambition and responsibility have never been traits of modern Jewish elites, the parvenus proved to be even less responsible than the previous generations of privileged Jews. The court Jews and Jewish financiers of the previous eras also lived in isolation from the wider Jewish community; nevertheless, they performed the role of its patrons and protectors. The parvenus, on the other hand, lost the desire to rule the less privileged Jews, as well as the sense of political responsibility for their fate. By accepting the notion of Jewishness as racially determined identity and by developing Jewish chauvinism with its racial theories, the Jews in effect accepted the role the anti-Semites ascribed to them. The Jews were the one perfect example of a people in the tribal sense, their organization the model the pan-movements were trying to emulate, their survival and their supposed power the best proof of the correctness of racial theories. (239) Racial anti-Semitism 140

became a key component of tribal nationalism because the Jews were perceived as an example of a people in the tribal sense that the nationalists wanted to emulate; as the chosen people they at the same time provoked jealousy and hatred of the nationalists who claimed divined chosenness for their nations. When the pan-Germanic anti-Semites and later on the Nazis ascribed to Jews the desire to rule the world, they were in effect projecting their own desires.19 **** In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt criticizes the Jewish elites for their lack of solidarity with and political responsibility for the Jewish people. One would therefore expect Arendt to be a staunch supporter of the Jewish national political movement that emerged at the end of nineteenth century of Zionism. Arendt had friends among the Zionists and during the war she briefly worked for the movement. Nevertheless, she did not consider herself a Zionist and eventually became very critical of certain aspects of Zionism. Zionism, which emerged as a kind of counterideology, [as] the answer to anti-Semitism (OT, xv) according to Arendt developed into a kind of a tribal nationalism. Arendt argues that Herzls nationalism was inspired by German, as opposed to French sources. (JP, 172) Herzl, according to her, did not think in term of universal principles that inspired the French Revolution, but in terms of nations, which he understood as organic bodies unified by a common enemy. (JP, 148) Herzl did not oppose the principle of antiSemitism; in his own words he understood the anti-Semites because he regarded inter-ethnic hostility as a natural phenomenon. (JP, 165) According to Arendt Herzls solution to antiSemitism, the creation of a Jewish national state, is in the final analysis not a solution to, but an escape from anti-Semitism. Arendt contrasts Herzls Zionism with that of Bernard Lazare. Like Herzl, Lazare was turned into a conscious Jew and a Zionist by anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, his response to anti-Semitism was radically different from Herzls. In contrast to Herzl, he rejected the persecution not only of

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Jews but of all oppressed peoples as a matter of principle. The territorial question or the creation of Jewish national state was only of secondary importance to Lazare. What he sought was not an escape from anti-Semitism but a mobilization of the people against tits foes.. The consequence of this attitude was that he did not look around for more or less anti-Semitic protectors but for real comrades-in-arms, whom he hopped to find among the oppressed groups of contemporary Europe. (JP, 128) Arendt is clearly a champion of Lazares, as opposed to Herzls, Zionism. During the War, she criticized the Zionist leaders for their reliance on the great powers, for their exclusive focus on the establishment of a Jewish nation state in Palestine, as well as for their organic Herzlian nationalism. She advocated the creation of a Jewish army that would fight against Hitler alongside the Allies and hoped for the creation of a Jewish national homeland as a part of a Federation of European Peoples after the War20. Arendt gave up the hope for such a European solution of the Jewish question after the full extent of the Jewish tragedy had become clear. Nevertheless, she remained very critical of the project of the creation of the Jewish nation state in Palestine. In a 1945 article Zionism Reconsidered21 she criticized the 1944 resolution of the American Zionist Organization that called for the creation of a Jewish state on the entire territory of Palestine. The failure of the resolution to even mention the Palestinian Arabs, according to Arendt, implied that they would have to chose between voluntary emigration and second class citizenship. (JP, 131) The resolution in effect confirmed the victory of Herzls chauvinistic tribal nationalism. Arendt predicted that a Jewish state in Palestine would have to constantly struggle with the oppressed Arab population within its borders, as well as with the neighboring Arab countries. She also argued that the survival of the Jewish state s would depend on protection by one of the great powers most likely the United States. As Benhabib points out, Arendt in effect anticipated the post-1968 development of the American Middle-Eastern policy.22 Arendt opposed not just the radical and chauvinistic demand for creation of a single Jewish state on the territory of the whole Palestine, but also the plan for a two state solution. Partition, in

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her opinion, could not solve any of the problems posed by the plan for the creation of a single Jewish state on the territory of entire Palestine. Instead, she supported the position held by a minority of advocates of Jewish-Arab co-operation such as Jehuda Magnes. Magnes and other moderates supported the creation of a bi-national state on federal basis. Arendt continued to support this position even after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 in her essays To Save the Jewish Homeland and Peace or Armistice in the Near East?.23 Arendts criticism of Zionism and her support for the creation of a bi-national state, in which Jews and Arabs would participate in politics through the Jewish-Arab community councils have been interpreted24 as a proof of her lack of realism. History, or so the argument goes, proved Arendt wrong. Israel as a Jewish state has not only survived for more than fifty years but prospers and flourishes as the only Middle Eastern democracy. I would on the contrary argue that the historical development since the creation of the State of Israel vindicates Arendts arguments. While it is true that Israel prospers as the only more or less democratic state in the region, it is also true that so far it did not solve any of the problems identified by Arendt in her essays from the 1940s. While the Israeli Arabs do enjoy political and civil rights, they are de-facto secondclass citizens. Their position is analogous to the position of the national minorities in the CentralEuropean countries after World War I. The position of the Palestinian Arabs living on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip is of course much direr. Israel also continues being surrounded by hostile Arab countries and depends for its survival on the military assistance of the United States. Recent developments therefore seem to vindicate Arendts argument that the solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict must be political, based on mutual negotiations, rather than military and unilateral. Confederation or some other form of close co-operation between Israel, the future Palestinian state and possibly Jordan was envisioned as a part of the long-term solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict by the Israeli peace movement Gush Shalom, as well as by former Prime Minister and current President Shimon Peres.25 143

Nationalism and the Future of European Integration Arendts criticism of nationalism and of the nation state may help explain the development that led to the rise of totalitarianism and to World War II. On the other hand, it seems to have only little, if any, relevance in the current, post-totalitarian stage of the development of mass-society. After all, Arendt herself argues that the political development since the rise of totalitarianism has been characterized by the decline of the nation state. This decline is exemplified not just by the current process of economic globalization, but also by European integration, which in effect consists in the limitation of the scope of the decision-making power of the political bodies of the member states by gradual delegation of these powers to the European Union. The most powerful institution of the Union, which is empowered to both draft and enforce common legislation, is the European Commission a purely bureaucratic body with no political responsibility. It may even seem that the resurrection of the nation state is the only possible response to the de-politicization of public life that is entailed in both of these trends.26 Nonetheless, one could also argue that the current development in Europe confirms the continuing relevance of Arendts analysis. The post-Cold War development led to resurgence of tribal nationalism not just in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where it led to disintegration of the former federations (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), but also in Western Europe, where it led to the federalization of Belgium, reinvigoration of nationalist movements of the ethnic groups that had never achieved national statehood (Basque, Corsican or Scottish nationalism), as well as to the rise of popularity of xenophobic anti-immigration political parties (FN in France, FP in Austria, or Vlaams-Blok in Belgium.)27 This last brand of xenophobic nationalism, which is aimed against immigrants from nonEuropean, mostly Muslim countries, seems to be especially important for the future of European 144

integration. It also proves the continuing relevance of Arendts criticism of nationalism and of the nation state. The failure of European societies to integrate immigrants proves the continued relevance of nationalism as an expression of this perversion of the state into an instrument of the nation and the identification of the citizen with the member of the nation (OT, 231) and reveals the ethnic or tribal core of all nationalisms. The prime example is offered by France, which continues to be the nation par excellence. French nationalism is ostentatiously republican and cultural. French politicians steadfastly reject the notion of affirmative action as reverse discrimination as well as the notion of multiculturalism and of hyphenated identities. These Anglo-Saxon ideas are supposedly incompatible with the French republican ideal of galit. The French Republic is allegedly color-blind and treats all French citizens as equal. The problem is that the notion of galit, as the French still understand it, is not limited to the principle of political and legal equality of all citizens before the law, but entails the requirement that all French citizens identify themselves as French, as members of France as la nation une et indivisble. To identify oneself as a French-Algerian or French-Muslim, to be both a loyal and patriotic citizen of the French Republic and a proud heir of the Muslim culture is apparently incompatible with the French understanding of equality and nationality. French understanding of nationality is ostentatiously political and cultural. The immigrants are encouraged to become assimilated into the French society and to adopt French culture. This requirement entails a perverse demand that one gives up his or her inherited identity. This is obvious from the recently adopted educational policies. In recent years, the French Government banned wearing ostentatious religious symbols (i.e. primarily of Muslim headscarves in public schools) and issued a directive requiring the public schools to emphasize the positive role of the mission civilisatrice in their discussion of French colonial history.

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Nevertheless, as the Muslim and African immigrants and their children in France have discovered, the requirement of cultural assimilation is impossible to meet even if one is willing to toss off his or her inherited identity and become civilized. As the French nationalists put it, to be French, one must be born French. Someone with dark skin or Arabic name will never be perceived as French, no matter how well versed he or she is in the French culture. Muslim and other non-European immigrants in France and many other European countries are in similar position as Jews in the nineteenth century. Society requires that they become assimilated and get rid off their otherness, but at the same time makes such assimilation impossible. The situation of Muslim and other non-European immigrants in France proves that even cultural nationalism has an ethnic or tribal core. National culture is a symbolic expression of the common identity of the nation, which is defined as an affective community based on the common origin of its members. The progressing integration of the European Union is in itself unlikely to solve the problems with the integration of immigrants that are caused by the continuing presence of nationalism in continental Europe. On the contrary, the debate about accession of Turkey to the European Union reveals a tendency of unifying Europe to construe European identity in cultural terms. Such a development could be disastrous in the long term. Regardless of how the question of Turkish membership is resolved, Europe will live in the neighborhood of Muslim countries. More importantly, the numbers of Muslim and other non-European immigrants to Europe, will continue rising in the future. This development is inevitable, and in the light of European demographic development even desirable. Construction of European identity on a cultural basis would prevent integration of these immigrants and relegate them to the status of second-class citizens; it would essentially affirm their identity as aliens and Muslims and encourage them to adopt political Islamism. To avoid this prospect, both individual European states and the unifying Europe must abandon the model of the nation state and construe their identity on a political, rather than cultural basis. 146

The question that remains to be answered is what model, what political form, would Arendt replace the nation state with. The answer is the republic. While it is true that Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism expresses her respect for France, as Canovan puts it,28 she does not admire France the nation state based on the dubious principle of popular sovereignty, but rather France the Republic based on the principles of freedom, justice and equality. The true nature of Arendts admiration of France becomes apparent in her analysis of the Dreyfus affair. Her hero is not Dreyfus, who was an unfortunate victim of circumstances, but Clemenceau, who led the campaign for Dreyfuss acquittal in the name of republican principles. Clemenceau did not get engaged in the affair because of any particular sympathy for Dreyfus, but because he believed that by infringing the rights of one, you infringe on the rights of all. (OT, 106) The greatness of Clemenceaus approach lies in the fact that it was not directed against a particular miscarriage of justice, but was based on such abstract ideas as justice, liberty, and civic virtue. (110) Against the fanaticized mob, rallied under the slogans Death to the Jews or France for the French, Clemenceau managed to organize a broad coalition consisting of men of different social and political backgrounds, who were not united by any common interest, but by their belief in the abstract republican principles of justice, liberty, and civic virtue. Such principles, rather than the interest of the nation, form the basis of true republican patriotism. The true model of a modern republic for Arendt is, however, not France, but the United States. In France the republican principles have been on the defensive ever since the Jacobins replaced them with the notion of the sovereignty of the French people. In contrast to France, the United States with its principles of constitutionalism, separation of powers, federalism and local self-government, according to Arendt, proved to be a viable and exemplary modern republic. According to Arendt, the American republic succeeded because it never exchanged the principles of the rule of law and sovereignty of the Constitution for the doubtful principle of the sovereignty 147

of the people or nation and therefore never became a nation state in the European sense.29 Arendts republicanism will be discussed in the last chapter of this study. Before turning to Arendts vision of the political solution of the present crisis of modernity, I would like to address what could be called her theoretical solution of this crisis. In the next chapter, I will discuss her reconsideration of the relationship between philosophy and politics.

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The true forerunner of modern mass man is this individual, who was defined and indeed discovered by those, who like Rousseau in the eighteenth century or John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, found themselves in open rebellion against society. (BPF, 199) 2 Most importantly in the Social Contract, Considerations on Government of Poland and Constitutional Project for Corsica. 3 Arendt herself does not use the term civic nationalism and talks instead about Western or West-European nationalism. I have introduced the term civic nationalism, in order to contrast the West-European brand of nationalism, which is based on belonging to certain body politic, with Central- and East-European tribal nationalism. 4 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 32. 5 Arendt further develops her critique of nationalism in her later works, most notably in O n Revolution and to a lesser extent also in The Human Condition. 6 For historical differences in the development of West- and Central- and Eastern-European nationalisms see Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1983). For Similarities between French and German nationalisms especially with regard to their use of history and culture see George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses (New York: H. Fertig, 1974). 7 According to Arendt, compassion is nevertheless not identical with active goodness. (OR, 83) 8 For Jesus, faith was closely related to action (cf. 33 below); for Paul, faith was primarily related to salvation. (HC, 8n.) 9 Arendt develops this argument against the absolute nature of the Christian principle of active goodness in her interpretation of Melvilles Billy Bud. (OR, 82-5) In The Human Condition, she makes a different argument about the anti-political nature of active goodness. She argues that the principle is inherently anti-political; the good works are supposed to be done for nothing but goodness sake. When goodness appears openly, it is no longer goodness Therefore: Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them. (HC, 74) Moreover, she argues that the Christian teaching of turning the other cheek, i.e. of extending the principle of charity to ones enemy, could lead to the victory of evil. According to Arendt, this insight is behind Machiavellis argument, according to which a successful prince must know how not to be good. (HC, 77) 10 The Nation (Review of La Nation by J. T. Delos), The Review of Politics Vol. 8 (1946), 139. Delos work appears to have strongly influenced Arendts own understanding of nationalism. 11 According to Arendt, a political alternative to compassion or pity is solidarity. Compassion is moved by the suffering of others, it does not respect others as individuals; it abolishes the interpersonal distance and perceives only the suffering. Solidarity, on the other hand, respect the person-hood of the oppressed or exploited, with whom it establishes deliberate and, as it were, dispassionate community of interest. (OR, 88) The common interest, upon which the solidarity is founded, is not based on any material self-interest, but rather on such abstract ideas as the grandeur of man, or the honor of the human race, or the dignity of man. (OR, 88) 12 Arendts claim that introspection, which is exemplified by Rousseaus Confessions, creates rather than discovers the internal, emotional self, may seem at odds with her claim that Rousseau discovered rather than created modern individual. The point is that Rousseaus discovery, the authenticity of which, according to Arendt, is beyond any doubt concerned the tendency of modern individual to seek refuge from the conformist society in the intimacy of heart and engage in introspection. On the other hand, Arendt maintains that introspection construes 149

rather than discovers the internal, emotional self. Hence her claim that The authenticity of Rousseaus discovery [of the tendency of modern individual to seek refuge in the intimacy of heart and engage in introspection] is beyond doubt, no matter how doubtful the authenticity of the individual who was Rousseau. (HC, 39; emphasis added) 13 For our trust in the reality of life and in the reality of the world is not the same, the latter derives primarily from the permanence and durability of the world, which his far superior to that of mortal life. . Trust in the reality of life, on the contrary, depends almost exclusively on the intensity with which life is felt, on the impact with which it makes itself felt. This intensity is so great and so elementary that wherever it prevails, in bliss or sorrow, it blacks out all other worldly reality. (HC, 120) 14 De Anima, 403a5-10, as quoted by Arendt LMI, 33. 15 De generatione animalium, II, 3, 763b5-29, as quoted by Arendt, LMI, 34. 16 Arendt underlines that it is the not the passions themselves that we admire, but rather the resulting conduct, which is shaped by deliberation that often restrains passions and emotions. The courageous man is not one whose soul lacks this emotion, [i.e. fear] or who can overcome it once and for all, but one who has decided that fear is not what he wants to show. (36) Still, it is obvious that for instance Achilles would not have an opportunity to display his courage, had he not been moved by passion. 17 EU, 5, 12; See Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 105-108. 18 See Chapter 1. 19 Arendt argues that the immense popularity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion among the Nazis was based on admiration and eagerness to learn rather than on hatred. (OT, 358) 20 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2003), 38. 21 Originally published in Menorah Journal Vol. 33 (August 1945). Reprinted in JP. 22 Benhabib, 40. 23 Originally published in Commentary Vol. 5 (May 1948), respectively in Review of Politics Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1950). Both articles were reprinted in JP. 24 For example by Ronald Beiner in his article Arendt and Nationalism in, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44-62. 25 Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993). 26 This position is held for example by Pierre Manent in his Cours familier de philosophie politique (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). 27 Beiner argues that the increased salience of nation-state politics after 1989 (each defeat of communism became a triumph for nationalism) underscores the inadequacy of [Arendts] theoretical response to nationalist politics. Like generations of liberals and Marxists before her, Hannah Arendt was too quick to assume that the nation-state had already been tossed on the dustheap of history. (Beiner, 56) In my opinion, the resurgence of nationalism after the end of cold war on the contrary proves the persisting relevance of Arendts analysis of nationalism. 28 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 32. 29 [T]he United States is not a national state in the European sense of the word. (JP, 158)

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Chapter 4: Arendts Critical Thinking: Between Kant and Heidegger

As I argued in the first Chapter, Arendts political philosophy entails a radical reconsideration of the traditional understanding of the relationship between philosophy and politics, between theory and practice. Our philosophical tradition, which was founded by Plato, has construed this relationship in terms of mutual opposition of action and thought, which was to be resolved by subordination of politics to philosophy. The task of political philosophy, according to this traditional understanding, is to reveal absolute standards of truth and justice, which are supposed to serve as ideal models for human legislators and as yardsticks by which the justice of human laws is to be measured. These standards are absolute and eternal and therefore external to the world of politics and of everyday experience. In order to contemplate ideas, the philosopher in Platos parable must first leave the cave, which represents the polis and the whole world of everyday and from the philosophers perspective illusory experience. Plato, according to Arendt, did not write his political teaching because he wanted to make the polis more just, but because he wanted to make it safer for the philosophers. Platos attitude toward politics, which can be described as a combination of hostility and indifference, then set the tone of the whole tradition of political philosophy and metaphysics. (As discussed in the first Chapter, Arendt considers these two traditions to be two sides of the same coin.) Plato, according to Arendt, developed his hostility to politics in response to the trial and condemnation of Socrates. This event also made him doubt the validity of opinion, which governed the Athenian polis, and led to his sharp juxtaposition of mere opinion and absolute truth and consequently to his theory of ideas. Arendt argues that this juxtaposition of opinion and truth was, the most anti-Socratic conclusion that Plato drew from Socrates trial. (PP, 75) For Socrates, opinion, or doxa, is not an inherently deficient mode of truth a mere opinion but a formulation in speech of what dokei moi, that is of what appears to me. (PP, 80) The opinions 151

are necessarily subjective, because the world reveals itself to each individual differently. Contrary to Plato, Arendts Socrates does not believe that man can attain absolute and immutable truth. The task of philosophy is not to replace the plurality of opinions by a single truth, but rather to reveal the truth inherent in various opinions by cross-examining them. Arendt argues that Socrates was genuinely interested in politic and that he performed his dialectics publicly for political reasons. Socrates was aware of the potentially destructive potential of the agonal spirit of the Athenian democracy and wanted to remind the Athenians that the truth inherent in their various opinions can be revealed only through dialectical examination. He wanted to make philosophy relevant to politics not by offering expert advice, but by engaging his fellow citizens in philosophical dialogue, by infecting them with philosophy. Socrates wanted to blur the edge of the agonal spirit of Athenian democracy by introducing Athenians to dialectics, which as a mutual quest for truth requires respect for opinions of others. By casting doubt on all unexamined opinions, he also wanted to teach them how to think critically and independently. Arendt suggests that her political philosophy overcomes metaphysics, or, rather, resolves problems caused by the collapse of metaphysics, by reversing Platos turn away from politics and returning philosophy back to polis and to its Socratic roots. The collapse of the metaphysical tradition, according to Arendt, is a consequence of the modern transformations of the world. Traditional answers to philosophical questions and the traditional way of framing these questions are no longer plausible because the world itself has changed. The collapse of metaphysics can also be described as a breakdown of the connection between the true and the apparent world, between thinking and Being. The loss of connection between thinking and Being has been, according to Arendt, the central problem of all philosophy after Hegel. (EP, 36) Arendt resolves the problem by circumventing it, by turning attention from the apparent world or Being to this

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world and to modern transformations of the world that make human life meaningless. The central concern of her philosophy is not Being but freedom. Arendt suggests that her reversal of Platos turn away from politics was inspired by Kant. She argues that Kants critical philosophy not only destroyed metaphysics, but also laid down foundations for a new mode of critical thinking, which closely resembles Socratic dialectics. The purpose of Kants critical destruction of metaphysics was the liberation of thinking and mankind. It is this fundamental orientation on freedom that makes Kants philosophy so attractive to Arendt. Kant is for her primarily the philosopher of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution. The central topic of Arendts own philosophy is the crisis of modernity and the disappearance of freedom from modern world. Arendts intention is to discover the way out of the present crisis, to save the project of the Enlightenment from its current impasse. She therefore turns to Kant and to his understanding of the Enlightenment. Arendt decided to study philosophy when she as a fourteen-year old read Kants Critique of Pure Reason. (EU, 8) Kant also remained a strong source of inspiration for her own thinking. Nevertheless, Arendts philosophy was more immediately influenced by her mentor Martin Heidegger. Before turning attention to Arendts interpretation of Kants critical philosophy, I will therefore first discuss her reception of Heideggers thought. As I shall argue, Arendt describes Heideggers philosophy as an attempt to reverse Kants destruction of metaphysical ontology and as a nihilistic reversal of Kants humanism. At the same time, however, she appropriates certain themes of Heideggers thought and transforms them for her own purposes.

Arendt and Heidegger The discussion of Heideggers influence on Arendt cannot omit the somewhat sensitive issue of the personal relationship between the two thinkers. Heidegger was not only Arendts teacher, but 153

also her lover. While their affair lasted only for some three years,1 Arendt and Heidegger remained on friendly terms for the rest of their lives. Their friendship, however, was interrupted by almost twenty years of estrangement, which was caused by the impact of political events on the lives of both protagonists. After the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, Arendt, who was Jewish, emigrated first to France and then to the United States. Heidegger, on the other hand, joined the Party and became a rector of Freiburg University. The rectorship was, in accordance with the totalitarian nature of the new regime but also with the traditional status of German universities as state institutions, a political appointment. Heideggers official title was RectorFhrer and his rectoral address, other public speeches, as well as lectures on philosophy from that period included various pro-Nazi statements. Although he resigned as a rector after only ten months, Heidegger remained a card-carrying party-member until the end of the war. Understandably enough, Heideggers collaboration with the Nazis hurt Arendt, and she severed contacts with him for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, Arendt and Heidegger reunited in 1950 and remained friends until Arendts death in 1975.2 I would like to focus primarily on the relationship between Heideggers and Arendts ideas. The personal relationship between the two authors, on the other hand, has only little relevance for the present considerations. Nevertheless, Heideggers and Arendts affair has already become a matter of public knowledge and has been exploited in a rather tasteless manner by several critics of Arendt.3 What I find most objectionable in the approach of critics like Wolin, Jones or Pitkin, is the peculiar way in which they conflate comparative interpretation of Arendts and Heideggers ideas with the history of their personal relationship. This approach in effect fails to take Arendt seriously as a thinker and an author, as it subordinates interpretation of whatever she has to say to psychologizing speculations about what makes her say it. I believe that this criticism deserves a response, which is also the only reason I am dwelling at this matter. In the following paragraphs I would like to give closer consideration to Richard Wolins essay Hannah Arendt: Kultur, 154

Thoughtlessness, and Polis Envy, which in my opinion demonstrates most clearly the tendency of Arendts critics to substitute speculations about the effects of Arendts personal relationship with Heidegger for a serious consideration of her critical reception of Heideggers ideas. * *** Wolin depicts Arendt as a loyal and dedicated admirer of her former mentor, who uncritically adapted Heideggers ideas and turned them into the foundation of her own work. He argues that Arendts thought differs from Heideggers only in unsubstantial details and implies that it consists of little more than slightly repackaged Heideggers ideas. To add insult to injury, he implies that Arendts intellectual dependency on Heidegger is essentially a consequence of her emotional dependency. Wolins arguments rely mostly on allusive references to the personal relationship of the two authors rather than on serious analysis of their ideas. Hannah Arendt, a frail eighteen-year-old from the East Prussian city of Knigsberg, was according to Wolin seduced by the brilliant and already famous professor. The affair was initiated by Heidegger, who had already acquired a considerable reputation, in the Socratic tradition, as a seducer of the youth.4 Arendt, an impressionable eighteen year old, is portrayed primarily as a victim of the brilliant but apparently immoral professor. Nevertheless, the moralizing tone of Wolins paper implies that Arendt was herself also not completely innocent; otherwise she would not have succumbed to Heideggers wooing. Heidegger was apparently not only an accomplished seducer of students but also a seductive and mesmerizing lecturer, who seduced not only Arendts heart but also her mind. To the very end Arendt remained in Heideggers thrall. (38) Love for Heidegger apparently blinded Arendt and prevented her from critically judging his ideas as well as his deeds. Wolin claims that Arendt was capable of mustering some critical distance vis--vis Heidegger only at the lowest points of their relationship for instance after their break-up and especially after Heidegger accepted the rectorship and became a member of the Party. As Wolin points out, after Heidegger 155

became rector of Freiburg University and enacted anti-Jewish decrees, Arendt sent him an accusatory letter. She also criticized Heidegger in her correspondence with Jaspers. More importantly, in an essay What is Existenz Philosophy? published in 1946 in Partisan Review, she publicly criticized Heideggers philosophy and its political implications, as well as Heideggers personal involvement with Nazism. Following their reconciliation, however her tone changed abruptly. Thereafter, she systematically downplayed the gravity and the extent of Heideggers Nazi past. In her contribution to a Festschrift commemorating Heideggers 80th birthday, Arendt went out of her way to dispute the relationship between Heideggers philosophy and his enlistment for Hitler. (50) Love for Heidegger apparently influenced also Arendts own work. Her political thought is supposedly just a variation of Heideggers political existentialism, a kind of left Heideggerianism. Both Heidegger and Arendt sought to surmount the mediocrity and routine of mass society by embracing the virtues of action. (67) The only difference between Heideggers and Arendts political thought is supposedly their opposite ideological orientation. Arendt, according to Wolin, transposed the revolutionary energies that Heidegger praised in right-wing revolutionary movement to the ends of the political left. Nevertheless, her thinking remains decisively elitist and antidemocratic and her embrace of political existentialism is unequivocal. (69) Wolin argues that Arendts criticism of modern society in The Human Condition is based on Heideggers condemnation of everydayness from Being and Time and her understanding of the Greek polis as the archetypal political community on the discussion of the polis in Introduction to Metaphysics. Since Heidegger praises the Greek principles of rank and domination and the violence of the great poets, thinkers, and statesmen, Arendts understanding of politics must therefore be similarly antidemocratic and elitist, never mind her emphasis on equality among citizens or her condemnation of slavery or subjection of women.5 Wolin does not even consider the possibility of any substantial differences between Arendts and Heideggers thought, or for that matter try to comprehend Arendts arguments. 156

To support his thesis, Wolin relies on highly selective quotations from Arendts work. His main argument, however, is implicit in his account of Arendts personal relationship with Heidegger. This account is in itself grossly partial and misleading by implying that Heidegger was Arendts life-long love. Here too Wolin relies on suggestive quotations taken out of context from Arendts letters to Heidegger6 and on Ettingers tendentious account of the affair.7 For Wolin, Arendt is primarily not an author and thinker, but a woman who was seduced and forever mesmerized by the magician of Messkirch. The subordination of the argument about the relation of Arendts and Heideggers ideas to the account of their personal relationship strikes me as tasteless and sexist. We should note that Wolin portrays Arendt as the passive partner in both the romantic and the intellectual relationship with Heidegger, as a passive tool in the hands of the Magician of Messkirch, while at the same time criticizing her for her own moral failure that enabled Heidegger to use her as his tool. To understand the full nature and extent Arendts moral transgression as Wolin portrays it, we must turn to another aspect of his criticism of Arendt.

According to Wolin, Arendts Heidegger problem was related to her Jewish problem, to Arendts personal struggle with her own Jewish identity. Arendt, as Wolin explains, was born into a well to do, assimilated Jewish family.(35) Her parents, like many other German Jews of their generation, believed that cultural assimilation was a ticket to full membership in the German society. Arendt herself, Wolin explains, also believed that if one only tried hard enough to internalize the virtues of Geist, the doors to German society would magically open (39) and she too abandoned Jewish tradition and religion for the sake of German culture. Wolin implies that young Arendt identified more with German rather than Jewish culture, and, following Ettinger, suggests that she embarked on the romance with Heidegger a lapsed catholic and a convinced provincial and most importantly an anti-Semite and a future Nazi in order to solve her Jewish problems: 157

She shared the insecurity of many assimilated Jews who were still uncertain about their place, still harboring doubts about themselves. By choosing her as his beloved, Heidegger fulfilled for Hannah the dream of generations of German Jews, going back to such pioneers of assimilation as Rahel Varnhagen.8 Arendt was supposedly forced to confront her repressed Jewish identity only by rejection by Heidegger amid a rising tide of German anti-Semitism. Wolin argues that these two circumstances must have been maddeningly conflated in Arendts mind (48) and to underline the point, he conflates the end of Arendts relationship with Heidegger with Hitlers rise to power and Heideggers acceptance of the rectorship, which in fact occurred some five years later. (45) Wolin argues that this personal crisis led Arendt to write the highly autobiographical Rahel Varnhagen, in which she supposedly rejected her earlier Germanophilia and embraced her Jewish identity. Nevertheless, presumably because she had abandoned Jewish religion and traditional Jewish culture, Arendt never fully resolved the problem of her Jewishness. (39) Wolin implies that her Jewishness as a raw ontological datum for Arendt remained to be the last stumbling block on her path towards becoming German, a stumbling block that she could not overcome and therefore came to hate. Arendt succumbed to Heideggers wooing so easily not only because of her loose morals but also because she saw in him the German Philosopher who could turn her into a full member of the German society. Wolin repeats Ettingers argument, according to which Heidegger sought reconciliation with Arendt because he needed to use her as a Jew to cleanse his name. And indeed, Arendt diligently became not only Heideggers de facto American literary agent, (49) but also an advocate of his personal record under Nazis, as well as of his thought. By adapting his thought and giving it a more acceptable slightly-left leaning ideological faade, Arendt lends respectability to Heideggers corrupt thought and helps to disseminate his potentially dangerous and inherently fascist ideas. By interpreting totalitarianism and the Holocaust in the context of a global crisis of modernity, rather than as a specifically German problem, Arendt supposedly diminishes the guilt

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of Germany and of the Germans for the War and for the Shoa. To make things even worse, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, she criticizes the Jews for being apolitical, thus blurring the distinction between the perpetrators and the victims. This tendency culminates in Eichmann in Jerusalem, where Arendt on the one hand criticizes the co-operation of the Jewish councils with the Nazis and, on the other hand, diminishes Eichmanns guilt by describing him as a deskmurderer, as a bureaucrat diligently obeying orders of his superiors without thinking about the moral consequences of his deeds, rather than as some demonic monster, and by describing his evil as banal.9

The notion of Arendt as a self-loathing Jew is much older than Wolins paper or Ettingers book on Arendt and Heidegger. It emerged for the first time during the public dispute between Arendt and Gershom Scholem, which followed the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Scholem, just like Wolin, criticized Arendt for blurring the distinction between the perpetrators and the victims and for diminishing the extent of Eichmann's guilt by calling his evil banal. Wolins verdict, according to which Arendts greatest failings as an analyst of the Jewish response to Nazism was that, regarding the most tragic hour of modern Jewish history, she came off seeming hard-hearted and uncaring (56) reads like an echo of Scholems accusation of Arendts lack of Ahavat Israel or love of (the people of) Israel. Arendts reply to Scholem is very telling: You are quite right. I am not moved by any love of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in my life loved any people or collective neither the German people, not the French, not the American, no the working class or anything of this sort. I indeed love only my friends and the only kind of love I know and believe in is the love of persons. Secondly, this love of the Jews would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish as something rather suspect. I cannot love myself of anything which I know is part and parcel of my own person. In this sense, I do not love the Jews. Not do I believe in them; I merely belong to them, as a matter of course, beyond dispute or argument I have never pretended to be anything else or to be in any way other than I am, and I have never even felt tempted in that direction. There is such a thing is basic gratitude for everything that is as it is. (JP, 245) 159

I believe that this reply reveals the real source of the antipathies towards Arendt on the part of the critics, who describe her as a self-loathing Jew. Arendt never denied being Jewish; on the contrary, she always presented herself as a Jew. Nevertheless, she refused to accept the notion of Jewishness based on the self-abnegating identification with the people of Israel, on absolute and unquestioning love of essentially ethnically or racially defined group and on similarly unquestioning obedience to its traditional and political authorities. She refused the notion of Jewishness based on the secularized version of the notion of the chosen people, which she saw as the archetype of tribal nationalism. (OT, 74; JP, 172) Being Jewish for Arendt entailed a right, or rather a duty of criticizing those aspects of Zionist and Israeli politics she did not agree with in particular the notion of Zionism as tribal nationalism and the conception of the State of Israel as a Jewish nation state. Arendt was in particular outraged by the relegation of Israeli Arabs to the status of second-class citizens and by the de facto ban on intermarriages,10 which she found to be scandalous and reminiscent of the infamous Nrnberg laws. (EJ, 7) Being Jewish for Arendt entails solidarity not only with Jews, but also with all other oppressed peoples,11 as well as the right to criticize the elements of Jewish politics she does not agree with.

Wolin argues that by describing totalitarianism as an outgrowth of modern mass society, Arendt on the one hand fails to appreciate the liberal and parliamentarian traditions and, on the other hand, diminishes the specifically German responsibility for Nazism and Holocaust.12 Arendts indiscriminate criticism of modern society is, according to Wolin, rooted in the visceral anitmodernism of Germanys Zivilisationkritiker of the 1920s. (63) Arendt was supposedly influenced not just by Heidegger, but also by such right wing luminaries . As Sprengler, Moeller van den Bruck [or] Carl Schmidt. (63) The more sympathetic readers of Arendt, such as Dana Villa, according to Wolin, demonstrate a blissful lack of awareness concerning the historical and cultural matrix in which the political thought of Arendt and Heidegger developed 160

and fail to take seriously the frankly antiliberal context in which Arendts political philosophy emerged. (48) Nevertheless, it is rather Wolin who ignores the historical and political background, against which Arendts political thought developed. This background is defined by such events and phenomena as the Holocaust, totalitarianism, the Cold War with its looming threat of nuclear holocaust, as well as the perils of late capitalism and contemporary scientific and technological civilization. As discussed above,13 Arendt turned to political theory in response to the rise of totalitarianism, which she regards as the most radical denial of freedom. (EU, 328) Her work as a whole then constitutes a critique of the contemporary crisis of modernity, which is animated by Arendts concern for freedom. Arendt also praises the American and into lesser extent the British constitutional and political system. Ironically enough, some of Wolins own arguments are decisively illiberal and put him into the very same company into which he is trying to situate Arendt. Wolin for instance finds astounding Arendts claim that the crimes that had been committed at Auschwitz said nothing about German history or German national character. This failure is apparently related to Arendts unacceptable description of Eichmann as normal. The enormous scale of the evil deeds for which Eichmann was responsible implies that Eichmann must have been a monster, a perverted sadistic personality (62) and presumably a typical exemplar of the corrupt German national character. According to Wolin, the ultimate explanation of Shoa and of all the horrors of Nazism is the perverse German national character, which is a product of the deformations of [German] historical development. (62) Wolins emphasis on the responsibility and guilt of Germans as Germans appeals to the same base differentiation between Us and Them, which the foundation of tribal nationalism. In this respect, it is Wolin, rather than Arendt, who demonstrates affinity with the political thought of Carl Schmidt.

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Arendts Criticism of Heidegger Let us now have a look at Arendts own description of her intellectual indebtedness to Heidegger. In her tribute to Heideggers 80th birthday Arendt explains that it was Heidegger who first inspired her in her pursuit of philosophy and taught her how to think. She recalls that Heidegger, who had not yet published any famous work, was already then famous among the young adepts of philosophy as a hidden king of the realm of thinking. (MH80) Unlike most professors, Heidegger did not teach about philosophy, but instead, so to speak, philosophy practiced. Heidegger was not interested in philosophy in the sense of an academic discipline, of a systematic body of knowledge or doctrine, but in the subject-matter of philosophy, in the timeless questions that have always concerned thinking men. He did not teach about Plato and his doctrine of ideas, but rather for an entire semester a single dialogue was pursued and subjected to question step by step until the time-honored doctrine had disappeared to make room for a set of problems of immediate and urgent relevance. In other words, the objective of the study of the works of past philosophers was not to learn their answers to various philosophic problems, but rather to learn from them how to address these problems. The rumor about Heidegger put it quite simply: Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out tat they propose things altogether different from the familiar, wornout trivialities they had been presumed to say. There exists a teacher; one can perhaps learn to think. (MH80)

The process or technique of Heideggers thinking seems to be more important for Arendt than its subject-matter or its conclusions. As Arendt argues in The Life of the Mind, thinking does not lead to any definite results and does not have any specific subject. Thinking seeks meaning, rather than truth and meaning appears to be somewhat elusive or incommunicable. Meaning is always in some sense ineffable and can be communicated only through metaphors and analogies. (LMI, 110) In order to understand some philosophical problem, we must think it through. It is the 162

process of thinking itself that reveals the meaning. The outcome of thinking is however never definite; on the contrary, thinking acts in a peculiarly destructive or critical way towards its own results. (MH80) Arendt describes Heideggers thinking as passionate and explains that thinking, like any other passion or pathos, seizes the person seizes those qualities of the individual of which the sum, when ordered by the will, amounts to what we commonly call character. (MH80) Arendt notes that the only philosopher before Heidegger who described thinking as pathos was Plato, who in Theaetetus calls wonder the beginning of all philosophy. This is just one of several remarks, in which Arendt directly compares her former teacher to Plato. She also notes that Heideggers destructive thinking caused the collapse of the whole edifice of metaphysics and praises him for not having just destroyed metaphysics, but for having thought [it] through to its end. This remark reads as a compliment, suggesting that metaphysics could have been thought through to its end only by a thinker of a stature equal to its founder. Indeed Heidegger, as Arendt portrays him, seems to be a thinker not only of the same stature or rank as Plato, but also of the same tenor or style of thinking. According to Arendt, Heidegger, just like Plato, accepted the wonder of Being as his abode. Thinking is always out of order, it turns things upside down and the abode of the professional thinkers therefore lies outside of the habitations of men. (MH, 80) Philosophers, who are always absorbed in their speculations, have been known for their absent-mindedness and for their ignorance of politics and of practical matters in general. Arendt recalls the story of the Thracian peasant girl who laughed at Thales when he fell into a well as he was staring at the stars, and remarks that Platos attempt to turn the tyrant of Syracuse into a philosopher-king was far more laughable. She then compares Platos journey to Sicily with Heideggers own venture into political life his ten months of rectorship and involvement with the Nazis. As Arendt remarks, it may seem striking and perhaps exasperating that Plato and Heidegger, when they entered into 163

human affairs, turned to tyrants and Fhrers. (MH80) Nevertheless, these facts should not be surprising, for they merely confirm the attraction to the tyrannical that is a dformation professionale of professional thinkers and that is common to most philosophers. Wolin interprets Arendts explanation of Heideggers co-operation with the Nazis as a consequence of dformation professionale of philosophers as her apology of Heidegger. Nevertheless, as Jacques Taminiaux points out, Arendts laughter at Heideggers accident is in fact highly ironic, and the parallels Arendt draws throughout the paper between Heidegger and Plato contain hidden criticism of her former teacher. One after all, does not find a trace to say the least of any re-appropriation of Plato in [Arendts] own work.14 Indeed, the parallels Arendt draws between Heidegger and Plato suggest that Heidegger was too close to Plato, that while he managed to destroy metaphysics and think it through to the end, he did not manage to overcome it. The explanation of Heideggers involvement with the Nazis as a consequence of the professional deformation of philosophers therefore should not be interpreted as Arendts attempt to exculpate Heidegger, but on the contrary as her indictment of the anti-political tendency inherent in the philosophical tradition.

As discussed above, Arendt traces historical origins of this fundamentally anti-political bend of our philosophical tradition to Platos reaction to the trial and condemnation of Socrates. The primary cause of the conflict between philosophy and politics, however, lies at a deeper level. Arendt argues that the basic dualistic structure of all metaphysics is based on the experience of the thinking mind. When we think, we do withdraw from the everyday world around us into the internal world of ideas. The inherently solitary nature of thinking may explain the lack of any genuine interest in political and practical matters on the part of philosophers. Nevertheless, the active hostility of metaphysical philosophy to politics is a consequence of a particular mode of thinking or philosophizing. The particularly metaphysical way of thinking, which conceives 164

thinking as contemplation of truth, was discovered by Plato, who wanted to prolong indefinitely the speechless wonder, which is at the beginning and the end of philosophy. (PP, 101) Philosophical wonder is the wonder at the unity of Being and the attempt of metaphysics to prolong this wonder indefinitely, to contemplate Being in its entirety and eternity, leads to the philosophers hostility towards politics, which is characterized by plurality of erring opinions and contingency of action. Preoccupation with the eternal and necessary makes the philosopher hostile not only towards politics, but towards the entire realm of becoming and ultimately against life as such. This preference for death (KL, 23) appears to be the germ of nihilism, which had been present in the metaphysical tradition since its inception, and which became fully apparent in Heideggers thought. As we can see, Arendts tribute to Heideggers eightieth birthday contains, apart from the praise of Heideggers thought, also somewhat hidden but at the same time serious criticism. Arendt suggests that Heidegger failed to overcome the fundamentally ontological and antipolitical orientation of philosophy in the platonic tradition and implies that this failure is related to his engagement with the Nazis. The analogy Arendt draws between Plato and Heidegger also implies that Heidegger, in spite of being such a profound thinker, misunderstood the nature of thinking. Platos notion of philosophy as contemplation of truth, according to Arendt, obscures the fundamental rootedness of thinking in the human condition of plurality. While the speechless wonder, according to Arendt, is the origin of all philosophical thinking, thinking itself always proceeds in speech, which in turn originates in inter-personal communication. The solitary internal dialogue of thinking is an internal part of being and living together with others. (PP, 101) Wolins argument, according to which Arendt in her birthday tribute denies the connection between Heideggers thought and his political engagement appears to be unwarranted and so does his claim that Arendt essentially adapts Heideggers critique of modernity in all of its substantial points, while she changes its political spin. Arendts criticism of Heidegger, on the contrary, aims 165

at the very core of his philosophy. This is apparent from her other texts that explicitly criticize Heidegger.

In What is Existenz Philosophy? Arendt situates Heideggers thought within the broader framework of Existenz philosophy, which she describes as an attempt to re-establish the unity between Being and thought that was inadvertently destroyed by Kants Critique of Pure Reason. She describes Heideggers project of fundamental ontology as an attempt to undo Kants destruction of metaphysics. Heidegger, according to her, attempts despite and against Kant, to re-establish ontology, to find a new foundation for metaphysics. (EP, 46) The attempt to stretch the new questions and concern to the old [metaphysical] framework nevertheless does not lead to the foundation of some new ontology, but to the formulation of the philosophical basis for modern Nihilism. (47) Arendt argues that the cause of Heideggers nihilism is his existential solipsism. Although Heidegger claims that the first question of his philosophy is the question of Being, in Being and Time he addresses this question indirectly, by questioning of the being of man or, as he puts it, of Dasein. Heidegger uses the neologism in order to indicate that he is interested in the existence of a concrete human being, rather than in the abstract idea of man. Dasein (from da Sein, i.e. beingthere) is always concrete, always situated in the world. Nevertheless, Being as being-in-the-world or being-with-others is, according to Heidegger, always fallen and inauthentic. Dasein can be authentically only in absolute isolation. In the anxiety of the anticipation of its own death, Dasein realizes being-with-others as inauthentic and the world into which it is thrown as something radically alien. Authentic Being is possible only in radical isolation as the care for one selfs authentic being towards death. Heidegger thus replaces the question of the meaning of Being with the question of the meaning of Self. And since the isolated self is defined only by its own death, Heidegger, according to Arendt, consistently proves that the meaning of Being is Nothingness. 166

Heideggers nihilism according to Arendt amounts to a reversal of Kants humanism: In this absolute isolation, the Self emerges as the concept really contrary to Man. If, namely, since Kant the nature of Man consisted in the fact that every individual man represents humanity; and if since the French Revolution and the rationalizing of human law it belonged to the concept of Man that in every single individual humanity can be debased or exalted, then the Self is the concept of Man according to which he can exist independently of humanity and need represent no one but himself his own nothingness. As the Categorical Imperative in Kant asserted that every action must assume responsibility for all humanity, so the experience of guilty nothingness would precisely eliminate the presence of humanity in every man. The Self as conscience has put itself in place of humanity, and the Being of the Self in place of the Being of Man. (EP, 51) Heideggers philosophy, according to Arendt, stems from the resentment of modern man against everything given. Arendt describes this resentment as a reaction to the realization that while man might have killed God, as Nietzsche put it, he can never take his place. The aim of Heideggers philosophy, according to Arendt, is to turn man into the Master of Being, (EP, 47) to transform him from a god-like being into a divine being. This hubristic attempt to elevate man to the position of God fails, and Heideggers philosophy, as expressed in Being and Time, ends up being the philosophical basis for modern Nihilism: The Nothing tries, so to speak, to reduce to nothing the given-ness of Being, and to put itself in Beings place. If Being, which I have not created, is the occasion of a nature which I am not and do no know, then perhaps the Nothing is the really free domain of Man. Since I am not a world-creating being, perhaps my nature is to be a world destroying being. (EP, 47) Heideggers existential solipsism, according to Arendt, is an expression of the nihilistic sentiment of the age in which it was written. Nevertheless, this nihilism is at the same time rooted in the old ontology itself.15 Heideggers rejection of being-in-the-world and being-with-others as inauthentic modes of existence, is a vestige of the old hostility of the philosophy toward the polis. (EU, 432) His understanding of philosophy as the highest possibility of human existence that contrasts with the fallen everyday being of the they (das Man) is then essentially a reformulation of Aristotles notion of bios theoretikos as the highest possibility of human life. (EP, 48)

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In spite of being fundamentally apolitical, Heideggers philosophy it is not without political consequences or, for that matter, contents. As if in spite of the solipsistic spirit of his philosophy, Heidegger attempts to incorporate in it certain reflections about the role of community (Gemeinschaft) or Nation (Volk).16 Arendt argues that since sociability is not a part of Heideggers concept of Man (or Dasein), the notion of Volk appears to be an afterthought, a device that can organize the Selves engaged in willing themselves in an Over-self, in order to make a transition form the fundamental guilt, grasped through resoluteness, to action. (51) The people (Volk) conceived as an organic community (Gemeischaft) united by common destiny is for Heidegger essentially a device that enables the fundamentally isolated Selves to realize their authenticity by leaping ahead into action. The resolute leap-into-action, which in effect collapses the distinction between thinking and acting, enables Dasein to realize authentic existence and at the same time overcome its radical isolation. Arendt points out that the combination of extreme subjectivism with a notion of nation as an organic community resembles German romanticism and calls Heidegger the last (we hope) romantic. (EP, 46 n.) Heideggers own resolute leap into action led to his short-lived rectorship and membership in the Party. Both Arendt and Wolin interpret this episode as Heideggers attempt to become an official philosopher of the Third Reich. As discussed above, Arendt presents this episode as a foolish and even laughable enterprise, as a consequence of Heideggers ignorance of politics, which is common to most philosophers. Heideggers enthusiasm for the Third Reich, according to her, was matched only by his glaring ignorance of what he was talking about. (EU, 202) Arendt explains Heideggers leap into action as a consequence of his existential solipsism, as an attempt to give meaning to his own existence through participation in a world-transforming event.17 Heideggers attempt to become the official philosopher of the Third Reich failed because the Nazis had no use for his ideas. The Nazis had their own ideas what they needed were 168

techniques and technicians with no ideas at all or educated from the beginning in only Nazi ideas. (EU, 202) Nevertheless, the support of Heidegger and many other German intellectuals, who were eager to read their own intellectual fantasies into the reality of the up-and-coming movement, helped to make Nazism seem respectable.

In the second volume of The Life of the Mind Arendt argues that Heideggers experience with his encounter with politics led to the turn, or Kehre in his thought. The Kehre signifies a substantial transformation of Heideggers position. The care for the Self gets replaced by the care for Being and the quest for authenticity, which Heidegger now views as being driven by the Will to Power, gets replaced by the Gellasenheit the serenity of letting be and the paradoxical Will-not-to-will. (LMII, 188) In place of the authentic Self from Being and Time, we find the Thinker who listens and responds to the call of Being, revealing in speech the meaning of the current world-historical situation. While Heideggers position in Being and Time, according to Arendt, was characterized by extreme subjectivism, his thought after the Kehre is marked by complete effacement of subjectivity: The Self [or the Thinker] no longer acts in itself but, obedient to Being, enacts by sheer thinking the counter-current of Being underlying the foam of beings the mere appearances whose current is steered by the will-to-power. (LMII, 187) Nevertheless, Arendt argues that the turn in the final analysis represents a mere variation of Heideggers basic teaching. (194) While in Being and Time Heidegger collapses the distinction between thought and action in the resolute leap into action, after the Kehre he maintains that solitary thinking in itself constitutes the only relevant action in the factual record of history. (181) This notion is entailed in Heideggers concept of the History of Being (Seinsgeschichte), which like Hegels World Spirit acts beings the backs of men and secretly steers the course of history. Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between Hegels and Heideggers understanding of this invisible hand. As Taminiaux points out, Hegel distinguished the World 169

Spirit as a hypostatized teleology of history on the one hand from the actors who follow their own goals and, on the other hand, from the thinker, who discerns the World Spirit in the backward glance of history.18 Heidegger in effect collapses both of these distinctions; History of Being is for him identical with the activity of thinkers and the thinker thus becomes a conscious agent of the History of Being, an incarnation of Hegels World Spirit. With Heidegger, this Nobody [i.e. the World Spirit], allegedly acting behind the backs of acting men, had found a flesh-and-blood incarnation in the existence of the thinker, who acts while doing nothing, a person, to be sure, and even identifiable as Thinker which, however, does not signify his return to the world of appearances. He remains the solus ipse in existential solipsism, except that now the fate of the world, the History of Being, has come to depend on him. (LMII, 187) Arendts insistence on the continuity of Heideggers thought before and after Kehre may be somewhat exaggerated. That, however, does not affect Arendts main argument against late Heidegger, namely that he remains detached from and indifferent to the factual day-to-day events brought about by erring men, (194) in other words, to politics and to the entire realm of human affairs. This philosophical aloofness and tendency to perceive everything from an ontological perspective makes Heidegger blind to the political and human dimension of reality and allows him to argue that mechanized agriculture and gas chambers, or Soviet Russia and America are essentially identical.19 While Arendts own critique of modern science and technology is undoubtedly influenced by Heideggers later work, it is notably free of the totalizing tendency of Heideggers ontological critique of technology.20 Even more importantly, Arendt, as Villa points out, hardly subscribed to [Heideggers] solution of the present crisis: [W]hile the later Heideggers diagnosis of the pathologies of modernity led him to a will not to will and an intensified thinking withdrawal, Arendts critical appropriation of his diagnosis led to a renewed emphasis upon the importance of political action, moral judgment, human freedom, and an engaged worldliness.21 ****

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In What is Existenz Philosophy? Arendt contrasts Heideggers philosophy with the teaching of her other mentor and life-long friend Karl Jaspers. According to Arendts interpretation, Jaspers appears to be in many ways a polar opposite of Heidegger. While she criticizes Heidegger for his attempt to undo Kants critique and re-establish traditional ontology, Arendt praises Jaspers as a follower of Kant whose thought is unambiguously post-metaphysical. For Jaspers, the goal of philosophizing is not discovery of any truths, any positive results, but rather perpetual appeal to the powers of life in oneself and others and Illumination of Existenz. (E P , 52) Communication, which has been traditionally neglected by philosophy, assumes in Japsers thought utmost importance. Arendt argues that Jaspers communication centered philosophizing reminds in its method of Socratic maieutic except that what Socrates calls maieutic, Jaspers called appeal. (EP, 52) Like Socrates and Kant, Jaspers rejects the traditional opposition between the few and the many, the traditional philosophers contempt for human affairs, as well as the claim to exclusive access to the absolute truth. To put it shortly, Japsers philosophy appears to be in many respects genuinely political as opposed to metaphysical: Existenz is for Jaspers no form of Being, but a form of human freedom and indeed the form in which Man as possibility of his spontaneity turns against his mere Being-aresult. Mans Being as such and as given is not Existenz, but Man is in his human reality possible Existenz. Thus the word Existenz expresses the meaning that only insofar as Man moves in the freedom that rests upon his own spontaneity and is directed in communication to the freedom of others, is there Reality for him. (EP, 53) Jaspers in effect replaces the question of Being with the question of freedom. In this context the question concerning the meaning of Being can be so suspended that the answer to it runs: Being is such that this human reality is possible. (EP, 53) This contrasts not only with Heideggers oft-repeated argument about the primacy of the question of Being, but also with his existential solipsism. Existenz itself is never essentially isolated; it exists only in communication and in the knowledge of the Existenz of others. Ones fellow men are not (as in Heidegger) an element which, thought structurally necessary, nevertheless destroys Existenz; but on the

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contrary, Existenz can develop only in the togetherness of men in the common given world. (EP, 55-56) In Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought, which was written several years after What is Existenz Philosophy?, Arendt reconsiders the usefulness of Jaspers notion of communication for the understanding of politics. She now argues that the notion of communication, which is based on the personal encounter of I and Thou, corresponds to the internal dialogue of thinking, rather than to any specifically political experience.22 (EU, 443) Interestingly enough, Arendt also suggests that certain aspects of Heideggers philosophy, namely his notion of world and his understanding of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and Being-withothers could be instrumental for philosophical understanding of politics. At any rate, because Heidegger defines human existence as being in the world, he insists on giving philosophic significance to structures of everyday life that are completely incomprehensible if man is not primarily understood as being together with others. (EU, 443) This claim may at first seem as somewhat counterintuitive and contradicting Arendts earlier criticism of Heidegger. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily imply any reversal of Arendts position. The point is that Heideggers analysis of human existence as Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others can be useful for understanding of politics only after a significant revision of this analysis, which in effect amounts to a reversal of Heideggers position. Arendt reverses what she regards as the fundamentally ontological and anti-political orientation of Heideggers philosophy. Following Jaspers, she suspends the question of Being and replaces it with the question of freedom. She agrees with Jaspers that Existenz itself is never isolated.Existenz can develop only in the togetherness of men in the common given world. (EP, 55) Being-with-others, which for Heidegger signifies an inherently inauthentic mode of existence, for Arendt becomes a hallmark of authentic existence. Public realm, which Heidegger regards as the location of fallen everyday Being and of mere talk (Gerede), for Arendt becomes

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the stage on which humans can reveal themselves as unique individuals through political action and speech.23 Arendt also agrees with Jaspers on the importance of communication, which is in her understanding related to both acting and thinking. The notion of communication stands in opposition to Heideggers notion of speech, which provides an abode to Being and which is related to thinking (and poetry) but not to acting. Arendt nonetheless criticizes Jaspers understanding of communication. Communication, according to her, corresponds to human condition of plurality, which cannot be reduced to an encounter between I and Thou. Arendt discovered an alternative model of communication, which captures more adequately its political aspects and its grounding in the human condition of plurality, in the unwritten political philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

Arendt and Kant Arendt and Heidegger both respond through their thinking to the same world-historical crisis, which announces itself in the modern feeling of homelessness and alienation. While Heidegger at least according to Arendts interpretation interprets this feeling as self-alienation, Arendt interprets it as world-alienation. She therefore replaces Heideggers concern for the self and for Being with the concern for the world. The problem, according to her, is not that human existence as such would be absurd, but that the present world has reached a crisis and is out of joint. (EU, 438) Arendts philosophy is not focused on Being, but on the existential structures that condition the appearance of Being to us on the structures that both constitute worldly reality and enable the experience of freedom. Arendt argues that her philosophy overcomes metaphysics by reversing Platos turn towards Being, by returning philosophy back to the polis and to its Socratic roots. In her Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy she argues that this reversal was achieved already by Kant, whose critical philosophy not only destroyed metaphysics, but also opened up

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the possibility for a new mode of critical thinking, which closely resembles Socrates practice of midwifery. (KL, 37) Kant himself, according to Arendt, did not realize the full consequences of his critique. His intention, after all, was not to destroy metaphysics, but to lay down foundations for a new, purely rational, metaphysical system. Kants unwritten political philosophy, which Arendt extrapolates primarily from Critique of Judgment, is therefore not only at odds with the political philosophy Kant actually wrote, but implies substantial re-interpretation of Kants entire critical project. Arendt is aware that her interpretation is inconsistent with Kants own understanding of his ideas. That, however, does not mean that she would be simply appropriating Kants ideas for her own purposes, that her re-interpretation of Kant would have not very much to do with Kants intellectual concerns but have everything to do with Arendts concerns24 as Beiner suggests. Arendt presents her extrapolation of Kants unwritten political philosophy as a consistent interpretation of his philosophy, rather than as a transplantation of some of his ideas into the context of her own work. She insists that her interpretation is consistent with the overall spirit and intentions of Kants critical project and that it reveals the meaning of his ideas better than his own texts. As she notes, Kant himself once remarked while discussing Plato that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subjectto find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. (LMI, 63) Political philosophy, according to Arendt, necessarily implies the attitude of the philosopher to politics. (BPF, 17) Her extrapolation of Kants unwritten political philosophy is therefore based on his attitude to politics, which is implied in Kants understanding of the Enlightenment and in his enthusiastic endorsement of the French Revolution. **** Although Kant never wrote any doctrinal metaphysics, his critical philosophy can be interpreted as a closed quasi-metaphysical system or doctrine. The cornerstone of this system is the idea of 174

human dignity, which consists in the autonomous, i.e. self-legislative character of humans as rational beings. Legislation is for Kant the supreme faculty of both theoretical and practical reason. The task of reason, according to Kant, is to impose rational order on reality. The idea of human dignity as autonomy is also the foundation of Kants political philosophy. The only legitimate political regime according to Kant is republic.25 Republican constitution is based on the consent of citizens with the rule of law and on representative government, which allows citizens to act through their representatives as co-legislators. Such consent is the only possible foundation of legitimate government compatible with the idea of human autonomy. Republican constitution is the perfect and the only legitimate political regime because it enables full development of mans natural capacities, because it enables realization of mans purpose as an autonomous being. That, however, does not mean that the establishment of a republican constitution would require as its precondition moral perfection of citizens. On the contrary, the republican constitution and only the republican constitution ensures that the Right will prevail if everybody follows his self-interest. Positive law is for Kant essentially an embodiment of categorical imperative, a universal rule that everybody in principle accepts as necessary for the society, although as a self-seeking individual one might be inclined to exempt oneself from it.26 The rule of law then supplements the internal constraint of the categorical imperative and ensures that citizens will act as if they were moral. Realization of a republican constitution therefore does not require that people are moral but only that they are rational, that they are capable of following their enlightened self-interest. It is a problem that can be solved even by a nation of devils (as long as they possess understanding). This coincidence of the enlightened self-interest and morality is the ruse of nature, which, according to Kant, guarantees that men, driven as they are by their self-seeking nature, will establish republics and that the principle of right will eventually prevail even in international relations. The ruse of nature guarantees that man or rather mankind will achieve its purpose, 175

which is perfect civil union of mankind27 a cosmopolitan federation of independent republics.28 Nature forces people to establish states, in order to prevent the Hobbesian war of everyone against everybody. The external warfare among these states, as well as political oppression within these states (which gives the ease and leisure to work in science and art to the minority while confining the majority of people to provide the material necessities of life for the privileged few), leads to the development of culture and of understanding, and ultimately enables the establishment of rightful order both on the national level (republican constitution) and on the international level (cosmopolitan order of perpetual peace). Decisive factor behind this Progress of human history towards its goal is the spirit of commerce which sooner or later takes hold of every people, and cannot exist side by side with war.29 Interpretation of Kants philosophy as a quasi-metaphysical system also implies certain understanding of Kants role as the philosopher of the Enlightenment. Kants philosophy understood as a purely rational philosophical system outlines the project of the Enlightenment as the Age of Reason. By determining the limits of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant liberated science and at the same time proved the futility of all metaphysical speculations. By defining the ideal of human dignity as autonomy in the Critique of Practical Reason and by drawing out its political implications, Kant proclaimed, or called for, moral and political liberation of man. Finally, in his theory of history Kant discovered and correctly predicted the role warfare, science and commerce would play in the progress of mankind. This understanding of Kants role as the philosopher of the Enlightenment is in agreement with Fukuyamas optimistic interpretation of end of the Cold War as the end of history. One could argue the end of the Cold War and the ensuing advancement of economic globalization vindicates Kants ideas and predictions, that it is just a matter of time before the spirit of commerce and the advancement of (scientific) understanding bring about the final achievement of the perfect civil union of mankind. 176

Kants Destruction of Metaphysics Arendts interpretation of Kants unwritten political philosophy stands in opposition not so much to Kants written political philosophy, but to the doctrinal interpretation of Kants philosophy, as it is outlined above. The assumption that Kants work constitutes a closed philosophical system, according to Arendt, underestimates the radicalism of his critical assault on metaphysics. The doctrinal interpretation implies that by overcoming metaphysics, Kants critique replaced it, that it assumed its position and its claim to possess the absolute truth. It assumes that Kants critical philosophy, which once and for all determined the limits of reason and proved the futility of all metaphysical speculations, represents (or is meant to represent) the last word of philosophy, the final, purely rational philosophical system. The doctrinal interpretation also assumes that Kants political philosophy maintains the traditional status and role of political philosophy. Indeed, as we saw above, Kants written political philosophy is firmly grounded in his Critique of Practical Reason and in his broader critical project, which emphasizes the legislative function of reason. Kants political philosophy is therefore derived from his critical philosophy in the same way Platos political philosophy is derived from his metaphysics. Kant, just like Plato, attempts to impose upon politics standards derived from thinking. He also maintains the traditional focus of political philosophy on legislation, i.e. on setting limits to action, rather than on action itself. The one substantial difference, which according to the doctrinal interpretation separates Kants philosophy from the tradition, consists in his elevation of morality. Kants political philosophy is derived from the practical reason, the use of which must be expected from everyone, rather than from the speculative reason of philosophy. Moreover, practical reason plays a decisive role in Kants whole philosophical system. By elevating morality, Kant in effect reversed the traditional assumption about the primacy of theory over practice and abandoned the traditional distinction between the philosophers and ordinary mortals. Morality is the Kantian answer to the arrogance of philosophers that their quest for truth is what exclusively confers 177

cosmic seriousness upon human purposes.30 From Arendts perspective, however, Kants turn to morality is not radical enough to constitute a veritable turn of philosophy from the contemplation of Being to the reflection of practice. The point is that Kants practical philosophy is primarily moral philosophy; it is concerned with the question What should I do?, with moral law, rather than with political action. Kants practical philosophy, according to Arendt, therefore remains firmly grounded in the metaphysical tradition. Kants understanding of freedom is based on the Christian concept of free will and his notion of legislative faculty of reason is based on the model of the Hebrew God who was a lawmaker because he was the Maker of the Universe. (OR, 189)

Arendt argues that Kants critical philosophy constitutes a much more radical turn of philosophy to practice than the doctrinal interpretation suggests and than Kant himself realized. This turn, however, is not apparent in Kants practical philosophy, which remains rooted in the tradition. According to Arendt, it is apparent rather in the overall spirit of Kants critical philosophy and in particular in Kants understanding of the relationship of his critical philosophy and the Enlightenment. According to Kant, the Enlightenment is the age of criticism31 and Kants critique is the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Enlightenment is mans emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use ones own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!32 The task of Kants Critique of Pure Reason, according to Arendt, is to discover the sources and limits of reason (KL, 32), to determine what can, and more importantly what cannot be known and thus to prepare ground for Selbstdenken (thinking for one self), for the use of ones own understanding. The purpose of the critique is purely negative; its goal is liberation of thinking from prejudices and authorities. By determining the limits of reason, by proving that we can never know the answers to philosophical questions, Kant not only dismantled traditional 178

metaphysics, but also made any future metaphysics impossible. That, however, does not mean that Kants critical philosophy would have replaced metaphysics, that it would have assumed its position. The critique is not opposed to particular metaphysical dogmas, but to the dogmatic status of metaphysics itself, to its claim to possess the truth. Kants Critique of Pure Reason, according to Arendt, can neither provide a foundation to a future metaphysical system, nor does it constitute a quasi-metaphysical system. It can provide a foundation for critical philosophy, for critical thinking, i.e. Selbstdenken. Philosophy itself, according to Kant, has become critical in the age of criticism and Enlightenment the time when man had come of age. (32) Kants critical thinking, according to Arendt, stands in twofold opposition to dogmatic metaphysics on the one hand, to skepticism on the other. (32) Critical thinking overcomes both dogmatism and skepticism by assuming that men, thought they have a notion, an idea, of truth for regulating their mental processes, are not capable, as finite beings, of the truth. (The Socratic: No man is wise.) (33) Arendt argues that Kant in effect abolished Platos juxtaposition between absolute truth and mere opinion and compares his critical thinking to Socrates practice of midwifery. (As she points out, the parallel was suggested by Kant himself. 37) Kant abandons not only the traditional claim of metaphysics to possess absolute truth, but also the traditional distinction between the philosophers and the many. Philosophizing, according to Kant, is not an esoteric activity reserved for a privileged minority, but a general human need, the need of reason as a human faculty. The philosopher clarifies the experiences we all have [he] remains a man like you and me, living among his fellow men, not among his fellow philosophers. (28) Kant also follows the example of Socrates in bringing the philosophy to the market. His works were not addressed to the professional thinkers but to the entire reading public. As Arendt points out, Kant was seriously concerned with popularizing his work. Not because he would have wanted to enlighten his contemporaries with some true opinions, but because he 179

hoped his Critique would encourage them to think critically, to use their own reason (Selbstdenken). Besides that, critical thinking requires publicity; it requires public use of ones reason in all matters.33 The most important political freedom for Kant was not, as for Spinoza, the libertas philosophandi but the freedom to speak and to publish. (39) Arendt explains that Kants understanding of freedom of publicity is very different from the liberal notion of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression allows individuals to express their existing opinions in order to persuade others about their correctness. (Or, we could add, to express ones identity.) The purpose of Kants freedom of publicity, on the other hand, is to allow confrontation of various opinions and thus to enable critical thinking. Kant believes that the very faculty of thinking depends on its public use; without the test of free and open examination no thinking, and no opinion formation is possible. (40) Critical thinking, as Kant describes it in What is Enlightenment?, is concerned with matters that are of public concern with matters that concern others as members of a given community or as human beings, that is to say with both political and philosophic or religious matters. Critical thinking thus abolishes distinctions between philosophers and non-philosophers on the one hand, and between political and philosophical issues on the other hand. An officer may for instance publicly use his reason as a scholar to criticize military policy. Similarly, a priest may use his reason publicly to criticize the doctrine of his church. We should note that Kant contrasts the public use of reason with private use, by which he means the use of reason by a man as a civil servant or to put it more broadly as a bearer of certain social function. Such private use of reason is restricted; an individual is in such a case just a part in the machine of society.34 As such he must obey, he must behave as a part of the system and he must also employ his reason as a part of the machine, that is according to the rules and in the service of instrumental rationality, on which the system is based.

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Enlightenment and Critical Thinking Arendt rejects not only the doctrinal interpretation of Kants work as a quasi-metaphysical system, but also the related understanding of the Enlightenment. According to the doctrinal interpretation, Kants philosophy defined the program, the goals and the values of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is then understood as the Age of Reason, in the sense of scientific rationality, and Freedom, in the sense of the liberal personal freedom. All that is required for further advancement of the Enlightenment is that we stick to its values and principles, that we follow the program that was outlined by Kant. As citizens of liberal democracies we should obey the law and vote for the right candidates; as members of liberal societies we should rationally follow our self-interest, which means that we should behave as parts of the social mechanism and employ our reason strictly in the service of instrumental rationality that governs the society. As private persons and autonomous moral agents, we should uphold our human dignity and act morally. Most importantly, we must put out faith in the scientific, technological and economic progress. It is this faith in automatic and infinite progress rather than the faith in Kants regulative ideas that guarantees the success of the whole enterprise and meaningfulness of our existence. Definition of the Enlightenment in terms of values and goals engenders dogmatism and discourages critical thinking. It leads to what Michel Foucault in his essay What is Enlightenment? calls the blackmail of the Enlightenment,35 to castigation of the critics of the values of Enlightenment as un-enlightened, irrational and anti-modern. Foucault rejects this intellectual blackmail and argues that Enlightenment and modernity should not be defined as a set of values that demand our loyalty, but rather as a certain ethos or attitude, as a certain way of thinking namely as the critical thinking or Selbstdenken for which Kant calls in his What is Enlightenment? Foucault argues that such critical thinking is not concerned with determining once and for all the conditions under which true understanding is possible, but rather with 181

questions What is our present situation (actualit)? What is the current field of possible experiences?36 What are the current conditions and limits of freedom? It is exemplified not by the Critique of Pure Reason, but rather by the texts in which Kant himself reflects on the present situation by What is Enlightenment? and by the second part of The Conflict of the Faculties, in which Kant raises the question of the meaning of the French Revolution. (That is to say by the texts that are of paramount importance also for Arendts re-interpretation of Kants political philosophy.) Foucaults essay must be read as a defense of his own work against accusations of undermining the values of the Enlightenment. Foucault retorts by arguing that his critics do not understand the meaning of Enlightenment, which requires constant engagement in critical thinking, constant quest for truth and freedom. To support his arguments, he turns to Kant, as the philosopher of the Enlightenment. I believe Foucaults essay provides a key to the interpretation of Arendts extrapolation of Kants unwritten political philosophy. Like Foucault, Arendt was criticized for allegedly debunking the values of the Enlightenment, for being anti-egalitarian, antiliberal and anti-modern.37 Arendts Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy can be interpreted38 as her reply to such criticism. In her lectures Arendt explains the status of her own critical philosophy and argues that it is grounded in Kants critical project, that it is engaged in the same cause namely in the cause of the Enlightenment.

Beiners suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding,39 Arendt by no means rejects Kants vision of human dignity. On the contrary, she is trying to uphold this vision in a society that turns its members into thoughtless slaves of technological rationality. Arendt also does not reject Kants normative political philosophy. In fact, she maintains Kants ideal of the peaceful federation of independent republics. Nevertheless, she believes that Kants republican

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constitution with its emphasis on the rule of law and on liberal negative freedom in and by itself is not a sufficient guarantee of political freedom. Kant approaches the problem of freedom from the moral point of view; he is concerned with the moral duty an individual owes to himself. Arendt, on the other hand, is concerned with the political dimension of freedom; she is not looking for a universal moral law or for principles of republican government, but for the standard and explanation of political judgment. Political judgment is always concerned with particular and contingent acts and events and therefore cannot be guided by any universally valid rule. Arendt discovered a model political judgment in Kants aesthetic judgment, which is the subject of the first part of the Critique of Judgment. (BPF, 219, KL, 14) Kants Third Critique is according to Arendt pregnant with politically significant themes. In distinction from the other two Critiques, it is not concerned with man as an intelligible or a cognitive being, but with men as social and political beings. While the moral laws of the Critique of Practical Reason are valid for all intelligible beings, the rules of aesthetic judgment are strictly limited in their validity to human beings on earth. (KL, 13) The Critique of Judgment therefore should have become the centerpiece of Kants political philosophy. (9) Arendt reinterpretation of Kants political philosophy therefore shifts the focus from the Second Critique a cornerstone of Kants philosophy understood as a system to the Third Critique, which becomes a cornerstone of her interpretation of Kants critical philosophy. Kant himself, according to Arendt, relied on reflective judgment when he enthusiastically greeted the French Revolution as a proof of moral predisposition of mankind and a sign of progress. What according to Kant constitutes the greatness of the revolution, what makes it an event that is not to be forgotten, (46) is not the deeds of the revolutionaries which Kant condemns as immoral but the judgment of the spectators, their wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm.40 We could also say that Kant welcomes the enthusiastic 183

endorsement of the Revolution by the European public because it resonates with his own enthusiasm and, conversely, that his judgment of the Revolution appeals to the common sense of mankind. Aesthetic judgment, as Kant construes it, likewise appeals to common sense. Aesthetic judgment does not rely on any universal rule. It is also strictly subjective: if I do not like something, no argument can persuade me that it is beautiful. Nevertheless, when we declare something beautiful, we expect others to agree with us, we seek their approval of our judgment, of our taste. The standard of aesthetic judgment is not universal validity but general communicability, which is grounded in our common sense that fits us in the community. Reflective judgment proceeds by comparing our judgment with the possible judgments of others, by considering different perspectives. This allows us to enlarge our mentality and consider matters from a more general standpoint (which, however, is never universal). That, however, does not mean that aesthetic judgment should defer to the judgment of others. It must be our own judgment, it requires that we think for ourselves. Nevertheless, without the existence of others, without the existence of common sense, we could not form aesthetic judgment at all. Arendt applies Kants model of reflective judgment to all judgments concerning particular and contingent events. For Arendt, common sense becomes the foundation not just of our aesthetic taste, but of our sense of reality. Common sense is also the foundation and precondition of thinking. Thinking, according to Arendt, is a solitary business, which requires that we withdraw from the company of others and from the world into the internal world of our thoughts. Thinking, or at least philosophical or speculative thinking also strives to transcend common sense understanding. (BPF, 221) Nevertheless, common sense is inevitably the starting point of all thinking. Thinking would also be impossible without the possibility of communication: unless you can somehow communicate and expose to test to others, either orally or in writing, whatever you may have found out when you were alone, this faculty exerted in a solitude would 184

disappear. General communicability, which is for Kant the standard of aesthetic judgment, is according to Arendt the standard of philosophical truth. (KL, 40) * ** * In What is Existenz Philosophy? Arendt calls Kant the true, if also clandestine founder and the secret king of Existenz philosophy, implicitly comparing him with Heidegger as its apparent king. Kant is the true founder of Existenz philosophy, because by destroying the correspondence of Being and thought he destroyed the ancient notion of Being itself. By destroying the true world, he destroyed also the apparent one putting in question the Reality of everything beyond the individual. (EP, 39) Existenz philosophy attempts to re-establish this lost connection with Being. Kant is a clandestine founder of Existenz philosophy, because he himself was not aware of the full implications of his critique. The purpose of Kants destruction of metaphysics, as Arendt points out, was the liberation of reason and mankind. [Kant] is the first philosopher who wishes to understand Man according to his own law, and who frees man from the universal context of Being, in which a Man would be a thing among things (even if as a res cogitans he is opposed to res extensa.) (40). Nevertheless, from Arendts perspective, Kant remains bound to the tradition insofar as he understands this liberation as the establishing of the autonomy of man as a rational being. According to Kant, the task of Reason is to legislate, to impose rational order on reality and moral law on the realm of freedom. Freedom then consists of obedience to the self-imposed categorical imperative, of submission to the imperatives of (practical) reason. Kants Reason assumes divine position and Kants philosophy, insofar as it is preoccupied with the ideal rational order of reality and with the ultimate metaphysical questions, is still metaphysical. Arendt argues that Kants destruction of the ancient conception of Being, the purpose of which was the establishing of the autonomy of man, accomplished only half the job. While Kant destroyed the ancient notion of identity of Being and thought, he implicitly held on to a 185

related concept of Being as the given, to whose laws Man is in all cases subject. (EP, 40) Arendt argues that Man could suffer this notion only so long as he had, in the feeling of his security in Being and his belonging to the world, at least the certainty that he could know Being and the course of the World. (40) Kants critical philosophy destroyed this certainty and made Mans subjection to Being unbearable. The heros gesture has [therefore] not accidentally become the pose of philosophy since Nietzsche; it requires heroism to live in the world as Kant left it. (41) While Kant intended to establish the autonomy of Man and assert human dignity, he inadvertently lowered Man to the position of a slave of essentially alien and inscrutable Being. This problem (of which Kant himself was not fully aware) is not a sign of some deficiency of Kants philosophy. It is rather a theoretical expression of modern mans world-alienation. This problem is also related to Kants concept of freedom, in which, as Arendt puts it, oddly enough, the modern lack of freedom is indicated. (EP, 41; Cf. BPF, 145) According to Kant, Man has the possibility of determining his own actions out of the freedom of the good will; these actions themselves, however, fall under the causality of nature, a sphere essentially alien to Man. Man, free in himself, is hopelessly surrendered to the course of nature alien to him, a fate contrary to him, destructive of freedom. While Kant made Man the master and measure of Man, at the same time he lowered him to a slave of Being. (EP, 41) According to Arendt, freedom is the central concern of Kants thought. This fundamental orientation on freedom is also the main reason for Arendts admiration of Kant.41 Nevertheless, Kants understanding of freedom, which is influenced by the Christian notion of free will as well as by the traditional preoccupation of philosophy with what is eternal and necessary, is inadequate and paradoxical. Arendt resolves the paradoxes inherent in Kants understanding of freedom by shifting the focus from the moral to the political aspect of freedom that is to say to human action, as well as to other human activities that constitute and sustain human world. The world and the public realm, which, according to Arendt constitutes the stage for political action as

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well as the space in which worldly reality appears to us, is not simply given to man; it is constituted and sustained by human activity. Freedom, for Arendt, is not a phenomenon of will, but of action. Political action, as Arendt understands it, is always a common action undertaken by a plurality of actors in the public realm. Its object is care for the public, or political matters and for the common world.42

Arendts solution of the paradoxes inherent in Kants understanding of freedom is influenced by Heidegger most notably by his analysis of human existence as being-in-the-world and beingwith-others in Being and Time. This may seem surprising and even paradoxical. For while Kant was deeply concerned with freedom but failed to provide a satisfactory theoretical account of it, Heideggers thought consistently denies the very possibility of political freedom. Neither the extreme subjectivism of Being and Time, nor the effacement of subjectivity in Heideggers late thought can accommodate any politically meaningful notion of freedom. Arendts adaptation of Heideggers ideas for her purposes therefore entails their substantial revision. Arendt, as Villa puts it, uses Heidegger against Heidegger, in the service of ideas he would have condemned.43 As discussed above, Arendt in her revision of Heideggers analysis of human existence as being-in-the-world and being-with-others makes use of concepts and ideas derived from Kants Critique of Judgment as well as from his political writings. As we can see, Arendt in her thinking about philosophy and politics and their fate in modernity draws from both Kant and Heidegger. We could say that she moves between the two authors, critically adopting their ideas in ways they themselves might not approve of.44 Heideggers influence on Arendt is undoubtedly more immediate and more pronounced than Kants. This is only logical, since both Arendt and Heidegger are preoccupied with the same set of problems. Nevertheless, Arendts concern with freedom and politics suggests that the spirit of her thought is closer to Kant than to Heidegger.

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Arendt strives to uphold Kants ideal of human dignity, which she redefines as dignity of free and thinking beings, in a society which turns us into thoughtless slaves of our know-how, into mere cogs in social machinery. Arendts critical thinking focuses on the existential structures that condition the appearance of Being to us, on the structures that constitute worldly reality and enable the experience of freedom. Arendt is concerned primarily with the modern transformation of these structures and activities not with the construction of some ideal model of the public realm and of vita activa. Critical thinking, as Arendt understands it, constantly responds to transformations of reality through action. It is concerned with the particular and the contingent, hence it contains an element of judgment. Arendt discovered a model or an explanation of such judgment and such mode of thinking in Kants Critique of Judgment and in his notion of Selbstdenken. Kants unwritten political philosophy thus becomes a propaedeutic for her own critical and genuinely political philosophy. Although Kant himself did not realize it, his philosophy contains both the formulation and the solution of the central problem of the Existenz philosophy. This also explains Arendts enigmatic remark, according to which Kant is not only the true, if clandestine founder, but also the secret king of the Existenz philosophy.

Throughout this study I have argued that Arendts work represents a critique of the present crisis of modernity. This crisis can be described as an unintended outcome of modernity. Modernity can be in retrospect described as a project of emancipation of mankind, as to use Kants definition of the Enlightenment mans emergence from the self-incurred immaturity.45 Modern world, as the practical outcome of modernity, hardly represents the achievement of this goal. The modern transformations of the world and of human comportment to the world did not lead to the triumph of the idea of humanity, but on the contrary to dehumanization of the world and of man. Modernity did not bring the emergence of man from self-imposed immaturity, but new forms of self-imposed domination. And yet, the modern world is a logical outcome of 188

modernity and of the Enlightenment. The modern world is shaped by science and technology, which allow nearly total rational control of reality. In this respect, the modern world can be described as a triumph not only of the Enlightenment, but of the entire Western tradition of rationality. In her Kant lectures Arendt reconsiders the meaning of the Enlightenment as Kant understood it. She argues that the Enlightenment understood as mans emergence from self-incurred immaturity cannot be defined in terms of goals and values. The Enlightenment requires constant engagement in critical thinking, which challenges all dogmatically accepted values and opinions. [C]ritical thought is always antiauthoritarian. (KL, 38) Like Kant, Arendt does not address her writings to a closed community of scholars, but to a broad reading public. She appeals to her readers to think about what we are doing, to think about our predicament. Such thinking can make us, as individuals, aware of our predicament and prevent from becoming thoughtless slaves of scientific and technological rationality. Nevertheless, thinking alone cannot change our predicament and resolve the present crisis. Such change can arise only from political action. Arendts work offers only little guidance for such action. As she explains in the Prologue to The Human Condition, the answers to the problems and perplexities of the modern world are matters of practical politics, subject to the agreement of many; they can never lie in theoretical considerations or the opinion of one person, as thought we dealt here with problems for which only one solution is possible. (HC, 5) Political problems are not logical or technical problems that would have only a single solution. Their solution must arise from political debate, from the confrontation of various opinions of the plurality of actors which leads to political action, to common response to a given situation. Nevertheless, Arendt does discuss (primarily in O n Revolution and in The Crises of the Republic) various modern examples of political action. This discussion gives us some idea about what, according to Arendt, could be the sources, the form

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and the objectives of political resistance against the current system of social domination. This strand of Arendts work will be discussed in the next chapter.

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1 2

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 50. Young-Bruehl, 246. 3 Elzbieta Ettinger, Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Richard Wolin, Hannah Arendt: Kultur, Thoughtlessness, and Polis Envy, in Heideggers Children (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Michael T. Jones, Heidegger the Fox: Hannah Arendts Hidden Dialogue, New German Critique No. 73, Special Issue on Heiner Muller. (Winter, 1998); Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) especially chapter 3. 4 Wolin, 35. 5 The price for the elimination of lifes burden from the shoulders of all citizens was enormous and by no means consisted only in the violent injustice of pain and necessity. Since this darkness is natural, inherent in the human condition .. the price for absolute freedom from necessity is, in a sense, life itself, or rather the substitution of vicarious life for real life. (HC, 120) 6 Consider for instance this suggestive passage: To the very end, however, Arendt remained in Heideggers thrall. In 1974, the year before her death, she wrote to him in barely sublimated code: No one can deliver a lecture the way you do, nor did anyone before you. (Wolin, 38) The context in which the sentence was written however suggests that Wolins Freudian interpretation is far-fetched and manipulative: The detailed Kant interpretation in the freedom manuscript [Arendt is referring to a manuscript of Heideggers On the Essence of Human Freedom] was of crucial importance to me. No one reads the way you do, and nobody before you did either. As far as the problem of willing is concerned, I have largely put Kant aside for the time being (Arendts letter to Heidegger from July 26, 1974, in Ursula Ludz (ed.), Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger Letters 1925-1975 (Orlando: Harcourt, 2004), 210-211.) 7 An earlier version of Wolins paper appeared as Hannah and the Magician: An Affair To Remember, review of Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger by Elzbieta Ettinger, The New Republic (Oct. 9, 1995). 8 Ettinger 15, quoted by Wolin, 37. How could a secrete affair with her married professor serve as a ticket to social recognition remains a mystery. The strength of Wolins paper evidently lies not in logical argumentation, but rather in suggestive and moralizing rhetoric. 9 Not surprisingly, this line of Wolins argument also relies on the use of highly selective citations. Wolin does not mention Arendts assertions that she never considered herself to be German and that she was from her early childhood aware of being Jewish. Instead, he (mis)quotes another statement from the same interview: As a child I did not know that I was Jewish quotes Wolin, while Arendt in fact says I did not know from my family that I was Jewish. (EU, 6, emphasis added.) Wolin also does not mention that in the same interview Arendt explains that when she was just a little bit older, her mother taught her to be proud of her Jewishness and to defend herself against anti-Semitic remarks of other children, that she kept her maiden name after she married Gentile anti-Nazi Heinrich Blcher, because she wanted to be recognized as a Jew, or that after the Nazis got to power, she worked for Zionist organizations. 10 Marriages in the State of Israel are within jurisdiction of religious courts. Civil marriages are not possible, although Israel acknowledges validity of civil marriages concluded abroad. Nevertheless children of mixed marriages are legally bastards (children of Jewish parentage born out of wedlock are legitimate), and if one happens to have a non-Jewish mother he can neither be married nor buried. Israeli citizens, religious and nonreligious, seem agree upon the 191

desirability of having a law which prohibits intermarriage, and it is chiefly for this reason.that the are also agreed upon undesirability of a written constitution in which such a law would embarrassingly have to be spelled out. Whatever the reasons, there certainly was something breathtaking in the navet with which the prosecution denounced the infamous Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which had prohibited intermarriage and sexual intercourse between Jews and Germans. (EJ, 7) 11 I should like to make it clear that as a Jew I take my sympathy for the cause of the Negroes as for all oppressed or underprivileged peoples for granted... Reflections on Little Rock, Dissent Vo.6 (1959), 45. 12 Arendt is of course interested in totalitarianism, which includes not only Nazism but also Stalinist Bolshevism. That Nazism and Stalinism are so to say the same animal, that they are instances of a qualitatively new type of regime, of totalitarianism, is after all the central thesis of The Origins of Totalitarianism. Wolin, on the other hand, is interested primarily in Nazism and argues that the concept of totalitarianism in itself is just a tool for deflecting the blame from Germany. (Wolin, 57) 13 See Chapter 1. 14 Jacques Taminiaux, Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 3. 15 This, in any case is the philosophical basis for modern Nihilism, its origin in the old ontology; the attempt to stretch the new questions and content to the old framework here takes its revenge. (EP, 47) The wording of this sentence is somewhat awkward. Nevertheless the translation of a later German version of the same essay (published in 1948 in Arendts Sechs Essays, Heidelberg, 1948), which was published in Essays in Understanding, supports my reading: This is, in any case, the philosophical basis of modern nihilism, with its origins reaching back into the old ontology; in it, the arrogant attempt to fit new questions and elements into the old ontological framework has come home to roost. (EU, 177) Heideggers nihilism is hence the consequence of his attempt to fit the new questions and elements of existential philosophy to the old ontological framework. Nevertheless, the germ of this nihilism is contained already in the old ontology itself. 16 In the English version Arendt argues that Heidegger introduced these concepts in later lectures. Nevertheless, references to the people (Volk) and community (Geimeinschaft) figure already in section 74 of Being and Time. The rhetoric of this passage is very close indeed to Heideggers rectoral address and other infamous texts from the rectorship period, which led some authors to argue that already Being and Time reveals Heideggers affinity to the ideas of National Socialism. 17 In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt identifies such approach as typical among the intellectual critics of liberal democracy from both right and left in the interwar period. The intellectuals were ready to support any assault against the rotten bourgeois society without any regard for the consequences. 18 For, if Hegel reportedly said one day, after seeing Napoleon at Jena, that he had seen the Spirit of the World riding a horse, he was far from considering that the Emperor, just by himself alone, would be the agent of that Spirit, much less that he was its conscious agent. Neither did Hegel consider himself to be such an agent, since he limited himself to the role of remembering. (Taminiaux, 161) 19 Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and the starvations of nations, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs. Das Gestell the original lecture, as quoted by Michael T. Jones, 171. 192

From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same; the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man. An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 37. 20 While Arendt recognizes that Holocaust would not be possible without modern technology, she does not claim that technology would be its cause. Similarly, why she argues that capitalism and socialism are essentially identical systems of economic and social organizations, she would never claim that the United States and the Soviet Russia are identical. The key difference between the two countries, according to Arendt, is the difference between their political systems. (See Thoughts on Politics and Revolution in Crises of the Republic.) 21 Danna R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 79. 22 An error rather prevalent among modern philosophers who insist on the importance of communication as a guarantee of truth chiefly Karl Jaspers and Martin Buber, with his I-thou philosophy is to believe that the intimacy of the dialogue, the inner action in which I appeal to my self or to the other self, Aristotles friend, Jaspers beloved, Bubers Thou, can be extended and become paradigmatic for the political sphere. (LMII, 200) 23 We should note that Arendt at the same time argues that Heideggers analyses of average everyday life in terms of das Man in which the public realm has the function of hiding reality and preventing even the appearance of truth offer most penetrating insights into one of the basic aspects of [modern] society. Nevertheless, she adds that the limitations of Heideggers analyses appear if they are taken to cover the whole of public life. (EU, 432-433) In other words, Heidegger is wrong insofar as he extends his critique of everyday life to all forms of public realm. According to Arendt, his analyses of everyday life in terms of das Man is applicable only to the specifically modern social realm. 24 Ronald Beiner, Rereading Hannah Arendts Kant Lectures in Philosophy & Social Criticism Vol. 23, No. 1 21-32 (1997): 23. 25 A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly; the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens). Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991), 99. The external and rightful freedom enjoyed by the citizens of Kants republic is defined as a warrant to obey no external laws, except for those to which I have been able to give my own consent. (Ibid., 99 n.) 26 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Kant Political Writings, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991), 113. 27 Immanule Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991), 55. 28 This federation should be construed as peaceful coexistence of independent states that base their mutual relations on international law and abstain from using force as a tool of their international policy, rather than some federated world-state. 29 Perpetual Peace, 114. 30 Beiner, 23. 31 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, axi note - Preface to the first edition, as quoted by Arendt in KL, 32 32 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in Kant Political 193

Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991), 55. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 56. 35 Michel Foucault. What is Enlightenment, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 42. 36 Michel Foucault, Qu est-ce que les Lumires?, in Michel Foucault Dits et crits, ed. D. Defert, F. Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 687. 37 See the discussion of Wolins criticism of Arendt above. 38 This is not to suggest that Arendt actually wrote her lectures in response to such criticism. 39 Beiner, 23. 40 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 153. 41 Recent philosophers with their modern pose of the hero show only too plainly that they could follow Kant to the end in many directions, but not a step beyond him, if in fact they have not fallen, consistently and desperately, a few steps behind him. For they all, with the one great exception of Jaspers, have given up at some point Kants basic conception of freedom and dignity. (EP, 41-2) 42 For further discussion of Arendts understanding of political action see Chapters 3 and 5. 43 Villa, 77. 44 Arendt was obviously influenced also by other thinkers most importantly by Marx and Aristotle, but also by Jaspers, Nietzsche, Benjamin and others 45 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991), 54.

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Chapter 5: What to Do? Arendts Republicanism

As I argued in the previous chapter, Arendts thought is primarily critical, as opposed to than normative. Arendt diagnoses the current crisis of modernity, but she does not offer any cure, any solution, of this crisis. Such a solution must, according to her, arise from political action; it can never lie in theoretical considerations or the opinion of one person. (HC, 5) Nevertheless, Arendts thought does contain a quasi-normative dimension. Although Arendt does not offer any ready-made solution of the present crisis, her discussion of various modern examples of political action can be read as an analysis of possible forms and sources of resistance against the mechanisms of social domination. As Margaret Canovan points out, this strand of Arendts thought is inspired by the tradition of classical republicanism, which originated in Rome and was passed down through medieval city-states to Machiavelli and thence to Harrington, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Tocqueville. A republic according to this tradition is free in the sense that it is not subject to master but is the common possession of its citizens, a public thing.1 The notion of sovereignty is therefore wholly alien to this tradition; power is not conceived in terms of rule and domination, but in terms of common action of free citizens who together take care and sustain the res publica. Power and freedom are therefore understood not as mutually opposite, but rather as two sides of the same coin.

Political Principles Action is for Arendt the highest of activities pertaining to vita activa because it allows us to express who we are, to shape ourselves as unique individuals, and because it gives meaning to our existence. Arendts position has therefore been interpreted as a sort of political existentialism.2 This interpretation must be rejected as misleading. As discussed in the previous chapter, Arendt 195

criticizes Heideggers existentialism as solipsistic and fundamentally anti-political. In both What is Existenz Philosophy? and Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought she extends this criticism also to more explicitly political existentialism of Sartre, Camus or Marleau-Ponty. While she acknowledges that the French existentialists stand apart from other trends in contemporary philosophy in that they are the only ones whose concern with politics is at the very centre of their work, (EP, 47) she argues that even their existentialism is based on solipsistic and anti-political focus on ones own existence: the point is not that the present world as reached a crisis and is out of joint, but that human existence as such is absurd because it presents insoluble questions to a being endowed with reason. (EU, 438) For the French existentialists action becomes an aesthetic gesture, an attempt to make ones existence meaningful, to save ones soul. (EU, 438) According to Arendt, such a gesture cannot but confirm the absurdity of human existence against which it protests. Arendt responds to Heidegger and his French followers by shifting the focus from Being or ones own existence to the conditions of the modern world. The problem, according to her, is not that human existence as such would be meaningless, but that the modern world does not provide conditions for meaningful life. To make our lives meaningful, we must transform these conditions. Political action, according to Arendt, must be motivated by the concern for the world, rather than for ones own existence. The moment I act politically, Im not concerned with me but with the world. The decisive thing is whether your own motivation is clear for the world or for yourself, by which I mean for your soul. (HAHA, 311) The Greeks, according to Arendt, pursued political action in order to distinguish themselves, to gain immortal fame. Nevertheless, to achieve such immortal fame, they had to contribute to the glory of the polis, they had to show that they care for their city more than for their own life.3 Political action, as Arendt understands it, is not a matter of existential self-affirmation, means of expressing ones authentic self. It rather presents us an opportunity to give meaning to our 196

existence by transcending the concern for ourselves, by participating in common, that is political, matters. While the ancient Greeks might have pursued political action in order to gain immortal fame, it is doubtful whether such quest for personal greatness and immortal fame could, or, for that matter, should motivate political action under modern conditions. Unlike the ancient Greeks, we can no longer believe that the collective memory of our political communities could secure us the immortal fame praised by Pericles. The ever-changing modern world makes us aware of the transient nature of all political communities. More importantly, we are aware of the possibility of a nuclear holocaust that could destroy all mankind with all its historical memory. Courage, under the circumstances of modern warfare, has lost much of its old meaning. By putting in jeopardy the survival of mankind and not only individual life or at the most the life of a whole people, modern warfare is about to transform the individual mortal man into a conscious member of the human race of whose immortality he needs to be sure in order to be courageous at all and for whose survival he must care more than for anything else. (EU, 422) In any case, concern for immortal fame plays virtually no role in Arendts discussion of modern examples of political action.4 Arendt underlines rather the disinterested nature of political action that transcends concern for ones own reputation or fame. As discussed above,5 Clemenceau and other supporters of Dreyfus were motivated by such abstract ideas as justice, liberty, and civic virtue. (OT, 110) Similarly, in her discussion of the 1960s students political movement Arendt stresses that the participants of this movement did not simply carry on propaganda, but acted, and, moreover, acted almost exclusively from moral motives (CR, 203) and goes on to argue that such moral motivation is characteristic of all revolutions. Arendt clearly admires this moral aspect of revolutionary political action; it is this moral motivation of the revolutionaries and political activists that in her mind makes their action noteworthy and memorable.6

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The kind of moral motivation of political action Arendt admires must be distinguished from the moral rage that drove the French Revolution. The civil rights activists were not moved by a quasi-religious desire for absolute freedom or justice, but by principles of freedom and equality that are embodied in American Constitution. They were not moved by pity for the poor and oppressed, but rather by solidarity with the citizens who had been disenfranchised, who were not treated in accordance with the principles of the republic. The action of Danish citizens, who defied the orders of the German occupation authorities to protect Jewish citizens and residents of Denmark from Nazi persecution, was also motivated by adherence to abstract moral or political principles and by solidarity with the Jews. (EJ, 171-175) Arendt argues that political action is always moved and determined in addition to internal motives of individual actors and to the aim of the particular action by some political principle. She borrows the notion of principle from Montesquieu, who in The Spirit of the Laws distinguishes between the nature of political regime, which is determined by its structure, and its principle, which is the spring that sets it in motion.7 In distinction from internal motives of individual actors (which are perceived as passions),8 the principles do not operate from within the self, but inspire, as it were, from without. (BPF, 152) In distinction from the goal of an action, which is always particular and which ceases to exist once it is achieved, political principles are universal and inexhaustible. However, the manifestation of principles comes about only through action, they are manifest in the world as long as the action lasts, but no longer. (Ibid.) Such principles are honor or glory, love of equality which Montesquieu called virtue, or distinction or excellence but also fear or distrust or hatred. Freedom or its opposite appears in the world whenever such principles are actualized. (Ibid.) Action inspired by principles such as fear, distrust, or hatred, obviously does not lead to the appearance of freedom, but of its very opposite. Such action therefore cannot be regarded as political action in the full sense of the 198

word. Raison dtre of politics, according to Arendt, is freedom and only action that reveals freedom is, properly speaking, political.

Arendt actually gives two different accounts of the purpose of politics. According to one formulation, the raison dtre of politics is freedom. (BPF, 151) According to the other one, the end or raison dtre of politics is to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom can appear. (BPF, 154) These two definitions can be in fact interpreted as identical or synonymous. Arendts argument that freedom or the establishment of a space where freedom can appear is the end or the raison dtre of politics should not be interpreted in terms of means and ends categories, as if freedom or space where freedom can appear were goals of action. The means and ends categories of instrumental rationality are, according to Arendt, derived from the experience of work, i.e. fabrication and cannot be applied to political action. Such misinterpretation of action as fabrication is inherent in the Platonic tradition of political philosophy, which is concerned primarily with legislation and founding of new cities, with creating boundaries and setting limits for action. To understand the emergence of freedom or the establishment of a space where freedom can appear as goals of political action would mean to repeat the error of modern revolutions that turned the achievement of freedom into their ultimate goal or end; reaching of this goal, achieving of liberation would then make further political action unnecessary or even impossible. Revolutions in the tradition of the French Revolution invariably failed to achieve their goal. Instead of establishing a lasting space where freedom could appear, they ended up establishing revolutionary or in case of the Russian Revolution totalitarian dictatorships engaged with the violent and never ending business of liberation. Alternatively they ended up in a kind of stalemate with the ancient regime, which led to establishment of constitutionally limited government, that is

199

to liberation from tyranny. According to Arendt, liberation from tyranny is, however, only a necessary precondition of political freedom. Freedom is not a goal that is to be achieved by action; freedom is rather revealed and actualized in action.9 Men are free as distinguished from their possessing the gift of freedom as long as they act, neither before not after; for to be free and to act are the same. (BPF, 153) Political action is always an action in concert; it is possible only in the company of others and it requires a common public space to meet them. (BPF, 148) Such public realm does not have to be formally constituted. On the contrary, it comes to being whenever men are together in the manner of speech and action. (HC, 199) The public realm in the most elemental sense not only does not depend on the existence of any official political structures, but can emerge in opposition to such structures. Such underground public realm was brought to being by the French Resistance (BPF, 3) or by the dissidents in the former Communist countries. The public realm in this elemental sense however disappears together with the action that brought it to being; liberation from the Nazi, respectively Communist domination somewhat paradoxically brought to an end the underground public realm of the French resistance (BPF, 9) as well as the parallel societies of the Central-European dissidents. In order to gain some stability and permanence, the public realm must be institutionalized and protected by the laws and institutions of polis, republic, or some other form of political regime.

American Revolution Rousseau compared establishing of a new political regime to the problem of squaring the circle in geometry and declared that it is a task for a god, rather than for a man.10 This task seems especially daunting in our situation, precisely because we can appeal to no god, to no higher order that could serve as the source of authority of the new political regime. The collapse of the 200

traditional authoritative order, which has been described as the Death of God or the end of metaphysics, is, according to Arendt, the consequence of the revolutionary modern age. Full implications of the modern collapse of the traditional authoritative order, namely modern nihilism and collapse of the common sense, become fully apparent only in the modern world that came to being with the rise of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, all modern revolutions, starting with the American and the French Revolution, were aimed against the traditional political order and, by extension, against the higher divine cum metaphysical order. While all of these revolutions managed to overthrow the old regime, none of them with the exception of the American Revolution succeeded in laying down foundations of a new political regime, in creating a lasting space where freedom can appear. The triumphantly successful American Revolution was, according to Arendt, overshadowed by the French Revolution, which ended in disaster. (OR, 56) The French, rather than the American Revolution became the paradigm of a revolution, the model that future revolutions followed. Arendt argues that insofar as we regard the failed French Revolution as the paradigm of a revolution, we cannot understand the task and the meaning of revolution. One cannot learn what a revolution is meant to be and how it can succeed from a revolution that failed. To understand the meaning of revolution, we must turn to the successful American Revolution. In On Revolution Arendt wants to remind her readers about this Revolution, which she regards as perhaps the greatest, certainly the boldest, enterprise of European mankind. (OR, 55) She wants to remind the would-be revolutionaries, who in the 1960s searched for inspiration mostly in the works of Marx and his successors, about the true meaning and goal of revolution and to dissuade them from following the violent and fruitless path of the French Revolution and of all revolutions that followed in its footsteps. She also tries to dissipate the fear of revolution which was the leitmotif of post-War American foreign policy (OR, 217) by reminding Americans about the revolutionary origins of their own country. 201

Arendts account of the American Revolution and American Constitution in On Revolution is to a great extent idealized. That, however, does not mean, as was suggested by one of the reviewers,11 that Arendt wrote her book in order to express gratitude to her adopted homeland. On Revolution must be interpreted in the context of Arendts criticism of contemporary American society12 and especially in the context of her essays and articles on the contemporary political crisis of American Republic.13 Arendt did not write her book to express gratitude to her adopted homeland, but rather to remind Americans about the glorious origins and greatness of their republic and to warn them against its current decline. Arendt compared her idealization of American Constitution to Montesquieus idealization of English Constitution. (HAHA, 329) We could also compare it to Ciceros De re publica. Like Cicero, Arendt is concerned with the decline of the republic and, as I shall argue, with its transformation into an empire.

Hegel and Marx interpreted French Revolution as an inevitable outcome of the internal logic of historical development. According to both of them, the course of the Revolution was driven by an irresistible quasi-natural force of historical development, rather than by deliberate acts of the revolutionaries. Arendt criticizes Hegels and Marxs historical determinism as theoretically flawed because of its failure to take into account the contingency of human action, and as politically dangerous because of its tendency to replace reality by ideology. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that the Revolution was perceived as an irresistible process already by its contemporary observers, as well as by the revolutionaries themselves. The French Revolution, according to her, assumed the character of an irresistible quasi-natural process once the liberated masses of the poor burst onto the scene, demanding not political freedom, but liberation from hunger and poverty. For Arendt, the French Revolution does not represent a culmination of the quasi-natural historical process, but on the contrary a beginning of a quasi-natural process of modern historical development, which is driven by the life-process itself. (OR, 59) 202

The American Revolution was spared of the same fate thanks to the abundance of material resources and the absence dire of poverty in the North American colonies. These fortunate circumstances influenced the overall spirit of the American Revolution. While the participants of the French Revolution came to believe that they could not influence the course of the revolutionary process they helped to unleash, the actors of the American Revolution were convinced that man is master of his destiny, at least with respect to political freedom. (51) While the French revolutionaries were intoxicated by passion, their American counterparts were engaged in sober deliberation. The French Revolution was violent and its aim was primarily negative: liberation from tyranny of the ancient regime. The American Revolution, on the other hand, was, at least in what Arendt regards as its decisive stage, non-violent and its objective was positive it consisted of the establishment of a new body politic. The Revolution of course started by the Revolutionary War, the goal of which was liberation from the British colonial rule. Nevertheless, the decisive moment of the Revolution came only after this negative goal had been achieved. The positive goal of the Revolution, establishment of a new republic, was achieved by means of non-violent political action, which consisted in public deliberation, and which culminated with the acceptance and ratification of the new Constitution.

Arendt argues that the American Constitution is the only modern constitution in the full sense of the word. It is the only constitution that succeeded in constituting a new political regime and a new body politic. The French constitution of 1791 remained a piece of paper, (125) with no practical significance. The constitutions of experts adopted in various European countries after World War I, on the other hand, were by no means the result of revolution; they were imposed, on the contrary, after a revolution had failed, and they were, at least in the eyes of the people living under them, the sign of its defeat, not its victory. (144) Their purpose was not to create space where freedom could appear, but on the contrary to set limits to action. Arendt argues that 203

while the legal experts who drafted these constitutions looked for inspiration to the American Constitution, they failed to appreciate its main purpose and its greatest achievement. They understood the purpose of a constitution in purely negative terms, as limitation of the prerogatives and power of government and protection of the rights of citizens, and failed to grasp the positive aim of the American Constitution the fact that the actual content of the Constitution was by no means the safeguard of civil liberties but an establishment of an entirely new system of power. (147) **** To lay down foundations of a new political regime means to establish a new system of power and a new source of authority. The task of establishing a new source of authority is seemingly insoluble, because the act of founding itself must be based on some existing authority. This problem appeared to the men of both the American and the French Revolution as a problem of the absolute, as a problem of an absolute and transcendent, that is divine, source of political authority. The revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic were still under the influence of the tradition, which had amalgamated the originally Roman notion of authority with Christianity and with Greek metaphysics. As discussed in the First Chapter, the Romans, according to Arendt, used to derive authority from the act of founding of the City, rather than from some higher transcendent authority. As discussed above,14 the French Revolution resolved, or, rather, short-circuited the problem of the absolute by proclaiming the sovereignty of General Will. The nation in effect replaced the absolute monarch, whose sovereign will, as the source of all political power and all earthly laws, was itself above the law. The authority of the absolute monarch was derived from divine authority and his will represented Gods will on Earth.15 Replacing the sovereign and unlimited will of the king by the equally sovereign and unlimited will of the nation led to the establishment of a democracy, i.e. rule of the demos or nation, rather than to the foundation of a republic. Instead of 204

founding a source of stability and authority of a new political regime, it unleashed the destructive and unstoppable force of the Revolution. Robespierres attempt to establish a new religion, the cult of the Supreme Being, was according to Arendt supposed to arrest the Revolution, which had run amok (184), by subjecting the General Will subject to some higher authority. According to Arendt, one of the good fortunes of the American Revolution was the fact that it grew out of conflict with a limited monarchy. In the government of king and Parliament from which the colonies broke away, there was no potestas legibus soliba, no absolute power absolved from laws. (157) The Founding Fathers were therefore not even tempted to pose the problem of the foundation of a new political regime and a new body politic in terms of sovereign power that is above and beyond law. They took it for granted that law must limit power and that the source of law and power cannot be identical. The seat of power to them was the people, but the source of law was to become the Constitution . a written document [rather than a] subjective state of the mind, like the will. (157)

While their experience with the limited power of the British Government had taught the Founding Fathers that the source of law cannot be identical with the source of power, their experience with political life within the colonies had taught them that political power is not a product of a single will, but a result of common action of a plurality of men bound together by mutual promises compacts and covenants like the Mayflower Compact that in effect established new political associations. Due to this colonial experience, the Founding Fathers understood that the source of political power is common action and that what keeps the public space of action in existence, is the force of mutual promise or contract. (HC, 245) While the men of the American Revolution agreed with their French counterparts that all power resides in the people, they understood this proposition in a diametrically different way. In France, power was supposed to reside in the people or nation conceived as a single entity. The 205

men of the American Revolution, on the other hand, did not conceive of the people as a single entity directed by a single will, but on the contrary as a multitude of individuals who combine in order to act in concert, united by a common case. In contrast to its French counterpart, the American Revolution was not carried through by unorganized masses who had been thrown back to the state of nature by the collapse of an absolutist regime, but people who were used to political action and who had already been organized into political bodies. Political power, according to Arendt, can arise only out of common action of a politically organized plurality of actors never out of unorganized masses. Political power that carried the revolution through could be preserved in the new Republic thanks to its federal structure. Arendt argues that the division of power between the Union and its member states is a no less important aspect of the Constitutions system of division of power than the separation of the three branches of government. Had the pre-existing duly constituted states been dissolved in a single nation state, the political power of the newly established body politic would not increase but on the contrary diminish. (OR, 154)

The American Revolution was nevertheless not spared of the question of the absolute. Covenants and contracts alone cannot serve as a foundation of the perpetual union because they cannot bind future generations. (OR, 182) American independence was won by the power of people acting in concert and the new Federal Republic was established by a mutual compact of people organized in thirteen duly constituted states. In order to become a new source of authority, a guarantee of the perpetual nature of the new Union, the Constitution had to be sanctioned by a higher authority. In the eyes of the Founding Fathers such higher authority could be provided only by the divine law. This is the reason the Declaration of Independence appeals not only to the law of nature but also to natures God. Nevertheless, what Arendt considers to be the most important reference to the absolute in the founding documents of the American Republic 206

concerns (at least explicitly) neither the law of nature, nor the avenging God, but certain truths that we hold to be self-evident. (192) By proclaiming the proposition that all men are created free and equal a self-evident truth, Jefferson turned it into an absolute axiomatic assumption that can become a foundation of an argument that would be as irrefutable as arguments derived from mathematical assumptions. Jeffersons somewhat incongruous formulation We hold these truth to be self-evident according to Arendt suggests that he was aware that the proposition that all men are created free and equal is by no means as self-evident as the proposition that two plus two equals four. The proposition that men are created free and equal was valid because the revolutionaries agreed upon it, because they held it to be self-evident, not because it would have been an irrefutable rational verity. The grandeur of the Declaration of Independence according to Arendt, does not consist in its philosophy and not so much even in its being an argument in support of action as in its being the perfect way for an action to appear in words. (130) The Declaration of Independence is first and foremost a political statement, the validity of which is derived from its power to persuade, to woo agreement or approval. Its greatness lies in respect to the Opinion of mankind, in the appeal to the tribunal of the world for our justification. (129) In other words, the Declaration does not represent an irrefutable rational argument for American independence based on an axiomatic proposition that men are created free and equal, but a compelling political argument in support of this proposition. This argument, which still seeks the agreement of the tribunal of the world, of the opinion of mankind,16 is now supported by the evidence of the successful Revolution and of more than two hundred years of existence of the American Republic. The continued existence of the United States proves that the Revolution succeeded in creating a lasting body politic, that the Constitution indeed became a new source of authority. This authority, however, is not grounded in some higher absolute authority (whether it be divine law or 207

some self-evident truth) but in the act of foundation itself. While the Founding Fathers believed that authority of the new Constitution must be derived from some higher authority, they inadvertently returned the notion of authority back to its original Roman meaning.17 Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the American and the Roman notion of authority. In Rome, the function of authority was political, and it consisted in giving advice, while in the American Republic the function of authority is legal and it consists in interpretation. (200) While in Rome authority had been vested in the Senate, in the United States the institutional seat of authority was shifted to the Supreme Court.18 The Supreme Court preserves authority of the Constitution by interpreting it. Interpretation, of course, implies that the Constitution keeps evolving and the Supreme Court therefore is indeed, in Woodrow Wilsons phrase, a kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session (200) The continuous evolution of the Living Constitution corresponds to the Roman notion of auctoritas, which consisted in augmenting (augere) of the foundations of the city. The authority of American Constitution could have been preserved for over two hundred years thanks to the mechanisms of judicial review and legal interpretation that protect the authority of the Constitution while constantly evolving its interpretation. Without these mechanisms, the Constitution would have become either irrelevant, or it would have to be subject to extensive amendments. In either case, the authority grounded in the act of founding, would have been lost.19 **** Although the American Revolution was triumphantly successful, its success was not unqualified. While the Revolution succeeded in establishing a new body politic and a new source of authority, it largely failed in preserving the spirit of the Revolution, that is the spirit of political freedom. Americans of course still perceive their country as the beacon of liberty. The problem is that the focus shifted almost completely from political freedom to civil liberty, to liberal freedom from politics. The pursuit of what the Founding Fathers called public happiness, which could be 208

attained only by participation in political life, was replaced by the pursuit of private happiness. (135) To put it in constitutional terms, the emphasis shifted from the Constitution with its system of the division of power as a guarantee of republican form of government to the Bill of Rights, as a guarantee of civil liberty. As discussed above,20 Arendt regards civil liberty as an indispensable aspect of political freedom and as a necessary prerequisite of political freedom in its positive sense. The Bill of Rights is therefore, according to her, a necessary supplement to the Constitution. (152) The problem is that civil liberty came to be perceived as an end in itself rather than as a prerequisite of political freedom in the positive sense, that it became primarily a guarantee of the pursuit of private rather than public happiness. Arendt attributes the decline of the spirit of political freedom in America to two factors. On the one hand, the very success of the Revolution constitution of the state and federal government led to the decline of importance of township meetings and other venues of direct democracy. Only the representatives of people, not the people themselves, had an opportunity to engage in those activities of expressing, discussing, and deciding which in a positive sense are the activities of freedom. (235) On the other hand, the pursuit of private happiness, which all too often came to mean the pursuit of wealth, led to the transformation of the public into social realm. The wealth of the New World, which prevented the social question from appearing in the form of poverty, also allowed it to slip in through the back door in the form of quest of wealth.

Imperialism and the Crisis of the Republic As I argued above, Arendts eulogy of the American Revolution and of the American Constitution must be interpreted in the context of her analysis of the current crisis of American society and, more importantly, of the current crisis of American Republic. Both of these crises broke out in the aftermath of the Second World War and both of them are part of the broader crisis of modernity. 209

The crisis of modernity broke out with the rise of totalitarianism, which announced the end of tradition and the coming of the modern world. Totalitarian attempt to impose meaning on this modern world, to shape it through ideology, revealed with unparalleled clarity the essence of the crisis of modernity and its political and existential implications. It revealed that modern world is characterized and shaped by human struggle for total control of reality and that the hubristic attempt at a total control of reality leads to complete destruction of freedom and to reduction of human existence to its biological level. The totalitarian, or, to put it more specifically, the Nazi attempt to impose total domination on a global scale then started the Second World War. Modern world, however, emerged in its authentic form only with the first nuclear explosions that symbolically ended the War. The explosions revealed that the future of mankind would be determined by scientific and technological progress, rather than by political mobilization of masses through ideology and terror. The first nuclear weapons were designed and used by the United States and the modern world emerged in its authentic form in America. American society became the archetype of posttotalitarian mass society, American civilization the archetype of scientific and technological civilization and American culture the archetype of consumer culture. The current system of social domination emerged first and in its purest form in the United States and led to the crisis of American society.

The political crisis of American Republic must be distinguished from this crisis of American society. Whereas the crisis of American society is a consequence of Americas post-War position as the most economically and technologically advanced country, the political crisis of American Republic is related to its position as one of the two remaining great powers. The ground cause of the political crisis of American Republic appears to be the immense military might of the United States. At the beginning of her essay On Violence Arendt reminds the reader of one of political 210

sciences oldest insights, namely that power cannot be measured in terms of wealth, that riches are particularly dangerous to the power and well being of republics and argues that under current circumstances the truth of this insight has acquired a new dimension of validity by becoming applicable to the arsenal of violence as well. (CR, 113) Arendt does not suggest that the crisis of American Republic was an automatic consequence of World War II. It was rather caused by the post-War political developments. The Second World War was not followed by peace but by cold war and the establishment of the militaryindustrial-labor complex. (111) After the War, the United States did not return to its normal peace state. It continued operating under a war regime, under an assumption that the country was on the brink of war and in some sense actually at war. American foreign policy during the Cold War period was defined by the maxims of deterrence of the Soviet threat and containment of Communism. Arendt describes the Cold War peace as a continuation of war by other means [by] actual development in the techniques of warfare. (CR, 111) The ultimate goal of arms races, according to Arendt, was to develop an ultimate weapon that would enable its owner to destroy the enemy, while denying the enemy the ability to retaliate. Such weapon would not have to be used; its mere existence would persuade the enemy to give up. It would in effect make war impossible (OR, 16) and at the same time enable its owner to dominate the whole world. In On Revolution Arendt remarks that the strategy of deterrence has openly changed the role of the military from that of protector into a belated and essentially futile avenger. (OR, 15) In On Violence she spells out the consequences of this reversal of the relationship between the army and the state. Arendt argues that during the Cold War, the war making potential became the principal structuring force in the society.21 (CR, 111) The establishment of the militaryindustrial-labor complex meant a continuation or return to the war economy, in other words increased governmental role in the management of national economy which served not only 211

military but also economic and social objectives.22 The Cold War arms races became on both sides of the iron curtain the driving force of scientific, technological, and economic progress.

Arendt argues that American foreign policy during the Cold War period was driven by ideological concerns. Americans, according to her, responded to the perceived threat of Soviet military and ideological expansionism by creating an ideology of their own anti-Communism. This ideology, rather than the real Soviet threat, became the foundation of the doctrine of containment. Anti-Communism, according to Arendt, was originally a brain child of former Communists who needed a new ideology by which to explain and reliably foretell the course of history. (CR, 39) The ex-Communists turned Communism upside down and all politics for them became a struggle between Communism and its adversaries. Every political conflict was to be explained in terms of this dialectical struggle. The world became divided between the Communists and the anti-Communists, which were the only two positions that ultimately mattered. The cause for which the anti-Communists were fighting was of course freedom and democracy. Within the framework of their ideology, freedom was, however, defined simply as the opposite of communism and the fight for freedom as the fight against Communism. Since Communism was the ultimate threat, fighting it justified the use of any means and turned any opponent of Communism, or, for that matter, of any popular political movement, into an ally in the fight for freedom and democracy. In the battle against Communism, political freedom was defined primarily in terms of free enterprise. The inherently totalitarian ideological way of thinking turned the American Republic, which itself had been founded by a revolution, into a reactionary guardian of the status quo and opponent of all revolutions. Fear of revolution has been the leitmotif of postwar American . with the result that American power and prestige were

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used and misused to support obsolete and corrupt political regimes that had long become objects of hatred and contempt among their own citizens. (OR, 217) As could have been expected, the adoption of inherently totalitarian way of thinking with its characteristic contempt for factual reality backfired. The American reactionary stance led the fighters for freedom around the world to embrace Communism and seek Soviet support.23 More importantly, the anti-Communist ideology backfired at home, where it led to domestic spying and purges of the McCarthy era and to unprecedented growth of power of the intelligence services in general. (OT, xx) The Cold War era also brought the concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch of federal government at the expense of the other two branches and of the states. Arendt regarded McCarthyism as a proof that America is not immune to totalitarian threat.24 While the above mentioned developments did not transform the United States into a totalitarian regime, they have started eroding the foundations of republican government.

Anti-Communist ideology is not the only source of deformations of American politics during the Cold War period that Arendt criticizes. In Lying in Politics she argues that the political realm of the American Republic was in the post-war period invaded by marketing and management techniques that originated in the business sphere. According to Arendts analysis, these techniques resemble ideology insofar as they attempt to both predict and manipulate reality. As is the case with ideology, the reliance on these techniques leads to ignorance of and contempt for factual reality. The two new variet[ies] of the art of lying (CR, 9) that originated in the social sphere and that in the Cold War period infiltrated the political sphere consist on the one hand of various techniques of manipulation of public opinion (advertisement, public relations and image making) and, on the other hand, of various pseudo-scientific techniques, which explain and predict political and historical facts. (11)

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The impact of these techniques on politics is most visible in the arena of electoral politics. Instead of persuading voters about who they are and what they stand for, todays politicians rely on their pollsters, image-makers and public relations managers, who predict the development of public opinion and create and sell the candidates image. In Arendts words, the relationship between the representative and the elector is transformed into that of seller and buyer. (OR, 276) What prevents elections from degenerating into something as meaningless as a competition between two brands of soap is the power of reality to prevail over the artificially fabricated image. At the end of the day, politicians get rewarded or punished according to real consequences of their policies, which, despite assurances of their advisors from the ranks of social scientists, cannot be reliably predicted or calculated. According to Arendt, lying on principle, which has been characteristic of totalitarian ideologies, can work only through terror. (RJ, 265; see also CR, 8) Only terror and violence can force people to play the role assigned to them by ideology.25 Constitutional mechanisms in the United States and other functional republics prevent politicians from using terror and violence in domestic politics. This limitation, however, does not exist in the area of international politics. In this sphere, politicians may use violence to prove the predictions of their theories. This temptation is particularly strong, if the politicians come to believe that the means of violence they have at their disposal make them omnipotent. In her study Lying in Politics Arendt analyses the Vietnam War as a case study of limitations and consequences of policies that rely on such combination of brute force with public relations and management techniques. Throughout the war, the administration followed a policy of public opinion manipulation and deception, concealing unfavorable reports from the battlefield and replacing them with constant progress reports to Washington, in the case of Ambassador Marti continuing up to the moment when he boarded the helicopter to be evacuated. (RJ, 264) The crucial point is that these lies were supposed to deceive not the enemy, but the people and the

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Congress of the United States. (Secrecy and deliberate deception of the enemy have of course always been a legitimate part of warfare.) (CR, 14) The official justification of the war and the declared goal of the campaign kept changing throughout its course. Whenever it became clear that the declared goal could not be met, a new goal had to be substituted. Arendt argues that the only permanent goal underlying all of these declared objectives was to convince the world that America is the greatest power in the world. (17) The objective of the war was not to achieve power, profit or any real interest but merely to project an image of American power. The war itself, according to Arendt, was nothing else than a giant image-making campaign. It is therefore quite astonishing, as Arendt points out, that none of the image-makers in charge of planning of the war sensed that the world might get rather frightened of American friendship and commitment when the lengths to which the US will go to fulfill them were shown and contemplated. (19) The national security managers who planned the war were not only blissfully unaware of the terrible humane consequences of their policies, but seemed to be completely isolated from reality. Their decisions were not based on the accurate factual reports and assessments of the intelligence services, but on preconceived assumptions and theories. The decision to get engaged in Vietnam was based on the domino theory, according to which the fall of one country to the communist conspiracy would lead to fall of other countries in the region. Underlying the domino theory was the Cold War assumption about a monolithic Communist world conspiracy and the existence of the Sino-Soviet block. (CR, 26) This assumption, which was a product of the anti-Communist ideology, was contradicted by obvious facts, such as the constant tension between the Soviet Union and China or the fragmented nature of the post-war Communist movement. The domino theory was also contradicted by a 1964 CIA assessment, according to which [w]ith the possible exception of Cambodia, it is unlikely that any nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam.26 215

While the domino theory was a product of the anti-Communist ideology, the professional problem solvers, who were the architects of American engagement in Vietnam, were no ideologues. [T]hey believed in methods but not in world-views (CR, 40) Their methods were not derived from Marxs and Hegels philosophy of history, but from game theory and system analysis. Nevertheless, these pseudo-mathematical methods proved no less efficient in shielding their proponents from reality than ideology. According to Arendt, the assumption that reality is calculable is as hubristic as the ideological belief that the course of history is predictable. The problem-solvers were so confident in their theory that they simply disregarded the factual proofs of the failure of their policies; they kept evolving and changing their scenarios, but they remained confident that their theory would in the end prove true and that they would achieve their goal. Arendt ends her essay in a cautiously optimistic tone. On the one hand, she argues that in Vietnam, as well as in Latin America the United States embarked, in spite of its old anticolonial sentiments, on an imperialist policy. (CR, 45) On the other hand, she expresses hope that the United States will be less able to employ [such imperialist policies] successfully than almost any other country in the world. (46) Although the administration started undermining the constitutional system of the division of powers by failing to seek consent and advise of Congress prior to waging the war, by deceiving Congress and the public throughout the war and by intimidating its opponents, the Republic proved its vitality. Congress responded by investigating the conduct of the war and by reasserting its prerogatives vis--vis the executive branch and, more importantly, American citizenry informed by the free press responded through extraordinary strong, highly qualified, and well organized opposition (46) against the war.27 This, according to Arendt, suggests that American Republican spirit did not completely disappear and that the transformation of the United States into an imperial power is unlikely: in order for this country to carry adventurous and aggressive policies to success there would have to be a decisive change in American peoples national character. (46) 216

**** Recent developments unfortunately suggest that Arendt might have been too optimistic in her predictions. As was noted by a number of authors from both sides of the political spectrum, the United States, which emerged from the Cold War as an unmatched hegemonic power, has since embarked on an openly imperialist policy.28 As was the case during the Cold War, this new American imperialism constitutes a vital threat to the American Republic. The most flagrant manifestation of this new American imperialism is the current war in Iraq. The conduct of this war has been marked by the same deadly combination of the arrogance of power with the arrogance of mind (C R, 39) by the same disregard for factual reality that, according to Arendts analysis, characterized the Vietnam War.29 Deception and opinion manipulation have likewise played important roles in the present conflict. There were the public relations stunts from Collin Powels presentation of the doctored intelligence evidence of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in the UN, through the orchestrated toppling of the Saddam Husseins statue in the centre of Baghdad, to President Bushs landing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln under the Mission Accomplished sign. As was the case in Vietnam, these lies and public relations gimmicks were supposed to deceive and manipulate not the enemy, but the people and the Congress of the United States, as well as the elites and citizens of the allied countries. As was the case in Vietnam, the justification of the Iraq war has been changing throughout the conflict. The originally announced casus beli was the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq that supposedly posed imminent threat to the United States and its allies. Once it became obvious that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destruction, the focus shifted to the alleged connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda. When the claims about the link between Iraq and Al Qaeda proved to be as bogus as those about the weapons of mass destruction, yet another reason was offered liberation of the Iraqi people from the oppressive regime and installation of 217

democracy in Iraq. This reason was later further developed into a kind of reversed domino theory: a successful democratic transition in Iraq was supposed to jump-start a series of democratic revolutions throughout the Middle East. Since the overthrow of Saddams regime was not followed by a rise of democracy but by escalating ethnic and sectarian violence, the last remaining reason for the continued American presence in Iraq is to avoid defeat and thus preserve the image of American power and prevent further destabilization of the region.

The geopolitical and ideological background of the Vietnam war was defined by the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and by the Anti-Communist ideology. The present war in Iraq must be analogously interpreted against the geopolitical and ideological background defined by the post-Cold War American hegemony and by the war on terror, which appears to be a reincarnation of the Cold War Anti-Communist ideology. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the only remaining superpower and proceeded to consolidate its hegemonic position. Since the main source of American power throughout the Cold War had been its economic power, consolidation of American power consisted primarily in integration of the former Eastern block countries into the global free trade system and in promoting further globalization. The United States also proceeded by consolidating and strengthening its military hegemony, integrating former Warsaw Pact countries (including three former Soviet Republics) into NATO and by creating new overseas bases. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s the United States refrained from acting unilaterally from the position of force. This changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks provided the partisans of American imperialism with an excuse for an openly militant stance and became the basis for a new ideology that could functionally replace Anti-Communism as an ideological justification of American imperialism.

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The war on terror, which was declared by President Bush after the September 11 attacks, represents a new ideological justification for American imperialism and can be described as a functional equivalent of the Cold War ideology of anti-Communism. Similarly to antiCommunism, it is defined primarily in negative or defensive terms as ideology of defense of freedom against its mortal enemy. Like anti-Communism, it divides the world between us and them, between friends and enemies.30 Like anti-Communism, it turns freedom or democracy into an ideological objective, the achievement of which justifies any means necessary. Like AntiCommunism and other ideologies it provides a simple formula that can be used to explain reality and provide justification for any action. Like Anti-Communism it threatens the very freedom it claims to protect and is counterproductive even in protecting American national security.31 The war on terror has been used as a pretext for undermining both the constitutional system of checks and balances and personal freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It was used to justify usurpation of dictatorial powers (in the Roman sense of the word) by President Bush under broadly construed doctrine of inherent war powers. Under this doctrine the President as the Commander in Chief claims the right to wage war without congressional approval and to detain terrorist suspects including US citizens as enemy combatants for the duration of the war on terror, in other words indefinitely. The enemy combatants are simultaneously denied the right of habeas corpus and prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention. Some of the suspected enemy combatants were kidnapped by CIA from foreign countries in blatant violation of international law and in many cases subjected to torture either by American intelligence services or similar services of allied authoritarian regimes. The inherent war powers doctrine has been also used to justify an extensive secret program of monitoring and eavesdropping electronic communications within the United States without a court warrant required by the Constitution and standing laws.

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The war on terror provides ideological justification for the new American imperialism. The imperial intent was announced in thinly veiled terms in the 2002 National Security Strategy document.32 The Introduction to the document states that The greatest struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom and a single sustainable model of national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. The United States will use its position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence to defend and extend the peace based on freedom, democracy and free enterprise, to use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. Although the document proclaims that the United States seek just peace and will not use [its] strength to press for unilateral advantage, it makes it clear that the conditions of the just peace will be defined by the United States, which will maintain its unparalleled military strength and dissuade the rise of any peer competitor. In other words, the intention of the Unites States is to preserve and reinforce its hegemonic position. As I argued above, the post-Cold War world order is defined primarily by the globalizing economic system. Despite the lip service paid to freedom and democracy, there is little doubt that the operative term is, as it was throughout the Cold War, free enterprise. To preserve its hegemonic role, the United States must therefore maintain not only its military strength, but also, and more importantly, its unique position within the global economic system. This position is based on the role of the US dollar as the world currency, by American influence over the Breton Woods institutions, and last but not least by the economic power of US based multinational companies. The central position of the United States within the global economic system, and the stability of the whole system, is currently threatened not only by massive economic growth of China and India but also by the dwindling reserves of fossil fuels especially of oil. David Harvey points out that most known oil reserves are located in the Middle East and the role of the Middle East as 220

the main source of oil is likely to further increase over the coming decades, as oil fields elsewhere are being depleted.33 Therefore, whoever controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot controls the economy, at least for the near future.34 Harvey concludes that the real reason for American invasion of Iraq was securing American control over Middle-Eastern oil reserves and ultimately preservation of the dominant position of the United States within the global economic system. I should note that there are many competing explanations of the American invasion to Iraq. Immanuel Wallerstein, for instance explains the invasion as an attempt to reverse the decline of American geopolitical power and argues that securing of Middle Eastern oil reserves played no role in the decision to invade Iraq.35 It is also possible that at least some of the architects of the war genuinely believed that the toppling of Saddam Husseins dictatorship would be followed by a painless and peaceful transition towards democracy. Harveys argument according to which the securing of US control over Middle Eastern oil reserves was the only reason for American invasion of Iraq36 strikes me as reductionist. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that securing of the oil reserves did not play any role in the decision to invade Iraq. Regardless of the adequacy of Harveys explanation of the Iraq war, his work is relevant for the present discussion because it exposes, using Arendts analysis of imperialism, the economic dimension of current American foreign policy.

Harvey traces the roots of the new (post-Cold War) American imperialism back to the Cold War period. As discussed above, Arendt explains the Cold War strategy of containment as a consequence of the anti-Communist ideology. While Harvey agrees with Arendt that the antiCommunist ideology was the driving political force behind the strategy of containment, he also argues that:

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[I]t is hard to make sense of the general territorial strategy of containment without recognizing the compelling need felt on the part of business interests in the United States to keep as much of the world as possible open to capital accumulation through the expansion of trade, commerce, and opportunities for foreign investment. 37 The policy of containment of Soviet and communist threat was at the same time a policy of building, protecting and expanding American dominated system of international trade. Harvey underlines that the political or ideological dimension of the Cold War dynamics cannot be simply reduced to the economic dimension. According to Harvey, the economic and the political (or, in Harveys terms capitalist and territorial) logics are in a problematic and often contradictory dialectical relationship. Nevertheless, Harvey maintains that the American cold-war strategy was driven primarily by the capitalist logic of power. American Cold War policy of economic hegemony is according to Harvey a new form of 19th century imperialism, which was driven by the expansion of capital. In contrast to the 19th century imperialism, American policy of economic hegemony was not openly imperialistic. It was masked by the rhetoric of universalism of freedom understood primarily as free enterprise. The United States also did not rely on direct administrative control over subjected territory, but rather on a system of alliances and client states. Up until 1970s, the United States managed to mask its imperialism as benevolent hegemony. The international economic system in that period was remarkably stable. The US Dollar, which had become the world currency, was backed by gold. International trade in goods was liberalized through GATT agreements, but the nation states retained control over the movement of capital. This period was characterized by nearly universal economic growth and in developed countries also by equalization of class disparities and rise of consumer driven economy. (58) The period of economic growth ended with the economic crisis of the 1970s, which had been preceded and partly caused by the Vietnam War. (61)

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The 1970s crisis eventually led to the fall of the Breton Woods currency system and to further liberalization of the international economic system. American dollar was no longer backed by gold, and international flows of financial capital weretotally liberated from the state controls. (62) The United States retained its dominant position in the international economic system by dominating the newly liberalized global financial system. The new situation also led (with the exception of certain strategic sectors) to the further decline of US manufacturing. The US was moving towards becoming a rentier economy in relation to the rest of the world and a service economy at home. (66) This process, which other authors describe as globalization, then received further impetus with the end of the Cold War. Harvey argues that the liberalization of the movement of capital and reliance on the power of financial capital as means of control of the global economic system has in the long run undermined the dominant position of the United States in the global economic system. Financialization of American economy and outsourcing of manufacturing led to the rise of new economic powers (most notably China and India) and to unprecedented growth of the power of multinational corporations. This development at the same time led to permanent US trade deficit, which is financed largely by US trade partners. Invasion of Iraq in an attempt to secure American control of Middle-Eastern oil reserves then, according to Harvey, represents an attempt to stabilize the dominant position of the United States in the global economic system, or in other words, an attempt to make up for the decline of economic power though use of military force. The new American imperialism, which was announced in the 2002 National Strategy document and which led to the war in Iraq, is according to Harvey continuation of the Cold War policy of covert economic imperialism in a new openly imperialistic form.38

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Political Power vs. Social Domination We should note that there is an important difference between Harveys and Arendts analysis of American Cold War foreign policy. While Arendt agrees with Harvey that the doctrine of containment led the United States to embark on imperialist policy, she explains this policy solely in terms of ideological competition between Communism and anti-Communism and explicitly denies that the United States would be culpable of economic imperialism.39 It appears that while Arendt recognized the upcoming process of globalization,40 she did not realize to what extent this process constitutes a continuation of the nineteenth century imperialism, which she so brilliantly analyzed in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendts denial of the existence of economic motivations behind American Cold War policy of containment and her rejection of the notion of neo-colonialism as a recent and dangerous attempt to translate the Marxist division between capitalist and proletariat into terms of foreign relations (EU, 414) must be attributed to her structural revision of the Marxist model of capitalism. Arendt believes that class antagonism and ownership of the means of production have in the present stage of capitalist development become largely irrelevant. The development of consumer economy, according to her, is driven primarily by technological progress and by automatism of the life process of society. As discussed above, Arendt also claims that mass society is fundamentally egalitarian and that capitalism and socialism are just two forms of the same economic system.41 Arendts structural revision of Marxism reflects the historical context in which it was written. As discussed above, American economic imperialism was up until the 1970s relatively muted and American economic domination appeared as benevolent hegemony. The whole period was characterized by rapid economic growth of both developed and underdeveloped countries; in the developed countries the period was also characterized by Keynesian interventionism and by equalization of class differences.

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The imperialist nature of American economic hegemony, at least according to Harvey, became apparent only with the advance of globalization after the economic crisis of the 1970s. Liberalization of the movement of capital led to predatory exploitation of underdeveloped economies.42 The same development decreased the ability of governments to control their national economies while increasing, albeit only temporarily, the ability of the United States to control the global financial system. Globalization also reversed the trend of equalization of class disparities in developed consumer economies and especially in the United States. A number of authors have argued that this development led to a rise of a new transnational ruling class of directors and top managers of multinational corporations. This class reaps most of the profits from increasing efficiency of globalizing economy. Labor, on the other hand, bears the costs in the form of decreased wages, social benefits and job security.43 Arendts structural model of capitalism tends to obscure these consequences of globalization. That, however, does not mean that history has proven Arendt wrong, or that her analysis has become under present circumstances irrelevant. Arendts structural and the classical Marxist models of capitalism should be regarded as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. After all, Harvey agrees with Arendt that the development of the global economic system is in the long run determined by the impersonal logic of capitalism, rather than by voluntary acts of the dominant player. He argues that the financialization of American economy and liberalization of movement of capital has in the long run undermined the dominant position of the United States in the global economic system. The attempt to stabilize American hegemonic position by military means is, according to him, futile because the military expenditures will further deteriorate the American economic situation. * *** The development of capitalism is in the long term determined by automatic forces of economic and technological progress. Globalization, which decreases the ability of governments to control 225

their national economies and eventually absorbs these national economies into the global economic system, makes this automatism of economic and technological progress further unmanageable. Arendt is concerned exactly about this automatism of economic and technological progress. She not only recognized the upcoming process of economic globalization, but also warned against its consequences against further decline of political control over, or containment of, the automatic forces of market and technology. She realizes that capitalism as a system of economic and social domination displaces and colonizes political structures and argues that this process must be reversed, that political action and political and legal institutions must be used to counter or contain the automatism of progress. Just as the family and its property were replaced by class membership and national territory, so mankind now begins to replace nationally bound societies, and the earth replaces the limited state territory. But whatever the future may bring, the process of world alienation, started by expropriation and characterized by an ever-increasing progress of wealth, can only assume even more radical proportions if it is permitted to follow its own inherent law. (HC, 257; emphasis added) [O]nly legal and political institutions that are independent of the economic forces and their automatism can control and check the inherently monstrous potentialities of this process. What protects freedom is the division between governmental and economic powers, or, to put it into Marxian language, the fact that the state and its constitution are not superstructures. (CR, 212-213) This crucial point of Arendts analysis of the contemporary situation is often lost on her critics, who read her distinction between the social and the political as an argument for a complete separation of the two spheres. According to this interpretation, Arendt believes that government or politics should not be concerned with social and economic issues at all. Pitkin for instance argues that Arendt believes that material concerns (and bodily functions as well) must be excluded from the public realm.44 While it is true that some of Arendts statements45 do suggest such an interpretation, the thrust of her critique of the crisis of modernity points in the exactly opposite direction. Arendt definitely does not believe the social sphere should be left to its own devices to the forces of market and technology and to bureaucratic administration; on the

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contrary, she warns against development in this direction. Arendts critique of contemporary mass society is also not driven by some nostalgia for an agrarian, hierarchical society of freeholders and eloquent town councils, as one of her critics suggests.46 As is apparent from her analysis of tribal nationalism47, Arendt does not share the longing of Macintyre48 and other communitarian critics of liberalism for a pre-modern organic community. Arendt argues that contemporary classless, stateless and increasingly labor-less mass society can be regarded as a practical realization of Marxs communist utopia except that this dream has been realized beyond the wildest fantasies of its author through the advancement of technology whose provisional last stage is automation; the noble dream has changed into something closely resembling a nightmare. (RJ, 262) Arendt wants to uphold Marxs noble dream and save it from its perversion into the nightmare of consumer mass society. She argues that Marxs dream was a dream of freedom, rather than material abundance. Liberation from necessity, or, in other words, solving of the social question, is just a necessary precondition of political freedom. Contrary to Marx, Arendt believes that the social question cannot be resolved politically, by socialization of the means of production. What allows us to solve the social question is technology. [I]t was only the rise of technology, and not the rise of modern political ideas as such, which has refuted the old and terrible truth that only violence and rule over others could make some men free. (114) Technology is hence both the curse and the blessing of modern civilization. The question is how to tame technology, how to make it serve us and prevent it from turning us into helpless slaves of our know-how. Needless to say, Arendt does not propose that the governments should attempt to subordinate the technological and economic developments to political control. An attempt to consciously control and direct the automatic forces of Progress would inevitably be counterproductive. Such an attempt, which would inevitably rely on technocratic means and hence would remain firmly rooted within the framework of technological rationality, could only lead to further centralization and strengthening of the system of social domination. 227

After all, an attempt to subject technological and economic development to governmental control was already conducted with disastrous results in the socialist economies of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. As I already argued, Arendt maintains that the free-market and the centrally-planned economies are just two versions of an essentially identical system. [S]tate socialism is the same thing as the state capitalism would be that is, total expropriation. (CR, 212) The only difference is that the centrally planned model tends to be grotesquely inefficient in economic terms and at the same time extremely efficient as a system of social domination. If the government is the sole employer, it can deprive its opponents of the means of subsistence at will. No man [in the Soviet Union] is so rich that he cannot be made a beggar overnight without even the right to employment in case of any conflict with the ruling powers.(212)

The current system of social domination, which is driven by the anonymous forces of market and technology, cannot be countered by subordinating the forces of progress to governmental control or direction. Political power must be rather used to keep these forces in check, to resist their dynamics. Such political resistance against the system of social domination requires as its precondition uncoupling of the political structures from the logic of economic and technological Progress. Since the single most important bond between the political structures and the logic of Progress is the economic bond, political resistance against the current system of social domination requires first and foremost uncoupling of the political structures from economic interests and from the logic of capitalism. Arendt argues that the economic progress and the current system of social domination can be controlled and checked only by legal and political institutions that are independent of the economic forces and their automatism. Such political controls seem to function best in the socalled welfare states (CR, 212-213; emphasis added) Welfare state alone obviously cannot solve the problem at hand. It is not a model to be emulated, it rather points in the right direction, 228

insofar as it counters the automatism of economic forces. Welfare state, as it has developed in Western Europe, cannot do the trick because it is not truly independent of the economic forces. As the term implies, its task is promotion of growth and equitable distribution of social wealth. The welfare state, or for that matter any contemporary representative democracy, is tied with automatism of progress in three dimensions. First, its political structure is based on representation of social interests through political parties. Most of these interests are concerned with the questions of accumulation and redistribution of wealth. According to Arendt, this problem is especially grave in multi-party democracies, where no party ever bears full responsibility for the government. Multiparty parliamentary systems are therefore most prone to substitute horsetrading of interests for political deliberation.49 Second, the governments of welfare states rely on centralized bureaucratic administration. The problem at hand, i.e. uncoupling of political structures from automatism of progress, obviously cannot be resolved through technical or bureaucratic means. Bureaucracy, which is ruled by the same instrumental rationality as technology, is on the contrary part of the problem. Arendt once reminded a Marxist critic of her work (Michael Bernstein) that bureaucracy is a reality much more so today [as opposed to 19h century] than class. (HAHA, 319) Contemporary mass societies are not ruled by any economic class but by anonymous governmental and corporate bureaucracy. Third and most importantly, consumer economy in welfare states just as everywhere else develops its own system of social and economic domination. This system of domination cannot be countered by governmental control of national economy or by redistribution of wealth. Consumer economy developed even in the communist states of Central Europe.50 Consumption, according to Arendt, can play this role because mass society does not provide opportunity for any more meaningful activities. We could say that consumption is a highly addictive tranquilizer that makes bearable the meaninglessness and loneliness of life in mass society. Conspicuous 229

consumption also becomes a symbol of social status, a sign of ones ability to produce wealth, which is the main, if not the only, field in which the members of mass societies can excel and seek recognition. It should be noted that this excellence requires according to Arendt only seemingly political skill of ruling, or directing, others. Arendt explains the feelings of loneliness and meaninglessness of life in modern world as symptoms of world-alienation. The central aspect of world-alienation is the absence of freedom of a possibility to have ones opinions heard and, more importantly, to influence the course of events. The development of modern world is not determined by political action but by automatism of economic and technological progress. According to Arendt, automatism of progress and dynamics of social and economic domination can be countered only by political power, which can be generated only by common action of a plurality of politically organized citizens. Apart from being the only source of political power that could curb the anonymous forces of market and technology, direct engagement of citizens in politics in itself counters the dynamics of social domination by empowering the citizens and providing them with an opportunity to do something meaningful, to influence the course of events through their words and deeds.

According to Arendt, the current system of social domination can be countered only by political power that arises out of common action of politically concerned and organized citizens. The problem is that contemporary representative democracies, according to Arendts analysis, lack any genuinely public realm that could provide a venue for such action. Political institutions of representative democracies, which should in principle provide such a venue, have been colonized and rendered powerless by the system of social domination. The professional politicians in todays democracies represent primarily various economic interests and the main, if not the only, task of their governments is administration of national economy. More importantly, 230

representative democracies by definition lack a venue that would allow ordinary citizens to get directly engaged in political action. Arendt extends this criticism even to the United States, whose political structure she otherwise praises as a viable alternative to the obsolete model of European nation state. The decentralized federal structure of the United States and the strong tradition of local selfgovernment contrast with the centralism of the unitary nation state. Similarly, the American notion of the rule of law, institutionalized in the strict separation of the three branches of government and especially in the institute of judicial review, contrasts with the notion of popular sovereignty. Last but not least, American strictly political notion of citizenship and of national identity contrasts with European nationalism. Nevertheless, even the American Constitution fails to provide a venue for direct political participation of citizens. In On Revolution Arendt argues that Thomas Jefferson was aware of this shortcoming of the new Constitution and praises his plan to remedy it by dividing counties into wards.51 Nevertheless, Arendt was apparently even more impressed by a different model of direct democracy by the revolutionary system of councils or soviets, which appeared for the first time in the form of sections of the Parisian Commune during the French Revolution and then reappeared in subsequent revolutions throughout Europe from 1848 through 1871, 1917, up to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and, we could add, Central-European revolutions of 1989. In spite of Arendts undeniable enthusiasm for the councils, it would be a mistake to read her discussion of the council system from On Revolution as a proposal for an institutional solution of the present crisis of American society and American Republic. Arendt was aware that the councils were always short-lived revolutionary organs and in an interview with Adelbert Reif she opined that the chances of establishing the council system are very slight.(CR, 233) As discussed above, Arendt herself stressed that any solution of the present crisis must arise from political action. The obvious question is where could such action arise and what form could it take in mass society, 231

which, according to Arendt, lacks any genuine public realm. Before turning to this question, I would like to discuss what is perhaps the most peculiar aspect of Arendts understanding of power the sharp distinction she makes between political power and violence.

Power and Violence According to Arendt, [p]ower and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. (C R, 155) This argument sounds counterintuitive, to say the least. Does not political power always rely on institutionalized violence? Was not a sword an instrument of violence the symbol of political power of European kings? Arendt realizes that there exists a consensus among political theorists from Left to Right to the effect that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power. (134) Authors from Weber and Marx to Bernard de Juvenile and Mao Tse-tung all agree that the essence of power is rule or domination, which consists of imposing ones will upon others, and which relies on violence. Arendt acknowledges that this view finds strong support in our tradition of political thought. As she explains, it echoes the notion of sovereignty that was conceptualized by Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin; nevertheless, its roots can be traced back to the Greek classification of political regimes according to the number or quality of the rulers and to Judeo-Christian imperative conception of law, which construes law on the model of Gods Commandments. (137-8) Arendts own understanding of power is based on another tradition and another vocabulary no less old and time-honored. (139) It is the tradition of politics, as it was practiced in the Greek polis or Roman res publica. When the Athenian city-state called its constitution an isonomy, or the Romans spoke of the civitas as their form of government, they had in mind a concept of power and law whose essence did not rely on command-obedience relationship and which did not identify power and rule or law and command. It was to these examples that the men of the eighteenth-century revolutions turned when they ransacked the archives of antiquity and constituted a form of government, a republic, where the rule of law, resting on the

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power of people, would put an end to the rule of men over man, which they thought was a government fit for slaves. (CR, 139) In this tradition, power is not related to rule or domination but emerges from common political action of free and equal citizens. Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert. (143) Power is not understood as a property of an individual; it springs up from and is sustained by common action. When we say of somebody that he is in power we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. (143) Violence, on the other hand, does not rely on numbers and support but on instruments. Violence itself is an instrument of imposing ones will on others. Arendt admits that power and violence almost always appear in some combination. (145) Government uses violence against a foreign enemy as well as domestic criminal who does not respect the law. Nevertheless, she insists that power is not just a velvet glove covering the iron fist of violence. No government rests solely on violence even totalitarian ruler needs a power basis the secret police and its net of informers. (149) Once the government loses its power, once its commands are no longer obeyed, the means of violence become useless. This happens in revolutions, which arise when the governmental power breaks down.52 Although violence can destroy power, it is utterly incapable of creating it. (CR, 155) This is what the Germans found out in Denmark when they could not carry out plans for deportation of the Jews, this is what the Americans are discovering in Iraq. Arendt points out that the concepts of power and violence as she construes them hardly ever correspond to watertight compartments in the real world, from which nevertheless they are drawn. (CR, 145) The two concepts are rather ideal types, just like her categories of labor, work and action. Nevertheless, the validity of Arendts distinction between power and violence may still seem doubtful especially if we consider that power, as Arendt construes it, almost always relies on violence. Even the ancient Greeks, who refrained from using power in their political

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life,53 used violence not just in warfare, but also to dominate slaves. Moreover, such domination, according to Arendt, relied primarily not on violence but on superior organization of power that is on organized solidarity of masters. (CR, 149) All of this seems to suggest that power and violence are two sides of the same coin, that the power generated within certain group is a source of domination that relies on violence or threat of violence. Arendts claim that defense, policing, or dominating slaves are pre-political activities does not prove anything, because it depends on the definition of politics that excludes violence.

More convincing and in the present context more relevant is Arendts observation that warfare under current conditions has lost much of its effectiveness. (CR, 105) The current decline of the effectiveness of warfare is a consequence of the technological development of weaponry. The existence of nuclear weapons makes war, or at least full-scale war, between great powers all but impossible. Apart from that, American experience in both Vietnam and Iraq proves that overwhelming firepower and technological advantage in itself does not guarantee victory. This paradox of modern warfare can be also, at least in part, explained by technological reasons. Technologically superior weapons tend to be not just more efficient but also more vulnerable. A tank can be destroyed by a home-made mine, a fighter plane can be shot down by a machine gun, etc. The current decline of efficiency and usefulness of warfare has also political reasons. Neither the Vietnam War, nor the present war in Iraq, was a war in the traditional sense of the word; neither was an armed conflict between two states. In Vietnam, the United States intervened in a civil war that had started as a revolutionary war of national liberation. In Iraq, the United States overthrew Saddam Husseins dictatorship in an attempt to provoke or orchestrate a revolution. In both cases the United States attempted to use military force to obtain political control over population, rather than physical control over territory. In both cases they have discovered that 234

armies are not suitable tools for nation building, that violence alone cannot generate political power. This lesson is relevant especially because the wars in Iraq and in Vietnam are by no means exceptional in having as their objective political control over population, rather than physical control over territory. All Cold War proxy wars were fought over such objective. As Arendt points out, this phenomenon is even older. Ever since World War I, a defeat in war has been almost always followed by a revolutionary change in government whether such change was caused by a domestic revolution or enforced by the victorious powers. This means that even prior to the horror of nuclear warfare, wars have become politically a matter of life and death. (FR, 585) Arendt offers various hypothetical explanation of this phenomenon such as weakening of government as such or a loss of authority of great powers but does not pursue the question any further. The main cause of this transformation of the nature of warfare under current conditions appears to be the fact that the control of territory under modern conditions no longer guarantees control over population. As Foucault points out, domination over individuals and their bodies has in modernity replaced control over territory as the most important aspect of political domination. This transformation is related to the development of modern industrial economy, as well as to the development of modern nation state.54

The declining effectiveness of warfare, according to Arendt, suggests that war has become obsolete.55 Nevertheless, Arendt acknowledges that warfare is still with us (although actual warfare has been largely replaced by arms-races) because no substitute for the final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene. . Nor is a substitute likely to appear so long as national independence, namely freedom from foreign rule, and the sovereignty of the state, namely the claim to unchecked and unlimited power in foreign affairs, are identified. (107)

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It would be a mistake to read this explanation as a sigh of helplessness, as a tacit admission of inevitability of the Hobbesian state of nature in international relations. It should be rather interpreted as Arendts endorsement of Kants vision of a cosmopolitan federation of independent republics. In her essay Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World? she argues that the development of modernity, which culminated with the birth of the new, modern world, led to unification of mankind, to a practical realization of what Kant regarded as the end or purpose of History.56 Nevertheless, the unity of mankind owes its existence almost exclusively to the technical development of the Western world (MDT, 82) and relies on negative solidarity of mankind (83) on the fear of global destruction and on the forces of globalizing economy. Transformation of the factual unity of mankind into Kantian cosmopolitan federation of independent republics would require supplanting of this negative solidarity with positive political solidarity. The achievement of Kantian cosmopolitan federation, according to Arendt, does not require creation of a world government. Arendt agrees with Kant that a world-state would inevitably be tyrannical and would mean the end of political life as we know it. (81) [T]he final resort should not be supernational but international. (CR, 230) The creation of Kantian federation rather requires renouncement of the doctrine of sovereignty defined as the claim to unchecked and unlimited power in foreign affairs (107) and of the related notion of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. In other words, it requires replacement of the permanent struggle for security and domination, which takes the form of both military and economic competition of the nation states, by cooperation based on mutual respect and on international law. The achievement of Kantian perpetual peace is obviously a long-term goal that may never be fully achieved. Arendt did not expect the complete disappearance of war in the foreseeable future and we have no reasons to be more optimistic in this regard. That, however, does not mean that Arendts argument should be dismissed as idealistic daydreaming. The results of the current war in Iraq seem to confirm Arendts argument that the amount of violence at disposal of any given 236

country is not a reliable indicator of the countrys strength. (112) American invasion not only brought mayhem of civil war to Iraq, but destabilized the entire Middle-Eastern region. The war in Iraq and the broader war on terror provided an impetus for further rise of militant Islamism both in the Muslim countries and among Muslim communities in Europe.57 The current militant and openly imperialist policy of the United States also threatens to restart the Cold War arms races. So far, it has provoked Iran and North Korea to redouble their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and led Russia and China to increase their defense spending and renew the development of advanced weapon systems. All of this suggests that a national security strategy that relies solely on Americas unparalleled military strength is counterproductive. It is likely to make the world less stable and secure and to further diminish the already damaged international prestige and political power of the United States. Political power, according to Arendt, arises out of common action of free and mutually equal actors. To increase its political power and to restore its prestige as the beacon of freedom and democracy, the United States should therefore renounce the quest of Pax Americana and replace it with the quest of genuine Kantian perpetual peace. Instead of relying on their military strength they should use political means negotiation and cooperation with other independent countries in order to foster their political power and influence in the world. Such development would benefit not only the political well-being of the American Republic, but also American national interests and global political stability.

Arendt wrote her study On Violence in response to two interrelated phenomena. One of the problems that caught her attention was the above-discussed decline of the efficiency of warfare, which was manifest in the ongoing war in Vietnam. The other phenomenon that caught Arendts attention was the enthusiastic celebration of revolutionary violence by the New Left, as well as actual adoption of violent tactics by students and other rebels against the system. While Arendt 237

shared many of the causes of the New Left, she regarded its militancy as politically counterproductive and theoretically sterile. She criticized authors like Fanon or Sorel who embrace violence as an expression of creativity of the life process itself and for whom violent political action becomes (similarly to Sartre)58 an existential gesture. The aim of political action, as conceived by these authors, is to unmask the enemy and his devious machinations and manipulations that permits him to rule without using violent means, that is, to provoke action even at the risk of annihilation so that the truth may come out.59 (CR, 163) Arendt nevertheless acknowledges that violent rage against the amorphous and hypocritical system of domination is understandable. In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left against whom one can argue, to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless, we have a tyranny without a tyrant. .. I am inclined to think that much of the present glorification of violence is caused by severe frustration of the faculty of action in the modern world. (CR, 178 - 180) Although Arendt found the violent rage of the student rebels against the system understandable, she did not approve of their violent tactics, which she deemed to be irresponsible and counterproductive. Arendt was no pacifist and she acknowledged that violence might in some instances serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention. (CR, 176) Nevertheless, she believed that under given conditions violence can succeed only in provoking a violent reaction, in making the repressive system more violent. The main reason why violence cannot be effective in the struggle against the current system of social domination is that in a tyranny without a tyrant there is no tyrant that could be thrown down. According to Arendt, the current system of social domination is strictly structural and cannot be construed as the rule of one group of people over another. It does not dominate people by openly coercing them to do what they otherwise would not do, but rather by frustrating their faculty of action. Resistance against such a system of domination therefore cannot be aimed at 238

overthrowing the rulers but rather at generating political power. Its goal must be, so to say, positive, rather than negative. In this respect the model for such resistance is the American, rather than the French Revolution.

Civil Society The current system of social domination cannot be countered by violence, but only by political power generated by non-violent action of organized citizens acting in concert. This action should not be aimed against the increasingly impotent political structures, but on the contrary should reclaim these structures as a bulwark against the system of social domination. The question is what form can such action take and wherefrom can it arise in mass society, which, according to Arendt, lacks genuine public realm. Public realm that could provide space for political action of concerned citizens obviously cannot be located within mass society that is defined by the structures of economic and social domination. These structures, nevertheless, are neither omnipresent nor omnipotent. Although the system of social domination displaces and colonizes political structures, it does not destroy them; rather, it renders them increasingly impotent. (CR, 183) Most importantly, it leaves intact, at least in the United States, the constitutional guarantees of the division of powers and of civil liberties. These constitutional guarantees also continue to protect potential public space that can be actualized through political action. As discussed above, Arendt was concerned about the impact of the Cold War power politics on these constitutional structures. The Cold War not only accelerated the displacement of government by bureaucratic administration and by the system of social domination, but also led to an open assault on the constitutional system of checks and balances and on civil liberties. At the same time, she found reasons to be optimistic about the future of the Republic. The assault on constitutional structures by the administration eventually led to a response of the legislative and judiciary branches of the government, which re-claimed their powers and reasserted 239

constitutionally guaranteed liberties. More importantly, the Vietnam War era also witnessed the revival of the republican spirit of public freedom among American citizens. The public, informed by independent press, acted and organized extraordinarily strong (46) opposition against the war and against the administrations assault on civil liberties. The public realm that is protected by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is not located in the halls of the White House and Congress, but in civil society.60 Civil society as a venue for political action is obviously not identical to the liberal civil society, which is preoccupied primarily with commerce. It is rather civil society in the sense used by Vclav Havel and other dissidents in former Communist regimes the public space, in which citizens can discuss politics in free press and engage in political action by forming civic associations and undertaking political initiatives. The Vietnam War era witnessed revival of civil society in the form of Civil Rights, anti-war and radical student movements. While Arendt criticized the violent tactics that were embraced by some anti-war and Civil Rights activists, she was very impressed by the ability of these movements to organize highly effective non-violent political action. She admires especially the disinterested and moral motivation of the activists. (CR, 203) The students who joined the Civil Rights movement in the South, or who went on strike on behalf of underpaid university employees, were not motivated by self-interest or by lust for power, but by political principles such as equality and justice and by their solidarity with the victims of oppression and injustice. One can even say that the disinterested and moral nature of the Civil Rights movement is what makes it from Arendts perspective truly political. This may seem puzzling, given Arendts opposition to subordination of politics to morality. The point is that the Civil Rights movement exemplifies specifically political morality, which is in many respects different from morality in the traditional sense of the word. Traditional Christian morality is defined in terms of absolute imperatives of Gods Commandments, or, in Kants transformation of the imperatives of 240

practical reason. Moral duty is construed as an absolute duty I owe to my God or to my self. Political morality, on the other hand, is defined in terms of political principles. It does not appeal to absolute justice defined in terms of imperatives, but to common sense of the political community which respects these principles. Arendt explores the specifically political morality of the Civil Rights movement in her essay Civil Disobedience. She argues that civil disobedience can be neither justified nor explained as a political phenomenon in terms of traditional absolute morality. She criticizes Thoreaus understanding of civil disobedience, arguing that Thoreau confuses civil disobedience with an act of conscientious objection. Thoreau, who refused to pay poll tax to the government that supported slavery, was motivated by moral motives. He demonstratively refused obedience to a law that he deemed in his conscience unjust. He acted not as a citizen but as a man, as a moral subject. In contrast to the Civil Rights activists, Thoreau also did not care about the consequences of his action. He did not want to change the world, but to wash his hands by demonstratively refusing to participate in evil-doing. (CR, 60) While civil disobedience is a moral and fundamentally a-political act that arises from the conflict between legal obligation and individual consciousness, civil disobedience, as Arendt understands it, is politically motivated action, that arises out of conflict between legal obligation and a certain political principle. The Civil Rights activists did not disobey the law as individuals, but as an organized minority of citizens, who decided to demonstratively break the laws, which they deemed incompatible with the word and spirit of the Constitution and with the political principles upon which their country was built. As discussed above, Arendt argues that the power of the law in the United States, and in principle in any republic, is derived from the consent of the citizens. In contrast to Kant, Arendt does not construe such consent in terms of mere acquiescence, but rather in terms of active support and continuing participation in all matters of public interest. (CR, 85) American law is, 241

according to her, modeled after a compact or covenant made by the citizens, rather than an absolute commandment. Civil rights activists in their collective acts of civil disobedience symbolically withdrew their consent with the laws against which they protested, demonstratively appealing to the civil conscience of the broader political community. Their goal was to persuade the majority of citizens of their opinion by appealing to their civic conscience. We could also say that the goal of their action was to persuade others about their opinion by revealing the truth inherent in this opinion through dramatization. As we can see, there is certain affinity between Arendts understanding of direct political action (which can take other forms than civil disobedience) and Sorels or Fanons notion of violent action as a gesture that reveals the truth about the hypocritical system of domination. The crucial difference is that the aim of political action, as Arendt understands it, is always the achievement of some positive results. Political actors are always concerned with real consequences of their action, rather than with abstract truth. The goal of the Civil Rights activists was not to unmask hypocrisy of the system, but to persuade others of their opinion and to change the system. Political action can succeed both in changing the reality and in revealing the truth precisely because it appeals to the common sense of a given community rather than to some absolute truth, because it offers an opinion for consideration, rather than demonstratively executing moral judgment through an act of violence.

Public realm of civil society opens to the citizens of representative democracies, who would otherwise be in a position of subjects of their elected rulers, a possibility to directly participate in political life. Such participation is by no means limited to acts of civil disobedience or other kinds of direct action (such as strikes or demonstrations). Citizens can participate in politics also on a more permanent basis through various civic associations and advocacy groups. Arendt argues that civil disobedience is nothing but the latest form of civil association that was praised by 242

Tocqueville as one of essential institutions of American democracy and a guarantee against the tyranny of majority (CR, 96-97) and speaks in favor of more permanent organization of the civildisobedience groups in the form of voluntary associations that could represent minority opinions just as various pressure groups represent minority interests. Civil society includes also institutions such as the independent press, universities, libraries, or public radio and television, whose primarily role is the free exchange of information and opinions. Civil society is the source of all political power in the republic and any political resistance that can counter the system of social domination and the automatism of progress as its driving engine must arise from this sphere. This is not to suggest that the official political structures, i.e. the three branches of government on all levels, would be irrelevant, or that the civil society could do without them. Any reforms initiated by politically engaged citizens within civil society can be realized only through the existing governmental structures. (The goal of the Civil Rights movement, for instance, was to persuade the government to change the discriminatory laws.) American Republic (or, for that matter, any modern republic) is defined as rule of law over man and the governmental institutions are irreplaceable in their task of enacting and enforcing laws. Government also performs the indispensable pre-political tasks of defense, policing and administration. As Kateb points out, Arendt never even toys with the idea that a society could exist without government (in the executive, bureaucratic sense).61 Most importantly, the institutional structures of representative democracy protect the informal public space of civil society. As I argued in the previous chapter, Arendt adopts Kants normative ideal of republican constitution as the only model of legitimate government under current conditions. Nevertheless, as a part of her broader re-interpretation of Kants critical project, she re-interprets the task and the significance of the republican constitution. Arendt agrees with Kant that republic is the only legitimate regime because it enables realization of human freedom. Nevertheless, while for Kant 243

freedom is primarily a moral phenomenon, for Arendt it is first and foremost a political phenomenon. Freedom, according to Arendt can be realized only in action. Kants definition of political freedom as a warrant to obey no external laws, except for those to which I have been able to give my own consent62 is from Arendts point inadequate. Negative freedom or civil liberty is according to her merely a precondition of political freedom, which can be actualized only in action. A republican constitution in itself cannot make us free; it can only provide preconditions for political freedom both by liberating us from tyranny and guaranteeing civil liberties and by providing a framework for political action. Such framework entails both the governmental institutions and the loosely structured public realm of civil society, which is the source of all political power in the republic. Arendts interpreters are often puzzled by the question of what, according to Arendt, should be the content of political action.63 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Arendt argues that the end and raison dtre of politics is freedom or establishing and maintaining of space where freedom can appear. This definition leads George Kateb to the conclusion that according to Arendt the goal of political action in an established republic is defense of a democratic constitution against internal erosion.64 Arendts selection of modern examples of political action the Civil Rights movement, the French Resistance or the Dreyfus affair seems to support Katebs conclusion. Nevertheless, the present analysis suggests that Katebs interpretation is too narrow. The current system of social domination does not directly threaten the democratic constitution or the institutional framework of the republic. It rather colonizes the constitutional or political institutions and renders them powerless. Political action, according to Arendt, consists of the care for public affairs, for the res publica and its aim is the maintenance and actualization of the political space in which freedom can appear. Under present circumstances, such care for the public affairs which aims at the maintenance, or, to put it more strongly, defense, of the public 244

realm must consist primarily of sustained resistance against the mechanisms of social domination, against automatism of economic and technological progress.

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1 2

Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 202. Richard Wolin, Hannah Arendt: Kultur, Thoughtlessness, and Polis Envy, in Heideggers Children (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 69. 3 For Arendts interpretation of the Greek understanding of political action see Chapter 2. 4 The only exception is the American Revolution. The Founding Fathers were concerned with their immortal fame, they were concerned with how will they be remembered. Arendt nevertheless attributes this concern to their awareness of the exceptional nature of their undertaking. (OR, 204) 5 See Chapter 3. 6 This reminds of Kants reaction to the French Revolution, which he regarded as evidence of moral predisposition of human race and as an omen of progress . For such a phenomenon in human history is not to be forgotten. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 159. 7 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 2. 8 See Chapter 3. 9 Arendt points out that according to Aristotle the end (telos) [of action and speech] is not pursued but lies in the activity itself which therefore becomes an entelechia. (HC, 206) 10 Letter to Marquis Mirabeau, July 26, 1767, quoted by Arendt, OR, 183-4. See also On the Social Contract, Book II, chapter 7. 11 Bernard Crick, Revolution vs. Freedom, London Observer, 23 February1964. 12 Arendt develops her critique of contemporary American society especially in The Human Condition and in Between Past and Future. 13 These texts include especially the essays published in Crises of the Republic, Home to Roost a speech delivered on the occasion of the bicentennial anniversary of American independence (reprinted in Responsibility and Judgment) and three Commonweal articles on the Cold War The Ex-Communists, The Threat of Conformism, and Europe and Atom Bomb which were reprinted in Essays on Understanding. 14 See Chapter 3. 15 This notion of an absolute, sovereign power of the absolute monarch whose will represents the will of God, was itself a consequence of a previous breakdown of the medieval notion of authority of divine law, which had been embodied in the Church and which had imposed limits on the power of secular princes. 16 We should note that Arendt misquotes the Declaration of Independence to bolster her argument about its political, persuasive nature. The last paragraph of the Declaration does not appeal to the tribunal of the world but to its Supreme Judge. 17 Arendt also argues that American reverence for and worship of the Constitution can be called religious only in the original Roman understanding of religion as a bond that used to bind Romans with their ancestors and ultimately with the moment of the founding itself. 18 American Senate, according to Arendt, was supposed to play another important role. It was to serve as a place of deliberation and represent opinions as opposed to interests represented in the House of Representatives. (OR, 216) 19 Arendts understanding of legal interpretation of the Constitution is notably similar to Ronald Dworkins notion of Law as ever-evolving interpretative concept. See: Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1986). 246

We should note that this understanding of legal interpretation is specific to the Common Law system; continental judges do not interpret law but apply legal norms to particular circumstances according to abstract legal principles. English understanding of law thus belongs (although Arendt does not raise this point), together with the notion of the rule of law, among the blessings the American Republic inherited from the British legal and political tradition. Contemporary critics of judicial activism, who argue that the judges should be strictly bound by the text of the statute (or the Constitution) and by the intentions of its authors, seem to be oblivious to the paramount importance of legal interpretation in the Common Law tradition. To abandon this concept in order to return to the original intentions of the Framers of the Constitution would mean to destroy the living tradition of legal interpretation of Constitution and to undermine not only the authority of the Supreme Court and courts in general, but also the authority of Constitution itself. 20 See Chapter 3. 21 Arendt is quoting from the anonymous Report from Iron Mountain. 22 It is no secret that the billions of dollars demanded by the Pentagon for the armaments industry are necessary not for national security but for keeping the economy from collapsing. (RJ, 273) 23 Arendt for exampled believed that one of the consequences of American reactionary policy was that the Cuban revolution fell so easily under the sway of Bolshevism. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 389. 24 See especially The Threat of Conformism, The Commonweal, September 24, 1953. (Reprinted in EU.) 25 Totalitarian combination of terror and ideology however cannot replace truth with the ideological lie. There always comes a point beyond which lying becomes counterproductive. This point is reached when the audience to which the lies are addressed is forced to disregard altogether the distinguishing line between truth and falsehood to be able to survive. (CR, 7) 26 The Pentagon Papers, quoted by Arendt in CR, 24. 27 Robert McNamaras decision to find out what went wrong according to Arendt restored, at least for a fleeting moment, this countrys reputation in the world. (CR, 44-45) 28 See for example: David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Niall Fergusson, Colossus: The Price of Americas Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004); Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2004). 29 An unnamed senior aid to President Bush scolded a New York Times reporter for being a member of what we call the reality-based community, which he defined as people who believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.'' The aid then proceeded to explain that ''[t]hat's not the way the world really works anymore, We are an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality judiciously, as you will we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.'' Ron Susskind, Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush, New York Times Magazine, October 17, 2004. 30 President Bush declared in his address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001: Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. 31 This is not to suggest that political Islamism would not pose a threat to American national interests and, indeed, to Western civilization. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the subsequent attacks in London, Madrid and elsewhere demonstrate that this threat is very 247

real. As was noted by Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib, the Islamist movement in many respects resembles the nineteenth century pan-movements as well as twentieth century totalitarian movements. Nancy Fraser, Hannah Arendt in the 21st Century, Contemporary Political Theory, Vo. 3 (2004); Seyla Benhabib, Political Geographies in a Global World: Arendtian Reflections, Social Research Vol. 69, No. 2, (Summer 2002). Nevertheless, the heavy-handed and ideology driven American response to Islamist terrorists is not only unlikely to be effective in the fight against Islamism, but arguably led to the rise of its popularity both in the Muslim countries and among Muslim populations in Europe. In Frasers words: Locked together in a self-propelling destructive cycle, the mutually reinforcing projects of jihadism and the war on terror recapitulate key aspects of Arendts diagnosis, even as they generate new forms of menace to humanity, which she herself could not have imagined. (255) Besides that, at least in Iraq, the war on terror represents an ideological justification or excuse of American invasion, rather than its actual cause. 32 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, Washington DC, 2002. 33 Harvey, 23. 34 Harvey, 19. 35 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power (Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2004) quoted by Eric Mielants, The New World Order?, International Journal of Comparative Sociology Vol. 45, No. (2004). 36 The title of the first chapter of Harveys book is All About Oil. 37 Harvey, 30. 38 Harveys analysis of the new American imperialism is corroborated by the Director of Pentagons Office of Force Transformation, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (ret.), who in his speech to the Heritage Foundation argues that economic globalization led to the decline of power of the nation states and at the same time to the rise of power of the global economic system and of non-state actors. The new situation, according to Cebrowski, requires that the United States and its military establishment abandon the realist principle of the balance of power and assume the role of the System Administrator of the global economic system. The task of the System Administrator is, among other matters, to provide security for the energy flows. Cebrowski argues that the central divide in the contemporary world is between the functioning core of globalization versus the non-functioning gap of globalization. The non-functioning gap of globalization is a source of instability and security threats and must be pacified by being integrated into the functioning core of globalization. If you are fighting globalization, if you reject the rules, if you reject connectivity, you are probably going to be of interest to the United States Department of Defense. Cebrowskis speech is noteworthy not only because of the frankness with which it acknowledges the imperial ambitions of the United States, but also because of his understanding of the globalizing economy in terms of a cybernetic system and the notion of the United States as a System Administrator. Compare with the discussion of the Matrix in Chapter 2. Arthur Cebrowsi, Speech to the Heritage Foundation, May 13, 2003, Transformation Trends (27 May, 2003). 39 to these real problems in Americas international relationships, the Communist propaganda abroad adds the palpably false accusation that the United States became rich from imperialist exploitation. (EU, 414) 40 Just as the family and its property were replaced by class membership and national territory, so mankind now begins to replace nationally built societies, and the earth replaces the limited state territory. (HC, 257) See also Chapters 2 and 3. 248

41 42

Arendts critique of capitalism is discussed in Chapter 2. Harvey, 66. 43 See for example: Pierre Bourdieu, Firing Back (New York: The New Press, 2003) or William Pfaff, France: The Childrens Hour, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 53 (11 May 2006). Harvey also analysis social consequences of globalization and mentions emergence of a transnational elite of bankers, stockbrokers, and financiers. (Harvey, 67) 44 Hannah Pitkin, Justice: On relating Private and Public, Political Theory Vol. 9 No. 3 (Aug. 1981): 336. See also Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littelfield Publishers, 2003), 138-166. 45 During a discussion at a conference on her own work, Arendt tried to explain the relation between the social and the political spheres: There are things where the right measure can be figured out. These things can really be administered and are not then subject to public debate. Public debate can only deal with things which if we want to put it negatively we cannot figure out with certainty When asked to elaborate further, she explained that for example The social problem is certainly adequate housing. But the question of whether this adequate housing means integration or not is certainly a political question. . But if its a question of how many square feet every human being needs in order to be able to breathe and to live a decent life, this is something which we really can figure out. (HAHA, 317-319) Needless to say, the last argument is not very persuasive. 46 George Steiner, Lafayette, Where Are We?, Reporter, 9 May 1963, 42-43. 47 See chapter 5. 48 See especially Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 49 See OT, 250-262. 50 Vclav Havel, Moc bezmocnch (Prague: Lidov noviny, 1990), 17. 51 Arendt quotes Jeffersons statement As Cato concluded every speech with the words Carthago delenda est, so do I every opinion with the injunction divide counties in the wards and explains that the reference to Cato was no idle slip of a tongue used to Latin quotations. . Just as Rome, according to Cato, could not be safe so long as Carthago existed, so the republic, according to Jefferson, would not be secure in its very foundations without the ward system. (OR, 248-9) 52 A collapse of governmental power, however, is not followed by revolution automatically. The collapse of governmental power is revealed only in confrontation; the governmental machinery can continue working automatically for long time, if no one tests its power, or if no one is capable of picking the power up and assuming responsibility. That is, what according to Arendt, happened in France in 1968, where nobody, least of all the students, [was] prepared to seize the power and the responsibility that goes with it. (148-9) 53 To be political, to live in a polis, meant that every thing was decided through words and persuasion and not through violence. (HC, 26) 54 See especially Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), Part 5. For comparison of Foucaults and Arendts understanding of modern forms of domination see Chapter 2. 55 The fact that war is still the ultima ratio, the old continuation of politics by means of violence, in the foreign affairs of underdeveloped countries is according to Arendt no argument against its obsoleteness. (CR, 108) 56 See Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991). 57 See note 31 above. 249

58

See the discussion about Arendts criticism of French political existentialists in the previous chapter. 59 Such tactics were used in practice by violent demonstrators, who provoked the police in order to unmask the violence of the authorities. Arendt compares such tactics to the old Communist nonsense of the thirties, that the victory of fascism was all to the good of those who were against it. (CR, 195) 60 Arendt herself does not use the term civil society in this sense. 61 George Kateb, Hannah Arendt (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), 125. Arendt argues that the Greeks were willing to share in the burden of jurisdiction, defense and administration of public affairs for the sake of their love of action and of the body politic that made it possible to them all. (HC, 41) 62 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Kant Political Writings, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1991), 99. 63 Kateb, 16. 64 Kateb, 20.

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Conclusion

Throughout this dissertation, I explored various aspects of Arendts political philosophy, focusing on what I consider to be its main theme Arendts critique of the present crisis of modernity. As discussed in the Introduction, my interpretation challenges a more conventional reading of Arendts work, which portrays Arendt as an anti-modernist and anti-democratic admirer of the Greek polis, whose thought has only little, if any, relevance for contemporary democratic politics or for understanding of the problems of todays world. I have argued that this interpretation, which regards The Human Condition as the most systematic statement of her political philosophy, is based on fundamental misunderstanding of the very nature of Arendts project. Arendts political philosophy, as I argue, is primarily critical, as opposed to normative. Arendt does not construe rules for political action or posit an ideal model of the political realm,1 but aims to achieve understanding of politics and of the present historical situation. Her thought is therefore not motivated by a nostalgia for the lost glory of ancient Greece, but by urgent concern for the present situation and uncertain future of Western civilization and of the world. Its main subject, as I argue, is the present crisis of modernity, which is at the same time a crisis of the entire Western civilization. This crisis, according to Arendt, emerged together with totalitarianism and totalitarianism also reveals its essence. Interpretation of Arendts work should therefore proceed from The Origins of Totalitarianism, rather than from The Human Condition. To put it more specifically, Arendt subsequent works, which explore on the one hand the current, post-totalitarian stage of the crisis of modernity and, on the other hand, the historical origins of this crisis, should be interpreted in the light of her analysis of totalitarianism. This approach puts Arendts thought into a completely different light than the traditional interpretation, leading to radically different conclusions about her philosophic and political commitments. 251

I argue that in spite of her harsh critique of various aspects of modernity, Arendt cannot be described as an anti-modernist or as a reluctant modernist.2 Arendts intention is not to undermine or reverse the project of modernity, but on the contrary to save it from its current impasse. She should be therefore described as a radically modern thinker. Since she describes the onset of the present crisis as a radical and irreversible break in history, which entails the collapse of our philosophical and religious tradition (i.e. what Lyotard calls the loss of credibility of metanarratives),3 she could be also described as a postmodern thinker. I also dispute the frequent characterization of Arendt as an anti-democratic or anti-liberal thinker. I argue that Arendts critique of contemporary liberal democracies is much more nuanced than her critics often assume and that her work as a whole constitutes a powerful defense of democratic politics.

In the Introduction, I defined the principle objectives of this dissertation in the following way: First, to offer a consistent and plausible interpretation of Arendts political philosophy understood as a critique of the present crisis of modernity. Second, to demonstrate that Arendts political philosophy, which evolved from her reflections on totalitarianism and was written against the background of the Cold War, remains highly relevant even today, as it helps to elucidate various post-Cold War developments. The latter of these two objectives appears to be, according to Arendts own standards, more important. Since the task of political philosophy, as Arendt defines it, is to critically respond to the present historical situation, the continuing relevance of her own political philosophy depends on its ability to elucidate our present historical situation. In the following pages, I would like to briefly summarize the conclusions of my dissertation with special regard to the lasting significance of Arendts critique of the crisis of modernity. Apart from recapitulating arguments raised in the previous chapters, I will address the question of the historical significance of the end of the Cold War. It could be argued that this event and hence the demise of totalitarianism, rather than its rise, constitutes the central event of our world. 252

(EU, 308; emphasis added) Indeed, the collapse of Communism in Europe, which was followed by a global wave of democratic revolutions, has been initially interpreted as a final victory of freedom and democracy over totalitarianism, as an end of history and beginning of Kantian perpetual peace. This view, which was promoted by Francis Fukuyama,4 was characteristic for the jubilant and optimistic spirit of the 1990s.5 In retrospect, this initially prevalent interpretation of the end of the Cold War seems overly optimistic and nave. The collapse of Communism provided a boost for economic globalization, which has been on its way since at least the 1970s.6 As was noted by various authors, this process, which gradually subjects the entire mankind to the forces of global capitalism, posses a similar threat to human freedom and plurality as totalitarianism.7 As I argued above, economic globalization is closely related to the rise of new American imperialism that brought the current war in Iraq and the broader war on terror and that can be interpreted as a resurgence of Cold War dynamics.8 That, however, does not mean that the initial enthusiasm with which people across Europe greeted the 1989 anti-Communist revolutions had been misguided or that the collapse of Communism just opened a door for a new (quasi-)totalitarian project with global ambitions. While the system of social domination associated with modern capitalist economy, which globalization integrates at a global level, is in many ways analogous to totalitarianism, it is not identical to it. Moreover, the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe seem, even in retrospect, successful, insofar as they replaced oppressive post-totalitarian regimes9 with functional liberal democracies, that are based on the rule of law, respect for civil rights and accountability of government. The question we have to ask in the present situation therefore is not are we really living in a post-totalitarian world?10 but rather what threats to freedom comparable to totalitarianism do we face in the present, post-totalitarian world? In what way does totalitarianism, even after its 253

demise, still illuminate the predicaments of our time? Arendts political philosophy can help us answer these questions. One of its advantages is that while Arendt criticizes various flaws of contemporary liberal democracy, she at the same time offers a sensible and principled defense of the key liberal-democratic principles and institutions. This sets her critique of the crisis of modernity apart from Hardt and Negris or Grays critique of globalization.11

Arendt argues that totalitarianism is not simply a new version of tyranny, but a completely new kind of political regime, which is based on ideology and terror. Its ultimate goal is total domination of the total population of the earth and elimination of every competing nontotalitarian reality. (OT, 392) Total domination requires complete annihilation of human spontaneity, which is the source of human freedom and without which neither political action nor thought would be possible. That would, according to Arendt, amount to nothing less than transformation of human nature itself. (458) Totalitarianism dehumanizes its subjects, reducing them to the biological level of their existence and turning them into conditioned animals that can be controlled at will but that have no will of their own. Together with spontaneity, totalitarianism also destroys human plurality; its aim is to transform the entire mankind into One Man of gigantic dimensions (466) that is controlled by the omnipotent will of the totalitarian leader. Nevertheless, the totalitarian leader, in marked contrast to traditional tyrants, regards himself as a mere agent of superhuman forces, as an executioner of the law of history, as it is revealed by ideology. Totalitarianism thus combines hubristic belief in human omnipotence with a nihilistic denial of human freedom and of the meaning of human life. Arendts analysis reveals the essence of totalitarianism and of the broader crisis of modernity as nihilism. Totalitarianism, however, transforms the nihilistic denial of moral limits to human action into an affirmative principle of human omnipotence. In Arendts words, it transcend[s] the nihilistic principle that everything is permitted replacing it with a principle, 254

according to which everything is possible. (440) This brand of nihilism, according to Arendt, did not disappear with the demise of totalitarianism. On the contrary, as she suggests in both the opening and closing sections of The Origins, (viii, 460) it assumes its authentic form only in the present, post-totalitarian world.

Arendt explores the current, post-totalitarian stage of the crisis of modernity in her later works, most importantly in The Human Condition. Reading this work against the background of The Origins, I argue that Arendts account of the rise of the social describes the gradual development of a specifically modern form of social domination. Especially in its fully developed form, characteristic of the present, post-totalitarian mass society, this system of social domination functions analogously to total domination. Like total domination, it dehumanizes its subjects, reducing them to the biological level of their existence and exploiting their life energy or biopower. Similarly to total domination, it destroys human spontaneity and plurality, transforming human beings into conditioned animals (HC, 45) and pursuing control over the life-process of human species. Analogously to total domination, which aims to accelerate and direct the allegedly inevitable process of historical development, the present system of social domination aims to accelerate and direct the quasi-natural and seemingly automatic process of Progress. While the present system of social domination is analogous to total domination, it is not identical to it. Most obviously, it is infinitely less cruel. It does not rely on terror and ideology but on hidden persuasion (RJ, 265) exerted through advertisement, mass media and conformist, consumer oriented mass culture. It manipulates individuals by arousing desire and pleasure rather than by inflicting fear and pain. Apart from that, the present system of social domination was not consciously created by some political movement but evolved organically. In contrast to total domination, which concentrates all power in the hands of the totalitarian leader, the present 255

system of social domination is centre-less. It is strictly structural and cannot be described as a rule of one group of people over another. Mass society, according to Arendt, is classless and egalitarian, insofar as all of its members are equally powerless vis--vis the anonymous system of social domination. The system of social domination, as Arendt understands it, is shaped and controlled on the one hand by the logic of modern capitalist economy and, on the other hand, by the development of modern science and technology. While these two dynamics mutually reinforce each other, neither of them can be reduced to the other one and both are equally important for the development and functioning of the system of social domination. Arendt argues that the development of both capitalist economy and of modern science and technology assumes the character of a quasi-natural self-perpetuating process, which is under no ones control and which is turning human beings into conditioned animals, into helpless slaves not so much of our machines as of our know how, (HC, 3) of our technological rationality. I have argued that Arendts understanding of the present system of social domination closely resembles Foucaults notion of biopower. Similarly to Foucault, Arendt underlines the nonsovereign character of social domination, which does not operate on the level of legal commandments and prohibitions addressed to men as legal and moral subjects, but instead endeavors to control and manage the life process of both individual human bodies and of entire populations and ultimately of the human species. In Arendts words, society constitutes the public organization of the life process itself. (HC, 46) Like Foucault, Arendt describes contemporary mass society as normalizing society, underlying the normalizing (in Foucaults terms disciplinary) role of social sciences. Nevertheless, in contrast to Foucault, who is concerned especially with the effects of modernization on the dominated subject, Arendt is concerned primarily with its effects on the public realm and on the world.

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The crisis of modernity, according to Arendt, engenders world alienation. Contrary to the opinion of some interpreters, who regard Arendts political philosophy as a precursor of communitarianism,12 Arendts critique of modern world alienation has only little in common with the communitarian critique of liberalism. Although she describes world alienation in terms of rootlessness and homelessness, Arendt does not share the longing of MacIntyre and other communitarians for a closely-knit pre-modern community. On the contrary, as is apparent from her critique of nationalism, she regards such longing as a symptom of, as much as a reaction against modern world alienation. The distinction between Arendt and the communitarians is apparent from her understanding of the world. The world, as Arendt understands it, is a human artifact that contrasts with the givenness of nature. It consists on the one hand of more or less durable man-made objects and, on the other hand, of the web of human relationships of political and legal institutions, relationships, as well as shared interests and beliefs. And while she maintains that only man-made world can provide a home for a fully human, that is free life, Arendt also makes it clear that human relation to the world can never be natural or unproblematic. Moreover, in contrast to Aristotle and his communitarian admirers, Arendt claims that truly political communities exist for the sake of their members. The very purpose of their existence, as political communities, is to enable their citizens to practice freedom, to shape and express themselves as unique individuals through political action. According to Arendt, [t]he raison dtre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action. (BPF, 146) The public or political realm is therefore reserved for individuality. (HC, 41) World alienation, as Arendt understands it, therefore cannot be construed as a loss of a traditional community or Gemeinschaft that could provide a foundation for a rooted existence. In other words, it cannot be construed as a loss of a natural and unproblematic connection with

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the world or Being. World alienation consists rather of a loss of a meaningful and objective (HC, 58) comportment to the world, of a possibility to engage worldly reality. Modern society, according to Arendt, displaces the world-related activities of work and action that allow us to transcend the concern for mere living and achieve something more permanent than life itself. (58) Society is concerned exclusively with economic issues and the only activities it recognizes as publicly significant are labor and consumption, that is activities related to the maintenance of its collective life process. In contrast to work and action, which allow us to express our freedom by relating in a meaningful way to the world, labor and consumption on the contrary isolate us from the world. [I]n labor and consumption man is utterly thrown back on himself. (EU, 21) The present mass society, in which labor and consumption are the only publicly relevant activities, prevents us from achieving a meaningful and objective relationship with the world and with others. Arendt argues that this world alienation, which philosophers from Rousseau through Marx to Heidegger and the French existentialists mischaracterized as self-alienation, is the main source of loneliness and unhappiness of modern man. World alienation can be described also as the disappearance of the public or political realm. In modern society the public realm, which provides a stage for political action, gets displaced by the social realm, which is primarily an arena of economic activity. In contrast to the genuinely political public realm, which is characterized by the plurality of opinions, the social realm is ruled by social conformism, which replaces free and spontaneous action with normalized and predictable behavior. The public realm is not only a stage for political action but also the space, in which reality appears in multiplicity of perspectives. The displacement of the public realm therefore strips the world, as well as the lives of its inhabitants, of worldly reality. Mass society then displaces worldly reality with an image or simulacrum of reality created by the mass media, advertisement and entertainment-based mass culture. 258

Capitalist economy destroys not just the public realm, which is in its broadest sense more or less identical with the web of human relationships that constitutes the immaterial dimension of the human world. It transforms and dehumanizes also the physical world of man-made objects. Modern economy, which replaces durable objects with consumer goods of ever-shorter life span, according to Arendt, destroys the stability of the world. The perpetually transforming modern world that is shaped by quasi-natural forces of capitalist economy and of scientific and technological progress resembles a quasi-natural environment that may guarantee the survival of the species on a world-wide scale but that at the same time threaten[s] humanity with extinction. (HC, 46; emphasis added)

Arendts political philosophy is primarily critical, as opposed to normative. Arendt diagnoses the present crisis of modernity, but does not offer any cure, any solution of this crisis. Such a solution, according to her, can arise only from political action. The obvious question is wherefrom can such action arise and what form can it take in a society, which, according to Arendts own account, lacks any genuine political realm. Arendt is known for her criticism of liberal democracy. She argues that the liberal thinkers, who define freedom in negative terms as freedom from coercion and locate it in civil society, mistakenly identify freedom with security. Following Marx and Rousseau, she maintains that civil society is in fact a sphere of necessity, which is ruled by the logic of capitalism and by social conformism. Arendt is equally critical of the democratic or republican aspect of liberal democracy. She argues that representative democracy by definition deprives most of its citizens of an opportunity to actively engage in politics. Moreover, since the administration of the national economy is the main, if not the only task of contemporary governments, political institutions become integrated into the system of social domination.

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Arendts criticism of liberal democracy contributed to her reputation as an anti-liberal and anti-democratic thinker. Nevertheless, I have argued that this criticism is largely unfounded. While she criticizes doctrinaire individualistic liberalism, Arendt is also a staunch defender of such liberal principles as the rule of law, equality or personal freedom. And while she criticizes the liberal negative conception of freedom as too narrow, she does not simply dismiss it as irrelevant. On the contrary, she regards it as an indispensable aspect of freedom and as a necessary prerequisite of political freedom in the positive sense. Arendts criticism of representative democracy is also more nuanced than her critics often assume. Based on her discussion of the 1960s Civil Rights, anti-war and radical student movements I have argued that Arendt does acknowledge that the constitutional structures of contemporary representative democracies, which include both the system of division of power and constitutional guarantees of civil rights, do in fact protect at least a potential public realm that can be actualized by political action of concerned citizens. This informal public realm, which consists not only of ad hoc political movements, but also of more permanent civic associations and advocacy groups, as well as such institutions as the free press or universities, can be described as civil society in the sense the term has been used by Vclav Havel and other opponents of former Communist regimes. Arendt regards civil society in this sense as the only possible source of political power that could counter the current system of social domination. That, however, does not mean that the unstructured public realm of civil society could replace the political and legal structures of representative democracy. Arendt, on the contrary, underlines the indispensable role these structures play in protecting and stabilizing the political realm. The system of social domination, as Arendt construes it, does not rely primarily on political structures of liberal democracy. It is sustained by anonymous forces of market and technology that displace and colonize the political structures rendering them increasingly impotent. The 260

resistance against the system of social domination therefore should not be aimed against the increasingly powerless political structures, but on the contrary should reclaim and empower these structures, using them to counter the automatic forces of market and technology. I have disputed the argument of various interpreters, according to which Arendt advocates a complete exclusion of social and economic matters from the political realm. Such a separation of social and political spheres would leave the social realm to its own devices to the forces of market and technology and to bureaucratic administration. That, however, is precisely the development against which Arendt warns. Nevertheless, Arendt at the same time does not believe that the governments should attempt to subordinate the economic and technological development to political control. Such an attempt would inevitably remain entrapped within the framework of technological rationality and could lead only to further centralization and strengthening of the system of social domination. Political power, according to Arendt, should be rather used to keep the forces of market and technology in check, to counter their destructive dynamics. Arendts analysis of the present situation gives only little, if any, hope for the possibility of some revolutionary overthrow of the system of social domination that would once and for all liberate mankind. That, however, should not be interpreted as a sign of resignation or fatalism on Arendts part. Arendt, on the contrary, calls for care for the public affairs and for the world, for active resistance against the existing system of social domination. According to Arendt, [m]en are free only insofar as they act. (BPF, 153) Political action then consists of the care for the public affairs and its aim is the maintenance and actualization of political space, in which freedom can appear. Under current circumstances, such defense of the public realm must consist primarily of sustained resistance against the system of social domination and against the anonymous forces of market and technology that sustain this system.

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Arendts political philosophy, as I argue, constitutes both a critique of the present crisis of modernity and a powerful defense of democratic politics. This is apparent especially in her praise of the American Constitution and American republicanism in On Revolution and in her essays on the crisis of the American Republic. I argue that Arendt regarded the political system of her adopted homeland as a viable alternative to the defunct model of European nation state. She admired especially American federalism and the strong tradition of self-government, which contrasts with the centralized structure of European nation states, as well as American constitutionalism and the notion of the rule of law, which contrast with the notion of popular sovereignty. Last but not least, she admired the American inclusive and strictly political notion of citizenship and national identity, which contrasts with ethnocentric European nationalism. While she praised the American Constitution and American republicanism, Arendt was also deeply concerned with what she considered to be the current crisis of the American Republic. The American political system has been obviously negatively affected by the broader crisis of modernity. Indeed the post-totalitarian mass society with its system of social domination developed first and in its purest form in the United States. Arendt is nevertheless even more concerned with the political consequences of Americas post-war position of one of the two superpowers and of its role in the Cold War. Arendt argues that American foreign policy during the Cold War was driven primarily by anti-Communist ideology rather than by real Soviet threat. The ideology-driven struggle against the global Communist conspiracy, which was conceived as a defense of freedom and democracy against its mortal enemy, somewhat paradoxically turned the United States into a reactionary guardian of the status quo and an opponent of all revolutionary movements and led it to embark upon an openly imperialistic policy. More importantly, the adoption of an inherently totalitarian ideological way of thinking started threatening freedom and democracy in the United States itself. The anti-Communist hysteria led to the domestic spying and purges of the McCarthy era and to 262

unprecedented growth of power of the intelligence services. The Cold War era also brought about the concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch of the federal government, undermining the constitutional principles of the division of power and federalism. While these developments did not turn the United States into a totalitarian state, they started undermining the foundations of the republican government.

The analysis of the Cold War plays a crucial role in Arendts broader critique of the present, post-totalitarian stage of the crisis of modernity. As discussed above, Arendt describes the development of the current system of social domination as gradual displacement of political power by anonymous forces of market and technology. Nevertheless, her analysis of the Cold War reveals that these seemingly automatic and quasi-natural forces are in fact driven by the Hobbesian pursuit of power for powers sake. The Cold War was an imperial and ideological struggle of two superpowers for global domination that can be described as a continuation of [Second World] war by other means [by] actual development in the techniques of warfare. (CR, 111) The Cold War arms races, which replaced actual warfare by the technological development of weaponry, became, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the main driving force behind scientific, technological and economic progress. It was the immense destructive potential of nuclear weapons that prevented the Cold War from turning into a hot one. The existence of nuclear weapons made a major conflict between two great powers practically impossible. The American fiasco in Vietnam then, according to Arendt, proved that overwhelming firepower and technological advantage do not automatically guarantee victory even in conventional warfare. It proved that while military might, which relies on the instruments of violence, may be capable of conquering territory or of destroying an existing political order, it is in itself incapable of generating political power, or in other words, imposing 263

political control over a population. According to my interpretation, this decline of the effectiveness of warfare under current circumstances is the main argument behind Arendts claim that political power and violence are mutually opposite. At the same time, it is the main source of her hope that the Hobbesian pursuit of power for powers sake, which still characterizes international relations, can be replaced by a Kantian federation of independent republics. Arendt argues that the development of modernity, which culminated with the birth of a new, modern world, led to unification of mankind, which Kant had postulated as the purpose of History. Nevertheless, the unity of mankind is so far based on the negative solidarity of mankind (MDT, 82) on the fear of the nuclear holocaust and on the forces of market and technology. Transformation of the factual unity of mankind into genuine Kantian federation of independent republics requires supplanting of this negative solidarity by positive political solidarity. It requires the replacement of the permanent struggle for security and domination, which takes the form of both military and economic competition of sovereign states, by cooperation based on mutual respect and on international law.

As I argued at the beginning of this Conclusion, the end of Cold War was initially interpreted as a sign that mankind has finally started moving in this direction. More recent developments nevertheless suggest that this optimism was misplaced. The end of Cold War provided boost to the process of economic globalization and, more recently, led to the rise of the new American imperialism. Especially the latter of these developments can be interpreted as a return to the Cold War dynamics. The war on terror, which provides ideological justification for American imperialist policy, is presented even by its supporters as a successor to the Cold War struggle against global Communist conspiracy. Analogously to the Cold War anti-Communist ideology it divides the world between us and them, between friends and enemies. Like anti-Communism it turns freedom 264

or democracy into an ideological cause, the defense of which justifies the use of any means. Like anti-Communism it threatens the freedom it clams to protect and is counterproductive even in protecting American national security. The disregard for the law and Constitution by the current administration, which in the name of the war on terror started undermining both the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the constitutional system of checks and balances, gives new relevance to Arendts argument about the detrimental consequences of ideology-driven imperialistic policy for the republican government. The disastrous consequences of American invasion of Iraq then demonstrate the shortsightedness of a foreign policy that relies exclusively on the unparalleled military strength of the United States, proving Arendts argument that violence and political power are not identical. The post-Cold War developments not only demonstrate the continued relevance of Arendts political philosophy, but also reveal some of its shortcomings. Following David Harvey, I have argued that American post-Cold War hegemony relies not just on the military strength of the United States, but also, and more importantly, on its dominant position in the global economic system. The current war in Iraq should then be interpreted as an attempt to secure this position by military means. According to Harvey, the new American imperialism is a continuation a covert economic imperialism, which the United States practiced throughout the Cold War under the pretext of defending democracy from the Communist threat. Arendts analysis, which explains the Cold War policy of containment in purely ideological terms, obscures this economic dimension of the Cold War dynamics. I have argued that Arendts denial of economic motivations behind American Cold War foreign policy is a consequence of her structural revision of the Marxist model of capitalism. Arendt argues that the class antagonism and ownership of the means of production have in the present stage of capitalist development become largely irrelevant. Consumer oriented economy, according to her, promotes the equalization of incomes and the development of egalitarian mass 265

society. Recent economic developments, however, challenge the validity of these arguments. Economic globalization brought increased exploitation of underdeveloped countries, as well as the growth of income disparities within developed economies. That, however, does not mean that Arendts structural revision of Marxism should be rejected as irrelevant. Arendts structural and the classical Marxist model of capitalism should be regarded as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. While the recent economic development increased income disparities within developed economies, it is extremely unlikely to lead to a reestablishment of economic classes in the nineteenth century sense. Similarly, while the global economic system is driven by economic competition between nation states, the long-term development does decrease the ability of governments to control their national economies. Most importantly, the principle economic problem, at least in developed countries, is not the disparity of incomes but rather the unlimited economic growth. The impending global environmental crisis, as well as the diminishing supplies of fossil fuels, makes us increasingly aware that the current economic model is unsustainable and that the immense power of capitalist economy and modern technology is not only a blessing but also a curse of our civilization.

The post-Cold War developments, in particular the advance of economic globalization and the rise of the new American imperialism, demonstrate that Arendts political philosophy, which evolved from her response to totalitarianism, remains highly relevant even in the present, posttotalitarian world. One could even say that only now we are in the position to fully appreciate Arendts argument, according to which the true predicaments of our time will assume their authentic form though not necessarily the cruelest only when totalitarianism has become a thing of the past. (OT, 460) Seen from this perspective, Arendts critique of the crisis of modernity can be regarded as a much needed antidote to Francis Fukuyamas interpretation of the end of the Cold War as the end 266

of history. Fukuyama interprets the end of the Cold War as an ideological victory of liberal democracy over Communism, arguing that this victory constitutes an end of history because liberal democracy is the final and unsurpassable ideology. Liberal democracy, which for Fukuyama includes both political and economic liberalism, supposedly resolves all fundamental contradictions and satisfies all human needs and therefore cannot be possibly challenged by any new rival ideology. While admitting that nationalism and religious fundamentalism may still challenge liberal democracy in the backward regions that have not yet reached the end of history, Fukuyama predicts that the demise of Communism will be followed by growing Common Marketization of international relations,13 in other words by the development of the global economic system, which will eventually bring the blessings of liberal democracy to all of mankind. Arendts work reveals that the emergence of a new totalitarian ideology is by no means the only threat to freedom and democracy in the post-totalitarian world. A far greater threat is posed by forces that operate within contemporary liberal democratic societies by the destructive dynamics of market and technology. Arendt maintains that the unrestrained development of these forces poses the same threat to our freedom and hence to our very humanity as totalitarianism. This obviously does not mean that liberal democracy itself would be totalitarian. As discussed above, Arendt on the contrary argues that the political and legal institutions of liberal democracy provide at least some protection against the forces of market and technology and, more importantly, that they can be used to resist these forces through political action. Arendts analysis reveals that liberal democracy, as defined by Fukuyama, contains a major contradiction between its political and economic principles between democracy and capitalism, or between political and economic liberalism. Arendt, however, does not believe that this contradiction could be resolved at the level of ideas. The problems of contemporary liberal democracies, according to her, can be resolved only through political action. The task of political 267

philosophy, as Arendt understands it, is not to offer internally consistent worldviews, but to critically respond to political reality, to the present historical situation. Fukuyamas interpretation of the end of the Cold War represents an example of ideological thinking that Arendt criticized as inherently anti-democratic and anti-political. Like all ideologies, it serves as a shield from reality obscuring the most pressing problems of the contemporary world. Like all ideologies, it can be used as a political weapon to justify acceleration of the historically inevitable expansion of political and especially economic liberalism around the globe. (In spite of his criticism of Marxs materialism, Fukuyama apparently regards economic development as the principle driving force of history.) Indeed, we could say that Fukuyamas interpretation of the end of Cold War is at least implicitly present in the ideological justifications of both economic globalization and the new American imperialism. The interpretation of the end of Cold War as ideological victory of liberal democracy over Communism perpetuates the Cold War mentality, which regards world politics as a perpetual struggle between competing ideologies. To put it more precisely, we could say that it perpetuates the inherently totalitarian ideological way of thinking, which in its historic determinism denies the political significance of human freedom. Arendts non-ideological defense of liberal-democratic political principles suggests a different interpretation of the end of Cold War, which avoids this trap of ideological thinking. This alternative interpretation also better captures the spirit of the 1989 anti-Communist revolutions, as well as the enthusiastic response of people across Europe to these events. According to this interpretation, the end of Cold War should not be regarded as an ideological victory of liberal democracy over Communism, but rather as an end of the Cold War ideological struggle and an end of ideology. It should not be regarded as a strategic victory of the United States over Communism, but rather as an end of the struggle of two superpowers for world

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domination. Finally, it should not be regarded as a victory of capitalism over socialism, but as a victory of freedom and democracy over tyranny. Above, I have characterized Fukuyamas interpretation of the end of the Cold War as naively optimistic. This description, however, captures only one aspect of Fukuyamas essay. While Fukuyama greets the end of the Cold War as the culmination of Western historical development and a triumph of the Western idea,14 he at the same time expresses concern with the intellectual emptiness of the upcoming post-historical epoch: The end of history will be a very sad time, The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk ones life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual care taking of the museum of human history.15 This aspect of Fukuyamas interpretation of the present situation as the end of history and the beginning of a post-historical epoch seems to be rather close to Arendts view of the present situation as the end of tradition and emergence of the new modern world. Nevertheless, there are some important differences between Fukuyamas end of history and Arendts end of tradition. Arendt obviously identifies the end of tradition and the emergence of the modern world with the rise of totalitarianism, rather than with its demise. That, however, is not the only difference between the two authors. Fukuyama, who draws from Kojves interpretation of Hegel, regards the end of history as the culmination of Western intellectual development; the end of history is for him therefore more or less identical to the end of our philosophical tradition. Arendt, on the hand, resolutely rejects Hegels idealism, arguing that history is made by events, not by ideas. The development of modernity, which culminated with the end of tradition and the emergence of the modern world, was according to her shaped by the advancement of modern science and technology, as well as by modern political, economic and social transformations. Rather than being the driving force behind the development of modernity, modern philosophy, 269

according to Arendt, has been reacting to these developments that were brought about by acting men. The end of tradition then, according to Arendt, represents a collapse, rather than a culmination of our philosophical tradition. Fukuyamas Hegelianism, his conviction that the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas appears to be the main reason for his blindness to the political consequences of unrestrained economic and technological development. Fukuyamas Hegelian identification of human history with the history of ideas, which leads him to the absurd conclusion that the end of history represents both a culmination of Western philosophy and its inevitable end, also seems to be the main reason behind the strange mixture of optimism and resignation, which permeates his essay. To put it more strongly, we could say that Fukuyamas conviction that Hegel already achieved absolute knowledge, leads him to accept the inevitability of the nihilistic post-historical epoch. Arendt resolutely rejects this combination of reckless optimism and reckless despair, (OT, viii) which she regards as characteristic of the present modern world. While she agrees with Fukuyama that the present modern world is post-historical, insofar as it is shaped primarily by automatic forces of market and technology, rather than by human action, she refuses to accept the inevitability of this development. And while she agrees with him that the end of history (or of tradition) entails an end of traditional (that is metaphysical) philosophy, she rejects his conclusion that philosophy or thought is no longer possible. To accept as inevitable the disappearance of action and thought is for Arendt tantamount to renouncing our freedom and hence our very humanity. The acceptance of the inevitability of the current historical development is, according to Arendts analysis, a sign of the thoughtlessness and conformism engendered by the crisis of modernity. The main intention of Arendts political philosophy is to confront this thoughtlessness and conformism. Arendts critical thought rejects the current dogmas, namely the unthinking 270

reliance on technological rationality and the narrow, liberal understanding of freedom. She reminds her readers about the true meaning of thought and action and appeals to them to use their own understanding, to think [about] what we are doing (HC, 5) and to take active responsibility for their common affairs and for the fate of the world.

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Arendts account of the Greek polis from The Human Condition, which the standard interpretation regards as such an ideal model of political realm, should be interpreted rather as an analytical model of political community, which allows Arendt to illuminate the predicaments of the present modern world. 2 As does Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). 3 Jean-Franois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 4 In his essay The end of history?, National Interest No. 16 (Summer 1989), which became the foundation for a later book The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Fukuyamas thesis will be discussed later on in this Conclusion. 5 The optimistic and triumphant spirit was especially strong in the countries of Central Europe, which became liberated from the Soviet-backed Communist rule. Nevertheless, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism was welcome across Europe as the end of the division of the continent by the Iron Curtain. 6 William I. Robinson, Social theory and globalisation: The rise of a transnational state, in Theory and Society, 30, 2001 pp. 157-200. Arendt nevertheless discerned the beginnings of globalization already in the 1950s. (HC, 257) 7 See for instance Michael Hardt and Tony Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusion of Global Capitalism (New York: New Press, 1998), Pierre Bourdieu, Firing Back (New York: The New Press, 2003). 8 See Chapter 5. The analogy with the Cold War was drawn by both the critics and the supporters of the war on terror. See for example Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why We Have to Win It, Commentary, September 2004. 9 The Communist regimes during the 1980s were no longer strictly speaking totalitarian in Arendts sense of the word. (According to Arendt, totalitarianism in the Soviet Union ended with Stalins death. OT, xxxiv) Nevertheless, while these post-totalitarian single-party regimes no longer relied on totalitarian terror, they still regarded the Communist ideology as an unchallengeable official doctrine and exercised strict control over all public discourse. 10 Nancy Fraser, Hannah Arendt in the 21st Century, in Contemporary Political Theory, 2004 Vol. 3: 258. In her essay, Fraser compares Hardt and Negris, as well as Grays critique of globalization with Arendts work. In contrast to the present analysis, Fraser focuses on the applicability of Arendts analysis of totalitarianism on the present situation, largely ignoring Arendts own analysis of the present, post-totalitarian stage of the crisis of modernity. Fraser for instance notes that both Gray, on the one hand, and Hardt and Negri, on the other, imply a structure of control very different from Arendtian totalitarianism. In neither case is domination institutionalized directly, by a powerful identifiable center analogous to the Nazi or Stalinist party-state. Rather, it is institutionalized indirectly, by means of decentralized apparatus: the market in one case, and the nexus of multiple governance apparatuses on the other. (259) After criticizing both Gray, on the one side, and Hardt and Negri, on the other, for exaggerating the systematicity and totalizing character of 21st-century forms of domination Fraser concludes that it should rather be called proto-totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian. (260) According to the present interpretation, Arendt herself distinguishes between the centralized total domination and centre-less system of social domination, characteristic of the post-totalitarian mass society, which is shaped by the logic of market and technology. 272

11

Gray is so preoccupied with preserving a plurality of capitalisms that he ends up defending nondemocratic alternatives to American hegemony. And while Hardt and Negri fantasize about the spontaneous revolt of a constituting multitude, they have little appreciation of either the practice of democracy or its institutional conditions. (Fraser, 259.) 12 Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993), 13. Cited by Ronald Beiner, Arendt and nationalism, in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 13 Fukuyama (1989). 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

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