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REMEDIAL LAW CASES

RSP AND KBL

CANDIDO V. MACAPAGAL

SECTION 2 OF P.D. NO. 1508


"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties ACTUALLY RESIDING IN THE SAME CITY OR MUNICIPALITY for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
1.

SECTION 3 OF P.D. NO. 1508


"SEC. 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons ACTUALLY RESIDING IN THE SAME BARANGAY
shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay.

Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof:

Those involving ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF DIFFERENT BARANGAYS WITHIN THE SAME CITY OR MUNICIPALITY
shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.

2.

Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

3.

However, all disputes which involve REAL PROPERTY OR ANY INTEREST therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

4.

Offenses where there is no private offended party;


Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government."

"The Lupon shall have NO AUTHORITY over disputes:


1.

5.

involving parties who ACTUALLY RESIDE IN BARANGAYS OF DIFFERENT CITIES OR MUNICIPALITIES, except where such barangays adjoin each other; . . ."

1. 2.

From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are ACTUAL RESIDENTS of barangays located in the SAME CITY OR MUNICIPALITY OR ADJOINING BARANGAYS OF DIFFERENT CITIES OR MUNICIPALITIES.

THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT, RESIDE IN THE SAME MUNICIPALITY OF OBANDO, BULACAN DOES NOT JUSTIFY COMPULSORY CONCILIATION UNDER P.D. NO. 1508 WHERE THE OTHER CODEFENDANTS RESIDE IN BARANGAYS OF DIFFERENT MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND PROVINCES. PETITIONERS CAN IMMEDIATELY FILE THE CASE IN COURT.

GARCES VS. CA

HELD

P.D. 1508 DOES NOT REFER HERE TO ONE'S LEGAL RESIDENCE OR DOMICI LE WHICH, FOR DIFFERING PURPOSES MAY DIFFER FROM THE ACTUAL OR PHYSICAL HABITATION OF A LITIGANT.

The policy of the law is evidently to promote dispute settlement through non-litigious, compulsory conciliation procedures and disputes arise where people actually or physically reside. The fact that respondent Escalante stays in the apartment unit in Malate five (5) DAYS A WEEK, EVERY WEEK, IS MORE THAN ADEQUATE PROOF that, within the meaning of the Decree, respondent "ACTUALLY RESIDES" in Manila.

ROYALES VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

PEREGRINA VS PANIS

prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement

Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and nonobservance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.

PROHIBITED PLEADING

this case was, before the Metropolitan Trial Court, governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure and that under Section 15 (a) and (g) of that Rule, no motion to dismiss and no petition for certiorari or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court, is possible

respondent Escalante (contrary to the suggestion of petitioner) had not waived expressly or impliedly the procedural requirement under P.D. 1508 and that, since the Decree is applicable in the present case, petitioner Garces' complaint should have been DISMISSED

DOCTRINE OF NONEXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:

The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by nonexhaustion of administrative remedies: the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. 13

The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. 14

1. 2.

Any ground for dismissal of the complaint should be raised in the ANSWER, OR OTHER PLEADING allowed under that Rule

VDA. DE BORROMEO V. POGOY


SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER PRESCRIBES IN 1 YEAR COUNTED FROM DEMAND TO VACATE THE PREMISES

FACTS

Petitioner seeks to stop respondent Judge Pogoy from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which was leased to herein petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five days of the month. On August 28, 1982, Atty Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overde rentals corresponding to the period from March to September (1982), and thereafter vacate the premises. Petitioner failed to do so, thus the respondent instituted an ejectment case against the former. Petitioner moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. She points out that the parties are from the same cities and as such they must refer the dispute to the barangay Court or Lupon before going through the judicial courts. Respondents defense was that it was danger of prescribing under the statute of limitations. The motion was dismissed thus this case.

ISSUES

HELD

WON it was indeed in danger of prescribing?

NO.

WON going through Lupon was necessary?


NO.

The defense of Atty Reyes regarding the statute of limitations is unacceptable because the case was filed on September 16, 1982, less than a month before the letter of demand was served. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER PRESCRIBES IN ONE YEAR COUNTED FROM DEMAND TO VACATE THE PREMISES AND THE LAW ONLY REQUIRED 60 DAYS UPON WHICH THE PARTIES SHOULD TRY TO RECONCILE IN LUPOn; Respondent had more than 9 months left even if reconciliation failed. However, PD No. 1508, wherein it is required to go through Lupon first before going to courts ONLY APPLIES TO INDIVIDUALS. In this case, Ricardo reyes is a MERE NOMINAL PARTY who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo thus it is inapplicable to them.

PEREGRINA V. PUGOY

Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically provides: t.hqw Disputes between or among persons actually respectively in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. ... It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law: t.hqw SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. ...

MORATA VS. GO, VDA. DE BORROMEO VS. POGOY, P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation
process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. 2 The condition is analogous to EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, 3 OR THE LACK OF EARNEST EFFORTS TO COMPROMISE SUITS BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS, 4 lacking which the case can be dismissed. 5

1.

2.

1. NO PRIOR REFERRAL

WRIT OF ATTACHMENT

The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases. 6

Not only was the application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law, but also, fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is not available in a suit for damages where the amount, including moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated. 7

APPLICABLE LAW:

Rule VI, Section 7 KBL

COMPLAINANT,

RESPONDENT

SECTION 7. Failure to appear.The complaint may be DISMISSED when COMPLAINANT, after due notice, wilfully fails or refuses to appear on the date set for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Such dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, shall bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action as that dismissed.

Upon a similar failure of the RESPONDENT to appear, any counterclaim he has made that arises from or is necessarily connected with complainant's action, may be DISMISSED. Such dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary, as the case may be, shall BAR the respondent from filing such counterclaim in court; and it shall likewise be a sufficient basis for the issuance of a CERTIFICATION FOR FILING COMPLAINANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION in court or with the proper government agency or office.

HELD

In addition, such WILLFUL FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO APPEAR may subject the recalcitrant party or witness to punishment as for CONTEMPT OF COURT, i.e., by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos (P100.00) or imprisonment of not more than one (1) month or both.

Thus it is very clear from the Rules that the WILLFUL REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO APPEAR ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT is sufficient basis for the complainant present to be given a CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION. The issuance of a certification to file action means that the complainant may already bring his case to the court or other government office for adjudication.

LAW

HELD

Section 4[b] of PD No. 1508


if the Punong Barangay fails in his mediation efforts within fifteen [15] days from the FIRST MEETING OF THE PARTIES, he shall forthwith set the date for the constitution of the PANGKAT.

However, such referral to the Pangkat is mandatory only in those cases where BOTH PARTIES have submitted themselves to the Lupon for conciliation and

BAARES V. BALISENG

FACTS

Petitioners were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa. Filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the filing of the same was PREMATURE, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal.4Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were required under SECTION 412 in relation to Section 408 Of The Local Government Code Of 19915 and SECTION 18 OF THE 1991 REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE6 to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.7

ISSUES

1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain FINALITY if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case; 2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be REVIVED BY MOTION after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and 3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without prejudice still have JURISDICTION TO ACT ON THE MOTION TO REVIVE after the order of dismissal has become final and executory. 25

FINALITY? YES.
I.

DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE ATTAIN FINALITY IF NOT APPEALED WITHIN 15 DAYS?

Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals

an ORDER DISMISSING A CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE IS A FINAL ORDER 31


IF NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL THEREFROM IS TIMELY FILED.

The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.

People vs. Bans


FINAL ORDER

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

one which disposes

of the subject matter in its entirety or a particular proceeding or action,

terminates

leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. 29

does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. 30

REVIVAL BY MOTION? NO. NOT MERE MOTION FOR REVIVAL BUT NEW COMPLAINT

II. WON the action or case that had been DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE may be REVIVED BY MOTION after the order of dismissal had become FINAL AND EXECUTORY

Sec. 22. RRSP

Applicability of the regular rules.

VALERA VS. TUASON, JR.,

1.

2.

The regular procedure prescribed in the RULES OF COURT shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a SUPPLETORY CAPACITY insofar as they ARE NOT INCONSISTENT therewith. 43

MAXIM INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of

RATIONALE: DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS

The DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS is grounded on fundamental considerations of PUBLIC POLICY AND SOUND PRACTICE
that

at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become FINAL AT SOME DEFINITE DATE SET BY LAW. 48

MILLARE VS. HERNANDO

ROYALES VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

IT IS WELLSETTLED THAT THE NON-REFERRAL OF A CASE FOR BARANGAY CONCILIATION WHEN SO REQUIRED UNDER THE LAW 52

MAY THEREFORE BE DEEMED WAIVED IF NOT RAISED SEASONABLY IN A MOTION TO DISMISS.

NOT JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE

ALABANZAS VS. IAC

The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of PREMATURITY of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.

may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had already become FINAL AND EXECUTORY, and as earlier stated, MAY NO LONGER BE ANNULLED 55 by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court. 56

JURISDICTION ON MOTION TO REVIVE? NO.


III.

WON COURT OF OJ of the case still have JURISDICTION TO ACT ON THE MOTION TO REVIVE after the order of dismissal has become final and executory.

DOCTRINE OF FINALITY/ IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. 33 [RULE 40, SECTION 2 IN RELATION TO RULE 13, SECTIONS 9 AND 10, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED.] [ALABANZAS VS. IAC] After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes FINAL AND EXECUTORY and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. 34 A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which

After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes OUTSIDE THE COURT'S POWER TO AMEND AND MODIFY, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.

Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco

The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket.

Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, THE CASE COULD NO LONGER BE REINSTATED OR "REVIVED" BY MERE MOTION IN THE ORIGINAL DOCKETED ACTION, BUT ONLY BY THE FILING OF ANOTHER COMPLAINT accompanied, of course, by the PAYMENT OF THE CORRESPONDING FILING FEES prescribed by law.

SECTION 408 OF LGC

Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 41 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be REVIVED ONLY AFTER SUCH REQUIREMENT SHALL HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.

This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the

Sec. 22. RRSP Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the RULES OF COURT shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a SUPPLETORY CAPACITY insofar as they ARE NOT INCONSISTENT

A careful examination of SECTION 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40, SECTION 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, 44 and Rule 36, Section 2 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the RULES REGARDING FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS ALSO APPLY TO CASES COVERED BY RSP.

VIDAL V. ESCUETA

FACTS

When Abelardo Escueta died intestate on December 3, 1994, he was survived by his widow Remedios Escueta and their six children, including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta and her brother Herman O. Escueta. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate over the property. They also executed a special power of attorney authorizing Ma. Teresa Escueta to sell the said property.[4] Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before the Lupon of Barangay Highway Hills. In the meantime, on April 15, 1999, the heirs of Abelardo Escueta executed a deed of conditional sale[6] over the property including the house thereon, to Mary Liza Santos forP13,300,000.00.

On May 5, 1999, Escueta and Llanera, and the sublessees, executed an Amicable Settlement,[9] where they agreed that (a) the owners of the property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents therein (lessee and sub-lessees) starting May 1999, with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property on or before December 1999; (b) time was the essence of the agreement, and that consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property on or before December 1999, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court order to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the property.[10] The amicable settlement was attested byPangkat Chairman Jose Acong. The parties did not repudiate the amicable settlement within ten days from the execution thereof. Neither did any of the parties file any petition to repudiate the settlement.

Llanera vacated the leased premises. Later, twenty of the sub-lessees also vacated the property. By January 2000, five sub-lessees, namely, Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu Marquez, Marcelo Trinidad, Carlos Sobremonte,[12] and Jingkee Ang remained in the property, and requested Escueta for extensions to vacate the property. Escueta agreed, but despite the lapse of the extensions granted them, the five sub-lessees refused to vacate the property. Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through the Punong Barangay as provided for in the amicable settlement. Neither did she file a motion with the Punong Barangay for the enforcement of the settlement. Instead, she filed on May 12, 2000, a verified Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sublessees with the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution. The pleading was docketed as Civil Case No. 17520, with Teresa Escueta as plaintiff, and the sublessees as defendants.[13]

ISSUES

NO LONGER THE REAL PARTY-ININTEREST. CANNOT BE EJECTED AND CAN EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. VIOLATED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY WRITTEN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT NOT ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS AND IN NOT ORDERING SAID DEFENDANTS TO PAY THEIR ARREARAGES IN RENTAL PAYMENTS FROM MAY 1999 UP TO THE DAY THEY ACTUALLY LEAVE THE PREMISES AS WELL AS ATTORNEYS
[16]

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