United Bank of India

Head Office
GUIDELINES ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR BANK BRANCHES

COMPILED BY:

SECURITY DEPARTMENT 11, HEMANTA BASU SARANI KOLKATA 700 001

CONTENTS

CHAPTE R I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. INTRODUCTION

CONTENTS

PAGE 12 35 6 11 12 18 19 23 24 37 38 40 41 51 52 53 54 70 71 85 86 90 91 92 93 - 101 102 - 104

GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CURRENCY CHESTS AND REPOSITORIES CASH REMITTANCE SECURITY DEVICES SECURITY PERSONNEL AND TRAINING ATM SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT AND STAFFING OF SECURITY PERSONNEL BOMB THREAT AND CONTINGENCY PLAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION HIGH RISSE FIRE SAFETY HALON AND ITS ALTERNATIVE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND HALON ALTERNATIVES MAP

Restricted

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Banking Industry as a whole has been afflicted by a number of dacoities, robberies, hold-ups, looting of cash-in-transit, thefts, burglary and other form of violence/crime. There has been an increased activity of crimes against the banks by criminals as well as extremist organizations/anti-nationals/terrorists/naxalites etc. Generally, the Banks are considered a soft and lucrative target for any form of criminal attacks. On the other hand, the Banking Industry will have to live and work in this environment, taking necessary measures to ensure least disruption in its operation and safety of money and valuables, of which it is the custodian. Banks have also to ensure the safety and security of their employees and customers.

Banks are attacked not only for the magnitude of treasures they hold but also because of the mileage derived by way of instant publicity. Terrorist attack on financial system will result into serious disruption of business, leading to huge financial loss and in the long run may shatter public confidence and may even have an adverse effect on the nations economy.

In insurgency/terrorist-prone areas the Branch Heads as well as the employees are receiving extortion letter regularly, which demoralizes the officers and employees.

We are aware that all crimes cannot be prevented. But by eliminating or reducing the chances of such incidents to happen through reasonable measures, an organization can reduce direct losses due to crime committed and the associated losses that can arise.

Security Management is a part of Operational Risk Management. Unlike Financial Risks the physical risks to Banks assets are easily identifiable and preventable by effective security systems.

Risk Assessment of the Branches must be based on threat perception. Evaluation of the system and risk assessment is not a one-time project. This exercise has to be gone through continuously, because in a dynamic environment, new threats could emerge, posing new challenges to the Security Administrators. It must be

borne in mind that of late criminals are also adopting new and sophisticated / advanced techniques to achieve their ends.

The three parts of risk are criminal interest, criminal capacity and opportunity. Opportunity is the only factor security can influence. By using policy and control, the Security manager can reduce the opportunity before an incident occurs.

Regardless of the type of crime involved, each incident has three phases (a) the invitation, (2) the confrontation and (3) the attack itself.

The invitation to the attack is any situation that prompts the criminals to initiate the crime. An invitation can be through many things, e.g. high cash holding, nonavailability of armed guard, keeping the cash room door open, opening of branch by Badli or Part Time sweepers etc. Similarly, non adherence of guidelines while remitting cash from one branch to another may attract the attention of criminals. It may be kept in mind hat the cash, while in transit is most vulnerable and exposed to threat. The Bank has experienced a few incidents involving looting of cash in transit in recent past. Complacency and negligent/indifferent attitude provided to be sufficient invitation and led to huge losses to the Bank.

The confrontation of the attack is anything that makes the invitation less attractive. Therefore, if the opportunity is reduced by means of effective policy and control, it increases confrontation and that results into less chance of attack.

Another dimension of risk to Bank is of natural or man-made disasters. A single natural disaster, e.g. an earthquake or a man-made disaster, e.g. a Bhopal like situation can throw the entire system out of gear in a vast area causing losses for in excess of a large number of crimes. It is, therefore, necessary that the scope of Bank security to be extended to cover all measures taken to protect the Banks assets from crime as well as all forms of disaster.

Therefore, the importance of a well-established security set up within the Banks organizational structure, with clear-cut delegation of authority and responsibility, cannot be over-emphasized. The Chief Security Officer and Regional Security Officer must be given appropriate position and status within the hierarchy of the Bank.

CHAPTER II

Guidelines for security arrangements:

[The Reserve Bank of India issues guidelines / circulars from time to time regarding physical security measures in the Bank. All such instructions will always supersede the previous guidelines issued by the Bank on the same subject.]

1.

BRANCH LOCATION:

The basic protective and security measures needed to be taken before a new branch is opened are

i)

While selecting a site for a branch, it must be ensured that the location provides natural security i.e., the site should not be isolated or located in an area, which is crime-prone or vulnerable; To assess the crime proneness or vulnerability of branch, the local police must always be consulted and their views be taken into account;

ii)

iii) The branch should be located as near to the Police Station/Booth as possible. In rural branches, if there is no Police Station/Booth, the site selected should be near a public place such as the Post Office or the local market; iv) Static safeguards during construction of new buildings or hired building are essential to thwart attempts by robbers/dacoits/burglars/miscreants to rob or burgle the branch. In deciding on the materials to be used this aspect must be borne in mind; v) The building should be strong and modern and should provide for natural structural safety from hazards of fire, theft and collapse; In multi-storied buildings with a height of 15 meters and above, provision of fire hydrant system should be made as per National Building Code.

vi) The premises should have high compound walls and should have two (2) entrances; vii) Key-holders (officer in charge/joint custodian) should not be residing in the same premises viii) It would be preferable to have the Branch Managers residence on the same premises. If this is not possible, his residence should be as near to the branch office as possible.

ix) Access to the branch must be controlled. Entry to the branch should not be through a common entrance that provides access to other offices; x) Collapsible shutters on outer doors, grills on windows and ventilators on outer walls, must be provided; xi) To the extent possible, the entire branch should be located in one floor only, for better supervision and control; xii) RCC constructions for strong rooms should be as per specifications. In rural branches, where strong rooms are not available, the cash safe should be adequately embedded into the walls and that portion of the walls should be strengthened. In addition, there should be a grill on the front side. The strong room should be so located that get away is not easy. 2. Lay Out of a Branch:

In regard to the lay out of a branch, some of the important considerations that should not be forgotten are indicated below:

i)

Security concern should over-ride elegance/look of a branch for ensuring its security to desired level. The composition of sub-department in a branch will depend on the nature and volume of business. The lay out of a branch should be so arranged that in addition to functional efficiency, the security requirements are well met; The cash counter should be located as far away from the main entrance as possible; To the extent possible, the cash counters should be located as near to the strong room/cash safe, so that the distance between the two is kept to the minimum; The branch should have one main entrance with usual door and an additional collapsible gate. The collapsible gate should be closed immediately after the close of banking hours. All other gates, if any should also be kept permanently closed and only used during an emergency; Customar traffic must be regulated. It should be ensured that the cash counters are located at a place where customers traffic is the least; Customers aisles, even secondary or tertiary aisles, should not pass through the work areas, particularly where cash is handled.

ii) iii)

iv) v)

vi)

vii)

viii)

ix)

It may be desirable to have at the bigger metropolitan and urban branches, at least one work station having an overview of both, the Branch Managers cabin and the cash counters and if possible, entrance to the strong room as well. Adequate illumination, both, during banking hours and at night, must be ensured. An independent source of light for the currency chest/strong room must be provided; Emergency lights should be provided; Cash safes should be kept away from the view of the general public; The Branch Managers cabin should provide all-round observation through glass partition devoid of dark glasses / sun films / window blinds etc. The strong room / cash room should be so located that its door is not under direct observation of customers/visitors from Banking Hall. Wherever the Branch is spread over two floors the department having frequent customer dealing (advance/term deposits etc.) should be located on one floor i.e. to imply that the cash department and cash counters should be on one floor and the remaining departments may be located on other floors. It should be ensured that the door of the cash cabin is always latched from inside.

x) xi) xii) xiii) xiv)

xv) xvi)

xvii)

xviii) The branches having gold loan facilities must ensure that the gold is always kept in a separate safe exclusively provided for this purpose. 3. Branch Entrance / Exit i) In view of focus on the ambience, customer comforts and convenience, the Bank may consider provision of sliding door with toughened glass at the main door in the branches located in metropolitan areas / large cities. However, the present arrangement may be continued at all those branches which are considered vulnerable and in crime-prone / insurgency-prone areas. At entrance/exit both collapsible gate and rolling shutter be provided. The rolling shutter should have floor embedded central lock. During Banking Hours the collapsible gate should be chained in such manner that there is enough gap to permit entry/exit of only one person at a time. After the Banking Hours, the collapsible gate should be locked and the second entrance should be in use.

ii) iii)

iv)

v) vi)

Standard and good quality locks preferably BIS Mark should be used. Ensure all doors, windows and ventilators of the branch premises are properly closed from inside prior to closing the main door of the Branch after working hours.

CHAPTER III

1.

Currency Chests and Repositories:

The Reserve Bank of India has classified currency chests into four categories viz., Class AAA, AA, B and C. AA & AAA class shall be constructed in Metro cities, state capital and District Headquarter while B & C class currency chests may be constructed in hilly/ inaccessible areas as considered by state Government or other appropriate authorities provided these are not within 80kms of international Border.

For promoting Financial inclusion the Reserve Bank of India has permitted the Banks to set up B & C class currency chest in rural areas ( with a population upto 9999 & semi-urban area (with a population of 10,000 to 99999) provided such areas are not Naxal affected, insurgency prone and do not have a history of Law & Order problem.

In addition to the Reserve Bank of India specifications for currency chests the following guidelines should be followed.

2.

Physical Safe Guards: i) Strong rooms of currency chests should be constructed in banks own buildings wherever possible; As far as possible, the currency chests should be in the basement. However, in flood prone areas chests should not be in the basement but on the ground floor. If it is on the ground floor, there should be at least one floor above and this floor should not only in the occupation but also in the use of the Bank. In case of higher floors, structural support should be adequate. There should only be one/single entrance to the currency chest. This entrance should be provided not only with a normal Godrej-type door but also with a grill door. In the case of large currency chests having a balance of more than Rs.50 Crore, the lay out should be such that the cash van can come very close to the entrance of the strong room so that the distance between the strong room and the cash van is as short as possible. The parking place of the Cash Van should be an enclosed space to ensure that it is protected and no outsider or unauthorized people can entre the area of loading/unloading.

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

There should be a separate enclosure for counting/sorting of cash received from the branches/other banks/Reserve Bank of India, which should be outside the strong room. This should be in an enclosed hall, fully covered on all four sides from the floor to the ceiling. There should be only one door, which should have an automatic locking device. It should be illuminated properly. The entry to and exit from the sorting room should be regulated and an armed guard should always be posted outside. There should be a relief guard available so that at no point of time, the door is left unguarded. An alarm bell should invariably be installed at the branches having currency chest. The switches of the alarm bell should be placed near the strong door, inside the strong room, inside the sorting room and in the area in which police guards remain on duty. There should be as many points as possible from where alarms can be activated.

vi)

vii) viii)

ix)

Wherever possible electrically or magnetically operated door locks should be fixed on the main entrance doors of the strong room. These can be activated remotely through electrical means in emergent situations. Time Lock System should be installed in all Currency Chests irrespective of its size and cash holding as per guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. Similarly, as per guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India Close circuit Television System with 90 days recording facility should be installed in all currency chest branches. In all currency chest, telephone with hotline connectivity between the chest and the nearest police station may be provided. The strong room should be properly illuminated. There should be an emergency light. All electric fittings inside the strong room should be provided in conduits. An automatic switch/plug/socket should also be provided outside the strong room so that, the electric power is cut out when the vault door is closed. Perimeter security light must also be ensured. Air Ventilators of strong room must have proper security grill / mesh constructed by authorized vendor of repute in accordance with specification IS 14387:2003. All other windows, doors or openings in the currency chest premises must have adequate grill or similar protection. For instant and full-proof communication between the currency chest and the nearest police station a suitable communication system i.e. HOTLINE is mandatory.

x)

xi)

xii)

xiii)

xiv)

xv)

xvi)

Auto Dialers may be installed in addition to Hotline, wherever necessary. Time Lock must be installed on the strong room door in order to provide additional safety. An override facility like Master Key or a Unique Code should not be held in the same premises.

xvii)

xviii) Close Circuit Television System (CCTV) with adequate number of camera with recording facility must be installed at all currency chest branches. Arrangements should be made for uninterrupted power supply.

xix) xx)

In C Class chests adequate arrangements must be made to prevent electric shock since the entire structure is made of steel. The currency chests located in terrorist / insurgency/ naxalite-prone areas should have sand bag / mobile bunkers for armed guard at the main gate. Mirrors of adequate size should be fitted at the corner of patrolling corridor at 45 Degree angle so that the complete passage can be seen from one spot.

xxi)

3.

Guarding of Currency Chests:

The currency chests must be guarded round-the-clock by the armed guards. It could be the Banks own guards or police guards. All arrangements for getting the police guards should be completed before a currency chest is opened.

4.

Operational Safeguards: i) ii) The strong room meant for currency chest should be under dual control. The duplicate keys of the vault and the bins should be kept in safe custody of the local branch of one of the public sector banks.

iii) The doors of the currency chest and the strong room must always be closed and locked except during the time necessary for moving notes/coins into or out of the currency chest. iv) The joint custodians of the currency chest should invariably be present from the time the chest is opened for storing/removing treasures, till the time it is closed.

v)

Identity Cards should be issued to serving staff / others who are normally required to go inside the currency chest.

vi) Persons engaged for job work inside the currency chest should be properly screened. vii) Only limited bundles of cash should be removed from the currency chest for sorting at any one time. This amount should not normally exceed Rs.25.00 Lakh at any one time (as recommended by IBA). viii) Cash received from branches/other banks should be counted/sorted immediately instead of keeping it in locked boxes for a long time. ix) The cash should be stored in the bins provided for this purpose. x) As prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India, surprise verification of cash should be arranged every month. external

xi) The Regional Heads/Security Officer should pay surprise visits to the currency chest to ensure that the vigil kept by the armed police guard is adequate. xii) The branches having currency chests should keep close liaison with the Police Authorities. 5. Strong Rooms Specifications: i. The Reserve Bank of India has classified currency chests into four categories viz., Class AAA, AA, B and C. AA & AAA class shall be constructed in Metro cities, state capital and District Headquarter while B & C class currency chests may be constructed in hilly/ inaccessible areas as considered by state Government or other appropriate authorities provided these are not within 80kms of international Border. ii. For promoting Financial inclusion the Reserve Bank of India has permitted the Banks to set up B & C class currency chest in rural areas ( with a population upto 9999 & semi-urban area (with a population of 10,000 to 99999) provided such areas are not Naxal affected, insurgency prone and do not have a history of Law & Order problem. ii. To the extent possible, entrance to the safe deposit vault and the strong room should not be the same. Where necessary, the strong room should be separated from the safe deposit vault area by a grill door. iv. In addition to the doors being built according to the specifications laid down, grill doors must be provided, so that the grill door can be bolted from within during operation of the strong room to prevent intrusion. v. Adequate protection to the openings for ventilation must be ensured. Shutters, collapsible grills wherever possible, should be provided.

vi. The strong room must be under the double lock of the joint custodians in charge of the cash. Both officials jointly in charge of the cash must be present when the strong room is opened and neither may enter it except in the presence of the other. vii.All safes and as far as possible, all receptacles in the strong room which are used for storing cash must also be under the double lock of the joint custodians. It must be ensured that the locking mechanism of all receptacles is effective and that the doors of all cupboards etc. are securely fastened before being locked. 6. Opening / Closing of Strong Room: i) In the morning, when the strong room is opened, the Banks guards (armed or unarmed) must be present. The main door should be kept closed when the strong room is opened. The cash department door should also be securely locked if the strong room is located in the cash department. The joint custodians, before opening the safe, must ensure, in the presence of the Bank Guard, that the locks are intact and that there has been no tampering with the main door of the strong room. The strong room door may then be opened by the joint custodians. The grill door, which must also have a double locking system, should be opened to enter the strong room and immediately closed from inside.

ii)

iii) The cash, which is withdrawn from the strong room, should be stored in a box or a trunk and preferably be locked before being taken out from the strong room. iv) A banks guard (armed / unarmed) must be present when the strong room is closed at the end of the day by the joint custodians. After the strong room is closed, the guard on duty must ascertain the strong room is securely locked and confirm this to the joint custodians. 7. Cash Counters and Movement of Cash from strong room to Counter & Vice Versa:

Apart from the structural precautions, the security of cash on the counters can be ensured through a proper cash management and control programme. The following measures are suggested for implementation:

i)

It must be ensured that the amount of cash at the counter does not exceed the amount required.

ii)

Dual control must be exercised at all times. If on occasion, one of the joint holders has for some reason to be away from the branch during banking hours, appropriate arrangements should be made for the continuance of the dual control.

iii) All withdrawals and lodgments of cash from/into the cash safe/strong room must be undertaken by exercising dual control. Every entry in the cash-safe-in and the cash-safe-out register must be authenticated by both the joint holders. The number of occasions when cash is taken out of the strong room should be kept to the minimum. iv) The cash safe should be secured after each time it is operated. v) The collapsible gate at the main door of the branch should be closed and bolted from inside when the cash is taken out of the strong room to the counters in the cash department and similarly when the cash is brought back from the counters to the strong room. When an armed guard is posted, he should escort such cash in transit.

vi) The cashier must invariably bolt and lock the door from inside when he is in the cabin. Similarly the cash cabin door must also be locked from outside whenever the cashier goes out of the cabin even for a short period, so that no unauthorized person can enter the cabin. vii) The cashier may leave the cash cabin, only after ensuring that both the cash cabin doors and drawers are safely locked. viii) When cash is being handled on the cash counter, it must be ensured that the cash is not left on the table in such a way that it can be reached by a person, by stretching a hand in the window from outside. ix) No person, whether a member of staff or public, should be allowed access to the Cash Department without adequate reason and the permission of the Head Cashier/Cashier-in-Charge of the Cash Department. x) Enquiries from the public must not be entertained at the cash counters. All such persons making enquiries should be directed to the enquiry counter/other officer(s). xi) Unusually heavy receipt of cash should be transferred to the strong room at the earliest opportunity. 8. Design and Description of Cash Counters:

Certain basic structural designs are required in the cash cabins to ensure the safety of funds within the cash cabins. These are indicated below:

i)

The cash cabins must be enclosed by see-through partition walls. Thick plate glass or wire-netting of 2.5 cm square may be used for the purpose. It must be ensured that registers and other books/records are not piled against the partition, thereby obstructing the view. The cash cabin doors must be fitted with night latches, so that once closed from within, they cannot be opened from outside without operating the key. This should equally be applied to the teller cabin as well as to the door of the Cash Department. The cashiers cabin should have a very small opening (tray-type_ not exceeding 5 cm in height and as far away as possible from the door latch at the rear, so that cheques, registers, etc. can be passed through it without opening the door. The windows of the cash counters should be provided with sliding flaps which cannot be opened from outside. The height of the cash cage should be adequate to prevent a person standing outside from reaching the counter level. The breadth of the work table on the cashiers side of the counter should likewise be such that a person standing outside cannot reach the cash drawer level. The cash counter should have work tables at two levels one of the same levels as the counter on the customers side and the second at a lower level where drawers for keeping cash will be fitted on the cashiers side. The cash drawers should have appropriate locking arrangements. The cash window should provide space just enough for a hand to pass through.

ii)

iii)

iv) v) vi)

vii)

viii) ix)

CHAPTER IV
1) Cash Remittances: One of the most vulnerable points in cash-in-transit is when it is being loaded or offloaded. It is at this time that the doors of safes and of vehicles are in an open state. Except in very rare cases, it is impossible for the carrying vehicle to approach the safe or the strong room area, and therefore, the cash has to be carried in container between the two points. During this period cent percent security reliance has to be placed on man, the most fallible and vulnerable of all protective elements. The protection of money and valuables on the move, therefore, is one of the most important aspect if not the most important, in the security set up in a bank.

The non-currency chest branches are permitted to hold a specific amount of cash only depending on their volume of business. The excess cash is required to be remitted to the nearest currency chest branch on regular basis due to the following reasons:

i) ii)

Accumulation of excess cash exposes the Bank to greater security threat; Excess cash, when deposited to the currency chest branch, entitles the Bank to earn interest at a specific rate, which adds to the profitability of the Bank.

Similarly, whenever a non-currency chest branch falls short of cash, it receives inward remittance from a currency-chest branch. Therefore, the cash remittance may take place between:-

A currency chest branch (own bank or State Bank of India or other nationalized bank) and a non-currency chest branch; ii. A Remittance Centre and a Currency Chest/Non-currency Chest Branch. iii. 2 (two) non-currency chest branches and / or Extension Counter; iv. A currency chest/non-currency chest branch and an ATM; The Bankers Indemnity Policy covers cash-in-transit providing the following insurance limit:

i.

i) ii) iii) iv)

Limit of cash-in-transit Remittance without Armed Guard Remittance with one Armed Guard Remittance with two Armed Guards

Rs.300.00 Lakh per occasion upto Rs.20.00 Lakh Above Rs.20.00 with a maximum of Rs.50.00 Lakh Above Rs.50.00 Lakh

In the background of security reasons and impact on Banks overall profitability, noncurrency chest branches are permitted to hold only stipulated amount of cash on dayto-day basis. Excess cash held by the branches, therefore, are required to be remitted to the nearest currency chest branch. Such excess cash, when in transit, becomes most vulnerable due to its exposure and casual attitude often adopted by the remittance team.

Threat Perception:

It must be borne in mind that the cash while in transit becomes most vulnerable because of its exposure and casual attitude often adopted by the remittance team; The time when the cash is loaded / off-loaded are the most crucial and demands utmost vigilance. During its movement the vehicle is exposed to ambush by criminals / extremists, road-blocks, traffic jams, public unrest etc. Moreover, cent percent security reliance has to be placed on man the most fallible and vulnerable of all protective elements.

Possible Reasons:

Lack of secrecy by the branch concerned i.e. only the staff members of remittance team should know others need not. ii) Lack of adequate caution or mental alertness on the part of the Banks staff during preparation, loading, carrying and handing over the remittances; iii) Lack of alertness and preparedness on the part of the escort and ineffectiveness of the fire-arms and ammunition; iv) Lack of proper planning; v) Casual attitude of branch management towards cash remittance. It is often found that the Canteen Boy or Generator Operator has been entrusted with hiring the remittance vehicle. vi) Leakage of information from branches; vii) Not following the guidelines issued by Head Office, Regional Offices with regard to cash remittance. viii) Not paying heed to local restrictions issued by Police Authority, especially in the disturbed areas; ix) Movement of cash on the same day of the week almost at the same time taking the same route e.g. cash van from A CCRC Branch lifts cash from G, H, I Noncurrency chest branches on Fridays taking the same route in the same sequence; x) Instead of cash van, 2-wheelers, 3-wheelers or other mode of transport being used at random; xi) Steel Trunks not being used or not being chained to the body of the vehicle; xii) Remittance carried out by single officer in his own vehicle / hired car/ two wheeler

i)

Precautionary Measures:

i) ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi) vii) viii) ix) x)

xi) xii) xiii)

xiv) xv) xvi)

As far as possible the cash should be transported only through the Banks own cash vans. In case of non-availability vehicle should be hired very cautiously; An Outward Remittance Register should be maintained by each branch and the details of hired vehicle should be noted (Date, Amount, Number of Vehicle, Persons Travelling, Signature of Head Cashier, Dy.Manager, Receiving Clerk, Cash Peon, Drivers Name, License Number, Owners Name) All cash remittance should be accompanied by at least 2 (two) employees, one of whom must be from cash department while the other should be the Armed Guard (for remittance between RS.20.00 Lakh & Rs.50.00 Lakh). All cases of remittances exceeding Rs.50.00 Lakh should be escorted by two armed guards, one of whom should sit beside the driver and the other in the rear where cash container is kept. In other cases, where there is only one armed guard, he should occupy the seat in front beside driver. Before the cash is taken out from the strong room, it must be ensured that the main entrance to the branch remains locked from within to deny access to the outsiders. Branches having grill enclosure in the Cash Section should be locked from inside; The Banks armed guard (s) should check his/their fire-arm(s) and position himself/themselves suitably. Joint custodians of cash may thereafter arrange for the cash to be taken out of the strong room. Joint custodians should satisfy themselves that precautionary measures have been taken; When ready to leave, the escort should go out of the branch first. On being satisfied that there is no danger in and around, he should give signal to the Cash Peon to come out of the branch. The armed guard belonging to the remitting branch at the entrance should keep a sharp vigil in the vicinity. The cash box should then be carried to the cash van under the supervision of accompanying cashier, loaded on the vehicle and chained to the chassis of the vehicle; Armed guards should not be used as carriers of the cash. Rather they should remain alert with their weapons in loaded condition as long as it is being used for protection of the Banks assets. The driver of the vehicle should remain on his seat when the cash is brought out. No unauthorized person should be allowed to enter or take a lift in the remittance vehicle, whether he is an employee or an outsider. Only the employees having specific office order are allowed to board the cash van/remittance vehicle. The cash van driver and the accompanying armed guards must be on guard and be very cautious about fake accidents, fake police officials, unusual traffic diversion, sudden roadblocks and any vehicle following from behind. If the vehicle is required to take halt for some genuine reason, no conversation should be opened with any unknown persons. If the same cash van is used for transporting remittance to more than one branch, it is necessary to maintain punctuality and delay at any point must be avoided and security precautions must not be slackened at any place.

xvii) The cash van should be parked nearest to the Branch premises to facilitate quick loading and off-loading of cash. xviii) The door of the vehicle must have locking facility from inside. xix) The vehicle should have appropriate fittings so that the cash containers can be secured to the vehicle. xx) When transportation of cash between two branches is a regular feature, care should be taken to ensure that a specific pattern with regard to days, dates, timings, routes, frequency do not emerge. xxi) Keys of the cash boxes will not be carried in vehicle. Currency chest branches should maintain separate locks for each non-currency chest branch. One set of key will be kept in non-currency chest branch. xxii) In case of roadblocks, sudden strike, civil unrest, accidents etc. the vehicle should be taken to the nearest Police station. If the police station is very far off then the vehicle should be taken to a nearest Govt. Office/Post Office or any other big organization. In case it cannot proceed further the remittance team should go back to the originating branch. xxiii) The remittance team should come back to the currency chest branch after days work positively before sunset within duty hours. xxiv) Additional security measures i.e. GPS based tracking devices may be installed on the cash van in terrorist / insurgency prone areas. xxv) In case of remittance by hired vehicle, the following precautions should be taken: a) The same car should not be hired time and again; b) The registration of the vehicle, drivers license should be checked and details to be recorded in a register; c) The vehicles fuel tank must be full and it must not stop enroute for re-fuelling; d) The vehicle belonging to staff members will not be used under any circumstances;

Use of Taxi, Three Wheeler/Cycle Rickshaw for cash remittance:

i)

ii) iii) iv)

v)

Where a cash van/banks vehicle is NOT available, a private vehicle may be hired on contract. It must be ensured that the van is hired from a reputed agency/party. The antecedents of the cash van owner as well as the driver should be verified. In case due to some unavoidable reasons even cash van on contractual basis is not available then a private vehicle may be used. But as far as possible a taxi should be preferred to a three wheeler scooter, and three-wheeler scooter to a cycle rickshaw. Vehicles owned by bank staff or their close relatives should not be used. Where a taxi is used, the cash box should NOT be kept in the luggage boot/carrier but should be kept inside the car. Where private vehicles are used, only closed vehicles should be used. Precautions applicable to the transportation of cash from the strong room to the cash van (where the banks own vehicle is used) must be followed; The cash container should be chained to the body of the vehicle. The vehicle should be inspected to ascertain that the arrangements for chaining the cash box to the body of the vehicle are available and that the doors can be locked from inside.

vi) vii) viii)

Wherever possible, an audible alarm should be fitted to the cash container. A whistle is a recommended, as an alternative, as it immediately attracts the attention of the people around. Stationary vehicle near to the exit of the branch should not be used. Also, such vehicles should not be from any particular stand but from different stands, so that prospective miscreants cannot plan his strategy. Minimum two persons should escort the cash in all cases where a cash remittance is sent by a hired vehicle.

Carrying of Cash on Foot:

a) b) c)

d) e) f) g) h)

In case no mode of transport, either private or public, is available and the distance to be covered is short, cash remittances may have to be sent on foot. In such cases, remittance should not exceed Rs.2.00 Lakh in each case. Where cash is carried on foot, the dangers are greater. The use of a bag for carrying money to and from a bank presents the opportunity for a thief to snatch it when the carrier would probably be unprepared to resist. As far as possible the bag containing the cash should be fitted with an Alarm Device. Specially designed leather bags which incorporate audible alarms when snatched from the carrier, may also be considered. The escort should walk a few paces behind the carrier. He may even use a stout walking stick, if not armed. Both the carrier and the escort should walk on that side of the road, which faces oncoming traffic. They should keep away from the kerb. Wherever possible, busy roads and frequented streets should be used. When ready to leave, the escort should go out of the branch first. When satisfied that there no danger, he should signal to the cash carrier to leave. The carrier of cash must NOT get into a conversation with any person not even with a bank employee and on arrival, reach a place of safety at the earliest opportunity.

Remittance by Other Public Transport:

In case, the bank does not have its own vehicle for cash remittance in a particular area and either no private mode of conveyance are available or the distance between two branches is quite long it may be necessary to send the cash remittance by public transport such as trains and buses. Night halts, if any, during such journeys, should be at secure locations, preferably at Police Station. In such cases, following safeguards must be observed:

a)

Remittance by Train:

i) ii) iii) iv)

In the case of overnight journey or where large remittances exceeding Rs.50 lakh are sent, police escorts should be arranged; If cash remittances by train are a regular feature, different trains should be used on different days, if these are available during the daytime. Journey should be undertaken only with proper reservation, preferably in less crowded trains; Containers/boxes must be chained to the seat and escorts need to maintain vigilance right through.

b)

Remittance by Bus: i) ii) iii) iv) The seats occupied by the carrier and the escort should be away from the door; The escort should sit behind the carrier as far as possible; Direct bus routes should be preferred and circuitous should be avoided; The container should be chained to the seat.

General Precautions for Cash-in-Transit:

Cash-in-transit being the most vulnerable aspect in the security set up in a bank all precautions should be taken to ensure that it is fully protected. The following are some of the general precautions to be observed:

a)

The amount of cash sent from one point to another, should not exceed the limit for which transit insurance cover has been arranged. It is preferable to divide large amounts and carry them in separate batches, if necessary at different times during the day. Where transportation of cash between two offices is a regular feature, care should be taken to ensure that a specific pattern with regard to days, dates, timings, routes, frequency etc. does not emerge. In other words, the days, dates, timings, routes and the staff should be changed at regular intervals as frequently as possible. Wherever dual keys for the container are used, the two keys should be kept and carried separately by the carrier and the escort respectively. Routes where traffic bottlenecks are common feature should be avoided. Great secrecy should be maintained regarding the despatch of remittance. Advance intimation, either on phone or by any other means should be sent by the remittance branch to the receiving branch. In the event of failure to

b) c)

d) e) f) g)

report in time, on the part of the employees accompanying the cash, immediate appropriate action should be initiated by the receiving branch. h) In sending such information great precautions are to be taken. Information must, therefore, be sent very carefully and if possible through coded message. Discussions about such remittances should be restricted to those people directly concerned with remittances. Remittance should be sent only during day time. The cash and valuables, which are to be sent, should be ready well before the actual time of loading. Similarly, the vehicles, the armed escort, the accompanying cashier and the messenger should be ready well before time. If cash is being transported by train seats farthest away from the door should be occupied. In case of doubt / suspicion, the remittance should be taken back or the driver should drive his vehicle to the nearest police station. During civil unrest/riots, turbulence an disturbed conditions if the remittances have to pass through affected areas, remittance may be avoided and if it cannot be avoided additional security arrangements must be made. At the receiving branch, on receipt of information that a remittance is being received the armed guard, if any, should be alerted. The receiving branch should verify that the persons accompanying the cash are in fact the representatives deputed by the remitting branch. This can be achieved by a matching of signatures or by the use of identity cards. The receiving branch should open the container in the presence of the joint custodians of cash at the branch and the employee from the remitting branch accompanying the remittance. Any discrepancy found in the remittance should be pointed out at once to the latter and signature obtained thereof. The remittance should be opened in the strong room or in the room where the safe is located and the precautions laid down for the opening of the safe, should be strictly followed. Receipt of the remittance should be acknowledged to the remitting branch with special urgency. Guards should not be used as carrier. In rural branches, where a choice between a public transport and coolie /pack-animal services is available the former should be used. A check list of precautionary measures must be evolved and followed.

i) j) k)

l) m) n)

o) p)

q)

r) s)

t) u) v) w)

CHAPTER V SECURITY DEVICES

1) Alarm System: The alarm system is an important and integral element in the physical safe guards against bank dacoities and robberies. Alarm system has three fold objectives. These are

a) b)

To scare and frighten the thieves and robbers and force them to flee; To alert neighbours so that they can i) ii) iii) iv) v) Inform the police immediately about the occurrence of the theft or robbery. Organize measures for apprehending the culprits; Organize measures for putting blockades at exits, obstructing any each escape; Observe the vehicles used by the culprits, their features etc. so that subsequent identification and apprehension become easy. To alert the police so that they can apprehend the thieves/robbers.

2) Alarm Systems and its effectiveness: The alarm system has to be activated as soon as there is apprehension of danger. It should, therefore, be always operational and provide for being activated from various points. It can thus transmit signals, whether silent or audible, so that the public in the neighbourhood on getting the signal could be alerted. It can alert the armed guards and the police in the neighbourhood, if any. The alarm system should be simple so that it can be operated by one and all. Care should be taken to ensure that false alarms are eliminated. The alarm system should also be tamper-proof as the culprits would first of all attempt to cut the wires of the alarm system also delink the telephones. The system should also be capable of indicating defects automatically.

3) Burglar Alarm System: (a) Burglar Alarm System should be installed at all currency chests / branches, which should be tested periodically and their proper functioning at all times should be ensured. Any repair if necessary should be carried out immediately. Alarm Switches (hand/foot or remote controlled) should be provided to cashiers, Head Cashiers, Accountants, Branch Head, Manager (Operation)

(b)

as well as inside and outside strong rooms. In addition, switches should be provided to toilets, canteens etc. (c) The siren/hooter must be located in such a place, which enabled the system to be effective when sounded. Auxiliary Hooter may also be installed in a very large or exceptionally large branches. The fuse/Multi-Circuit Breaker (MCB) for the Alarm should be independent of common fuse/MCB provided for electrical installation of the branch. The Alarm Fuse / MCB should be located away from public view. The entire staff including the security guard should be familiar with the action to be taken when the alarm is sounded. The electrical connection for security equipment should be from a point between the Meter and the Main Switch. The Alarm System should also have a facility to automatically switch over to the back-up battery system in case the electrical supply is cut-off.

(d)

(e) (f)

4) Advantages of Alarm System: a) It may frighten and scare the criminals and force them to flee, immediately. Staff outside and staff within the premises but outside the area of control of the dacoits would be in a position to organize resistance and alert outsiders. The system will solicit assistance from the public in apprehending the culprits and also in delaying their escape by placing road blocks and blockades along the escape route. The robbers would become panicky and may run away immediately with the available loot and may not remain within the bank premises to collect all the cash. Since the alarm will be sufficiently audible it may get immediate response from the police patrol if they are within the vicinity of the bank. Since the alarm will be audible to the entire neighbourhood, the police will be alerted by different agencies and persons rather than by one source. It may help boosting the morale of the employees as they would know that the alarm has been activated and outside help is expected at any moment.

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

g)

A number of other sophisticated physical safe guards such as time locks for strong rooms and safe deposit vaults and safes, closed circuit TV concealed cameras etc. are also available.

i.

Time Lock: This will be ideal for being used in currency chests, strong rooms. The doors of the strong room can be locked and opened only at a pre-set time. So far as the currency chest is concerned, once they are closed in the evening, they need not be and should not be opened till the next morning. It could also be installed in strong rooms of bigger branches where the cash holdings are relatively high. At present all our currency chest branches and approximately 450 NonCurrency Chest Branches are equipped with Electronic Lock System. It will be our endeavour to provide Time Lock System to all High Risk and vulnerable branches also.

ii. Close Circuit Television: The closed circuit TV is useful in bigger metropolitan branches. By CCTV it would be possible for the armed guards or any other person sitting at a remote and protected area to closely watch and monitor the happenings inside the branch including the cashiers cabins, the safe vaults, doors inside the strong room etc. The cost of operation, however, would be substantially high and hence may be installed in very large branches. iii. Access Control System: Access control for currency chests and branches has to be exercised keeping in view the risk classification / profile of the branch. Broadly Access Control is to be organized on three lines of defence / deterrence / delay as given below: a) Perimeter security i.e. a boundary wall with an entrance, which should normally be closed after offices hours; A large number of branches may not have independent premises or surrounding open area, in such premises the first line of entry should be the main entrance of the Branch. The second line of defence must be created at the exterior wall of the premises. In addition to the existing system of grilled gates and collapsible doors, an effective means of controlling entry at this stage is to be use turnstile doors, which enables only one person enter at a time. An arrangement to remotely lock the turnstile would be useful in case of a hold-up. The third line of access control may be based on biometric access verification system. To protect the most valuation and vulnerable part of the Branch / Controlling Office such as cash area, data centre, server room, treasury operation area etc. such access control system would be useful.

b.

c.

iv.

Concealed Cameras: These cameras can be activated at a predetermined time when the risk is high. It would be installed at important and strategic points and also be linked with an automatic

control system. If there is a robbery or dacoity and if the alarm system is activated the cameras too get activated automatically. v. Auto-Dialers: Auto-Dialer System may be installed at high risk branches. The electronic alarm system may either be fully integrated with Auto Dialer or it should be installed in Standalone Mode. Magnetic Sensor: Magnetic Contacts / Sensors may be installed on doors and windows as well as the rolling shutters. These are in turn connected to the security alarm system to send loud audio visual signal in case of emergency.

vi.

vii.

Hotlines: As per the Reserve Bank of India guidelines all currency chest branches are to be linked through telephonic hotline with nearest police station / police control room. This can enable the police to come into action immediately. Safe: Safes were categorised into the following, depending on the degree of resistance offered to Torch or Tool or both and Fire exposure:

Class

Classification of Code TL 30DTL10x-FR30

Remarks

Safes having door with tool resistance capacity of 30 minutes and other five sides with tool resisting capacity of 10 minutes each. Safe with fire resisting capacity for 30 minutes. Safes having tool and oxy-acetylene torch resistance door with 15 minutes resisting capacity. Safe with fire resisting capacity for 30 minutes. Safes having tool and oxy-acetylene torch resistance capacity for 30 minutes on all 6 sides. Safes with fire resisting capability for 30 minutes. Safes having tool and oxy-acetylene torch resistance capacity on all six sides for 30 minutes each. Fire resistance capability not specified, preferably 30 minutes. Safes having tool and oxy-acetylene torch resistance capacity on all six sides for 60 minutes each. Fire resistance capability not specified, preferably 30 minutes.

TRTL15D TL15 x FR 30

BB

TRTL 15 x 6FR 30

TRTL 30 x 6

AA

TRTL 60 x 6

Vault (Strong Room Doors): Vault (strong room) doors were also catagorised into 5 types depending on the degree of resistance offered to torch or tool attack both and fire exposure. The rating based on net working time to effect entry are as follows:

Class C Class B Class A Class AA Class AAA

15 minutes 30 minutes 60 minutes 120 minutes 180 minutes

Safe Deposit Locker Cabinet: Safe Deposit Locker Cabinet would be of standard nature and only the number of lockers should vary depending on its size. The locker unit should be tested for its performance against burglary attack with common hand tool, crowbar and screwdrivers. The locker unit should be strong enough to withstand such attack successfully for not less than 15 minutes. Depository Cabinet: The cashiers have to handle a lot of cash over the counter. Periodically the amount increases to a large amount and becomes exposed to lifting / cutting of cash counters. To avoid such untoward incidents a Depository Cabinet having 2 (two) drawers may be provided to cash counters. The first drawer is used for keeping loose cash while the second drawer is a depository drawer, which has a drop down mechanism. The bundle of cash automatically falls from first to second drawer when it is closed. It is advisable to take the following actions before choosing the type of safe / locker / strong room door etc.: a) b) c) d) Carry out a detailed study to check adequacy of existing security system. Ascertain the degree of vulnerability to burglar attack; Ascertain the value of treasure to be held i.e. daily cash, gold etc. Assess the physical structure of the building;

Top priority should be given for replacement of old / obsolete security equipments in identified high risk / vulnerable branches to prevent occurrence of untoward incidents. Specification / Standard of security equipments: All existing standard i.e. BIS, ISO etc. and products conforming to the same should be used. Wherever BIS / ISO standards are not available, equipments conforming to UL / EU may be used. In case of electronic security equipment test report by the Regional Electronic Test Development Centres may be obtained in case other standards are not available. In respect of construction of strong room/locker room, the specifications issued by the Reserve Bank of India and ISI should be followed. Installation of Security Equipment while opening a new branch/shifting of a branch to a new premises While opening a new branch/shifting of a branch to new premises, the following security equipments should be installed from the very beginning: i) The cash safe should be at least B Class at all branches but BB Class in rural branches in isolated locations;

ii) Electronic Alarm System with burglar alarm should be installed; iii) A Close Circuit TV System with 4 (four) Cameras having 7 (seven) days recording facility (DVR) should be installed; iv) An Electronic Locking System should be fitted on Cash Safe/Strong Room Door; v) The front facia of the Cash Counter should be reinforced with Steel Sheet (5 mm) to prevent any attempt of cutting. vi) All existing cash safes, which are not of Defender Series or do not have oxyacetylene proof capability, may be replaced in a phased manner.

CHAPTER VI
SECURITY PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 1. The Security Set-up: A Security Planning Cell (SPC) has been set up in the Central Office of the Reserve Bank of India, in accordance with RBI Circular No. Staff (Sec.III) 13633/23(10) (k) 86/87 Dtd.30.06.1987. The Cell is responsible for looking into all relevant aspects affecting security in banks and issuing clear guidelines for strengthening and streamlining the security arrangements. The Cell reports directly to the Deputy Governor, who guides its functioning. All Public Sector Banks are required to constitute a Central Standing Security Committee (CSSC) headed by the Chairman & Mg.Director and consisting of the Executive Director, General Manager (Planning), General Manager (Inspection) and AGM (Security & CC) as members (Reserve Bank of India letter No.SPC.585/SPC.1/88-89 Dtd.12.11.1988 refers). The AGM (Security & CC) will act as the Member Secretary of the Committee. The CSSC is responsible for looking into all relevant aspects affecting security in the bank and interacting with the Security Planning Cell at RBI. The CSSC should meet at least once a year to review security aspects of the bank

during that year as also to plan, guide and monitor the working of the security organization at the field level. A communication that such a meeting of the said committee was held and security arrangements reviewed is required to be furnished to RBI by 30th April every year. 2. The Security Set-Up within the Bank: The importance of a wellestablished security set-up within the banks organization structure, with clear-cut delegation of authority and responsibility cannot be overemphasized. Government has issued instructions to banks to gear up their security machinery and to appoint a Chief Security Officer who shall be assigned the overall responsibility of optimizing the security arrangements within the bank. The security set-up may differ from bank to bank as it will have to be planned and programmed depending upon various factors including the size of the bank, its geographical spread, extent of its operations, the mix of its branches, etc. The hierarchical set-up should, however, have a minimum of 3 tiers, viz. 1st at the Central Office (The Chief Security Officer), 2nd at the Zonal / Regional Office (The Zonal/Regional Security Officer) and the 3rd at the branch level (The Armed Guard). State Bank of India, however, has another tier in the form of Circle Security Officer, who performs most of the duties listed below as CSOs duties. 3. The Chief Security Officer (CSO): The CSO is the head of the security setup in a bank. The following should be his primary duties: a. To work under the general supervision, direction and control of the top management. b. As Head of Banks Security, to plan the strategy for security and to maintain it in a state of high efficiency. Also, to be responsible for the training, discipline and morale of banks security staff including security officers deployed in Zones/Regions etc. c. To keep himself abreast of the developments affecting physical security of the bank. d. To collect intelligence data so as to keep him informed of internal and external developments on matters affecting the security of the bank. To take all steps necessary for formulating a security policy for the bank in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Government and the Reserve Bank of India from time to time and also issue specific instructions covering aspects such as code of conduct for security staff, training in weaponry, checking of arms and ammunition. Right of self-defence, occasions when shooting can be resorted to, etc. e. To direct, guide and supervise the Zonal/Regional security Officers and to ensure that each Zonal/Regional Security Officers and to ensure that each Zonal/Regional Security Officer maintain the security staff in his charge at a high level of efficiency, discipline, training, conduct and morale. f. To co-ordinate with and to issue instructions and to guide Zonal/Regional Security Officers in matters of security of the branches / within their jurisdiction. g. To undertake tours of the Zones/Regions and to carry out surprise checks of branches on security aspects from time to time. h. To make suitable plans with regard to the requirement of security officers, new equipment to be installed any vintage equipment to be

i. j. k. l.

m.

n. o. p.

q. r.

s. t. u.

v. w. x.

phased out etc. to ensure that the bank security remains updated and there are no gaps whatsoever. To maintain close liaison with the Police and other Central / State Government Authorities, Fire Brigade and other local functionaries, so as to secure their co-operation and co-ordination. To prepare annual budget estimates of the security for the bank. To evolve strategy and decide upon the sources from where the security staff may be recruited or outsourced. To prepare an Annual Action Plan for the bank in consultation with Zonal/Regional Security Officers, and get it approved by the Management and also to be responsible for its implementation. Similarly, to ensure preparation of a security profile for each branch, indicating its weaknesses and strengths and also the steps necessary for improving the security aspects. To ensure preparation of the contingency plan, duly vetted by the Management, Police, Fire Brigade Officials and the appropriate Government Agencies, etc. to meet all eventualities in the case of emergencies at currency chests. To prepare the Disaster management Plan for the Bank and be responsible for its implementation. To introduce appropriate records, documents, etc. necessary for efficient security system. To formulate guidelines for the use of security staff in areas such as escorting cash from one place to another, both within the branch and outside, steps to be taken before, during and after a hold-up, what is to be done when there is a disturbance, riot, fire, search by police etc. To formulate measures for inculcating security consciousness amongst bank staff by coordinating with the banks training staff. To inspect currency chest branches at least once in a year and to ensure that all steps are taken for the safety and security of cash inside the currency chest. As far as possible, Island Currency Chests be inspected preferably once in Two Years. To conduct Annual Training Seminars and Advanced Training Seminars for the Security Officers of the bank to keep them updated with latest security developments including the equipments. Likewise to advise the ZSO/RSOs to conduct such training programme for the armed guards of the Zone/Regions. To recommend mobile communication facility for Regional Security Officers and Bank Cash Vans on Need to Have basis to Banks Top Management, for better and effective communication, command and control. To ensure adequate training is imparted to all the Security Officers through internal and external training programmes. To recommend to Personnel Department placement of the Security Officers based on Security needs of Zones/Regions during general transfer policy of the Bank and on administrative grounds. To conduct security audit of all currency chests at least once in 3 (three) years.

4. The Zonal / Regional Security Officer: All public sector banks have set up Zonal/Regional Offices. There are controlling offices with a considerable amount of power delegated to them. They are in charge of supervision and control of branches under them. The

number of branches under each Zonal / Regional Office varies from bank to bank. It should be the responsibility of the Zonal/Regional Security Officer to ensure that proper security measures are followed by branches falling within the Zone/Region. RSO / ZSOs should be provided with residential as well as mobile phones to enable them to perform their duties effectively and to make them accessible to the Regional / Branch Managers at all times. The Security Officer should in particular be given the following duties: (a) (b) (c) To ensure security of Bank Branches in the Zone / Branch shall be the primary duty of Security Officer. To work under the direct supervision, direction and control of the Zonal / Regional Manager and to report to the Chief Security Officer (CSO) on all technical matters. To maintain the bank security staff under his charges in a state of high efficiency, and is responsible for their training, discipline and morale and towards this, to issue necessary instructions/directions within the framework of the policy outlined by the bank through Circulars. To assist Zonal/Regional Head in the selection and recruitment of armed guards in his Zone/Region. To aid and advise the Zonal / Regional Managers in matters of security and fire safety and to take adequate protective precautionary and preventive measures with regard to security and protection of the bank. To act as the convener member of the Zonal/Regional Security standing Committees and to hold meetings once in six (6) months and to forward its minutes to Head Office. To ensure enforcement of all instructions, directions and regulations in respect of security, administration and safety arrangements issued by the bank. To supervise the working of all branches from the viewpoint of security and protection of all property, buildings and assets of the bank in his jurisdiction. To pay supervisory visits to find out whether the instructions issued are being followed, the state of alertness of the security staff, their morale etc. To inspect the branches including Off-Site ATMs in his jurisdiction at least twice a year to assess the security arrangements in vogue and suggest means for strengthening these arrangements. To ensure that shooting practice and fire safety training is carried out by Security Guards at least once in a financial year. To inspect the currency chest branches in his region once in 3 (three) months. To maintain close liaison with the state police. To keep him apprised of all offences affecting Banks property and to advise ways and means to combat them. To exercise authority and control in matters relating to the extent of powers delegated to him. To make efforts to inculcate security consciousness amongst bank staff by associating himself with the banks training programme. To submit all Reports and Returns to CSO/Head Office on time. To prepare an Action Plan based on crime review of the branches under his jurisdiction in collaboration with the respective Branch

(d) (e)

(f) (g) (h)

(i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q)

(r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w)

(x) (y) (z) (aa) (bb) (cc) (dd)

Managers incorporating security lapses and suggesting remedial measures. To prepare a contingency plan, duly vetted by the Management, Police and the Government to meet all eventualities in the case of an emergency whether manmade or natural. To advise Regional/Branch Managers on the installation of suitable electronic gadgets for better security coverage of the branches within his jurisdiction. To be responsible for management of the security staff under his command including their induction, transfer, posting, promotion, accommodation and other welfare measures. To report on the technical aspects relating to the performance of the security staff as a part of the employees confidential report. To arrange for procurement of arms and ammunition as well as licenses for weapons for the staff working in branches of the Zone/Region. To aid and advise the management in consultation with the police and other local functionaries, regarding the selection of site for building of the branches from the security point of view, the topography and crime-proneness of the area, the criticality and vulnerability of the branches being the guiding factors. To be a member of Premises Committee at Regional Level for the selection of Premises for branches/ATM sites etc. viewing it from the security point of view. To recommend suitable security measures at the design stage to ensure in built security in the branches with special reference to in depth security of the strong room. To project categorization/re-categorization of the branches to the CSO in the context of security environment prevailing in the area. To recommend posting of Bank Security Guard at Low Risk Branch, which is not authorized a guard based upon bad law and order situation on certification by SSP (Civil Police) at District Headquarter. To prepare Security Standing Orders for Branches / Currency Chests. To organize District Level Security Committee (DLSC) meeting in consultation with Lead District Manager (LDM) once in a quarter. Composition of the DLSC may be decided by respective LDM. As per the Nayak Committee Report approved by the Govt. of India the Security Officer will i. Be given additional duties involving ONLY Security of information, asset protection and loss prevention; ii. Be assessed for their technical performance by the CSO.

5. The Armed Guard: The security guard is the person who has to ultimately carry out and implement the security instructions issued to the branches. The foiling of the robbery / dacoity and apprehending of the culprits will essentially depend upon the alertness shown by him and his mental preparedness. The security guard should perform the following duties: (a) Work under the general supervision and control of the Branch Manager.

(b) (c)

(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)

(l) (m) (n)

(o) (p) (q) (r) (s)

(t)

Perform diligently all such duties assigned to him by his Branch manager / Security Officer or other authorized officers. Be fully conversant with the standing instructions about his duties and responsibilities, with special reference to his area of jurisdiction, lay out of the building, telephone numbers of Security Officer/Branch Manager/Regional Manager/Fire Brigade and the Police to inform/seek assistance in case of need. To wear the prescribed uniform smartly and correctly while on duty. Be vigilant and alert on duty and not leaving his post until properly relieved. To guard and protect all assets of the branch and its building. Be polite and courteous yet firm in his dealings with the public. Exercise restraint and avoid being provoked. When on duty at the strong room carefully examine every aspect of security of the strong room and in the case of any discrepancy, immediately bring it to the notice of his superiors. While at the gate, ensure proper access control as per instructions to prevent unauthorized entry. Not to allow any visitor effecting ingress in the branch with unauthorized weapons/materials like firearms, explosives, etc. Keep a close watch inside and outside the branch and in the case of any anticipated/existing risk/suspicion, immediately take appropriate action as warranted and also report the matter to his superiors. When on patrol duty, be vigilant and alert and carefully search all such places which seem suspicious and where a criminal can hide. At the time of handing/taking over of duty, check all locks of rooms and record the result of checking. Both guards to sign the register. Ensure that before/after banking hours all gates are closed. During non-banking hours, allow entry to people, only on production of identity cards/appropriate evidence, or with the permission of the Branch Manager/Security Officer after proper identification. In the case of a security alarm being raised, close the gate (s). Be thoroughly conversant with the security standing orders; shooting orders and other orders issued from time to time on matters covering security duties of the branch. Be thoroughly conversant with the location of fire alarm and hydrants and the places where fire extinguishers are kept and take prompt action in the case of fire. Be fully conversant with the use of fire fighting equipment in the branch. Be fully conversant with the photographs of criminals / suspects available in the rouges gallery. Be fully conversant with the sequence of action to be taken in the following situations: i. Burglary/theft. ii. Dacoity/robbery. iii. Demonstration. iv. Hold-ups. v. Procession/Morcha. vi. Squatting (Dharna). vii. Gherao. While deployed at the strong room/currency chest, not to move away from his post under any circumstances, especially when the strong room remains opened.

(u) (v) (w) (x) (y)

(z)

(aa) (bb) (cc) (dd)

While at the strong room / currency chest duty, ensure that only athorised persons are allowed to open the strong room and that too, during the working hours. Not to permit movement/loitering of any unauthorized person in the close proximity of the strong room. Make note of any suspicious movement in the vicinity of the strong room and apprise the Branch Manager/Security Officer. While at the strong room duty, ensure before leaving, that all the doors are properly locked and the electrical current is shut off and also ensure that nobody remains in the strong room. Be thoroughly conversant with the communication system other than telephones and electrically operated devices, to be able to raise a general alert and inform the Branch Manager/Supervisory Security Staff in the case of any eventuality. While on patrol, perform the following duties: i. Carry out surveillance of the premises; ii. Prevent use of premises by squatters, hawkers or undesirable characters; iii. Prevent misuse of premises for anti-social activities by public or bank staff; iv. Check points and stretches not visible from the static point-duty guard; v. Assist the static point-duty guards; vi. Open and close unmanned gates in an emergency; vii. Deal with untoward incidents; viii. Keep a close watch over the building and other property, against attempts at arson or accidental Fire and take action as per the branchs standing orders on fire fighting; ix. Collect security information and convey the same to the superiors; x. Check the identification of all persons, especially at night, found loitering in close proximity of the Bank. While on duty check that arms and ammunition are in serviceable condition. He should maintain his weapon properly and keep it in serviceable condition at all times. Not to carry the cash container himself; Refrain from participating in the trade union activities.

6. Training of Bank Staff and Security Personnel: To ensure protection against damages to or losses of bank property and safety of people in the bank i.e. the staff and the customers, it is necessary to understand the entire gamut of training on the subject of security and risk management. Further, it is to design suitable training programmes for all categories of staff from Top Management down the line. Bank security and Risk Management involves management of existing and perceived threats, manmade or natural, emanating from external or internal factors or a combination of both. It is one of the functions of the CSOs to study all these threats and devise suitable training programmes for the training of Security Officers, Security Guards and other staff members at all levels. The CSO should also be responsible for giving appropriate instructions to Zonal/Regional Security Officers for making arrangements

for conducting of training programmes for the Guards in the Zone / Region including the annual fire practice, giving lectures on various aspects relating to security and ensure that all of them remain active and alert. No security programme can succeed without the active involvement of the banks employees. The relevance; therefore, of an adequate security training programme for the banks personnel needs no reiteration. A continuous and effective training programme provides the necessary awareness as to what constitutes an effective security system. The following guidelines for an appropriate training programme are recommended: (a) Banks should immediately include security measures in their curricula of all induction training programmes for all classes of employees. Similarly, in their other training programmes of one week or more. Also, there should be adequate emphasis on security measures by earmarking one session for security alone so as to inculcate a high degree of security consciousness. The training programme should cover subjects such as how and in what manner help should be summoned, how to delay the hold-up and gain time, to what extent and how to comply with the dacoits instructions, how and in what circumstances the alarm should be activated, how and when to obtain outside help, adoption of a low temperament profile, identification and description of culprits etc. Specific guidelines containing a list of dos and donts in the event of hold-up, robbery, burglary, fire, industrial agitation etc. should be prepared and made available to all employees on training. Departmental examinations and interviews for promotions should include some questions on security. In professional banking examinations also, questions on security should be included. Posters, leaflets, placards and films on security should be used for training. Experts from the Police, CBI, IB and other organizations should be invited to address seminars and workshops. Mock exercises should be conducted, so that the employees are familiar with the minute details and know what to do under difficult circumstances. Contact numbers for police assistance and the various measures to be taken in the event of a dacoity should be made known to all employees. The staff should be attuned to recognize suspicious / irregular features, and to be wary of hangers-on or people coming to the branch without valid reason. The employees must be made aware of the importance of detective security and must be trained to look for signs that will help in detection of the culprits. Adequately designed forms must be used to record observations. When the bag containing the money is being handed over, it may be held upside down so that there is a possibility of the money falling on the floor. All the employees of the branch should keep an eye on all the robbers/dacoits and minutely observe the details of all the happenings of the crime. They should be in a position to accurately report the correct description of the suspects, their accomplices, if

(b)

(c)

(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)

(k) (l)

(m)

(n) (o)

(p) (q) (r)

any, the vehicles used, the route followed and any other detail. These descriptions are critical in apprehending the suspects. The description of the suspect should include items like age, height, weight, sex, hair style, colour of eyes, complexion, glasses, moustaches, beard, sideburns, speech impediments or accent, tattoos, scars or marks, dress, distinguishable gait or limp, weapon carried, car/motor cycle number, colour and make, direction in which it moved etc. The description of the suspects should be written down independently by the employees and they should not discuss this among themselves as the description gets distorted and influenced by the employee having the most dominating personality. If at the time of hold-up any employee happens to be outside the branch and he comes to know about the hold-up, he should not enter the branch, but should organize outside help and alert the police. Immediately after the hold-up, the public, the press and the police rush to the place of hold-up and collect all the possible information directly or by inference. The cardinal principle should be that while the police should be told everything that can be recollected, the press and the public should be told only what the bank wants them to know. The police should be informed immediately by the quickest means about the hold-up by two different persons; while one report on telephone, the other can inform them personally, if possible. All the members of the staff and customers should be requested not to touch anything on which fingerprints have possibly been left behind by the miscreants. If a branch is located in a market area, the day on which the branch remains closed should preferably be the same as the day on which the market is closed.

7. Bank Security Seminar for Executives & Regional Heads: The imperative need to have a well-tailored training system is well established. The Reserve Bank of India Working Group has recommended adoption of various types of training programme for different categories in the form of seminars/programmes, the duration of which for different staff members is as below: (a) (b) Bank Security Seminar for Top Executives Bank Security Seminar for Regional Heads 1 Day 2 Days

8. Programme for other Staff/Officers: Bank Security Training: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Initial Training Programme for bank officers Refresher Training for Bank Officers Training for Probationary / Promotee Officers Training for Award Staff (Clerks) Training for Award Staff (Subordinate Staff) Orientation Training for Security Officers Refresher Training for Security Officers Advanced Training for Security Officers :3 :3 :4 :3 :1 :4 :4 :3 days sessions * sessions sessions days days every year days days

i. Orientation Training for Armed Guards j. Refresher Training for Armed Guards * May be included as part of training in General Banking

:3 days :2 days every year

9. In the various programmes to be held for different categories of Bank Staff members including the Top Management, the syllabi should mainly consist of the following topics: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. p. q. r. s. t. u. v. w. 10. Concept of Security Risk Management; Crimes in Banks and Structural Security of a Branch; Annual Action Plan; Group Discussions Training Films Review of Govt. of India/Reserve Bank of India /IBA Guidelines/Instructions relating to Security Arrangements in Banks; State Level Security Committee Meetings; Liaison with State Police and District Authorities; Security Precautions in the Cash Department, Currency Chests and Cash in Transit. Risk Classification of Branches; Arms and Ammunition and Their Maintenance; Right of Private Defence; Fire Detection and Alarm System and overall Fire Safety precausions; Computer/ATM Security; Insurance Policy and procedures for Making Claims; Cash Studies and Group Discussions; Lessons Learnt; Handling of Unidentified Objects, i.e. Bomb Threat; Management of Unforeseen Situations like Riots, Strike, Dharna etc. Security Environment prevailing in the country; its Impact on Bank Security; Branch layout and installation of various security systems; Bank hold-ups; Latest development in Access Control and Surveillance equipment; Unarmed combat.

Orientation and refresher programme for the security officers has also been recommended by the Reserve Bank of India Working Group, which will have mainly the following subjects to acquaint them about the banking in general and security aspects in particular. The contents recommended are as under: Orientation Programme for newly inducted Security Officers (4-days): BLOCK SYLLABUS

Sl. No. 1. 2.

Subject General banking and general subjects Specialized Subject on Security Aspects

No. of Periods Allotted 2 6

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Specialised Subject on Fire Safety Case Study and Discussions (2 cases) Exhibition of Films and Discussions Fire and Alarm Systems Demonstrations Introduction to security electronic devices Open Session TOTAL

1 2 1 1 2 1 16

Yearly Refresher Training for Security Officers (4-days) BLOCK SYLLABUS

Sl. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Subject National and Regional Security Scenario with reference to Bank Security Analysis of Crime against Banks and remedial measures Latest security electronic devices their characteristics and uses Planning and execution of Annual Action Plan on Security Mix items at the Branch level Safety of Cash-in-Transit Need for liaison with Police HQ/Dist. HQ authorities and procurement/renewal of gun licences IPC provision on Right of Private Defence and Handling of Arms and Ammunition by Bank Guards Syllabus Mode and Pattern of Training of Bank Guards at Regional Level Case Studies (Two) on Bank Robbery/Hold-ups Fire Safety and Demonstration Group Discussion (Open Session) Submission of Reports and Returns to CSO/Head Office TOTAL No. of Periods 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 16

Training and Motivation of Banks Staff Regarding Security Consciousness and General Precautions:

No security programme can, however, succeed without the active involvement of the Banks employees. Adequate security training is to be imparted on them by including security measures in their curricula of all induction training programmes for all classes of employees. Similarly in their other training

programmes also, there should be adequate emphasis on high degree of security consciousness. The training programme should cover subjects like How and in what manner of help should be summoned, How to delay the hold up to gain time, To what Extent and How to Comply with the preventive instructions on dacoity, How and under what circumstances the alarm should be activated, How and When to obtain outside help, Adoption of a Low Temperament Profile, Identification and Description of Culprits etc. Mock exercise should be conducted, so that the employees are familiar with the minute details and know about the action to be taken under different circumstances.

Security consciousness is not an inherent state of mind. It has to be acquired. All employees must be made aware of the possible threat of robberies and dacoities and the way to thwart them.

Bank robbers greatly rely on the fear phobia of the employees, so that they can intimidate them and succeed in their attempt at robbery. No amount of training can take care of this behavioral pattern, unless the staffs are actively motivated to feel involved and become prepared. Banks staff must, thus be motivated to keep their eyes and ears open to be able to sense danger and to effectively counter it.

General Precautions:

Certain general precautions may be followed by the banks:

a) As soon as a branch is opened, a reference should be made, in writing to the local police seeking their protection. b) Continuous liaison should be maintained between the branch manager and the local police. c) Any information received from them about movements of criminal, gang or other factors increasing the vulnerability of the branch must be meticulously noted and precautionary measures ensured. d) The telephone number of the nearest police station/booth must be prominently displayed near the telephone. Some designated employees must memorize the telephone numbers. e) The location of the control switch of the alarm system should be known to more that one person in the branch; f) The robbers normally guess the environments of the branch, the habit pattern of the employees, leave periods etc. before making any attempt. Employees should not, therefore, follow a set pattern of

going out of the branch especially during lunch, recess at a fixed time. g) Police verification of the antecedents of the newly recruited employees should be insisted upon before actually appointing them. h) Bait or Decoy Money should be used on the cash counters and in the safes. Wherever possible, some decoy money should be passed on to the culprits. Actions to be taken during Hold-ups:

i)

The importance of passive resistance must be explained and understood to the staffs. An employee should not voluntarily offer any clue about the money kept elsewhere during hold-ups. Dilly-dally tactics should be adopted. If demanded by the robbers to fill currency notes into a bag, as far as possible, notes of smaller denomination and change should first be given, so that the bag becomes heavy and difficult to carry.

j)

k) Bait or Decoy Money should be given to the culprits. l) All the employees of branch should keep an eye on all the robbers/dacoits and minutely observe the details of all the happenings of the crime. They should be in a position to accurately report to correct description of the suspects, their accomplices, if any, the vehicle used, its number, the route followed and any other relevant details.

The descriptions are critical in apprehending the suspects. The description of the suspects should include points like age, height, weight, sex, hair style and colour, colour of eyes, complexion, glasses, moustaches, beard, side burns, speech impediment or accent, language spoken, tattoos, scars or marks, dress, distinguishable gait or limp, shoes, weapon carried, car/motor cycle number, colour and make, direction to which it last moved.

A hold-up description questionnaire should be used.

m) If at the time of hold-up, any employee happens to be outside the branch and he comes to know about the hold-up, he should not enter the branch but should organize outside help and alert the police. Actions to be taken after hold-ups:

n) The police should be informed immediately by the quickest means about the hold-up by two different persons, while one report on telephone, the other can inform them personally if possible. o) If the alarm bell has not been activated during the time of hold-ups, it is to be activated at the earliest. p) All the members of the staff and customers should be requested not to touch anything on which finger prints have possibly been left behind by the culprits. q) As soon as the police arrive, the police should be informed precisely of the time and the direction in which the hold-up men left and if possible the description and number of the fleeing vehicle and a brief description of the hold-up men, their number, age group etc. r) Outsiders should not be allowed to enter inside the bank. s) The media/press and the public should be told only what the bank wants them to know. Statement should preferably be given to the media either by Branch Manager or any other officer. t) The descriptions of the suspects should be written down independently by the employees and they should not discuss this among themselves as the description gets distorted and influenced by the employee having the most dominating personality. u) In case of any dacoity/burglary in the branch, after informing the local police station and concerning Regional Head notice to be informed to the local administrative heads and senior police officials, so that simultaneous action could be taken from all corners to round up the culprits.

STANDING SECURITY COMMITTEE

In terms of Reserve Bank of India letter No.SPC.585/SPC-1-88/89 Dtd.12.11.1988 a Standing Security Committee was formed at our Head Office for implementation of the guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India and Management of Security of the Bank. Similarly, guidelines have been issued to form Standing Security Committee at the Regional Offices. The proposed composition of the Standing Committee at Head Office and Regional Office level are as follows:

i)

At Head Office Level: a. Executive Director a. General Manager (RM) b. Dy.General Manager (Inspection) c. Asstt.General Manager (Security & Currency Chest) d. Chief Manager (Security) e. Chief Manager (Vigilance) At Regional Level:

ii)

a. Chief Regional Manager /Asstt.General Manager of Region b. Chief Manager or DRM (Admin) from Regional Office c. Manager (Security) of the Region iii) At Branch Level: a) Branch Manager b) Dy.Manager/Senior Manager c) Manager (Security) from Regional Office

Conclusion: There is imperative need for the banks to develop security knowledge and consciousness among all the categories of bank staff through appropriate training and motivation as discussed above, which shall go a long way in further strengthening the security set-up in the banks especially at the grass-root level.

CHAPTER VII
ATM SECURITY 1. ATM SECURITY: i) General: Banking operations are being carried out through an Automated Teller Machine popularly known as ATM, which are located both On-Site (at the branch) and Off-site (away from the branch). This being an automated machine containing upto Rs.6.00 to Rs.7.00 Lakh or even more, the security of this cash is as important as security of any other asset belonging to Bank. The ATMs have inherent security risks, which should be countered through proper security measures. The ATM machines must have metallic sheets of appropriate thickness, lever locks of acceptable quality as well as state of the art, digital locks and vibration detection based alarm system. At present BIS has not formulated any specifications for ATM machines; as such, specifications as contained in UL specification No.291 (physical security Level 2) may be adhered to.

ii)

2. Physical Security: a) Location of ATM: Offsite ATMs are being established at Airports, Shopping Mall, Petrol Pumps, Restaurants, and Railway Station etc. as per Banks consideration. While selecting the location it must be ensured that no ATM is installed at an isolated location. b) The ATM Cabin should have a floor area of approximately 60 100 sft. c) Entrance should have a rolling shutter with embedded central locking system (for emergency use); d) The ATM cabin should have at least 9 thick wall on its three sides and 6 RCC roof and flooring. e) Glass door fixed on the ATM entrance should have magnetic locks which can be opened only by inserting ATM Card. f) An ATM machine selected should have adequate inbuilt security features (UL-291-Level 2 or higher). g) A CCTV System, comprising one in-built camera and another concealed, motion activated camera may be installed for detection of fraud / theft; h) A security guard (bank or private) may be posted at ATM site. i) Fire detection and alarm system with hand-held carbon dioxide (CO2) fire extinguishers may be installed in the customer area. The ATM should be provided with an automatic modular type fire extinguisher system. The ATM should be grouted to the floor of the room.

j)

3. Operational Security: a) The Branch Manager should display important telephone numbers along with a list of Dos and Donts for customers in the ATM Cabin. b) In case of any defect in ATM operation, security guard should inform the Branch Manager / concerned department immediately. c) Security guard should not leave the place of duty unless properly relieved. d) Security guard should report any untoward incident to the branch manager or concerned department. e) Security guard should behave politely with the customers. f) The Branch Manager in charge of ATM should maintain proper record of security guard posted at ATM from time to time. g) The Branch Manager and Manager (Security) should visit ATM site and check whether laid down security instructions are properly adhered to. h) Cash loading or any cash related activity should be manually handled in the presence of Bank Guard or the Agency authorized by the Bank. The Security Guard should verify the Identity Card of the personnel before permitting them. i) Belongings of the personnel (handbags/briefcases etc.) required for Cash Safe operation should be checked thoroughly while entering and leaving the site. j) Any new fittings being installed at the ATM Site or at the ATM should be brought to the notice of the concerned guard; k) No vendor personnel should be allowed to work on the ATM without proper authorization from the vendor as also without proper Identity Card. l) The Bank should provide Security Guards with a torch. m) Security Guard has to be extra vigilant during the cash loading operation. Duties of Private Unarmed Security Guard at ATM Sites: Security Guard should: a) Allow access to ATM cardholders only, one at a time; b) Do not permit any Arms and Ammunition inside the ATM by customers; c) In case anybody leaves behind any bag, or suspicious item etc. Security Guard, on duty, should immediately inform Branch Manager, Security Officer or Civil Police; d) He should not handle ATM Card of customer for any reason whatsoever; e) In case of any UNREST in the area, Security Guard should lower down the Roller Shutter and inform the Branch Manager / EDP manager/Resident Security Officer (RSO); f) He should handle customers tactfully; g) He should ensure that the ATM site is not unsecured / blocked by parking heavy vehicles etc. h) He should remain in proper uniform and be alert at all times; i) He should inform Branch Manager, in case of any defect in ATM working etc. j) He should not leave the place of duty unless properly relieved. He should report any untoward incident to Branch Manager and own Security Officer immediately.

Physical Security of Data Centre

General: In todays computerized environment, it is imperative for Banks to preserve and protect their Data Centre against any attempt of hacking, burglary, fraud, theft or damage due to natural disasters. Hence, the security measures recommended in succeeding paragraph may be adopted. Selection of Data Centre: Following guidelines may be adopted: a) b) c) Proposed location should be away from disturbed areas (from law and order point of view) areas prone to natural calamities like fire, flood and earth quake. Building housing the Data Centre should be strong and safe against any outside intrusion. Cabins and the equipments dedicated to Data Centre equipment should be free from dust, smoke, humidity and very high ambient temperatures.

Physical Security: Following security measures are suggested: a) A Senior Bank Officer who is qualified and experienced should be nominated Officer-in-Charge of Data Centre. b) Access Control to the Data Centre should be exercised strictly. Authorised persons should only be permitted to enter Data Centre; c) Data Centre should be guarded by Armed Guards round-the-clock (24 x 7); d) No item of hardware/software, documents, files be brought inside and to be taken out without written permission of the Officer In charge; e) Fire Detection and Alarm System be installed at the Centre against fire hazarssd. In addition hand held Carbon dioxide (CO2) fire extinguishers be installed; f) A Close Circuit TV with recording facility may be installed, if required. g) Electronic Data storage devices must be stored in Fire Resistant Cabinets; h) Computer Data operational Security is ensured by the personnel of Bank Information Technology Department.

CHAPTER VIII

RISK ASSESSMENT OF BRANCHES AND STAFFING OF SECURITY PERSONNEL

The security problem of banks has increased greatly during the last few years. The security risks to banks from external agencies particularly in the form of armed robberies have posed serious problems to the banks managements. Several efforts have been made by banks individually and also at the coordinated level by the Government of India (GoI), Banking Division, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Indian Banks Association (IBA) to attempt measures for tackling the situation.

Earlier; an assessment of both the security-proneness of a branch, as also the security measures to be initiated, have been subjective. A quantitative assessment on both the aforesaid areas was being resorted to. Instructions issued by the GoI, Ministry of Finance, asking banks to categorise branches according to their cash holdings and to determine the allotment of security guards according to that categorisation, was the first attempt towards quantified assessment. In the light of these instructions, an attempt to quantity the security risk to our branches was made in 1996 by the Committee, which had framed a format based on four major factors viz. Location, Operational and Economic, Psychological and Structure and Layout. All the four factors were accorded equal weightage of 25% each. The first factor (Location) had 10 questions with 10 points each (single weightage), while the remaining factors had five questions each with 20 points per question (double weightage).

With the changing banking scenario and no respite from the ever-increasing incidents of crime against banks, a need has been felt to review the existing parameters / sub-parameters and the weightage given to them while arriving at risk retained viz. Location, Operational and Economic, Psychological and Structure and Layout. But, the aspects covered in each major factor have been subdivided into Single Weightage Group and Double Weightage Group in accordance with their importance our effect on the security of the branch. The number of questions and the weightage accorded has been revised. The total points for the questionnaire are 400. Having assessed the security risk of each branch, the branch can be categorised as HIGH RISK, NORMAL RISK and LOW RISK on the basis of the following yardstick:

Total Points out of 400 280 and above 200 279 < 200

Risk Classification HR NR LR

Staffing / Allotment of Armed Guards:

The scale of allotment of Armed Guards will be as under:

a) b) c) d)

High Risk and Currency Chest Branches Normal Risk Branches Low Risk Branches For each cash van

2 1 NIL 2

Periodicity of Risk Assessment:

Risk assessment exercise should be carried out for every branch / extension counter / satellite branch once in 3 years or on the following occasions:

a) b) c) order d)

When a new branch is opened or new premises occupied; When a bank merges with another bank; In case of any major changes in the basic factors like location, law and scenario; When required by the top management of the Bank.

Instructions for filling up the assessment format:

Instructions with regard to each factor and sub-factor are given below:

Part I

Location:

Single Weightage Factors:

1. Location of Branch: City etc. A Branch located in capital city is less vulnerable as compared to branch located in District HQs and likewise. A branch located in Other Places would be the most vulnerable among all the branches with the logic that capital cities have well organised and effective law enforcement agencies as compared to the rest of categories in that order. 2. Location of Branch: Area Classification: A branch located in Commercial Area is logically less vulnerable as compared to a branch located in remote / isolated area. Hence, points would be accorded in that order. 3. Internal Disturbances / Riots: Assessment should be made of the vulnerability of the area prone to Internal Disturbances / Riots. Neutral Areas as per assessment would get the least points viz. the locations prone to riots etc. 4. Type of Branch: The rating of type of branch would be given in the indicated ranges. Depending on other environmental conditions, a branch would, with its sub-factors get a higher or lower rating e.g. if a branch was categorised as rural branch its rating would be either 01 or 02. If a particular branch were more risk-prone than another branch, that branch would get more points. 5. Premises: A branch located in a separate building with high perimeter wall is less prone to burglary risks as compared to a branch located in a building with no perimeter wall. Accordingly, points will be accorded. 6. Telephone Communication: Telephone communication would indicate the facility to communicate and transmit an alarm message telephonically. A branch with no telephone facility would get the highest rating. If a branch does not have a telephone within its premises but has the facility in the neighbourhood, it would get a lower rating. 7. Power Supply: This will depend upon factors like load shedding, frequency of break down and availability of alternative source of power. No breakdowns (like in Mumbai city) would get NIL point. 8. Proximity to Police Stations: Branches located near the police stations / chowkies have the natural security cover. Hence the location of branches away from them would be considered vulnerable accordingly.

Double Weightage Factors

9. Area (Law and Order): Law and order situation is the most important location factor guiding the vulnerability of the branch. If the situation were not conducive to the flawless banking environment, it would attract the maximum points and vice versa.

10. Area (Crime against Banks): If a successful attempt were made in a particular area in a branch of a Bank, the culprits would definitely take chances in that area or in the neighbouring localities (psychologically their morale gets boost up). Hence, the area becomes vulnerable and so are the branches located therein. However, if the area is totally indifferent (peaceful) towards the crime against banks, it would be awarded the least points and vice versa. 11. Proximity to International Border / LOC: Self-explanatory.

Part II Operational and Economic Factors:

Single Weightage Factors:

1. Type of Banking: Type of Banking also affects the vulnerability of a branch, Big Corporate and Govt. Accounts mostly indulge in instruments transfer rather than cash, whereas Feeding Branch would be holding on a to huge cash balances that invariably would provoke the miscreants and hence the branch becomes more vulnerable. Moreover, Govt. A/cs means Govt. machinery involved, hence less lucrative to the miscreants as compared to other accounts. 2. Banking Hours: We are heading towards 7 days x 24 hours banking in the present scenario. Hence, timings also play a crucial role in determining the vulnerability of a branch. Holiday working implies less resistance to the attempt and easy exit routes after the strike. Also, darkness multiplies the threat and hence has been accorded the highest points. 3. Banking Environment: Modernisation and competition to woo the customers have opened the floodgates of vulnerability. We tend to overlook the basic security parameters like installing rolling shutters and collapsible gate at the entrance, cash transactions without cash cabins, etc., in order to maintain the ambience. Hence, conventional banking environment with all the physical security measures would attract fewer points as compared to the any window concept.

Double Weightage Factors:

1. Category of Branch: The bigger the branch, the more would the operations and thus comparatively more vulnerability; 2. Average Cash Holding: Instead of the prescribed cash holding, the actual cash holding should be taken into account over a period of time (average). The more the cash, the more the threat and hence more weightage.

Part III Psychological Factors:

All the sub-factors listed under this group would essentially relate to a value judgment. A pragmatic assessment would have to be made to ascertain the following points:

Single Weightage Factors:

1.

Level of Co-operation

: Self-explanatory.

2. Security Force Level: Armed Guard is a deterrent and hence his presence in a branch would definitely have positive impact in preventing physical crime. 3. No. of Staff in Branch: The number of staff (persons) is inversely proportional to the vulnerability of the branch. The more the number, the less is the vulnerability. More so, the increasing number of staff would increase the spread of the branch also (to accommodate them), which means that more number of persons (dacoits) are required to pin down the staff and to cover a larger carpet area. 4. Security Awareness / Training: High standards of security training and security awareness among staff members would definitely play a positive role in averting (if not averting, then at least minimising loss and/or casualty) crime against banks and hence taken into account. Trained person can handle the situation effectively, in that he can offer passive resistance in the face of crime by keeping his cool. Hence, the degree of awareness and standard of training dictate the points. The lesser the degree, higher the points and vice versa. 5. Staff Awareness Security Gadgets in Branch: Security Gadgets are the deterrents and hence their presence would definitely thwart the physical attempts against the Banks. The gadgets would come handy only when the staffs are aware of their operations. If the branch is well equipped with a good mix of security gadgets along with their operational and tactical awareness (importance) to the staff, it is least vulnerable to attempts.

Double Weightage Factors:

6. Attitude of Police: Psychologically, attitude of police plays a crucial role in curbing or promoting crime. 7. Liaison with Local Administrative Machinery: Support of the administrative authorities, psychologically, boost-up the morale of the staff of the branch and simultaneously, probably, lowers the morale of the culprits. Accordingly, the points have been allocated.

Part IV Structure and Layout:

Double Weightage Factors:

1. Premises Structure: Quality construction would attract less points as compared to the premises, which are weak e.g. a concrete construction is preferred to the brick construction and brick construction is preferred to wooden construction and likewise. Major effort is required to breach concrete construction but it is very easy to break into a wooden structure. 2. Strong Room: Same as Point No.1 above.

3. Safe: Safe located inside the strong room is quite safe as compared to the safe located outside the strong room. Accordingly points are accorded. 4. Branch Layout: Layout of the branch also plays a crucial role in the safety of the branch. If the layout of a branch is not capable of restricting publics access into the staff working area, it cannot be considered as excellent / good. Similarly, if the strong room of a branch is visible from outside the premises also, the layout cannot be considered as good. 5. Cashiers Cabin: Self-explanatory.

Conclusion:

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, if any Regional Head feels compelling need to upgrade the risk categorization of any Branch / Extension Counter / Satellite Branch for any specific reason, it may be done with the concurrence of the Chief Security Officer of the Bank.

sec_iba

PROFORMA FOR RISK CATEGORISATION OF BRANCHES:

Branch & Location

PARAMETER Part I - LOCATION

RANGE

RATING

Single Weightage Factors:

1. Branch is Located in: a) Capital City b) District HQs c) Block HQs d) Other Places 2. Branch is located in: a) Commercial Area b) Industrial Area c) Residential Area d) Remote / Isolated Area 3. Branch is located in areas prone to Internal Disturbances / Riots

01 02 03 05 06 08 09 10

01 02 03 05 06 08 09 - 10 01 10

4. Location of Branch a) A part of an other building b) Separate building with 8-12 sft Perimeter wall c) Separate building but with Perimeter wall/spites less than d) Separate building without perimeter 5. Type of Branch: a) Rural b) Semi-Urban

00 01 02 03 - 04 05

00 01 02 03

c) Urban d) Metropolitan 6. Telephone Communications a) No telephone facilities in Branch b) No telephone facilities in neighbourhood c) No telephone facilities in the area 7. Availability of Power Supply a) No Breakdowns b) Frequent Breakdowns/ Regular Load Shedding c) No power supply but Substitute available d) No power supply & No substitute available

04 05

01 03 04 - 09 10

00 01 - 05 06 - 09 10

8.

Proximity to Police Stations/Authorities a) Immediate Vicinity/Within a Km. b) Between 01 & 03 kms. c) Between 03 & 05 kms. d) Beyond 05 kms.

00 02 03 05 06 07 08 10

Double Weightage Factors:

9. Area (Law & Order) a) Safe b) Crime Prone c) Unsafe / Highly Crime Prone (Naxalites, Insurgent movements etc.)

01 08 09 - 16 17 - 20

10. Area (Crime against Banks) a) No incident ever b) Incident (s) occurred (prior to 5 yeas) c) Incident (s) occurred d) Incident have occurred in the current year 11. Proximity to a) International Border b) Inter-state Border

01 05 06 - 10 11 - 15 16 20

01 10 11 20

A.

TOTAL OBTAINED

PART II OPERATIONAL & ECONOMIC FACTORS Single Weightage Factors:

1. Type of Banking a) Large Corporate & Govt. Accounts b) Branches holding gold jewellery c) Large Safe Deposit Vaults d) Feeding Branch & facility for remittances

01 02 03 - 05 06 - 08 09 - 10

2. Banking Hours a) Market Day working b) Day Banking c) Holiday Working d) Nigh Banking 3. Banking Environment a) Manual Working (Conventional Banking set up) b) Partial Computerisation (Conventional Banking Set up) c) Total Computerisation (Conventional Banking set up) d) Total Computerisation (Any Window Concept)

01 02 03 - 05 06 - 08 09 10

01 02

03 - 05 06 - 07 08 - 10

Double Weightage Factors

4. Category of Branch a) Small b) Medium

01 04 05 - 09

c) Large d) Extra Large 5. Average Cash Holding a) Rs.1 10 Lakhs b) Rs.10 15 Lakhs c) Rs.15 20 Lakhs d) Above 20 Lakhs

10 - 15 16 20

01 04 05 - 09 10 - 15 16 20

A. TOTAL OBTAINED

PART III PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Single Weightage Factors

1. Level of co-operation between police & state a) Good to Excellent 01 - 02 b) Poor 03 05 2. Security Force Level a) Whether Armed Security Guards (Police/PMF/Banks)

00 01

b) Whether Armed Private Security Guards 02 c) Whether unarmed Security Guards 03 - 04 (Police / PMF / Others) d) Whether No Guards 3. No. of Staff in the Branch a) More than 20 b) Between 11 & 20 c) Between 05 10 d) Less than 05 4. Security Awareness / Training a) High Awareness b) Average Awareness 05

00 02 03 - 05 06 - 07 08 10

00 02 03 - 05

c) Below Average Awareness d) No Awareness 5. Staff & Security Gadgets in Branch a) High Awareness & Functional Time Lock, EAS etc. b) Average Awareness with Time Lock, EAS etc. c) Below Average Awareness with a few gadgets d) No Awareness with no gadgets Double Weightage Factors

06 - 07 08 10

00 02 03 - 05 06 - 07 08 10

6. Attitude of Police a) Very co-operative b) Respond promptly c) Lengthy response time (Casual approach) d) Routine effort(no priority) 7. Liaison with Local Administrative Machinery a) Excellent b) Good c) Average d) No Liaison 8. Attitude of Banks Management (R.O) a) Pro-active b) Reactive

01 04 05 - 09 10 - 15 16 20

01 04 05 09 10 15 16 20

01 - 10 11 20

C. TOTAL OBTAINED

PART- IV STRUCTURE & LAYOUT

Double Weightage factors

1. Premises a) Safe / Major effort to break through b) Fairly safe / difficult to break through c) Unsafe / easy to break through 2. Strong Room / Safe Deposit Vault a) Impregnable b) Difficult / major effort c) Minor effort 3. Safe a) Located in strong room b) Embedded in RCC enclosure c) Quality of Safe (fire proof, drill proof, oxy-acetylene, gas proof) d) Visibility to public 4. Branch Layout (other than cashiers cabin) a) Excellent b) Good c) Average d) Poor

01 04 05 - 10 11 20

01 - 04 05 - 10 11 20

01 04 05 - 08 09 - 14 15 20

01 - 04 05 - 08 09 14 15 20

5. Cashiers Cabin (Design, Layout & Condition) a) Excellent & conforming to RBIs 01 04 Specifications b) Average & conforming to RBIs Specifications c) Excellent but not conforming to RBIs specifications d) Average and not conforming To RBIs specifications 05 - 08 09 - 14 15 - 20

D. TOTAL OBTAINED

GRAND TOTAL (A + B + C + D)

ASSESSMENT (Refer the Table Below)

SENIOR MANAGER(SECURITY)/ MANAGER (SECURITY)

BRANCH MANAGER

Total Points out of 400 280 and above 200 to 279 Less than 200 Note:

Risk Classification HR NR LR

Notwithstanding the above form and the points awarded, if any Regional Head feels compelling need to upgrade the risk categorisation of any Branch / Extension Counter / Satellite Branch for any specific reason, it may be done with the concurrence of the Chief Security Officer of the Bank.

RECOMMENDATION TO UPGRADE RISK CATEGORISATION ON SPECIAL GROUNDS

Asst. General Manager (Security & CC)

Chief Regional Manager

sec_iba

CHAPTER IX
Bomb Threat and Contingency Plan:
A. A contingency plan is the best possible way to deal with any crisis with calmness. Proper planning can also reduce the threat of panic, the most contagious of all human emotion. Panic is sudden, excessive, unreasoning and infectious terror. In the context of a bomb threat, panic is the ultimate achievement of the caller. A clearly defined line of authority will instill confidence and avoid panic. Therefore, it is necessary for every organization to prepare a carefully thought out bomb threat contingency plan suitable to the organizational requirement. Some features of the contingency plan are as follows: I. If bomb threat is received on telephone, the receiver should react in the following manner: a) Keep the caller on the line as long as possible and try to obtain maximum information about the bomb such as location, likely time of explosion, shape and size of the bomb or container etc. and record every word spoken by the caller; b) A particular attention to the background noises, which may give a clue as to the location of the caller e.g. railway station, airport, road side etc. c) Listen carefully to the voice, voice quality, accent and speech impediments; d) Report the threat to the person designated as Bomb Threat Coordinator; e) Remain available till the police arrived; II. If the threat is received by post, the following actions may be taken: a) b) c) d) Save all materials; Avoid unnecessary handling; Handover the message to police; If the message is received by Email or SMS, dont delete the same and forward the text to the police followed by hard copy of the same.

B. Bomb Threat Co-ordinator: A Senior Manager (Security) may be designated as Bomb Threat Coordinator. An alternate co-ordinator may also be designated in his absence. C. Bomb Threat Co-ordination Control Room: The Chief Security Officer/Chief Manager (Security) and his office may be utilized as a Bomb Threat Coordination Control Room. The following documents / facilities should be available with the office: i. A blue print of floor diagrams; ii. A list of likely target area; iii. A list of necessary telephone numbers; (police/bomb disposal squad/ambulance/fire-brigade/hospital etc.)

iv. v. vi.

Duplicate keys of all important areas / departments; A system of signal for evacuation; Details of evacuation plan;

D. Bomb Threat Assessment Committee: It is recommended that the bank should have a Bomb Threat Asessment Committee comprising of the following: i. The ii. iii. iv. v. General Manager in charge of Security Department The Chief Security Officer/Chief Manager (Security) The Resident Security Officer Asstt.General Manager (Premises & Security) An Officer from Public Relations Department

E. Evacuation: An immediate and total evacuation will be the most appropriate response to any Bomb Threat Call. For this purpose a detailed evacuation plan is to be chalked out and circulated to all the employees. The Evacuation Drill may also be coupled with Fire Evacuation Drill. However, the following points should be borne in mind: i. Dont announce Bomb Scare ii. Use of safest routes to assembly area, dont use lift/elevator iii. Dont be panicky, panic may lead to accidents / stampede iv. Go to the designated area and wait for further instructions v. Turn off / switch off electrical gadgets vi. Dont obstruct passage of security / Bomb Disposal Squad vii. Follow the instructions given by the Security Department /Bomb Disposal Squad.

CHAPTER X

Disaster Management: Overview of Indias Vulnerability to Natural Disasters.

What is Disaster? Disaster is a sudden, calamitous event bringing great damage, loss, destruction and devastation to life and property. The damage caused by disasters is immeasurable and varies with the geographical location, climate, type of earths surface and degree of vulnerability. This influences the socio-economic, mental, political and cultural state of the affected areas. Generally, disaster has the following effects in the concerned areas: v) It completely disrupts the normal day to day life; w) It negatively influences the emergency systems x) Normal needs and processes like food, shelter, health etc. are affected and deteriorate depending on the intensity and severity of the disaster. It may also be termed as a serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses, which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope with using its own resources Thus, a disaster may have the following main features: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. Unpredictability Unfamiliarity Speed Urgency Uncertainty Threat

In the last 10 years, India has been the victim of various disasters, including earthquake in Bhuj, Super Cyclone in Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and worst of all the earthquake that triggered a series of devastating TSUNAMI, killing more than 2,25,000 people in eleven countries bordering the Indian Ocean. The Indian Sub Continent is amongst the most hazard prone regions of the world. It is estimated that 18.6 million hectors of our land area is flooded every year and 65% of our land area is vulnerable to earthquakes. The 17 states identified as multihazard prone are Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Delhi, Sikkim, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Gujarat, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Types of Disaster: Generally, disasters are of 2-types i.e. natural and manmade. Based on the devastation, these are further classified into major/minor natural or manmade disasters. Some of these are as follows:

Major
Natural Flood, cyclone, earthquake, drought Manmade Epidemic, fire, chemical or biological disaster, wars, forest fire, terrorist attack

Minor
Natural Cold wave, thunderstorm, heat waves, storm, land/mud slides Manmade Road/train accident, riot, food poisoning, gas/chemical leaks, pollution

Risk: RISK is a measure of the expected losses due to a hazardous event of a particular magnitude occurring in a given area over a specific period of time. Risk is a function of the probability of particular occurrence and the losses each would cause. The level of risk depends on: i. Nature of Hazard ii. Vulnerability of elements, which are affected iii. Economic value of those elements Vulnerability: It is defined as the extent to which a community, structure, service, and/or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of a particular hazard, on account of their nature, construction and proximity to hazardous terrain or a disaster prone area. The extent of damage in a disaster depends on: i. The impact, intensity and characteristics of the phenomenon and ii. How people, environment and infrastructures are affected by that phenomenon Disasters affecting Bank: The disasters, which would affect the assets and operations of Bank, are as follows: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. Earthquakes Floods Cyclones Landslides Chemical/biological disaster Fire

Effects of Disasters: Almost all types of natural disasters enumerated above threaten life (of Bank employees and customers) and also cause physical damage of building structures and infrastructure. The area affected is vast in case of earthquakes and cyclones, while it may be localized in case of floods and landslides while with an earthquake there may be secondary effects of fire, landslide, flooding, breakdown of services like electricity, water supply communication facilities etc. The greatest secondary effect recently experienced by the society was TSUNAMI in 2004. As a result of

any of these natural disasters, banking operation is likely to be affected in the following manner: Branches / currency chests get flooded/buried Damage to currency, documents, bullion etc. Loss of life, injuries in respect of staff, customers Total breakdown of communication system affecting Core Banking System Loss of valuable data Therefore, it is necessary for the Bank to implement appropriate measures for mitigating and preparedness to meet various types of disasters. Disaster Management: The important terms and their definitions are as follows: i. Disaster Management: It is the range of activities designed to mitigate the effects of disaster and emergency situations and to provide a framework for helping people at risk to avoid or recover from the impact of the disaster. Managing the disaster includes steps to be taken prior to, during and after the disaster and involve preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery; ii. Disaster Mitigation: A collective term used to encompass all activities undertaken in anticipation of the occurrence of a potentially disastrous event, including preparedness and long term risk reduction measures. Mitigation is often not given the same priority as preparedness or recovery. This is because there is a tendency to view disasters and development in terms of Trade-Offs with needed resources being diverted from development towards disaster mitigation. iii. Relief: Refers to a period immediately following the occurrence of a disaster when steps are taken to meet the needs of survivors with respect to shelter, water, food and medical care. iv. Rehabilitation: It includes activities that are undertaken to support the victims return to normal life and reintegration into regular community functions. v. Disaster Management Cycle: Disaster Preparedness Response Mitigation Rehabilitation Prevention Reconstruction Development Many people and agencies take part in emergency response operations including local population and community-based organizations like Civil Defence and National Emergency Structures, Fire Brigades, Red Cross, international agencies, NGOs and others. Disaster preparedness, particularly in terms of post-disaster response, is primarily a Govt. responsibility.

National Disaster Management Authority:

The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), headed by the Prime Minister, is the apex body for Disaster Management in India. The setting up of the NDMA and the creation of an enabling environment for institutional mechanisms at the state and District levels is mandated by the Disaster Management Act, 2005. Evolution of NDMA: Emergence of an organization is always an evolutionary process. Establishment of NDMA has also gone through the same process. Towards this aim, the Govt. of India (GoI), in recognition of the importance of Disaster Management as a national priority, has set up a High-Powered Committee (HPC) in August 1999 and also National C0ommittee after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, for making recommendations on the preparation of Disaster management plans and suggestion effective mitigation mechanisms. The 10th Five-Year Plan Document also had, for the first time, a detailed chapter on Disaster management. Similarly, the 12th Finance Commission of India was also mandated to review the financial arrangements for Disaster management. Roles and Responsibilities: NDMA as the apex body is mandated to lay down the policies, plans and guidelines for Disaster Management to ensure timely and effective response to disasters. Towards this, it has the following responsibilities: Lay down policies on disaster management; Approve the National Plan; Approve plans prepared by the Ministries or Departments of the GoI in accordance with the National Plan; Lay down guidelines to be followed by the state Authorities in drawing up the State Plan; Lay down guidelines to be followed by the different Ministries or Departments of the GoI for the purpose of integrating the measures for prevention of disaster or the mitigation of its effects in their development plans and projects; Co-ordinate the enforcement and implementation of the policy and plan for disaster management; Recommend provision of funds for the purpose of mitigation; Provide such support to other countries affected by major disasters as may be determined by the Central Government; Take such other measures for the prevention of disaster, or the mitigation, or preparedness and capacity building for dealing with the threatening disaster situation or disaster as it may consider necessary; Lay down broad policies and guidelines for the functioning of the National Institute of Disaster management; Organization: NDMA has been constituted with the Prime Minister of India as it Chairman, a Vice-Chairman with the status of Cabinet Minister, and eight (8) members with the status of Ministers of state. Each of the members has

a well defined functional domain covering various states as also disaster specific areas of focus and concern to carry out the mandated functions. NDMA has evolved a lean and professional organization, which is IT-enabled and knowledge based. Skills and expertise of the specialists are extensively used to address all the disaster related issues. A functional and operational infrastructure has been built, which is appropriate for disaster management involving uncertainties coupled with desired plans of action. The concept of organization is based on a disaster divisions-cumsecretariat system. Each member of the Authority heads disasterspecific divisions for specific disaster and functional domains. Each member has also been given the responsibility of specified states and UTs for close interaction and co-ordination. The NDMA Secretariat, headed by a Secretary is responsible to provide secretarial support and continuity. National Disaster Response Force (NDRF): The Disaster Management Act, 2005 has mandated constitution of NDRF, a Specialist Response Force, for the purpose of specialized response to natural and manmade disasters. This force will function under the NDMA, which has been vested with its control, direction and general superintendence. This will be a multi-disciplinary, multi-skilled, high-tech force for all types of disasters capable of insertion by air, sea and land. All the eight battalions of NDRF are equipped and trained for all natural disasters including four battalions in combating nuclear, biological and chemical disasters. National Policy on Disaster Preparedness: Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and United Nations Development Programme has signed an agreement in August 2002 for implementation of Disaster Risk management Programme to reduce vulnerability of the communities to natural disasters, in identified multi-hazard disaster prone areas. In each state, State Level machinery has been created under the Chief Secretary for Disaster Management. The four main objectives of this programme are: i. National capacity building support to the Ministry of Home Affairs; ii. Environment building, education, awareness programme and strengthening the capacity of at all levels in natural disaster risk management and sustainable recovery; iii. Multi-hazard preparedness, response and mitigation plans for the programme at state, district, block and village/ard levels in select programme states and districts; iv. Networking knowledge on effective approaches, methods, and tools for natural disaster risk management, developing and promoting policy frameworks.

Measures against Natural Calamities:

Natural calamities like earthquake, cyclone and flood can result in devastation of property and create considerable human pain and misery. Though such calamities cannot be prevented, adequate contingency plans and timely follow-up measures can minimize the damage and loss significantly. Therefore all staff members should be conversant with and apply the guidelines given in the succeeding paragraphs. Maps showing earthquake, cyclone, and flood prone areas are enclosed as Appendices. i. Earthquake: Earthquake can occur at any place due to constant changes in the seismological features below the surface of the earth. However, some past history of a place can give a clue to the possibility of earthquakes in the area, which can be known by branches/offices from the local authorities. If they get information about possibility of an earthquake in an area, branches / offices can make contingency plans to reduce damages and casualties. The following course of action should be taken before, during and after an earthquake: General Precautionary Measures: a) Branches in earthquake-prone area should be in premises strong enough to withstand tremors of high intensity. Existing premises should be got checked with the help of qualified structural engineers/professionals and strengthened, if need be. If necessary, assistance of the local Public Works Department (PWD) may be requisitioned for this purpose. Establish close and continuous liaison with the local Disaster Management Unit or Civil Defence Unit or other organizations formed for dealing with such contingencies to obtain all relevant information about their set-up and warning system and to formulate contingency plans with their assistance. Keep important telephone numbers handy. Contingency plan should include proper planning at all levels, formation of various committees and delegation of responsibilities. Arrange for anchoring heavy furniture/fixtures, which may cause casualties. Heavy items should be kept on the floor and not on top of almirah, cabinets etc. Large and heavy objects inside almirahs should be kept on the lower shelf. Ensure that insurance cover for property against earthquake has been taken. Make evacuation plan for staff and their dependants. Prepare a first aid box in consultation with a medical officer. Apart from other items, it should also have water sterilization tablets to counter water pollution.

b)

c) d)

e) f) g)

h)

It is advisable to keep torch light with cells, candles, matchbox, crowbar, picks and shovels and ropes as emergency kit, ready and handy. From groups for fire fighting, relief and rescue work, first aid and security. Each group leader should be carefully selected after considering his aptitude, initiative and determination. Staff and their family members should be educated on the basics of First Aid and Fire Fighting. Ensure that water heaters and gas appliances are firmly fixed and remain shutting off when not in use as broken gas/pipes/other appliances are likely to be a major fire hazard. All should know the system of shutting off electricity/water and gas valves. Review protective arrangements from time to time and ensure serviceability of first aid fire fighting appliances. Staff should be trained and mentally prepared for First Aid work and Fire Fighting. Arrange for duplication of important documents and keep them offsite preferably in another branch of the Bank.

i)

j)

k)

l)

Actions to be taken during Earthquake: a) b) Do not panic; keep calm; The safest place during an earthquake is an open area. So if you are near an exit, run outside, 10-20 meters away, so that you can avoid collapsing walls. Once outside, do not go near buildings, boundary walls, chimneys and electric power lines. Always seek protection from falling debris. If the earthquake occurs when you are indoors, do not run from a building during earthquake, stay indoors, and take cover under a sturdy table or desk so that large falling objects may not hurt you. If the tremor causes the desk or table to move, be sure to move with it. Cover your head with helmet or pillow / cushion. Stay away from windows or mirrors and dont go out on to balconies, terrace or projections. Dont stay under or near any object that can fall and avoid staying in the kitchen, where the stove, refrigerator and other cabinet contents may move violently. If the earthquake occurs when you remain outside, move away from buildings and utility wires. Once in the open, stay there till the tremor is over. Do not run through or go near buildings. The biggest danger from falling debris is just outside doorways and close to outer walls. Do not use candles, matches or open flame. Put out all fires. If you are in a moving cash van or car, stop as quickly as possible, and stay in it till the earthquake stops, but do not stop on or under bridge.

c)

d)

e) f)

Actions to be taken after earthquake: a) Open the door or a window to secure an exit. Before making exit, switch off all electrical appliances and turn off the water and gas. If gas leak is suspected, open all windows and doors, leave immediately

b) c)

d)

e) f)

g)

h) i)

j) k) l)

m)

n)

and report it to the authorities (use someone elses phone). Do not use the elevator and use staircase instead. Do not go outside with bare feet, as it is likely that there will be broken glass or debris on the floor. Protect your head from falling debris by covering it with a helmet or a cushion / pillow. Do not touch fallen electric poles. In case of a building collapse or if you think that the building is uninhabitable after an earthquake, contract the nearest Disaster Management Unit of the Government or other local authorities for rescue, relief and security of the branch/office. Arrange for rescue and relief operation as per plans. Immediate information should be sent to the controlling offices and Senior Executives from the controlling offices should visit the spot and help the affected staff. Arrange for evacuation of trapped staff and others and provide First Aid to casualties, if any. With the help of civil authorities, arrange for their evacuation to relief camps / safe areas and if possible, arrange for shelter, food, clothes and medical treatment. Arrange for immunization against small pox and cholera. Do not use the telephone except for emergency purposes. Keep conversations to an absolute minimum. Do not call Civil defence authorities for information. This could jeopardize timely assistance to those in need. All relevant information will be announced immediately in the media. Arrange for inspection of building / utilities but do not turn them on as the earth movement might have broken water, gas and electric conduits. Ascertain the extent of damage to the building and properties. Do not enter a building, if it is cracked or shows visible sign of damage till it is declared safe by the civil authorities. Arrange for cordoning off the area, if necessary. Arrange for repair of building / utilities in consultation with the local authorities / co-coordinators. Electric, water and gas connections should be thoroughly checked before use; After the building has been declared safe, organize salvage of cash, records, equipments and other undamaged properties and take security measures in consultation with police authorities to prevent looting and theft. Tally the cash with entries in the Cash Balance Book. If lockers are damaged, owners must be called upon to verify the contents. Godowns/factories should be inspected to assess the extent of damage to the goods, raw material/machinery etc. pledged/hypothecated to the Bank. Damage to property should be assessed and claim lodged with the Civil Authorities for release of compensation, if any. Arrange for reconstruction of account books and try to restore normal functioning as soon as possible either in the same or alternative premises. If the Branch needs to move to an alternative premises, intimate the controlling office and obtain due approval from the competent authority. In case of expected delay in normal functioning, put up notice and advise the public about the likely date of opening. Assure the customers that their cash valuables are safe and will be available to them within a short period. Inform the Insurance Company of the incident and lodge proper claims.

o) p)

q)

Keep the controlling office informed of all developments by the fastest means. Take adequate number of photographs for submission of report to the controlling office. After an earthquake of high intensity, intermittent tremors may be continuing. Do not jump to conclusion on hearsay or unofficial information without seeking clarifications from competent civil authorities. Listen to news bulletin latest information. Stay away from beaches. High tidal wave can occur after the ground has stopped shaking.

Cyclone and Flood:

A cyclone is a vast, violent whirl of wind, which moves from the high seas towards the coastal areas. Floods in low-lying areas generally follow a cyclone. Since cyclones and floods can be predicted fairly accurately, branches and offices in areas prone to cyclone and floods should take adequate precautionary measures. Some of the vital measures to be adopted are given below. Before going into details of contingency plan, we must understand the five stages of cyclone/flood, which must be taken care of while preparing the contingency plan. i) Various stages of Cyclone / Flood: : Warning received Cyclone/Floods are likely a. 1st stage : Warning received Cyclone/Floods are imminent b. 2nd stage c. 3rd stage : Cyclone / Flood has started. The branch gets Flooded and surrounded by water. d. 4th stage : The branch remains marooned for several days e. 5th stage : The flood starts receding and water drains out ii) Preparation of the contingency plan: The plans to deal with cyclone/flood situations should be based on the following three fold preparations: a. Adequate preparations should be made to meet the onslaught of cyclone and flood on receipt of the warning orders so that during the actual flood minimum dislocation is caused to the branches; b. Ensure that available Bank staff is rationally olrganised to take on the relevant work during emergency in a systematic and orderly manner. c. Ensure that proper attention for the restoration of the branch or office is well chalked out in advance to attend to the major problems facing the branch, soon after the receding of floodwater, to bring order out of the confused situation. iii) Appointment of a Coordinator: It is essential to appoint an individual as a coordinator to assume overall responsibility of the effected branch/office. The coordinator should be a senior person who enjoys executive authority. The Regional Head/Branch Head or his representative may be assigned the responsibility for coordination work during floods. iv) Flood Emergency Committee: A committee comprising the representatives of the various departments of the branch / office be appointed under the coordinator to help him in preparation of plan and executing the plan. Staff dealing with the Personnel, Public Relations, Premises and Security Departments should be included in the committee for obvious reasons. The formation of the flood emergency committee

should be reviewed every year before the monsoon so that every member is fully aware of his duties. v) Delegation of Responsibility: At the time of getting flood warning, it is normal practice to delegate responsibility to the committee members. It is also essential that senior most member under the coordinator should be able to take up the task of organizing flood relief work. The telephone number of the key personnel and contact numbers be made available and should be kept up to date at hand. vi) General Precautionary Measures: a. Avoid occupation of low-lying areas. b. Ensure that the premises are in good state of repairs and maintenance. Loose tiles, broken doors/windows, etc., if any should be repaired so that they are not blown away. If the roof and supporting structures of the premises are weak, these must be strengthened so as to withstand the fury of the cyclone. All loose wiring should be repaired and secured with batons or conduit pipes. c. Windows and doors should be properly closed and latched at the time of closing the premises; d. Ledgers and documents should not be kept on the floor but kept on the upper racks of almirahs and cabinets. Higher denomination currency notes should be kept on the highest and the lower denomination notes and coins in the lower racks of cash bins / safe. Electronic / mechanical equipments like computers, adding machines, typewriters etc. should be kept at high levels. e. Back up documents / floppies to be kept at safer premises in consultation with the regional office. f. Branches in coastal areas prone to cyclones should keep some wooden boards ready so that glass windows can be boarded up. g. Torchlight and spare batteries should be kept handy for an emergency. h. Survival / First Aid Kit to be checked out and kept ready before monsoon season. i. The staff should keep track of weather warnings and maintain close liaison with flood-control / flood forecasting centres. Disaster Management plans should be made in consultation with the civil and police authorities, which should include cyclone shelters, arrangements for evacuation of currency and important documents, stand-by transport arrangements and escort arrangements. j. The controlling offices should be informed as soon as cyclone / flood warning is received from the concerned authorities or reliable TV Channels/ broadcasting agencies and they should be kept updated with the latest developments from time to time. vii) Action on Receiving the Cyclone / Flood Warning: a. After a cyclone warning has been received, the staff members should be on alert and; b. It will be in the interest of branch if its employees living in low lying areas are helped to evacuate to safer places right in the beginning so that they are available to help in the evacuation of the branch as and when it becomes inevitable.

c. Staff and their families should stay indoor and listen to the latest weather bulletin or instructions from the nearest Metrological Office/Weather Forecasting Centres/All India Radio/Doordarshan, but should not be misled by rumors. d. At the first instance of any indication of flood, the controlling office should be apprised of the need, if any, to move out from the present premises. The concerned branch should obtain permission over phone and organize removal of cash, valuables and securities. Police, fire service and civil administration should be informed about the need to remove the important documents and cash. Ensure security of the premises in consultation with local police. e. If asked to evacuate, act promptly, turn off the gas, electricity and water, and if possible, move your valuable articles to upper floors to minimize flood damage. Close all the doors and windows and securely fasten them. On being asked to evacuate, the staff should head for proper shelters or evacuation point, if indicated. At the shelter, follow instructions of the Officer In charge and remain in the shelter till the ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL is given. Casualties, if any, should be given necessary First Aid. f. Ledgers and documents should not be kept on the floor but kept on upper racks of almirahs and cabinets. Higher denomination currency notes should be kept on the higher racks of safe. Electronic / mechanical equipment like computers, adding machines, typewriters, fax etc. should be kept at higher levels. g. Evacuation of currency, property etc. if it becomes necessary, should be organized as per plans. Arrangement for police escorts should be made well in advance. h. Make a list of items / equipments left behind in the branch to facilitate inventory control after the flood recedes and survey by Insurance Agents. Take a few photographs of the flooded branch / office, if possible. i. Leave the branch/office well before the routes to high ground are flooded. j. Branches and offices should be in constant touch with the local civil/police authorities and take their advice. k. Duty roster for the staff members to be on the duty round-the-clock at branches/offices should be prepared; l. Back up documents / floppies to be kept at safer premises; m. Inform customers maintaining locker to remove the valuables from their lockers; n. If the flood / cyclone emergency arises after office hours or on a holiday, the contingency plan must lay down the procedure for the staff to assemble at the branch to see the branch is safe. viii) Action After Flood / Cyclone: a. Building / Strong Room Door/ Safe Deposit Locker Room / Time Lock / Alarm System / Hotline should be inspected for any damage or signs of damage and repairs, if required, should be undertaken at the earliest. b. Arrange salvage of damaged property and make drying arrangements, if necessary.

c. Electric wiring should be checked thoroughly and repaired before reconnecting the power. Any loose and dangling wire from lamp post is strictly avoided. d. Make out a complete list of detailed damage and work out a time schedule for its restoration, reconstruction of accounts and requisition of stationary and OFF items. e. Physical check of the inventory and damage to movable properties and records etc. should be undertaken. f. Fire fighting equipments and alarm systems should be checked for serviceability. g. Go downs / factories should be inspected to assess the extent of damage to the goods, raw material / machinery etc. pledged / hypothecated to the Bank. h. If a branch has to stop functioning temporarily and move to its alternative location, the concerned Reserve Bank of India Office and other statutory agencies should be intimated. A notice for the information of the public about the possible date of re-opening of the branch and address of the alternative premises from where the Branch will function temporarily should be displayed prominently. The Branch should be reopened and normal functioning started as quickly as possible. i. The branch should be thoroughly cleaned and allowed to dry up before restarting its functioning; j. Electric wiring should be thoroughly checked and repaired before reconnecting the power. k. Sometimes it may become necessary to change the premises due to extensive damage caused to the walls and floor of the building. In that case immediate action to change the premises should be taken; l. Loss of any article from the branch should be prima facie considered as a loss due to the cyclone / flood. However, a report / complaint should be lodged with the police about the loss. Damage to property should be assessed and a claim lodged with the Civil Authorities for release of compensation, if any. m. A detailed report regarding the flood and damage to building, property, ledgers, documents, currency etc., should be submitted to the controlling authority and insurance claim should be lodged. List of damaged and condemned items of furniture; stores and equipments should be made and handed over to the insurance companies under intimation to the controlling offices. Such stores should be shown to the insurance company representatives for their inspection and assessment. Subsequently, these stores should be disposed off by public auction or through limited tender after obtaining approval from competent authority; n. Cash vans, cars and other motor transports should be driven carefully; o. Staff not knowing swimming should not venture out in waterlogged streets or building; p. Because of flood, supply water could be contaminated. It is advisable to drink boiled water to safeguard against waterborne diseases. Insecticide should be sprayed in the premises. q. The head of the controlling office must visit the branch as soon as possible; r. Arrange photographic coverage for insurance purposes to support claims at a later date;

s. Keep up the welfare and morale of the effected bank employees and their families by providing them food, temporary shelter and money; t. Prepare a duty roster for staff on duty round-the-clock at the branch / offices; u. Keep the higher offices informed; v. Looting by unruly elements is always a hazard, which must be guarded by issuing identity slips, passes etc. to identity casual employees; ix) Chemical / Industrial Accident / Attack: Chemicals are found everywhere, they purify drinking water, increase crop production and simplify household chores. But the same chemical properties that help us can also be hazardous to humans or the environment if chemicals are used or released improperly or accidentally. Hazard can occur during production, storage, transportation or disposal. Chemical plants are one source of hazardous materials but there are many others. a. Be aware of hazardous chemical industries in the vicinity of the Bank. Interact with such industries to find out nature of chemicals being used, their disaster response mechanisms, antidotes for the type of chemicals being used etc. b. Be prepared to evacuate. An evacuation could last for a few hours or several days. c. Also assemble a shelter kit to be used to seal the shelter room during a chemical release. The kit should include plastic sheeting, duct tape, scissors and modeling clay or other material to stuff into cracks. d. Sufficient number of gas masks (low cost, anti-pollution type) should also be kept available at branches located in close vicinity of chemical installations. x) What to do during a hazardous materials incident: a. If you witness a hazardous materials accident where smoke or fumes are being released, call local emergency notification number or the fire department as soon as possible. b. Stay away from the incident site to minimize the risk of contamination. Some toxic chemicals are odourless. c. If you are caught outside rember that gases and mists are generally heavier than air. Try to stay upstream, uphill and upwind. Hazardous materials can quickly be transported by water and wind. Try to go at least one half kilometer from the danger area. d. Evacuate, if necessary. xi) Chemical and Biological Weapons: In case of a chemical or biological weapon attack near you, Govt. authorities will instruct you on the best course of action. This may be to evacuate the area immediately. The best way to protect you is to take emergency preparedness measures ahead of time and to get medical attention as soon as possible, if required. xii) Chemical Agents: Chemical warfare agents are poisonous vapours, aerosols, liquids or solids that have toxic effects on people, animals or plants. They can be released by bombs, sprayed from aircraft, boats or vehicles or used as a liquid to create a hazard to people and environment.

xiii) Biological Agents: Biological agents are organisms or toxins that can kill or incapacitate people, livestock and crops. The three basic groups of biological agents that would likely to be used as weapons are bacteria, virus and toxins. xiii) What to do to prepare for a chemical or biological accidents / attack: a. Talk to the doctor to ensure all required or suggested immunizations are up to date. b. Assemble a disaster supplies kit including battery-powered commercial radio, non-perishable food, drinking water, roll of duct tape and scissors, first aid kit and sanitation supplies. xiv) What to do during a chemical or biological accident/attack: a. Listen to the instructions from Government authorities whether to remain indoor or evacuate. b. When selecting a shelter-in place avoid the furnace or utility room. c. Do not use any major appliances provided in your shelter in place. d. If you are in a vehicle and unable to go inside the building, stay in the vehicle, roll up the windows, turn off the engine and shut all vents. xv) What to do after chemical or biological accident / attack: a. Immediate symptoms of exposure to chemical agents may include blurred vision, eye irritation, difficulty in breathing and nausea. Decontamination is needed within minutes of exposure to minimize health consequences. b. Seek medical assistance for treatment.

LANDSLIDE
1. General Characteristics: Landslides usually occur as secondary effects of heavy storms, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The materials that compose landslides are divided into two classes, bedrock or soil (earth and organic matter debris). Its type of movement as given below may classify landslide: a. Falls: A fall is a mass of rock or other material that moves downward by falling or bouncing through the air. These are most common along steep road or railroad embankments, steep escarpments, or undercut cliffs especially in coastal areas. Large individual boulders can cause significant damage. b. Slides: Resulting from shear failure (slippage) along one or several surfaces, the slide material may remain intact or may break up. c. Topples: A topples is due to overturning forces that cause a rotation of the rock out of its original position. The rock section may have settled at a precarious angle, balancing itself on a pivotal point from it tilts or rotates forward. A topple may not involve much movement and it does not necessarily trigger a rock fall or rockslide. d. Lateral Spreads: Large blocks of soil spread out horizontally by fracturing off the original base. Lateral spreads usually break up internally and form numerous fissures and scarps. The process can

be caused by liquefaction whereby saturated, loose sands or silts assume a liquefied state. e. Flows: Flows move like a viscous, fluid, sometimes very rapidly and can cover several miles. Water is not essential for flows to occur, however, most flows form after periods of heavy rainfall. A mudflow contains at least 50 percent sand, silt and clay particles. 2. Factors contributing to vulnerability: The greatest threat of landslide exists in: a. Areas prone to earth tremors and earthquakes; b. Mountainous areas; c. Areas of severe land degradation; d. Areas covered with fine-grained sand or tephra (material ejected by volcanic eruptions); e. Areas that receive high rainfall. 3. Physical Damage: Anything on top of or in the path of a landslide will suffer severe damage or total destruction. In addition, rubble may damage lines of communication or block roadways. Waterways may be blocked creating a flood risk. Casualties may not be widespread, except in the case of massive movements due to major hazards such as earthquakes and volcanoes. 4. What do to before landslide: a. Get a good assessment of your property and familiarize yourself with surrounding area. b. Minimize hazards by having flexible pipe fittings installed, which are more resistant to breakage to avoid gas or water leaks. 5. Landslide Warning Signs: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Doors or windows stick or jam for the first time. New cracks appear in plaster, tile, brick or foundations. Outside walls, walks or stairs begin pulling away from the building. Slowly developing, widening cracks appear on the ground or on paved areas such as streets or driveways. Underground utility lines break. Bulging ground appears at the base of a slope. Water breaks through the ground surface in new locations. Fences, retaining walls, utility poles or trees tilt or move. The ground slopes downwards in one specific direction may begin shifting in that direction under your feet.

6. What to do during a heightened threat of landslide: a. Be prepared to evacuate if instructed by local authorities. b. Be alert when intense, short bursts of rain follow prolonged heavy rains or damp, which increase risks. c. Listen for any unusual sound that might indicate moving debris. A trickle of flowing or falling mud or debris may precede large landslides. You may hear a faint rumbling sound that increases in volume as a landslide nears.

7. What to do during a landslide: a. Move away quickly from the path of landslide. b. Areas considered safe include i. Areas that have not moved in the past; ii. Relatively flat lying areas away from drastic changes in slope; iii. At the top of or along ridges set back from the tops of slopes. c. If escape is not possible, curl into a tight ball and protect your head. 8. What to do after a landslide: a. Stay away from the slide area. There may be danger of additional slides. b. Check for injured and trapped persons near the slide without entering the direct slide area. c. Landslides can provoke additional associated dangers such as broken electrical, water, gas and sewage lines and disrupt roadways and railways. d. Check the foundation and surrounding land for damage it may help you assess the safety of the area.

TERRORISM

Introduction:

Terrorism emerged as a global phenomenon in the late nineties and despite sustained Govt. efforts to combat it, this has become a nightmare and will continue to spill more blood and launch more violent and spectacular attacks. 26th November has gone down in history as a day of largest ever terror strike on Indian soil. Even before that 9/11 exhibited an attack, which was meticulously planned and executed with clockwise precision. It cannot, therefore, be ruled out that the modern terrorists resorting to nuclear, biological and chemical attacks to cause mass destruction.

Preparedness and Prevention:

Prevention entails legislations and actions by the nation to prevent terrorist actions by sound intelligence synergized action by law enforcing agencies. India has passed the WMD Act, 2005 and Disaster Management Act, 2005, but what is lacking is credible Anti-terrorism Act. India had experimented with the POTA and TADA, both of which have since been done away with.

Preparedness means adequately preparing our intelligence; anti-terror forces and the public to deal with terrorism and at the same time prepare for the aftermath in terms of detection, diagnosis and minimize injury and sickness.

Response: The response to any terrorist attack should be two pronged. Firstly, the Armed or special force to contain and neutralize the threat and catch/destroy the perpetrators. Secondly, relief and treatment to the affected persons.

Anti-terrorist Apparatus:

Indias anti-terror mechanism is controlled by the Internal Security Cell at Ministry of Home Affairs. It attempts to co-ordinate the actions at various intelligence agencies and Police, Para Military Forces and National Security Guards.

Mechanism for Disaster Management:

The country has been facing both natural and man-made disasters since long. While the Government has established a very comprehensive and entailed structure for combating disaster, it is primarily organized to deal with natural disasters. The National Crisis Management Committee oversees all disaster related efforts. The Government has also set up National Disaster Management Authority in 2005 for drawing up and monitoring the implementation of disaster management plans, ensuring measures by various departments of the Government for prevention and mitigating the effects of disasters. State Governments are autonomous in organizing State Crisis Management Group. At the District Level, the District Collectors/District Magistrate is responsible for organizing the pre-disaster and post-disaster management.

In case of terrorist related disaster the entire nation jumps into action with all its resources and the area is generally taken over by Armed Forces/NSG etc. Eight (8) Battalions of CRPF/CISF/BSF/ITBP have been trained as the National Disaster Response Force. Four out of these have been equipped especially for Radiological, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical disaster/Terrorist strikes. The Govt. has with the help of Bhaba Atomic Research Centre has recently set up 18 Radiation Emergency Response Centers in different parts of the country.

CHAPTER XI
FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION 1. General 1.1. Definition of Fire: Fire can be defined as a phenomenon of uncontrolled combustion as manifested in the form of flame, heat and light. Other definition of Fire could be chemical change of a substance by combining with oxygen with evolution of heat and light. 1.2. a) b) c) 1.3. The three main factors required to start a fire are: Combustible material (solid, liquid or gas); Oxygen (air); Heat (Ignition Temperature). Fire Triangle:

Oxygen

Fire Combustible Material

(solid, liquid or gas)

Heat (Ignition Temperature)

1.4. Principle of Fire Fighting: If any one or more of the above factors (i.e. oxygen, heat and combustible material) is/are removed from the scene of fire, the fire can be put out. This is the basic principle of fire fighting. 1.5. Classification of Fire: In order to identify which extinguishing method/medium is best suited for putting off a particular type of combustion, fires are classified as under: a) Class A Fire (Carbonaceous Fire): these are fires involving ordinary combustibles, such as paper, wood, rags, textiles etc., where cooling effect of water is essential for putting out the fires. b) Class B Fire (Oil Fires): fires involving inflammable liquids like oil, solvents, petrol, petroleum products, paints, varnish etc. where cooling effect of water is essential for putting out such fires. c) Class C fire (Gaseous Fires): Fires involving gases under pressure such as L.P.G acetylene, butane, propane etc. d) Class D Fire (metal fires): There are fires involving combustible metals like magnesium, aluminum, zinc, potassium etc. The burning metals are reactive to water and require special extinguishing agents. e) Class E Fire: Fires involving electrical materials and equipment. This classification now stands withdrawn. 1.6. Methods of Extinguishing a Fire: extinguishing a fire and these are: there are three methods of

a) Starvation: This can be achieved by removing the combustible material from / or in the vicinity of the fire. b) Smothering: This involves cutting off or reducing the supply of oxygen from / to the burning material so that the oxygen percentage in the surrounding air is below the combustible level;

c) Cooling: This can be achieved by using water, which absorbs heat from the burning material. Pouring water on the burning surface of oil will, however, have no effect because, water being heavier than oil, will sunk down letting oil to burn more fiercely. Water should also not be used against any electrical fires as water is very good conductor of electricity and may cause harm or fatality to the operator. 1.7 Fire Fighting Appliances: There are various kinds of first aid fire fighting appliances and the selection thereof is made according to the nature and type of fire. The appliances should be placed in conspicuous positions, preferably near the gates and readily accessible for immediate use. If fixed to the wall, the handle of the appliances should not be higher than 5 feet from the ground. The following types of fire fighting appliances are normally used in Banks: a) Fire Buckets for storage of water: These are useful for fires on wood, paper, plastics, fabrics, coal etc. b) Fire Buckets for storage of Sand: These are useful for small fires of the above type also for small spill fires of oil etc. The sand should always be kept loose dry and clean; Note: Fire buckets may be used only in rural branches or basement etc. of huge administrative buildings. In no case should be sand buckets be used in a computerized branch. c) Water CO 2 Type Extinguishers: These are suitable for carbonaceous fires of wood, paper, plastics, fabrics, coal etc. These should not be used on electrical fire unless the electric mains have been switched off; d) Foam Type Extinguishers: These extinguishers are suitable for use on fires in oil, petrol, diesel, paints, varnishes etc. e) Dry Chemical Powder Type Extinguishers: These extinguishers are suitable for use on fires in flammable liquids and fires involving electrical equipments. However, limited results may be obtained if used in fires mentioned in (a) & (c) above. f) Carbon-di-oxide Type Extinguishers: These extinguishers are suitable for use on fires involving electrical appliances / inflammable liquids. However, limited results may be obtained if used in fires mentioned in (a) and (c) above. g) Automatic Fire Suppression Systems: These should be installed for vital installations such as Data Centers, Disaster Recovery Sites and Treasury Dealing Centers (national and international). 1.8
Sl. No. (a) (b) (c) (d) Area

The following yardsticks may be applied for planning fire equipment in the branches:
Water CO2 Lit. 1 1 Foam 9 Type 9 Lit. 1 DCP 5 kg 1 1 1 1 CO2 4.5 kg. 1 1 Fire Buckets 9 Lit. 2 -

Public space for every * sq. ft. Near Main Electric Switch Room Containing Generator Stationery Room

(e) (f)

Strong Room/Safe Room Computer Room

1 -

* The exact number of fire extinguishers/equipment will depend on the type of fire risk, floor area, type of office premises, layout etc. A minimum of four fire buckets, two water CO2 9 Lit. and two DCP (5 kg) type fire extinguishers should be provided at each floor irrespective of its size and lay out. A minimum of one foam type of extinguisher should be placed in the ground floor where vehicles are parked. Where canteens / mess functioning, minimum of one DCP (kg) extinguisher should be installed. Extinguishers bearing ISI mark should only be purchased, as other substandard brands are likely to fall and cause accidents. 1.9 Classes of Fire and the Fire Extinguishers to be used:
Class of Fire Description Extinguis hing Medium Fire involving ordinary Water combustible materials like wood, paper, textile etc, where the cooling effect of water is essential to extinguish fire Fire inflammable liquids Dry like oils, solvents, Chemical petroleum products, Powder varnishes, paints etc. where blanketing effect is required and electrical fires Fire involving gaseous CO2 & substances under Dry pressure such as LPG Chemical etc. where it is essential Powder of to dilute the burning gas ABC Type at a very fast rate with an inert gas or powder Fire involving metals Special like magnesium, zinc, Dry potassium etc. where Powders the burning metal is reactive to water and requires special extinguishing media. Electronic Equipment CO2 and computers Type of Fire Extinguisher to be used a) Water CO2 Type b) A.B.C. Dry Powder Type a) B&C Dry Powder b) Dry Type a) Type b) Dry Type A.B.C. Powder IS:13849-1993 Indian Standard

IS:940-1976

IS:2171 1976 (4308)-1982 IS: 13849-1993

CO2 ABC Powder

IS : 2878 1976 IS: 13849 1993

CO2 type

IS:2878-1976

2.

Fire Fighting Instructions and Evacuation Procedures:

2.1 The devastating effects of some fires can scarcely be exaggerated. Apart from loss to life and property, considerable inconvenience is causes. In addition to the loss arising from damaged property, the costs include the lost man-hours, which are providing adequate knowledge and training in the matter of fire safety. The implications are even more serious in the operational offices of banks i.e. the branches. All banks operations are evidenced in the records that these operations generate. Such records are the books of accounts 2.2 (ledgers), contract documents such as vouchers, schedules, registers etc. Some or all of these records may also be in the form of magnetic media/disks where computers are in use. In all probability, a very serious fire would wipe out most of the records available at the branch premises. 2.2 An analysis of fires in various buildings has brought out the fact that in most cases the cause of fire is attributable to carelessness or negligence on somebodys part. It remains a fact that if early action is taken to extinguish or contain fire, the loss due to it can be considerably reduced. The aim of all prevention and fire fighting drills/procedures is: a) Firstly, to ensure measures for prevention of fire; b) Secondly, should there be an outbreak of fire, to detect it early and attack it in its initial stage and put it off. If this cannot be accomplished, then at least to contain it and prevent it from escalation till the arrival of fire brigade; c) Thirdly, to bring all occupants of the premises to a central place of safety outside the building, in an orderly manner without causing panic and stampede; d) To salvage valuables, assets. 2.3 Fire Safety:

Fire safety is the total concept of providing safety to personnel and property of the bank from fire. It involves the following: a) b) c) d) e) f) Fire Engineering; Fire Prevention Fire Discipline Training Fire Fighting Evacuation, First Aid and Salvage The measures highlighted above are elaborated as follows: 2.3.a) Fire Engineering: Fire Engineering is concerned with the science of preventing fire through architectural design and use of fire resistant materials in construction of the building. This part is taken care of by the architect / civil engineer / builder at the time of construction or modification of the building 2.3.b) Fire Prevention: The best way to prevent fire is to eliminate the possible sources of fire. The following precautions are essential: (a) Electricity: Electricity is a major source of fire. Particular attention is necessary on the lines indicated hereunder:

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

(viii)

It should be ensured at regular intervals that electrical equipment, machinery and circuits are checked for short-circuiting, overloading and insulation. All additional connections should properly be planned and installed by an approved electrical firm; Where electrical wiring is of the concealed type, a plan of existing circuit should be drawn up and kept on record. Changes must be incorporated in this plan to keep it up-to-date at all times. Electric wire should not be run under carpets. If unavoidable, iron/conduit pipe must be used. Loose electric wire should not be kept lying/hanging around. Overloading of a circuit by multiple electric connections from a single point is a potential risk. This should never be allowed. Adequate number of plug points should be provided. Proper fuses should be used. Under no circumstances their rating should be increased than those recommended. Flickering tube lights, humming starters/chokes and overheated switches should be put right or replaced immediately. Electric connection to the Strong Room/Safe Room/Safe Deposit Locker Room should be provided through a plug and socket. The plug with the wire should be kept inside the room and the socket should be fixed on the wall outside and next to the Rooms door. A 15/30 Amps. Control switch should be provided with the socket to activate the circuit.

2.3.c) Housekeeping: Good housekeeping for fire prevention is a continuous process. Absolute cleanliness must be insisted upon at all times. The following precautions should be taken in this regard: i) Combustible materials such as waste paper, oil, rags wooden packing cases should not be left lying about. Metal bins with lid should be provided at suitable places, wherein waste paper and other garbage must be deposited. These bins should emptied at the end of the day / the following morning and their contents disposed off. If waste paper is to be destroyed by burning, an incinerator or metal drum should be used. The surroundings of the building should be kept free of combustible material. Papers/stationery/records etc. should be stacked carefully but never should stacks touch the ceiling / false ceiling. In fact, a clear gap must be maintained between the top of the stock and the ceiling. In no case, such stacks should touch any electrical wiring. Sufficient number of ashtrays and spittoons must be provided in the corridor (s)/ staircase (s) and banking hall. Cigarette butts and lighted match sticks must be fully extinguished before throwing in the ashtrays. Safety lights should adequately illuminate the staircase (s) escape route (s). All exit points must be kept free from obstructions. Preparation of tea etc. should always be away from escape route / combustible materials. Oil spillage must be avoided. In case of any spillage, it must be cleaned immediately. In case coal / firewood are required to be stored for use as fuel in the canteen, it should be stored in a metal drum kept covered with a

ii) iii)

iv)

v) vi) vii) viii)

metal lid away from the place of fire. The containers / tins containing kerosene oil should be kept on a little raised and sandbased platform so that any spillage is absorbed by sand. Stock of these fuels should be kept to the minimum required level.

2.3.d) i) ii) iii)

Gas connections: Gas line, if any, should be properly closed before leaving the kitchen at the end of the day; Leakage in the gas pipe should immediately be attended to; Gas cylinders should not be exposed to intense heat. Valves of cylinders must be properly closed when not in use. The rubber pipe connecting the gas cylinder and the burner/oven must be examined every time a cylinder is changed and it be replaced with new one as and when required. Naked light should not be brought near gas cylinder. Other Precautions: In addition to the preventive measures mentioned above, the following precautions should be observed: Smoking should not be permitted inside Strong Room / Safe Room, Stationery / Record Room and Store Room. In such places, NO SMOKING boards should be prominently displayed; Where the use of petromax / hurricane lanterns cannot be avoided, these must be secured on the table so that they do not topple due to physical impact. It must be seen that these do not touch the curtains etc., while swaying due to breeze. Adequate water supply must be available at all times. Water reservoirs must be kept full and the water pumps, if any, should be in perfect working order. Location of fire hydrants and any other source of water such as tanks, wells, canals etc., in the vicinity should be known to the security staff. Telephone numbers of Fire Brigade, dependent Police Station, Branch Manager / other officer, Security Officer (s) and Circle Security Officer must be prominently displayed near the telephone (s).

iv) 2.3.e) i) ii)

iii)

iv)

2.3.f) Fire Discipline: It is very important that the staff do not become panicky. They should conduct themselves in a disciplined and orderly manner in case of fire. They should obey the instructions issued by the person controlling the fire fighting. 2.3.g) Training: The main object of training in fire fighting is to ensure that staff, particularly the security staff remain calm, collected and do not panic. Further, action to fight fire should be automatic and correct and they should not act in a haphazard manner. Need for tact and discipline, particularly on the part of the supervising and security staff cannot be overemphasized. Keeping these points in view, the training should be so organized that the staff act as a team. The training should include: (a) Familiarization with various types of fire and use of right type of fire extinguisher to combat each type of fire. (b) Ascertaining the cause of fire and countering it.

(c) Organizing evacuation of personnel whose presence is not immediately required; (d) Salvage operation. (e) Practice of Evacuation Drill by the occupants of the building (at least twice a year); (f) The importance of vigilance at all times; (g) Maintaining liaison with the Fire Station. 2.3.h) Fire Fighting During Working Hours: The following actions should be taken to combat any incidents of fire that takes place during working hours: (a) Any person (s) noticing smoke or fire should raise alarm by shouting FIRE, FIRE or AAG, AAG, AAG and also he / they should use the fire alarm, if provided. (b) He/they should go to the place where fire has taken place and ascertain the cause of fire i.e. whether it is carbonaceous or electrical and try to contain and extinguish the fire using the right kind of fire fighting equipment. (c) A member of staff should inform the Fire Brigade and the Police Station / Police Control Room. (d) The main switch and the gas connection should be switched off. (e) The senior most person present will organize fire fighting in an appropriate manner till the arrival of Fire Brigade, who will assume charge on arrival. Strong Room/Safe Room / Locker Room should be closed and locked, if open. (f) All important documents should be removed / placed in strong Room or in a fire proof safe, if provided. (g) All combustible materials should be removed from the vicinity of fire. (h) In case of electrical fire, water jet or Soda-acid type extinguishers should not be used. These may, however, be used after the main switch has been switched off. (i) In case anyone is trapped inside the room/place of fire and smoke, he should lie on the ground with head downwards and nose touching the floor and then try to crawl to the exit door in the same position. (j) The senior most person present must make appropriate security arrangements for the property that has been removed from the vicinity of fire; (k) Persons not required for fire fighting should be evacuated in a disciplined manner giving priority to physically challenged and aged person. (l) Fire-aid should be provided to fire casualties and, if necessary, the injured person (s) should be evacuated to the hospital. (m) Assistance should be provided to the Fire Brigade, if required by them. (n) After the fire has been controlled and extinguished, salvage of Banks property should be organized. 2.3.i) Fire Fighting During Non-Working Hours: The following actions should be taken to combat fire during non-working hours:

(a) Guard (s)/ Watchmen/any other person noticing smoke or fire should raise alarm by shouting FIRE, FIRE, FIRE or AAG, AAG, AAG and he / they should operate the fire alarm, if provided; (b) He / she should go to the scene of fire, ascertain the cause of fire and try to contain and extinguish it using the right type of fire fighting equipment. (c) Fire Brigade should be informed immediately; (d) The main switch and the gas connections should be switched off; (e) The Branch Manager / Supervising Staff /Security Staff/Security Officer / Police Station should be informed; (f) All combustible material should be removed from te vicinity of fire; (g) In case of electrical fire, water jet or Soda-acid type fire extinguisher should be used only after the main switch has been switched off; (h) All assistance should be rendered to the Fire Brigade, if necessary. 2.3.j) Evacuation, First Aid and Salvage: Evacuation: Personnel not employed in Fire fighting must vacate the building using the staircase or escape route in a single line keeping to the wall. This will enable the fire fighting squad to move unhindered. Lift must not be used for evacuation. The evacuation should be carried out silently and without getting into or creating a panic. First aid should be given to the needy. Salvage: The past experience shows that the damage due to fire is much more but to the reasons other than fires itself. The primary purpose of salvage, therefore, is to reduce to the minimum the damage, which might otherwise occur because office and the consequent fire fighting operations. It is essential that all concerned should possess some knowledge about the different types of damages, which occur and the methods adopted to minimize them, which are: 2.3.k) Action After Extinction of Fire: After a fire has been extinguished, the senior most person present will take the following action: (a) Investigating the cause of fire; (b) Assess the extent of damage; (c) Comment on the fighting efficiency of the staff and recommend any cases of extreme devotion to duty and courage or otherwise. Fire Report: The Branch Manager should submit a telephonic / Email report about the outbreak of fire to the Controlling Authority, followed by a written report giving the following details: Time of outbreak and cause of fire; Detection of fire and by whom it was detected; Time of informing the Fire Brigade and time of their arrival; Time of informing the Police and time of their arrival; Time of informing the Branch Manager/Supervising Staff/Security Officer and time of his / her arrival; (f) Time of extinction of fire; (g) Action taken to salvage the Banks property; (h) Extent of loss / damage; 2.3.l) Fire Alarm: Distinct alarm sound recognizable and audible even in the remotest part of the building should be provided as a fire alarm; (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

2.3.m) Fire Notice: Fire Notice in English, Hindi and Regional languages containing the following information should be prominently displayed at the Branch: (a) Fire prevention Dos and Donts; (b) Action in case of fire; (c) Telephone numbers of local Fire Brigade, Police Station, Branch Manager any other Supervisory Staff, Security Officer, Circle Security Officer, Regional Manager;

SPECIMEN FIRE NOTICE

FIRE PREVENTION Dos: 1. Do keep your office clean and tidy at all times. 2. Do switch off all electrical appliances, lights, fans before closing / leaving office/room even for a short while; 3. Do deposit waste paper / sweeping / garbage etc. in a metal bin covered with lid and have them disposed off regularly; 4. Do burn waste paper in an incinerator; 5. Do keep the premises clear of waste, rubbish, broken furniture / fixture, old carpets. Keep the stair-cases/other escape routes free of obstruction at all times; 6. Do deposit cigarette butts and match sticks, properly extinguished in ashtrays; 7. Do switch off all switches during load shedding or temporary failure of electric supply; 8. Do tap electrical energy carefully and in a planned manner; 9. Do insist on proper insulation of electrical wires; 10. Do close all gas valves and gas mains when not in use; 11. Do learn how to use the fire extinguishers by reading the instructions on its body; Donts: 1. Do not smoke inside the Strong Room / Safe Deposit Locker Room, Record Room, stationery room, store room, godowns and in areas having NO SMOKING sings; 2. Do not light match stick / lighter / naked light near inflammable materials; 3. Do not throw burning / smoldering cigarette ends and match sticks; 4. Do not tamper with fire fighting equipment; 5. Do not remove fire fighting equipment from its location; 6. Do not use fire buckets for other purposes; 7. Do not use generator/petromax / hurricane lantern/candle inside the strong room, safe deposit locker room, record room and stationery room; 8. Do not sleep inside a store having flammable material; 9. Do not obstruct escape route (s)/staircase (s); 10. Do not use naked wires in sockets; 11. Do not tamper with electrical wiring or equipment; 12. Do not tap electrical energy indiscriminately; 13. Do not use unauthorized electrical appliances;

Do not change the fuse wire of high resistance to the one other than that recommended by Electrical Engineer; 15. Do not panic. Remain calm and collected; 16. Do not create confusion and spread rumors; 3. Precaution in Multi-storied / High Rise Building: The following additional precautions should be strictly observed in multi-storied buildings: (a) The high rise building should have statutory fire protection measures as all National Building Code and local by laws applicable in the State / City. (b) Fire notices should be displayed prominently on each floor and in each lift; (c) Electronic Smoke Detectors should be fixed in multi-storied buildings. These should be connected to a control room, which must be manned round-the-clock; (a) Hand/battery operated alarm system should be provide on each floor; (b) Battery operated public address system for early warning must be provided in the building. This should be installed after taking into account the requirement peculiar to each building; (c) A plan of location of the fire fighting equipment on each floor should be drawn; a copy of the same should be provided to the Security Officer / Caretaker of the building; (d) A plan for the electric circuits / installation should be drawn for the building floor-wise. A copy should be provided to the Security Officer / Caretaker of the building. (e) In case of out-break of fire in the buildings, the main gas line of the building, if any, should be immediately shut-off; (f) The water pressure of wet riser system should be checked regularly. Similarly, the dry riser system should also be checked periodically. (g) A plan for the evacuation of personnel and property should be prepared and the occupants must be briefed about it. (h) All escape routes/cases should be kept free from obstruction at all times and the safety lights should adequately illuminate these routes/staircases. (i) Lifts will NOT repeat NOT be used for evacuation; (j) Air conditioning ducts are excellent carriers of fire and must, therefore, be fitted with automatic anti-fire devices. (k) The building should have adequate supply of water. Reservoir should be provided at the base / overhead in building; (l) Stand-by generator must be installed to run water pumps during power failure; (m) The Security Officer/Caretaker of the building must be informed and his permission should be obtained before storing any inflammable liquid/material in the building. 4. Precautions in Godowns: The following additional precautions should be observed in godowns:

14.

i. Packages/bundles should be so stacked as to provide easy access to the top. ii. There should be clear gap of 3 between the ceiling and top of the stacks as well as on all sides. If the depth of the stack is more than 50 then there should be a 3 wide central gangway at the centre. Under no circumstances, the packages / bundles should touch any portion of the wall /ceiling. iii. The packages / bundles must not touch nay portion of the electrical wiring or appliances. iv. Where the stacks are covered with tarpaulins, free circulation of air should be ensured. The stack should be aired by removing tarpaulin at least once a fortnight. v. Godown must be aired at least once a fortnight. vi. Smoking in godown must be prohibited. NO SMOKING signs should be prominently displayed in and outside the godowns. vii. Flammable materials should be stored in a separate godown. License/permission from the Fire Brigade should be obtained before storing any flammable material in the godown. viii. The entrance of the godown should be kept clear of all obstructions Door(s) and Window(s) should remain open fully. 5. Control Organisation: A control organization as suggested below should be formed in each branch and administrative office for efficient execution of the fire fighting and evacuation drills: a. Overall In-Charge (OIC): The Branch Manager or a senior officer deputed by him by name should act as the OIC under whose directions all actions related to the above should be undertaken. He will be assisted by the Floor Marshal and Dy.Floor Marshal. b. Floor Marshal and Dy.Floor Marshal: In the case of a branch, which has only one floor, the entire premises will have only one floor marshal and one Dy.Floor Marshal nominated by name by the Branch Manager. Multi-storeyed complexes will have one floor marshal and one Dy.Floor Marshal nominated for each floor. In the absence of Floor Marshal, the Dy.Floor Marshal shall assume the duties of floor Marshal and he can nominate any member of his branch / floor as Dy.Floor Marshal to assist him. The Floor Marshal and the Dy.Floor Marshal shall keep a muster of the staff members working in their branch/floor. c. Fire Fighting Party: This party should comprise 4 (four) members including one as leader. Its duty is to fight the fire and put it off or contain it using available fire extinguishers, sand water etc. Depending on the magnitude of the fire, the other staff members may also join this party to put off the fire. d. Rescue and Search Party: This party should consist of 3 (three) members including one as a leader. Its duties are: i. To immediately switch off the mains of electric power supply if not already done; ii. To keep all evacuation routes clear of all hindrances and guide staff members in evacuation. iii. To systematically search the floors, cabins, hall, toilets etc. They will assist the needy and those who are trapped.

e. First Aid Party: The composition of this party should include a doctor where available and 3 (three) members. If a doctor is not available, the party will have only 3 (three) staff members consisting of men and women where feasible. Their duties include rendering of first aid to the needy and arranging evacuation of serious cases to the nearest hospital. The above set up is only suggestive in nature. Branches, depending upon their requirement and staff strength, can modify the composition. 6.1 6.2 Fire Protection in Fully Computerized/CBS Branches: Fire Safety Measure: a. Fully computerized/CBS branches shall be protected with automatic fire detection and alarm system, which should conform to IS-2189. Cabling and equipment of the auto fire detection and alarm system should be independent of any other system such as anti-burglar alarm system. b. The auto fire detection and alarm system may at the discretion of Controller, be integrated with an auto dialer in respect of fully computerized branches, which are unguarded/non-guarded roundthe-clock. However, auto dialers need not be installed in the branches, which are guarded round-the-clock. c. The designated telephone numbers for auto dialing shall be of the Branch Manager, Senior Manager (Operation)/Cashier and the nearest Fire Station. d. Fully computerized branches (whether guarded or unguarded roundthe-clock) should be provided with adequate number of fire extinguishers in consultation with Fire Officer/Security Officer; e. The existing Halon type extinguishers are to be continued till they are serviceable. Similarly, the existing B&C Dry Powder Type extinguisher may be continued in place of ABC Dry Power type extinguisher till the former are serviceable and subsequently replaced by the later. f. Proper care should be taken for selecting the location of computer rooms. Adequate counter measures shall be provided to contain the threat of windstorms, earthquakes, flooding etc. There should be no high fire or explosion hazard nearby. Computer areas should be isolated from all other unrelated occupancies by fire walls and doors. g. Provision should be made in the air conditioning system to stop it in case of actuation of any detection or manual call points. h. Master switch to cut-off the electric supply to the entire branch should be provided near the entrance. i. Emergency lights and exit signs should be provided. j. Electric supply is cut-off in the computer rooms and to all computers during non-working hours. k. NO SMOKING should be strictly enforced in computer rooms. l. Computer data transmission and power supply cables should be encased in separate metal / fire resistant PVC conduit pipes. m. The U.P.S. room should be provided with proper ventilators and exhaust fan; n. As per the capacity of computer load, a compatible capacity U.P.S. should be installed in the Branch;

o. Generator shall be installed away from the main computer area and other inflammable material. p. To the extent possible, all wooden partition walls / doors of the computer and U.P.S. rooms should be of fire resistant particle boards. If they are of plywood type, these should be painted with fire retardant paint of one hour rating. q. Micro fire resistant cabinet may be provided for storage of magnetic media and micro processed data etc.

6.3

Automatic Fire Detection and Alarm System: The consequential losses due to a fire can have a devastating effect on banking operations. The crucial factor of effective fire protection is therefore, an early warning system. The automatic fire detection system ensures detection of fire in this incipient stage, enabling the occupants to contain the fire before it spreads as also to evacuate the occupants of the building. An automatic fire detection and alarm system consists of: (a) Control Unit; (b) Fire detectors / sensors; (c) Manual call points; (d) Electronic Hooters etc.

The fire detectors / sensors, manual call points and hooters are wired to the control panel. 6.4 Control Panel / Central Processing Unit (CPU): Control Panel / CPU are a console to control and monitor the Fire Alarm System peripherals and to initiate warning and identify the affected area. In the event of a fire, the fire detectors / sensors located in the affected area will trigger the CPU which in turn will activate the hooters and indicate the affected area / zone to enable immediate response. The CPU generally operates on 230 V.AC or 24 V.DC. (Back up battery). This is a console to repeat the main fire alarm control panels indications. Fire Detectors / Sensors: These are essentially sensing units located at strategic locations to detect one or more of the three characteristics of a fire i.e. smoke, heat or flame. Choice of the type of detectors for particular premises depends upon the type of fire hazard and the conditions prevailing in and around the premises. In some cases, it may be useful to combine different type of detectors for early detection of fire. Description of various types of detectors is given below: a. Ionization Smoke Detector: Ionization Smoke Detectors are suitable for a wide range of industrial commercial and residential applications and operate on the principle of Ionization. On ingress of smoke into the Open Chamber of the detector, the resistance caused is measured and transmitted to the Control Panel, which in turn, initials a Fire Alarm. b. Photoelectric Smoke Detector (Optical): Photo-electric Detectors operates on the light scattering effect. A light source is beamed into

6.5 6.6

an area not normally seen by a photo sensitive element. These detectors are preferred where large particles of combustion are to be detected. c. Fixed Temperature-cum-Rate of Rise in Temperature Detector: This detector is a combination of fixed and rate of rise in temperature operating elements. This detector responds when the predetermined temperature is reached or when the rise in ambient temperature exceeds the predetermined amount. Suitable for installation in areas where smoke / dust is likely to be present. 6.7 Manual Call Point: Manual Call Point is manually operated device to initiate an alarm. These are made of sturdy M.S. enclosure and are provided with a hammer to break the glass to initiate an alarm. Electronic Hooter: The electronic hooter/speaker is capable of producing dual tone (fire alarm). These hooters can also be connected to an amplifier for public address as well. Operates on 24 V.D.C. Response Indicator: The response indicator, also known as the Remote Response Indicator, the name suggests, is to visually indicate response of a detector located in a remove (hidden) area, such as above the false ceiling, below the false floor and inside rooms, which are normally kept closed or are locked after office hours. Smoke Detector and Alarm System in Computerized Branches: On merits, self-contained smoke detectors can be installed at computerized branches as these are considered to be very useful for detecting fire in early stages and are reliable and cost effective. The details of these detectors are as follows: a. Detection Unit; b. A dry cell battery and c. An alarm sounder in a single case. In this regard the following precautions are also required to be taken: i) Self-contained stand alone smoke detector needs to be fixed on the room ceiling; ii) The dry cell battery needs to be replaced once in year; iii) The detectors also have a pair of additional output points, from where two wire lead can be taken to sound external alarm. Fire Protection in High Rise Buildings: i. Any building with height of 15 meters and above is referred to as a High Rise Building in accordance with provisions of National Building Code (NBC) 1983. In accordance with the above and in terms of the provisions of local by-laws prevailing in a city / state all high rise buildings are required to comply with a number of Fire Prevention and Dire Fighting provisions. Details of these may be obtained by the Banks Security / Fire Officer. Vide the above mandatory provisions, all high rise buildings are required to be installed with the following systems: a. Wet Riser-cum-Down Comer; b. Fire Detection and Alarm System c. Sprinkler System. d. Alternate Powder Supply Generator System; e. Public Address System; f. Portable Fire Extinguishers

6.8

6.9

6.10

6.11

ii. Wet Riser or Down Comer or Wet Riser-cum-Down Comer System: These systems are normally referred to as Fire Hydrant Systems. As per Section 6.10.03 to 6.10.5 of Part IV of NBC, based on occupancy, one Wet Riser-cum-Down Comer or only Down Comer (G.I. C Class Pipe) of 100/150 mm minimum internal diameter has to be provided for every 1000 sq. meter floor areas. This system should be connected to the underground overhead tanks of specified capacity through pumps of specified capacity through pumps of specified capacity near the underground static tank and overhead tank. Twin hydrants, each of 63 mm internal diameter, have to be provided at each floor with sufficient hose pipes and branch pipes, to cover the full extent of floor area of the building. In addition, hose-reelhose of 12 mm diameter also have to be provided from the landing valve of wet riser at each floor level. The pumping facility forms the heart of the fire hydrant system. Normally one electricity motor driven and stand-by diesel engine driven pumps are installed to ensure the functioning of the system even during mains failure. The pump is basically used to lift the water from the reservoir/tank and deliver the same under pressure to the hydrant points for fighting fires. A jockey pump is also installed to make minor pressure losses. This pump functions automatically when a pressure loss is felt in the hydrant system, but has to be switched off manually for obvious reasons. The fire hydrant system, unlike the portable fire extinguishers, uses water as the principal extinguisher. However, in certain types of fires involving petroleum and oils etc. special branch pipes are used to deliver foam in conjunction with the standard delivery hose. With discrete use of a special branch pipe, the water under pressure can also be used as a Sheet to push smoke from entering a room / building. Hydrant valves are located at strategic points in the premises / building and with the help of the hoses placed near these valves; water can be directed to fight fires; 6.12 6.13 Fire Detection and Alarm System: This system has already been covered in detail. Sprinkler System: As per Section 6.10.6 of Part IV of NBC, Automatic Sprinkler System is a must for basement of parking area and other risk areas of high rise buildings where large quantities of combustible material are stored or kept. The spacing (coverage) of each sprinkler head shall be 6.96 sq. meters on every Bay or Room. The entire sprinkler system has to be connected to a separate water tank with pump capable of delivering water at adequate pressure. The capacity of the water tank and pump shall be determined based on the number of sprinkler heads. 6.14 Alternate Power Supply System: A standby generator should be installed to supply power for staircase lighting, corridor lighting, fire pump, pressurization fan and blowers in the event of disconnection or failure of mains supply. Public Address System: Every High Rise Building should have a public address system with 2-way communication (Talk Back provision) to

6.15

conduct evacuation in a systematic manner and to communicate any message to occupants on every floor from the Control Room. 6.16 6.17 Portable Fire Extinguishers: Suitable First Aid Fire Extinguishers shall be provided on each floor to contain and extinguish the fire at the initial stage. Fire Protection Safety Signs: The escape route shall be marked with a signboard on the corridor and passage to guide evacuation normally, the escape route board must be written in luminous paint for easy identification even at night.

CHAPTER XII
HIGH RISE FIRE SAFETY

Every year there are about 7,000 fires that break out in high rise office buildings causing deaths, injuries and millions of dollars in fire damage. Most of these could be eliminated if everyone practiced good fire prevention on the job and planned ahead for a fire emergency.

In terms of fire safety, a high rise building could be defined as a building taller than four stories or 75 feet since fire department aerial ladders rarely reach anything higher than that. The possibility of a fire deserves serious thought. In a high rise building, it's especially important to know when and how to escape in case of fire.

Prevention

Smoke only where it is permitted. Use large non-tip ashtrays and empty them only when you are sure the ashes, matches and butts are cold. Make sure that no one, including visitors, has left cigarettes smoldering in wastebaskets or on furniture. Be alert around electrical equipment. If electrical equipment is not working properly or if it gives off an unusual odor - often the first sign of a problem that could cause a fire - disconnect the equipment and call the appropriate maintenance department. Promptly replace any electrical cord that is cracked or has a broken connection. When using extension cords protect them from damage; do not put them across doorways or any place where they will be stepped on or chafed. Check the amperage load specified by the manufacturer or the "listing

laboratory," and do not exceed it. Do not plug one extension cord into another and do not plug more than one extension cord into one outlet. Keep all heat-producing appliances away from the wall and away from anything that might burn. Leave plenty of space for air to circulate around copy machines, word processors and other equipment that normally gives off heat. Make sure all appliances in your work area - such as coffee makers and hot plates - are turned off at the end of each work day. It's best to assign one person to make this check every day. Keep storage areas, stairway landings and other out-of-the-way locations free of waste paper, empty boxes, dirty rags and other material that could fuel a fire or hamper an escape. Arson is the largest single cause of fires in office buildings. Therefore, proper security measures to keep unauthorized people out of the building will help prevent both theft and fire. In addition, make sure that alleys and other areas around buildings are well-lit.

In Case of Fire

If a fire does break out, sound the alarm and call the fire department. Large fires start as small fires. Learn the sound of your building's fire alarm. Encourage management to schedule regular fire drills so that everyone will know how the alarm sounds and how to escape. Evacuation plans for your building should be posted where everyone can see them. They should be discussed with new employees during orientation. Learn the evacuation plans and participate in fire drills. Know the location of the two exits closest to your work area. Count the number of doors between your office and each of those exits - in case you must escape through a darkened, smoke-filled corridor where you can't see very well. Close the door to the room containing the fire and close all other doors that you pass through during your escape, assuming you are the last person out. Closing the doors helps to control the spread of fire. If it becomes necessary to use an escape route where there is smoke, crawl low under the smoke. Stay close to the floor where visibility is better, the air is less toxic and it is cooler. Before you open a closed door, feel it with the back of your hand. If it is hot, don't open it. Use your alternate escape route. If it feels normal, open it carefully. Be ready to slam it shut if heat or smoke starts to rush in. Once you are outside the building, move well away from the building to a designated meeting area where all members of your floor can be accounted for. If anyone is missing, notify the fire department, DO NOT re-senter the building. If it's not possible to escape from the floor you are on, don't panic. Stay calm. Try to go to a room with an outside window and stay there. Try to keep smoke out and be sure doors are closed. Stuff the cracks around the door and vents using clothing, towels, paper or whatever is available. If water is available, dampen a cloth and breathe through it to filter out smoke and gases. If there is a working telephone, call the fire department and tell them exactly where you are. This information will be relayed immediately to the firefighters on the scene. Stay where you are and wave something to attract their attention. Each person with a disability should be assigned a co-worker (and an alternate) to render assistance in case of an emergency. Participating in drills is especially important for people with disabilities. Never use an elevator during a fire emergency. Most modern elevators select buttons are heat-activated, so they might go to the fire floor and stop there with the doors open, exposing passengers to deadly heat and fumes. Be sure that stairwell doors are never locked.

Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers are useful only if they are used properly, if they are right for the type of fire and if the fire is discovered immediately.

If there is a portable fire extinguisher in or near by, take the time to read the operating instructions and get training in how to use. No one should attempt to fight even a small fire until people have been evacuated from the area and the fire department has been called. Never attempt to fight a fire if any of the following is true: Uncertainty about use of extinguisher. The fire is spreading beyond the immediate area where it started. The fire could block the escape route.

Owners, Managers and Employers

If you own, manage or employ workers in a high rise building, you should have the answers to these questions:

Do you have a fire emergency plan? Has it been reviewed and approved by the fire department? Have tenants and employees been given full instructions on the details of the plan? Can the building be evacuated to the street without interfering with fire department personnel? If the answer to question #4 is no, are there areas of refuge in the building? Is there provision for physically challenged people who may be in the building? If a fire starts, will it be detected promptly? How? Will the fire department be notified promptly? How? Is there a provision for heating, ventilation and air conditioning smoke control? Is there an emergency communications system? Does the building have area or floor fire wardens? Have they been trained? Are fire pumps, emergency generators and lighting systems ready to use if needed? Are all exit doors and exit ways clear? Are emergency hand lines and fire extinguishers in working order? Will security measures, such as locking of doors, interfere with evacuation of occupants or access of firefighters? Is the fire department familiar with the building in all pertinent details? Has space been designated for a fire department command center in the building?

Smoke

We've all seen the movies where the hero enters a burning building to rescue someone. Flames are everywhere and there's not very much smoke. The hero storms from room to room, standing straight up and looks through the flames for the victim. He finds the victim easily enough, picks her up in his arms and runs out of the house...a hero.

Unfortunately, that is a long shot from the way it really is. Unless an arsonist has set several fires, there is usually only one point of origin for a fire. That one point could smolder for quite some time. Even after flames flare, a tremendous amount of smoke is generated. In a realistic situation, our hero would rush into a burning building and find a room thick with black, toxic smoke.

Visibility would be zero. He may not even see any flames because there would be so much smoke. If he was standing straight up as he entered the building, he would probably fall down unconscious in a matter of seconds because he would be inhaling that poisonous smoke. Movie producers would run out of heroes quickly.

Smoke Rises:

In a fire, heat rises. Therefore, smoke rises. In the early stages of a structure fire, it is very common for smoke to accumulate near the ceiling. That is why smoke detectors are always placed high on a wall or ceiling. They detect the first signs of smoke, which rises to the top of the room. Firefighters know this and that is why, when they enter a burning building, they are down on their hands and knees. There is far less smoke near the floor and the visibility is much better.

Smoke Inhalation can be Fatal:

In most cases, fire fatalities result from victims who have succumbed to smoke inhalation long before burn injuries occur. Eighty percent of those who die in residential fires have first inhaled smoke and other toxic gases. Fire produces many gases that are highly poisonous. These are found in smoke and include carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen sulfide. They displace oxygen in the room, which can cause suffocation. Fire also consumes oxygen. This reduces the amount of oxygen available for persons to breathe. When a person is exposed to the toxins of smoke, muscle control is lost, judgment is impaired and the ability to reason diminishes. At a time when a fire emergency is present, it is important to

be able to make quick decisions. Yet, the toxic gases, superheated air, smoke and limited visibility may cause someone to act in an inappropriate or irrational manner. It is vital to recognize smoke in the home and be able to quickly escape by crawling low under smoke.

Drop and Crawl

When you are caught in a building with smoke, drop to your hands and knees and begin crawling to the nearest exit. If you come to a closed door, don't open it before testing it for heat. Place the back of your hand against the door. If it is hot, don't open it. Turn around and seek another exit. If it is not hot, slowly open it but be prepared to slam it closed again if you should encounter flames. Continue to crawl until you get outside. You may have to use the walls of the building to help you. Just place your shoulder against the wall and keep crawling with your shoulder against the wall. By doing so, you will reduce your chances of getting lost in the smoke. The best plan is to have a pre-arranged meeting place outside the house where everyone should meet and be accounted for.

CHAPTER XIII

HALON AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

Halon (Chlorofluorocarbons CFC) is a Clear Agent and has been used for fire and explosions protecting throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first Century Carbon Tetrachloride (Halon 104) was being before 1900, even though its combustion bye-products were lethal. Due to a number of deaths, a search for something safer began. Several other Halons were tried, but it was not until 1947 that research by the Purdue Research Foundation and the US Army resulted in the discovery of two effective low toxicity Halons; 1211 & 1301. When used properly, these Halons have an excellent fire fighting record. Both contain low-toxicity, chemically stable, nonconductive compounds that are easily recyclable.

Meanwhile, in 1973 chemists Frank Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina, working at the University of California, Irwin, began studying the impacts of FCS on the earths atmosphere. They discovered that CFC molecules were stable enough to remain in the atmosphere until they got up into middle of the stratosphere where they would finally be broken down by ultra violet radiation releasing chorineantom. Rowland and Moulina then proposed that these chlorine atoms might be expected to cause the break down of large amounts of ozone (O3) in the atmosphere. The environmental consequence of this discovery was that, since stratospheric ozone absolves most of the ultraviolet B (UV B) radiation reaching the surface of the earth, depletion of the ozone layer by CFCs would lead to increase in UV-B radiation on the surface, resulting in an increase in skin cancer and other impacts such as damage to crops and to marine phytoplankton. Rowland, Mokiana and Paul J. Crutzen were awarded the 1995 Novel Prize in Chemistry for their work on this problem.

The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone-layer is an international treaty designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of a number of substances believed to be responsible for ozone depletion. It is believed that if the international agreement is adhered to the ozone layer is expected to recover by 2050. The treaty is structured around several groups of Halogenated Hydrocarbons that have been shown to play a role in ozone depletion. All of these ozone depleting substances contain either chlorine or bromine. Substances contained only fluorite do not harm ozone buyer. The Protocol envisages the following:

i)

Consumption and production of CFC 11, 12,113, 114, 115 should be zero from 1996. ii) There is a slower phase out for other substances i.e. Halon 1211, 1301, 2402 to zero by 2010.

Halon Alternatives:

The scientists and chemists, therefore, started searching for an alternative to Halons as useful clean agent for extinguishing fire. Hydro Chlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) were found to be transitional CFCs replacement, used as refrigerants, solvents, blowing agents for plastic and foam manufacturer and five extinguishers. In terms of Ozone Depletion Potential (ODP) in comparison with CFCs that have ODP 0.6 to 1.0, the HCFCs has lower ODP, i.e. 0.01 to 0.5, whereas in terms of global warming potential (GWP) in comparison with CFCs that have GWP 4680 to 10720, HCFCs have less GWP, i.e. 76 to 2270. Therefore, it was agreed upon that the year 2013 may be set as the time to freeze the consumption and production of HCFC. Realizing the amount of CFCs and HCFCs stored all over the world the Montreal Protocol currently calls for complete phase out of HCFCs by 2030.

FM-200, chemically known as heptafluropropane is an alternative fire suppression system manufactured in the USA. FE-227 (HFC) is also manufactured and marketed to fire protection industry by another manufacturer. Heptafluropropane has no ozone depletion potential. Often HFC 227 systems are installed to protect critical installations formerly protected by Halon-1301.

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CHAPTER - XIV Montreal Protocol and Halon Alternatives:

The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer) is an international treaty designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of a number of substances believed to be responsible for ozone depletion. The treaty was opened for signature on September 16, 1987, and entered into force on January 1, 1989, followed by a first meeting in Helsinki, May 1989. Since then, it has undergone seven revisions, in 1990 (London), 1991 (Nairobi), 1992 (Copenhagen), 1993 (Bangkok), 1995 (Vienna), 1997 (Montreal), and 1999 (Beijing). It is believed that if the international agreement is adhered to, the ozone layer is expected to recover by 2050. Due to its widespread adoption and implementation it has been hailed as an example of exceptional international co-operation with Kofi Annan quoted as saying that "perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date has been the Montreal Protocol".

Terms and purposes of this treaty The treaty is structured around several groups of halogenated hydrocarbons that have been shown to play a role in ozone depletion. All of these ozone depleting substances contain either chlorine or bromine (substances containing only fluorine do not harm the ozone layer). For a table of ozone-depleting substances see:

For each group, the treaty provides a timetable on which the production of those substances must be phased out and eventually eliminated.

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) Phase-out Management Plan

The stated purpose of the treaty is that the signatory states: : ...Recognizing that worldwide emissions of certain substances can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse effects on human health and the environment, ... Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge ... Acknowledging that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing countries... shall accept a series of stepped limits on CFC use and production, including: from 1991 to 1992 its levels of consumption and production of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A do not exceed 150 percent of its calculated levels of production and consumption of those substances in 1986; from 1994 its calculated level of consumption and production of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does

not exceed, annually, twenty-five percent of its calculated level of consumption and production in 1986. From 1996 its calculated level of consumption and production of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does not exceed zero.

There is a slower phase-out (to zero by 2010) of other substances (halon 1211, 1301, 2402; CFCs 13, 111, 112, etc) and some chemicals get individual attention (Carbon tetrachloride; 1,1,1-trichloroethane). The phasing-out of the less active HCFCs started only in 1996 and will go on until a complete phasing-out is achieved in 2030.

Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) Phase-out Management Plan (HPMP)

Under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, especially Executive Committee (ExCom) 53/37 and ExCom 54/39, Parties to this Protocol agreed to set year 2013 as the time to freeze the consumption and production of HCFCs. They also agreed to start reducing its consumption and production in 2015. The time of freezing and reducing HCFCs is then known as 2013/2015.

The HCFCs are transitional CFCs replacements, used as refrigerants, solvents, blowing agents for plastic foam manufacture, and fire extinguishers. In term of Ozone Depleting Potential (ODP), in comparison to CFCs that have ODP 0.6 1.0, these HCFCs ODP have less ODP, i.e. 0.01 0.5. Whereas in term of Global Warming Potential (GWP), in comparison to CFCs that have GWP 4,680 10,720, HCFCs have less GWP, i.e. 76 2,270. There are a few exceptions for "essential uses", where no acceptable substitutes have been found (for example, in the metered dose inhalers commonly used to treat asthma and other respiratory problems) or Halon fire suppression systems used in submarines and aircraft (but not in general industry). The substances in Group I of Annex A are: CFCl3 (CFC-11) CF2Cl2 (CFC-12) C2F3Cl3 (CFC-113) C2F4Cl2(CFC-114) C2F5Cl (CFC-115) The provisions of the Protocol include the requirement that the Parties to the Protocol base their future decisions on the current scientific, environmental, technical, and economic information that is assessed through panels drawn from the worldwide expert communities. To provide that input to the decision-making process, advances

in understanding on these topics were assessed in 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002 in a series of reports entitled Scientific assessment of ozone depletion.

Several reports have been published by various governmental and non-governmental organizations to present alternatives to the ozone depleting substances, since the substances have been used in various technical sectors, like in refrigerating, agriculture, energy production, and laboratory measurements.

History

In 1973 Chemists Frank Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina, then at the University of California, Irvine, began studying the impacts of CFCs in the Earth's atmosphere. They discovered that CFC molecules were stable enough to remain in the atmosphere until they got up into the middle of the stratosphere where they would finally (after an average of 50100 years for two common CFCs) be broken down by ultraviolet radiation releasing a chlorine atom. Rowland and Molina then proposed that these chlorine atoms might be expected to cause the breakdown of large amounts of ozone (O3) in the stratosphere. Their argument was based upon an analogy to contemporary work by Paul J. Crutzen and Harold Johnston, which had shown that nitric oxide (NO) could catalyze the destruction of ozone. (Several other scientists, including Ralph Cicerone, Richard Stolarski, Michael McElroy, and Steven Wofsy had independently proposed that chlorine could catalyze ozone loss, but none had realized that CFCs were a potentially large source of chlorine.) Crutzen, Molina and Rowland were awarded the 1995 Nobel Prize for Chemistry for their work on this problem. The environmental consequence of this discovery was that, since stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the ultraviolet-B (UV-B) radiation reaching the surface of the planet, depletion of the ozone layer by CFCs would lead to an in increase in UV-B radiation at the surface, resulting in an increase in skin cancer and other impacts such as damage to crops and to marine phytoplankton.

But the Rowland-Molina hypothesis was strongly disputed by representatives of the aerosol and halocarbon industries. The chair of the board of DuPont was quoted as saying that ozone depletion theory is "a science fiction tale...a load of rubbish...utter nonsense". Robert Abplanalp, the president of Precision Valve Corporation (and inventor of the first practical aerosol spray can valve), wrote to the Chancellor of UC Irvine to complain about Rowland's public statements (Roan, p. 56.)

After publishing their pivotal paper in June 1974, Rowland and Molina testified at a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives in December 1974. As a result significant funding was made available to study various aspects of the problem and to confirm the initial findings. In 1976, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a report that confirmed the scientific credibility of the ozone depletion

hypothesis. NAS continued to publish assessments of related science for the next decade.

Then, in 1985, British Antarctic Survey scientists Farman, Gardiner and Shanklin shocked the scientific community when they published results of a study showing an ozone "hole" in the journal Nature showing a decline in polar ozone far larger than anyone had anticipated.

That same year, 20 nations, including most of the major CFC producers, signed the Vienna Convention, which established a framework for negotiating international regulations on ozone-depleting substances. But the CFC industry did not give up that easily. As late as 1986, the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy (an association representing the CFC industry founded by DuPont) was still arguing that the science was too uncertain to justify any action. In 1987, DuPont testified before the US Congress that "we believe that there is no immediate crisis that demands unilateral regulation."

Multilateral Fund The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol provides funds to help developing countries to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances. The Multilateral Fund was the first financial mechanism to be created under an international treaty. It embodies the principle agreed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 that countries have a common but differentiated responsibility to protect and manage the global commons. The Fund is managed by an executive committee with an equal representation of seven industrialized and seven Article 5 countries, which are elected annually by a Meeting of the Parties. The Committee reports annually to the Meeting of the Parties on its operations.

Up to 20 percent of the contributions of contributing parties can also be delivered through their bilateral agencies in the form of eligible projects and activities.

The fund is replenished on a three-year basis by the donors. Pledges amount to US$ 2.1 billion over the period 1991 to 2005. Funds are used, for example, to finance the conversion of existing manufacturing processes, train personnel, pay royalties and patent rights on new technologies, and establish national ozone offices.

Ratification

As of September 16, 2009, all countries in the United Nations have ratified the original Montreal Protocol (see external link below), Timor-Leste being the last country to ratify the agreement. Fewer countries have ratified each consecutive amendment. Only 154 countries have signed the Beijing Amendment.

In the United States, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (P.L. 101-549) contain provisions for implementing the Montreal Protocol, as well as explicit, separate authority for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to regulate ozone depleting chemicals.

Impact

Ozone-depleting gas trends Since the Montreal Protocol came into effect, the atmospheric concentrations of the most important chlorofluorocarbons and related chlorinated hydrocarbons have either leveled off or decreased. Halon concentrations have continued to increase, as the halons presently stored in fire extinguishers are released, but their rate of increase has slowed and their abundances are expected to begin to decline by about 2020. Also, the concentration of the HCFCs increased drastically at least partly because for many uses CFCs (e.g. used as solvents or refrigerating agents) were substituted with HCFCs. While there have been reports of attempts by individuals to circumvent the ban, e.g. by smuggling CFCs from undeveloped to developed nations, the overall level of compliance has been high. In consequence, the Montreal Protocol has often been called the most successful international environmental agreement to date. In a 2001 report, NASA found the ozone thinning over Antarctica had remained the same thickness for the previous three years. However, in 2003 the ozone hole grew to its second largest size. The most recent (2006) scientific evaluation of the effects of the Montreal Protocol states, "The Montreal Protocol is working: There is clear evidence of a decrease in the atmospheric burden of ozone-depleting substances and some early signs of stratospheric ozone recovery."

Unfortunately, the hydrochlorofluorocarbons, or HCFCs, and hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs, are now thought to contribute to anthropogenic global warming. On a molecule-for-molecule basis, these compounds are up to 10,000 times more potent greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide. The Montreal Protocol currently calls for a complete phase-out of HCFCs by 2030, but does not place any restriction on HFCs. Since the CFCs themselves are equally powerful as greenhouse gases, the mere substitution of HFCs for CFCs does not significantly increase the rate of anthropogenic global warming, but over time a steady increase in their use could increase the danger that human activity will change the climate.

HALON ALTERNATIVE

What is Halon and How Does it Work? Halon is a "Clean Agent." The National Fire Protection Association defines, a "Clean Agent" as "an electrically non-conducting, volatile, or gaseous fire extinguishant that does not leave a residue upon evaporation." Currently, there are two common types of Halon in use; Halon 1211 (a liquid streaming agent) and Halon 1301 (a gaseous flooding agent). Both contain lowtoxicity, chemically stable, non-conductive compounds that are easily recyclable. Halon is an extraordinarily effective fire extinguishing agent, even at low concentrations. According to the Halon Alternative Research Corporation: "Three things must come together at the same time to start a fire. The first ingredient is fuel (anything that can burn), the second is oxygen (normal breathing air is ample) and the last is an ignition source (high heat can cause a fire even without a spark or open flame). Traditionally, to stop a fire you need to remove one side of the triangle - the ignition, the fuel or the oxygen. Halon adds a fourth dimension to fire fighting breaking the chain reaction. It stops the fuel, the ignition and the oxygen from dancing together by chemically reacting with them." A key benefit of Halon, as a clean agent, is its ability to extinguish fire without the production of residues that could damage the assets being protected. How is Halon Used? Halon is widely employed in areas such as computer rooms, data storage areas, libraries and museums, where the use of water or solid extinguishing agents could cause secondary damage exceeding that caused by the fire itself. The non-conductive nature of Halon enables it to be used for the protection of electrical and electronic equipment, and its low toxicity allows its use in areas where the egress of personnel may be undesirable or impossible - important in closed areas such as aircraft, boats and armored fighting vehicles. Halon is also used extensively in oil production and electric power generation. The EPA recognizes that Halon is a very effective extinguishing agent, and the agency continues to allow the use of Halon despite the gas's ozone depleting potential. All Halon now available is recycled. How Long Has Halon Been Used For Fire Protection? Halon has been used for fire and explosion protection throughout the twentieth and into the twenty first century. Carbon tetrachloride (Halon 104) was used prior to 1900, even though its combustion by-products were lethal. Due to a number of deaths, a search for something safer began. Several other Halons were tried, but it was not until 1947 that research by the Purdue Research Foundation and the U.S. Army resulted in the discovery of two effective low toxicity Halons: 1211 and 1301. When used properly, these Halons have an excellent fire fighting record with little, if any, risk.

How is Halon Use Restricted? The Montreal Protocol of 1987 identified Halon as one of many compounds requiring limitations of use and production and an amendment to the original Protocol resulted in the halting of Halon production on January 1, 1994. Careful use and conservation of Halon is, therefore, important so that existing supplies will be sufficient to meet all future needs.

In the United States, there are currently no regulations mandating the decommissioning of Halon systems or portable fire extinguishers. In fact, the FAA continues to recommend Halon fire extinguishers for use on aircraft due to its effectiveness to weight ratio and low toxicity.

However, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) strongly encourages the use of non-ozone depleting alternatives, and in 1990, the US EPA established its Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) to evaluate new chemicals and technologies for the replacement of ozone depleting substances. On March 5, 1998, the US EPA issued a final rule governing the release of Halon into the atmosphere during maintenance, repair, and disposal of Halon containing equipment. Disposal of Halon containing equipment must be conducted by a Halon manufacturer, a Halon system manufacturer, a fire equipment distributor, or a Halon recycler. And, the company receiving the Halon must operate in accordance with all requirements of NFPA 12A. If the owner is disposing of the Halon permanently, it must be disposed of by sending it for recycling to a recycler operating in accordance with NFPA 12A. In order to recycle Halon, Underwriters Laboratories Inc. approved equipment must be employed.

How Long will Halon be Available for Use? Although Halon is no longer manufactured, according to an industry white paper by Wickman Associates dated March 16, 2002, there will be a bank of approximately 3,748 tons in 2030. At H3R Clean Agents, we believe that the eventual demise of Halon will result not from insufficient supply, but from the development of an equally effective agent, that does not damage the ozone layer and is cost effective. Although progress is being made on Halon alternatives, none yet meets these criteria.

HALON ALTERNATIVES

What Halon Alternatives Are There? In response to the ban on Halon 1301 manufacture, the fire suppression industry has responded with the development of alternative clean agents that pose less of a threat

to the ozone layer. Two classes of agents have emerged as suitable replacements: halocarbon-based agents and inert gas agents. The halocarbon-based agents are carbon-based compounds and extinguish fire primarily via the absorption of heat. Inert gas agents are based on the inert gases (i.e., nitrogen, argon, carbon dioxide) and extinguish fire via oxygen depletion. Under its Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to evaluate alternative chemicals and processes intended to be used in place of ozone-depleting substances to ensure that they are acceptable from a human health and environmental perspective. With the advent of the new clean agents, businesses worldwide will continue to have the ability to protect critical equipment and irreplaceable items, despite the ban and inevitable disappearance of Halon 1301 from the marketplace. With the mandated decommissioning of Halon 1301 in the EC and the increasing pressure from governments worldwide to reduce dependency on ozone depleting substances, it is expected that the future will see an increased utilization of Halon alternative clean agents.

How Do the Alternatives Compare to Halon? Although the Halon 1301 alternatives are only approximately 70% as effective as Halon 1301 at extinguishing fires, the alternatives have similar characteristics. Like Halon 1301, the new agents are clean (i.e., they leave no residues following extinguishment). As a result, no cleanup is required after discharge of the agents. Because the agents form no corrosive or abrasive residues they are suitable for use on delicate, expensive assets that might otherwise be destroyed by non-clean agents such as foam or water (e.g. books, paintings, cultural heritage items). The clean agents are non-corrosive and non-conductive, and hence can be employed for the protection of sensitive electrical and electronic equipment. Most of the new agents are nontoxic at their typical design levels, and hence are acceptable for use in occupied areas. The clean agents are gases, and can thoroughly flood a protected area, affording rapid extinguishment of even obscured or hard to reach fires. The clean agent systems are applicable to Class A, B and C fires. When coupled with an early detection system, clean agent systems provide rapid extinguishment, reducing equipment damage and ensuring the safety of personnel within the fire area. Appearance-wise, clean agent systems are similar in many aspects to Halon 1301 systems, although, in general, none of the clean agents can serve as a complete dropin replacement for Halon 1301: all require modification to the piping systems and or nozzles and system cylinders. Halocarbon agents are stored as compressed liquefied gases, and systems are typically super pressurized to 25 or 40 bar with nitrogen, with the exception of FE-13, which does not require super pressurization. Inert gas agents are supplied in high-pressure gas cylinders, typically pressurized to 200 or 300 bars.

For both halocarbon and inert gas systems, additional system components include the usual collection of selector valves, piping, and nozzles.

HALOTRON

Halotron I is a proven clean fire extinguishing agent designed for streaming applications in portable and handheld fire extinguishers. It is the worlds most widely distributed halocarbon-based clean fire extinguishing agent for such applications. Halotron I has shown, by way of repeated successful extinguishment of real-world fires, that it can quickly and effectively protect valuable assets without generating an undesirable solid residue during the fire-extinguishment process. It is common for users of fire extinguishers to have limited experience in their operation, and an independent study showed that Halotron I is easier to use for such relatively inexperienced users than other halocarbon clean agents. Halotron I is a safe, effective, environmentally acceptable chemical blend based on the raw material HCFC-123. It was originally introduced in 1992 to replace severe ozone depleting halon 1211, or bromochlorodifluoromethane (BCF). Halotron I is discharged as a rapidly evaporating liquid, with a throw length of 6 to 45 feet (1.8 to 13.7 meters). Its relatively high boiling point of 80.6F (27C) gives it an advantage over other clean extinguishing agents, which tend to have lower boiling points and therefore evaporate sooner, limiting their throw length and overall effectiveness to the non-expert firefighter. Also, unlike traditional dry chemical agents such as monoammonium phosphate (ABC Dry Chemical) or potassium bicarbonate (Purple K), which can be corrosive, Halotron I is a clean agent that leaves no residue after application, and consequently inflicts little to no collateral damage on equipment in the vicinity of the fire. Halotron I is approved as environmentally acceptable under the U.S. EPAs SNAP program and has undergone the most extensive testing of any halogenated clean agent for portable fire extinguishers since 1992. There are more than 30 separate UL listings for Halotron I portable extinguishers, which is more than twice the number available with any other halocarbon-based clean agent.

FM-200 Fire Suppression Systems FM-200 , chemically known as heptafluoropropane, is an alternative fire suppression system agent manufactured in the United States by Great Lakes Chemical Corporation. DuPont also manufactures heptafluoropropane (HFC-227ea) and markets to the fire protection industry under the trademark FE-227 .It is a replacement for the ozone depleting Halon 1301 used extensively before 1994. HFC-227ea has no ozone depletion potential. Its ODP is zero. HFC-227ea has found by leading toxicologists to be safe for use when people are present. Just as with Halon 1301, people can be exposed to normal extinguishing concentrations of without any fear of health problems. Often HFC-227ea systems are employed to protect critical installations formerly protected by Halon 1301. These include:

Data Processing Centers Telephone Switches Process Control Rooms Art and Historical Collections Facilities where water damage from sprinklers must be avoided at all costs

In a typical system the extinguishing agent is typically stored in cylinders or spheres. It is delivered to distribution nozzles through a system piping network. Critical to the functioning of the system is the fire detection and control network. Typically smoke detectors sense the presence of fire in the protected facility. The detection and control panel then sounds an alarm, shuts down air handlers, disconnects power from the protected equipment, and then releases agent into the protected area.