HISTORY OF PAKISTAN ARMY FROM 1965 TO 1971

Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired)

Stray Reflections on Commencement of Writing 'Pakistan Army Since 1965'

A.H Amin
The first part of this book 'The Pakistan Army till 1965' was distributed free of cost to a vast cross section of people including retired and serving Pakistani army officers of ranks varying from captain to four star general. Some copies were sent to libraries both Pakistani as well as foreign and some copies sent to research oriented organisations. No feedback was received from Pakistani readers, a happening, which may be termed as a rule rather than an exception. I have been writing for various Pakistani military journals since 1989. The various articles, which I thus wrote, dealt with doctrine, military training, leadership etc. With the exception of four cases out of which three were letters written praising my articles in two lines by officers who retired as colonels or brigadiers and one in which a factual error inadvertently committed by me was pointed out by the late General Attiq-ur-Rahman. No letter was written by any officer critically analysing my articles. The same is true for the vast majority of articles published in various army journals and magazines. The trend in Pakistan since independence has been towards antiintellectualism. There are historical reasons for this antiintellectualism. The irony is that the situation was not remedied after independence. Education in British India was aimed at acquiring degrees so that Indians could become lawyers doctors or government officials. That they surely did, in the process of which some acquired great wealth and also became political leaders, senior civil servants and prosperous middle class professionals. The intellectual basis of modern Europe's success was the renaissance, the French Revolution and the Industrial revolution. During this period great progress was made in Europe in political thought, philosophy and scientific advancement. The Indo-Pak sub-continent was introduced to modern thought by the British by virtue of being colonial subjects of the English East India Company.

Thus research intellectual activity etc were never important or of any consequence for the people of the Indo-Pak. On the other hand a mad rush towards acquiring rank and status, government jobs or political power by claiming to be champions of Hindu and Muslim rights plagued the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent! Once this mad rush for government patronage and jobs got an impetus from 1858, communalism became a major factor in Indo-Pak politics. This was since at this time the other parts of the world were talking about nationalism, socialism and political liberties. All the intellectual thrust of Indians was towards interpreting laws in communal terms! This was a Godsend blessing for the British colonial rulers! They encouraged communalism since it divided the Indians and ensured that they stayed away from dangerous ideas like war of liberation against the colonial state or from socialism or communism. The British very cleverly introduced parliamentary institutions, which enabled the leading Indians to divert their energy into harmless constitutional debates! The fathers of communalism as an idea in Indian politics were Syed Ahmad Khan, Lala Lajpat Rai, Gandhi and the Jauhar brothers! The British on the other hand right from 1858 followed a subtle but brilliant policy, introducing parliamentary democracy as bait to divert the energies of the more prominent Indians! A bait, which aroused ambition, whether based on ego, lust for glory, social recognition or material rewards! Peaceful yet heroic! Safe yet glorious! The double advantage of pursuing a prosperous law practice or business career or wielding feudal power while at the same time also being leaders of the subject Indians and the possible successors of the British Viceroys! Parliamentary democracy or its prospects once the British finally left India produced two distinct kinds of reactions, both of which helped the British and went against the people of the Indo-Pak Sub-continent! The leaders of the Hindu majority saw themselves as successors of the British Viceroys while the principal leaders of the Indian Muslims hypothesised that parliamentary democracy in independent India would mean Hindu ascendancy and Muslim subservience or more correctly all power in the hands of the Hindu politicians! The HinduMuslim question in reality was a 'Hindu-Muslim leaders clash of ego' question! It all started once the British introduced local selfgovernment based on elections from the 1860s and aggravated more and more as leaders who were Hindu by accident of birth tried to sideline other leaders who were Muslim by accident of birth! Initially leaders from both the communities talked in terms of high sounding slogans like 'Nationalism' 'Liberty' 'Democracy' etc but became more narrow in approach once their religion became a psychological disqualification in being leaders of all Indians!

The fact that the vast majority of Indians whether Muslim or Hindu would remain poor as they were before 1947 and are in the year 2000 was not important for these men. The Congress and League were essentially bourgeois parties with a larger feudal presence in the league and a larger urban business presence in the Congress. Both these parties employed religion as a tool to further their party agendas, middle class business class or feudal on the whole and egoistic at the higher level! Nehru was an atheist and a socialist, Mr Jinnah was a highly Westernised man, and yet both were great Hindu and Muslim leaders. Both the parties were instruments of business professional and feudal classes to achieve maximum power and both increasingly divided Indian society on communal lines simply because their leaders were essentially highly egotistical men! The irony of IndoPak history is the fact that modern Indo-Pak history is a story of clash of great men like Nehru and Jinnah who employed religion as a tool simply because they correctly albeit ironically realised that the people of the Indo-Pak were too naive to understand vague slogans like liberty or democracy and could only be galvanised or mobilised by raising religious slogans! In a more advanced Indian society Nehru and Jinnah may have been leaders of all Indians rather than only Hindu Indians or Muslim Indians! India, however, was like Europe around the time of the 30 years war and thus both these great men were forced by historical circumstances to be only communal leaders! Both wanted to be leaders of all Indians regardless of race or religion, but both were forced, thanks to the fire of religious communalism lit by glorified agitators or complex and outwardly impressive hypocrites like Gandhi to be communal leaders! Nehru was too sophisticated a man to be a Hindu and Jinnah was too enlightened a man to be only a leader of Indian Muslims. It was a twist of fate that both are today remembered albeit rightly as leaders of Hindu or Muslim India. Thus while the other parts of the world intellectually as well as materially made great progress during the period 1850-1950 all the energies of the Indians at all levels were increasingly diverted into communalism; thereby ensuring that intellectually as well as materially the Indo-Pak SubContinent remained backward! History was written as Muslim or Hindu history, politics was practised as Hindu or Muslim politics and while Europe was experimenting with radical social legislation, all the energies of Indian constitutionalist were absorbed in debating representation on basis of religion! College or University education was important because it was a pre-requisite for government jobs or to practise in the law courts! Research teaching and writing were unproductive jobs since they did not enable a man to be a deputy collector or barrister or doctor! It was a mad race made further mad by frequent outbursts of communal frenzy, which increased as population increased during the period 1890-1940.

All this helped the Britishers who had been traumatically shaken by the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 when a largely Hindu majority army had rebelled under Muslim leaders! The British were thus happier playing the role of judges resolving Hindu Muslim disputes rather than performing the more unpleasant task of facing a combined political movement of all Indians regardless of race or religion as in 1857, 1919 or 1922 ! This is the basis of anti-intellectualism in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent. It is more true for Pakistan since the Muslims were educationally more backward and relatively less true, yet still true and applicable to India too! Pakistan and India have produced very few serious military writers. In Pakistan the situation is worse since an unofficial ban was imposed on military writing by various military usurpers who ruled the country for the greater part of its history. Unfortunately the larger number of men who joined the officer corps of both the Indian and Pakistan Army were from the relatively less educated or superficially educated classes of Indo-Pak society. There were some military writers in Pakistan like Attiq-ur-Rahman, Fazal Muqeem, Shaukat Riza and A.I Akram. Attiq-ur-Rahman wrote well but was more obsessed with more outward forms of military discipline and was more of a martinet and proper soldier than a military writer of depth. A man of impeccable integrity, a man of Honour and a most cultured and proper soul, Attique did not have any of the dynamism or subtlety of a Liddell Hart or Fuller. He was never remembered as an inspiring field commander but as a 100 percent proper soldier who was obsessed with military drill and haircut.As a retired officer he was obsessed with Golf Courses which he rightly regarded as a waste of time and effort. However, this was where his concern ended. He stopped writing after 1990 and thus retired from the army's intellectual life at a time when the army needed a serious military writer. General A.I Akram wrote well but his books dealt with seventh and eighth century Arab Wars and had little relevance as far as practical utility in terms of modern warfare unit level tactics or operational strategy was concerned. General Shaukat Riza dabbled more with military writing but his writing lacked depth, broad outlook and dynamism. He was employed by Zia's military regime to write a heavily doctored trilogy on the history of the Pakistan Army at a time when the man was semi-senile and sick. The resultant three books thus lacked depth of analysis, their only significance being, a collection of three rudimentary handbooks which provide basic facts about order of battle, broad outline plans and other basic details which untouchable low caste retired majors like this scribe cannot ever obtain access to through normal official channels available to any researcher in any civilised country! Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan stands out as the relatively most competent clearheaded and coherent out of all the above mentioned gentlemen. His books lacked strategic vision and a

broad outlook but nevertheless were precise and forthright without confusing layouts which are hallmarks of all Shaukat Riza's books. The unfortunate part about Muqeem's writings was the fact that Muqeem wrote first as a sycophant serving general hopeful of getting the next rank and later as a retired general to please or at least cover up an all powerful serving prime minister. The positive aspect about Muqeem's works was the fact that Muqeem was generally precise, correct and exact in analysing a fallen gladiator, a typical quality of all successful men, at least in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent, where a primitive historical state of civilisation and political system do not allow dispassionate, blunt critical and forthright analysis. This is relatively more true for Pakistan which has witnessed military rule or dictatorship in guise of democracy for the greater part of its history; I would say, for its entire history from 1947. Lack of critical analysis due to dangers of being labelled blasphemous is the greatest tragedy of history writing in all countries where Muslims live! Perhaps the reasons can be found in the fact that Christianity is 500 years older than Islam and may be in the year 2500 we in this part of the world will be writing history the way Europeans are doing in 2000! The problem with history writing in Islamic countries is lack of tolerance. Those in power are sacred figures by virtue of authority and totalitarian powers. Analysis or forthright analysis is dangerous in most cases and injudicious in many! Muqeem may have been an excellent historian in West Europe! But the question is that Muqeem was not willing to be sidelined or isolated or persecuted in a society, which does not tolerate criticism of those in the higher echelons of power! Thus each of Muqeem's work although relatively better than others was a condemnation of the previous regime's military efforts! Thus in his first book he criticised Liaquat the first Prime Minister for incompetence in the Kashmir War while raising Ayub to the level of a modern Napoleon. In his second major book Fazal rightly criticised Ayub for structurally weakening the army by encouraging sycophants and retiring relatively better officers who were perceived as likely political threats. Similarly Muqeem's analysis of the 1971 war is reasonably balanced, but exonerates Mr Bhutto of all blame and also exonerates the Pakistan Army of the terrible genocide that it carried out in East Bengal in 1971. Shaukat criticises Bhutto since he was Zia's principal political opponent but exonerates Ayub of all the blunders and the follies committed in the period 1950-1969! A very learned gentleman who I hold in very high esteem by virtue of being a close friend of one of my dearest friends rightly told me to reduce what he called 'polemics' in the first volume of this history. A conceptual difference arises about the use of the word 'Polemics'. The term has different meaning for different people and is

unfortunately used in a sweeping manner to dismiss valid historical criticism! There is no denying of fact in stating that 'Polemic' may be an unpleasant figure of speech for a professor of English literature or a criminal error of conduct for a sycophant or a man of this world. The fact that polemics i.e. 'practice of controversial discussion' is something, which is the essence of all historical writing, is absolutely undeniable and incontrovertible. The historian cannot be a diplomat in order to escape being branded as one who indulges in polemics. The historian has to indulge in controversy because there are no archives or source material in any library or records office in this world, which enable a research scholar to understand the innermost depths of human personality. Every historian who wants to be loyal to posterity has to be polemical. History is but another name of a never-ending controversy! At some point in time or text all historians enter the realm of polemics! It's a part of their craft or calling! I wrote an article for the Command and Staff College Quetta about two years ago. It contained some criticism about the higher organisation of the Pakistan Army. The article was surprisingly published since the Staff College was headed at that time by one of the most upright and intellectually honest generals of Pakistan Army; a rare commodity in a subcontinental army and I would say in any army of the world. In addition the staff college's principal magazine's editor at that time was one of the most dynamic and boldest colonels, (at least in my humble opinion), of the army! The colonel editor who twice risked his career by attacking the Quetta Police over an entirely honourable issue in 1979, and by refusing to supervise Degchas in a general officers daughter's wedding in early 1987 was being posted out to command a tank regiment. Somehow he managed, or I should say was instrumental in ensuring that my article criticising the higher command organisation be published in the 'Citadel' magazine. The Editorial Introduction was, however, written by another colonel who succeeded him as the editor and belonged to the majority 'go safe' calculate a decade ahead 'take no risk' breed of career officers! The clever editor exonerated himself of all that I had said in the article by stating that 'the article lacks documentation for certain controversial assertions'. The gentleman's point was valid but this is what historical analysis is all about; i.e. dealing with controversy in face of fog and obscurity and lack of documentation! Who in this world can find documentary evidence for saying that many wars that this world fought were to satisfy egos of Kings, Presidents or Prime Ministers! That revolutions killed millions or that countries were divided simply because one politician did not want the other to be the country's next Prime Minister or Governor General! So much for 'Polemics', bad word for professors, careful men, career officers, successful men! But one of the most essential tools in historians craft.

THE PAKISTAN ARMY From 1965 to 1971

Selected Excerpts from Pakistan Army Since 1965 re-drafted as an article exclusively for the Defence Journal. The Pakistan Army Since 1965 is the second volume of the Two Volume history of Pakistan Army and covers Pakistan Army from 1965 till 2000.

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC makes an interesting foray down memory lane.

The finest summarising of the incalculable qualitative harm inflicted

on the Pakistan Army, by the self-promoted Field Marshal of peace, by a contemporary, was done by Major General Fazal I Muqeem, when he described the state of affairs of the Pakistan Army during the period 1958-71; in the following words: "We had been declining according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political government, the selection and promotion of officers to the higher rank depended on one mans will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the army, the higher command had been slowly weakened by retiring experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage of senior officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to their efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for" 1.

The advent of Yahya Khan and Yahyas Personality

Immediately after the 1965 war Major General Yahya Khan who had commanded the 7 Division in the Grand Slam Operation was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, appointed Deputy Army C in C and C in C designate in March 1966 2. Yahya was a Qizilbash3 commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun on 15 July 1939. An infantry officer from the 4/10 Baluch Regiment, Yahya saw action during WW II in North Africa where he was captured by the Axis Forces in June 1942 and interned in a prisoner of war camp in Italy from where he escaped in the third attempt4. In 1947 he was instrumental in not letting the Indian officers shift books 5 from the famous library of the British Indian Staff College at Quetta,where Yahya was posted as the only Muslim instructor at the time of partition of India.Yahya was from a reasonably well to do family, had a much better schooling than Musa Khan and was directly commissioned as an officer. Yahya unlike Musa was respected in the officer corps for professional competence. Yahya became a brigadier at the age of 34 and commanded the 106 Infantry Brigade, which was deployed on the ceasefire line in Kashmir in 1951-52. Later Yahya as Deputy Chief of General Staff was selected to head the armys planning board set up by Ayub to modernise the Pakistan Army in 1954-57. Yahya also performed the duties of Chief of General Staff from 1958 to 1962 from where he went on to command an infantry division from 1962 to 1965.

Yahya was a hard drinking soldier approaching the scale of Mustafa Kemal of Turkey and had a reputation of not liking teetotallers. Yahya

liked courtesans but his passion had more to do with listening to them sing or watching them dance. Thus he did not have anything of Ataturks practical womanising traits. Historically speaking many great military commanders like Khalid Bin Waleed, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Eftikhar Khan and Grant were accused of debauchery and womanising. These personal habits still did not reduce their personal efficiency and all of them are remembered in military history as great military commanders! The yardstick is that as long as a military commander performs his job as a military leader well, debauchery drink etc is not important. Abraham Lincoln a man of great integrity and character when told by the typical military gossip type commanders, found in all armies of the world and in particular plenty in the Indo-Pak armies, about Grants addiction to alcohol dismissed their criticism by stating "I cannot spare this man. He fights"! Indeed while the US Civil War was being fought a remark about Grant was attributed to Lincoln and frequently repeated as a joke in army messes. The story thus went that Lincoln was told about Grants drinking habits, and was asked to remove Grant from command. Lincoln dismissed this suggestion replying "send every general in the field a barrel of it"! Once Lincoln heard this joke he said that he wished very much that he had said it! 6 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, praised by his enemies, i.e. the British, in the British Official History of WW One, as one of the greatest military commanders in worlds history was a great consumer of alcohol and chronic womaniser! It has been alleged that Kemal was a homosexual (a typically Turkish pastime) too and frequently suffered the ravages of venereal disease! The same was true for Petain one of the greatest military commanders of the French Army in WW One! Gul Hassan Khan who served with Yahya in the General Headquarters in the early 1960s described Yahya as "professionally competent" and as a man of few words whom always approached the point at issue without ceremony.7 Muqeem described Yahya as "authoritarian by nature" and "reserved by temperament".8 Major General Sher Ali under whom Yahya served assessed Yahya as an officer of the "highest calibre". Shaukat Riza writing as recently as 1986 described Yahya as a good soldier, as a commander distinguished for his decision making and generous nature and one who gave his total trust to a man whom he accepted as part of his team or a colleague.9 Contrary to Gauhars judgement Yahya, at least in 1966-69, was definitely viewed as a professional in the army. His shortcomings in functioning as the Supreme Commander that became evident in the 1971 war were not known to anyone in 1966. No evidence exists, but it appears that Yahyas sect and ethnicity may have played a part in Ayubs decision to select Yahya as C in C. Musa writes in his memoirs that Yahya was not his first choice as Army C in C but was selected by

Ayub overruling Musas reservations about Yahyas character 10. This further proves that Ayub selected Yahya as the army chief for reasons other than merit. I am not implying that Yahya was incompetent, but merely the fact that Ayub was motivated by ulterior reasons to select Yahya. These reasons had something to do with Yahyas political reliability by virtue of belonging to a minority! Yahya was not a Punjabi or a Pathan but belonged to a minority ethnic group as well as a minority ethnic group, just like Musa.This was no mere coincidence but a deliberately planned manoeuvre to have as army chief a man who was not from the two ethnic groups which dominated the officer corps, the Punjabis being more than 60 % of the officer corps and the Pathans being the second largest group after the Punjabis!11 Altaf Gauhar Ayubs close confidant inadvertently proves this fact once he quite uncharitably, and for reasons, other than dispassionate objective historical considerations, described Yahya as one " selectedin preference to some other generals, because Yahya, who had come to hit the bottle hard, had no time for politics and was considered a harmless and loyal person".12

Selection of Army C in C
Foreign readers may note that almost all army chiefs of Pakistan Army were selected primarily because they were perceived as reliable as well as pliable! In Addition ethnic factors Vis a Vis prevalent political considerations played a part in their selection. Thus Liaquat the first premier selected a non Punjabi as the armys first C in C since in 1950 Liaquat was involved in a political confrontation with Punjabi politicians of the Muslim League and had established a Hindustani-Pathan-Bengali alliance to sideline the Punjabi Muslims. Thus the most obvious nominee for the appointment of C in C i.e. Major General Raza, a Punjabi Muslim was not selected. Instead Ayub an ethnic Pathan, and one who already had been superseded and sidelined, and with a poor war record was selected as the first Pakistani Muslim army C in C. Similarly Ayub selected Musa simply because Musa was perceived as loyal despite not being competent! Yahya as Gauhar Ayubs closest adviser and confidant admits, as earlier mentioned, was selected because he had hit the bottle hard; i.e. was harmless, and was loyal, and thus no danger to Ayub! In other words Gauhar advances a theory that Ayub selected Yahya (Gauhars subjective judgement) simply because it was politically expedient for Ayub to have this particular type of man as army chief! Gauhar judgement of Yahya has little value since it was highly subjective but Ayubs reasons for selecting his army chief, as Gauhar describes it speaks volumes for the character of Ayub and I would say the orientation of all Pakistani politicians, both civilian and military! In third world countries every army chief is a

military politician! The process was carried on and continues to date but this chapter deals with only 1965-1971, so more of this later! The same was true for extensions given to the army chiefs. Ayub got three extensions since Iskandar Mirza perceived him as a reliable tool. He booted out Mirza, his benefactor, after the last extension in 1958! Ayub gave Musa an extension of four years in 1962 since he perceived Musa as reliable and politically docile, and thus no threat to Ayubs authoritarian government. Since 1962 when Musa got his extension of service by one additional term of four years, which prolonged his service from 1962 to 196613, no Pakistani army chief was given an extension beyond his three or four year term. The situation however was still worse since Yahya took over power in 1969 and thus automatically extended his term as C in C till December 1971. Zia usurped power in 1977 and thus gave himself a nine year extension as Army Chief till he was removed to the army and the countrys great relief in August 1988 by Divine Design! Beg attempted to get an extension by floating the idea of being appointed as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces14 but was outmanoeuvred by his own army corps commanders, who gave a lukewarm response to the idea and by Ghulam Ishaq who was a powerful president and had a deep understanding of the military mind by virtue of having loyally and successfully served three military dictators.

Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971

Yahya energetically started reorganising the Pakistan Army in 1965. Today this has been forgotten while Yahya is repeatedly condemned for only his negative qualities (a subjective word which has little relevance to generalship as proved in military history)! The post 1965 situation saw major organisational as well as technical changes in the Pakistan Army. Till 1965 it was thought that divisions could function effectively while getting orders directly from the armys GHQ. This idea failed miserably in the 1965 war and the need to have intermediate corps headquarters in between the GHQ and the fighting combat divisions was recognised as a foremost operational necessity after the 1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one corps headquarter i.e the 1 Corps Headquarters. Soon after the war had started the US had imposed an embargo on military aid on both India and Pakistan. This embargo did not affect the Indian Army but produced major changes in the Pakistan Armys technical

composition. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up when he said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight, but were not going to pay for it"!15 Pakistan now turned to China and for military aid and Chinese tank T-59 started replacing the US M-47/48 tanks as the Pakistan Armys MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80 tanks, the first batch of T-59s, a low-grade version of the Russian T54/55 series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965-66. The first batch was displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on 23 March 196616. The 1965 War had proved that Pakistan Armys tank infantry ratio was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry divisions (9, 16 and 17 Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese equipment and popularly referred to by the rank and file as "The China Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 196817. Two more corps headquarters i.e. 2 Corps Headquarters (Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and 4 Corps Headquarters (Ravi-Sutlej Corridor) were raised. In the 1965 War India had not attacked East Pakistan which was defended by a weak two-infantry brigade division (14 Division) without any tank support. Yahya correctly appreciated that geographical, as well as operational situation demanded an entirely independent command set up in East Pakistan. 14 Divisions infantry strength was increased and a new tank regiment was raised and stationed in East Pakistan. A new Corps Headquarters was raised in East Pakistan and was designated as Headquarters Eastern Command.18 It was realised by the Pakistani GHQ that the next war would be different and East Pakistan badly required a new command set up. Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the armys Chief of General Staff and thus Principal Staff Officer to the C in C soon after the 1965 war. Yaqub was an aristocrat from a Hindustani Pathan background and was altogether different from the typical north of Chenab breed in depth of intellect, general outlook and strategic perception! In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who was not lavish in praising anyone "planning had taken a turn for the better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of General Staff.19 In other words Muqeem was implying that planning level in the army was relatively poor before Yaqub became the Chief of General Staff. But Muqeem went further and stated that the armys war plans in the post 1965 era were still vague about "what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted against East Pakistan".20 We will discuss more of this later.

Promotions and Appointments

Selection and assessment of officers for higher ranks had depended on one mans will and his personal likes and dislikes since 1950. Initially it

was Ayub from 1950 to 1969 and Yahya from 1969 to 1971. Dictators fear all around them and this was the principal tragedy of the Pakistan Army. Selection and assessment of men was not a plus point in Yahyas personality. It appears that either Yahya was not a good judge of men. In this regard Yahya continued Ayubs policy of sidelining talented officers who had the potential of becoming a rival at a later stage! We will first deal with selection for higher ranks vis-a-vis war performance. Almost no one, who had blundered, except Brigadier Sardar Ismail the acting divisional commander of 15 Division, was really taken to task for having failed in the discharge of his military duties!21 Lord Bashir of Valtoha fame was promoted, and commanded the 6th Armoured Division after the war! On the other hand Major General Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub continental standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired in the same rank!22 Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistans territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may be gauged from the fact that at the time of outbreak of the 1971 War Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was only commanding the Armoured corps recruit training centre, a poor appointment for a man who had distinguished himself as a tank regiment commander in stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose units performance was described by the enemy opposing him as one "which was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured Division and its objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General Headquarters pedantic officers as fit only to command a recruit training centre while one who was instrumental in failure of the main Pakistani armour effort at Khem Karan was promoted to Major General rank and trusted with the command of Pakistans Armoured division! Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade commander in 10 Division area in Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade commanders of the army who had led from the front. Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely praised anyone had the following to say about Shers conduct while leading the Pakistan armys most important infantry brigade counter attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15 Division despite considerable numerical superiority was completely thrown off balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep, moved from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops worth their salt could ignore".24 but the Armys Selection Boards ignored Qayyum Sher once his turn for promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well in war and was awarded the Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the HJ! But war performance or even performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria for promotion in the Pakistan Army! Qayyum retired as

a brigadier, remembered by those who fought under him as a brave and resolute commander, who was not given an opportunity to rise to a higher rank, which Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did.

Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War

The 1965 War was rich in lessons and many lessons were learned; however the armys reorganisation was badly affected by the political events of 1968-71. The two major areas of improvement after the war were in the realm of military organisation and military plans. It was realised finally that infantry and armoured divisions could not be effectively employed till they were organised as corps with areas of responsibility based on terrain realities. The post 1965 army saw major changes in terms of creation of corps headquarters. On the other side no major doctrinal reappraisal was done after the 1965 War except raising new divisions and corps no major reform was undertaken to produce a major qualitative change in the armys tactical and operational orientation. Today this is a much criticised subject. The events of 1965-71 however must be taken as a whole. When one does so a slightly different picture emerges. A major start was taken soon after 1965 after Yahya had been nominated as the deputy army chief, towards improving higher organisation and corps were created, but this process was retarded by the much more ominous political developments which increasingly diverted the army chiefs energies into political decision making from 1969 onwards. The 1965 War was a failure in higher leadership. This was true for both sides. However, qualitative superiority by virtue of superior doctrine strategic orientation and operational preparedness became relatively far more important for the Pakistan Army than the Indians. The Indians had already embarked on a programme of rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The material and numerical gap between the Indian and Pakistan armies started widening from 1962 and after 1965 it reached dangerous proportions! Further because of the 1965 War the Indians got an opportunity to improve their command and control procedures. The Indians the reader must note were already one step ahead of the Pakistanis in higher organisation since their army was organised to fight as corps since 1947-48 while the Pakistan Army had fought the 1965 War organised in divisions. The Indians had failed to make good use of their considerable numerical superiority in infantry in 1965 but, they had learned many lessons which. This meant that in the next war the Indians could

employ their numerically superior forces in a relatively better manner than in 1965. Further Pakistan had lost its major arms supplier the USA which had imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan. Thus the technical superiority in equipment which Pakistan had enjoyed in 1965 was nullified after 1965. On the other hand India had a much larger economy and thus far greater potential to buy from the open market than Pakistan. All these factors demanded a major qualitative change. One that would ensure that Pakistan could survive another war with India.It was an entirely new situation. The year 1965 was a watershed in Pakistani military history. Till 1965 Pakistani planners thought in terms of liberating the Pakistani Alsace Lorraine i.e. Kashmir! The issue in the next war was no longer adding more territory but merely preserving the countrys territorial integrity! The country was in the grip of serious internal and external crisis. The Internal crisis stemmed out of 11 years of military rule which had sharply polarised the country into two wings i.e the Eastern and the Western Wing and even within the Western Wing the bulk of the populace was alienated with the Ayub regime. It appears that this major change in the overall geostrategic position was not grasped by those at the highest level. It appears that till December 1971 no one in the Pakistani GHQ seriously thought that the Indians would overrun East Pakistan. Too much hope was based on US or Chinese intervention. The Chinese could not possibly have intervened since all Himalayan passes were snowbound in Nov-Dec 1971. The United States on the other hand made no serious effort to pressurise India into not attacking East Pakistan. To make things further complicated the countrys internal cohesion was seriously weakened by the political conflict between the East and West Pakistan Provinces and the countrywide anti Ayub agitation which finally led to the exit of the self promoted Field Marshal Ayub from power in March 1969. The situation was extremely delicate, complicated and only a truly great leader at both civil and military level could have remedied the situation. Unfortunately for the Pakistan Army and the country there was no such man to steer the countrys ship out of troubled waters. It appears that 1965 war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan at all. In this regard the Pakistani military decision-makers were swept away in the emotional stream of their own propaganda! The fact that the Pakistan Army was in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the Indians in the war, but failed due to primarily poor leadership at and beyond brigade level, and due to doctrinal and organisational deficiencies at the higher level was not accepted! It was a natural result of the fact that Pakistan functioned as a pseudo democracy under one man! This in turn had led to a ban on frank and open analysis of the armys performance and role! On the other hand the

Indian Armys poor performance was openly and frankly analysed and the Indian critics did not spare the Indian C in C General Chaudri.25 It would not be wrong to say that the Indians thanks to a democratic system in which the army was not a sacred cow, unlike Pakistan, analysed their failings in 1965 in a more positive and concrete manner. Shaukat Riza the officially sponsored historian of the Pakistan Army admitted this fact. Shaukat thus observed, while briefly analysing the Commander in Chiefs General Training Directive of 1968, that "We admitted that the enemy would have better resources in number of troops, quality of equipment, research, development and indigenous production. In face of superiority we were relying solely on quality of our troops to win a war against India. But there was nothing in our satchel of organisation, tactical doctrine or even quality of professional leadership, which could substantiate this confidence. This was self-hypnosis where we were not really hypnotised.26 It may be noted that the General Training Directive identified the enemy threat relatively realistically only in an extremely vague and rudimentary sense but gave no solution or tangible doctrine to combat it except, operations on broad front for all formations except those in Kashmir, Mountain Warfare for formations in Kashmir and Baluchistan, Snow Warfare for troops in the Northern Areas, Desert Warfare for formations located in Sind Baluchistan and Bahawalpur, Jungle and Riverine Warfare for formations in East Pakistan and Frontier Warfare for all formations in NWFP and Baluchistan!27 It was a piece of extreme naivety and was probably drafted by a staff officer after reading the recommendations of the last two years training directives and was merely signed by the army chief 28. The 1969 training directive dealt with attack by infiltration and anti infiltration measures29, something, which was just a whimsical fancy in a staff officers mind! Infiltration was buried soon and in 1971!

Strategic and Operational Dilemmas

Fazal Muqeem quite correctly described the adverse strategic situation in the post 1965 period in the following words, "with the almost daily expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war, it had become economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with her. The policy of matching Indian strength with even 1/3 or _ in numbers had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all that Pakistan could do was to avoid war with India and to strive to resolve her disputes through political and diplomatic means.30 The only problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period 1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs was ready to think so realistically and rationally! Fazals wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight, expressed some two years after Pakistan Army had fought the disaster and humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was

dismembered into two countries. The Pakistani nation had been fed on propaganda about martial superiority of their army! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi who served in the armys propaganda/media management wing known as the ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate) states that "the 1965 war had exalted the military image to mythical heights. 31 The common man drew false conclusions and to compound things further, the 1965 war was viewed differently in West and East Pakistan. The West Pakistani populace and particularly the majority West Pakistani ethnic groups i.e. the Punjabis saw the war as a triumph of a preponderantly Punjabi Muslim army over a numerically larger Hindu army! The East Pakistanis viewed the war as a war fought by a West Pakistani dominated army to protect West Pakistan, where some 90 % of the army was stationed! The Indians had not attacked Pakistan deliberately since their strategy was based on the fact that in case the bulk of Pakistan Army in the West Pakistan provinces northern half i.e. Punjab was destroyed Pakistan would automatically sue for peace or collapse! Thus they had concentrated the bulk of their army against West Pakistan in the 1965 War. On the Eastern Front the Indians outnumbered the Pakistani troops defending East Pakistan by more than three to one but did not attack East Pakistan out of fear of Chinese Army the bulk of which was concentrated opposite Indias Assam Province and the North East Frontier Agency. Later after the 1965 war the Indians with the benefit of hindsight painted this timid action in not attacking East Pakistan as an act of grand strategic dimensions. In any case the harm was done as far as East Pakistani perceptions about the war were concerned. The East Pakistanis increasingly started viewing the army as a west Pakistani entity created to defend only West Pakistan. The seeds of secession were firmly sown as a result of the 1965 War. The strategic and operational dilemmas faced by the Pakistan Army can only be understood in terms of the complicated political situation in the period 1969-1971. Yahya Khan attempted to solve two highly complicated political problems that he had inherited from his predecessor and who were also the father and architect of both the problems. These were restoration of democracy and resolving the acute sense of deprivation which had been created in the East Pakistan province as a result of various perceived or real injustices during the period 1958-1969. Secessionist tendencies had emerged in the East Pakistan province where the people viewed Pakistans federal government with its capital in the West Pakistan as a West Pakistani elite dominated affair. A government which was Muslim in name but West Pakistani (Punjabi, Pathan and Hindustani in order of merit)32 dominated in essence and which had been exploiting the East Pakistan province like a colony since 1947! We will not examine the details of this perception since it is beyond the scope of this book. We

are only concerned with the fact that this perception made things very complicated for the Pakistan Army. The bulk of the army was concentrated in the West Pakistan province in line with the strategic doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. The likely political danger now lay in the fact that the East Pakistanis were increasingly viewing the army as a foreign and hostile entity. This perception could make things difficult for the lone infantry division of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. The Indian Army had been rapidly expanded since 1965 and the Indians now possessed a military capability to overrun East Pakistan while part of its army kept the bulk of the Pakistan Army stationed in the West wing in check. The situation was made yet more complex by fears in West Pakistan about the East Pakistani majority leader Mujeebs intention to reduce the army in case he won the 1970 elections that Yahya had promised. Further Mujeebs "Six Point Formula" if enforced would have led to virtual disintegration of Pakistan since it envisaged a confedral system with a very high level of provincial autonomy. What would happen in case a civil war started in the East wing after the 1970 elections and India decided to take advantage of the adverse internal political situation by invading East Pakistan. The military planners in the GHQ knew clearly that in case an armed insurrection broke out in the East Pakistan province one infantry division would not be control it. In case troops were sent from the West wing to reinforce the East Pakistan garrison, the war plans in the West Wing would be compromised. These were serious questions, which no one in the GHQ could answer in 1969. No one exactly knew what would happen in the first general elections of Pakistan. How could anyone know? This basic right had been denied to the common man in both the wings since 1946!

Yahya Khan and the Political Situation- 1969-1971

Now a word on Pakistans internal political situation in 1969 and its negative effects on the Pakistan Army. It appears that, had not Ayub Khan alienated the East Wing by his pro West Pakistani elite policies and also had not alienated the West Pakistani and East Pakistani populace by his self-serving policies, there would have been no East Pakistan problem which resulted in Pakistans break-up in 1971 or any anti-Ayub agitation in both the countrys provinces of East and West Pakistan that finally led to the fall of the Ayubian system of government in March 1969. The foreign readers may note that the East wing versus West wing rivalry had been constitutionally resolved through the passing of the 1956 Constitution, once the representatives of the East wing had most large heartedly accepted the principal of 50 % parity in the countrys legislature despite the fact that their actual ratio in the countrys population entitled them to 54 % seats in the

assembly! Both the wings now started coming closer since issues were settled inside the parliament rather than by subversion or agitation. However Ayub in league with the president Iskandar Mirza repeatedly conspired to derail democracy and in league with Iskandar Mirza finally usurped power in the country by imposing the first Martial Law in October 1958. He sidelined Mirza in less than a month and imposed a one-man rule on the country. Ayub despised the East Pakistanis and as Army C in C had stopped more raisings of infantry battalions of East Pakistanis. The East Pakistanis on the other hand were anti-Ayub and resented Ayubs policies of allocating a predominantly large part the resources of the country on the development of the West Wing. Further during the Ayub era, the strategic doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in concentrating the bulk of the Pakistan Army in the West wing was developed. This further alienated the East wingers since there was an unofficial ban on recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms of the army and the expanded army increasingly became a West Pakistani army, instead of being a national army.33 Once Ayub handed over power to Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969 Yahya inherited a two-decade constitutional problem of inter provincial ethnic rivalry between the Punjabi-Pathan-Mohajir dominated West Pakistan province and the ethnically Bengali Muslim East Pakistan province. In addition Yahya also inherited an eleven-year-old problem of transforming an essentially one-man ruled country to a democratic country, which was the ideological basis of the anti Ayub movement of 1968-69. Herein lies the key to Yahyas dilemma. As an Army Chief Yahya had all the capabilities, qualifications and potential. But Yahya inherited an extremely complex problem and was forced to perform the multiple roles of caretaker head of the country, drafter of a provisional constitution, resolving the One Unit question 34, satisfying the frustrations and the sense of exploitation and discrimination successively created in the East Wing by a series of government policies since 1948. All these were complex problems and the seeds of Pakistan Armys defeat and humiliation in December 1971 lay in the fact that Yahya Khan blundered unwittingly into the thankless task of cleaning dirt in Pakistans political and administrative system which had been accumulating for twenty years and had its actual origins in the pre 1947 British policies towards the Bengali Muslims. The American author Ziring well summed it up when he observed that, "Yahya Khan has been widely portrayed as a ruthless uncompromising insensitive and grossly inept leaderWhile Yahya cannot escape responsibility for these tragic events, it is also on record that he did not act aloneAll the major actors of the period were creatures of a historic legacy and a psycho-political milieu which did not lend itself to accommodation and compromise, to bargaining and a reasonable settlement. Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were all conditioned

to act in a manner that neglected agreeable solutions and promoted violent judgements. 35 The irrefutable conclusion is that Yahya failed as an Army Chief not because he lacked the inherent capabilities but because he tried to do too many things at the same time. This as we earlier discussed was the prime reason for failure of the Pakistan Army to develop and function as a dynamic entity beyond unit level in the 1965 war and in the pre 1965 era. In all fairness one cannot but admit that, Yahya Khan, sincerely attempted to solve Pakistans constitutional and inter provincial/regional rivalry problems once he took over power from Ayub in March 1969. The tragedy of the whole affair was the fact that all actions that Yahya took, although correct in principle, were too late in timing, and served only to further intensify the political polarisation between the East and West wings. He dissolved the one unit restoring the pre 1955 provinces of West Pakistan, promised free direct, one man one vote, fair elections on adult franchise, a basic human right which had been denied to the Pakistani people since the pre independence 1946 elections by political inefficiency, double play and intrigue, by civilian governments, from 1947 to 1958 and by Ayubs one man rule from 1958 to 1969. However dissolution of one unit did not lead to the positive results that it might have lead to in case "One Unit" was dissolved earlier. Yahya also made an attempt to accommodate the East Pakistanis by abolishing the principle of parity, thereby hoping that greater share in the assembly would redress their wounded ethnic regional pride and ensure the integrity of Pakistan. Instead of satisfying the Bengalis it intensified their separatism, since they felt that the west wing had politically suppressed them since 1958. Thus the rise of anti West Wing sentiment in the East Wing, thanks to Ayub Khans anti East Wing policies, had however reached such tremendous proportions that each of Yahyas concessions did not reduce the East West tension. Yahya announced in his broadcast to the nation on 28 July 1969, his firm intention to redress Bengali grievances, the first major step in this direction being, the doubling of Bengali quota in the defence services 36. It may be noted that at this time there were just seven infantry battalions of the East Pakistanis. Yahyas announcement although made with the noblest and most generous intentions in mind was late by about twenty years! Yahya cannot be blamed for the muck that had been accumulating for more than two decades. Yahyas intention to raise more pure Bengali battalions was opposed by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, the General Officer Commanding 14 Division in East Pakistan, since the General felt that instead of raising new purely Bengali battalions,

Bengali troops should be mixed with existing infantry battalions comprising of Punjabi and Pathan troops.37 Such was the strength of conviction of General Khadim about not raising more pure Bengali battalions that once he came to know about Yahyas orders to raise more East Pakistani regiments, he flew to the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi to remonstrate against the sagacity of raising more pure Bengali units. Khadims advice that Bengali troops could not be relied upon in crisis situations should have been an eye opener for all in the GHQ. No one at least at that time took his advice seriously. It appears that the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek to ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan Muslim The Bengalis were despised as non martial by all West Pakistanis. However much later an interesting controversy developed in which the Punjabis and Hindustanis blamed each other for doing so! The Hindustanis blaming Aziz Ahmad etc and the Punjabis blaming many Hindustani ICS old foxes of the 1950s! There is no doubt that this exercise in Bengali degrading was neither totally or exclusively Punjabi led but a a true for all West Pakistanis business! The foreign reader may note that Bengalis were despised as a non martial race from the British times. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan a Hindustani Muslim and an eminent Muslim leader of the North Indian Muslims in late 19th century made open fun of Bengalis in his various speeches, notably the one delivered at Lucknow in 1887. I.H Qureshi another prominent Hindustani Muslim and a post 1947 cabinet minister declared in a roundabout manner that the Bengalis were an inferior race. Ayub made various remarks implying that the Bengalis were an inferior race in his memoirs written in 1967.38

Inflated Perceptions about Pakistani military effectiveness

The essence of the whole business was the fact that the Pakistani GHQ placed entire reliance on the Superior Valour and Martial Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war and felt that somehow, in the next war to miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army would do well! The tangible military facts of the Indo Pak politico-military scenario were not analysed in their true dimension! It was a classic case of perceptual distortion and losing sight of reality. Eric Berne an eminent psychologist defined "adjustment" as "ability to change ones images to correspond to a new reality. Berne rephrases "adjustment" as "flexibility" which he defines as " ability to change your images as they should be changed according to reality". This in Bernes view is more important than intelligence. Berne thus concluded that the successful

man is the one whose images correspond most closely to reality, because then his actions will lead to the results, which he imagines".39 This as a matter of fact are one of the prime functions of a military and political leader. The success of the western democracies lay in the fact that one man was never totally in command but civil and military functions were divided and shared between various appointment holders aided by a host of staff officers and research Organisations. This sadly was not Pakistans case where one man from 1958 wielded all power, both civil and military onwards. The situation was not so complicated till 1965 since Pakistan enjoyed material and technical superiority till 1965 and because the troop ratio between Pakistan and India was relatively manageable40. Unfortunately in Pakistan after 1971 all blame was heaped on Yahyas shoulders. The fact that the psychosis that had afflicted the Pakistani decision makers in the period 1966-1971 and finally led to the great humiliation of 1971, had a close connection with the nature of Pakistans experiences as a nation in the period 1947-1971 was not accepted and instead Yahya was made a scapegoat for all that had gone wrong. We will analyse more of this in the next chapter. I will quote Berne once again to define greatness or the lack of it in Pakistan during the period 1947-1971. But before we do it we must understand that man is not fully autonomous but is a prisoner of historical environmental and physiological circumstances. There are very few truly great men who act more autonomously than the multitude. Berne thus defined individual human greatness as " A great man is the one who either helps to find out what the world is really like or else tries to change the world to match his image. In both cases he is trying to bring images and reality closer together by changing one or the other. In the period 1966-1971 Pakistan did not have the resources to change the world to match its images nor great men who had the depth of character and intellect to find out what the world is really like and changing their images! Many Pakistani intellectuals with the naivety of a provincial farm maiden try to heap the whole blame on liquor and Yahya or on liquor alone! This unfortunately is too simplistic a view! The Pakistanis as a nation were forming wrong and unrealistic images right from 1947! Too much faith was based on ideology (Islam) to unite two entirely diverse regions of East and West Pakistan! Even Shauakat Riza a pro establishment historian, commenting on religion as a common factor between the East and West wings caustically noted that Twenty four years is too long to gamble on one card41 History was distorted to show that the Muslims were ruling the timid Hindu when the British snatched power from the brave Muslims by treachery! This was sadly not the case! In reality the Muslims were saved from total defeat by the British advent in India! A false image was formed by official propaganda right from 1947 that the Muslims were more martial than

the timid Hindus were! It was a poor modification of the "Martial Races Theory" of the British, which was a purely imperialist theory to "Divide and Rule" India! But once Pakistan was defeated in 1971, all blame was heaped on Yahya and liquor, disregarding the fact that Yahya was merely the tip of the iceberg, and the irrefutable fact that many great commanders in history were absolutely incorrigible and compulsive womanisers and drinkers! This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965 but the majority were victims of the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-1971! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Armys press image thus narrated a thought-provoking incident soon after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations and myths that were being created as a result of the official propaganda. Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, "Miracles he mused, may indeed have happened, but they happen only once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies. That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit Gods help is of the utmost importance but its no substitute for ones own performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar military systems and institutions and fights like hell when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought largely on his own home ground as a defender. Siddiqi further noted that "The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war more realistically simply betrayed a diffident and defeatist mentality The merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance became a taboo.42 Sher was not alone in entertaining these views.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TAJAMMUL HUSSAIN MALIK

Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, "We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions were comparatively ill equipped and untrained and they had to guard a much bigger frontier. 43

Many years earlier one of the greatest thinkers of this world Sigmund Freud rightly noted that "the irrational forces in mans nature are so strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against them. Freud thus concluded that "a small minority might be able to live a life of reason but most men are comfortable living with their delusions and superstitions rather than with the truth". As a matter of fact whole nations can be victims of delusions. This has happened many times in history. The same was true for the Pakistani nation, or the predominantly West Pakistani elite! Sultan Khan who served as Pakistans Foreign Secretary with Yahya during the fateful year of 1971 noted at many places in his memoirs that most Pakistani generals thought that the Pakistani soldier was more martial and would somehow emerge successfully through the East Pakistan War. Gul Hassan, Sultan thus noted, was one of them and firmly believed in the power of bayonet to solve all problems! The tragedy is that after the war all the blame was heaped on Yahya and the fact that the whole elite and all those who mattered were under influence of highly irrational ideas was deliberately suppressed. Till this day in presentations and studies carried out in Pakistan Armys schools and colleges of instruction, Yahya is made the scapegoat for the entire 1971 fiasco and the fact that the whole of West Pakistani was under influence of a psychotic state is ignored.

Historical Background of Superiority Complex in the Pakistan Army

It is necessary to examine the historical reasons for this false feeling of superiority in the Pakistan Army in 1969-71. It may be noted that the vast bulk of Muslims, just like the vast bulk of Hindus of the Indo Pak Sub Continent were caught in a vicious square of "ethnicity "ideology" "exploitation by feudal and capitalist classes" and above all "British Colonial rule" during the period 1858-1947. In 1857 the common soldiers (sepoys), both Hindu (some three fourth) and Muslims (around one fourth) from modern UP province attempted a rebellion against the British. This rebellion was crushed by the Britishers using European as well as Punjabi (largely Muslim and relatively less Sikh and Hindu) Pathan (less in number than Punjabis) Gurkha and Madrasi troops. The rebellions end in 1858 marked a major turn in British policy in India. Till 1857 British policy as executed by various Viceroys of the private English East India Company was markedly egalitarian and anti feudal. A major policy change was introduced from 1858 onwards once the British crown took over the governance of India. Feudals who were viewed as unnecessary anachronisms by Dalhousie were now viewed as allies against future rebels while ethnic/religious factors which were not important in army recruitment before 1857, now became a matter

of careful policy, since the pre 1857 was largely one in which soldiers were mixed down to platoon level regardless of race or religion. The British policy now changed since the Hindustani44 Hindus and Muslims regardless of race or religion had jointly rebelled. Thus from 1858 onwards the British introduced the concept of One class companies with soldiers from one religious as well as ethnic class in any single infantry company or cavalry troop. Due to various reasons discussed in detail in the previous volume of this history the British actively followed a policy of Punjabising from 1858 to 1911. As a result by 1911 the Indian Army was largely a Punjabi although not a Punjabi Muslim dominated army45. The reader may note that during the period 18851911 when the ethnic composition of the British Indian Army changed from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non Muslim dominated army to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911; no major war took place; that could prove that Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the Hindustani troops, and the concept that the British changed the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military history. Thus the Martial Races Theory was based more on political considerations than on any tangible or concrete military effectiveness or relative combat effectiveness in any war! In any case the pre 1947 Indian Army was never a Muslim majority army at any stage of its history. Many Britishers were crystal clear about the situational or historical relativity of the so called martial effectiveness even in the first half of the nineteenth century. Henry Lawrence a Civil Servant of the English East India Company thus summed up the whole business about martial effectiveness once he said Courage goes much by opinion; and many a man behaves as a hero or a coward, according as he considers he is expected to behave. Once two Roman Legions held Britain; now as many Britons might hold Italy". On the other hand , the reasons why the British preferred the Punjabis in the army in preference to other races were rationalised by many Britishers by stating that the British preferred the Indian Army to be composed of Martial Races46. The "Martial Races Theory" in reality was an Imperial gimmick to boost the ego of the cannon fodder. Various British writers like Philip Mason frankly admitted that the real reason for selective recruitment was political reliability in crisis situations which the Punjabis had exhibited during the 1857-58 Bengal Army rebellion.47 Another British officer thought that "Martial Races Theory" had a more sentimental and administrative basis rather than anything to do with real martial

superiority. C.C Trench thus wrote, Reasons for preferring northerners were largely racial. To Kiplings contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to beThere was a general preference for the wild over the half educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinkingBrahmins had been prominent in the mutiny, and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active service48. The Special Commission appointed by the Viceroy to enquire into the organisation of Indian Army was more blunt in outlining the political reliability factor once it stated that "lower stratum of the Mohammadan urban population, the dispossessed landholders (many of them, off course, Muslims), the predatory classes, and perhaps the cadets of the old Muhammadan families (as) the only people who really dislike British rule 49 . The reason why the Punjabis whether Sikh Hindu or Muslim were more loyal to the British at least till 1919 lay in complex socio-political background of the province and the complex relationship between the Sikhs Hindus and Muslims of the province. Its discussion is beyond the scope of this work. The fact remains that in the first world war the Punjabi case for priority race for recruitment to the army was once again reinforced when the Punjabi soldiers, Sikh Muslim and Hindu loyally served the British in France Mesopotamia Egypt Palestine and Gallipoli. Philip Mason thus wrote that the "Punjabi Muslims were steady as a rock while a faint question mark hung over the Pathans 50. Such was the difference in reliability within the units that when two Pathan squadrons of 15 Lancers passively refused to fight against the Turks in Mesopotamia, the Punjabi Squadrons remained staunch and the Pathan squadrons were disbanded and replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat Squadrons from 14th Murray Jat Lancers! The Hindustani/Ranghar Muslims were also further discredited once the 5th Light Infantry a pure Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim unit composed of Delhi region Hindustani Pathans, and Ranghar Muslims rebelled and seized Singapore for about a day in 1915.51 It was more a question of political reliability than being more martial that led to further Punjabisation of the army after the first world war. Thus in 1929 as per the Report of the Statutory Commission on Indian Constitutional Advancement, military ability was not evenly distributed in the entire population and, the capacity to fight was confined to the martial races! The commission ignored the fact that recruitment was done to fill ethnic quotas as decided by the Indian government and was not open to all classes! As per this commissions report some 86,000 or some 54.36% Indian Army combatants out of a total of 158,200 were from Punjab province. These did include some Ranghar Muslims who were administratively Punjabi although Hindustani ethnically/culturally, but there is no doubt that the vast bulk of these men were ethnically Punjabi. The important part of the whole business was the fact that

once 19,000 Nepali Gurkhas, who were in reality foreigners, included in the above mentioned total of 158,200 men are excluded the Punjabi share in Indian Army rose to 61.8%. The Pathans thanks to their political record in the First World War had been reduced to just 5,600 men 52 or just 4.02% out of which at least a thousand were non Pathans! The same state of affairs continued till the outbreak of the Second World War with the major change being the Punjabi Sikhs who became relatively less reliable politically because of being under communist influences 53. However the reader may note, so as not to be led astray by any false claims that in 1939 the Indian Army was only 37% Muslim, the rest being non Muslim including about 12.8 % Sikhs 10.9% Hindu Gurkhas and 37.6% other Hindus54. Immense demands of WW Two forced the British to diversify the recruitment pattern of the Indian Army and although Punjab remained the top contributor of recruits, it provided about 754,551 out of a total of 24,61,446, or 30.65% recruits to the Indian Army between 3rd September 1939 and 31 August 1945. 55 The reader may note that some 314,356 or a total of 41.66% from the Punjab contribution and 12.77% recruits were Punjabi Muslims56. Thus although Punjab led positionwise as a province in recruitment, there never was any Punjabi Muslim majority or even Punjabi Muslim majority or even near majority in recruitment to the Indian Army in WW Two. However a myth was widely propagated in Pakistan that the Punjabi Muslims were the most martial race and the Pathan Muslims were the second most martial race57. I may add that I heard this ridiculous and irrational myth thousands of times in the course of my 13 years service in Pakistan Army. On the other hand the knowledge of historical knowledge may be gauged from the fact that as late as 1992 in a book written and published in the staff college a brigadier made the Mughal Emperor Humayun fight the second battle of Panipat, at a time when Humayun was already dead! In August 1947 the British Indian Army was divided into the Pakistan and Indian armies. Two divergent recruitment policies were followed in both the armies. The Indians broadened their armys recruitment base, officially declaring that recruitment was open to all Indian nationals.58 Thus the post 1947 Indian Army drifted away from being the pre 1939 Punjabised army. In Pakistan, Mr Jinnah the politician-statesmen who created Pakistan almost single-handedly, as the countrys first Head of State, adopted a sensible policy, to make the army a national army. Jinnah ordered immediate raising of two infantry battalions of Bengali Muslims in 1948 reversing the anti Bengali policy of the pre 1947 British colonial government.59 Jinnahs far sighted as well as just policy of bringing Bengalis in the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army was discontinued by General Ayub Khan who was the first Pakistani Muslim

C in C of the Pakistan Army and became the Army Chief in January 1951. Ayub although allegedly guilty of tactical timidity in the WW Two in Burma60 had a low opinion61 about the Bengalis and discontinued the expansion of the East Bengal Infantry Regiment from 1951 to 1966. Thus by 1966 the Pakistan Army was a predominantly West Pakistani (Punjabi dominated) army. In addition the vast bulk of it except one infantry division was stationed in West Pakistan in line with the strategic concept evolved in Ayubs time that the defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. Thus the Martial Races Theory was carried on till 1971 and in 1971 the vast bulk of West Pakistanis really felt that they were a martial race. This superiority complex played a major part in the wishful thinking in the Pakistani High Command that somehow the Indians would not invade East Pakistan in strength or even if they did so, the troops of this martial race (which was subdued by an 8 % Sikh minority from 1799 to 1849, till it was liberated by the English East India Company!) would frustrate the Indian Army, despite all the tangible numerical and material Pakistani inferiority. Foreign Secretary Sultan Khans memoirs are full of the existence of this irrational belief in the Pakistani High Command. Whatever the case at least the 1971 War proved that the real reason for the Indian Armys martial fervour or relatively better performance was the British factor, keeping in mind the net total available resources of British Empire or its allies in the two world wars.

New Raisings 1966-1971 and the armys operational plans

New raisings as discussed earlier were done right from 1965-66 onwards. The Pakistani high command correctly assessed that lack of infantry played a major role in the failure of Pakistani armour to translate its convincing material and technical superiority into a major operational or strategic success. New raisings became more essential since US military aid, which had enabled Pakistan Army to function relatively more effectively as compared to the Indians, was no longer available because of the US ban on arms exports to both India and Pakistan.

EXISTING DIVISIONS AND NEW RAISINGS FROM 1965 TO DECEMBER 197162 SER 1965 REMARKS 1966 REMARKS 1968 REMARKS

NO Peshawar

1968 7 DIV Part of 2 Corps.

1971 Reserve Division to Support 1 Armd Div Operations in Bahawalnagar area. Defence of Shakargarh Bulge. Under 1 Corps Defence of Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Part of 4 Corps

8 DIV 10 DIV

Sialkot. Corps

Part of 1 Corps

3 4

Lahore 1 Corps

Part of 4 Corps. Part of 4 Corps.

11 DIV

Ditto Headquarter s In Murree East Pakistan

12 DIV 14 DIV 15 DIV

Defence of Azad Kashmir Defence of East Pakistan Defence of Sialkot Sector.Under 1 Corps Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Multan. Under 2 Corps. Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Kharian. Under 1 Corps. Airlifted to E.Pak in March 1971 Ditto

6 7

Sialkot

Part of 1 Corps. 1 Part of 2 Corps. Part of 1 Corps. Reserve Div. Raising 9 completed DIV at Kharian by 1968. 16 Reserve DIV Div. Quetta. Raising

1 Multan ARM Corps D DIV 6 Kharian 1 ARM Corps D DIV

10

11

12

complete by 1968. Kharian. Raising 17 complete by DIV 1968. Reserve Division

To support 6 Armoured Division operations Raised at Hyderabad in June-July 1971 for defence of 560 miles area from Rahimyar Khan to Rann of Katch. Raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 for Chhamb-Dewa Sector previously in area of 12 Div. Raised in December 1971.Reserve Division of 2 Corps later split between Shakargarh Bulge and Sindh in the war. Raised in Dec- 71 Jan72.

13

18 DIV

14

23 DIV

15

33 DIV

16

37 DIV

The table of raisings above is self-explanatory. The most important organisational changes which occurred in the army till the 1971 war were as following. Firstly the army was organised into three corps i.e the 1 Corps, 2 Corps and 4 Corps and 12 18 and 23 Divisions. The 1 corps headquarter was designated to command four divisions i.e 8, 15, 17 InfantryDivisions and 6 Armoured Division63. 15 and 8 Infantry Divisions were responsible for defence of Sialkot Sector and the Shakargarh Bulge respectively while 17 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division were the strike force of the corps and also part of Pakistan Armys strategic reserves. In addition the 1 Corps also had an independent armoured brigade (8Armoured Brigade). 4 Corps consisting of 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, 105 Independent Infantry Brigade and 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade was responsible for the area between Ravi River and Bahawalpur. The 2 Corps with its headquarters at Multan was a strategic reserve corps. This corps consisted of the 1st Armoured Division (Multan), 7 Infantry Division and

later 33 Infantry Division. Three infantry divisions i.e the 12, 23 and 18 Infantry Divisions were directly under GHQ and responsible for defence of Azad Kashmir, Chhamb-Dewa Sector and Sind-Rahimyar Khan respectively.

Tangibles and Intangibles - The Pakistan and Indian Armys military worth by January 1971
By January 1971 the Pakistan Army was a reasonable military machine. Its main battle tank was the Chinese T-59 which was almost as good as any Indian tank.Its strategic reserves had the potential to deter any Indian aggressive military move. It was on its way to becoming a really national army since Yahyas announcement of 1969 to allow recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms. Organisationally the command was coherently and logically distributed in corps and divisions and the organisational imbalances of 1965 had been totally removed. Yahya Khan had not failed as the C in C. The Indian Army was numerically larger but the advantage was not overwhelming since the Indian Army was divided between the Chinese Border West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Technically the Indians had relatively better Soviet tanks but numerically the Pakistani armour was larger than Indian armour and possessed more higher organisational flexibility by virtue of having two full fledged armoured divisions as against one Indian armoured division. Later events of 1971 clouded our perception and we in Pakistan tend to view things as entirely simple for the Indian military planners. The Indian military dilemma was a possible three front war with the Indian Army divided between West Pakistan East Pakistan and the Indo Chinese border. The Pakistani defence problem was a two front war with its army divided into two parts i.e one defending the East Pakistan and the major part defending West Pakistan. The Pakistani planners had evolved a clear-cut strategy to overcome this dilemma. The Indian strategy as it was later applied in 1971 war was based on a choice of time which reduced the likely threats that it faced from three to two since the December snow effectively nullified chances of Chinese intervention and enabled release of Indian Mountain Divisions earmarked for the Chinese Border to participate in a war against Pakistan. Even then the final Indian plan was a gamble and would have failed if Pakistan had launched a pre-emptive attack in October 1971. The C in C Indian Western Command admitted this fact. General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the

consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us.64 There were however major shortcomings in both the armies at the higher leadership level. These pertained to the "Intangible aspects of military leadership". The mercenary origins of the pre 1947 Indian Army had resulted in the creation of an orders oriented machine! This was true for both Indian and Pakistani Armies. These shortcomings had their origin in the pre 1947 British era and were common with the post 1947 Indian Army. The Indian Armys military worth was retarded and downgraded because of a civilian leadership which viewed the army as a reactionary entity consisting of mercenaries who had collaborated with the British rulers. This attitude was revised once India suffered serious loss of prestige in the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962. However changes in military spirit of an army occur very slowly and by 1971 Indian Army was still trying to recover from many teething problems. The Pakistan Army in 1947 had consisted of relatively talented as well as spirited officers. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951 had however started a witch-hunt and many dynamic officers were removed or sidelined. This conspiracy against originality and boldness had intensified when Ayub Khan started manipulating extensions from politicians and the army was reduced to a personal fiefdom of Ayub during the period 1951-1969! In the process the Pakistan Army lost the services of many more experienced officers simply because they were sidelined through political supersession or were retired. The gap between the two Indo Pak armies in quality of experience may be gauged from the fact that the first Indian C in C was eight years senior to Ayub in service and the course mate of Musa, the second Muslim C in C of the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became the Indian C in C eleven years after Musa! This may have worked positively for the Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with an independent outlook! Musa on the other hand as Gul Hassans memoirs revealed lacked independent judgement dynamism or talent! The Pakistan army during the period 1951-71 became a highly orders oriented machine! Smart on the drill square, tactically sound but strategically barren and lacking in operational vision! One whose first Pakistani C in C was more interested in political intrigue and industrial ventures than in the basics of higher military organisation or operational strategy! The reader must bear in mind that the only major difference despite all other differences between the Indian and Pakistan Armies was that the Indian Army was numerically larger than the Pakistan Army was. In quality of higher military leadership both the armies by virtue of being chips of one pre 1947 block were little different from each other! Both the Indian and Pakistan Armies of 1971 were like the Austro-Hungarian

armies of 1809. They consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but were severely handicapped since rapid expansion since the SinoIndian war of 1962 and since the 1965 war. Having more corps and division despite being impressive on paper had not made the Indian or Pakistani military machine really effective because of poor training at divisional and brigade level. Both numerically larger than they were in 1965, but were organisationally ineffective beyond battalion level, having dashing young leaders but tactically and operationally inept brigade divisional and corps commanders from the older pre 1947 commissioned generation whom were initially supposed not to go beyond company level, had the transfer of power not taken place in 1947. The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war was a newly raised formation whose corps commander and armoured divisional commanders were about to retire in 1965 when war broke out. The Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men who had experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two and did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to the failures in achieving a decisive armour breakthrough in both sides. It was a failure of command as well as staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life. It was this British system in which every senior commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to the lack of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level. They were trained that way and there behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this context. Yahya was not a superman who could clean up the Pakistani political system and reform Pakistan Army within an year or two! He started the job of reorganising and reforming the Pakistan Army but had to leave it half way once he was forced to clean up the political mess in 1969. He made an admirable attempt to clean the political garbage which had accumulated since 1948 but was over taken by the tide of history which in 1971 was too powerful to be manipulated by any single man! The Indian Army of 1971 was much larger than the Indian Army of 1965! It was many times superior strategically and operationally to the

1965 Indian Army in terms of material strength, technological strength and numerical strength. The Pakistani defence problem was far more complex in 1971 than in 1965. Even in terms of foreign policy Pakistan had just been ditched by one superpower in 1965. The situation in 1971 was far more worse since India had been adopted by another superpower which, unlike the Naive half hearted, American Village maiden, was resolutely poised to go with India through thick and thin! Yahya made unique and brilliant moves to bring the USA and China together and vainly hoped that the Americans would help him! Unfortunately the US betrayed a country which had been loyally served US interests since 1954! Foreign Secretary Sultan Khans memoirs recognise Yahyas contributions and dismiss many myths about Yahya having gone out of his way to annoy the Soviets. This aspect is however beyond the scope of this article. CONCLUSION The Pakistan Army and Yahya inherited a complex historical problem, which had many fathers, at least half of whom were civilians and politicians! The Bengali alienation started from 1948 over the language question, was increased through Liaquats political intrigues to sideline Suharwardy and delay constitution making and thus holding elections which held a threat of a Bengali prime minister challenging the Hindustani-Punjabi dominance of Muslim politics! The first sin was committed once Suharwardy was sidelined! This was followed by coercion and intrigue to force parity on the Bengalis! They even accepted this unjust formula in 1956! Ask the Punjabis today to agree to a 50% parity as against all three provinces and then evaluate the generosity and magnanimity of the Bengalis! The death verdict of Pakistans unity came in 1958 when Ayub took over and allied with the West Pakistan civil-military-feudal-industrialist clique to sideline the Bengalis for eternity from the corridors of power! Familiar names , and a familiar combination constituted the ruling clique! A Punjabi financial wizard, one Dawood, some generals, some civil servants, some Hindustani specialists, one old fox who knew how to twist the law, then young, and some younger whiz kids constituted the ruling clique! They took Pakistan back to 1864 or even 1804! Local bodies, two huge provinces like the Bengal and Bombay Presidency etc! The seeds of the division were laid between 1958 and 1969! Yahya Khan whatever his faults was a greater man than Liaquat or Ayub! He held the first ever general elections based on adult franchise! Something that the so called Quaid e Millat had failed to hold for four long years, not withstanding all hollow rhetoric by his admirers that he was going to make a great announcement on 16 October 1951, the original D-Day in 1999 too! Yahya restored provincial autonomy, brought the Bengalis in the army, and reorganised the army! He did everything that was right

but it was too late! He was fighting against the tide of history! The Pakistan Army was tossed into a volcano whose architect enjoyed total power for eleven years and retired peacefully to enjoy his hard earned wealth. Ayubs son has remained in the corridors of power in one form or another and is still a running horse! Yahya Khan is much criticised for problems with which he had nothing to do! For having done a job which Liaquat should have done in 1950! The Pakistan Army was a relatively good fighting machine in 1971! Great reforms were made in organisation, education and training! It was recovering from the curse of one-man rule! The cyclone of 1970 in words of an Indian general destroyed everything! Yes there was a far more dangerous intangible and invisible cyclone that had been building up since 1948! This cyclone had four great fathers! Yahya Khan was not one of these four great men! The "Martial Races Theory" that played a major role in Pakistani overconfidence in 1971 before actual operations had many fathers and dated from British times.These British officers had in 1930s described Jews as non martial! Compare the four Arab-Israeli wars with this attitude! The military action in 1971 was widely hailed in West Pakistan! Yet in December 1971 only Yahya was blamed! Yahya was not the architect of the problems that destroyed the united Pakistan of 1971! He paid for the sins of all that ruled Pakistan from 1947 to 1969! He could do little more than what a midwife can do in birth of a child as far as the childs genetic codes are concerned! The failure of 1971 was not an individuals failure but failure of a system with flawed constitutional geographic philosophic and military organisational and conceptual foundations! I find nothing better to repeat once again the saying that Success surely has many fathers and failure is an orphan! We must however not forget that the failure of 1971 had roots that go back to 150 years of history! References and Explanatory Notes
1Page-258 & 259- Pakistans Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973--Fazal I Muqeem was a sycophant, but a clever one in the sense that once he wrote his first book "The Story of the Pakistan Army", he was in the run for promotion and naturally had to play the sycophant which most men who rise to higher positions do! In 1973 Fazal was a retired man and under no external motivation to please Ayub! Any dispassionate reader can gauge Fazals calibre as a writer from reading both his books. It was certainly much higher than Shaukat Riza whose three books on the Pakistan Army in some ways are harder to decipher than the Dead Sea Scrolls! 2Page-125- The Military in Pakistan-Image and Reality Brigadier A.R Siddiqi (Retired)-Vanguard-Lahore-1996. 3 Qizilbash is a Persian speaking tribe of Turkish origin employed as mercenary soldiers by Safavid kings of Iran and by Nadir Shah who himself was a Turk but not a Shia unlike the Qizilbashes. Once Ahmad Shah Abdali became the first king of

Afghanistan after its independence many Qizilbashes entered his service and were based in Kandahr and later Kabul. Many Qizilbash nobles were posted in Peshawar as Nadir Shahs officials once Nadir Shah invaded India in 1739. In addition many Qizilbashes were granted estates by Ahmad Shah Abdali and some came and settled in Lahore after the First Afghan War. The Qizilbash were Shia by sect and Persian speaking. Yahya Khan was from the Peshawar branch of Qizilbashes. Those living in Peshawar identified themselves as Pathans and spoke Pashto as a second language but were distinct from Pathans as an ethnic group. Yahyas father was from the Indian Police Service and served in various appointments as a police officer during the British Raj. Yahyas brother was also in the Police Service of Pakistan and later served as Director Intelligence Bureau. 4 Page-122- The Pakistan Army-War 1965 Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)Army Education Press-Rawalpindi-1984. 5 The Indians deny this assertion but this is something which is accepted in Pakistan as an irrevocable fact of history. It is of little military bearing since few officers make use of libraries anyway! This career profile may not be very accurate since I do not have access to official records. These details are based on various references to Yahyas military career. RefersPage-111- Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan KhanLieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan -Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993. Pages131 & 144- The Story of the Pakistan Army- Major General Fazal I Muqeem KhanOxford University Press-Lahore-1963. Pages-47 & 122- Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. Page-37 Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. 6Pages-192 & 194- Partners in Command- Joseph.T.Glatthaar- The Free Press-New York-1994. 7Page-238-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit. 8 Page-28-Fazal Muqeem-Crisis in Leadership--Op Cit. 9Page-154-The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan-Major General Sher Ali (Retired)-First Printed-1976-Third Edition-Syed Mobin Mahmud and CompanyLahore-1988. Page-122-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit. 10 Page-187-Jawan to GeneralGeneral Mohammad Musa- East and West Publishing Company-Karachi-1984. 11The Punjabis as an ethnic community were the largest community in the officer corps of the pre 1947 Indian Army. No exact statistics exist but by and large the Sikh/Hindus of Punjab were the largest group in the officer community followed by Punjabi Muslims survey of Indian officer cadets done in 1954-56 showed that majority of the officer cadets were from Indian Punjab or from Delhi which was a Punjabi majority city (Indian Parliament Estimates Committee-1956-57-Sixty Third ReportMinistry of Defence Training Institutes-New Delhi-Lok Sabha Secretariat-AppendixSeven--Quoted by Stephen Cohen-Page-183-The Indian Army-Stephen.P.CohenOxford University Press-New Delhi-1991) after 1947 The Punjabi Muslims were however denied the top slots in the army during the period 1947-72, Ayub being a Hindko speaking Pathan, Musa being a Persian speaking Mongol-Hazara and Yahya being a Persian speaking Qizilbash. Tikka was the first Punjabi chief of the army.In my course of stay in the army I had various discussions with old officers and almost all agreed that there were groupings in most units on parochial lines which were mostly Punjabi and Pathan groups. The Punjabis of areas north of Chenab river

tended to be more clannish with stress on district or sub regional groupings like Sargodha, Chakwal, Pindi, Attock Khushab etc. The Punjabis of areas south of Chenab river which were more economically prosperous and more educationally advanced were by and large not parochial having acquired the big city or urban mentality. These tended to look down upon groupings based on caste and district lines and operated more on relations based on personal rapport than kinship on village and district basis. There was definitely a strong feeling in Punjabi officers (something which was most natural) of the pre 1971 era that the army was Pathan dominated.Both Ayub and Yahya although not Pashto speaking were viewed as Pathans by Punjabi officers. Musa was viewed as a rubber stamp and as a mere shadow of Ayub. The Hindustani Muslims the third largest but relatively better educated group (although not distinguished for any unique operational talent) were not united because they were mostly from urban backgrounds and had like the Punjabis from big cities south of Chenab the selfish or self centred big city mentality. Thus as individuals the Hindustani Muslims like the urban Punjabis did well but were not parochial like the Pathans or the Punjabis from north of Chenab river. They were viewed as politically more reliable by virtue of being an ethnic minority but were sidelined from higher ranks in most cases. The most glaring of all was the case of Major General Abrar Hussain who was not promoted despite outstanding war performance at Chawinda.Sahibzada Yaqub who later refused to agree to military action in East Pakistan was also a Hindustani Muslim. Yahyas circle was not based on ethnicity on the principles of companionship. Thus Peerzada was from Bombay, while Umar and Hameed were Punjabis. Bilgrami another close associate was Hindustani. Lieutenant General Chishti described Yahyas attitude towards selecting officers for higher command ranks the following words; Do you see this. I told you, we do not need educated people in the Army (Quoted by Lieut. Gen. F.A Chishti- Betrayals of Another Kind-Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chishti-Asia Publishing House-London-1989). It is not possible to cross check Chishtis statement and it may be an exaggeration.Yahya however did promote some ex rankers and known Yes Men with extremely limited intellect like Tikka and Niazi. Chishti was not an ex ranker. His book on the Zia era is thought provoking and is compulsory reading for anyone who wishes to understand the post 1971 Pakistan Army. Chishti is one of the few generals from the Zia era who did not establish huge business empires like sons of the ex ISI Chief Akhtar Abdul Rahman etc. Chishtis book contains valuable insights into the sycophantic nature of Zia! 12Page-407 & 408- Ayub Khan-Pakistans First Military Ruler Altaf Gauhar-Sang IMeel Publications-Lahore-1993.Altaf Gauhar had the reputation of a Sycophant Par Excellence" while serving with Ayub as Information Secretary. Gauhar a civil servant who had joined the coveted "Civil Service of Pakistan" without sitting in the Indian Civil Service Competitive Examination, having initially been inducted as a Finance Officer, was the man principally responsible as Ayubs information man for destroying Pakistans free press. He was Yahyas rival and harboured political ambitions. His biography of Ayub is a defence of his benefactor and an attempt to portray Ayub in a favourable light and one who was led astray by evil minded advisors like Bhutto who was again Gauhars rival in sycophancy with Ayub, and was far more talented than Guahar. Gauhar was instrumental in the personality assassination campaign of Ayub against Bhutto when Bhutto fell out with Ayub. Later when Bhutto became Prime Minister, Gauhar was booked under law and prosecuted for having the copy of an old "Play Boy" Magazine and half a bottle of Whiskey! 13Page-115-Brigadier A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

14This was in 1991 while this scribe was serving in the army and a letter from GHQ was circulated to all headquarters for comments on the proposal of having the appointment of supreme commander of the armed forces. 15Page-239-India and the United States-Estranged Democracies Dennis KuxNational Defense University Press-Washington D.C-June 1993. 16Arms Trade Register-Arms Trade with Third World-Stockholm International Peace Research Institute- (SIPRI)-1975 and Page-120-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. 17Page-148-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit. It may be noted that during the 1965 war and immediately after cease fire two infantry battalions were raised and added to each existing infantry division. In addition soon after the war one infantry division and two independent infantry brigades wee raised. (Refers-Page-147-Ibid). A new corps headquarter i.e. 4 Corps Headquarters at Lahore was also raised 18Till 1965 East Pakistan was defended by a two brigade infantry division known as 14 Infantry Division. This division had no tank regiment. 19Page-106-Fazal Muqeem-Ibid. Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan was born in 1920 and commissioned in 1940 he served in the Middle East Theatre in WW Two where he saw action in North Africa and became a German/Italian prisoner of war like Sahibzada Yaqub Tikka and Yahya (who later successfully escaped) and later commanded 6 Lancers and 11 Cavalry. He graduated from Command and Staff College Quetta in 1949 and Ecole Superieure de Guerre, Paris and Imperial Defence College London later. Appointed the Vice-Chief of General Staff in 1958, Yaqub was at Staff College Quetta when the 1965 War started. He was sent to Headquarter 1 Corps in order to supply the Headquarters with badly needed Grey matter and was appointed the Deputy Corps Commander of 1 Corps. He later commanded the 1st Armoured Division and later appointed Corps Commander and Commander Eastern Command, from where he was sacked by Yahya in March 1971 following Yaqubs refusal to carry out a military action against the population of East Bengal. Yaqub was later appointed as an ambassador of Pakistan to France was in February 1972 and to the USA in December 1973. He later served as Ambassador to the USSR in 1979-1980 and later as Foreign ministers during the Zia regime from 1980 to 1985. Yaqub was a Hindustani Pathan from Rohailkhand. His ancestors were Yusufzai Pathans, from the Kabul river valley of present NWF Province of Pakistan and had settled in Rohailkhand in modern UP in the 18th century. Yaqub was a fourth generation aristocrat from a family with considerable landed wealth. He was serving in Viceroys Bodyguard at the time of partition and later served with Mr. Jinnah as the first Pakistani Muslim Commandant of the Governor Generals Body guard. The unit is now known as Presidents bodyguard and is now commanded by a lieutenant colonel. 20Ibid. 21Ismail was not as guilty as his corps commander i.e. Lieutenant General Bakhtiar Rana, but was penalised, and sacked. Ismail was sacked because of the Jassar Bridge crisis and replaced by Major General Tikka Khan as General Officer Commanding 15 Division on the afternoon of 8th September 1965. (Refers-Page-153-Shaukat Riza1965-Op Cit). Brigadier Sardar Ismail Khan was an Army Service Corps Officer and should not have been placed as an infantry division commander in the first place .It is a tribute to General Musas intellect that a non fighting arm officer from the services was acting divisional commander of one of the most crucial divisions of the Pakistan Army!

22Many were promoted despite known military incompetence in the 1965 war at brigade level. These included one Brigadier Bashir. Bashir was commanding the 5 Armoured Brigade of the 1st Armoured Division in Khem Karan area in the 1965 War, and was responsible for its poor handling on 7th 8th and 9th September. Gul a seasoned armour officer squarely condemned Bashir for inefficiency and inaction as commander 5 Armoured Brigade. Gul described Bashirs conduct as that of one who had "drifted into stupour", one who was not in command of his faculties, and one who did not prod his staff into action! (Refers-Page-214-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit). Gul highlighted the deficiencies in Bashir and expressed wonder as to why a career officer who had served as an instructor at the command and Staff College performed so poorly! (See Page-210-Ibid). Bashir was a Kaimkhani Rajput from Rajhastan and had attended the Army War Course in 1964. (Page-35-- National Defence CollegeRawalpindi-Alumni DirectoryResearch Cell-National Defence College-RawalpindiMay 1992) It appeared that Bashir had a good rapport with Yahya and Hamid and survived the Khem Karan fiasco. He became a major general and commanded the 6th Armoured Division, the newly raised 23 Division and the newly raised 37 Division. Bashir was retired in 1972 by Tikka since he was perceived as one close to Yahya. He became a Minister in the Zia era. Lieutenant General Yusuf presently serving in the GHQ is a relation of Bashir. 23Page-395- The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971 Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1994. 24Page-203-Shaukat Riza-1965 War Op Cit. 25Pages-116 & 117-Brig A .R Siddiqi-Op Cit. 26Page-67-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired) Wajid Alis Private Limited-Lahore-Services Book Club-1990. This was the last book in Shaukat Rizas trilogy. The book is poorly written but extremely valuable in terms of basic facts about organisation, order of battle, and names of commanders etc. It has occasional flashes of insight, which came to Shaukat Riza, and which escaped the simpleton and pedantic although extremely narrow scrutiny of the pedants in the Military Intelligence Directorate, though relatively infrequently. The readers may note that all articles published in the army journals are vetted in some manner by the Military Intelligence Directorate. The book is not reliable in terms of battle accounts, has extremely poor battle maps and does not even give the total casualties of the army. However, due allowance must be given to the author who was not in the prime of his health and was forced to write the book according to the GHQs myopic and petty requirements. 27 Page-66-Ibid. 28 This is the standard practice in units, headquarter and schools of instruction. The clerical staffs are such experts that they bring a Solomons Solution based on an old letter written in a similar situation, as DFA (Draft for Approval) and the concerned officer signs it with minor alterations! I am sure that the Indians must be operating similarly! 29Page-67-Shaukat Riza-1966-1971-Op Cit. 30Page-111-Fazal Muqeem Khan-Op Cit.

31Page-121-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. 32The East wingers viewed everyone from the West Wing as a Punjabi. Punjabi was more of a term to describe all non-East Pakistanis or to be more precise all nonBengalis. It may be noted that Ayub who ruled the country from 1958-1969 was not a Punjabi, nor was Yahya, nor Bhutto, who was later accused by many to be the principal culprit in 1971 of creating the political crisis which finally led to the March 1971 military crackdown in East Pakistan and finally the 1971 war. 33See Page-136- Sher Ali Op Cit, for the development of the strategy "defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan". In 1963 the Bengali representation in the army was just 7.4% in the rank and file and 5.0% in the officer corps. (Refers-Government of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan,Debates,March 8, 1963 as reported on pages-30 & 31- Pakistan Observer- Dacca-Issue dated 27 June 1964. 34The One Unit was an absurd administrative arrangement legalised in the 1956 constitution and resented by the smaller provinces of West Pakistan. One Unit meant the concentration of the previously four provinces, states and territories into one huge monster of a province known as West Pakistan disregarded the huge differences between the old provinces/territories/states in terms of ethnicity language social and cultural differences and distribution of resources. The One Unit was viewed as an instrument of imposing Punjabi domination on the population wise old smaller provinces/states/regions/commissionerates of Sind Baluchistan NWFP Bahawlpur etc. 35Page-104-Pakistan-The Enigma of Political Development Lawrence Ziring William Dawson and Sons Kent England1980. 36Page-9- Witness to Surrender Siddiq SalikFirst Published1977Third Impression-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1998. 37Siddiq Salik has dealt with the issue in considerable detail and has described Yahyas final compromise decision of, mixing Bengalis with West Pakistani troops in existing infantry battalions and also raising more purely Bengali battalions of the East Bengal Regiment, as the decision of an indecisive commander. Salik says that Yahya ordered raising of two more battalions (Refers Pages-9 & 10-Siddiq Salik-Op Cit) but Shaukat Riza states that Yahya ordered raising of three more battalions (Refers Page79-Shaukat Riza-1966-1971-Op Cit). This as per Shaukat Riza happened "some time in 1970" (all praise to staff officers who assisted Shaukat in terms of preciseness of simple facts like dates!!!!!). (Refers-Ibid.). 38The reader must note that Shaukat and Siddiq Salik criticised Yahyas decision to raise more pure Bengali units with the benefit of hindsight; i.e. Salik doing it eight years after the war and Shaukat leisurely doing so some twenty years later. I remember as a school student in the period 1969-70 in Quetta where my father was a grade two staff officer of operations in the 16 Division in Quetta, that even schoolchildren (most of them being sons of army officers, Quetta being a very large garrison town) used to joke about Bengalis, bragging that one Punjabi/Pathan was equal to ten Bengalis! This was common thinking at that time and what was later branded as Yahyas blunder, much later after the 1971 fiasco, was an indisputable assertion believed as a common fact in 1970 ! The foreign reader may note that Bengalis were despised as a non martial race from the British times . For Sir Syed Ahmad Khans anti Bengali views see Page-308-Aligarhs First Generation David Lelyveld- Oxford University Press-New Delhi-1978 . For I.H Qureshis views see Page-

28-Ethnicity and politics in Pakistan-Dr Feroz Ahmad-Oxford University Press-Karachi1999. For Ayubs remarks see Page-187-Friends not Masters- Ayub Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1967. 39See Chapter One-Pages-31 to 62- A Laymans Guide to Psychiatry and PsychoanalysisEric Berne-Penguin Books-England-Reprinted-1984. 40 Page-Story of My Struggle- Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik (Retired) Jang Publishers-Lahore-1990. 41Page-80-Shaukat Riza-1966-1971-Op Cit. 42Pages-108 & 109-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. 43Footnote on page-78-General Tajammul-Op Cit. 44The inhabitants of areas south of Ambala in Indian Punjab and till Indian Bihar inclusive in the east and till the southern boundaries of modern UP Province of India were referred to as Hindustanis. The bulk of these were Hindus but Muslim Ranghars (also in Hindustani category) and Hindustani Muslims of mostly Pathan descent were predominant in the pre 1857 Bengal Armys cavalry, which as an arm was far smaller than the much larger infantry. It was this Bengal Army (it had no Bengali soldiers, Bengal only being an administrative classification since the entire area from Burma till the Afghan border till 1858 was known as the Bengal Presidency) which had rebelled in 1857. In addition there were two smaller armies of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies known as the Madras and Bombay armies. These armies had stayed loyal. In 1895 all three armies were merged into one British Indian army. 45See chapter Five, Pakistan Army Till 1965Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired) Strategicus and Tacticus Lahore-17 August 1999. Also, page-7, Recruiting in India Before and during the War of 1914-1918 "-Army Headquarters, India, 1919. Also see page-Pages-51 & 58- India and World War One-S.D Pradhan Columbia University Press-1978. There are no exact figure about the ethnicity of fighting arms in 1914. Pradhan places the figure of ethnically Punjabi soldiers at about 50%. These were roughly assessed from the approximate statistics of 1096 infantry companies out of which 431 were wholly Punjabi and 221 were partly Punjabi, and 155 total squadrons of cavalry out of which 95.5 were wholly Punjabi and 47.5 were partly Punjabi. 46Lord Roberts a Bengal Artillery officer who served as C in C of the Madras Army from 1881 to 1885 and the Bengal Army (which meant that he was also C in C India) from 1885 to 1893 was one of the principal exponents of this theory. Roberts was in favour of recruiting the Punjabis and Pathans over Hindustanis who were the vast bulk of the Bengal Army at least as late as 1885 when Roberts became C in C of the Bengal Army. Roberts rationalised his anti Hindustani bias by theorising that the Hindustanis had degenerated as a result of the benefits of the British rule and : not enough adversity. Pages-441 & 442-Forty One Years in India-Volume Two Lord Roberts- William Bentley and Son-1897. Roberts policy of Punjabising the Indian Army was followed by his successors i.e Creagh Kitchener etc till WW One. 47Page314, A Matter of HonourPhilip Mason, Jonathan CapeLondon-1974. 48Page-11-The Indian Army and the Kings Enemies-1900-1947Charles Chenevix Trench-Printed in German-1988.

49Page-10-Report of the Special Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor General in Council to enquire into the Organisation and Expenditure of the Army in India Simla Government of India Printing Press-1879. 50Page-442-Philip Mason-Op Cit. The layman reader may note that the Pathans had wavered in terms of loyalty to the British once fighting against the Muslim Turks and Germans; with many Tribal area Pathan soldiers defecting to the German lines in France (Page-418 & 425-Ibid), the Turkish lines in Mesopotamia and Egypt/Palestine and some units which even attacked British officers like the 130 Baluchis (RefersPage- 427-Ibid) 51Page- 426-Ibid. 52Map on page-96Report of Indian Statutory Commission-Volume One-Calcutta Government of IndiaPublication Branch 1930. 53Page- 349- Fidelity and Honour Lieut Gen S.L Menezes Viking- Penguin Books India-New Delhi 1983. Pages 514 & 515 Philip Mason Op Cit. Page54Page-210- Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective Noor ul Haq National Institute of Historical and Cultural ResearchIslamabad-Pakistan1993. Major part of this book is based on the book mentioned in the next footnote, however relatively speaking the author has made a commendable effort in doing some very interesting research about the recruitment policies of the British. The book however suffers from the harm inflicted by Fazal Muqeem once he most fallaciously declared that there were no all-Muslim units in the British Indian Army. A statement which was erroneously accepted first by Cohen the American writer, and later by many more like Noor ul Haq (See page-8-Ibid) as the gospel truth. 55Appendix 16- Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organisation-1939-1945 S.N Prasad and Dharm Pal-Combined Inter Services Historical Section-India and Pakistan-1956. 56Appendix-13-Ibid. 57This myth has the status of being the gospel truth in Pakistan till to date, although the 1971 War and the relatively poor performance in 1965 war did slightly deflate this myth. After 1971 the armys stature was slightly reduced but soon Mr Bhutto gave the army a chance to improve its self-image by employment against the Baloch Muslims in the 1974-77 insurgency. The armys inflated image got a further boost when US aid started flowing inside Pakistan after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The Kargill Operation launched in 1999 was a manifestation of this myth. A major general, a certain Jamshed writing in Dawn Daily in May 2000 asserted that the Pakistani Muslims were more martial than the Indians were. Reference is made to Muslims being more martial than all infidels, but the ulterior meaning always is that the Punjabi or Pathan Muslims are more martial! 58Footnote-25-Page-187 Cohen/Indian Army Op Cit. 59Page-7, Brigadier A.R Siddiqi, Op Cit. Jinnah made a historic speech on the occasion of the raising of the 1st Battalion of the East Bengal Regiment. Jinnah thus said During the foreign regime you were classed as non martial. It is your own country, your own state now and it is up to you to prove your worth. (Refers-Ibid).

Ayub Khan who took over as C in C in 1951 reversed the policy of Mr Jinnah and no further battalion of the East Bengal Regiment was raised till 1966. Thus the Pakistan Army remained a Punjabi dominated army . The infantrys regiments i.e the largest Punjab regiment was more than 65% Punjabi, the remaining being Pathans or Ranghars (Rajput Muslims from East Punjab/Hariana and previously a sub category of Hindustani Muslims of the pre 1947 British Indian Army). The "Baluch" and "Frontier Force" Regiment also being West Pakistani with a 60% Punjabi majority in the "Baluch" regiment and a "Pathan-Punjabi " parity in the "Frontier Force" Regiment. The Azad Kashmir regiment of the post 1971 war, which was known before 1971 as the "Azad Kashmir Regimental Force" or the "AKRF" was also almost hundred percent Punjabi with the bulk of troops being from the Punjabi speaking districts of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir known as "Azad Kashmir" in Pakistan. The other arms like artillery engineers services etc were also Punjabi dominated. The armoured corps (tank corps) was roughly divided into one-third Ranghar Muslims and about 40% Punjabi Muslims and about 30% Pathans. However, some Bengalis were introduced as a small percentage in the 1960s. The recruitment to all infantry and tank regiments was governed by fixed class quotas of Muslim Sindhi and Baluchi or MS & B under which all Ranghars were enrolled, Punjabi Muslim or PM and Pathan Muslims or Ptn. Even promotion of the Other Ranks i.e all rank and file other than officers was governed by class quotas. Much later in 1980-81 the Sindh Regiment" of infantry was raised. The Sindh regiment was largely Punjabi but from 1989 the Sindhi Muslim proportion was increased and brought to figures varying battalion wise from 15 to 50%. The junior most infantry unit i.e the "NLI or Northern Light Infantry" was recruited from men of the Gilgit and Skardu Regions of the Federally Administered Northern Areas. The NLIs origins dates from the 1971 war and it became a regular battalion of infantry in 1998-99. It is almost wholly recruited from the "Northern Areas" which are inhabited by a racial/ethnic group totally different from the Punjabis or Pathans. 60 The reader may note that Ayub ordered destruction of all documents pertaining to his war performance in Burma after he became the Pakistan Army C in C in January 1951. Ayub was C in C till 1958 and President of Pakistan and supreme commander of the armed forces from 1958 till 1969 and thus it was no problem for him to remove all documents that proved his tactical timidity in Burma. However there are other sources that prove that Ayubs war record was not very illustrious in Burma. Joginder Singh who was his unit officer in the 1930s says that Ayub used to visit his house in 1944 and was not considered fit enough to command a battalion of his parent "Punjab Regiment". (Refers-Page-30-Behind the Scene-An Analysis of Indias Military Operations-1941-1971-Major General Joginder Singh (Retired)-Lancer International Delhi-1993). As per Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was an officer in WW One having been commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dera Dun in August 1936.Shaukat states that he met Major General Reese who at that time was commanding the Punjab Boundary Force in 1947. Reese had been Ayubs General Officer Commanding in Burma and in 1947 was assisting Reese again as Pakistan Army representative. Reese thus told Shaukat; Shaukat, whatever has come over your people, that against the fine soldier that India has selected to represent their country on the Boundary force, you have selected a man whom I had sent back from Burma when he showed tactical timidity, after the death of his commanding officer? He was therefore posted to the training command in India. How do you expect him to be of any assistance to you, and how could I learn to depend on his wisdom after what he had done in the past? (Refers- page-182-The Nation that lost its Soul-Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan-Jang Publishers-Lahore-1995. Sher Ali cited Messervy the first

The 1971 War An examination of the strategic concept of the 1971 war
The strategic concept of Pakistans defence i.e. Defence of East Pakistan lies in the West was formulated by Ayub Khan in late fifties and became the foundation of Pakistans defence policy. The concept envisaged having bulk of the army in the northern half of the West Wing and was based on the assumption that this arrangement would force India to keep bulk of its army/strategic reserves on its western front. We will analyse the various aspects of this concept as following:ALPHA :--The interconnection between the internal and external fronts. The basis of defence and stability of a country is absolute harmony and in consonance with the internal and external fronts. The internal front means morale of the civilian population their belief in the legitimacy and moral credibility of the political government belief in national aims and ideology of the country identification with the Armed Forces of the country as defenders of the countrys integrity etc etc. External front includes the countrys Armed Forces, and its foreign policy. A countrys defence is based on both and any weakness in one will weaken the other. This inter-relationship was ignored by Pakistans civilian and military leadership during the period 1947-71. The Muslim League was initially dominated by a partnership of refugees from Muslim minority provinces and later by a combination of Punjabi Muslims and civil-military bureaucrats. The Bengalis were alienated first because of the National language issue and later because of the constitutional representation issue. The Bengalis were initially patriotic and only demanded linguistic equality and had even agreed to political parity in 1956. This arrangement was seriously disturbed once Ayub usurped political power in 1958. Immediately after independence the founder of the nation Mr Jinnah made an attempt to broaden the armys recruitment base by ordering the raising of the East Bengal Regiment in 1948. This was a purely political decision taken by Mr Jinnah and implemented by a British C in C. By December 1948 two battalions of this unit composed of Bengali Muslims had been raised. This process was, however, discontinued once Ayub Khan an intellectually naive and tactically timid man became the Pakistan Armys C in C in 1951. Ayub was biased against having Bengalis in the army. During his tenure an unwritten policy of not raising any more

Bengali infantry battalions was followed. Ayub also retired the most promising Bengali officer Major General Majeed soon after taking over. The East Bengal Regiment was limited to two units and the expanded Pakistan Army remained a largely Punjabi dominated army. The irony of the whole affair was the fact that during this entire period all the army chiefs were non-Punjabi! In any case this was the first serious negation of the concept of having a national army. The Army was on the other hand firstly viewed as a Punjabi Army in the East Wing. Secondly and far more worse; it was viewed as an organisation designed primarily for the defence of the West Wing. The 1965 war further convinced the Bengalis that the army was not a national army but one designed to defend the West Wing. Thus from 1965 the rift between the internal and external fronts became much wider and the army was increasingly viewed as a foreign entity in the East Wing. The seeds of the events of 1971 were laid during the Ayub era. The Bengali populace viewed the federal government as a neo colonial government with its political base in the West Wing. The Army was increasingly viewed as a coercive instrument which was aimed at perpetuating the West Wings political and economic exploitation of the East Wing. By 1971 Pakistans Internal Front was seriously eroded and this in turn greatly weakened its external front. BRAVO:--The Military Capability to implement the strategic concept. Till 1962 the military balance between Pakistan and India was equal. The Sino-Indian conflict led to a major change in Indian defence policy and the Indians initiated a major programme of military expansion. In 1965 when the second Indo-Pak War took place; the relative Indo-Pak military capabilities were not as significant; and Pakistan was better placed at least in terms of strategic reserves. Stoppage of US military aid in 1965 brought a major change in the military sphere. Pakistan concluded an alternate defence arrangement with China but this was not sufficient to redress the imbalance. India on the other hand more rapidly expanded her Armed Forces and the gap between India and Pakistan in terms of infantry formations became far more wider than in 1965. Thus Indias overall military superiority over Pakistan increased from 1965 when it was about 20 to 35 in Infantry1 to 15 to 32 in 1971. The situation became far more worse in terms of strategic reserves since Pakistans armour potential was severely reduced because of stoppage of US aid. The Indians on the other hand almost completely replaced their ancient tank fleet of 1965 with brand new Vijayanta-Vickers or Russian supplied T-54/55 Tanks. In brief Pakistan did not possess the military capability to implement the strategic concept. CHARLIE:--Pakistans Internal Situation. The military regime of Yahya made an honest attempt to bring democracy in Pakistan and successfully held Pakistans first ever general elections based on Universal Suffrage since 1946. The country was already polarised because of the political legacy of the Ayub era and the East Wing was on the verge of

secession. This situation was not of Yahyas making but inherited by him. The situation demanded extraordinary political vision which was sadly missing in the countrys political as well as military leadership. Yahya although sincere at heart believed in the power of bayonet and thought that the East Wing could be kept within the federation through military action. The consequences of the surgical and brief military action were not fully grasped by Yahya and most of the West Wings politicians. In 1971 the country was divided and in no position to simultaneously deal with a civil war as well as an external war. This adverse internal situation nullified the whole concept. DELTA:--Lack of clarity in the Pakistani Military Higher Command about the Modus Operandi of executing the Strategic Concept. It may be noted that at least till 1968-69 the Pakistani GHQ was not clear about what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an Indian attack was mounted against East Pakistan2. In brief the Pakistani military leadership was confused and vague about the method of execution of the strategic concept; i.e. Defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan as late as 1968-69 at the time when defence plans were revised under General Yaqub Khans tenure as CGS. The concept was based on the assumption that Indian pressure/threat against East Pakistan could be dealt with by launching a major counter offensive taking the war inside Indian territory on the Western Front. This was a very generalized assumption and was interpreted by different officers in a different manner. General Gul Hasan who took over as CGS had more clear ideas about the implementation of this concept; but Guls views were not shared by the higher military leadership. One school of thought led by the CGS General Gul Hassan felt that this could be best done by simultaneous launching of preliminary operations and the counter offensive or that the reaction to any Indian invasion of East Pakistan should be an all out offensive by Pakistans Strike Corps i.e. the I Corps3. Yahya and his Chief of Staff General Hameed felt otherwise. They were of the view that preliminary (local level tactical attacks) operations by the holding formations should be launched first and when the preliminary objectives had been secured and the enemys attention had been diverted, the main counter offensive should be set in motion.4 Yahya and Hameed failed to realise that the only chance of salvation in 1971 when Pakistan was facing serious odds was in resorting to the boldest measures. Guls views were not accepted and Yahya and Hameed decided on a vague plan of first launch preliminary operations followed by counter offensive. The final strategic plan was vague and confusing on two counts; i.e. firstly it did not take into account the fact that the Indians enjoyed overwhelming superiority in the Eastern Theatre and possessed the potential of overrunning East Pakistan; secondly no time frame was fixed for launching the counter offensive of 1 Corps. It may be noted that Pakistan possessed relatively superior strategic reserves on in the

Western Theatre and its 1 Corps two strike divisions i.e. 6 Armoured Division and 17 Division had no offensive role. In brief once Pakistan embarked on war its strategic plans were confused and vague and its strike formation was not clear about when it was to be launched. This conceptual confusion doomed Pakistans strategic plans from the onset. The Validity of the Chinese Card The Chinese card on which so much hope was based had limited and seasonal validity! The Himalayan snow fall blocked the passes through which China could militarily influence the war! This seasonal factor was never incorporated as an important factor in the Pakistani strategic plan. If China was to be involved or Chinese friendship tested the ideal time to launch a pre-emptive attack on India was mid-June or mid-July or even September. Manekshaw the Indian Chief realised this and forced Indira to wait till December when the Himalayan snowfall had completely nullified chances of Chinese overland intervention and had freed Indias Mountain Divisions facing China for the attack on East Pakistan. The Fate of Pakistan Armys Strategic Plan in Actual Execution Foch defined two broad essentials of strategy i.e. Economy of Force and Preservation of Freedom of Manoeuvre. The Pakistani GHQ did well in case of the first and created a strong strategic reserve by new raisings and by economising sectors which were relatively less vulnerable. Its response to the East Pakistan insurgency in the first phase in March 1971 was praised even by Indian military writers as a remarkable performance on Pakistans part5. China aided Pakistan immensely and two new infantry divisions were raised to replace the 9 and 16 Divisions which were Pakistans strategic reserve till March 1971. In addition Pakistan raised 18 and 23 Division in June July 1971 and the 33 and 37 Division on the eve of the war. It may be noted that apart from this Pakistan had also raised two independent armoured brigades in 1970 by withdrawing the integral armoured regiments of some of its existing infantry divisions.6 All these measures gave the Pakistani commanders a significant strategic reserve to implement the official strategy of launching a counter offensive on the Western Front aimed at ensuring that the Indians could not concentrate their entire strength and over run East Pakistan. However, the Pakistani GHQ failed in the actual execution of this strategic plan. It was in preservation of Freedom of action that the Pakistani GHQ failed. This freedom of action could be preserved and denied on the other hand to the Indians only if Pakistan launched its counter offensive immediately after the war started. If this had been done it was possible that the Indians could have been forced to pull out some of their formations from the Eastern Theatre; thereby reducing the pressure on Pakistans Eastern Command. Since no such counter offensive was launched; India was allowed to invade and conquer East Pakistan at leisure. In the meantime two Pakistani armoured divisions; one independent armoured brigade (3 Armoured Brigade-Lahore) and three infantry

divisions (17, 7 and 37) remained uncommitted during the entire war. Once the war started the Indians were extremely cautious. Once they realised that Pakistan was irresolute; they became more audacious and stepped up their offensive operation. In Shakargarh for example the Indian 1 Corps Commander had initially earmarked five of his nine infantry brigades for a holding role. Once he realised by 7th September that Pakistan was not launching any major attack in his area of operations he switched three of his holding infantry brigades into an offensive role. This increased pressure, forced the Pakistani GHQ to pull out one armoured regiment from its 23 Division attack in Chamb and to commit half of its 33 Division (a part of the strategic reserve) to defence of Shakargarh. In addition the other half of 33 Division was committed to the defence of the Southern Sector once the 18 Division attack towards Loganewala failed. As a result of this increased pressure the Indians were unable to impose their will on the Pakistani GHQ in strategic terms. This was despite the fact that Pakistan had a relatively better offensive potential in the Western Theatre. Yahya Khan based the entire Pakistani plan on the wishful thought that the Indians would never invade East Pakistan. Once the Indians did so he became indecisive and kept on delaying the decision of launching Pakistans strategic reserve in order to reduce Indian pressure on the Eastern Command. He only decided to launch the counter offensive on 16 December when the Eastern Command had surrendered. Thus the strategic concept i.e. defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan; whatever it was worth in words of General K.M Arif was never tried or implemented. Chances of Success of Pakistani I Corps Offensive We will examine in brief the chances of success of the Pakistani 2 Corps offensive; in case it had been launched in brief. The Strike Force consisted of one armoured division (T-59/T-54/55 Tanks) and two infantry divisions (7 and 37 Division) which were based in area Arifwala-Pirowal-Burewala-Bahawalnagar. This strike corps was to launch the main attack inside Indian territory from general area Sadiq Ganj-Amruka-Minchinabad and thrust towards Bhatinda; thereafter, swinging north towards Ludhiana. The Indians were relatively well placed in this area and had their 1st Armoured Division in Muktsar area consisting of four armoured regiments (Vijayantas) and three mechanised infantry battalions. Apart from this they had two covering troop forces i.e. the Mike Force (T-54 and T-55) comprising one tank regiment and one tank regiment minus, one squadron in area in Ganganagar area. This force was tasked to threaten the flanks of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division in case it attacked India while the 1st Indian Armoured Division manouvred into action. In addition the Foxtrot Force (T-54/55) consisting of one tank regiment and another tank regiment less one squadron was already under command 67 Independent Brigade tasked with defence of Fazilka. The above mentioned dispositions meant that force wise the Indians were well

poised to defend the area where Pakistans main counteroffensive was to be launched. The result would surely have been a fierce clash of armour which may have led to a draw or one side inflicting relatively greater losses on the other without making much headway in the final reckoning. This means that the 1 Corps attack even if launched held no guarantee of success in terms of relieving the pressure on East Pakistan or in terms of capturing a strategic objective. There was, however, one guarantee of success for Pakistans 2 Corps too! This was in case Pakistan launched a pre-emptive attack on India in early October. This would have been a good option. Pakistan in any case had been condemned for human right violations and genocide and this allegation is levelled even today. Unfortunately its leadership remained obsessed with diplomatic niceties and hairsplitting and tried to play an all correct conduct game. Thus this golden chance was lost. Other Offensive Options Pakistan had other offensive options to relieve pressure on East Pakistan. These included employment of its northern strike corps i.e. the 1 Corps (6 Armoured Division and 17 Division) to launch a thrust in the far more vulnerable Indian belly between Pathankot and Chamb; thereby threatening the lifeline of four Indian divisions in Kashmir; forcing the Indians to switch their 1st Armoured Division north of Beas River. This was a far better option since an advance of 15 to 20 miles would have enabled Pakistan to sever the Indian line of communication. In the case of 2 Corps counter offensive the operation involved an advance of more than 60 miles in face of an Indian armoured division. In 1 Corps area the Indians had two armoured brigades as against one Pakistani Armoured Division and one independent armoured brigades. The Pakistani GHQ, however, made no plans for any offensive employment of 1 Corps, offensive employment and this formation was left unutilised throughout the war. Initially two of its armoured regiments were employed in the 23 Division attack in Chamb and after 10 December once, one of its armoured regiments reverted back to it; it was given no other task except to be prepared to launch a counterattack in Zafarwal. Pakistani Military Leaderships Dilemma. It became fashionable after the war to heap all the blame on Yahya and his cronies. Yahya, as a matter of fact was a far more capable chief than Musa. He inherited a situation which was of Ayubs making. Yahya did his best to remedy the serious military imbalances; raised new formations; improved plans where none as a matter of fact had existed. He was faced with a hostile neighbour having full support of USSR; while at the same time facing a civil war created because of ambition of two crafty politicians. The odds with which Yahya was faced were high and demanded the strategic vision of Moltke and the operational talent of a Rommel or Manstein. There were some Rommels like General Eftikhar but no Moltkes to give higher strategic direction. Yahya was initially dynamic but successively became more timid and cautious at a time when the

only salvation was in resorting to the boldest measures. Even the Indians praised Yahyas initial conduct. One author thus wrote: Nevertheless Yahya showed a good sense in taking decisions and his command decisions were generally well deliberated upon and sound. He had been thrown into a rotten situation, which had come into being the day Pakistan came into being with its two wings. His only hope lay in somehow getting round Mujeeb and getting him to see reason, he tried that... he had perhaps achieved a measure of success too... but the cyclone of 12/13 November destroyed everything... the elections gave the Bengalis an overwhelming majority. The Six Points would have meant a virtual dismemberment of Pakistan. This could not be permitted. So the only course open was to hold military rule and restore the law and order if necessary by force7. Kissinger in his White House Years has asserted that it was USAs intervention which saved West Pakistan from being overrun by India. This is a vague statement. It is doubtful whether India was willing to invade West Pakistan in force after the fall of East Pakistan. The answer to Pakistans dilemma was a bold attack and only a bold all out attack could have forced India to drop the idea of invading East Pakistan. Long ago Clausewitz well summed up the solution for states like Pakistan in 1971 when he said Offensive war, that is the taking advantage of the present moment, is always commanded when the future holds out a better prospect not to ourselves but to our adversary. In this case the future had better prospects for India and Pakistans only hope was an all out offensive posture. Clausewitz defined the solution in yet more detail in the following words Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages it will rather increase the disparity of forces-but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account8. Indian General Candeth who commanded the Indian Western Command made a very thought-provoking remark in his memoir of 1971 war which proves that Pakistans only chance lay in offensive action. Candeth thus wrote:- The most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack, during that period, the consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts during the war would have been spent in trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us.9 Conclusion Only a Napoleon or a Frederick could have saved Pakistan in 1971 from being divided and humiliated and cut to size! There were potential Napoleons and Fredericks in the Pakistan Army in 1947-48 but these

were systematically sidelined or weeded out from 1950 to 1958. A conspiracy against originality and boldness! Ironically the political situation that the Pakistan Army inherited was created once the West Pakistan Civil servants and the then army C in C had ganged up in the period 1951-58 to keep the much despised Bengali in his place! The civilians did well in creating the 1956 Constitution which solved all major political problems of Pakistan. The politicians were, however, never allowed to implement this constitution since its implementation through holding of a general elections in 1959 may have led to a East Bengali victory, thus seriously reducing the civil-military dominance of Pakistani politics. Thus martial law was imposed in 1958 to avoid a general election! Ironically the army finally saw the light of the day a bit too late once a martial law was imposed in 1969 to hold a general election ! The tide of history in these 11 years had become irreversible! Strategic insight could at best have averted total humiliation! But there was no strategic insight since Ayub Khan had ensured from 1950 to 1969 that no strategic insight should be groomed and cultivated!

Tank Ambush at Kushtia Squadron and Company Commander Dislocate a Corps Commander!
The tank battle of Kushtia is Greek to most in Pakistan. Ironically it was one of the most classic tank actions of 1971 war in which a vastly outnumbered tank infantry force of squadron company level inflicted such a punishment on the Indians that their corps commander lost his mental equilibrium and earmarked a whole division to deal with a Pakistani delaying force of squadron battalion strength. Civil War followed by a mixed Civil War and Conventional War further compounded by atrocities, confused real military competence with abnormal psychology and even genuine heroism or resolution in face of tremendous adversity was forgotten while atrocities were remembered! It is ironic that many purely military writers like Shaukat Riza and Fazal Muqeem Khan ignored this inspiring battle! Of all the people it was Siddiq Salik, more a journalist than a soldier who most precisely described the battle of Kushtia as "the first and last battle

that Brigadier Manzoor's brigade fought in the entire war1"! Siddiq, however, never knew the degree to which this battle influenced the higher commander's perceptions and actions! But then Siddiq was more of a civilian and cannot be blamed for this lapse once we see socalled military historians making the same error! I came to know of the significance of this thought-provoking battle only after I read some Indian military accounts! No tribute to the cause of military history in Pakistan, which likes the politicians, has hit the rock bottom! The Hamood Ur Rahman Commission found villains but ignored existence of heroes! It is again ironic that Hamood found villains not merely because they existed but because those who had ordered the inquiry wanted some villains to keep the men in Khaki in their place! Hamood thus unwittingly became the tool of politicians despite the fact that he was an illustrious judge! Pakistan's legal or political history with the exception of one decision of the Sindh High Court and one single resolute Sindhi Muslim Chief Justice is after all little more than the confinement of all who matter in petticoats, in terms of resolution and heroic defiance since 1954! Robes or any other dress in the symbolic form are an illusion! Petticoats, are the essence! Chief Justice Hamood ur Rahman like all his predecessors or followers was a rubber stamp, as far as the big flies were concerned, since laws as the truest saying in English language states are like cobwebs through which the greater flies brake through! Hamood's findings had no de facto value! Ironically on the other hand the men who were identified as villains and cowards by the Hamood Commission were promoted while many real heroes were sidelined or superseded! Thus while Tajammul, Saadullah and Sher ur Rahman were sidelined Jehanzeb Arbab, Rahim Khan, Rahimuddin Khan, Admiral Sharif and many more did extremely well after the 1971 War and are doing well to date!

ESSENTIAL FACTS Opposing Strengths 2 Indian Corps (a newly raised corps headquarters) was tasked with the reduction of the SouthWest Sector of East Pakistan. The Indian 2 Corps was vastly superior to Pakistan's 9 Division defending the Sector. It had two over sized infantry divisions (4 Mountain and 9 Infantry Division) and one independent infantry brigade (50 Independent Para Brigade). 4 Indian Mountain Division had three infantry brigades (7, 41 and 62) one of which (7 Brigade) was initially held back as corps reserve. In addition this division also had under command a tank squadron (45 Cavalry/PT-76), a Mechanised Infantry Company and an

additional medium artillery battery apart from its integral divisional artillery. 9 Indian Infantry Division had three infantry brigades (33, 35 and 42) and one tank regiment less one squadron (45 Cavalry/PT-76) and one tank squadron (63 Cavalry/T-55). Lieutenant General Raina the Indian Corps Commander had seen action in WW II in North Africa and Burma. Pakistan's 9 Infantry Division comprised two infantry brigades, 57 Brigade (Brigadier Manzoor) holding the northern half and 107 Brigade (Brigadier Hayat) holding the Central Approach i.e Jessore. An ad hoc brigade consisting of Para military forces of dubious military value was holding the southern approach (Khulna Sub-Sector). In addition there was the "Divisional Reserve" consisting of half battalion Recce and Support, one infantry battalion and a tank squadron of M-24 Chafee Light Tanks. The Pakistani 9 Division was commanded by Major General Ansari an artillery officer who proved in the war that he was an honest man and a devout Muslim, but did little in the realm of commanding his division or anything in terms of leading from the front! Opposing Plans The operational task assigned to the 2 Indian Corps was to capture Khulna, Jessore, Magura, secure ferry sites over Madhumati and finally either capture the Golaundu Ghat or to secure Paksay Bridge (Hardinge Bridge) over the Ganga, whatever ordered. 4 Mountain Division was tasked with the capture of Magura and securing of Ferry Sites over the Madhumati and subsequently secure Goalundu Ghat or Paksey Bridge. 9 Division was tasked to capture Jessore in the first phase and Khulna in the second phase. Pakistan's 9 Division had employed five regular infantry battalions to hold the five main approaches running from West to East in between the Ganges River with 57 Brigade in the north and 107 Brigade in the centre. We will not discuss the details of these dispositions since these are beyond the scope of this article. Summary of Operational Situation till Battle of Kushtia The Indians had been actively conducting military operations against the Pakistani 9 Division since mid-November 1971. The pace of these operations was, however, extremely conservative unimaginative and timid! Indian victory in terms of tangible superiority in quantum of forces was a forgone conclusion in this sector as in any other sector of East Pakistan! The reader may note that the ad hoc force at Khulna bolted towards Dacca around 4th/5th December without having been attacked! The Indian tactics were based on establishing roadblocks in the Pakistani brigades rear with forces of battalion, tank squadron/troops strength while vastly superior tank and infantry forces attacked frontally and contained and pinned down the Pakistani infantry brigades. Brigadier Manzoor the 57 Brigade Commander made the Indian task easier by assuming that they would attack Chuadanga and denuded all other approaches while concentrating most of his troops to defend Chuadanga! Manzoor in the process, wittingly or unwittingly offered the Indian commander a golden opportunity to compromise the operational integrity of the 9 Pakistani Infantry

Division. The Indians had logically assumed that the Pakistani brigades would withdraw eastwards and fight as a division. They did not know that both the Pakistani brigade commanders had decided to fight their private wars and had already decided to withdraw northeastwards and southeastwards! The next Indian move against Jhenida commencing from 4 December when the Indians established a tank infantry roadblock at a point halfway between road Chuadanga-Jhenida, thus came as a surprise to 57 Brigade which was effectively cut off from its parent formation i.e 9 Division. The 1971 war was over the 9 Division as a division from 4th December 1971! Its brigades continued fighting but they fought as brigades since the division commander had failed to goad and spur them into fighting as a division! The division commander who preferred sitting on his prayer mat2 rather than leave his headquarters and goad men like Brigadier Manzoor, remained plagued with inertia and inaction! There is not much to write about 9 Division's operational role after 4th December! 41 Brigade after its brilliant success advanced to Jhenida supported by tanks. Jhenida, thanks to Manzoor's Chuadanga blunder was almost defenceless and the Indians captured it after some limited fighting on 7th December 1971. Meanwhile, 62 Indian Brigade advanced towards Kaliganj which was defended by a very small ad hoc force under colonel staff 9 Division. Kaliganj was captured by morning of 7th December. 9 Division's story ends here. Its divisional headquarter withdrew to Faridpur while K.K Afridi's ad hoc force delayed the Indians over the Madhumati! The 2 Indian Corps which was commanded by as much of a windbag as the Pakistani divisional commander now finally released 7 Brigade less battalion to 4 Mountain Division on 8th December. The Indian Corps Commander, the readers may note, thought that 57 Brigade had withdrawn towards Faridpur along with Headquarter 9 Division.3 The 7th Brigade reached Jhenida during night 8th/9th December 1971 and was ordered to advance towards Kushtia on 9th December. For this purpose 7 Brigade was also assigned two tank troops of the 45th Cavalry. Tangibly everything was now excellent for the Indians . Battle of Kushtia 9 Division was assigned with a squadron of 29 Cavalry for the defence of Hardinge Bridge.4 This squadron was commanded by one Major Sher ur Rahman.5 At this stage 57 Brigade was in the process of withdrawing across the Hardinge Bridge to Nator in 16 Division area. Manzoor tasked Sher ur Rahman along with an infantry company commanded by Major Zahid (18 Punjab) to delay the Indian force which was reported by the para-miltary Razakars to be on the way to Kushtia. Sher ur Rahman, as I many years later heard first hand from many soldiers of 29 Cavalry who had fought with him at Kushtia was no Manzoor! He selected an ambush site along with Major Zahid the infantry company commander inside Kushtia. The main road passed across a high embankment at this site and there was some open face on both flanks while some trees and buildings provided

concealment and firing positions to Sher ur Rahman's two tank troops6 and Major Zahid's infantry company. The ground on both sides of the road was boggy limited manoeuvre options of Indian tanks leading the 7 Brigade advance. The Indian tanks (two troops) leading the advance reached the outskirts of Kushtia at 2 p.m. and deployed outside the towns built up area. As per the Indian armoured corps historian precisely at this point in time the Indian 2 Corps Commander Raina along with GOC 4 Mountain Division arrived in a helicopter and "chided the commanders on the spot for their unnecessary caution when there was no enemy who was, in any case, on the run. He told them not to waste time on battle procedure but press on with tanks because there was no requirement to lead with infantry through the town".7 The Indians commenced advance tanks leading and infantry very close behind. The first shot as per one 29 Cavalry veteran was fired once the sixth and the last Indian tank was in range and the infantry company (of 22 Rajput) was also within small arms range. The scene after this was one of total chaos. Most of the infantry company was gunned down within no time and as per Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu "within a few minutes the battalion (22 Rajput) ceased to exist as a fighting force" and "stragglers kept trickling away until the next day".8 The Indian tank corps historian states that "The first shot from a Chafee (29 Cavalry) split open the fifth tank down the line". Only one out of six tanks escaped the ambush. The battle was over! All that the Indian 7 Brigade Commander now did was to organise a defensive position with his second battalion behind a canal close to Kushtia. Gurcharan admitted and this was stated by many 29 Cavalry veterans that "Pakistani tanks made contact with the canal and engaged the defenders. At last light they blew up the canal bridge and withdrew to Paksay".9 57 Brigade was given the breather it needed to withdraw across the Ganges. Many years later I had the opportunity of hearing a first hand account of this withdrawal while under intense air attack from another direct participant Colonel Rathore from Engineers. Rathore was a very fine officer and a gentleman and when I heard him that he was staff officer with my father in 491 Brigade Group at Jaglot Farm. This was 8 years after the war i.e July 1979. Reaction of Indian Corps Commander The reactions of Indian 2 Corps Commander may be termed as typical reactions of any Indo-Pak subcontinental Corps commander! I will simply quote Indian military historians in describing this part of the battle! Gurcharan Singh gives the following picture. "The Corps Commander received the news of the mishap on return to his headquarter. He over-reacted and ordered 4 Mountain Division to halt its advance along the Faridpur axis and contain the enemy along Madhumati with one battalion. The rest of the division ( i.e some two infantry brigades) was to back track to Kushtia, capture and clear the Hardinge Bridge. Two tank troops of 45 Cavalry were ordered to move from 9 Division to make up its "A" Squadron in Kushtia. Kushtia was

bombed and strafed by the IAF on 10 and 11 December. Pakistanis had evacuated it during night 9-10 December. 4 Division concentrated outside the town by morning of 10 December. Elaborate plans were made for a divisional attack on 11 December, when the town was found clear".10 I am quoting Praval a more balanced historian since some Indians may find Gurcharan's more forthright criticism unpalatable! Praval states "Unfortunately Barar and Raina over reacted to the reverse. During the evening the former ordered 41 Brigade top move from Jhenida to Kushtia. Later during the night Raina told Barar to move the third brigade too also, leaving a battalion on the Madhumati.

Authors Father who served as GSO 2 Operations 16 Division East Pakistan from Mrch 1971 to October 1971 and as CI of 6 Engineer Battalion tasked to bridge Indian Gong Canal for the planned counteroffensive

Thus by evening of 10 December the whole division assembled in front of Kushtia"!11 Now compare the Indians with what Shaukat Riza! Shaukat merely states without naming Sher or Zahid that "Enemy 7 Mountain Brigade attacked the position and suffered serious casualties".12 Fazal Muqeem merely brushes the affair aside by stating that "the attack was repulsed and three tanks captured".13 Is this the way military history is written? Its not difficult to figure that Gurcharan Singh and Praval were fairer with Majors Zahid and Sher ur Rahman than Shaukat Riza and Fazal Muqeem Khan. This is the sub-continental psyche! Talent must never be recognised! A conspiracy against originality and boldness! Heroism died in 1858! At least as far as higher level leadership was concerned! ANALYSIS Technical and Numerical Inferiority Nullified by Superior Tactics and Resolute Leadership The battle of Kushtia proves that technical and numerical inferiority can be nullified by superior tactics and resolute leadership. Unfortunately while there were many Shers and Zahids there were no Lettow Vorbecks or Rommels commanding the Pakistani divisions or corps. There was one Rommel but he was on the western Front! Ask the troops who fought under him, not irresolute people who he kicked and abused in Chamb and you can find out . Lack of Higher Planning at Divisional Level which led to independent withdrawal by brigade commanders and failure of 9 Division to function as a credible operational entity The readers may note that the state of demoralisation and apathy in the 9 Division at higher level was such that no credible or concrete plan had been prepared for withdrawal of the division's two regular brigades in case of an Indian breakthrough which was most likely, keeping in view the immense disparity between the Indian and Pakistani forces! It appears that both the regular brigade commanders i.e the 57 and 107 Brigade Commanders had made up their mind to withdraw northeast and Southwest to the safety of Rajshahi north of Ganges in 16 Division area and Khulna in the south! Whatever the motives of the brigade commanders this action resulted in rendering the 9 Division into an operational non-entity soon after the commencement of actual war on 5th December 1971! One of the brigade commanders was thus later condemned in the Hamood Report for this unauthorised withdrawal! Even Fazal Muqeem 14 admitted this fact once he said "Headquarters 9 Division (Major General M.H Ansari) which had lost control earlier ...". Dislocation of Enemy Higher Commander's Military Equilibrium Two majors dislocated the enemy higher commanders mental equilibrium. What would have happened had there been some Sher ur Rahmans and Zahids in 9 Division Headquarter too. What would have happened had the Pakistani GHQ allocated a few more tanks for the Eastern Command earlier in 1971 or 1970! If the Indians could employ T-55/T-54 tanks why could not Pakistani T-59s have been employed there? And what did most of Pakistan's T-59s in 1971 war do in the 1971 War apart from

hiding in reserve forests or moving in trains! Quality of Higher Military Leadership The Pakistani 9 Division was commanded by Major General Ansari an artillery officer who proved in the war that he was a devout Muslim, but did little in the realm of commanding his division or anything in terms of leading from the front! Ansari sat on the prayer mat but did little else during the war! He was as good as any unit Pesh Imam of his division. His operational role was zero multiplied by zero in the war! Defenders of Ansari assert that he was a decent man, but there are so many decent men in this world, who don't command divisions in battle but perform other minor roles more commensurate with their temperament or genius! There was no military leadership at divisional level in the Pakistani 9 Division. This over ensured that the battle was relegated to the two infantry brigade commanders, one bold but not interested in fighting a divisional battle, while another who was most keen to hit the Paksey Bridge and become a part of the 16 Division! Brigadier Hayat took his own decisions, mission oriented but ones which compromised his divisions integrity withdrawing his brigade to Khulna, fighting an excellent brigade battle while also ensuring that the Indians were given an excellent gap to race forward towards Dacca in the middle! Brigadier Manzoor's performance was "hopeless" in words of a participant and his role in the flight of his brigade cannot be over exaggerated! A Battle of Offensive Defence or Clausewitzian Shield of Blows The battle was a classic application of Clausewitz's concept of offensive defence in which he described defence as a shield of arrows! A Case Study of Divisional Battle The battle of 9 Division in 1971 illustrates the barrenness at divisional level. The absence of the GOC as a decisive operational division makes at divisional level.

CONCLUSION

The South Western Sector of Eastern Command was not a really very decisive sector of the 1971 War. The significance of the "Tank Ambush at Kushtia" lies in the heavy odds involved and how certain military commanders at squadron company level through resolution ingenuity and sheer tenacity emerged at least tactically victorious against vastly superior forces. The true significance of the "Battle of Kushtia" lies in the fact that "ingenuity, resolution and a positive mental attitude could have enabled the Eastern Command to fight longer than it did"! That the seeds of the dramatic collapse of 16 December lay not in numerical inferiority alone but in phenomenal lack of military competence in the Eastern Command and those in the Military Operations Directorate in the Pakistani GHQ who insisted that the Eastern Command must conduct a rigid defensive strategy of holding every inch! This article does not aim at proving that East Pakistan could have been a Pakistani victory but only that a more imaginative higher strategy could have resulted in a less humiliating defeat than what actually happened! The failure in East Pakistan was not a political failure alone but a military failure at the highest level! Sher ur Rahman lives in the hearts of 29 Cavalry veterans as the ultimate war hero! This I discovered in the Rakhs of Qila Sobha Singh! In Pakistani military history he figures nowhere, since he was not from the trade union of generals! Wrong forever on the throne! Truth forever on the Scaffold! References 1Page-145-Witness to Surrender-Siddiq Salik-Oxford University PressPakistan-First Published in 1977-Third Impression-Oxford University Press-Pakistan -1998. 2Page-145-Siddiq Salik-Op Cit. 3Page-439-The Indian Armour-History of Indian Armoured Corps-19411971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi1993. 4Page-141-The Pakistan Army-1966-71-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Services Book Club-1990. 5 I first heard his name while talking with my squadron commander Captain Azam Niazi in October 1984 while serving in 29 Cavalry. I had

been attached with this unit since around 25th September (following another attachment period with 15 SP from 09 August 1984 to 25th September 1984) due to some disciplinary problem with my commanding officer in 11 Cavalry. Azam said that he joined the unit because he had been deeply impressed by Sher ur Rahman's exploits in 1971 War. The time spent with Azam was memorable and we made good use of it by hunting around the Degh Nala and the marshes around Qila Sobha Singh and Dhamtal. At that time, thanks to Durga Devi and Terry Tyrant seemed imminent and 8 Armoured Brigade was deployed close to the border. 6 Page-439-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Op Cit. I have relied on the Indian general's description in stating that the ambush force consisted of two tank troops! 7 Page-439-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 8 Page-439-Gurcharan Singh -Op Cit. 9 Page-441-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 10 Page-441-Ibid. 11Page-331-The Indian Army Since Independence-Major K.C PravalLancer Books-New Delhi-1992. 12 Page-142-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 13Page-179-Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973. 14 Page-179- Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.

THE BATTLE OF CHAMB

THESE MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN ENTIRELY ORIGINALLY AND ANY ONE WHO REPRODEUCES THEM MUST SEEK PRIOR PERMISSION.HOWEVER NOTHING GOOD IS EXPECTED FROM HOPELESS OFFICERS OF INDO PAK ARMIES WHOSE HALLMARKS ARE SYCOPHANCY BALL LIFTING HYPOCRISY AND INTRIGUE.
The Battle of Chamb 1971 The Battle of Chamb of 1971 stands out as the finest display of an offensive battle in the Indo-Pak operational scenario. Symbolically speaking it was this battle which sustained the morale of the army in West Pakistan and provided much needed credibility to sustain and preserve the armys image in the wake of the traumatic events of December 1971. The Indians justly described it as the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war. (refers page.488-the Indian armour history of the Indian Armoured Corps -1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi). It is ironic that Third World countries study Napoleon and Slim when they have great military commanders like Eftikhar, Akhtar and Abrar. The Battle of Chamb of 1971 was an epic feat of arms. Even today it stands out as one of the most instructive battles of all three Indo-Pak wars in terms of operational strategy, small unit actions, handling of armour and above all as a supreme example of the power of personality and leadership in war.Any student of the art of war who wishes to understand the Indo-Pak way of war will find the battle complete in terms of valuable insights and thought-provoking lessons connected with leadership, strategy and tactics. Above all the Battle of Chamb convincingly proves that the major part of pitfalls and drawbacks which inhibit many Third World armies are more connected with leadership morale and conceptual hangovers and have little connection with material factors like equipment or simple numerical inferiority or superiority.

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS THE BATTLE GROUND Chamb had become a household name in Pakistan in 1965, thanks to the famous Operation Grand Slam and General Akhtar Hussain Maliks lightning advance towards Akhnur. In 1965, however, it was a much easier place to enter since its importance had been realised by the Indians only shortly before the war started. Thus in 1965 Chamb was held only by an independent Infantry Brigade while in 1971 it was held by an Infantry Division which had been heavily fortifying and improving its defences since 1965, keeping in view the lightning Pakistani advance in this sector in 1965.The sector is bounded by the ceasefire line/international border in the west and south while a range of hills constitutes its northern portion running roughly in an east west line. Some ridges, however, jut downwards from this range of hills and run along a north south alignment, most prominent of these being the Phagla Sakrana Bridge which perpendicularly cuts the main road/approach to Chamb from west and provides good defensive positions like Point 994 etc. Average relative height of Phagla Sakrana Ridge was 60 to 70 feet and it ran south till a place called Jhanda. The most prominent and tactically most important ground in the entire sector were two ridges known as Mandiala North and South. These two ridges dominated Chamb and the bridge over River Tawi 2 miles north of Chamb. No attacker advancing towards Chamb or planning to attack the bridge or to bypass Chamb from the north and cross River Tawi could be successful unless these two ridges were captured. Both the ridges ran in a roughly north west-south west direction and were parallel to each other. Both were 60 to 70 feet high. Mandiala North ran along southern bank of Sukh Tao Nullah from its bend near village Kahni till a round hill near 200 R. The southern ridge dominated the town of Chamb and the Tawi bridge. River Tawi and Sukhtao Nullah were the two main water courses running from north to south. Sukhtao Nullah was a tributary of Tawi and joined it a little north of the Tawi bridge. In the summers River Tawi was a partial tank obstacle with a wide bed steep banks with crossing places at Chhanni Chamb and Mandiala. In the winters, however, tanks could cross the river after recce. There were, however, boggy patches on both sides of the river

south of Chamb. (Refers-page. 498-Indian Army after IndependenceMajor K.C. Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987 and the Indian Armour-Maj Gen. Gurcharan Singh-earlier quoted-page 488).The Tawi was spanned by a bridge built after the 1965 war about 2 km north of Chamb. Average width of Tawi was 150-300 yards (Refers-discussion of the author with various participants of the 1971 operation from 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 19 Baluch) and was roughly 7 to 8 kilometers east of the ceasefire line/international border.

The area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a funnel which is wide at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower by virtue of closer successive proximity of lines of hill on the north and the River Chenab to the south. Thus the defenders task became easier as an attacker advanced eastwards from Koil to Jaurian and to Akhnur making any outflanking operation more and more impracticable by virtue of high hills on the north and the unfordable River Chenab to the south. All the ridges in the area followed a north south alignment with a ridge and a nullah (dry water course) alternating each other approximately every 1000 to 2000 metres all

the way from the international border till River Tawi making the defenders task easier and the attackers task extremely arduous and time consuming. Most of the area was covered by 8 to 10 feet high grass and wild shrubs and was sparsely populated. The continuous line of hills on the north, however, made the gunners task very easy and this was true specially for area around Chamb Mandiala and Kamali Chappar. Thus a large proportion of casualties were caused by artillery fire. The most dominating and high features in the sector were however in the north i.e. the red hill lalaea etc. These were however away from Chamb and were of local significance. Their loss or possession had no connection with the advance towards Chamb or Palanwala in direct terms. The main metaleed roads in the area were road Koil-Chamb running from Koil on the border till Chamb and two metalled roads east of Tawi i.e., Akhnur-Jaurian) Chamb and Akhnur-Kalit Mandiala which were parallel the former being south of the latter. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING FORCES In 1965 Pakistan enjoyed technical superiority over the Indian armour by virtue of having technically superior US Patton tanks. In 1971 this was no longer the case since the Indian army possessed the Russian T54/55 tanks and the Patton was no longer the best tank in the subcontinent. In 1965 the Indians had a squadron of French AMX-13 tanks in Chamb as compared to two Pakistani armoured regiments in the initial phase. Thus the situation in 1971 was radically different from 1965. The Indian 10 Infantry Division had been deployed in Chamb since 1965. The Indian units in Chamb knew the area like the palm of their hand and had made extremely thorough preparations for its defence. In 1965 the newly raised headquarters 10 Indian Infantry Division had arrived in Akhnur from the south on 28 August 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. The Indian Military Historian exhibited great intellectual honesty when he rightly said In 1965 the Pakistanis had succeeded in capturing Chamb with a surprise attack. There should have been no surprise in 1971 but they succeeded again). (Refers-page 494 the Indian Army after independence -Major K. C. Praval-earlier quoted).The Indian 10 Infantry Division had four

Infantry Brigades (14 battalions, two regiments of armour i.e. 9 Deccan Horse (T54) 72 Armoured Regiment (T-55), 2 independent armoured squadron ex-Central India Horse (AMX-13), two engineer battalions, six regiments of artillery (two medium, three field, one light). The division also had a para-company and a company of ATGM of entac ATGMs. Two BSF battalions manning the border were also under command 10 Division. The Pakistani 23 Division was a five Infantry Brigade Division, however, its fifth Infantry Brigade i.e. 7 AK Brigade (three battalions) was facing largely the 25 Indian Infantry Division deployed north of 10 Indian Division. Thus against 10 Indian Division the Pakistan 23 Division could field four infantry brigades (13 battalions).

The Pakistani artillery consisted of four field regiments, one field battery, two mountain batteries, one medium battery, a section of heavy guns. The most formidable force multiplier for the Pakistan Artillery, however, was Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar who compensated for lack of sophisticated Russian guns on part of the Pakistani artillery. The 23 Division had two armoured regiments i.e. 26 Cavalry which was its integral armoured regiment (Sherman 11) 11 Cavalry which was placed under command in October 1971 (T-59) was also placed under command. In addition Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was also placed under command in end October 1971.Outwardly it appears from the above mentioned information that 23 Division was superior only in

terms of armour vis-a-vis the 10 Indian Division. However in actual fact it was vice versa. All Indian tanks in both the armoured regiments were T-54/55 which were slightly superior to T-59; whereas only 11 Cavalry and 28 Cavalry possessed T-59 while the 26 Cavalry and 12 independent squadron were equipped with the obsolete Sherman 11/M-36/B-2 tanks of world war vintage. Further 28 Cavalry had just 31 tanks. In total 23 division had 129 tanks out of which 55 Sherman 11/M-36/B2 were largely ineffective in operational terms; leaving some 74 T-59 against some 90 T-54/T-55 tanks. Thus though slightly numerically inferior in numbers i.e. 129 versus 104; the Indians were qualitatively superior as far as armour was concerned. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb- Lt. Col Saeed(GSO-I 23 Div in 1971- P.13 Army Education Press-1979). In addition the Indian T-54/55 tanks possessed pads ammunition firing capability which was not available as far as the Pakistani T-59 tanks were concerned. The T-54/55 gun had a far superior stabilisation system.In artillery there was relative parity; Pakistan having 130 guns of all calibres while the Indians possessed 126 guns which could have possibly been increased to 144 guns if 19 Brigade Artillery of the neighbouring Indian 26 Division also extended fire support to the 10 Infantry Division. Three Pakistani battalions i.e. 42 Punjab, 47 Punjab and 33 FF were only 8 to 9 months old. The AK regiments were also not as well trained as the regular infantry. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb-earlier quotedpage.2). On the Indian side the 72 Armoured Regiment was a newly raised regiment having been raised in Ahmad Nagar in July 1971. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page. 412)It is significant to note that even General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu has acknowledged the fact that T-59 and M-36 Shermans were far inferior to Indian tanks technically in his history of Indian Armoured Corps. Thus General Gurcharan stated A major weakness in the Pakistan army at the time was the state of its armour ... The Americans had stopped military aid after 1965 war to both India and Pakistan. The step did not materially affect Indias capability but Pak armour was seriously handicapped ... she had to resort to alternative sources and imported 225 T-59 tanks from China but the number was not large enough to replace her aging fleet ... Sherman tank destroyers etc. were by 1971 becoming obsolescent. Even Chinese T-59, the latest in the Pak inventory were a Chinese version of the Russian T-54 which the Soviets had discarded and replaced by a much improved T-55 version. (Refers-page 425-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier

quoted). SIGNIFICANCE OF CHAMB SECTOR The area of Chamb was regarded as territory of crucial significance by both India and Pakistan. For the Indians its defence was of paramount significance since it was the direct approach to the Indian jugular vein of Akhnur Bridge which lay on the main Indian line of communication to the Indian 25 Division holding Poonch and all area west of Pir Punjal Range in Kashmir. Capture of Akhnur by Pakistan could lead to an easy advance towards the Jammu Srinagar Road at least theoretically, although in 1971 the Pakistan army was in no position to carry out such an ambitious offensive. The Indians based on their harsh experience in 1965 i.e. the lightning Pakistani offensive towards Akhnur were firmly resolved to pre-empt any Pakistani move towards Chamb by resorting to an offensive operation into Pakistan territory from Chamb.The Pakistani military planners on the other hand perceived the Indian position of Chamb as a springboard from which the Indians could launch a swift counterstroke into the soft underbelly of Pakistan and sever the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road; which was just 35 to 40 miles from the Indian held territory of Chamb. The Pakistani fears about Indian designs were further compounded by the fact that unlike the area south of River Chenab there was no water obstacle in between Chamb and the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road running north to south though the towns of Kharian, Lalamusa and Gujrat; all three of which were within striking range of Chamb. THE BATTLE PLANS THE INDIAN PLAN There was some difference of opinion among the various Indian commanders at various levels regarding the proposed Indian design of battle in Chamb. The GOC Western Command General Candeth wanted to initially fight a governing troops withdrawal battle from the border till River Tawi to wear down and exhaust the expected Pakistani attack on Chamb; followed by a change of posture and a deliberate Indian counter attack which would push the attacking Pakistani troops backwards.

The Indian counter attack was based on employment of a complete Independent Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments (8th Light Cavalry, Central India Horse, 72 Armoured Regiment) one mechanised infantry regiment (7th Grenadiers) and a fourth Integral Armoured Regiment of 10 Division i.e. the Deccan Horse. The plan visualised having just one infantry battalion west of Tawi assisted by a tank squadron. The plan was based on the assumption that complete surprise would be achieved by rafting all three armoured regiments of the 3rd Armoured Brigade across the Chenab. (Refers-the western front- Lt. Gen. K. P Candeth-Allied Publishers Delhi 1984-page75). (refers-history of the Indian armoured corps earlier quoted page483). It appears that by November 1971 the Indian General Headquarters lost the nerve to launch this formidable plan which keeping in view the great Indian numerical superiority in tanks; had the potential to seriously jeopardise 23 Divisions operational position at worst and at best ensure that Chamb stayed in Indian hands. However by November 1971 the Indian GHQ prevailed upon Candeth to not to resort to the initial unorthodox and bold plan and instead follow a typical Indo-Pak compromise plan of holding territory west of Tawi in strength.

It appears that both the GOC Western Command Candeth and the Corps Commander 15 Corps General Sirtaj Singh were obsessed with launching an attack and did not take the Indian GHQs orders to stand on defensive till ordered otherwise. According to Major K. C. Praval this information reached the HQ 10 Indian Division only on the evening of 01 December; primarily because of lethargy in passing down information (refers-the Indian Army after Independence earlier quotedpage. 495). There is an apparent divergence in the accounts of Candeth and Praval and it is obvious that it was not lethargy in passing down orders but overconfidence in the impregnability of their position on account of superior numbers which led the Indian command to underestimate the offensive potential of the 23rd Division. THE INDIAN PLAN WAS AS FOLLOWING:-1. Area west of Tawi to be initially held by two brigades i.e. the 28 Brigade holding the hill sub-sector i.e. area Dewa Red Hill Laleal etc. The 191 Brigade to hold area west of Tawi and to the south of 28 Brigade in strength with three battalions holding area west of Tawi and one battalion east of Tawi supported by a tank squadron ex-Deccan Horse and ATGM company with the following dispositions:a. 5 Sikh holding area south of Laleali-Dewa and Mandiala. b. 4/I Gurkha Rifle in the middle holding area Mole and Phagla. c. 5 Assam defending area Barsala-Jhanda-Munawar and the Darh crossings over Tawi. d. 10 Garhwal east of Tawi in area Chhati-Tahli Hamirpur.(Refers: The Western Front:- Page 76 and History of the Indian Armoured CorpsPage. 483) 2. 52 Infantry Brigade east of Tawi in area Kalit Troti with be prepared orders to occupy defences on East Bank of Tawi in case of a Pakistani attack and defend the southern approach i.e. Line Hamir Pur-Chati-Tali which was at the moment thinly held on extended frontage by 10 Garhwal. This brigade was also designated to advance into Pakistan territory along with 68 Indian Brigade in case of an Indian offensive mounted inside Pakistan territory from Chamb. 3. 68 Brigade was not deployed fully/partially unlike the other infantry brigades and was held in reserve along with 72 Armoured Regiment to

either defend Chamb or Akhnur area as a reserve force or to be prepared to launch the projected Indian offensive inside Pakistan territory. 4. According to K.C Praval the 15 Corps plan was to use 10 Infantry Division to advance along the north bank of Chenab river towards Tanda-Gujrat while 26 Infantry Division was to advance south of River Chenab towards Sialkot. (Refers the Indian Army after Independenceearlier quoted-page. 493). It appears that Candeth did have grandiose plans of advancing inside Pakistan as amply seen from Pravals previously quoted account of 15 Corps plans. However, since Candeth wrote his book more than a decade later he wisely disassociated with his earlier plan and we dont find any of what Praval stated in his book about 15 Corps plans in Candeths book.5. The RHQ of Deccan Horse was located east of Tawi at Kachreal. Its A squadron was tasked to cover the approaches to Chamb from the south and west and was located west of Tawi River under command 191 Brigade. B squadron was located at Kachreal along with the RHQ, C Squadron was tasked to cover the southern approach and was located in the 10 Garhwal area east of Tawi river. The regiments CO was wounded in an accident and the regiment was commanded by its 2/IC during the entire operation. (Refers-The History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.483)6. The Indians had full intentions of launching an offensive and for this reason had left a gap in between the area BarsalaJhanda which was only covered by a dummy minefield. They had also left a similar gap in the area south west of the southern crossing places near the 20 Pakistan Brigade area. Later on this gap in between Barsala and Jhanda greatly facilitated the advance of the armoured brigade towards Chak Pandit. (Refers - the History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page-483). THE PAKISTANI PLAN The Pakistani GHQ had given GOC 23 Division the primary task of clearing the enemy held territory up to River Tawi. (Refers-Pakistans Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal -i- Muqueem Khan, National

Book Foundation - Islamabad-1973-page-197.)We have seen that terrain in the northern part of the sector was more hilly and broken than in the south. Before the war started there was a school of thought that the ideal line of advance into Chamb was from the south i.e. from north of Tanda. However, according to General Fazal-i-Muqeem, General Eftikhar had rejected this idea. The Generals rationale for doing so was that although in the north terrain was bad; this fact was balanced by the fact that in the south the enemy was much stronger and there was a greater chance to surprise the enemy. (Refers-Pakistans Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.197).

The key idea of General Eftikhars plan was that once Mandiala bridge was captured; the Indians would be forced to abandon Chamb and all area west of Tawi; since the loss of the bridge would outflank their entire position west of Tawi and render it untenable.

In brief 23 Division plan was as following:-1. 66 Brigade and 111 Brigade to secure lodgement in the area between Mungawali-Khalabat Jhil in the north and Ghogi in the south. This lodgement would result in the breakup of the main line of Indian forward defended localities and provide own armour with a firm base for breakout at first light. This operation was to commence at 2100 hours 03 Dec and the lodgement established by first light on 04 December 1971.2. 11 Cavalry Group comprised 11 Cavalry, a squadron of 26 Cavalry, 4 Punjab, one company 19 Baluch (Recce & Support), 24 field company engineers were to breakout from area Manawanwali in the northern part of the lodgement and advance towards Mandiala cutting road Dewa Mandiala at Kamali Chappar and to secure the home bank of Tawi in Mandiala area on night 4/5 December 1971. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-15). 11 Cavalry (old P.A.V.O) Group was theoretically under Command 66 Brigade but practically speaking as we shall see later 66 Brigade HQ had little control if any on the battle fought at Mandiala.3. 111 Brigade to carry out offensive probe towards Chamb and Chak Pandit and draw enemy reserves. On 05 December 111 Brigade was to advance and capture Chamb.4. Following the capture of Chamb; the 66 Brigade and the 111Brigade were to clear the entire salient up to west bank of Tawi.5. Operations across Tawi were planned but no fixed plan was made and the future plan to do so was to be in relation to the operational situation later. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted page-15).6. 20 Brigade in the south was to hold ground in the south, to make attack demonstrations in area Burjeal-Manawar and Nadala enclave. According to the divisions GSO-I the primary task of the 20 Brigade was to hold ground against a possible counter offensive of the enemy in the southern half of the salient. (Refers-Ibid-Page-15). Later on once the main attack of 66 and 111Brigade in the north had succeeded; the Brigade was to advance northward as far as possible capturing Jhanda Manawar etc.7. In the north opposite what the Indians called hill sub-sector there were two Pakistani brigades i.e. 4 AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade.

The GOC correctly appreciated that no major fighting would take place in this area.8. The HQ 2 Armoured Brigade was assigned 12 Independent Armoured Squadron, 13 AK Battalion, 28 Cavalry (A surprise arrival which joined the division after last light 04 Dec), and a company R & S. It may be noted that 13 AK was Reserve Battalion of 7 AK Brigade but had been ordered to march south on 02 December to be part of the main attack in the south as part of 2 Armoured Brigade.

CONDUCT OF BATTLE
THE INITIAL ATTACK AND THE BATTLE OF MANDIALA The initial two days of the Battle of Chamb proved Moltkes famous saying that no plan survives on contact with the enemy. 66 Brigade started its attack after the preparatory bombardment which had commenced at 2020 hours 03 December and by 0200 accomplished its task of capturing an area of 3000 yards depth. Thus a lodgement area wide enough for 11 Cavalry Group to break out was secured. 111 Brigade, however, failed to accomplish its assigned task to capture a similar 3000 yards deep objective south of 66 Brigade. It was held up by an enemy company in Moel area.Meanwhile the Indians who had been alerted by the preparatory bombardment took the following counter measures:a. Deployed three tank troops of A Squadron Deccan Horse in areas Barsala, Jhanda and Munawar respectively in order to cover the southern approach to Darh crossings on the Tawi. b. The fourth troop of the A/M Squadron was kept as reserve in depth. c. The RHQ of Deccan Horse moved to Chamb close to 191 Brigade Headquarters from Kachreal. Two troops from B Squadron Deccan Horse previously east of Tawi were sent to border posts at Moel Add

Paur where Pakistani tanks had been reported on the evening and night of 03 December. Squadron Headquarters of B Squadron was deployed along with two troops in depth at Barsala. d. One troop of C Squadron which was supporting 52 Brigade was detached and sent to defend the Mandiala crossing. (Refers-History of Indian Armour-Page-484)These counter measures taken on night 03 December illustrated that the Indians expected the attack in the south, since no armour was sent to cover the Dewa Mandiala approach. Meanwhile 11 Cavalry Group had commenced its advance towards Mandiala and by mid-day was reported by Indians in area Gurha on track Mandiala-Dewa. HQ Indian 191 Brigade correctly sensed the threat posed by 11 Cavalry tanks to Mandiala and at 0900 hours ordered Deccan Horse to reinforce the northern axis. Thus two tank troops of Deccan Horses B Squadron were sent to Phagla and Mandiala ridge respectively. The remaining two RHQ Deccan Horse were sent to take position at Gurha north west of Mandiala. The sheer Indian desperation may be gauged from the fact that the two RHQ tanks were sent to engage the main enemy attack. At midday 11 Cavalry appeared in area Gurha and was immediately engaged by the RHQ Tanks Deccan Horse and B Squadron Deccan Horse tanks at Mandiala. The Indian tanks were deployed in extremely dominating positions and within few minutes 11 Cavalry lost 7 tanks. It is best in a battle account to quote the enemy and this is how the Indian historian of the Indian armoured corps described the traumatic but epic battle of Mandiala:"About mid-day 11 Cavalry made its appearance in area Gurha ... RHQ tanks had selected their position well and within a few minutes knocked out 7 T-59 tanks and two recoilless guns ... 11 Cavalry less a squadron had, however, followed a route further north along the bed of Sukhtao Nullah. 191 Brigade must have been unaware of this thrust. Enemy tanks appeared behind Mandiala north and Gujha ridge along the Nala bed and destroyed a B Squadron tank in Mandiala. They also shot up the squadrons echelons dispersed in the foothills. By three P.M. 11 Cavalry had captured Mandiala north but could not secure the crossing held by a troop of tanks from C Squadron, Deccan Horse. (Refers: History of Indian Armoured Corps-Page-485) 11 Cavalry had suffered heavy casualties on 04 December i.e. 5 tanks destroyed and 9 men killed and 7 wounded. In total 11 tanks were hit.4 Punjab occupied Mandiala north.Meanwhile 28 Cavalry had been assigned to 23 Division and had reached area Assar on the evening of 03 December. 66 Brigade which was supposed to overall control 11 Cavalry operations was stuck up at Phagla and was in no position to provide any infantry support to 11 Cavalry or to control its operations.The 111 Brigade which was supposed to have captured

Chamb by 05 December was still near the border many miles from Chamb. A situation entirely unexpected had thus developed. General Eftikhar, however, remained unruffled and resolute and adopted the following modified plan:-a. 11 Cavalry to go into Leaguer behind Gura and to rest, replenish and recuperate. Resume attack on Mandiala after replenishment.b. HQ 4 AK Brigade along with 6 AK and 13 AK to establish a bridgehead east of Tawi after last light 04 December capturing high ground east of Sahamwan.c. 28 Cavalry to breakout from the Bridgehead secured by 4 AK Brigade at first light 05 December to capture Pallanwala and advance as eastwards as possible.d. 11 Cavalry to stay in reserve on 05 December 1971.e. 66 Brigade to move forward, and follow 11 Cavalry groups advance and close up to River Tawi.f. 111 Brigade and 20 Brigade to continue as per initial battle plan.Meanwhile by mid-day 04 December the Indian commander was clear about the main direction of Pakistani attack. Thus the Deccan Horse was reinforced by one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which joined Deccan Horse by the evening of 04 December. In addition one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and 7 Kumaon (68 Brigade) were despatched from Akhnur to launch a counter attack to recapture Mandiala north. The regiment along with C Squadron 72 Armoured Regiment, however, reached the east bank of Tawi after last light 04 December and immediately lost its Commanding Officer due to Pakistani artillery shelling along with 4 other officers of 7 Kumaons O Group. Thus the battalion being rendered leaderless could not be immediately deployed. Since it had reached Tawi after last light its mission was changed to take up positions on the east bank overlooking Mandiala crossing. On 04 December only the para company of 9 Commando was guarding Mandiala crossing and Mandiala crossing was only saved, thanks to the tenacious courage of the 5 Sikh and the tank troops of Deccan Horse which were holding Mandiala south.It may be noted that by the evening of 04 December the B Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which had been placed under Command Deccan Horse was deployed west of Tawi; two troops on the Phagla ridge facing west and north west and the Squadron Headquarters and two troops in reserve at Chak Pandit. THE 4 AK BRIGADE ATTACK ACROSS TAWI 04/05 DECEMBER 1971 4 AK Brigade was assigned 13 AK and 47 Punjab minus a company for the attack across Tawi. One squadron of 26 Cavalry and 12 Independent Squadron which had only 4 tanks available was also under command 4 AK Brigade. The 4 AK Brigades attack plan was as following:-a. 6 AK and 13 AK to launch night attack across Tawi; 6 AK on the left and 13 AK on the

right. Both the battalions were to capture Spur Feature.b. Two companies of 47 Punjab and one squadron 26 Cavalry under command RHQ 26 Cavalry and one company 47 Punjab were to be held in reserve. It may be noted that there was literally no enemy in front of 4 AK Brigade, 7 Kumaon still lost due to loss of its CO and O Group and just one Indian para company holding the Chamb Mandiala bridge. At night it appeared that only a miracle could save the Indians.4 AK Brigade had been alerted to launch the attack from 1000 hours 04 December. Later the subject attack was postponed from 1800 hours 04 December to 05 December 0400 hours. Both the 6 AK and 13 AK were well aware about their tasks in the planned attack. However, somehow at the appointed time the CO of 6 AK failed to join the unit to lead it into the approach march to the forming up place since he had lost his battalion. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb Col Saeed-pages 42 and 43). 13 AK, however, launched the planned attack at 0300 hours 05 December. 13 AK ran into the Indian unit 9 Jat and dispersed it and advanced forward to capture its objective i.e. Spur Feature. However, no unit was supporting it and the Indians in its rear reorganised themselves and surrounded the brave battalion in the morning. Elements of 5 Sikh, 9 Jat now surrounded 13 AK organised a breakout back to own lines but lost heavily losing 26 men killed and 50 wounded including its brave CO Col.

Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.During this whole confusion 4 AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26 Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate the bridgehead. When these moved forward the Indians who had by now reoccupied their defensive positions.Candeth the Indian GOC western command acknowledged 13 AKs performance in the following words:Pakistans 13 AK Battalion had by then succeeded in capturing the bridge (Mandiala) but their attempts to get their tanks across was thwarted by 9 Horse ... Taking advantage of the gap caused by absence of 7 Kumaon 13 AK Battalion got through to the gun positions of 39 medium and 216 medium regiments.Refers-The Western FrontCandeth-Page-79 As per the Indian account the situation of utter panic caused by 13 AK attack was only checked by personal intervention of Commander Indian 68 Brigade who in words of Praval reached the scene on the morning of December 5 with a company of 9 Jat mounted on two troops of tanks from 72 Regiment 5 (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-497). Absence or presence of commanders can be decisive in crisis situations. The previously mentioned Indian accounts prove that 4 AK Brigade attack across Chamb had the potential to cause a major crisis in the Indian position, provided 4 AK Brigade Headquarters had exercised control on the battle like fighting from the front like Commander 68 Brigade who joined the battle all the way from Akhnur. Once compared with General Shaukat Razas account of the 4 AK Brigade the Indians sound very different; Shaukat Raza had the following to say about 4 AK Brigade:-By first light 5 December Brigade Major 4 AK Brigade confirmed capture of Bridgehead over River Tawi. The information was premature. Enemy positions had been reinforced. As our troops neared Tawi the Indians counter attacked with tanks, our troops hurriedly withdrew. (Refers-the History of the Pakistan ArmyShaukat Raza Services Book Club-1990-page-182). Once the actual situation was discovered by 4 AK Brigade early in the morning of 05 December; a feeble attempt was made to retrieve the situation by sending forward a squadron of 26 Cavalry and parts of 47 Punjab; but by now the Indians had firmly regained their composure and 26 Cavalry Squadron failed to advance suffering three tank casualties in the process. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-45) in the meantime Headquarters 23 Division discovered that 66 Brigade was still in the lodgement area and had not closed on to River Tawi as earlier ordered. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-42). Had 66 Brigade been at Tawis west bank near Mandiala 4 AK Brigades position could have been saved. It may be noted that HQ 66

Brigade had been ordered on 04 December 1971 to move forward and relieve 11 Cavalry Group i.e. 4 Punjab which was holding Mandiala north. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-46). These orders had been passed at 0900 hours 04 December 1971.

MODIFIED PLAN TO CAPTURE CHAMB-05/06 DECEMBER AND ITS EXECUTION The operational situation on the morning of 05 December was as following:a. 13 AK was back on west bank of Tawi having failed to hold the Bridgehead due to absence of 6 AK.b. 66 Brigade was still in lodgement area west of Phagla.c. 111 Brigade had failed to capture Point 994 the crucial feature dominating the approach to Chamb. The Point was captured once by 10 Baluch but lost soon as a result of a resolute Indian counter attack.d. 20 Brigade had made no worthwhile progress.e. 11 Cavalry had failed to succeed in its probing efforts in Sukh Tao and Tawi river area due to heavy fire from east of Tawi and Mandiala south which dominated the approach to Tawi bridge.It was something like failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack in 1965 in Khem Karan. The whole atmosphere was grim and gloomy. General Eftikhar, however, retained his mental equilibrium and was not unnerved by the reverses of 04/05 December. He immediately adopted the following modified plan to carry on the battle:-a. Bulk of the armour to be pulled out from area north of Chamb and regrouped in area east of Jaimal Kot for launching a fresh attack on Chamb Salient from the south aimed at Area Chak Pandit south of Chamb with HQ 2 Armoured Brigade comprising 28 Cavalry, one Squadron 11 Cavalry, one Squadron 26 Cavalry, 23 Baluch, one Company R & S.b. Pressure to be kept on the Indian position north of Chamb by continuing the attack on Mandiala south using 11 Cavalry minus one squadron, and 4 AK Brigade.c. 111Brigade to continue its attack on Chamb. One squadron 26 Cavalry also assigned to 111Brigade for this attack.d. 66 Brigade to continue its attack towards Mandiala south.2 Armoured Brigade units started moving towards the forward assembly area east of Jaimal Kot starting from evening of 05 December and the movement continued throughout the night 05/06 December 1971. By 0445 hours the infantry units arrived in the forward assembly area. 23 Baluch commenced the attack at 0530 hours and soon captured Bakan and Paur its objectives. There was hardly any opposition since no attack was expected by the Indians in this area. At 0800 hours 2 Armoured Brigade commenced its advance towards Chak Pandit. Opposition was nil since by 05 December the Indians were convinced that the main Pakistani attack was coming from the north. The intentionally left Indian gap in their minefield between Barsala and Jhanda proved a blessing in disguise for the 2 Armoured Brigade. A few tanks were, however, damaged on the outer fringes of the dummy minefield. The tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade captured Chak Pandit at 1730 hours, in the evening 2 Armoured Brigade captured Pallanwala.It may be noted that once 2 Armoured Brigade had first encountered the dummy minefield between Barsala and Jhanda on its way to Chak Pandit; the progress of their advance had become very slow since they had started probing to find a gap in the minefield. It was at this juncture that the GOC flew in his helicopter to Chanir where he met Commander

2 Armoured Brigade and exhorted him to make a frontal rush and cross the minefield. Once this was done the Brigade made an almost clean sweep with the exception of three tanks damaged. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page-58 and page.59) Colonel Saeed in his book surprisingly noted about this incident that surprisingly very few tanks ran over mines (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-59). It was so because the minefield was dummy and left to enable the Indians to launch their planned offence inside Pakistan!Meanwhile Mandiala South was captured by 4 AK Brigade by the evening of 06 December 1971. What the Indians had refused to abandon in three days hard fighting was lost in one evening by means of a brilliant indirect approach as a result of the modified plan of 23 Division i.e. the advance to Chak Pandit. At 1930 hours in the evening of 06 December GOC 10 Indian Division Major General Jaswant Singh decided to give up the western bank of Tawi. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted -page. 487). Orders were given to Headquarters 191 Indian Brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of Tawi at 1930 hours 06 December 1971. The Indian withdrawal was completed by midnight 06/07 December and the hotly contested bridge at Mandiala was blown up at midnight.It is significant here to describe that it was 5 Sikh which was the real obstacle holding 66 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade from capturing Mandiala south. This fact was well acknowledged by GSO-I of 23 Division Lt Col. Saeed in the following words once he described 5 Sikhs crucial role on the two days i.e. 04 and 05 December in the following words:-If the Indian Commander now knows full details of what was coming for him on the morning of 05 December he can rightly congratulate the Commanding Officer of 5 Sikh and the Squadron Commander who held Mandiala south that day with so much grit and determination. They both saved a sad day for him. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Page.51) THE FINAL BID FOR PALLANWALA While 2 Armoured Brigade was moving towards Chak Pandit the indomitable General Eftikhar had made up his mind to use 2 Armoured Brigade to attack Pallanwala across Tawi from Chak Pandit. Whatever historians may think the Indians have acknowledged the fact that it was well within 23 Divisons capability to capture Pallanwala. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence K.C. Praval-earlier quoted-page 498).Chamb was captured by 2 Armoured Brigade by the morning of 07 December. This was a foregone conclusion since the Indians had already abandoned it on night 06/07 December 1971.General Eftikhar gave his orders for capture of Pallanwala at 1430 hours on 07 December. 2 Armoured Brigade was to cross Tawi east of Nageal. General Eftikhar correctly appreciated that Pallanwala could be captured if an immediate attack was made. A fact which has been acknowledged much later with the benefit of hindsight by Indian historians (Refers-KC Praval Indian Army after Independence page. 498). Thus General Eftikhar wanted that the attack across Tawi on Pallanwala should

commence by late evening. When the GOC told Commander 2 Armoured Brigade about his plan. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade felt that the timings were too tight but was firmly ordered by the GOC to carry out these orders. The order to establish the bridgehead could not be implemented since the two battalions who were supposed to establish the bridgehead could not be located by Commander 2 Armoured Brigade as per General Shaukat Raza. (Refers-History of Pakistan Army-1966-71 page.185). Col Saeed the GSO-I of the Division, however, categorically states in his book that 23 Baluch which was supposed to launch the attack and knew about Commander 2 Armoured Brigades O Group for the subject attack did not send any officer to attend the O Group. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 67). Whatever the actual reason the fact is indisputable that 23 Division lost a golden opportunity to capture Pallanwala while the Indians were disorganised and no battalion was holding the area opposite Tawi across Chak Pandit. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade had to cancel the crucial attack till 0100 hours 08 December. Till six the next morning HQ 2 Armoured Brigade failed to locate 4 Punjab or 23 Baluch and no attack was launched! (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-68 and 69). Finally at six in the morning of 08 December Commander 2 Armoured Brigade informed the GOC that it had not been possible to launch the attack. (Refers-IBID Page.69)Finally the proposed task of attack was given to 111Brigade. The subject attack was to be launched on the night of 08/09 December by 4 Punjab of Mandiala fame and 10 Baluch. By now, however, the Indians were well established. Failure to make use of the critical time span on 07/08 December had doomed the likelihood of success of 23 Divisions bid for Pallanwala. The Indians in the two precious days had brought their complete 68 Brigade forward and had organised their defences as following.a. 68 Brigade to hold northern half of the east bank of Tawi; while 52 Brigade was to hold the southern half of the east bank of Tawi.b. 72 Armoured Regiment under Command 68 Infantry Brigade was to cover the Mandiala and Chamb crossings.c. Deccan Horse under Command 52 Brigade was to cover all crossing places south of Chamb in the 52 Brigade area of responsibility. Squadron Deccan Horse was in reserve in area Khaur near Pallanwala.Meanwhile on 09 and 10 December GHQ placed restriction on use of 11 Cavalry east of Tawi since they wanted to move 11 Cavalry to Sialkot. Thus practically the only Armoured Regiment left for the Divison was 28 Cavalry which had just 28 tanks left. On the evening of 09 December, General Eftikhars helicopter crashed and the general who was mortally wounded was evacuated to Kharian. Officiating command of the division was assumed by Brig Kamal Matin. The planned attack on Palanwala was launched by 111 Brigade and 28 Cavalry. The infantry attack commenced at 0100 hours on night 09/10 December opposite Darh and Raipur ferries. By the afternoon of 1.0 December a Bridgehead which was 4,000 yards wide

and 1,000 yards deep (Refers-The Western Front Candeth-page 82). The Indians speedily launched a counter attack employing elements of 7 Kumaon, 5/8 Kurkha, 10 Garhwal and 3/4 Gurkha supported by a squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment under the direct supervision of General Sartaj Singh the Commander 15 Indian Corps. The Bridgehead was contained. As per Lt Colonel Saeed there was misreporting on part of BM 111 Brigade Major Nazar Hussain also; thus the BM gave an incorrect report that 28 Cavalry was down to 4 tanks. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 80). Meanwhile the new GOC General Umar had arrived. At 1400 hours on 10 December HQ 23 Division ordered withdrawal of 111Brigade. The Battle of Chamb was a battle of lost opportunities. But these opportunities came because the indomitable spirit of General Eftikhar who had the burning desire to beat the enemy and commanded his division from the front. Even today he lives in the hearts of many ex-servicemen who saw him from close quarters, always rushing towards the sound of gun fire; in search for the leading tank troop or the first wave of infantry. Alas, had he lived, many cowards may not have prospered.ANALYSISHANDLING OF ARMOURThe Battle of Chamb 1971 stands out as the most significant battle in the history of Pakistan armoured corps as a battle in which armour was used in a successful manner in an offensive role. Later on with the benefit of hindsight General Eftikhars handling of armour was criticised. The criticism that armour was distributed on too wide a front is often made about 23 Division employment of armour. As a matter of fact armour was used in a concentrated manner and all the reverses suffered by the division were because of lack of infantry at the correct place. Like 11 Cavalry successfully captured Mandiala north and following this complete 4 Punjab was absorbed in holding Mandiala north. The Squadrons of 26 Cavalry were allotted to the 66 and 111Brigade because there was Indian armour supporting 5 Sikh, 4/I Gurkha and 5 Assam. In any case there was hardly any room for manoeuvre in the Mandiala area where the first main attack was launched.Later on once 28 Cavalry arrived on 04 December armour was used in a concentrated manner. The decision to leave regiment minus of 11 Cavalry in the north of Chamb when 2 Armoured Brigade was a brilliant case of deception rather than dispersal of armour; because presence of tanks opposite Mandiala on 05/06 December convinced the Indians that main effort of 23 Division was still in the north. This led to the successful grand surprise at Chak Pandit which forced the Indian commander to abandon what three brigades of infantry had failed to achieve in three days of fighting.On the Indian side, however, tanks were under employed. Initially only one squadron was deployed west of Tawi and this squadron was further sub-divided into parts; one troop each in Jhanda Barsala and Munawar and one in reserve. When the artillery shelling started on evening of 03 December two more tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse were sent towards

Moel but the Mewa Mandiala approach was totally ignored providing 11 Cavalry a clean sweep to Mandiala. This was an entirely avoidable and inexcusable blunder since firstly the Indians had seven tank Squadrons and secondly the Dewa Mandiala approach had already been used by Pakistani armour in 1965. Four tank troops on this approach in well sited positions were enough to stop 11 Cavalry Group well short of Mandiala. However, when 11 Cavalry was approaching Mandiala there was no Indian armour on this approach and only at 9 Oclock in the morning was the Indian commander 191 Brigade sufficiently alerted to hastily despatch two tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse. One of these tank troops was already deployed opposite Koel Moel while the second was in reserve east of Barsala. In additon in sheer desperation the two RHQ tanks of Deccan Horse were also deployed on Mandiala south to defend the ridge. However, three tank troops were no consolation and 11 Cavalry was easily able to outflank the Indian position by outflanking it by approaching through the bed of Sukhtao Nullah.By evening of 04 December B Squadron 7 Armoured Regiment was also placed under Command Deccan Horse but Mandiala north had been lost and a dangerous imbalance in the Indian 10 Division position which was entirely avoidable had been created by virtue of 23 Divisions successful capture of Mandiala north.The Indian commander employed armour in penny packets and to act as a stationary retaining wall rather than a dynamic element which could be swiftly made to change its role as per particular dynamics of a tactical situation. Thus C Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which was given to 191 Brigade was relegated to stationary observation duties on the east bank of Tawi opposite Mandiala and the Sukhtao Nala-Tawi junction. Similarly A Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which crossed the Tawi at 1100 hours on 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was in the process of launching its fateful and decisive attack on Chak Pandit was aimlessly divided into two parts; two troops being sent to Jhanda in the south opposite the Pakistani 20 Brigade and two troops being sent to reinforce Point 994 opposite the 111Brigade front, the three reserve tank troops at Chak Pandit were moved to Chamb to act as a reserve. The third squadron of Deccan Horse never crossed the Tawi and stayed to guard the Darh crossings and the area in south. The independent squadron was never moved and guarded the Akhnur Bridge on the Chenab till end of the war.The Indians can be accused of under employing the armour justly but nothing in 23 Divisions employment of armour warrants the unjust criticism levelled by writers writing books 20 years after the war. It was the balanced distribution of armour by 23 Division which confused the Indians and forced them to divide their armour. The Indians broke the integrity of tank squadrons and grouped tank troops of one regiment with another. This was not done by 23 Division at any stage. The opinion of Indian Armoured Corps historian about employment of armour is worth quoting:-

Armour available to 10 Division was not properly employed. The inherent flexibility and mobility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice. Neither the Divisional Commander nor his Armour Advisor appreciated this characteristic of armour. On the first day only two Squadrons out of seven available were employed. One Squadron was left unemployed throughout the war because it was earmarked for the defence of Akhnur Bridge/town which the remotest threat disappeared after our attack on chickens neck. The second armoured regiment was not inducted even after the enemys intention became quite clear. When employed its Squadrons were brought in one by one merely to make up losses suffered by the Deccan Horse. The 10 Divisions appreciation of the armour threat from Pakistan and the consequent employment of the Deccan Horse was faulty. Pakistan had used the northern approach in 1965. What justification could be there six years later to ignore this approach and to allot no armour for its defence? It is said that the commanders concerned did not want to employ armour earmarked for the offensive for defensive purposes. But this is not a valid justification because the flexibility of armour enables it to switch roles at short notice; in any case it would appear that there were adequate resources available centainly in armour after 10 December to regain lost territory but no attempt was made: (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page 489) AREA TANK TROOPS INDIAN PAKISTANI MANDIALA AND EAST OF TAWI NEAR MANDIALA 12 8 PHAGLA GURHA 4 4 CHAK PANDIT 1 17 JHANDAMUNAWAR 4 4 DARH-EAST TAWI 3 - AKHNUR-EAST OF TAWI 4 - 28 33* * Troops does not mean all three tanks since many tanks were distributed/inoperational MODIFICATION OF PLANS IN CRISIS SITUATION KEY TO THE ISSUE It is regarded as an impossibility in our tactical exercises that plans can fail at divisional and corps level; whereas in actual fact it is at divisional and corps level that plans succeed or fail. Moltke correctly stated that: It is a delusion, when one believes that one can plan an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the first battle will determine a new situation through which much of the original plan will become inapplicable. (Refers-Military Works-Berlin-E. S. Mitter Und Sohn-1892-1912- Volume Four-pages 70 to 117). Moltke went further and said: Everything comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and prepare it energetically. (Refers- Military Works-Moltke-earlier quoted-Volume Four-pages 1, 71-73). The position of 23 Division after the failure in the north on 04 and 05 December was similar to that confronted by the Indian Armour GOC opposite Chawinda in 1965 and the Pakistani Armour GOC opposite Valtoha after failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack. GOC 23 Divison had much less resources than both of the commanders just mentioned. Yet he remained calm, resolute and optimistic and brilliantly modified his plan to once again attack in the south at Chak Pandit.Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil

of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is concerned stood like a rock against which the sea breaks. Its fury in vain. (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-Anatol Rapoport-National Book Foundation-page-163).John Keegan describes the German definition of operational strategy in the following words:-Even higher in the German armys scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between Strategic and Tactical, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion. (Refers-Six Armies in Normandy-John Keegan-Fontana Books-Reprint-1985Page.238) LEADING FROM THE FRONT It was leading from the front for which General Eftikhar is remembered even today by the troops who served in 23 Division during the Battle of Chamb. It was this quality which enabled him to arrive at a realisttic appraisal of the actual situation without undue reliance on exaggerated reports from lower echelons.Absence of this doctrine or system of command due to the British heritage at brigade and divisional level, however, led to certain command failures at the Brigade level. The Pakistan and Indian armies are basically the continuation of the old British Indian army steeped in a system of command in which the GOC and Brigade Commanders rarely left their headquarters; placing full trust in the fighting ability of the battalion commanders fighting the main battle. Eftikhars approach was more close to the German way of war. Thus while he himself was leading from the front; others like the brigade commanders were not doing so. On the other hand the staff officer in the British/Indo-Pak system had a lesser mission oriented and independent role than the German General Staff which led to breakdown in command. Staff officers trained in the British way of war were not trained to think independently; thus there were no Westphals or Mellenthin to keep the things rolling while the Pakistani Rommel was moving with the leading tank troop. Similarly there were no Neumann, Silkows and Suemermann among the Brigade Commanders who fought

from the front. Thus 4 AK Brigade and 66 Brigade Commanders were not accustomed to the system of exercising command from the front and in turn the Headquarters of 23 Division was unable on 05 and 06 December to make a correct assessment of the situation. Similarly this was the reason why 2 Armoured Brigade Headquarters could not find its infantry units on night 06/07 December to launch the planned attack across Tawi. The flaw was both doctrinal as well as organisational. The executive weakness of the staffs and subordinate headquarters was the principal obstacle and reason for 23 Division failure to capture Pallanwala. The troops fought magnificently, the GOC was a great military commander. But somewhere in the middle there was a gap; created as a result of the colonial legacy of an army which followed an operational philosophy which was orders oriented rather than mission oriented.It may noted that according to the German doctrine: A Divisional Commanders place is with his troops ... During encounters with the enemy seeing for oneself is best ... Commanders are to live with the troops and share with them danger deprivation, happiness and suffering. (Refers-Truppenfuhrung- Commnd of Troops-Berlin-E.S Mittler und Sohn 1936-page-2-4, 33-34). The spectacular German successes of World War 11 were the direct result of the fact that the German General Officer multiplied the combat effectiveness of his Division by leading from the front. Thus on the average during Second World War one German Corps Commander was killed per three months and one Divisional Commander was killed every three weeks. This calculation is based on the facts that 3 Army Commanders, 23 Corps Commanders and 110 Divisional Commanders were killed in the German army fighting World War 11. (Refers-Die Generale Des Heeres-Friedburg-Frg-Podzun-Pallas Verlag-1983 This work contains bio notes on all German General Officers of WW 11 and has been translated by US army into English). THE POWER OF DEFENCE IS A RELATIVE AND COMPLEX FACTOR The Battle of Chamb was a convincing proof that keeping in view comparative equipment resources etc tanks in defence were a much more formidable weapon than in offence. A tank advance even with artillery support was near suicidal when the enemy in front was well entrenched and had sited its defence well. Thus while 11 Cavalry swiftly advanced till Mandiala because no tanks were covering this approach; armour failed to achieve a breakthrough on 04 and 05 December. Some critics condemned this employment of armour; however it was unavoidable. In the first phase wherever tanks were launched there were bound to be casualties and in Chamb due to the dominating ridges the defender was ideally placed. To cause dislocation some attrition in terms of tank casualties was thus inevitable. The Indian commander on the other hand underestimated the power of defence. Thus in the initial discussions before the war General Candeth in his own words advanced the mistaken viewpoint that Positions west of Tawi were

not tactically sound (Refers-Candeth-The Western Front-earlier quotedpage-75). Tactically there was nothing wrong with the Indian positions as amply demonstrated by the performance of Indian 191 Brigade in blocking the advance of four infantry brigades in the first four days of the war. The Indian failure in losing Chamb was entirely a command failure at divisional level and Chamb was not lost by I91 Indian brigade but by 10 Indian Divisional Commander. The tank casualties of 1971 merely hint at a trend in favour of Defence as the stronger form of warfare as witnessed in the limited success of armour attacks even in the 1973 war and in the Iran-Iraq war. The Kuwait war cannot be cited as an example of success of tanks in attack since the contest was one sided.The dilemma which faced General Eftikhar was that casualties were unavoidable. Someone with some tank squadrons had to move forward and create a dislocation in the Indian defensive posture so as to fix the enemy commanders attention and create conditions which would lead to commitment of reserves finally leading to a situation which offered a vulnerable area through which own armour could breakthrough and paralyse the will of the enemy. The frontal attack on Mandiala and the high tank casualties around Phagla Gurha and Sukhtao Nullah were a pre-requisite for the success later on achieved at Chak Pandit. The relentless attacks of 23 Division in Mandiala area on 04 and 05 December convinced the Indians that the Pakistanis would continue banging their heads against Mandiala. Just like the Indian Armoured Division had done at Chawinda. Thus the sudden appearance of armour at Chak Pandit caused a mental paralysis and the Indians lost the will to fight. General Eftikhar in words of Clausewitz By strategem made the Indians commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into one result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes (Refers-On War earlier quoted-page.274).Defence is the stronger form of war and it is extremely difficult to dislodge well entrenched soldiers with similar equipment and weapon systems. The only remedy in such a case is dislocating the enemy commanders mental equilibrium by surprise in terms of force ratio and time and space.The defender lays down the first laws of war, in words of an author he forces the attacker to establish his plan ... But defence is the weaker form of warfare in short conflicts like Indo-Pak wars where resources are few and it is a nearly impossible task to change posture from defence to offence as was the Indian plan/thus after 10 December though 23 Division was greatly exhausted the Indians could not regain what they had lost. Had they taken their main defence on Tawi rather than west of Tawi as Candeth wanted; they may even have lost Pallanwala. Much more strength of will, intellect and courage is required to fight a successful offensive battle. 10 Indian Divisions initial defensive battle was a masterpiece effort in terms of 191 Indian Brigades conduct in facing four advancing Brigades. Where the Indians failed was in terms of the conduct of battle at the divisional level;

placing of reserves; launching of timely counterattacks etc etc. THE TERM FLANK A great deal of emphasis is placed on the term flank. In the Indo-Pak way of warfare the term Vulnerable Point is better than the term Flank. Flanks may not necessarily be the best place to attack. In any case Flanks are created only after breakthroughs are made. The 11 Cavalry advance to Mandiala was, however, a peculiar operation because it was made in a situation in which no real breakthrough had been achieved; but a penetration had captured the Mandiala north ridge 191 Indian Brigade was outflanked. If this advantage had been immediately exploited a serious defeat would have been inflicted on the Indians. However, since the Indians got one day the gap north of Mandiala and the vulnerable flank created as a result of capture of Mandiala north was undone and a continuous line was once again established once Indians brought 68 Brigade units opposite Mandiala crossing on 05 December. The Indian Commanders mental fixation with Mandiala led to weakening of Indian defences in the middle. This was well exploited by General Eftikhar vide his Chak Pandit thrust of 06 December, which created another exposed flank for the Indians. There are thus no flanks initially but flanks are created as a result of own offensive action or as a result of enemys attention being fixed on one part of the front. There is a great deal of truth in General Wetzell who was General Ludendorfs Chief of Operations saying that :-The enemy is not necessarily the weakest on his flanks, nor will he make most of his mistakes on the wings, his weakness and his efforts may occur at other places. The main condition of success is to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they are and to attack the enemy wherever he is weak and wherever he has committed an error. (Refers-Surprise-General Waldemar Erfurth-First Translation-1943Military Service Publishing Company-Stackpole Books-1974 page.2 and 3)It may be noted that the above mentioned quotation exactly describes the Indian position at Chamb. Initially they were strong in the centre south; while in the later part they became the strongest on the northern flank and the weakest in the centre opposite Barsala; it was General Eftikhars greatness as a General that he correctly perceived this Indian vulnerability and exploited it by launching the 2 Armoured Brigade opposite Chak Pandit.Another flank was created on 06/07 December opposite Nageal but since 23 Division could not exploit it; the same vulnerable point was strengthened by 08/09 December when finally the 111Brigade attack was launched. THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION FACTOR Suspension of Action which means a state of action in which an army or any military entit Battle of Chamb offers some very fine instances of application of this concept.According to Clausewitz; there were three reasons for Suspension of Action in a war or a battle. Firstly, Naturally timidity and want of resolution in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the moral world produced by dread of danger and responsibility (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-edited by Rapport-

National Book Foundation-page.292); Secondly, The imperfection of human perception and judgment, because a person hardly knows his own position from one moment to another, and can conjecture only on slight grounds that of the enemy (Refers-ibid-page 292); Thirdly, the Greater strength of the defensive form (Refers-ibid-page.292).Like all other armies in the world 23 Division also at various times went into a state of suspension of action. The foremost reason for this was the third reason, ie, Greater strength of the defence and this was true for the various battles at Mandiala, Phagla and Point 994. The other two reasons certainly played a role on 05 and 06 December and golden opportunities were lost to inflict a crushing defeat on the Indians. In an article published in Citadel issue I/91 titled Do we lack aggressiveness The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where The momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat (Refers-Citadel-issue I/91page.56). The question raised by this learned author was answered by Clausewitz long ago when he identified suspension of action as an important reality of war. The problem was common to all armies in the world including the great Prussian army to which Clausewitz belonged. But Clausewitz suggested an antidote to Natural timidity and want of resolution; it was The will of the commander ... by the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others ... whenever that influence ceases, and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all others ... the spirit of all others sink into the lower region of animal nature, which shrink from danger and knows not shame. (Refers Clausewitz-On War-page.I45). There is no doubt that General Eftikhar possessed tremendous personal courage both physical courage which enabled himself to expose him-self to fire and thereby act as an example for all under command; and moral courage which enabled him to take sound operational decisions. His appearance at Mandiala while 11 Cavalry was engaged in a life and death struggle with the Indians played a significant role in reducing the suspension of action or inactivity period at Mandiala; similarly his landing at Chanair and spurring of 2 Armoured Brigade to quickly cross the minefield (which later on was proved to be a dummy minefield) played significant role on the fateful 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was advancing towards Chak Pandit. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Colonel Saeedpage 59).As regards the factor of imperfect human perception; here too the 23 Division enjoyed tremendous advantage by virtue of having the Generals penetrating perception; his penetrating coup de oeil which enabled him to finally switch to the south on 06 December.In short all armies suffer from the suspension of action paradox; however, it can be countered by resolute leadership. The conclusion is simple; to firstly recognise suspension of action as an important reality in military training and secondly to select resolute commanders who can spur and

goad their formations in actual battle by leading from the front. PERFORMANCE OF 23 DIVISION The 23 Division was the only formation whose performance was appreciated even by the enemy. Thus the following was the opinion of various Indians about the war performance of 23 Division and General Eftikhar:-Major General Iftikhar Khan, the Divisional Commander, showed skill and determination in carrying out his misison.(K.C Praval- Indian Army after Independence Page.496)The enemy commander showed commendable flexibility. Having achieved surprise by using the northern approach, he switched to the south when he found himself firmly checked at Mandiala crossings(Ibid. page.499)The permanent loss of tactically and economically valuable territory on the west bank of Munawar Tawi was the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 warThe History of the Indian Armoure Corps-1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Page.488)In the Second World War one percent of the pilots of the US Air Force were responsible for shooting down in air fights some 40% of enemy war planes. (Refers-The Professional Soldier-Moris Janowitz-The Free Press of Glencoe-USA-1960-page-41). During the decisive battle of Assaye the British Infantry Regiment 74th Foot did bulk of the fighting and its casualties amounted to 501 whereas the other European casualties of all other units were just 143. (RefersWellingtons Campaigns in India Intelligence Branch Indian Armypage-176). In 1857 the British casualties at the siege of Delhi exceeded British casualties at all other battles in 1857 totalled by some 200 additional casualties. (Refers-The Indian Mutiny-G.W. ForestVolume One-page-150 and 151) it is a fact of history that very often bulk of the fighting is done by a qualitatively superior force; as we have seen in the above mentioned instances. For 1971 war also strictly keeping the facts in mind almost half of casualties sustained by the army on the western front were borne by the valiant 23 Division. Thus while the total army casualties on the western front were 4958 (RefersPakistans Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.280) those of 23 Division alone were 2216 (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page87).On the other hand at times it has been stated that 23 Division could not have captured Palllanwala since the Indians were too strong east of Tawi. These are writers about whom Clausewitz warned us long go when he said:- Not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which thirty years later people still wrote and spoke. (On Warearlier quoted-page.245). There is simply no doubt that 23 Division could have captured Pallanwala on 07 or even 08 December had the 2 Armoured Brigade and 111Brigade been handled with resolution. The Indian writer K.C. Praval admitted this fact when he said:-Iftikhar Khan did not pursue 191 Brigade across the Munawwar Tawi straight away. This gave Indian troops the time to strengthen their defences and the enemy lost the chance of establishing itself east of Tawi. (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-498).It was not General

Eftikhar who paused but the Brigade Headquarters who were not led by individuals like General Eftikhar who fought from the front. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE VERSUS OFFENSIVE PLANS The Indian plan lacked integrity and this compromised their dispositions. Their commanders were so obsessed with launching the offensive that they disregarded their prime task of defence of Chamb till an attack was launched. Glaring among these planning errors was disregard for the security of the Mandiala Dewa approach, leaving of the large minefield gap in Barsala Jhanda area.The Indian commanders assumption that commencement of offensive in Chamb would by itself ensure the defence of Akhnur Chamb sector was a highly erroneous assumption. Thus the bulk of 10 Indian Division troops were not in their defences when the Pakistani attack was launched since they were in concentration areas preparing for the offensive. (Refers KC Pravalpage-495) PSYCHOLOGICAL DISLOCATION OF HIGHER COMMANDER It was psychological dislocation of the Indian Commander which was the crucial factor in the final analysis. In this regard an interview of a senior Indian Staff Officer is highly thought-provoking:-Fascinating indeed! you had almost done it. It was a matter of just touch and go. We really did not know what happened to you after you took the spur and did not pursue. We did not have much to stop you at all (Reference to 13 AK attack). God alone knows where you would have stopped that evening if only you had got going. Our situation was really bad. (Refers: Opinion of Indian Col General Staff Colonel Rege immediately after the war-quoted by Colonel Saeed-Battle of Chamb-page-85)The Indians were simply psychologically dislocated. With no superiority in troops, on the whole it was superior leadership of General Eftikhar which was 23 Divisions principal asset. It is absence or presence of great leaders which is decisive in the final reckoning.When General Eftikhar switched south following failure in the north the Indian Commander was simply overwhelmed by complete surprise. The brilliant manner in which Eftikhar shifted the entire Schwerpunkt of the battle from north to south within one night has no parallel at least in the history of Indo-Pak wars. Thus by 5th December once the Indians were finally feeling secure; convinced that the situation had been stabilised; the shocking report received on 6th December that a large tank force was advancing at Barsala on 6th December was traumatic at least for the Indian commander! A counterstroke which in the IndoPak scenario may be compared to achievement of a Manstein or Sharon.Later on elements started destroying talent in our army; Eftikhars achievements were down played and Shaukat Raza who was hardly an independent historian writing what the officials in GHQ wanted downplayed Chamb. It is shocking that he did not even mention 13 AK attack or the criminal delay by 2 Armoured Brigade or 111 Brigade on 07 and 08 December. Today the civilians hardly know Eftikhar and all the glory that Chamb was. Instead we are being

repeatedly told about soldiers who were warriors more known for dexterity in handling CIA dollars of Afghan wars than guns. Logically these men should not even have been mentioned after they met an accidental end which ended their unsoldierly pursuits in August 1988 by divine design.The men who led us in 1971 were not as outwardly wise with NDCs and AFWCs as todays officiers; but they were a finer lot. Inshallah the next war will prove to be the final audit of mediocrity instilled in our army in the period 1977-88.

PAKISTANS CHARGE OF VERY HEAVY TANK BRIGADE A.H AMIN OCTOBER 1999 It is because of failures in pointing out such criminal military blunders,one cannot forgive Shuja Nawaz,author of Crossed Swords. Agha

Second Lieutenant Yaqub Malik ,Troop Leader 13 Lancers , brother of Brigadier Faruq Yaqub (11 Pavo Cavalry) and son of Lieut Colonel Yaqub Malik (Pavo Cavalry) killed in action at Bara Pind

A very juniour troop leader of 13 Lancers Killed in action at Bara Pind Captain Ejaz Alam of 13 Lancers (brother of Brig Z.A Khan,Vice Admiral Shamoon Alam,General Shamim Alam,Lieutenant Genera Javed Alam,Lt Col Feroz Alam,Group Captain Mushtaq Alam,Group Captain Shuaib Alam ) killed in action at Bara Pind

A very juniour troop leader of 13 Lancers Killed in action at Bara Pind

Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha District who played a key role in saving Indian position at Bara

Pind.Killed in action and awarded PVC the highest military Award of India

Major Alley Ahmad ,Tank Squadron of 31 Cavalry Killed in action at Bara Pind

Lieutenant Zaheed Rashid Mirza of 31 Cavalry, tank troop leader,killed in action at Bara Pind

Into the Valley of Death, Rode the 600, Theirs not to question why Theirs but to do and Die The Stench of burnt human flesh many miles around In those dark Rakhs (Forests ) of Shakar Garh Bulge

A Story of the miserable Command Failure of Pakistans 1 Corps led by Lieutenant General Irshaad,8 Infantry Division led by Major General Abdul Ali Malik and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade at Bara Pind in 1971 War Valuable human lives sent into certain and pointless slaughter simply because of poor leadership and planning In the Memory of all who participated in that bloody tank battle Major Agha H Amin (Tank Corps-Pavo Cavalry)
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INDIAN SOLDIERS STANDING ONE OF PATTON TANKS OF 13 LANCERS IN THE BATTLE

THIS IS NOT SOMETHING COPY AND PASTE BUT BASED ON ENTIRELY ORIGINAL RESEARCH OF MAJOR A.H AMIN FROM 1983 TO 1999 AND ONE OF THE CHAPTERS OF :-"INDO PAK WARS-A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS-1947-71" BY MAJOR A.H AMIN" WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN MANY LEADING MILITARY LIBRARIES OF THE WORLD.I HAD CONSIDERED A WASTE OF TIME AND VALUABLE EFFORT TO SEND IT TO ANY PEDANTIC PAKISTANI LIBRARY OR PAKISTANI MILITARY INSTITUTION,WHICH ARE BASTIONS OF PEDANTRY AND MYOPIC LEARNING

Battle of Barapind-Jarpal 16 Dec 1971 A.H Amin September 1999

The Battle of Barapind or Jarpal, fought on the northern border of the ShakarGarh Bulge, as the Pakistanis and Indians respectively call it, was one of the most bloody and pointless battles of the 1971 war as far as the Western Front was concerned. The battle has remained shrouded in a number of myths and controversies with one unit accusing another of cowardice and misreporting, further compounded by the artillery accusing armour as an arm and armour in turn blaming the infantry for all its tactical blunders! Around the 1980s some gentlemen particularly in the armoured corps rationalised the battle and the immense losses in men and material by claiming that had the counterattack not been launched, the Indians would have broken through and may have perhaps captured Zafarwal or Pasrur. Another school of thought in the armoured corps heaped the entire blame on the armoured brigade commander, while totally denying that the Barapind-Jarpal fiasco had any connection with faulty doctrine, organisational imbalances/deficiencies, battle procedure or with the command echelons higher than brigade level! Many rationalised the failure by insisting that the Indians enjoyed numerical superiority and the losses suffered by the armoured brigade were inevitable. Yet another school of thought, particularly in the armoured corps alleged that the fiasco occurred because of misreporting of enemy situation by an infantry battalion!We will briefly analyse the battle and endeavour to arrive at conclusions which are realistic and free from negative biases like inter arm rivalry, personal likes and dislikes and a mistaken feeling of espirit de corps which propels many to regard forthright analysis as against regimental loyalty or as unpatriotic etc. COMPARISON OF FORCES Pakistan's I Corps (Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan) consisted of three infantry divisions, an armoured division and an armoured brigade. Two of its infantry divisions were deployed to defend the entire area from Marala Headworks in the north till the Narowal area where the Ravi river finally enters Pakistan. 8 Infantry Division (Major Abdul Ali Malik)1 comprising four infantry brigades2 being responsible for defence of Shakargarh Bulge and 15 Division (Major General Abid Ali Zahid) for the defence of Sialkot.

8 Independent Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Syed Mohammad Ahmad) comprising three tank regiments (13 Lancers, 27 Cavalry and 31 Cavalry), one self-propelled artillery regiment (15 Self- Propelled Regiment or simply 15 SP)3 and a mechanised infantry battalion (29 Frontier Force or simply 29 FF) was to assist both 8 and 15 Division in the defence of the Ravi-Chenab corridor by launching counterattacks or occupying counter penetration positions. 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division although theoretically under command 1 Corps were essentially the Pakistan Army's strategic reserve and were in concentration areas in general area Pasrur-DaskaGujranwala. These were to be employed only as a last resort and as a matter of fact were not employed at all by the GHQ because of lack of resolution! India's I Corps comprised three infantry divisions (36, 39 and 54 Divisions), two armoured brigades (2 and 16 Independent Armoured Brigades), two independent artillery brigades (31 and 41) less a medium regiment and approximately two engineer brigades. The Indian infantry divisions did not have any integral tank regiments. The independent artillery brigades were equivalent to what the Pakistanis called corps artillery, subdivided into two brigades for greater flexibility, keeping in view the large frontage of the area of operations. The infantry divisions however had their own respective divisional artillery brigades. The Indians enjoyed a significant, although not overwhelming superiority in infantry, having approximately 27 infantry battalions as against 8 Divisions 12 infantry battalions. I have used the word significant because the 17 Division although never employed by Pakistan was also available, at least potentially for use. In armour the Indians enjoyed qualitative but not quantitative superiority as was later fallaciously claimed by some in order to rationalise the blunders committed by Pakistan's I Corps. They had six tank regiments and two independent recce squadrons as against five tank regiments and one independent squadron of 8 Division and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade and four tank regiments of 6 Armoured Division4. It may be noted that 6 Armoured Division was reinforced by 11 Cavalry

by the time the Barapind battle was fought and thus the total Pakistani potential tank strength which could be employed against the Indian I Corps (minus 15 Division, which was opposite Indian 15 Corps 26 Division) was nine tank regiments as against six Indian. The Indian qualitative superiority in tanks was also not applicable as far as Barapind-Jarpal battle was concerned.This was so because all the T-54/T-55 Indian tanks were concentrated in its 2 Armoured Brigade whose all three units were equipped with T series tanks, while the 16 Independent Armoured Brigade, which fought the Barapind Battle was equipped with the same Centurions which the Indians had in 1965 as against the same Pattons of Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade, which Pakistan had in 1965 war. The 6 Armoured Division was equipped with T-59 tanks which were at par with the Indian T-54/T-55 tanks and far superior to Centurions. AREA OF OPERATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE The Shakargarh Bulge by virtue of its location parallel to the only Indian road link to Kashmir for more than 54 miles was an area which the Indians could not ignore. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the bulge into Kashmir at any point along the entire 54 miles stretch from Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the road link between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to fifteen miles inside Indian territory! This would have meant isolation of five infantry divisions; something which could have affected the whole outcome of war! It was for this reason that the Indians had selected the northwestern part of Shakargarh Bulge to launch their main attack in 1965.Shakargarh was not as vital for Pakistan as for India, being one of the few areas north of Sutlej river where Pakistan could afford to trade space for time, at worst and launch a major thrust inside Indian territory to force the Indians to commit their reserves and even ease the pressure on the East wing, at best. It was a potential springboard for launching a significant thrust inside India, which had the ability to seriously limit Indian Army's freedom of manoeuvre, provided there was a Moltke or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! While having all the advantages of a springboard for offensive operations, Shakargarh was a defender's nightmare.

There were no serious water obstacles, unlike the areas south of Ravi River, to restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of a force commanded by an imaginative and resolute commander. The area was flat, firm and free of the boggy patches found in plenty in the areas west of Pasrur or south of the MRL canal and Ravi River. The area was bisected by a large number of water courses and their tributaries (see map) running in a general north east- south west direction from Indian held Kashmir into Pakistan.These were nonperennial and fordable with minor recce in winters. Fields of fire were limited between 600 to 1200 yards due to clumps villages and sugar cane crops and artificial plantations called 'Rakhs' or 'Reserve Forest'. The Pakistanis had constructed a number of embankments (bunds) and anti- tank ditches to restrict an attacker's freedom of manoeuvre. These obstacles were further strengthened by construction of concrete bunkers. In addition three lines of mines, each approximately 600 to 800 metres were laid before the commencement of the war. OPPOSING PLANS PAKISTANI PLAN: The Pakistani plan for employment of I Corps and defence of Shakargarh was an essentially reactive rather than proactive plan. As per Fazal Muqeem the Pakistani I Corps was tasked to eliminate the Indian enclave (Dharm Enclave) on the Pakistani side of the River Ravi in area Narowal on the south western border of the Shakargarh Bulge and simulate offensive actions in order to draw enemy forces into the Shakargarh area5. The defence was based on two strong points organised around the small towns of Shakargarh, Narowal and Zafarwal which were to be held by 14 Para Brigade and 24 Brigade respectively6. It was appreciated that the main Indian thrust would be launched in the area between Degh Nala and Bein Nala. An ad hoc covering troops force known as the 'Changez Force' under Brigadier Nisar (of Gadgor fame in 1965 war) consisting of two tank regiments (20 Lancers, the I Corps Recce Regiment and 33 Cavalry ex 8 Division) and 13 Punjab were to fight a delaying battle at each minefield belt between the two strong points i.e. Zafarwal on the east bank of Degh Nala and Shakargarh on the west bank of Bein Nala, 'with a view to causing maximum attrition

on enemy armour and infantry, thereby creating an opportunity for effective counterattack by corps/division resources'7. One tank regiment (20 Lancers having 35 Sherman, M-36-B-2 Tanks) of this force was to delay the advancing enemy along the first minefield while the second tank regiment (33 Cavalry having 41 Patton M-47/M48 Tanks)8 was to impose delay along the second minefield. 13 Punjab the foot infantry unit with Changez Force was to provide infantry support to the Changez Force. The road between Zafarwal and Shakargarh was designated as line of no penetration and any enemy thrust south of this line was to be eliminated by launching the corps armoured reserve i.e. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade. The 8 Armoured Brigade was not tasked to do anything to wrest initiative from the enemy and the 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division were also assigned no offensive roles and were in MODC role (Ministry of Defence Constabulary)10. INDIAN PLAN:The essence of Indian I Corps plan was to take offensive action and advance into Shakargarh Bulge from the north and east with an infantry division each spearheaded by an independent armoured brigade, with a view to ensure, the security of the Pathankot Base and also the corridor leading to Kashmir on which the 15 Indian Corps in Kashmir depended11 while also ensuring that Pakistani reserves were also committed in defence of Shakargarh Bulge and could not be used in an offensive role. The original Indian plan, keeping in view their comparative strength, was extremely ambitious and envisaged the capture of Pasrur followed by an advance to the MRL Canal12. This was revised following the Pakistani build up against Poonch. 197113.The modified Indian plan involved a two prong advance by 54 and 39 Infantry Divisions supported by 16 and 2 Independent Armoured Brigades respectively with 54 Division with 16 Independent Armoured Brigade under command was to advance southwards in the area between Degh and Karir Nala and capture Zafarwal-Dhamtal complex. The 39 Division (with 72 Infantry Brigade consisting of four battalions and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade) was to advance from the north and capture Shakargarh.The 36 Infantry Division tasked to defend the most critical Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur area was to initially stay on

the defensive and to attack westwards towards Shakargarh in case the operational situation warranted (ie after ensuring that no Pakistani threat was imminent against Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur complex). The Indian plan was extremely conservative. There were nine infantry brigades available to Lieutenant General K.K Singh (commander of 1 Armoured Brigade at Chawinda in 1965). He earmarked four of these (168, 323, 87 and 18) along with six tank squadrons ( complete 14 Scinde Horse and 16 Light Cavalry) for guarding the critical areas of the Indian border on both flanks against a likely Pakistani attack. These troops were deployed west of Degh Nala (two infantry brigades and a tank regiment less one squadron), opposite Nainakot (one infantry brigade and one tank squadron) and in area Dinanagar-Pathankot (one infantry brigade and one tank regiment). This left the Indian I Corps with four infantry brigades and two armoured brigades less one tank regiment each to advance inside Pakistani territory! OPERATIONAL SITUATION FROM 4TH TO 16TH DECEMBER 1971 The Indians were as concerned about their security as the Pakistanis but superiority in infantry enabled them to assume an offensive role.Their relatively limited armoured resources vis-a-vis the total available Pakistani armour in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor however ensured that although Pakistani territory all along the eastern and northern boundary of Shakargarh Bulge was captured, no major strategic gain was made. The Indian because of the minefields and because of the skill with which Brigadier Nisar handled Changez Force was slow. Soon after the commencement of operations once they realised that no Pakistani threat was likely against Pathankot-Kathua or Samba the 36 Division was also given an offensive task on 8th December, to advance against Shakargarh from the east with an infantry brigade and a tank regiment. 39 Infantry Divisions rate of advance was extremely slow and on 12 December its only two advancing brigades i.e. 72 Brigade and the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (less one tank regiment) were placed under command 54 Division (72 Brigade and one tank regiment) and 36 Division (2 Armoured Brigade and less two tank regiments). In addition 87 Brigade and one tank squadron of 39 Division which were in defensive role opposite Nainakot were also placed under command 36 Division and assigned an offensive role of advancing against Shakargarh along with 36 Divisions other brigades.

39 Infantry Division Headquarters was shifted to Samba area and made responsible for commanding the three infantry brigades and one tank regiment less one squadron in holding role in 'X Sector' on the right flank of the 1 Corps between Degh and Aik Nala.The 54 Infantry Division and 16 Armoured Brigade with whom we are primarily concerned as far as the analysis of the 'Battle of Barapind-Jarpal' is concerned advanced cautiously and slowly but enough to unnerve the Pakistan Army's Chief of Staff General Hameed who despatched one of the infantry brigades (124 Brigade) of the reserve division 33 Division to I Corps on 9th December 1971 and alerting 11 Cavalry till then in Chamb for move to Shakargarh on 10th December14. The Pakistani defences opposite 54 Division followed an inverted 'L Shaped' alignment with a horizontal alignment along 'Sakror Bund', an anti-tank ditch and embankment which ran all the way between Degh and Basantar Nala and a vertical alignment along the west bank of Basantar Nala from a point a little north of Lalial village where the Sakror Bund joined the Basantar Nala, running in a north-south direction from this point.

54 Indian Division advanced two brigades up both supported by tanks from 16 Armoured Brigade with 47 Brigade on the right and 91 Brigade on the left while the third brigade ie 74 Brigade in reserve. 47 Brigade was assigned the mission of contacting Basantar Nala opposite general area Lagwal-Jarpal and establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of Basantar Nala through which 74 Brigade was to breakout towards Zafarwal. 91 Brigade was to move on the east flank of 54 Division. By 15th December the 47 Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) closed with Basantar Nala opposite Lagwal and made a successful assault across the minefield laid in the bed of Basantar Nala on night 15/16 December15. A tough infantry fight took place and one of Indian infantry battalion commanders was killed during this operation16. FORMATION OF BRIDGE HEAD BY INDIAN INFANTRY ACROSS BASANTAR

CLICK ON TOP TO ENLARGE

The 47 Indian Infantry Brigade was tasked to establish a bridgehead in general area Sikandarpur-Lalial-Barapind17. It captured Siraj Chak and Laleal Forest at 8.30 p.m and Jarpal at 11.30 p.m18. Stiff fighting took place at Jarpal; and Major Hoshiar Singh a hardy Sikh Jat from Sisana in Hissar district was awarded a Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award18a. The Indian infantry reported at 2.00 p.m. that they were being attacked by Pakistani tanks and sent an SOS for tank support.This forced Indian 47 Brigade Commander to ask 17 Poona Horse to move into the bridgehead at once. As per the Indian armoured corps historian, the situation was so desperate that one squadron of Poona Horse was rushed across part of the minefield even though a lane had not been cleared18b. A firefight followed and Indians claim that they destroyed a Pakistani Sherman despite having no night firing capability!The forward extent of the bridgehead was east of the Lalial Reserve Forest and this forced

the Poona Horse tanks to cross the forest at night and establish themselves on its western edge, so as to be able to effectively engage any counter attack force the next morning. The Lalial Reserve Forest was thus cleared by a night assault launched by 'C' Squadron 17 Poona Horse immediately followed by an APC mounted company of 18 Rajput. The CO of 17 Horse also joined C Squadron along with RHQ Troop. The rest of the regiment followed and by first light the whole 17 Poona Horse was deployed; 'C' Squadron opposite Lalial village and to the south of it on the forward edge of the forest, 'B' Squadron less two troops south of 'C' Squadron opposite Ghazipur and 'A' Squadron in reserve in area Siraj Chak a village east of Ghazipur on the eastern side of the reserve forest. Two tank troops of 'B' Squadron were deployed in Jarpal area in the defences of 3 Grenadiers. 16 Madras which was the right forward battalion in the assault was deployed in line with the tanks in the north, in area Lalial-Ghazipur, 6 Madras which was in reserve in the assault phase was also brought forward and deployed in the middle and 3 Grenadiers which had played a major role in the initial assault as the right forward battalion in Jarpal and east of Barapind. It is significant to note that the Indians were all praise for the Pakistani infantry defending Jarpal; unlike the Pakistani infantry on the north i.e. opposite 6 and 16 Madras18c. THE 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE COUNTER ATTACK ON BARAPIND JARPAL -16 DECEMBER 1971 It appears that Headquarters 1 Corps did not seriously appreciate the gravity of 54 Indian Division's advance towards Zafarwal. 8 Armoured Brigade was concentrated in general area Qila Sobha Singh-Pasrur from 11th December onwards. On 15th December the brigade was told to be prepared for ' a brigade attack east of Bein Nala to recapture lost territory up to River Ravi'!19 It may be noted that no effort was made to impose caution on the advancing enemy who leisurely breached all three minefields from 5 to 15 December maintaining a rate of mile on an average one and a quarter mile per day. This was not because of paucity of reserves, but paucity of resolution and decisiveness in the 1 Corps Headquarters or in the GHQ to spur 1 Corps! General Fazal Muqeem very accurately described 1 Corps conduct of the defensive battle as 'passive defence of 1 Corps' 20.8 Armoured Brigade was preparing for the grand counter attack that it was supposed to launch east of Bein Nala to recover all lost territory up

to River Ravi which it was supposed to launch in Nainakot area when it was suddenly informed at 0430 hours 16th December by the infantry formation in defence that the enemy had breached the minefield on Basantar Nala at Lagwal21. At 0515 hours the armoured brigade headquarters issued a warning order assessing an enemy tank squadron and an infantry battalion which had crossed the Basantar Nala and was established in area Lalial Forest and was being 'contained by own infantry and an independent squadron'22. On the other hand the infantry brigade commander of the area i.e. Brigadier Sher Ali Baz (24 Brigade) assessed the enemy in Jarpal as one tank troop and one infantry company!23 Lieutenant General Irshad the 1 Corps Commander ordered 8 Independent Brigade Commander to 'Restore the situation with minimum force'24.8 Armoured Brigade Commander earmarked 13 Lancers one of its three tank regiments to deal with the situation and gave the following instructions/orders:-'Approximately squadron of tanks and infantry battalion in village Siraj Chak area on the west bank of Basantar. This penetration has been contained by own infantry/tanks...and directed 13 Lancers to establish a counter penetration position25 in area Pindi Channian west of village Jarpal immediately 26'13 Lancers along with other 8 Brigade units was located a little south of Zafarwal. It concentrated in Jabal-Mehla area by 0745 hours along with its affiliated armoured infantry company. 'A' Squadron which was earmarked for the 'Counter Penetration' task was briefed by the CO 13 Lancers and crossed road Zafarwal-Shakargarh at 0800 hours. While on the move it was ordered on wireless by the CO to move towards area Sikandarpur and destroy a few enemy tanks which were breaking out from area Lalial. (It may be noted, that this must have been a false alarm, since no Indian account mentions any such offensive movement at eightish in the morning). This modification in plan resulted based on new orders from 8 Armoured Brigade Commander who had received these from 24 Infantry Brigade Commander. The brigade commander had asked CO 13 Lancers to 'send a squadron to contain enemy penetration' but the CO decided to 'attack north and destroy enemy tanks'27. 'A' Squadron moved to Sikandarpur and was fired at by enemy tanks/anti-tank guns from Ghazipur village. The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks and two officers killed and wounded. The remaining six tanks withdrew

and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror Bund. Meanwhile at 0830 hours while 'A' Squadron was moving towards Ghazipur CO 13 Lancers, entirely on his own judgement, also ordered 'C' Squadron to take a 'Counter Penetration Position' in Pindi Chanian area and while 'C' Squadron was preparing to do so changed his orders, ordering both 'B' and 'C' Squadrons to 'proceed to Barapind and attack six to seven enemy tanks and infantry company in Jarpal area'28.All that followed was disastrous and both the squadrons were engaged by heavy enemy anti-tank and artillery fire, losing twenty tanks and in the process, three officers killed and two officers wounded.

MAJOR HOSHIAR SINGH CHEEMA A JAT FROM SISSANA IN HISSAR DISTRICT OF HARIANA FIRED WITH AN ANTI TANK GUN HITTING SOME TANKS AND LIVED TO WIN A PVC , A UNIQUE HONOUR,NORMALLY AWARDED POSTHOMOUSLY

ATTACK BY A SQUADRON 13 LANCERS-CLICK ON TOP TO ENLARGE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN

It was during this action that Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha exhibited extreme valour and saved the Indian position as per the Indian Armoured Corps historian; an action which was acknowledged by grant of a posthumous Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award. 13 Lancers claims that the enemy fell back from Barapind29

MAJOR HOSHIAR SINGH CHEEMA (which was of no consequence to both Indians and Pakistanis in any case) while the Indians claim that they had never occupied Barapind30 (again of no consequence even if they had done so).We will briefly discuss the Indian position during this whole affair. ATTACK BY B AND C SQUADRONS OF 13 LANCERS-CLICK TO ENLARGEORIGINAL A.H AMIN CREATION

The Indians were holding the bridgehead as we earlier discussed with two tank squadrons with a third in reserve (it has been erroneously claimed that there were two or three Indian tank regiments defending the bridgehead); 'C' Squadron Poona Horse on the right holding area Lalial and south , 'B' Squadron less two troops holding area Ghazipur and south and two troops of 'B' Squadron beefing up the defences of 3 Grenadier Battalion in village Jarpal. It was essentially 'C' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers and 'B' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'B' and 'C' Squadrons of 13 Lancers. Once 13 Lancers brought in its two remaining squadrons the Indians reinforced Jarpal with half squadron of its 'A' Squadron which was in reserve in Siraj Chak area. Once 31 Cavalry attacked the Indians

brought the remaining tanks of 'A' Squadron in Jarpal area.By 1200 hours 13 Lancers which was praised by the Indians for its tremendous valour, keeping aside all the foolhardiness of their modus operandi,31 was written off from the order of battle of the 8 Armoured Brigade!

The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process. Such was the elan and dash of this attack that the Indian armoured corps historian admitted that 'the only occasion that a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers (following Major Nasir's exhortation described in the previous sentence) attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of the Poona Horse averted the danger' But the Indian historian went further and instead of making ridiculous claims that the Indians were more martial frankly admitted that the Pakistani failure had a direct connection with incompetent leadership. Gurcharan Singh thus said: 'Pakistani armour suffered casualties because of bad use of ground and tactical ineptness'31a.

8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters now ordered its second tank regiment 31 Cavalry to attack the Indian bridgehead from the direction of Marara Wazirpur in the gap between the place where 'C' and 'B' Squadrons 13 Lancers had attacked. The Indians admitted that the attack of 31 Cavalry was more methodical and deliberate32 than 13 Lancers, with the regiment attacking as an entity; two squadrons providing static fire support and one assaulting. The deliberate manner in which the attack was launched could not compensate for the nominal artillery support and the frontal approach and the attacking squadron of 31 Cavalry was beaten back with a loss of ten out of fourteen tanks destroyed and a squadron commander and another officer killed. 31 Cavalry now did what 8 Armoured Brigade may have done at 8 O' Clock in the morning; ie it went into a counter penetration position around Marara Wazirpur at about 1400 hours.33

AFTER 13 LANCERS FAILED , 31 CAVALRY REGIMENT WAS LAUNCHED TO ATTACK THE INDIAN BRIDGE HEAD-CLICK TO ENLARGE

It was after this second attack of 31 Cavalry that the Indians reinforced the bridgehead with approximately 12 tanks from Brigade headquarters, and half squadron 4 Hodsons Horse. The situation now was well in control with 27 Cavalry and 35 FF of 124 Brigade in reserve and the Indian threat (that is if there was any despite Pakistani numerical tank superiority of three to one or three to two in BarapindJarpal area) was removed.

Remnants of 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers remaining tanks were in counter penetration position opposite Ghazipur, 'B' and 'C' Squadrons in counter penetration position opposite Barapind and Jarpal and 31 Cavalry in the middle.On night 16/17 December the 8 Brigade and 24 Brigade commander decided to attack the bridgehead which had been most disastrously contained with the third tank regiment 27 Cavalry and 35 FF, both of which were to attack and capture Jarpal (another mud village of no tactical consequence). The infantry battalion was delayed and the armoured brigade commander called off the planned attack34 which was originally scheduled to be launched at 0430 hours 17 December35. The infantry brigade commander who according to many officers of the 24 Brigade rarely left his headquarters however insisted that 35 FF, a newly raised but highly integrated and motivated foot infantry unit to launch a daylight attack without tank support on a bridgehead which two tank regiments had failed to dent ! Due to some phenomenal command blunder artillery fire support was not coordinated and 35 FF attacked without artillery fire support36 at 0530 hours. The commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja led the senseless attack and it is best to quote the Indians who were all praise for the gallantry of this indomitable battalion and were shocked at the senselessness of the whole affair; 'At dawn 39th FF launched its attack for the recapture of Jarpal. The attack was doomed to failure Launched in broad daylight as it was over open ground in full view of one tank squadron plus and one infantry battalion and covered by their combined weapons. Tanks and artillery opened fire when the Pakistanis emerged from cover from their forming up place.It was a foolhardy venture,the attackers were literally massacred but they persisted in their attempt to close until the few remnants fell only about 50 metres from tanks of 4 Hodsons Horse. At about that time the news of Pakistani acceptance of ceasefire was received. The whole of this gallant battalion was sacrificed to no purpose...ceasefire became effective at 8.00 p.m. and guns fell silent on both sides.The next day 80 dead bodies of the 39th Frontier Force including their commanding officer, second in commands and adjutants were handed over to the Pakistanis'37'Hail Indomitable Heroes Hail! Despite of all your Generals and Brigadiers ye prevailed! The Indians rightly awarded two of their highest gallantry awards to their soldiers, but nothing beyond an SJ

was granted to the brave men who died at Barapind-Jarpal! The Indians even awarded their highest award to Major Hoshiar Singh Cheema who survived the battle but many equally brave soldiers of 13 Lancers, 31 Cavalry or 35 FF were not considered worthy of being awarded a Nishan-i-Haidar. Perhaps there is something seriously wrong with the whole system of the award of gallantry in our army? What is the basis;is it that an officer has won the Sword of Honour or is from an old regiment, or that his citation was written well, or that he was liked by his brigade or divisional commander before the war?Fazali-Muqeem well summed up at least 8 Division's performance when he said: 'The few counter attacks, which 8 Division tried during the war were most noticeable by their lack of planning. The units were hurled into battle without having been given enough time for planning and preparations'.38

ANALYSIS Impact of Experiences of 1965 War on the Principal Decision Makers' Minds. Most analysis of Barapind-Jarpal are unfortunately superficial because they concentrate on the superficial aspects of the whole affair. The principal reason for the failure at Barapind was neither the artillery factor, nor the assessment of situation, nor incompetence of the armoured brigade commander but something much deeper. This was the deep impact of experiences of 1965 war on the principal decision makers' mind. First of all we will discuss Brigadier Ahmad the commander of 8 Armoured Brigade. Brigadier Ahmad, had distinguished himself as a squadron commander at Gadgor in 1965 war a few miles west of Degh

Nala and had played a major role in the failure of the Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure to achieve a major breakthrough on 8th September. It appears that this experience at Gadgor shaped many of his actions in 1971. The Battle of Gadgor was a peculiar battle in which Pakistan's 25 Cavalry had clashed with two tank regiments of the Indian Army, with both units on the march and with both deploying in a line formation in a most impromptu manner without knowing the strength or composition of the enemy in front. The Indians had the potential to outflank 25 Cavalry by virtue of having nine tank squadrons against three of 25 Cavalry but failed because their armoured brigade commander (who ironically commanded 1 Indian Corps in 1971) was unnerved due to reports of a false alarm on his flank. The action at Gadgor was a glorious feat as far as 25 Cavalry and then Major Ahmad were concerned. But it was one of those unique incidents which rarely occur in military history!Both sides did not know, who was opposing them; 25 Cavalry having no clue that they were opposing the whole Indian armoured division and the Indian 1st Armoured Division thinking that they were opposed by an armoured brigade! Artillery was of no consequence in this action since both sides clashed by accident and artillery fire made a limited impact on the battle! At this time there were no armoured brigades in Pakistan 6 Armoured Division and the Battle of Chawinda was fought as a largely ad hoc battle with divisional headquarters directly telling units what to do. It appears that Gadgor experience influenced both Brigadier Ahmad and GOC 8 Division who at that time was commanding 24 Infantry Brigade at Gadgor. Later on artillery played a pivotal role in defeating deliberate Indian assaults opposite Chawinda from 12th to 21 September 1965.

However these were downplayed because of the inter arm rivalry and Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Choudhry the architect of artillery plan at Chawinda was sidelined and retired as a brigadier despite having had a brilliant career. Post 1965 propaganda in Pakistan painted the Battle of Chawinda as a triumph of armour and infantry; hardly ever admitting that artillery played any role in it! This was due to the British inherited legacy in which artillery was despised as an arm by infantry and armour officers! Now we will discuss 13 Lancers. The experiences of this unit in 1965 war played a major role in conditioning its attitude in 1971. In 1971 this unit was launched in Chamb against an Indian Squadron equipped with AMX-13 tanks which had no potential to oppose the six to one tank superiority concentrated against them by Pakistan in Chamb during Operation Grand Slam. Even technically AMX-13 was a matchbox with extremely thin armour as compared to the Patton/Sherman tanks employed by Pakistan against it. 13 Lancers was conditioned by the Grand Slam experience when it was opposed by an enemy which was outnumbered, as well as surprised. This experience conditioned their behaviour in 1971 and they had faith in the tank charge which had succeeded in Grand Slam in front of AMX-13 but had no chance of success in front of Centurions of a tank regiment as illustrious as 13 Lancers!

DOCTRINAL AND OTHER TACTICAL FAILURES

The conduct of the two tank regiments clearly point towards doctrinal procedural and tactical failures particular to the armoured

corps.Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General) who was from 13 Lancers categorically said that the armoured briagde commander asked both 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry to attack as soon as possible implying that there was no need to cut short the batle procedure and there was no need to panic;but both the units and specially 13 Lancers cut through various parts of the battle procedure like liaision with infantry,preliminary recce etc leading to the phenomenal tank losses that it later suffered.Even the method of attack of both units was different;which proved that even at brigade level;tactical thinking was whimsical and differed from unit to unit;even in important things like basic drills of operations CRUX OF THE WHOLE ISSUE There is one fact which is missed in most analysiss of the Battle of Barapind and most other tank battles of Indo-Pak war.This refers to handling of units above regiment level.There is one striking parallel between Battle of Gadgor fought in 1965 where 25 Cavalry checked the 1st Indian Armoured Briagde(ie 1st Indian Armoured Div) and in Barapind where 16 Light Cavalry stopped the whole 8 Armoured Brigade. The fact that stands out is that handling of unit till regiment level was good in defence while handling of units beyond brigade level was extremely poor and especially in offensive operations! Even the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division which did well in Chawinda fought an essentially defensive battle. In Gadgor, 25 Cavalry did extremely well as a unit but the Indians failed miserably as a brigade at Gadgor;despite a four to one superiority; and the same happened at Barapind.The conclusion is that both the armies failed to function as dynamic entities beyond regimental level!The troops and the young leaders till squadron were equally brave and leaders beyond unit level almost equally weak in handling more than one unit! Even in Khem Karan Pakistani armour succeded till unit level but failed misearbly beyond in attack; which is a far more difficult operation to coordinate, execute and synchronise than attack. Thus Khem Karan was triumph of 6 Lancers and failure of 4 and 5 Armoured Brigades in attack!The same tendency was present at the Corps level, althoughn the Indians improved over it since they had the system of corps in vogue earlier than Pakistan Army.

They learnt it from 1965 when their 1 Corps had miserably failed to function as a Corps. Even in Shakargarh the Indians failed to concentrate more than one armoured regiment at any one place at a particular time. The Battle of Barapind was the triumph of one unit over a brigade in defence but proved that the Gadgor experience;ie inability of both armour commanders to handle more than one tank regiment was valid even in 1971!

The only man in the subcontinent who came close to succesful handling of more than one tank regiment in offence was an infantry general (like Rommel) ie General Eftikhar who despite near parity successfully handled an armoured force of more than two tank regiments. A small feat in western military terms but a big one in the Indo-Pak military scenario. Praval the Indian writer hit the nail on the head when he observed that in Shakargarh bulge the Indians failed to concentrate at any one time more than one tank regiment and that at no time was more than one tank regiment in action, or in contact with the enemy. EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES Clausewitz clearly and repeatedly stated many times in his book 'On War' that a strategic reserve that had no bearing on the decisive battle was a negation of the whole idea of having a strategic reserve. Thus what was the use of 6 Armoured Division or 17 Division when they did nothing and had no bearing on the whole battle of Shakargarh! There is some truth in Iqbal's verse 'Man never suffers defeat, without perishing he goes into retreat ROLE OF HEADQUARTER 1 CORPS The only role of 1 Corps Headquarters was handling of Corps reserves but commander 1 Corps abdicated from this responsibility taking no interest in what 8 Armoured Brigade did or what it was supposed to do. 1 Corps Headquarters was as a matter of fact overtaken by the friction of war. The gears of whole higher command mechanism of 1 Corps were jammed and Commander 1 Corps did not have the powerful iron will to overcome this friction, nor did he have the coup d oeil or operational vision to supply the much needed oil to lubricate the gears of 1 Corps operational ability.

1 Corps possessed numerical superiority over the Indians in armour, the arm of decision and had the potential to make the Indians react to its moves rather than reacting to their moves. As Fazal Muqeem rightly described 1 Corps assumed a passive role and merely kept reacting instead of seizing the initiative; which was well within its capability; keeping in view the relative superiority in tanks. So disgusted were the officers with the army high command, that the revolt which finally resulted in the exit of Yahya Khan started from 6 Armoured Division, which was not utilised at all throughout the war. 1 Corps Headquarters was vacillating and indecisive, unable to even assess as to which was the most dangerous enemy threat, and till 15 December was thinking of employing 8 Armoured Brigade for a raid at Nainakot, more than 20 miles east of Barapind!1 Corps Headquarters was also directly responsible for keeping the artillery out of the planning of operations. Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this antiartillery bias of Headquarters 1 Corps in the following words: 'When Headquarters 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur. Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarters Artillery I Corps was kept out of picture'39. Instead of ensuring that artillery, armour and all arms worked as a team, Commander 1 Corps established a precedence which aimed at increasing the inter arm rivalry which both Pakistan and Indian Armies had inherited from the British (but which had been reduced in Indian Army, by virtue of having an artillery C in C etc). Thus when commander 8 Armoured Brigade made his counterattack plans he did not consult the corps artillery Commander or any other infantry divisional artillery commander at all.40 ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION Barapind-Jarpal was essentially a failure in assessing a situation correctly. There was no doubt from 5 December onwards that the principal threat to Pakistani 1 Corps was from the 54 Division which although very slowly was surely advancing towards Zafarwal-Pasrur complex, possession of which was vital for anyone who wanted to hold the initiative in Shakargarh Bulge. 1 Corps Headquarters failed to assess this simple fact and did not function at all as an operational

headquarters except as a post office processing requests for reinforcements. The crossing of Basantar should not have come as a surprise at all on the morning of 16 December, but it appeared that the corps headquarters was not prepared for this eventuality. Instead the situations assessment was relegated to the holding infantry battalion and the infantry brigade commander made no serious attempt to keep a close liaison with either the armoured brigade headquarters. Even as late as the morning of 16 December he insisted that enemy strength across Basantar was no more than a tank troop and an infantry company. The armoured brigade commander also made no independent effort to confirm or disregard the assessment of the infantry commander and assumed that a tank regiment could deal with the situation without utilising divisional or corps artillery's fire support. The CO of 13 Lancers who should have been the most concerned person made no effort to assess the situation and was confident that one tank squadron could deal with the enemy! The engagement that followed was impromptu and 13 Lancers, was committed as a unit of sheer reflex action while conducting fire fights with individual Indian tanks. ROLE OF 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE HEADQUARTER VIS-A-VIS ITS UNITS 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters' failed in three counts; i.e. was the assessment of the situation, ability to employ the tank resources correctly and in incorporating artillery to support its offensive operations. The headquarters was formed in 1970 and the concept of an independent brigade fighting in the environment of a corps was new at least as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned. The operational situation in 1971, was far more complex than the one in 1965 when the 6 Armoured Division was fighting a battle on a twelve mile frontage with an enemy which was only attacking it frontally. In 1971 1 Corps was dealing with an operational situation in which Shakargarh Bulge was being attacked from three distinct directions over a frontage which was more than 60 miles wide with no clear cut operational plan to counter it. 8 Armoured Brigade had worked on about 25 contingencies and operated in an environment in which its corps headquarters was already paralysed by indecision and vacillation.Later on it became fashionable to criticise Brigadier Ahmad and to state that it was a failure of one man. Brigadier Ahmad was one of the finest officers of the armoured corps and was therefore placed in

an independent command. The failure of 8 Armoured Brigade was not failure of one individual but that of the whole Pakistan Armoured Corps! The blunders were committed at all levels and 13 Lancers lost most of its tanks, not because of Brigadier Ahmad but because of the erratic attitude of its CO who on his own decided to reap some glory by ordering an attack when he had been ordered by his brigade commander to go into counter penetration position. 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarter's major failure was in failure to utilise artillery; but we must remember that at that time and to some extent till even now at least in armoured corps, artillery was despised as an arm, and any other man in Ahmad's place would have acted no differently41. It appears that 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters was unnerved once 13 Lancers was decimated and ordered 31 Cavalry to attack at once without realising that the one tank regiment attacking at the same place where another had just failed was against all tactical principles! It is possible that Brigadier Ahmad was forced to bring in 31 Cavalry since the high losses of 13 Lancers had created a grave situation which could be remedied only by bringing in another tank regiment, to deter the Indians from exploiting their tremendous success against 13 Lancers. Even the contrast between 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry's conduct was glaring. 31 Cavalry despite being a new unit conducted its attack in a far more deliberate manner than 13 Lancers; something which was noticed; as we have already discussed even by the Indian armoured corps historian. The unnecessary losses that 13 Lancers suffered were entirely avoidable had its CO followed the instructions he had received and went for a counter penetration position. The Indians fought well, but they did so out of sheer desperation!It is ironic that while armour was singled out as an arm for the Barapind failure,the disease which had led to it was not diagnosed.It was a disease born in the Ayub-Musa era and had a deep connection with the British military legacy afflicting the whole army. Brigadier Ahmad was not promoted after the war, but this had less to do with Barapind and more with personal likes and dislikes! GOC 8 Division whose conduct as we have discussed was complimented by Fazal Muqeem was promoted! Another Brigadier who did not have the moral courage to join his brigade in Chamb and evaded active service on the pretext of martial law duty, was promoted and became a full general! GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION

The failure at Barapind was later rationalised by saying that the Indian threat was grave and that the blunders committed were a natural result of the confusion caused because of the gravity of the threat! We will examine this extremely fallacious assertion in brief. The principal decision makers as we have seen assessed that the enemy in front was a troop of tanks or a squadron and thought in a most cavalier manner that it could be swept aside by just sending a tank regiment without any deliberate corps artillery support! The corps commander specifically used the words restore the situation by use of minimum force, thus implying that the threat was not as grave as to merit the employment of maximum force!Even keeping in view the relative strength the Indians were not capable of achieving much. What did they have; a tank regiment and two Madras and one Grenadier battalions against three Pakistani tank regiments and one infantry brigade immediately available and one tank division and infantry division within 20 miles of the bridgehead! And if the threat was so grave, how was it that 1 Corps realised its gravity only at 0430 hours on 16 December.Two factors stand out in the whole affair. One was a vacillating and highly indecisive corps headquarters which had no clear grasp of the operational situation and viewed things in view of straight geometrical lines like a drill sergeant major! There was no cause for concern and 8 Armoured Brigade was leisurely being told to raid Nainakot till 15 December and suddenly the situation became grave when the enemy crossed the line of no penetration. What was the rationale in not accepting the gravity of threat from 5 December onwards and resorting to countermeasures to wrest the initiative from the enemy, when it was evident that the intention of this particular enemy division was to capture Zafarwal and to cross the so called line of no penetration!

The second factor which stands out is that 8 Division Commander, 24 Brigade Commander and perhaps the armoured brigade commander wanted to achieve a local victory which they suddenly realised was much required keeping in view the drain on the morale of own troops due to the constant withdrawal through the various layers of minefields since 05 December. If this was the motivation then the modus operandi in which it was aimed at was extremely costly! The thirst for glory and honour are perfectly reasonable and honourable aspirations provided they are matched by equal willingness to share risks of battle and are

accompanied by strength of intellect and ability and the resolution to execute a viable plan. These were sadly missing in all headquarters from brigade and onwards!It appears that the prime motivation in all the principal decision makers mind at both brigade and regimental level in 8 Armoured Brigade was ''thirst for glory'' which they thought was cheaply purchasable by launching a squadron or two at a force estimated at six or seven tanks or a squadron at the most; not a grave threat, and something that could be dealt with by utilising, just one third of 8 Armoured Brigade's tank strength! It was only after 16 December when the outcome turned out to be disastrous; was a myth created that 8 Armoured Brigade despite suffering colossal losses had saved Shakargarh Bulge or Zafarwal! That the enemy in front was a tank brigade or two tank regiments; and certainly not a single tank regiment; which unfortunately was the actual case! Injustice to the brigade commander it must be admitted that he had asked 13 Lancers to contain the enemy by fire; but CO 13 Lancers on his own overzealous attitude decided to attack! Had he died like Akram Raja of 35 FF the trauma may have been much less! At Chawinda just six years earlier the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division with a lesser strength in infantry but parity in tanks had stopped the whole Indian 1st Armoured Division aided by two infantry divisions from breaking out! Here at Chawinda; the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division had stopped the Indians not by charging without artillery support; but by making optimum use of tanks containing the Indians by fire and defeating Indian infantry attacks by artillery fire. At Barapind what was the gravity in containing an Indian infantry brigade with one tank regiment with three tank regiments and one foot infantry and one mechanised infantry battalion by fire as was done six years earlier with exactly the same Patton tanks in defence and the same Indian Centurion tanks seeking to breakthrough!!!! Since I joined the armoured corps in 1981 I heard thousands of time that despite losses 8 Armoured Brigade had done a wonderful job! The fact remains that the only people who did a wonderful job despite all the tactical ineptness at regiment and above were the officers and men of 13 Lancers; men like Major Nasir41a who were praised by the Indians, or 35 FF who assaulted in face of certain destruction!

EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARMOUR The battle of Bara Pind was not only a failure of Brigade and Corps level but also a failure at tactical level. It is unfortunate that while the armoured brigade commander was criticised, the fact that execution at regimental level played as much a part in failure as the higher headquarters was ignored.The battle even without sufficient artillery support was not as potentially disastrous as made by the piecemeal and cavalier manner in which 13 Lancers was handled in particular by its CO. Instead of utilising the whole regiment to attack in depth he employed a squadron; ordering it into certain depth. The second attack involving two squadrons, however, came close to achieving a breakthrough; something which was admitted by the Indians and proves that a more deliberate attack by I Lancers could have led to a breakthrough. Gurcharan Singh thus said, 'Firstly it made no sense to attack with only one squadron at a time. The armour counter attack neither had the numerical advantage nor the depth to have a chance to succeed; the only occasion when a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last ditch stand by three tanks of Poona Horse averted the danger.' This proves that a regiment attack with all threquadrons could have succeeded and Bara Pind which has gone down in history as a childish blunder could have been a great battle if Commander 8 Brigade had insisted that 13 Lancers must attack as a regiment ... but then there were serious doctrinal and battle procedures in armoured corps as an arm and the fact that Bara Pind was a fiasco despite the fact that the best officer of the armoured corps was commanding the brigade; does not paint a bright picture about the armoured corps of that time! Later on the whole blame was heaped on the brigade commander and the fact that the failure had a lot to do with doctrine, poor tactics as taught and practised was ignored. This does not mean that the armoured corps did not have good brigadiers. Gurcharan Singh saw in Brigadier Nisar the commander of Changez Force a much better commander. He actually praised Changez Force saying; 'Pakistan armour functioned well in the role of covering troops.

It managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it could have planned for', a tribute from an enemy to a brigadier who was not promoted for having done well!

It is instructive to note that the Indians have admitted that the day was saved by a 'last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader', which means that Bara Pind like Gadgor in 1965 was a fluke where the Indians were able to hang on by the sheer skin of their teeth, while in 1965 it was one tank squadron in particular and ironically Brigadier Ahmad's squadron with Brigadier Ahmed in lead which saved the day! Perhaps there is a greater power which decides the fate of armies in which doctrine and tactics are taught in the manner of a novice and concentration is on polo; push and pull etc. EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY There was nothing new in employing or not employing artillery at Barapind! The fact that no use was made of the six field, eight medium and two heavy artillery batteries42 which could have been potentially utilised by 8 Brigade or 24 Brigade or 8 Division proves the presence of a disease which was not presently merely in 8 Armoured Brigade but in the whole army! Poor employment of artillery had led to a serious British reverse at Chillianwala in January 1849. The British learnt their lesson and made full use of artillery at the final battle of Gujrat if the 2nd Sikh War as a result of which they won this battle with minimum casualties. One British writer was frank enough to admit that Gujrat was won because of 'the power of superior artillery and disciplined cooperation against a more numerous, equally brave, but less coherent enemy compelled to fight on open ground'43. In Pakistan at least at the army level the role of artillery in all our successes was not fully appreciated as well as incorporated in doctrine training and in operational methodology. Thus the concentration was on the macho image of the tankman or infantry man whereas in reality artillery had played a decisive role in many Indian failures opposite Lahore, in Chamb and at Chawinda! Those from infantry and armour who dominated the scene were not honest enough to admit it; and thus at Barapind despite all the martial and Islamic fervour and a clear cut three to one majority in tanks, but

minus artillery support of something like 4 Corps Artillery Brigade; 8 Armoured Brigade; an elite fighting outfit ,was brought to grief; failing to dislodge one regiment of Centurions supported by three infantry units, out of which one was that of a mixed composition and two of those Madrasis despised as non-martial in Pakistan! Our soldiers were second to none in valour; but valour alone minus military talent, coup d oeil and artillery support is no guarantee of success. It was for this reason that G.G.O Number. 1277 of 1861 had laid down specifically:-'Resolved henceforward, with such few exceptions as may be rendered necessary by local considerations, there shall be no native artillery'.44

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN CASUALTIES I came across the assertion many times while in service that 1 Corps caused enormous casualties on the Indians in Shakargarh. This assertion is not proved by facts. The toughest battles of the 1971 war were fought opposite 54 Division and the following facts do not prove that 54 Division suffered high casualties45:Formation 10 Division -Chhamb 54 DivisionShakargarh 67 BrigadeSulaimanke Kill Missing ed 440 190 76 Wound Prisone Tota ed r l 723 272 425 60 195 Included in 1353 Missing 298 811 81 278

190 196 28

4 Para-Jalwala 21 Shyok -Kargil 55

This cannot be Reconciled Rest of the since many missing were Formations on 846 subsequently found the Western PW/wounded/killed Front categories TOTAL 162 253 8

2456

No 3703 Figures 6,52 4

4131

512

Now compare the Pakistani losses of 35 FF at Jarpal ie 64 killed,75 wounded and 12 missing46 or that of 13 Lancers which exceeded the figure of 50 casualties. Were these necessary or justified and for what purpose? Just because one feather in someone's cap was wanted. Had there been an Eftikhar leading from the front these losses may have made some sense! AN ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONAL REMEDY It has frequently been asserted that 1 Corps had no other alternative but to resort to a passive defence. This is a totally false assertion, if we take into account the resources available to 1 Corps vis-a-vis the Indians. 1 Corps had nine tank regiments in all as against six Indian tank regiments in Shakargarh Bulge. Further 17 Division was not utilised at all to do anything throughout the war. In Chamb with just a slight numerical superiority and qualitative inferiority in tanks and parity in infantry General Eftikhar wrested the initiative from Indians in such a manner that by 10th December the Indians had withdrawn one battalion from 168 Brigade in the 'X Force Sector' opposite Charwa in 1 Corps area, and had placed the same brigade at few hours notice to move to Chamb in view of 23 Divisions attack at Pallanwala. The Pakistani GHQ's strategy in Shakargarh was reactive rather than proactive, and all initiative despite numerical superiority in armour was surrendered to the Indians. A strategy involving a more offensive posture would have definitely forced the overcautious Indians to resort to the defensive. It was here that we enter the realm of military talent. There was no general officer in 1 Corps with the operational talent or resolution of an Eftikhar; and this in the final analysis was the singular misfortune of Pakistan's 1 Corps. Till ceasefire five armoured regiments were kept on sentry duty in Pasrur area and were not utilised. The saying that a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity, can be exactly applied to 1 Corps conduct of battle in Shakargarh Bulge.

LEVEL OF STRATEGIC SUCCESS

The Indian 1 Corps Commander was able to impose his will in strategic terms on Pakistan's 1 Corps. With a slight relative superiority in infantry (if 17 Division is included) the Indian 1 Corps commander succeeded on two counts; firstly in ensuring that Pakistan's 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division remained fixed in Shakargarh and secondly by exerting such a pressure; despite his numerical inferiority in tanks that the Pakistani GHQ was enough unnerved to pull out 11 Cavalry from Chamb on 10 December; and bring it to Pasrur (also destroying Satrah Road on the way with their steel tracks!!!!); thereby reducing the pressure that Pakistan's 23 Division was exerting on the Indians and ultimately leading to 23 Divisions withdrawal to the west bank of Tawi. The Indian Corps Commander was not brilliant but definitely more decisive and bold; at least as compared to 1 Corps Commander opposing him. So apprehensive was this man of Pakistani offensive capability that he initially assigned four out of his nine infantry brigades and two tank regiments out of six for a defensive role. Once he realised that the Pakistani commander opposite him was not like Abrar Akhtar or Eftikhar; he mustered greater resolution and used his troops more offensively. FRONTAL ATTACK IN MILITARY HISTORY VERSUS IMAGINATIVE USE OF TANKS IN DEFENCE A frontal attack against an enemy who has not been neutralised by artillery fire or surprised by following a stratagem has rarely succeed.

In 1815 at New Orleans when the British Army was one of the finest armies of the world; a similar frontal attack had led to one of the most disastrous repulses in British military annals! Thus the British suffered 2037 casualties including their commanding general killed while the US defenders suffered just 61 casualties47! It is interesting that to note that tank is such a versatile weapon system; that the worst possible tank in defence can play havoc with the best tank when it comes to firing at an advancing tank from a stationery defensive position. The Italians in North Africa had the technically speaking most pathetic tanks of WW Two. During the battle of 'Crusader' in November 1941 the British 22nd Armoured Brigade equipped with the technically overwhemingly superior 'Crusader' Tanks with 2 Pounder gun and

49mm frontal armour lost 40 out of 160 tanks when it gallantly but frontally charged the far inferior Italian Ariete Division equipped with M-13 tanks! Most of the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns which were closely integrated with Italian tanks! In July 1944 SS Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman was able to stop the British 7th Armoured Division with just four Tiger Tanks, annihilating their complete advance guard, knocking out 25 tanks, 14 carriers and 14 half tracks! Wittman did so without charging, but by conducting a highly imaginative defensive battle!
Notes 1 Page-199-Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973. 2 Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1990. 3 I had the privilege of serving in 15 SP in its 'R' Battery which was one of the units of 8 Independent Armoured Brigade, under Major Zohrab,one of the most upright officers that I came across in the army, from 9 August 1984 to 10th October 1984 in Kharian as well as Dhamtal-Qila Sobha Singh area,at a time when war was imminent, and thus was able to interview many gunners who had taken part in the Barapind Battle.15 SP in 1984 was still equipped with Priest Self Propelled Guns of WW Two vintage,which it had at the time of Battle of Barapind.In 1984 these guns although extremely efficiently handled were at the last leg of their life,and this in itself was a direct tribute to 15 SPs excellence as a unit. 4 Most Pakistani authors while discussing 1 Corps operations conveniently omit mentioning 6 Armoured Division.This includes General Shaukat Riza who wrote the officially sponsored history of the 1971 war.Shaukat did not mention at all in his book that the 6 Armoured Division was also in I Corps area of operations around a place called Pasrur and gave no reason why this division was condemned to stationary guard duty throughout the war! Unfortunately instead of dispassionately analysing our previous wars,there has been a marked tendency in our country,that motivates military historians to rationalise all our failures by citing the excuse that we were outnumbered and all the battles where our military commanders blundered were ones in which defeat or failure was inevitable. 5 Page-199-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit. 6 Page-190-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 7 Page-191-Ibid. 8 Page-190-Ibid.

10 A lazy second line para military force which performs sentry duty at various ordnance factories. Thus in planning terms Pakistan's numerical superiority and technical parity in armour by virtue of 6 Armoured Division and the considerable infantry resources of 17 Division although available were assigned no role in the area of operations.Why this was done has not been touched at all by Shaukat Riza and Gul Hassan in their otherwise lengthy accounts? 11 Page-29-The Western Front-Lt Gen K.P Candeth (Retired)-Allied Publishers-New Delhi-1984. 12 Page-495-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-19411971-Maj Gen Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993. 13 Page-65-Candeth-Op Cit and page-495-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. This led to despatch of 33 Infantry Brigade of 39 Division to Poonch on 21 November,since the Pakistani build up opposite Poonch had started from November. 14 Page-213-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit and page-195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-72-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Col Saeed-Army Education Press-GHQRawalpindi-1979. 15 The assertion by many eminent personalities in Pakistan Armoured Corps in particular that the Indians got two nights to consolidate their position before 8 Armoured Brigade attacked it on the morning of 16 December 1971 has no conection with facts,and is merely a figment of these honourable gentlemen's cavalier imagination! General Jahangir Karamat who was one of the squadron commanders in 13 Lancers at Barapind admitted that 'At 0430 hours on 16th December the infantry formation in defence informed the armoured brigade headquarters that the enemy had breached the minefield at Basantar Nala at Lagwal' (Page-3'The Tank Attack that Failed'- Brigadier Jahangir Karamat- Sabre and Lance Magazine-1982 Issue-School of Armour Nowshera-1983. 16 Page-511-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987.This was Lieutenant Colonel V.Ghai of 16 Madras.The three infantry battalions of this brigade were 3 Grenadiers,6 Madras and 16 Madras). 17 Page-510-Ibid. 18 Page-504-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 18a Ibid and Page-513-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.Authors Note;-The Jat Sikhs of Hissar were an extremely tough lot famous for rowdiness and riotous habits.This was noted by an ICS officer Badruddin Tayyabji who served in Hissar before partition.The Jat Sikhs of Sisana and surrounding villages were famous before partition for distilling 'illicit home made liqour also known as Desi'.This created a close bond between them and many Ranghar Muslims of the same district!After partition many Ranghar Muslims of Sisana settled in Multan,Khanewal and Vihari districts and continue to brew excellent Desi with a far superior impact than any western brand, as per

the 'Sisana' recipee!I have been always curious to know whether Sisana is still famous for the Desi which many old Ranghar armoured corps soldiers of Hissar used to nostalgically remember long after partition! 18bIbid. 18c Ibid. 19 Page-2-'Sabre and Lance' Issue-1982-Op Cit . 20 Page-215-Fazal Muqeem Khan.Late Major General Abdullah Saeed described 1 Corps Headquarters in 1971 as a headquarter struck by inertia and a paralysis.It is impossible to substantiate this assertion,but a dispassionate analysis of the 1 Corps battle proves that decisiveness,resolution or energy in conduct of operations were certainly not the hallmarks of 1 Corps Commander's personality. 21 Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit. 22 Ibid. 23 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 24 Ibid. 25 A Role in which tanks occupy hides covering the most likely enemy tank approaches.from these the tanks move to pre arranged and possibly pre prepared fire positions with the aim of halting the enemy attack which has penetrated in between localities or overrun them' (Refers-GSP-1518Armoured Regiment in Battle-1972).The Glossary of Military Terms GSP1538 of 1973 defined counter penetration as 'The action taken by a defender to halt penetration of his defences by the enemy and to destroy by fire enemy forces which have penetrated between his defended localities'. 26 Page-194 & 195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit.General Jahangir Karamat specifically stated that the CO of 13 Lancers stated the number of enemy tanks to be not more than 'six or seven'.Thus there is a discrepancy here in between Shaukat Riza and Jahangir's account. 27 Page-3-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit. 28 Page-4-Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.It may be noted that 13 Lancers was never ordered to capture the 'Carthage or Rome' that Barapind was but to go into counter penetration opposite Jarpal.This undue emphasis on the glory of capturing villages with mud houses or stating that they were never driven out is a good indicator of the extreme myopicness of the Indo-Pak

military mind!The Kargil episode with both sides making claims of retaining or capturing Tiger Hill etc proves that despite all the NDCs and AFWCs the emphasis still is on tactical gains rather than at anything more significant. 31 Page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.The Indian Armoured Corps historian praised 13 Lancers gallantry mentioning in particular Major Nisar (actually Major Nasir later Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir or Pervez Nasir).The 13 Lancers did extremely well what they were told to do as far as their squadron commanders and all lower echelons were concerned.Posterity will remember the services of all who participated in that grim battle from major and downwards. 31a Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 32 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 33 Page-4-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit. 34 Page-4-Ibid. 35 Page-196-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 36 Page-196-Ibid. 37 Page-508 and 509-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 38 Page-215 and 216-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit. 39 Page-188-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 40 Page-194-Ibid. 41 Brigadier Ahmad was described by most armoured corps officers as one of the finest and most competent officers of the armoured corps. 41a Nasir was conspicuous in being praised by both Gurcharan Singh and K.C Praval (refers-page513-K.C Praval-op cit and page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit).I think the only Major at least from armoured corps,so openly and frankly praised by the Indians for leading his squadron from the front .It's a pity that he never became a major general! 42 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 43 Page-148-The Punjab in Peace and War-S.S Thorburn-1904-London 44 Page-20-The History of the Indian Mountain Artillery-Brig Gen C.A.L Graham-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1957. 45 Based on K.C Praval and Candeths books-Op Cit. 46 Page-197-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

47 Page-3-The Birth of the Modern World Society-1815-1830-Paul JohnsonHarper Collins-New York-1991.The exact casualties were:-British:-291 killed and remaining missing/wounded;US:-13 Killed,29 Wounded and 19 Missing. 48 Page-135 and 136-Tank Commanders-George Forty-Firebird Books-UK1993.

ALL MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN IN JANUARY 2000 AND PUBLISHED IN JANUARY 2002 IN DEFENCE JOURNAL , KARACHI. CLICK ON MAPS TO ENLARGE The Western Theatre in 1971 A Strategic and Operational Analysis A.H AMIN January 2002 The Western Front in 1971 War has not received the due attention that it deserved from the point of view of lessons learnt and generalship in action. The obvious reasons for this reason lie in the fact that the East Pakistan crisis was the focus of attention and the surrender a Dacca was too large an historical event! The war on the Western Front is an invaluable study in terms of strategy, operational leadership and battle tactics. The future reorganisation of Pakistan and Indian Army was done based on the experiences of 1971.Historical BackgroundThe 1965 War produced a major change in both Indo-Pak armies. In Pakistan Army the two key lessons derived from 1965 War were to have more infantry and to have intermediate higher commands between units and brigades based on the corps rather than the division command concept. Till 1965 Pakistani GHQ had naively hoped that division headquarter was a suitable level of operation command. Thus in 1965 Pakistan Army had just one corps headquarter and all other formations were divisional headquarters which functioned under higher command of the GHQ.This concept of organisation had broken down in Khem Karn where the main Pakistani attack of the war was launched. Further there had been lack of cooperation between the armoured and infantry division in this battle since no higher corps headquarter was controlling

both the divisions and the infantry and armoured division commander had a personality clash. The Pakistani GHQ now firmly decided to iron out these contradictions and created three more corps headquarters i.e Headquarter 2 Corps to control/coordinate Pakistans 1st Armoured Division and its sister infantry formation, Headquarter 4 Corps to control operations of the 10 and 11 Division in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and Eastern Command to command the troops stationed in East Pakistan. Organisationally the Pakistan Army was now on a sound footing, but this process was soon derailed since political developments, threw the entire post-1965 reorganisation to winds. Developments in East Pakistan in 1971 forced the Pakistani GHQ to move its strategic reserves i.e 9 and 16 Divisions to East Pakistan.These divisions had been raised in 1966-68 soon after 1965 War. This necessitated the raising of two more divisions to take the place of the reserve divisions sent to East Pakistan i.e the 33 and 37 Divisions. The 23 Division was raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 to look after the Chamb-Dewa area thus reducing the 12 Division of the burden of looking after a 200 mile plus area of responsibility.18 Division was raised at Hyderabad to look after the 560 mile stretch between Rahimyar Khan and Rann of Katch. The Indians also drew significant lessons from 1965 War and increased the number of formations protecting their line of communication between Pathankot and Jammu and in giving greater importance to the hitherto neglected area south of Sutlej starting from Sulaimanke. In addition the Indian High Command keeping the political developments in East Pakistan changed its 1965 Strategy of attacking West Pakistan in strength and decided to launch their major attack on East Pakistan from early 1971. To do this Indians had to use three corps i.e 2,4 and 33 Corps. Pakistani Forces and Plans-Western TheatreTill 1965 Pakistan Army keeping in view its equipment and training was relatively superior to the Indian Army. India under Nehru was a peaceful country but the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 transformed the whole scenario. Thus while Indian Army had by and large registered no major expansion since 1947 after 1962 the Indians embarked on a highly ambitious expansion programme.It was Pakistans good luck that in 1965 this process was at a very rudimentary stage, however by 1971

the whole strategic scenario had changed from 1965.Indian Army as it stood in 1971 was much stronger vis-a-vis Pakistan Army as compared with the situation of 1965. Fazal Muqeem was thus not wrong when he stated that with the almost daily expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war, it had become economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with her. The policy of matching Indian strength with even 1/3 or 1/4 in numbers had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all that Pakistan could do was to avoid war with India and to strive to resolve her disputes through political and diplomatic means.1 The only problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period 1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs was ready to think so realistically and rationally! Fazals wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight, expressed some two years after Pakistan Army had fought the disaster and humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was dismembered into two countries. Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the armys Chief of General Staff and thus Principal Staff Officer to the C in C soon after the 1965 war. In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who was not lavish in praising anyone planning had taken a turn for the better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of General Staff.2 However, Muqeem adds that the armys war plans in the post1965 era were still vague about what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted against East Pakistan.3 The two statements somewhat contradictory prove that although planning improved Yaqub did not give a concrete answer or plan to solve Pakistans strategic dilemma.Although no archives have been declassified Fazal Muqeem who had access to various highly classified documents by virtue of being secretary defence armed with semiofficial mandate from the then prime minister to write a book on 1971 war states that the plan of mounting a counter-offensive from the Western Theatre centred around a corps with an armoured division and two infantry divisions ......while remainder of the army was to perform mainly a holding role. The most significant aspect of the armys main plan of attack i.e when to launch the attack as per the then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army,General Gul Hassan Khan was left undecided.5 Muqeem states that There appears to have been a heated discussion on the timing of launching a counter-offensive.

There were two schools of thought here i.e one who favoured an immediate counter-offensive in relation to any Indian invasion of East Pakistan while the second a procrastinating one maintained that counter offensive should commence only after completion of preliminary operations to fix and divert the attention of the enemy.6 PAKISTANI WAR PLAN IN THE WESTERN THEATRE Pakistani plan in the Western Front was as following: Preliminary/Fixing Operations: a. 12 Infantry Division at Opposite Poonch. The aim was to force the Indians to reinforce Poonch thus weakening their other formations in 15 Corps and 1 Corps areas of responsibility,thus improving chances of success of 23 Division in Chamb and a possible counter attack by 6 Armoured Division in Shakargarh-Sialkot area. b. 23 Infantry Division in Chamb Sector. Not allowing the Indians to exploit a jumping area opposite Pakistans soft underbelly and crucial North-South line of communications passing via Gujrat. This division was allotted two additional infantry brigades (111 and 66) an independent armoured brigade(2 Armoured Brigade) for the task.111 Brigade was a reserve brigade while 66 Brigade originally belonged to 17 Division. c. 18 Division Opposite Jaisalmer-Longanewala. It was hypothesised that this attack would attack Indian armour southwards thus making Pakistans 1st Armoured Divisions task in Ganganagar area easier. Another aim of this attack was to protect the vulnerable Pakistani North-South road link which was just about 65 kilometres from the border in this area. d. 105 Independent Infantry Brigade Group opposite Fazilka. This was essential to ensure the safety of the most crucial Sulaimanke Headworks which was just about 1500 metres from the international boundary.

Main Attack-Counter Offensivea. a. Attack with 1st Armoured Division and two infantry divisions (7 and 33) opposite Ganganagar-Anupnagar. b. This force after crossing the Bikaner Canal (Gong Canal) opposite Bahawalnagar was to capture Bhatinda and then swing north to possibly threaten Ludhiana. Candeth the Indian C in C Western Command was of the opinion that the main objective of this Pakistani attack was to cut the road Ferozpur-Ludhiana and then isolate/eliminate Indian garrison at Ferozpur.7 The Pakistani official historian Shaukat Riza in line with the pedantic sub continental tradition of hiding what is no longer relevant even two decades after an event states nothing about aims/objectives of this grand counter offensive in his monumental The Pakistan Army-1966-71. Formations in Holding Rolea. 12 Division in Kashmir except in Poonch Sector.b. 23 Division in Hill Sector North of Dewa.c. 8 and 15 Division in Sialkot and Shakargarh Bulge.d. 10 and 11 Division in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.e. 18 Division in all sectors except Reti-Ubauro.f. Northern Area Scouts in Northern Areas. Formations tasked for Counter Penetration or Counter attack Role:--a. 6 Armoured Division less two armoured regiments detached to command 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Group under command 23 Division in Chamb and 17 Infantry Division less one infantry brigade detached under command 23 Division in Chamb to counter attack in Ravi-Chenab Corridor when ordered. Both formations were under command Headquarter 1 Corps and were also army reserves. 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Headquarter was given two units of the 6 Armoured Division i.e 11 Cavalry and the newly raised 28 Cavalry.2 Independent Armoured Brigade Headquarter had been raised following a wargame held in August 1970 which had concluded that Pakistan had insufficient reserves for a reasonable counter offensive.8 b. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade stationed in general area Pasrur and tasked to carry out various contingency counter-attack or counter penetration tasks when ordered by Headquarter 1 Corps.8 Armoured Brigade had been raised based on findings of a wargame held in August 1970 by withdrawing integral armoured regiments from some infantry divisions.

c. 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade stationed in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor under command Headquarter 4 Corps was tasked with various contingency counter attack plans of counter attack/counter penetration.15 Lancers one of the units of this brigade was assigned the responsibility of looking after the line of Sutlej River from Kasur till north of Sulaimanke. CLICK ON MAPS TO ENLARGE

Recently in a book published in 1998 Brigadier Z.A Khan stated that this brigade was also to perform duties of flank protection with the 2 Corps counter offensive force.9

Indian Forces and Plans-Western Theatre

Indian strategy in the Western Theatre was basically to stay on the defensive while its Eastern Command conducted an all out offensive campaign aimed at reducing East Pakistan. The prime aim in words of Gurcharan Singh Sandhu being to prevent Pakistan from being any sizeable inroads into Indian territory10 while the Eastern Command was busy in the creation of Bangladesh Indian Forces a. Western Command: Commanded by Lieutenant General K.P Candeth consisting of 15 Corps (Lieut General Sartaj Singh) deployed in Kashmir,1 Corps (Lieut Gen K.K Singh) was tasked with the defence of the area from Aik Nala in Kashmir till and excluding Dera Baba Nanak Enclave on the Ravi River north of Amritsar and 11 Corps (Lieut Gen N.C Rawlley) holding area from Dera Baba Nanak Enclave in the North till a point on the Rajhastan border south of Anupgarh. b. Southern Command: Commanded by Lieut General G.G Bewoor this command was responsible for the defence of area starting from Bikanir Sector in the North till the Arabian Sea in the south.This area of responsibility of this command was divided in four sectors i.e Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer and Katch. This command had two divisons i.e 12 Division in the north and 11 Division holding Barmer and Katch Sectors.In addition it was supported by an armoured regiment, two independent armoured squadrons and one missile squadron. c. Army Reserves: 1st Armoured Division was stationed in Muktsar area against the expected Pakistani 2 Corps Counteroffensive in Ganganagar area.14 Infantry Division was stationed with Headquarters in Faridkot area.This division was also given some defensive responsibilities by Headquarter 11 Corps in Ferozpur and Fazilka Sectors. CLICK ON MAPS TO ENLARGE

Indian plan/dispositionsWestern Command: a. 15 Corps : This corps consisted of five infantry divisions (3,19,25,10 and 26) and one independent armoured brigade.3rd Infantry Division was tasked to hold Ladakh Sector bordering Chinese Held Tibet and till Fortu La Pass. Since no threat was expected in this sector one of the infantry brigades of this division was stationed at Suratgarh area. The other two brigades of the 3rd Mountain Division were in their divisional area while the independent brigade holding Kargil Sector (Fortu La Pass to Zoji La Pass) was also placed under command 3rd Division. The Partapur Sector opposite Shyok River Gorge was held by Ladakh Scouts.19 Division was looking after the Kashmir Valley Sector from Zojila Pass till Hajipir Bulge in the Pir Panjal Range.25 Division was in charge of the Rajauri Sector comprising Rajauri,Poonch and Nowshera areas. 10 Division was looking after the Hill Sub Sector and Chamb.15 Corps was given the defensive tasks in all areas except 10 Division in Chamb Sector. 10 Division was tasked to attack towards Gujrat-Tanda area based on the assumption that an offensive posture in this area was the

best guarantee for the defence of Chamb. The Corps Headquarter of this corps was at Udhampur. b. 1 Corps: This corps consisted of three infantry divisions (36,39 and 54) and two independent armoured brigades (2 and 16). This corps was assigned an offensive task of attacking Pakistans Shakargarh Bulge with a view to commit Pakistans 1 Corps into defensive tasks thus ensuring that Pakistan could not launch any offensive adventure in Indian territory specially against the Indian line of communication from Punjab to Kashmir i.e the Gurdaspur-Pathankot-Samba-Jammu Road. This corps move to the area was carried out as a direct reaction to the movement of the strike elements of Pakistans 1 Corps i.e 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Divisions into the Ravi-Chenab Corridor. The reader may note that the Shakargarh Bulge by virtue of its close proximity to Pathankot-Samba-Jammu Road, was a great source of mental tension to the Indian High Command.11 The Indians saw the bulge as a great natural threat and 1 Corps prime task was to ensure that Pakistans 1 Corps could not use this bulge as a diving board to launch a lightning thrust against the Indian line of communication from Indian Punjab into Kashmir. Thus 1 Corps was given various offensive tasks in Shakargarh like capture of Shakargarh and Zafarwal. 1 Corps was tasked to first contain any Pakistani advance in Indian territory frontally and to then deliver a riposte against Pakistani line of communications so as to force them back.12c. 11 Corps:11 Corps consisted of three infantry divisions i.e 15 Division, 7 Division and Foxtrot Sector (ad hoc) and an independent armoured brigade (14 Armoured Brigade). 14 Armoured Brigade theoretically consisted of five armoured regiments (18 Cavalry, 62 Cavalry, 64 Cavalry, 70 Armoured Regiment, 71st Armoured Regiment,) one independent recce tank squadron and one mechanised infantry battalion. Practically most of its units were dished out to 86 Brigade in Dera Baba Nanak Enclave ,F Sector and Mike Force and it only retained one tank regiment i.e 64 Cavalry (T-54). The area of responsibility of the corps was from Dera Baba Nanak Enclave in the north till a point near Anupgarh in Bikaner area. No major fighting took place in this corps area, however, the vast bulk of Indian armour units were stationed in this corps area of responsibility during the war.15 Division (Four infantry brigades and two armoured regiments)was responsible for defence of area from Dera Baba Nanak Enclave till and including Lahore-Amritsar Road.

In addition 11 Corps had a reserve brigade taken from 14 Infantry Division in Ajnala area.7 Infantry Division (Three brigades and an armoured regiment)was responsible for axis Khalra-Lahore,Khem Karan-Kasur and Ferozpur-Kasur till and including Jalalabad South of Ferozpur. F Sector (three infantry brigades and approx seven tank squadrons) was responsible for area from excluding Jalalabad till a point south of Anupgarh. Mike Force was a reserve held by Western Command.This force consisted of 62nd Cavalry (T-55),18TH Cavalry less B Squadron (T-54), one Mechanised Infantry Company and a medium artillery regiment.Its headquarter was at Abohar and the units were located east of Ganganagar.

In addition 11 Corps had a reserve brigade taken from 14 Infantry Division in Ajnala area. Before 1965 both sides had hardly any troops in the area south of Sutlej less Fazilka which was held by a brigade each. After 1965 both sides constructed extensive obstacles in the entire area from Chamb till Sutlej making the area literally extremely expensive to trespass ! Thus the emphasis after 1965 shifted to area south of Sutlej River and both sides knew that any major attack would come in the area south of Sutlej. Thus the area south of Sutlej in 11 Corps area of responsibility was accorded great importance.Thus the Foxtrot Sector backed by an armoured division to its immediate rear. Army Reserves: a. 1st Armoured Division: (Four Tank Regiments) . b. 14 Division: Three infantry brigades. c. These Indian Army Reserves stationed in 11 Corps area of responsibility. The 11 Corps and Western Command in consonance with the tradition of bullying lower headquarters wrested two brigades (one placed at Ajnala and one to Hussainiwala) from 14 Infantry Division. However 1st Armoured Division commander successfully resisted these attempts from both higher headquarters.13 Both these divisions were tasked to counter any attack by Pakistans 2 Corps in the area south of Sutlej. The Indian GHQ had positioned 1st Armoured Division at Muktsar North of Fazilka and East of Bikanir Canal thus in case the Pakistani 1 Corps attack had been launched the Pakistanis would have had a free run till the Bikanir Canal. However it appears that the Indian plan in this area was to subject any Pakistani thrust to stiff resistance on the line of Bikanir Canal.Candeth the Indian Army Commander Western Command states that the reason for placing 1st Armoured Division North of Fazilka was to deny Pakistans 1st Armoured Division the opportunity to threaten Ferozpur or Ferozpur-Ludhiana Road.14 Southern Command: The Southern Command had two divisions deployed along Pakistans southern border i.e the 11th and 12th Infantry Divisions. There were four sectors in this command i.e Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer and Kutch. Fighting took place only in the Jaisalmer and Barmer Sectors while the other two sectors saw negligible activity because of absence of communications. Indian deployment/plans were as following:

a. 12 Division: This division was deployed in the Jaisalmer sector and was commanded by Major General Khambata with headquarters at Tanot 120 Kilometres north of Jaisalmer. This division had three infantry brigades,a tank regiment consisting of AMX-13 tanks, an independent tank squadron (T-55) and an engineer battalion. The division was tasked to advance on Axis Kishengarh-Rahimyarkhan towards the Pakistani communication centre Rahimyarkhan located on the main Pakistani north-south Lahore-Karachi Highway with a strength of one infantry battalion, light artillery regiment, one tank regiment (20 Lancers) and an independent tank squadron consisting of T-55 Tanks.Another holding brigade of the same division was to launch a diversionary attack by attacking and capturing Islamgarh. The third brigade was to hold a firm base. b. 11 Division: This division was deployed in Barmer Sector and was commanded by an armoured corps officer Major General R.D.R Anand. It was concentrated in Barmer area by October 1971. The division had two brigades and a tank squadron(T-55). It was tasked to capture Naya Chor by advancing along axis Gadra Road-Munabao.Subsidiary attacks were to be made on Khinsar and Chacchro. 1971 War Western Theatre 12 Division Operations The Pakistani plan to capture Poonch was a bold gamble undertaken with insufficient resources. The essential idea being to outflank main Indian defences at Poonch by an attack by infiltration capturing dominating features of Thanpir and Chandak to the east and rear of Poonch garrison thus threatening Indian line of communication going north to south over Poonch River thus forcing them to abandon Poonch. The Indian garrison at Poonch consisted of an infantry brigade (93 Brigade) while 12 Division had planned to infiltrate with two infantry brigades. The plan was sound in conception but failed because of irresolution at divisional level,loss of surprise, poor logistic arrangements and refusal of Indian brigade commander at Poonch to panic.Surprise was lost before the operation was launched since Indian intelligence gave their higher headquarters about the impending operation. Thus the Indians reinforced the area before war had begun (on 25 November )15 with another brigade i.e the 33 Infantry Brigade from the 39 Division of 1 Corps tasked to attack Shakargarh Bulge.

This move certainly caused imbalance to the Indian 1 Corps plans against Shakargarh but saved Poonch. Pakistans 2 AK Brigade and 26 Brigade were to execute the plan. The attack initially went very smoothly and the Thanpir and Chandak Ridges were captured by Pakistan Army. However, Danna on the deep right flank of the Pakistani infiltrating brigade was strongly defended and resisted capture. The troops who had captured the Thanpir and Chandak Ridges were not adequately supplied, as per Fazal Muqeem the divisional commander Major General Akbar Khan (later a candidate for post of chief in 1976) did not lead from the front to give the required push and there was a lack of a necessary push and drive at brigade and battalion level.16 Finally the infiltrating force had to withdraw. There was no General Wolfe here to lead the infiltrating Pakistan Brigade onto the narrow path to victory.But then Wolfe died and Quebec was captured by his troops. At Poonch no Pakistani officer beyond colonel rank was killed and Poonch stayed in Indian hands! It may be added that the Northern Areas were given very low priority by the Pakistani GHQ. This enabled the Indians to capture important posts overlooking Kargil-Leh Road and in Paratpur Sector. Later these posts became the stepping ground for Indian infiltration into Siachen. 23 Division Operations Pakistans 23 Division was facing a larger division in Chamb yet it captured Chamb despite determined Indian opposition. After this the division established a bridgehead opposite Pallanwala across the Tawi to conduct further operations against Jaurian.The whole process came to a full stop on 10th December when Major General Eftikhar the indomitable GOC of the division was killed from injuries suffered in a helicopter crash. At this stage the Indian 10 Division had strong reserves which were uncommitted i.e an infantry brigade which was free after capturing the Phulkean Salient and the 3rd Armoured Brigade comprising 8th Light Cavalry (Vijayanta) and Central India Horse (T-55).However in case Pakistans 23 Division had captured a foothold across Tawi.These Indian reserves would have become committed. 1 Corps Operations

Pakistans 1 Corps was responsible for defence of Shakargarh Bulge and Sialkot.The Shakargarh Bulge offered many jumping areas for Pakistans 6th Armoured Division to sever the Indian line of communication from Pathankot to Jammu.The Pakistanis had three excellent minefields protecting the bulge apart from the Ravi River on the south and adequate reserves to launch an attack into Indian held Kashmir while the attacking Indians were caught in the three minefields.The Pakistani GHQ was, however, already dominated by a defensive mindset and the 1 Corps Commander was one known for procrastination,indecision and vacillation. A man of few words whose professionalism ended at checking arcs of fire of all infantry trenches of all infantry battalions holding the forward defended localities.Lieutenant General Irshad viewed his task as that of a sentry who had to react only when threatened and would do nothing else ! Thus the 6th Armoured Division remained on rear sentry duty around Pasrur and Daska while the 17 Division was deployed to defend the Marala-Ravi Link many miles in the rear and at no stage under any Indian threat.

The Indian Corps Commander K.K Singh was another PHENOMENALLY HOPELESS similarly typical sub continental corps commander,mediocre in operational outlook,immensely concerned about security,timid in

offensive operations.He was the same man because of whose irresolution and poor handling of armour the Indians failed to win the 1965 War within few hours at Gadgor on 8th September! K.K Singh had two armoured brigades and a comfortable superiority in infantry. However he was more concerned about security just like his Pakistani counter part and had deployed half of his corps in holding roles,divided his armour, dishing it out to holding infantry formations leaving two weak armoured brigades to lead infantry division advances at infantry pace at many points. The result in words of an Indian analyst was pathetic......there was total lack of offensive spirit at any level!17 However, by 15th December one Indian Division whose advance was spearheaded by a tank regiment had breached all three minefields! Now comes the reaction of Pakistans 1 Corps Commander like an NCO drilling a platoon of recruits! 8 Armoured Brigade is told to launch a counter attack to restore the situation with minimum force. No artillery beyond the obsolete 105 MM Priest Self-Propelled Guns was used to support the attack and the result was an Indian tank regiment contained with three Pakistani Tank Regiments two of which lost almost half of their tanks! One of the most unfortunate incidents of 1971 War was the 35 FF attack on Barapind-Jarpal. The Indian Armoured Corps historian called it an attack doomed to failure and one in which a heroic battalion was sacrificed to no purpose!18 Even Pakistani historian Fazal Muqeem found nothing correct in this attack and thus concluded The few counter attacks which 8 Division (Major General Abdul Ali Malik) tried during the war were noticeable by their lack of planning...The worst example of this attack was on December 17.19 The hallmark of higher commanders in both Pakistani and Indian 1 Corps was phenomenal incompetence. The Indians captured some large size mud villages of no strategic consequence which were returned at Simla Talks. Pakistans 6th Armoured Division and 17th Division remained unemployed and no effort was made by Pakistans 1 Corp Commander to wrest the initiative from the Indians or to make the Indian Corps Commander to his offensive moves! Mediocrity was the common factor on both sides in 1 Corps battle. The Indian 1 Corps Commander advanced because he was told to do so and the Pakistani 1 Corps Commander did not advance because no one told him to do so!Hopeless windbag generals on both sides.I think th situation has worsened since then and not improved.Good for both the countries. 4 Corps Battle Operations

4 Corps of Pakistan was in holding role in the Ravi Sutlej Corridor and facing about two Indian divisions with two of its own.Certain minor actions like capture of Indian Enclave opposite Hussainiwala Headworks took place in 4 Corps operational area. Hussainiwala was an enclave west of Sutlej and difficult to hold. The Indian battalion 15 Punjab fought well and this was acknowledged by Fazl Muqeem20 but was betrayed by its commanding officer who had pitched his headquarter in the safety of Sutlej River on the East bank.Most notable here was the conduct of Pakistans Lt Col Ghulam Hussain Chaudhry of 3rd Punjab who led his battalion from the front and was killed in action. One of the very few commanding officers to get killed in action on the Western Front. No road in any major cantonment is named after this brave man in Pakistan! Hussainiwala was a small affair in terms of casualties. The Indians who were well entrenched suffered a total of 19 Killed 21 casualties.105 Independent BrigadePakistans 105 Brigade carried out a small scale but highly aggressive operation in Sulaimanke area opposite Indian town of Fazilka. The strength here was in Indian favour but Indian brigade commander S.S Chowdry was highly incompetent in placing his forward battalion 10 kilometre ahead of his other two battalions. This enabled Pakistans 105 Brigade to capture the Bund ahead of Sabuna Distributary thus ensuring the safety of Pakistans most crucial Sulaimanke Canal Headworks which was just 1,500 metres from the border. 105 Brigades determined counter attack severely depressed Indian Higher Commanders and 11 Corps Commander expressed a desire to abandon the area and withdraw to Fazilka Fortress and to replace 67 Brigade which was defending the area.22 Such was the state of Indian demoralisation that Western Command Army Commander finally sacked 67 Brigade Commander on 11th December.23 S.S Chowdhry was replaced by Brigadier Piara Singh. At this stage the Indian brigade commander was so demoralised that he overestimated the Pakistani strength opposite him to be two infantry brigades supported by an armoured regiment24 while in reality the Pakistani strength on east bank of Sabuna was only an infantry battalion (6 FF) supported by a depleted tank squadron of WW Two vintage tanks. The Indians suffered heavy casualties at Sulaimanke.Some 190 Killed, 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.25 These casualties were far heavier than those suffered by 54 Division which fought battles like those around Bara Pind Jarpal which suffered a total of some 76 Killed and 272 wounded.26 Desert Sector-Rahimyarkhan-Sindh 18 Division plan to capture Longanewala was brilliant in conception. It failed because of poor logistic planning and lack of air cover. There was

hardly anything in front of the 18 Division attacking force heading for Longanewala and Jaisalmer, however, since there was no air support just two Indian Hunters neutralised Pakistani armour! This attack has been much criticised by arm chair strategists in Pakistan. However, the situation was saved by the fact that Indians opposing 18 Division were equally incompetent and hesitated from attacking the withdrawing Pakistani troops from Longanewala. One positive aspect of the whole affair despite all Pakistani imperial blunders was the fact that the attack even in its failure caused such mental discomfort to Indian Higher commanders that the Indian plans to attack Rahimyar Khan were dropped.27 Thus Indian Southern Command Army Commander Lieutenant General Bewoor requested Manekshaw for a change in task with the plea that resources placed at his disposal were insufficient for capture of Rahimyarkhan.28 The Indians decided to call off all offensive operations of 12 Division against Rahimyar Khan and transferred one of the three brigades of 12 Division to Kutch Sector on the 12th December for the planned attack on New Chhor.29

This reinforcement was a sugar coated bullet for 11 Indian Division since it only further compounded the logistic nightmare of 11 Indian Division.30 Indian Armoured Corps historian was intellectually honest enough to admit that main toll was taken by the terrain,the IAF destroyed a sizeable number of tanks and vehicles while the 12 Division itself did little.31The Pakistani GHQ was perturbed by the failure of 18 Division and was forced to break up their strategic reserve infantry division sending one brigade to Chhor and another to Shakargarh on 7th December.32 While the move of a brigade to Chhor was most necessary that of sending one to Shakargarh was avoidable.Indian 11 Division was assigned the task of capturing New Chhor held by a Pakistani brigade supported by a tank squadron. A force comprising 85 Infantry Brigade and an independent tank squadron(T-55) was earmarked. This force contaced the outer defences of New Chhor at Parbat Ali on 8th December. The Indians wanted to mount a divisional attack on New Chhor but were delayed due to administrative reasons. By 11th December the second Indian brigade also reached the area. On 13th December the Indians launched a brigade plus attack capturing Parbat Ali. However, their time and space was by now totally off balance. The area had been reinforced by another brigade of 33 Division and on 15th December as per their own admission a probing force of the Indians opposite New Chhor was severely mauled.33 This was done by 60 Brigade consisting of three fine infantry units i.e 44 Punjab, 45 Punjab and 46 Baluch. 44 Punjab in particular distinguished itself at 199 and 200 r! The Brigade in actual fact was commanded in the field by Lt Col (later Brig) Muhammad Taj SJ & Bar, who was CO 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh). 44 Punjab was the hub for the defence of Naya Chhor, the Indians actually withdrew in the face of aggressive patrolling. This fact was acknowledged by Indian GOC 11 Division in his flag meeting with Major General Iqbal (later CJCSC) after the war.34 There is a Nicholson Memorial at Taxila but no memorial in Chhor for Pakistan Army soldiers who saved Sindh in 1971! It is an irony of Pakistani military history that Major General Shaukat Riza has not mentioned this incident at all while it was Major K.C Praval an Indian military historian who acknowledged this fact. On the other hand Fazal Muqeem criticises the decision of sending 60 Brigade to Sindh. Had 60 Brigade not come to New Chhor the Indians may not have stopped before reaching Mirpur Khas! Fazal Muqeem

thus did not mention 60 Brigade at all in his book. Perhaps doing so would have contradicted his brilliant criticism of dividing 33 Division! The Indian brigade operating in Umerkot-Nagarparkar area captured many thousand square miles but all these consisted of empty desert. Another aspect of military history writing in Pakistan is regimental bias and personal likes and dislikes. It is significant that all the three units of 60 Brigade were new units and thus not worthy of being mentioned by stalwarts from old units. The same was the case with Bara Pind where 31 Cavalry and 27 Cavalry were praised by Indians for better planning and good battle procedures but were not praised by any Pakistani military historian!At one stage during the war the Indian GHQ wanted Southern Command to capture Badin with a brigade group from Kutch side but this idea was dropped because of administrative/logistic problems.35 ANALYSIS Quality of Strategic Orientation Both sides were equally barren in terms of strategic insight. Thus one Indian army officer who occuped a senior position in 1971 noted At the time of the Bangladesh War no institution of Indian Army taught or studied strategy. Thus as per Jacob no realistic ,overall estimate of war situations by the Army Headquarters was made. There was in fact no strategic or political definition of policy,nor an appropriate higher command organisation to plan or direct the war.36 Jacob states that Manekshaws handling of senior officers was not conducive to creating confidence.37Intellectually speaking the Pakistani higher command was an equal negation of two nation theory at least in terms of mediocrity in higher ranks. Starting from what East Pakistan the Pakistani GHQ had a naively simplistic attitude towards Bengali separatism. They did not realise that political problems could seriously compromise the strategic equilibrium of the army. This dawned upon them only once the armys reserve 9 and 16 Divisions were airlifted to East Pakistan in March-April 1971. If two divisions were raised to replace 9 and 17 Divisions in 1971 two divisions could have been raised to serve in East Pakistan in the period 1965-66!

The much trumpeted phrase defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan was an oversimplified and highly vague statement.Thus the admission of Fazal Muqeem that as earlier discussed no one knew what action would be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted against East Pakistan. This was not because Yahya or his junta was intellectually inferior in any manner than the Ayub-Musa duo but simply because by 1971 the strategic balance had overwhelmingly tilted in favour of India! As a matter of fact Pakistan Army improved in the positive direction after 1965 and Yahya relatively speaking was a far better professional than Musa. He was, however, only an individual and could not alter the movement of historical forces which were far stronger than any individual actor. He was the product of an age and a military system which wanted to produce Indian officers who could command companies but not brigades or divisions what to talk of a corps or an army. The only answer to Pakistans strategic dilemma was to mount a preemptive attack on India in Monsoon season before the Indian Army had fully mobilised and the Himalayan Passes had not become snow bound. This did not happen because Indira Gandhi conducted skilful diplomacy and also because Pakistans military junta lacked strategic insight. Indian Western Command C in C Candeth admitted the fact that all Indian plans to attack Pakistan would have gone to winds had Pakistan attacked in October 1971.38 Thus Candeths remark that Yahya Khan had tarried too long and had missed the boat. Degree of Success of Diversionary attacksThe Pakistani GHQ had a difficult task as far as balancing means availabale and ends sought were concerned. Despite inept execution diversionary attacks did overthrow Indian plans off balance. Thus the Poonch operation affected Indian 1 Corps plans in Sialkot-Shakargarh because of despatch of 33 Brigade from 1 Corps to 15 Corps area opposite Poonch. Similarly the ill-fated LonganewalaJaisalmer operation made the Indians abandon their plans to conduct offensive operations against Rahimyarkhan. The 105 Brigade operation against Sulaimanke came very close to strategic success and both the local brigade commander and the corps commander wanted to withdraw to Fazilka 15 Kilometres to the rear. This was only stopped once Candeth stepped in. Timidity at Operational LevelWhile the lower levels of command were in relatively high spirits timidity at operational level severely retarded conduct of operations.Glaring among all was conduct of 1 Corps Commander in Ravi-Chenab Corridor who was overcome by inertia and indecision from day one.

Throughout the war he reacted to Indian moves rather than making any attempt to make the opposing Indian commander react to his moves despite the fact that he had sufficient reserves to do so.Compare his conduct with that of GOC 23 Division General Eftikhar who achieved a breakthrough despite having no superiority at all. On the other hand 1 Corps Headquarter functioned like a glorified post office simply processing reinforcement requests and waiting for the enemy to breach the last Pakistani minefield.Indian 1 Corps Commander also proceeded with equal caution but was forced to attack since he had been ordered to attack. Even then he did so in a fairly bureaucratic manner, neatly dividing his armour so that all divisional attacks made progress but no major breakthrough was achieved. The average sub continental corps commanders first priority was security and safety rather than speed and dynamism in the conduct of operations. In words of an Indian observer 1 Corps advance in Shakargarh was pathetic... the plan was not designed for a quick advance but was merely to play safe!39 This was despite the fact that this illustrious career officer had fought the 1965 War in the same sector (pathetically at Gadgor), had served as Director Military Operations and then risen to three star rank to command Indias elite strike corps on the Western Front! Praval described this illustrious three stars corps battle as one smitten with indecision, a corps whose offensive failed without the capture of its initial objectives ...one which advanced just 13 kilometres in 12 days.40 I would say that this man was no different from any of the top brass I saw in my 13 years service ! Ones who have an immense sense of timing , not in matters operational or strategic but in personal career planning and getting the right ACR from the right man at the right time ! It is consoling to hear from General Jacob that the same state of affairs plagues the Indian High Command to date! 41 Missed Opportunities There were certain missed opportunities in the war in the sense that the wrong men were at the right places.Thus Major General Eftikhar a highly operationally gifted commander was given a limited offensive role and limited resources.Had this man been given one more infantry

brigade and an armoured brigade he could conveniently have forced the Indians to shift brigades from 1 Corps area into Chamb. As a matter of fact at one stage in battle one of the brigades in 1 Corps area was alerted to move to Chamb. Similarly had this man been the Pakistani Corps Commander in 1 Corps the whole story of conduct of operations may have been different. Similarly in 105 Brigade area with just another armoured regiment Amir Hamza could have achieved a breakthrough and gone right till Bikanir Canal. It is a credit to this indomitable leader of men that despite no superiority in resources he almost made the Indians abandon Sabuna Line and advocate withdrawal to Fazilka and Gong Canal. But then Hamza was packed off as a major general and Pakistan Army was gifted with four stars who had not been seen by the FOOs of their divisional artillery throughout the war! Chances of Success of the Counter Offensive There has been too much rhetoric about the Pakistani Counter Offensive that was never launched.In the first place once the war started the counter offensive was already late by one month as Candeth stated. Secondly the objectives of the counter offensive i.e Bhatinda or some say even Ludhiana were unrealistic if we keep in mind the pathetic performance of Pakistani armour in 1965 despite having achieved total strategic surprise and having relatively better equipment.

THE AUTHORS FATHER WHO SERVED AS CO OF THE ENGINEER BATTALION TASKED FOR BRIDGING THE CANAL FOR 2 CORPS COUNTER OFFENSIVE STATED THAT THE 1ST ARMOURED DIVISION OFFICERS WERE LEAST INTERESTED IN THE PLANNED ATTACK .THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS WAS THE CO 12 CAVALRY SHAH RAFI ALAM. Thirdly while in 1965 Pakistans armoured division was only opposed by a weak infantry division and later by a weak tank brigade, here was a situation where the Indian armoured division was already well poised and waiting for the attack. The result would have been a clash of armour in almost equal strength with both sides getting bloody noses and achieving nothing on the strategic plane. True that the Pakistanis may have had a free run till Gong Canal or even a little to its east but East Pakistan was already lost and by the time Pakistan Army was across the Gong Canal it would have been facing the first additional Indian corps arriving from East Pakistan. That is if the counter attack was to be launched on 16 December as planned. There was a chance of achieving some success in case the counter offensive had been launched on 4th or 5th December, but then Pakistani Higher Command was against it.No tribute to their strategic

acumen! Analysis of Casualties An analysis of casualties prove that the bulk of the fighting was done firstly by 23 Division at Chamb which suffered almost half of the casualties sustained in the Western Theatre. Similarly this division inflicted the heaviest number of casualties on the Indians. Second as per this scale was 105 Brigade at Sulaimanke which suffered second highest casualties on Indians despite having no superiority in numbers. Third position may be assigned to the forces opposite Poonch. The Indians opposite 105 Brigade lost more men than opposite 8 Division at Sialkot. The magnitude may be imagined from the fact that while the Indians lost some 67 Killed and 90 wounded at Hilli from 23rd November to 11 December, 39 at Sulaimanke they lost something like 190 Killed and 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.42 Formation Killed Missing Wounded Prisoner Total Remarks 10 Division 440 190 723 1353 Chamb 54 Division 76 272 298 Shakargarh 67 Brigade 190 196 425 811 Sulaimanke 4 Para 21 60 81 Jalwala Shyok-Kargil 55 28 195 278 Rest of 846 Cannot be 2546 No Exact 3703 Formations on reconciled figures Western Front with missing and prisoners Total 6,524 The following table showing Indian casualties on the entire Western Front in 1971 is self explanatory:43 Almost half of the casualties sustained by the Pakistan Army in the Western Theatre were sustained by the valiant 23 Division.Thus while total army casualties in the western Theatre were 4,958 those of 23 Division alone were 2,216.44 Defence as the stronger form of war

The lessons of 1971 War were not digested by Asian countries.Indian Army on the Western Front had failed throughout the war to achieve any breakthrough on the Western Theatre.Similarly the Indian efforts to attack positions in East Pakistan mostly failed. This lesson was convincingly once again proved in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 when both sides failed to achieve any breakthrough.East Pakistan where the Indian Army did achieve a breakthrough was an exceptional case where conditions were highly unnatural and where superiority was overwhelming. Thus the validity of Indian analyst Brigadier Sodhis conclusion that the success of the army in Bangladesh was mainly due to peculiar conditions prevailing there,which are difficult to imagine obtaining in any future war and that the true performance of the army was in the Western Theatre45 whereas per Sodhi the Indian Army failed to overcome any main enemy position. I am not implying that things would have remained the same if all three corps committed in East Pakistan had arrived. However, even then the cost would have been high. One which Indira Gandhi was not willing to pay. Thus the unilateral Indian ceasefire of 17th December 1971! No attack succeeded anywhere except in Chamb where the general officer commanding was of an exceptionally high calibre. The defender was stronger and the Chawinda experience of smaller forces defeating larger forces when smaller forces was convincingly proved when three Pakistani tank regiments miserably failed to make a dent against one Indian tank regiment. All battles where any side did well were battles in which the side which performed better was in defence. This was because of the immense lethality of modern weapons and increased ground friction. Thus 6 FF inflicted maximum casualties on Indians while it was defending Sabuna Drain rather than when it attacked it. Shakargarh again was triumph of defence.Use of ReservesThe decision to divide 33 Division after failure of the 18 Division Operation opposite Longanewala was subjected to much criticism by Fazal Muqeem. While sending one brigade might sound unnecessary there is no doubt that the decision to send 60 Brigade and a tank regiment (Guides Cavalry) to 18 Division area was a sound operational decision. The situation after the Longanewala fiasco was serious, had the Indians exploited it. Even the Indian historian noted that 12 Division missed a

rare opportunity.46 In this case Yahya and his team reacted correctly.At the strategic level both sides showed a remarkable hesitation in use of reserves which illustrates that generalship at higher level was barren. What is the use of a strategic reserve that is never used. Thus both sides armoured divisions were not committed and both sides at the highest level were happy that these were not committed.Yahya stated unofficially in private conversations that the armour commanders particularly Gul Hassan and some other generals had lost the will to fight. Gul claims in his memoirs that it was Yahya who was delaying the counter offensive.47 An engineer battalion commander who this scribe interviewed stated that 1st Armoured Division staff and commanders less than lieutenant colonel Shah Rafi Alam showed no interest in bridging plans across Gong Canal ! Perhaps by December 1971 some had lost the will to fight. There was perhaps a deeper philosophical explanation. Long ago Carl Von Clausewitz beautifully summed up Yahya Khans dilemma once he said There are two considerations which as motives may practically take the place of inability to continue the contest. The first is the improbable, the second is the excessive price of success!48 Perhaps Yahya was more concerned about saving West Pakistan which would have come under heavy attack once three Indian corps free from the Eastern Theatre were to be shifted to the Western Theatre! The decision which Yahya took was based on a rationale and was not an act of a drunkard as was later claimed in cheap polemics! Use of ad hoc forces and minefields If desert delayed Indians in 11 and 12 Division areas, minefields and Changez Force played a major role in delaying the Indians in 8 Division area. Changez Force was an ad hoc force raised under Brigadier Nisar of Gadgor fame who had by a rare exercise of coup d oeil blocked the Indian 1st Armoured Division in 1965. Changez Force operated in between the three layers of minefields in Shakargarh Bulge. Even the Indian Armoured Corps historian acknowledged its role when he stated Pak armour functioned well in the role of covering troops.It managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it could have been planned for.49 Praval acknowledged the effect of minefields when he said 1 Corps commenced operations in an area which was very heavily defended by minefields.50

Influence of Generalship on Operations in the Field In most of the formations on both sides general officers preferred conducting the battle by wireless and telephone. Moltke the Elder correctly stated It is a delusion, when one believes that one can plan an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the first battle will determine a new situation through which much of the original plan will become inapplicable.51 Moltke went further and said Everything comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and prepare it energetically.52 John Keegan described the German definition of operational strategy in the following words:- Even higher in the German armys scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between Strategic and tactical, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion.53 In 1 Corps area on both Indian and Pakistani side general officers fought the battle from their headquarters. A young officer then serving as a liaison officer described the siting of the headquarter of one infantry brigade commander near Zafarwal with immense care to ensure that nothing in the Indian armoury could have even a dent on this great field commanders headquarter.54 The battles in this area were fought by troops who fought well but were not led by dynamic commanders.What was Bara Pind? A battle in which Indian position was saved by the skin of its teeth55 because of the last ditch stand by a troop leader who was a subaltern ! No tribute to Vaidya the brigade commander or the 54 Division Commander! What was glorious about Jarpal and Barapind apart from the stoical bravery of 13 Lancers,31 Cavalry and 35 FF ! It was only in Chamb in Pakistans 23 Division that operational leadership in its true dimension was exhibited ! General Eftikhar was a dynamic leader of men praised by Indian military historian Praval as one who exhibited commendable flexibility ..... one who showed skill and determination in carrying out his mission.56 In the true Clausewitzian definition of a military genius he spread light around with the spark of his breast, exhorting men to drive on, exposing himself countless times to fire ! If he expected too much then there is no doubt that he gave too much and to this day his name

is remembered with great respect by old veterans of 11 Cavalry (Frontier Force) who was lucky to serve under his command!57 His photograph hangs in the officers mess and every second lieutenant from the military academy is told about his exploits. The tragedy is that Eftikhar was a piece of rock in empty space,a lone lighthouse in a sea of mediocrity! The Eftikhar way of command was never institutionalised! Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is concerned he stood like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in vain.58 A battle was fought by a general officer at the true operational level in 1971 only by Pakistans Major General Eftikhar. It is an irony of Pakistani military history that many of our so-called military heroes at the general level had nothing to do with any operational strategy in any war! It is a strange fact that this mans generalship in 1971 was not given the space of a line by Pakistan Armys last C in C in his voluminous memoirs despite the fact that Gul claimed that Eftikhar was his friend!59 Artillery as a factor in success or failure Artillery had played a major role in many Pakistani successes. On the other hand where artillery factor was missing invariably failures occurred. The Bara Pind Counter attack apart from other factors was a glaring example of failure in absence of artillery. Absence of sufficient artillery played a major role in many of Pakistani failures in East Pakistan. Even the Indian bypassing of Pakistani defences had a link with absence of sufficient artillery with Pakistani forces. Conclusion Strategic ineptness and phenomenal operational incompetence triumphed on both sides of the Radcliffe Line in 1971. Bravery at junior level compensated things to some extent. What did India achieve apart from simplifying Pakistans strategic problems is for Indians to ponder. They did inflict a severe psychological defeat on Pakistan which in turn has given birth to a dangerous kind of extremism in the post-1971 politics. When the student attending the armed forces war course at the

prestigious National Defence College writing a paper on 1971 War claims with pride that all major Pakistani garrisons had survived surrender in 1971 till the fall of Dacca,he is stating a truism which even a student at infantry school knows. What is the glory in holding individual garrisons when higher headquarters lost the will to fight and an army of brave men was condemned to incarceration in prisoner of war camps for two years! On the other hand there is little comfort in the fact that we were strategically inept and saved from total elimination simply because our enemy is equally inept at the strategic level. Vajpayee is too late in trying to solve the Pakistan problem in the post-Pokhran stage. What could have been achieved by dishing out a few ministries to Indian Muslims by Nehru in 1937 cannot be today accomplished by an Indian with a fine nuclear arsenal! The finest compliment to Indian political leadership was paid by General Jacob when he stated At the negotiating table at Simla we were unable to obtain a permanent settlement of outstanding issues with Pakistan. The advantages gained on the battlefield were frittered away at the Simla Conference!60 In 1971 the Pakistan Army army fought a war albeit half heartedly and had many heroes who did well and are remembered. An uncertain future faces us. This century has seen great armies,once considered impregnable collapsing without fighting a battle simply because their highest political leadership betrayed them! Thus the suicide note of Marshal Akhromyev of USSR, Everything I have devoted my whole life to building is collapsing. Armies are defeated but survive defeats. They are only destroyed once their leaders betray them like Tejh Singh and Lal Singh betrayed the Khalsa in 1845-46!

The Anatomy of Indo-Pak Wars A Strategic and Operational Analysis

India and Pakistan have fought three declared wars and many undeclared wars of proxy or low intensity wars. This article is a brief analysis of the essence of these wars at the strategic and operational level.1947-48 Kashmir WarThe 1947-48 War was an improvised war fought on an ad hoc basis. It began with some tangible operational strategy and little definite strategy on the Pakistan side and a definite operational strategy on the Indian side. At the onset Mr Jinnah the Governor General of Pakistan ordered the British Acting C in C Pakistan Army to order two brigades into Kashmir, one on the Sialkot-Jammu Axis and the other on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar-Axis. This was a tangible plan based on a precise strategy of severing Indian landward and aerial lines of communication to Kashmir. The plan was rendered null and void since the Britisher refused to obey Jinnahs order.This was followed by a hastily scrambled series of actions with regular Pakistan Army officers leading irregulars, irregulars besieging Indian/Dogra garrisons and conducting mini-wars against Chamb, Naushera, Srinagar, Skardu, Leh etc. In April 1948 the regular Pakistan Army entered the scene. At this stage the Indians were in a strategically disadvantageous position. Leh being cut off, Poonch besieged, Skardu besieged, Naushera threatened etc. At this stage the Pakistani strategy was to contain Indian Army advance towards Muzaffarabad, capture Poonch and safeguard Pakistans soft underbelly opposite Gujrat. No one at this stage thought of a ceasefire, which would have been of great strategic advantage to Pakistan. The Indians conceived a fine plan to outflank Muzaffarabad and executed a brilliant brigade level march across against the 3,000 metres plus high Nastachun Pass, thus unexpectedly forcing their way with great ease to Tithwal. The Pakistani official history noted Brigadier Harbux Singh, commander of the 163 Brigade waited at Tithwal for two days to let the rest of his brigade join him there . He lingered a little longer to prepare for his next move and perhaps also to coordinate his moves with that of the Indian offensive in the Jhelum Valley for a two pronged push towards Muzaffarabad. This delay changed the subsequent course of history in Kishanganga Valley, as it enabled the first two companies of 4/16 Punjab under Major Mohammad Akbar Khan to reach by a forced march in the vicinity of Tithwal and take up positions there1. The Pakistanis saved their position by reinforcing it with a brigade.On the operational level the Pakistanis did well by capturing Pandu a position of tactical importance in the Jhelum Valley by a brilliant infiltration plan conceived by Commander 101 Brigade Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO with the indomitable Major Ishaq MC as his Brigade Major. Akbar deputed Lt Col Harvey Kelly, commanding 4/10 Baluch to plan the attack in detail.2 Pandu, however, was an operational episode of great tactical significance but limited strategic value.From April 1948 to December 1948 the Pakistani GHQ merely reacted tactically moving companies

and battalions while the Indians moved strategically. In Phase One, they recaptured Rajauri the gateway to Poonch with a single tank squadron! In Phase Two, they achieved two strategic triumphs! They forced their way through Zojila Pass driving on to relieve Leh and capture Kargil Dras and they relieved Poonch which was a mini-Indian East Pakistan surrounded from all sides by Pakistani troops.At this stage the Pakistani GHQ had conceived the Operation Venus. Venus was a thrust against the Indian line of communication leading to Poonch Valley with an infantry and a heavy tank brigade in NausheraBeri Patan area. At this stage the Indians were involved in the relief of Poonch and Leh and strategically off balance. The official account of 1970, however, maintains that the aim of Venus was not to sever the Indian line of communication to Poonch but merely to force the Indians for ceasefire which they did and which came into effect on night 31 Dec 1948/01 January 1949. If ceasefire was the aim then the Pakistani strategy was barren since a ceasefire in July 1948 would have been far more strategically desirable! This was so since in April 1948 Zojila (captured by Gilgit Scouts under Lieut Shah Khan on 7th July 1948) the gateway to Srinagar as well as Ladakh in Pakistani hands, the frontline near Rajauri and Poonch surrounded by Pakistani troops/irregulars. It is not clear what the Pakistani GHQ advised the civilians at this stage but no records have been made public which prove that they gave any advice!In the 1960s General Fazal-i- Muqeem asserted that the ceasefire of 1948 took place to the armys horror since the army was close to a great victory. However, this point is refuted by the Pakistan Armys Official account of 1970. Much later in 1976 General Sher Ali who was commanding a brigade of the Venus Force asserted that had the operation been launched Pakistani tanks would have been in Jammu within no time! This has to be taken with a pinch of salt once we compare it to the performance of armour in an offensive role in 1965 and 1971!The Kashmir War ended with the Indians as masters of Poonch Valley, Srinagar Valley and Leh Valley but with a communication to all three valleys running precariously close to the Pakistani border! Thus strategically the Indian position despite all their strategic triumphs was not secure since their line of communications offered multiple objectives to any single Pakistani thrust. One tank brigade with a twenty mile thrust could threaten the existence of a whole Indian army corps. The Indians took no care to remedy this state of affairs despite many war games held in their Kashmir Corps to show that the Pakistanis could threaten the Indian line of communication in Poonch Valley.31965 WarThe 1965 War was a comical affair! Civilians at the foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out at the strategic level while soldiers at the highest military level and political level, the president being a soldier were not interested in any military adventure. The civilian hawks led by Bhutto, however, were in league with a group of generals and brigadiers within the army and

finally succeeded in persuading the president(famous for tactical timidity in Burma) into embarking on a military adventure. Musa the army chief had little strategic insight and was against any military adventure in which he may be forced to exercise his qualities of leadership! Musa had rudimentary understanding of strategy and tank warfare since he was a political choice appointed more because he was seen as politically no threat rather than for any military strategic or operational talent!The Pakistani offensive plan i.e. a thrust against Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in Kashmir or/and against Indian line of communication between Indian Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on AmritsarJullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception. This was so because if successful any of the two plans would have forced the Indians to sue for peace at best and to surrender at worst. No less an authority than the Indian Western Command C in C Harbaksh Singh thus confessedA Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage.To the Pakistan Armys misfortune a plan which was brilliant at the strategic and operational level failed simply because those who were leading the military machine at the highest level lacked the strategic insight as well as resolution! The first opportunity was thus missed in Chamb-Jaurian Sector, when even a foreigner i.e. Chinese Foreign Minister visiting Pakistani thought that Akhnur5 was the key!The second and most serious operational failure occurred in Khem Karan.This had more to do with poor execution at the divisional and brigade level and poor initial higher organization and composition of troops at the divisional level. The first being an operational failure and the second being an organizational failure at the higher command level.At the operational and tactical level three events stand out in the war i.e. the Grand Slam Operation in Chamb-Jaurian, blunting of Indian offensive at Chawinda at Gadgor on 8th September when one lone tank regiment gave a severe mauling to two tank regiments out of a total available Indian force of an armoured division, and a brigade level counter attack in Lahore Sector.Grand Slam failed because of change of command! Not because Akhtar Malik was better than Yahya but because one man either Akhtar or Yahya should have conducted the whole operation! The Indians admitted that their position was saved because of the pause of 48 hours, which occurred at Tawi after the Pakistani Chief Musa ordered change of horses in the mid stream!Now the battle of Gadgor. Technically Gadgor was 24 Infantry Brigade Group versus 1st Indian Armoured Division. In reality the contest was 25 Cavalry versus Poona and Hodsons Horse since 24 Brigade Commander told Colonel

Nisar to do something6 the vaguest order of 1965 War! Nisar had no idea of what was in front but by a miraculous coup d oeil deployed his tank regiment 25 Cavalry in a manner which would produce an instant nervous breakdown in an instructor who taught tank tactics at the armour school! 25 Cavalry was deployed by Nisar like a thin line of steel! Like a thin net to catch a whale! The manoeuvre if it can be called one succeeded because the Indian brigade commander was paralysed by the fog of war! Thus Commander Indian 1st Armoured Brigade saw a finger as a mountain! He saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a half squadron of Indian 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and fired at Indian Artillery opposite Rangre! What Nisar deployed after the Do Something order was seen by the Indian brigade commander as a tank brigade! Thus he lost the will to use two uncommitted tank regiments to outflank the Pakistani position! Gadgor was a psychological defeat inflicted on K.K Singh by Nisar with Nisar not knowing what was in front of him and K.K Singh over estimating three times what was really in front of him. Thus in cognitive terms, at Gadgor was a tank regiment commander who did not know what was in front of him against a tank brigade commander who was overawed by what he assessed was in front of him and was reduced into a state of total inertia and indecision. The important factor in this decisive battle was the fact that tangibly K.K Singh had the third tank regiment as well as three uncommitted squadrons within his two committed tank regiments with which he could have easily outflanked Nisar and got to his rear! Nisar had tangibly no reserves with which he could have countered K.Ks outflanking manoeuvre.The counter attack of Brigadier Qayyum Sher in Lahore Sector was a successful divisional battle ordered by Major General Sarfaraz MC and executed by Brigadier Qayyum Sher most resolutely! It produced a crisis on the Indian side and threw the Indians off balance! Both retired in the same rank sometimes after the war!1971 WarThe 1971 War was a strange war! The Indians won great glory but failed to strategically solve their military problems! They overran East Pakistan creating a new state of Bangladesh but merely reduced Pakistans defence problems and increased their own problems by creating a new state which became more hostile to India and is far more difficult to militarily to deal with than the old East Pakistan!The Indians, and an authority no less eminent than their 1971 GOC Western Command General Candeth have admitted that had the Pakistanis started a pre-emptive war in October 1971 all their plans to attack East Pakistan would have been thrown to the winds!7 But strategic insight had not been inculcated yet in the Pakistan Army! The Pakistanis waited and allowed the Indians to attack them in December 1971.Much has been said about a Pakistani counter offensive in December 1971 to save East Pakistan. At this stage the Indian 1 Corps was in position and the Pakistani Higher Command like K.K Singh on 8th September to gamble their last card!

There was a reason for this inaction. One that the cost was too heavy and the second that armour higher commanders (the CGS Gul Hassan and GOC 1st Armoured Division) as Yahya Khan asserts had lost the will to launch an attack.Two cases of operational brilliance and one case of a Gadgor type tactical heroic stand out in 1971. These are the cases of the Pakistani 23 Division offensive in Chamb, the Indian defence of Poonch and the Barapind-Jarpal Battle. In Chamb Pakistans General Eftikhar successfully fought a divisional battle in which he deliberately manoeuvred a force of two plus tank regiments inflicting a severe mauling on the Indians forcing them to abandon Chamb. Eftikhar was firmly in control at all stages. When his initial tank thrust was checked at Maandiala he did not sink into inertia or indecision like K.K Singh at Gadgor or Pakistans Naseer at Khem Karan! Nor did Eftikhar tell his armoured brigade commander to Do Something! Eftikhar did not abdicate the conduct of operational strategy to any tank regiment of tank brigade commander! He resolutely regrouped his command and launched another attack from the south emerging victorious! The second case was the Indian stand at Poonch. The Pakistanis conceived a fine plan to capture Poonch but the Indian brigade commander at Poonch was too resolute while the Pakistani divisional and brigade commanders at Poonch lost their nerve!The third case of a Gadgor type battle occurred at Barapind! Here the Pakistani tank brigade commander gave a simple order to resort to counter penetration to his tank regiment commander who on his own converted it into an attack! Unfortunately he carried out a piece meal attack, first sending in a squadron and then two more! The Indians admit that had 13 Lancers attacked with all three squadrons8 they would have broken through despite nominal artillery support. The hero of this battle was not the Indian brigade or regiment commander but the Indian squadron who blunted the attack and the Indian troop leader Arun Khetarpal who stopped the attack by skin of his teeth losing his life in the process! In words of Indian Armoured Corps historian the Indian success was attributable to a last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader.1984 CrisisThe 1984 Crisis was a calculated Indian response against alleged Pakistani involvement in the Sikh Insurgency in Punjab. Tangibly the Indian position was far superior to Pakistan since Pakistan Army was still equipped with the old T-59s. The situation was saved by two Individuals who polished off the Indian Durga Devi thus leading to a swift de-escalation of the crisis.Siachen Crisis 1984-To Date A case of zero strategic insight on the Indian side and of personal ambition on part of two and three star Indian generals to start private wars to gain promotion. Both sides gained nothing and one Indian Division and one Pakistani brigade is committed to a mad sentry duty role since 1984!1987 CrisisThe 1987 Crisis was a case of over enthusiasm at the military level with little outward enthusiasm at the highest political level. The Indian Chief Sundarji was living in

visions of Glory and visualized that a military manoeuvre would escalate into a war which would lead to a successful Indian military thrust severing the Pakistani line of communication in Rahimyar Khan Sector thus leading to the emergence of a new state in Pakistani Sindh and the creation of a second Indian Field Marshal after Manekshaw i.e Sundarji!Comically Sundarjis visions of glory were not matched by strategic insight! Thus he was overawed into inaction and inertia like K.K Singh at Gadgor, once the Pakistani High Command relocated the Pakistani reserves northwards in a purely defensive move!1987 was a watershed and marked the Indian Army at its lowest position in the eyes of the highest Indian political leadershipvis-a-vis the high position of 1971. Sundarji destroyed all that the Indian Army had gained in 25 years with one night of irresolution and inertia!1999 CrisisThe 1999 Crisis in Kargil were the result of an audacious Pakistani plan to inflict a sharp but highly subtle psychological defeat on the Indians by threatening the Indian line of communication to Leh and Siachen by placing a small Pakistani force on the heights overlooking the DrasKargil-Leh Road. The execution at tactical level was brilliant albeit marked by poor logistic arrangements at divisional level! The Pakistani political leadership lost the resolution to press home the move to its final conclusion. Full facts are not available about what the Pakistan Armys highest leadership wanted at this point in time.The Indians payed a heavy price in terms of casualties for an intelligence failure. What Pakistan gained or lost is not clear although a debate continues about who was Kargils winner. Kargil stands out as merely one stage in a long series of actions in Pakistani military history. If Kargil was a political failure then logically the army should have packed off the political leadership in June 1999! Yet it chose to blame Nawaz only later on like it blamed Liaquat for calling off Operation Venus in 1948! Have things changed or we changed!ConclusionIndo-Pak Military history is a continuous story of strategic failures and a mix of operational successes and failures. At the tactical level both the armies fought well.The reasons for the strategic failures are historical. Both states are successor states of the British Colonial Indian Empire. Indians were not groomed or trained for making strategic decisions. Strategic insight is the result of a process spread over many generations. The German General Staff was not created by a sudden flight. Even the British Empire was not created by the strategic genius of one man! Militarily the failure of both armies at the higher level is more easy to understand. Both were the continuation of a colonial army designed for internal security and brigade level actions. The Indian Army in WW Two either fought as part of a larger British Army or in circumstances of immense material superiority with massive US military aid as in Burma! The political failure in Pakistan is equally simple to explain since in words of Mr Jinnah most of the Muslim

politicians would not do anything without consulting the DC (Deputy Commissioner)! That may be a reason why Nawaz Sharif went to DC!

Indo-Pak Wars A Strategic Summing Up

Clausewitz states that it is far more difficult to understand strategy than tactics since things move very slowly in strategy and the principal actors are far away from the heat and friction of the battlefield. Thus strategy is a hundred more times difficult to comprehend and conduct than tactics. In this final chapter which sums up all that happened we will endeavour to arrive at a strategic summing up. The first fact that stands out is that the men who dominated the Indo-Pak scene, in the period that we have studied, both soldiers and politicians, were all tacticians, none being a strategist! They, some of whom were great men, were caught in historical currents, which were too strong to be manipulated! On one side was a Jungian situation with deep hatred of communalism firmly ingrained in the unfathomed and mysterious subconscious of the vast bulk of the populace! An irrational albeit substantial hatred that increased with leaps and bounds as ambitious middle and higher classes fought for jobs and legislative council seats! These men were clever in a tactical way, having been to some British University or a Legal Inn and were driven by burning egos to be the successors of the British Viceroys! Initially they borrowed some leafs from Europes Nationalism and talked about India and Indias independence as a country! Politics, however, remained in the drawing rooms of rich businessmen and feudals and chambers of barristers and lawyers till the First World War. The First World War constitutes a watershed in world history! It destroyed five Empires, four i.e the Romanoff, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman totally and one i.e the British who won the war but theirs was a Pyhric victory! They lost the will to retain their empire since the flower of its youth was destroyed on the battlefields of France! This fact was indirectly acknowledged by Alan Brooke the British Warlord once he admitted in writing that Britain lost its best men in the First World War. The First World War aroused great expectations in India and the mild lawyers who dominated the Indian political scene before the war saw far greater opportunities in the near future! If Lenin could mobilize the masses in the name of revolution and Kemal could do it in the name of Turkish Nationalism, why not mobilize the Indian masses too over some slogan! Alas India

was only a geographical expression! A mosaic of complicated ethnic groups, castes, religions, sects! Who could be the Indian Lenin or Mustafa Kemal! How to bring a revolution! A Hindu called Gandhi discovered one cheap tactical response! A melodramatic employment of ancient Indian/Hindu slogans and names! This wily man tactically outwitted the outwardly more clever nationalists who dominated the pre-war congress! Two Muslims also arrived at similar conclusions like Gandhi! These were the Jauhar Brothers who mobilized the Indian Muslims in the name of Islam by unsolicitedly taking up the already doomed c!ause of the Turkish Caliphate! Religion was injected in the blood of Indian politics! It started from Punjab, which had been bled, white on the bloody fields of Flanders, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli and Egypt! Martial Law was imposed in the Punjab in 1919! The sword arm of India, at least the areas south of Chenab, was now suddenly transformed into a bastion of revolutionary activity! The Britishers were saved simply because while Punjab burnt, Bengal was relatively tranquil and UP was still not mobilized by Gandhi and Jauhar! Just like 1857 when UP was in rebellion and Punjab and Bengal were staunchly loyal! Politicians in a vague political environment in which no one was clear about Indias political future employed religion as a tactical weapon! This was the period 1919-1923! What was the Khilafat Slogan in the strategic sense, except as a short-term ploy to mobilize the Indians! What was Gandhis Non- Co-operation without violence! A river raised into a massive flood, which ended in a destination less desert! Tactical behaviour does not lead to strategic results and this is what happened! The Congress remained the largest organized party but was perceived as a Hindu dominated entity by the more provincial as well as Muslim dominated parties! The Khilafat exhausted the Muslims without any long-term aims! The British came up with a strategy of provincial autonomy with the carrot appointment of provincial premiers that effectively checked chances of success of any all India rebellion against the British! Mr Jinnah left the Congress but was confined to the Muslim minority provinces! And had no concrete programme, at least in the period 1923-39. So much for the politicians! Now the soldiers! The Indians finally achieved their target of having commissioned ranks in the army! Here too the victory was tactical! Indians a term then used for all who lived in the Indo-Pak before 1947 were supposed to be platoon commanders or company commanders and not battalion, brigade, divisional or corps commanders! Needless to add some even today are platoon or company commanders despite outwardly wearing ranks of brigade, divisional or corps commanders! Pakistan was more unfortunate in having one who was the army chief but functioned like a platoon commander during the period 1958-66! Another such platoon cum corps commander doomed the Pakistani cause in 1971 in the East Pakistan! True that he was an MC, but then many JCOs were MCs and retired as MCs! If gallantry awards alone are

a criteria for higher ranks then at least five of Indian or Pakistan Army chiefs should have been rankers who won the VC in WW Two! A fifty percent ranker quota in the officer ranks deliberately imposed by the British ensured that the Indian officer corps remained naive in essence! The other fifty percent were also taken care of simply by ensuring that watchful deputy commissioners weeded out the potentially brighter and independent ones in the initial screening for officer ranks! The Second World War changed everything! The British even then ensured that no Indian should command anything beyond a battalion in actual combat barring Thimaya who commanded a brigade in action in an acting capacity! Instead the British promoted many Britons with five or six years service to command brigades! Indians were kept at mostly administrative jobs or did not cross the battalion commander line! This was an imperial strategic response! The Britishers were clear that more Indians in higher ranks after the war could be potentially dangerous! Thus the response not to have Indians in higher ranks! The Second World War, however, destroyed the British resolve to stay in India! Even then what we call the Independence and what they call the transfer of power in 1947 was their parting kick! One state too big to be effective as an advanced and developed state and one state with a geographical incoherence was their parting gift! The irrefutable lesson of post-1919 Indian history is the fact that the British response at every stage was strategic, while the Indian response at every stage was tactical! The reason was simple! India was too diverse and disunited to respond strategically! The Congress move not to have Muslim ministers in UP in 1937 was a cheap tactical reaction which strategically doomed the Congress aim to rule over an undivided India! Mr Jinnahs agreement on the clause that each princely states ruler could opt to join India or Pakistan regardless of the states religious composition was again a tactical response! The imposition of Boundary Commissions to partition Punjab and Bengal were again strategic responses of the British to ensure that Indo-Pak remains a hostage to a vicious cycle of never ending disputes! The Second World War strategy not to have Indians in higher ranks paid immense dividends in the First 1947-48 Indo-Pak War in Kashmir! Both the armies had British C in Cs who were in constant communication with each other many times in a day and conducted the strategy while Indian brigade and divisional commanders took care of the tactical part! Mr Jinnah did make one meaningful attempt to be the strategist once he ordered the Pakistan Army into Kashmir but this move was blocked because Jinnah had no capable lieutenant and institutionally the Pakistan Army was British dominated! Mr Nehru remained a tactician even as prime minister of India! He saw the army as a threat and attempted to reduce its stature! He learnt his lesson in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and, thereafter, did make an attempt to introduce strategic reforms in the Indian Army. Pakistan on the other hand remained in the hands of

second rate tactician politicians who delayed constitution making simply because the ruling elite which was from the west wing knew that elections would mean sitting in the opposition ranks with a Bengal Muslim Aborigine ruling them! The Pakistan Army was doomed to be led by an indigenous chief who had no strategic understanding and did not want to have anything to do with higher strategy! He did have grandiose ideas like Napoleon the Third but lacked operational insight or strategic depth. We will examine the strategic scenario with the above-mentioned background in mind. The First 1947-48 Indo-Pak War The British started with a strategic plan having Britishers dominating the key posts in both the newly created countries! The war was fought largely by individuals on the Pakistani side and by the British Governor General and senior army commanders on the Indian side! Gilgit was won by Pakistan simply because the British officers of Gilgit scouts and the Gilgit Scouts VCOs acted with remarkable unison! No credit to the Pakistani Government, which had no clue about what was happening in Gilgit in September-October 1947. The Indians were doomed in this case since their Dogra Governor made plain his intentions to do away with the Gilgit Scouts! The VCOs of the Gilgit Scouts acted tactically but while doing so achieved a great strategic victory for Pakistan! It was a fairly even contest. There were two non- Muslim Companies in the 6 J and K at Bunji against two non-Muslim Companies! There was an airfield at Gilgit just like there was one at Sringar! The Indians lost the Northern Areas because of outright strategic incompetence! The Pakistanis have proved equally strategically barren! No statue at Islamabad commemorates what the VCOs of the Gilgit Scouts led by the indomitable Scott Major W.A Brown achieved for Pakistan in October November 1947! Without Gilgit or Baltistan what would have been Pakistans China policy! There was a Dogra Governor in Gilgit in 1947! Today the Northern Area still does not have a Gilgiti Muslim Governor! The situation in the Jhelum Valley was saved by tribals who possessed lan and great fervour but had no strategic insight! Something for which they cannot be blamed! Bhimbhar was won by local militia while Poonch was besieged by local militias only to be lost once Pakistan Army had entered the scene in 1948. On the Indian side the crowning feat of strategic insight was capture of Zojila, the brainchild of Thimaya. Something, which vindicates this scribes humble assertion in the previous paragraphs, i.e Thimaya was the only Indian who had commanded a brigade in actual action in the Second World War! In the final summing up, the Kashmir war of 1948 was a partial Indian victory and a strategic Pakistani failure since the Indians delayed ceasefire till the relief of Poonch and recapture of KargilLadakh, while the Pakistani leadership delayed ceasefire while Poonch was surrounded by West Pakistan like East Pakistan was surrounded by India and Zojila the gateway to Baltistan was in Pakistani hands! The Indian acceptance of ceasefire on 31 December 1948 had a strategic

design while the Pakistani non acceptance of ceasefire earlier was a matter of lack of strategic insight! The important fact here is that the Britishers who led India both politically (Mountbatten) and militarily Russell and Bucher had greater strategic insight than Messervy or Gracey! 1965 War Strategically the Indians were ascendant at the time of ceasefire in 1948. Their superiority suffered once Nehru downsized the Indian Army viewing it as a colonial relic. The Indian Armoured Corps historian is stating nothing but the simple truth once he states The first fifteen years after independence saw a steady decline in the efficiency, state of equipment and importance of Indias Armed Forces... the belief in ahimsa and the consequent pacifist strain in our people. Gurcharan further adds, The Governments attitude became plain to all ranks soon enough when their pay and allowances were drastically reduced. From 1954-58 the strategic balance started tilting in favour of Pakistan. US military aid enabled the Pakistan Army to acquire greater organizational flexibility and operational efficiency. The balance swung in favour of Pakistan particularly in terms of armour and artillery. Technical superiority is, however, meaningless unless it is matched and accompanied by corresponding organizational superiority and strategic insight. On both, strategic as well as organizational plain the Pakistan Army remained as barren as in 1947. Till the divisional level the Pakistani organisation was qualitatively superior to the Indians. The trouble started at corps and army level. The ruling Pakistani clique had no understanding of higher military organisation! They viewed war as a clash of battalions, brigades and divisions which could be conducted by a General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. At the army level there was equal barrenness and ineptitude! They saw any future war in Kashmir as a Limited War something like the 1947-48 Kashmir War! If Nehru had not attacked across the international border in 1948 why should Shastri who was smaller should do so! These pedants forgot the fact that Nehru did not attack in 1948 because Liaquat decided at the last moment to call off Operation Venus aimed at cutting Indian communications to the Poonch Valley! On the strategic plain the Pakistani cause was doomed from the beginning not because of any tangible inferiority but simply because Pakistans military leaders had no clue about their capability to inflict a strategic defeat on India! These men who dominated the corridors of the armys higher command had rudimentary ideas about operational strategy or higher strategy. They did not have confidence in themselves! On the other hand the civilians in the cabinet were far more resolute than the army C in C and the president! The conduct of 1965 War and its subsequent analysis, however, later became a highly politicized issue. Thus the resultant analysis was highly subjective. It became a battle of Bhutto haters and Ayub haters! Largely Bhutto haters wrote the history of that war in the period 1977-90 and a highly distorted picture emerged as a result of these exercises in personal hatred. The 1965

war could have been a Pakistani strategic victory if the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division had achieved a breakthrough in Khem Karan! Had the Pakistani Blitzkrieg succeeded, and there was a great chance of it succeeding at one stage, three Indian divisions would have been rolled like Hitler rolled up the bulk of the French Army and the BEF in France in 1940. 1965 would have gone down in history as a Pakistani victory. This fact has been openly admitted by no less a man than the Indian C in C Western Command Harbaksh Singh when he stated A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage. Harbaksh was not a member of Bhuttos party but an illustrious officer of the Indian Army who held the highest operational appointment in the Indian Army.1965 was not a foreign policy failure as Shaukat Riza the mouthpiece of the military establishment asserted but a military failure. A military failure that was avoidable, had the military establishment been led by more dynamic people! A military failure which occurred because of poor higher command structure and absence of a corps headquarter and an infantry division, both of which could have been raised with ease only if someone in the higher quarters in the GHQ knew their operational significance! Now the strategic rationale why Pakistan had to resolve the issue through a resort to arms in 1965. The Indians had started reorganizing their army after the Sino Indian War of 1962 and the balance of forces was fast tilting in Indian favour. What was the solution to this problem! Long ago, Clausewitz gave an answer to this when he said Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages it will rather increase the disparity of forces but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account. There is no evidence which indicates that Ayub or Musa read Clausewitz! It appears that Bhutto had read Clausewitz! Bhutto and Aziz did have a strong rationale for being the hawks that they were in 1965. Strategically, 1965 was the last Pakistani chance to impose a military solution on India. The events of 1971 prove that the balance was fast tilting in favour of India. The US had decided to revise its policies keeping in view Pakistans China policy. A war had to be fought in 1965! The failure did not lay in the fact that 1965 War was fought but in the fact that the Pakistani higher command was conceptually intangibly qualitatively and intellectually

incompetent to win a war which tangibly speaking it had the potential to win! 1971 War Pakistan Army did learn some strategic lessons from the 1965 War. The army was organized on rational lines. Many corps headquarters were created. However, the whole situation had now drastically changed. While 1965 was the best chance for Pakistan to go at war, 1971 was the worst moment to start war with India! Again as in 1947 the Pakistani leadership was caught in an irrevocable vicious whirlpool of history! Since Ayub lacked both political as well as military strategic insight he had irrevocably alienated the countrys East Wing! Pakistan in 1971 was a house divided against itself and East Pakistan had to fall! Sometimes history assumes an air of inevitability. Beyond one point the flow of events becomes irreversible and even a Napoleon or Alexander cannot change the current.This is what happened to Pakistan in 1971. Interestingly, 1971 was an Indian strategic failure too . They achieved a short-term aim but failed to strike at the centre of gravity i.e West Pakistan.In the final reckoning they created another hostile anti-Indian state which is far more difficult to subdue than the former East Pakistan as it was in 1971! On the other side the Pakistan problem as the Indians call it has not been resolved! Kashmir is a huge blotting paper that keeps at least half a million Indian troops occupied while militancy goes on and no solution is in sight! Religious extremism which had witnessed a decline in the period 1947-77 on both sides of the Radcliffe line after 1947 is now ascendant! Post-1971 situation to date The Indians have failed to arrive at a strategic solution to their military problems. The initiative has been in the Indian hands since 1971 but they have proved equally inept ! In 1971 they did not have the will to launch a second phase i.e the reduction of West Pakistan! In 1984 they came close to a conflict which was avoided only because Durgas Sikh guards polished her off! In the post-1979 period both the Soviets and Indians failed strategically. The Soviet response to the Afghan problem should have been increased aid to India so that Pakistan was made to react to a strategy of indirect approach. This did not happen. In 1987 the Sundarji was playing the part that Bhutto was playing in 1965 i.e manipulating an indecisive political chief executive into a war! Rajiv Gandhi checked Sundarjis ambitions and decided to make peace. The Pakistani military establishment had realized after 1971 that India could not be defeated in any future conventional war. Thus the switch over to Low Intensity Wars like in Indian Punjab in 1984 and in Kashmir from 1987 onwards. The future of Indo-Pak will be decided by a series of Low Intensity Wars. The Low Intensity War in Kashmir is likely to be followed by one in Sindh or Balochistan. The possibility that the US encourages Low Intensity Wars in Chinese Sinkiang through India cannot be ruled out. The principal danger lies in escalation of a low intensity war into a nuclear conflict. This is a serious possibility unless major political changes occur on both sides of the Radcliffe Line. The rise of religious extremism on both sides of the

Radcliffe Line is the most serious threat to future regional stability. On the Indian side this threat is more political while on the Pakistani side this threat has a deeper connection with militants who are a smaller group but enjoy greater support in the countrys Armed Forces. No one can predict whether the militants will succeed in Pakistan or not. The distant rumbling of a revolution or a coup can be felt but can never be accurately predicted. Religious militancys success or failure in Pakistan has a deep connection with the success or failure of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan. Religious militancy will receive a boost in both cases. If, the Taliban fail it will be seen as a conspiracy of the West against Islam. If they succeed their success will be seen as a model which must be repeated in the entire Islamic World!

Why Indo-Pak Armies Failed in War The failures of the two armies in the various conflicts.
Around the time of partition there were great expectations from the successor armies of the old British Indian Army i.e the Pakistan and the Indian Army! Thus while discussing the boundaries of the to be partitioned province of Punjab an Indian giving evidence before the Punjab Boundary Commission stated If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measur-able distance of Ambala, but they (The future Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of 40 miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angle to their forces. The same person in this discussion gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan!Compare this remark with the later performance of both Indian and Pakistan

Armies in actual war which was pathetic in terms of speed of advance or area captured in all three Indo-Pak wars! On a personal level I may add that this subject of phenomenal mediocrity at strategic as well as operational level motivated me to write The Pakistan Army till 1965.The reasons for the dismal performance of both the armies are to be seen in their historical background, the classes which were inducted in both the armies and in the impact of British military as well as colonial legacy on both the armies!The reader may note that since it was the failure of success of armour that decided the issue in all IndoPak Wars at least as far as any decisive breakthrough was concerned the discussion centres around employment of armour and leadership with special reference to armour.Before proceeding into the analytical phase a glance at two comparative decisive battles is necessary so that necessary lessons can be linked to the analysis. The four test studies are Pakistani armours failure to achieve a breakthrough on the first day of Operation Grand Slam in 1965, both Pakistani and Indian 1st Armoured Division's major offensives opposite Khem Karan and Chawinda Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's failure opposite Bara Pind. Following is a summary of the four battles.Pakistani failure to achieve a decisive breakthrough on first day of Grand SlamThe Chamb Sector in 1965 was a very weakly held sector held by three dispersed Indian infantry battalions supported by a tank squadron of AMX-13 tanks which were like matchboxes as compared to the Pattons held by the two opposing Pakistani tank regiments i.e a superiority of 6 to 1 in tanks. Further Pakistan had immense artillery superiority both numerical and material of 6 to 1. Pakistani 8 Inch Guns were phenomenally superior to anything that the Indians had. Unfortunately, the Pakistani armour was distributed in penny packets to the two infantry brigades. Thus instead of using armour as a punch it was employed as a thin net as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced. Thus many tanks were lost on the first day and Indian brigade holding the sector withdrew during the night in an organized manner. This initial setback on the first day reduced Pakistani chances of victory which was later on compromised due to other political reasons.Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure at ChawindaThe major Indian attack of 1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank regiments as opposed to 1 tank regiment of Pakistan Army! There was no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one battalion in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur! While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow front unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank regiment, two Indian tank regiments in the rear were not employed by an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia vacillation and procrastination ! This was not a case of a more martial

morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu soldier at Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many miles in the rear! Thus the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on higher leadership marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily combined but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great it required the King's boldness, determination and strength of will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke.The most interesting aspect of the first engagement opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's 25 Cavalry which faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an Indian Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division commander was also not aware that there was only one tank regiment opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then 25 Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by irresolution and inertia and history may have been different and the Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and bypassed the unit! However, this is the realm of speculation! More important is what actually happened! The Indian commander decided not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1) that his four tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2) no news of his left flank protection force (3) that his rear was under attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander withdrew his division back and stayed inactive till 10th September 1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area with its 6th Armoured Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire could not be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive point had been compromised! The reason why the Indian commander thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was Pakistan's 25 Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force had lost his way because of poor map reading and strayed out of wireless contact and the attack on his rear which unnerved him was an exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own artillery guns! These three reasons were considered enough by the Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and do nothing for the next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed advance the Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no room for a battle of manoeuvre! Pakistani 1st Armoured Division's failure at Khem KaranPakistan's 1st Armoured Division with five tank regiments and additional two supporting tank regiments on the flanks failed to breakthrough the Khem Karan area on 7th and 8th September at a time when only one Indian tank regiment with ancient Sherman tanks was opposing the Pakistani five tank regiments having most modern Patton Tanks. The reason of the dismal performance was not Indian resistance but poor initial planning and staff work in not taking adequate measures to ensure crossing of one water course and one

canal both in Pakistani territory! This delayed the induction of the armoured division in the battle area enabling the Indians to reinforce their lone Sherman tank regiment with two more tank regiments! It is ironic to note that the Pakistani plan to attack in this sector was not new but formulated many years before the war. Here was a case like Chawinda earlier discussed where there was failure in achieving a breakthrough despite a five to one superiority simply because the superiority could not be put into practice due to poor initial planning and staff work.Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's Failure at Bara PindPakistan's 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was launched at Bara Pind on 16th December 1971! The situation here was ironically similar to Indian situation at Gadgor on 8th September 1965! Three Pakistani Patton Regiments were available as against one Indian Centurion tank regiment holding a bridgehead at Bara Pind-Jarpal! Ironically as happened with the Indians at Gadgor here too the Pakistani tank brigade commander failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a three to one superiority. The first Pakistani tank regiment was initially launched with the initiative of the detailed planning of the attack, decentralized to the tank regiment commander! This was a fatal decision! The tank regiment commander known as Masood Chhakrra initially launched one tank squadron in attack. Once this squadron was badly beaten being in a frontal role against Indian tanks in static positions, he launched his remaining two squadrons a little to the north and again with disastrous consequences! Once the first tank regiment had failed the Pakistani tank brigade commander launched his second regiment again with disastrous results. In short three tank regiments failed to dislodge a single Indian tank regiment in a counter attack which was a planned contingency before the war and carried out in Pakistani territory. Prominent in this case was failure to coordinate artillery support which was available in abundance but not utilized in the attack plan. The Indian armoured corps historian held the view that the Pakistanis could have broken through even without artillery support if all three squadrons of 13 Lancers had attacked the Indian position in concentration!3Analysis Failure occurred not because of material or numerical but other reasonsIt has been a common practice to cite insufficient numerical superiority at the decisive point as a reason for failure. In all four cases, all decisive battles, this was not the case. The Pakistanis failed at Grand Slam despite 6 to 1 superiority on the first day. This was a case of not concentrating tanks and using them as infantry support vehicles. The Indian failed at Gadgor despite a 4 to 1 superiority. This was a case of the Indian brigade commander losing his nerve because of timidity and irresolution and the Indian GOC not spurring his brigade commander and instead withdrawing to the rear for the next two days while only one tank regiment opposed his division. The Pakistanis failed at Khem Karan despite a five to one superiority because of poor initial planning and incorrect armour

tactics in withdrawing to the leaguer at night. Again Bara Pind was a failure in not integrating artillery in attack and in not concentrating the armoured brigade in attack.British Colonial LegacyOnce the British initially came to India they allowed Indians entry in officer rank. The real danger in history has always been posed not by weapons but by men of resolute description! Thus Mustafa Kemal defied superpowers of his day not by any nuclear warhead but by generalship in the field! Once the British came to India initially they were not aware of the dangers that Indians in higher rank could pose to their rule! Thus once a cavalry unit Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 it was an All Muslim unit with Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg. More notable was the case of Yusuf Khan!Back in 1752 a Muslim of Pathan descent enlisted under Colonel Clive and distinguished himself in battle (not by verbosity on courses or in model discussions) on many occasions. As a reward for excellence in battle Yusuf Khan was made commandant of all Indian sepoys in the service of the English East India Company in 1754, three years before Plassey, presented with a medal in 1755 and further rewarded by renting of two districts in Carnatic for 20 Lakh Rupees in 1759 ! From 1760 onwards Yusuf Khan became more powerful and started defying the English East India Company. The Englishman were forced to start a war against Yusuf Khan which lasted for more than an year! All the British Troops of Madras Army were committed and peace only came after Madura Yusuf Khan's stronghold was finally captured on 13th October 1764! 4No more Yusuf Khans! This was the Englishmen's conclusion and this they enforced religiously right till 1947! Have no native leadership in the Indian Army! This was ensured as a policy right till 1947 even though Indo-Pak natives were admitted synthetically in the officer rank in 1919! While Indians were recruited as officers from 1919 it was ensured that these must be the most slavish and meek ones! Outwardly smart and impressive in bearing, but loyal to the core, lacking initiative in higher decision making and good till only company and platoon level! Thus the basic aim of Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was to produce Indian officers who at best could be good company commanders and nothing more! This system was enforced as a Machiavellian policy! Sir Sivaswamy Ayer in 1921 demanded in the Indian legislative assembly that all seats to commissioned officer rank in Indian Army should be filled by open competitive exam held on all India basis.The British sabotaged this scheme! Thus when Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was established the Britisher ensured a slavish Indo-Pak officer corps by insisting that 30 out of 60 officer vacancies be given to rankers from Indian Army who had spent many years in ranks under British officers and considered more loyal than educated Indo-Pak candidates selected on the open merit!As a result the Indian Army and its successors Indian and Pakistan Army remained pro West and conservative in outlook! In 1950s Ayub Khan was ready

to defend Anglo Iranian Oil fields in Iran for US interests! A relationship with USA was cemented with the rationale that it would enable Pakistan to regain Kashmir! Yet when the time came in 1965 Pakistan's self-promoted field marshal had cold feet! The military advantage over India in 1965 in terms of superior equipment was lost in Khem Karan not because of material inferiority, where Pakistan had tank superiority of 6 to 1 on 7th and 8th September, but qualitative inferiority on part of Pakistani higher military leadership! India's leading military thinker Ravi Rikhye admitted in an article on www.orbat.com that Khem Karan had the potential to be India's Fourth Battle of Panipat had the Pakistan Army broken through! Deliberate measures were taken to instil an inferiority complex in the Indian officers! Major General Jahanzeb who was commissioned in 1942 states In their regiments they were treated with undignified and unconcealed contempt. Once a British regiment invited the Indian C in C to dinner. On enquiry about the segregated table he was told unabashedly that it was for the attached Indian officers. The general further stated that till midthirties Indians commissioned from Sandhurst were not allowed to enter the precincts of the Peshawar Club and there were cases when an Indian officer asked for a chair being told by the quartermaster that Indian officers were not authorized chairs.5 Indian Army experience in WW TwoThe British Indian Army was basically an internal security army designed to ensure continuity of British rule in India. It had no dynamic operational role. Tanks were inducted only in 1938 and Indians were discriminated against in tank units. Major General Jahanzeb states The Indian cavalry was the domain of the British aristocracy. The odd Maharaja's sons were admitted on sufferance. In 1932 three cavalry regiments were Indianised, the 3rd 7th and 16th. They accepted rich and titled Indian officers. The other regiments admitted Indian officers almost two years after declaration of World War Two, a fact which was to cost Pakistan dearly when it came into being.6To compound the fact further, the British had a phenomenally incompetent record in handling of armour and were beaten decisively by the Germans repeatedly from 1940 till 1942 when overwhelming material superiority enabled them to turn the tide.In addition Indian war record was nominal since most of the Indian units in North Africa comprised of armoured cars while in Burma where the Indian tank regiments had Shermans there was no worthwhile enemy in front since the Japanese had very inferior tanks.The Indian experience in WW Two was also significant. In North Africa they encountered Rommel who was a master of armoured warfare who could appear from any direction. Thus a strange fear of enemy on the flanks or in the rear imported from North Africa. Similarly, the Japanese who confronted the Indians in Burma were again masters of infiltration and the emphasis that the Indian officers saw was on security and defence rather than any bold offensive tactics.The resultant failures in 1965 and 1971 had deep

historical reasons.The Indian commanders who failed beyond unit level consisted of men who had operated in a tactical and operational environment in WW Two where operations were infantry biased. Even at Al Alamein the major tank attack was carried out by pure British army units while Indian units and formations were in a static or holding role or assisting British units in the initial breakthrough as infantry units. Thus, the post 1947 commanders of Indian and Pakistani army did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding because of which both sides failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough in all three wars.It was a failure of the command as well as the staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and thought in terms of yards and furlongs rather than miles.Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their typical idea of a battlefield was a linear one rather than a multi-linear one. Their Burma and North Africa experience where the Japanese or Germans frequently appeared in their rear made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army. These men had joined the army for social and personal advancement reasons and warfare to them was a job like WAPDA rather than a supreme test of nationalism or ideology.Further, in the British way of war a higher commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to lack of initiative and dynamism.The same legacy was imported in the post-1947 Pakistan and Indian Armies. ConclusionToday the serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army console themselves with the fact that today's officer is far more educated than his predecessors. The matter is not as simple as it appears. Both the armies have crossed the stage where a decisive defeat could be inflicted on each other. In the post-Nuclear Age conventional superiority or conventional weapons are no longer decisive. Warfare has been privatized with ideological organizations conducting a war that is spread all over the globe with multiple cells in nominal communication with each other. Today when an army marches into operation in one region its enemies react by bomb blasts in areas previously considered unassailable! The mainland of USA once considered impregnable has been rendered vulnerable since 9/11.The other country's army is no longer the decisive target to be eli-minated as the Iraq war has proved.Iraqi resistance continues despite the demise of Iraqi Army! Airpower alone cannot win wars as is proved in Afghanistan and Iraq!The Indian thrust is today no longer to defeat Pakistan in Siachen or Kargil! The thrust is on cultural wars, psychologically disarming moves and on strengthening the economy.Seen in this context Pakistan Army is still preparing for the previous war. No effort is being made to organize the populace for a

conflict which would continue even after the conventional army has collapsed.The future wars will have no beginning and no end, fought with soft power and by modifying educational syllabi and trade regulations! Conducted by proxy through minority ethnic groups and by minority sects who are threatened by majority sects.Conversely, the Indian leadership has realized that it would be cheaper to win the race by unconventional means and projecting India as a moderate state with its western borders with a state full of fanatics and lunatics who deserve to be bombed without remorse. Whatever policies that President Musharraf is following are seen in the West as the efforts of one man, while the Pakistani nation is being increasingly perceived as an unstable state which must not be trusted with nuclear weapons. If the military regime fails to find a viable solution to the political problems of Pakistan and design a suitable exit strategy Pakistan's future may not be brighter than Serbia or Somalia!The fact that today's Pakistan is far more vulnerable than 1947 or 1965 or 1971's Pakistan is not being understood. Nuclear weapons may not prove to be a guarantee of Pakistan's survival unless the political and military forces decide in the best interest of the nation to respect each other! The important point to be noted is that Pakistan was the result of a political process and the armed forces were meant to be a subordinate organ of the political leadership!The next threat would not be the Indian 1st Armoured Division with its many mechanically unfit tanks but combined forces of many hostile neighbours attacking Pakistan's Nuclear facilities by stealth! The next conflict will be multi-national and very fast moving! This time there would be no KK Singhs worrying about their flanks since Pakistan may be facing not India alone but a combined Indian-Israeli-US onslaught!The lesson of today's Pakistan remains that Pakistan is ill-equipped for the future challenges that it may face! Rather Balkanisation at best and Somalisation at worst cannot be ruled out! With a crisis of legitimacy paralyzing this country's natural growth since 1954 the future does not appear to be bright!All depends on which country has a superior Grand Strategy and can handle its total national resources in a better manner! EMPLOYMENT IN 1971 BATTLE OF CHAMB Battle of Chamb fought in 1971 was the only battle in Indo Pak where a force of armoured brigade level was successfully employed by an infantry general in an offensive manner to achieve a successful breakthrough. This battle was covered in great detail by this scribe in DJ's September 1999 issue. First the 23 Division tried to make a breakthrough from the north but once this failed General Eftikhar Khan in the classic German manner made a swift re-assessment and

regrouped his forces to launch an attack from the south towards Chak Pandit as a result of which the Indians abandoned Chamb Salient. It was a classic case of dislocating the enemy commander's mental equilibrium. Eftikhar by redeploying and changing direction of armour attack did something which three of his division's infantry brigades had failed to do while attacking frontally! Eftikhar later planned another outflanking thrust at Pallanwalla but his efforts were frustrated due to two irresolute as well as incompetent brigade commanders which included his armoured brigade commander who was unable to concentrate his tank and infantry units and was many times publicly abused by him for incompetence and irresolution!79 BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH BULGE/BARAPIND The Battles fought in Shakargarh Bulge and at Bara Pind-Jarpal were the second major battles of the 1971 war as far as armour was concerned. Two major tank operations were conducted here. I will only quote few lines from the Indian Armoured Corps History to describe the first i.e delaying battle of Changez Force, which was conducted by the indomitable Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry of Chawinda fame. The Indian historian thus noted Nisar's brilliance, something that the Pakistani selection boards later failed to note, as following; "Pak armour functioned well in the role of covering troops. It managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it could have planned for".80 The other major tank battle i.e the Pakistani armoured brigade counter attack at Bara Pind was one of the most heroic, but tragic affairs in the history of Indo Pak wars. The initial rot started at Corps level where the commander who had served in staff jobs, despised artillery81 and had vague ideas about tank warfare. He viewed the armoured brigade as a hammer meant to crush an enemy by a direct assault rather than a dynamic operational entity used for dislocation or disruption of enemy plans. The armoured brigade thus initially did nothing in the first twelve days of the war as happens in all successful model discussions at the staff college and the defence college, but was finally ordered to eliminate an enemy force which had achieved a limited breakthrough. Two major failures occurred here. One was at brigade level in failure to incorporate artillery in the brigade plans82. The major failure here occurred at armoured regiment level when one tank regiment ordered to contain the enemy penetration instead attacked the enemy frontally like the Light Brigade with nominal artillery support and suffered very heavy tank casualties. A second tank regiment was then launched which contained the bridgehead

established by an Indian tank regiment, suffering heavy but relatively less losses once compared with the first regiment! On the Indian side the situation was equally dismal, as far as higher leadership at brigade level was concerned, and the day was saved only by "a very gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of Poona Horse"83 commanded by a Punjabi Hindu subaltern from Sargodha district! DESERT SECTOR The Pakistani attack in the desert sector with two tank regiments was another Quixotic effort which failed because of poor inter arm cooperation between the army and the airforce and was a battle in which two Indian Hunter aircraft84 engaged a tank regiment caught in the open desert without anti-aircraft cover or aerial support and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses. THE 2 CORPS COUNTER OFFENSIVE The Pakistani 2 Corps offensive involving attack by an armour and infantry division which was never executed has remained a subject of much speculation and controversy . Indian Western Command C in C Lieutenant General Candeth has acknowledged that had this operation been launched between 8 and 26 October, it could have caused serious disruption in Indian plans to attack East Pakistan.85 Once the war started the Indians had brought their armoured division opposite the Pakistani division and the resultant clash would have been "a futile frontal bloody clash of armour".86 One observer who was Tikka's contemporary has opined that the 2 Corps Commander i.e Lieutenant General Tikka Khan "had neither the ability to handle such a large force, nor the experience of such a war".87 The observer in this case may be dismissed as one saying so out of professional rivalry, but a dispassionate glance at handling of armour in all three Indo Pak wars beyond tank regiment level, by both armour and non-armour officers gives great substance to this criticism. Major General Eftikhar the lone exception is an altogether different case. Such men are born once in many centuries. In any case Eftikhar took immense pains in learning about armour by attending a short but effective basic course at the School of Armour Nowshera where his photograph as a general officer student was hanging in the Communication Group as I last saw it in January 1984. In addition Eftikhar had very effectively commanded the 6 Armoured Division before the 1971 war.

POST-1971 DEVELOPMENTS LESSONS OF 1971 WAR There is no doubt that the armoured corps learnt a great deal from 1971 war, specially as far as integration of artillery in armour attack and brigade level attacks were concerned. It was, however, a case of preparing for a war which had already been fought. The Indo Pak difference in conventional forces continued to increase after the 1971 war and the whole strategic scenario was transformed after India's nuclear blast in 1974. No major lesson was, however, learnt in higher organisation and the armoured corps continued as it had before 1971 as far as higher organisation was concerned. The armour had not been tested at divisional level and no major reappraisal at divisional level was undertaken. More armoured regiments were raised by milking the existing units and eliminating the fourth tank troop in each tank squadron.

THE 1984 AND 1987 WAR SCARES Pakistan concluded a major arms deal with the US in 1981 but the urgent need to modernise/upgrade the armour was not realised since the military junta was enjoying siphoning the fruits of massive US aid into private bank accounts. Thus once Indira Gandhi mobilised her forces in the wake of the Sikh Insurgency and concentrated them close to the border in mid-September Pakistani armour was in bad shape both technically as well as maintenance wise having the same old 1966-71 T-59 tanks. War looked imminent but the tension de-escalated after Indira Gandhi's assassination.

THE AUTHOR IN 1984 SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER WAR SCARE MOBILISATION In 1987 again Pakistani armour was qualitatively inferior having the same 1971 T-59's albeit new or reconditioned vis-a-vis Indian T-72s. War looked imminent in January 1987 but did not break out due to sheer irresolution on Rajiv Gandhi's part. Later much propaganda was done in Pakistan about some visionary soldiers but as this scribe wrote in a letter published in one of the most prestigious journals of the

Pakistan Army "As far as BRASS TACKS is concerned, I beg to submit that there was no countermove with the deliberate intention to frighten the Indians.The move of the Strategic Reserve (Pakistan's 2 Corps) from Cholistan to Ravi-Sutlej Corridor was a purely defensive move. If Sunderji lost his nerve then it was a matter of pure chance otherwise the Pakistani intention was never to unnerve Sunderji but to get its strategic reserve to a more central location which it occupied in both 1965 and 1971 wars. Later on with benefit of hindsight some people here did attempt to make the effort appear as a visionary soldier's piece of military genius".88 The readers may note that this assertion was not challenged by anyone which either means that the staff college magazine is either distributed in graveyards or no one has the time or energy to read or contest anything! The situation in 1987 was most grave for Pakistani armour at least technically and numerically and the Indians due to sheer irresolution lost a golden chance to impose a military solution which in the postChaghi scenario is no longer possible. One explanation of the Pakistani armoured division's withdrawal north of Sutlej lies in Pakistani governments desire not to provoke the Indians. Technically, however, Pakistan Armour was not in a reasonable shape to fight a war in January 1987.

THE AUTHOR TRAINING HIS DELTA SQUADRON IN 1986-87 MOBILISATION IN THE DESERT

NEW RAISINGS 1971-1994 AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS New raisings were done after the 1971 war but every new raising was based on milking of existing units and was matched by new raisings on the other side. Thus these new raisings did not produce any qualitative or quantitative situation in the overall comparative military balance. Some units were raised soon after the 1971 war while six units were raised as a result of the return of personnel of Tabuk Brigade in 1985 and 1988 respectively. Three more units were raised on the return of the armoured brigade despatched to the Gulf in 1991, while two more units were raised from the existing independent squadrons one of which was raised in 1971 and was commanded by this scribe till November 1993. Both these two units were raised in infantry divisions and thus deprived of the relatively far superior training environment that should have been available to them by virtue of being raised in an armoured division. This was done at a time when there were many senior armour officers in the General Headquarters and this simple truism could have been conveyed to the concerned authority. The sending of two batches of officers and men to Saudi Arabia in 1982 and 1985 seriously undermined armoured corps efficiency. Two classes were created in both within the officers and the rank and file. The incentive to somehow go to Saudi Arabia created unpleasant situation in many units in terms of class rivalry, favouritism and even further dilution of uprightness and soldierly forthrightness and simple approach towards regimental soldiering. Only individuals gained while the military spirit of the army described by Clausewitz as the most

important foundation of an army was eroded. This was followed by other carrots that made people more money minded and calculating like secondments to Somalia, Bosnia etc. The net goodwill they brought can be gauged from the fact that Pakistan is on the borderline in the US State Department's list of terrorist nations and is on the brink of financial default which will force its government, military or civil to finally bend to superpower dictation regardless of all rhetoric! During the period 1977-88 the armoured corps got the best opportunity to benefit from the fact that an armour officer was the master of everything! Paradoxically professionally things deteriorated! Two messes were built in Nowshera and Rawalpindi which are not for armour officers, at least those below brigadier! The one in Rawalpindi is a personal fiefdom and is an excellent means of exercising patronage and enhancing contacts! The armour school during this period went on the same lines as in 1960s. No new building was built. It retained its unique distinction of being the final resting place of near superseded or superseded brigadiers at a time when from 1983-84 the infantry school was upgraded to a general rank headed institution, and some very fine officers (barring few exceptions!!!!) were posted to head that institution! The armoured corps suffered in terms of promotion since promotions became a far more personalised affair since those on top knew officers intimately and lavishly exercised their powers to promote or demote in a typical third world whimsical style.Thus many fine officers like Sher Azam Malik and Javed Hussain were sidelined while many officers reached the general rank despite the fact that at least one was not recommended for next rank by his infantry division commander and corps commander. It is true that some individuals gained four star rank without commanding a division or a corps or in other ways but the armoured corps as an arm suffered. It became a personal fiefdom from 1976 to 1988. It will take many years to recover from the negative effects of that "Darbari Era". Perhaps the next war towards which the sub-continent is invariably being pushed into due to myopic vision and lack of statesmanship will be the final audit of the armoured corps of both sides since 1971! Our only hope is that our Indian friends I hear are almost as incompetent as we are beyond tank regiment or brigade level. At least their performance beyond unit level in both 1965 and 1971, provides a lot of solace and indicates that their commanders beyond unit level are as illustrious as ours! There is nothing much to write about Zarb-i-Momin as far as armour was concerned. This by all definitions, is ironic since it was supposed to be an armour dominated show supposedly designed to derive lessons which were special to armour. What happened in reality was a farce. The enemy armoured divisions reconnaissance teams were in the

enemy territory some four months before the war broke out, conducting Recce and familiarising themselves with the area. Engineer units arrived months before to improve tracks to enhance mobility inside enemy territory! This scribe was then serving in 3rd Armoured Brigade Headquarters. The only redeeming feature of the exercise was the 3rd Armoured Brigade counter-attack, which succeeded by divine design since bad weather rendered the enemy air inoperational. Huge exercises in which millions are spent, however, cannot be justified simply because of attacks, which succeed, by divine design! There was no element of the fog of war for the advancing side, while the defenders final attack succeeded by Divine Design! The military objectives of the exercise, at least meaningful ones pertaining to higher direction of war, or inter corps co-ordination i.e holding and striking corps operating in the same area, were not achieved. If anyone claims that these were achieved then the fact that no co-ordinating headquarter was created to regulate the holding and striking corps between 1989 and 1998 proved that the lessons, that is if any, apart from those in the realm of propaganda and public relations, were learnt, were either not implemented (a serious command failing if true) or disregarded by the successors of the then chief. The second conclusion is also highly improbable since the then chief was in chair for more than one and half year after the exercise, and had ample time to incorporate the lessons, that is if any meaningful ones were learnt. Since this scribe does not have the power of ESP it is not possible to gauge whether the ulterior motives of that exercise, if any were achieved or not! The problem with the army of 1984-90, at the top was that it was dominated by men who had not commanded armoured formations beyond unit level or brigade (and that too for few months) in case of armour and even had not commanded infantry formations in major general rank which held even a tank squadron on their order of battle! Zia who had commanded an armoured division in peace and a corps for an year had utilised bulk of his time in sycophancy with the PPP stalwarts in Multan and had nothing to do with any armoured battle in both the wars! The best product of this galaxy of talents was the bifurcation of the older corps into striking and holding formations as stated earlier, without earmarking any co-ordinating headquarter and would have been a recipe to diasaster in case a war had broken out! This Quixotic bifurcation as earlier stated was not tested in Zarb-eMomin. ANALYSIS ARMOUR IN TRAINING MANOEUVRES

Various divisional level training manoeuvres were held after 1971 and many lessons were learnt. However, there is no organisational or institutional framework to scientifically evaluate the command abilities of officers beyond tank regiment level. This assertion is based on conviction and was pointed out in writing by this scribe in various army journals and is on record : "Evaluation of exercises which is one of the major peactime methods of judging resolution in a commander is an extremely rigorous and scientific affair. It is felt that this should be done by a select corps of officers who will be less biased in judging a man's professional calibre. The present system, it is felt is less objective, less scientific and less profession oriented. Probably it is so because those who evaluate each

other spend more time together in cantonments than in the field and thus go into the field with preconceived ideas further biased by personal likes and dislikes ............the present system of exercises are not aimed at testing the command qualities which are really decisive like resolution. Even if this is being done in certain cases then it is confined to lower command levels, which a study of military history illustrates is just not enough ........." We have got to train our commanders for adverse situations which demand unconventional audacious and imaginative planning. Presently we are afraid this is not being done. Rather exercises are demonstrations on a massive scale".89

THE AUTHOR AS MECHANICAL TRANSPORT OFFICER OF 3RD ARMOURED BRIGADE WITH STAFF CAPTAIN ABID HAMZA WHERE HE WITNESSED THE GRAND DEMO ZARB I MOMIN AND BILLED HIS BRIGADE COMMANDER 35 THOUSAND RUPEES FOR MISUSING HIS STAFF CAR IN 1989.I CONVINCED ABID HAMZA TO JOIN HIS FATHERS BATTALION 10 PUNJAB BY CHANGE OF ARM.THE UNIT HAD ALL SHORT SERVICE COURSE OFFICERS IN 1990 AND HAMZA RESIGNED IN DISGUST SEEING THEIR OR TYPE BEHAVIOUR.HE JOINED THE PIA AS A PILOT LATER.

"There are institutions (referring to one particular institution) which deliver a verdict on command qualities of an individual without a single exercise in the field"!90 ......... " Commanders above unit level are rarely properly exercised" ........ " The system is producing many whose tour of regimental soldiering is with the primary aim of getting a hole punched in the service record card".91 "Many military systems that this world saw were a conspiracy against originality and boldness"......"Create an 'Evaluation Corps' which will be a full time corps primarily designed/dedicated to test the professional competence of commanders at all levels (till divisional level)".92

THE AUTHOR AT EXERCISE ZARB I MOMIN 1989 AT SERAI KRISHNA

"Establishment of training command, responsible for planning and monitoring Army's training is an inescapable necessity".93 The rationale behind quoting all these observations which are on record is to prove that training manoeuvres as this scribe saw them

while serving for four continuous years, without going on a single course or even a month's leave in an armoured divison or later in other infantry formations, were not being held on a scientific basis. There were exceptions like Generals Hameed Gul, Sajjad or Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi (his other qualities/peculiarities apart) who took training manoeuvres religiously and conducted them brilliantly, but these men and particularly Hameed Gul (his so called fundamentalist political views aside) was an exception and the next two years after his departure from the armoured division as this scribe saw were the most barren years of training. The reason is simple, i.e procedural and institutional arrangements are longer lasting and more consistent and to a considerable extent compensate for individual human qualitative differences resulting from change of command from person "X" to person "Z". The problem is that lack of a neutral organisation which could give a second opinion on the command abilities of a commander beyond squadron unit or brigade level was missing. It was common to hear many brigade and unit commanders brag that it was their pen and not the performance of an officer on training manoeuvres which would decide the issue. This was true since it was common to see many excellent brigade commanders and unit commanders who handled their command outfits superbly in field training manoeuvres being sidelined to oblivion and obscurity while many relatively incompetent, as far performance in field was concerned, but "on paper good officers", getting the best appointments and rising to general rank.This is as far as the armoured corps was concerned. The secondment to Saudi Arabia propelled another breed who had a good time in three years in Tabuk where exercises were a "hoax" and reached high ranks without commanding an armoured brigade (the Lahore armoured brigade being an exception since it hardly does any meaningful training at brigade level and performs other more important non training duties) or armoured division. There emerged during the period 1977-1994 a breed of essentially paper tiger commanders who had all the holes punched and had also mastered the techniques of conducting perfect armoured attacks (in reality, carefully rehearsed demonstrations) under conditions in which all the friction of war which that poor Prussian Clausewitz had written about had been eliminated through whiz kid techniques mastered in the process of hole punching and keeping the OEI high ! HANDLING OF ARMOUR IN SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION Handling of armour in schools of instruction also requires serious reevaluation. During my stay in the School of Armour I observed that there were no fixed parameters or training guidelines at army level

which regulated that institution. All depended on the commandant's personality. If there was a hard taskmaster like Sher Azam Malik everything went well but everything would suddenly transform once person "Y" or "Z" came. As far as I know the school with few exceptions was a dumping ground for superseded or about to be superseded brigadiers, at least after 1971 with perhaps one or two odd exceptions. Naturally these commandants were on their way out and with few exceptions took more interest in preparing themselves for their future retired life!

THE AUTHOR AS AN INSTRUCTOR OF TACTICS AT THE TANK SCHOOL TACTICAL WING NOWSHERA NOVEMBER 1991 The same was true for instructors at Lieutenant Colonel level out of whom very few went beyond brigadier. Further the school's location being far away from both the armoured divisions did not allow integration of students doing courses in major armour training manoeuvres as is done in the Infantry School in Quetta. This school should be re-located somewhere in the desert in Cholistan or perhaps its outer fringes or in the Potohar plateau! This scribe in May-June 1993 had made a similar recommendation for the independent armoured squadron that he was commanding and was then stationed in Okara (through an official written letter held on record) to be shifted to the

desert in Tamewali or Bahawalnagar. The recommendation made as part of unit points for the divisional conference was approved by Major General Zia ul Haq the General Officer Commanding the infantry division and implemented much to the chagrin of officers who later joined the new tank regiment raised from the Phoenix ashes of that squadron! Coming back to the main line of discussion there was no system of grading in the school and the powers of the officers in charge course, the chief instructor and the higher

THE AITHOR WITH GENERAL M.A BEG IN 1990 appointment holders to alter a tactical grading done by an instructor of major or colonel rank were not limited by any margin of plus one or two as was the practice in Infantry School. I don't know whether it has changed now from 1992. The instructors posted after staff college to armour school were those majors who were not fit to be brigade majors or were there simply because no unit or other vacancy was available for them! This did not mean that these majors were not good since the system of assessment of staff college needs considerable revamping. The bad part was that these majors did not put up maximum hard work since they knew that the seal of relatively mediocre majors had been stamped on them and, however, hard they worked their chances for promotion beyond colonel

rank were remote! Two buildings were completed in 1988-89 but these were hardly sufficient to meet the existing demands! The transparency of the system of grading could be gauged from the fact that the only two officers who got an alpha grade in tactical leg of the young officer's basic course were sons of serving generals! This scribe had the opportunity to see one of them during the basic course and was perplexed and surprised as to how he was graded alpha. On the other hand a retired three star general's son who had already managed a Bee Plus in the junior Staff Course (a far more tough affair than the mid career course) while his father was a serving three star general, was initially graded as Bee Minus in the Mid-Career Course whereas he certainly deserved a Bee! Later on I believe he was given a Bee, after much haggling as happened at Valtoha between 1 FF and 6 Lancers. HIGHER ARMOUR OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANISATION No major change in Pakistani higher armour command as earlier discussed in brief was made till 1987. In 1986-87 the older corps which contained both holding and striking formations were sub-divided into holding and striking corps. This arrangement although outwardly neat and superficially sound was essentially confusing and fallacious. It was regarding this change that this scribe pointed out in an article "It is felt that during conduct of operations two formation commanders of equal rank commanding a holding and strike formation respectively in the same area of operations, cannot function effectively. Even during Exercise Zarb-e-Momin this aspect was not put to trial. Training of holding and strike formations needs to be integrated thus meriting a unified operational command vested in the person of one officer of the rank of lieutenant general. The change may require creation of Army Headquarters in certain operational areas".94 The arrangement of holding and striking corps without any higher coordinating headquarter was a recipe for confusion and disaster as I witnessed while serving in a holding corps, once I personally saw the lack of communication and co-ordination in training and cooperation between the concerned strike and holding corps. Thus, I was motivated to write another article in which this scribe's recommendations for establishing a co-ordinating headquarters for the holding and striking corps were seconded by the worthy editor of the Citadel Magazine as ones which "certainly merits consideration".95 The rationale on which these recommendations were based were: "The concept of holding and striking formation also needs reappraisal....the bifurcation in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and theoretically sound is historically without a successful precedent. The issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by

subjecting it to the friction of a rigorous training manoeuvre".96 "The shield and the spear or the hammer and the anvil can function effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarter regulates their operations.How can one main headquarters 200 or 400 miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of, effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil".97 "The need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable necessity".98 I believe that there has been some progress since these recommendations which are on record were made in 1998. All credit, however, goes to then commandant Major General Amjad and his team who published these two above quoted articles. Had these been written in 1987 or 1988 no editor would have dared to publish them. 99 POOR INTER-ARM/INTER- UNIT COOPERATION AND LACK OF DIVISIONAL SPIRIT Poor inter-arm cooperation seriously retarded the combat potential of the Pakistan Armoured Corps right from 1947. This was the worst British legacy that both the Indo-Pak armies inherited. A British observer in WW Two noted that "in the training of the armoured division, I stressed the need for co-operation of all arms in battle. One had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years, aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of winning an action without the assistance of other arms. The Chief agent in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war pundits were the German".100 The secret of the German Blitzkrieg tactics which revolutionised warfare lay in intimate inter-arm cooperation. The US concept of Combined Arms Teams is actually the old German inter-arm cooperation within the Panzer Division concept 'wine in new bottles'. The British tanks in WW II on the other hand repeatedly failed to function effectively because of poor inter-arm cooperation based on inter-unit rivalry and excess of regimentation. The Pakistan Army inherited this disease and this disease instead of getting reduced became more pronounced after 1947. The army remained infantry dominated since all the chiefs from 1948 to 1972 were from infantry. From 1977 to 1988 the army remained armour dominated and preference in promotion was given to those close to Zia. Poor inter-arm cooperation led to serious operational failures in Khem Karan and in Grand Slam in 1965 and at Bara Pind in 1971. The similarity between the lack of infantry tank cooperation in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan and those of similar incidents in the case of British

infantry and tanks at Gazala etc is remarkable. Even when I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in March 1983, 29 Cavalry (in which this scribe later served for some time) being a new unit was regarded as second among equals, 7 FF the mechanised infantry unit of our brigade was viewed as an enemy and 15 SP the artillery unit was despised and considered too insignificant even to be considered an enemy. The Supply and Transport unit was regarded as a bunch of untouchables! The EME was not liked but feared, for their nuisance value in inspections, though secretly despised. It was out of question to visit the messes of these units and my friendship with an officer of 7 FF was viewed by many seniors as disloyalty to the regiment! Officers from armoured regiments were mostly friendly with officers from other armoured regiments. It was rare that any officer of the infantry division met any officer of the armoured division in Kharian. Even within the very small armoured corps of the 1950s and 1960s there were glaring differences from regiment to regiment. There were regiments with a much higher representation in the top hierarchy dating from 1947 and there were fatherless regiments who had done well in war but had no patrons beyond the brigadier rank. The negative factor here for the armoured corps was the fact that while the regiment in infantry had a much larger number of units like the Punjab and FF group, each armoured regiment was as different from each other as France from Germany and an officer from any tank regiment only believed in patronising his very own regiment! Parallels can be found in battle of Bir El Gubi in 1941 where the 22 Armoured Brigade frontally charged the Italians with the support of just one battery of 25 Pounders 101 and failed to capture it suffering in the process huge losses and in the Battle of Bara Pind where Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade did a similar thing. The German tank general and illustrious staff officer Von Mellenthin noted this failing when he said, "their commanders would not concentrate tanks and guns for a coordinated battle".102 On the other hand notorious examples of non-cooperation in 1965 and 1971 wars can be compared with the conduct of the British armour at Gazala in 1942 when the 2nd Highland infantry was destroyed by German tanks while a superior British tank force merely looked on, or in the case of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles who were abandoned to German Panzers simply because the British armour had to go into leaguer!103 One of the most notorious examples of lack of inter-arm co-operation took place in Chawinda when first the Indian tanks withdrew from Jassoran-Buttur Dograndi-Sodreke area on their own104, and later

when Indian tanks ordered to re-attack the same area later were not informed about the failure of the last night's infantry attack!105 An Indian general frankly admitted this lack of inter arm cooperation when he said, "There were misunderstandings galore between the infantry and armour commanders in the second battle of Chawinda. A lack of rapport seems to be the only explanation..".106 This lack of cooperation was something like 13th century inter-arm and individual rivalry which led to the failure of the Crusaders or the Mongols against the Mamelukes.Toynbee the great historian thus wrote, "the individual Mongol champion was promptly overcome by the disciplined heavy cavalry of the Egyptian Mamlukes (mostly kidnapped slaves of Slav/European origin converted to Islam after being bought by the Kurds etc). These had given warning of the supremacy of their technique at the Battle of Mansurah in AD 1250, when Frankish army of Saint Louis had paid a disastrous penalty for the thoughtless individualism of its knights, each anxious for personal honour at the expense of the disciplined formation".107 I can state with confidence that as late as 1993 that almost each tank regiment (having seen five tank regiments and one tank squadron) or infantry regiment behaved at least symbolically like these thirteenth century knights described by Toynbee, at least in garrisons and on field manoeuvres! I am sure that the Indian army being the chip of the same block and led by as mediocre and orders oriented men is no different! At least in strength of reservoirs of mediocrity the subcontinent consists of men belonging to one nation! THE CAVALRY CHARGE TRADITION The Armoured Corps inherited a typically British cavalry charge tradition, an irrational urge of being "brave to the point of foolhardiness".108 The Indians suffered from a similar malady and lost many tanks in attacks delivered in a cavalry charge manner at Gadgor, Phillora, Buttur, Dograndi, Sodreke, etc. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim who was sent as Deputy GOC of 6 Armoured Division described these encounters as "Kabbadi Matches". Riaz thus observed "The normal practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a time to probe and infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side reacted with launching one of their own armoured regiments to stop and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank casualties on both sides".109 Riaz states that "The first thing that I did was to stop the 'Kabbadi Game' i.e for one regiment sailing into the blues and coming back with a bloody nose".110 NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN WW TWO AND INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATIVE BRITISH DOCTRINE

In all fairness the nature of Indian Army's employment as far as the armoured corps was concerned did not make things any easier for the armoured corps of both the countries. The Indian Armoured Corps was either employed in a screen/scout role or in conditions where their opponent as in Burma was vastly inferior both numerically and quantitatively in number of tanks. Indians were not groomed for higher ranks and even the British despite better education superior literacy level and technically and qualitatively superior position did not produce a single good tank commander at any level higher than tank regiment. No wonder that they failed the Germans in France and North Africa from 1940 till 1942 when finally the scales were turned, not because of better generalship but by virtue of overwhelming numerical superiority. Further the conservative British tank doctrine which both the armies inherited and made no effort to change that armour commanders beyond unit level remained as mediocre as they were on the British side in WW II. It is no credit to the quality of British armoured corps that General Mellenthin who saw the British Army as its direct opponent for some two years noted that " The British Artillery was the best trained and best commanded element in the British Army".111 MISCELLANEOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL HANGUPS The armoured corps of 1947 inherited many psychological hang-ups. The subconscious emphasis inherited from the British was on being an "arm of fashion and wealth" "affected carelessness" and worst of all "an arrogant non-chalance towards the duller aspects of their work".112 During a winter collective which this scribes unit had to conduct for another armoured brigade, the other brigades units insisted that their tank commanders cannot advance unless there is a visible track going through the desert. In this case there was none! Finally the problem was resolved by asking for engineer support and a track was made with the help of earthmoving equipment! During my service I frequently heard many officers saying that a fourth tank troop in a squadron was good and added flexibility while many said that it was difficult to manage. These officers probably never understood that the Germans performed miracles with armoured divisions, which had just one Panzer Regiment (tank brigade). LACK OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT BRIGADE/BEYOND AND DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION AT SPECIAL TO ARM TACTICAL LEVEL Firstly we shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because

they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab but mobility oriented since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured territory was important, the operational situation was totally different from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell Hart. There was an inclination in some strike formations to use French terms in operational orders! On one occasion shortly before retirement while this scribe was an umpire with a strike infantry division, I read the term "Coup de Main" describing the division's main attack. My knowledge of French was limited but as far as I then knew "Coup de Main" in the British military sense was a term used for a surprise attack launched in a manner which was not very deliberate or conventional. Once I pointed this out the majority was outraged and two colonels who had done the French Staff Course insisted that "Coup de Main" was the right word for describing "Main Attack or Effort". Then we come to brigade level. The Khem Karan failure was essentially the failure of 5 Armoured brigade. On the first day the brigade was dispersed without any coherent plan one tank regiment going for Assal Uttar from the centre and left, one tank regiment (some 19 tanks) going for Valtoha without any sizeable infantry support and the brigade headquarters sitting in Khem Karan as if it was the headquarters of Mountbatten's South East Asia Command rather than a brigade tactical headquarter. It appears that there was no operational philosophy of handling armour at brigade level. The brigade was thus doing what a German Panzer Division could not do i.e attacking on some three axis instead of developing the operations on what the Germans called the "Schwerpunkt".113 The concept of all arms cooperation was not understood and 6 Lancers was despatched to Valtoha on its own . Its Commanding Officer did make a request for infantry114 but this was brushed aside and mechanised infantry which was available that day did little, regardless of whatever they may claim now in their regimental histories.

Major failures in both Indian and Pakistan Armies in handling of armour occurred at brigade and division level. It appears that no lessons were derived from these failures. In my thirteen years service I witnessed changes in concept of employment of armoured brigade and division with change of brigade and divisional commanders. Thus what was executed by Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi for two years was disregarded in near totality once Inayat departed and was endorsed by the same commanding officers who had served earlier under Inayat as the Gospel truth! One i.e my second commanding officer, who had dissented under both the commanders albeit tactfully retired as a colonel! This is just one example out of innumerable examples. The School of Armour as far as I know till 1992 had no concrete or tangible set of recommendations about concept of employment or doctrine of employment of an armoured brigade or division in the various types of terrain/scenarios where employment was likely. I was in charge of all the scripts held in the Tactical Wing from December 1991 to December 1992 and did not find any such thing! Even in the School, concepts of employment changed with change of commandant or change of chief instructor! The Divisional Battle Schools of Armoured Divisions were dumping grounds of superseded or near superseded majors and colonels and their cardinal attribute was "silence of a graveyard" as I pointed out to a letter to editor of Citadel magazine in mid-1998. There was no specific to corps area of operations doctrine of operations of armour at least till 1994, at a time when the existence of a multiple number of formations like mechanised brigade, corps reserve, army reserve operating in the same area made a clarity of role/mission/doctrine of employment all the more necessary! Infantry lieutenant colonels who had done foreign staff college had rudimentary ideas about the non-linear armoured battle and the behaviour of enemy armour in the post-breakout stage! Armour after all in all three wars has failed to breakout successfully as far as both sides are concerned! TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND BEYOND One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a snail's pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a

permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade, divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in Mellenthin's observation that "the officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders (Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands".115 LACK OF OFFENSIVE SPIRIT There was a serious lack of offensive spirit at all levels beyond unit level. Thus Ayub did not leave Rawalpindi throughout the war. As late as 1991 a Directing Staff of Command and Staff College observed this glaring lack of aggressiveness in the army in an article published in 1991.116 The writer then an instructor at the command and Staff College and now probably commanding a division somewhere thus noted, "The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where the momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat". The readers may note that this man was one of the few generals who led from the front. Some of the many who saw him in that role, who this scribe knows/met are Majors Suleman Butt (11C), Iftikhar Chaudhry (11 C), Shujaat Ali Janjua (the indomitable Panther Janjua from (11C) and Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rehman who was commanding an R & S Company. POOR GENERAL STAFF PROCEDURES AND PLANNING ABILITY AT HIGHER LEVELS This factor played a serious role in the Pakistani armoured division's failure at Khem Karan in 1965. At the GHQ level the failure to appreciate that the armoured division must get out of the bottleneck between Rohi and Nikasu Nala was not appreciated. Nothing in the orders given to the 1st Armoured Division indicates that the planners understood this problem. Nikasu Nala was a pre-1947 landmark while Rohi Nala was no common pin to have missed the eyes of the planners.

Poor general staff procedures at brigade and division level led to failure to concentrate all three armoured brigades across the Rohi Nala and thus was the principal reason for failure of the armoured division's effort. The GHQ vacillation and indecision on 6th, 7th and 8th September when it issued contradictory orders to the 1st Armoured Division, sometimes to send one of its brigades to Lahore and sometimes to Sialkot117 also played a major role in adding to the imperial confusion in the armoured division. Correlli Barnett's observations on the British Staffs of WW II fit well on the Pakistani Staff officers role in failure to handle armour. Barnett thus noted "The pace (referring to that of armoured operations) was too fast for the slow working staffs of lower formations (referringto corps/divisional/brigade staffs) ......(German staff work, because of greater experience and better training, was always faster and more lucid than British).....and detailed organisation for the offensive was poor and confused".118 This observation fits well with the Military Operations Directorate of both sides and all staff officers down to armoured brigade level responsible for planning/executing the operations of both the Pakistani and the Indian 1st Armoured Divisions. The British perhaps were unlucky that their opponents were Germans and the Indians and Pakistanis were perhaps very lucky that their opponents were Pakistanis and Indians! CONCLUSION The Gul theory of failure because infantry officers were commanding the armoured division is not vindicated by actual facts of the 1965 war. Was the Indian 1st Armoured Division or its 1st Armoured Brigade commanded by an infantry officer and yet they proved as incompetent as Naseer. After all Rommel was from infantry, Macarthur, Mead and Lee were from Engineers and Napoleon was from artillery. The fault lay in the military clique of that time who made promotions on whims and on basis of personal likes and dislikes rather than on merit. After all the finest armoured commander that the sub- continent produced was Eftikhar who was an infantry man! The Pakistan armoured corps with the exception of one unit of armoured cars was not employed in 1947-48 war. In 1965 Pakistan Armoured Corps failed to achieve a major breakthrough despite relative qualitative superiority in tanks as well as overwhelming numerical superiority in total available number of tanks in Khem Karan due to doctrinal leadership and essentially staff incompetence centred reasons. A breakthrough was possible and one Indian general was frank enough to recall as late as 1993 General Harbaksh Singh's remarks that "A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand

Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals.It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage"119. Long before 1965 and 1971 civilians on the board of the boundary commission had very high hopes from both the Indian and Pakistan Armies and thus one had said "If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance, then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measurable distance of Ambala,but they (referring to the Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of forty miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angles to their forces..."120. The same member went further and gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan!121 Compare these remarks with two Indian three star generals remarks: "We penetrated only 11 miles (despite a five to one superiority in tanks on 8th September and a much larger one in infantry-this scribe's remarks) into enemy territory beyond the bridgehead at our deepest stretch, when, but for the mishandling of our forces, especially armour, the completion of our mission appeared well within our grasp".122 Another sadly noted "it ground to a halt just four miles ahead of the bridgehead"!123 This happened not as propagandists assert in Pakistan because of some superior martial race or ideological reasons but simply because the Indian brigade and division commander lost their nerve. The Indians, the lower ranks till battalion/regiment level fought as bravely at Chawinda as their Pakistani counterparts, tankman and infantry man alike, at Khem Karan where Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division also failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a seven to one superiority in tanks in total number. Leave aside west or east of Rohi Nala which was entirely a command as well as staff planning failure. The Nikasu Nala was even clearly marked as a large water obstacle even on the maps of the Punjab Boundary Commission!124 So where do we go. The common man, the tax payer has been bled white on both sides with a very large percentage being spent on armoured corps which failed to advance pathetically beyond 4 miles on the first day of the war in face of nominal opposition or eleven miles in all 17 days or got stuck between a Nala and a canal in own territory! The generals on both sides should explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for strategic and operational incompetence despite being provided with superiority at the decisive point and why their command outfits which are too large for their intellectual/resolution capabilities to handle in war should not be cut to one fourth their present size! But who will bell the cat! Why not employ a good team of psychiatrists at one-fiftieth the cost spent on armour and other expensive hardware and cure the

pathetic minds of the sick Indo Pak psyche! Alas! we forget what long ago Freud said, "The irrational forces in man's nature are so strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against them. A small minority might be able to live a life of reason, but most men are comfortable living with their delusions and superstitions than with truth". Freud thus sadly concluded "Society which has been fashioned by man reflects to a great extent man's irrationality. As a consequence each new generation is corrupted by being born in an irrational society. The influence of man on society and of society on man is a vicious circle and only a few hardy souls can free themselves". That was in the interwar years with Fascism rising and hatred gripping all Europe. Europe paid its price in million of lives in WW II. The Indo-Pak subcontinent has yet to learn. We saw one holocaust in 1947 but have learnt very little from it. The 1971 holocaust did not affect many in the West Wing.Brahmaputra and the tidal rivers had the capacity to take a huge load and disposal of anything was a simple operation! Had our higher leaders both civil and military or the armoured commanders been more competent, perhaps things may have been settled a bit less amicably albeit more swiftly in the 1947-48, 1965 or 1971 wars! In the post-nuclear scenario both sides sure do need psychiatric help! n REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES 79 Interviews with a large number of participants including Major later Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rahman from 19 Baluch (R & S) residing in Lahore Cantt and one who I first met at the Lahore Cantt Polo Ground jogging track, Major Iftikhar a dear friend and senior from 11 Cavalry who commanded a tank troop in Chamb in 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Suleman Butt from 11 Cavalry who is a unit officer and a relative by family inter-marriages, who was a troop leader and was seriously wounded in Chamb and more than 100 other ranks of 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 26 Cavalry with whom I served in 11 Cavalry, 58 Cavalry and 5 Independent Armoured Squadron. 80Page-513 & 514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 81Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971- Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Printed for Services Book Club by Wajid Alis (Private Limited) -Lahore-1990. Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this anti-artillery bias of Headquarter 1 Corps in the following words; "When Headquarter 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur. Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarter Artillery I Corps was kept out of picture."

82Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Pakistan Army-1966-71-Op Cit. Riza writes that "Brigadier Ahmad (armoured brigade commander) made approx 25 counter-attack plans. However, the artillery commander from 1 Corps and neighbouring divisions were neither consulted nor advised about these plans.This was to have unfortunate consequences as the battle unfolded." 83Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. 84 Pages-531 & 532-Ibid. 85 Page-28-The Western Front-Indo Pakistan War 1971- Lt Gen P. Candeth -Allied Publishers-Madras-1984. General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that "the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a preemptive attack during that period the consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us " 86 Page-25-Article- The Armoured Thrust-An Operational AnalysisMajor A.H Amin (Retired)- The Citadel -Issue Number - 1/98- Command and Staff College- Quetta-April 1998. 87Page-25-Article- Why I Lay down Arms-Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi (Retired) - Defence Journal-Issue Number -3-41979- Volume Number Five-Karachi-1979. 88 Page-8-Letter to the Editor from Major A.H Amin - Readers Forum"The Citadel-No. 3/93"- Command and Staff College Quetta-November 1993. 89Pages-39 & 40-Article - Resolution -the Cardinal Command VirtueCaptain A.H Amin-Pakistan Army Journal-June 1992 Issue-Inspector General Training and Evaluations Branch-Training publication and Information Directorate-General Branch -Rawalpindi. 90 Page-14- Article- The Intangible Forces Behind a Military Manoeuvre- Major A.H Amin -Pakistan Army Journal-June 1993 IssueInspector General Training and Evaluations Branch-Training Publication and Information Directorate-General Headquarters -Rawalpindi. 91 Ibid. 92 Pages-32 & 35-Article-Plain as well as Subtle aspects of Military Decision Making- Major A.H Amin (Retired)-The Citadel-Issue Number

1/94- Command and Staff College -Quetta-April 1994. This article was submitted for publication while the author was in service commanding an independent tank squadron in September 1993 but published after retirement in April 1994. 93 Page-32-Citadel Issue 1/98-Op Cit. 94 Page-31-Ibid. 95Page-3- Editors Note-The Citadel-Issue Number 2/98- Command and Staff College Quetta-December 1998. 96Page-50-Article-The Relationship of Organisation to Doctrine and Conduct of War- Major A.H Amin (Retired)-Citadel Issue number 2/98Op Cit. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 The reader may note that the Glasnost/Perestroika of the Pakistan Army as far as military writing is concerned began from 1988-89 onwards once General Baig became the COAS and Major General Riazullah became the Director General of Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR). Riazullah essentially a fighting soldier and a career officer with a fine written expression was one of the most capable and brilliant heads of the ISPR. In addition Lieutenant Colonel I.D Hassan was particularly instrumental and decisive in improving the quality of the "Pakistan Army Journal". Colonel I.D Hassan was succeeded in turn by two almost as brilliant editors i.e Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad both of whom raised the standard of the Pakistan Army Journal to a very high level. Unfortunately after Colonel Jawaid Ahmad's departure in 1994 the magazine's standard deteriorated and by 1997 its circulation despite the massive financial resources at its backing had been reduced from quarterly to six monthly. 100 Page-28-Eight Years Overseas-Field Marshal Henry.M. Wilson of Libya-Hutchinson Boks-London-1950. 101 Page-138-J.A.I Agar Hamilton-Op Cit and Page-40-The Mediterranean and Middle East-Volume Three-Major General I.S.O Playfair-Her Majesty's Stationery Office-London-1960 102Page-79-Panzer Battles-General Von Mellenthin-Corgi/Ballantine Books-New York-1977.

103 Page-243-The Crucible of War-Auchinleck's Command- Barrie PittMacmillan-London-1986. 104 Page-156-War Despatches-Op Cit. Page-404-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. The reader may note that Indian armour withdrew north of the railway line at Chawinda on its own, but some units in Pakistan claim that it was they who attacked the Indians and drove them out ! 105 Page-405-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.This incident illustrates poor staff procedures too since the headquarter of 1st Armoured Division was also responsible for this lapse. 106 Page-496 - Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit 107 Page-197-A Study of History-The One Volume Edition- Arnold Toynbee-Thames and Hudson-Published with arrangement with Oxford University Press, London-1988. 108 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit. 109 Pages-12 & 13-Brigadier Riazul Karim Khan, MC, LOM -Op Cit. 110 Page-13-Ibid. 111 Page-79-Von Mellenthin-Op Cit. 112 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit. 113 Page-39-Tank Warfare-Richard Simpkin-Brasey's Publishers Limited London-1979. 114 Page-232-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cited.Shaukat writes that although an infantry company was to go (which means that it was ordered to go) with 6 Lancers....after some haggling (as if 5 Armoured Brigade was a fish market!!!!) only one platoon was made available. Shaukat writes that later Sahibzada Gul (6 Lancers) asked for more infantry and an air strike on Valtoha but neither came. It appears that the gears of the 5 Armoured Brigade were completely jammed due to the friction of war and despite all this its commander was promoted after the war while Nisar the real hero of tank battles in both 1965 and 1971 did not go beyond a brigadier. The finest infantry brigade commander of the 1965 Brigadier Qayyum Sher who was praised by Shaukat Riza (Page-203-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit) was also retired as a brigadier while one who was on the sidelines in Chawinda (i.e Niazi) became a lieutenant general. The same happened in India to Harbaksh

Singh since he was a Punjabi and a Sikh while Manekshaw who had played no role in 1948 and 1965 wars became a C-in-C. The lesson is that in Indo-Pak armies as perhaps in all armies; actual on ground war performance is less important than PR! Thus a brigadier who absented himself from his headquarters in 1971 on pretext of martial law duty later became a four star general while another who was accused of many atrocities/plunder in East Pakistan became a lieutenant general ! On the other hand the brigade commander who was most openly praised by the Indians in East Pakistan i.e Tajammul Hussain Malik was superseded as a major general. The German General Staff identified talent and groomed and polished it.The Indo Pak armies identify mediocrity and take it to the highest limits ! 115 Pages-89 & 90-Von Mellenthin-Op Cit. 116 Page-56- Article- Do we Lack Aggressiveness-Lieutenant Colonel Javed Alam Khan- Citadel -Issue Number 1/91-Command and Staff College-Quetta-June 1991. The worthy writer who was one of the few genuinely professional officers who I served with while he was a major and I was a lieutenant in the adjacent unit/same division for four long years during the period 1985-89. His sense of humour at that time was a bit unconventional (as second in command he kept a special box in his drawer, with a scandalous creature, a kind of a puppet, that was enough to ensure that all JCOs, especially the Tabuk returned Hajis, asking for leave bolted out of room instantaneously and it was a folly to greet him by hugging him in the traditional manner on Eid. I have not met him since 1994 and I wonder whether he has succumbed to the genetic transformation that occurs once most officers reach general rank or has managed to retain his forthright resolute and intellectually honest approach which he possessed in abundance till at least brigadier rank in 1995. 117 Pages-236 , 237 & 238-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit. 118 Page-90-The Desert Generals -Correlli Barnett-London-1984. 119 Page-496 & 497-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit recalling General Harbaksh Singh's remarks on page-161-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit. 120 Page-318-Remarks of Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan-The Partition of the Punjab-A Compilation of Official Documents-Volume Two- National Documentation Centre-Lahore -1983-Printed at Ferozsons.

121 Page-319-Ibid 122Page-496-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit. 123Page-160-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit. 124 Map on page 6 Volume Four-The Partition of Punjab-Official Documents-Op Cit.

THOUGHTS ON THE 1971 EAST PAKISTAN DEBACLE By

THE PAKISTAN ARMY CONSISTING IN LARGE PART OF RANKERS OR RANKERS SONS HAD NO TRADITION OF MISSION ORIENTED MODIFICATION OF ORDERS KNOWN AS

A.H AMIN Analysis of Book Review by Ahmad Faruqui

AUFTRAGSTAKTIKS.ITS OFFICERS MAY BE BRAVE OR SPIRITED LACKED INITIATIVE,AND MADE THEIR WAY UP THE LADDER BY SYCOPHANCY AND YES MAN SHIP.THIS WAS THE FACTOR IN EAST PAKISTAN AND THE SAME MEDIOCRITY SIGNIFIES THE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL TO DATE.AN ARMY LED BY OFFICERS WHO ARE CLERKS AND EMPTY WINDBAGS IN SPIRIT. A.H AMIN ,2000

BOOK REVIEW The Betrayal of East Pakistan BY A.A.K NIAZI AHMAD FARUQUI reviews the book of the former Commander Eastern Command in 1971. PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL 2000 On December 16, 1971, under clear skies, and in front of a restless crowd of nearly a million Bengalis, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander, Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army, surrendered first his pistol, then his sword, and then half his country to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Indian Army.2 In West Pakistan, the President of Pakistan, its Chief of Army Staff, and its Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Yahya came on the radio to reassure his shocked nation that even though fighting had ceased on the eastern front due to an arrangement between the local commanders, the war with India would continue. However, on the very next day, realizing that his chances of surviving a fullscale war with India on the western front without US or Chinese support were nil, he agreed to a ceasefire. An exultant Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and daughter of Indias first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared that we have

avenged the Muslim capture of Somnath and our history of a thousand years.3 General Yahya had boasted earlier in the year that if India choose to declare war on Pakistan I will shoot my way out of it. He had also boasted about how he had escaped from a prisoner of war camp in Italy during the Second World War, while Sam Manekshaw, now the Indian Chief of Staff, was one of many fellow prisoners who had been unable to escape. Now, in vastly different circumstances, a chastened General Yahya sought to justify the ceasefire by stating that I have always maintained that war solves no problem. However, as Oxford historian Robert Jackson noted in South Asian Crisis, the victors in Dacca knew otherwise. East Pakistan had passed into the history books, and with it some argued the two nation theory that had led to Pakistans independence. How did things come to such a sorry pass for Pakistan? A nation as proud of its martial traditions as Pakistan has still not to come with this sad legacy. Heir to the glorious traditions of the Arab, Turkish and Moghul armies of Muslim history, the Pakistani army was expected to fight to the last man, last round in East Pakistan, and to do anything but surrender itself to the Indian Army. Several years later, a Pakistani general officer summed up the nations feelings when he said that Never before had a Muslim sword been turned over to a Hindu. In Islam, surrender is taboo; you either return with the land, or you bathe it in your blood4.

What went wrong? Pakistanis may well find an answer to this troubling question in General Niazis book, even though it is not the disingenuous answer that presented by the author. Soon after the war ended, Indian authors, gloating over their victory, produced a plethora of books with jingoistic titles such as The Lightning Campaign, Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan and The Liberation of Bangladesh. A few months prior to the surrender, the Chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party, and soon to be the new president and first civilian martial law administrator of truncated Pakistan, penned his version of events. It blamed the inept Army leadership and the intransigent Awami League for The Great Tragedy. There was no mention of Bhuttos own intransigence in accepting the right of the Awami League to form the government, which was its constitutional right given its absolute majority in parliament. Nor was there any mention of his collusion with the ruling junta in launching Operation SEARCHLIGHT on March 25. Unable to hide his relief at the military crackdown, he had ranted prematurely on the following day that Thank God Pakistan has been saved.

When he took over the presidency in Islamabad, he asked Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan who had earlier written A Story of the Pakistani Army during the presidency of Ayub Khan to write a military history of last years events. Pakistans Crisis in Leadership conveniently placed the blame squarely on Pakistans erstwhile military junta. To deal with any potential public outcry for justice, Mr. Bhutto appointed a judicial commission of inquiry headed by then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hamood-ur-Rehman. The Commission laboured over several months to interview serving and retired generals, air marshals, admirals, civil servants and politicians. However, there was one surprising exception: Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, who had launched the ill-fated Operation SEARCHLIGHT, and who would later become Chief of Army Staff. The Commissions report was completed but never saw the light of the day. It remains Top Secret to this day, because its release may compromise national security. As the years went by, Major Siddiq Salik, Public Relations Officer to General Niazi in Eastern Command, produced a lucid and compelling first-hand narrative called Witness To Surrender. This placed the blame largely on General Niazis shoulders. More recently, Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, then Chief of General Staff, produced his Memoirs. Accepting responsibility for his portion of the blame, he stated that we lost half of the country due to our mistakes. He also stated that General Niazi should never have been appointed to this command because he had an undistinguished military record and that his professional ceiling was that of a company commander. However, he does not explain how then Brigadier Niazi was one of only eight officers to be awarded the Hilal-e-Jurat in the 1965 war. General Niazis Version In his book, Niazi reproduces a letter of recommendation from Lieutenant General Tikka Khan where the latter expresses complete confidence in Niazi and says that I will have him on my side in war. As the war began, Niazi notes that I had vast experience of commanding troops. The troops under my command were probably the best in the world. And five months later, General Abdul Hamid Khan, de facto C-in-C during the 1971 war, called him the highest decorated officer of our Army, and one of our best field commanders. General Niazi says that 24 medals adorned his chest, including for some unexplained reason the Hilal-e-Jurat and Sitara-e-Pakistan for his performance in the 1971 war. After being released as a prisoner of war, he states that he volunteered for Court Martial because the truth would come out and the real culprits would be exposed. However, no one took him up on the offer. Niazi puts the blame for the military debacle on the GHQ and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He alleges they conspired to surrender the Eastern wing of the country to India, so that they could hang on to power in the Western wing. He simply dismisses all other books that critique his role in the debacle,

such as those by Salik and Gul Hassan, as a pack of lies. Nowhere does he find any fault with himself. If anything, he states that he never abandoned his soldiers, and proudly states that both Hannibal and Napoleon had done so at least once.

Niazi comes across as a general officer eager to follow orders. Three such orders led to disaster. The first order was to command the Eastern Garrison. Several generals senior to him had declined the opportunity. He knew the mission assigned to him was not achievable with the resources given to him, but he accepted that order even though I had been given a rudderless ship with a broken mast to take across the stormy seas, with no lighthouse to me in any direction. The second order was to not take the war into India, even though he had planned to capture Agartala and a big chunk of Assam, and develop multiple thrusts into Indian Bengal. We would cripple the economy of Calcutta by blowing up bridges and sinking boats and ships in the Hoogly River and create panic amongst the civilians. But this proposal was rejected by General Hamid who said that the Pakistan government was not prepared to fight an open war with India...You will neither enter Indian territory nor send raiding parties into India, and you will not fire into Indian territory either.

And the third order was to surrender the Eastern garrison to India, to save West Pakistan, our base, from disintegration and Western Garrison from further repulses. Thus, the defence of West Pakistan had now become contingent on the surrender of East Pakistan, in an ironic reversal of Pakistans strategic doctrine that the defence of the East lay in the West. He states that he had 32,000 men and the wherewithal to continue the war and were nowhere near defeat. The number of men cited seems implausible since he had started the war with 45,000 troops. It is highly unlikely, given his deployment of forces, that he could have concentrated 32,000 for the Battle of Dacca. In fact, others have argued that he only had 5,000 men available for the defence of Dacca, since the troops had been deployed in penny packets around the entire border with India, and were instructed to fall back only when they had experienced 75% casualties.5 Regardless of the number of troops available to him, it is not clear how long he could have survived, since there was no hope for reinforcements of any kind from any source. Notes Brian Cloughley, the concept of operations was faulty: all brigades were forward, with nothing in reserve...The outcome of the Indian advance was inevitable.6 General Niazi requires an unusual amount of gullibility from his readers when he states that he was forced to surrender by his Commander-in-Chief. It is the very opposite of what typically happens in such situations. Informed that Paulus had surrendered the Sixth Army to the Soviet Union, an infuriated Hitler said: This hurts me so much because the heroism of so many soldiers is nullified by one single characterless weakling...What is Life? Life is the Nation. The individual must die anyway...What hurts me most, personally, is that I still promoted him to Field Marshal. I wanted to give him this final satisfaction. He could have freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into eternity and national immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow.7 Valid Insights He contends correctly that General Yahya disappeared from East Pakistan after March 25, 1971. This was inexcusable behaviour on the part of the Supreme Commander and President. To make matters worse, when asked about East Pakistan, Yahya would say that all I can do about East Pakistan is pray. General Abdul Hamid Khan, the acting C-in-C, visited the troops in the East just twice. General Gul Hassan, the Chief of General Staff, would not answer Niazis phone calls. The top brass of the Pakistan Army had abandoned their most decorated officer to his own devices. General Niazi excoriates General Yahya and the GHQ for waging a lack lustre campaign on the Western front, where they had a near parity of forces with India and could choose the time and place of attack. He states that the Western Garrison lost 5,500 square miles of territory in ten days, and failed to launch their much awaited counter offensive into India. He calls this a setback militarily unbelievable, unacceptable and unforgivable.

Lieutenant General Attiqur Rahman states that the counter offensive was not launched for reasons that remain a mystery, but lack of morale was not one of them. Without any success being achieved in the West, the fate of the garrison in East Pakistan was sealed. As noted by Sisson-Rose, the war was planned and pursued with a lack of coordination and foresight not dissimilar to that of 1965.8 Niazi boldly and correctly calls for a computer model of the conduct of operations by the Armed Forces in the whole of Pakistan, as well as separately for East and West Pakistan, keeping in view the political and military environment at that time. This is the modern method for assessing performance... If this were done, I and my generals would be shown to be among the most successful generals of this century. By prejudging the outcome of such a computer simulation, he erodes the credibility of this useful suggestion. The Engima of Surrender General Niazi is not inclined to accept any blame for himself. Having prided himself on his superiority to Hannibal and Napoleon, he states elsewhere that he did more for the good of the country and its armed forces than anyone else. As mentioned earlier, he says he challenged the Pakistan Army to Court Martial him, but they refused. It is likely that much would have come out of such proceedings that would have implicated not only the top Army brass but also General Niazi himself. It is very likely that he would have been subjected to intense cross examination on his conduct of war. Perhaps the following questions would have been put to him. (1) Did you think that East Pakistan could be defended with the troops that were likely to be made available to you? I.e., three divisions without much supporting armour or artillery, and only one squadron of subsonic Sabre fighter bombers. War with India was coming on the heels of a gruelling civil war, and your troops were not only tired and exhausted but had swollen feet, ravaged chests, and bare legs, because clothing and footwear were not available in the required quantity. (2) Did you not anticipate that you would be required to simultaneously fight a conventional war and a guerilla war? The Mukti Bahini was fighting a war of liberation, supported by a local population of 75 million up in arms against the Pakistan Army which it viewed as an occupation force. (3) What stroke of generalship led you to believe that India would merely conduct a minor incursion into East Pakistan to set up a puppet regime? Is that why you deployed your troops in penny packets? Niazi told his captors that they always seemed to come round behind us. Pran Chopra argues that the credit for this goes very largely to the Mukti Bahini. Jointly, the IAF and the Mukti Bahini destroyed the logic of Niazis strategy.9 (4) Why did you expect Pakistan would succeed in pulling off its well-known but untested strategy that the Defence of the East lies in the West. Was this not a

case of putting all your eggs in one basket? (5) What caused you to expect the Chinese would intervene through the Himalayan passes which the winter snows had rendered impassable in December? Were you not aware of Indias treaty with the Soviet Union, and the decision of the Soviet Union to deploy scores of additional divisions along the Manchurian border with China. Did you not recall that China had issued an ultimatum to India during the September 1965 war, but then never delivered on it? (6) Given his poor track record, what caused you to think that General Hamid would indeed send your beleaguered garrison supplies from the West through the hump back trade route that traverses Tibet, thereby circumventing the Indian blockade of the sea routes? He states that when he asked General Hamid to send him supplies through this route, Hamid dismissed the request politely by simply saying that it was infeasible. (7) Did you honestly think the US government was in a position to intervene on Pakistans side, in the face of significant domestic opposition to the wellpublicized brutalities of Tikka Khans military crack-down? You surely had seen first hand how the US had abandoned its military ally, Pakistan, during the 1965 War with non-aligned India. That equal embargo on both India and Pakistan had significantly affected importdependent Pakistan without making any dent in India war-making capabilities. (8) When hostilities broke out, why did you succumb to a bunker mentality and did not dare to venture out of Dacca. On reaching Calcutta after the surrender, he stated to reporters that the IAF bombing had kept him awake for 12 nights, and he just could not continue any more.10 There were times when he would break down during military briefings. Once he did that in the presence of Bengali servants, who were immediately ordered outside where they gleefully reported that the Sahibs are crying inside. Post Script This book is a failed attempt by General Niazi to clear his name, and its tone is entirely self-serving. Ironically, the book provides unique insights into the workings of his mind. Such insights could not have been obtained through other means. That alone makes it essential reading for students of military history.Sums up Brian Cloughley: Yahya bore overall responsibility for what befell his country; but General Niazi was the commander who lost the war in the East. Perhaps the book should have been entitled General Niazis Betrayal of Pakistan. The book makes it very clear why the Pakistan Army surrendered in 13 days with more than 45,000 soldiers still in fighting condition. As General Gul Hasan notes, with Niazi at the helm, they had no chance. Of course that begs the question of who put Niazi

there. The most strategic command in the Army was turned over to a hastily promoted Major General.11 The list of culprits begins with Generals Yahya and Hamid, but it cannot exclude General Gul Hasan either, who was then Chief of the General Staff. There is then the bigger question of why did Pakistan get involved in a war with India under such adverse circumstances. Can India be blamed for assisting the Mukti Bahini guerillas in seeking the liberation of Bangladesh? In one year, India implemented successfully what Pakistan had been trying unsuccessfully for two decades to implement in Kashmir. And then of course there is the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, unwilling to take a back seat to Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. He insidiously ingratiated himself with leading personalities of the military junta, including Generals Peerzada, Mitha, and Umar, and blocked the National Assembly from meeting in Dacca. That essentially sealed the fate of United Pakistan. Later on, he tore up the Polish resolution which would have preserved the honour of the Pakistan Army from being considered by the United Nations Security Council.12 Writes Robert Jackson, now a British Member of Parliament, Looking back on it all, the sad story of the demise of East Pakistan does seem to have been a miasma of personal ambition.1314 REFERENCES 1 The author is an economist in Palo Alto, California. He lived in Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars. He has written on Pakistans Strategic Myopia in the RUSI Journal, and reviewed Mazaris book, Journey to Disillusionment for International Affairs. 2James P. Sterba, Wall Street Journal, November 6, 1984. 3Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan: Leadership Challenges, OUP, 1999. 4Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, 1990. 5Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, OUP, 1999. 6Brian Cloughley, op. cit. 7Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943, Penguin Books, 1998. 8 Sisson-Rose, op. cit. 9Pran Chopra, Indias Second Liberation, MIT Press, 1974. 10Pran Chopra, op. cit. 11Brigadier A. A. K. Chaudhry, September 1965, Ferozesons, 1977. 12 Sisson-Rose, op. cit. 13 Personal correspondence, January 20, 2000.

ANALYSIS OF AHMAD FAUQUIS BOOK REVIEW

BY

A.H AMIN
The book review on General Niazis book was a very fine effort. There are some observations which I wish to share with the readers. Firstly the writers quoting another author saying that creation of Bangladesh was the end of the two nation theory. We in Pakistan have twisted Two Nation Theory very subjectively . We have forgotten that Mr Jinnah the founder of Pakistan favoured creation of an Independent Bengal in 1946. H.V Hodson perfectly reliable authority states that Mr Jinnah said that he would be delighted if Bengal stayed united and independent and added, What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta? They had much better remained united and independent: I am sure they would be on friendly terms with Pakistan. (Refers-Page-246- The Great Divide- H.V Hodson- Oxford University Karachi-1985). Bengal did not become independent because of Bengali Hindu fears about being in a Muslim majority independent Bengal.

THE ABJECT SURRENDER OF A TIGER.A MAN WHOSE ANCESTORS WERE BETRAYED BY THE MUSLIMS OF RAWALPINDI IN 1857 CAN UNDERSTAND THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO MARTIAL RACES REFERRED TO IN PAKISTAN ! Thus the connection with Two Nation Theory was not the reason why Bengal was divided in 1947. Mr Jinnah saw in 1946 i.e the inadvisability of having Bengal in Pakistan without Calcutta. Something that the Pakistani policy makers failed to grasp till 1971! It is to Jinnahs credit that he brought Bengalis in the army by raising the first two battalions of the East Bengal regiment. A process, which was stopped by Ayub from 1950 to 1966, as a result of which Pakistan Army instead of becoming a broad based national army like the post 1947 Indian Army, remained, a Punjabi dominated army. A factor which contributed a great deal to the separation of East Pakistan. The Two Nation Theory was created due to certain reasons which at that time were valid albeit relatively. It did not exist in 711 AD or in 1857 but was enunciated in the period 1860-1940. In 1971 it was no longer valid at least for the Bengali Muslims and they rejected it. My second contention pertains to the authors quoting a Pakistani General stating that Never before had a Muslim army surrendered before a Hindu army or the assertion that the Pakistan Army was a bearer of traditions of the early Muslim conquerors of India! This assertion is absolutely false ! The problem is that we have to get out of this

Martial Races Syndrome. The vast bulk of Pakistan army consists of men with Hindu or Buddhist ancestry! As a matter of fact the Hindu Rajputs of the north of Chenab area from where the vast bulk of Pakistan army is recruited were far more difficult to govern before they were converted to Islam! The only positive connection that these races had with the Muslim Turks was the fact that one of their members killed Sultan Ghauri! Even the Pathans, the second largest group of Pakistani soldiers, had little connection with Turkish invasions of India! Babar did not like the Pathans and the Pathans generally remained in conflict with the Muslim governments in Delhi! Many Muslim forts surrendered to the Hindu Marathas during the Maratha war in the south. The Marathas captured Delhi long before 1971 in mid -18th century and held it with uneven gaps till 1803 once the British captured it. As a matter of fact the problem is that most of our worthy generals have not read military history of the sub-continent. The Pakistan Army is not the descendant of the Turk armies that invaded India! Of course with the exceptions of some genuinely Mughal villages like Lehr Sultanpur etc! The Pakistan Army is a chip from the block of the old mercenary British army with its origins in the Mutiny Loyalty of Punjabi Muslim Pathan and Sikh soldiers who attacked Delhi for the first time in September 1857 and in phenomenal staunchness of Punjabi soldiers while facing the Muslim Turks in WW One!

The Punjabis once totalled as Muslim Hindu and Sikh, as an ethnic group became the largest single group and the vast bulk of the British Indian Army in the period 1883-1911. In 1883 there were about 34.09 % or 120 Punjabi companies (25 Punjabi Muslims, 18 Punjabi Dogra Hindus and 77 Punjabi Sikhs) and 15 Pathan companies out of the total 352 infantry companies of the Regular Bengal Army. By 1911 the Indian Army was a more than 50 % Punjabi army although never a Muslim majority army. In 1929 thanks to Pathan and Ranghar defiance of the British in WW One the Punjabi percentage (divided into roughly one third Muslim Sikh and Hindu) of the Indian Army rose to 54.36% if the Gurkhas were included and to 61.8 % if Gurkhas were excluded.

The Pathan share at this time stood at 4.02 % out of which all were not ethnic or linguistic Pathans. (Refers- Map on page-96 - Report of Indian Statutory Commission-Volume One- Calcutta - Government of India Publication Branch 1930). The low caste Hindu Marathas militarily defeated the Mughals long before 1971 and their hold on India was finally successfully challenged not by any Punjabi or Pathan Muslim army but by the Bengal and Madras armies of the English East India Companies at Laswari and Assaye respectively in 1803! Punjab later dubbed as a martial province with a Muslim majority was firmly under Sikh domination despite the fact that the Sikhs were a 8 or 9 % minority! During Sikh rule mosques were often used as military magazines, including the famous Badshahi mosque and some times plastered with cow dung (Pages -347 to 360 Lahore -Past and Present - M.Baqir, Punjabi Adabi Academy, Lahore1984)as happened with the Golden Mosque of Kashmiri Bazaar Lahore ! So much for the martial traditions, just 122 years ago, of the largely Punjabi Muslim army that surrendered in East Pakistan! The problem ironically was the fact that the same West Pakistanis, who despised Bengalis as non-Martial race in March 1971, at least were not as martial in 1849, as they became in 1914, because of British recruitment policies and situational reasons! The problem is that we have forgotten that all territory west of Aligarh district (including Aligarh), including Delhi Agra Punjab and Frontier was under Hindu Maratha or non-Muslim Sikh rule till 1803 or as late as 1849! There were no martial races in Muslim majority Punjab, at least to rule Punjab till 1849! So much for the martial traditions of Muslims of Indo-Pak! It was all situational, there being no martial races! But somehow in Pakistan by 1950s myth became mixed with reality and myth finally gained the upper hand ! The winter of our discontent finally came in the killing fields of Bengal in December 1971! General Niazi, the much maligned man, was the tip of the iceberg only! But we realise this only if he is assessed in the light of the other factors. He was a product of the Ayubian system when officers with ranker background or those who lacked independent judgements were preferred for higher ranks! The class conscious British who were extremely snobbish in selection of regular officers for the British Army very cleverly kept a 50% quota for Indian Army rankers (24 on internal merit and 6 on nomination) in each intake ( 30 out of 60 cadets) of the Indian Military Academy Dera Dun. The ulterior motive was to ensure that relatively more pliable , politically inert, and orders oriented material entered the Indian officer corps. In India the ranker breed did not do as well as Pakistan because their first Indian C-in-C Cariappa was from the 1919 commissioned Indian course. On theother hand in Pakistan the civilian leadership in

its zeal to have a non-Punjabi C-in-C at a time when the PunjabiHindustani conflict was at its peak selected Ayub who was a 1927 commissioned officer. This led to the exit of many Sandhurst/Daly College commissioned Muslim officers who were senior to Ayub. The leftover of Sandhurst commissioned officers were eliminated by Ayub through forced retirement or by promotion of Musa to C-in-Cs appointment in 1958. Thus the Pakistan Army lost the services of many more experienced officers simply because they were sidelined through political supersession or were retired. The gap between the two Indo Pak armies in quality of experience may be gauged from the fact that the first Indian C-in-C was eight years senior to Ayub in service and the course mate of Musa, the second Muslim C-in-C of the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became the Indian C-in-C eleven years after Musa! This may have worked positively for the Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with an independent outlook! Musa on the other hand as Gul Hassans memoirs revealed lacked independent judgement dynamism or talent! The Pakistan army during the period 1951-71 became a highly orders oriented machine! Smart on the drill square, tactically sound but strategically barren and lacking in operational vision! One whose first Pakistani C-in-C was more interested in political intrigue and industrial ventures than in the basics of higher military organisation or operational strategy! Modern warfare on the other hand demanded mission-oriented approach, which was sadly lacking in both the Indo Pak armies! This was thanks to the British inherited orders oriented approach which in words of General Mellenthin of the Wehrmacht, reduced British officers to the status of clerks and mouthpieces of their commanders! The British with all the resources of the British Empire and thanks to US aid in both world wars managed to survive despite phenomenal military incompetence. Thus Alanbrooke the British Chief lamented during WW Two once he said It is lamentable, how poor we are in army and corps commanders; we ought to remove several , but heaven knows where we shall find anything much better...the flower of our manhood was wiped out some twenty years ago and it is just some of those that we lost then that we require now (Refers-Page-239- The Turn of the Tide-Arthur Bryant -Collins Saint James Place-London-April 1957). But this incompetence was no longer affordable in the resource starved Pakistan Army of 1971! The Indian problem was less serious since many of their drawbacks were overcome by the fact that they were numerically superior, and possessed larger material resources. This was applicable relatively less in 1965 and convincingly more in 1971! Secondly the Indians had lesser number of ranker officers in their higher ranks and had benefited from the experience of a larger number of service chiefs with more experience in terms of length of service as well as war record than Pakistan Army, whose first chief was

famous for tactical timidity in Burma, while the second chief was a non entity, whose only quality was humility, albeit, commensurate with his actual potential (!) and political reliability! Some readers may find the approach biased. Nevertheless it is based on lessons of military history. Leadership is a situational process. The finest leadership seen in an institutionalised form was developed in the German Army. The German officer corps was dominated by two classes of men. One, scions from aristocratic families of Prussia or the impoverished nobility weak in land holding but bearers of a long tradition in officer rank. Men with the title/prefix Von. Second were men of learning who made their way upwards in the officer corps through sheer merit and on total intellectual grounds. Like Moltke Gneisenau and Scharnhorst (of humble origins but educated under a nobles patronage who saw great talent in him). Take Moltke the Elder, the writer of a large number of military history works and a profound thinker. He cannot be compared with Niazi Tikka or Musa, all of whom entered the army on the ranker quota and the last were not famous for any qualities of higher military leadership apart from eminence in conducting ruthless counter insurgency operations in Baluchistan or East Pakistan! Men who had not written even a single article or composition on any military subject, with any trace of depth of intellect! When I was commissioned in the army in March 1983 we had two officers in 11 Cavalry who specialised in narrating anecdotes of General Tikka Khans utterances of Solomons wisdom on various occasions while he was the chief! Take Ayub Khan. Guilty of tactical timidity in Burma! No comparison with Thimaya the only Indian to command an infantry brigade in actual action in WW Two or Rajendarsinhji the first Indian to get a DSO! Those who did have the talent of higher command or grasp of strategy like Yaqub were sidelined! Those who did have a record of accomplished generalship as divisional commanders like Abrar or Sarfaraz or brigade commanders like Qayyum Sher were not promoted! The reviewers observation about gallantry awards may be compared with Tajammuls observation about the round about manner in which gallantry awards were awarded in 1965, e.g Aziz Bhattis case who as per Tajammul died on the home bank of BRB (by fluke) but was awarded a Nishan e Haidar on the basis of the citation (which was rewritten three times) written by his Commanding Officer Colonel Ibrahim Qureshi (a man the readers may or may not know of considerable literary merit). (RefersPage-74-The Story of My Struggle- Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik-Jang Publishers- Lahore -1991) . In any case Hilal I Jurrat was awarded even to Niazi again and to General Rahim (accused of fleeing in a unsoldierly manner later), Ansari, Sharif (God knows why) during the period when the army was engaged in minor operations against the so-called Mukti Bahini insurgents from March to December

1971 (Page -126-Ibid). Tajammul a Punjabi Muslim from Chakwal forthrightly admitted that these above-mentioned awards were given to these gentlemen for killing their own countrymen! (Ibid). The problem of the Pakistan Army was not lack of talent but of operating in an environment, which I have always referred to in a selfcoined phrase as conspiracy against originality and boldness, something which I at least witnessed in my 13 years service from 1981 to 1994. Why this conspiracy against talent? We enter the political realm once again! The German Kaisers had nothing to fear from a Moltke or Blucher but military or civilian usurpers of Pakistan had a lot to fear from a more talented general! Thus the necessity for (another self-coined phrase) Goof Selection Syndrome, a process initiated by Liaquat the first prime minister under able advice of Iskandar Mirza and perfected by Ayub and Bhutto. Select a man from an ethnic or sectarian minority or at least a politically docile man or one who is mediocre or at least perceived/assessed as such. Thus in the Ayubian era officers with ranker background, were not preferred on merit, but on the basis of lack of talent and thus lack of ambition in being politically docile, or being from ethnic and sectarian minorities as was the case with Musa and Yahya. The German Army which we were discussing as late as 1930s the German army was a Von dominated army. As a matter of fact most of the German generals who opposed Hitlers rule and many of his unsound strategic decisions were men like Fritsch Manstein etc, all of them with an aristocratic background. In India unfortunately the British with an ulterior motive had encouraged men from the ranks to be officers with the thinking that these would be more reliable. There never was any 50 % quota for rankers in Sandhurst! Why the British were so generous with the despised Indians! Even the Punjabi dominated army which was so much criticised by the British press for atrocities in East Pakistan was a British creation whose origins dated back to the period 1883-1911! The army did have potential Moltkes Mansteins and some Grey Wolfs but the vast bulk of these, perhaps with the exception of men like Eftikhar Khan were sidelined! Even Eftikhar, thanks to his unorthodox personal life, was a sidelined man, once the war broke out, and it was Pakistan Armys good luck that this great leader of men, our finest commander commanded the 23 Division! I remember a session with General Attiq ur Rahman whenI presented him with a book that I had written on Clausewitzs military thoughts .The book was dedicated to Eftikhar Khan. Attiq was horror struck and remembered Eftikhar as a horrible man , as Attiq saw him in the light of Attiqs strict standards of morality as Eftikhars Directing Staff in Staff College Quetta. I dismissed General Attiques objections since I viewed Eftikhar as all the officers and men of my unit 11 Cavalry saw him in Chamb in 1971. Moving towards the sound of guns,

racing ahead of the leading tank ! Goading cursing and prodding with his stick irresolute lower commanders ahead ! Our problem has been failure to identify and groom talent! A natural result in a country where the Prime Minister or the President wants to have the most pathetic man in the highest ranks, just because he feels safer with them! There were some charismatic and resolute men in East Pakistan at brigade level like Tajammul or Saadullah but Tajammul was described as a nut to this scribe by his brigade major! Nut because he wished to fight till the bitter end and was abandoned by most officers of his headquarter while doing so ! But these men Tajammul, Saadullah etc were the exception rather than the rule! An officer who served in 16 Division Headquarters and stayed as a prisoner stated in a conversation in 1983 that the choice in December 1971 was between getting massacred by the Bengalis or safety of an Indian camp and many, specially those involved in atrocities against non combatants/civilians were positively relieved on hearing the announcement of surrender. On the other hand surrender was a traumatic experience for many upright officers like some who I saw even as late as 1985 as brigadiers were bitter about the terrible psychological experience of the whole affair. There were fighting soldiers who had no part in any atrocities against non-combatants! Many fine souls like Ijaz Mustafa, Sultan Mahmood and many more died in the fighting, but today they are not remembered since they had no one to write a good citation or no patron in the higher headquarters to send their names ahead. The Eastern Command on the other hand required a mission-oriented commander with independent judgement! Niazis intellectual level as stated by Gul and many others was not beyond that of a company commander! The GOCs that he had were equally illustrious! On the other hand the strategic situation in 1971 required a Moltke or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! Thus the basic reasons for surrender do not lie in Niazis personality alone, but in other factors! The surrender in 1971 was the combined result of absence of a Von Lettow Vorbeck (German commander in East Africa in WW One) in East Pakistan and an absence of a Moltke the Elder or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! The surrender had two angles, one strategic, which was in the realm of the Pakistani GHQ and the other operational i.e the realm of the Eastern Command. I will quote an Indian to prove that East Pakistan could have been saved despite all the horrible things done by another ranker Tikka, had the Pakistani GHQ acted with a greater sense of timing! General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all

our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us (Refers-Page-28The Western Front-Indo Pakistan War 1971- Lt Gen P. Candeth -Allied PublishersMadras-1984). The fact that Niazi became a three star general proves that incompetent men can reach relatively high ranks in an army. SURRENDER DAY 16 DECEMBER 1971 BELOW ,SEEN IN THE PICTURE IS SHAH BEG SINGH MAJOR GENERAL INDIAN ARMY WHO TRAINED THE MUKTI BAHINI AND DIED FOGHTING THE INDIAN ARMY AT THE GOLDEN TEMPLE IN 1984

Who can say that Niazi was different from the bulk of other generals of the Pakistan Army in 1971! An army in which between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. (Refers- Page258 & 259Pakistans Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973). An army in which in the words of a major general who served in the same period, anyone in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service or one in which Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for! (Ibid). An army where gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators! (Refers-Ibid). An army in which security of commission and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary dismissal thanks to laws amended from early 1950s were so lacking that some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an armed force officer. (Refers-Ibid). As a matter of fact Clausewitz recognised mediocrity in higher ranks. As per Gul obsequiousness helped Niazi in his rise. Then being from Ayubs unit also played a part in his promotion to higher ranks. As far as gallantry is concerned Niazi did win an MC in WW Two and an HJ in 1965! But then, the resolution required at higher level, as Clausewitz the great

philosopher of war says, is far different from that required at a lower level, thus higher the rank the more necessary it is that boldness be accompanied by a reflective mind, compare this with General Niazi. Much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics; judge Yahya in the light of this statement and the situation is easier to comprehend! Yahyas war record, successful escape from a Prisoner camp, or combat action as a company officer or company commander or command of a division, was no guarantee that Yahya possessed the strategic vision or talent to function successfully as Pakistans Supreme War Lord in a conflict with an enemy with a marked numerical superiority! He simply did not have the strength of will or the strategic insight to execute a sound military strategy in a situation which required a man with a Moltke the Elders calibre! It was not a question of valour or more being more martial but a conflict of David and an over cautious Goliath (as Candeths statement proves) in which the David lost or lost too badly; not because of weak muscles or fists but because of lack of resolution and strategic talent at the operational as well as strategic level! Lastly the military conduct of war in East Pakistan. The failure to withdraw to the Dacca bowl, the failure to foresee the pattern of Indian operations in case of war! Niazi alone cannot be blamed for it! In foreseeing this the GHQ, Niazis staff, all five of his GOCs and above all Yahyas strategic failure in exercising the offensive strategy to remedy the operational crisis resulting from an Indian attack on East Pakistan were the ultimate reason for surrender. The only two areas where Niazi and his team of staff officers and divisional commanders, can be blamed is not for fighting longer than they did, and setting an example in resolution and heroism and for not being mission oriented and in blindly following orders to defend every inch of territory against his better judgement, if there is a grain of truth in what he asserts, was his better judgement in that particular situation at that point in time! But surrender even then was a foregone conclusion! In the past when armies fought till the end, even when it was militarily pointless, was not due to their being more martial, but simply because of sheer desperation, since at that time prisoners were not taken, all found alive were liquidated! This was no longer the case in civilised warfare!

The only exceptions to this rule being the Japanese! Surrender took place, not because Pakistan army was less martial but because it was without air cover blockaded and encircled and surrender was the only option as many other armies had done in Singapore, France, Poland etc. In any case Hara Kiri or fighting till death was not a part of the historical traditions of the areas from which the bulk of Pakistan Army was recruited! Had that been the case the Punjab and an 8 % Sikh minority could not have ruled Frontier! An admirer addressed Moltke the Elder after his military triumphs against Austria and France as a

great military commander. Moltke said that he was not a great military commander since he had never carried out a withdrawal operation. The operational problem in East Pakistan involved withdrawal to the Dacca bowl and was not as simple as it seemed. The fact thus remains that even the operational problems in East Pakistan were too complicated for Niazi and his staff officers and even for the Military Operations Directorate of the Pakistani GHQ! Gul the Pakistani CGS being a man in words of Sultan Khan who firmly believed in the power of bayonet to settle all issues! Now coming down to actual on ground odds. Manekshaw admitted that The Pakistanis (in East Pakistan) fought well... and that they could not have fought any better and ...their defeat keeping in view the overwhelming Indian superiority was a foregone conclusion. Surrender was a natural result of higher military incompetence and political bankruptcy. Niazi the product of the Ayubian system was relatively as good or as bad as most of the general officers of that era. Ironically since no other three star general was tried in 1971 like Niazi, Niazi stands out as a scapegoat! To conclude there were many intangible factors that counted. It takes me 32 years back as a school going lad to Quetta where my father was a grade two operations staff officer with the 16 Division (which was airlifted from Quetta to East Pakistan in 1971) from 1969 till October 1971! How the school children mostly army officers sons, or even common West Pakistani soldiers referred contemptuously to Bengalis as one West Pakistani (Punjabi or Pathan) is equal to ten Bengalis! A perception based on the myth of the Martial Races Theory as I discovered much later! What about the immense psychological the burden of having carried out a genocide on the Muslim population of Bengal from March to October 1971.

CANTT PUBLIC SCHOOL QUETTA WHERE THE AUTHOR WAS STUDYING IN 1971 WHEN THE 16 DIVISION MOVED FROM QUETTA TO EAST PAKISTAN IN MARCH 1971 An officer, one Major Bhatti, brother of another officer who became a three star general, who was there in that gory period, and admitted that atrocities were carried out by both sides on a lavish scale, once told me that there was ferocity in the Bengalis as if they had a 50 year old debt to repay ! True that all officers were not guilty of atrocities, nor were all the divisions, brigades or units! But there were Hodsons and Calleys and the actions of these men weighed heavily on the whole army! These are the intangible factors that many of us now discount. But these were there! Somehow everyone in 1971 had been under estimating the Bengalis! A race, which led India at least as far as the Bengali Hindus, was concerned in defiance of imperialism! The indomitable man who threw a bomb on the British viceroy at Delhi in 1913 was not from the so-called martial races but a thoroughbred Bengali! Clausewitzian solution to Pakistans strategic dilemma visa-vis India Long ago Clausewitz gave a strategic solution to Pakistans military dilemma visa-vis India when he said, Offensive war, that is the taking advantage of the present moment, is always commanded when the future holds out a better prospect not to us but to our adversary. In this case the future had better prospects for India and Pakistans only hope was an all out offensive posture. Clausewitz defined the solution in yet more detail in the following words; Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a

very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages - it will rather increase the disparity of forces - but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account. VON FRANCOIS WHO CARRIED THE DAY BY DISOBEDIENCE AT TANNENBERG IN 1914.THE HALL MARK OF PAKISTAN ARMY OFFICERS WHO LED IT AS GENERALS WAS SYCOPHANCY AND DOCILITY

THE PAKISTAN ARMY CONSISTING OF RANKERS OR RANKERS SONS HAD NO TRADITION OF MISSION ORIENTED MODIFICATION OF ORDERS KNOWN AS AUFTRAGSTAKTIKS.ITS OFFICERS MAY BE BRAVE OR SPIRITED LACKED INITIATIVE,AND MADE THEIR WAY UP THE LADDER BY SYCOPHANCY AND YES MAN SHIP.THIS WAS THE FACTOR IN EAST PAKISTAN AND THE SAME MEDIOCRITY SIGNIFIES THE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL TO DATE.AN ARMY LED BY OFFICERS WHO ARE CLERKS AND EMPTY WINDBAGS IN SPIRIT

The problem is that the men at the helm of affairs did not read Clausewitz in the period 1947-1971! Even debauchery was not the problem for there was no greater womanizer and drinker than Mustafa Kemal; often contracting Syphilis and Gonorrhea in the course of satisfying his heavy appetite, and yet at the same time he was such a great military commander that his exploits were acknowledged even by his opponents, the British, in their official history of the WW One! Our problem in 1971 and to date was not debauchery but lack of resolution and strategic talent at the higher level! The present generation of our senior officers has not been tested in any war since none of them commanded anything beyond a company in any war! Only the audit of war will prove their actual worth. We must remember that fighting the Indians is not as simple as removing Feroz Khan Noon, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharifs government . Or even as simple as dealing with other pillars of state! Even Kargil about which there has been so much sabre rattling was a junior leaders triumph! It is hard to believe that we were so close to a strategic triumph and our noble leaders gave up the triumph! If that was so then Mr Nawaz Sharif should not have been allowed to land after negotiating the Blair House sell off! The actions of 12th October although necessary were late by some four months! POSTSCRIPT AS I SEE BOLD AND DYNAMIC OFFICERS ARE ON THE AVERAGE NOT REACHING HIGHER RANKS.THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS LIKE MAJOR GENERAL TARIQ KHAN BUT OUTSTANDING OFFICERS LIKE TARIQ ASLAM ARE BEING DUMPED WHILE MANY VERY SHALLOW OFFICERS ARE REACHING THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE TO ATTEND WAR COURSE WHICH MAKES THEM FUTURE GENERALS WHO WILL BE REMEMBERED AS CAREER OFFICERS WHO FAILED MISERABLY IN WAR LIKE A.A.K NIAZI AND NASEER OF FISRT ARMOURED DIVISION.

LIEUTNANT COLONEL TARIQ ASLAM AN OFFICER WHO I THOUGHT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A FUTURE GENERAL .WITH THE AUTHOR IN 2008

AS A RULE CAREFUL WINDBAGS ARE BEING PROMOTED WHILE OFFICERS WITH GUTS AND PRIDE ARE BEING SIDELINED. THIS REMAINS THE TRAGEDY OF PAKISTAN ARMY.