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Art.3: Felonies ............................................................................................................................. 6 Classification of Felonies According to the Means of Commission ............................................ 6 Calimutan v. People (G.R. No. 152133) ................................................................................ 6 Manuel v. People (G.R. No. 165842) .................................................................................... 9 Mistake of Fact ...................................................................................................................... 12 U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488) ........................................................................................... 12 Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673) ............................................................................ 14 People v. Fernando (G.R. No. L-24978) .............................................................................. 16 Mala in se v. Mala prohibita .................................................................................................. 18 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560) ...................................................................... 18 People v. Go Shiu Ling (G.R. No. 115156) ........................................................................... 19 Art. 4: Criminal Liability ............................................................................................................. 20 Wrongful Act Done be Different from That Intended ............................................................. 20 Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511) ....................................................................................... 20 People v. Ortega (276 SCRA 166) ....................................................................................... 21 People v. Pilda (405 SCRA 134) .......................................................................................... 22 Impossible Crimes ................................................................................................................. 23 People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245) .................................................................................. 23 Intod v. CA (215 SCRA 52) .................................................................................................. 25 Art. 6: Stages of Execution ......................................................................................................... 27 People v. Campuhan (G.R. No. 129433) ............................................................................. 27 Valenzuela v. People (G.R. No. 160188) ............................................................................. 29 People v. Orita (G.R. No. 88724) ........................................................................................ 31 Art. 8: Conspiracy ...................................................................................................................... 33 People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509) ........................................................................................ 33 People v. Comadre (431 SCRA 366) .................................................................................... 35 Sim v. CA (428 SCRA 459) ................................................................................................... 37 Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances ............................................................................................... 40 Self-defense .......................................................................................................................... 40 People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 161007).................................................................................. 40 Soplente v. People (G.R. No. 152715) ................................................................................ 42 Urbano v. People (G.R. No. 182750)................................................................................... 44 Defense of Relatives .............................................................................................................. 46 Balunueco v. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968) ................................................................. 46 Fulfilment of a Duty ............................................................................................................... 48 Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)..................................................................................... 48 1|P ag e
Baxinela v. People (G.R. No. 149652) ................................................................................. 50 Angcaco v. People (G.R. No. 146664) ................................................................................. 51 Obedience to an Order .......................................................................................................... 53 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 103501-03) ............................................................. 53 Art.12: Exempting Circumstances .............................................................................................. 55 Insanity/Imbecility................................................................................................................. 55 People v. Rubios (G.R. No. 138453) .................................................................................. 55 People v. Valledor (G.R. No. 129291) ................................................................................. 58 Minority ................................................................................................................................ 61 Llave v. People (G.R. No. 166040) ..................................................................................... 61 Jose v. People (G.R. No. 162052)........................................................................................ 63 Declarador v. Judge Gubaton (G.R. No. 159208) ................................................................ 65 Accident ................................................................................................................................ 67 Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94) ......................................................................................... 67 People v. Concepcion (386 SCRA 74) .................................................................................. 68 Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear ................................................................................... 70 Ty v. People (G.R. No. 149275)........................................................................................... 70 Entrapment v. Instigation ...................................................................................................... 72 People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019) .............................................................................. 72 People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309) ...................................................................................... 74 Chang v. People (G.R. No. 165111) .................................................................................... 76 Art. 13: Mitigating Circumstances.............................................................................................. 78 Incomplete Justifying or Exempting Circumstances................................................................ 78 People v. CA and Tangan (G.R. No. 103613) ....................................................................... 78 No Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong ............................................................................ 81 People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701) ..................................................................................... 81 Vindication of a Grave Offense .............................................................................................. 82 People v. Torpio (G.R. No. 138984) .................................................................................... 82 Passion or Obfuscation .......................................................................................................... 84 People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438) .................................................................................... 84 People v. Bates (G.R. No. 139907)...................................................................................... 86 People v. Malejana (G.R. No. 145002) ................................................................................ 88 Voluntary Surrender .............................................................................................................. 89 People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051) ................................................................................... 89 Andrada v. People (GR No. 135222) ................................................................................... 91 People v. Quimzon (G.R. No. 133541) ................................................................................ 93 Confession of Guilt ................................................................................................................ 95 People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57) ....................................................................... 95 People v. Dawaton (G.R. No. 146247) ................................................................................ 97 2|P ag e
Similar and Analogous Circumstances.................................................................................... 98 Canta v. People (G.R. No. 140937) ..................................................................................... 98 Art. 14: Aggravating Circumstances ......................................................................................... 100 Classes of Aggravating Circumstances.................................................................................. 100 People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152)........................................................................................ 100 People v. Palaganas (501 SCRA 533) ................................................................................ 101 People v. Mendoza (327 SCRA 695) ................................................................................. 102 In Contempt or With Insult to the Public Authorities ........................................................... 103 People v. De Mesa (G.R. No. 137036)............................................................................... 103 People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39) ............................................................................... 104 Abuse of Public Position ...................................................................................................... 106 Fortuna v. People (G.R. No. 135784) ................................................................................ 106 People v. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08) ......................................................................... 107 People v. Magayac (G.R. No. 126043) .............................................................................. 108 Nighttime, Uninhabited or Obvious Place or Band ............................................................... 109 People v. Villanueva (G. R. No. 135330) ........................................................................... 109 People v. Ancheta (G.R. No. 70222) ................................................................................. 112 People v. Baroy (G.R. Nos. 137520-22) ............................................................................. 114 Recidivism ........................................................................................................................... 116 People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368) .................................................................................. 116 Reiteracion .......................................................................................................................... 118 People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498) .................................................................................. 118 By Means of Inundation, fire, etc. ........................................................................................ 121 People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470)............................................................................... 121 People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559) .............................................................................. 123 Craft, Fraud or Disguise ....................................................................................................... 125 People v. Labuguen (G.R. No. 127849) ............................................................................. 125 Abuse of Superior Strength ................................................................................................. 127 People v. Amodio (G.R. No. 177356) ................................................................................ 127 People v. Jamon (413 SCRA 282) ...................................................................................... 129 People v. Calpito (416 SCRA 491) ..................................................................................... 131 Treachery ............................................................................................................................ 133 People v. Piedad (393 SCRA 488) ..................................................................................... 133 People v. Piliin (515 SCRA 207) ........................................................................................ 135 People v. Ilo (392 SCRA 326) ............................................................................................ 137 Ignominy ............................................................................................................................. 139 People v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 148712-15) ........................................................................... 139 People v. Bumidang (G.R. No. 130630)............................................................................. 141 People v. Siao (G.R. No. 126021) ...................................................................................... 144 3|P ag e
Aid of Minor or By Means of Motor Vehicles ....................................................................... 146 People v. Mallari (404 SCRA 170) ..................................................................................... 146 People v. Enguito (326 SCRA 508) .................................................................................... 148 Cruelty ................................................................................................................................ 151 People v. Guerrero (389 SCRA 389) .................................................................................. 151 Simangan v. People (434 SCRA 38) ................................................................................... 153 People v. Catian (374 SCRA 514) ...................................................................................... 154 Art. 15: Alternative Circumstances .......................................................................................... 155 Relationship ........................................................................................................................ 155 People v. Calongui (G.R. No. 170566) ............................................................................... 155 People v. Marcos (G.R. No. 132392) ................................................................................. 156 Intoxication ......................................................................................................................... 157 People v. Marquita (G.R. No. 137050) .............................................................................. 157 People v. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954) .............................................................................. 159 Arts. 16-20: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies ................................................................... 160 Principals............................................................................................................................. 160 People v. Batin (GR No. 177223) ...................................................................................... 160 People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939) ............................................................................... 162 People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368) .................................................................................. 165 Accomplices ........................................................................................................................ 167 People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)................................................................................... 167 Abarquez v. People (G.R. No. 150762) ............................................................................. 169 People v. Compo (G.R. No. 112990) ................................................................................. 171 Accessories.......................................................................................................................... 173 People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179) ............................................................................. 173 People v. Cui (G.R. No. 121982) ....................................................................................... 176 People v. Verzola (G.R. No. L-35022) ................................................................................ 179 Accessories Exempt from Criminal Liability .......................................................................... 181 People v. Mariano (G.R. No. L-40527) .............................................................................. 181 Arts. 21-24: Penalties in General ............................................................................................. 184 Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws .......................................................................................... 184 People v. Evina (G.R. No. 124830-310) ............................................................................. 184 People v. Lazaro (G.R. No. 112090) .................................................................................. 185 People v. Pacifador (G.R. No. 139405).............................................................................. 186 Pardon by Offended Party ................................................................................................... 187 Sta. Catalina v. People (G.R. No. 167805) ......................................................................... 187 Balderama v. People (G.R. No. 147578-85) ...................................................................... 189 People v. Dimaano (G.R. No. 168168) .............................................................................. 191 Arts. 25-45: Penalties .............................................................................................................. 193 4|P ag e
Reclusion Perpetua.............................................................................................................. 193 People v. Novio (G.R. No. 139332) ................................................................................... 193 People v. Zacarias (G.R. No. 138990)................................................................................ 195 People v. Ramirez (G.R. No. 138261)................................................................................ 196 Arts. 46-77: Application of Penalties ........................................................................................ 197 Complex Crime .................................................................................................................... 197 People v. Latupan (G.R. Nos. 112453-56) ......................................................................... 197 People v. Pineda (G.R. No. L-26222) ................................................................................. 199 People v. Sanidad (G.R. No. 146099) ................................................................................ 201 Delito Continuado ............................................................................................................... 203 Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 169727-28) ........................................................... 203 Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266) ..................................................................... 205 Habitual Delinquency .......................................................................................................... 207 People v. Espina (G.R. No. 43556) .................................................................................... 207 People v. De Jesus (G.R. No. 45198) ................................................................................. 208 Arts. 89-93: Total Extinction of Criminal Liability...................................................................... 210 Death of the Accused .......................................................................................................... 210 De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 154579) .......................................................................... 210 People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) ................................................................................ 211 People v. Abungan (G.R. No. 136843) .............................................................................. 213 Prescription of Offenses ...................................................................................................... 214 Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571) ............................................................................... 214 Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 881).................................................................................. 216 Caniza v. People (159 SCRA 16) ........................................................................................ 218 Amnesty .............................................................................................................................. 220 People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457) ............................................................................ 220 Arts. 100-103: Civil Liability ..................................................................................................... 223 Nuguid v. Nicdao (G.R. No. 150785) ................................................................................. 223 Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons ............................................................................ 226 Nueva Espana v. People (460 SCRA 547) .......................................................................... 226 Pangonorom v. People (455 SCRA 211) ............................................................................ 229 Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511) ..................................................................................... 231 Probation Law (P.D. No. 968)................................................................................................... 233 Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747) .................................................................................... 233 Lagrosa v. People (G.R. No. 152044) ................................................................................ 235 Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203) .................................................................................... 237 Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) ............................................................................................ 238 Francisco v. People (434 SCRA 122) ................................................................................. 238 Tan v. People (313 SCRA 220) .......................................................................................... 240 5|P ag e
Art.3: Felonies
Classification of Felonies According to the Means of Commission
Calimutan v. People (G.R. No. 152133)
Facts: Victim Cantre and Saano, together with two other companions had a drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten oclock in the morning of February 4, 1996. Thereafter, they decided to part ways and went to their respective houses. On their way home, Cantre and Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the one responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night. After being hit, bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as mans fist, ran toward Cantre, and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back. When Cantre turned his attention to the petitioner, Sanano tried pacify the two. Both Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. When Cantre arrived at his house, he complained of the pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the stone. At that night, he again complained of backache and also of stomachache. Hes condition immediately became worst, and at around three oclock in the following morning, Cantre died. Right after his death, Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer and made a findings that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the Cantre family requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim by the NBI. Dr. Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. The victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.
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Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but the latter refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. When he saw the victim was about to stab Bulalacao, he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim. He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense of his companion. The RTC rendered a decision, which was later affirmed by the CA, holding that petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a stone from behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony which caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. Hence, these case. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim and thus liable for homicide? Decision: While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the CA as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender. In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional,
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it
being
simply
the
incident
of
another
act
performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.
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that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA maintaining his contentions. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. Hence, these case. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has criminal intent to contract on the second marriage to be liable for bigamy? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
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Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary." Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.
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Mistake of Fact
U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)
Facts: Defendant herein a chinese man named Ah Chong is employed us a cook at Fort Mckinley. At that time there were rumours and accounts of frequent robbing of homes in the area. On the night of the killing, Ah chong before going to bed, and afraid of the rumoured robberies taking place in the vicinity locked himself in their room by placing wooden blocks and chairs for the purpose of thwarting robbers in case they tried to rob him. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by the noise of someone trying to open the door. Ah Chong for his part called out twice, Who is there, but to no avail. Fearing that the person trying to enter was robber Ah Chong leaped from his bed and shouted If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was suddenly struck by the chair that he had placed in the door, and believing that he was being attacked he seized a knife and struck it on the supposed assailant/robber, who was killed by the blow. However the deceased was not a robber not intruder it turned out that the person was his roommate, trying to enter their room.
Decision: NO. Ah Chong must be acquitted on the basis of honest mistake of fact. Where the facts been as Ah Chong perceived them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under Article 11 of the Revised, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for a valid self-defense of his person. If the
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intruder was indeed a robber, forcing his way to enter the room, unlawful aggression would be present. Also the necessity means to avoid or to repel the attack would be reasonable. Using the knife to defend himself. And lastly Ah Chong gave no provocation at all to warrant such aggression. The Supreme Court Held that there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well in the act of Ah Chong, his act would not have been a felony if the real scenario was the facts he believed them to be.
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decisions that mistake of fact, which would could be a valid defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a
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lay person, from liability. In People vs. Bidtu the Supreme Court held that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce decree under Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify the her act. The Court further that it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one doe not know that his act constitutes a violation of law does not exempt him from the consequence thereof.
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Decision: Yes. But not for the crime of murder. The accused being agent of the law, to whom notice was given of the presence of the suspicious looking persons who might be the escapees. The appearance of a man unknown to him, dressed in
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clothes as that of the escaped convicts, and calling to the owner of the house, of which the daughter of the owner of the house did not also recognized, caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the escaped convicts, and after firing a warning shot, the man still did not halt his advance with bolo in hand. In the midst of the circumstances and believing that the man was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the allege intruder. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation. However, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but a relative when the man called Nong Miong, and in not asking the daughter of the owner of the house who was it who was calling to her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before talking such fatal action. Hence he is liable for homicide through reckless negligence.
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Decision: The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. BIg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
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Issue: Whether or not a crime for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is a crime malum prohibitum? Decision: Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminal responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is a malum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. As held inPeople v. Lo Ho Wing: Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a "malum prohibitum" because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent. Likewise, in People v. Bayona, it was held: The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act."
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Facts: On Nov. 13,1995, Dante Andres and Randyven Pacheco invited Wilson Quinto and Edison Garcia to go fishing with them inside a drainage culvert. However, only Quinto joined the two, Garcia remain in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. After a while, Pacheco came out, went back again, and emerged again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area and went to the house of Wilsons mother and informed her that her son had died. After more than three months, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed and the NBI performed an autopsy thereon. An information was later filed with the RTC changing Andres and Pacheco with homicide. Issue: Whether or not the accused has criminal liability for the death of the victim?
Decision: The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It failed to prove the guilt of the accused is criminality liable although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts that the proximate cause of the death of the victim was not cause by any wrongful act of the accused. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove the corps delicti which consists of criminal act and the defendants agency in the commission of the act. This, the prosecution failed to do.
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Issue: Whether or not the appellant may be held criminally liable as principal by direct participation in the absence of proof of conspiracy?
Decision: The court in applying paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code ruled that even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. They are all criminally liable although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.
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Impossible Crimes
People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245)
Facts: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque Street in Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man (Domasian) who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate.Enrico agreed to help and rode with Domasian in a tricycle to Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, Domasian flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. Domasian told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the driver got suspicious and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. The tanods went after the two, Somehow, Domasian managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination.The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.
Issue: Whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime?
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Decision: No. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective
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Decision: Yes. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment and under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either
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impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
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Decision: Judgment modified into attempted rape. In People vs. Dela Pena, the SC clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attackers penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp of flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into
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the victims vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victims testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be touched by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape. Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oftquoted touching of the female organ, but has also progressed into being described as the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, or the bombardment of the drawbridge. But to the SC's mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or a "strafing of the citadel of passion." Under Art.6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape and only of attempted rape are present in the instant case; hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
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Decision: Petition dismissed. Under the statutory definition of theft, free disposal of the stolen items is not a constitutive element of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of theft is defined as follows. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without force or violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the property of another without the latters consent xxx On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the definition that in order such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and is was without the consent of the owner of the property. For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commissions in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely disposed of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. Indeed the SC, after all, held that unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment of the offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
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Decision: The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rapeand sentenced to reclusion perpetua.There is no debate that rape can be attempted and consummated. Our concern now is whether or not the crime of rape can be frustrated. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished (consummated). In the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. In the case of People v. Eria, We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. There was no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim, but neither was it ruled out. However the medical certificate stated that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. However, Dr. Zamoras (in place of Dr Abude) testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible.
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Art. 8: Conspiracy
People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509)
Facts: On December 4, 1993, in celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a benefit disco dance was held at the local UCMA Village. Appellants, Juanito and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, attended. At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the night with some friends. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home. Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would just follow. Wilson was behind them at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms when the group passed by the house of Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in front of his house and frisk them. Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug, Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they proceeded to the airport runway. Wilson, hidden behind a bush, said he could hear Benjamin plead for his life. A few seconds later, Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel while Juanito started stabbing him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting Roel. The lower court and Court of Appeals find that there was conspiracy and convicting them despite their defense of alibi.
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Decision: Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime.Neither it is necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design. The conspiracy in the instant case was sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and walking together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed performed acts in unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common purpose and design. Anent Marios defense of alibi, despite corroboration from Exequiel Aranas, it is still an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Absent arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence, we will not interfere with the credence given to the testimony of Wilson over that of Mario and that of Exequiel, as assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial court whose proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony. Moreover, as correctly discussed by the Court of Appeals, the distance between the scene of the crimes and where Mario claims he passed out is not so far away as to prevent him from being physically present at the place of the crimes or its immediate vicinity at the time the crimes were committed.
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Decision:
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.
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He had been
dealing with accused Elison Villaflor for twenty years, as the latter is engaged in
signature of the owner, Henry Austria. After private complainant signed the deed of sale, he gave it back to Elison to be brought back to Dagupan City for signing by the owner/vendor and transfer of registration in the name of private complainant. On June 7, 1998, Elison returned and delivered to private complainant the deed of sale signed by the owner/vendor, together with the new C.R. and O.R. issued by the LTO of Lingayen, Pangasinan in the name of private complainant. The checks given by private complainant in payment of the vehicle were deposited by petitioner in his name at Solidbank-Dagupan Branch. All five checks were debited in favor of petitioner. After receiving the registration papers from Elison, private complainant was eventually able to use the Nissan Pathfinder. On October 28, 1998, private complainants vehicle was apprehended by Anti-Carnapping operatives of the Philippine National Police (ANCAR NCRTMO). The vehicle and its registration papers were inspected and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. It turned out that the vehicle was a "hot car." Thereafter, Elison and petitioner were charged and convicted with estafa. Further the court also ruled that conspiracy is present. With this, the accused appealed. Issue: Whether there was conspiracy between petitioner and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan?
Decision: Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.
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In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioners actions in relation to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts transcend mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison. Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who dealt with or personally transacted with private complainant until the time the sale was consummated, by his own testimony petitioner admitted all the acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the fraud upon private complainant. That petitioner is a conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is evident from the fact that as between them, both knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner.Petitioner, together with Elison, clearly deceived private complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the latters damage and prejudice. In addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting himself to private complainant as having the necessary authority to possess and sell to the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him P480,000.00 only to renege on that promise and for failure to reimburse the said amount he collected from private complainant, despite demand, amount to estafa punishable under Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
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the victim. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting selfdefense. In this case, the twin circumstances of Jamero's shovel getting stuck in the mud and his running away from Sanchez convincingly indicate that there was no longer any danger to the latter's life and limb which could have justified his pursuit of Jamero and subsequent hacking and killing of the latter.
Sanchez's failure to prove unlawful aggression by Jamero and the prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that it was Sanchez who was the unlawful aggressor completely discounts Sanchez's claim of self-defense. Even incomplete self-defense by its very nature and essence would always require the attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be shown.
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Issue: Whether or not our laws on self-defense are suppose to approximate the natural human responses to danger. Decision: At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio could not have been obliged to view Notarte, or any other member of the posse for that matter, as a less menacing threat than Leyson. We have to understand that these events occurred spontaneously in a matter of seconds or even simultaneously. Rogelio bore no superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent the events from unfolding at virtual warp speed, to be able to assess with measured certainty the appropriate commensurate response due to each of his aggressors. Even those schooled in the legal doctrines of self-defense would, under those dire circumstances, be barely able to discern the legally defensible response and immediately employ the same. Our laws on self-defense are supposed to approximate the natural human responses to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient rulebook based on which we should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril. It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have discerned the appropriate calibrated response to Notartes kicking when he himself was staring at the evil eye of danger. That would be a gargantuan demand even for the coolest under pressure.
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Decision: When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. In the instant case, Tomeldens insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
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Defense of Relatives
Balunuecov. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968)
Facts: On May 2, 1982 at around 6:00 oclock in the evening Amelia Iguico saw accused Reynaldo, his father Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the five (5) individuals in hot pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of Amelias house. Meanwhile Senando went out of the house fully unaware of the commotion going on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention on him and gave chase. Senando instinctively fled towards the fields but Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Armando cornered him and ganged up on him. To shield him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but it was not enough to detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg. In his defense, accused Ricardo invoke defense of relatives. He testified that at that time he was fetching water he heard somebody shout. When he hurried to the place, he saw his brother Ramon embracing Senando who was continuously hacking Reynaldo. Thereafter, Senando shoved Ramon to the ground and as if further enraged by the intrusion, he turned his bolo on the fallen Ramon. Ricardo screamed, "tama na yan, mga kapatid ko yan." But the assailant would not be pacified as he hacked Ramon on the chest. At this point, Servando, the brother of Senando, threw an axe at him but Reynaldo picked it up and smashed Senando with it. The trial court found the accused guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide. According to the trial court, the denial of Ricardo was self-serving and calculated to extricate himself from the predicament he was in. Further, the trial court added that the wounds allegedly received by Ricardo in the hands of the victim, Senando Iguico, if at all there were any, did not prove that Senando was the aggressor for the wounds were inflicted while Senando was in the act of defending himself from the aggression of Ricardo and his co-conspirators.
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The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo with modification that his conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, should be for attempted homicide only.
Decision: Petitioner invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code. The essential elements of this justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative. It has always been so recognized in the decisions of the courts, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code. Having admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has the burden of proving these elements by clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the prosecution evidence is weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has admitted the killing. In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando.
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Fulfilment of a Duty
Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)
Facts: On July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the evening, a certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, MagnanakawMagnanakaw. Several residents responded and thereupon chased the suspect who entered the yard of Antonio Abacan and proceeded to the rooftop of Abacans house. At about 9:00 oclock that same evening, the desk officer of the Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a telephone call that a robberyholdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, immediately contacted and dispatched to the scene the crew including herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun. With the permission of Abacan, petitioner Mamangun, and two others went to the rooftop of the house whereat the suspect was allegedly taking refuge. The three policemen, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. There, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras (Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound. Issue: Whether or not the shooting in question was done in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office? Decision: No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense
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successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was in accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from criminal liability. To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the petitioners firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
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took
two
steps
and
then
fell
down.
Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty is applicable in this case? Decision: No. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.
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In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. The standard procedure in making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee under custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.
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Obedience to an Order
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 103501-03)
Facts: Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in the total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA. Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said Company signed by the then President Marcos. In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented.
Decision: Yes. It is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving intergovernment agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation.
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Issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type? Whether or not the court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
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the commission of the crime. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was committed. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robios. Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of his act.
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Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robios, all the other defense witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been detained in prison. To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible. Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at any time thereafter. Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim. Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish its existence. Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
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observations, physical mental and psychological examinations the patient Enrico Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder characterized by deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight. Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse. This is characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated by continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical problems. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact that when he allegedly committed the offense charged he was mentally ill, out of his mind or insane?
Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that in considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
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In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that accusedappellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accusedappellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims. Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." Then, too, the medical findings showing that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
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Minority
Llave v.People (G.R. No. 166040)
Facts: On Sept. 24, 2002, on an errand from her mother, the victim, who was only 7 years old at that time, proceeded to their house, where the accused waited for her, and accosted her; he proceeded to sexually abuse her, while the victim cried for help. A barbecue vendor nearby heard her cries and came to the scene; the accused fled, and the vendor told the victim to tell her parents what happened. Together with her parents, the victim went to the police and reported the incident; the vendor also testified to what he saw during that time. The medical examiner found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora; there was also fresh abrasion of the perennial skin at 1 oclock position near the anal opening. The trial court found the victim guilty, declaring that he acted with discernment, but crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of minority.
Issue: W/N accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and if yes, whether he acted with discernment, being a minor of age more than 9 years old but less than 15? Decision: YES Penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the
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penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated. While it is true that medical examiner did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainants genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case. The court have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The accused, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passers-by would not be able to discover his dastardly acts.
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Issue: W/N petitioner acted with discernment and that prosecution failed to allege in the information that he acted with discernment? Decision: NO For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, if he could afford to buy shabu.
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There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused.
2010-0204
Decision: YES The benefits of P.D. No. 603 shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. Furthermore, it shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence or, when at the time of the promulgation of judgment, the juvenile is already 18 yrs. old.
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The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. Rep. Act No. 9344 only amended the disqualification of those juveniles in conflict with law, who at the time of the promulgation of judgment, was already 18 years old, and allowed the benefits to apply to them. The other disqualification in P.D. No. 603 remains unchanged. Hence, the accused is still disqualified under law to benefit from such suspension of sentence. Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto.
Eddie Tamondong
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2009-0178
Accident
Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94)
Facts: The accused Toledo was charged with homicide for the killing of one Ricky Duarte. Toledo insisted that when he killed the victim, the same was purely accidental. He claimed that the victim was so drunk that the same charged at the door of his house. This prompted the accused to get his bolo and when he tried to prevent Ricky from entering, he accidentally hit the latter whereby killing him. But still the RTC and the Ca found him guilty. And so, the accused goes to the SC wherein this time, he claims that his actions were purely on self-defense. It was done when the victim attacked him and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed Duarte. Issue: Should the Court find his actions exempting and/or justifying? Decision: The Sc ruled that there is no such thing as accidental self-defense. The accused cannot claim the death purely accidental and when the findings of the lower courts were unfavorable, later on change his defense by alleging that what happened was purely self-defense. The two defenses perpetuated by the accused are totally inconsistent with each other. Although in the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is excused because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an unlawful aggression which could have killed or injure him. And so, such acts are not in tune with ACCIDENT which presupposes an act which was not even contemplated or planned but purely accidental.
Eddie Tamondong
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2009-0178
Galang. But herein lies the differences in the testimonies. The prosecution witnesses (2 of them) testified that while interrogating Galang, Concepcion suddenly fired two shots past the ear of the victim without injuring him. But later on, he hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot which wounded Galang in the thigh and then Concepcion fired three more shots which hit the victim in the chest and killed him. But according to the accused, he was merely pacifying Galang when the victim became so unruly that the accused fired two warning shots. But instead of scaring Galang, the latter tried to grab the gun from the accused. Two shots were accidentally fired which hit Galang thus causing his death. The accused claims that he should be exempted because he was just performing his lawful duty as a police officer and that the shooting was purely accidental. The trial court found Concepcion guilty.
Issue: Should the accused be exempted from criminal liability due to accident?
Decision: Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has theburden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. However, once the
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defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code. Unfortunately for the accused, his testimony was too full of inconsistencies which failed to discharge the burden . For one, Concepcion claims that when the victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. But then he claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the BARREL OF THE GUN. This was very inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not believable that a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a police officer who also had a handgun tucked by his waist. Lastly, the prosecution witness categorically testified that he saw Concepcion shoot the victim with the M-16 rifle. And so, the finding of guilt by the lower court was proper.
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Decision:No. Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
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Entrapment v. Instigation
People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019)
Facts: On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November 29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latters house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellants house and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellants house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram. The accused was charged of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
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The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision denying the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not instigation was the act which preceded Sta. Marias arrest?
Decision: In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of the course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
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Issue: Whether or not the buy-bust operation that led to the appellants arrest was valid?
Decision: In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would- be
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defendant into the commission of the offense and become co- principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engage in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. The records show that the operation that led to the arrest of the appellant was indeed an entrapment, not instigation. Courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in the regular manner. In entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by the prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold was a dangerous drug. The elements were duly proven in the case herein. The record shows that the appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers.
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San Mateo arrived and joined Magat at his table. Chang arrived and joined the two. Magat told Chang and San Mateo that GDI was ready to pay and asked them if they could give him the Certificate of Examination showing that GDI has no more tax liability. Chang handed the Certificate while Magat gave the brown envelope. At that instant, the NBI agents announced that they were being arrested. The Sandiganbayan convicted San Mateo and Chang of violation of sec 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Hence, this appeal.
Decision: Petitioners were undisputedly public officers at the time of the commission of the offense. The prosecution, not only established creditably how the offense charged was committed. It is established just as creditably how petitioners conspired to commit the crime. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens reoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. From the evidence of the prosecution, it was clearly established that the criminal intent originated from the mind of the petitioner. Even before the June 19, 1991 meeting took place, petitioners already made known to Magat that GDI only had two options to prevent the closure of the company, either to pay the assessed amount of P494,601.11 to the Municipality or to pay the amount of P125,000 to them.
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wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused. The accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda. Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. Manuel looked for the gun and ran after Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew. Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way. Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. However, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm. Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered. After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case. Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment
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be modified by convicting accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.
Decision: Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of selfdefense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. The exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.
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Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The lack of intent to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefore, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
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Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense is appreciated? Decision:
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The Supreme held that the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. However, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.
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Passion or Obfuscation
People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438)
Facts: Segundina Cayno was engaged in the business of selling rummage goods. Early in the morning of October 21, 1996 her son, Jerry Cayno went to the dap-ayan or barangay hall, in front of the Tadian Public Market to display the goods for sale. After displaying the goods, Segundina arrived and took over. Before noontime, while Nancy and Julie were plucking the white hair strands of Segundina, appellant Wilson Lab-eo arrived and approached his aunt, Segundina. Upon seeing him, Nancy went to a distance of about two meters while Julie was still near Segundina. Appellant sat down in front of his aunt and uttered something to her in a very soft voice. Nancy did not hear what he said because of her distance from them while Julie could not make out the conversation because of the sound coming from a running motor engine. What they only heard was Segundinas answer which was uttered in a loud angry voice koma-an ka tay baka mahigh bloodac (you get out because I might suffer high blood). They saw appellant leave. When appellant returned about 3 to 5 minutes after, Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of her were Nancy and Julie, they did not notice appellants return, especially Segundina who had her back to appellant. When Julie saw appellant approach Segundina from the back, Julie thought that he would just box his aunt because she did not see the knife, which was wrapped in his blue jacket. Then appellant suddenly made a thrusting motion and he stabbed Segundina on the left portion of her back. He then ran away leaving the knife at the victims back with the jacket he had covered it with, hanging by the knifes handle. Appellant surrendered to the police authorities. The appellant was indicted for murder. The appellant does not deny stabbing Cayno. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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Issue: Whether or not the actuation of the accused can be properly appreciated as passion or obfuscation in his favour? Decision: For a person to be motivated by passion and obfuscation, there must first exist an unlawful act that would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to overcome reason and self-control. There is passional obfuscation when the crime is committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In asking the appellant to leave, the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the appellant was utterly humiliated by the victims utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. The victims utterance was not the stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome reason and self-restraint.
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Issue: Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?
Decision: Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of appellant. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
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However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.
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Voluntary Surrender
People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051)
Facts: On November 3, 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information for Murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around 10:00 oclock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifiying circumstance of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without warning one Norman Conception y Habla while the latter was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the victims death. When arraigned on November 9, 1999, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to the charge therein. Thereafter, trial ensued. Appellant, on his defense admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted that he did the same in self-defense. Furthermore, appellant also claimed that Norman is taller than him; that he was forced to kill Norman because the latter insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City to surrender to police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa City. The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant Honorato Beltran, Jr. is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?
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Decision: Appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code states that the offenders criminal liability may be mitigated if he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent. Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police by a certain Tomas Dimacuha. Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the bext day, to his sister in Lipa City. It took him three long days to surrender to the police authorities. Moreover, the flight of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating circcumstance of voluntary surrender.
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Decision: Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was apprehended by responding police officers in the For waiting shed at the corner of Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue.
voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.
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Issue: Whether or not the appellant Ricky Quimzon is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Decision: It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of the MTC of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on
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An examination of the records reveals that it can not be For the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surreder to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concominant to his capture. The surrender of appellant was far from being spontaneous and unconditional. The warrant of arrest is date June 17, 1992 and all the accused, including appellant, remained at-large, which prompted the Executive Judge of the RTC of Palo, Leyte to achieve the case. It took appellant two years before he finally surrendered to the police. In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Fix Bail Bond without surrendering his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion had been acted upon by the trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a condition set by him before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his subsequent act of surrendering from being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
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Confession of Guilt
People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)
Facts: On 18 November 1996, William Montinola, armed with an unlicensed Cal .380 Pistol Llama deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence against or intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount of P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion. Montinola shot the victim on the neck, killing Reteracion. Two criminal cases were filed against Montinola and he was later on sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with homicide and death for illegal possession of firearm. Issue: Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide? Decision: Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said Presidential Decree was however, amended by R.A. 8294, while Montinolas case was still pending. R.A. 8294 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court held In recent cases, we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
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circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of homicide or murder may be counted in the determination of the penalty for robbery with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime was committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being unfavorable to him. The Court further held Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we would apply retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the imposable penalty would be death. Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez, insofar as the new law would aggravate the crime of robbery with homicide and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, it would not be given retroactive application, lest it would acquire the character of an ex post facto law. Hence, we shall not appreciate that special aggravating circumstance. There being no modifying circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-appellant WILLIAM.
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Issue: Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the accused was correct?
Decision: No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not considering the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused. Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the crime was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents. The Court further stated that Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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Decision: No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v. Macatanda,P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the law provides: The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e.,prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum period.
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Decision: With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
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Issue: Whether or not voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstances of treachery?
changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not. 32 Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.
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Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed?
Decision: Yes. The prosecution failed to positively prove the presence of anyqualifying aggravating circumstance whereby the crime committed is only homicide for which the imposable penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code is Reclusion Temporal. Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law may now be applied and absent any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
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Issues:
Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in crimes of homicide and murder? Decision: No.Under an information charging homicide or murder, the use of an unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance nor can it be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death or reclusion perpetua. The character of the instrument used in taking or destroying
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human existence is not one of those included in the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, under an information for unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession if the unlicensed firearm was used to destroy human existence. Though it is not one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be considered to increase the penalty imposed because of the explicit provision of the said special law.
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Issue: Whether or not abuse of public position should be taken as an aggravating circumstance by the mere fact that the accused were police officers? Decision: The Supreme Courted held that the lower courts failed to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. Being police officers, it placed them in a position terrify the Montecillos to surrender their money as bail. It was on the account of their authority that convinced the Montecillos that they had committed a crime and that they would be taken to the police station. Had they not been police officers, they would have not convinced the Montecillos into giving them their money.
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Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court properly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was improperly applied. A public officer must use the influence that is vested in his office as a means to realize the purpose of the crime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. The question Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime must be asked in order to appreciate this circumstance as an aggravating circumstance. No proof was shown that Villamor took advantage of his position of being a policeman when he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence, prestige or ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even without occupying a public position, the accused could have committed the crime.
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Issue: Whether or not the circumstance of taking advantage of public position should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance considering the facts of the case? Decision: The Supreme Court held that in the commission of the offense, there was no aggravating circumstance, specifically abuse of public position. Considering the facts of the case, Manuel was a member of the CAFGU and the weapon used to shoot Jimmy was a government issued M-14 rifle. These, however, do not necessarily prove that Manuel took advantage of his public position as a member of the CAFGU when the crime of murder was committed.
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Decision: The issue of credibility raised in the three assigned errors should be resolved against Camilo. Nia clearly testified that Camilo raped her. She recounted the details of her harrowing experience in a credible, convincing and straightforward manner. The prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the fact of penetration, although incomplete. In order that the crime of rape may be said to be consummated, the successful penetration by the rapist of the females genital organ is not indispensable. Penile invasion, it has often been held, necessarily entails contact with the labia and even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence. It would, in fine, be enough in a conviction for rape that there is an entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Neither the penetration of the penis beyond the lips of the vagina nor the rupture of the hymen is indispensable to justify conviction. Consequently, the finding that Nias hymen is intact does not disprove that rape was committed. Even the fact that there was no reddening or hematoma in the external genitalia does not render the occurrence of rape improbable. The doctrine is well settled that the absence of external injuries does not negate rape.Even Camilos claim that the sperm found in the vagina of NIA was not his because he has undergone vasectomy, is inconsequential. The absence of spermatozoa is not an essential element of rape. This is because in rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. On the issue of inconsistencies and discrepancies, these things on minor matters neither impair the essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness honesty. Such inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of the memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
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Camilo has moral ascendancy over Nia, being the common-law spouse of her mother and the man who acted as her father since she reached the age of reason. Nias tender age and Camilos custodial control and domination over her had rendered her so meek and subservient to his needs and desires, thus, becoming an easy prey to Camilos lecherous advances. Moreover, Camilo threatened her with a knife. For rape to exist it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. It is this form of intimidation which explains why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker. Under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished in the new Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
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Issues: Whether or not there was conspiracy between and among the accused? Whether or not the penalty imposed on Ancheta was proper? Decision: On whether or not there was conspiracy between and among the accused. The Supreme Court agreed that there was a conspiracy among the accusedappellant and his two companions when they forcibly entered the house of Teresa Gorospe and burned it after their demand for P1,000.00. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. It is settled that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
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conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them. The conspiracy having been established, it should follow that the accusedappellant is as guilty as his companions of the crime of arson, even if it be conceded that he was not the one who actually poured the kerosene and ignited it to burn Teresa Gorospe's house. When there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and visits equal guilt upon every conspirator. On whether or not the penalty imposed on Ancheta was proper. Under Article 321 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed "if the offender shall set fire to any building, farmhouse, warehouse, hut, shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more persons. .... " The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was correctly appreciated because it was sought by the defendants to facilitate the commission of the offense and their subsequent escape. Evident premeditation should also have been applied because the offenders had deliberately plotted the crime, as early as 9 o'clock of the night in question, or two hours before they actually burned the house. With these aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances to offset them, the proper penalty as imposed by the trial court is reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity of P40,000.00 is allowed, but the costs of the suit shall be adjudged in toto against the accused-appellant and not to be shared, as ordered by the trial court.
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we resolve to rule in favor of the accused. If the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. Based on his Birth Certificate, it is clear that Baroy was only fourteen (14) years old when he committed the crime of rape. Hence, a reconsideration of the Courts 9 May 2002 Decision is proper. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the offender is a minor x x x under fifteen years x x x a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. The penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed by Baroy is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.Additionally, Baroy is entitled to the benefits granted by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
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Recidivism
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)
Facts: Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot were indicted for murder in an information and that the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The case against appellants co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter. When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12, 2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year. On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death. The Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not it is necessary, in recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, to be alleged in the information? Decision: The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that
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he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the accused.This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
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Reiteracion
People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498)
Facts: On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a resident of Manila, arrived in Basey, Samar, and stayed with her sister Marie. The following day, Marita was fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also known as Meling, and by the latters common law husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as Elming. Upon being told by Meling that they would be going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went with Meling and Elming to the couples house in Sitio Catuhaan in Barangay Serum. Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita stayed with Meling and Elming together with their two (2) small children in a house consisting of only one room without any partition. In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining witness Marita Cajote slept at one end of the room with the two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at the other end. At about two oclock the following morning Marita was awakened by the weight of accused who was already on top of her. The accused who was holding a bolo told her to keep quiet or he would kill her. He then placed his bolo aside and held Maritas hands with his right hand. With his left hand accused lowered Maritas pants as well as her panty down to her knees. Marita shouted for help but her sister Meling just wrapped her head with their mosquito net and pretended to be asleep. Marita struggled continuously against the advances of the accused but he was much stronger, while she was getting weak. The accused first inserted his fingers into Maritas private part and later succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. Meling then pulled Elming away from Marita and hit Elming in the eye. Elming boxed Meling on the mouth and kicked her when she fell on the floor. Elming went back to Marita and continued with his beastly acts. By this time, Marita was already too weak to resist. Elming inserted his fingers first and then his penis into her private organ. The older of the two (2) children of Meling cried. Meling who was holding her youngest child helplessly watched the accused rape her younger sister.
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The trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to show any compelling or justifiable reason to set aside his conviction for rape and his penalty of death, citing Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Qualified Rape. Decision: The Solicitor General is correct in finding the accused guilty of rape. The bare denial of the accused and his common-law wife cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. Denial when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters. No woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. The Court likewise agrees with the finding of the trial court that Maritas positive identification of the accused as the person who raped her was given in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner which rendered it worthy of faith and belief. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and the stand of the Solicitor General, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. It was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of death. Although the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was alleged in the Information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the lack or absence of such circumstance to qualify the rape because the accused and Merly Tagana, sister of the victim Marita Cajote, were mere common-law husband and wife and were not legally married at the time of the rape. The accused and the victim cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the commission of the crime.Neither can the accused be convicted of qualified rape on the basis of the circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of the relatives of the victim within the third degree of
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consanguinity because this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the Information or in the Complaint against the accused. The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991.Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case. The Decision of the trial court convicting the accused ELMEDIO CAJARA alias Elming of Qualified Rape is MODIFIED to the effect that he is convicted instead only of Simple Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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Revised Penal Code Art. 320. Destructive Arson xxxx If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. Presidential Decree No. 1613 Sec. 5. Where Death Results from Arson if by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. Both laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The reason is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence. The case falls under simple arson since from a reading of the body of the information it can be seen that it states that the accused, with intent to cause damage, xxx deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house, xxx that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, xxx which were the direct cause of their death xxx. It is clear that her intent was merely to destroy her employers house through the use of fire. When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.
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Whether or not appellants conspired to kill the victims? Decision: Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. The information alleges that both treachery and the use of explosive attended the crime. Since both circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudencesupport this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance. No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.
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Issue: Whether or not the court has correctly appreciated the employment of generic aggravating circumstance of fraud and craft in the commission of the crime even if not alleged in the information? Decision: Though not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft were properly appreciated by the trial court. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. By saying that he would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to buy, appellant was able to lure the victim to go with him. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Robbery with Homicide is reclusion perpetua to death Applying Article 63 of the same Code, the imposable penalty under the premises is death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of craft and fraud and the absence of any mitigating circumstance. Four members of the Court are steadfast in their adherence to the separate opinion expressed in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. However, they bow to the majority opinion that the aforesaid law is constitutional and therefore, the penalty prescribe thereunder has to be imposed.
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The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not the killing was qualified by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength?
Decision: No.The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength had not been sufficiently proved. To appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. Mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior strength. There must be clear proof that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked. In this case, although the victim was unquestionably outnumbered, it was not shown that accused-appellants deliberately applied their combined strength to weaken the defense of the victim and guarantee the execution of the crime. Notably, accused-appellants took turns in boxing the victim. When the victim fell, the prosecution witness was able to hold him, preventing accused-appellants from further hurting him. Then accused-appellants simply turned away. To be sure, had accused-appellants really intended to use their superior strength to kill the victim, they would have finished off the victim, and probably even the lone prosecution eyewitness.
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Decision: Yes.The prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. In the present case, the victim was a woman with a smaller build. She was unarmed. Appellant was a fifty-one-year-old male, in the prime of his life, and armed with a deadly weapon. The killing indubitably constitutes an instance of abuse of superior strength, hence the offense is qualified to murder, and not merely homicide.Thus, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, as alleged in the information, attended the fatal shooting of Victoria Tacla.
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The appellant attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas and Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas which caused her death and a wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical attendance on him for a period of 5-7 days and which incapacitated him from performing his usual work for the same length of time. However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial. But on June 15, 1993, appellant was re-arraigned and after being appraised of the consequences of the nature of his offense, he changed his plea to one of guilty. The court a quofinding the charge of Robbery with Homicide
unsubstantiated by evidence, convicted appellant of the crime of murder. Appellant, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of Murder instead of Homicide and in failing to apply the mitigating circumstance of minority. The court denied the motion and affirmed appellants conviction for murder. Issue: Whether or not the abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder?
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Decision: Yes.A perusal of the facts of the case readily reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In several cases, this Court has ruled that this circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime. In a recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressors superior strength. The circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a knife.
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Treachery
People v. Piedad (393 SCRA 488)
Facts: On the night of April 10, 1996, victim Mateo Lactawan, and his friend Andrew were drinking beer when he got involved in a fist fight with other people drinking alcohol in the nearby store. That was when Luz, Mateos wife arrived in the scene of the crime and saw that a group of men were attacking his husband. Among the other aggressors who continuedly boxed Mateo whos already lying on the ground, Luz saw Niel struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Lito stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateos death. Niel Piedad claims that the attack on the victim was made upon an impulse of the moment and was not the product of deliberate intent; while Lito Garcia contends that treachery cannot be appreciated inasmuch as the attack was preceded by a quarrel and heated discussion. Issue: Whether or not treachery must be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance? Held: Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove: a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
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The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. While it is true that the victim herein may have been warned of a possible danger to his person, since the victim and his companion headed towards their residence when they saw the group of accused-appellants coming back for them after an earlier quarrel just minutes before, in treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any chance of defending himself from the concerted assault of his aggressors, even if he was forewarned of the attack. Mateo was obviously overpowered and helpless when accusedappellants group numbering around eight, ganged up and mauled him. More importantly, Mateo could not have actually anticipated the sudden landing of a large concrete stone on his head. The stone was thus treacherously struck. Neither could the victim have been aware that Lito came up beside him to stab his back as persons were beating him from every direction. Litos act of stabbing the victim with a knife, inflicting a 15-centimeter-deep wound shows deliberate intent of using a particular means of attack. Considering the location of the injuries sustained by the victim and the absence of defense wounds, Mateo clearly had no chance to defend himself. In view of the foregoing, treachery was correctly appreciated by the trial court.
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Decision: Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in their execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed. The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the
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latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Appellants wife witnessed the incident from its inception up to its consummation. In this case, the victim was about to park his car when appellant suddenly appeared and shot him without any warning. The attack was so sudden that the latter had no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. It can readily be inferred that the manner of the attack adopted by appellant manifested treachery. Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the weapon used and the nature of the injury inflicted, which pertained to the lone gunshot fatally wounding appellant, established that appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the particular mode of attack to ensure the commission of the offense with impunity.
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Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the killing of the victim ? Decision: NO.Treachery is not presumed. The circumstances surrounding the murder must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. To constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated if the assailant did not make any preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend herself. The prosecution must prove that the killing was premeditated or that the assailant chose a method or mode of attack directly and especially to facilitate and insure the killing without danger to
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himself. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. There is no treachery where the attack is neither sudden nor preconceived and deliberately adopted but just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the offender. To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the offender made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself. The mode of attack must be planned by the offender and must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation between the victim and the assailant such that the victim was forewarned of the impending danger. The prosecution failed to discharge its burden. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence as to the relative positions of appellant vis--vis the victim. Taking into account the sequential continuity and rapidity of the events resulting in the death of Virginia, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant made preparations to kill Virginia and adopted a mode of attack as to make it impossible or difficult for her to defend herself.
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Ignominy
People v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 148712-15)
Facts: On December 28, 1999, at 6:00PM, two armed men suddenly entered Barnachea residence in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. The two ordered a 12-year old boy, Jessie E. Barnachea, to drop the floor by hitting him in the back with the butt of a long gun. They hurriedly proceeded to the living room and shot Jessies uncle, Victorino Lolarga, and continued shooting in the kitchen hitting his mother Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr., and his cousin Rubenson Abance. His eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, who then was in his uncles house, noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables dealer," and with the description of the "El Shaddai" parked in front of the fence of their house. Also, the jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors, Russel Tamba and Francisco Andrada. The incident was immediately reported to the police and at around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter brought to the Aringay police station and then turned over to the Bauang police. Jessie was able to identify two of the eight appellants by the name of Cachola and Amay as the two assailants who entered the house. The next day a paraffin test was conducted on the appellants. The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on her head and three on her body; Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and arms; Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his body, and with his penis excised;Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head and a stab wound that lacerated his liver.
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RTC convicted all the eight appellants but the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended the affirmance of the conviction for murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the other appellants for failure of the prosecution to establish their identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not excising of penis amounts to ignominy that can aggravate the offense charged?
Decision: NO. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victims moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. In this case, the information states that Victorinos sexual organ was severed after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating circumstance. SC sustained the conviction of Cachola and Amay but the rest of the six appellants were acquitted for the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
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On 8 October 1996, a complaint for rape was filed before the MCTC of Villaverde-Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya, and found a prima facie case against Bumidang. The records were forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. When it reached RTC, it rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to death by lethal injection. Issue: Whether or not dwelling, nighttime and ignominy shall be appreciated as aggravating circumstances of the crime of rape? Decision: YES. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. There was a clear violation of the sanctity of the victim's place of abode when Gloria, who apparently did not give any provocation, was raped in her own house. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture. In this case, other than the fact that the crime was committed at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, nothing on the record suggests that Bumidang deliberately availed himself or took advantage of nighttime nor proved that Bumidang used the darkness to facilitate his evil design or to conceal his identity. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account if means are employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral suffering. In this case, it was established that Bumidang used the flashlight and
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examined the genital of Gloria before he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed in the presence of Gloria's old father. These facts clearly show that Bumidang deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria, thereby aggravating and compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a woman was raped in the presence of her betrothed or of her husband or was made to exhibit to the rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her. SC sustained RTCs decision finding Baliwang guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
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Issue: Whether or not ignominy, as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of rape, is attendant to justify the award of exemplary damages? Decision: YES. The RTC overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven in the case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof. Still, SC respected RTCs finding of facts and found any inconsistencies in the witnesses testimonies inconsequential considering that they referred to trivial matters w/c have nothing to do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even if it was pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a span of less than 30 mins, w/c does not conform to common experience, rape was still present from the evidence because rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied by many people at the time of the crime, rape was still committed because lust is no respecter of time and place. And Estrellas and Gimenas decision not to flee proves only the fear and intimidation that they were under because Siao was after all their amo or employer who threatened to kill them or their family if they did not succumb to his demands. The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of a deadly weapon. Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral damages, w/c is automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in the amount of PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of ignominy justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment affirmed w/ modification of damages awarded.
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Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle was correctly appreciated by the trial court in imposing the death penalty?
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Decision: The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph. The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, we shall apply Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in the information, were not proved. What was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution. In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
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Issue:
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Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle should be considered in this case?
Decision: The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-appellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased[16] who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him. Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide with two (2) mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and voluntary surrender; and had the charge been homicide he could have pleaded guilty. We find that these mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping and pushing the motorela which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and he was allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him. When he regained consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a policeman to report that he was mauled. Clearly, accusedappellant's state of mind after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme. For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the
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mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". SPO3 Catiil further testified that appellant did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its right tire was already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being driven by accused-appellant already destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it was running flat. Clearly, accusedappellant could have eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his vehicle suffered a flat tire. The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The crime was committed in 1992 where the penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious crime, was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty for murder should be imposed for the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries considering that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. And, consonant with the ruling in People vs. Muoz that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution did not change the period of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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Cruelty
People v. Guerrero (389 SCRA 389)
Facts: Orlando Guerrero, Jr., also known as Pablo, together with his father Orlando Guerrero, Sr., nicknamed Dino, was accused of murder. The accuseds, conspired, confederated and mutually helped one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without justifiable cause, attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut off the penis of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which caused his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his lawful heirs. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Orlando interposed selfdefense while his father, Dino, denied any complicity in the killing. According to the the witness, Jacalne, he was informed that one Dino Guerrero was inside the house nearby. Dino Guerrero came out with his hands extended forward. SPO1 Emilio Taracatac immediately frisked and handcuffed him. Before Dino was handcuffed, according to the witness, he said that it was his son who had killed the victim. Thereafter, Dino was brought to the police station for custodial investigation. Further, Jacalne testified that appellant Orlando Guerrero, Jr., was not at the scene of the crime during their investigation. But upon their return to the police station, appellant was already there.[11 Appellant admitted killing the victim, according to Jacalne, by clubbing the victim first with the wooden stick, and then cutting his head and his penis with a knife. Another withness, Ireneo Acierto, appellants brother-in-law, testified that while he was resting in his house at past 11:30 in the morning of July 7, 1997, he heard someone screaming. When he looked out from his window, he saw that the person screaming was his sister-in-law, Ana. He went out of the house and went near the porch of the Guerreros, where he saw Ernesto Ocampos head about to be severed by appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed
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the same on the right side of the victims trunk. After that, appellant cut off Ernestos penis. Ireneo noticed that while the head was being severed, the victim was lying down on the floor, but not moving. Ireneo then told appellant, That is enough, bayaw. Stop it. According to the witness, his wife Ana was also saying, That is enough, Manong. Appellant angrily turned to Ireneo, telling him not to interfere or else he might also be implicated. Ireneo hurriedly went away after that. Ireneo did not see his father-in-law, Dino, at the time of the incident and did not know where Dino was. The trial court convicted Orlando Guerrero, Jr. of murder while his father Dino was acquitted. Issue: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of cruelty and/or outraging and scoffing the corpse in order to classify the killing as murder despite failure of the prosecution to allege the same in the information Decision: The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of (1) treachery and (2) evident premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in the perpetration of the crime, where there was deliberate and inhuman suffering of the victim and the offender had scoffed at the victims corpse. On treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the requirements of the law.[ we hold that in the present case, the trial court did not err when it found neither treachery nor evident premeditation. However, the trial court found there was cruelty as well as outraging or scoffing at the corpse, thus, qualifying the crime to murder.
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Decision: Yes. The testimonies of Romeo and Sofronia are credible. Thus, Simangans conviction is affirmed. It is found that Simangan stabbed Ernesto 10 times, three of which were fatal. But the number of stab wounds does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance against Simangan for it must be proven that Simangan intended to exacerbate the suffering of Ernesto. Nigh time is also not appreciated as it was included in the original information.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that there was treachery?
Decision: The record shows that the appellant had a previous misunderstanding with Ligaya Santos; and that when he suddenly attacked her he was with a group of armed men so that there was present not only the element of surprise but also the advantage of no risk to himself. Aleviosa was certainly present.
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Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and relationship be appreciated against Calonqui and the latter circumstance as an alternative circumstance?
Decision: Calonqui and Maricel live under the same shelter as they are first cousins. At the time of the incident, both are living in the same house and in the same room. Therefore, the supposed aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated as there was no trespass to the sanctity of the house of the victim on the part of Calonqui, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship is likewise cannot go against Calongui, even as an alternative circumstance, as being first cousins is not within the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. However, his conviction is nonetheless affirmed.
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considered as Aggravating.
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Intoxication
People v. Marquita (G.R. No. 137050)
Facts: On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her house. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibua. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn was about to go upstairs, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but was overpowered by the accused. Junilla shouted for help and the accused run away. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired. On August 12, 1998, the provincial prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, an Information for murder against accused George Cortes y Ortega. Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn and enter the plea of guilty of the said crime. The prosecution presented evidence to prove the presence of intoxication as aggravating circumstances. The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the alternative mitigating of intoxication. On September 2, 1998, the trial court rendered decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentence to suffer the penalty of Death.
Issue: Whether or not the crime committed by the accused was aggravated by reason of intoxication? Decision: Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or
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subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information and considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that "the only aggravating circumstance present was treachery which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759
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Issue: Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable as principal by inducement? Decision: The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice were credible and
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sufficed to prove Castors indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was. While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castors utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony. Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.Even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same. Castors argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words Sige, banatan mo na cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement. Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. The moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression. There is no doubt in our minds that Castors words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime.
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Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant when the witnesses testimony didnt confirm who chased and stabbed the victims?
Decision:
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Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or whether the accused merely incited his companions in the jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the determination of his liability because a conspiracy among the occupants of the jeepney has been established. In order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy." The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed that where there are several accused and conspiracy has been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the fatal wound. Where conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their participation because the act of one is the act of all. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more person agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of
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a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. When a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of conspiracy between the appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus, criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he did not actually stab the latter.
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Decision: The rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any such disclaimer by appellant. Moreover, despite appellants self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. Assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellants admission that he participated in its commission by holding Rosemaries legs made him a principal by direct participation. Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present: 1.) they participated in the criminal resolution and 2.) they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common purpose or design.
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Accomplices
People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)
Facts: An information for the murder of Roderick Ferol was filed against accusedappellant Restituto Roche and three others, namely, Marcelino Fallore, Francisco Gregorio, and one John Doe. The Court found that the prosecution evidence has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Restituto Roche for the crime of murder but could not make a pronouncement as to the guilt of accused Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and therefore could not be arraigned.Finding that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of accused Francisco Gregorio and Marcelino Fallore, both accused were acquitted.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant should held liable for the killing of Roderick Ferol on the ground of conspiracy?
Decision: No. In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.Apart from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accusedappellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
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accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In People v. Elijorde, Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference. Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out of the desire to get even with him for the offense committed against his brother. In no way can such act be attributed to accused-appellant.Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites must concur in order that a person may be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has not been proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes plan to attack and kill Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant, we cannot uphold the trial courts finding of guilt. Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.
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(2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice; that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. The court held in one case that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. In convicting Abarquez in this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuelas criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.
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Decision: No. The court held that the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Basically, accused-appellant Lemuel was convicted based on the testimony of the conductor of passenger bus Gilberto Libardo who saw Lemuel carrying an Indian Pana and a flashlight. Without any testimony positively identifying accused-appellant as the assailant nor any evidence directly linking him as the author of the crime, Lemuel Compo cannot be convicted of the murder of Dales. The accused-appellant deserves an acquittal and must forthwith be given back his liberty. The testimony of witness Mauricio Gonzaga, states that Lemuel was merely present before the stabbing incident, holding a flashlight. No other overt act was established to prove that Lemuel shared and concurred with the criminal
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design of Mauricio. The mere presence of Lemuel, who was not shown to be armed, at the scene of the crime does not connote conspiracy. Singularity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish conspiracy. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.Conspiracy transcends companionship.The presence and company of Lemuel were not necessary or essential to the perpetration of the murder. Neither can Lemuel be considered an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. To be convicted as such, it is necessary that he be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime. The prosecution, however, failed to present convincing evidence establishing that accused-appellant Lemuel knew of the other accused's intent to kill Dales. Again, his mere presence at the scene of the crime and his flight therefrom with the other accused are not proof of his participation in the crime. The quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution to support a conviction has not been reached with regard to accused-appellant Lemuel. The oft-repeated truism that the conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence applies.He must, therefore, be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Accessories
People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)
Facts: On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan. Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room.Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death. After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila and Merwin and warned them that if they will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told them. On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one who killed
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Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also fingered the former as the killer of Sagario. However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently consciencestricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros. The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant (Jonathan Fabros) manifested his approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other accused.8 Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be convicted as an accessory? Decision: Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an
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accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes. Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case. In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his coaccused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril. The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.
Jasmine Calaycay
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2005-0049
would be placed at gun point together with the other members of the Lim household when the crime is committed. However, he refused to join the plot during the December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the residence of the Cuis in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even invoked their close ties as godfathers of each other's children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey, Sadam and the Cuis. On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement reiterating these revelations in writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by executing a Joint Affidavit. Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr. filed an information for Kidnapping with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and the members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn statement.On the same day, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested. On March 14, 1991, Joselito "Tata" Garcia, Hilaria Sarte and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso, referred to by Basingan as "Laring" and "Leos", respectively, were arrested in the neighboring Negros Island. The next day, however, Tata Garcia died due to "hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds." Upon presentation of his death certificate, the trial court ordered his name deleted from the information. After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Manuel J. Adlawan found that the participation of the Cuis was only that of accomplices amended the Information downgrading the charge against the Cuis as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of Stephanie Lim. On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty. On June 27, 1991, Basinga escaped from the prison. Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia. On February 13, 1992, Beinvenido Nacario, alias "Rey Nacario", was arrested. On arraignment on April 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1991, he, too, escaped from detention and remains at large to this date. On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested before the trial court that, per newspaper report, Toto Garcia had been killed in Davao. Thus, on December 6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and Nacario.
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Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appeal on May 19, 1994. The Cuis filed theirs on May 31, 1994.
Issue: Whether or not the Cuis are liable as accessories? Decision: Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accessories to the crime those who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime, without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the following elements: (1) that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These twin elements are present in the case of the Cuis, and indubitable proof thereof is extant in the records of the case. The Court held that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are liable as accessories.
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husband already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was sworn to by her before Municipal Judge Francisco T. Valera. On that same morning, appellant Verzola was picked up by the police and brought to the municipal building, and there he also executed a written statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. Both appellants admit that it was appellant Verzola who inflicted the fatal blows on the victim. The trial court convicted Verzola as principal and Josefina Molina as an accessory to the crime of murder. Issue: Whether or not assisting the principal in bringing the body of the deceased to the ground will make one an accessory to the crime?
Decision: An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. The concealing or destroying of the body of the crime, the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime. In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it was easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been any attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. Thus, Josefina Molina is acquitted.
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On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows: Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with this Court, the case involving the subject properties had already been heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the Military Commission, and as such this Court is without jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis supplied) Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not Mariano can be held liable for estafa? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent court gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before the SC the accused in one is different from the accused in the other. The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided that Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months,or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
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imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance. The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims in his Order is that his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military commission and because the latter tribunal was the first to take cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court lost jurisdiction over it .That statement of respondent court is incorrect. In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, it is rightly contended by the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM649 was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that was December 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any Presidential issuances under Martial Law. The Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
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Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances be considered in fixing the penalty? Decision: The aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant. Although the aggravating circumstances in question cannot be appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier penalty in this case, they should, however, be considered as bases for the award of exemplary damages, conformably to current jurisprudence.
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Issue: Whether or not the accused can be rightfully convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms separately from the crime of homicide under RA 8294 (amending PD 1866).
Decision: No. As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application except where the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant Lazaro from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive application. Accordingly, accused-appellant Lazaro should be spared from a separate conviction for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of the present review. Accused-appellant Lazaro was hereby acquitted of the said crime and the case was dismissed.
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Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Ballacer will justify the dismissal of the action?
Decision: The Supreme Court held that an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. In the case at bar, Ballecer made the so-called pardon of Sta. Catalina after the institution of the action, almost two years after the trial court had rendered its decision. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who had given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
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Issue: Whether or not Armamentos affidavit of recantation will result to the dismissal of the complaint?
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Decision: The Supreme Court held that the complaint shall not be dismissed. A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. In this case, there is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on the guilt of the accused Balderama and Nagal.
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Issue: Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the Affidavit of Desistance by Maricar is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint against Edgardo?
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Decision: The Supreme Court held that by itself, an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the accused arrested by the police, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. In the case at bar, Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.
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Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the proper penalty for the crime of rape? Decision: No, the Supreme Court held that the penalty imposed by the trial court is void. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, the prescribed penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. However, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirty years of reclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court is void.Although under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic 7659, reclusion perpetua has a range of twenty years and one day to forty years, by nature, the penalty remains a single and indivisible penalty. It cannot be divided into periods or equal portions. If the law prescribes reclusion perpetua as a single and indivisible penalty for a felony, the trial court is mandated to impose said penalty, absent any privileged mitigating circumstances conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court is not authorized to vary the penalty provided for by law either in the character or the extent of punishment inflicted. There was no need for the trial court to specify the duration of thirty years of reclusion perpetua whenever it is imposed as a penalty in any proper case. The Court is not impervious to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which pertinently provides that, in applying the so-called three-fold rule, i.e., that (w)hen the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, . . . the maximum duration of the convicts sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him the duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. The imputation of a thirty-year duration to reclusion perpetua in Article 70 is, as this Court recently held, only to serve as the basis for determining the convicts eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
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Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in specifying the length of imprisonment in the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua? Decision: No, the Supreme Court held that in sentencing appellant "to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua." There was no justification or need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment, because reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The significance of this fundamental principle was laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit, "Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code)."
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Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of double murder?
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Decision: The trial court, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the "complex crime of double murder" and separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." The instant case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances when a complex crime is committed. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." Thus, accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime of double murder, but for two separate counts of murder, and separate counts of physical injuries.
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Issue: Whether or not there should be one information, either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide or should the five indictments remain as they are?
Decision: Four separate crimes of murder and a frustrated murder result from the firing of several shots at five victims. The crimes are not complex. Five information should be filed. There is a complex crime where one shot from a gun results in the death of two or more persons, or where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latters body and wounded another, or where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons are killed. When various victicms expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
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The trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused and convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, and sentenced them to death.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder and imposing upon then the supreme penalty of death? Decision: The Supreme Court fully agreed with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.
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Delito Continuado
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 169727-28)
Facts: Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land, Ombudsman Investigators Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio Alejandrino of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, the following may be charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019: petitioner B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-RSBS president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department in charge of Land Acquisition; Capt. Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-RSBS Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land Acquisition; and Notaries Public Alfredo Nasser and Manuel Satuito. The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued on March 30, 2001 a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to file the corresponding Informations for 148 counts of violation of Article 315, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty. Manuel Satuito. However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against petitioner be dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability. After conducting clarificatory hearings, the investigating panel issued a Memorandum, recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be charged with 148 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents, and one count violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors. Petitioner and his co-accused filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the investigating panels June 15, 2004 Memorandum.The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It likewise denied the
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motion for the consolidation of the cases, considering that the other cases filed were pending in its other divisions. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution which was denied again by the Sandiganbayan. Motion to Quash was likewise denied. Issue: Whether or not only one information for estafa should be filed for all these cases?
Held: The petition has no merit.The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the contention of respondents and ruled that the determination of (a) the charge/s and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the sound discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution. When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his coaccused for a consolidation of the charges filed against them before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting that there were as many crimes committed by the accused as there were sales contracts forged by them. Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado or classified as concurso de delitos; orinvolve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
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The Court find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." The original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act - that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
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Habitual Delinquency
People v. Espina (G.R. No. 43556)
Facts: The appellant was charged in the lower court with the crime of theft of articles valued at P 585.15 and, having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional and, being a habitual delinquent, to an additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional. The appellant is a recidivist and plead guilty to the crime of theft. He is also a habitual delinquent, this being his third conviction. Issue: Whether or not recidivism, as inherent in habitual delinquency, should still be taken into consideration in fixing the principal penalty? Decision: Yes, recidivism should still be taken into consideration in fixing the principal penalty even though it is inherent in habitual delinquency. The appellant in this case is a habitual delinquent, this being his third conviction. Recidivism, although inherent in habitual delinquency, should still be considered in fixing the principal penalty. There is no doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing additional penalty on a habitual delinquent is to punish him more severely. However, the result would be otherwise if, for imposing the additional penalty, recidivism could not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the principal penalty. In the instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty is present. If the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is not to be taken into consideration for imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, the mitigating circumstance would require that the penalty prescribed by law be imposed in it minimum period. The imposition of the additional penalty would make the penalty lighter, instead of more severe, contrary to the purpose of the law.
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Decision: Yes, recidivism can be considered as an aggravating circumstance in determining the principal penalty and as a qualifying circumstance in habitual delinquency.
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As to the principal penalty, there is the rule that in cases in which the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the courts must take into consideration, in the application of said penalty, the aggravating or mitigating circumstances established at the trial if they do not appear to be compensated by other circumstance. It is reiterated in People vs. Melendrez that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, even in cases of habitual delinquency, should be taken into consideration in the application of the principal penalty in the corresponding period. The proposition that if recidivism is considered an inherent or qualifying circumstance of habitual delinquency it should not be taken into account in the imposition of the principal penalty, seems to be untenable because it is based upon the erroneous assumption that habitual delinquency is a crime. It is simply a fact or circumstance which, if present in a given case, gives rise to the imposition of the additional penalties prescribed therein. As to the additional penalty, if we must rely upon the spirit and letter of the law, we would say that the purpose of the latter in establishing it was to prevent those for the second time or more commit the crimes from relapsing thereafter at least during the period fixed thereby. The lower court correctly ruled in imposing the additional penalty.
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Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Decision: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
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Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) . . . e) Quasi-delicts Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
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Decision: In the present case, it is clear that, following the case of People vs.Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
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Prescription of Offenses
Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)
Facts: Cawili and his business associate Tongson borrowed from Panaguiton (petitioner) sums amounting to 1,979,459. They issued checks signed by both of them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon presentation.Panaguiton made demands to pay but to no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24, 1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutors Office. Tongson moved to drop his name from the case as his signatures were allegedly falsified. Case against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding that Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the chief state prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.Tongson moved for reconsideration but denied. In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the complaint for the action has prescribed pursuant to Act 3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She claims that the filing of the complaint on August 24, 1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the law refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolled the prescriptive period?
Decision: Yes. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolls the prescriptive period for violations of BP22.When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary investigation of cases was done by the justices of peace, and not by agents of the executive department (i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time is
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that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of peace (a judicial process). However, since then, the conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to the function of the executive department. Today, the term proceedings must be understood to mean either executive or judicial proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of investigation may ultimately lead to sufficiently toll prescription. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays not under his control. As seen in this case, various conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his cause. Aggrieved parties who do not sleep on their right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of circumstances beyond their control.
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Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed? Decision: No. Prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal. Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal. Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The
petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefore, which in this case is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos. Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
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total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the time the second Information was filed in court. Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification of public document committed by a private individual the offense with which petitioner Caiza is presently charged - prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respect, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further: Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run fromthe day on which the crime is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents, andshall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation, andshall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,or are justifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
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Amnesty
People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)
Facts: On August 16, 1990, an Information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., for killing Alfredo Arevalo. Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. On January 20, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision convicting the herein accused-appellant. Thus, Accused-Appellant filed his appeal. However, while his appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. After a careful verification and evaluation on the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It, thus, recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
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The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC. In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 on May 17, 1996.
Issue: Whether or not the grant of amnesty in favor of Jose Patriarca, Jr. - while the various criminal cases filed against him were pending - shall completely extinguished his criminal liability? Decision: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
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In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given: "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense." This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.
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Issue: Whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum ofP1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the aggregate amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid?
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Decision: From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate
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court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability. Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest on a daily basis. In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount. From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner]. Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code]. By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.
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As a result the trial court, besides imprisonment, awarded the following amounts to the heirs of the victims:
y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM REYNARD SO 1) P2,997,000.00 indemnity for loss of earning capacity of victim 2) 14,200.00 for expenses of the wake 3) 20,000.00 for funeral parlor 4) 12,000.00 for the tomb 5) 53,000.00 for cost of burial site 6) 30,000.00 for attorneys fees 7) 200,000.00 for moral damages 8) 100,000.00 for exemplary damages P3,429,200.00 TOTAL AMOUNT TO THE HEIRS OF VICTIM NILO CASTRO 1) P1,728,000.00 indemnity for loss of earning capacity 2) 20,000.00 for funeral expenses 3) 200,000.00 for moral damages 4) 50,000.00 for exemplary damages P1,998,000.00 TOTAL AMOUNT
The court based the amount of loss of earning capacity based on the formula used by the Supreme Court as illustrated: As to the civil liability, particularly the indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the victims, the formula last enunciated by the Supreme Court is:
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Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross-living expenses annual (50% of gross annual income)
Thusly, since the victim Reynard So was earning P80,000 a month at the time of his death when he was thirty (30) years old, his lost earning capacity should be computed as follows:
x = 2 (80 30) x [P960,000.00 P480,000.00) 3 x = 33.4 x P480,000.00 x= x P16,032,000.00
With respect to the victim Nilo Castro, he was earning P8,000.00 a month when he died at the age of twenty-six (26). His lost earnings were:
x = 2 (80 26) [P96,000.00 P48,000.00] 3
x = 36 x P48,000.00 x = P1,728,000.00
As a result, petitioner appeals to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court regarding the damages, Consequently, the CA declared that Vallacar Transit Inc., should not yet be held subsidiary liable for the liability of the petitioner as its driver. Thus, this petition for review with the SC.
Decision: The SC modifies the award of damages mostly to the fact that loss of earning capacity should be properly adduced and supported by competent evidence to prove the same. This rule also applies to the funeral and burial expenses. In the case at bar, the lower courts based their award for damages solely on the testimony of SOs father and Castros mother, even though both of them never substantiated the amounts claimed with receipts, papers and other evidence. And so the award is modified as follows:
To summarize, the heirs of the deceased Reynard So are entitled to the following: P 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto 73,000 actual damages 25,000 temperate damages 50,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages
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30,000 attorneys fees P 253,000 TOTAL The heirs of Nilo Castro are also entitled to the following: 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto 50,000 temperate damages 50,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages 30,000 attorneys fees P 205,000 TOTAL P
The SC meanwhile adopts the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals regarding the subsidiary liability of petitioners employer, Vallacar Transit Inc., under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. An employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in the criminal action if it can be shown that: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) the accused is insolvent. However, subject to prevailing jurisprudence, the subsidiary liability may be enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary writ of execution against Vallacar Transit, Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.
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Issue: Did the CA err in not holding MMTC not subsidiary liable despite the fact that the RTC did not mention anything to that effect? Decision: The SC ruled that even when the dispositive portion of an RTC decision does not expressly pronounce subsidiary liability of the employer, they are deemed written into the judgment whenever applicable. But, he subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of
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execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced. In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until sometime after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course. The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accusedemployee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.
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Decision: The civil action based on delict is not extinguished unless the court itself finds that civil liability did not arise. In the case at bar, the trial court was very clear that the prosecution was not able to establish a preponderance of evidence to find the respondents liable. As to whether preponderance of evidence should have been considered, the trial court and the CA was correct in their findings. Preponderance of evidence should not be based on the fact that the evidence of the defense is
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weaker. The evidence presented must be strong enough to SUFFICIENTLY SUSTAIN THE CAUSE OF ACTION. In the case at bar, the prosecution single prosecution witness testified that the hematomas on the alleged victim may have been caused by either hitting with a blunt object or slipping and falling on the hard pavement. Even the friend of the deceased testified that the drainage was so dark and this was the reason that he did not come with the other boys inside. And so, the possibility of slippage by Wilson was very much a possibility.
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Decision: NO Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
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That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. The penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. Considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
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Issues: Whether or not petitioner can still apply for probation?NO Whether or not Fransisco v. CA applies in this case?YES
Decision: The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
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although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this proposition, especially given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own undoing.
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Decision: NO The fact that the City Prosecutors Office has not yet entered its appearance is no justification to petitioners adamant and continued insistence not to comply with a lawful order of the court. Every court has the power to enforce and compel obedience to its orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings pending before it. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application for probation.
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Decision: The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
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Macario Linghon testified that he sold the jewelry to petitioner. Although the wellentrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be credible and reliable. In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be dubious; hence, barren of probative weight. The Court further held It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property.
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Facts: Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries; upon inventory, she found that several pieces of equiptment were missing. Manuelito Mendez was a former employee of Lim, who left her employment before Lim found out that her goods were missing. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Tan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner?
Decision: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
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any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The Supreme Court stated that there was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. The theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.The Court held that accused Tan could not be held guilty because there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.
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