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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT xxxxxxx DISTRICT OF XXXX xxxxxxx DIVISION

CASE NO: XXXXX In re: XXXXXXX Debtor, XXXXXXX Plaintiff, vs. ONEWEST BANK, FSB, MTC FINANCIAL CORPORATION; TREASURY BANK, N.A; LENDER PROCESSING SOLUTIONS Defendants, VERIFIED COMPLAINT DISALLOWENCE OF LIEN AND TO DISALLOW SECURED CLAIM, TILA VIOLATION, FRAUD, LIBEL, QUIET TILE, UNFAIR BUSINESS PREACTICES FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE AND COMPLY WITH STIPATED JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ADVERSARY NO:XXXXXXX

COMES NOW, Debtor-Plaintiff XXXXXXXX, (hereinafter referred to as the Plaintiff or Debtor.

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1.

Plaintiff, files this Adversary Complaint to Determine the Validity of

a Lien, Complaint for Quiet Title, for Declaratory Relief, for Permanent Injunction, and a Conditional Action for an Accounting and to Obtain Unapplied Credits. The causes of action in the form of request for relief are contained in those paragraphs with a heading.

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2.

The remaining paragraphs contain background and factual

allegations necessary or relevant to the causes of action. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This adversary proceeding is brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506

and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001. 4. This court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 151, 157 and 1334(b). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1409. 5. This adversary proceeding is a core proceeding as defined at 28

U.S.C. 157(b)(2)(b) and (b)(2)(K) in that it is an action to determine the nature, extent and validity of a lien on property evidenced by a deed of trust, and the allowance or disallowance of a claim. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(b), and jurisdiction exists pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 502 (a) and (b) (1), 11 U.S.C. 544 (a) (3) and (b) (1), 28 U.S.C. 1334, 28 U.S.C. 2201 for declaratory relief and 28 U.S.C. 1367 for pendent state claims. 6. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C

157; 1334; 1652; 25-1; FRCP 57; and B.R. 7001, et seq. Pursuant to B.R. 3007(b), and Objection to Claim may be included in an Adversary Proceeding. Venue is appropriate in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1408 and 1409.

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This matter is a core proceeding. 7. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a

party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. 'Otherwise a party may amend the

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party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. PARTIES 8. Plaintiff is an individual having standing to bring this action

pursuant to 11 U.S. C. 323, 1302, and 1330. 9. Plaintiff is the Debtor of the within captioned bankruptcy case,

having filed a Voluntary Petition for relief under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Code on ____________, 20__ ("the Bankruptcy Case") in the XXXXX District of ______________Case Number: ______________. 10. Plaintiff is and at all times mentioned herein is the owner and

purchaser of real property known as ___________________________ (herein referred to as Primary Lien). 11. Plaintiffs are and at all times relevant have been residents of the

County of __________ State of _________________ of a parcel of Real Property commonly known as: ______________________. 12. Defendant ,ONEWEST BANK, (hereinafter, ONEWEST) is and at

all times herein mentioned was, a member of the Federally Chartered Saving Bank, and at all times herein was conducting intrastate business in the State of California, and is a Loan Servicer for FDIC.

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13.

Defendants, TREASURY BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

(hereinafter, TREASURY) is and at all times herein mentioned was a member of the National Banking Association at all times herein was conducting intrastate business in the State of California, and claims to be the assigned

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beneficiary, under the deed of trust; recorded in XXXX County on XXXXX, 2009. 14. Defendant MTC FINANCIAL CORPORATION, (doing business as),

TRUSTEE CORPORATION, (hereinafter MTC) and alleged Appointed Substituted Trustee, as of June 15, 2009), at all times relevant is and was a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of California, and is conducting intrastate business in the State of California. 15. A relevant party, ERICA JOHNSON-SECK, a employee of OneWest

and/or an agent for OneWest (hereinafter SECK) was an employee of OneWest. 16. A relevant party, BETHANY HOOD, (Hereinafter HOOD) was an

employee of LPS and an agent for LPS. 17. A relevant party, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION

SYSTEMS INCORPORATED (Hereinafter MERS), as original beneficiary, at all times relevant is and was a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of California, and is conducting intrastate business in the State of California. 18. A relevant party, CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY (hereinafter, CTC),

original trustee, at all times relevant is and was a corporation existing by virtue
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of the laws of the State of California, and is conducting intrastate business in the State of California. 19. Plaintiff is not aware of the true names and capacities of

defendants sued herein as DOES I through 100, inclusive, and therefore sue

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these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. 20. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon alleges that, at all

times herein mentioned each of the defendants sued herein was the agent and employee of each of the remaining defendants and at all times was acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment. 21. The defendants indentified in paragraphs shall thereinafter be

referred to collectively as Defendants. Whenever reference is made within a cause of action in this Complaint to any act or and Defendant that allegation shall mean that each defendant acted individually and jointly with the other Defendants. 22. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true name and

capacities when ascertained informed and believe and thereon allege that each of these fictitiously name Defendants claim some right, title, estate, lien or interest in the hereinafter-described property adverse to Plaintiffs title to their claims, and each of them, constitute a cloud on Plaintiffs title to that property. INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF DEFENDANT PARTIES 23. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges, that in

committing certain acts herein alleged, some or all of the Defendants herein
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named were acting as the agents, joint ventures, partners, representatives, subsidiaries, affiliates and/or employees of some or all of the other Defendants, and that some or all of the conduct of such Defendants, as complained of herein, was within the course and scope of such relationship.

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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 24. property. 25. On or about XXXXXXX Plaintiff executed a Option ARMs Deed of This matter springs from a fraudulent foreclosure of Plaintiffs real

Trust reflects TD Service Company as trustee and MERS as beneficiary Later Plaintiff defaulted on the DOT. 26. March 9, 2009 a backdated assignment of mortgage, which claim

that an assignment occurred whereby MERS, as Beneficiary assigned a mortgage to IndyMac, was endorsed by Secks as Vice President for MERS. (Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein).) 27. A similar untimely assignment of DOT was purportedly executed

by MERS, which allegedly transferred legal interest in the subject property to Indymac. At the time of the transfer of the Note and DOT, Indymac was defunct and nonexistent. This document was purportedly executed in Texas on April 14, 20xx and was not executed in California. 28. XXXXX, 2009 Defendant MTC recorded a Notice of Default

claiming that Plaintiff to be in default of her monthly obligation under the

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promissory Note and DOT. 29. XXXXX, 2009 Seck signed the Assignment as Vice President of

MERS and as Vice President of Indymac to Treasury. This assignment was not duly acknowledged, executed and recorded before starting foreclosure as

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required in CCC 2923.3 and there now exist a conflict of interest in that Seck alleges to assign as V.P for both MERS and Indymac. 30. XXXX, 2009, TC purportedly recorded a notice of trustee sale

setting a sale date of July 6, 2009. The subject property was sold to Treasury. Thereafter, Plaintiff and Treasury have been engaged in both unlawful detainer litigation and a state civil lawsuit. 31. XXXX, 2009 MERS recorded an assignment of DOT to Indymac,

there was no acknowledgment executed before starting the foreclosure process in violation of CCC 2923. MERS had no authority to assign the DOT to anyone for MERS was never entitled to payment on the Note and as such, is not a beneficiary of the Note and has no interest in the property. 32. At the time that MTC signed the Notice of Default, MTC had not

been substituted as the trustee in place of TD. 33. MTC had no beneficial interest in the DOT not as beneficiary or as

a trustee, either originally or substituted, at the time it signed the NOD as required by CCC 2923.5. 34. Each and every defendant failed to comply with California Civil

Code Section 2923. 5. 35. TD as Trustee was the only party who had the right to assign the

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DOT. 36. The Notice of Default is VOID thus the statutory rules for a valid

foreclosure under the California Civil Code were not complied with by MTC or any of the foreclosing Dependents.

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37.

INDYMAC was not the beneficiary and did not exist and could not

transfer interest in this property to TREASURY. 38. TREASURYS assignment was unlawfully procured and constitutes

extrinsic fraud and collusion and there now exist a fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent foreclosure of Plaintiffs property and raises a conflict of interest issue because Seck appears on both sides of the mortgage assignment. This type of conflict of interest has been raised with Seck and Hood repeatedly in state and bankruptcy courts. BETHANY HOOD KNOWN AS A ROBOSIGNER 39. XXXXX, 2009, Bethany Hood, acting as Assistant Secretary for Indymac

Federal Bank endorsed a Substitution of Trustee in favor of MTC Financial Inc, dba Trustee Corps, this substitution was recorded in official records, XXXXXXXXX County Recorder office document #XXXXXXXXX on March XX, XXXX. (Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein). 40. Bethany Hoods substitution of trustee were fraudulent because Hood

was a supervisor on the mail team in Minnesota office FIS Foreclosure Solutions Inc., aka Lenders Process Solutions (hereinafter, LPS) and who signed mortgage documents using fraudulent job titles. LPS and Hood, participated in a fraudulent scheme to foreclosure on Plaintiffs property, they knew they signed and filed false and

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fraudulent documents in order to achieve trustee sale of Plaintiffs property. (Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein). See page 20. 41. Both confirmed robo-signers Erica A. Johnson-Seck and Bethany Hood

are named defendants in several state, district court and bankruptcy court actions for

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fraudulently signed assignments and is guilty of fraudulent schemes to foreclose on Plaintiffs property and at all times continue to collude with mortgage lenders expedite the foreclosure sale. Both Seck and Hood fraudulent acts are reflected throughout this Complaint in certain Memorandum of Law and Points of Authorities. SECK KNOWN AS A ROBOSIGNER 42. Seck is not a Vice President of MERS and is an employee of OneWest,

and holds a position with OneWest as Vice President of the bankruptcy and foreclosure departments, since March 19, 2009. 43. Seck is a previous employee of Indymac and is not an employee or Vice

President of MERS, and she has executed legal documents filed in the certain districts on behalf of MERS for the benefit of OneWest as Attorney in Fact. 44. The assignment done by Seck was allegedly notarized in Texas on April

14, 2009. Mai La Thoa, a notary public did not acknowledge that robosigner Seck personally appeared before her and executed the assignment, as required by California law. Civil Code 1185. 45. Mia La Thoa did not acknowledge that Seck executed the instrument

and did not fully identify Seck. The certification of acknowledgement was incomplete and fraudulently recorded. In fact Mai La Thoa acknowledged that Seck personally appeared before under penalty of perjury in Williamson Texas. This acknowledgement

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was false and therefore constitutes fraud. 1

Ms. Johnson-Seck was deposed in a Florida foreclosure action (Indymac Federal Bank, FSB v. Machado), where she admitted to being a robo-signer. She admitted to executing approximately 750 mortgage documents a week, including sworn documents outside the presence of a notary public. Moreover, she admitted that she did not even read the documents before signing them. Also see OneWest Bank, F.S.B v. Drayton, et al., 2010 WL 4187065 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. 2010). -9

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46.

Seck, fraudulently assigned and endorsed a Deed of Trust to Treasury

as Vice President of Indymac and filed this fraudulent assignment in the official records of xxxxx County Assessor/Recorder dated xxxxxx (Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein). 47. On July 9, 2009, In a eight four page sworn deposition Seck stated she

is the Vice President of Bankruptcy and Foreclosure at OneWest Bank (Exhibit C attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein). MERS AND ONEWEST COLLUSION 48. MERS did not have the authority to assign any interest of IndyMac to

anyone on that date. Upon information and belief, MERS was never entitled to payment on the Note, and, as such, is not a Beneficiary of the Mortgage, and was not a real party in interest to the Note.2 49. The primary focus here is whether or not the assignment was

fraudulently executed to mislead and burden the court and the foreclosure defendant and thereby achieve an objective of trustee sale without standing. 50. OneWest did not have the authority to assign any interest in the note to

Treasury or to anyone on that date. 51. OneWest was never entitled to payment on the Note, and as such, is not

a Beneficiary of the Mortgage, and does not have an interest in the property and was
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In MERS v. Coakley, the Court ruled that postdates of this nature are ineffective [MERS v. Coakley, at 674; see also Kluge v. Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537 (2nd Dept. 1988)]. There being no evidence that the assignment was made prior to the commencement of the action, Plaintiff failed to establish that it was in possession of the mortgage at the time it commenced this action. On September 30, 2010, US Bankruptcy Judge Harry C. Dees, Jr., Northern District of Indiana, South Bend division, confronted head-on the widespread practice of employees of mortgage servicing companies signing mortgage assignments with false job titles. [Koontz v. EverHome Mortgage and MERS, case number 0930024, Proc. No.10 3005].

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not a real party in interest to the Note. 52. MERS, and OneWest were not the actual note holder when the

foreclosure was initiate. One of the most innovative ways banks have avoided paying county clerks fees for transferring titles from one property owner to another is by the use of Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS. The problem with MERS is that its operational model requires a bifurcation or separation of the Deed of Trust from the promissory Note. In almost every MERS loan, the note names a different entity, while the Deed names MERS as the beneficiary. To perfect a lien, the holder of the note should be the same entity that holds the Deed. However, with the securitization of most mortgages, and the use of MERS, it is almost impossible for that to happen. MERS THE NOTE AND THE DEED 53. Because the MERS system separates the note and the Deed which is

evident since both documents name different entities, the Deed of Trust is rendered unenforceable because it is in violation of Carpenter v. Longan. In 1872, The United States Supreme Court announced this classic statement in this rule: The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. (quoting Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 271, 274 (1872). BNT Terminals, Inc., 125 B.R. 963 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (An assignment of a mortgage without a transfer of the underlying note is a nullity. . . . It is axiomatic that any attempt to assign the mortgage without transfer of the debt will not pass the mortgagees interest to the assignee. In another ruling, First Natl Bank of SACO v. Vagg, 212 P. 509, 511 (Mont. 1922) A mortgage, as distinct from the debt it secures, is not a thing of value nor a fit subject of transfer; hence an assignment of the
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mortgage alone, without the debt, is nugatory, and confers no rights whatever upon the assignee. The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while the assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. The mortgage can have no separate existence.3 54. The biggest problem MERS Deeds of Trust face is that there is no

Grantor, Grantee or what has been granted that was named. MERS and securitization are fairly new. However, many courts have held that a document attempting to convey an interest in realty fails to convey that interest if the document

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does not name an eligible Grantee or Grantor. Courts around the country have long held, There must be, in every Grant, a Grantor, a Grantee and a thing Granted, and a deed wanting in either essential is absolutely void. 55. Look at any MERS Deed of Trust, youll see that most of them violate

this rule. In the case of Richey v. Sinclair, 47 N.E. 364, 365 (Ill. 1897) 4 In Disque v. Wright, 49 Iowa 538, 540 (1878) (It has been frequently held that slight omissions in the acknowledgment of a deed destroy the effect of the record as constructive notice. A fortiori, it seems to us, should so important and vital an omission as that of the name of the Grantee have that effect.) INDYMACS ASSETS 56. Plaintiffs loan references a Secondary market securitized

mortgage backed asset that is comprised almost entirely of securitization structures related which is to a Trust. Thus the reference to securitized
In Southerin v. Mendum, 1831 WL 1104, at * 7 (N.H. 1831) ([T]he interest of the mortgagee is not in fact real estate, but a personal chattel, a mere security for the debt, an interest in the land inseparable from the debt, an incident to the debt, which cannot be detached from its principal.) Another ruling was in Barton v. Perryman, 577 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Ark. 1979) and also in Kelley v. Upshaw, 246 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1952) (In any event, Kelleys purported assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt which is secured was a legal nullity.)
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the court ruled, (The law is well settled that a deed without the name of a Grantee is invalid. It is said there must be in every Grant a Grantor, a Grantee, and a thing Granted; and a deed wanting in either essential will be void.). - 12

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mortgage loans. 57. The Trustee cannot own the assets of the REMIC. A REMIC

Trustee could never claim it owned a mortgage loan. Hence, it can never be the owner of a mortgage loan. 58. Pursuant to the Custodial Agreement between the Custodian

and the Trustee, the Custodian is required to hold the related Mortgage Loan Documents (loan level file) on behalf of the Trustee in an individual file, separate from other Mortgage Loan Files held by the Custodian, and is also required to maintain the said documents in a fireproof facility intended for the safekeeping of such Mortgage Loan Files. (Exhibit) 59. Upon information and belief, Indymac was a Loan Servicer and

not a hold of a Note after Indymac sold its interests in the Note to the first of a series of entities within days or weeks of its execution. After said sale, Indymac no longer had any interest in the Note and no power to transfer it, because it had already been sold and transferred to the investors of the MBA. 60. Indymac sale was part of a series of loans that were contractually

required to each own and hold the Note in succession for the Note to be successfully pooled into the Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) Trust to which it was intended to be pooled prior to the loan having been made. The funds

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that were loaned to Plaintiff came from investment dollars generated by the sale of interests in one or more MBS Trusts, in the form of a Mortgage Backed Securities, aka Mortgage Bonds. According to the contractual requirements of the securitization documents that formed the MBS Trust, the Note had to be

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sold, negotiated and transferred to a number of entitles in succession before the eventual sale, negotiation and transfer to the MBS Trust for pooling. In the case of the Indymac, Asset-backed-pass through Certificates, Series INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005-AR3, the Certificate Holders of which OneWest, claims to be acting as Trustee, it is contractually and legally impossible for the Trust to ever obtain legal title to the Note, for the benefit of the investors, if the Note had not been sold, negotiated and transferred serially from Indymac, Originator, to OneWest. 61. Additional requirements in the Securitization Documents are that

the intervening endorsements had to be specifically payable to each transferee in proper order and only the final endorsement to the Investors. The sales, negotiations and transfers done properly as set forth above will be called the proper serial transfers for successful pooling of the Note. The basic that Indymac could have to enforce the Note would be if it would be doing so as a MBS Trustee for the investors in pooled notes in which the Plaintiffs Note was included. However, the sale, negotiation and transfer of the Note to OneWest was not perfected. Such transfer is VOID by strict STATE trust law, which governs such a Mortgage Backed Security. 62. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that

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Indymac served as the Master Servicer for the INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005-AR3. 63. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that The Pooling and Servicing agreement requires that such note be endorsed

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within 30 days after being placed into the Trust. Therefore the endorsement should be acknowledged and endorsed into the name of Indymac as Trustee of the INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2005AR3, whereby Indymac had Servicing Rights pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.5 INDYMAC CEASED TO EXISIT AS OF JULY 28, 2008 64. July 11, 2008, Indymac ceased to exist and was taken over by Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Receiver for Indymac Federal Bank, FSB. The FDIC granted Limited Power of Attorney to OneWest Bank, to Execute, acknowledge, seal and deliver on behalf of the FDIC, all instruments of transfer and conveyance, appropriately completed, with all original or necessary endorsements, acknowledgements, affidavits and supporting documents as may be necessary or appropriate to evidence the sale and transfer of any asset pursuant to that certain Servicing Business Asset. 65. March 19, 2009, OneWest entered into a Purchase Agreement

between the FDIC as RECEIVER for Indymac Federal Bank. 66. September 29, 2009, a Limited Power of Attorney was recorded in Plymouth County Registry of Deeds , Book 37518 Page 22 and reflects Erica Johnson-Seck as a Attorney-in Fact for OneWest Bank, although OneWest was

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given a Limited Power of Attorney there exists no record that would show that Indymac or the FDIC assigned Plaintiffs particular note to OneWest as specified in
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Re Argent, handed February 10, 2011 (case no. 8-10-77338-reg), the court found that the MERS business model was not consistent with the lawful transfer of securities nor does its nominee relationship create a nexus of agency that would give Robosigners, such as Bethany Hood, the authority to endorse Assignments. The court concluded that MERSs position that they can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the mortgagee is absurd, at best.

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the FDIC Purchase Agreement with Indymac. 67. Even if Indymac or FDIC did in fact assign the Plaintiffs particular Note

to OneWest as specified in the FDIC Purchase Agreement, the assignment would be null and void because the only party that has true authority to assign the Note would be the securitized trust. 68. The Servicing Agreement between FDIC and OneWest bank,

specifically states in Article XI , Miscellaneous, Section 11.01(a) The Servicer hereby acknowledges that this Agreement constitutes a personal services agreement between the Company and the Servicer. This agreement specifically states : The Servicer shall not assign any rights or obligations hereunder to any other person other than as is expressly provided in this Agreement. Any purported sale, sub-participation or assignment or delegation in violation of this Section 11.01(a) shall be void ab initio and of no force or effect whatsoever. (Exhibit D) attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein). FRAUDULENT SCHEMES 69. In the deposition of Christian S. Hymer, an officer of LPS, taken on January 13, 2010 in the Western District of Washington case of Kristin Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group Inc., et al., Mr. Hymer says in his testimony that the assignment in that case, which was also endorsed by Bethany Hood and notarized by Paris Jackson, the same notary on the assignment in this case, was generated by the foreclosing law firm, aka the regional trustee: by signing the document, [Bethany Hood is] essentially attesting that the information on this appears to be accurate. However, again, we rely upon the law firm to draft the document(Page 91). Question: but from my understanding of what you told me earlier the request to sign the document would have come from regional trustee, the law firm, or ---. Mr. Hymer: Correct. (Page 97-98) Question: So in this scenario that you just gave me a few minutes ago, a law firm drafts the document, and its sent to LPS to see whether or not it's appropriate for LPS to sign the document. That's considered a support service? Mr. Hymer: That's - that's part of the - Yeah. Correct. That would be one of the support services it would provide, and part of what the fee they would pay would include that activity. (Page 22) (emphasis added)
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From this deposition we can ascertain that pursuant to the business model for servicing foreclosures, post foreclosure assignments would be generated by the law firm and endorsed by an LPS employee acting as a vice president for MERS. In the instant case Stephen J. Baum, PC, was acting as the regional trustee for HSBC. Hence, the instant assignment was drafted by the Baum law firm and electronically forwarded to the LPS facility located in Minnesota for the nominee endorsement of Ms. Hood. This document was generated to fraudulently advance a foreclosure action and clearly does not qualify as a valid contract between parties. The state court and the foreclosure defendant were not aware of Ms. Hood's true status as what has come to be known as a Robosigner, or a robotic clerk for a strawman entity, nor were those parties aware of the law firms role in advancing the MERS Members business model. (Haley v. Bloomquist, 204 Cal. 253 [268 P. 365]; Dealey v. East San Mateo Land Co., 21 Cal.App. 39 [130 P. 1066]; Bernheim v. Cerf, 123 Cal. 170 [55 P. 759]; Packard v. Bird, 40 Cal. 378; Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461 [76 Am. Dec. 540].) [2 In re Brian W. Davies, Case No 6:10bk-37900-TD, USBC, Central District of California, a case involving OneWest Bank as both the movant and as agent of Deutsche Bank. In a very simple Order, the Court ruled 1) 1. OneWest Bank and OneWest Bank as Agent for Deutsche Bank lack standing; and 2) that the movants declaration lacks credibility, having signed as both an employee of the movant and as an agent for MERS. 70. The Foreclosure Fraud against Plaintiff is one of thousands of fraudulent

foreclosure schemes done in the State of California and many other states as part of a
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foreclosure mill practice which, upon information and belief , Defendants participated in a scheme to file fraudulent foreclosure documents against Plaintiff and others within the State of California to extract money from desperate homeowners throughout the State of California after Defendants profited in the billions of dollars from the securitization and sale of the bad paper mortgages of homeowners nationwide during the home buying boom. 71. Each and every Defendant is a part of the nationwide foreclosure

scandal who knew in advance their bad paper would bust, so they sold and resold it to investors over the years and when it completely failed, after making money on it,
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they knew they created a new income stream by filing fraudulent foreclosure documents to sell off that business, by the filing of motion for relief from stay actions within the Bankruptcy Courts and the filing of fraudulent Proof of Claims to increase bankrupt debtors plan payments for the sole purpose of forcing those bankruptcy debtors into defaulting on their chapter 13 plan payments and for the sole purpose to conspire to foreclosure on debtors real properties. 72. Each and every Defendant knew Note was assigned fraudulently and

knew there to be grounds for Plaintiff to bring an action of fraud against each and every. 6 73. Each and every Defendant knew they had no standing to foreclose and

Treasury had no standing to file a proof of claim or to file a motion for relief from stay or file a state court action to evict Plaintiff from her home. 74. Plaintiff alleges that the willful creation of documents pre-petition were

an effort to create, perfect, and enforce against the property of the Plaintiff a lien that arose before the commencement of the case in violation of 11 U.S.C 362(a)(4) and 362(a)(5). 75. Defendants willfully, knowingly altering documents (or forging

signatures) with the specific intent to defraud, filing false and forged documents with the County Recorder, Failing to having the proper witnesses.

21 22 23 24 25 MERS realized it had a problem and in February 2011 released a memo asking all entities to stop foreclosing in its name. The memo in part reads: To comply with this guidance, MERS Members should implement the following practices, effective immediately. In most recent legal challenges have arisen regarding alleged inadequacies and improprieties in the foreclosure process including allegations of insufficient or incorrect supporting documentation and challenges to the legal capacity of parties right to foreclose . . . MERS is planning to shortly announce a proposed amendment to Membership Rule 8. The proposed amendment will require members to not foreclose in MERS name. Consistent with the Membership Rules there will be a 90-day comment period on the proposed Rule. During this period we request that Members do not commence foreclosures in MERS name.
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76.

Defendant TREASURY, failed to provide the court with valid proof to

substantiate their cause of action in its Motion for Relief from Stay, Proof of Claim and Objection to Confirmation of Plan and thus lacked standing to pursue any action against Plaintiff and stood upon a fraudulent document to maintain the appearance of STANDING in the State and Bankruptcy Courts. 77. Defendant LPS is guilty of extrinsic fraud in that they colluded to

generate a fraudulent assignment to make it appear as though ONEWEST had standing to foreclose on the subject property. 78. LPS is a giant electronic butler for the big banks and other companies in

the industry. It attends to routine tasks the loan servicers prefer not to do themselves. These include tracking mortgage payments, calculating amounts owed to investors who purchased bundles of mortgages, ensuring that property taxes and insurance get paid -- and automatically filing foreclosure actions when homeowners go into default. 79. MERS, ONEWEST AND LPS, participated in a fraudulent scheme to

foreclosure on Plaintiffs property and knew they assigned, transferred and filed false and fraudulent documents with the county clerk to foreclose on Plaintiffs property. THE COURTS POWER TO VACATE FORECLOSURE SALE 80. It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure

sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or
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where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties. Sham bidding and the restriction of competition are condemned, and inadequacy of price when

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coupled with other circumstances of fraud may also constitute ground for setting aside the sale. 81. Clear Title May Not Derive from a Fraud (including a bona fide

purchaser for value). In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 stated:7 82. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents or forged

signatures should be void and without any legal effect.8 RATIFICATION OF COMMENCEMENT 83. Because the fraud is extrinsic in nature, Treasury is precluded from

raising the doctrine of res judicata as a defense against this Courts obligation to verify first and foremost that the claimant has federal jurisdiction real party in interest status. 84. Treasury Bank must comply with the applicable procedures of federal

court. Two such procedures stand in the way of granting the motion for relief from stay in this case. The first procedural problem arises from the real party in interest rule. 85. Because there are material, factual and legal issues as to subject matter

and in persona jurisdiction under rules 17 (a)(3), and 12b(1)(2)(6) and (7) do to the lack of Ratification of Commencement by the Real Parties in Interest that needs to be

21 22 23 24 25
7

"Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief." (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted). This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated: "It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties." (Emphasis added).
8

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addressed by this Court and its Trustees sua sponte as a threshold issue under Article 3 2 of national Constitution, this court should not grant and/or should not have granted a motion for relief of stay as a party that seeks relief from automatic stay must be a real party in interest 11 U.S.C.A 362(d); Fed. Rules Bankr. Proc. Rules 4001, 7017, 9014, 11 U.S.C.A. Re Kang Jin Hwang 396 B.R. 757. Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal., 2008. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 86. Standing is a "threshold question in every federal case, determining the

power of the court to entertain the suit.9 87. The inquiry into standing "involves both constitutional limitations on

federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise The RookerFeldman doctrine cannot override the requirement of any party advancing a claim in federal court to pass the Real Party in Interest test. The Second Circuit has delineated four elements that must be satisfied in order for Rooker-Feldman to apply: First, the Federal Court plaintiff must have lost in state court. Second, the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment. Third, the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment. Fourth, the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. (In re Comcoach), 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983). 88. The United States Constitution Article III 2 specifically limits the

jurisdiction of the federal courts to Cases or Controversies. Justice Powell delivered the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Warth v. Seldin
9

." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Hence, "a defect in standing cannot be waived; it must be raised, either by the parties or by the court, whenever it becomes apparent." U.S. v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 116 n. 7 (1st Cir.1992). - 21

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

addressing the question of standing in a federal court as follows: 89.

10.

In its constitutional dimension, standing imports judiciability:

whether the plaintiff has made out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art.III. This is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit. As an aspect of judiciability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the courts remedial powers on his behalf. 90.
11

The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to

protect against injury to the complaining partyA Federal courts jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered some threat or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146,1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). Warth v. Seldin 422U.S.490, 498 (1975) Apart from this minimum constitutional mandate, this Court has recognized other limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts decisional and remedial powers. even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the case or controversy requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must

21 22 23 24
10

assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on

25

In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of the particular issues. This query involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. 11 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S.186,204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663(1962). - 22

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

the legal rights or interests of third parties. 91.

12

The Debtor in the instant case reiterates that a party seeking relief

in any Federal Court bears the burden of demonstrating standing and must plead its components with specificity. Coyne v American Tobacco Company, 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999). Again, the minimum constitutional requirements for standing are: proof of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 92.
13

It is well anticipated that ONEWEST will respond to this Complaint

by asserting that the assignment, regardless of validity, is unnecessary. This phenomenon of submitting written assignments and then arguing they are of no consequence or otherwise unnecessary, is not unique to the documents submitted in this Court . 93. The Defendants in this case is not complaining of injuries caused by a

judgment nor inviting a review and rejection of the judgment based on its merits or reasoning. The plaintiff merely asks this Court to, first; make a determination as to whether or not ratification of commencement has occurred, and secondly; to consider whether the Assignment of Mortgage that's attached to Treasury's Motion for Relief from Stay action was extrinsically fraudulent or does it qualify as merely an instrument associated with the issue that gave rise to the Foreclosure Action.

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94.

Treasury does not qualify as a real party of interest" pursuant to

Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: "An action
E.g., Tilestion v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 493, 87 L.Ed. 603 (1943). Warth v. Seldin 422U.S.490, 499 (1975) (emphasis added) 13 Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982). Furthermore, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution, any claimant asserting rights in a Federal Court must show he has personally suffered some actual injury as a result of the conduct of the adverse party. Coyne, 183 F.3d at 494; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
12

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must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." The purpose of this rule is to require that an action be brought "in the name of the party who possesses the substantive right being asserted under the applicable law...." A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 1541 (1990) ("WRIGHT"). 95. Rule 4001 provides: "A motion for relief from an automatic stay ...

shall be made in accordance with Rule 9014," which provides procedural rules for contested matters. Rule 9014 provides, in turn, that many of the rules for adversary proceedings apply to contested matters. Among the adversary proceedings rules incorporated by reference in Rule 9014 is Rule 7017, which provides:
14

DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS 96. Defendants misconduct in the matter before the court makes his

hands "unclean" and he may not hold with them the pristine remedy of injunctive relief.15 97. Robosigned documents are intended for use in California

Bankruptcy Court matters. One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankruptcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove "standing" to proceed with a

21 22 23 24 25

foreclosure. If they are not signed by persons with the requisite knowledge,
14

"Rule 17 F.R.Civ.P. applies in adversary proceedings...." Treasurys obligation to meet the requirements of Rule 17 is a federal jurisdiction threshold issue. A party that seeks relief from stay must be a "real party in interest. 15 California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. Californias unclean hands rule requires that the Plaintiff dont cheat, and behave fairly. The plaintiff must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615. - 24

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affidavits submitted in bankruptcy court proceedings such as objections to a plan and Relief from Stays are perjured. 98. In fact, the Defendants had no right to title or interest in the

Subject Property and no right to entertain any rights of ownership including the right to foreclosure, offering the Subject Property for sale at a trustees sale, demanding possession or filing cases for unlawful detainer. Nevertheless, the Defendants proceeded with a non-judicial foreclosure sale, through TC as alleged trustee, illegally and with unclean hands. Plaintiffs are willing to tender the amount received subject to equitable adjustment for the damage caused to the Plaintiffs by the Defendants activities. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF [Declatory Relief to Determine an Interest in Property] [F.R.B.P 7001(2) and 7001(9)] 100. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations contained in preceding paragraphs, inclusive, as though set forth at length herein. 101. Plaintiff alleges that he holds and interest in the Property free and clear of any interest of Dependents, in that the lien as evidenced by the Deed of Trust and its subsequent assignments has no value since it is wholly unsecured, and that accordingly, the Deed of Trust is null and void. 102. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants allege that the Deed of

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Trust cannot be determined to be null and void because it is secured by the Property which is Plaintiffs principal residence and is not wholly unsecured. 103. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants dispute the contention alleges herein.

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104. An actually controversy exists between Plaintiff and Dependents with regard to the validity, nature and extent of their interest in the Property. 105. It is necessary that this Court declare the actual rights and obligations of the parties and make a determination as to the validity, nature and extent of Defendants interest in the Property. SECOND CLAIM OF RELIEF [Declaratory Relief to Determine Status of Disputed Claim] [11 U.S.C. 506 and F.R.B.P 7001] 106. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations contained in preceding paragraphs, inclusive, as though set forth at length herein. 107. Plaintiff alleges that the lien as evidenced by the MERS Assigned Deed

of Trust has no value since it is wholly unsecured; that the Disputed Subject Property claim is not allowable as a secured claim, and that accordingly, the Deed of Trust and its subsequent assignments is null and void. 108. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant ONEWEST alleges

the Deed of Trust cannot be determined to be null and void because it is secured by the Property which is Plaintiffs principal residence and is not wholly unsecured. 109. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants

disputes the contention alleges herein. 110. An actual controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant

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TREASURY with regard to the status of its claim as secured or unsecured. 111. It is necessary that this Court declare the actual rights and obligations

of the parties and make a determination as to whether Defendants claim against Plaintiff shall be allowable as

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secured or unsecured. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF [As to Defendants ONEWEST AND TREASURY] [15 U.S.C. 1641(g)] 112. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations contained in

preceding paragraphs, inclusive, as though set forth at length herein. 113. In May 2009, "The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009"

was enacted into law that calls for notice to the consumer when a "mortgage loan" is transferred or assigned. The provision was effective immediately and violations are subject to TILA liability. ONEWEST as the purported new loan owner never contacted or sent Plaintiff such notice when the assignment was executed on or about July 27, 2009. 15 U.S.C. 1641 was amended by adding at the end the following: "(g) NOTICE OF NEW CREDITOR.-(1) IN GENERAL.-In addition to other disclosures required by this title, not later than 30 days after the date on which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the borrower in writing of such transfer, including-(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new creditor;(B) the date of transfer;(C) how to reach an agent or party having authority to act on behalf of the new creditor;(D) the location of the place where transfer of ownership of the debt is recorded; and (E) any other relevant information regarding the new creditor. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF [As to Defendant ONEWEST] [Fraud in Conveyance] 114. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations contained in preceding paragraphs, inclusive, as though set forth at length herein. 115. MERS, a Nominee for TD SERVICES., purportedly assigned the Deed of Trust, together with note to ONEWEST as evidenced by the Assignment of the

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DOT filed on XXXXX, 2009 . 116. MERS [a foreign corporation, having no authority to conduct business in the State of California], fraudulently represented itself as the beneficiary under the DOT, at a time the principle Indymac. held no interest, as it materially misrepresented, and subsequently authorized by SECK, an employee of INDYMAC. 117. The Assignment of DOT assigned ownership information was false, Seck worked for ONEWEST, she does not get paid as an officer of MERS. 118. The MERS assignment purports to assign the beneficial interest to ONEWEST which was not the beneficial owner. Defendants including LPS knew then, should have known, and know now that this was not a valid assignment. 119. Defendants through the misrepresentation falsified land title records,

created [scienter] a fabricated paper trail evidence of ownership, at a time when Defendant knew, should have known, and know such beneficial ownership is not held by MERS or Indymac Servicing. 120. Defendants conspired to make the ownership records appear to show and ownership interest in ONEWEST when all participants knew, should have known, or know today was not true, and in fact misleading and fraudulent. 121. Defendants acted in these land title records to fraudulently deceive and conspire to cause Plaintiff to act upon such information with respect to his Subject

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Property, while knowing that they did not or could not act as represented [as they knew, should have know or know today] while continuing to misrepresent these facts to this Plaintiff and this Court. 122. Defendants acted with the knowledge that such beneficial ownership

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was not properly represented to Plaintiff, and subsequently Plaintiff acted on such material misrepresentation to the detriment of this Plaintiff and to the anticipated benefit of Defendants while the Defendant knew the misrepresentations were untrue. 123. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff therefore alleges that neither MERS, ONEWEST nor INDYMAC paid any consideration for the promissory note. Assuming Arguendo that if ONEWEST purchased the promissory note and paid MERS, such assignment would constitute a fraudulent conveyance. 124. Defendants participated in the fraud by processing a falsified assignment of Deed of Trust as the Beneficiary owning an interest in the Note at a time when they knew, should have known they did not or could not have owned such an interest. 125. This misrepresentation was done with scienter as they knew that they did not or could not have owned the beneficial interest. Such act was done with the intent to deceive this Court for the sole reason to enrich this Defendant to the detriment of the Plaintiff. 126. TREASURY falsely represented to Plaintiff that they received valid beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust. The representations made by said Defendants were in fact false. 127. The true facts were that MERS could not act as a nominee for TD

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SERVICE in assigning the Deed of Trust to ONEWEST. In fact, MERS had no interest in the promissory note and could not assign or enforce the promissory note. MERS could not assign an interest as TD SERVICES. did not have an interest to assign, and that the beneficial interest vested in an undisclosed purported

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beneficiary. 128. Plaintiff, at the time these representations were made by Defendants, and at the time Plaintiffs took the actions allege herein, was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants' representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations Plaintiff has been damaged. 129. The aforementioned conducts of the Defendants were intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of material fact known to the Defendants with the intention on the part of the Defendants of thereby depriving the Plaintiffs of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected the Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of the Plaintiffs' rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages. FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF [As to All Defendants and All Persons Claiming by, Through, or Under Such Person, All Persons Unknown, Claiming Any Legal Or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien, or Interest in the Property Described in the Complaint Adverse to Plaintiffs' Title Thereto and DOES 1-150] [LIBEL] 130. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations contained in preceding paragraphs, inclusive, as though set forth at length herein. 131. The conduct of Defendants constitutes libel that tends to defame, disparage, and injure Plaintiff in his business and reputation and has also caused pain and suffering. 132. Such libel has occurred on a continuing basis from approximately 2009 through the present. 133. As a result of Defendants' acts and omissions, Plaintiff has been injured in an amount yet to be ascertained. 134. The conduct of these Defendants as alleges herein was willful, fraudulent, malicious, and oppressive. As a result, Plaintiff requests an award of

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punitive damages. SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 135. [As to all Defendants and All Persons Claiming by, Through, or Under Such Person, All Persons Unknown, Claiming Any Legal Or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien, or Interest in the Property Described in the Complaint Adverse to Plaintiffs' Title Thereto and DOES 1-150] [QUIET TITLE] 136. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations contained in preceding paragraphs, inclusive, as though set forth at length herein. 137. Plaintiff is the owner of the subject property now held by the Plaintiffs estate. The basis of Plaintiff's title is a deed granting the above-described property in fee simple to Plaintiff. 138. Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such information and belief alleges that. Defendant BAC Servicing and DOES 1-100 and all persons claiming, by, through, or under such person, all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the Complaint adverse to Plaintiffs title thereto, claim an interest adverse to Plaintiff in the above-described property as adverse interest the holder of a deed of trust against the subject property. Some of the Defendants and unknown defendants, specifically those additionally designated as DOES 1-100, inclusive claim interests in the property adverse to Plaintiff as assignees and successors of Defendants. PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows: 1. This Court finds that the factual contentions in the creditors

motion for relief from stay were not based on a reasonable review of the transfer, transactional or account records of the Plaintiffs loan as maintained

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by the Master Servicer, the Primary Servicer, the Subservicer, the Default Servicer, the Claimant, or any third-party vendor; or

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2.

This Court determines that the proof of claim and motion for relief

from stay was/were filed for some improper purpose such as to harass the Plaintiff, generate fees (legal, servicing or otherwise) or to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of debtors Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. 3. Then and in the event any one or more of such findings are made

by this Court then the Plaintiff respectfully move this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code for the recovery of their legal fees and expenses. 4. That the Plaintiff(s) be granted a preliminary injunction on all

issues raised by the pleadings in this case; 5. The Assignment upon which plaintiff necessarily relies identifies no

entity to have authority and or capacity to enforce a trustee sale. 6. For a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties, specifically

that the foreclosure of Plaintiffs residence was wrongful. 7. 8 9 10. For issuance of an Order canceling all Trustees Deed Upon Sale. To vacate the Trustees Deed. To quiet title in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants. For compensatory, special, general and punitive damages

according to proof against all Defendants.

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11

Pursuant to Business and Professions Code 17203, that all

Defendants, their successors, agents, representatives, employees, and all persons who act in concert with them be permanently enjoined from

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committing any acts of unfair competition in violation of 17200, including, but not limited to, the violations alleged herein. 12. For civil penalties pursuant to statute, restitution, injunctive relief

and reasonable attorneys fees according to proof. 13. For reasonable costs of suit and such other and further relief as

the Court deems proper.

DATED: By: ____________________________ Debtor/Plaintiff

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