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Essae Chandran Institute

Essae

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

202 / FMEA / B 01

Essae Chandran Institute

Dont Let This Happen To You

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202 / FMEA / B 02

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Increasing Customer Expectations


Additional Functions Increasing complexity Systems Products Higher Efficiency Processes Extreme Operating conditions Increased Reliability Service Friendliness Products with value for the money Shorter Development cycles

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202 / FMEA / B 03

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Quality Planning
System Development Component Concept Development Design Tryout

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Mfg. Planning M/C: Eqpt, Tool Planning Procurement

System FMEA

Finalise Measures

Further updating

Design FMEA

First Development

Finalise Measures

Further updating

Process FMEA

First Dev.

Finalise Measures Pilot Run

Further updating Production

Preliminary Special characteristics

QA1

Finalise special characteristics

QA2

Product SupplyRelease

QA3

Ensure Special Characteristics e.g. Cpk

System Dev.- order

Component Dev. - order

202 / FMEA / B 04

Start B (C) Proto sample Mfr. & Tryout

Plan & order Product pre-release

Product Release

Time Start Production

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Cost Effective in using FMEA


Identification and Prevention of Potential defects Design FMEA Process FMEA Detection and Removal of Internal defects. SPC PPM Goods Inwards Inspection SPC Final Inspection Detection and Elimination of External defects Inspection by customer

Essae

Design and Development

Manufacturing planning

Planning

Purchase

Manufacturing

Useage
Customer

Manufacturer
202 / FMEA / B 05

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What is An FMEA
A tool used to evaluate potential failure modes and their causes. Prioritizes Potential Failures according to their Risk and drives actions to eliminate or reduce their likelihood of occurrence Provides a discipline / methodology for documenting this analysis for future use and continuous process improvement By its self, an FMEA is NOT a problem solver. It is used in combination with other problem solving tools. The FMEA presents the opportunity but does not solve the problem.

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Application
Fundamental New Development Significant changes Technical Safety requirements Customer request

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Updating on
Product changes New conditions / applications New materials / processes Complaints

202 / FMEA / B 07

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QFD Process
Design Requirement Customer Requirements

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Part Characteristics Design Requirements

Product

Manufacturing Operations
Part Characteristics

Part

Production Requirement Manufacturing Operations

Process

Production
202 / FMEA / B 08

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Origin & History


Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 1960s and 70s The FMEA discipline was developed in the United States Military. Military Procedure MIL-P-1629, It was used as a reliability evaluation technique to determine the effect of system and equipment failures. Failures were classified according to their impact on mission success and personnel/equipment safety. In 1988, the International Organization for Standardization issued the ISO 9000 series of business management standards. QS 9000 is the automotive analogy to ISO 9000 In accordance with QS 9000 standards, compliant automotive suppliers utilize Advanced Product Quality Planning (APQP), including design and process FMEAs, and develop a Control Plan.

Essae

QS 9000 compliant automotive suppliers must utilize Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in the Advanced Quality Planning process and in the development of their Control Plans.

202 / FMEA / B 09

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The FMEA Process


Identify Functions Identify Failure Modes Identify Effects of the Failure Mode Define severity Apply procedure for potential consequences Identify Potential Causes Determine occurrence Calculate criticality Identify Design or Process Control(s) Determine Detection RPN & Final Risk Assessment Take Actions to Reduce Risks Identify Special Characteristics Identify Root Causes

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202 / FMEA / B 010

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Cause and Effect Cascade


Cause Design Effect Environmental Exposure Cause Moisture Effect

Essae

Cause = Corrosion Effect=High Resistance


Cause = High Resistance Effect = Insufficient Current
Cause Effect Corrosion

Cause = Insufficient Current Effect = Dim Bulb


Poor contact (High Resistance) Cause

Cause = Design Effect=Env. Exposure Cause = Env. Exposure Effect = Moisture

Cause Effect

Effect
Insufficient Current Cause

Cause = Moisture Effect = Corrosion

Effect Dim Bulb

202 / FMEA / B 011

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Automotive FMEAs
Failure Mode
System FMEA
The ramification of the problem

Essae

Effect

Cause
The Cause(s) of the Problem

The Problem

Design FMEA

The Cause(s) of the Problem from the System FMEA

The effect from the system FMEA with a Better Definition

New root causes for the design failure Modes

Process FMEA

The Cause(s) of the Problem from the Design FMEA

The Same effect as the Design FMEA

Specific root Causes for the Process Failure Modes

202 / FMEA / B 012

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Automotive FMEA Timeline


System FMEA

Essae

Design FMEA

Process FMEA

Concept

Design Go-Ahead

Design Completion

Prototype Build

Eng/Mfg Sign off

Production Start

Design FMEA
Start early in process, complete by the time preliminary drawings are done but before any tooling is initiated.

Process FMEA
Start as soon as basic manufacturing methods have been discussed. Complete prior to finalizing production plans and releasing for production
202 / FMEA / B 013

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Essae

Important Factors Timeliness i.e. before the event Action and not after-the-Fact Exercise. Greatest value: before failure mode is designed into. Up front time spent on changes alleviate late changes crisis.

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Specific Uses
Design FMEAs are used to analyze products before they are released to production Focus on potential failure modes of products caused by design deficiencies. Identify potential designated characteristics called Special Characteristics Process FMEAs are used to analyze manufacturing and assembly processes. Focus on potential product failure modes caused by manufacturing or assembly process deficiencies. Confirm the need for Special Controls in manufacturing and confirm the designated potential Special Characteristics from the Design FMEA. Identify process failure modes that could violate government regulations or compromise employee safety.

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202 / FMEA / B 015

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FMEA Outputs
Design FMEA Outputs A list of potential product failure modes. A list of potential Critical Characteristics and/or Significant Characteristics. A list of design actions to reduce Severity, eliminate the causes of product failure modes, or reduce their rate of Occurrence, or improve detection. Confirmation of the Design Verification Plan (DVP). Feedback of design changes to the design committee. Process FMEA Outputs A list of potential process failure modes. A list of confirmed Critical Characteristics and/or Significant Characteristics. A list of Operator Safety and High Impact Characteristics. A list of recommended Special Controls for designated product Special Characteristics to be entered on a Control Plan. A list of processes or process actions to reduce Severity, eliminate the causes of product failure modes, or reduce their rate of Occurrence, and to improve product defect detection if process capability cannot be improved. Changes to process sheets and assembly aid drawings.
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General Benefits of FMEAs


Prevention Planning Identifies change requirements Cost reduction Increased through-put Decreased waste Decreased warranty costs Reduce non-value added operations

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FMEA TEAM
Main Team
System FMEA System Dev.:
Application Moderator

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Design FMEA Design:


Tryout Plant (Q or Engg) Moderator

Process FMEA Process Engg.:


Q.A. Design or Tryout

Partly
Component Dev. Sales

Application Reliability testing Corporate Depts. Sales Plant

Production Tryout or Design Corporate Depts.

Others: Interface FMEA; Logistics FMEA


202 / FMEA / B 018

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FMEA Prerequisites
Select proper team and organize members effectively Select teams for each product/service, process/system Create a ranking system Agree on format for FMEA matrix (Typically set by AIAG) Define the customer and customer needs/expectations Design/Process requirements Develop a process flow chart **
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FMEA Format Columns


Design FMEA
Occurrence Detection Occurrence

Essae
Detention

Severity

RPN

Process FMEA
Process Function Requirements

Severity

RPN

Nomenclature & Number. Enter all to be analysed. Basis for selection = importance to Q. function
Design FMEA System, Sub-system, component If > one function with diff. failure modes list all Basic function /Purpose to meet Example: Actuate relay Open valve Process FMEA Process / Opns./Opnl. Steps If numerous opns, eg., Assly) with difference Failure Modes list all Example: Grind taper Insert shaft

202 / FMEA / B 020

RPN

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Recommended Actions and Status

Action Taken

Occurrence Severity Detention

Occurrence

Detection

Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

RPN

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

Severity

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Recommended Actions and Status

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Design FMEA
A Design FMEA is an analytical technique utilized primarily by a Design FMEA team to ensure potential failure modes and their associated causes are identified, considered and addressed.

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Design FMEA Foci


Customers include: End User Repair Functions Dealership or other Sales Outlet Designer of the next level system or product Process Engineers Assembly Engineers Test Engineers Product Analysis

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202 / FMEA / B 022

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Typical Design Considerations


Design Intent Customer Needs - Can be specified and measured Customer Wants - Some cant be explained Product Requirements Manufacturing assembly requirements
Quality Function Deployment Customer Contacts Competitive Analysis Known Product Quality Reliability Requirements Manufacturing Requirements
Start with a list of: What the design is expected to do What the design is expected NOT to do

Essae

Think about what documents in your company are used to define these

202 / FMEA / B 023

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Design FMEA Benefits


Aids in the objective evaluation of design requirements and alternatives. Increases the probability that potential failure modes and their effects on the system / product have been considered. Aids in the planning of design test and development programs. Aids in analyzing field concerns, design changes and in developing advanced designs. Ranks potential failure modes according to their effect on the customer, thus prioritizing improvements and development testing. Provides an open issue format for recommending and tracking risk reducing actions. Can reduce product development timing, production startup problems, reduce costs and enhance product quality, reliability and safety.

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202 / FMEA / B 024

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More Design FMEA Considerations


The Design FMEA is a living document and should be initiated at, or by, design concept completion. The Design FMEA should be continually updated as changes occur throughout all phases of product development. The Design FMEA should be fundamentally complete along with the final product drawings. The Design FMEA addresses the design intent and assumes the design will be manufactured / assembled to this intent. The Potential Failure Modes/Causes which can occur during manufacturing or assembly process are covered by the Process

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FMEA and therefore should NOT be included in a Design FMEA.


202 / FMEA / B 025

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CAUTION! DO NOT mix up:


Design Failures & Causes with Process Failures & Causes
Design Failures
Insufficient lubrication capability

Essae

Process Failures
Insufficient lubrication applied

Incorrect material specified

Incorrect material used

202 / FMEA / B 026

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Design Block Diagram Example

Essae

If the product function is complex, break it down into smaller sub-systems. Identify Primary Vs Secondary functions

System

Body

Sub System Component

Doors

Exterior

Window

Interior

Door Inner Panel

Glass

Sealing With Strip

Latch / Lock

202 / FMEA / B 027

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 2 : Failure Modes (potential)
Occurrence Detection Occurrence Severity
Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures
Current Design Controls Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

Essae

Severity

RPN

Manner in which

A component / sub-system Process Could potentially fail to meet design intent Process requirements and / or design intent
Can be a cause of F.Mode in higher level sub-system in down stream opns. an effect of one in a previous opn.

in lower level component


202 / FMEA / B 028

RPN

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Recommended Actions and Status

Detention

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Failure Mode (Potential)


Assumption: Failure could occur but may not necessarily occur for PFMEA, incoming Parts / materials are correct.
Typical Modes: Design* : Mech: Broken, Deformed, Sticky Hydraulic: Untight, blocked, No Pressure. Electrical: Shorted, wrong poles, interrupted

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* - In physical terms not as a symptom noticed by customer. * - also modes under certain opr. Conditions / usage conditions.

202 / FMEA / B 029

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Failure Mode (Potential)


Process FMEA: In terms of components etc., or Process characteristic for the particular opn. Questions: How can the process / part fail to meet specifications? What would a customer (end user, subsequent operations) consider objectionable Starting point: Design FMEA: Past failures, concerns reports, Brain storming. Process FMEA: comparison of similar Process, Customer claims
202 / FMEA / B 030

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 3: Failure Effects
Occurrence Detection Occurrence Severity
Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures Current Design Controls Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

Essae

Severity

RPN

Design FMEA On the function as Perceived by the Customer Internal as well as ultimate end user In terms of specific component etc., under analysis

Process FMEA On the customer

In terms of what the customer (s) might notice or experience

202 / FMEA / B 031

RPN

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Recommended Actions and Status

Detention

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Effect(s) of Failure (Potential)


Two considerations 1. How does the failure affect ...? Component groups Product Vehicle Environment. System

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Actuating Piston connects Piston Rod with Piston: Fails due to Fatigue resulting in Disengagement from Piston with Consequential Effect Loss of Braking Function.
202 / FMEA / B 032

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Effect(s) of Failure (Potential)


2. How does the customer notice / experience the failure?
ANNOYANCE - Noise, smell - Ventilation Vapours - Vibration
SAFETY - Vehicle out of control - Failure of Brakes - Failure of steering systems

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FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT

- Starting Difficulties - Irregular Function - Leakages

Next process (Opn.): Can not mount; does not connect Does not match; can not bore / tap.

202 / FMEA / B 033

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 5: Failure Causes
Occurrence Detection Occurrence Severity

Essae

RPN

Definition: Design FMEA: A Design weakness consequence is failure mode. Process FMEA : How failure could occur, in terms what can be corrected / controlled.

List every conceivable cause for each Failure Mode Concise and completeness

202 / FMEA / B 034

RPN

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

Severity

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Recommended Actions and Status

Detention

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FMEA Failure Causes


Typical Causes: Examples
Design FMEA: Incorrect Material Specification, Overstressing, Inadequate Lubrication Capability, Error in dimensioning Process FMEA: Torque less / more; Gauging inaccurate, Inadequate gating / venting, Improper HT temp., Timing Only specific Errors: Example: Opr. Fails to install seal. Not ambiguous Phrases : Example: Opr. Error; M/c. Malfunction TYPICAL FAILURE MECHANISM: YIELD, CREEP, CORROSION, WEAR
202 / FMEA / B 035

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Design Failure Cause Examples


Improper Tolerancing Incorrect Stress Calculations Wrong Assumptions Wrong Material Call Out Lower Grade Component Lack of Design Standards Improper Heat Treatment Improper Torque Call Out

Essae

Correcting the cause has direct impact on Failure Mode? If so FMEA thought process complete. DOE to find root cause (s) for correction or control
202 / FMEA / B 036

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 7: Current Design Control
Occurrence Detection Occurrence Severity
Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures Current Design Controls Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

Essae

Severity

RPN

(What measures to avoid failure causes have been implemented) Reduction in Ranking of Occurrence Severity Thro -Design Validation / Verification No No - Design Revision (removal / controlling causes Yes Yes Actions DOE; Revised test Plan Revised Design: material specification

(and/or) Detention No Yes

202 / FMEA / B 037

RPN

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Recommended Actions and Status

Detention

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Design Controls
Design controls are those actions taken as a normal part of the development process that are designed into the process to minimize the occurrence of failure or to detect specific failure modes . Design controls should directly relate to the prevention and / or detection of specific causes of failures
202 / FMEA / B 038

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Design Control Examples


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Reliability tests / prototype testing Design reviews Worst case stress analysis Consider Interpretation of Robust design data Environmental stress testing Designed experiments Finite element analysis Variation simulation FT Analysis

202 / FMEA / B 039

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Process FMEA Current Control


Hazardous to personnel Mfg. / Assembly? Prevention by eliminating or controlling causes (e.g Mistake proofing) OR operator Protection
Occurrence: To reduce probability - Process and / or Design Revision Initiate Process Study / Improvement for Defect Prevention
Severity: Design Revision Only brings Reduction in severity

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202 / FMEA / B 040

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Process FMEA Current Control


Detection: Process and/or Design revisions - Costly & Ineffective - Q.C. Inspection only to be temporary - Design change to specific part - Control system changes

Essae

Prefer SPC & Process Improvement to Random Q. checks & Associated Inspection

202 / FMEA / B 041

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 8: Detection
Occurrence Detection Occurrence Severity

Essae

RPN

Assessment of ability of controls to identify:


* Design FMEA : Potential cause before production Release. Process FMEA: Failure Mode before part leaves Mfg. * For Lower ranking : improve validation / verification (Enter checks / Symptoms to detect the failure mode and / or Cause)

202 / FMEA / B 042

RPN

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Responsible Activity and Target completion Date

Severity

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Recommended Actions and Status

Detention

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Assessment of ability of controls to identify:


* Design FMEA : Potential cause before production Release. Process FMEA: Failure Mode before part leaves Mfg.

Essae

* For Lower ranking : improve validation / verification

(Enter checks / Symptoms to detect the failure mode and / or Cause)

202 / FMEA / B 043

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Generic Design FMEA Severity


FMEA Basic Column 4
Effect
Hazardous without Warning Hazardous with Warning Very High High Moderate Low

Essae Ranking
10

Criteria: Severity of Effect


Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and /or involves non-compliance with government regulation without warning Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and /or involves non-compliance with government regulation without warning Vehicle / item inoperable, with loss of primary function. Vehicle / item operable but at a reduced level of performance, customer dissatisfied Vehicle /item operable, but control / convenience item(s) inoperable; customer experiences discomfort Vehicle / item operable, but comfort / convenience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers. Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers.

8 7 6 5

Very Low Minor Very Minor

4 3 2

None

No effect.

202 / FMEA / B 044

Generic FMEA Occurrence


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FMEA Basic Column 6
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates

Essae

Ranking
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Very High: Failure is almost 1 in 2 inevitable 1 in 3 High: Repeated Failures 1 in 8 1 in 20 Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 1 in 400 1 in 2,000 Low: Relatively Few Failures 1 in 15,000 1 in 150,000 Remote: Failure Unlikely 1 in 1,500,000

202 / FMEA / B 045

Generic FMEA Detection


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Essae

FMEA Basic Column 8


Detection
Absolute Uncertainty Very Remote Remote Very Low Low Moderate Moderately High High Very High Almost Certain

Criteria: Likelyhood of detection by Design Control


Design Control will not and/or can not detect potential cause / mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no design control Very remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very low chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Low chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderately high chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderate high chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. High chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very high chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Design control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

Ranking
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

202 / FMEA / B 046

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DFMEA Recommended Actions


When the failure modes have been ranked by their RPN, Corrective actions should be first directed at the highest ranked concerns and critical items identified The intent of any recommended action is to reduce one or more (or all) of the occurrence, severity and/or detection rankings. Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the severity ranking. If no actions are recommended for a specific cause, this should be indicated. A reduction in the occurrence ranking can only be effected by removing or controlling one or more of the causes of the failure mode through a design revision. An increase in design verification actions will result in a reduction in the detection ranking only. Design FMEA doesnt rely on process controls to overcome potential weaknesses in the design; however, it does take technical and physical limitations of a process into consideration (Design Rules)
202 / FMEA / B 047

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202 / FMEA / B 048

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202 / FMEA / B 049

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202 / FMEA / B 050

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Process FMEA Foci


Customers include: End User Next Manufacturing or Process Step Process Engineers Repair Functions Test Engineers Product Analysis Dealership or other scales outlet
202 / FMEA / B 051

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Process FMEA Benefits


As a systematic approach, the process potential FMEA parallels and formalize the mental discipline that an engineer goes through in any manufacturing planning process. The process potential FMEA identifies potential product related process. The process potential FMEA assesses the potential customer effect of the failures. The process potential FMEA identifies potential manufacturing and/or assembly process causes. The process Potential FMEA identifies significant process variables to focus controls for occurrence reduction and detection of failure conditions. The process potential FMEA develops a list of potential failure modes ranked according to their affect on the customer, thus establishing a priority system for corrective and preventive action considerations.
202 / FMEA / B 052

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More Process FMEA Consideration


The process FMEA is living document. The process FMEA should be continually updated as changes occur throughout all phases of product development and on into and through to the end of production. The process FMEA should begin with a flow chart of process from receiving through shipping and warehousing. The potential failure modes/causes which can occur during manufacturing or assembly process are covered by the process FMEA but some information (severity ranking, identification of some effects) may come from the design FMEA.

Essae

A reduction in occurrence ranking can only be achieved by implementing a process change that controls or eliminates one or more causes of the failure mode.
202 / FMEA / B 053

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Process Failure Causes


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Omitted processing Processing errors Errors setting up work pieces Missing parts Wrong parts Processing wrong work piece 11. Poor control procedures 13. Bad recipe

Essae

12. Improper equipment maintenance

14. Fatigue
15. Lack of safety 16. Hardware failure 17. Failure to enforce controls

7.
8. 9. 10.

Mis-operation
Adjustment error Equipment not set up properly Tools and/or fixtures improperly prepared

18. Environment
19. Stress connections 20. Poor FMEA(s)

202 / FMEA / B 054

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Process Control Examples


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Standardized work instructions/procedures Fixtures and jigs Mechanical interference interfaces Mechanical counters Mechanical sensors Electrical/electronic sensors Job sheets or process packages Bar coding with software integration and control Marking Training and related educational safeguards Visual Checks Gage studies Preventive maintenance Automation (real time control)
Controls can be process controls such as fixture fool-proofing or SPC, or can be post-process inspection testing

Essae

Inspection / testing may occur at the subject operation or at subsequent operation(s) that can detect the subject failure mode.

11. 12. 13. 14.

202 / FMEA / B 055

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Typical Process Documents


SPC records Visual aides Work instructions Inspection instructions / records Equipment operating instructions Training records Traceability records

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202 / FMEA / B 056

Generic PFMEA Severity


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FMEA Basic Column 4
Effect
Hazardous without Warnin g Hazardous with Warnin g Very High High

Essae
Ranking
10

Criteria: Severity of Effect


May endanger machine or assembly operator. Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non complaisance with government regulation. Failure will occur without warning May endanger machine or assembly operator. Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non complaisance with government regulation. Failure will occur without warning Major disruption to production line. 100% of product may have to be scrapped. Vehicle/item inoperable, loss of primary function. Customer very dissatisfied. Minor disruption to production line. Product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) scrapped. Vehicle/item operable, but at reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied. Minor disruption to production line. A portion (les than 100%) of the product may have to be scrapped (no sorting). Vehicle/item operable but some comfort/convenience item(s) inoperable. Customers experiences discomfort. Minor disruption to production line. 100% of product may have to be reworked. Vehicle/item operable, but some comfort/convenience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Minor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) reworked. Fit & finish / squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. Minor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) reworked online but out of station. Fit & Finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers. Minor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) reworked on line but in station. Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by a discriminating customers. No effect.

8 7

Moderate

Low

Very Low

Minor

Very Minor

None

202 / FMEA / B 057

Generic PFMEA Occurrence


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Essae

FMEA Basic Column 4


Probability of Failure Very High: Failure is almost inevitable Possible Failure Rates 1 in 2 1 in 3 High: Generally associated with process similar to previous process which have often failed Moderate: Generally associated with process similar to previous process which have experienced occasional failures, but not in major proportions. Low: Isolated failures associated with similar processes. Very Low: Only isolated failures associated with almost identical processes. Remote: Failure Unlikely. No failures ever associated with almost identical processes. 1 in 8 1 in 20 1 in 80 1 in 400 1 in 2,000 1 in 15,000 1 in 150,000 1 in 1,500,000 Cpk < 0.33 0.33 0.51 0.67 0.83 1.00 1.17 1.13 1.50 1.67 Ranking 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

202 / FMEA / B 058

Generic PFMEA Detection


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FMEA Basic Column 8
Detection Criteria: Likelyhood the existence of a defect will be detected by process controls before next or subsequent process, or before part or component leaves manufacturing assembly location. Ranking
Essae

Almost No known control(s) available to detect failure mode. impossible Very Remote Very remote likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. Remote Remote likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. Very Low Very low likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. Low Low likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. Moderate Moderate likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode.

10 9 8 7 6 5

Moderately Moderately high likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. High
High High likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. Very High Very high likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode.

4
3 2

Almost Certain Current control(s) almost certain to detect the failure mode. Reliable detection controls are known with similar processes.

202 / FMEA / B 059

Contd

Generic PFMEA Detection

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FMEA Basic Column 8

Essae

Assume the failure has Occurrence and then assess the capabilities of all current controls to prevent shipment or the part having this failure mode or defect Random quality controls checks would unlikely detect the existence of an isolated defect and therefore would result in low to remote detection ranking. Sampling done on a statistical basis is a valid detection control. A reduction in detection ranking can only be achieved by improving process control system(s)
202 / FMEA / B 060

PFMEA Essae Chandran Institute


Recommended Actions Corrective action should first directed at the highest concern as rank ordered by RPN. The intent of any recommended action is to reduce the occurrence, severity and/or detection rankings. If no action are recommended for a specific cause, then this should be indicated. Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the severity ranking. To reduce the probability of occurrence, process and/or specification revisions are required. To increase the probability of detection, process control and/or inspection changes are required. Improving detection controls is typically costly. The emphasis should be placed on preventing rather than detecting, defects.
202 / FMEA / B 061

Essae

Contd

Essae Chandran Institute

PFMEA Recommended Actions


The severity applies to the effect only. The effect of a given failure will not change unless you change the design of the system or part. In the parachute example. If the chute doesnt open, you probably die and therefore it is a 10 (failure occurs without warning). Now suppose I design a smart chute that has built in diagnostics that emits a loud audible alarm telling me it is not going to openIt still doesnt open, but warns me that I am about to die, therefore making it a 9 (failure occurs with warning). If I take it step further, and add a smaller backup chute that deploys, that allows me to land without dying, I can make a case for the severity being a 7 (item operable, but at a reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied)
202 / FMEA / B 062

Essae

Essae Chandran Institute

Action on severity
The Question of action should be based on the RPN, not severity alone. If the severity is high, we at least think about any changes that might be made. Often times, we have no control on what the vehicle does when our parts fail. This is determined by the car companies and we all know they are infinitely wise in areas of quality and safety. If changes are not feasible, we then focus on occurrence and detection to bring the RPN into an acceptable level.
202 / FMEA / B 063

Essae

Essae Chandran Institute

Essae

202 / FMEA / B 064

Essae Chandran Institute

Five Methods of Mistake-Proofing


Variation control using assembly aids Identification by visual techniques Standardized work and workplace organization Self-check (in-process)

Essae

Poka-Yoke
Is a method which prevents a mistake from occurring or which
prevents a defective piece from further passing down the line POKA: Accidental or unintentional occurrence of a mistake. YOKE: Avoiding the production of a defective piece or its passage down the line.
202 / FMEA / B 065

Essae Chandran Institute

Risk Assessment (RPN) Factors


RPN=(S)x(0)x(D) S=Severity O= Likelihood of Occurrence D= Likelihood of Detection
Prevention Vs Detection Automotive Expectations: 1000 is the Maximum and 75 is considered OK High and low numbers are the important ones to consider input concept

Essae

202 / FMEA / B 066

Essae Chandran Institute

Assessment Rating Vs Actions


Assessment Rating O S 1 1 10 10 1 10 10 D 1 10 1 10 1 1 Causes of Failure Action Taken

Essae

1
1 1 1 10 10 10

Ideal situation
Assured mastery Failure does not reach user Failure reaches user Freq. fails w/o major impact Trouble!

No Action N/A N/A YES YES YES YES YES

Freq. fails, detectable, costly YES

10

202 / FMEA / B 067

Essae Chandran Institute

Mistake-Proofing
Emphasizes Prevention! Principles

Essae

Build into processes Eliminate inadvertent errors Stop doing it wrong Do it Right! Work Together Find True Cause!
Guide for part (fixture) Error detection alarm Limit switch Counter Check List

Examples

202 / FMEA / B 068

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