Criza

Pe msur dezvoltrii sale o ntreprindere trece printr-un numr de crize. Acestea din urm nu trebuie
s fie privite ca accidente regretabile, dar din contra, ca faze normale care influeneaz ntreprinderea s
asimileze metode i tehnici de funcionare mai performante. Dac managementul ntreprinderii posed
cunotine suficiente privitor la natura i originea acestor situaii de criz, atunci este n stare s le
anticipeze i s le limiteze efectele negative.
Viaa unei ntreprinderi este o succesiune de faze de evoluie relativ calme i de perioade de evoluie pe
care le numim crize de cretere i care nu reprezint altceva dect rezultatul unei buni dezvoltri a
ntreprinderii pe parcursul fazei precedente. Creterea volumelor de afaceri i a numrului de angajai,
penetrarea pe piee noi, construirea unor uzine noi etc. sunt creteri de evoluie care distrug echilibrul
fragil atins anterior i pun totul n haos. Organizarea i metodele de management existente devin
ineficiente, numrul conflictelor ce apar se mrete - ntr-un cuvnt ntreprinderea se afl n situaie de
criz. Pot fi identificate patru tipuri de "crize:
1.
Criz de dirijare. Entuziasmul i creativitatea care a stat la baza nfiinrii ntreprinderii nu mai
sunt adaptate la talia pe care a atins-o aceasta (volum de producie, numr de angajai, nivelul de
investiii etc.). Dac conductorii doresc s in sub control situaia, atunci ei trebuie s implementeze o
organizare mai strict i s foloseasc metode de management mai riguroase.
2.
Criz de autonomie. Structurile i metodele implementate pentru a iei din criza precedent se
dezvolt pn la momentul cnd sunt simite drept o frn: este timpul s se bazeze pe competenele care
au fost dezvoltate i s se recurg la delegare.
3.
Criz de control. Pe msura creterii taliei ntreprinderii strategia delegrii adoptate devine o
surs de erori, nenelegeri i contradicii pe care conductorii nu le mai pot evita. Acum ei trebuie s
implementeze o strategie de recentralizare i proceduri de coordonare pentru ca fiecare s lucreze
eficient n direcia dorit.
4.
Criz de birocraie. Acest ru este destul de des ntlnit n structurile mari, odat ce persoanele
responsabile pentru asigurarea coordonrii se cufund prea adnc n chestiuni de procedur i i mresc
influena asupra structurilor operaionale. n acest caz apare necesitatea de a trece la o viziune mai
global a ntreprinderii, avnd o structur organizatoric format din uniti relativ independente care s
lucreze n colaborare i s fie sprijinite de ctre o structur central flexibil. n dependen de mrime i
de vrst ntreprinderea se afl undeva ntr-o faz de cretere sau chiar ntr-o criz acut.
A restructura o ntreprindere nseamn a efectua o serie de schimbri eseniale prin identificarea i
nlturarea locurilor nguste din cadrul acesteia, implementarea unor tehnologii progresive de producie,
implantarea tehnicilor performante de management, dezvoltarea calitativ a funciei de marketing,
crearea unui sistem informaional performant, mbuntirea calitii produselor fabricate i elaborarea
unor produse noi, reducerea semnificativ a costurilor de producie, ridicarea calitii personalului etc.
Numai prin efectuarea unor astfel de msuri pot fi obinute o serie de efecte pozitive, concretizate n
creterea vnzrilor, sporirea profiturilor, ridicarea nivelului de eficien, mbuntirea capacitii
ntreprinderilor de rambursare a creditelor i nu n ultimul rnd - ameliorarea situaiei privind salarizarea
i motivarea angajailor.
Restructurarea reprezint un complex de msuri juridice, tehnice, organizatorice i operaionale, iniiat
de creditori, de proprietarul sau managerul ntreprinderii, orientat spre remedierea financiar i
economic a ntreprinderii pe baza de recapitalizare, de schimbare a structurii activelor, de reorganizare
a managementului i a strategiei de pia, de efectuare a unor schimbri n procesul operaional de
producie.
The recent wave of financial crises in emerging marketsMexico in 1994-1995, Asia in 1997-1998,
Russia in 1998, and Argentina in 2001has exacted a considerable toll in terms of lost output and
welfare and at times even posed a threat to the stability of world financial markets. As a result, many
policymakers and economists have focused on the lessons to be learned from these experienceslessons
both in how better to prevent crises in the first place and in how to manage crises once they occur.
These country lessons also have a lot in common with some lessons from recent high-profile U.S.
corporate failuresLong-Term Capital Management (LTCM), Enron, Global Crossing, and Kmart, to
name a few. One common thread is that, in market-based economies, country crises and corporate
failures are inevitable. The hard truth is that markets impose consequences for both bad policies and for
bad luck. Bad policy at the corporate level may be anything from misguided plant expansion plans to

"crony accounting"; bad policy at the country level may range from inappropriate exchange rate targets
to "crony capitalism." Bad luck at the corporate level can be a tornado in Texas or an earthquake in
California that disrupts businesses; bad luck at the country level can be a worldwide investor panic that
indiscriminately sucks the capital out of emerging market economies, punishing the innocent as well as
the guilty.
This Economic Letter discusses the lessons that apply to country crises and corporate failures and
illustrates that the lessons on prevention share many similarities, while the lessons on crisis management
have some interesting and complex differences.
Lessons in prevention
The three basic lessons for preventing problems are pretty similar for both countries and corporations.
First, improve the quality and transparency of information provided to markets. At the corporate level,
recent concerns about disclosure practices have led firms, like GE, IBM, and others, to offer clearer
information about balance sheets and earnings in order to bolster their credibility. At the international
level, recent crises have led the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International
Settlements, and others to lean on emerging markets to be more transparent about their policy intentions
and more timely in providing data.
Second, improve the effectiveness of monitoring by regulators. For firms, the near-meltdown of LTCM
prompted the Federal Reserve to look more carefully at the exposure of U.S. commercial banks to hedge
funds. More recently, concerns about "creative accounting" are likely to affect the way the Securities
and Exchange Commission monitors corporate business practices. For countries, the IMF and other
bodies are developing international standards, codes, and best practices in such areas as corporate
governance and bank regulation. A good example in the latter case is the latest work revising the Basel
Accord guidelines on bank capital adequacy.
Last, but not least, corporations and countries both have a better chance of surviving the market's
punishment for bad policy and of weathering spells of bad luck by improving their underlying
fundamentals. At the corporate level, the shake-up among dot-coms has reminded us of the importance
of reliable earnings. At the international level, recent experience has shown that countries do better if
they pursue credible monetary and fiscal policies, reduce their short-term foreign borrowing, and
strengthen their financial systems. The need to maintain good fundamentals has become particularly
important as countries have liberalized their economies and become more sensitive to market forces.
Managing crises and failures
When it comes to managing crises and failures, there are more differences than similarities between
countries and corporations. A key similarity is the set of goals. One goal is to permit the restructuring of
debt financing in times of economic weaknessin other words, to give a firm or a country an orderly
way to reorganize activities and adjust the terms of debt contracts, so as to avoid the premature
liquidation of assets and also to balance its interests against those of creditors. A second goal is to limit
the possibility of wider contagion effects of individual crises and failures. Though the goals are similar,
the way crises and failures are managed at the corporate and country levels is very different.
Corporate failures. In dealing with corporations, U.S. bankruptcy lawsparticularly Chapter 11are
designed to achieve the first goal, namely, permitting debt restructuring so as to balance the interests of
the firm against those of its creditors. Specifically, Chapter 11 allows firms to apply for breathing room
from creditors, obtain infusions of new working capital, and submit a plan of reorganization to a
bankruptcy judge It also addresses the so-called "collective action" problem in getting creditors to accept
the plan. The collective action problem arises when a deal that is in the best interests of the creditors as a
group gets blocked by individual creditors who want more for themselves. Chapter 11 handles this by
allowing a deal to go through if it is accepted by a supermajorityusually two-thirdsof the creditors,
or by the judge.
The second goallimiting contagioncomes into play in special cases where the failure of a big firm
or bank poses systemic concerns to the economy. In this case the government may act as a lender of last
resort. The Treasury did this by bailing out Chrysler in the 1970s, and the Fed has done it occasionally,
as in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash and the terror attacks of September 11. In addition,
the government may act as a crisis manager to deal with systemic concerns in other ways. For example,
in 1998, the Fed helped get LTCM's management and its major creditors to meet and catalyzed the
firm's reorganization.

Country crises. Managing a crisis when a debtor country has repayment problems is very different from
the corporate setting, because there is no equivalent legal procedure to provide breathing room and work
out the problems, nor is there any clear lender of last resort.
In the country crises during most of the 1990s, the IMF and international development banks served as a
quasi lender of last resort by providing some official financingso-called "bailout" loansin exchange
for domestic policy reforms. These actions were accompanied by the hope that the debtor country and its
creditors could work out some form of debt restructuring.
This approach has met with several criticisms. First, the string of recent crises has pushed the
international system to the limit of funds available for bailouts. Second, this approach introduces moral
hazard considerations that may reduce the incentive to prevent new crises, as politicians, borrowers, and
investors all expect the IMF always to rescue them. Lastly, the debt restructuring process typically has
been ad hoc, slow, and cumbersome.
To balance the legitimate need for funds against moral hazard concerns, some incremental changes have
been implemented in recent years. These include setting up contingency credit lines to qualifying
countries in advance of the possible need for funds and raising the cost of obtaining bailout loans.
Current efforts to improve the management of crises have focused on trying to smooth the debt workout
procedure. The emphasis of this new approach is to encourage private creditors to restructure their loans
to debt-burdened countries voluntarily. In other words, it tries to get the private sector to share more in
the costs of resolving country crises. This approach is called "bailing-in" the private sector, or
"involving the private sector."
Getting this new approach to work is very hard, however, because of the collective action problem,
which itself has become even more complicated now that countries facing repayment problems typically
have many more creditors to deal with. Back in the 1980s, emerging markets' borrowing was mainly
syndicated loans from a small number of large banks, which could be easily corralled around a table by
the IMF and cajoled into rolling over the debt and, sometimes reducing it. Even as recently as 1997 this
approach worked when the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and others got major foreign banks to roll over their
loans to Korea.
During the 1990s, however, countries have come to borrow more by issuing bonds. For example,
Argentina currently has thousands of bond creditors through more than 120 different bond issues
outstanding, which are subject to multiple jurisdictions and laws. Working out an agreement among such
large numbers of creditors can be a nightmare, since unanimous consent is generally required.
Particularly disruptive have been the so-called "vulture investors" who buy up cheap, discounted country
bonds in the secondary market and then threaten to hold up deals unless they get full payment. For
example, a hedge firm, Elliott Associates, bought Peruvian debt at a deep discount for $11 million and
successfully got back $58 million.
Two proposals are now on the table to remedy this collective action problem, one from the U.S.
Treasury and one from the IMF. The Treasury plan involves modifying international bond contracts and
still largely letting the markets solve the problem. Specifically, borrowers would write clauses into their
bond contracts that would allow restructuring deals to go through if a supermajority of bondholders, say
75%, agree. This approach raises questions, though. Might the inclusion of these new bond clauses
create the perception that it is easier for countries to default, resulting in higher costs of borrowing for
emerging countries? What about older issue bonds without these clauses? What about bank loans that do
not involve formal contracts?
The IMF plan relies less on the market and more on legal procedure. It would create a formal
international bankruptcy procedure, sort of a "sovereign Chapter 11," that would cover all debt
contracts. Under this procedure, a country with debt problems could do the equivalent of filing for
bankruptcy and receive a temporary timeout periodtermed a "standstill"during which it could stop
paying its debts to all of its creditors. The country would then negotiate the terms of a new payment plan
that is conditioned on domestic policy changes.
The IMF approach also raises a question. Who would play the international equivalent of a domestic
bankruptcy judge? The IMF initially recommended itself, but creditors were concerned that the IMF
might not fully protect their rights, especially since the IMF is itself a major creditor of many countries.
As a result, the IMF has modified the plan to leave the final terms of any restructuring deal in the hands
of a supermajority of creditors, with an independent panel of judges handling any loose ends. (Further

details about the IMF and Treasury proposals are provided in the next issue of the FRBSF Economic
Letter.)
Where do things stand now?
While we cannot expect to eliminate crises and failures from market-based economies, we can learn
from experience. In fact, there already is evidence that progress has been made on learning how to
prevent country crises better. For example, the crises in Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2000, and Argentina
last year have had relatively few contagion effects across borders. There is also widespread agreement
that we need a new approach to manage and resolve country crises. The current debt renegotiation
process is generally too cumbersome and costly for all involved. The Treasury and IMF proposals both
draw on the principles of domestic corporate bankruptcy laws to provide a new approach. And both
proposals head in the same direction: allowing country debtors and creditors to work out mutually
beneficial deals in a more orderly and less costly manner. Though different, the two proposals are not
mutually exclusive. In fact, the G-7 Finance ministers, including the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
recently endorsed a two-track approach towards pursuing both plans.
How to: Assess the threat before it happens, Create a crisis management plan, Create a crisis
management team, Plan simulations to make your organization or community less vulnerable, Choose a
spokesperson, Respond to the media during a crisis, Help victims, families, and staff to cope and
recover, Return your organization to normal after the crisis is over.
"This is a very important reference for managers and operational supervisors in this contemporary
climate of the unexpected. It provides an essential starting point to the successful management of crises.
Agencies and executives who must respond to a crisis together must also plan together, train together
and exercise together. Finally, we have a common reference we can use together, and that is The
Handbook for Effective Emergency and Crisis Management." Fred Villella, Founder and Director of the
National Emergency Training Center
"The authors have put together a textbook that will allow organizations to easily move from the
unfavorable mode of managing by crisis to that of managing crises." John P. Boland, Police Inspector,
Operations, The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Police Department
"This is an excellent guide to preparing for and handling a crisis, be it a flood or an international
terrorist, etc. It will play a major role in preparing our nation's crisis managers. The authors have done a
tremendous public service in shedding light on this toughest of subjects." Senator Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
"On the community or national level, we cannot afford to respond to natural or man-made crises in a
haphazard, impromptu fashion. The authors offer an organized, practical approach to this vital area for
managers or executives at whatever level of responsibility." Representative Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of
the House of Representatives
"Nudell and Antokol show that crisis management has come of age. They have written a volume that
should be on the desk of any security expert or chief operating officer who recognizes that corporations
and government agencies must react to crises and anticipate them. This work literally may help save
lives in the future. To ignore it is to operate in an environment where inaction could lead to crisis."
Stephen Sloan, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma
"This book should be required reading for any organization or agency that has to plan for crisis
contingencies. The book is practical, easy to read, and replete with useful checklists to assist executives
and administrators in crisis contingency planning. Although the book is written for corporate executives
and agency directors, it will also be of interest to academics interested in crisis management and
terrorism." Douglas Stuart, Ph.D., Coordinator, International Studies Program, Dickinson College
"A good instructional text for those responsible for developing emergency programs in their
organization; provides identification of resources that could assist in developing a comprehensive and
effective program." Terry L. Foster, Asset Protection Director, Hershey Foods Corporation "The
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