Presumption of Innocence

Cases:
Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001
People vs. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998
 Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001
BUENA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner, Elvira, was harge of malversation germinated from an audit conducted on 14 July 1986
by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on
petitioners accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and
admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In
effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner
Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge and
categorically denied having malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own personal use or
benefit. With petitioners admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For its
part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and shatter the prima facie evidence
of conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira Agullo; Rene Briones
Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia
Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the defense as
incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner
Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that no evidence has been
presented linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused
(herein petitioner).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which
violates the petitioners constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioners
guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon
thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo
has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as
to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that
satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or
gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and
deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecutions
evidence This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

All told, this Court, through the scholarly ponencia of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz in People vs. De Guzman,
inked in vivid prose the premium accorded to the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, to wit:

The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of
Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the
lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its
inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be
acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of doubt.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 People vs. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing the Decision of the Court of Appealsfinding
Sergio and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. Both accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1994, the said Court promulgated the assailed Decision
affirming their guilt but increasing the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Appellants raised the defense of denial,
they maintained that their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernestos murder is merely an
afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the doctrine that appeals involving reclusion perpetua
are subject to a review de novo,this Court pored over the entire records of both lower courts and concluded,
after careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty that appellants are guilty. The totality of the prosecution
evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the
accused. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome
the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or even
the absence of his defense. By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is accordingly vested on the
prosecution. In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in the
killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010
NACHURA, J.

FACTS: This is an appeal by Ronaldo De Guzman in a decision of the trial court found De Guzman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
a Decision dated June 26, 2008. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers
complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points to the fact that the
seized items were not marked immediately after his arrest; that the police officers failed to make an
inventory of the seized items in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and of a representative from
the media and from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized
items and of appellant. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not
established. Further, appellant contends that the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation
in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers duties. The findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded great respect, even finality when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of the
case have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has been met.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to De Guzmans contention, the trial court correctly found
that the buy-bust transaction took place. The buyer (SPO1 Llanillo) and seller (De Guzman) were both
identified and the circumstances of how the purported sale of the illegal drugs took place were clearly
demonstrated. Thus, the prosecution successfully established the first and third elements of the crime.
However, there is a problem in the prosecutions effort to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti. In a
prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a condition
sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and
its IRR must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact.
The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. In this case, it was admitted that
it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the seized items, and only upon seeing the
items for the first time at the police station. Moreover, there was no physical inventory made or photographs
of the seized items taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. There was also
no mention that representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected official, were present
during this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the failure to observe the proper procedure negates
the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the testimonies
of the police officers who apprehended the accused are accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. But when the performance of their duties is
tainted with failure to comply with the procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively
destroyed. Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecutions whole case still falls. The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 Right to be Heard
Cases:
People vs. Magsi, G.R. No. L-32888, August 12, 1983
Amion vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999
People vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
People vs. Alcanzado, G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2004
 People vs. Magsi, G.R. No. L-32888, August 12, 1983
MAKASIAR, J.

FACTS: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6)
times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario
Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty.
Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel.
Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on
by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio
and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day
and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing
date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day
as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but
qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the
other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be
effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244):
the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in
capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of
the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that
the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused
has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio
counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for
alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the
accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 Amion vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999
MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance
of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio
despite the appellants opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty.
Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted
respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that his
representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order
to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement
of the hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the
accused in the case at bar.

HELD: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An
examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation
rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way,
deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for
not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination
of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by
the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in
the administration of justice.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 People vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: This is a review pursuant to Rule 122. Section 10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the
decision, finding accused-appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay the offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. Accused-appellant
invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that he was denied the same because: (a) the trial judge
disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera concerning the latters sworn statements on the
ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial court denied the motion made by accused-appellants
counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician, because of which
the said counsel consequently waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded
numerous questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and (d) the trial
courts decision was promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted his memorandum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant was denied of his right to due process of law.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that they find no merit in accused-appellants argument that he was
denied due process considering the speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against him, which
judgment was promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court
gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the courts findings on
the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both
parties. Citing the case of People v. Mercado:

. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and
the transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the
case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not
supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and
devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision
has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants memorandum and the
promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the
decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a
speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due
dispatch. . .

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University

People vs. Alcanzado, G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2004

 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision
issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66) of Makati City finding accused OSCAR ALCANZADO y
ORQUEZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER. However, a careful examination of the records
reveals that the assailed decision will have to be set aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for
reception of evidence for the defense. The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision
after denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving
appellant the opportunity to present his evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his
defense.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to the RTCs assertion in its decision that the demurrer to
evidence was denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying
appellants demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court
violated the aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it
was denied, the trial court should have given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally
astonishing is the fact that appellants counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this
Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the procedural unfairness and
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC,[9] a remand of the case for
reception of defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his
defense has been violated. So that appellant may be spared from further delay, the Court deems it
necessary to treat the herein assailed judgment as a mere resolution denying the demurrer to evidence and
ascertain whether the RTC has committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting the same.
Consequently, for purposes of determining whether the demurrer to evidence should have been granted, the
connection between the service gun and appellant as the perpetrator of the shooting, without any
countervailing evidence, had been sufficiently established. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence BUT it committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly
convicting appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua when appellant
has not been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court.

Further, the attendant justifying, mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as self-defense, treachery and
voluntary surrender could only be ascertained fully after the defense evidence, rebuttal and sur-rebuttal, if
any, shall have been adduced and evaluated by the RTC in the rendition of its judgment on the case.

Had Presiding Judge Rosario, Jr. not compulsorily retired from the Judiciary, he could have been
admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
Right to be Informed
Cases:
People vs. Bayya, G.R. No. 127845, March 10, 2000
People vs. Malansing, G.R. Nos. 131736-37, March 11, 2002
Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004
People vs. Alvarado, G.R. No. 145730, March 19, 2002
 People vs. Bayya, G.R. No. 127845, March 10, 2000
PURISIMA, J.

FACTS: Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at the
point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a
week afterwards, and then later used her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5,
1995.

During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice but
theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In view of the facts
established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate
penalty of death.

Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that the Information
filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial of his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that a careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a
crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be
informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same was proven during trial as
borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried
or therein necessarily included.

The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent is the special qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by degrees.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 People vs. Malansing, G.R. Nos. 131736-37, March 11, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS: This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for each
count. Appellants are brothers. Joey Manlansing denied participation in the killing, but he admitted boxing
Jorja in the face to prevent her from shouting, while Mario was assaulting her husband. Mario Mallansing
claimed he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario affirmed his confession and insisted
that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths He claimed that Joey woke up only after he killed Magin
and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully stop him from attacking Jorja. He said he killed the couple out of anger
after Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his motive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and taking advantage of night-time.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating either
killing to murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses committed by appellants only constitute
two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death. In evaluating the
circumstances that qualified the crimes to murder, the trial court considered, aside from evident
premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of a deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and dwelling The Supreme Court note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were
not alleged in the informations. In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the
brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is absorbed by the
former. We are thus left to review only the allegation that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were present in the commission of the crimes.

At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the darkness
of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to
ensure its execution with impunity.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

FACTS: Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks
to annul and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in
Valencia. Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded not guilty. On 23 February
1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the prosecution and moved
for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits A
to S of the prosecutions evidence but rejected Exhibits T, U, and V. It also denied petitioners
demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a decision. The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable
errors in convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves
in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the
offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because they were
never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with,
and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent
is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering that it was not charged in
the information.

In Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the
offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds
application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 People vs. Alvarado, G.R. No. 145730, March 19, 2002
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52,
finding accused-appellant Armando Alvarado guilty of rape of his 14-year old daughter Arlene and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. Accused-appellant argues that complainants testimony should
not have been given credence. He contends that, although Dr. Villarosa found that complainant had sexual
intercourse recently, it could not have been with accused-appellant since the examining physician testified
that complainant might have had sexual intercourse either a week or a month before her examination on
September 19, 1997, and complainant had sexual relationships with different men in August 1997. He
contends that the trial court should have given greater weight to his defense as the same purportedly
conformed to the findings of the expert witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled disagree with the petitioner's contention. It is a time-honored rule that
the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if
not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing
the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case. In this case, the Supreme Court find no compelling reason to
depart from this rule. Indeed, complainant proved herself to be a credible witness. Her narration of how she
was sexually assaulted by her own father remained, as also noted by the trial court, plain, candid,
straightforward, and unflawed by serious contradictions in spite of the lengthy and tedious cross-
examination by the defense counsel. It is also noteworthy that, in the course of her testimony, Arlenes eyes
overflowed with tears, which only revealed the depths of the shame and suffering she endured as a
consequence of the violation of her virtue and personhood, and the truthfulness of her charge. She was not
impelled by any bad motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant, as shown by the admissions by the
latter and his mother that they did not know of any reason why Arlene filed the rape charge against him. The
reasons offered by accused-appellant that Arlene had many boyfriends and that he would always scold her
for attending dances and entertaining suitors are flimsy. In fact, when the trial judge asked her if her
accusation against her father was true considering that the death penalty could be imposed on him, Arlene
unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
Right to be Informed
Cases:
Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
 Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
PUNO, J.

FACTS: On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as Erap) was
elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps alleged
involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity
among different social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. And
because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000. Upon its
resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret bank account cut
short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of
Manila.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also
appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and
Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether or not petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that as of the issue of prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the
present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Theyre
essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a
learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also
said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against
petitioner were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with
prosecution.

Darenn S. Ba-at-Escrupulo JD-1

Central Philippine University
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Tenth Congress

Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."

Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the
justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of Facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall
not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2
hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a
lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law,
public morals, or public policy.

Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does
not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of
cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.

Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters
not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent
manifest injustice.

Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject
to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6)
months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the
accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. -
The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from
the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least
fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed
by the court.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a
negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require
the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried again following an
order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a
new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall
not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if
unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30)
days impractical.

Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-
calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to
trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month
period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time
limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.

Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not
limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency, or
physical incapacity;

(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;

(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty
(30) days,

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any
proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an essential
witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered absent when
his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or
prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential
witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for
trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically
unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed
against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period
of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to
the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the
court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance
has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on
motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge
granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable
under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons
for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of
the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall
consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are
as follows:

(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a
continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of
accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate
preparation within the periods of time established by this Act.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of general congestion of the
court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the
public prosecutor.

Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public attorney knows that a
person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime
and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in
any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:

(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the
person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to
demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the
prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the
person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent
promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the
prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly
supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that
public attorney.

Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an accused is not
brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the
information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of
supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in
connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among other
factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal,
and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver
of the right to dismissal under this section.

Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or public
attorney:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness
would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without
merit;

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false and
which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this
Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be
instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or
attorney, as follows:

(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by
imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in
connection with his/her defense of the accused;

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten
thousand pesos (10,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court
considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power
available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing
any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section.

Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations, administrative
orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who
willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.

Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative orders and
circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall
be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter,
such additional amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision of this Act shall be
interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution.

Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other
provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become
effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this
Act.

Approved: February 12, 1998