DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN ORTEGA vs. CEBU City G.R. No.

181583 - 84 October 2, 2009

CASE: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega (Spouses Ortega) and petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu City) assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated petition FACTS: Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Hipodromo, Cebu City. ne-half of the above described land is occupied by squatters. On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed an ejectment case against the squatters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of [the spouses Ortega]. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued on February 1, 1994. On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of [the spouses Ortegas] land (which is occupied by the squatters), and appropriating for that purpose. The amount will be charged against Continuing Appropriation, repurchase of lots for various projects. The value of the land was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994. Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City] against [the spouses Ortega]. On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that [Cebu City] has the lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation. Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners (one of whom was the City Assessor of [Cebu City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated May 21, 1999, fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) per square meter and ordering [Cebu City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONE MILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just compensation for the expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B. The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory because of [Cebu Citys] failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to

enforce the courts judgment. Upon motion of [the Spouses Ortega], the [RTC] issued an Order dated March 11, 2002 for execution or garnishment. [Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion was denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July 2, 2003 Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a Notice of Garnishment to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch Cebu City, garnishing [Cebu Citys] bank deposit therein. Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before [the CA]. Cebu City] filed before the [RTC] a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519 is not actually an existing bank account and that the garnishment of [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of public policy. The [RTC] issued an Order dated March 8, 2004, denying said motion. [Cebu Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. The Spouses Ortega] filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the New Manager of Philippine Postal Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount, which was granted by the [RTC]. [Cebu City] filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative. RULING: It is well settle in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative. The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statue, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.

LBP vs. RUFINO G.R. No. 175644 October 2, 2009

CASE: Challenged in these consolidated Petitions for Review is the December 15, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appealshttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/o ctober2009/175644.htm - _ftn4 affirming with modification that of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 98-6438 setting the valuation of respondents 138.4018-hectare land taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) at P29,926,000, exclusive of the value of secondary crops thereon. FACTS: Respondents Jose Marie M. Rufino (Rufino), Nilo M. Resurreccion (Resureccion), Arnel M. Atanacio (Atanacio), and Suzette G. Mateo (Suzette) are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Barangay San Benon, Irosin, Sorsogon. By respondents claim, in 1989, they voluntarily offered the aforesaid property to the government for CARP coverage at P120,000 per hectare. Acting thereon, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996 declaring that out of the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was subject to immediate acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40 based on the assessment of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the matter was referred by the provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurispru dence/2009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn6 By Decision of November 21, 1997,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2 009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn7 the DARAB sustained LBPs valuation upon respondents failure to present any evidence to warrant an increase thereof. Meanwhile, upon the DARs application, accompanied with LBPs certification of deposit of payment, the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon partially cancelled TCT No. T-22934 corresponding to the the property) and issued TCT No. T-47571 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic thereupon subdivided the property into 85 lots for distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. On February 23, 1998, respondents lodged with Branch 52 of the Sorsogon RTC (acting as a Special Agrarian Court) a complaint for

determination of just compensation against Ernesto Garilao, in his capacity as then DAR Secretary, and LBP. Respondents contended that LBPs valuation was not the full and fair equivalent of the property at the time of its taking, the same having been offered in 1989 at P120,000 per hectare. LBP countered that the property was acquired by the DAR for CARP coverage in 1993 by compulsory acquisition and not by respondents voluntary offer to sell; and that it determined the valuation thereof in accordance with RA 6657 and pertinent DAR regulations. The DAR Secretary argued that LBPs valuation was properly based on DAR issuances. The trial court appointed the parties respective nominated commissioners to appraise the property. Commissioner Jesus S. Empleo appraised the property based on, among other things, the applicable DAR issuances, average gross production, and prevailing selling prices of the crops planted thereon which included coconut, abaca, coffee, and rice. He arrived at a valuation of P13,449,579.08.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisp rudence/2009/october2009/175644.htm _ftn12 Commissioner Amando Chua of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc., used the market data approach which relies primarily on sales and listings of comparable lots in the neighborhood. Excluding the secondary crops planted thereon, he valued the property at P29,925,725. Eugenio Mateo, Sr. (Mateo), attorney-in-fact of respondents Rufino, Resurreccion, and Atanacio, declared that Commissioner Chua erroneously considered the secondary crops as merely enhancing the demand for the property without them significantly increasing its value; and that the coffee intercropping on the property which yielded an estimated profit of P3,000,000, spread over a 12-year period, should be considered in the determination of just compensation. By Decision of July 4, 2000,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2 009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn15 the trial court found the market data approach to be more realistic and consistent with law and jurisprudence on the full and fair equivalent of the property. Applying the average rate of P216,226 per hectare, it arrived at a valuation of the 138.4018-hectare property at P29,926,000, to which it added P8,000,000 representing 50% of the value of trees, plants, and other improvements thereon, bringing the total to P37,926,000. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration, while the DAR filed a Notice of Appeal. By Order dated August 21, 2000, the trial court denied the motion of LBP prompting it to also file a Notice of

Appeal.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence /2009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn17 By consolidated Decision of December 15, 2005,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2 009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn18 the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts valuation of P29,926,000 as just compensation. The appellate court found that, among other things, it would be specious to rely on the DARs computation in ostensible compliance with its own issuances; that Commissioner Empleo failed to consider available sales data of comparable properties in the locality; and that the value of secondary crops should be excluded as the same is inconclusive in view of conflicting evidence. Petitioners and respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration which were denied by the appellate court by Resolution of November 28, 2006.

ISSUE: WON the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules are to be considered in determining just compensation.. RULING: While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the SC nonetheless disregarded the RTCs determination when the judge did not fully consider the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. In LBP vs. Banal, the Court ruled that the factors laid down in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 and the formula stated in DAR AO 6-92, as amended, must be adhered to by the RTC in fixing the valuation of lands.

LBP vs. J.L. JOCSON AND SONS G.R. No. 180803 October 23, 2009
FACTS: Subject of the present controversy is a 27.3808hectare portion (the property) of two (2) parcels of tenanted rice land located at Barangay Magallon Cadre, Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-72323 and T-72324 registered in the name of J. L. Jocson and Sons (respondent). The property was placed under the coverage of the governments Operation Land Transfer2 (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued the compensation therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following the formula prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the 6% annual interest increment due on the property per DAR

Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994, which amount respondent withdrew in 1997, without prejudice to the outcome of the case it had filed hereunder to fix just compensation. Finding the DARs offer of compensation for the property to be grossly inadequate, respondent filed a complaint on July 18, 1997 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Br. 46, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), against the Land Bank (petitioner), the DAR, and the tenant-beneficiaries, for "Determination and Fixing of Just Compensation for the Acquisition of Land and Payment of Rentals." The complaint prayed that petitioner and the DAR be ordered to compute the just compensation for the property in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Section 17 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the property was acquired by the government under its OLT program and their valuation thereof constituted just compensation, having been made pursuant to the guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27. By Decision of May 19, 2003, the SAC, after noting the report contained in a Compliance submitted on February 29, 2000 of the Commissioners appointed to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to respondent, fixed the just compensation at P2,564,403.58 (inclusive of the P903,637.03 earlier withdrawn). In arriving at the just compensation, the SAC adopted a higher valuation (P93,657.00/hectare) which the DAR had applied to a similar landholding belonging to one Pablo Estacion adjacent to respondents. Both petitioner and the DAR filed motions for reconsideration of the SAC Decision but the same were denied, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals via petition for review pursuant to Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 vis a vis Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Assailing the SACs decision fixing the amount of just compensation for respondents properties at P2,564,403.58 as a violation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, petitioner insisted that the SAC erred in using P300.00 as the government support price (GSP) in 1992, instead of P35.00 as provided under E.O. No. 228, considering that respondents property was acquired under OLT pursuant to P.D. No. 27. The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, as claimed by petitioner, or R.A. No. 6657, as claimed by respondent, should govern in determining the value of the property. RULING: In no uncertain terms that Republic Act No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it more equitable to determine just

compensation based on the value of the property at the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the previous Court stance in Gabatin vs. LBP where it declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228.

EUSEBIO vs. LUIS G.R. No. 162474 October 13, 2009

CASE: This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 28, 2003, affirming the trial court judgment, and the CA Resolution dated February 27, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside. FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig, n Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated November 25, 1994 to Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio calling the latters attention to the fact that a property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road. Subsequently, respondents counsel sent a demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents property. In response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996 informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee. On October 8, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No. 65937) against herein petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Respondents prayed that the property be returned to them with payment of

reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the event that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until full payment. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in its Decision dated November 28, 2003. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated February 27, 2004.

WON the owners action to recover the land or the value prescribe.
ISSUE: RULING: Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value does not prescribe. Petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents action for recovery of their property, which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation is already barred by prescription.

CITY OF ILOILO vs. CONTRERAS-BESANA G.R. No. 181583 - 84 October 2, 2009 CASE: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeks to overturn the three Orders issued by Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 32. FACTS: On September 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana (Javellana) and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. The complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in Javellanas name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject Property was declared for tax purposes to have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total value of P43,560.00. On December 9, 1981, Javellana filed his Answer where he admitted ownership of the Subject Property but denied the petitioners avowed public purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since the City of Iloilo already had an existing school site for Lapaz High School. Javellana also claimed that the true fair market value of his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter. On May 11, 1982, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1533 after it had deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation. Javellana filed an Opposition to the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession citing the same grounds he raised in his Answer that the city already had a vast tract of land where its existing school site was located, and the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Propertys tax valuation was grossly inadequate. On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an Order which granted petitioners Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and authorized the petitioner to take immediate possession of the Subject Property. Thereafter, a Writ of Possession was issued in petitioners favor, and petitioner was able to take physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985. At no time has Javellana ever denied that the Subject Property was actually used as the site of Lapaz National High School. Aside from the filing by the private respondent of his Amended Answer on April 21, 1984, the expropriation proceedings remained dormant. Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made. In support of this contention, private respondent presented a Certification from the Philippine National Bank stating that no deposit was ever made for the expropriation of the Subject Property. Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as

well as interest. Attempts at an amicable resolution and a negotiated sale were unsuccessful. It bears emphasis that petitioner could not present any evidence whether documentary or testimonial to prove that any payment was actually made to private respondent. April 2, 2003, private respondent filed a Complaint against petitioner for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. Private respondent alleged that since he had not been compensated for the Subject Property, petitioners possession was illegal, and he was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots. He prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the Subject Property and pay rentals amounting to P15,000.00 per month together with moral, exemplary, and actual damages, as well as attorneys fees.1avvphi1 On May 15, 2003, petitioner filed its Answer, arguing that Javellana could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject Property was already taken for public use. Rather, private respondent could only demand for the payment of just compensation. Petitioner also maintained that the legality or illegality of petitioners possession of the property should be determined in the eminent domain case and not in a separate action for recovery of possession. Both parties jointly moved to consolidate the expropriation case and the case for recovery of possession which motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated August 26, 2003. On November 14, 2003, a commission was created to determine the just compensation due to Javellana. On November 20, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion/Manifestation dated November 19, 2003 claiming that before a commission is created, the trial court should first order the condemnation of the property, in accordance with the Rules of Court. Javellana likewise insisted that the fair market value of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the date when the court orders the condemnation of the property, and not the date of actual taking, since petitioners possession of the property was questionable. Before petitioner could file its Comment, the RTC issued an Order dated November 21, 2003 denying the Motion. Javellana filed on November 25, 2003, an Omnibus Motion to Declare Null and Void the Order of May 17, 1983 and to Require Plaintiff to Deposit 10% or P254,000.00. Javellana claimed that the amount is equivalent to the 10% of the fair market value of the Subject Property, as determined by the Iloilo City Appraisal Committee in 2001, at the time when the parties were trying to negotiate a settlement. On December 12, 2003, the RTC issued the First Assailed Order, which nullified the Order dated May 17, 1983 (concerning the issuance of a writ of possession over the Subject Property). Neither party sought reconsideration of this Order. Nonetheless, about six months later, the RTC issued the Second Assailed Order, which it denominated as an "Amended Order". The Second Assailed Order was identical to the first, except that the reckoning point for just compensation was now the "time this order was issued," which is June 15, 2004.

After the parties were able to fully ventilate their respective positions, the public respondent issued the Third Assailed Order, denying the Motion for Reconsideration , and ruling as follows:

The Order dated June 15, 2004 among other things stated that parties and counsels must be bound by the Commissioners Report regarding the value of the property not at the time it was condemned but at the time this order was issued.

ISSUE: WON the correct reckoning point for the determination of just compensation is at the time the expropriation complaint was filed in court. RULING: YES. Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing to withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private respondent not only accepted the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end. As such, private respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property, but is entitled to just compensation. The City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking private respondents property without payment of just compensation.

REPUBLIC VS. MANGOTARA G.R. No. 170375 July 7, 2010 CASE: Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land. FACTS: In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way of consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106, particularly, the: (1) Resolution dated July 12, 2005 which, in part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the latters failure to implead indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2) Resolution dated October 24, 2005, which denied the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic. Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doa Demetria Cacho (Doa Demetria) applied for the registration of two parcels of land. Both parcels are situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy. Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doa Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos. Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon. Doa Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2 from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue. Only the Government opposed Doa Demetrias applications for registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally known as Camp Overton. On December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC) rendered its Decision in those land property applied by Doa Demetria. The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. And it is ordered that a new survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be presented, excluding all the land not occupied and cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey be made and the corrected plan presented on or before the 30th day of March, 1913, with previous notice to the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines. Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doa Demetria appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated December 10, 1914, the Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10, 1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact of the

court below were fully sustained by the evidence adduced during trial. Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals. On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa Demetrias son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs) Teofilos petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan. Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC initially dismissed Teofilos petition for reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate evidence to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. According to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for the reconstitution of decrees. Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his amended petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to SC in Cacho v. Mangotara, the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept Teofilos amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees. In opposing Teofilos petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real party-ininterest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doa Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were ever issued in Doa Demetrias name; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular. After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilos petition and ordering the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 . Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality. As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Doa Demetrias name. The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. In the Resolution dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions considering that they either originated from the same case or involved similar issues. The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority

(ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latters mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988. On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation. Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004 seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches. In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA. In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTCBranch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1. MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an

action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation. Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution on July 12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case.

What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doa Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed. This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic], however, did not state such fact in its "Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping" attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case without making a mockery of justice. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution31 dated October 24, 2005. On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE: 1. WON the owners of the property to be expropriated is the only party to the expropriation proceedings. WON the REPUBLIC is engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcel of land.

2.

RULING: 1. Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:

Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as

defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint. For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term owner when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 127775 dated November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.

of action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there was no showing that the late Doa Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Additionally, the Regalian doctrine does not apply to Civil Case No. 6686 because said doctrine does not extend to lands beyond the public domain. By the own judicial admission of the Republic, the two parcels of land in question are privately owned, even before the same were registered in Doa Demetrias name. Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight. The right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is rooted in the Regalian doctrine. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article XII, Section 2 which declares "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x" No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the State. Just because OCTs were already issued in Doa Demetrias name does not bar the Republic from instituting an action for reversion. The Court further finds that the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 sufficiently states a cause of action for reversion, even though it does not allege that fraud was committed in the registration or that the Director of Lands requested the reversion.

2.

The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other.

The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof. The SC disagree that the complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 seeks the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), with all their derivative titles, and reversion. The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order dated December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, on the ground that the State does not have a cause

REPUBLIC VS. MENDOZA G.R. No. 185091 August 8, 2010

CASE: FACTS: Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas). On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots. As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property. The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been taxdeclared. The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled. On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republics immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it. Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before it. The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor. PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes.

In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government. Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: 1. WON the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. 2. WON it is the value of the property at the time of the taking that is controlling for the Court to award just compensatyin even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceedings. RULING: The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the RTCs power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property

or its value and damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. LBP VS. LIVIOCO G.R. No. 170685 September 22, 2010 CASE: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the August 30, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), as well as its December 5, 2005 Resolution. FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is the government financial institution established to aid in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as well as to act as financial intermediary of the Agrarian Reform Fund. Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of 30.6329 hectares of sugarland located in Dapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Sometime between 1987 and 1988, ivioco offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form he submitted to the DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an international paper mill. The DAR referred Liviocos offer to the LBP for valuation. Following Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991, the LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a total of P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco was then promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been "kept in trust pending [his] submission of the [ownership documentary] requirements." It appears however that Livioco did not act upon the notice given to him by both government agencies. On September 20, 1991, LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for Liviocos 26 hectares. It was only two years later that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that its value had already appreciated from the time it was first offered for sale. The request was denied by Regional Director Antonio Nuesa on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. The DAR proceeded to take possession of Liviocos property. In 1994, the DAR awarded Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering Liviocos property to 26 qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to recover his property but the same proved futile. The first case he filed in 1995 was for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against the DAR, LBP, Register of Deeds, and the farmer-beneficiaries. In its final and executory Decision, the CA sustained the validity of the CLOAs. Livioco then filed in 1998 a petition for reconveyance before the DAR Regional Office. The case eventually reached the CA, which dismissed the petition on the ground that the validity of the compulsory acquisition had already been decided with finality in the earlier CA case. As the disputed property was eventually acquired through Compulsory Acquisition, its reconveyance to the petitioners was properly disallowed by the DAR. The certifications by

other government agencies that the land was identified as a resettlement area [are] of no avail as the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Upon the request of DAR, LBP made two amendments to the valuation. At first, they reduced the acquired area from 30.6329 hectares to 23.9191 hectares. Later, they increased the acquired area to 24.2088 hectares. The remaining 6.4241 hectares of the property was determined as not compensable because this comprised a residential area, a creek, road, and a chapel. The total value for 24.2088 hectares was P770,904.54. Livioco was informed on August 8, 2001 that the payment was already deposited in cash and agrarian reform bonds and may be withdrawn upon submission of the documentary requirements. Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes was an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR, LBP, and the CLOA holders before Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City on December 18, 2001. He maintained that between 1990 and 2000, the area where his property is located has become predominantly residential hence he should be paid his propertys value as such. Livioco then presented evidence to prove the value of his property as of 2002. According to his sworn valuation, his property has a market value of P700.00/square meter. He also presented the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal value for residential lands in Dapdap, as ranging from P150.00 to P200.00/square meter. He then presented Franklin Olay (Olay), chief appraiser of the Rural Bank of Mabalacat, who testified and certified that he valued the property at P800.00 per square meter, whether or not the property is residential. Olay explained that he arrived at the said value by asking the buyers of adjacent residential properties as to the prevailing selling price in the area. There was also a certification from the Pinatubo Project Management Office that Liviocos property was valued at P300.00/square meter. Livioco prayed that just compensation be computed at P700.00/square meter. Only LBP filed its Answer and participated in the trial. It justified the P3.21/square meter valuation of the property on the ground that it was made pursuant to the guidelines in RA 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991. LBP objected to respondents theory that his property should be valued as a residential land because the same was acquired for agricultural purposes, not for its potential for conversion to other uses. LBP presented its agrarian affairs specialist who testified that, due to the increase in the acquired area, she was assigned to amend the claim of Livioco. She computed the total value thereof at P770,904.54, using the DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991. The only other witness of LBP was its lawyer, who explained the legal basis for the DAR administrative orders and the factors for land valuation provided in Section 17 of RA 6657. Apparently aware that neither party presented relevant evidence for the proper computation of the just compensation, the trial court issued its April 2, 2003 Order requiring the reception of additional evidence. Based on the records, the next hearing took place on July 10, 2003 where none of the parties presented additional evidence, whether testimonial or documentary. Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to rule in favor of Livioco. Defendants Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines are, therefore, ordered to pay [respondent] the amount of Php700.00 per square meter multiplied by 24.2088 hectares representing the entire area taken by the government from the plaintiff.

Defendants Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines are, therefore, ordered to pay [respondent] the amount of Php700.00 per square meter multiplied by 24.2088 hectares representing the entire area taken by the government from the plaintiff. The trial court was of the opinion that Livioco was able to prove the higher valuation of his property with a preponderance of evidence. In contrast, there was a dearth of evidence to support LBPs P3.21 per square meter valuation of the property. Not a single documentary evidence was presented to substantiate its valuation. LBP sought a reconsideration of the adverse decision arguing that the court should have considered the factors appearing in Section 17. It stressed that in failing to consider the propertys productive capacity (capitalized net income), the court placed the farmer-beneficiaries in a very difficult position. They would not be able to pay off the just compensation for their lands because it is valued way beyond its productive capacity. The same was denied by the trial court. Upon respondents motion, the lower court ordered LBP on March 29, 2004 to release as initial cash down payment the amount of P827,943.48, inclusive of legal interest accruing from the time of taking on September 20, 1991 (the date when LBP informed the Register of Deeds that it has earmarked the said amount in favor of Livioco). LBP sought a reconsideration of the said order. It clarified that the just compensation deposited by LBP in the account of respondent was only P770,904.54 for the 24.2088 hectares. It likewise asked that the release of the deposit be subject to respondents compliance with the release requirements of the ownership documents. The records are silent as to the courts action on the motion as well as to the execution of this order. Petitioner turned to the CA to no avail. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. A motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 2005, which was denied in a Resolution dated December 5, 2005. ISSUE: WON the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. RULING:

For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.