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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW Baguio City

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Atty. Stephanie Rachel P. Castro, Professor

Case Digests

3 rd Year Special Section

STUDENT NAME

DIGESTED CASES

1. PASCUA, JAYBEE D.

1-8

2. DAMPAG, JONELLA

9-16

3. APPAG, ANNIELYN

17-24

4. AGPAD, AMALIA

25-32

5. SANTUCAY, ANNABEL

33-41

6. ELAD, MARCIAL

42-50

7. GANO, JEVAN KLAIRE

51-59

8. URBANO-BALMEO, MAURYNE FE

60-68

9. LAURENA, AUGUSTU RAY ANTHONY

69-77

10. SANTOS, RYAN

78-86

11. VALDEZ, LUIGI

87-95

12. ATANACIO, ZINNIA FARICA MAY

96-104

13. LACMAA, FRECHIE

105-113

14. TAMANG, SWITLE MAE A.

114-122

15. URBANOZO, LAIRD DIONEL N.

123-131

16. DELA ROSA, JOHN ROME

132-139

17. BARCELON, FREDERICK

140-149

18. MANGANIP, WINNIE

150-158

19. TABUZO, MAE ABEGAIL

159-167

20. CASIL, LEO ANGELO

168-176

21. RODRIGUEZ-ARORONG, LALAINE

177-185

22. PUBLICO, LOVELI ANNE

186-190, 1, 1-3

23. BARONA, SHERIELYN

4-12

24. HIRANG, LEOMARIE

13-21

25. BALAGOT, JESSIE

22-30

26. BASUNGIT, ANTONIO

31-39

27. PIAGA, RICHARD

40-48

28. APIDCHOR, EMERSON

49-57

29. PACIO, MANUEL

58-67

30. BAYTAN, ROGELIO

68-76

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. QUASI-DELICT

1. NAGUIAT VS. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564(1997)

2. PNB VS. CA, ET AL. 83 SCRA 237

3. SILA VS. PERALTA, 110 PHIL 57

4. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP. VS. CA, 217 SCRA 16(1993)

5. ELCANO AND ELCANO VS. HILL AND HILL, 77 SCRA 98

6. VIRATA VS OCHOA, 81 SCRA 472

7. ANDAMO VS. CA 191 SCRA 195

8. DULAY VS. CA, APRIL 31, 1995

9. WYLIE VS. RARANG, 209 SCRA 327

10. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS IAC, 148 SCRA 353(1987)

11. QUISABA VS. STA INES-MELALE VENEER AND PLYWOOD, INC., 58 SCRA 771

12. GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM, 203 SCRA 126, 137 (1991)

13. TUPAS VS. CA, 193 SCRA 597, 602 (1991)

14. GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY, 29 PHIL. 542 (1915)

15. GELUZ VS. CA, 2 SCRA 802 (1961)

16. PNB VS. CA, 83 SCRA 237(1978)

17. NAT’L IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC, 214 SCRA 35(1992)

18. PHILIP S. YU VS. HONORABLE CA, 217 SCRA 328(1993)

19. GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY, 24 PHIL 471 (1913)

20. ILOLILO COLD STORES CO. VS. MUNICIPAL COUNSEL, 24 PHIL 471

21. DE AYALA VS. BARRETTO, 33 PHIL 538

22. SANRAFAEL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. CITY OF MANILA, 46 SCRA 40

23. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, 16 PHIL 8

24. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJAS. 27 PHIL. 284

25. TAYAG, SR. VS. ALCANTARA, 98 SCRA 723

26. VERAGARA VS. CA, 154 SCRA 564

27. ANDAMO VS. IAC, 191 SCRA 195

28. PHIL. BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA, 269 SCRA 695

29. RAKES VS. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO., 7 PHIL 359

30. BARREDO AND GARCIA VS. ALMARIO, 73 PHIL 607

31. DIANA AND DIANA VS. BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO., 93 PHIL 391

32. CARPIO VS. DAROJA, 180 SCRA 1

33. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. VS. CA, 240 SCRA 348

34. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY ET SL. VS. MARJORIE NATIVIDAD, ET AL., FEBRUARY 6, 2003

35. AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, SEPTEMBER 28, 1966

36. LAYUGAN VS. IAP, 167 SCRA 363

37. VALENZUELA VS. CA, 253 SCRA 303

38. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA, 194 SCRA 341, 356-357(1991)

39. VALENZUELA VS. CA, 253 SCRA 303

40. ONG VS. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, 104 PHIL 398

41. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADM. VS. CA, & ERNEST E. SIMKE, NOV. 8, 1998

42. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY VS. CA, 297 SCRA 30

43. PEOPLE VS. RAMIREZ, 48 PHIL 204

44. ADZUARA VS. CA, 301 SCRA 657

45. MCKEE VS. IAC, 211 SCRA 517

47.

BULILAN VS. COMMISSIO ON AUDIT, 285 SCRA 445(1998)

48. ASTUDILLO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., 55 PHIL 427

49. NAT’L IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC, 214 SCRA 35(1992)

50. UNITES STATES VS. CLEMENTE, 24 PHIL 178

51. VALENZUELA VS. CA, 253 SCRA 303, 1996

52. PLDT COMPANY, INC. VS. CA, G.R. 57079, SEPT. 29, 1989

53. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAY VS. IAC, 217 SCRA 409(1993)

54. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROD AND LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL 8

55. JARCO MARKETING CORP. VS. HON. CA, G.R. 129792, DEC. 21, 1999

56. JULIAN DEL ROSARIO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., 57 PHIL 478(1932)

57. FEDERICO YLARDE VS. EDGARDO AQUINO, 163 SCRA 697(1988)

58. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING CO. VS. CA, 297 SCRA 30(1998)

59. CULION ICE AND ELECTRIC CO. VS. PHIL. MOTORS CORP., 955 PHIL 129(1930)

60. E.M. WRIGHT VS. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., G.R. 7760(1914)

61. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS VS. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., 27 SCRA 674(1969)

62. VICTORINO CUSI & PILAR POBRE VS. PHIL. NAT’L RAILWAYS, G.R. L-29889, MAY 31, 1979

63. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC. VS. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, 99 PHIL 480 (1956)

64. CIPRIANO VS. CA, 263 SCRA 71(1996)

65. F.F CRUZ AND COM.,INC VA. CA, 164 SCRA 733(1988)

66. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GRAGORIO VS. GO CHONG BING, 102 PHIL

556(1957)

67. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. VS. CA, 300 SCRA 20(1998)

68. VDA. DE GREGORIO VS. GO CHING BING, 102 PHIL 556(1957)

69. NEGROS NAVIGATIO CO., INC. VS. CA, G.R. 110398, NOV. 7, 1997

70. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOP., INC. VS. CA, G.R. 127326, DEC 23, 1999

71. MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. INC. VS. CA, G.R. 83491, AUG. 27, 1990

72. ROGELIO RAMOS VS. CA, G.R. 124354, DEC. 29, 1999

73. D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. VS. CA, G.R. 137873, APL 20, 2001

74. BATIQUIN VS. CA, 258 SCRA 334 (1996)

75. CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS VS. WILLIAM LINES, G.R. 132607, MAY 5, 1999

76. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORP. VS. CHATTO, 210 SCRA 18(1992)

77. DRA. ABDULIA RODRIGUEZ VS. CA, G.R. 121964, JUNE 17, 1997

78. WINDVALLEY SHIPPING CO. VS. CA, G.R. 119602, OCT 6, 2000

79. ESPIRITU VS. PHIL. POWER AND DEV. CO., G.R. L-3240-R, SEPT 20, 1949

80. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. CA, G.R. L-44748, AUG. 29, 1986

81. CUSTODIO VS. CA, 253 SCRA 483

82. CABIGAO VS. UNIV. OF THE EAST, C.A. G.R. 33554-R, AUG 224, 1973

83. DANGWA TRASPORTATION CO., INC. VS CA, 202 SCRA 575

84. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY VS. NATIVIDAD, G.R. 145804, FEB 6, 2003

85. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES VS. BALANDAN, 91 PHIL 488(1952)

86. ANDAMO VS. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 (1990)

87. ROMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. CA, G.R. 125018, APL 6, 2000

88. JULITA VDA. DE SEVERO VS. FELECIANO, 157 SCRA 446 (1988)

89. PHIL. BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA, 269 SCRA 695(1997)

90. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. VS. CA, 237 SCRA 761(1994)

92.

TABACALERA INSURANCE CO. VS. NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES INC., 272 SCRA 572(1997)

93. BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. VS CA, 256 SCRA 746(1996)

94. FABRE JR VS. CA, 259 SCRA 426 (1996)

95. REYES VS. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, 341 SCRA 760(2000)

96. DR. NINEVETCH CUZ VS. CA, 282 SCRA 188(1997)

97. ROGELIO RAMOS VS. CA, G.R. 124354, DEC 29, 1999

98. GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO, 278 SCRA 769

99. DOMINGA ROQUE vs. MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, 89 SCRA 178(1979)

100. RAYNERA vs. HICETA , G.R. No. 120027, April 21, 1999

101. PLDT vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57079, September 29, 1989

102. KIM vs. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI CO., 58 Phil. 838

103. PHIL. COMMERCIAL INT’L BANK vs. CA, G.R. No. 121413, Jan 29, 2001

104. NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 222 SCRA 415

105. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. vs. CA, G.R. 126389, July 10, 1998

106. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CA, 179 SCRA 5(1989)

107.

PLEASANTVILLE DEV’T CORPORATION vs. CA, 253 SCRA 10(1996)

 

108.

YOBIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 281 SCRA 1(1997)

 

109.

KRAMER, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 178 SCRA 518(1989)

 

110.

RAYNERA vs. HICETA, 306 SCRA 102(1999)

 

111.

PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. IAC, G.R. Nos. 66102-04, Aug 30, 1990

 

112.

FILOMENO URBANO, vs. HON. IAC AND PEOPLE, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,

1988

113.

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE vs. IAC, G.R. 70493, May 18, 1989

114.

ROGELIO ENGADA vs. HON. CA, G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003

 

115.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. VS. MARICAR BAESA, G.R. NOS. 79050-51. NOVEMBER 14, 1989

116.

LBC AIR CARGO, INC., VS. HON. CA. 241 SCRA 619(1995)

 

117.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 297 SCRA 469(1998)

118.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP vs. THE HON. CA, 176 SCRA 778(1989)

119.

LLORENTE vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, 202 SCRA 309(1991)

 

120.

ARTURO VALENZUELA vs. THE HON. CA, G.R. No. 83122 (1990), 190 SCRA 1

121.

AMONOY vs. GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001

122.

JOSUE ARLEGUI vs. HON. CA, G.R. No. 126437

,

March 6, 2002

123.

PETROPHIL CORP vs. CA, G.R. No. 122796, December 10, 2001

124.

VIRGINIA M. ANDRADE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 127932, 2001

125.

UNI. OF THE EAST vs. JADER, G.R. No. 132344, Feb 17, 2000

126.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. CA, G.R. No. 97336 Feb 19, 1993

127.

MARILYN L. BERNARDO vs. NLRC, March 15, 1996

 

128.

DRILON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 270 SCRA 211(1997)

129.

PONCE vs. LEGASPI, 208 SCRA 377(1992)

 

130.

YASOÑA vs. RODENCIO ET. AL, G.R. No. 156339, October 6, 2004

 

131.

PATRICIO vs. LEVISTE, G.R. No. L-51832 April 26, 1989

 

132.

MARIA FORD VS COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 51171-72(1990)

 

133.

ERLINDA ILUSIO VS ERLINDA BIDNER, G.R. No. 139789(2000)

134.

BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, G.R. NO. 127685, JULY 23, 1998

135.

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. VS. CAPULONG, G.R. No. 820380, APL 29, 1988

136.

RODRIGO CONCEPCION VS CA, G.R. 120706, JAN 31, 2000

137.

MVRS VS. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL, 396 SCRA 210(2003)

138.

INT’L

SCHOOL

ALLIANCE

OF

EDUCATORS

VS. QUISUMBING

AND

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, G.R. 128846(2000)

139.

BIBOSO VS. JUDGE OSMUNDO M. VILLANUEVA, 2001

140.

PHIL. AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORP. VS. NLRC, G.R. 124617, 2000

141.

OBRA VS CA, G.R. NO. 120852, OCTOBER 28, 1999

 

142.

SERRANO VS NIRC, G.R. NO. 117040, JANUARY 27, 2000

143.

ABERCA VS MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, G.R. NO. L-96866, APRIL 15, 1988

144.

ALONZO VS CA, 241 SCRA 51, 1995

 

145.

SAZON VS CA, 255 SCRA 692, 1996

146.

BORJAL VS CA, G.R. NO. 126466, JANUARY 14, 1999

147.

OCCENA VS ICAMINA, 181 SCRA 328(1990)

148.

PEOPLE VS DEVARAS, 228 SCRA 482(1993)

149.

PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS, 236 SCRA 239(1994)

150.

VILLEGAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 217 SCRA 148(1997)

151.

AVELINO CASUPANAN vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, G.R. 14539(1992)

152.

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORP. vs. PEOPLE, G.R. 129029(2000)

153.

RUBEN MANIAGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 104392(1996)

154.

TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA 518(1992)

155.

LIBI VS IAC, 214 SCRA 16(1992)

 

156.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA, 194 SCRA 341(1991)

157.

SOLIMAN VS

TUAZON, 209 SCRA 47(1992)

158.

JOSE S. AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. L-47745(1988)

159.

PHIL. SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. CA, 205 SCRA 729

160.

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, Feb. 6, 2002, G.R. No.

143363.

161.

VICTORY LINER, INC. vs.HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN, December 27, 2002, G. R. No. 154278

162.

MARTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 591(1992)

163.

CARTICIANO v. NUVAL, September 28, 2000,

G.R. No. 138054.

164.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION VS.CA, 287 SCRA 719(1998)

165.

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. vs. CA, 221 SCRA 389 (1993)

166.

NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 294 SCRA 209(1998)

 

167.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. IAC, 212 SCRA 637(1992)

168.

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP vs. CA, G.R. 141089(2002)

169.

SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. CA, 300 SCRA 20(1998)

170.

ERNESTO PLEYTO vs. MARIA D. LOMBOY, G.R. No. 148737. June 16, 2004

171.

ERNESTO SYKI vs. SALVADOR BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149. October 23, 2003

172.

FIGURACION VDA. DE MAGLANA, vs. CONSOLACION, G.R. No. 60506, August 6,

1992

173.

CONRADO AGUILAR, SR. vs. COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK, G.R. No. 128705. June 29, 2001

174.

EQUITABLE LEASING CORP. VS. LUCITA SUYON, G.R. 143360, 2002

175.

1ST MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANCE CORP vs. CA, 209 SCRA 660(1992)

176.

NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA VS. DOMINGO, GR NO. 144274. SEPT 20, 2004

177.

ABELARDO LIM VS CA, G.R. 125817(2002)

 

178.

CARPIO VS DOROJA, 180 SCRA 1(1989)

179.

FRANCO VS IAC, 178 SCRA 331(198)

180.

YONAHA VS CA, 255 SCRA 397(1996)

181.

GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. 61516(1989)

182.

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL VS IAC, G.R. 74431(1989)

183.

THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN RIZAL VS. LOOD, 47 SCRA 174

185.

SANGALANG VS IAC, 1989

186. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. CA, 227 SCRA 293(1993)

187. VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO VS. CA, G.R. NO. 118325, JAN. 29, 1997

188. PHILIP S. YU VS. CA, G.R. NO. 86683 JANUARY 21, 1993

189. SO PING BUN vs. CA, G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999

190. GARCIA vs. CORONA, 321 SCRA 218(1999)

II. DAMAGES

1. PEOPLE vs. BALLESTEROS, 285 SCRA 438(1998)

1. BARITUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS , 267 SCRA 331(1997)

2. HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 363 SCRA 753

3. CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 252 SCRA 483(1996)

4. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, vs. BONIFACIO, 109 SCRA 233

5. AUYONG HIAN vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, 59 SCRA 110

6. FAROLAN vs. SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION, 1991

7. SABA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 189 SCRA 50(1990)

8. SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO vs. CA, 253 SCRA 483

9. CASTRO vs. ACRO TAXICAB CO., INC., 82 SCRA 369

10. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP. vs. HON. CA, 297 SCRA 402(1998)

11. INTEGRATED PACKAGING CORP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 333 SCRA 170(2000)

12. KIERULF vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 269 SCRA 433; March 13, 1997

13. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.CA, (249 SCRA 331) (1995)

14. LUFTHANZA GERMAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 243 SCRA 600(1995)

15. BARZAGA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (258 SCRA105) (1997)

16. PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ , (258SCRA70) (1996)

17. GATCHALIAN V DELIM, 203 SCRA 126FELICIANO; October 21, 1991

18. RAAGAS vs TRAYA (22 SCRA 839) (1968)

19. FUENTES VS COURT OF APPEALS (323 PHIL 508) (1996)

20. SUMMA INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA (310 Phil. 367) (1996)

21. TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION (247 SCRA 361) (1996)

22. DAYWALT vs. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 69 Phil

587

23. CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (181 SCRA 455, January 11, 1990)

24. LUZON CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (135 SCRA 455)

25. KAIRUZ vs. PACIO, 108 PHIL. 1097

26. ROGELIO E. RAMOS vs. CA, [G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999].

27. SPS. RENATO S. ONG VS. CA, [G.R. NO. 117103. JANUARY 21, 1999]

28. MANZANARES vs. MORETA, (38 Phil 823)

29. GREGORIO PESTAÑO V. SPOUSES PAZ, G.R. NO. 139875 - DECEMBER 4, 2000

30. MONZON, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (169 SCRA 76 [1989])

31. PEOPLE VS SUITOS, 220 SCRA 420(1993)

32. PEOPLE VS CORDERO, 263 SCRA 122(1996)

33. PEOPLE VS ARINGUE, 283 SCRA 291(1997)

35.

PLEYTO VS LOMBOY, G.R. NO. 148737, JUNE 16, 2004

36. PEOPLE VS MATARO, G.R. NO. 130378(2001)

37. PEOPLE VS NULLAN, 305 SCRA 679(1999)

38. PEOPLE VS LISTERIO, GR. NO. 122099, JULY 5, 2000

39. PEOPLE VS SANCHEZ, 313 SCRA 694(1999)

40. PEOPLE vs. EFREN MINDANAO, G.R. 123095, JULY 6, 2000

41. PEOPLE vs. VERDE, 302 SCRA 690(1999)

42. PEOPLE vs. Pedro Perreras, G.R. 139622, JULY 31, 2000

43. PEOPLE vs. UGANAP, G.R. 130605, JUNE 19, 2001

44. SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY CORP. vs. BORJA , G.R. 143008(2002)

45. PEOPLE vs. ELGER GUZMAN, G.R. 132750(2001)

46. PEOPLE vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, G.R. 121039(2001)

47. PESTAÑO vs. Spouses SUMAYANG, G.R. 139875(2000)

48. CONSOLIDATED DAIRY PRODUCTS CO vs. COURT OF , 210 SCRA 810(1992)

49. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJAS, 27 PHIL. 284

50. QUIRANTE VS. IAC, G.R. 73886(1989)

51. AGUSTIN VS. CA, JUNE 6, 1990

52. BICARME VS. CA, JUNE 6, 1990

53. PEOPLE VS. BERGANTE, 286 SCRA 629(1998)

54. CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., VS. CA, G.R. 12872(1999)

55. BAUTISTA VS. MANGALDAN RURAL BANK, INC., 230 SCRA 16(1994)

56. ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION. VS. CA, 185 SCRA 398(1990)

57. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA VS. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION, 77 SCRA 24

58. DEL ROSARIO VS COURT OF APPEALS, 267 SCRA 58(1997)

59. PEOPLE VS BUGAYONG, G.R.NO. 126518(1998)

60. ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC. VS CLEOFAS, 92 SCRA 389

61. EXPERT TRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.N NO. 130030

62. “J” MARKETING CORPORATION VS SIA JR., 258 SCRA 580(1998)

63. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE CO. VS PABLO BONDAD, G.R.NO. 136722(2000)

64. TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES INC. VS. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608(1998)

65. NESCITO C. HILARIO VS NLRC, 252 SCRA 555(1996)

66. ARCONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 134784(2002)

67. GREGORIO FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 286 SCRA 698(1998)

68. SUMALPONG, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, 268 SCRA 764(1997)

69. PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA), G.R. 111584(2001)

70. PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA), G.R. 111584, 96 PHIL 321

71. ABS-CBN V CA, G.R. 128690(1999)

72. NPC v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, 369 SCRA 629(2001)

73. GERALDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 230 SCRA 320 (1994)

74. PEOPLE vs. CRISTOBAL, 252 SCRA 507(1996)

75. PEOPLE VS. MATRIMONIO, 215 SCRA 613(1992)

I.

QUASI-DELICT

1. NAGUIAT vs. NLRC

FACTS: Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation.

Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN). Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days.

AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union.

The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to “impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeure would be unfair and unjust.”

The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was corporate tort committed by the corporation and their respective officers?

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: No. Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its

stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be held personally liable.

2. PNB vs. CA

FACTS: Mrs. Tapnio had an export sugar quota of 1,000 piculs for the agricultural year 1956-1957 which she did not need. She agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to use said quota for the consideration of P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract of lease of sugar allotment.

At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation for the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop. This arrangement was necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on the crop, may effectively enforce collection against her. Her sugar cannot be exported without sugar quota allotment Sometimes, however, a planter harvest less sugar than her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use. This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon regarding the former's excess quota for 1956-1957.

Since the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the contract of lease had to be approved by said Bank, The same was submitted to the branch manager at San Fernando, Pampanga. The latter required the parties to raise the consideration of P2.80 per picul or a total of P2,800.00 informing them that "the minimum lease rental acceptable to the Bank, is P2.80 per picul." In a letter addressed to the branch manager on August 10, 1956, Mr. Tuazon informed the manager that he was agreeable to raising the consideration to P2.80 per picul. He further informed the manager that he was ready to pay said amount as the funds were in his folder which was kept in the bank.

When the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando recommended the approval of the contract of lease at the price of P2.80 per picul), whose recommendation was concurred in by the Vice-president of said Bank, J. V. Buenaventura, the board of directors required that the amount be raised to 13.00 per picul. This act of the board of directors was communicated to Tuazon, who in turn asked for a reconsideration thereof. On November 19, 1956, the branch manager submitted Tuazon's request for reconsideration to the board of directors with another recommendation for the approval of the lease at P2.80 per picul, but the board returned the recommendation unacted upon, considering that the current price prevailing at the time was P3.00 per picul.

The parties were notified of the refusal on the part of the board of directors of the Bank to grant the motion for reconsideration. The matter stood as it was until February 22, 1957, when Tuazon wrote a letter (Exh. 10-Bank informing the Bank that he was no longer interested to continue the deal, referring to the lease of sugar quota allotment in favor of defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio. The result is that the latter lost the sum of P2,800.00 which she should have received from Tuazon and which she could have paid the Bank to cancel off her indebtedness,

The court below held, and in this holding we concur that failure of the negotiation for the lease of the sugar quota allocation of Rita Gueco Tapnio to Tuazon was due to the fault of the directors of the Philippine National Bank, The refusal on the part of the bank to approve the lease at the rate of P2.80 per picul which, as stated above, would have enabled Rita Gueco Tapnio to realize the amount of P2,800.00 which was more than sufficient to pay off her indebtedness to the Bank, and its insistence on the rental price of P3.00 per picul thus unnecessarily increasing the value by only a difference of P200.00. inevitably brought about the rescission of the lease contract to the damage and prejudice of Rita Gueco Tapnio in the aforesaid sum of P2,800.00. This decision of the of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the damage caused due to the disapproval

of the lease by the Board of Directors of petitioner.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, 4 This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because

"generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body."

3. SILVA vs. PERALTA

FACTS: At the outbreak of the war in 1941, the defendant Esther Peralta she resided with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia, in Maco, Tagum, Mabini Davao. Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen and an officer of the United States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of Australia, had been ordered to sent to the Philippines during the enemy

occupation to help unite the guerillas in their fight for freedom. He was the commanding officer of the 130th Regiment general headquarters at Magugpo, Tagum, Davao.

Sometime during the year 1944, Florence, a younger sister of the defendant, was accused of having collaborated with the enemy, and for this she was arrested, and accompanied by Esther, brought to Anibongan and later to the general headquarters at Magugpo for investigation that Silva first met Esther Florence was exonorated of the charges made against her and was ordered released, but with the advice that she should not return to Maco for the time being. Heeding such advice, Florence and her sister, appellee herein, went to live with the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Camilo Doctolero at Tipas, Magugpo, Davao.

Silva started to frequent the house of the Doctoleros, and soon professed love for Esther. Having been made to believe that he was single, she accepted his marriage proposal; and the two were married on January 14, 1945 by one Father Cote on the occasion of a house blessing. No documents of marriage were prepared nor executed, allegedly because there were no available printed forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived together as husband and wife. From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino Silva, Jr., was born.

On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of Ising, for which reason, he was transferred to Leyte, and later to the United States, he divorced Precilla Isabel and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriage with plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.

Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther Peralta demanded support for their child, and, his refusal, instituted a suit for support in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the present action was filed against Esther, and another suit against her was instituted in Cotabato.

The Trial Court awarded damages in favor of the defendant thus the plaintiffs-appellant appeal on both questions of fact and law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao to the Supreme Court, the amount involved being more than P200,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct consequence of Silva's deceitful maneuvers in making love to appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his wife.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES. It is to be noted that while the latter's liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under the Civil Code in 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he had forseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also for lacrum cessans, as required by Article 1106. Article 1002 of the 1889 Civil Code of Spain formulated no standard for measuring quasi-delictual damages, the article merely prescribing that the guilty party "shall be liable for the damages so done". This indefiniteness led modern civil law writers to hold that the standards set is articles 1106 and 1107, placed in the general rules on obligations, "rigen por igual para las contractuales y las extras contractuales, las pre establecidas y las que borten ex-lege de actos ilicitos". (Roces, Notes to Fisher)" Los Daños Civiles y su Reparacion,"(1927).

It is well to note in this connection, that Silva's act in hiding from appellee that he could not legally marry her, because, he allegedly have an Australian wife, was not mere negligence, but actual fraud (dolo) practiced upon the appellee. Consequently, he should stand liable for any and all damages arising therefrom, which include the expense of maintaining the offspring and the expenses of litigation to protect the child's right's and the loss of the mother's own earnings. This is a liability that flows even from Articles 1902 and 1107 (par. 2) of 1889 (Arts. 2176 and 2202 of the New Code).

Art. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage as done.

Art. 1107. In case of fraud (dolo) the debtor shall be liable for all losses and damages which clearly arise from the failure to fulfill the obligation.

4. ALBENSON vs. CA

FACTS: In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.

When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.

Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson. On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson.

On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.

On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.

Regional Trial Court petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00. Dissatisfied to the decision, they appealed the case before the court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision of the Trial Court with modification.

ISSUE: Whether or not because of the malicious prosecution of criminal case filed by the petitioners against the private respondent, petitioner can be held liable for damages to private respondents based on Article 19, 20 and 21.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO. The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article

(Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.

5. ELCANO vs. HILL

FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss. However the trial court dismissed the same. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

1)

Whether or not the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and Marvin

Hill is barred by res judicata.

2)

Whether or not there is vicarious liability on the part Reginald’s father, Marvin.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO.The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation, which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607).

In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)

Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: “Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.”

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the former’s liability is now merely subsidiary.

Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing.

The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do not any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.

6. VIRATA vs. OCHOA

FACTS: Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victoria Ochoa.

An action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Maximo Borilla in the CFI of Rizal.

Atty. Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file separately the civil action for damages against the driver for his criminal liability, which he later on withdrew and presented evidence on the damages.

The Heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action.

They commenced an action for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the vehicle, Victoria Ochoa.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action pending for the same cause.

The CFI acquitted Borilla on the ground that he caused the injury by accident. The motion to dismiss was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata?

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES. In negligence cases, the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code is to recover twice for the same negligent act.

In this case, the petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before the Criminal Case was decided, they manifested in the said case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict.

Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’.

The source of damages sought to be enforced in the Civil Case is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Art. 1157 of the Civil Code, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.

Moreover, for petitioners to prevail in the Civil Case, they have only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of evidence.

7. ANDAMO vs. IAC

FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away

costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land.

On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: Yes. A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi- delicts. All the elements of a quasidelict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431

of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and

voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in

a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,

provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.

8. DULAY vs. CA

FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.

Private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi- offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.

Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.

Respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. Petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Appeals but Court Appeals Eight Division affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO. Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and

intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.

Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex- delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.

Cases 1-8 PASCUA, JAYBEE D.

9. WYLIE V. RARANG

FACTS: Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard. Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the “Plan of the Day” a daily publication that featured among others, an “action line inquiry”. On Feb. 3, 1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed or used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain “Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.)She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved.

Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. Defendants appealed the decision to the CA but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions are still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit.

SC RULING: No. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner

Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent

10. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC

FACTS: 1:30 am, 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. He was crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

CFI RULING : ruled in favor of Dionisio

IAC Ruling

: affirmed TC but modified amounts.

ISSUE: Whether or not last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages.

SC RULING: NO- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common

law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in A2179 CC- Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Art. 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance is the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such actor omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission, To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount.

11. QUISABA VS. STA. INES-MELALE VENEER AND PLYWOOD, INC

FACTS: Petitioner Jovito Quisaba was in the employ of the defendant Corporation for 18 years but was temporarily relieved as internal auditor due to his refusal to purchase logs for the company’s plant as instructed by the company’s Vice President, Robert Hyde which he claims to be inconsistent with his position as an internal auditor. Petitioner then filed a complaint with the CFI of Davao for moral damages, Exemplary damages, termination pay, and attorney’s fees against the respondent corporation. Respondent filed their answer and moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC since it involves employer- employee relationship.

CFI : granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employer – employee relationship.

ISSUE: Whether a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney’s fees, arising from an employer’s constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the National Labor Relations Commission.

SC RULING: It is cognizable by the regular courts of justice. Although the acts complained seemingly appear to constitute “matters involving employee-employer relations” as Quisaba’s dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employer- employee relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. The right of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression either capital or labor against the other, in Article 21, which makes the person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages is provided in Article 2219 no. 10.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of the lower court is set aside and this case is hereby ordedre remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with the law. Costs against the private respondents.

12. GATCHALIAN V. DELIM

FACTS: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent’s spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the respondent was negligent. (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages.

SC RULING:

(1) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that

it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

(2) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

13. TUPAS VS. CA

14. GILCHRIST V. CUDDY

FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. On April 24, He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125. A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist. Cuddy then rented the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga for P350 for the week knowing that it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it because he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but they didn't know the identity of the other party. Gilchrist filed for injunction against these parties. The trial court and CA granted that there is a contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist.

SC RULING: YES. Judgment is affirmed, that Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract, and there can be no doubt. The mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights. Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria(loss without injury), unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. Liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages.

An injunction is a "special remedy" which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law . Irreparable injury does not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law. Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court. The remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of a contract.

15. GELUZ V. CA

FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by defendant. After the marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by defendant in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic. Nita was again aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff’s basis in filing this action and award of damages. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be recovery for damages resulting to the death or abortion of an unborn child.

SC RULING: This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed w/ personality. Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

(1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty- four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

16. PNB vs. CA

FACTS: Plaintiff, Philamgen as surety, issued a bond in favor of Tapnio, to secure the latter’s obligation to PNB of the sum of P2371.79 plus 12% interest. Philamgen paid the said amount to PNB and seek indemnity from Tapnio. Tapnio refused to pay alleging that he was not liable to the bank because due to the negligence of the latter the contract of lease with Tuazon was rescind which amounts to P2, 800.Tapnio mortgage his standing crops and sugar quota to PNB. Tapnio agreed to lease the sugar quota, in excess of his need to Tuazon which was approved by the branch and vice president of the PNB in the amount of P2.80 per picul. However, the bank’s board of directors disapproved the lease, stating that the amount should be P3.00 per picul, its market value. Tuazon ask for reconsideration to the board which was not acted by the board, so the lease was not consummated resulting to the loss of P2,800, which could have been earned by Tapnio. The Trial court and CA ruled that the bank was liable to Tapnio. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is liable to Tapnio.

SC RULING: Yes, PNB is liable to Tapnio. PNB argue that it has a right both under its own Charter and under the Corporation Law, to approve or disapprove the said lease of sugar quota and in the exercise of that authority. The SC said that time is of the essence in the approval of the lease of sugar quota allotments, since the same must be utilized during the milling season. There was no proof that there was any other person at that time willing to lease the sugar quota allotment of private respondents for a price higher than P2.80 per picul. Also, Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured by chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of leasehold rights and interests on her properties, and surety bonds and that she had apparently "the means to pay her obligation to the Bank, there was NO REASONABLE BASIS for the Board of Directors of petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents.

The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and and good faith. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." This grants adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

DAMPAG, JONELLA L.

17. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC

FACTS: Private respondents Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo ,Alfonso Ventura and Florentino Ventura are leasehold tenants of a parcel of the land consisting of about five (5) hectare of Riceland situated at sitio Dagat-dagatan,STO.Rosa,Nueva Ecija,Sometime in 1967,petitioner NIA constractedan irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which passed through the private respondent’s landholding as said irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-cinco creek which abut said landholding.The irrigation canal has two (2)outlets which provide private respondent’s landholding with water coming from said canal and at the same time serve to drain the excess water of said landholdings.

On February 13, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint per the abatement of nuisance with damages against pititioners NIA and or the administrator of the NIA alleging that the two outlet were with gates to regulate the flow of water from the canal to their landholdings which resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing the power to sustain damages consisting in the destruction of the planted palay crops and also prevented them from planting on their landholdings.

Ruling of the Trial Court: The court finds the complaint meritorious. However,since there were typhoons and plant pests that reduced the harvests of the plaintiffs and that there were benefits that accrued to the plaintiffs by reason of said irrigation canal, the civil liability of the defendant should naturally be reduced.

Wherefore,judgment is hereby entered:1)Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of 35,000.00 representing damages;2)Ordering defendant to pay 5,000.00 for attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit.

Not satisfied with said decision,petitioners elevated the matter to the appellate court which rendered a decision on Feb.27,1986 affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.

Ruling of the Intermediate Appellate Court: It has been established that the plaintiffs landholdings were actually inundated. The testimonies by all the plaintiffs with respect to the amount of the loss they suffered were not impugned by any contradictory evidence of the defendant .To our mind,the testimonies are sufficient proof to make the grant of damages valid and proper.Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is just and reasonable considering the circumstances of the case.

ISSUE: The petitioners contended that the respondent appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court because NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict or tort, and assuming NIA could be sued, it is not liable for tort since it did not not act through a special agent as required under paragraph 6,Article 2180 of the civil code of the Philippines.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Petitioners are in error. As correctly ruled by the court below the NIA is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D.

552.

P.D. NO.552 amending R.A NO.3601 shows

the granting to NIA the power to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.

A reading of section 2,sub-paragraph(j) of

Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kinds of an, actions ,whether contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the instant case considering that private respondent’s action is based on damages caused by the negligence of petitioners. This court had previously held that the NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary function as it has its own assets and liabilities as well as its own corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.

Paragraph 6,Article 2180 states that: “The state is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official

to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176

shall be applicable.

Article 2176:”Whoever by acts or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if here is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Wherefore, this petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of merit.

18. YU VS.COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wall covering products in the Philippines, cried foul when his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased the merchandise from the house of Mayfair in England through FNF Trading in West Germany and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Both the court of origin and the appellate court rejected petitioner’s thesis that private respondent was engaged in a sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Article 28 of the New Civil Code. Hence, the petition at bar. In the suit for injunction which petitioner filed before the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region (Manila), petitioner pressed the idea that he was practically by-passed and that private respondent acted in correct with the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Private respondent professed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of the petitioner. Even then, private respondent responded by asserting that petitioners understanding with Mayfair is binding only between the parties thereto.

Petitioner impressed before the lower court that he is seeking to enjoin the sale and distribution by private respondent of the same goods in the market.

Ruling of the Trial Court: There is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the controversy in this case arose from a breach of contract by the FNF Trading of Germany, for having shipped goods it has purchased from the house of

Mayfair to the Philippines; It appears to the court that to restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of Germany , would be without legal justification.

Wherefore, the motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF trading of Germany is hereby Denied.

The indifference of the trial court towards petitioners supplication occasioned the filing of a petition for review on certiorari with the CA.

Ruling of the CA: the CA concurred with the trial court stating that petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete stranger vis-a-vis the covenant between petitioner and Mayfair.

ISSUE: Did the respondent appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the visit solicited by herein petitioner?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Verily, injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable (Gilchrist VS. Cuddy, 29 Phil.542); 4-A Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1988 Ed; p.90). The liability of private respondent, if any, does not emanate from the four corners of the contract for undoubtedly, Unisia merchandising Co.,Inc. is not a party thereto but its accountability is .” an independent act generative of civil liability?

Wherefore, the petition is hereby Granted the decision of the CA are hereby reversed and set aside. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

19. GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY

FACTS: C.S Gilchrist, the plaintiff, proprietor of the Eagle Theater of Iloilo, contracted with E.A. Cuddy, one of the defendants, of manila, for a film entitled “Zigomar or Eelskin, 3d series “ to be exhibite in his theater in Iloilo during the week beginning may 26,1913. Later, the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga,who were also operating a theater in Iloilo ,representing Pathe Freres, also obtained from Cuddy a contract for the exhibition of the film aforesaid in their theater in Iloilo during the same week.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Cuddy and the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga for the specific performance of the contract with Cuddy.

The complaint prays “ the court, by a mandatory injunction, order Cuddy to deliver , on the 24 th of may,1913, is accordance with the aforesaid contract; the said film to the plaintiff Gilchrist, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, so that plaintiff can exhibit the same during the last week beginning may 26,1913, in the Eagle theater, in Iloilo; that the court issue a preliminary injunctions against the defendant Espejo and Zaldariaga prohibiting them from receiving, exhibiting, or using said film in Iloilo during the last week of may, 1913, or at any other time prior to the delivery to the plaintiff;

that, on the trial said injunction be maid perpetual and that Cuddy be ordered and commanded to specifically perform his contract with the plaintiff.

Ruling of the Trial Court: The court entered an order which provided that Cuddy should not send said film Zigomar to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga and that he should send its to the plaintiff, Gilchrist.

Defendant Espejo and Zaldarriaga having received due notice of the issuance of the mandatory injunction and restraining order, appeared before the court and move that the court vacate such order prohibiting them from receiving and exhibiting the film. Ruling of the CA: The court sustained their objection and declined to dismiss the action as to them, the court denied the defendants the relief asked for and dismissed their claim for damages.

They thereupon took an appeal from that order.

ISSUE: Does the fact that the appellant did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee of the film militate against Gilchrist right to a preliminary injunction, although he appellants incurred civil liability for such interference?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: In the examination of the adjudicated cases, where in injunctions have been issued to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, we have been unable to find any case where this prices question was involved , as in all of those cases which we have examined, the identity of both of contracting parties was known to the tort-feasors. We might say, however, that this fact does not seem to have been a controlling feature in those cases.

There is nothing in section 164 of the code of civil procedure which indicates, even remotely, that before on injunction may issue restraining the wrongful interference with contracts by strangers ,the strangers must know the identity of both parties.

In the case at bar, the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist – Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire ; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach.

It is therefore, clear under above authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee of the film.

20. ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. VS. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

FACTS: The plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant, constructed an ice and cold storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Sometime after the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort.

Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained in said complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well founded.

The defendant council then passed a resolution which reads in part as follows.”that after the approval by the honorable provincial board of this resolution , a period of one month will be granted to the said entity , the Iloilo Ice and Cold storage company , in which to proceed with the elevation of said smokestacks, and if not done the municipal president will execute the order requiring the closing or suspension of operation of said establishment.

Upon notice and after heaving, a preliminary injunction was issued. Subsequently thereto the dependent answered the allegations in the complaint and prays that it be absolved from the complaint and the plaintiff be declared to have no right to the remedy asked, and that the preliminary injunction issued I this case be set aside, with the cost against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff demurred to this answered, and this answer, and this demurred was sustained.

Ruling of the trial court: the defendant will amend his answer within 5 days or the injunction will be permanently granted as prayed for, with costs to the defendant.

To this order the defendant excepted and not desiring to amend its answer, appealed to this court.

ISSUE: Is the municipal council has the power to declare the plant of the petitioner a nuisance and abates.

HELD: The municipal council is under section 39(j) of the municipal code, specifically empowered “ to declare and abate nuisances”.

A nuisance is according to Blackstone, “ anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience , or

damage they arise from pursuing particular trades or industries in populous

neighborhoods; from acts of public indecency ,keeping disorderly houses and houses of

ill fame, gambling houses.

Nuisances have been divided into 2 classes: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. Nuisance per se belong those which are unquestionably and under all circumstances, Nuisances, such as gambling houses of ill fame, etc. The number of nuisances are such because of particular facts and circumstances surrounding the otherwise harmless cause

of

the nuisance.

In

the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per

se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot determined by a mere resolution of the board.

It

is said that plaintiff cannot be compelled to build its smoke stock higher if said stock is

in

fact a nuisance for the reason that the stock was built under authority granted by the

defendant and in accordance with the prescribe requirements.

For the foregoing reason the order sustaining the plaintiff demurrer to the defendant answer is reversed. The record will be returned to the court when it came with

instructions to proceed with the trial of the cause in accordance with this openion. No costs will be allowed in this instance. So ordered order reversed.

21. DE AYALA VS. BARRETTO

FACTS: This is a suit for a permanent injunction against the erection and operation of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano in the city of Manila, on the ground that it will be a nuisance. From a judgment denying the relief prayed for, the plaintiffs have appealed. The twenty-two plaintiffs are either residents or property owners on Calle General Solano. Twelve of them are actual residents of the street and of these twelve, six are lessees of the property owned by other plaintiffs.

General Solano has long been a fashionable residence street and the dwellings located upon it are large and expensive. At the present day, however, some of these residences are being used for other purposes. There are now upon this street a coal yard, a warehouse, and a cigarette factory, all very near the proposed location of the defendant’s brewery, and there are also a public school and a club on the street.

ISSUE: Is Calle General Solano is a strictly residential street, and that the proposed plant to be operated will create such nuisance?

HELD: Under these facts we do not think that it can be said with entire correctness that the street in question is a strictly residential street. That it is not purely a residence street is clear, and that there are numerous businesses near it in nearly every direction is also clear. There is no doubt that the appropriateness of the locality selected by the defendants as the site of their proposed plant must have considerable bearing upon the question whether the plant will create a nuisance. It appears that the locality in question is gradually being transformed from a fashionable residence district into an industrial center.

We think that the preponderating weight of evidence is to the effect that the new brewery will be operated with a minimum of offense to nearby residents, and that in view of the semi-industrial character of the locality, what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable. It is possible that plaintiffs, or some of them, might prove damages by reason of property depreciation. But at all the events, this is not a proper case for the issuance of the extra-ordinary remedy of injunction. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. SO ORDERED.

22. SAN RAFAEL HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. VS. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: Civil case no.65992 and civil case no. 66179, the first prohibition with preliminary injunction and the second for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction were filed in the Court of first instance of Manila by the San Rafael Homeowners Association, Inc. and others. The respondents were the City of Manila and the members of the city officials. The petitioners sought to restrain the respondents from conducting a public bidding for the construction and establishment of an incinerator-thermal plant as a system of garbage and refuse disposal in the City of Manila on the ground that an incinerator is a nuisance per se. The records shows that since 1955 the City of Manila had been conducting studies on the problem of garbage

and refuse disposal. In 1961 a pilot composting plant was in operation at the North Harbor. On November 15,1965 city ordinance no. 5274 was enacted,” Authorizing the establishment , equipping and construction of a garbage and refuse disposal plant” and appropriating the sum of 15,000.00 for that purpose. The two cases were heard jointly, and from the decision of the court a quo dismissing them the petitioners brought an instant appeal. In their brief the petitioners cite numerous errors in the decision of the lower court. The main points, however are that the advertised bidding for an incinerator was in excess of the respondents authority because an incinerator is a nuisance per se and because its establishment would violate ordinance no. 5274, the City charter of Manila, the revised administrative code, an the local autonomy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the argument of the petitioners that composting is better than incineration as a method of garbage and refuse disposal and that incineration will prove to be a nuisance is meritorious?

HELD: It is, to our mind, entirely pointless to go into an academic discussion of the relative merits of the composting and the incineration methods of garbarge and refuse disposal for purposes of deciding whether or not at this stage prohibition should issue to stop the bidding called for by the respondents. The instant petitions for that purpose are premature. Certainly this court cannot and should not substitute its judgment this early for that of the respondents, and on a purely theoretical basis rule that the bids submitted should not be opened, or if opened should not be accepted, because not one of the plants therein offered to be established would serve the purpose envisaged and because, if so established, it would so pollute the environment as to constitute a nuisance. If and when such a result becomes a reality, or at least an imminent threat, that will be the time the petitioners may come to court .That they are not successful now will not preclude them from doing so, because a continuing nuisance calls for a continuing remedy.

Wherefore, we find the present appeal to be without merit, and hereby affirm the judgment of the court a quo, with costs against the petitioners-appellants. Judgment affirmed.

23. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.

FACTS: An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of,15 years of age. On the 30 th of September , 1905 David together with his companion Manuel Claparols went to the company’s premises and found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They tried to break the cap with a stone and hammer but failed, so they opened one of the caps with a knife and finding that it was filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it with a match and explosion followed causing them more or less injuries and to the removal of the right eye of David. So this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: The claim of the plaintiff shows that evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its property.Thus,

applying the provisions of the Articles 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902,1903, and 1908 of that Code, the company is liable for the damage which was occurred.

Not satisfied with the decision of lower court, counsel for defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not establish the liability of the company under the provisions of these articles.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to damages

HELD: In the case at bar, we are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury .We think it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the explosion ,the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury ,was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having “ contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover”.

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and 10 days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. SO ORDERED. Judgment reversed.

24. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJAS

FACTS : Plaintiff received personal injuries as a result of defendant’s negligent act and was incapacitated for two months. Plaintiff was a commission agent, had about twenty regular customers, who purchased his wares in small quantities, necessitating regular and frequent deliveries. Being unable to attend to their wants during the two months he was incapacitated, his regular customers turned their trade to other competing agents. On recovering, he had lost all but four regular customers, whose purchases netted him about seven pesos per month. It took him four years to build up his patronage to its proportions at the time of the accident. At that time this trade netted him about fifty pesos per month.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: Under this state of facts, the lower court, while recognizing the justness of the claim, refused to allow him anything for injury to his business due to his enforced absence therefrom, stating that the civil liability is almost always limited to indemnity for damage to the party aggrieved for the time during which he was incapacitated for work.

ISSUE: Whether this damage to his business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any amount whatever

HELD: When it is shown that a plaintiff’s business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendants wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued producing this average income so long as is usual with things of that nature. When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed , there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant.

In the present case ,we not only have the value of plaintiff’s business to him just prior to the accident, but we also have its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had earned about 15 pesos during the 2 months that he was disabled. That this almost total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to defendant’s wrongful act there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiff’s claim altogether as it would be a reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all.

Wherefore ,the judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following damages: ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his enforce absence from his business ; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits ,or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos .No cost will be allowed in this instance. Judgment set aside, damages allowed.

Cases 17-24 APPAG, ANNIELYN D.

25. TAYAG VS. ALCANTARA

FACTS: Pedro Tayag, Sr. on his way home was riding a bicycle along Mcarthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac when he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing a body number 1107 and a plate number YL604PUB’74 which was being driven by Romeo Villa. As a result, Pedro Tayag, Sr. suffered injuries which caused his instant death. The heirs of Pedro Tayag then filed a case against the bus company and the driver in a Civil Case No. 5114.

Philippine Rabbit filed a motion to suspend the civil case on the ground that the criminal case against the driver is still pending. When the driver was acquitted on the criminal case, the bus company filed a motion to dismiss the civil case which was granted by the Hon. Judge Alcantara. This now led to the petition for certiorari by the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Hon. Judge Alcantara acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the civil case.

HELD: Yes. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict.

In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.

26. VERGARA vs. CA, AMADEO AZARCON

FACTS:Martin Belmonte was driving a truck belonging to Vicente Vergara when it rammed “head-on” to the store-residence of Amadeo Azarcon causing damage amounting to Php53,024.22. Vergara alleged that what happened was an act of God being that the cargo truck had mechanical problem in a way that the steering wheel refused to respond causing the driver to lost control.

The trial court decided in favor of Amadeo Azarcon which was affirmed in too by the CA ordering Vergara and the insurance company to pay jointly and severally Amadeo Azarcon. Thus the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in holding the owner Vergara liable for fault and negligence.

HELD: Yes. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be considered as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver.

27. ANDAMO vs. IAC

FACTS: Spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo owned a land adjacent to the property of the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc. The missionaries constructed

in the property waterpaths, contrivances and artificial lake which inundated and eroded

the property of the Andamos casuing the death of a man and damaged the crops therein and endangered the life of the workers of the Andamos.

The Andamos then filed a criminal case against the missionaries then later on filed a civil case praying for preliminary injunction. The lower court, deciding on the opposition of the missionaries, suspended the further hearing on the civil case and then finally basing on Sec. 3, Rule 11 of Rules of Court dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction since the criminal case was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed the decision and denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the civil case based on Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court was proper.

HELD: It is not proper. Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one

under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or

negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of

the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

28. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA

FACTS: Rommels’s Marketing Corporation ( RMC ) maintained 2 separate accounts with the Philippine Bank of Commerce in Pasig Branch. For one ( 1 ) years, the RMC has been entrusting funds in the amount of Php304,979.74 to Irene Yabut, the company secretary, for the purpose of depositing the said funds in the company’s account under PBC. Unknown to the knowledge of the company, Irene Yabut has been depositing the funds in the account of his husband Cotas. When depositing, Yabut will fill-up the deposit slip with its duplicate where the original copy contains the name account number of her husband while the duplicate contains the company’s account number but the name was left blank but still the teller validated the deposit slip. The RMC then filed an action to recover the money.

The trial court found PBC negligent ordering it together with the teller, Mabayad, to pay jointly and severally the following: 304,979.72 representing the lost deposit plus interest; 14% thereof as exemplary damages; and 25% of the total amount due as attorney’s fees. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC. Thus the present case at the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PBC is liable for the lost deposits due to the negligent act of it’s teller Mabayad.

HELD: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit.

It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.

Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be

borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. Irene Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.

29. RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF and PACIFIC CO.

FACTS: M.H. Rakes who was under the employment of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company was at work transporting iron rails from the barge from the harbor to the company’s yard in Manila. During the process, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car carrying the said iron rails either canted thus the rails slid off hitting the leg of Rakes causing it to be amputated. Rakes then filed an action against Atlantic for their negligence. The trial court decided in favor of Rakes ordering the Atlantic to pay Rakes the amount of Php5,000.00. The Atlantic then filed a petition alleging therein that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action and the negligence of Rakes was the cause of his injury for having noticed the depression in the track he still continued his work and that he walked at the side of the car instead of along the boards. The appellate court affirmed the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of Rakes is considered negligent thus contributed to his injury exempting the Atlantic from any liability.

HELD: Although the defendant’s’ negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party’s negligence.

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shrinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event

should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of both instances, and ten days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.

30. BARREDO and GARCIA vs. ALMARIO

FACTS: A taxi cab owned by Fausto Barredo and was being driven by Pedro Fontanilla collided head-on to a carretela being guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned inflicting injuries to the passenger Fausto Garcia who later on died because of the injury sustained in the collision. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in which he was convicted to an indeterminate sentence which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The parents of Faustino then filed a separate civil action against Barredo and Fontanilla where the trial court ruled in favor of the parents of Faustino. The appellate affirmed the decision stating therein that there is no proof that Barredo exercised the diligence f a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Thus this appeal to the Supreme Court where Barredo alleged that his liability is only subsidiary and as there has been no civil action against Fontanilla, the criminally liable person, Barredo cannot be held responsible.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is liable being the owner of the taxicab and making him responsible to the acts of his driver.

HELD: “ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. “ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of

evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others.

In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re- establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petitioner.

31. DIANA and DIANA vs. BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO.

FACTS: Florencio Diana and some other passengers died while riding in Truck No. 14 owned Batangas Transportation Co. and being driven by Vivencio Bristol when it rammed into a ditch at Bay Laguna. Bristol was then charged with multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and was convicted thus ordering him and Batangas Transportation Co. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The heirs then filed a civil case to recover from the Batangas Transportation for the negligent act of their driver. A writ of execution was issued but Bristol was unable to comply with his obligation and the Batangas Transportation failed also to comply under its subsidiary liability.

The lower court dismissed the civil case acting on the motion to dismiss of the Batangas Transporation basing it on Rule 8, Sec. 1 (d) of Rule of Court alleging that the criminal action for the same caus of action was still pending. The court of appeals did not take on the case on the ground that is poses merely a question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the civil action by the lower court under Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is correct.

HELD: No it’s not correct. The requirements for the application of Rule 8, Sec. 1 (d) are:

1.) Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions. 2.) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for the relief being founded on the same facts. 3.) The identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will be regardless of which party if successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve two different remedies, it can hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in both actions as to make the present case fall under the operation of Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is a mistake to say that the present action should be dismissed because of the pendency of another action between the same parties involving the same cause. Evidently, both cases involve different causes of action. In fact, when the Court of Appeals dismissed the action based on culpa aquiliana (civil case No. 8023), this distinction was stressed. It was there said that the negligent act committed by defendant's employee is not a quasi crime, for such negligence is punishable by law. What plaintiffs should have done was to institute an action under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (CA-G.R. No. 3632-R). And this is what plaintiffs have done. To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of defendant's employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our duty to prevent.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

32. CARPIO vs. DOROJA

FACTS: Edwin Ramires, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney which was owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionision Carpio while crossing the street which caused him a fractured left clavicle and other injuries. An action for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was filed against Ramires where he pleaded guilty to the lower offense. He was then sentenced to suffer I month imprisonment and to indemnify Carpio in the amount of Php45.00 representing the ½ can of tomatoes, Php200.00 which he paid in the hospital, and Php1,500.00 as attorney’s fees.

The civil aspect was appealed where the appellate court modified granting the victim to recover moral damages in the amount of Php5,000.00 at the same time affirming the other civil liabilities.

A writ of execution was then served but the driver was insolvent thus Carpio moved for the imposition of the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator but the trial judge denied alleging that the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of the owner and that Carpio failed to raise the matter in his appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial for the writ of execution against the owner in performance of his subsidiary liability was proper.

HELD: The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa- aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision.

The position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private respondent.

Cases 25-32 AGPAD, AMALIA B.

33. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. CA, et al.

FACTS: Luis Luna has a FAREASTCARD issued by Far East Bank and Trust Company. with a supplemental card issued to Clarita S. Luna.

Clarita lost her credit card and informed Far East. She submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank would record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

When Luis had lunch for a close friend at a restaurant in a hotel, the card was not honored then Luis was forced to pay in cash so he felt embarrassed.

Luis Luna demanded from Far East the payment of damages. The vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in a letter. A letter was also sent to the restaurant to assure that Luis was "very valued clients" of Far East. The hotel wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question." Still evidently feeling aggrieved Luis filed a complaint for damages.

RTC found Far East liable and ordered to pay Luna. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not this is an action for quasi-delict.

HELD: No. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve Luna's case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, Luna's damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to Luna; in its stead, Far East is ordered to pay an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages.

34. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs. NAVIDAD

FACTS: About half an hour past 7pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard, employed by Prudent Security Agency, approached Navidad. A misunderstanding ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. When Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in that struck him and killed him instantaneously.

The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc., and Prudent for the death of her husband. Prudent denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

Trial Court found in favor of Natividad and against Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the jointly and severally payment of actual damages , compensatory damages, indemnity for the death of Nicanor, moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. But the Court of Appeals exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor and, instead, held the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Prudent Security is liable for negligence of its employee Escartin.

HELD: No. If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

There is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to award of damages and Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.

35. AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO et al.

FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes.

Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to a "first class" round trip airplane ticket for Carrascoso from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the airline forced him to vacate the "first class" seat because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat he refused, and told the Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the manager, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and he reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

The CFI ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral damages, exemplary damages, and the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: WON moral damages could be recovered from AirFrance, granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act.

HELD: Yes. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same.

36. LAYUGAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et. Al.

FACTS: While Pedro Layugan and companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck

which was parked along the right side of the National Highway, Godofredo Isidro truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped them. As a result, Layugan was injured and hospitalized and spent P10, 000.00 and will incur more expenses for recuperating. He would be deprived of lifetime income of P70, 000.00 and has paid his lawyer P10,

000.00.

Trial Court: Isidro was found liable.

Intermediate Appellate Court: It reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants.

ISSUE: Whether or not Isidro was liable by the negligence of Serrano.

HELD: Yes. It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moreover, to our mind, the fact that the Isidro used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. Isidro or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver toLayugan. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by

Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

Wherefore, decision of the trial court is hereby REINSTATED in toto.

37. VALENZUELA vs. C.A., et al.

FACTS: At around 2:00 in the morning, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving from her restaurant to her home. She was travelling with a companion, Cecilia Ramon. She noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been verified, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Valenzuela was thrown against the windshield of the car Li and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body.

Lower court sustained the plaintiff’s submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals found Li grossly negligent that there was ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial courts finding that the Valenzuela’s car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by Li’s car.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD: No. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.

While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself

and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court:

She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuelas car was parked very close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuelas car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others." It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.

The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:

Under present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to negligence.

Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own making.

Wherefore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is reinstated.

38. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. C.A.

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman high school student, wanted to join a school picnic of another class. Ferdinand's parents, Dr. Romulo and Lilia Castillo, because of

short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.

During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died.

Trial court found the teachers failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen but dismissed the complaint against the school.

Court of Appeals found the teachers and the school liable.

ISSUE: (A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants.

(B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable

to the case at bar.

HELD: (A) No. no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.

(B) No. Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the

Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.

Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school

day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra- curricular activity.

Wherefore, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.

39. VALENZUELA vs. C.A., et al., 253 SCRA 303, same(37)

40. ONG, et al. vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

FACTS: Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by MetropolitanWater District (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.

Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, one bather noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and another notified the lifeguard in attendant (Abaño), who immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived multiple times but of no avail.

Lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of Metropolitan and/or its employees.

HELD: No. The existence of fault or negligence on the part of the employees is belied by the written statements of two witnesses. Nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a comic magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately respond to the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.

There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Metropolitan employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a

male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.

The record also shows that after retrieving the body from the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, the nurse and sanitary inspector came with an oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao but already dead. All of the foregoing shows all humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong was done and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

We do not see how the doctrine of last clear chance may apply. As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of Metropolitan as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abanio responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of Metropolitan had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to Metropolitan.

Wherefore, decision of the lower court is affirmed.

41. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

FACTS: Ernest Simke is a naturalized Filipino citizen and the Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines.

One afternoon, he, with several other persons, went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. He and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. While walking on the terrace, Simke slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the far end of the terrace. He fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. The next day, he was operated.

CFI rendered in Simke’s favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligent on the part of Civil Aeronautics.

HELD: Yes. The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or

pedestrians from sliding. But if, it pedestrian purposes.

it will not serve its purpose, for

is

a

step then

The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code. As the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.

Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private respondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Simke could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if he had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. As the trial court found:

In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, shows a section of the floorings oil which plaintiff had tripped, This sketch reveals two pavements adjoining each other, one being elevated by four and one-fourth inches than the other. From the architectural standpoint the higher, pavement is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen around, the edge of the elevated pavement slanted outward as one walks to one interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between the edges of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the inclination because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would not have lost his balance. The same sketch shows that both pavements including the inclined portion are tiled in red

cement, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would therefore be difficult for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of persons in the terrace as was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no warning sign to direct one's attention to the change in the elevation of the floorings.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is affirmed.

Cases 33-41 SANTUCAY, ANNABEL R.

42. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. CA

FACTS: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel wasB assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.- When the vessel reached the landmark (the bigchurch by the Tondo North Harbor) one- half mile fromthe pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold ,he ordered the engines half- astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier a pron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.

RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs of suit.

RULLING BY THE CA:Respondent appellate court affirmed the findings of the court a quo except that if found no employer-employee relationship existing between herein private

respondents Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) and Capt. Gavino. This being so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, and accordingly modified said decision of the trial court by holding MPA, along with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA to reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund.

ISSUE: WON both the pilot and the master were negligent

RULLING BY THE SC: YES.- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (basedon common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent.

PILOT

- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel

into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert who’s supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor

not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings.

MASTER

- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The

master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk.- Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part.He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing.- The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.

CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS

- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the

sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may

appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the

injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrong doer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.- There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review are DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt with more severely.

The original members of the legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General assigned to this case, namely, Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings due to delayed filing of required pleadings shall also be dealt with more stringently.

The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of this case and to adopt provident measures to avoid a repetition of this incident and which would ensure prompt compliance with orders of this Court regarding the timely filing of requisite pleadings, in the interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal records of the lawyers named herein in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

43. PEOPLE vs. PEDRO RAMIREZ

FACTS: On the night of February 18, 1923, Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused, Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and Agustin Menor to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three proceeded to hunt, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer from the place where the act complained of took place. Upon the hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who was carrying the shotgun of Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay there and watch over the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus Victoriano Ranga and Agusto Menor were waiting when suddenly the report of the shotgun was heard hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on that night as a result of the wounds.chan

RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: Ramirez was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, for the crime of homicide, to the penalty of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the mother of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs.

ISSUE IN THE SC: Whether or not there existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant against the offended party and had exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident.

RULLING BY THE SC: The defense alleges that the trial court must have solved the reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant. After considering carefully the evidence and all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion and so hold that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, and must be punished under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code.

Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by the law, must be imposed upon him, and with modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

44. ADZUARA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS OF THE CASE: On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning, Xerxes Adzuara y Dotimas, then a law student, and his friends Rene Gonzalo and Richard Jose were cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan along the stretch of Quezon Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at approximately 40 kilometers per hour.Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street their car collided with a Toyota Corona sedan owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez. Martinez had just attended a Loved Flock meeting with his daughter Sahlee and was coming from the eastern portion of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circle. He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident occurred.

Sahlee Martinez sustained physical injuries which required confinement and medical attendance at the National Orthopaedic Hospital for five (5) days.

Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green traffic lights although the investigating policeman Marcelo Sabido declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange when he arrived at the scene of the accident an hour later. On 12 July 1991 petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. On 11 December 1991, before the presentation of evidence, private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to institute a separate civil action for damages against petitioner.

RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, convicted Xerxes Adzuara after trial and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months and fifteen (15) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P50,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

RULING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the fine of P50,000.00.

ISSUE ON THE SC: What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require at half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue.

RULING BY THE SC: In the instant case, nothing on record shows that the facts were not properly evaluated by the court a quo. As such, we find no reason to disturb their findings. It bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner's post-collision behavior serves only as a means to emphasize the finding of negligence which is readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that they saw the car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of the brakes. Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.

What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At half past 1:00 o'clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed, right of way and traffic light. The claim of petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible since a U- turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that he was driving at a fast clip in negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he drove at the speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at the opposite lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none; then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara's car. The extent of the damage on the car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm the finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by the circumstances.

It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen the Martinez car.He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to avoid the accident which he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed that on the assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. The negligence of Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.

Petitioner insists that the traffic light facing him at the intersection was green which only indicated that he had the right of way. But the findings of the court a quo on the matter countervail this stance, hence, we see no reason to disturb them.

To weaken the evidence of the prosecution, petitioner assails the testimony of Martinez as being replete with inconsistencies. The records however reveal that these inconsistencies refer only to minor points which indicate veracity rather than

prevarication by the witness. They tend to bolster the probative value of the testimony in question as they erase any suspicion of being rehearsed.

Finally, petitioner claims that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution was uncorroborated by actual testimony of the physician who accomplished the same and as such has no probative value insofar as the physical injuries suffered by Sahlee are concerned. Regretfully, we cannot agree. The fact of the injury resulting from the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the injured person. In the case at bar, Sahlee Martinez testified that her injuries as described in the medical certificate were caused by the vehicular accident of 17 December 1990. This declaration was corroborated by Gregorio. This, no less, is convincing proof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 22 November 1995 finding petitioner XERXES ADZUARA Y DOTIMAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) months and fifteen (15) days of arresto mayor medium is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

45. MCKEE vs. IAC

FACTS: To avoid hitting 2 boys who suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car, Jose Koh blew the horn of his car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. He attempted to return to his lane but before he could do so, he already collided with the cargo truck.-Truck and Ford collided in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. 3 people in the Ford escort died including the driver, Jose Koh.

RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

RULLING BY THE IAC: On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041,the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants.

ISSUE: WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo)are liable for the resulting damages

RULLING BY THE SC: YES, The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Manalo and Tayag are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible

defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:

The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of

a family to prevent damage. The diligence of a good father referred to means the

diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. 60 The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.

In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death must, however,

be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.

Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

46. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPAN vs. REMOQUILLO

FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.

RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor to the respondents — P10,000 as compensatory damages;P784 as actual damages,ryP2,000 as moral and exemplary damages; and P3,000 as attorney’s fees, with costs.

RULLING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs.

ISSUE: WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.

RULLING BY THE SC: NO- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.

Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua.” Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his“media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3ft and 11 3/8inches.- The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.- The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.- To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident

We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), un insulated and so close to houses is a constant source of danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to be near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But maybe, the City of Manila authorities and the electric company could get together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city where there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where the wires carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better protection of the public.

In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.

47. BULILAN VS. COMMISSION OF AUDIT

48. ASTUDILLO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

FACTS: The district of Intramuros, Manila, is surrounded by a wall with openings at intervals for ingress or egress. One of these openings toward Manila Bay is known as the Santa Lucia Gate. Above the gate and between the wall and a street is a considerable space sodded with grass with the portion directly over the gate paved with stone. This has become a public place where persons come to stroll, to rest, and enjoy themselves. Near this place is an electric light pole with the corresponding wires. The pole was located close enough to the public place above described that a person by reaching his arm out of the full length would be able to hold of one of the wires. At about 6 o’clock in the evening of August 14, 1923, a group of boys came to this place. One of these boys for some unknown reason, placing one foot on a projection reached out and grasped a charged electric wire. Death resulted almost instantly. This action was instituted by the mother of the deceased boy to recover damages from the electric company.

RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P15,000, and costs.

ISSUE: WON the action should be dismissed due to thecontributory negligence of the plaintiffs

RULING BY THE SC: NO- The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it- The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.

The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. But the evidence indicative of the true measure of those damages is sadly deficient. All that we know certainly is that the deceased was less than 20 years of age, a student, and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but at what wages we are not told. We are also shown that approximately P200 was needed to defray the travel and funeral expenses. As would happen in the case of a jury who have before them one of the parents, her position to life, and the age and sex of the child, varying opinions, have been disclosed in the court regarding the estimate of the damages with reference to the next of kin. Various sums have been suggested, beginning as low as P1,000 and extending as high as P5,000. A majority of the court finally arrived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate damages in this case. The basis of this award would be the P1,000 which have been allowed in other cases for the death of young children without there having been tendered any special proof of the amount of damages suffered, in connection with which should be taken into account the more mature age of the boy in the case at bar, together with the particular expenses caused by his death. (Manzanares vs Moreta [1918], 38 Phil., 821; Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant [1930], 54 Phil., 327; Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co. [1930], p. 18, ante.)

In the light of the foregoing, the various errors assigned by the appellant will in the main be overruled, but as above indicated, the judgment will be modified by allowing the

plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P1,500, and the costs of both instances.

49. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC

FACTS: Private respondents Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo, Alfonso Ventura and Florentino Ventura are leasehold tenants situated in Nueava Ecija. In 1967, petitioner NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which passed through the private respondent’s landholdings as said canal traverses the Cinco –Cinco creek which abuts the landholding.

On Febuary 13,1975, private respondents filed a complaint for the abatement of the nuisance with damages against petitioners NIA in which the said canal resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing damages in the destruction of the planted palay crops and also prevented them from planting on their landholdings,

RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court finds the complaint meritorious ordering the defendants to pay for the damages and the cost of suit.

RULLING BY THE APPELLATE COURT: Affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are liable for the damages caused by their negligent act.

RULING BY THE SC: With regards to petitioner’s contention that the respondent appellate court erred in awarding damages to prive respondents, we find the court’s decision in accordance with the evidence and the law. As correctly held by the appelleate court:

“It has been established that the platiff’s landholdings were actually inundated. The testimonies by all the plaintiffs with respect to the amount of the loss they suffered were not impugned by any contradictory evidences of the defendant. To our mind, these testimonies are sufficient proof to make the grant of damages valid and proper. Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is but just and reasonable considering the circumstances of the case.”

WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

50. UNITED STATES vs. CLEMENTE

FACTS: That on the 17th day of June, 1912, in the city of Manila, Enrique Clemente, at the time being and acting as motorman of a street car No. 111 upon the line Pasay- Cervantes of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a corporation duly organized and doing business in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and then and there directing and operating said street car, as the motorman thereof, upon and along Dakota Street in said city, and then and there being under the obligation as such motorman of said street car to conduct and direct the same with due care and caution, in order to avoid any accident which might occur to the vehicles and pedestrians who were passing upon and over said Dakota Street, with reckless imprudence and with

inexcusable negligence and in violation of the ordinance pertaining to the matter, conducted and directed said street car, without paying any attention to the pedestrians who were crossing said street of his lack of care and reckless negligence he directed and conducted street car No. 111 against and over the body and head of Juan Garcia, a child 3 years of age, who was then and there passing across the said Dakota Street, dragging the body of said child over said street-car track for a considerable distance, fracturing and destroying its skull and causing instant death.

RULING BY THE TRIALCOURT: Enrique Clemente, not guilty as charged in the complaint of homicide through reckless negligence or rather through fearful negligence, but find him guilty of a violation of the regulations through imprudence and negligence, which resulted in the death of the child as alleged in the complaint, and sentence him to five months of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs of the action.

RULING BY THE SC: We are aware that the crime of homicide through an act of simple negligence which violates an ordinance of regulation is not necessarily included in the crime of homicide through reckless negligence. The latter crime might possibly be committed without the violation of an ordinance or regulation. In that event it would not include the crime of homicide through an act of simple negligence which violates an ordinance or regulation. The courts have not yet gone so far as to hold that, where there is an acquittal of the greater crime and a conviction of a lesser crime not included in the greater and not charged in the information, an appeal from a conviction of the lesser crime opens the way to a conviction of the greater crime in the appellate court if the evidence is there found sufficient; nor has there been such holding in a case where two crimes, neither one included in the other, were charged in the same information, and an acquittal was had as to the higher and a conviction as to the lower.

In the case at bar, however, we have both the higher and the lower degrees of the same crime charged in the information. We have, also, a case in which the commission of the homicide was accompanied by a violation of the ordinance, and in which, therefore, the crime of homicide through an act of negligence which violates an ordinance was included in the crime of homicide by an act of reckless negligence. This is a case where, as a matter of fact, the one was included in the other. Under the authorities, therefore, an appeal from a conviction of the lower grade opens the whole case for reconsideration by this court upon all the evidence, and requires us in the performance of our duty to pronounce such a judgment in the premises as in conscience we ought.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the accused is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide committed through reckless negligence, and is hereby sentenced to one year and one day of prision correccional with the accessories provided by law, with costs.

Cases 42-50 ELAD, MARCIAL A.

51. VALENZUELA vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., alighted from the car, put on her emergency

lights and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damage, alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. The RTC found Li guilty of gross negligence; Alexander and Li solidarily liable. Later, the CA affirmed but absolved Alexander.

ISSUES:

1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car.

2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence

HELD: Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.

The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened.

We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

52. PHIL. LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On July 30, 1968, the jeep of Esteban spouses ran over amound of earth and fell into an open trench, anexcavation allegedly undertaken by PLD T for theinstallation of its underground conduit system. Thecomplaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work. The R TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.

ISSUE: WON PLDT is liable to respondent Esteban spouses.

HELD: The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. 30 The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger; hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

53. PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. INTERMIDIATE APPELATE COURT

FACTS: The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Hagonoy,

Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR, and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes. The trial court held by imputing negligence on the part of the train engineer and his employer. CA affirmed.

ISSUES:

1. WON, both drivers are negligent; that likewise which of said companies was negligent at said railroad intersection.

2. WON, BTI has exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

HELD: Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver; it was evident that he had taken the necessary precautions before passing over the railway track; if the bus was hit, it was for reasons beyond the control of the bus driver because he had no place to go.

The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said devices or equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid jurisprudence. In the opinion of this Court the X sign or the presence of "STOP, LOOK, LISTEN" warnings would not be sufficient protection of the motoring public as well as the pedestrians, in the said intersection.

Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent rain which should have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident (page 10, Brief for Petitioners). All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis the weather condition including the presence of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he slackened his speed and applied the brakes (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918]).

Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an employer in the selection and supervision of its employees, respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on this score since it allowed Honorio Cabardo, who finished only primary education and became an engineer only through sheer experience, to operate the

locomotive, not to mention the fact that such plea in avoidance was not asserted in the answer and was thus belatedly raised on appeal.

54. TAYLOR vs MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO

FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age. On September 30, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, 12, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, to visit one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Upon inquiry that Mr.Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. Here they found some 20 or 30 brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons. No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.

ISSUE: WON the defendant’s negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

HELD: We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, “attributable to the negligence of the defendant”, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff’s action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

55. JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel’s Department Store, Makati City. On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s Dept. Store. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter’s hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor, pinned by the gift wrapping counter. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital. She was operated on immediately at the hospital. She died 14 days later, on the hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The

Aguilar’s

the

petitioner’s the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills, and wake and funeral expenses. Petitioners refused to pay. So the Aguilar’s filed a complaint for damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner. The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.

demanded from

ISSUE:

(1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence; (2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.

HELD: Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.

The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH’s death could only be attributed to negligence.Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store’s employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners’ theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse.

CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The

ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not

loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us.

who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

time and distance were both significant.

She even admitted to the doctor

56. JULIAN DEL ROSARIO vs MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

FACTS: This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son, Alberto, resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. Aug 4, 1930, shortly after 2 o’clock in the afternoon trouble developed in an overhead wire conducting electricity for lightning purposes in the City of Manila. The wire soon parted and one of the charged ends fell to the ground in shrubbery close to the way. The lightning company received a telephonic report of this incident at 2.25 p.m. and promised to send an inspector. At 4 p.m., the neighboring school turned out and as the children went home one of the boys, of the age 9 years, touched the wire with his hand and received a shock which resulted in his death. The CFI renders decision in favor of Manila Electric. Co.

ISSUE: WON Manila Electric Co. is liable.

HELD: We are of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the breakage of this wire has been overcome, and the defendant is in our opinion responsible for the accident. Furthermore, when notice received at the Malabon station at 2.25pm, somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared on the scene, and in the meantime this child had been claimed as a victim.

The circumstances that the boy who was killed touched the wire after one of his companions had warned him not to do so, did not relieve the company of responsibility, owing to his immature years and natural curiosity of a child to do something out of ordinary.

57. FEDERICO YLARDE vs EDGARDO AQUINO

FACTS: Soriano was the school principal and Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig but work wasn’t finished. The following day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 pupils to continue. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone. 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. The 2 kids were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, he died. Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed the case and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent.

ISSUE: WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages.

HELD: As regards the principal, we hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line with our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual labourers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by them, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

58. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR was owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Co

arrived at the port of Manila from Columbia. Capt. Abellana was tasked by Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing. Senen Gavino was assigned by Manila Pilot’s Association to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth 4. Gavino boarded the vessel with Victor Kavankov, the master vessel. The vessel then anchor and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The vessel reached the landmark and Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was about 2,000 ft. from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped and the two shackles were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected and the speed of the vessel did not slacken causing a commotion to ensue. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half- astern. Abellana, who was then at pier apron noticed the vessel was approaching fast. Gavino thereafter gave full- astern but before the right anchor and shackles could be dropped, the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing damage to the peir. The vessel sustained damage too. The PPA filed

before the trial court for a sum of money against Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA. The trial

It

court renders decision in favor of PPA. The CA affirmed the findings of the court with modifications.

ISSUE: WON, FESC, Gavino, and MPA are solidarily liable.

HELD: Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability- every man who offers his services to another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence.

Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between the tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.

As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

59. CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO. vs PHIL. MOTORS CORPORATION

FACTS: The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands. In January, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He therefore made known his desire to McLeod & Co., thru Mc Kellar, and was told that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors Corporations. Cranston had a conference with PMC thru Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. As a result of the aforesaid interview, work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest. Quest then installed a new carburetor. The result of this experiment was satisfactory.

In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding; this was called to Quest's attention. After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made, the boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The first part of the course was covered without any untoward development. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done, the mechanic, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered

with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their escape was safely affected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occurred, as the court found, was P10, 000

ISSUE: WON defendant is liable for the loss of the boat.

HELD: The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. We are unable to accede to this point of view. Certainly, Quest was not in charge of the navigation of the boat on this trial run. His employment contemplated the installation of new parts in the engine only, and it seems rather strained to hold that the defendant corporation had thereby become bailee of the boat. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. But though defendant cannot be held liable in the supposition that the burden of proof had not been sustained by it in disproving the negligence of its manager, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages resulting there from are chargeable to the negligence or lack of skill of Quest.

Cases 51-59 GANO, JEVAN KLAIRE L.

60. E. M. WRIGHT vs MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.

FACTS: This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident which occurred in Caloocan on the night of August 8, 1909. The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.

Trial Court: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent.

SC: No. As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.

It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co., above; and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.

61. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.

FACTS: On the evening of Feb 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base, the jeep that Ralph W. Corliss was driving collided collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company. Before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, the defendant blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks.

Trial court: Dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss. The lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation."

ISSUE: Wether or not the decision of the lower court is correct.

SC: Yes. Mr. Justice Cardozo said that “bear witness to the need for caution in framing

standards of behavior that amount to rules of law

wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace

or normal."

Extraordinary situations may not

What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with

the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.

What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court:

"Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

62. VICTORINO CUSI and PILAR POBRE vs PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

FACTS: On the night of October 5, 1963, plaintiffs-appellees attended a birthday party inside the United Housing Subdivision in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up at about 11 o'clock that evening, the plaintiffs-appellees proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train, Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two. The impact threw the plaintiffs- appellees out of their car which was smashed. One Benjamin Franco, who came from the same party and was driving a vehicle right behind them, rushed to their aid and brought them. to San Juan de Dios Hospital for emergency treatment. Victorino Cusi claimed that prior to the accident he was a successful businessman — the Special Assistant to the Dolor Lopez Enterprises, the managing partner of Cusi and Rivera Partnership, the manager of his ricemill, and with substantial investments in other business enterprises. As a result of his injuries, he was unable to properly attend to his various business undertakings. On the other hand, his wife, Pilar, was a skilled music and piano teacher. After the accident, she lost the dexterity of her fingers forcing her to quit her profession. She also bore ugly scars on several parts of her body, and she suffered anxiety of a possible miscarriage being then five (5) months pregnant at the time of the accident.

Court of First Instance: Ordered defendant-appellant to indemnify the plaintiffs- appellees in the total amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand and Six Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos, and Seventy-Two Centavos (P239,648.72) for injuries received in a collision caused by the gross negligence of defendant-appellant, plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

ISSUE: Wether or not gross negligence of Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the collision.

SC: No.After a thorough perusal of the facts attendant to the case, this Court is in fun accord with the lower court. Plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to avoid injury to -himself and to others. We find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate the impending danger. The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of the existence of the railroad crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before proceeding to the party. At the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle from an oncoming train. They safely traversed the crossing. On their return home, the situation at the crossing did not in the least change, except for the absence of the guard or flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for passage as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of speed for going over railroad crossings. Had defendant-appellant been successful in establishing that its locomotive driver blew his whistle to warn motorists of his approach to compensate for the absence of the warning signals, and that Victorino Cusi, instead of stopping or slackening his speed, proceeded with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened danger, then We would have been put in doubt as to the degree of prudence exercised by him and would have, in all probability, declared him negligent. But as the contrary was established, we remain convinced that Victorino Cusi had not, through his own negligence, contributed to the accident so as to deny him damages from the defendant-appellant.

The only question that now remains to be resolved is the reasonableness of the amount awarded as damages to the plaintiffs- appellees.

The following actual expenses and losses are fully substantiated:

(a) Hospital bills of Mrs. Cusi from October, 1963 to May, 1964 in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos and Five Centavos (P13,550.05);

(b) Another hospital bill of Mrs. Cusi in 1965 in the amount of Three Thousand and One

Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P3,001.90);

(c) Doctor's fees for two surgical operations performed on Mrs. Cusi by one Dr. Manuel

Rivera in the amount of One Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (Pl,500.00);

(d)

Loss of Victorino's wrist watch valued at Two Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P250.00);

(e)

Loss of Pilar's half of her pair of demand earrings(l-½carrats) valued at Two Thousand

Seven Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P2,750,00);

(f) Repair of the damaged Vauxhall car in the amount of Two Thousand Eight Hundred

and Ninety Four Pesos and Seventy- Seven Centavos (P2,894.77).

The total award of actual damages in the amount of Twenty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Six Pesos and Seventy-Two Centavos (P23,946.72) is, therefore, correct.

The lower court awarded Twenty-One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P21,600.00) to Mrs. Cusi for loss of income for the three years that she was under constant medical treatment, and Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00) for impairment of her earning capacity; and Forty Thousand Pesos (P 40,000.00) to Mr. Cusi for loss of income for the eight months that he was disabled and impairment of his earning capacity. We find the award reasonable. The records show that Mrs. Cusi, previously a skilled piano teacher averaging a monthly income of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00), cannot now teach nor play the piano since the accident which resulted in the loss of the dexterity of her fingers;

likewise, Mr. Cusi cannot now vigorously attend to his businesses which previously netted him a monthly average income of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

As regards the award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for profits which Victorino Cusi failed to realize from a certain real estate transaction with the Dolor Lopez Enterprises, we affirm the same as the defendant-appellant has failed to present an iota of evidence to overcome plaintiffs-appellees' evidence credited by the lower court as to the certainty of the materialization of the stated transaction.

The award of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) to Mrs. Cusi and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Victorino Cusi as moral damages is not excessive. In their own respective fields of endeavor, both were successful. Now they have to bear throughout their whole lifetime the humiliation wrought by their physical deformities which no doubt affected, and will continue to do so, their social lives, their financial undertakings, and even their mental attitudes.

Likewise, the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) given as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is not unreasonable. The total amount of damages awarded by the trial court should bear legal interest at 6% from the rendition of the j judgment, which was on March 26, 1968.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the total amount of damages shall bear legal interest at six per cent (6%) from the rendition of the decision dated March 26, 1968

63. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., vs THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

FACTS: on August 23, 1951, at 6:chanry00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of theRespondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others.”

Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter.

THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION: Confirming the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death.

ISSUE: wether or not violating the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks would constitute negligence.

SC: There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was the employer’s prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute

negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances.

However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it may be evidence of negligence. (C.J.S., Vol. 65, p. 427.)

This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders. Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may not overrule in this certiorari proceeding.

Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious” negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross” negligence 3 — implying “conscious indifference to consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter disregard of consequences.” (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk was apparent.”

There being no other material point raised in the petition for review, the award of compensation is hereby affirmed, with costs against Petitioner.

64. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES vs. CA

FACTS: In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondent’s Kia Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage.

On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against petitioner. Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioner’s failure to register his business with the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.

In his Answer, petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he alleged was due to a fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices and that the fire was

an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of any negligence on his part. He further averred that private respondent’s car was ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was private respondent’s delay in claiming it that was the cause of the loss.

RTC: The trial court sustained the private respondent’s contention that the “failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire,” even as it ruled that the business of rustproffing is “definitely covered” by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the case and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00.

CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the provisions of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable to this case, and that the law applicable to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose of which is to protect customers who entrust their properties to service and repair enterprises.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received by him in the course of his business. Whether or not his failure to do so constituted negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against.

SC: We hold that both questions must be answered in the affirmative.

We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death.

Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Thus, P.D. No. 1572, § 1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of petitioner’s to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this Order provides in pertinent parts §1- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION 1) Enterprises applying for original accreditation shall submit the following:

1.2.

List of certified engineers/accredited technicians mechanics with their personal

data;

1.3.

Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the property entrusted by its

customer for repair, service or maintenance together with a copy of the official receipt

covering the full payment of premium;

1.4. Copy of Bond referred to under Section 7, Rule III of this Rules and Regulations;

1.5. Written service warranty in the form prescribed by the Bureau;

1.6. Certificate issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Articles of

Incorporation or Partnership in case of corporation or partnership;

1.7. Such other additional documents which the Director may require from time to

time.

1.8 - INSURANCE POLICY The insurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and loss

should

electronics, electrical, airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines and data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service in the premises of the applicant.

engines,

cover

exclusively

the

machines, motor

vehicles, heavy

equipment,

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event, [ this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.

We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of attorney’s fees by the lower court. It is now settled that the reasons or grounds for an award of attorney’s fees must be set forth in the decision of the court. They cannot be left to inference as the appellate court held in this case. The reason for this is that it is not sound policy to penalize the right to litigate. An award of attorney’s fees, being an exception to this policy and limited to the grounds enumerated in the law, [ must be fully justified in the decision. It can not simply be inserted as an item of recoverable damages in the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no justification for the award of attorney’s fees in the decision of the trial court, it was error for the Court of Appeals to sustain such award.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.

65. F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC vs THE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable substances.

Court of First Instance: the Court hereby renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the defendant:

1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P80,000.00 for damages

suffered by said plaintiffs for the loss of their house, with interest of 6% from the date of the filing of the Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of

plaintiffs' furnitures, religious images, silverwares, chinawares, jewelries, books, kitchen

utensils, clothing and other valuables, with interest of 6% from date of the filing of the Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid; 3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees;

4. With costs against the defendant;

5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages. The damages to be awarded to plaintiff should be reduced to P70,000.00 for the house and P50,000.00 for the furniture and other fixtures with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment.

ISSUE: whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this cases

SC: The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.

It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumble and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendant's negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis supplied.] In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court

as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA

181.]

The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents.

2. Since the amount of the loss sustained by private respondents constitutes a finding of fact, such finding by the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed by this Court [M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 559], more so when there is no showing of arbitrariness.

In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in agreement as to the value of private respondents' furniture and fixtures and personal effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With regard to the house, the Court of Appeals reduced the award to P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot be categorized as arbitrary considering that the evidence shows that the house was built in 1951 for P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its reconstruction would cost P246,000.00. Considering the appreciation in value of real estate and the diminution of the real value of the peso, the valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at the time it was razed cannot be said to be excessive.

3. While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages to private respondents as found by the Court of Appeals, the fact that private respondents have been indemnified by their insurer in the amount of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its contents has not escaped the attention of the Court. Hence, the Court holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded as damages. Said article provides:

Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]

The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.

On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek reimbursement of the amount it indemnified private respondents from petitioner. This is the essence of its right to be subrogated to the rights of the insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss [Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.]

Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the indemnity received by the insured is the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Heald Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the insurer is

not a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications as to the damages awarded for the loss of private respondents' house, considering their receipt of P35,000.00 from their insurer:

(1) the damages awarded for the loss of the house is reduced to P35,000.00; and (2) the right of the insurer to subrogation and thus seek reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,000.00 it had paid private respondents is recognized.

66. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO, ET AL., vs GO CHONG BING

FACTS: On or before June 2, 1952, defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador or driver's helper by the name of Francisco Rosomera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to follow another track driven by his driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog river which was then flooded, should it be unable to cross the river because of the flood. Romera at that time was not a licensed driver. He only had a student's permit, issued to him on March 31, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). The truck started from the town of Lupon at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, driven by Romera. Some persons boarded the truck and among them was one policeman by the name of Venancio Orfanel. While the truck was on the way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera, while the latter stayed on the driver's left, reclined on a spare tire inside of the truck. As to the circumstances under which Orfanel was able to take hold of and drive the truck, there is some dispute and this matter will be taken up later in the decision.

While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, with another truck ahead of it driven by defendant's driver it so happened that they came to a truck that was trying to park on the left side of the road. Romera suggested to Orfanel that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they approached the parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the truck towards the right. It so happened that at that time two pedestrians were on the right side of the road, As the truck had swerved to the right and was proceeding to hit the said pedestrians, Romera told Orfanel to apply the brake, but Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the gasoline and the truck did not stop but went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by the name of Quirico Gregorio. The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are Gregorio's widow and his children and of the accident, Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced accordingly.

Court of First Instance: absolved defendant from liability for the accidental death of Quirico Gregorio

ISSUE: whether or not the defendant is liable.

SC: We are of the belief that defendant's claim that Romera gave the wheel to the policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The testimony of witness Dayo is not corroborated by any other testimony. As he testified that he was two meters behind Romera, he could not have noticed with exactness the circumstances under which the policeman was able

to get hold of the wheel and drive the truck and his testimony in that respect cannot be believed. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the defendant's cargador, or Francisco Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for the latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because he believed that the latter had both the ability and the authority to drive the truck, especially as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's license.

The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or accident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any way related to the defendant, and as such act or omission was punishable by law, and as a matter of fact he had already been punished therefor, no civil liability should be imposed upon the defendant. Against this decision the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, contending that when defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a driver's license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this constitutes negligence per se. (People vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admitting for the sake of argument that the defendant had so violated the law, or may be deemed negligent in entrusting the truck to one who is not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not be declared liable for the accident because his negligence was not the direct and proximate cause thereof. The leading case in this jurisdiction on negligence is that of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil. 8. Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil law and in American cases was carefully considered and it was held:

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra. p.15)

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in order that a person may be held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is produced by the said act or omission.

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July 6, and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An Act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or the omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully;

'necessarily presupposing, a legal ground for imputability. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra, p. 28.).

It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the plaintiffs' intestate was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from defendant's cargador, in spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the defendant therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident had already received indemnification for the accident, but because there is no direct and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's intestate.