Cases

LABOR STANDARDS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 ABELLA VS NLRC G.R. No. 71818 Date: July 20, 1987 Petitioners: Rosalina Perez Abella/Hda. Danao-Ramona Respondents: The Honorable National Labor Relations Commission, Romeo Quitco and Ricardo Dionele, Sr., Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS: On June 27, 1960 the petioner, Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years. She opted to extend the leased contract for another ten (10) years. During the existence of the lease, she employed the private respondents Ricardo Dionele, Sr., and Romeo Quitco. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981, who continued the management, cultivation and operation of the farm. On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District Office, for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After the parties had presented their respective evidence, Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a Decision dated July 16, 1982, ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation pay. Petitioner appealed, the National Labor Relations Commission, in a Resolution affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130 is the law applicable in this case. The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the thirty three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The instant petition is hereby dismissed and Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution of the ministry of labor and employment are hereby affirmed. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay?
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW LSSL CASE DIGESTS
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 CALALANG VS WILLIAMS (Social Justice as the aim of Labor Laws) G.R. No. 47800 Date: December 2, 1940 Petitioner: Maximo Calalang Respondents: A.D. Williams, et al., Ponente: Laurel, J.
FACTS: Maximo Calalang, private citizen and a tax payer prayed for the prohibition against the respondents, A.D. Williams at al.,. In his petition, Calalang alleged that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited form passing along the streets of Manila for a period of one year. The said resolution was enforced by the Mayor of Manila and the Chief of Police of Manila, that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the C.A. No. 548 which authorized the Secretary of Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use and traffic on the national road and streets. The said law became the basis of the resolution of July 17, 1940 prohibiting the animal-drawn vehicles from passing to some streets of the City of Manila. One of the contentions raised by the petitioner is that the rules and regulations complained of infringed upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of Social Justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. ISSUE: Whether or not the complained resolution infringes the constitutional precept of promoting Social Justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? HELD: The answer is in the negative, the promotion of Social Justice, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 CEREZO VS THE ATLANTIC & PACIFIC COMPANY G.R. No. L-10107 Date: February 4, 1916 Plaintiff- appellant: Clara Cerezo Defendant-appellant: The Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company Ponente: Trent, J.
FACTS: The deceased was an employee of the defendant as a day laborer on the 8th of July, 1913, assisting in laying gas pipes on Calle Herran in the city of Manila. The digging of the trench was completed both ways from the cross-trench in Calle Paz, and the pipes were laid therein up to that point. The men of the deceased's gang were filling the west end, and there was no work in the progress at the east end of the trench. Shortly after the deceased entered the trench at the east end to answer a call of nature, the bank caved in, burying him to his neck in dirt, where he died before he could be released. It has not been shown that the deceased had received orders from the defendant to enter the trench at this point; nor that the trench had been prepared by the defendant as a place to be used as a water-closet; nor that did the defendant acquiesce in the using of this place for these purposes. The trench at the place where the accident occurred was between 3 and 4 feet deep. Nothing remained to be done there except to refill the trench as soon as the pipes were connected. The refilling was delayed at that place until the completion of the connection. At the time of the accident the place where the deceased's duty of refilling the trench required him to be was at the west end. There is no contention that there was any danger whatever in the refilling of the trench. An action for damages was instated against the defendant for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge Ocumen, on the 7th of July, 1913 The plaintiff insists that the defendant was negligent in failing to shore or brace the trench at the place where the accident occurred. While, on the other hand, the defendant urges (1) that it was under no obligation, in so far as the deceased was concerned, to brace the trench, in the absence of a showing that the soil was of a loose character or the place itself was dangerous, and (2) that although the relation of master and servant may not have ceased, for the time being, to exist, the defendant was under no duty to the deceased except to do him no intentional injury, and to furnish him with a reasonably safe place to work. udgment was entered in a favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 1,250.00, together with interest and costs. Defendant appealed.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff has a right to recover for damages under the Employers Liability Act (Act No. 1874) or the Civil Code; and 2. Whether or not it is necessary to determine the effect of the former upon the law of industrial accidents in this country?
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HELD: 1. The Plaintiff cannot recover from neither laws, an overwhelming jurisprudence holds master was bound to exercise that measure of care which reasonably prudent men take under similar circumstances. But the master was not an insurer and was not required to provide the safest possible plant or to adopt the latest improvements or to warrant against latent defects which a reasonable inspection did not disclose. It was only necessary that the danger in the work be not enhanced through his fault. It is provided further that; the right of the master to shift responsibility for the performance of all or at least most of these personal duties to the shoulders of a subordinate and thereby escape liability for the injuries suffered by his workmen through his non-performance of these duties, was, in England, definitely settled by the House of Lords in the case of Wilson vs. Merry (L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. Appl Cas., 326; 19 Eng. Rul. Cas., 132). This was just two years before the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act of 1880, and no doubt the full significance of such a doctrine was one of the impelling causes which expedited the passage of the Act, and chiefly accounts for the presence in it of subsection 1 of section 1. The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of the earth which fell upon him, but was due to suffocation. He was sitting or squatting when the slide gave way. Had he been even half-erect, it is highly probable that he would have escaped suffocation or even serious injury. Hence, the accident was of a most unusual character. Experience and common sense demonstrate that ordinarily no danger to employees is to be anticipated from such a trench as that in question. The fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week, without indication of their giving way, strongly indicates that the necessity for bracing or shoring the trench was remote. To require the company to guard against such an accident as the one in question would virtually compel it to shore up every foot of the miles of trenches dug by it in the city of Manila for the gas mains. Upon a full consideration of the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion that ordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place where the deceased met his death. The event properly comes within the class of those which could not be foreseen; and, therefore, the defendant is not liable under the Civil Code (Article 1105, Civil Code). 2. Yes. Act No. 1874 is essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act. We now come to the consideration of Act No. 1874 for the purpose of determining what effect this Act has had upon the law of damages in personal injury cases in this country, bearing in mind that the Act is, as we have indicated, essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act which has "prevailed in the State of Massachusetts some years and upon which interpretations have been made by the Massachusetts courts, defining the exact meaning of the provision of the law." (Special report of the joint committee of the Philippine Legislature on the Employers' Liability Act, Commission Journal 1908, p. 296.) We agree with the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that the Act should be liberally construed in favor of employees. The main purpose of the Act, as its title indicates, was to extend the liability of employers and to render them liable in damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which it was thought they were liable under the law prior to the passage of the Act.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES VS OPLE G.R. No. 73681 Date: June 30, 1988 Petitioner: Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc., Respondent: Hon. Blas F. Ople and Colgate Palmolive Sales Union Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS: On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union. After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code. Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc in its position stated that there is no legal basis for the charge that the company refused to bargain collectively with the union considering that the alleged union is not the certified agent of the company salesmen. The union's status as a legitimate labor organization is still under question because on March 6, 1985, a certain Monchito Rosales informed the BLR that an overwhelming majority of the salesmen are not in favor of the Notice of Strike allegedly filed by the Union. While the respondent Union, on the other hand, in its position paper, reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations. On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which found no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioner as regards the alleged refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage unionism. It also found the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante & Cornelio Mejia "not without fault" and that "the company has grounds to dismiss above named salesmen" Respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first offenders. Hence, the Petitoner now seeks to set and annul the order of then Minister Blas Ople. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when he directly certified the Union solely on the basis of the latter's self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioner's company? and; 2. Whether or not respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when, notwithstanding his very own finding that there was just cause for the dismissal of the three (3) salesmen, he nevertheless ordered their reinstatement.
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HELD: 1. Yes. The respondent Minister has the power to decide a labor dispute in a case assumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of the Labor Code but this power was exceeded when he certified respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company's salesmen since this is not a representation proceeding as described under the Labor Code. Moreover the Union did not pray for certification but merely for a finding of unfair labor practice imputed to petitioner-company. 2. Yes. The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring employees namely, Mejia, Sayson and Reynante would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner company involved in the same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated. As stated by Us in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs. National Labor Union, 2 "an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest."
` Judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the Order of the respondent Minister, dated December 27, 1985 for grave abuse of discretion. However, in view of the fact that the dismissed employees are first offenders, petitioner is hereby ordered to give them separation pay. The temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 EURO-LINEA PHIL., INC., VS NLRC G.R. No. 78782 Date: December 1, 1987 Petitioners: Euro-Linea Phil., Inc. Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission and Jimmy O. Pastoral Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS: On August 17, 1983, petitioner hired Pastoral as shipping expediter on a probationary basis for a period of six months ending February 18, 1984. However, prior to hiring by petitioner, Pastoral had been employed by Fitscher Manufacturing Corporation also as shipping expediter for more than one and a half years. Pastoral was absorbed by petitioner but under a probationary basis. On February 4, 1984, Pastoral received a memorandum terminating his probationary employment effective also on February 4, 1984 in view of his failure to meet the performance standards set by the company. To contest his dismissal, Pastoral filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered to reinstate complainant with six months backwages. Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling against the dismissal of the respondent, a temporary or probationary employee, by his employer (Petitioner)? HELD: In the instant case, it is evident that the NLRC correctly applied Article 282 in the light of the foregoing and that its resolution is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Although a probationary or temporary employee has a limited tenure, he still enjoys the constitutional protection of security of tenure. During his tenure of employment or before his contract expires, he cannot be removed except for cause as provided for by law. Petitioner not only failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate the cause of private respondent's dismissal, but likewise failed to cite particular acts or instances to show the latter's poor performance. It must be emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay- off an employee must be done without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only petitioner's position but also his means of livelihood Finally, it is significant to note that in the interpretation of the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the constitution and the labor laws and rules and regulations implementing the constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 GELMART INDUSTRIES PHIL., INC., VS NLRC G.R. No. 85668 Date: August 10, 1989 Petitioner: GELMART Industries Phil., Inc., Respondents: Hon. National Labor Relations Commission and Felix Francis Ponente: Gancayco, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. sometime in 1971. As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and underchassis, as well as trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles. He is likewise entrusted with some tools and spare parts in furtherance of the work assigned to him. On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces of "used' motor oil, without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under GELMART's rules and regulations. By reason thereof, petitioner, on April 13, 1987, was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation of company rules and regulations. Under the said rules, theft and/or pilferage of company property merits an outright termination from employment. After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987, private respondent was found guilty of theft of company property. As a consequence, his services were severed. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latter's reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual reinstatement. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with payment of backwages equivalent to six (6) months? HELD: No. Consistent with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the underprivileged workingmen and the more affluent employers, the NLRC rightfully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen and this was done without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his property. Thus, without being too harsh to the employer, on the one hand, and naively liberal to labor, on the other, the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot totally escape liability for what is patently a violation of company rules and regulations.
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To reiterate, be it of big or small commercial value, intended to be re-used or altogether disposed of or wasted, the "used" motor oil still remains, in legal contemplation, the property of GELMART. As such, to take the same out of GELMART's premises without the corresponding gate pass is a violation of the company rule on theft and/or pilferage of company property. However, as this Court ruled in Meracap vs. International Ceramics Mfg. Co., Inc., "where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. On this score, it is very difficult for this Court to discern grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in modifying the appealed decision. The suspension imposed upon private respondent is a sufficient penalty for the misdemeanor committed. Considering that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen (15) years of service with petitioner GELMART the value of the property pilfered (16 ounces of used motor oil) is very minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non-dismissal of private respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the policy of the State, as embodied in the Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of laborAt this point, this Court does not see any reason to deviate from the said ruling.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS NLRC G.R. No. 78763 Date: July 12,1989 Petitioner: Manila Electric Company Respondents: The National Labor Relations Commission, and Apolinario M. Signo Ponente: Medialdea, J.
FACTS: In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company for electrical services at his residence at Peafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway, Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo facilitated the processing of the said application as well as the required documentation for said application at the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof, private respondent received from Fernando de Lara the amount of 7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the application for electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company. However, the residence of de Lara was located is not yet within the serviceable point of Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30-meter distance from the nearest existing Meralco facilities. In order to expedite the electrical connections, certain employees of the company, including respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the sari-sari store at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the subdivision, is applicant de Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the latter. As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were installed and made possible. However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division of Petitioner Company, Fernando de Lara was not billed for more than a year. In an investigation conducted by the company, respondent Signo was found responsible for the said irregularities in the installation. Thus, the services of the latter were terminated on May 18, 1983. Notwithstanding that the private respondent has been employed by the petitioner company since 1963. Signo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, and separation pay. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision directing the petitioner to reinstate respondent without back wages. Both parties appealed to the Commission and were dismissed to reinstate by the Commission for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed from petitioner company on grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence?
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HELD: No. There is no question that herein respondent Signo is guilty of breach of trust and violation of company rules, the penalty for which ranges from reprimand to dismissal depending on the gravity of the offense. However, as earlier stated, the respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiter found that dismissal should not be meted to respondent Signo considering his twenty (20) years of service in the employ of petitioner, without any previous derogatory record, in addition to the fact that petitioner company had awarded him in the past, two (2) commendations for honesty. If ever the petitioner suffered losses resulting from the unlisted electric consumption of de Lara, this was found to be the fault of petitioner's Power Sales Division. This Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions, that notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer. Further, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140). In view of the foregoing, reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the award of backwages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 MATERNITY CHILDRENS HOSPITAL VS SECRETARY OF LABOR (Labor Law defined) G.R. No. 78909 Date: June 30, 1984 Petitioner: Maternity Childrens Hospital, represented by Antera L. Dorado Respondents: The Honorable Secretary of Labor and the Regional Director of Labor, Region X Ponente: Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Petitioner is a semi-governmental hospital in Cagayan De Oro and Employing forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount of which is deducted from their respective salaries. On May 3, 1986, ten (10) employees filed a complaint with the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region 10, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS. Consequently, the Regional Director directed two of his labor standard and welfare officers to investigate and ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Based on the report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an order dated August 4, 1986, directing payment of 723, 888.58, to all the petitioners employees. The Secretary of Labor likewise affirmed the Decision and dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner. In a petition for certiorari, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and the allembracing applicability of the award involving salary differentials and ECOLAS, in that it covers not only the hospitals employees who signed the complaints, but also those who are not signatories to the complaint, and those who were no longer in the service of the hospital at the time the complaint was filed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case; and 2. Whether or not the Regional Director erred in extending the award to all hospital employess? HELD: 1. The answer is in the affirmative the Regional Directos has a jurisdiction in this labor standard case. This is Labor Standard case, and is governed by Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code , as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. We believedthat even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16, 1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system.
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2. The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees who signed the complaint, as well as those who did not sign the complaint, but were still connected with the hospital at the time the complaint was filed. The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given to the Secretatry of Labor labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over individual members/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/ or compliance by such firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. However, there is no legal justification for the award in favor of those employees who were no longer connected with the hospital t the time the complaint was filed. Article 129 of the Labor Code in aid of the enforcement power of the Regional Director is not applicable where the employee seeking to be paid is separated from service. His claim is purely money claim that has to be subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 MENDOZA VS RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN G.R. No. 155421 Date: July, 7, 2004 Petitioner: Elmer M. Mendoza Respondent: Rural Bank of Lucban Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS: On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, that in line with the policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system[,] all officers and employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments. Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers and employees from the branch office to the head office and vice-versa.. Pursuant to Board Res. No. 95-52 the following branch employees; Joyce V. Zeta, Clodualdo Zagala, Elmer M. Mendoza and Chona R. Mendoza are reshuffled to their new assignments without changes in their compensation and other benefits. Petitioner Elmer Mendoza in an antedated letter expressed his opinion on the reshuffled to the management. Upon the reply of the Bank Chairman, Daya, it informed it informed that it was never in their intention to downgrade the position of the petitioner in the bank considering that his due compensation as bank appraiser is maintained and no future reduction was intended. Petitioner filed a leave of absence for 10 days due to ailment and then another 20 days leave of absence. While on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages -- was filed against the Rural Bank of Lucban and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and its Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V. Cada. Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for constructive dismissal, because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any work to do, while his table had been placed near the toilet and eventually removed. He adds that the reshuffling of employees was done in bad faith, because it was designed primarily to force him to resign. The Labor Arbiter rendered the decision in favor the petitioner, the respondent Bank appealed and the NLRC reversed the Decision. After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the foregoing Resolution. The Court of appeals Find that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment?
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HELD: No. The petition has no merit. Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. In the case at bar, the reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made the basis of a finding of constructive dismissal. In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another -- provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprise effectively. The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them. There appears no justification for denying an employer the right to transfer employees to expand their competence and maximize their full potential for the advancement of the establishment. Petitioner was not singled out; other employees were also reassigned without their express consent. Neither was there any demotion in the rank of petitioner; or any diminution of his salary, privileges and other benefits. This fact is clear in respondent's Board Resolutions, the April 30, 1999 letter of Bank President Daya to Branch Manager Cada, and the May 10, 1999 letter of Daya to petitioner. The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of management. Courts will not interfere with business judgments of employers, provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. The transfer of personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a managerial prerogative that shall be upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 PEOPLE VS POMAR (Police Power as the basis of Labor Laws) G.R. No. L-22008 Date: November 3, 1924 Plaintiff- appellee: The People of the Philippine Islands Defendant-appellant: Julio Pomar Ponente: Johnson, J.
FACTS: The defendant is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabel, a tobacco factory pertaining to the La Compania General de Tobaos de Filipinas. An employee by the name of Macaria Fajardo was granted a vacation leave by the defendant which began on July 16, 1923, by the reason of her pregnancy. Said manager failed and refused to ar Fajardo the sum of 80.00 to which she was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after the delivery and confinement pursuant to Sec. 13 of Act No. 3071, which took place on August 12, 1923 Fajardo filed a complaint against the defendant. The defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered and admitted at the trial all the allegations contained in the complaint, he contended that the provisions of Sec. 15 of Act. No. 3017 upon which the complaint was based was illegal, unconstitutional, and void. The defendant was found guilty of the allege offense described in the complaint and sentenced him to pay a fine of 50.00 or to suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pat the cost in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 15 of said Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state?
HELD: Yes. We are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12, Public Laws, p. 238.) Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and the defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.
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RATIO DECIDENDI: The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of this court, and is no longer open to question. Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as the result of private bargaining. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578; 591; Adair vs. United States, 208 U. S., 161; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.) x x x x x x x x x
The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a lossThe law takes no account of periods of distress and business depression, or crippling losses, which may leave the employer himself without adequate means of livelihood. To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole. The failure of this state which, perhaps more than any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work the employee engages to do. The declared basis, as already pointed out, is not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous circumstances that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her subsistence, health and morals. . . . The necessities of the employee are alone considered, and these arise outside of the employment, are the same when there is no employment, and as great in one occupation as in another. . . . In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling labor and the case of selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker, or grocer to buy food, he is morally entitled to obtain the worth of his money, but he is not entitle to more. If what he gets is worth what he pays, he is not justified in demanding more simply because he needs more; and the shopkeeper, having dealt fairly and honestly in that transaction, is not concerned in any peculiar sense with the question of his customer's necessities. Should a statute undertake to vest in a commission power to determine the quantity of food necessary for individual support, and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the individual at all, to furnish that quantity at not more than a fixed maximum, it would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The fallacy of any argument in support of the validity of such a statute would be quickly exposed. The argument in support of that now being considered is equally fallacious, though the weakness of it may not be so plain. It has been said that the particular statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose end freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the common good, and the line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, may be made to move, within limits not well defined, with changing needs and circumstances.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 PEOPLE VS VERA REYES G.R. No.L-45748 Date: April 5, 1939 Plaintiff-appellant: The People of the Philippines Defendant-appellee: Franco Vera Reyes Ponente: Imperial, J.
FACTS: The defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the assistant city fiscal with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958 The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the some time after, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands. The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional. After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the facts alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio. The fiscal appealed from said order. In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958 unconstitutional, and in dismissing the cause.
ISSUE: 3. Whether or not the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as amended by Act. 3958 is constitutional and valid?
HELD: It is constitutional and valid. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will show that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment, shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation of Act No. 3958, and the second is estafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
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Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. (12 C. J., p. 904.) In the exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion of Act No. 3958 which punishes the employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of his laborers or employers in the specified periods of time. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties. Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager salaries would be compelled to institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would cost them more than that which they would receive in case of a decision in their favor. We hold that the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as last amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, is valid, and we reverse the appealed order with instructions to the lower court to proceed with the trial of the criminal case until it is terminated, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 PHILIPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS INC VS DRILON G.R. No. 81958 Date: June 30, 1988 Petitioner: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc., Respondents: Hon. Franklin M. Drilon as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and Tomas D. Achacoso, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Ponente: Sarmiento, J. FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "Guidelines Governing The Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers." Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
ISSUE: Whether or not Department Order No. 1 in the police power measure is valid under the Constitution?
HELD: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
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"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 87676 Date: December 20, 1989 Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Parks Development Committee Respndents: The Hon. Court of Appeals and the national Parks Development Supervisory Association & their Members Ponente: Grio-Aquino, J.
FACTS: The NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September 21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and nonprofit corporation, known as "The National Parks Development Committee, Inc." However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificate of Registration should not be suspended for. The NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SEC that his Office had no objection to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate of Registration of NPDC. By virtue of Executive Order No. 120, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department) of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on Audit and pursuant to Executive Order No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Civil Service Commission Commission.
Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holding supervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206. Two collective bargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989. On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC. On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaint against the union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being government employees, have no right to strike although they may form a union. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 8844048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.
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ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to strike. HELD: NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180). While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment. The petition for review is granted. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public Sector Labor-Management Council as provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180.
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Aguirre, Nolaida 2011-0087 SOSITO VS AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. L-48926 Date: December 14, 1987 Petitioner: Manuel Sosito Respondent: Aguinaldo Development Corporation Ponente: Cruz, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, when he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on January 16, 1976. On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to employees in the active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later than July 31, 1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity benefits" promised. However, his resignation was not acted upon and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The petitioner complained to the Department of Labor, where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. The company was ordered to pay Sosito the sum of 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the etitioner is entitled to separation pay under the retrenchment program? HELD: No. It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service. We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code, which was in force at the time. The company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them.
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While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
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Princess C. Aragon 2011-0238 ASSOCIATED WATCHMEN AND SECURITY UNION VS LANTING G.R. No. L-141120 February 29, 1960 Petitioner: Associated Watchmen and Security Union (PTWO) Respondent: The Hon. Judges Juan Lanting, Arsenio Martinez, Emiliano Tabigne, of the Court of Industrial Relations and Macondray and Co., Inc. Ponente: J. Labrador Facts: The Republic Ships Security Agency is one of three agencies, together with K. Tagle Ship Watchmen Agency and the City Watchmen and Security Agency, employed by certain shipping agencies in the City of Manila and respondent Macondray and Company, Inc., in guarding ships or vessels arriving at the port of Manila and discharging cargo on its piers. Thirty-eight affiliates of the Republic Ships Security Agency belong to the petitioner labor union. Petitioner union and its members declared a strike against 19 shipping firms in the City of Manila. Attempts were made by the Court of Industrial Relations to settle the strike. At the hearing or conference before the court on 16 March 1956, the strikers, through counsel, expressed their desire to return back to work and maintain the status quo. The manager of respondent Macondray and Company, Inc. expressed willingness to employ the strikers belonging to the petitioner union under the condition that the agency to which they belong file a bond in the sum of P5,000 in favor of Macondray and Company, Inc. to respond for any negligence, misfeasance or malfeasance of any of the watchmen of petitioner. However, the Republic Ships Security Agency, to which most of the members of the petitioner union belonged, failed to comply with the demands of Macondray and Company, Inc. that they furnish such a bond. Because of the failure of the Republic Ships Security Agency to furnish a bond, Macondray and Company, Inc. refused to employ watchmen from the said agency. On 15 November 1956, Macondray and Company, Inc. was charged with unfair labor practice for having dismissed and refused to employ 38 members of the petitioner herein. Respondent contends that they did not demand a bond from the members of the petitioner union but from the Republic Ships Security Agency; that it has not discriminated against members of the petitioner union. Issue: Validity Held: The refusal of the respondent to employ guards affiliated with a security or watchmen agency that does not furnish a bond can not constitute an unfair labor practice. Such refusal is merely the exercise of respondent's legitimate right to protect its own interests. Respondent never had any contract or agreement with the petitioner union; respondent secured security guards through the three watchmen agencies above mentioned, without reference to the unions to which the different guards may have pertained. The members of the petitioner union or of the shipping agencies are not ordinary permanent and continuous employees, but merely casual guards who are employed only when there is a ship to be guarded and during the stay of the ship in the port of Manila. Ruled in favor of the respondents. of the bond imposed by respondent Macondray and Company, Inc.
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Princess C. Aragon 2011-0238 CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION VS. CLAVE G.R. No. L - 49582 January 7, 1986 Petitioner: CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION Respondent: THE HONORABLE JACOBO C. CLAVE, Presidential Executive Assistant, and COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES Ponente: J. DE LA FUENTE Facts: Petitioner Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union (CBTC) lodged a complaint with the Department of Labor, against private respondent bank (Comtrust) for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Article 95 (now Article 94) of the Labor Code. Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. On 22 April 1976, the Arbitrator handed down an award on the dispute in favor of petitioner union. The next day, 23 April 1976, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. 9, a policy regarding the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Said bank interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), contending that the Arbitrator demonstrated gross incompetence and/or grave abuse of discretion when he failed to apply Policy Instructions No. 9. This appeal was dismissed on 16 August 1976. Private respondent then appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 30 June 1977, the Acting Secretary of Labor reversed the NLRC decision. On the principal issue of holiday pay, the Acting Secretary, guided by Policy Instructions No. 9, applied the same retrospectively, among other things. Issue: Whether or not the monthly pay of the covered employees already includes what Article 94 of the Labor Code requires as regular holiday pay benefit in the amount of his regular daily wage. Held: In excluding the union members the benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicated his ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement Article 94 of the Labor Code promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor and Policy Instructions No. 9. In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, this Court's Second Division, speaking through former Justice Makasiar, expressed the view and declared that the section and interpretative bulletin are null and void, having been promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor in excess of his rule-making authority. The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Ruled in favor of the petitioners. Presidential Executive Assistant and the Acting Secretary of labor are set aside, and the award of the Arbitrator reinstated.
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Princess C. Aragon 2011-0238
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS. BORROMEO G.R. No. 156515 October 19, 2004 Petitioner: China Banking Corporation Respondent: Mariano M. Borromeo Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.
Facts: Respondent Mariano Borromeo was Assistant Vice-President of the Branch Banking Group of China Banking Corporation for the Mindanao Area. Without authority from the Executive Committee or Board of Directors of the bank, he approved several DAUD/BP (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposits/Bills Purhcased) accommodations amounting to P2,441,375 in favour of Joel Maniwan. Such checks, which are not sufficiently funded by cash, are generally not honoured by banks. This came to the knowledge of the bank authorities. A memorandum was issued to the Mariano seeking clarification relative to the matter. The respondent accepted full responsibility for committing an error in judgment and abuse of discretion. Mariano resigned from the Bank and apologized for all the trouble I have caused because of the Maniwan case. The respondent, however, vehemently denied benefitting therefrom. His acts having constituted violation of the Banks Code of Ethics, the respondent was directed to restitute the amount of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of P1,675,263.10 incurred by the Bank. However, in view of his resignation and considering the years of service in the Bank, the management earmarked only P836,637.08 from the respondents total separation benefits or pay. The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums demanded from Maniwan in a civil case filed against him by the bank with the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent made a demand on the bank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits, but the bank maintained its position to withhold the sum of P836,637.08. Thus, Mariano filed with the NLRC a complaint for payment of separation pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the bank. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the bank. Respondent appealed to the NLRC but it affirmed in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The CA, however, alleging that respondent was denied his right to due process, set aside the NLRC decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further hearings on the factual issues involved. The bank filed a motion for reconsidered but denied the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the bank has the prerogative or right to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
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Held: The bank was left with no other course but to impose the ancillary penalty of restitution. It was certainly within the banks prerogative to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations. The petitioners bank business is essentially imbued with public interest and owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations must be respected. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect. Significantly, the respondent is not wholly deprived of his separation benefits. As the Labor Arbiter stressed in his decision, the separation benefits due the complainant were merely withheld. Even the petitioner bank itself gives the assurance that as soon as the bank has satisfied a judgment in the civil case, the earmarked portion of his benefits will be released without delay. The petition is granted. The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The Resolution of the NLRC is reinstated.
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GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES VS. ROLDAN G.R. No. L-6846 July 20, 1955 Petitioner: Gregorio Araneta Employees' Union, etc., et al. Respondent: Arsenio C. Roldan, et al. Ponente: J. Jugo
Facts: The Agricultural Division of the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., was established in 1947 with a capital of P200,000. The total investment in that Division in 1953 was about P3,000,000. To reduce this overcapitalization, the Board of Directors felt that it was necessary either to invite fresh capital from outside or to adopt a retrenchment policy. When Heacock and Company refused the invitation to invest in the enterprise, the Board took the alternative of retrenchment. The Board required a reduction in the volume of business necessitating likewise a reduction of personnel and caused the laying off of 17 employees. The selection of those to be laid off was made by a technical man and approved by the Board. These employees were given one month separation pay, except Nicolas Gonzalez who refused to receive it. Issue: Whether or not the retrenchment policy adopted by the company is an unfair labor practice. Held: No. The reorganization of the Agricultural Division was adopted by unanimous resolution of the Board of Directors as a consequence of the retrenchment policy. Thus, the laying off of the 17 employees was due to the retrenchment policy which the Company had to adopt in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses. The volume of business was considerably reduced. This was adopted even before the petitioner, "Gregorio Araneta Employees' Union", was organized and; consequently, it was never directed against the union or any of its members for union or labor activities. The petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs.
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LAGATIC VS. NLRC G.R. No. 121004 January 28, 1998 Petitioner: Romeo Lagatic Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Cityland Development Corporation, Stephen Roxas, Jesus Go, Grace Liuson, and Andrew Liuson Ponente: J. Romero
Facts: Petitioner Lagatic was employed by Cityland, first as a probationary sales agent, and later on as a marketingspecialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for thecompany, with the corresponding duties of accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the submission of daily progress reports on the same. Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit cold call reports for some time. This notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with a warning that further non-compliance would result in his termination from the company. In a reply, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest omission brought about by his concentration on other aspects of his job.Cityland found said excuse inadequate and suspended him for three days, with a similar warning. Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given up a due date to do so. Instead of complying with said directive, petitioner wrote a note, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES?" and exhibited the same to his co-employees. Petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland should not make good its previous warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the written statement aforementioned. He sent a letter-reply alleging that his failure to submit cold callreports should trot be deemed as gross insubordination. He denied any knowledge of the damaging statement allegedly made by him.Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland served a notice of dismissal upon him on February 26,1993. Aggrieved by such dismissal, petitioner filed a complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and attorney's fees. The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse. Issue: 1. Whether or not NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed. 2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to amounts illegally deducted from his commissions, to unpaid overtime, rest day and holiday premiums, to moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs.
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Held: 1. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely:(1) the employee must be afforded due process, and(2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause. Petitioner loses sight of the fact that "(e)xcept as provided for, or limited by, special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment." Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the government of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a part of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with. "Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose . . . lack of regard for his employer's rules . . .has so plainly and completely been bared." Petitioner's continued infraction of company policy requiring cold callreports, as evidenced by the instances of non-submissionof aforesaid reports, justifies his dismissal.
Moreover, petitioner made it worse for himself when he wrote the statement, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHOCARES?" When required to explain, he merely denied ally knowledge of the same. Cityland, on the other hand,submitted the affidavits of his co-employees attesting to his authorship of the same. Petitioner's only defense is denial. The rule, however, is that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has no weight in law. Based on the foregoing, we find petitioner guilty of willful disobedience. Willful disobedience requires the concurrence of at least two requisites:a. the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and b. the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. 2. With the finding that petitioner's dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and exemplary damages , as well as attorney's fees, must fail. Also, petitioner failed to show his entitlement to overtime and rest day pay due, to the lack of sufficient evidence as to the number of days and hours when he rendered overtime and rest day work. Entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that said overtime work was actuallyperformed, before an employee may avail of said benefit. The Assailed Resolution is affirmed and the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
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Princess C. Aragon 2011-0238 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, ET AL. G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 Petitioner: Luzon Development Bank Respondent: Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees and Atty. Ester S. Garcia in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR Ponente: J. Romero
Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia,in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. Issue: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities Held: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
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The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
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NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION VS. JUCO G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985 Petitioner: National Labor Relations Commission and National Housing Corporation Respondent: Benjamin C. Juco Ponente: J. GUTIERREZ, JR. Facts: Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case because NHC is a government-owned corporation and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the Civil Service Commision. Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHC in turn appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, is covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service. Held: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered. This constitutional provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. The petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
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NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION VS. NLRC G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988 Petitioner: NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ Respondent: THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO Ponente: J. Padilla Facts: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing vs. Juco. Issue: Whether or not the employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law. Held: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in NHC vs. Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Constitution starkly differs from the 1973 constitution where NHC vs. Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.
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PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY VS PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939 Petitioner: Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. Respondent: Pambusco Employees Union, Inc. Ponente: J. Moran
Facts: On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union. Issue: Whether or not the right of the employer to select its employees was violated. Held: Yes.The Supreme Court hold that the Court of Industrial Relations has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is oppression." (Mills vs. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div., 605; 91 N.Y.S., 185, 189-192.) chanrobles virtual law library. Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-being of their members." The term "collective bargaining" denotes, in common usage as well as in legal terminology, negotiations looking toward a collective agreement. This provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co. vs. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62 Law. ed., 260, 276):
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. . . Whatever may be the advantages of "collective bargaining," it is not bargaining at all, in any just sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides. The same liberty which enables men to form unions, and through the union to enter into agreements with employers willing to agree, entitles other men to remain independent of the union, and other employers to agree with them to employ no man who owes any allegiance or obligation to the union. In the latter case, as in the former, the parties are entitled to be protected by the law in the enjoyment of the benefits of any unlawful agreements they make. This court repeatedly has held that the employer is as free to make non-membership in a union a condition or employment, as the working man is free to join the union, and that this is a part of the constitutional rights of personal liberty and private property, not to be taken away by legislation, unless through some proper exercise of the paramount police power. Thus considered, the order appealed from was reversed, with costs against the respondent Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.
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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988 Petitioner: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. Respondent: Hon. Franklin M. Drilon as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and Tomas D. Achacoso, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Ponente: J. Sarmiento
Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm 1 "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. Issue: Whether Held: The court held that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled that equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers. The petition is DISMISSED. No costs. or not the Department Order No. 1 is constitutional.
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PHILIPPINE SHEET METAL WORKERS' UNION VS. CIR G..R. No. L-2028 April 28, 1949 Petitioner: Philippine Sheet Metal Workers Union Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Can Co., and Liberal Labor Union Ponente: J. Reyes
Facts: On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union.The said order was issued of said court involving an industrial dispute between the respondent company (a corporation engaged in the manufacture of tin plates, aluminum sheets, etc.) and its laborers some of whom belong to the Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) and some to the Liberal Labor Union. The dispute was over certain demands made upon the company by the laborers, one of the demands, being for the recall of eleven workers who had been laid off. Temporarily taken back on certain conditions pending final determination of the controversy, these eleven workers were in the end ordered retained in the decision handed down by the court on February 19, 1947. The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the respondent company due to their union activities. On February 10, 1947, that is, nine days before the decision came down, filed a motion in the case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15 workers in its can department on the ground that the installation and operation of nine new labor-saving machines in said department had rendered the services of the said workers unnecessary. Issue: Whether or not the firing of the laborers due to their union activities is valid? Held: Yes. The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account of their union activities. But neither should it be denied when it is shows that they are not discharging their duties in a manner consistent with good discipline and the efficient operation of an industrial enterprise. The petitioner contends that the order complained of was made with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in that it is contrary to the pronouncement made by the lower court in its decision in the main case where it disapproved of the dismissal of eleven workers "with whom the management is displeased due to their union activities." It appears, however, that the pronouncement was made upon a distinct set of facts, which are different from those found by the court in connection with
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the present incident, and that very decision, in ordering the reinstatement of the eleven laborers, qualifies the order by saying that those laborers are to be retained only "until the occurrence of facts that may give rise to a just cause of their laying off or dismissal, or there is evidence of sufficient weight to convince the Court that their conduct is not satisfactory." After a careful review of the record, the court find that the Court of Industrial Relations has neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the order complained of. The petition for certiorari is, therefore, denied, but without costs against the petitioner for the reasons stated in its motion to litigate as pauper.
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RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP VS. NLRC G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987 Petitioner: Rizal Empire Insurance Group, and/or Sergio Corpus Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Teodorico L. Ruiz, as Labor Arbiter and Rogelio R. Coria Ponente: J. Paras
Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his positiondesignation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal on a technicality. Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the
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Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]). Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. The petition is DISMISSED.
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TIONG KING VS. CIR G.R. No. L-3587 December 21, 1951 Petitioner: Tiong King Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations and The National Tailor's Association Ponente: J. Paras
Facts: Gaw Pun So owned and operated a tailor shop known as the Army Shirt Factory, located in his own house at Nos. 231-245 Soler Street, Manila. In January, 1948, he had a labor dispute with his personnel and, pending the case in the Court of Industrial Relations, Gaw Pun So, irked and worried by the incidents of litigation, thought of dissolving the business and selling the sewing machines. Tiong King offered to take over the business by leasing the place and the sewing machines. The transfer was put in writing. Tiong King continued the Army Shirt Factory from the month of February with the same employees had by Gaw Pun So. This transfer was known to the personnel, so much so that the latter, as petitioner in the pending dispute in the Court of Industrial Relations, prayed that Tiong King be included as a respondent. In due time, the National Tailors Association entered that all cases were terminated against the respondents. This agreement was duly approved by the Court of Industrial Relations. On April 27, 1948, Tiong King filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations Case No. 117-V3, alleging that since he operated his shop in February, 1948, he had continually suffered losses; that as there remained only very little of the capital originally invested, and that he was definitely closing the shop on May 30, 1948. Tiong King accordingly prayed that he be allowed to close his tailor shop and business from six o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1948. On May 29, 1948, Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan of the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order enjoining Tiong King not to close his factory and not to dismiss, suspend or lay off any laborer or employee without previous authority of said court. Upon petitioner for reconsideration filed by counsel for Tiong King, the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated a resolution dated May 27, 1949, allowing Tiong King to close his business and shop, subject to the condition that, upon reopening the same, his former personnel would be taken back. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the National Tailor's Association, the Court of Industrial Relations, promulgated a resolution dated October 31, 1949, reaffirming their stand on the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations under date of July 1, 1949. The present appeal by certiorari was taken by Tiong King against the last resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations. Issue: Whether or not he was the owner or operator thereof and had the right to file the petition in the Court of Industrial Relations to close the tailors shop.
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Held: Upon this point, it is only sufficient to recall that the National Tailors Association entered into a stipulation with Tiong King alone whereby they agreed that all cases against the former owners of the business were terminated. That Tiong King was conceded to be the owner and operator of the army shirt factory at the time his petition to close it was filed, is conclusively borne out by the fact that Presiding Judge Roldan in his decision of January 13, 1949, ordered Tiong King, and not Gaw Pun So, to pay the salaries and wages of the personnel. It is contended, however, that "If at all the court has approved of the agreement between the National Tailors' Association and Mr. Tiong King it was because 'this arrangement is a very good solution to the present conflict as it is advantageous not only to the union but also the management, and, is in consonance with the contract entered into between the management and the new workers." This contention is followed with the remark that the approval of said agreement did not include a finding that Tiong King was either the owner or the lessee of the Army Shirt Factory. We are unable to agree. In entering into the agreement with the National Tailors Association, Tiong King acted in his own behalf, regardless of the former owners of the business. Indeed, it was covenanted that all the cases against the latter were deemed terminated. Considerations of fair play and justice demand that Tiong King be given the full legal effect of said agreement which before the sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations. There being no question that Tiong King's capital invested in the Army Shirt Factory was almost exhausted at the time of the filing of his petition to close it, said petition must necessity be granted. It is admitted by all the Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations that an employer may close his business, provided the same is done in good faith and is due beyond his control. To rule otherwise, would be oppressive and inhuman. The court reversed the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated October 31, 1949, and affirmed the resolution of said court dated May 27, 1949.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, Minister of Labor and Employment G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 Eastern Shipping Lines Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Minister of Labor and Employment Cruz, J.
Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accidentin Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2of the POEA.The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by thePOEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance.The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of theparties ruled in favor of the complainant.The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining orderdated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseasworker. 2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principleof non-delegation of legislative power. Held: 1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive OrderNo. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier underArticle 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEAis vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for death,disability and other benefits arising out of such employment. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made bythe POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domesticshipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
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2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contractprescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by theemployer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring themodel contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in theexercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, increating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rightsof overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076
Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts:
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP. VS NLRC G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988 Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation National Labor Relations Commission Feliciano, J.:
Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor), petitioner seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Resolutions of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986, denying Pascor's appeal for having been filed out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. Private respondent Teodoro Rances sometime in March 1984, was engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehavior and inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination. On 4 September 1985, the POEA found private respondent liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer disciplinary sanction. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of private respondent. In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated; that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the claim had already been resolved in POEA, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim. In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." This decision was served on petitioner's counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a 'Memorandum on Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986. Issue: Whether or not POEA denial of petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration is within its jurisdiction in rendering decision of its Orders dated 14 August and 19 November 1986?
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Held: The court conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Decision dated 14 April 1986 and its Order dated 20 May 1986, and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986 denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate another proceeding before the POEA against petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment which existed between said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances may seek to show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer to his wife. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Resolutions of public respondent NLRC dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 8 December 1986 is hereby made PERCENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. They were again allegedly forced by their foreign employer to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 ordering respondent PHILSA to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan. In a decision dated July 26, 1989 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. The awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001 Philsa International Placement And Services Corporation The Hon. Secretary Of Labor And Employment Gonzaga-Reyes, J
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Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 31, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the public respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries for the supreme court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge. 2. Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Held: 1. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order." The fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.
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2. No. The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 Eastern Shipping Lines Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Cruz, J.
Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2of the POEA.The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance.The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining orderdated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principleof non-delegation of legislative power. 2. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseasworker. Held:
1. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, increating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rightsof overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices 2. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive OrderNo. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino contract workers, including
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seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for death,disability and other benefits arising out of such employment. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Andres E. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation, through its local agent, Asia World, the other private respondent, to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. The contract was for nine months, at a monthly salary of US$1,100.00 or US$275.00 weekly, and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers. Arriving on November 30, 1984, in Luanda, capital of Angola, the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central maintenance shop from December 2 to 25, 1984. On December 26, 1984, he was informed, to his distress that would be transferred to Kafunfo, some 350 kilometers east of Luanda. This was the place where, earlier that year, the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate workers, killing two Filipinos in the raid. Naturally, Ditan was reluctant to go. However, he was assured by the INTRACO manager that Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops; moreover, he was told he would be sent home if he refused the new assignment. In the end, with much misgiving, he relented and agreed. On December 29, 1984, his fears were confirmed. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him and sixteen other Filipino hostages, along with other foreign workers. The rebels and their captives walked through jungle terrain for 31 days to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border. They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. They subsisted on meager fare. Some of them had diarrhea. Their feet were blistered. It was only on March 16, 1985, that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of their governments and the International Red Cross. Six days later, Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines. The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad, and eventually eleven of them were taken back. Ditan having been excluded, he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract and various other claims. Specifically, he sought the amount of US$4,675.00, representing his salaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his contract; US$25,000.00 as war risk bonus; US$2,196.50 as the value of his lost belongings; US$1,100 for unpaid vacation leave; and moral and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50,000.00, plus attorney's fees. All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27, 1987. 2 This was affirmed in toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14, 1987, 3 which is now being challenged in this petition. Issue: Whether or not this case is within NLRC jurisdictiona and if Ditan is entitled to any relief? DITAN VS. POEA ADMINISTRATOR G.R. No. 79560 December 3, 1990 Andres E. Ditan Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Administrator, National Labor Relations Commission, Asiaworld Recruitment, Inc., And/Or Intraco Sales Corporation, Cruz, J
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Held: Yes. The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned, after his reluctant consent, to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. This was a dangerous area. The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. That choice would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of an expectant family. It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. The hostages were immediately repatriated after their release, presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. The promise of INTRACO was that they would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. In the particular case of the petitioner, the promise was not fulfilled. It would seem that his work was terminated, and not again required, because it was really intended all along to assign him only to Kafunfo. The private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola, without indication of any particular place of assignment in the country. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country, including Kafunfo. When INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business, it was merely exercising its rights under the employment contract that Ditan had freely entered into. Hence, it is argued, he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is entitled to monetary redress. The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 4, issued pursuant to the mandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2, Rule VI, of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, categorizing Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6, 1985"after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27, 1984." Consequently, the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect. The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances attending this case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief. The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon his release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority in reemployment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound, many of his co-hostages were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. WHEREFORE, the challenged resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondents are hereby DIRECTED jointly and severally to pay the petitioner: a) the current equivalent in Philippine pesos of US$4,675.00, representing his unpaid salaries for the balance of the contract term; b) nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00; and c) 10% attorney's fees. No costs.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: March 7 1984: private respondent Isidro P. Olivar was hired by FEBROE, a foreign shipping company, through its local agent Tierra International Construction Corporation, to work as shift supervisor in its Base Operating Support (BOS) project for the U.S. Navy in the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia, for a period of one (1) year with a basic monthly salary of US $680.00. Olivars employment contract was renewed in 1985; the last renewal was on 8 May 1986. But on 1 October 1986, he was dismissed from employment, and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines. Olivar alleged that he was a victim of improper termination of employment thru gradual and systematic removal of high salaried employees. FEBROE averred that in July and August 1986, its management undertook a comprehensive audit and evaluation of its entire work force to promote economy, efficiency and profitability in its operations, and to reduce personnel whose positions were considered redundant or surplusage and/or to re-assign personnel to other available useful positions. One of the positions listed for abolition was the position of the olivar as "13401 Supervisor, Technical. POEA held that the termination was for authorized cause. POEA then ordered Tierra and FEBROE to pay Olivar his separation pay. Tierra contended that the employment contract does not provide for separation pay in case of termination based on redundancy or reduction of force due to a decrease in volume or scope of work. NLRC reversed the decision of POEA and ordered the company to pay Olivar corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. Issue: Whether or not termination of Olivar is illegal and Olivar is entitled to separation pay? Held: . YES, the termination was for a valid cause. In redundancy, what is looked into is the position itself, the nature of the services performed by the employee and the necessity of such position. Termination of an employee's services because of a reduction of work force due to a decrease in the scope or volume of work of the employer is synonymous to, or a shade of termination because of redundancy under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over-hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. Olivar received his notice of termination advising him that his position will be deleted because of a reduction of force due to a decrease in scope of work assigned. 28 other positions were also abolished. Olivar was not singled out and that his termination was not arbitrary or malicious on the part of the TIERRA INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP V NLRC (OLIVAR) G.R. No. 101825 April 2, 1996 Tierra International Construction Corp National Labor Relations Commission (OLIVAR) Mendoza, J.:
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employer. The law does not make any distinction between a technical and a non-technical position for purposes of determining the validity of termination due to redundancy. Neither does the law nor the stipulations of the employment contract here involved require that junior employees should first be terminated (in answer to NLRCs reasoning that junior employees should be terminated first b efore the technical and senior positions). YES, Olivar is entitled to separation pay. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. There is no mention of an award of separation pay in the contract between the parties. HOWEVER, Tierra admits that Article 283 of the Labor Code governs its employer-employee relationship with the private respondent as the same is deemed written in the employment contract signed by the parties. Thus, although a contract is the law between the parties, thereto, this provisions of law which regulate such contracts are deemed included and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. Decision of the NLRC is reversed and set aside, and the decision of the POEA is revived. No pronouncements as to costs.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: MILLARES VS. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 110524 Date: July 29, 2002 Petitioner: Douglas Millares and Rogelio Lagda Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Esso International Shipping Co., Ltd. Ponente: Kapunan, J. Facts: Douglas Millares was employed by ESSO International through its local manning agency, TransGlobal, in 1968 as a machinist. In 1975, he was promoted as Chief Engineer which position he occupied until he opted to retire in 1989. In 1989, petitioner Millares filed a leave of absence and applied for optional retirement plan under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP) considering that he had already rendered more than twenty years of continuous service. Esso International denied Millares request for optional retirement on the following grounds, to wit: 1) he was employed on a contractual basis 2) his contract of enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before the age of sixty years; 3) he did not comply with the requirement for claiming benefits under the CEIP, i.e., to submit a written advice to the company of his intention to terminate his employment within thirty days from his last disembarkation date. Subsequently, after failing to return to work after the expiration of his leave of absence, Millares was dropped from the roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner Lagda was employed by Esso International as wiper/oiler in 1969. He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a position he continued to occupy until his last COE expired in 1989. In 1989, Lagda likewise filed a leave of absence and applied to avail of the optional early retirement plan in view of his twenty years continuous service in the company. Trans-global similarly denied Lagdas request for availment of the optional early retirement scheme on the same grounds upon which Millares request was denied. Unable to return for contractual sea service after his leave of absence expire, Lagda was also dropped from the roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989. Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit for illegal dismissal and non-payment of employee benefits against private respondents Esso International and Trans-Global before the POEA. The POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA dismissing the complaint. NLRC rationcinated that Millares and Lagda, as seamen and overseas contract workers are not covered by the term regular employment as defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code. The POEA, which is tasked with protecting the rights of the Filipino workers for overseas employment to fair and equitable recruitment and employment practices and to ensure their welfare, prescribes a standard employment contract for seamen on board ocean-going vessels for a fixed period but in no case to exceed twelve months. Issue: Whether or not seafarers are considered regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code
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Held: . No, It is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. Quoting Brent School Inc. v. Zamora, 1990, and Pablo Coyoca v. NLRC, 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that seafarers are considered contractual employees. They can not be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. As ruled in Brent case, there are certain forms of employment which also require the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one year but do not necessarily attain regular employment status under Article 280. Overseas workers including seafarers fall under this type of employment which are governed by the mutual agreements of the parties. And as stated in the Coyoca case, Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard Employment Contract governing the employment of All Filipino seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall be for a fixed period. And in no case should the contract of seamen be longer than 12 months. Moreover, the Court held that it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for a long and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore society during the employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the limitation of its period.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay. The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed. Held: The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employees dismissal to be valid, 1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and 2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondents seamans book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private respondents services were highly recommended and that his conduct and ability were rated very good . Petitioners allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions. Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employees dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice whi ch informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional VINTA MARITIME COMPANY V NLRC G.R. No. 113911 January 23, 1998 Vinta Maritime Company National Labor Relations Commission Panganiban, J
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guaranty. Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the effectivity of his contract. .
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: Inter Orient Maritime Enterprises Inc, et al vs NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 115497 Date: September 16, 1996 Petitioner: Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., Fircroft Shipping Corporation And Times Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission And Constancia Pineda Ponente: Panganiban, J. Facts: The instant petition seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution dated March 30, 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16, 1992 of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C. Joson, This is a claim for death compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The following facts were found by the POEA Administrator. On September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila; that on October 5, 1990, it received a fax transmission from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2, 1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; that the police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who "approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda" Petitioner contends that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C. Part II, POEA Standard Format of Employment which state(s) that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, (in)capacity, disability or death resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own life by the seaman"; that the deceased seaman died due to his own willful (sic) act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense. After the parties presented their respective evidence, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial expenses. Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. In a Decision dated March 30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA. Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari per Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether the petitioners can be held liable for the death of seaman Jeremias Pineda? Held: Yes, The petitioners contention that the assailed Resolution has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with approval by the public respondent of the findings of the POEA Administrator, which recites at length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick prior to his death and concomitantly, was no longer in full control of his mental faculties. In this instance, seaman Pineda, who was discharged in Dubai, a foreign land, could not reasonably be expected to immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to
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such examination at that time, not to mention the fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he was already discharged and without employment his contract having already run its full term and he had already been put on a plane bound for the Philippines. Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport's immigration area on his own. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased's strange behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own self. The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exemption the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased's mental condition, petitioners "should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone", and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. Petitioners further argue that the cause of Pineda's death "is not one of the occupational diseases listed by law", and that in the case of De Jesus vs. Employee's Compensation Commission, this Court held that ". . . for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of the Rules (the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation) with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Cajeras was hired by Marsaman, local manning agent of Diamantides, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV Prigipos, for a contract period of 10 months with a monthly salary of US$600.00. Cajeras started work on 8 August 1995 but less than 2 months later, or on 28 September 1995, he was repatriated to the Philippines. Cajeras alleged that he was assigned not only as Chief Cook Steward but also as assistant cook and messman and performed various inventory and requisition jobs. Because of his additional assignments he began to feel sick and requested for medical attention. After the ship's arrival at Holland, he was examined at the Medical Center for Seamen by Dr. Hoed, who neither apprised Cajeras about the diagnosis nor issued the requested medical certificate allegedly because he himself would forward the results to Cajeras' superiors. Upon returning to the vessel, Cajeras was ordered to prepare for immediate repatriation the following day. He was handed his Seaman's Service Record Book with the entry: "Cause of discharge Mutual Consent" to which Cajeras promptly objected. After his arrival in Manila, Cajeras complained to Marsaman but to no avail. The Labor Arbiter resolved the dispute in favor of Cajeras ruling that the latter's discharge allegedly by "mutual consent" was not proved by convincing evidence. NLRC affirmed the appealed findings and conclusions. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Issue: Whether or not Cajeras was illegally dismissed and how much salary is due him? Held: . Yes, Petitioners covenanted strict and faithful compliance with the terms and conditions of the Standard Employment Contract approved by POEA/DOLE which provides that the employment of a Filipino seaman may be terminated prior to the expiration of the stipulated period provided that the master and the seaman (a) mutually consent thereto and (b) reduce their consent in writing. Petitioners fell short of the requirement. No document exists whereby the alleged "mutual consent" was reduced to writing. The vessel's Deck Log wherein an entry made by Capt. Alekos purported to show that Cajeras himself asked for his repatriation has no evidentiary value. It is a unilateral act denied by Cajeras and the entry in no way satisfies the bilateral documentation to prove early termination of an overseas employment contract by mutual consent as required by the Standard Employment Contract. MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC., ET AL. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 127195, August 25, 1999 August 25, 1999 Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc., Et Al. National Labor Relations Commission BELLOSILLO, J.
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On the amount of salaries due Cajeras, Sec. 10 of RA 8042 provides that an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at 12% per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less. Petitioners insist that Cajeras is entitled only to salaries for 3 months pursuant to the last portion of Sec. 10 as opposed to the salaries for 8.6 months awarded by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC. However, the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or 3 months' salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least 1 year or more. Therefore, petitioners should pay Cajeras his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or USD$5,100.00 and reimburse the latter's placement fee with 12% interest per annum conformably with Sec. 10 of RA 8042.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment. Respondent applied to work overseas as caretaker thru petitioner. The petitioner asked for a placement fee amounting to P100,000 but the respondent begged to reduced the fee and it was reduced to P94,000 with the petitioner paying only P30,000 and the remaining will be paid through salary deductions. Upon arrival on Taiwan, he was assigned to a mechanical shop, owned by Hsien, as a hydraulic installer/repairer for car lifters, instead of the job for which he was hired. He did not, however, complain because he needed money to pay for the debts he incurred back home. Barely a month after his placement, he was terminated by Hsien and received his salary and instructed for departure to the Philippines. Upon arrival, the respondent went to petitioners office and demanded for the reimbursement of P30,000 but instead the petitioner gave him a summary of expenses relating his deployment. The respondent filed a complaint before Adjudication Office of the POEA. However, because of financial constraints, he had to go home to Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte and filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal, violation of contract, and recovery of unpaid salaries and other benefits before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 9, Dipolog City. In its defense, petitioner alleged that under the employment contract, respondent was to undergo a probationary period of forty (40) days. However, at the job site, respondent was found to be unfit for his work, thus he resigned from his employment and requested for his repatriation signing a statement to that effect. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding petitioner and Wei Yu Hsien solidarily liable for the wages representing the unserved portion of the employment contract, the amount unlawfully deducted from respondents monthly wage, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It found that respondent was not at all dismissed, much less illegally. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in its second resolution. respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and granted the petition and reversing the questioned resolutions of the NLRC. Issue: 1. Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed, was it proper for the Court of Appeals to affirm in toto the monetary awards in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter? ATHENA INTL MANPOWER SERVICES INC V VILLANOS G.R. No. 151303 April 15, 2005 Athenna International Manpower Services, Inc., Nonito Villanos Quisumbing,J:
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Held: Yes, the respondent was illegally dismissed.The SC denied the petition and affirmed with modification the resolution by the Court of Appeals. On the first issue, An employee voluntarily resigns when he finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. In this case respondent avers that petitioner did not explain why he was unqualified nor inform of any qualifications needed for the job prior to his deployment as mandated by Art 281[9] of the Labor Code and failed to prove the legality of the dismissal, despite the fact that the burden of proof lies on the employment and recruitment agency. On the second issue, the SC declared the petitioner solidarily liable with Wei Yu Hsien to pay the unexpired portion based on Sec 10 RA 8042. Lastly, because of the breach of contract and bad faith alleged against the employer and the petitioner, we must sustain the award of P50,000 in moral damages and P50,000 as exemplary damages, in addition to attorneys fees of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary awards.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SERVICES V NLRC & IBNO MEDIALES G.R. No.: G.R. No. 131656 Date: October 12, 1998 Petitioner: Asian Center For Career And Employment System And Services, Inc. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission And Ibno Mediales Ponente: Puno, J.: Facts: Petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The term of his contract was two (2) years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997. On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay and was granted. While en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed. respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal. And found guilty and to pay the unexpired portion of the respondent s contract which is 1,200 multiplied by 8 months representing the unexpired portion. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC but the latter affirmed the decision of labor arbiter but modified the appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiters award by invoking Section 10 RA 8042 that a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less that is why it should be three years should be used for the unexpired portion. NLRC denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent is correct? Held: The SC affirmed the decisions of NLRC with modifications regarding the basis of amount that the petitioner will pay to the respondent for the unexpired portion of employment contract. In the case at bar, petitioners illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed. Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent. The effectivity of Section 10 RA 8042 took effect a year earlier from his vacation leave. Hence, it applies to the case. The respondent should be paid by petitioner the 3 months unexpired portion of the contract.
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Germarie I. Balberan 2011-0076 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accidentin Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2of the POEA.The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by thePOEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State FundInsurance.The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of theparties ruled in favour of the complainant.The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining orderdated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 Eastern Shipping Lines Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Cruz, J.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseasworker. 2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principleof non-delegation of legislative power. Held: 1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive OrderNo. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier underArticle 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEAis vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for death,disability and other benefits arising out of such employment. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made bythe POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domesticshipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
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2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contractprescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by theemployer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring themodel contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in theexercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, increating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rightsof overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY VS THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988 MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES CORTES, J.
GR number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts:
The Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steelman. The contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983, while he was working as a crusher plant operator, private respondent's right ankle was crushed under the machine he was operating. On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he was repatriated. Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses. Issue: Whether or not this was grounds for cancellation or suspension of license or authority of M. S. Catan Placement Agency. Held: Yes, Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreignbased employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. [Section 10(a) (2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code. The Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid salaries of a worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia. Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment contract because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private respondent.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: ESALYN CHAVEZ VS HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995 ESALYN CHAVEZ HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. PUNO, J.
GR number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent:
Ponente: Facts:
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan Co., Ltd., through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA approved the contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with her Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion. On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6) months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989. Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months. Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion. Issue: Whether or not the there was an invalid side agreement present in the case at bar. Held: Yes, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION VS SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al. L-79436-50 January 17, 1990 EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al. Narvasa, J.
In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration of J&B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a license to engage in business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond was filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation, herein petitioner, in virtue of which they both held themselves firmly bound unto Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Ministry of Labor in the penal sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY for the payment of which will and truly to be made, they bound themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally. In consideration of promised deployment, complainants paid respondent various amounts for various fees. Because of non-deployment, the applicants filed separate complaints with the Licensing and Regulation Office of POEA against J&Bfor violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code between the months of April to October 1985. EASCO essentially disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims were not expressly covered by the bond, that POEA had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bond, that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior to the period of effectivity of the bond. Issue: Whether or not the POEA or the Secretary Labor had proper jurisdiction over the claims for refund filed by non-employees. Held: Yes, The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this decision is declared to be immediately executory. The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA "on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, authority to conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP. VS WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 90273-75 November 15, 1989 FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP. WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT Feliciano, J.
Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan Pacific") is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and employment agency. T in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific posted a surety bond issued by petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and was granted a license to operate by the POEA. Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto Palero, Jr., Edwin Cardones and one Edwin Hernandez filed with the POEA separate complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended and for refund of placement fees paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for them. In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary of Labor affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated Article 32 of the Labor Code. Issue: Whether or not the POEA or the Secretary of Labor had proper jurisdiction over the case. Held: Yes, the Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The second paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code states that the secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the cash or surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. There is, hence, no question that, both under the Labor Code and the POEA Rules and Regulations, Pan Pacific had violated at least one of the conditions for the grant and continued use of the recruitment license granted to it.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and BARBER INTERNATIONAL A/S VS THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NELIA MISADA, for herself and in behalf of her minor children CAESAR and ALPHA JOY, all surnamed MISADA and HIMAYA ENVIDIADO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children HENREA, HAZEL, and HENDRICK, all surnamed ENVIDIADO G.R. No. 116629 January 16, 1998 NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and BARBER INTERNATIONAL A/S THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NELIA MISADA, for herself and in behalf of her minor children CAESAR and ALPHA JOY, all surnamed MISADA and HIMAYA ENVIDIADO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children HENREA, HAZEL, and HENDRICK, all surnamed ENVIDIADO PUNO, J.
GR number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent:
Ponente: Facts:
On July 5, 1991, private respondent Nelia Misada received notice that her husband, Eduardo Misada, died on June 28, 1991 while on board the M/V Pan Victoria. On July 12 1991, private respondent Himaya Envidiado likewise received notice that her husband, Enrico Envidiado, died on board the vessel. As heirs of the deceased seamen, private respondents, in their behalf and in behalf of their minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Contract of Employment and the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme (NIS) for Filipino Officers. Their claims were denied by petitioners. Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication Office. They prayed for U.S. $13,000.00 each as death compensation under the POEA Standard Contract of Employment and U.S. $30,000.00 for each wife and U.S. $8,000.00 for each child under eighteen years under the Norwegian NIS. The petitioners claimed that private respondents are not entitled to death benefits on the ground that the seamen's deaths were due to their own willful act. They alleged that the deceased were among three (3) Filipino seamen who implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their respective sexual organs on or about June 18, 1991; that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at the time and place of implantation, all three seamen suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died within days of the other; that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang, Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical.
Issue: Whether or not the heirs of the private petitioners are entitled to the death compensation benefits.
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Held: Yes. the petition is dismissed and the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 006490-94 is affirmed As correctly found by respondent Commission, petitioners' evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen were caused by their own willful and deliberate act. And even if the seamen implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their sex organs, the evidence does not substantially prove that they contracted tetanus as a result of the unsanitary surgical procedures they performed on their bodies. Neither does the evidence show that the tetanus was the direct cause of their deaths.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC. VS NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982 NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO RELOVA, J.
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00. In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case. Issue: Whether or not the National Seamen Board had proper jurisdiction over the case at bar. Held: Yes, According to Article 20 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BRIGIDO SAMSON, represented by wife, NORMA S. SAMSON G.R. No. L-63535 May 27, 1985 PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BRIGIDO SAMSON, represented by wife, NORMA S. SAMSON Alampay, J.
The case at bar stems from a claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses under employment contract, filed by private respondent herein, Brigido Samson, against the petitioner before the National Seaman's Board (NSB). On December 17, 1981, the appealed decision was affirmed by the NLRC. After the said decision reached finality, the corresponding writ of execution was issued and served on petitioner. On April 28, 1982, the Sheriff who served the writ submitted a report to the Board, stating that petitioner had paid P18,000.00 to private respondent herein which the latter accepted and evidenced by a voucher and a "Release" document dated May 7, 1981; and that because of said payment, the Sheriff had in the meantime refrained from collecting the balance of the award until the Board shall have passed upon this matter. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari, with petitioner attributing to the NLRC the commission of the following alleged errors, namely. The respondent NLRC erred in recognizing a clearly illegal decision, because said decision orders payment in the dollar standard in violation of law. Issue: Whether or not the respondent was in violation of R.A. No. 529. Held: No, Republic Act No. 529 makes it unlawful to require payment of domestic obligations in foreign currency, this particular statute is not applicable to the case at bar. A careful reading of the decision rendered by the Executive Director of the NSB dated April 2, 1981 and which led to the Writ of Execution protested to by petitioner, will readily disclose that the award to the private respondent does not compel payment in dollar currency but in fact expressly allows payment of "its equivalent in Philippine currency." WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 HORTENCIA SALAZAR HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ Sarmiento, J.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar with illegal recruitment. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. Issue: Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction to validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code. Held: No. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT SUPPLY VS NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989 SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT SUPPLY NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION GANCAYCO, J.
On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center from October 23, 1983 to March 27, 1984. On August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued describing his disability as "permanent in nature."Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability insurance in the amount of US $ 50,000.00 as provided for in the contract of employment but his claim was denied for having been submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for doing so. Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Pending resolution of their appeal because of the alleged transfer of the agency of Seagull to Southeast Asia Shipping Corporation, Seagull filed on April 28, 1987 a Motion For Substitution/Inclusion of Party Respondent which was opposed by Balatongan. This was followed by an ex-parte motion for leave to file third party complaint on June 4, 1987 by Seagull. Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed prohibited acts by altering or substituting employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor. Held: Yes, it shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority to substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor. The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between petitioner and private respondent to modify the original contract of employment The reason why the law requires that the POEA should approve and verify a contract under Article 34 of the Labor Code is to insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: NORBERTO SORIANO VS OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING CORPORATION, KNUT KNUTSEN O.A.S., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) G.R. No. 78409 September 14, 1989 NORBERTO SORIANO OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING CORPORATION, KNUT KNUTSEN O.A.S., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second
GR number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Division)
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Ponente: Facts: In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days. He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985 he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill its promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila. In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a complaint against private respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond allegedly in the amount of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed prohibited acts by altering or substituting employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor. Held: Yes, There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract without the approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation of law. In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations as not constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition, exceptions from the coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable, sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin Law. Fernan, C. J.
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Jose Mari R. Banico 2011-0148 Case title: RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, RAYMUNDO PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO CRISTOBAL VS THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC. G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15, 1989 RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, RAYMUNDO PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO CRISTOBAL THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC.
GR number: Date: Petitioner:
Respondent:
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J Facts: The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their employment contracts with the private respondent because they demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a third party, the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages over and above their contracted rates without the approval of the NSB. The petitioners were ordered to reimburse the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency representing the said over-payments and to be suspended from the NSB registry for a period of three years. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the NSB. In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon demand by the former, filed estafa charges against some of the petitioners. The criminal cases were eventually consolidated in the sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, which respectively pray for the nullification of the decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioners. In arriving at the questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to the wage differentials as determined by the ITF because the means employed by them in obtaining the same were violent and illegal and because in demanding higher wages the petitioners sought the aid of a third party, which, in turn, intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to respondents' demand for higher wages.
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Issue: Whether or not the NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal means in breaching their contracts of employment and punishing them for these alleged offenses. Held: Yes, WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the National Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty of the offenses for which they were charged. The petitioners' suspension from the National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the Special Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent Virgilio for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. Service agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year commencing from the date of his arrival in Saudi Arabia. However, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground that his performance was below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal termination against Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the POEA. Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of an employment agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement. Issue: Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad. Held: Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate. These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts. ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE VS. NATIONAL LABOR COMMISSI0N and VIRGILIO P. NACIONALES G.R. No. 78085 October 16, 1989 Royal Crown Internationale National Labor Relations Commission and Virgilio P. Nacionales J. Cortes RELATIONS
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: FACILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, J. S. DREYER, and J. V. CATUIRA, VS. LEONARDO DE LA ROSA AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS G.R. No. L-38649 March 26, 1979 Facilities Management Corporation, J. S. Dreyer and J. V. Catuira, Leonardo De La Rosa and the Honorable Court of Industrial Relation J. Makasiar
G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts:
Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. with full backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials. Petitioner alleged that he was employed by respondents as, painter, houseboy and cashier. He further averred that from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily and that this entire period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from respondents. The petitioner, a foreign corporation domiciled outside the Philippines was ordered by CIR then to pay the unpaid overtime and premium pay. However, on certiorari, the petitioner contended that because it was domiciled outside and not doing business in Philippines, it could not be sued in the country. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been doing business in the Philippines so that the service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction. Held: Yes, the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts. Indeed, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not banned from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines.
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: BuluChowdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale by recruiting Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea. Evidence shows that accused appellant interviewed private complainant in 1994 at Craftrades office. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was operating under temporary authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The compalinants also averred that during their applications for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already expired. For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's President and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the agency's Managing Director. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged. Held: No, an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and has an active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover, accusedappellant was not aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and the prosecution failed to prove that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of illegal recruitment being merely performing his task and unaware of illegality of recruitment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BULU CHOWDURY G.R. No. 129577-80 Feb. 15, 2000 Bulu Chowdury People of the Philippines J. Puno
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Accused-appellant Nellie Cabais met the complainants Joan Merante, Nancy Oidi, Florentino Balanon, Jr. and Imelda Mortera on different occasions. They were told that the accused-appellant was a legal recruiter working with a licensed recruitment agency based in Manila. She talked to complainants several times during the period of February 1994 up to May 1994, persuading them to be contract workers in South Korea. She even presented some persons to influence them. Convinced, the complainants complied with requirement and paid all the needed amounts. After complying with all the requirements, complainants were told to wait for their deployment. They waited and repeatedly inquired about the status of their applications. However, several months passed and they were not deployed as promised. Complainants checked with the office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in Baguio and learned that Nellie Cabais was not licensed to recruit in Baguio or in any part of the Cordillera Administrative Region. The accused was indicted for illegal recruitment and estafa. For her part, accused Cabais denied all the charges against her. She alleged that she was hired as an employee and as such employee, her duties only included processing other applications for job placement and entertaining applicants. Accused Cabais denied involvement in the recruitment of complainants, claiming that it was her boss who was doing recruitment activities. She admitted, though, that she received payments from complainants, but alleged that she was merely acting upon the instruction of Forneas and that she turned over all the payments to her employer. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant Accused-appellant Cabais is guilty of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Held: Yes, In this case, all the requisite of illegal recruitment are present. Accused-appellant was the one who informed complainants of job prospects in Korea and the requirements for deployment. She also received money from them as placement fees. Complainants parted with their money, evidenced by receipts signed by accused Cabais. Thus, accused-appellant actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants. Furthermore, accused-appellant did not possess any license to engage in recruitment activities, as evidenced by a certification from the POEA and the testimony of a representative of said government agency. Her acts constituted recruitment, and considering that she admittedly had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment. Despite the fact that she was just an ordinary employee of the company, her criminal liability would still stand for being a conspirator with the corporate officers in undertaking illegal recruitment activities. Since the recruitment involves three or more persons, accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in a large scale. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NELLIE CABAIS y GAMUELA G.R. No. 129070 March 16, 2001 Nellie Cabais y Gamuela People of the Philippines J. Pardo
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Accussed-appellant was charged and convicted before regional trial court of illegal recruitment and estafa. Complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo and Larry Tibor testified that the accused-appellants are recruiting for seaman to work abroad. They paid the needed payments for the processing of their applications but no receipts were issued upon them. They were assured of the employment and that they will be informed of the developments. The complainant followed up their application but each they were told to be patient. Realizing that they had been deceived, complainants went to the Baler Police Station 2 in Quezon City on November 11, 1994 to file their complaints for illegal recruitment and estafa against accused-appellant and other people who helped in recruitment with the accused. On November 14, 1994, complainants went to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and discovered that accused-appellant and her companions did not have any license or authority to engage in any recruitment activity. Accused-appellant denied having promised complainants overseas employment and having collected money from them. All she did was to refer the complainants to other persons who were the real recruiters. Issue: Whether or not referral made by accused-appellant would constitute of illegal recruitment in large scale. Held: Yes, under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment includes "referral," which is defined as the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer, or bureau. In these cases, accusedappellant did more than just make referrals. She actively and directly enlisted complainants for supposed employment abroad, even promising them jobs as seamen, and collected moneys from them. There was also conspiracy among accused-appellant and other recruiters who used fraudulent means and under pretense of legal recruiters in recruiting complainants for employment overseas. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUZ GONZALES-FLORES G.R. No. 138535-38 April 19, 2001 Luz Gonzales-Flores People of the Philippines J. Mendoza
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Accused Linda Sagayado was convicted before the regional trial court of illegal recruitment in large scale and fur charges of estafa. Complainants Gina Cleto, Rogelio Tebeb, Nata Pita and Jessie Bolinao recounted that the accused Sagayado propsed and encourage them for employment abroad in Korea. Complainants gave their respective payments to the accused for the processing of their travel papers and passport. They were assured of their flight and of employment abroad. However, months have passed but their flight never pushed through. They then inquired at the Baguio POEA office whether the accused was a license recruiter to which they receive certification that the accused was not a license recruiter. In her defense, the accused denied having recruited any of the private complainants. She claimed that they came to her voluntarily after being informed that she was able to send her three (3) sons to Korea. While accused admitted having received money from complainants Gina Cleto and Naty Pita, she said she used their money to buy their plane tickets. Gina and Naty were not able to leave because the Korean government imposed a visa requirement beginning January, 1992. When asked why she was not able to return the money of Gina and Naty, accused said that she returned the plane tickets to the Tour Master travel Agency for refund but said agency did not make reimbursements. With respect to complainants Jessie Bolinao and Rogelio Tibeb, the accused denied having received money from them. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Held: Yes, Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more person, individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1 ) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All the requisites are present in this case. The accused representations to the private complainants that she could send them to Korea to work as factory workers, constituting a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. From the testimonies of the priv ate complainants, there is no denying that accused gav e the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that the latter were conv inced to part with their money in order to be employed. As against the positiv e and categorical testimonies of the complainants, mere denial of accused cannot prevail. As to the license requirement, the record showed that accused-appellant did not have the authority to recruit for employment abroad as the certification issued by the POEA in Baguio City. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LINDA SAGAYDO G.R. No. 124671-75 Sep. 29, 2000 Linda Sagaydo People of the Philippines J. Pardo
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The regional trial court convicted accused Benson Ong of illegal recruitment and sev en charges of estaf a f or promising employment abroad to the f ollowing: 1.Noel Bacasnot Baldivino; 2.Ruth A Eliw; 3.Samuel Bagni; 4.Francisca Cayaya; 5.Teofilo S. Gallao,Jr.; 6.Sally Kamura; 7.Paul G. Esteban; 8.David Joaquin; and 9. Solidad M. Malinias The abov e complainants recounted that t he accused encourage them f or employment abroad. Some of them voluntarily sought the help of the accused believ ing that he is a legal and licensed recruiter. They paid the placement f ees and were assured f or employment abroad upon completion of their papers. Accused nev er f ulfilled his promise. Complainants sought help to the NBI about the recruitment activi ties of the accused. The NBI conf irmed f rom the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Regional Extension Unit (POEA-REU) in the Cordillera Autonomous Region that accused had not been licensed to recruit for overseas employment. On June 27, 1994, a team composed of NBI and special inv estigators conducted an entrapment operation which led to the arrest of the accused. For his part, the accused denied the charges and f or collecting f ees f rom them. He f urther claimed that his signatures on the receipt were f orged and he merely suggested to the complainants employment abroad . Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Held: The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENZONG ONG y SATE G.R. No. 119594 Jan. 18, 2000 Benzong Ong y Sate People of the Philippines J. Mendoza
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All the requi sites of Illegal recruitment in large scale are present in this case. Accused represented himself to complainants as one capable of deploying workers abroad and even quoted the alleged salary rates of factory and construction workers in Taiwan. He was not also authorized to recruit workers abroad as he has not been licensed by the POEA and he illegally recruited more than three persons. Even if accused-appellant did no more than "suggest" to complainants where they could apply for overseas employment, his act constituted "referral" within the meaning of Art.13 (b) of the Labor Code. Indeed, the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record shows that accused-appellant did more than just make referrals. The evidence shows that he made misrepresentations to them concerning his authority to recruit for overseas employment and collected various amounts from them for placement fees. Clearly, accused-appellant committed acts constitutive of large scale illegal recruitment.
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Reydante Calonzo Y ambrosio was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and 5 counts of estafa by Brenando Miranda, Danilo de los Reyes, Elmer Clamor, Belarmino Torregrosa and Hazel de Paula. The complainants recounted that they met the accused-appellant who was then employed in R.A.C Business Agency and offered to them employment in Italy. The accused was glib and persuasive that they were lured to give payment for the processing of their application for work in Italy. The accusedappellant was able to send the complainants to Bangkok and were brought to P.S Guest Hotel. While in Bangkok, the complainants again gave additional amounts to the accused. However, they only remain in Bangkok and the promise of employment in Italy was not fulfilled. Upon return to the Philippines, the complainants verified from POEA to which the latter issued a certification that the accused and R.A.C Business Agency were not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. As for his part, accused-appellant denies involvement in any recruitment activities. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Held: Yes, Illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when a person "(a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group." The above requisites to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale are present in this case, the testimony of complainants evidently showed that Calonzo was engaged in recruitment activities in large scale. Firstly, he deluded complainants into believing that jobs awaited them in Italy by distinctly impressing upon them that he had the facility to send them for work abroad. He even showed them his passport to lend credence to his claim. To top it all, he brought them to Bangkok and not to Italy. Neither did he have any arrangements in Bangkok for the transfer of his recruits to Italy. Secondly, POEA likewise certified that neither Calonzo nor R.A.C. Business Agency was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad. Appellant admitted this fact himself. Thirdly, appellant recruited five (5) workers thus making the crime illegal recruitment in large scale constituting economic sabotage. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYDANTE CALONZO Y AMBROSIO G.R. No. 115150Sep. 27, 1996 Reydante Calonzo Y Ambrosio People of the Philippines J. Bellosillo
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioners: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: In April 1993, eight informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large. The complainants namely, Narcisa Autor de Hernandez, Leonora Perez, Melanie Bautista Annaliza Perez, Edwin Coling, Estela Abel de Manalo, Anicel Umahon and Charito Balmes have their own similar stories about the illegal recruitment conducted by the accused-appellants. They recounted that accused Hernandez was the one convincing each of them to apply for employment abroad. Accused Hernandez asked for the payment for the processing of their papers, travel documents and visas. Complainants then were introduced by Hernandez to spouse Reichl who in turn promised them for employment abroad. The spouse issued reciept for the payments made by the complainants. The promises of employment however did not pushed through and the complainants remained in the Phillippines. Upon demands, the accused spouse promise them to refund the payment if their employments never materialized. These agreements were reduced into a document but the accused spouse never complies with their obligations. There was also a certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. As for their part, the spouse denied any of involvement of Hernandez's recruitment and their knowledge of promises for overseas employment. They further contended that they cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale as the several information were only filed by single complainant. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants were guilty of syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, G.R. No. 141221-36 March 7, 2002 Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez De Reichl People of the Philippines J. Puno
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Held: They cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Where only one complainant filed individual complaints as in this case, there is no illegal recruitment in large scale. However, they are guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, the accused-appellants are liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias Tommy Tan was charged and convicted with illegal recruitment in large scale and 6 counts of estafa before the regional trial court of cavity city. The complainants namely: Ernesto Orcullo, Manuel Latina, Neil Mascardo, Librado C. Pozas, Edgardo Tolentino and Cavino Asiman have similar stories about the illegal recruitment activities of the accused. Each of them recounted that they were informed of job employment in Taiwan. The transactions happened in certain house of Borja where the accused-appellant assured the complainants of employment at Rainbow Ship Co.. They were asked to pay a certain amount for placement and processing fees. The accused issued receipts. The promise of employment however did not push through and the complainants decided to file a complaint for illegal recruitment. They later found out that the accused-appellant was not a licensed overseas recruiter. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant was guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Held: Yes, the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. It is clear that accused-appellant's acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and representing to said applicants that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and placement under the above provision of the Labor Code. The accused was not also licensed by the POEA and thus making him an illegal recruiter. Moreover, illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In this case, the accused -appellant committed illegal recruitment in large scale for having recruited six complainants. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TAN TIONG MENG alias "TOMMY TAN" G.R. No. 120835-40 April 10, 1997 Tan Tiong Meng People of the Philippines J. Padilla
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: In October 1992, private complainants Violeta de la Cruz, Remelyn Jacinto, Teresita Lorenzo, Rolando Rustia and Noel de la Cruz were introduced by the latter's mother, private complainant Pelagia de la Cruz, to appellant Dioscora Arabia, a recruiter of job applicants for a factory in Taiwan. They all saw appellants at Quezon City where the appellants convinced them and other applicants to apply for jobs in Taiwan that would give them a monthly pay. Service fees for processing and placement, private complainants were told by appellants Arabia and Tomas, would be P16, 000.00 for each of them. Each of the private complainants give certain amount to Arabia at the latter's residence and in the presence of Tomas. Arabia, however, did not issue any receipt upon her assurance that she would not fool them. Various requirements, such as pictures, passports and bio-data, were submitted also by private complainants. However, private complainants were not able to leave for Taiwan because appellants told them that the person who was supposed to accompany them to Taiwan did not arrive. The departure date was thus reset but private complainants were still unable to leave. Private complainants asked for the return of their money as they were no longer interested in working abroad. They were informed by Arabia's sister, however, that appellants were arrested by the NBI and detained at the Quezon City Jail. Records also showed that appellants were neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Issue: Whether the accused-appellants committed illegal recruitment in large scale. Held: Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements:The accused undertook recruitment activity defined under Article 13 or any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code, he did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers and he committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. These essential elements are present in this case. Accused -appellants recruited at least four persons, giving them the impression that they had the capability to send them to Taiwan for employment. They collected various amounts allegedly for recruitment and placement fees without license or authority to do so. It is settled that the fact that an accused in an illegal recruitment case did not issue the receipts for amounts received from the complainants has no bearing on his culpability so long as complainants show through their respective testimonies and affidavits that the accused was involved in the prohibited recruitment. Thus, the accused-appellants were guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DIOSCORA M. ARABIA and FRANCISCA L. TOMAS G.R. No. 138431-36 September 12, 2001 Dioscoro M. Arabia and Francisca L. Tomas People of the Philippines J. Gonzaga-Reyes
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Sometime in October 1987, accused-appellant Elena Verano persuaded the three private complainants, Jose Daep, Arturo Espiel and Alfonso Abanes to accept overseas employment as salesmen in Bahrain. In consideration thereof, Alfonso, Arturo and Jose were required to pay P10, 000.00 each to cover the expenses for the processing of their passports, visas and the cost of their plane tickets, medical examination and recruitment fees. The complainants paid the amount which is covered by receipts issued and signed by the accused. However, for three times, the accused never showed up and failed to deliver the plain tickets, passports and visas before the supposed flight to Bahrain. The complainants then went to the Western Police District Headquarters to lodge their complaint. Accusedappellant was arrested on the same day and charged with illegal recruitment committed in large scale, and estafa. After trial, she was sentenced for life imprisonment. On appeal, the accused disputed the finding of facts. She argues that, she never represented herself as having the capacity to contract workers for overseas employment; and that she merely introduced private complainants to a certain Juliet Majestrado who was the one who claimed to have such capacity. Issue: Whether or not the finding of fact made by the trial court can be reviewed on appeal Held: No, well-settled doctrine that findings of fact made by the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. Except for a few recognized instances, which do not apply in the case at bench, such findings are bindings and will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court for the latter is not a trier of facts. The issues raised by appellant are purely and indisputably factual, as she herself admits. Considering that none of the exceptions apply the court would not be justified in reversing the judgment of conviction. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ELENA VERANO Y ABANES G.R. No. 90017-18 March 1, 1994 Elena Verano Y Abanes People of the Philippines J. Bellosillo
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Kenneth Yves C. Bergantin 2011-0050 Case Title: JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VS. ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC. G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989 Arsenio Al. Acuna, Newton Jison, Victorino Ferarris, Dennis Jereza, Herminigildo Gustilo, Paulino D. Tolentino and Planters Committee, Inc. Joker Arroyo, Philip E. Juico and Presidential Agrarian Reform J. Cruz
G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts:
The petitioners are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental and organization composed of 1,400 planter-members which seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. Proc. No. 131 and E.o. No. 229 were issued by President Corazon Aquino to institute comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) to uphold the P.D. No. 27 which provides for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. Issue: Whether or not the Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 are unconstitutional. Held: No, the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because measures Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 111870 June 30, 1994 AIR MATERIAL WING SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents. JUSTICE CRUZ, ponente.
FACTS: Luis S. Salas was appointed "notarial and legal counsel" for petitioner Air Material Wings Savings and Loan Association (AMWSLAI) in 1980. AMWSLAI issued order reminding Salas of the approaching termination of his legal services under their contract. This prompted Salas to lodge a complaint against AMWSLAI for separation pay, vacation and sick leave benefits, cost of living allowances, refund of SSS premiums, moral and exemplary damages, payment of notarial services rendered from February 1, 1980 to March 2, 1990, and attorney's fees. AMWSLAI moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It averred that there was no employeremployee relationship between them and that his monetary claims properly fell within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Salas opposed the motion and presented documentary evidence to show that he was indeed an employee of AMWSLAI. AMWSLAI was ordered to pay Salas his notarial fees from 1987 up to March 2, 1990, and attorney's fee equivalent to 10% of the judgment award. The decision affirmed in toto by the Commission prompted Air Material Wings Savings and Loan Association (AMWSLAI) to seek relief in the court. ISSUE: Whether or not employer-employee relationship exist in the case at bar? HELD: Yes. The court held in their decisions that the elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2) payment of wages; (3) power of dismissal; and (4) employer's own power to control employee's conduct. The existence of such a relationship is essentially a factual question. Which can be substantiated in the present case. In the case at bar the terms and conditions set out in the letter-contract entered into by the parties on January 23, 1987, clearly show that Salas was an employee of the petitioner. His selection as the company counsel was done by the board of directors in one of its regular meetings. The petitioner paid him a monthly compensation/retainer's fee for his services. Though his appointment was for a fixed term of three years, the petitioner reserved its power of dismissal for cause or as it might deem necessary for its interest and protection. No less importantly, AMWSLAI also exercised its power of control over Salas by defining his duties and functions as its legal counsel.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993 FARLE P. ALMODIEL, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS., INC., respondents. NOCON, J.: FACTS: Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was hired as Cost Accounting Manager of Raytheon Philippines, Inc. He started as a probationary or temporary employee. After a few months, he was regularized. Raytheon adopted and installed a new cost accounting system in their operation which Raytheon plants and subsidiaries worldwide used. As a consequence, the submission of periodic reports was no longer needed. Almodiel was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of redundancy. Thus, constrained him to file the complaint for illegal dismissal.The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor declaring that complainant's termination on the ground of redundancy is highly irregular and without legal and factual basis. On appeal. NLRC reversed the decision and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner separation pay/financial assistance. Unsatisfied, Almodiel filed the instant petition averring that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid and justified the termination of Almodiel on the ground of redundancy. Almodiel claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law. Raytheon insists that Almodiel's functions and duties had not been absorbed by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this country, because they are occupying entirely different and distinct positions requiring different sets of expertise or qualifications and discharging functions altogether different and foreign from that of petitioner's abolished position. ISSUE: Whether or not the Raytheon Phils., Inc. violates Art. 40 of the Labor Code in employing a resident alien without a working permit? HELD: No. Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires employment permit of no-resident alien . The employment permit is required for entry into the country for employment purposes and is issued after determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang Tan Chai is a resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.
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In the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the Court cannot substitute its discretion and judgment for that which is clearly and exclusively management prerogative. To do so would take away from the employer what rightly belongs to him as aptly explained in National Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC. Further, it is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the qualification and fitness of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. There is none in the instant case.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 87098 November 4, 1996 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER TEODORICO L. ROGELIO and BENJAMIN LIMJOCO, respondents. TORRES, JR., J.: FACTS: Benjamin Limjoco was a Sales Division Manager of Encyclopaedia Britannica and was in charge of selling the latter's products through some sales representatives and also allowed to use Encyclopaedia Britannica's name, goodwill and logo. As agreed upon he will receive commissions from the product sold by his agent less office expenses from Limjoco's commissions. Britannica will be informed about appointments, promotions, and transfers of employees in Limjoco's district. That, he was under the supervision of the Britannica's officials who issued to him and his other personnel, memoranda, guidelines on company policies, instructions and other orders. Limjoco resigned from office to pursue his private business. Respondent submitted his resignation letter containing the reasons of his decision ...was brought about by conflict with other interests which lately have increasingly required my personal attention.... Encyclopaedia Britannica alleged that Limjoco was not its employee but an independent dealer authorized to promote and sell its products and in return, received commissions therefrom. His salary and his income was dependent on the volume of sales accomplished. Limjoco had his own separate office, financed the business expenses, and maintained his own workforce. The salaries of his secretary, utility man, and sales representatives were chargeable to his commissions. Britannica argued that it had no control and supervision over the complainant as to the manner and means he conducted his business operations. The latter did not even report to the office of the Britannica and did not observe fixed office hours. Consequently, there was no employer-employee relationship. After a year Limjoco filed a claim for his benefits and was granted by Labor Arbiter on appeal to NLRC which affirmed the decision prompting the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employee-employer relationship in the case at bar? HELD: No. The court did not agree with the ruling of NLRC that there existed an employer-employee relationship and petitioner failed to disprove this finding.
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In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship the following elements must be present: 1) selection and engagement of the employee; 2) payment of wages; 3) power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's conduct. Of the above, control of employee's conduct is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to used in reaching that end. In ascertaining whether the relationship is that of employer-employee or one of independent contractor, each case must be determined by its own facts and all features of the relationship are to be considered. The records of the case at bar showed that there was no such employer-employee relationship."the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exists. In fine, there is nothing in the records to show or would "indicate that complainant was under the control of the petitioner" in respect of the means and methods in the performance of complainant's work. The fact that petitioner issued memoranda to private respondents and to other division sales managers did not prove that petitioner had actual control over them. The different memoranda were merely guidelines on company policies which the sales managers follow and impose on their respective agents. It should be noted that in petitioner's business of selling encyclopedias and books, the marketing of these products was done through dealership agreements. The sales operations were primarily conducted by independent authorized agents who did not receive regular compensations but only commissions based on the sales of the products. These independent agents hired their own sales representatives, financed their own office expenses, and maintained their own staff. Thus, there was a need for the petitioner to issue memoranda to private respondent so that the latter would be apprised of the company policies and procedures. Nevertheless, private respondent Limjoco and the other agents were free to conduct and promote their sales operations. The periodic reports to the petitioner by the agents were but necessary to update the company of the latter's performance and business income and he had to notify the petitioner about such appointments for purpose of deducting the employees' salaries from his commissions. Private respondent was merely an agent or an independent dealer of the petitioner. He was free to conduct his work and he was free to engage in other means of livelihood. At the time he was connected with the petitioner company, private respondent was also a director and later the president of the Farmers' Rural Bank. Had he been an employee of the company, he could not be employed elsewhere and he would be required to devote full time for petitioner. If private respondent was indeed an employee, it was rather unusual for him to wait for more than a year from his separation from work before he decided to file his claims. Evidently, Limjoco was aware of "conflict with other interests which . . . have increasingly required my personal attention". At the very least, it would indicate that petitioner has no effective control over the personal activities of Limjoco, Consequently, private respondent is not entitled to the benefits prayed for.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. L-48645 January 7, 1987 "BROTHERHOOD" LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ANTONIO CASBADILLO, PROSPERO TABLADA, ERNESTO BENGSON, PATRICIO SERRANO, ANTONIO B. BOBIAS, VIRGILIO ECHAS, DOMINGO PARINAS, NORBERTO GALANG, JUANITO NAVARRO, NESTORIO MARCELLANA, TEOFILO B. CACATIAN, RUFO L. EGUIA, CARLOS SUMOYAN, LAMBERTO RONQUILLO, ANGELITO AMANCIO, DANILO B. MATIAR, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, GENARO OLIVES, ENRIQUE CAMAHORT, FEDERICO OATE, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA, ANTONIO BOCALING and GODOFREDO CUETO, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: FACTS: Petitioners are workers who have been exclusively employed at the San Miguel Parola Glass Factory averaging about seven (7) years of service at the time of their termination. They worked as "cargadores" or "pahinante" at the SMC Plant loading, unloading, piling or palleting empty bottles and woosen shells to and from company trucks and warehouses. At times, they accompanied the company trucks on their delivery routes. The petitioners first reported for work to Superintendent-in-Charge Camahort. They were issued gate passes signed by Camahort and job orders and were provided with company tools, equipment and paraphernalia used in the loading, unloading, piling and hauling operation. Petitioners were paid every ten (10) days on a piece rate basis, that is, according to the number of cartons and wooden shells they were able to load, unload, or pile. Camahort give the final approval of report. The pay check is given to the group leaders for encashment, distribution, and payment to the petitioners in accordance with payrolls prepared by said leaders. The petitioner workers affiliated themselves with the petitioner union and engage in union activities, they pressed management, airing other grievances such as being paid below the minimum wage law, inhuman treatment, being forced to borrow at usurious rates of interest and to buy raffle tickets, coerced by withholding their salaries, and salary deductions made without their consent. However, their gripes and grievances were not heeded by the respondents. The petitioner union filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations in connection with the dismissal of some of its members who were allegedly castigated for their union membership and warned that should they persist in continuing with their union activities they would be dismissed from their jobs. The petitioner presented a letter to the respondent company containing proposals and/or labor demands together with a request for recognition and collective bargaining. Despite several conciliation conferences, refused to bargain with the petitioner union alleging that the workers are not their employees. Respondent asserts that the petitioners are employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independent labor contracting firm.
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On February 20, 1969, all the petitioners were dismissed from their jobs and, thereafter, denied entrance to respondent company's glass factory despite their regularly reporting for work. A complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice was filed by the petitioners. The petitioners strongly argue that there exists an employer-employee relationship between them and the respondent company and that they were dismissed for unionism, an act constituting unfair labor practice "for which respondents must be made to answer."
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners-members of the "Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines" (BLUM) and respondent San Miguel Corporation. HELD: Yes. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It. is the called "control test" that is the most important element (Investment Planning Corp. of the Phils. v. The Social Security System, 21 SCRA 924; Mafinco Trading Corp. v. Ople, supra, and Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople, 131 SCRA 72). Applying the above criteria, the evidence strongly indicates the existence of an employeremployee relationship between petitioner workers and respondent San Miguel Corporation. The court find that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neither substantial capital nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The premises, tools, equipment and paraphernalia used by the petitioners in their jobs are admittedly all supplied by respondent company. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply, suggesting the existence of a "labor only" contracting scheme prohibited by law (Article 106, 109 of the Labor Code; Section 9(b), Rule VIII, Book III, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code). Documentary evidence presented by the petitioners establish respondent SMC's right to impose disciplinary measures for violations or infractions of its rules and regulations as well as its right to recommend transfers and dismissals of the piece workers. The inter-office memoranda submitted in evidence prove the company's control over the petitioners. That respondent SMC has the power to recommend penalties or dismissal of the piece workers. There is no evidence to show that the alleged labor contractor had such right of control or much less had been there to supervise or deal with the petitioners.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. L-43825 May 9, 1988 CONTINENTAL MARBLE CORP. and FELIPE DAVID, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC); ARBITRATOR JOSE T. COLLADO and RODITO NASAYAO, respondents. PADILLA, J.: FACTS: Rodito Nasayao claimed that he was appointed plant manager of the corporation and receiving a compensation of P3,000.00, a month or 25% of the monthly net income of the company, which ever is greater, when the company failed to give his salary for the months of May, June and July Nasayo filed a complaint with the NLRC. Continental Marble Corp., denied the claim of Rodito Nasayao, that the latter was not an employee of the company, an undertaking agreed upon by the parties as joint venture, a sort of partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts from end-users for the installation of marble products, in which the company would not interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the corporation will earn, should there be any. The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the proceeding, Continental Marble Corp., challenged the arbitrator's capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from further hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. Later a judgement was rendered in favor of Rodito Nasayao. Upon receipt of the decision, Continental Marble Corp., appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final, unappealable, and immediately executory; and a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The Commission, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable and immediately executory. Continental Marble Corp., seek to annul and set aside the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employee-employer relationship between Rodito Nasayao and Continental Marble Corp.?
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HELD: No. The court relied on the so -called "control test" that is the most important element, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. In the instant case, it appears that the petitioners had no control over the conduct of Rodito Nasayao in the performance of his work. He decided for himself on what was to be done and worked at his own pleasure. He was not subject to definite hours or conditions of work and, in turn, was compensated according to the results of his own effort. He had a free hand in running the company and its business. The Court has accorded great respect for, and finality to, findings of fact of a voluntary arbitrator and administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their respective fields, like the Labor Department and the National Labor Relations Commission, their findings of fact and the conclusions drawn therefrom have to be supported by substantial evidence. In that instant case, the finding of the voluntary arbitrator that Rodito Nasayao was an employee of the petitioner corporation is not supported by the evidence or by the law. The court find the version of the petitioners to be more plausible and in accord with human nature and the ordinary course of things. As pointed out by the petitioners, it was illogical for them to hire the private respondent Rodito Nasayao as plant manager with a monthly salary of P3,000.00, an amount which they could ill-afford to pay, considering that the business was losing, at the time he was hired, and that they were about to close shop in a few months' time. Besides, there is nothing in the record which would support the claim of Rodito Nasayao that he was an employee of the petitioner corporation. He was not included in the company payroll, nor in the list of company employees furnished the Social Security System. Most of all, the element of control is lacking. Absent the power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which his work was to be accomplished, there was no employeremployee relationship between the parties. Hence, there is no basis for an award of unpaid salaries or wages to Rodito Nasayao.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. L-2216 January 31, 1950 DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS, respondents. TUASON, J.: FACTS: During the trial of an industrial dispute between Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc., and the respondent labor union, the former applied to the Court of Industrial Relations for authority "to hire about twelve more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis, to be chosen by the petitioner from either Filipinos or Chinese." the court granted the authority applied for but imposed as a condition that the majority of the twelve new laborers to be hired "should be native and only a nominal percentage thereof alien." In imposing such condition Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations. That, the Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and that "The restrictions of the number of aliens that nay be employed in any business, occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." ISSUE: Whether or not an order issued by CIR limiting alien employment violates the equal protection of the laws? HELD: No. The information does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's mind. An alien may question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and so far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. The decision is rooted under "Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of." The employer's right to hire labor is not absolute. "This privilege of hiring and firing ad libitum is, of course, being subjected to restraints today." The legislature has the power to make regulations subject only to the condition that they should be affected with public interest and reasonableness under the circumstances.The power may be exercised directly by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the courts or administrative agencies. The court is in opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public interest.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. L-32245 May 25, 1979 DY KEH BENG, petitioner, vs.INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents. DE CASTRO, J.: FACTS: Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of a basket factory was charge of unfair labor practice for discriminatory acts within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4). Republic Act No. 875, by dismissing on September 28 and 29, 1960, respectively, Carlos N. Solano and Ricardo Tudla for their union activities. After preliminary investigation was conducted, a case was filed in the Court of Industrial Relations for in behalf of the International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines and two of its members, Solano and Tudla. Dy Keh Beng contended that he did not know Tudla and that Solano was not his employee because the latter came to the establishment only when there was work which he did on pakiaw basis, each piece of work being done under a separate contract. That the private respondents "did not meet the control test in the fight of the ... definition of the terms employer and employee, because there was no evidence to show that petitioner had the right to direct the manner and method of respondent's work. Moreover, it is argued that petitioner's evidence showed that "Solano worked on a pakiaw basis" and that he stayed in the establishment only when there was work. The Court of Industrial Relations in their decision found the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice. Prompted the petitioner to seek review by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether there existed an employee employer relation between petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the respondents Solano and Tudla? HELD: Yes. An employee-employer relationship was found to have existed between Dy Keh Beng and complainants Tudla and Solano, although Solano was admitted to have worked on piece basis. The evidence for the complainant Union tended to show that Solano and Tudla became employees of Dy Keh Beng from May 2, 1953 and July 15, 1955, respectively, and that except in the event of illness, their work with the establishment was continuous although their services were compensated on piece basis. Evidence likewise showed that at times the establishment had eight (8) workers and never less than five (5); including the complainants, and that complainants used to receive ?5.00 a day. sometimes less.
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The Court upholds the control test under which an employer-employee relationship exists "where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end, " It should be borne in mind that the control test calls merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right. Findings shows that the establishment of Dy Keh Beng is "engaged in the manufacture of baskets known as kaing, it is natural to expect that those working under Dy would have to observe, among others, Dy's requirements of size and quality of the kaing. Some control would necessarily be exercised by Dy as the making of the kaing would be subject to Dy's specifications. Parenthetically, since the work on the baskets is done at Dy's establishments, it can be inferred that the proprietor Dy could easily exercise control on the men he employed.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: FACTS: Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., seeking reconsideration on the decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 which ruled that the Filamer is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver, that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the Filamer. Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., assert that the circumstances in the present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of Filamer. That under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the Filamer for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the Institute. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities. Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. While on their way home one late afternoon Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa to drive, and was allowed. It is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute. Hence, under their supervision. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code can be invoked in the case at bar? HELD: No. The court after a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts, reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision, applying Civil Code provisions. The Court reconsiders its decision.
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Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991 GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, and BASKETBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FELICIANO, J.: FACTS: The National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued Alien Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 to petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for General Milling Corporation ("GMC"). GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team. On 9 February 1990, GMC requested renewal of Cone's alien employment permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. DOLE granted the request on 15 February 1990 under Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December 1990. Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April 1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of Cone would redound to the national interest. GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration but said Motions were denied. Petition for Certiorari was filed on the court. GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative. ISSUE: Whether or not Secretary of Labor gravely abuse his discretion in rendering decision revoking petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit? HELD: No. The Court ruled that petitioners have failed to show that Secretary of Labor acted with grave of discretion in revoking petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.
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Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal basis at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien employment permit. There is no showing of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to the national interest. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent Secretary to make a determination as to the availability of the services of a "person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which an alien is desired." In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995 NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: FACTS: Respondent Roberto Capili was hired by petitioner Nitto Enterprise, a company engage in the sale of glass and aluminum products, sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker, thru an apprenticeship agreement for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990. An accidents happened because of respondents improper attitude towards work, and asked to resign. On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. After three days, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits. The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, directed to reinstate complainant to his work with backwages, and declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-apprentice relationship between petitioner and private respondent in the case at bar? HELD: No. Based on the evidence, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
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Since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code. Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. L-41182-3 April 16, 1988 DR. CARLOS L. SEVILLA and LINA O. SEVILLA, petitioners-appellants, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC., ELISEO S.CANILAO, and SEGUNDINA NOGUERA, respondents-appellees. SARMIENTO , J.: FACTS: On the strength of a contract entered into by and between Mrs. Segundina Noguera, and the Tourist World Service, Inc., leased the premises at Mabini St., Manila for the former's use as a branch office. In the said contract Una Sevilla held herself solidarily liable with the parties for the prompt payment of the monthly rental agreed on. Mrs. Sevilla did not receive any salary from Tourist World Service, Inc., which had its own, separate office located at the Trade Commerce Building; Mrs. Sevilla earned commissions for her own passengers, her own bookings her own business obtained from the airline companies. She shared the 7% commissions given by the airline companies giving Tourist World Service, Lic. 3% thereof aid retaining 4% for herself. Mrs. Sevilla likewise shared in the expenses of maintaining the A. Mabini St. office, paying for the salary of an office secretary It was the understanding between them that appellant Mrs. Sevilla would be given the title of branch manager for appearance's sake only. Tourist World Service, Inc., maintains, that the relation between the parties was in the character of employer and employee. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employee-employer relationship between Mrs. Sevilla and Tourist World Service, Inc.? HELD: No. In this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the evidence of an employeremployee relation. In general, we have relied on the so-called right of control test, "where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end." Subsequently, however, we have considered, in addition to the standard of right-of control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In the case at bar, Lina Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent Tourist World Service, Inc., either as to the result of the enterprise or as to the means used in connection therewith. In the first place, under the contract of lease covering the Tourist Worlds Ermita office, she had bound herself in solidum as and for rental payments. A true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his employer's business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. In that event, the parties must be bound by some other relation, but certainly not employment.
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Although, fares by any airline brought in on the effort of Mrs. Sevilla were payable to Tourist World services, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Sevilla was under the control of Tourist World Service, Inc. "as to the means used." Sevilla in pursuing the business, obviously relied on her own gifts and capabilities. It is further admitted that Sevilla was not in the company's payroll. The fact that Sevilla had been designated 'branch manager" does not make her, ergo, Tourist World's employee. As we said, employment is determined by the right-of-control test and certain economic parameters. But titles are weak indicators.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. L-80680 January 26, 1989 DANILO B. TABAS, EDUARDO BONDOC, RAMON M. BRIONES, EDUARDO R. ERISPE, JOEL MADRIAGA, ARTHUR M. ESPINO, AMARO BONA, FERDINAND CRUZ, FEDERICO A. BELITA, ROBERTO P. ISLES, ELMER ARMADA, EDUARDO UDOG, PETER TIANSING, MIGUELITA QUIAMBOA, NOMER MATAGA, VIOLY ESTEBAN and LYDIA ORTEGA, petitioners, vs.CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., LILY-VICTORIA A. AZARCON, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and HON. EMERSON C. TUMANON, respondents. SARMIENTO, J.: FACTS: The petitioners petitioned the National Labor Relations Commission for reinstatement and payment of various benefits, including minimum wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteen-month pay, and emergency cost of living allowance pay, against the respondent, the California Manufacturing Company. California denied the existence of an employer-employee relation between the petitioners and the company and impleaded Livi Manpower Services, Inc. as a party-respondent. Petitioners were assigned to work as "promotional merchandisers" for California pursuant to a manpower supply agreement. The agreement provided that California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over Livi's workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform California's obligation"; the Livi "is an independent contractor and nothing herein contained shall be construed as creating between California and Livi . . . the relationship of principal-agent or employer-employee'; that "it is hereby agreed that it is the sole responsibility of Livi to comply with all existing as well as future laws, rules and regulations pertinent to employment of labor" and that "California is free and harmless from any liability arising from such laws or from any accident that may befall workers and employees of Livi while in the performance of their duties for California. It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis"; that "cost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to California at cost "; and that "payroll for the preceding week shall be delivered by Livi at California's premises." The petitioners were then made to sign employment contracts with durations of six months, upon the expiration of which they signed new agreements with the same period. Pending proceeding they were notified by California that they would not be rehired. As a result, they filed an amended complaint charging California with illegal dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employee-employer relationship between petitioners and California Manufacturing Company?
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HELD: Yes. The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and being such, it cannot be made the subject of agreement. Hence, the fact that the manpower supply agreement between Livi and California had specifically designated the former as the petitioners' employer and had absolved the latter from any liability as an employer, will not erase either party's obligations as an employer, if an employer-employee relation otherwise exists between the workers and either firm. At any rate, since the agreement was between Livi and California, they alone are bound by it, and the petitioners cannot be made to suffer from its adverse consequences. The Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employeremployee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor. The fact that the petitioners have allegedly admitted being Livi's "direct employees" in their complaints is nothing conclusive. For one thing, the fact that the petitioners were (are), will not absolve California since liability has been imposed by legal operation. For another, and as the court indicated, the relations of parties must be judged from case to case and the decree of law, and not by declarations of parties. In the case at bar, Livi is admittedly an "independent contractor providing temporary services of manpower to its client. " When it thus provided California with manpower, it supplied California with personnel, as if such personnel had been directly hired by California. Hence, Article 106 of the Code applies. The Court need not therefore consider whether it is Livi or California which exercises control over the petitioner vis-a-vis the four barometers referred to earlier, since by fiction of law, either or both shoulder responsibility. The records show that the petitioners bad been given an initial six-month contract, renewed for another six months. Accordingly, under Article 281 of the Code, they had become regular employees-ofCalifornia-and had acquired a secure tenure. Hence, they cannot be separated without due process of law. The court reiterate that the petitioners are its employees and who, by virtue of the required oneyear length-of-service, have acquired a regular status.
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MITCHELLE D. BRACAMONTE 2011-0152 G.R. No. 100665 February 13, 1995 ZANOTTE SHOES/LEONARDO LORENZO, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. BENIGNO C. VILLARENTE, JR., JOSEPH LLUZ, LOLITO LLUZ, NOEL ADARAYAN, ROGELIO SIRA, VIRGINIA HERESANO, GENELITO HERESANO and CARMELITA DE DIOS, respondents. VITUG, J.: FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to Zanotte Shoes. Private respondents averred that they started to work for petitioners on, respectively, the following dates: NAME 1. Joseph Lluz 2. Noel Adarayan 3. Rogelio Sira 4. Lolito Lluz 5. Virginia Heresano 6. Genelito Heresano 7. Carmelita de Dios DATE March, 1985 Feb. 17, 1980 January, 1982 March, 1982 May, 1987 20-Oct-87 January, 1975 1
that they worked for a minimum of twelve hours daily, including Sundays and holidays when needed; that they were paid on piece-work basis; that it "angered" Lorenzo when they requested to be made members of the Social Security System ("SSS"); and that, when they demanded an increase in their pay rates, they were prevented from entering the work premises. Zanotte Shoes, claimed that their business operations were only seasonal, normally twice a year, one in June (coinciding with the opening of school classes) and another in December (during the Christmas holidays), when heavy job orders would come in. Private respondents, according to Zanotte, were engaged on purely contractual basis and paid the rates conformably with their respective agreements. Labor Arbiter Benigno C. Villarente, Jr., rendered judgment in favor of the complainants, ordered to pay the separation pay and all other cost. On appeal, NLRC sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal, denied motion for reconsideration. Hence the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether respondents? an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and private
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HELD: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with that of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect, if not finality, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that substantial evidence which might otherwise affect the result of the case has been discarded. The court see no reason, in this case at bench, for disturbing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between herein private parties. The work of private respondents is clearly related to, and in the pursuit of, the principal business activity of petitioners. The indicia used for determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, all extant in the case at bench, include (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the result of the work to be done and to the means and methods by which the work to be done and to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The requirement, so herein posed as an issue, refers to the existence of the right to control and not necessarily to the actual exercise of the right. Citing Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines, et al.,
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: AIR MATERIAL WING SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No.: G.R. No. 111870 Date: June 30, 1994 Petitioner: Air Material Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, et. al. Potente: CRUZ, J.:
Facts: Private respondent Luis S. Salas was appointed "notarial and legal counsel" for petitioner Air Material Wings Savings and Loan Association (AMWSLAI) in 1980 and then it was renewed for three years in 1987. On January 9, 1990, the petitioner issued another order reminding Salas of the approaching termination of his legal services under their contract. This prompted Salas to lodge a complaint against AMWSLAI for separation pay, vacation and sick leave benefits, cost of living allowances, refund of SSS premiums, moral and exemplary damages, payment of notarial services rendered from February 1, 1980 to March 2, 1990, and attorney's fees. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. it agued that there was no employer employee relationship, however the motion was denied. The parties were ordered to submit their position paper but AMWSLAI did not comply. Never the less the Labor Arbiter found out that Salas was not illegally dismissed and so not entitled to collect separation benefits. His claims for vacation leave, sick leave, medical and dental allowances and refund of SSS premiums were rejected on the ground that he was a managerial employee. He was also denied moral and exemplary damages for lack of evidence of bad faith on the part of AMWSLAI. Neither was he allowed to collect his notarial fees from 1980 up to 1986 because the claim therefor had already prescribed. However, the petitioner was ordered to pay Salas his notarial fees from 1987 up to March 2, 1990, and attorney's fee equivalent to 10% of the judgment award. On appeal the decision was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not Salas can be considered as an employee of the company? Whether or not he is entitled to collect notarial fees. Held: Existence of employer-employee relationship can be determined through the four fold test, the elements are: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2) payment of wages; (3) power of dismissal; and (4) employer's own power to control employee's conduct. The existence of such a relationship is essentially a factual question. The terms and conditions set out in the letter-contract entered into by the parties on January 23, 1987, clearly show that Salas was an employee of the petitioner. His selection as the company counsel was done by the board of directors in one of its regular meetings. The petitioner paid him a monthly compensation/retainer's fee for his services. Though his appointment was for a fixed term of three years, the petitioner reserved its power of dismissal for cause or as it might deem necessary for its interest and protection. No less importantly, AMWSLAI also exercised its power of control over Salas by defining his duties and functions as its legal counsel.
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A lawyer like any other professional may very well be an employee of a big company. Some lawyers are hired as regular members of the company's staff, at the same time may contract with law firms to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. Both groups of lawyers often work closely together, only that the one is an employee while the other group is not. With regard to the payment of notarial fees, the court does not agree with the findings of the decision of NLRC. There is no evidence to support that his notarial services will be paid separately. The lettercontract of January 23, 1987, does not contain any stipulation for the separate payment of notarial fees to Salas in addition to his basic salary. On the contrary, it would appear that his notarial services were part of his regular functions and were thus already covered by his monthly compensation. SC affirmed the NLRC decision but modified it by deleting the payment of notarial fees and the award of attorney's fees.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: ANGELINA FRANCISCO vs. NLRC G.R. No.: 170087 Date: August 31, 2006 Petitioner: Angelina Francisco Respondents: NLRC, Kasei Corp., Seiichiro Takahashi, Timoteo Acedo, Delfin Liza, Irene Ballesteros, Trinidad Liza, and Ramon Escueta Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Facts: In 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation with the designation as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of Makati to secure business permits, construction permits and other licenses for the initial operation of the company. In 1996, petitioner was designated Acting Manager. She was tasked to handle recruitment of all employees and performs management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings with government agencies, especially with the BIR, SSS and in the city government of Makati; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation. For five years, she manned this position. As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00 plus P3,000.00 housing allowance and a 10% share in the profit of Kasei Corporation. In January 2001, petitioner was replaced by Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. Her salary was reduced to P2500.00. Even worst the company stopped paying her reasoning that the company is not profiting. Petitioner then filed an action for constructive dismissal against respondent company. The company contended that she was not their employee, rather they only engaged her as technical consultant. As technical consultant, petitioner performed her work at her own discretion without control and supervision of Kasei Corporation. To prove further, they presented documents showing that she was not included in the employees reported to BIR. Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor, affirmed by NLRC but CA reversed the decision, thus this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was an employee of Kasei Corporation. Whether on not petitioner was illegally dismissed.
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Held: Generally the courts rely on the control test to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship, but sometimes it was proved insufficient thus the necessity to adopt the two-tiered test which would take into consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of the relationship between the parties. This is especially appropriate in this case where there is no written agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the worker over the period of the latters employment. The two-tiered test involve (1) the putative employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship. Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employers business; (2) the extent of the workers investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the workers opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business. By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporations Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement. The company also registered her in the SSS. She received regular compensation, bonus and other emoluments. Evidence gave no other conclusion that petitioner is an employee of respondent Kasei Corporation. With the above realities it is indeed certain that petitioner is the employee of the company. And that she was constructively dismissed when her salary was reduced to P2500 which amount to illegal dismissal. SC set aside CA decision and reinstated NLRC decision.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (PHILIPPINES), INC., vs. NLRC G.R. No.: 87098 Date: November 4, 1996 Petitioner(s): Encyclopedia Britanica (Philippines), Inc. Respondent (s): NLRC, Labor Arbiter Teodorico Rogelio and Benjamin Limjoco Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.: Facts: Benjamin Limjoco was a sales division manager of Encyclopedia Britanica. Limjoco has his own agents on which he receives commission out of their sales. Limjoco and petitioner Britanica agreed however that office expenses will be deducted from his commission. On June 14 1974, Limjoco resigned to pursue his own business. On October 30, 1975 he filed a complaint against petitioner Encyclopedia Britannica with the Department of Labor and Employment, claiming for non-payment of separation pay and other benefits, and also for illegal deduction from his sales commissions. Petitioner argued that respondent is not its employee but an independent dealer who received commission there from. Respondent insisted his claim that he was indeed an employee of respondent company assigned at the sales department earning an average monthly income of P4, 000.00 as his sales commission. He further claimed that he was under the supervision of the petitioner's officials who issued to him and his other personnel, memoranda, guidelines on company policies, instructions and other orders. Petitioner argued that it had no control and supervision over the complainant as to the manner and means he conducted his business operations. The latter did not even report to the office of the petitioner and did not observe fixed office hours. Consequently, there was no employer-employee relationship. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of respondent Limjoco, later affirmed by the NLRC, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent Limjoco is and employee of petitioner Encyclopedia Britanica.
Held: The court held that respondent Limjoco is not an employee of Encyclopedia Britanica. He was merely an agent or independent dealer of the company. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship the following elements must be present: 1) selection and engagement of the employee; 2) payment of wages; 3) power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's conduct. Of the above, control of employee's conduct is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employeremployee relationship.
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Although the company issued memoranda to respondent does not sufficiently prove that indeed the company has control over Limjoco. In fact it only issued such memoranda merely to set up guidelines and policies which the sales managers follow and impose on their respective agents. The issuance of such memoranda was done by the petitioner only to notify the respondent and other sales manager of the company's policies and procedures. Nevertheless, private respondent Limjoco and the other agents were free to conduct and promote their sales operations. Furthermore, the fixing of the price by petitioner was only for the purpose of uniformity, but never the less respondent is free to conduct his own marketing operations. Finally, respondent was absolutely free to conduct his work and indulge in other means of livelihood, wherein fact at that time he was also a director and later president of the Farmer's Rural Bank. If he was indeed an employee of petitioner it could have barred him from indulging in other employment or demanded his full time devotion to the company.
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Delatado,Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Domasig vs. NLRC G.R. No.: 118101 Date: September 16, 1996 Petitioner: Eddie Domasig Respondents: NLRC and/or Otto Ong and Catalina Co. Ponente: Padilla, J.: Facts: Eddie Domasig was employed by respondent Cata Garments Corporation as Salesman since July 6, 1986. He received a monthly salary of 1500 a month plus commission. In August 29, 1992 respondent company dismissed petitioner based on an allegation that he was being pirated by competitor company but was declined by the petitioner. Respondent company denied that petitioner was its regular employee; instead it tried to prove that petitioner was only a commission agent who receives a commission of 5.00 per article sold and 2.50 on bargain price. To support the claim, company presented the list of Sales Collections, Computation of Commission due, expenses incurred, cash advances received for the month of January and March 1992. On the other hand, petitioner presented the company ID issued to him by respondent company and the cash vouchers to prove that he receives a monthly salary. The labor arbiter decided in favor of petitioner, but was set aside by NLRC declaring that there was no sufficient evidence presented to prove the presence of employer-employee relationship, thus Labor Arbiter's decision was not supported by evidence. It ordered that the case be reverted to the arbitration branch of origin for further proceeding. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in vacating and setting aside the decision of the labor arbiter and remanding the case to the arbitration branch of origin for further proceedings. Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent. Held: In the case at bar respondent NLRC was not convinced that the evidence presented by the petitioner, consisting of the identification card issued to him by private respondent corporation and the cash vouchers reflecting his monthly salaries covering the months stated therein, settled the issue of employeremployee relationship between private respondents and petitioner. It has long been established that in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial evidence is sufficient as a basis for judgment on the existence of employer-employee relationship. No particular form of evidence is required is required to prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In a business establishment, an identification card is usually provided not only as a security measure but mainly to identify the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm that issues it. Together with the cash vouchers covering petitioner's salaries for the months stated therein, we agree with the labor arbiter that these matters constitute substantial evidence adequate to support a conclusion that petitioner was indeed an employee of private respondent. The list of sales collection including computation of commissions due, expenses incurred and cash advances received (Exhibits "B" and "B-1") which,
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according to public respondent, the labor arbiter failed to appreciate in support of private respondents" allegation as regards the nature of petitioner's employment as a commission agent, cannot overcome the evidence of the ID card and salary vouchers presented petitioner which private respondents have not denied. The list presented by private respondents would even support petitioner's allegations that, aside from a monthly salary of P1,500.00, he also received commissions for his work as a salesman of private respondents. Having been in the employ of private respondents continuously for more than one year, under the law, petitioner is considered a regular employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as a basis for judgment on the legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence for that matter, substantial evidence being sufficient. Labor Arbiter's decision on the presence of employer-employee relationship is supported by substantial evidence. On the issue of dismissal, it was indeed, illegal as it was not supported by any valid basis. Respondent di not deny the allegation that the sole basis of the dismissal was the allege enticement of other employer to work with them. Labor Arbiter was reinstated with modifications on the computation of monetary claims.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title:DY KEH BEN vs. INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. G.R. No.: L-32245 Date: May 25, 1979 Petitioner(s): Dy Keh Beng Respondent(s): NLRC, et. al. Ponente: De Castro, J.: Facts: A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of a basket factory, for discriminatory acts within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4). Republic Act No. 875, by dismissing on September 28 and 29, 1960, respectively, Carlos N. Solano and Ricardo Tudla for their union activities. Petitioner contended that he did not know Tudla while Solano was not his employee. He said that Solano would only appear to the establishment when there is work which he did on pakyaw basis, each work being under separate contact. Moreover, Dy Keh Beng countered with a special defense of simple extortion committed by the head of the labor union, Bienvenido Onayan. Petitioner further contended that without satisfying the control test there can be no employer-employee relationship. The hearing examiners report which was affirmed in toto by the CIR found that indeed there was employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents. Solano and Tudla became employees of Dy Keh Beng from May 2, 1953 and July 15, 1955, respectively, and that except in the event of illness, their work with the establishment was continuous although their services were compensated on piece basis. Issue: Whether or not there existed an employee employer relation between petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the respondents Solano and Tudla . Held: Contrary to the petitioners contention that the control test is not sufficiently satisfied, the court found that indeed petition exercise control over respondents. It should be borne in mind that the control test calls merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right. Considering the finding by the Hearing Examiner that the establishment of Dy Keh Beng is "engaged in the manufacture of baskets known as kaing, it is natural to expect that those working under Dy would have to observe, among others, Dy's requirements of size and quality of the kaing. Some control would necessarily be exercised by Dy as the making of the kaing would be subject to Dy's specifications. Since the work on the baskets is done at Dy's establishments, it can be inferred that the proprietor Dy could easily exercise control on the men he employed.
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As to the contention that Solano was not an employee since he only worked on pakyaw basis, the court adopted the finding of the court examiner that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. The court also noted the opinion of Justices Perfecto, concurring with Chief Justice Ricardo Paras who penned the decision in "Sunrise Coconut Products Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations" (83 Phil..518, 523), who stated that "Judicial notice of the fact that the socalled "pakyaw" system mentioned in this case as generally practiced in our country, is, in fact, a labor contract -between employers and employees, between capitalists and laborers."
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Equitable Banking Corporation vs. NLRC G.R. No.: 102467 Date: June 13, 1997 Petitioner: Equitable Banking Corp, Manuel Morales, George L. Go, John C. B. Go, et. al. Respondent: NLRC and Ricardo Sadac Ponente: VITUG, J.:
Facts: Ricardo Sadac was hired by petitioner bank as Vice president for Legal Department. Later on was designated also as General Cousel of the Bank. Various tasks of legal nature were assigned to him, he was also given the power to supervise all personnel in the legal department. In the contract also is stated that he may be given other duties as may be assigned by the president and Board of Directors. Sometime, 9 lawyers under him filed a petition accusing private respondent of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Mr. Banico, one of the directors, was assigned to investigate on the matter which declared that the allegations were true although no rigid investigation was made. Sadac was asked to resign, but refused instead demanded for a hearing in relation to the issue so that he may well clear his name, he also expressed his intent to file libel case against Banico. His persistent demand for hearing was not granted instead the president stated that he was not being terminated but must bear in his conscience that he will keep receiving his monthly salary and other benefits with out performing any work since his duties were now delegated to another lawyer, it was then that he lodged a complain before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The bank then formally terminated him. Respondent bank denied the existence of employer-employee relationship but instead argued that what exists is an ordinary client-lawyer relationship. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioner Bank, but was reversed by NLRC, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner bank and private respondent.
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Held: The decision was relied upon on the case of Hydro Resouces vs. Pagalilauan, where in the court stated that a lawyer like any other professionals may very well be an employee of a private corporation. The respondent bank did not state, otherwise prove that respondent was hired as an outside counsel paid on a retainer basis. On the contrary it is obvious that respondent performed functions directly related to the banks operation. His notarial services was likewise not given to him but accrued to the bank's income. More so, in several occasions evidenced by official company communications he was referred to by the president as an employee. In company record he is registered as one of its corporate officers. The company also registered him in the SSS as its employee. Furthermore, he enjoys benefits like any other company officers such as when he availed the car loan benefit of the company. The respondent bak also committed a grave error in dispensing with substantial and procedural due process. In any case prior to termination of an employee, he must be accorded due process. The right to be notified of the charges and to hearing cannot be dispensed with. Respondent was dismissed with out sufficient basis, only that of the allegation in the petition of the 9 lawyers but with out substantial proof, thus the dismissal is illegal. SC affirmed NLRC decision with modification as to the grant of moral and exemplary damages.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Equitable Banking Corporation vs. NLRC G.R. No.: 102467 Date: June 13, 1997 Petitioner: Equitable Banking Corp, Manuel Morales, George L. Go, John C. B. Go, et. al. Respondent: NLRC and Ricardo Sadac Ponente: VITUG, J.:
Facts: Ricardo Sadac was hired by petitioner bank as Vice president for Legal Department. Later on was designated also as General Cousel of the Bank. Various tasks of legal nature were assigned to him, he was also given the power to supervise all personnel in the legal department. In the contract also is stated that he may be given other duties as may be assigned by the president and Board of Directors. Sometime, 9 lawyers under him filed a petition accusing private respondent of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Mr. Banico, one of the directors, was assigned to investigate on the matter which declared that the allegations were true although no rigid investigation was made. Sadac was asked to resign, but refused instead demanded for a hearing in relation to the issue so that he may well clear his name, he also expressed his intent to file libel case against Banico. His persistent demand for hearing was not granted instead the president stated that he was not being terminated but must bear in his conscience that he will keep receiving his monthly salary and other benefits with out performing any work since his duties were now delegated to another lawyer, it was then that he lodged a complain before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The bank then formally terminated him. Respondent bank denied the existence of employer-employee relationship but instead argued that what exists is an ordinary client-lawyer relationship. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioner Bank, but was reversed by NLRC, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner bank and private respondent.
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Held: The decision was relied upon on the case of Hydro Resouces vs. Pagalilauan, where in the court stated that a lawyer like any other professionals may very well be an employee of a private corporation. The respondent bank did not state, otherwise prove that respondent was hired as an outside counsel paid on a retainer basis. On the contrary it is obvious that respondent performed functions directly related to the banks operation. His notarial services was likewise not given to him but accrued to the bank's income. More so, in several occasions evidenced by official company communications he was referred to by the president as an employee. In company record he is registered as one of its corporate officers. The company also registered him in the SSS as its employee. Furthermore, he enjoys benefits like any other company officers such as when he availed the car loan benefit of the company. The respondent bak also committed a grave error in dispensing with substantial and procedural due process. In any case prior to termination of an employee, he must be accorded due process. The right to be notified of the charges and to hearing cannot be dispensed with. Respondent was dismissed with out sufficient basis, only that of the allegation in the petition of the 9 lawyers but with out substantial proof, thus the dismissal is illegal. SC affirmed NLRC decision with modification as to the grant of moral and exemplary damages.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. HONORATO JUDICO G.R. No.: 73887 Date: December 21, 1989 Petitioner(s): Great Pacific Life Insurance Company Respondent(s): Honorato Judico and NLRC Ponente: PARAS J.: Facts: On June 9, 1976, private respondent Judico entered into an agreement of agency with petitioner Grepalife to become a debit agent attached to the industrial life agency in Cebu City. Petitioner defines a debit agent as "an insurance agent selling/servicing industrial life plans and policy holders. Industrial life plans are those whose premiums are payable either daily, weekly or monthly and which are collectible by the debit agents at the home or any place designated by the policy holder. Among his assigned duty was to perform the collection of premiums. He receives a fixed wage known as "sales reserve". Furthermore he receives a weekly allowance of 200. Later he was promoted to Zone supervisor and he was given an additional fixed allowance of 110 per week. On June 28, 1982, complainant was dismissed by way of termination of his agency contract. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner maintained its position that respondent is merely an agent and not its employee. Labor Arbiter decided favoring petitioner Grepalife, but ordered the awards of 1000 for Christian reasons, NLRC reversed the decision, although moot and academic at that point explained that the awards of 1000 has no legal justification. Issue: Whether or Not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent? Held: To determine the whether Judico is a regular employee, his nature of employment must be scrutinized. Unquestionably respondent Judico is an agent of the petitioner. However there are two types of insurance company agent: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives who work on commission basis. The agents who belong to the second category are not required to report for work at anytime, they do not have to devote their time exclusively to or work solely for the company since the time and the effort they spend in their work depend entirely upon their own will and initiative; they are not required to account for their time nor submit a report of their activities; they shoulder their own selling expenses as well as transportation; and they are paid their commission based on a certain percentage of their sales. One salient point in the determination of employer-employee relationship which cannot be easily ignored is the fact that the compensation that these agents on commission received is not paid by the insurance
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company but by the investor (or the person insured). After determining the commission earned by an agent on his sales the agent directly deducts it from the amount he received from the investor or the person insured and turns over to the insurance company the amount invested after such deduction is made. The test therefore is whether the "employer" controls or has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. Facts of the case showed that respondent has exercised control over petitioner. Moreover he receives a regular wage in the form of sales reserve, where in case of poor performance would revert to the beginner's stage wherein he will only receive the 200 weekly allowance. He was given a definite place to work in the office. He was also mandated to make regular reports. Respondent clearly belong to the first type of agents who are considered as regular employee. Respondent Judico is an employee of Petitioner Company and his dismissal is illegal.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. Pagalilauan G.R. No.: L-62909 Date: April 18, 1989 Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.: Facts: On October 24, 1978, Petitioner Corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well. On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. Petitioner contended that Aban was not its employee, but the relationship was only that of a client-lawyer relation. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed, affirmed by the NLRC Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the Petitioner Corporation and Aban. Held: A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. At the same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and other professionals. Applying the four fold test, Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his appointment paper (Exhibit "A"). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance. Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties well. (Exhibit "B"). Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation. The above-mentioned facts show that the petitioner paid Aban's wages, exercised its power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work all of which satisfies the elements of employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, petitioner company is now barred by estoppel. It initially presented documents before the labor arbiter to prove that Aban was a managerial employee, and now would try to prove that Aban was not its employee. The SC sustained the findings of the NLRC finding Aban was illegally dismissed, ordering that he shall be reinstated without lose of seniority plus back wages, but if reinstatement is no longer feasible to pay him separation pay.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division, Cebu City), LABOR ARBITER NICASIO P. ANINON and PANTALEON DE LOS REYES. G.R. No.: 119930 Date: March 12, 1998 Petitioner(s): Insular Life Assurance Co., LTD Respondet(s): NLRC, Labor Arbiter Aninon and Pantaleon De Los Reyes Potente: BELLOSILLO, J.: Facts: 21 August 1992 petitioner entered into an agency contract with respondent Pantaleon de los Reyes authorizing the latter to solicit within the Philippines applications for life insurance and annuities for which he would be paid compensation in the form of commissions. On 1 March 1993 petitioner and private respondent entered into another contract where the latter was appointed as Acting Unit Manager under its office. In the contract it expressly stated that there is no employer-employee relationship between company and De Los Reyes. Moreover, petitioner was prohibited from working in any other insurance company or even in the government without the respondents approval. The respondent was notified by petitioner on 18 November 1993 that his services were terminated effective 18 December 1993. Thus he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided adversely against respondent declaring that there in no employer-employee relationship. This decision was reversed by the NLRC, thus the petition. Issue: Whether or not there exist employers-employee relationship between Petitioner Company and private respondent. Held: Contrary to petitioner's argument the court found that the four fold test is sufficiently satisfied based on the facts of the case. In the case at bar, facts showed that company exercised effective control over respondent. De los Reyes was to serve exclusively the company, therefore, he was not an independent contractor; (b) he was required to meet certain manpower and production quota; and, (c) petitioner controlled the assignment to and removal of soliciting agents from his unit. Based on the new management contract, there is no doubt that an employer employee relationship exist. Finally, the existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in the management contract and providing therein that the "employee" is an independent contractor when the terms of the agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. In determining the status of the management contract, the "four-fold test" on employment earlier mentioned has to be applied. Respondent is an employee of Petitioner Company and his dismissal was illegal.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Manaay vs. Juico G.R. No.: 79777 Date: July 14, 1989 Petitioner(s): Nicolas S. Manaay and Agustin Hermano Jr. Respondent(s): Hon. Philip Ella Juico, Sec of Agrarian Reform and LBP Ponente: CRUZ, J.: Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. With the adoption of CARP law, the tenant are to be granted full ownership of the portion of the land they till. They also question the power of the president to issue the assailed E.O. arguing that such is a usurpation of legislative powers. They also raise the issue that said laws violate the equal protection law. Issue: Whether or not the said laws are in contravention with the constitution. Held: In resolving questions of constitutionality, the court takes a cautious step. We believes that the congress of the president before adopting a law made an exhaustive study that such law will be in accordance with the law. Most of the questions raised here in are now moot and academic. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. As to the power of the president to make a law, the presidential decrees are made in accordance with the law as grand by the martial law rule. During the time of Pres. Aquino she is empowered to do so by the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. On the question of equal protection the court find no violation of the elements of equal protection. The court therefore rules that the assailed laws and issuances are all constitutional.
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Delatado,Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Opulencia vs. NLRC G.R. No.: L-98368 Date: December 15 1993 Petitioner: Opulencia Ice Plant and/or Melchor Opulencia Respondent: NLRC, Labor Arbiter Villena and Manuel Esita Ponente: Bellosillo, J.: Facts: Manuel Esita was an employee of Opulencia Ice Plant for 20 years. He was initially assigned to the plant in San Pablo but was later moved to Calamba to replace the old and weak compressor operator Lorenzo Eseta. Sometime, for about a month he helped in the renovation of Dr. Opulencia'a house. On 6 February 1989, for demanding the correct amount of wages due him, Esita was dismissed from service. Consequently, he filed with Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch IV, San Pablo City, a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment, non-payment for overtime, legal holiday, premium for holiday and rest day, 13th month, separation/retirement pay and allowances against petitioners. On his defense Opulencia denied that Esita was his employee in the Ice plant. He contended that he was a mere peon during the renovation of his house. He further asserted that Esita was not even included in the payroll. He further contended that granting arguendo Esita was truly a mechanic, his services would only be required when there is a need for repair and therefore not on a regular basis. Lastly, Opulencia justified the stay of Esita in the premises of the ice plant saying that it is purely out of benevolence. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Esita and affirmed by NLRC with modifications as the the amount of monetary award. Thus the petition. Issue: Whether on not Manuel Esit is an employee of Opulencia ice plant? Held: The court cannot agree with the petitioner's contentions, his petition is devoid of merit. Absence of payroll or material evidence does not give rise to the conclusion the employer-employee relationship could no longer be proven. Absent such can still be validated through testimonial evidence. The admission of the petitioner that the weekly payroll he presented do not contain all the names of employee negates his claims. The court also took notice of his unwillingness to present the payroll covering the period on which Esita claimed to be the period of his employment. In this regard the court aptly applied the disputable presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. On the petitioners argument that Esita's mechanic services is not regular but based on necessity alone is likewise devoid of merit. We cannot sustain this argument. This circumstance cannot affect the regular status of employment of Esita. An employee who is required to remain on call in the employer's premises or so close thereto that he cannot use the time effectively and gainfully for his own purpose shall be considered as working while on call. In sum, the determination of regular and casual employment is not affected by the fact that the employee's regular presence in the place of work is not required, the more significant consideration being that the work of the employee is usually necessary or desirable in the business of the employer. More importantly, Esita worked for 9 years and, under the Labor Code, "any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to that activity in which he is employed . . . ." Petition is dismissed
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Case Title: EFREN P. PAGUIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No.: 147816. Date: May 9, 2003 Petitioner: Efren Paguio Respondets: NLRC,Metro Media Times Corp, Robina Y. Gocongwei, Liberato Gomez, Jr., Yolanda E. Aragon, Frederick D.Go and Alda Iglesia Ponente: VITUG, J.: Facts: Metro Times Corporation, publisher of "The Manila times" hired petitioner as account executive tasked to solicit advertisements for the said news paper. In return he will receive commission equivalent to 15% on direct advertisements subject to tax deductions. Furthermore he receives a monthly allowance of 2000 if he meets the quota. On August 15, 1992 barely 2 months after the fifth renewal of his contract with the company he was informed about his termination based on accusations not clearly established. In their contract, there is a stipulation which states that petitioner in not an employee of the company. Moreover, it states that either party may terminate the contract after 30 days notice. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter found respondent company liable for illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner. On appeal NLRC reversed the decision affirmed in toto by CA, hence the appeal. Issue: Whether on not petitioner in an employee of said company? Whether or not the dismissal was proper?
Held: The prime question here is whether petitioner is a regular employee or not. A regular employee is one who is engaged to perform activities which are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer as against those which are undertaken for a specific project or are seasonal. Even in these latter cases, where such person has rendered at least one year of service, regardless of the nature of the activity performed or of whether it is continuous or intermittent, the employment is considered regular as long as the activity exists, it not being indispensable that he be first issued a regular appointment or be formally declared as such before acquiring a regular status. Admittedly, company's president acceded that petitioners work is of great importance in the survival of the company being the advertisements solicited by the petitioner are the lifeblood of the company.
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Respondent company cannot seek refuge under the terms of the agreement it has entered into with petitioner. The law, in defining their contractual relationship, does so, not necessarily or exclusively upon the terms of their written or oral contract, but also on the basis of the nature of the work petitioner has been called upon to perform. The law affords protection to an employee, and it will not countenance any attempt to subvert its spirit and intent. A stipulation in an agreement can be ignored as and when it is utilized to deprive the employee of his security of tenure. The sheer inequality that characterizes employer-employee relations, where the scales generally tip against the employee, often scarcely provides him real and better options. The second question is whether the dismissal is justified. A lawful dismissal must meet both substantive and procedural requirements; in fine, the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause and must comply with the rudimentary due process of notice and hearing. It is not shown that respondent company has fully bothered itself with either of these requirements in terminating the services of petitioner. The notice of termination recites no valid or just cause for the dismissal of petitioner nor does it appear that he has been given an opportunity to be heard in his defense. SC set aside the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of NLRC and reinstated the original decision of the labor arbiter with modifications by deleting the award of moral damage there being no proof that the dismissal was done in bad faith.
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Delatado, Darwin A: 2011-0125 Case Title: ZAMUDIO VS. NLRC G.R. NO.: 76723 Date: March 25, 1990 Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: NOTE: No available full text. No copy in the SCRA, lawphil, SC e-library, Chan Robles virtual library. Facts: Petitioner rendered services important for the cultivation of respondents farm. However they do not work everyday all through out the year because of the nature of the work they perform. They only report on certain seasons. Never the less every year they come to do the same work. Since private respondent started to hire them until their dismissal they never stopped working every year.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are considered as employees or respondent. Held: The elements of the four-fold test are present in the case at bar. Furthermore, the nature of their employment, which is Pakyaw basis, does not make petitioners independent contractors. Pakyaw workers are considered employees as long as the employer exercises control over the means by which such workers are to perform their work inside private respondents farm, the latter necessarily exercised control over the performed by petitioners.
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The seasonal nature of petitioners work does not detract from the existence employer employee relationship. Seasonal workers whose work is not merely for the duration of the season, but who are rehired every working season are considered regular employees. The absence of the petitioners name in the payroll does not negate the fact of employer-employee relationship, as there are other factual bases to establish the presence of such relationship. Omission of petitioners in the payroll was not within their control, they had no hand in the preparation of the payroll. Such omission cannot be taken against petitioner.
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Delatado, Darwin A. 2011-0125 Case Title: Zanotte Shoes vs. NLRC G.R. No.: 100665 Date: February 13, 1995 Petitioner: Zanotte Shoes/Leonardo Lorenzo Respodents: NLRC, Hon. Benigno Villarente, Joseph Lluz et. al. Ponente: VITUG, J.: Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Zanotte Shoes owned by Leonardo Lorenzo for illegal dismissal and other monetary claim, however later the monetary claims were dropped with the respondents concentrating on the issue of illegal dismissal. Respondents alleged that they were dismissed from work when they demanded to the respondent to make them members of SSS and increase in their pay rates. Petitioners, in turn, claimed that their business operations were only seasonal, normally twice a year, one in June (coinciding with the opening of school classes) and another in December (during the Christmas holidays), when heavy job orders would come in. Private respondents, according to petitioners, were engaged on purely contractual basis and paid the rates conformably with their respective agreements. After the labor Arbiter's investigation, he rendered his findings in favor of the respondents sustaining the claim that indeed there exists an employer-employee relationship and ordered also the petitioner to pay respondents their respective separation pay. These findings were sustained by the NLRC, thus this petition. Issue: Whether on not the NLRC erred in sustaining the decision of the Labor arbiter finding the existence of employer-employee relationship and the award of separation pay. Held: Once again the Supreme Court emphasized, that factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with that of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect, if not finality, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that substantial evidence which might otherwise affect the result of the case has been discarded. There being no obvious manifestation that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of its discretion in arriving at its conclusion. In the case at bar, we see no reason for disturbing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between herein private parties. The work of private respondents is clearly related to, and in the pursuit of, the principal business activity of petitioners. The critteria used for determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, all extant in the case at bench, include (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the result of the work to be done and to the means and methods by which the work to be done and to the
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means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The reckoning point is the existence of the right to control but not the actual exercise of the right to control. While the court sustained the finding of the NLRC, it did not however consider the award of separation pay there being no actual dismissal nor abandonment. Where-in fact petitioner has insisted his willingness to rehire respondents but they have steadfastly refused the offer.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 ALITA VS COURT OF APPEALS GR No 78517 February 27, 1989 Petitioner(s): GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR Respondent(s): HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES Ponente: J. PARAS
Facts: Two parcels of land were acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), now Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Private respondents instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands. Issue: Whether the lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27. Held: P.D. 27 decrees that the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. The newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading: Section 6. Retention Limits.
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... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEM INC VS BAUTISTA G.R. No. 156367 May 16, 2005 Petitioner(s): AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC Respondent(s): ANTONIO BAUTISTA Ponente: J.CHICO-NAZARIO
Facts: Respondent Antonio Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. (Autobus), as driver-conductor with travel routes Manila-Tuguegarao via Baguio, Baguio- Tuguegarao via Manila and Manila-Tabuk via Baguio. Respondent was paid on commission basis, 7% of the total gross income per travel, on a twice a month basis. While he was driving he accidentally bumped the rear portion of Autobus No. 124. Respondent averred that the accident happened because he was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for almost 24 hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela. Respondent further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount of P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that despite respondents pleas for reconsideration, the same was ignored by management. After a month, management sent him a letter of termination. Bautista instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against Autobus. Issue: Whether Bautista is entitled to the grant of service incentive leave pay. Held: Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court emphasized that it does not mean that just because an employee is paid on commission basis he is already barred to receive service incentive leave pay. The question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee. According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee. Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a bus driver and that is a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired by Auto Bus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus stops who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and the driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised though he is away from the Auto Bus main office.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 CAURDANETAAN PIECE WORKERS UNION VS LAGUESMA G.R. No. 114911 February 24, 1998 Petitioner(s): CAURDANETAAN PIECE WORKERS UNION, represented by JUANITO P. COSTALES, JR. in his capacity as union president Respondent(s): UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and CORFARM GRAINS, INC., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CORFARM GRAINS, INC. and/or TEODY C. RAPISORA and HERMINIO RABANG Ponente: J. PANGANIBAN Facts: Complainants worked as cargador at the warehouse and ricemills of Private Respondent Corfarm. As cargadores, they loaded, unloaded and piled sacks of palay from the warehouse to the cargo trucks and those brought by cargo trucks for delivery to different places. They were paid by Corfarm on a piece-rate basis. When Corfarm denied them some benefits, they formed their union. Corfarm replaced them with non-members of the union. Respondent Corfarm denies that it had the power of control over the complainants rationalizing that they were street-hired workers engaged from time to time to do loading and unloading work; there was no superintendent-in-charge to give orders; and there were no gate passes issued, nor tools, equipment and paraphernalia issued by Cofarm for loading and unloading. It attributes error to the Solicitor General's reliance on Art. 280 of the Labor Code. Citing Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, private respondent asserts that a literal application of such article will result in absurdity, where petitioners members will be regular employees not only of respondents but also of several other rice mills, where they were allegedly also under service. Finally, Corfarm submits that the OSGs position is negated by the fact that petitioners members contracted for loading and unloading services with respondent company when such work was available and when they felt like it. Issue: Whether the street-hired cargadores are considered as regular employees. Held: The court considers the cargadores as regular employee. It is undeniable that petitioner's members worked as cargadores for private respondent. They loaded, unloaded and piled sacks of palay from the warehouses to the cargo trucks and from the cargo trucks to the buyers. This work is directly related, necessary and vital to the operations of Cofarm. Moreover, Cofarm did not even allege, much less prove, that petitioner's members have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, and work premises among others. Furthermore, said respondent did not contradict petitioner's allegation that it paid wages directly to these workers without the intervention of any third party independent contractor. It also wielded the power of dismissal over the petitioners. Clearly, the workers are not independent contractors.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 CITIZENS' LEAGUE OF FREEWORKERS ET AL VS ABBAS G.R. No. L-21212 September 23, 1966 Petitioner(s): CITIZENS' LEAGUE OF FREEWORKERS and/or BALBINO EPIS, NICOLAS ROJO, ET AL Respondent(s): HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao and TEOFILO GERONIMO and EMERITA MENDEZ Ponente: J. DIZON Facts: Respondents-spouses are owners and operators of auto-calesas. They filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Davao to restrain the Union and its members, who were drivers of the spouses in said business, from interfering with its operation. The complaint alleged that the defendants used to lease the auto-calesas of the spouses on a daily rental basis. Unable to get the spouses to recognize said defendants as employees instead of lessees and to bargain with it on that basis, the Union declared a strike and since then had paralyzed plaintiffs' business operations through threats, intimidation and violence. Issues: Whether employer-employee relationship exists between respondents-spouses and the individual petitioners. Held: In a similar case (NLRC vs DINGLASAN 98 PHIL 649), Court held that a driver of a jeep who operates the same under the boundary system is considered an employee within the meaning of the law and as such the case comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. In that case, Dinglasan was the owner and operator of TPU jeepneys which were driven by petitioner under verbal contracts that they will pay P7.50 for 10 hours use under the so called "boundary system." The drivers did not receive salaries or wages from the owner. Their day's earnings were the excess over the P7.50 they paid for the use of the jeepneys. In the event that they did not earn more, the owner did not have to pay them anything. The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and lessee between the respondent, owner of the jeeps, and the drivers, members of the petitioner union, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their compensation is the excess of the total amount of fares earned or collected by them over and above the amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent, and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers. These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship, between them from that of employer-employee, because the estimated earnings for fares must be over and above the amount they agreed to pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps. Not having any interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the management thereof, their service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 FEATI UNIVERSITY VS HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU G.R. No. L-21278 December 27, 1966 Petitioner(s): FEATI UNIVERSITY Respondent(s): HON. Jose S. Bautista, Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU Ponente: J. ZALDIVAR Facts: The private respondent wrote a letter to president of petitioner informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. President of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing twenty-six demands that have connection with the employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within ten days from receipt thereof. The President of the University answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least thirty days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and designation as a bargaining representative. President of the Faculty Club filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefore the refusal of the University to bargain collectively. The parties were called to conferences but efforts to conciliate them failed. Members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the management of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. The Judge endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty members would return to work and the University would readmit them under a status quo arrangement. On that very same day, however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and (2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR. The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. The University filed a motion for reconsideration by the CIRen banc, without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing but the University moved the cancellation of the said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc should first hear the motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein before the case is heard on the merits but denied. Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court certain parties, alleging that the University refused to accept back to work the returning strikers, in violation of the return-to-work order. The University filed its opposition to the petition for contempt by way of special defense that there was still the motion for reconsideration which had not yet been acted upon by the CIR en banc.
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Issue: Whether FEATI is an employer within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act. Held: The Supreme Court denied the petition. Based on RA 875 Section 2(c) The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization. In this case, the University is operated for profit hence included in the term of employer. Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the Industrial Peace Act. Professors and instructors are not independent contractors. university controls the work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent contractors. The principal consideration in determining whether a workman is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner of doing the work, and it is not the actual exercise of the right of interfering with the work, but the right to control, which constitutes the test.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC vs NLRC G.R. Nos. 83380-81 November 15, 1989 Petitioner(s): MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC., JORGE LEDESMA and CECILIO G. INOCENCIO Respondent(s): NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CEFERINA J. DIOSANA (Labor Arbiter, Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region), SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SANDIGAN)-TUCP and its members, JACINTO GARCIANO, ALFREDO C. BASCO, VICTORIO Y. LAURETO, ESTER NARVAEZ, EUGENIO L. ROBLES, BELEN N. VISTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESTRABO, VEVENCIO TIRO, CASIMIRO ZAPATA, GLORIA ESTRABO, LEONORA MENDOZA, MACARIA G. DIMPAS, MERILYN A. VIRAY, LILY OPINA, JANET SANGDANG, JOSEFINA ALCOCEBA and MARIA ANGELES Ponente: C.J. FERNAN Facts: Individual complainants have been working for Makati Haberdashery Inc. as tailors, seamsters, sewers, basters and plantsadoras. They were paid on a piece-rate basis except two who were paid on a monthly basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they were given daily allowance of P3.00 provided they report for work before 9:30am everyday. They were required to work from or before 9:30am up to 6-7pm from Monday to Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays. The Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino filed a complaint for underpayment of the basic wage, underpayment of living allowance, nonpayment of overtime work, nonpayment of holiday pay and othe money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of complainants which the NLRC affirmed. Petitioner urged that the NLRC erred in concluding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the petitioners and the workers. Issue: Whether employer - employee relationship is present between petitioners and its workers. Held: The test of employer-employee relationship is four-fold: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct. It is the so called "control test" that is the most important element. This simply means the determination of whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and method by which the same is to be accomplished. The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important requisite of control is present. As gleaned from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the haberdashery or its proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora" to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt as specified by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects the manner and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing.
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Assistant Manager also issued a memorandum on new procedures to be followed, it is evident that petitioner has reserved the right to control its employees not only as to the result but also the means and methods by which the same are to be accomplished. That private respondents are regular employees is further proven by the fact that they have to report for work regularly from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and are paid an additional allowance of P 3.00 daily if they report for work before 9:30 a.m. and which is forfeited when they arrive at or after 9:30 a.m.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 MARAGUINOT AND ENERO VS NLRC AND VIVA FILMS G.R. No. 120969 January 22, 1998 Petitioner(s): ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. and PAULINO ENERO Respondent(s): NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) composed of Presiding Commissioner RAUL T. AQUINO, Commissioner ROGELIO I. RAYALA and Commissioner VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY (Ponente), VIC DEL ROSARIO and VIVA FIMS Ponente: J. DAVIDE JR
Facts: Petitioners Maraguinot and Enero maintain that they were employed by VIVA Films as part of their filming crew. Their tasks consist of loading, unloading, and arranging movie equipment in the shooting area as instructed by the cameraman, returning the equipment to VIVA Films' warehouse, assisting in the fixing of the lighting system, and performing other tasks that the cameraman and or director may assign. Sometime in May 1992, Maraguinot and Enero asked that their salary be adjusted to the minimum wage rate. Instead of getting a pay increase, they were asked to sign a blank employment contract, and when they refused, their services were terminated. Petitioners filed a suit for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, private respondents claim that VIVA Films is the trade name of VIVA Productions Inc. which is primarily engaged in the distribution and exhibition, but not the making of movies. In the same vein, Private respondent Del Rosario asserts that he is merely an executive producer or the financier who invests money for the production of movies to be distributed and exhibited by VIVA. The respondents further assert that they contract with persons called producers to produce or make movies. VIVA Films and Del Rosario contend that the petitioners are project the employees of associate producers who in turn, act as independent contractors. Hence they say, petitioners are not employees of VIVA Films or of the executive producers. Issue: Whether complainants are to be considered as employees of the respondents. Held: Private respondents insist that petitioners are project employees of associate producers who, in turn, act as independent contractors. It is settled that the contracting out of labor is allowed only in case of job contracting. Assuming that the associate producers are job contractors, they must then be engaged in the business of making motion pictures. As such, and to be a job contractor under the preceding description, associate producers must have tools, equipment, machinery, work premises, and other materials necessary to make motion pictures. However, the associate producers here have none of these. Private respondents' evidence reveals that the movie-making equipment are supplied to the producers and owned by VIVA. These include generators, cables and wooden platforms, cameras and "shooting equipment;" in fact, VIVA likewise owns the trucks used to transport the equipment. It is thus clear that the associate producer merely leases the equipment from VIVA.
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If private respondents insist that the associate producers are labor contractors, then these producers can only be "labor-only" contractors, defined by the Labor Code. As labor-only contracting is prohibited, the law considers the person or entity engaged in the same a mere agent or intermediary of the direct employer. But even by the preceding standards, the associate producers of VIVA cannot be considered labor-only contractors as they did not supply, recruit nor hire the workers. In the instant case, it was Juanita Cesario, Shooting Unit Supervisor and an employee of VIVA, who recruited crew members from an available group of free-lance workers which includes the complainants Maraguinot and Enero. The relationship between VIVA and its producers or associate producers seems to be that of agency, as the latter make movies on behalf of VIVA, whose business is to "make" movies. As such, the employment relationship between petitioners and producers is actually one between petitioners and VIVA, with the latter being the direct employer. The employer-employee relationship between petitioners and VIVA can further be established by the "control test." While four elements are usually considered in determining the existence of an employment relationship, namely: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control of the employee's conduct, the most important element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods to accomplish the same. These four elements are present here. VIVA's control is evident in its mandate that the end result must be a "quality film acceptable to the company." The means and methods to accomplish the result are likewise controlled by VIVA, viz., the movie project must be finished within schedule without exceeding the budget, and additional expenses must be justified; certain scenes are subject to change to suit the taste of the company; and the Supervising Producer, the "eyes and ears" of VIVA and del Rosario, intervenes in the movie-making process by assisting the associate producer in solving problems encountered in making the film. Notably,the appointment slip does not indicate that it was the producer or associate producer who hired the crew members; moreover, it is VIVA's corporate name which appears on the heading of the appointment slip. What likewise tells against VIVA is that it paid petitioners' salaries as evidenced by vouchers, containing VIVA's letterhead, for that purpose. All the circumstances indicate an employment relationship between petitioners and VIVA alone, thus the inevitable conclusion is that petitioners are employees only of VIVA
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORP VS NLRC G.R. No. 101761 March 24, 1993 Petitioner(s): NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION Respondent(s): NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NBSR SUPERVISORY UNION, (PACIWU) TUCP Ponente: J. REGALADO
Facts: Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation, a corporation which is fully owned and controlled by the Government, operates 3 sugar refineries located at Bukidnon, Iloilo and Batangas. The Batangas refinery was privatized on April 11, 1992 pursuant to Proclamation No. 50. On June 1, 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees, from rank-and-file to department heads. As a result, all positions were re-evaluated, and all employees including the members of respondent union were granted salary adjustments and increases in benefits commensurate to their actual duties and functions.We glean from the records that for about ten years prior to the JE Program, the members of respondent union were treated in the same manner as rank-and file employees. As such, they used to be paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay. With the implementation of the JE Program, the following adjustments were made: (1) the members of respondent union were re-classified under levels S-5 to S-8 which are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and benefits; (2) there was an increase in basic pay of the average of 50% of their basic pay prior to the JE Program, with the union members now enjoying a wide gap (P1,269.00 per month) in basic pay compared to the highest paid rank-and-file employee; (3) longevity pay was increased on top of alignment adjustments; (4) they were entitled to increased company COLA of P225.00 per month; (5) there was a grant of P100.00 allowance for rest day/holiday work. Two years after the implementation of the JE Program, the members of herein respondent union filed a complainant with the executive labor arbiter for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code. Executive Labor Arbiter decided in favour of labor. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter on the ground that the members of respondent union are not managerial employees, as defined under Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code and, therefore, they are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay. Respondent NLRC declared that these supervisory employees are merely exercising recommendatory powers subject to the evaluation, review and final action by their department heads; their responsibilities do not require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment; they do not participate in the formulation of management policies nor in the hiring or firing of employees; and their main function is to carry out the ready policies and plans of the corporation. Issue: Whether supervisory employees, should be considered as officers or members of the managerial staff, and hence are not entitled to overtime rest day and holiday pay.
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Held: A cursory perusal of the Job Value Contribution Statements of the union members will readily show that these supervisory employees are under the direct supervision of their respective department superintendents and that generally they assist the latter in planning, organizing, staffing, directing, controlling communicating and in making decisions in attaining the company's set goals and objectives. These supervisory employees are likewise responsible for the effective and efficient operation of their respective departments. More specifically, their duties and functions include, among others, the following operations whereby the employee assist the department superintendent, trains and guides subordinates, recommends disciplinary actions etc. It is apparent that the members of respondent union discharge duties and responsibilities which ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the managerial staff, as defined in Section 2, Rule I Book III of the aforestated Rules to Implement the Labor Code, viz.: (1) their primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of their employer; (2) they customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; (3) they regularly and directly assist the managerial employee whose primary duty consist of the management of a department of the establishment in which they are employed (4) they execute, under general supervision, work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; (5) they execute, under general supervision, special assignments and tasks; and (6) they do not devote more than 20% of their hours worked in a work-week to activities which are not directly and clearly related to the performance of their work hereinbefore described. Under the facts obtaining in this case, we are constrained to agree with petitioner that the union members should be considered as officers and members of the managerial staff and are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82. Perforce, they are not entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 ORLANDO FARM GROWERS VS NLRC G.R. No. 129076 November 25, 1998 Petitioner(s): ORLANDO FARM GROWERS ASSOCIATION/GLICERIO AOVER Respondent(s): NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIFTH DIVISION), ANTONIO PAQUIT, ESTHER BONGGOT, FRANCISCO BAUG, LEOCADIO ORDONO, REBECCA MOREN, MARCELINA HONTIVEROS, MARTIN ORDONO, TITO ORDONO, FE ORDONO, ERNIE COLON, EUSTIQUIO GELDO, DANNY SAM, JOEL PIAMONTE, FEDERICO PASTOLERO, VIRGINIA BUSANO, EDILMIRO ALDION, EUGENIO BETICAN, JR. and BERNARDO OPERIO Ponente: J. ROMERO Facts: The Landowners, engaged in the production of export quality bananas, formed an unregistered association envisioned to deal more effectively with the company that buys their banana produce, with respect to technical services, canal maintenance, irrigation and pest control, among other services. The association, called Orlando Farm Growers, was not registered and therefore, did not have any legal personality of its own. However, it was authorized to transact business and carry out certain activities in the interest of the individual landowner members. The association's workers performed as packers, harvesters, etc. althought they were, in fact hired by the individual landowner members who were the ones paying the SSS contributions of the workers. The association issued identification cards to the workers and memoranda or circulars regarding absences of workers, and disciplinary measures. Later, about 20 workers were dismissed by the association. The workers filed individual suits for illegal dismissal with reinstatement and money claims. The association denied the existence of employer-employee relationship. It claimed that the workers were hired by the individual landowner members and therefore they were employees of the landowners. Furthermore, the association claimed that it was merely an unregistered association with no legal personality of its own and formed solely by the landowner members. Issue: Whether the Association is the employer of the workers and not the individual landowner members. Held: The Labor Code defines an employer as any person who acts in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly. The law does not require an employer be registered in order to be considered as an employer. Otherwise it would bring about a situation where employees are denied not only redress of their grievances but also the protection and benefits accorded them by law if their employer happens to be simply an unregistered association.
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An employer-employee relationship can be determined using the four fold test. In the case at bench, it was the Association which issued memoranda and circulars regarding employees' conduct and their identification cards. The Association was vested with powers to settle and pay the claims of the workers. While the original purpose in the formation of the Association was to provide the landowners with a unified voice in effectively dealing with the buying company, it exceeded its avowed intentions when by its subsequent actions, it performed the role of an employer to its workers. Thus, it is the Association that is deemed the employer of the workers, not the individual landowner members.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 PENARANDA VS BANGANGA PLYWOOD CORP G.R. No. 159577 May 3, 2006 Petitioner(s): CHARLITO PEARANDA Respondent(s): BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and HUDSON CHUA Ponente: C.J. PANGANIBAN
Facts: In June 1999, Pearanda was hired by Baganga Plywood Corporation, owned by Hudson Chua, to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler. Pearanda was employed as a Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer. He was tasked to supply the required and continuous steam to all consuming units at minimum cost, to supervise, check and monitor manpower workmanship as well as operation of boiler and accessories, to evaluate performance of machinery and manpower, to train new employees for effective and safety while working, and to recommend personnel actions such as: promotion, or disciplinary action. In 2001, BPC shut down due to some repairs and maintenance. BPC did not technically fire Pearanda but due to the latters insistence, BPC ga ve him his separation benefits. BPC subsequently reopened but Pearanda did not reapply. Pearanda now claims that BPC still needed to pay him his overtime pays and premium pays. The NLRC ruled that Pearanda is a managerial employee and as such he is not entitled to overtime and premium pay as stated under the Labor Code. Pearanda appealed. He contends that he is not a managerial employee. Issue: Whether Pearanda is entitled to overtime and premium pay. Held: Though there is an error made by the NLRC in finding Pearanda as a managerial employee, the Supreme Court still ruled that Pearanda is not entitled to overtime and premium pay. Pearanda is not a managerial employee. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, managerial employees are those that perform the following: 1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof; 2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein; 3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. Pearanda does not meet the above requirements. Pearanda is instead considered as a managerial staff. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, managerial staffs are those that perform the following: The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the employer;
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2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; 3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks; and 4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above. Pearandas function as a shift engineer illustrates that he was a member of the managerial staff. His duties and responsibilities conform to the definition of a member of a managerial staff under the Implementing Rules. Pearanda supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. Further, Pearanda in his position paper admitted that he was a supervisor for BPC. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 RUGA ET AL VS NLRC G.R. No. L-72654-61 January 22, 1990 Petitioner(s): ALIPIO R. RUGA, JOSE PARMA, ELADIO CALDERON, LAURENTE BAUTU, JAIME BARBIN, NICANOR FRANCISCO, PHILIP CERVANTES and ELEUTERIO BARBIN Respondent(s): NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and DE GUZMAN FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or ARSENIO DE GUZMAN Ponente: C.J. FERNAN Facts: Petitioners were the fishermen-crew members of one of the several fishing vessels owned by respondent De Guzman Fishing Ent. Petitioners rendered service aboard the fishing vessel in various capacities as patron or pilots, chief engineer, master fisherman, second fisherman and fisherman. For services rendered in respondent's regular business of trawl fishing, petitioners were paid on percent commission basis in cash. As agreed upon, they received 13% of the proceeds of the sale of the fishcatch if the total proceeds exceeded the cost of crude oil consumed during the fishing trip. Otherwise, they received 10% of the total proceeds of the sale. The patron or pilot, chief engineer, and master fisherman received a minimum income of P350 per week while the assistant engineer, second fisherman, and fisherman-winchman received a minimum income of P260 per week. When, for some unproved charges, their services were terminated, the fishermen filed illegal dismissal complaint. The vessel owners contended that they were not employees at all. Issue: Whether employer-employee exists between respondents and petitioners. Held: Court ruled that in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The employment relation arises from contract of hire, express or implied. In the absence of hiring, no actual employer-employee relation could exist. From the 4 elements mentioned, the court have generally relied on the so-called right-of-control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. The test calls merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right. The case of Pajarillo vs. SSS, supra, invoked by the public respondent as authority for the ruling that a "joint fishing venture" existed between private respondent and petitioners is not applicable in the instant case. There is neither light of control nor actual exercise of such right on the part of the boatowners in the Pajarillo case, where the Court found that the pilots therein are not under the order of the boat-owners as regards their employment; that they go out to sea not upon directions of the boat-owners, but upon their own volition as to when, how long and where to go fishing; that the boat-owners do not in any way control the crew-members with whom the former have no relationship whatsoever; that they simply join every trip for which the pilots allow them, without any reference to the owners of the vessel; and that they only share in their own catch produced by their own efforts.
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The aforementioned circumstances obtaining in Pajarillo case do not exist in the instant case. The conduct of the fishing operations was undisputably shown by the testimony of Ruga, the patron/pilot of 7/B Sandyman II, to be under the control and supervision of private respondent's operations manager. Matters dealing on the fixing of the schedule of the fishing trip and the time to return to the fishing port were shown to be the prerogative of private respondent. While performing the fishing operations, petitioners received instructions via a single-side band radio from private respondent's operations manager who called the patron/pilot in the morning. They are told to report their activities, their position, and the number of tubes of fish-catch in one day. As distinguished from the Pajarillo case where the crew members are under no obligation to remain in the outfit for any definite period as one can be a crew member of an outfit for one day and be the crew member of othe crew of another vessel the next day, the petitioners were directly hired by private respondent for a period of 8-15 years in various capacities. Aside from performing activities usually necessary and desirable in the business of private respondent, it must be noted that petitioners received compensation on a percentage commission based on the gross sale of the fish-catch i.e. 13% of the proceeds of the sale if the total proceeds exceeded the cost of the crude oil consumed during the fishing trip, otherwise only 10% of the proceeds of the sale. Such compensation falls within the scope and meaning of the term "wage" as defined under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 SY et al VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAHOT G.R. No. 142293 February 27, 2003 Petitioner(s): VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6BS TRUCKING CORPORATION, and SBT1 TRUCKING CORPORATION Respondent(s): HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT Ponente: J. QUISUMBING Facts: Complainant started working with respondent SBT Trucking in 1958 at age 23, first as a fire truck helper and later as truck driver, until 1994 when at age 59 he was separated for his inability to work due to sickness. When he inquired with the SSS, he learned that the trucking company never paid his SSS premiums. The company contended that he was never an employee but an industrial partner and that he would not have been separated if he returned to his work after his sick leave; it was he, rather, that could not resume his work. Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondent Sahot. Held: It shows that the complainant was only 23 years old when he started working with respondent as truck helper. SC questioned how a 23 year old man, working as a truck helper, be considered an industrial partner. Hence the Court ruled that complainant was only an employee, not a partner of respondents from the time complainant started working for respondent. There was no written agreement, no proof that the complainant received a share in petitioners profits, nor was there anything to show he had any participation with respect to the running of the business. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employees conduct. The most important element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. As found by the appellate court, petitioners owned and operated a trucking business since the 1950s and by their own allegations, they determined private respondents wages and rest day. Records of the case show that private respondent actually engaged in work as an employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have the freedom to determine where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He merely followed instructions of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA, private respondent had worked as a truck helper and driver of petitioners not for his own pleasure but under the l atters control.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 UNION OF FILIPINO EMPLOYEES VS VIVAR G.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992 Petitioner(s): UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE) Respondent(s): BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.) Ponente: J. GUTIERREZ JR
Facts: On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople. Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator. On January 2, 1980, Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished. On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the company's sales personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant of 10 days' holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor. Both Nestle and UFE filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration. Respondent Arbitrator treated the two motions as appeals and forwarded the case to the NLRC which issued a resolution remanding the case to the respondent arbitrator on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in voluntary arbitration cases pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. However, in a letter the respondent arbitrator refused to take cognizance of the case reasoning that he had no more jurisdiction to continue as arbitrator because he had resigned from service.
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Issue: Whether Nestle's sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay Held: Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The Court finds that the clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer. The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which represents the employee's annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday pay. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and after the grant of holiday pay. Respondent Nestle's invocation of solutio indebiti, or payment by mistake, due to its use of 251 days as divisor must fail in light of the Labor Code mandate that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." (Article 4). Nevertheless, in order to fully settle the issues, the Court resolved to take up the matter of effectivity of the holiday pay award raised by Nestle. Applying the operative factaforementioned doctrine to the case at bar, it is not far-fetched that Nestle, relying on the implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction before this Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give holiday pay benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondent Nestle's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair to impose additional burdens on Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984 was not in any way attributed to Nestle's fault. The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from the date of promulgation of the IBAA case.
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Etcubaez, Emilson O. 2011-0248 VILLAMARIA vs COURT OF APPEALS and BUSTAMANTE G.R. No. 165881 April 19, 2006 Petitioner(s): OSCAR VILLAMARIA, JR. Respondent(s): COURT OF APPEALS and JERRY V. BUSTAMANTE Ponente: J. CALLEJO, SR., Facts: Petitioner Villamaria and respondent Bustamante executed a contract entitled Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Sasakyan sa Pamamagitan ng Boundary-Hulog. Under the Kasunduan, respondent would remit to Villarama P550.00 a day for a period of four years; Bustamante would then become the owner of the vehicle and continue to drive the same under Villamarias franchise. It was also agreed that Bustamante would make a downpayment of P10,000.00. The parties agreed that if Bustamante failed to pay the boundary-hulog for three days, Villamaria Motors would hold on to the vehicle until Bustamante paid his arrears, including a penalty of P50.00 a day; in case Bustamante failed to remit the daily boundary-hulog for a period of one week, the Kasunduan would cease to have legal effect and Bustamante would have to return the vehicle to Villamaria Motors. Bustamante continued driving the jeepney under the supervision and control of Villamaria. As agreed upon, he made daily remittances of P550.00 in payment of the purchase price of the vehicle. Bustamante failed to pay for the annual registration fees of the vehicle, but Villamaria allowed him to continue driving the jeepney. In 1999, Bustamante and other drivers who also had the same arrangement with Villamaria Motors failed to pay their respective boundary-hulog. This prompted Villamaria to serve a "Paalala," reminding them that under the Kasunduan, failure to pay the daily boundary-hulog for one week, would mean their respective jeepneys would be returned to him without any complaints. He warned the drivers that the Kasunduan would henceforth be strictly enforced and urged them to comply with their obligation to avoid litigation. On July 24, 2000, Villamaria took back the jeepney driven by Bustamante and barred the latter from driving the vehicle. Bustamante filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against Villamaria. Issue: Whether employer-employee relations exists Held: The juridical relationship of employer-employee between petitioner and respondent was not negated by the foregoing stipulation in the Kasunduan, considering that petitioner retained control of respondents conduct as driver of the vehicle. Even if the petiti oner was allowed to let some other person drive the unit, it was not shown that he did so; that the existence of an employment relation is not dependent on how the worker is paid but on the presence or absence of control over the means and method of the work; that the amount earned in excess of the boundary hulog is equivalent to wages; and that the fact that the power of dismissal was not mentioned in the Kasunduan did not mean Villamaria never exercised such power, or could not exercise such power. In v iew of Villamarias supervision and control as employer, the fact that the "boundary" represented installment payments of the purchase price on the jeepney did not remove the parties employer-employee relationship.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioners, all seamen, entered into separate contracts of employment with the Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd; through its local agency, the Ace Maritime Agencies, Inc. Petitioners worked from May 7, 1985 until July 12, 1986. Later, petitioners collectively and / or individually filed complaints for non payment of overtime pay, vacation pay and terminal pay against private respondents. They also claimed that they signed a blank contract. Also, although they agreed to work on board the vessel Rio Colorado managed by Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., the vessel they really boarded was MV SOIC I managed by Columbus Navigation. Two (2) petitioners argued that although they were employed as Ordinary Seaman, they actually performed the work and duties of Able Seaman. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be entitled to overtime pay? Held: No. The Court ruled that entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that said overtime work was actually performed, before an employee way avail of said benefit. The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. For the employer to give him overtime pay for extra bonus hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable. The criterion is determining whether or not seamen are entitled to overtime pay is not, whether they were on board and cannot leave the ship beyond the regular 8 working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours. The decision of the NLRC is affirmed with the modification that petitioners Cagampan and Vicera are awarded their leave pay according to the terms of contract. JULIO N. CAGAMPAN ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ACE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC. G.R. No. 85122 - 24 March 22, 1991 Julio N. Cagampan NLRC And Ace Maritime Agencies, Inc. J. Paras
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: FELIX GONZALES AND CARMEN GONZALES VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DECEASED SPOUSE ANDRES AGCAOILE AND LEONORA AGCAOILE SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIA A. SISON G.R. No.: G.R. No. 36213 Date: June 29, 1989 Petitioner: Felix Gonzales And Carmen Gonzales Respondent: Hon. Court Of Appeals, Deceased Spouse Andres Agcaoile And Leonora Agcaoile Substituted By Lucia A. Sison Ponente: J. Grino, Aquino Facts: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals Petitioners leased a lot in the subdivision on which they built their house, and, by tolerance of the subdivision owner, they cultivated some vacant adjoining lots. When plaintiffs defaulted renting lot 1285 M, defendants sent a letter asking them to pay the accrued rentals or vacate the premises. Plaintiffs filed the present action seeking to elect the leasehold system and praying for a reliquidation of past harvests embracing the agricultural years 1961 1962 to 1967 1968. Defendants initiated an action for recovery of possession alleging that the property subject of the action is residential land. Court of Agrarian Relations, and CA ruled that the plaintiffs are not de jure agricultural tenants. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created over land embraced in an approved residential subdivision? Held: No. The Court ruled that an agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential land; petitioners are not entitled to reinstatement under Sec. 36 (1) of RA 3844 for the petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. They may not claim a right to reinstatement. Petition denied for lack of merit.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION FFW, ENRICO GONZALES AND MARIA THERESA MONTEJO VS. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC., AND HONORABLE LEONARDO QUISIMBING, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No.: G.R. No. 142834 Date: December 19, 2001 Petitioner: Interphil Laboratories Employees Union FFW, Enrico Gonzales And Maria Theresa Montejo. Respondent: Interphil Laboratories, Inc., And Honorable Leonardo Quisimbing, Secretary Of Labor And Employment Ponente: J. Kapunan Case Title: Facts: Interphil Laboratories Employees Union FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the business of manufacturing and packaging pharmaceutical products. They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective from August 1, 1990 July 31, 1993. The 2 union officers inquired about the duration of the CBA but received no response, so later on, all the rand and file employees of the company refused to follow their 2 shift work schedule of from 6am 6pm and from 6pm to 6 am; at 2pm and 2am, respectively. Later on the respondent company filed with the National Conciliation and Medication Board (NCMB) an urgent request for preventive medication aimed to help the parties in their CBA negotiations. However, it was unsuccessful so they filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment a petition for assumption of Jurisdiction. Labor Arbiter Caday recommended that herein petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the then existing CBA which prohibits the union or any employee during the existence of the CBA from staging a strike or engaging in slow down or interruption of work and ordering them to cease and desist from further committing illegal acts, which approved the said report. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the working hours maybe changed at the direction of the company? Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the working hours may be changed, at the discretion of the company, should such change be necessary for its operations, and that the employees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company. Respondents Company had to adopt a continuous 24 hour work daily schedule by reason of the nature of business and the demands of its clients. It was established that the employees adhered to the said work schedule since 1988. The employees are deemed to have waived the eight hour schedule since they followed, without any question or compliant, the two shift schedule while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto. The two shift schedule effectively changed the working hours stipulated in the CBA. As the employees assented by practice to this arrangement, they cannot be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because there were not obliged to work beyond eight hours. Petition is denied due course and CA decision is affirmed.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: MANUEL LARA, ET AL. VS. PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR. G.R. No.: L-6339 Date: April 20, 1954 Petitioner: Manuel Lara Respondent: Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr Ponente: J. Montemayor Facts: Defendant operated a taxi business in which the plaintiffs are employed as mechanics and drivers. Later on, defendant sold his 25 units to La Mallorca, a transportation company, without giving said mechanics and drivers 30 days advance notice ant the reason of losing their jobs because La Mallorca did not want to continue them in their employment. The petition was filed praying to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and Legal holidays and one month salary because the failure of their former employer to give them notice. The Court dismissed the complaint because the defendant being engaged in the taxi of transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by the eight hour Labor Law; and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, so they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20%. Issue: Whether or not Plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of eight hours a day, Sunday and holidays included? Held: No. The Court ruled that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving compensation for his employer uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the eight hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of eight hours a day. In the case at bar, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines their commissions. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, which was after the repeal of Art. 302 which they invoke. If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then computation of the months salary payable would be impossible. Art. 302 refer to employees receiving fixed salary. Order appealed is affirmed.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., VS. LUZON MARINE DEPARTMENT UNION AND THE HON. MODESTO CASTILLO, THE HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, THE HON. V. JIMENEZ YANSON and THE HON. JUAN L. LANTING, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS G.R. No.: L 9265 Date: April 29, 1957 Petitioner: Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. Respondent: Luzon Marine Department Union And The Hon. Modesto Castillo, The Hon. Jose S. Bautista, The Hon. V. Jimenez Yanson And The Hon. Juan L. Lanting Ponente: J. Felix Facts: Petition for review on certiorari in the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations. Herein respondents filed a petition with the CIR containing the full recognition of the right of Collective bargaining, close shop and check off. Also, that the work performed in excess of 8 hours be paid an overtime pay of 50 per cent the regular rate of pay, and that work performed on Sundays and legal holidays be paid double the regular rate of pay. In one of the hearing of the case, the Court ruled that the employees are only entitled to receive overtime pay for work rendered in excess of 8 hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays. Herein petitioner sought for the reconsideration of the decision only in so far as it interpreted that the period during which a seaman is aboard a tugboat shall be considered as working time for the purpose of the 8 hours Labor Law. However, it was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the definition for hours of work as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seaman? Held: No. The Court ruled that we do not need to set for seaman a criterion different from that applied to laborers on land, that the only thing to be done is to determine the meaning and scope of the term working place. A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he cease to work may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these requires are complied with, the period of such rest shall not be counted. Claimants rendered services to the Company from 6am to 6pm including Sundays and holidays, which implies either that said laborers were not given any recess at all, or that they were not allowed to leave the spot their working place, or that they could not rest completely. Resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed from are affirmed with costs against petitioner.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: MANILA TERMINAL COMPANY, INC. V. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANILA TERMINAL RELIEF AND MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION G.R. No.: L 4148 Date: July 16, 1952 Petitioner: Manila Terminal Company, Inc. Respondent: The Court Of Industrial Relations And Manila Terminal Relief And Mutual Aid Association Ponente: J. Paras Facts: On September 1, 1945, Herein petitioner undertook the arrastre service in some of the piers in Manilas Port Area at the request and under the control of the U.S. Army. Petitioner hired some 30 men as watchmen on 12 hour shifts at a compensation of P3.00 per day for the day shift and P6.00 per day for the night shift. On February 1, 1946, the petitioner began the postwar operation of the arrastre service at the present at the request and under the control of the Bureau of Customs, by virtue of a contract entered into with Philippine Government. The watchmen of the petitioner continued in the service with a number of substitution and additions, their salaries having been raised during the month of February to P4.00 per day for the dayshift and P6.25 per day for the nightshift. Later, some of the members of the Manila Terminal Relief and Mutual Aid Association, sent a letter to the Department of Labor, requesting that the overtime pay be investigated, but nothing was done by the Department. On May 27, 1947 the petitioner instituted the system of strict 8 hour shifts. On July 28, 1947 Manila Aid Association filed an amended petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying, among others, that petitioner be ordered to pay its watchmen or police force overtime pay from the commencement of their employment. The case thereafter alleviated in which Judge Lanting ruled; 1.) The decision under review should be affirmed in so far it grants compensation for overtime on regular days during the period from the date of entrance to duty to May 24, 1947, such compensation to consist of the amount that corresponds to the four hours overtime at the regular rate and an additional amount of 25 per cent thereof. 2.) As the compensation for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, the petitioner should pay its watchmen the compensation that corresponds to the overtime (in excess of 8 hours) at the regular rate only. 3.) The watchmen are not entitled to night differential pay for past service, and therefore the decision should be reversed. Hence, this petition, contending that the agreement under which its police force were paid certain specific wages for 12 hour shifts, included overtime compensation. Issue: Whether or not the agreement under which its police force were paid certain specific wages for 12 hour shifts, includes the overtime compensation?
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Held: No. The Court ruled that in times of acute employment, regardless of its terms and conditions, their main concern in the first place being admission to some work. The petitioners watchmen must have railroaded themselves into their employment for their subsistence, although they found themselves required to work for 12 hours a day. True, there was agreement to work, but it cannot fairly be supposed that they had the freedom to bargain in any way, much less to insist in the observance of the 8 hour labor law. Also, there was no reduction was made in the salaries which its watchmen received under the 12 hour arrangement. Although, it may be argued that the salary for the night shift was lessened, the fact that the rate for the day shift was increased in a sense tends to militate against the contention that the salaries given during the 12 hour shifts included overtime compensation. The law gives the Association the right to extra compensation. And they could not be held to have impliedly waived such extra compensation, for the obvious reason that could not have expressly waived it. It is high time that all employers were warned that the public is interested in the strict enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law. This was designed not only to safeguard the health and welfare of the laborer or employee, but in a way to minimize unemployment by forcing employers, in cases where more than 8 hour operation is necessary, to utilize different shifts of laborers or employees working only for 8 hour each. The appealed decision, in the form voted by Judge Lanting, is affirmed, it being understood that the petitioners watchmen will be entitled to extra compensation only from the dates they respectively entered the service of the petitioner.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. Herein respondent, filed a petition against Mercury Drug Company, Incorporated contenting: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25% additional compensation from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of the extra compensation on work done at night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to their former positions with back salaries; and as against the respondent union, for its disestablishment and the refund of all monies it had collected from petitioners. Mercury Drug is hereby ordered to pay the 69 petitioners another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up to June 30, 1962. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled for nighttime work premiums although there is a waiver of said claims and the total absence of evidence there on? Held: Yes. Work done at night should be paid more than work done at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the workers regular hours of duty, he should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work; Ruling of C.I.R awarding additional pay for nighttime work is supported by evidence. No additional evidence was necessary to prove that the private respondents were entitled to additional compensation for whether or not they were entitled to the same is a question of law which the respondent court answered correctly. The waiver rule does not apply in the case at bar. Additional compensation for nighttime work is founded on public policy; hence the same cannot be waived. Petition is dismissed. MERCURY DRUG COMPANY INCORPORATED VS. NARDO DAYAO, ET AL. L-30452 September 30, 1982 Mercury Drug Company, Incorporated Nardo Dayao J. Gutierrez, Jr.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION G.R. No.: L 15422 Date: November 30, 1962 Petitioner: National Development Company Respondent: Court Of Industrial Relations And National Textile Workers Union Ponente: J. Regala Facts: Case for review from the Court of Industrial Relations The National Development Company or government owned and controlled corporation had four shifts of work. 8am 4pm 6am 2pm 2pm 10pm 10pm 6pm Each shift had 1 hr meal time period, to wit; from (1) 11am to 12nn for those working between 6am and 2pm and from (2) 7pm to 8om for those working between 2pm and 10pm. The records show that although there was a one hour meal time, petitioner nevertheless credited the workers with 8 hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours. Also, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift, petitioner has been paying them for six hours only, and argued that the 2 hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in computing compensation. Respondents, whose members are employed at the NDC, asked the court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods. CIR issued an order holding that mealtime should be counted in determining overtime work and ordered to pay P101, 407.96 by way of overtime compensation. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but were dismissed by the CIR. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not on the basis of evidence, the mealtime breaks should be considered working time? Held: Yes. The Court ruled that when the work is not continuous, the time which the laborer is not working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. Claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6am 6pm implies either that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely. The CIRs finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in evidence. The timecards show that the work was continuous and without interruption breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation. Order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27, 1959 are hereby affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petition for review by certiorari of the orders of the Court of Industrial relations requiring it to pay its bargeman, Malondras, an overtime service of 16 hours a day for a period from January 1, 1954 December 31, 1956, and from January 1, 1957 to April 30, 1957, inclusive. NASSOO, engaged in the business of ship building and repair that needs a service of a bargeman. Bargeman are required to stay in their barges for on call duty, so they are given living quarters and subsistence allowance of P1.50 per day during the time they are on board. However, Malondras filed with the Industrial Court a complaint for the payment of overtime compensation because of his exclusion from the second report of the examiner. The examiner then submitted an amended report giving Malondras an average of 16 overtime hours a day, and recommending the payment to him of P15, 242.15 as overtime compensation during the period covered by the report. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent Malondras is entitled to 16 hours a day overtime pay? Held: No. The Court ruled that the correct criterions in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours; In such much as the parties show that the subsistence allowance is independent of and has nothing to do with whatever additional compensation for overtime work was due the petitioner, the same should not be deducted from his overtime compensation. Respondent Malondras should be credited (5) overtime hours instead of (16) hours a day for the periods covered by the examiners report. Order appealed is affirmed with modifications. NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS L-17068 December 30, 1961 National Shipyards And Steel Corporation Court Of Industrial Relations J. Reyes
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: PAN AMERICAN WOLRD AIRWAYS SYSTEM (PHIL.) V. PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION G.R. No.: L - 16275 Date: February 23, 1961 Petitioner: Pan American Wolrd Airways System (Phil.) Respondent: Pan American Employees Association Ponente: J. Reyes, J.B.L. Facts: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in case No. 1055 V dated October 10, 1959, and its resolution en banc denying the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner herein. The Court orders to compute the overtime compensation due the aforesaid fourteen (14) aircraft mechanic and the 2 employees from the Communication Department based on the time sheet of said employees from February 23, 1952 July 15, 1958 and to submit his report within 30 days for further disposition by the court. Petitioner contends that the finding of that the 1 hour meal period should be considered work (deducting 15 minutes as time allowed for eating) is not supported by substantial evidence. Issue: Whether or not the 1 hour meal period should be considered as overtime work (after deducting 15 minutes)? Held: Yes. The Court ruled that during the so called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry Employees Association up eating to perform work during this period. Judgment appealed from is affirmed. Cost against appellant.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEMA) AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS G.R. No.: L-30279 Date: July 30, 1982 Petitioner: Philippine National Bank Respondent: Philippine National Bank Employees Association (PEMA) And Court Of Industrial Relations Ponente: J. Barredo Facts: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. Petitioner allegedly failed to comply with its commitment of organizing a committee on Personnel Affairs to take change of screening and deliberating on the promotion of employees covered by a collecting bargaining agreement then in force between the said parties. In the first and causes of action the respondents Board of Directors approved a revision of the computation of overtime pay, but since the grant of benefits in question, without just cause, withdrew said benefits and in spite of repeated demands refused, and still refuses to reinstate the same up to the present. Petitioner has repeatedly requested Respondent that the cost of living allowance and longevity pay be taken into account in the computation of OT pay. Issue: Whether or not the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be included in the computation of overtime pay? Held: No. The Court ruled that the rationale for overtime pay is thus the additional work, labor or service employed and the adverse effects of his longer stay in place of work that justify and is the real reason for the extra compensation for overtime pay; There is presently a consciousness towards helping our employees by giving of additional allowance in times of economic uncertainly; The industrial court cannot even in a certified labor dispute impose upon the parties terms and conditions inconsistent with existing law and jurisprudence; Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of overtime pay when the Collective Bargaining Agreement so stipulates; The basis of computation of overtime pay beyond the required by law must be the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. VS. DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION, ET AL G.R. No.: L 18353 Date: July 31, 1963 Petitioner: San Miguel Brewery, Inc. Respondent: Democratic Labor Organization, et al. Ponente: J. Bautista Facts: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. Herein respondent filed complaint the San Miguel Brewery embodying 12 demands for the betterment of the condition of employment of its members. The union manifested its desire to confine its claim to its demands for overtime night shift differential pay and attorneys fees, additional separation pay and sick and vacation leave compensation. Judge Bautista rendered decision that with regard to overtime compensation, the Eight Hour Labor law applies to the employees concerned for those working in the field or engaged in the sale of the companys products outside its premises should be paid the extra compensation accorded them in addition to the monthly salary and commission by earned by them, regardless of the meal allowance given to employees who work up to late at night. Motion for Reconsideration in the industrial court en banc was denied, hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not outside or field sales personnel are entitled to the benefits of the Eight Hour Labor law? Held: No. The Court ruled that where after the morning roll call the outside or field sales personnel leave the plant of the company to go on their respective sales routes and they do not have a daily time record but the sales routes are so planned that they can be completed within 8 hours at most, and they receive monthly salaries and sales commission in variable amounts, so that they are made to work beyond the required eight hours similar to piece work, pakiao, or commission basis regardless of the time employed, and the employees participation depends on their indust ry, it is held that the Eight Hour Labor Law has no application to said outside or field sales personnel and that they are not entitled to overtime compensation. The decision of Industrial Court is modified.
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Marie Antoinette F. Espadilla 2011-0091 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products. Private respondent is an association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Beforehand, all company factory workers in Marikina including members of private respondent union worked from 7:45am to 3:45pm with a 30-minute paid on call lunch break. Petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory- based employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts. Private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid on call lunch break, hence the filling of complaint for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability. The Labor Article dismissed the complainant on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and did not decrease the benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not go beyond 8 hours. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not there was a diminution of benefits when the 30-minute paid lunch break was eliminated? Held: The right to fix the work, schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. The petitioner cities as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production. Since the employees are no longer required during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period. The new work schedule fully complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. Also, the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory similarly situated whether they are union members or not; Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees; it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives; Management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the working hours of its employees Petition is granted. The dismissed complaint against petitioner for unfair labor practice is affirmed. SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. VS. NLRC (2ND DIVISION) AND SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-TUCP) G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998 Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. NLRC (2nd Division) And Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP) J. Bellosillo
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioner is the salesman-in-charge of San Miguel Brewery, Inc. in Dagupan warehouse with a monthly pay of P240.00, P5.00 per diem and a commission of P0.75 per case sold. On October 9, 1956, 8 days after Baltazar was appointed as the salesman-in-charge, the regular employees in Dagupan warehouse went on strike because of unjust treatment. Baltazar was recalled to appellants Manila Office on the 13th of October, 1956 upon the order of his superior and conduct an investigation. The investigation found that the employees grievances were well founded. The next day, the strikers returned to their work voluntarily. On October 15, the petitioner was informed that he was not to return to Dagupan anymore but he still reported to work at the main office from October 16 to November 2, 1956 waiting for assignment. From November 3 to December 19 on the same year, he absented himself from work without consent from his superiors and without advising them or anybody else of the reason for his prolonged absence. He was dismissed from work because of petitioners unauthorized absence and if the company would consider its health, welfare and retirement plan requiring sick leave, still the petitioner did inexcusable actions since sick leave, to be considered authorized and excusable, must be certified to by the company physician and the appellant-company informed that Baltazar was dismissed effective November 30, 1956. Baltazar initiated a complaint which the trial court ruled that Baltazars dismissal was justified but, however, ordering San Miguel Brewery Inc. to pay Baltazar one month separation pay, plus the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to one month separation pay and the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave. Held: No, the petitioner is not entitled to one month separation pay and the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave. Under the Marcaida vs. Philippine Education Company 53 O.G. No. 23, RA 1052 makes reference to termination of employment, instead of dismissal, to exclude employees separated from the service for causes attributable to their own fault. It is limited in its operation, to cases of employment without definite period. When the employment is for a fixed duration, the employer may terminate it even before the expiration of a stipulated period, should there be a substantial breach of obligations by the employee; in which event the latter is not entitles to advance notice or separation pay. it would patently, be absurd to grant a right thereto to an employee guilty of the same breach of obligation, when the employment is without a definite period, as if he were entitled to greater protection than employees engaged for a fixed duration. In connection with the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave, it appears that while under the last paragraph of Article 5 of appellants Rules and Regulations of Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan, unused sick leave may be accumulated up to a maximum of 6 months, the same is not commutable or payable in cash upon the employees option. NICANOR M. BALTAZAR VS. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. G.R. No. L-23076 February 27, 1969 Nicanor M. Baltazar San Miguel Brewery, Inc. Dizon, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case Title: CEZAR ODANGO IN HIS BEHALF OF 32 COMPLAINANTS VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ANTIQUE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC. GR number: G.R. No. 147420 Date: June 10, 2004 Petitioner: Cezar Odango in his behalf of 32 complainants Respondent: National Labor Relations Commissions and Antique Electric Cooperatives, Inc. Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: Petitioners are monthly-paid employees whose workdays are from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. The Regional Branch of DOLE found Antique Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (ANTECO) liable for underpayment of monthly-paid employees after a routine inspection, hence directing the ANTECO to pay its employees wage differentials amounting to P1, 427,412.75. However, the respondent company failed to comply. This lead to the filing of complaint of 33 monthly-paid employees with the NLRC Sub-Regional Branch VI in Iloilo City, praying for the payment of wage differentials, damages and attorneys fees. The Labor arbiter, who heard the case, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners granting them the wage differentials amounting P1, 017,507.73 and attorneys fees of 10%. In Labor Arbiters ruling, he pointed out that ANTECO failed to disprove petitioners argument that monthly-paid employees are considered paid for all the days in a month under Section 2, Rule IV of Book 3 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. Petitioners claim that this includes not only the 10 legal holidays, but also their un -worked half of Saturdays and all of Sundays. The Labor Arbiter gave weight to petitioners arguments on the computation of wages based on the 304 divisor used by ANTECO in converting the leave credits of its employees. The Labor Arbiter concluded that ANTECO owed employees the wages for 61 days, the difference between 365 and 304, for every year. ANTECO appealed the decision to the NLRC and the latter reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and even dismissed the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In NLRCs ruling, the NLRC pointed out that the Labor Arbiters own computation showed that the daily wage rate of the employees involved were above the minimum daily wage of P124. It was shown that the lowest paid employees of ANTECO receiving a monthly wage of P3, 788. The NLRC applied the formula in Section 2 (Daily Wage Rate = (Wage x 12)/365 to the monthly wage of P3, 788 to arrive at the daily wage rate of P124.54, an amount clearly above the minimum wage. Petitioners then elevated the case to the SC through a Petition for certiorari which the Court dismissed due to petitioners failure to comply with Section II, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The SC referred the case to CA which the latter also dismissed the petition due to petitioners failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners being monthly-paid employees are entitled to their money claim.
Held: The petition is denied. Petitioners argument that under Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, monthly-paid employees are considered paid for all the days of the month including un-worked days and since in the computation of leave credits, ANTECO uses a divisor of 304, ANTECO is not paying them 61 days every year. This is unmeritorious. The said basis of
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petitioners arguments is already void and in Insular Bank of Asia v. Inciong, it stated that, Section 2, Rule IV, Book 3 of the Implementing Rules and Policy Instructions No. 9 issued by the Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Codes provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended then by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The Labor Code is clear that monthly-paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the Secretary of Labor excludes monthly-paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the implementing rules, that monthly-paid employees are presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. Even assuming that the said provision is valid, petitioners claim will still fail because of the basic rule of no work, no pay. The right to be paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the 10 legal holidays in a year. On the other hand, the use of ANTECO of a divisor less than 365 days cannot make the respondent company liable for underpayment. The facts show that petitioners are required to work only from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287, which is the result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays, and less than 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days means that ANTECOs workers are deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of the 10 legal holidays. The 304 divisor used by ANTECO is clearly above the minimum of 287 days.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES VS. RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ AND THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATUTUCP) G.R. number: G.R. No. 102132 Date: March 19, 1993 Petitioner: Libron, Gaspar and Associates Respondent: Bansalan B. Metilla for Association of Trade Unions (ATUTUCP) Ponente: Romeo, J. Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which, under Sections 1 and 3 of Article VIII, provides for sick leave with pay benefits each year to its employees who have rendered at least one year of service with the company. Under Section 1, Article VIII, the company agrees to grant 15 days sick leave with pay each year to every regular non-intermittent worker who already rendered at least one year of service with the company. However, such sick leave can only be enjoyed upon certification by a company designated physician, and if the same is not enjoyed within one year period of the current year, any unenjoyed portion thereof, shall be converted to cash and shall be paid at the end of the said one year period. And provided however, that only those regular workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the sick leave privilege. On the other hand, under Section 3 of the said article, it provides that all intermittent workers of the company who are members of the Regular Labor Pool shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay with the basis of the number of hours rendered including overtime. During the effectivity of the CBA until three months of its renewal with a total of 3 years and 9 months, all the field workers of petitioner who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool who had rendered at least 750 hours to 1,500 hours were extended sick leave with pay benefits. Every unenjoyed portion thereof at the end of the current year was converted to cash and paid at the end of the said one year period. However, the commutation of unenjoyed portion of the sick leave was withdrawn when the petitioner-company had a new assistant manager. It stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the ground that they are not entitled to the said benefits under the 1989 CBA, particularly Sections 1 and 3. The Union brought the matter to NCMB and the parties mutually designated Ruben Abarquez, Jr. to act as voluntary arbitrator. He ruled that Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Corporation should grant and extend sick leave privilege of the commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave of all the intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present extra pool in accordance with the CBA. The petitioner-company disagreed with the ruling. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present extra pool in accordance with the CBA are entitled to the commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave.
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Held: The petition is denied. A CBA, as used in Article 252 of the Labor Code, is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after the negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising such agreement. It is unreasonable for the petitioner to isolate Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1989 CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits. The manner they were deprive of the privilege previously recognized and extended to them by the petitioner is not only tainted with arbitrariness but likewise discriminatory in nature. Petitioner is of mistaken notion that since the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits is found in Section 1, Article VIII, only the regular non-intermittent workers and no other can avail of the said privilege because of the proviso found in the last paragraph thereof. Public respondents correctly observed that the parties to the CBA clearly intended the same sick leave privilege to be accorded the intermittent workers in the same way that they are both given the same treatment with respect to vacation leaves non-commutable and non-cummulative. If they are treated equally with respect to vacation leave privilege, with more reason should they be on par with each other with respect to sick leave benefits. Besides, if the intention is otherwise, during its negotiations, why did not the parties expressly stipulate in the 1989 CBA that regular intermittent workers are not entitled to commutation of the unenjoyed portion of their sick leave with pay benefits? There had been no grave abuse of discretion by public respondent in issuing the decision. Moreover, his interpretation of Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA cannot be faulted and is absolutely correct.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case Title: GR number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioners are monthly-paid employees whose workdays are from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. The Regional Branch of DOLE found Antique Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (ANTECO) liable for underpayment of monthly-paid employees after a routine inspection, hence directing the ANTECO to pay its employees wage differentials amounting to P1, 427,412.75. However, the respondent company failed to comply. This lead to the filing of complaint of 33 monthly-paid employees with the NLRC Sub-Regional Branch VI in Iloilo City, praying for the payment of wage differentials, damages and attorneys fees. The Labor arbiter, who heard the case, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners granting them the wage differentials amounting P1, 017,507.73 and attorneys fees of 10%. In Labor Arbiters ruling, he pointed out that ANTECO failed to disprove petitioners argument that monthly -paid employees are considered paid for all the days in a month under Section 2, Rule IV of Book 3 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. Petitioners claim that this includes not only the 10 legal holidays, but also their un -worked half of Saturdays and all of Sundays. The Labor Arbiter gave weight to petitioners arguments on the computation of wages based on the 304 divisor used by ANTECO in converting the leave credits of its employees. The Labor Arbiter concluded that ANTECO owed employees the wages for 61 days, the difference between 365 and 304, for every year. ANTECO appealed the decision to the NLRC and the latter reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and even dismissed the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In NLRCs ruling, the NLRC pointed out that the Labor Arbiters own computation showed that the daily wage rate of the employees involved were above the minimum daily wage of P124. It was shown that the lowest paid employees of ANTECO receiving a monthly wage of P3, 788. The NLRC applied the formula in Section 2 (Daily Wage Rate = (Wage x 12)/365 to the monthly wage of P3, 788 to arrive at the daily wage rate of P124.54, an amount clearly above the minimum wage. Petitioners then elevated the case to the SC through a Petition for certiorari which the Court dismissed due to petitioners failure to comply with Section II, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The SC referred the case to CA which the latter also dismissed the petition due to petitioners failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners being monthly-paid employees are entitled to their money claim. Held: The petition is denied. Petitioners argument that under Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, monthly-paid employees are considered paid for all the days of the month including un-worked days and since in the computation of leave credits, ANTECO uses a divisor of 304, ANTECO is not paying them 61 days every year. This is unmeritorious. The said basis of petitioners arguments is already void and in Insular Bank of Asia v. Inciong, it stated that, Section 2, Rule IV, Book 3 of the Implementing Rules and Policy Instructions No. 9 issued by the Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Codes provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended then by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The Labor Code is clear that monthly-paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the Secretary of Labor excludes monthly-paid employees from the said benefits by CEZAR ODANGO IN HIS BEHALF OF 32 COMPLAINANTS VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ANTIQUE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC. G.R. No. 147420 June 10, 2004 Cezar Odango in his behalf of 32 complainants National Labor Relations Commissions and Antique Electric Cooperatives, Inc. Carpio, J.
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inserting, under Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the implementing rules, that monthly-paid employees are presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. Even assuming that the said provision is valid, petitioners claim will still fail because of the basic rule of no work, no pay. The right to be paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the 10 legal holidays in a year. On the other hand, the use of ANTECO of a divisor less than 365 days cannot make the respondent company liable for underpayment. The facts show that petitioners are required to work only from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287, which is the result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays, and less than 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days means that ANTECOs workers are deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of the 10 legal holidays. The 304 divisor used by ANTECO is clearly above the minimum of 287 days.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: UNION FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE) VS. BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY FILIPRO, INC.) GR number: G.R. No. 79255 Date: January 20, 1992 Petitioner: Union Filipro Employees (UFE) Respondent: Benigno Vivar, Jr., National Labor Relations Commission and Nestle Philippines, Inc. (formerly Filipro, Inc.) Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J. Facts: The respondent, Filipro Inc. (Nestle Philippines, Inc.), filed with the NLRC a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay. Both Filipro and the UFE agreed to submit the case voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator, which the latter rendered a decision directing Filipro Inc. to pay its monthly-paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. Filipro Inc. filed a motion for clarification requesting the limitation of award to 3 years; the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives from the award of the holiday pay and deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. The respondent arbitrator ruled that the sales personnel are field personnel and are not entitled to holiday pay. He even ruled that the 251 divisor should be changed to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of the divisor 251. Hence, this petition. Issue/s: (1) Whether or not Nestls sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and (2) Whether or not, if they are entitled to such holiday pay, the divisor should be change from 251 to 261 days. Held: Sales personnel are not entitled of holiday pay. Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Field personnel is defined as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Even if theres an 8:00 am to 4:00 or 4:30 pm working period of the said sales personnel, they are still considered field personnel whose actual work in the field cannot be determined. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably determined. The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 am prior to the field work and come back at 4:30 pm really spend the hours in between in actual field work. Moreover, under Rule IV, Book II of the Implementing Rules provides the coverage of the holiday pay which states that rules on holiday pay shall apply to all employees except Field personnel and other employees whose in time and performance is unsupervised by the employer.. Petitioner contends these sales personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the SOD (Supervisor of the Day) schedule, however, this SOD does not at least signify that these sales personnels time and performance are supervised. The purpose of this schedule is merely to ensure that the sales personnel are out of the office not later than 8:00 am and are back in the office not earlier than 4:00 pm. With regards the change of divisor from 251 to 261 is modified since the change would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: WELLINGTON INVESTMENT AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, ELMER ABADILLA AND 34 OTHERS G.R. number: G.R. No. 114698 Date: July 3, 1995 Petitioner: Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation Respondent: Cresenciano B. Trajano, Under-Secretary of Labor and Employment, Elmer Abadilla, and 34 others Ponente: Narvasa, C.J. Facts: By virtue of the routine inspection conducted by a Labor Enforcement Officer, Wellington Flour Mills owned by the petitioner-company was found non-payment of regular holidays falling on a Sunday for monthly-paid employees. Wellington argued that the monthly-paid employees already includes holiday pay for all regular holidays and there is no legal basis for the finding of alleged non-payment of regular holidays falling on a Sunday. It further contends that it pays its monthly paid employees a fixed monthly compensation using the 314 factor which undeniably covers and already includes payment for all the working days in a month as well as all the 10 un-worked regular holidays within a year. The Regional Director ordered the petitioner to pay the employees additional compensation corresponding to 4 extra working days. However, the petitioner argued that the company, using the 314 factor already gave complete payment of all compensation due to its workers. Petitioner appealed and was acted on by the respondent Undersecretary. But still, Regional Directors decision was affirmed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a monthly-paid employees, receiving a fixed monthly compensation, is entitled to an additional pay aside from his usual holiday pay whenever a regular holiday falls on a Sunday. Held: Regional Directors decision, affirmed by the Undersecretary, is nullifi ed and set aside. Every worker should be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays; except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers, even if the worker does not work on these regular holidays. The Wellington had been paying its employees a salary of not less than the statutory minimum wage and that the monthly salary, thus, paid was not less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by 12. Apparently the monthly salary was fixed by Wellington to provide for compensation for every working day of the year including holidays specified by law and excluding only Sundays. Wellington leaves no day unaccounted for, it is paying for all the days of a year with the exception only of 51 Sundays.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution. It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a) personnel on monthly basis, who receive their monthly salary uniformly throughout the year, irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction for holidays; (b) personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and they received un-worked holiday pay; and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. They sign contracts before the start of the semester. National Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers filed a complaint against the college when the latter failed to pay them the required holiday pay. In the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it stated that the faculty and personnel of Jose Rizal College who are paid their salary by the month uniformly in a school year, irrespective of the number of working days in a month, without deduction for holidays, are presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays and are no longer entitled to the separate payment for the said regular holidays; the personnel of Jose Rizal College who are paid their wages daily are entitles to be paid the 10 un-worked regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; and, Collegiate faculty of Jose Rizal College who by contract are paid compensation per student contract hour are not entitled to un-worked holiday pay considering that these regular holidays have been excluded in the programming of the student contract hours. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters decision with regards to the collegiate faculty. NLRC held that collegiate faculty is entitled to holiday pay. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the collegiate faculty according to their contracts is paid per lecture hour are entitled to un-worked holiday pay. Held: The NLRC rendered a new decision exempting the college from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for regular holidays, whether the same be during the regular semesters of the school year or during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week vacations but ordering the said college to pay the faculty members their regular hourly rate on days declares as special holidays or for some reason classes are called off or shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions of class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members shall likewise be paid their hourly rates should they teach during said extensions. Article 94 of the Labor Code states the right to holiday pay. Under par. a, every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers, and Section 8, Rule IV, Book III of the IRR states the holiday pay of certain employees in which under par. a, private school teachers, including faculty members of colleges and universities, may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral vacations. They shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays during Christmas vacations etc. Under these provisions, the faculty members are entitled for un-worked holiday pay. However, the law is silent with respect to the faculty members paid by the hour who because of their teachings contracts are obliged to work and consent to be paid only for work actually done. Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as no class days, certainly the latter do not expect payment for said un-worked days, and thus this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contract. JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE VS. NLRC AND NAT/OFFICE WORKERS G.R. No. L-65482 December 1, 1987 Jose Rizal College National Labor Relations Commission and National Alliance of Teachers/Office Workers Paras, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioner is the salesman-in-charge of San Miguel Brewery, Inc. in Dagupan warehouse with a monthly pay of P240.00, P5.00 per diem and a commission of P0.75 per case sold. On October 9, 1956, 8 days after Baltazar was appointed as the salesman-in-charge, the regular employees in Dagupan warehouse went on strike because of unjust treatment. Baltazar was recalled to appellants Manila Office on the 13th of October, 1956 upon the order of his superior and conduct an investigation. The investigation found that the employees grievances were well founded. The next day, the strikers returned to their work voluntarily. On October 15, the petitioner was informed that he was not to return to Dagupan anymore but he still reported to work at the main office from October 16 to November 2, 1956 waiting for assignment. From November 3 to December 19 on the same year, he absented himself from work without consent from his superiors and without advising them or anybody else of the reason for his prolonged absence. He was dismissed from work because of petitioners unauthorized absence and if the company would consider its health, welfare and retirement plan requiring sick leave, still the petitioner did inexcusable actions since sick leave, to be considered authorized and excusable, must be certified to by the company physician and the appellant-company informed that Baltazar was dismissed effective November 30, 1956. Baltazar initiated a complaint which the trial court ruled that Baltazars dismissal was justified but, however, ordering San Miguel Brewery Inc. to pay Baltazar one month separation pay, plus the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to one month separation pay and the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave. Held: No, the petitioner is not entitled to one month separation pay and the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave. Under the Marcaida vs. Philippine Education Company 53 O.G. No. 23, RA 1052 makes reference to termination of employment, instead of dismissal, to exclude employees separated from the service for causes attributable to their own fault. It is limited in its operation, to cases of employment without definite period. When the employment is for a fixed duration, the employer may terminate it even before the expiration of a stipulated period, should there be a substantial breach of obligations by the employee; in which event the latter is not entitles to advance notice or separation pay. it would patently, be absurd to grant a right thereto to an employee guilty of the same breach of obligation, when the employment is without a definite period, as if he were entitled to greater protection than employees engaged for a fixed duration. In connection with the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the cash value of 6 months accumulated sick leave, it appears that while under the last paragraph of Article 5 of appellants Rules and Regulations of Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan, unused sick leave may be accumulated up to a maximum of 6 months, the same is not commutable or payable in cash upon the employees option. NICANOR M. BALTAZAR VS. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. G.R. No. L-23076 February 27, 1969 Nicanor M. Baltazar San Miguel Brewery, Inc. Dizon, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES VS. RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ AND THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATUTUCP) G.R. number: G.R. No. 102132 Date: March 19, 1993 Petitioner: Libron, Gaspar and Associates Respondent: Bansalan B. Metilla for Association of Trade Unions (ATUTUCP) Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which, under Sections 1 and 3 of Article VIII, provides for sick leave with pay benefits each year to its employees who have rendered at least one year of service with the company. Under Section 1, Article VIII, the company agrees to grant 15 days sick leave with pay each year to every regular non-intermittent worker who already rendered at least one year of service with the company. However, such sick leave can only be enjoyed upon certification by a company designated physician, and if the same is not enjoyed within one year period of the current year, any unenjoyed portion thereof, shall be converted to cash and shall be paid at the end of the said one year period. And provided however, that only those regular workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the sick leave privilege. On the other hand, under Section 3 of the said article, it provides that all intermittent workers of the company who are members of the Regular Labor Pool shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay with the basis of the number of hours rendered including overtime. During the effectivity of the CBA until three months of its renewal with a total of 3 years and 9 months, all the field workers of petitioner who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool who had rendered at least 750 hours to 1,500 hours were extended sick leave with pay benefits. Every unenjoyed portion thereof at the end of the current year was converted to cash and paid at the end of the said oneyear period. However, the commutation of unenjoyed portion of the sick leave was withdrawn when the petitioner-company had a new assistant manager. It stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the ground that they are not entitled to the said benefits under the 1989 CBA, particularly Sections 1 and 3. The Union brought the matter to NCMB and the parties mutually designated Ruben Abarquez, Jr. to act as voluntary arbitrator. He ruled that Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Corporation should grant and extend sick leave privilege of the commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave of all the intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present extra pool in accordance with the CBA. The petitioner-company disagreed with the ruling. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present extra pool in accordance with the CBA are entitled to the commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave. Held: The petition is denied. A CBA, as used in Article 252 of the Labor Code, is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after the negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising such agreement. It is unreasonable for the petitioner to isolate Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1989 CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits. The manner they were deprive of the privilege previously recognized and extended to them by the petitioner is not only tainted with arbitrariness but likewise discriminatory in nature. Petitioner is of mistaken notion that since the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits is found in Section 1,
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Article VIII, only the regular non-intermittent workers and no other can avail of the said privilege because of the proviso found in the last paragraph thereof. Public respondents correctly observed that the parties to the CBA clearly intended the same sick leave privilege to be accorded the intermittent workers in the same way that they are both given the same treatment with respect to vacation leaves non-commutable and non-cummulative. If they are treated equally with respect to vacation leave privilege, with more reason should they be on par with each other with respect to sick leave benefits. Besides, if the intention is otherwise, during its negotiations, why did not the parties expressly stipulate in the 1989 CBA that regular intermittent workers are not entitled to commutation of the unenjoyed portion of their sick leave with pay benefits? There had been no grave abuse of discretion by public respondent in issuing the decision. Moreover, his interpretation of Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA cannot be faulted and is absolutely correct.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Donald Kwok and his father-in-law, Patricio L. Lim, along with some other stockholders, established the Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Company in 1965. The petitioner retired 36 years later and upon retirement, he claimed the cash equivalent of what he believed to be his accumulated vacation and sick leave credits during the entire length of his service with the company, which the total amount reached P7, 080, 546.00 plus interest. The respondent corporation refused to accede to the petitioners demand claiming that the latter is not entitled to it. The petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC. He claimed that Lim made a verbal promise to give him unlimited sick leave and vacation leave benefits and its cash conversion upon his retirement or resignation without the need for application therefor. The respondent denied all of these and claimed that petitioners demand was without legal basis. It was further pointed out that as per Memorandum dated November 6, 1981, only regular employees and managerial and confidential employees falling under Category I were entitled to vacation and sick leave credits. The petitioner, whose position did not fall under Category I was not entitled to the benefits under the said memorandum. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. The corporation was directed to pay the petitioner the amount he was demanding plus interest and 10% attorneys fees. The corporation appealed the decision and the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. the petitioner appealed the NLRCs decision to the CA but the CA affirmed the NLRCs decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled, based on the documentary and testimonial evidence on record, to the cash value of his vacation and sick leave credits in the total amount of P7, 080, 546.00. Held: The petition is denied. The petitioner failed to convince the Court that the actual findings of the CA were arbitrary. Contracts entered into by a corporate officer or obligations or prestations assumed by such officer for and in behalf of such corporation are binding on the said corporation only if such ofiicer acted within the scope of his authority or if such officer exceeded the limits of his authority, the corporation has ratified such contracts. In the present case, the petitioner relied principally on his testimony to prove that Lim made a verbal promise to give him vacation and sick leave credits, as well as the privilege of converting the same into cash upon retirement. The Court agrees that those who belong to the upper corporate echelons would have more privileges. However, the Court cannot presume the existence of such privileges. The petitioner was burdened to prove not only the existence of such benefits but also that he is entitled to the same, especially considering that such privileges are not inherent to the positions occupied by the petitioner in the respondent corporation. In a testimonial evidence, the petitioner is aware that he is not covered of the Memorandum granting the PCMC employees the conversion of their unused vacation and sick leaves into cash. Even assuming that the petitioner is included among the regular employees referred in the memorandum, there is no evidence that he complied with the cut-off dates for the filing of the cash conversion of vacation and sick leaves. This being so, the petitioners money claim have already been barred by the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Additional to that, there is no proof that petitioner has filed vacation and sick leaves with the companys personnel department. Without a record of petitioners absences, there is no way to determine the actual number of leave credits he is entitled to. The amount which the petitioner DONALD KWOK VS. PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION G.R. No. 149252 April 28, 2005 Donald Kwok Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation Callejo, Sr., J.
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is demanding is baseless. Regarding the verbal promise that Lim made to the petitioner, the promise cannot bind the company in the absence of any Board resolution to that effect. The personal act of the company president cannot bind the corporation.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) a clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel due to alleged financial losses. However, the petitioners argued that the company is not suffering any losses and the real reason for their termination was their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case, the petitioner manifested that they no longer contesting their dismissal, however, they argued that they should be granted a separation pay. Each of the petitioners was receiving a monthly salary of P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every sale they made. Under the CBA entered by the Zuellig Inc. and the petitioners, in Article XIV, Section 1(a), Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one months salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months being considered one year, including probationary employment. Other basis for petitioners contention are Article 284 of the Labor Code with regards to reduction of personnel and Sections 9(b) and 10 of Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision directing the company to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service that they have worked with the company. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres filed a Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of petition contending that he had received, to his full and complete satisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay. Held: The petition is granted. Petitioners contention that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of separation pay due to them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together. Insofar as whether the allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos vs. NLRC, 76721, in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living allowances. In the issue of whether commission should be included in the computation of their separation pay, it is proper to define first commission. Blacks Law Dictionary defined commission as the recompensed, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that the commission are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some JOSE SONGCO VS. NLRC (FIRST DIVISION) G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990 Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), Labor Arbiter Flavio Aguas, and F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc. Medialdea, J.
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salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exist. In Soriano v. NLRC, it is ruled then that, the commissions also claimed by petitioner (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned during their last year of employment.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioners were the fishermen-crew members of 7/B Sandyman II, one of several fishing vessels owned by the De Guzman Fishing Enterprises which is primarily in the fishing business with port and office at Camarines Sur. On September 11, 1983, petitioners were told to proceed to the police station for investigation on the report that they sold some of their fish-catch at midsea. The petitioners denied the charge claiming that the allegation was a countermove because of the formation of their union. The complaint was dismissed because there were no witnesses that would support the companys allegation. The petitioners, however, were not allowed to return to the fishing vessel to resume their work on that same day. Each of the them filed a complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay, emergency cost-of-living allowance and service incentive pay with the Ministry (now DOLE). The company denied the petitioners being their employees, further contending that they were only engaged in a joint venture. The Labor Arbiter rendered a joint decision dismissing all the complaint of the petitioners. Petitioners appealed the case to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision that a joint fishing venture and not employer-employee relationship exist between the private respondent and the petitioners. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the fishermen-crew members of the trawl fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II are employees of its owner-operator, De Guzman Fishing Enterprise, and if so, whether or not they were illegally dismissed from their employment. Held: The petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment. In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The employment arises from contract of hire, express or implied. In the absence of hiring, no employer-employee relationship could exist. Records show in the instant case that petitioners were directly hired by the general manager of the company and its operations manager. Petitioner Alipio Ruga was hired on September 29, 1974 as patron/captain of the fishing vessels; Eladio Calderon started as mechanic on April 16, 1968 until he was promoted as chief engineer of the fishing vessel; Jose Pama was employed on September 29, 1974 as assistant engineer; Jaime Barbin started as a pilot of the motor boat until he was transferred as a master fisherman to the fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II; Philip Cervantes was hired as winchman on August 1, 1972 while Eleuterio Barbin was hired as winchman on April 15, 1976. While tenure or length of employment is not considered as the test of employment, nevertheless the hiring of petitioners to perform work which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of private respondent for a period of 8-15 years since 1968 qualify them as regular employees within the meaning of Article 281 of the Labor Code as they were indeed engaged to perform activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual fishing business or occupation of private respondent. The virtual dismissal of petitioners from their employment was characterized by undue haste when less extreme measures consistent with the requirements of due process should have been first exhausted. In that sense, the dismissal of petitioners was tainted with illegality. ALIPIO R. RUGA ET AL. VS. NLRC G.R. No. L-72654-61 January 22, 1990 Alipio R. Ruga, Jose Parma, Eladio Calderon, Laurente Bautu, Jaime Barbin, Nicanor Francisco, Philip Cervantes and Eleuterio Barbin National Labor Relations Commission and De Guzman Fishing Enterprises and/or Arsenio de Guzman Fernan, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioners were engaged in the business of marine coastwise transportation. They had a CBA with the Cebu Seamens Association. On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that the officers and men working on board the petitioners vessels have not been paid their sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened then to accept the reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners; that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P0.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were required to pay their meals and that because the captain had refused to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the petitioners dismissed the captain. The petitioner, on their defense, stated that they have suffered a financial losses in the operation of their vessels and there is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or vacation leave to employees of private firms; that with regards to their overtime pay, they have always observed the Eight-hour labor Law and that overtime does not apply to those who provide means of transportation. The decision ruled in favor of the respondent union. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the required meals which the petitioner company deducted from the salary of the employees is considered as facilities, and not supplements. Held: Supplements constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborers and his familys ex istence and subsistence so that by express provisions of law, they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay them just the same. It is argued that the food or meal given to the deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in question, were mere facilities which should be deducted from wages, and not supplements which, according to Section 19 of the Minimum Wage Law, should not be deducted from such wages. It was found out that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to the effectivity of the Minimum Wage Law while they were on the high seas not as part of their wages but as a necessary matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew members during the voyage. The deductions therein made for the meals given after August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels should continue giving the benefits. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, finding out that the meals or food in question are not facilities but supplements. STATE MARINE CORPORATION VS. CEBU SEAMENS ASSOCIATION G.R. No. L-12444 February 28, 1963 State Marine Corporation and Royal Line, Inc. Cebu Seamens Association Paredes, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner Norma Mabeza and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotels management to sign an instrument attesting to the latters compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision. The instrument provides that they have no complaints against the management of the Hotel Supreme as they are paid accordingly and that they are treated well. The petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the Citys Prosecutors Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That same day, as she refused to go to the City Prosecutors Office, she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings to the hotels premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was denied by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotels cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence. Three days after her attempt to return to work, she filed a complaint against the management for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Baguio City. In addition to that, she alleged underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, night differential and other benefits. Peter Ng, in their Answer, argued that her unauthorized leave of absence from work is the ground for her dismissal. He even maintained that her alleged of underpayment and non-payment of benefits had no legal basis. He raises a new ground of loss of confidence, which was supported by his filing of criminal case for the alleged qualified theft of the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the hotel management on the ground of loss of confidence. She appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal by the private respondent of petitioner constitutes an unfair labor practice. Held: The NLRCs decision is reversed. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employees right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employees scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The labor arbiters contention that the reason for the monetary benefits received by the petitioner between 1981 to 1987 were less than the minimum wage was because petitioner did not factor in the meals, lodging, electric consumption and water she received during the period of computations. Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legal requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot deduct the value f rom the employees ages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntary accepted in writing by the employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. These requirements were not met in the instant case. NORMA MABEZA VS. NLRC G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997 Norma Mabeza National Labor Relations Commission and Peter Ng/Hotel Supreme Kapunan, J.
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Private respondent failed to present any company policy to show that the meal and lodging are part of the salary. He also failed to provide proof of the employees written authorization and he failed to show how he arrived at the valuations. More significantly, the food and lodging, or electricity and water consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work on different shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondents hotel.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Armando Dolino was admitted to the PAL Aviation School for training as a pilot. The training agreement bound PAL to provide regular and permanent employment to Dolina upon the completion of the training course. Dolina completed the course and he was issued a license as Commercial Pilot and PAL extended him a temporary appointment for 6 months for Limited First Officer. When his appointment was due to expire, he fell short of the required time and to enable him to complete the requirement, his employment was extended for another 6 months which appointment was described as permanent. When hes appointment was due to expire again, he was still short of the minimum flying time requirement and he was extended again. On the third extension of his appointed, he completed the flying time requirements. Pending his physical examination, hes employment was extended again. When Dolina took a psychological examination, his adaptability rating was found unacceptable. The Board then decided that Dolina is not qualified for regular employment in the Company. PAL filed a clearance application for Dolinas termination and in the meantime, Dolina was placed under preventive suspension. However, the Department of Labor lifted the preventive suspension and ordered petitioner to reinstate Dolina to his former position with full backwages. PAL appealed the case and the decision was reversed. PAL removed Dolina from its payroll and claiming that it was no longer obliged to return Dolina from its payroll since the decision of the Labor Arbiter was a final resolution of the case by arbitration. Dolina appealed to the NLRC which the latter dismissed the clearance application of PAL. Dolina must be restored to the payroll and paid for his salaries from the date he was dropped from the PALs payroll. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent Dolina was entitled to his salaries from the time he was dropped from PALs payroll until this case is finally resolved. Held: The decision requiring the petitioner to restore private respondent to its payroll and ordering the payment of his salaries from the time he was dropped from PALs payroll until this case is finally resolved is null and void. In lieu of reinstatement and the payment of his backwages, private respondent was included in the petitioners payroll; effective from the time he was preventively suspended until final resolution of the case by arbitration, without having to perform any work for the petitioner. In entering into agreement, the parties could not have intended to include in the clause final resolution of the case by arbitration the whole adjudicatory process, including appeal. For it were so, even proceedings on certiorari before this court would be embraced by the term arbitration and private respondent will continue to receive monthly salary without rendering any service to the petitioner regardless of the outcome of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, for as long as one of the parties appeal to the NLRC and until the case is finally resolved by this court. This is absolutely in contrast with the principle of Fair Days Wage for a Fair Days Labor. The court holds that respondents NLRCs order for the continued payment of Dolinas salaries from he was dropped from the PALs payroll until the case is finally resolved is contrary to law and established jurisprudence and the NLRC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. NLRC G.R. No. 55159 December 22, 1989 Philippine Airlines Inc. National Labor Relations Commission and Armando Dolina Cortes, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The members of the respondent Union did not work during the 17-day strike declared in 1968 by the rank and file Union (the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions <PALFU>). The SSS and the PALFU had a disagreement concerning the interpretation of the provisions of their CBA. The PALFUs decision to strike is the effect of the CIR Order of August 29, 1968 enjoining the parties, for the sake of industrial peace..to maintain the status quo- the Union not to declare any strike and the Management not to dismiss nor suspend any of its employees nor to declare any lock out. The SSS, in that same case, filed an Urgent Petition to declare the strike illegal. The respondent Union filed a Motion for Intervention in the said case alleging that it had not participated in the strike; that its members wanted to report for work but were prevented by the picketers from entering the work premises; that under the circumstances, they were entitled to their salaries corresponding to the duration of the strike, which could be deducted from the accrued leave credits of their members. Issue: Whether or not the members of the respondent Union who admittedly did not work during the 17day strike conducted by the PALFU is entitled to their salaries. Held: According to the doctrine of Fair days wage for a Fair days labor, if t here is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed nor suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employers time. In this case, the failure to work on the part of the members of the respondent Union was due to circumstances not attributable to themselves. But neither should the burden of the economic loss suffered by them be shifted to their employer, the SSS, which was equally faultless, considering that the situation was not a direct consequence of the employers lockout or unfair practice. With this, it is fair that they wont be receiving their salary for those days they did not work. SSS vs. SSS Supervisors Union-CUGCO G.R. No. L-31831 October 23, 1982 Social Security System SSS Supervisors Union-CUGCO and Court of Industrial Relations Melencio-Herrera, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses from and promising employment in Saudi Arabia to four separate individuals, thus, violating Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. The private respondent filed a motion to quash alleging that the information do not constitute an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations and according to him, under Article 13(b), there would be illegal recruitment only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised of offered any employment for a fee. The position of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code and not under Article 13(b). However, Article 13(b) is somehow applicable since Article 39 in relation to Article 16 punishes acts of recruitment without proper authority. Issue: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code is applicable in determining the liability of the private respondent. Held: Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely specified to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whim, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring of workers. The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. It merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words shall be deemed create that presumption. PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO PANIS G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990 People of the Philippines Hon. Domingo Panis, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of ZAmbales and Olongapo City, Branch III and Serapio Abug Cruz, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution. It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a) personnel on monthly basis, who receive their monthly salary uniformly throughout the year, irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction for holidays; (b) personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and they received un-worked holiday pay; and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. They sign contracts before the start of the semester. National Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers filed a complaint against the college when the latter failed to pay them the required holiday pay. In the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it stated that the faculty and personnel of Jose Rizal College who are paid their salary by the month uniformly in a school year, irrespective of the number of working days in a month, without deduction for holidays, are presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays and are no longer entitled to the separate payment for the said regular holidays; the personnel of Jose Rizal College who are paid their wages daily are entitles to be paid the 10 unworked regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; and, Collegiate faculty of Jose Rizal College who by contract are paid compensation per student contract hour are not entitled to unworked holiday pay considering that these regular holidays have been excluded in the programming of the student contract hours. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters decision with regards to the collegiate faculty. NLRC held that collegiate faculty is entitled to holiday pay. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the collegiate faculty according to their contracts is paid per lecture hour are entitled to unworked holiday pay. Held: The NLRC rendered a new decision exempting the college from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for regular holidays, whether the same be during the regular semesters of the school year or during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week vacations but ordering the said college to pay the faculty members their regular hourly rate on days declares as special holidays or for some reason classes are called off or shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions of class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members shall likewise be paid their hourly rates should they teach during said extensions. Article 94 of the Labor Code states the right to holiday pay. Under par. a, every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers, and Section 8, Rule IV, Book III of the IRR states the holiday pay of certain employees in which under par. a, private school teachers, including faculty members of colleges and universities, may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral vacations. They shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays during Christmas vacations etc. JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE VS. NLRC AND NAT/OFFICE WORKERS G.R. No. L-65482 December 1, 1987 Jose Rizal College National Labor Relations Commission and National Alliance of Teachers/Office Workers Paras, J.
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Under these provisions, the faculty members are entitled for un-worked holiday pay. However, the law is silent with respect to the faculty members paid by the hour who because of their teachings contracts are obliged to work and consent to be paid only for work actually done. Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as no class days, certainly the latter do not expect payment for said un-worked days, and thus this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contract.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Donald Kwok and his father-in-law, Patricio L. Lim, along with some other stockholders, established the Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Company in 1965. The petitioner retired 36 years later and upon retirement, he claimed the cash equivalent of what he believed to be his accumulated vacation and sick leave credits during the entire length of his service with the company, which the total amount reached P7, 080, 546.00 plus interest. The respondent corporation refused to accede to the petitioners demand claiming that the latter is not entitled to it. The petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC. He claimed that Lim made a verbal promise to give him unlimited sick leave and vacation leave benefits and its cash conversion upon his retirement or resignation without the need for application therefor. The respondent denied all of these and claimed that petitioners demand was without legal basis. It was further pointed out that as per Memorandum dated November 6, 1981, only regular employees and managerial and confidential employees falling under Category I were entitled to vacation and sick leave credits. The petitioner, whose position did not fall under Category I was not entitled to the benefits under the said memorandum. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. The corporation was directed to pay the petitioner the amount he was demanding plus interest and 10% attorneys fees. The corporation appealed the decision and the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. the petitioner appealed the NLRCs decision to the CA but the CA affirmed the NLRCs decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled, based on the documentary and testimonial evidence on record, to the cash value of his vacation and sick leave credits in the total amount of P7, 080, 546.00. Held: The petition is denied. The petitioner failed to convince the Court that the actual findings of the CA were arbitrary. Contracts entered into by a corporate officer or obligations or prestations assumed by such officer for and in behalf of such corporation are binding on the said corporation only if such ofiicer acted within the scope of his authority or if such officer exceeded the limits of his authority, the corporation has ratified such contracts. In the present case, the petitioner relied principally on his testimony to prove that Lim made a verbal promise to give him vacation and sick leave credits, as well as the privilege of converting the same into cash upon retirement. The Court agrees that those who belong to the upper corporate echelons would have more privileges. However, the Court cannot presume the existence of such privileges. The petitioner was burdened to prove not only the existence of such benefits but also that he is entitled to the same, especially considering that such privileges are not inherent to the positions DONALD KWOK VS. PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION G.R. No. 149252 April 28, 2005 Donald Kwok Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation Callejo, Sr., J.
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occupied by the petitioner in the respondent corporation. In a testimonial evidence, the petitioner is aware that he is not covered of the Memorandum granting the PCMC employees the conversion of their unused vacation and sick leaves into cash. Even assuming that the petitioner is included among the regular employees referred in the memorandum, there is no evidence that he complied with the cut-off dates for the filing of the cash conversion of vacation and sick leaves. This being so, the petitioners money claim have already been barred by the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Additional to that, there is no proof that petitioner has filed vacation and sick leaves with the companys personnel department. Without a record of petitioners absences, there is no way to determine the actual number of leave credits he is entitled to. The amount which the petitioner is demanding is baseless. Regarding the verbal promise that Lim made to the petitioner, the promise cannot bind the company in the absence of any Board resolution to that effect. The personal act of the company president cannot bind the corporation.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner Norma Mabeza and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotels management to sign an instrument attesting to the latters compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision. The instrument provides that they have no complaints against the management of the Hotel Supreme as they are paid accordingly and that they are treated well. The petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the Citys Prosecutors Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That same day, as she refused to go to the City Prosecutors Office, she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings to the hotels premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was denied by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotels cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence. Three days after her attempt to return to work, she filed a complaint against the management for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Baguio City. In addition to that, she alleged underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, night differential and other benefits. Peter Ng, in their Answer, argued that her unauthorized leave of absence from work is the ground for her dismissal. He even maintained that her alleged of underpayment and non-payment of benefits had no legal basis. He raises a new ground of loss of confidence, which was supported by his filing of criminal case for the alleged qualified theft of the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the hotel management on the ground of loss of confidence. She appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal by the private respondent of petitioner constitutes an unfair labor practice. Held: The NLRCs decision is reversed. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employees right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employees scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The labor arbiters contention that the reason for the monetary benefits received by the petitioner between 1981 to 1987 were less than the minimum wage was because petitioner did not factor in the meals, lodging, electric consumption and water she received during the period of computations. Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legal requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employees ages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the NORMA MABEZA VS. NLRC G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997 Norma Mabeza National Labor Relations Commission and Peter Ng/Hotel Supreme Kapunan, J.
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provision of deductible facilities must be voluntary accepted in writing by the employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. These requirements were not met in the instant case. Private respondent failed to present any company policy to show that the meal and lodging are part of the salary. He also failed to provide proof of the employees written authorization and he failed to show how he arrived at the valuations. More significantly, the food and lodging, or electricity and water consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work on different shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondents hotel.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Armando Dolino was admitted to the PAL Aviation School for training as a pilot. The training agreement bound PAL to provide regular and permanent employment to Dolina upon the completion of the training course. Dolina completed the course and he was issued a license as Commercial Pilot and PAL extended him a temporary appointment for 6 months for Limited First Officer. When his appointment was due to expire, he fell short of the required time and to enable him to complete the requirement, his employment was extended for another 6 months which appointment was described as permanent. When hes appointment was due to expire again, he was still short of the minimum flying time requirement and he was extended again. On the third extension of his appointed, he completed the flying time requirements. Pending his physical examination, hes employment was extended again. When Dolina took a psychological examination, his adaptability rating was found unacceptable. The Board then decided that Dolina is not qualified for regular employment in the Company. PAL filed a clearance application for Dolinas termination and in the meantime, Dolina was placed under preventive suspension. However, the Department of Labor lifted the preventive suspension and ordered petitioner to reinstate Dolina to his former position with full backwages. PAL appealed the case and the decision was reversed. PAL removed Dolina from its payroll and claiming that it was no longer obliged to return Dolina from its payroll since the decision of the Labor Arbiter was a final resolution of the case by arbitration. Dolina appealed to the NLRC which the latter dismissed the clearance application of PAL. Dolina must be restored to the payroll and paid for his salaries from the date he was dropped from the PALs payroll. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent Dolina was entitled to his salaries from the time he was dropped from PALs payroll until this case is finally resolved. Held: The decision requiring the petitioner to restore private respondent to its payroll and ordering the payment of his salaries from the time he was dropped from PALs payroll until this case is finally resolved is null and void. In lieu of reinstatement and the payment of his backwages, private respondent was included in the petitioners payroll; effective from the time he was preventively suspended until final resolution of the case by arbitration, without having to perform any work for the petitioner. In entering into agreement, the parties could not have intended to include in the clause final resolution of the case by arbitration the whole adjudicatory process, including appeal. For it were so, even proceedings on certiorari before this court would be embraced by the term arbitration and private respondent will continue to receive monthly salary without rendering any service to the petitioner regardless of the outcome of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, for as long as one of the parties appeal to the NLRC and until the case is finally resolved by this court. This is absolutely in contrast with the principle of Fair Days Wage for a Fair Days Labor. The court holds that respondents NLRCs order for the continued payment of Dolinas salaries from he was dropped from the PALs payroll until the case is finally resolved is contrary to law and established jurisprudence and the NLRC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. NLRC G.R. No. 55159 December 22, 1989 Philippine Airlines Inc. National Labor Relations Commission and Armando Dolina Cortes, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses from and promising employment in Saudi Arabia to four separate individuals, thus, violating Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. The private respondent filed a motion to quash alleging that the information do not constitute an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations and according to him, under Article 13(b), there would be illegal recruitment only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised of offered any employment for a fee. The position of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code and not under Article 13(b). However, Article 13(b) is somehow applicable since Article 39 in relation to Article 16 punishes acts of recruitment without proper authority. Issue: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code is applicable in determining the liability of the private respondent. Held: Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely specified to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whim, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring of workers. The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. It merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words shall be deemed create that presumption. PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO PANIS G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990 People of the Philippines Hon. Domingo Panis, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of ZAmbales and Olongapo City, Branch III and Serapio Abug Cruz, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioners were the fishermen-crew members of 7/B Sandyman II, one of several fishing vessels owned by the De Guzman Fishing Enterprises which is primarily in the fishing business with port and office at Camarines Sur. On September 11, 1983, petitioners were told to proceed to the police station for investigation on the report that they sold some of their fish-catch at midsea. The petitioners denied the charge claiming that the allegation was a countermove because of the formation of their union. The complaint was dismissed because there were no witnesses that would support the companys allegation. The petitioners, however, were not allowed to return to the fishing vessel to resume their work on that same day. Each of the them filed a complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay, emergency cost-of-living allowance and service incentive pay with the Ministry (now DOLE). The company denied the petitioners being their employees, further contending that they were only engaged in a joint venture. The Labor Arbiter rendered a joint decision dismissing all the complaint of the petitioners. Petitioners appealed the case to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision that a joint fishing venture and not employer-employee relationship exist between the private respondent and the petitioners. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the fishermen-crew members of the trawl fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II are employees of its owner-operator, De Guzman Fishing Enterprise, and if so, whether or not they were illegally dismissed from their employment. Held: The petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment. In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The employment arises from contract of hire, express or implied. In the absence of hiring, no employer-employee relationship could exist. Records show in the instant case that petitioners were directly hired by the general manager of the company and its operations manager. Petitioner Alipio Ruga was hired on September 29, 1974 as patron/captain of the fishing vessels; Eladio Calderon started as mechanic on April 16, 1968 until he was promoted as chief engineer of the fishing vessel; Jose Pama was employed on September 29, 1974 as assistant engineer; Jaime Barbin started as a pilot of the motor boat until he was transferred as a master fisherman to the fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II; Philip Cervantes was hired as winchman on August 1, 1972 while Eleuterio Barbin was hired as winchman on April 15, 1976. While tenure or length of employment is not considered as the test of employment, nevertheless the hiring of petitioners to perform work which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of private respondent for a period of 8-15 years since 1968 qualify them as regular employees within the meaning of Article 281 of the Labor Code as they were indeed engaged to perform activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual fishing business or occupation of private respondent. ALIPIO R. RUGA ET AL. VS. NLRC G.R. No. L-72654-61 January 22, 1990 Alipio R. Ruga, Jose Parma, Eladio Calderon, Laurente Bautu, Jaime Barbin, Nicanor Francisco, Philip Cervantes and Eleuterio Barbin National Labor Relations Commission and De Guzman Fishing Enterprises and/or Arsenio de Guzman Fernan, J.
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The virtual dismissal of petitioners from their employment was characterized by undue haste when less extreme measures consistent with the requirements of due process should have been first exhausted. In that sense, the dismissal of petitioners was tainted with illegality.
Ladylynne P. Flores
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2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) a clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel due to alleged financial losses. However, the petitioners argued that the company is not suffering any losses and the real reason for their termination was their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case, the petitioner manifested that they no longer contesting their dismissal, however, they argued that they should be granted a separation pay. Each of the petitioners was receiving a monthly salary of P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every sale they made. Under the CBA entered by the Zuellig Inc. and the petitioners, in Article XIV, Section 1(a), Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one months salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months being considered one year, including probationary employment. Other basis for petitioners contention are Article 284 of the Labor Code with regards to reduction of personnel and Sections 9(b) and 10 of Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision directing the company to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service that they have worked with the company. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres filed a Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of petition contending that he had received, to his full and complete satisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay. Held: The petition is granted. Petitioners contention that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of separation pay due to them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added together. Insofar as whether the allowances should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos vs. NLRC, 76721, in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living allowances. In the issue of whether commission should be included in the computation of their separation pay, it is proper to define first commission. Blacks Law Dictionary defined commission as the recompensed, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that the commission are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some salesmen do not receive any basi c salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions alone, are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions JOSE SONGCO VS. NLRC (FIRST DIVISION) G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990 Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), Labor Arbiter Flavio Aguas, and F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc. Medialdea, J.
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alone, although an employer-employee relationship exist. In Soriano v. NLRC, it is ruled then that, the commissions also claimed by petitioner (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned during their last year of employment.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The members of the respondent Union did not work during the 17-day strike declared in 1968 by the rank and file Union (the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions <PALFU>). The SSS and the PALFU had a disagreement concerning the interpretation of the provisions of their CBA. The PALFUs decision to strike is the effect of the CIR Order of August 29, 1968 enjoining the parties, for the sake of industrial peace..to maintain the status quo- the Union not to declare any strike and the Management not to dismiss nor suspend any of its employees nor to declare any lock out. The SSS, in that same case, filed an Urgent Petition to declare the strike illegal. The respondent Union filed a Motion for Intervention in the said case alleging that it had not participated in the strike; that its members wanted to report for work but were prevented by the picketers from entering the work premises; that under the circumstances, they were entitled to their salaries corresponding to the duration of the strike, which could be deducted from the accrued leave credits of their members. Issue: Whether or not the members of the respondent Union who admittedly did not work during the 17day strike conducted by the PALFU is entitled to their salaries. Held: According to the doctrine of Fair days wage for a Fair days labor, if there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed nor suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employers time. In this case, the failure to work on the part of the members of the respondent Union was due to circumstances not attributable to themselves. But neither should the burden of the economic loss suffered by them be shifted to their employer, the SSS, which was equally faultless, considering that the situation was not a direct consequence of the employers lockout or unfair practice. With this, it is fair that they wont be receiving their salary for those days they did not work. SSS vs. SSS Supervisors Union-CUGCO G.R. No. L-31831 October 23, 1982 Social Security System SSS Supervisors Union-CUGCO and Court of Industrial Relations Melencio-Herrera, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: G.R. number: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioners were engaged in the business of marine coastwise transportation. They had a CBA with the Cebu Seamens Association. On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that the officers and men working on board the petitioners vessels have not been paid their sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened then to accept the reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners; that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P0.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were required to pay their meals and that because the captain had refused to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the petitioners dismissed the captain. The petitioner, on their defense, stated that they have suffered a financial losses in the operation of their vessels and there is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or vacation leave to employees of private firms; that with regards to their overtime pay, they have always observed the Eight-hour labor Law and that overtime does not apply to those who provide means of transportation. The decision ruled in favor of the respondent union. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the required meals which the petitioner company deducted from the salary of the employees is considered as facilities, and not supplements. Held: Supplements constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborers and his familys existence and subsistence so that by express provisions of law, they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay them just the same. It is argued that the food or meal given to the deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in question, were mere facilities which should be deducted from wages, and not supplements which, according to Section 19 of the Minimum Wage Law, should not be deducted from such wages. It was found out that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to the effectivity of the Minimum Wage Law while they were on the high seas not as part of their wages but as a necessary matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew members during the voyage. The deductions therein made for the meals given after August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels should continue giving the benefits. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, finding out that the meals or food in question are not facilities but supplements. STATE MARINE CORPORATION VS. CEBU SEAMENS ASSOCIATION G.R. No. L-12444 February 28, 1963 State Marine Corporation and Royal Line, Inc. Cebu Seamens Association Paredes, J.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: UNION FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE) VS. BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY FILIPRO, INC.) GR number: G.R. No. 79255 Date: January 20, 1992 Petitioner: Union Filipro Employees (UFE) Respondent: Benigno Vivar, Jr., National Labor Relations Commission and Nestle Philippines, Inc. (formerly Filipro, Inc.) Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J. Facts: The respondent, Filipro Inc. (Nestle Philippines, Inc.), filed with the NLRC a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay. Both Filipro and the UFE agreed to submit the case voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator, which the latter rendered a decision directing Filipro Inc. to pay its monthly-paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. Filipro Inc. filed a motion for clarification requesting the limitation of award to 3 years; the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives from the award of the holiday pay and deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. The respondent arbitrator ruled that the sales personnel are field personnel and are not entitled to holiday pay. He even ruled that the 251 divisor should be changed to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of the divisor 251. Hence, this petition. Issue/s: (1) Whether or not Nestls sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and (2) Whether or not, if they are entitled to such holiday pay, the divisor should be change from 251 to 261 days. Held: Sales personnel are not entitled of holiday pay. Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Field personnel is defined as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Even if theres an 8:00 am to 4:00 or 4:30 pm working period of the said sales personnel, they are still considered field personnel whose actual work in the field cannot be determined. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably determined. The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 am prior to the field work and come back at 4:30 pm really spend the hours in between in actual field work. Moreover, under Rule IV, Book II of the Implementing Rules provides the coverage of the holiday pay which states that rules on holiday pay shall
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apply to all employees except Field personnel and other employees whose in time and performance is unsupervised by the employer.. Petitioner contends these sales personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the SOD (Supervisor of the Day) schedule, however, this SOD does not at least signify that these sales personnels time and performance are supervised. The purpose of this schedule is merely to ensure that the sales personnel are out of the office not later than 8:00 am and are back in the office not earlier than 4:00 pm. With regards the change of divisor from 251 to 261 is modified since the change would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code.
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Ladylynne P. Flores 2011 0080 Case title: WELLINGTON INVESTMENT AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, ELMER ABADILLA AND 34 OTHERS G.R. number: G.R. No. 114698 Date: July 3, 1995 Petitioner: Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation Respondent: Cresenciano B. Trajano, Under-Secretary of Labor and Employment, Elmer Abadilla, and 34 others Ponente: Narvasa, C.J. Facts: By virtue of the routine inspection conducted by a Labor Enforcement Officer, Wellington Flour Mills owned by the petitioner-company was found non-payment of regular holidays falling on a Sunday for monthly-paid employees. Wellington argued that the monthly-paid employees already includes holiday pay for all regular holidays and there is no legal basis for the finding of alleged non-payment of regular holidays falling on a Sunday. It further contends that it pays its monthly paid employees a fixed monthly compensation using the 314 factor which undeniably covers and already includes payment for all the working days in a month as well as all the 10 un-worked regular holidays within a year. The Regional Director ordered the petitioner to pay the employees additional compensation corresponding to 4 extra working days. However, the petitioner argued that the company, using the 314 factor already gave complete payment of all compensation due to its workers. Petitioner appealed and was acted on by the respondent Undersecretary. But still, Regional Directors decision was affirmed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a monthly-paid employees, receiving a fixed monthly compensation, is entitled to an additional pay aside from his usual holiday pay whenever a regular holiday falls on a Sunday. Held: Regional Directors decision, affirmed by the Undersecretary, is nullified and set aside. Every worker should be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays; except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers, even if the worker does not work on these regular holidays. The Wellington had been paying its employees a salary of not less than the statutory minimum wage and that the monthly salary, thus, paid was not less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by 12. Apparently the monthly salary was fixed by Wellington to provide for compensation for every working day of the year including holidays specified by law and excluding only Sundays. Wellington leaves no day unaccounted for, it is paying for all the days of a year with the exception only of 51 Sundays.
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Maria Benelyn Joy D. Gardoce 2011 0159 ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING CO. INC. VS. ATOK BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION G.R. No. L-5276 March 3, 1953 Petitioners: Vicente Hilado, Pedro Lopez and Artemio A. Almendral Respondents: Sanidad, Ayson and Casia Ponente: Labrador, J. Facts: This is an appeal by certiorari against a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. On September 4, 1950, demand was submitted to petitioner by respondent union through its officers for various concession, among which were (a) an increase of P0.50 in wages, (b) commutation of sick and vacation leave if not enjoyed during the year, (c) various privileges, such as free medical care, medicine, and hospitalization, (d) right to a closed shop, check off, etc., (e) no dismissal without prior just cause and with a prior investigation, etc. Some of the demands were granted by the petitioner, and the other were rejected, and so hearings were held and evidence submitted on the latter. After the hearing the respondent court rendered a decision, the most important provisions of which were those fixing the minimum wage for the laborers at P3.20, declaring that additional compensation representing efficiency bonus should not be included as part of the wage, and making the award effective from September 4, 1950. It is against these portions of the decision that this appeal is taken. Issue: Whether or not the contention by petitioner that as the respondent court found that the laborer and his family at least need the amount of P2.58 for food, this should be the basis for the determination of his wage, not what he actually spends Held: The petition is dismissed. It is contended by petitioner that as the respondent court found that the laborer and his family at least need the amount of P2.58 for food, this should be the basis for the determination of his wage, not what he actually spends; that it is not justifiable to fix a wage higher than that provided by Republic Act No. 602; and that respondent union made the demand in accordance with a pernicious practice of claiming more after an original demand is granted. The respondent court found that P2.58 is the minimum amount actually needed by the laborer and his family. That does not mean that it is his actual expense. A person's needs increase as his means increase. This is true not only as to food but as to everything else education, clothing, entertainment, etc. The law guarantees the laborer a fair and just wage. The minimum must be fair and just. The "minimum wage" can by no means imply only the actual minimum. Some margin or leeway must be provided, over and above the minimum, to take care of contingencies such as increase of prices of commodities and desirable improvement in his mode of living. That the P3 minimum wage fixed in the law is still far below what is considered a fair and just minimum is shown by the fact that this amount is only for the year after the law takes effect, as thereafter the law fixes it at P4. Neither may it be correctly contended that the demand for increase is due to an alleged pernicious practice. Frequent demands for increase are indicative of a healthy spirit of wakefulness to the demands of a progressing and an increasingly more expensive world. We, therefore, find no reason or ground for disturbing the finding contained in the decision fixing the amount of P3.20 as the minimum wage.
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Maria Benelyn Joy D. Gardoce 2011 0159 CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY VS. OPLE G. R. No. L-58870 April 15, 1988 Petitioner: CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (CIT) Respondents: HON. BLAS OPLE, in his capacity as Minister, Ministry of Labor and Employment, JULIUS ABELLA, ARSENIO ABELLANA, RODRIGO ALIWALAS, ZOSIMO ALMOCERA, GERONIDES ANCOG, GREGORIO ASIA; ROGER BAJARIAS, BERNARDO BALATAYO, JR., BASILIO CABALLES, DEMOCRITO TEVES, VOLTAIRE DELA CERNA, ROBERTO CABARRUBIAS, VILMA GOMEZ CHUA, RUBEN GALLITO, EDGARDO CONCEPCION, VICTOR COQUILLA, JOSE DAKOYKOY, PATERNO WONG, EVELYN LACAYA, RODRIGO GONZALES, JEOGINA GOZO, MIGUEL CABAL, LES, CONSUELO JAVELOSA, QUILIANO LASCO, FRANKLIN LAUTA, JUSTINIANA LARGO, RONALD LICUPA, ALAN MILANO, MARIA MONSANTO, REYNALDO NOYNAY, RAMON PARADELA, NATALIO PLAZA LUZPURA QUIROGA, NOE RODIS, COSMENIA SAAVEDRA, LEONARDO SAGARIO,LETICIA SERRA, SIEGFREDO TABANAG, LUCINO TAMAOSO, DANILO TERANTE, HELEN CALVO TORRES, ERNESTORES SANANAM, RODRIGO BACALSO, YOLANDA TABLANTE, ROMERO BALATUCAN, CARMELITA LADOT, PANFILO CANETE, EMMANUEL CHAVEZ, JR., SERGIO GALIDO, ANGEL COLLERA, ZOSIMO CUNANAN, RENE BURT LLANTO, GIL O VILLANUEVA, DOLORES VILLONDO, EDWARD YAP, ROWENA VIVARES, DOLBATAYOLA VICENTE DELANTE, CANDELARIO DE DIOS, JOSE MA. ESTELLA, NECITA TRINIDAD, ROTELLO ILUMBA, TEODORICO JARAYMUNDO ABSIN, RUDY MANEJA, REYNA RAMOS, ANASTACIA BLANCO, FELICISIMO DELMUNDO, ELNORA MONTERA, MORRISON MONTESCLAROS, ELEAZAR PANIAMOGAN, BERNARDO PILAPIL, RODOLFO POL, DEMOSTHENES REDOBLE, PACHECO ROMERO, DELLO SABANAL, SARAH SALINAS, RENATO SOLATORIO, EDUARDO TABLANTE, EMMANUEL TAN, FELICISIMO TESALUNA, JOSE VERALLO, JR., MAGDALENO VERGARA, ESMERALDA ABARQUEZ, MAC ARTHUR DACUYCUY ACOMPANADA, TRINIDAD ADLAWAN, FE ELIZORDO ALCANTARA, REOSEBELLA AMPER, ZENAIDA BACALSO, ELISA BADANA, GEORGIA BAS, ERLINDA BURIAS, ELDEFONSO BURIAS, CORAZON CASENAS, REGINO CASTANEDA, GEORGE CATADA, CARMENCITA G. CHAVEZ, LORETTA CUNANAN, FLORES DELFIN, TERESITA ESPINO, ELVIE GALANZA, AMADEA GALELA, TERESITA JUNTILLA, LEONARDA KAPUNGAN, ADORACION LANAWAN, LINDA LAYAO, GERARDO LAYSON, VIRGILIO LIBETARIO, RAYMOND PAUL LOGARTA, NORMA LUCERO, ANATOLIA MENDEZ, ELIODORO MENDEZ, JUDALINE MONTE, ELMA OCAMPO, ESTEFA OLIVARES, GEORGE ORAIS, CRISPINA PALANG, GRETA PEGARIDO, MELBA QUIACHON, REMEDIOS QUIROS, VIRGINIA RANCES, EDNA DELOS REYES, VICENTE TAN, EMERGENCIA ROSELL, JULIETA TATING, MERCIA TECARRO, FELISA VERGARA, WEMINA VILLACIN, MACRINA YBARSABAL, MILAGROS CATALAN, JULIETA AQUINDE, SONIA ARTIAGA, MA. TERESITA OBANDO, ASUNCION ABAYAN, ESTHER CA VITLIANA VENERACION, LEONCIA ABELLAR, REYNITA VILLACARLOS Ponente: Cortes, J. Facts: Motions for Reconsideration and Clarification in four of these six consolidated cases decided by the Court on December 18, 1987 were filed and questions not clearly raised as issues or dealt with in the main petitions but which are necessary for the full resolution of the cases are presented in the following:
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I. Fabros Case (G.R. No. 70832) The petitioners express doubt on the applicability of the three-year period of prescription under the Labor Code. There is no doubt that the three-year period within which to file actions involving money claims arise out of an employer-employee relationship fixed by Article 292 of Pres. Dec. No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, equally applies to claims for the incremental proceeds arising from tuition fee increases under Pres. Dec. No. 451. The claims which gave rise to all these cases are clearly money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship and thus falls under the coverage of Article 292 of the Labor Code. II. Biscocho Case (G.R. No. 76521) This case concerns the award of ten percent (10%) of the backwages payable to all members of the bargaining unit as negotiation fee which covers attorney's fees. agency fee and the like. This Court in its December 18, 1987 Decision affirmed this award with the modification that only members of the bargaining unit should be made to pay this assessment. The present source of ambiguity is the basis for compute the ten percent (10%) negotiation fee. Petitioners and respondent Espiritu Santo Parochial School share the opinion that the negotiation fee of ten percent (10%) should not be charged against the sixty percent (60%) incremental proceeds from tuition fee increases on the ground that this is not a bargainable matter as it has already been fixed by law; hence, only thirty percent (30%) should be subject to the computation of the ten percent (10%) negotiation fee. The respondent Espiritu Santo Parochial School Faculty Association takes the contrary view by arguing that the whole ninety percent (90%) incremental proceeds from tuition fee increases should be the subject to the computation the ten percent (10%) negotiation fee. III. Divine Word College Case(G.R. No. 68345) The original complaint in this case which covered claims for the school years 1979-1980, 1980-1981, 1981-1982 and 1982-1983 was filed on February 17, 1983 before the Regional Office. Invoking Article 292 of the Labor Code, petitioner school submits that all claims prior to February 17, 1980 have already prescribed. Artide 292 of the Labor Code expressly provides that the period within which to file actions for money claims which accrued during the effectivity of the Labor Code is three (3) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Money claims which accrued more than three (3) years prior to the filing of the complaint are barred by prescription. In the instant case, inasmuch as the original complaint was filed on February 17, 1983, the claims prior to February 17, 1980 have indeed already prescribed. IV. Far Eastern University Case (G.R. Nos. 69224-25) The Court notes the Motion for Clarification of Judgment filed by counsel for petitioner Union as regards the payment of the " transportation allowance" which was held to be an equivalent an order requiring respondent Far Eastern University to pay its employees who have been paid such transportation allowance less than one-twelfth (1/2) of the latter's basic vary, the amount of the difference. A Motion for Issuance of An Order Awarding Attorney's Lien was filed by petitioner Union's former counsel, Atty. Herminio Z. Florendo. Movant alleges that pursuant to an agreement with the members of the Union, he filed the complaint for unpaid holiday pays, underpayment of thirteenth (13th) month pay and for violation of Pres. Dec. No. 451 with the Department of Labor. The agreement which is attached to the motion provides that the prosecution of the Union members' claim is on a contingent fee basis in an amount equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of whatever may be recovered relative to Id claim. The Labor Arbiter in
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his March 10, 1980 Order awarded the Union's claim for payment of legal holiday and thirteenth (13th) month pay but dismissed its claim under Pres. Dee. No. 451. Atty. Florendo perfected the partial appeal and memorandum for complainants-appellants with the National Labor Relations Commission. Pending the appeal, however, another lawyer entered his appearance for the appellant Union thereby substituting Atty. Florendo. Issue: Whether or not salary must be excluded in allowances Held: In the Biscocho case, (G.R. No. 76521), to CLARIFY the following points: A. The ten percent (10%) negotiation fee should be computed only on the amount in excess of the sixty percent (60%) portion allocated for teachers and other school employees under the law; B. The ten percent (10%) negotiation fee should be computed on the above amount for the period starting school year 1985-1986 and ending school year 1987-1988. In the Divine Word College of Legaspi case (G.R. No. 68345), (1) to MODIFY the Court's Decision of December 18, 1987 so that all claims of private respondents prior to February 17, 1980 shall be considered prescribed; and (2) to ORDER a recomputation of the actual incremental proceeds received from tuition fee increases. In the Far Eastern Universitycase (G.R. Nos. 6922425), (1) to MODIFY the Court's Decision of December 18,1987 so that claims for the school year 1974-1975 shall be considered prescribed; (2) to CLARIFY that Far Eastern University's remaining liability for the sixty percent (60%) allotment of the incremental proceeds shall be limited only to the portion of said sixty percent (60%) which answered for the increases in allowances and other benefits under Pres. Dec. No. 451; (3) to ORDER respondent Far Eastern University t0 pay its employees who have been paid the transportation allowance in an amount less than one-twelfth (1/12) of their basic salary, the amount of the difference in thirteenth (13th) month pay subject to the three-year period of prescription under the Labor Code; (4) to NOTE the two (2) motions for recording of attorney's lien and to REMAND to the National Labor Relations Commission the matter of recording attorney's lien and the determination of the matter of entitlement of Atty. Herminio Z. Florendo to Attorney's fees.
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Maria Benelyn Joy D. Gardoce 2011 0159
DE RACHO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ILIGAN G.R. No. L-23542 January 2, 1968 Petitioner: JUANA T. VDA. DE RACHO Respondent: MUNICIPALITY OF ILAGAN Ponente: Bengzon, J.P., J. Facts: Plaintiff Juana T. Vda. de Racho and the decedent, Manuel Racho, were spouses and had five minor children. On July 1, 1954 the decedent was appointed as market cleaner in the Municipality of Ilagan, Isabela, at the rate of P660.00 per annum (P55.00 monthly) which amount he received up to June 30, 1958. On July 1, 1958, decedent's salary was increased to P720.00 per annum (P60.00 monthly) by virtue of a promotional appointment extended to him by the Municipal Mayor. Decedent was then paid the money value of his accumulated leaves. Decedent died intestate at Ilagan. Plaintiff then filed on December 9, 1960 a claim for salary differentials with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor which dropped the case later for lack of jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing facts, the Court of First Instance of Isabela ruled that defendant Municipality of Ilagan must pay P1,766.00 to plaintiff representing the wage differentials and adjusted terminal leave of the decedent from December 9, 1957 to May 23, 1960, based on the monthly wage rate of P120.00 pursuant to the Minimum Wage Law. Issue: Whether or not the shortage and lack of available funds and expected revenue of a municipality validly exempt from complying with the Minimum Wage Law Held: The appealed judgment is affirmed. Lack of funds of a municipality does not excuse it from paying the statutory minimum wages to its employees, which, after all, is a mandatory statutory obligation of the municipality. To uphold such defense of lack of available funds would render the Minimum Wage Law futile and defeat its purpose. This also disposes of the implication appellant is trying to make that its duty to pay minimum wages is not a statutory obligation which would command preference in the municipal budget and appropriation ordinance. Moreover, we cannot sanction appellant's proposition that it would eventually and gradually implement the Minimum Wage Law, "if and when its revenues can afford." The law insofar as it affects government employees took effect in 1952. It should have been implemented or at least steps to implement it should have been taken right then. To excuse the defendant municipality now would be to permit it to benefit from its non-feasance. It would also make the effectivity of the law dependent upon the will and initiative of said municipality without statutory sanction. Defendant's remedy, therefore, is not to seek an excuse from implementing the law but, as the lower court suggested, to upgrade and improve its tax collection machinery with a view towards realizing more revenues. Or, it could for the present forego all non-essential expenditures.
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DURABUILT RECAPPING PLANT AND CO. VS NLRC G.R No. 76746 July 27, 1987 Petitioner: DURABUILT RECAPPING PLANT & COMPANY and EDUARDO LAO, GENERAL MANAGER Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. COMM. RICARDO C. CASTRO, HON. ARBITER AMELIA M. GULOY, KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA DURABUILT and REYNALDO BODEGAS Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J. Facts: On July 11, 1983, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent Reynaldo Bodegas, against petitioner Durabuilt, a tire recapping company. In a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter, the private respondent was ordered reinstated to his former position with full back wages, from the time he was terminated up to the time he is actually reinstated, without loss of seniority rights and benefits accruing to him. The petitioners failed to file a seasonable appeal and entry of final judgment. The petitioner filed its opposition to the computation on the ground that it contemplated a straight computation of twenty six (26) working days in one month when the period covered by the computation was intermittently interrupted due to frequent brownouts and machine trouble and that respondent Bodegas had only a total of 250.75 days of attendance in 1982 due to absences. According to the petitioner, Bodegas is entitled only to the amount of P3,834.05 broken down as follows: salaries P1,993.00; ECOLA P1,433.50, and 13th month pay P407.55. The Labor Arbiter denied the opposition to the computation. The petitioner appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the order of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the computation of back wages should be based on daily rather than on monthly pay schedules
Held:
The petition is granted. We have held that where the failure of workers to work was not due to the employer's fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer. Each party must bear his own loss. It would neither be fair nor just to allow respondent to recover something he has not earned and could not have earned and to further penalize the petitioner company over and above the losses it had suffered due to lack of raw materials and the energy-saving programs of the government. The private respondent
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cannot be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the petitioner company. The computation of back wages should be based on daily rather than on monthly pay schedules where, as in the case at bar, such basis is more realistic and accurate.
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Maria Benelyn Joy D. Gardoce 2011 0159 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) VS. HON. LEANDRO QUISUMBING ET. AL. G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000 Petitioner: INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) Respondents: HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC. Ponente: Kapunan, J. Facts: Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreignhires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires. The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows: All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Issue:
Whether there is difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires
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Held:
The petition is given due course. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The need of the School to attract foreign-hires is recognized, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,", "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
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PEOPLE VS. GOCE G.R. No. 113161 August 9, 1995 Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondents: Loma Goce y Olalia, Dan Goce and Nelly D. Agustin Ponente: Regalado, J. Facts: On January 12, 1998, Information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in a large scale was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the RTC. On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested. Hence, the trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the accused. Thereafter, on learning the whereabouts of the accused, one of the offended parties, Rogelio Salado, requested for a copy of the warrant of arrest. Eventually, Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque police. Her counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested that it be set for hearing. Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Only appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty as principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Issue: Whether or not Agustins act of introducing the couple Goce falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code Held: The appealed judgment of the court is affirmed. The testimonial evidence hereon shows that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency. As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment agency. There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send worker abroad. It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her money she demanded in order to be so employed.
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Maria Victoria G. Guarino 2011-0131
Case Title: C. PLANAS COMMERCIAL VS NLRC, A. OFIALDA ET. AL., GR NO.: G.R. No. 144619 Date: November 11, 2005 Petitioner: C. PLANAS COMMERCIAL and/or MARCIAL COHU Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), ALFREDO OFIALDA, DIOLETO MORENTE and RUDY ALLAUIGAN Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. Facts: On September 14, 1993, Dioleto Morente, Rudy Allauigan and Alfredo Ofialda (private respondents) together with 5 others filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day and night shift differential against petitioners with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In their position paper, private respondents alleged that petitioner Cohu, owner of C. Planas Commercial, is engaged in wholesale of plastic products and fruits of different kinds with more than 24 employees; that private respondents were hired by petitioners on January 14, 1990, May 14, 1990 and July 1, 1991, respectively, as helpers/laborers; that they were paid below the minimum wage law for the past 3 years. In the instant case, complainants alleged that despite employing more than twenty -four (24) workers in his establishment, hence covered by the minimum wage law, nevertheless the individual respondent did not pay his workers the legal rates and benefits due them since their employment. By way of answer, respondents countered that they employ less than ten (10) persons, hence the money claims of complainants lack factual and legal basis, the respondents raised the defense of exemption from coverage of the minimum wage law and in support thereof alleged that they regularly employed less than ten (10) workers to serve as basis for their exemption under the law, they (respondents) must prove that they employed less than ten workers, instead of more than twenty-four (24) workers as alleged by the complainants. However, apart from their allegation, respondents presented no evidence to show the number of workers they employed regularly. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is exempted from paying the minimum wage to its employees.
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Held: R.A. No. 6727 known as the Wage Rationalization Act provides for the statutory minimum wage rate of all workers and employees in the private sector. Section 4 of the Act provides for exemption from the coverage, thus: Sec. 4. (c) Exempted from the provisions of this Act are household or domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another, including family drivers. Retail/service establishments regularly employing not more than ten (10) workers may be exempted from the applicability of this Act upon application with and as determined by the appropriate Regional Board in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations issued by the Commission. Whenever an application for exemption has been duly filed with the appropriate Regional Board, action on any complaint for alleged non-compliance with this Act shall be deferred pending resolution of the application for exemption by the appropriate Regional Board. Clearly, for a retail/service establishment to be exempted from the coverage of the minimum wage law, it must be shown that the establishment is regularly employing not more than ten (10) workers and had applied for exemptions with and as determined by the appropriate Regional Board in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations issued by the Commission. Petitioners main defense in controverting private respondents claim for underpayment of wages is that they are exempted from the application of the minimum wage law, thus the burden of proving such exemption rests on petitioners. Petitioners had not shown any evidence to show that they had applied for such exemption and if they had applied, the same was granted.
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Case Title: DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES VS. ABARQUEZ GR No.: G.R. No. 102132 Date: March 19, 1993 Petitioner: DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES Respondents: RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ, in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator and THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU-TUCP) Ponente: ROMERO, Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent and the exclusive collective bargaining agent of the rank and file workers entered into collective bargaining agreement under Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII thereof, provide for sick leave with pay benefits each year to its employees who have rendered at least one (1) year of service with the company, thus: Section 1. Sick Leaves The Company agrees to grant 15 days sick leave with pay each year to every regular non-intermittent worker who already rendered at least one year of service with the company. However, such sick leave can only be enjoyed upon certification by a company designated physician, and if the same is not enjoyed within one year period of the current year, any unenjoyed portion thereof, shall be converted to cash and shall be paid at the end of the said one year period. And provided however, that only those regular workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the herein sick leave privilege. Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members of the Regular Labor Pool shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number of hours rendered including overtime. Upon its renewal, the coverage of the said benefits was expanded to include the "present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this Agreement." Section 3, Article VIII, as revised, provides, thus: "Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members of the Regular Labor Pool and present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this agreement shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number of hours rendered including overtime.
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Also, all the field workers of petitioner who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool hours were extended sick leave with pay benefits. Any unenjoyed portion thereof at the end of the current year was converted to cash and paid at the end of the said one-year period pursuant to Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the CBA. The commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent workers or its conversion to cash was, however, discontinued or withdrawn when petitioner-company under a new assistant manager, Mr. Benjamin Marzo (who replaced Mr. Cecilio Beltran, Jr. upon the latter's resignation), stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the ground that they are not entitled to the said benefits under Sections 1 and 3 of the 1989 CBA. The Union objected said discontinuance because it would violate the principle in labor laws that benefits already extended shall not be taken away and that it would result in discrimination between the non-intermittent and the intermittent workers of the petitioner-company. The Union brought it before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and said public respondent issued an award in favour of the Union. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: the Held: There is a violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines committed by the petitioner. It was said that CBA is not an ordinary contract but impressed with public interest, thus it must yield to the common good. It must be noted that the 1989 CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner's company, namely: (1) the regular nonintermittent workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the company and are governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA; and (2) intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool as of the signing of the agreement on April 15, 1989 or those workers who have irregular working days and are governed by Section 3, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA. It is thus erroneous for petitioner to isolate Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits, specifically Section 3 thereof, in its attempt to justify the discontinuance or withdrawal of the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefit to regular intermittent workers because well-settled is it that the said privilege of commutation or conversion to cash, being an existing benefit, the petitioner-company may not unilaterally withdraw, or diminish such benefits. It is a fact that petitioner-company had, on several instances in the past, granted and paid the cash equivalent of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefits of some intermittent workers. Under the circumstances, these may be deemed to have ripened into company practice or policy which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Whether or not the petitioner, in refusing to convert unused leave to cash, violated Article 100 of Labor Code of the Philippines
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Case Title: NESTLE PHILIPPINES VS. NLRC GR No: G.R. No. 91231 Date: February 4, 1991 Petitioner: NESTL PHILIPPINES, Respondents: THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO,J
INC
Facts: Nestl Philippines, Inc., seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the decision dated August 8, 1989 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), insofar as it modified the petitioner's existing non-contributory Retirement Plan. Four (4) collective bargaining agreements separately covering the petitioner's employees in its several factories all expired on June 30, 1987. Thereafter, UFE ( Union of Filipro Employees ) was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all regular rank-and-file employees at the petitioner's Cagayan de Oro factory, as well as its Cebu/Davao Sales Office. The employees at Cabuyao resorted to a "slowdown" and walk-outs prompting the petitioner to shut down the factory. Marathon collective bargaining negotiations between the parties ensued, but led to filing complaints. After the parties had filed their pleadings, the NLRC issued a resolution on June 5, 1989, whose pertinent disposition regarding the union's demand for liberalization of the company's retirement plan for its workers, provides as follows: 7. Retirement Plan The company shall continue implementing its retirement plan modified as follows: a) for fifteen years of service or less an amount equal to 100% of the employee's monthly salary for every year of service; b) more than 15 but less than 20 years 125% of the employee's monthly salary for every year of service; c) 20 years or more 150% of the employee's monthly salary for every year of service. On December 14, 1989, the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, alleging that since its retirement plan is non-contributory, it (Nestl) has the sole and exclusive prerogative to define the terms of the plan "because the workers have no vested and demandable rights thereunder, the grant thereof being not a contractual obligation but merely gratuitous. At most the company can only be directed to maintain the same but not to change its terms. It should be left to the discretion of the company on how to improve or mollify the same"
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Issue: Whether or not Retirement Plan. Held: The Court agrees with the NLRC's finding that the Retirement Plan was "a collective bargaining issue right from the start". The union's original proposal was to modify the existing plan by including a provision for early retirement. The company did not question the validity of that proposal as a collective bargaining issue but merely offered to maintain the existing non-contributory retirement plan which it believed to be still adequate for the needs of its employees, and competitive with those existing in the industry. The union thereafter modified its proposal, but the company was adamant. Consequently, the impass on the retirement plan become one of the issues certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The company's contention that its retirement plan is non-negotiable, is not well-taken. The NLRC correctly observed that the inclusion of the retirement plan in the collective bargaining agreement as part of the package of economic benefits extended by the company to its employees to provide them a measure of financial security after they shall have ceased to be employed in the company, reward their loyalty, boost their morale and efficiency and promote industrial peace, gives "a consensual character" to the plan so that it may not be terminated or modified at will by either party The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the plan, does not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations. As a matter of fact, almost all of the benefits that the petitioner has granted to its employees under the CBA salary increases, rice allowances, mid-year bonuses, 13th and 14th month pay, seniority pay, medical and hospitalization plans, health and dental services, vacation, sick & other leaves with pay are non-contributory benefits. Since the retirement plan has been an integral part of the CBA since 1972, the Union's demand to increase the benefits due the employees under said plan, is a valid CBA issue. The deadlock between the company and the union on this issue was resolvable by the Secretary of Labor, or the NLRC, after the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute (Art. 263, subparagraph [i] of the Labor Code). The petitioner's contention, that employees have no vested or demandable right to a noncontributory retirement plan, has no merit for employees do have a vested and demandable right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employer. The latter may not unilaterally withdraw, eliminate or diminish such benefits. NLRC erred insofar as it modified the petitioner's existing non-contributory
The NLRC's resolution of the bargaining deadlock between Nestl and its employees is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor whimsical. The benefits and concessions given to the employees were based on the NLRC's evaluation of the union's demands, the evidence adduced by the parties, the financial
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capacity of the Company to grant the demands, its longterm viability, the economic conditions prevailing in the country as they affect the purchasing power of the employees as well as its concommitant effect on the other factors of production, and the recent trends in the industry to which the Company belongs . Its decision is not vitiated by abuse of discretion.
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Case Title: R. TIANGCO AND V. TIANGCO VS. HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO JR GR No.: G.R. No. 57636 Date: MAY 16, 1983 Petitioner: Reynaldo Tiangco and Victoria Tiangco Respondent: Hon. Vicente Leogardo Jr., Ponente: CONCEPCION, JR., J Facts: The petitioner, Reynaldo Tiangco, is a fishing operator who owns th e ReynaldoTiangco Fishing Company and a fleet of fishing vessels engaged in deep-sea fishing which operates from Navotas, Rizal. His business is capitalized at P2,000,000.00, while the petitioner, Victoria Tiangco, is a fish broker whose business is capitalized at P100,000.00 Some of the priv ate respondent s were engaged by Reynaldo Tiangco as batillos,who were tasked to unload the fish catch from the vessels and take them to the Fish Stall of the petitioner Victoria Tiangco. The other private respondents were batillos engaged by Victoria Tiangco. They were all working as part - time since their work were limited to days of arrival of the fishing vessels and their working days in a month are comparatively few. Their working hours average four (4) hours a day. The priv ate respondent s f iled a complaint against the petitioners with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for non-payment of their legal holiday pay and service incentive leave pay, as well as underpayment of their emergency cost of living allowances which used to be paid in full irrespective of their working days, but which were reduced effective February, 1980, in contravention of Article 100 of the new Labor Code which prohibits the elimination or diminution of existing benefits. The petitioners on th e other hand, denied the laborers contention and stated that in addition to their regular daily wage, a daily extra pay in amounts ranging from 30centavos to 10 pesos were given to offset the laborers' claim for service incentive leave and legal holiday pay. They however, admitted that they had discontinued their practice of paying a fixed monthly allowance, and allowances for non-working days. They invoked the principle of No work, no allowances and said that the payment of such allowances will cause losses to their business. The petitioners now f iled a petition f or certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor which modified and affirmed the order of Director of the National Capital Region of the Ministry of Labor, which directed the petitioners to pay the private respondents their legal holiday pay, service incentive pay, and differentials in their emergency cost of living allowances.
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Issue: Whether the Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment erred in deciding that there is diminution of benefits in the discontinuance of giving of allowance.
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Held: The Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment correctly ruled that, since the petitioners had been paying the private respondents a fixed monthly emergency allowance since November, 1976 up to February, 1980, as a matter of practice and/or verbal agreement between the petitioners and the private respondents, the discontinuance of the practice and/or agreement unilaterally by the petitioners contravened the provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 100 thereof which prohibits the elimination or diminution of existing benefits. Section 15 of the Rules on P.D. 525 and Section 16 pf the Rules on P.D. 1123 also prohibits the diminution of any benefit granted to the employees under existing laws, agreements and voluntary employer practice. The decision of the Deputy Minister of Labor was modified, taking into consideration that the respondent employees are employed by different individuals with varying capitalization.
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Case Title: GLOBE MACKAY CABLE VS. NLRC GR No: G.R. NO. 74156 Date: JUNE 29, 1988 Petitioner: GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION Respondent: NLRC, FFW- GLOBEMACKAY EMPLOYEES UNION Ponente: MELENCIO- HERRERA, J. Facts: Wage Order No. 6 increased the cost - of - living allowance of non - agricultural workers in the private sector. Petitioner corporation (GMCR) complied with the said Wage Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the mandated P3.00 per day COLA. However, in computing said COLA, GMCR multiplied the P3.00 daily COLA by 22days, which is the number of working days in the company. Respondent Union disagreed with the computation of the monthly COLA claiming that the daily COLA rate of P3.00 should be multiplied by 30 days to arrive at the monthly COLA rate. The union alleged furthermore that prior to the effectivity of Wage Order No. 6, GMCR had been computing and paying the monthly COLA on the basis of thirty (30) days per month and that this constituted an employer practice,which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the monthly COLA should be c omputed on the basis of twenty two (22) days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 paid days in a month for monthlypaid employees in the company. To compel the respondent company to use 30 days in a month to compute the allowance and retain 22 days for vacation and sick leave, overtime pay and other benefits is inconsistent and unjust. If 30 days is used as divisor, then it must be used for the computation of all benefits, not just the allowance. But this is not fair to complainants, not to mention that it will contravene the provision of the parties' CBA. Howev er, the NLRC rev ersed the Labor Arbiter and held that petitioner was guilty of illegal deductions, upon the following considerations: (1) that the P3.00 daily COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of thirty (30) days instead of twenty two(22) days since workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on Saturdays,Sundays and legal holidays "even if unworked;" (2) that the full allowance enjoyed by monthly-paid employees before the CBA executed in 1982 constituted voluntary employer practice, which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. Issue: Whether or not petitioner, in computing COLA based on the number of working days of the company , violated Article 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines Held: There is no violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code on prohibition of wage diminution. The primordial consideration f or entitlement to COLA is that basic wage is being paid. In other words, the payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the employees are
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paid their basic wage, even if said days are unworked. So that, on the days that employees are not paid their basic wage, the payment of COLA is not mandated. Peculiar to this case, however, is the circumstance that pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Petitioner and Respondent Union,the monthly basic pay is computed on the basis of five (5) days a week, or twenty two (22) days a month. In determining the hourly rate of monthly paid employees for purposes of computing overtime pay, the monthly wage is divided by the number of actual work days in a month and then, by eight (8) working hours. If a monthly-paid employee renders overtime work, he is paid his basic salary rate plus one-half thereof. Thus, where the company observes a 5-day work week, it will have to be held that the COLA should be computed on the basis of twenty two (22) days, which is the period during which the employees of petitioner receive their basic wage. The CBA is the law between the parties and, if not acceptable, can be the subject of future re-negotiation. Payment in f ull by petitioner of the COLA bef ore the execution of the CBA in compliance with Wage Orders Nos. 1 to 5,should not be construed as constitutive of voluntary employer practice, which cannot now be unilaterally withdrawn by petitioner. To be considered as such, it should hav e been practiced ov er a long period of time, and must be shown to hav e been consistent and deliberate. Adequate proof is wanting in this respect. The test of long practice has been enunciated in Oceanic Pharmaceutical Employees Union v s.Inciong such that respondent company agreed to continue giving holiday pay knowing f ully well that said employees are not cov ered by the law requiring payment of holiday pay."Absent clear administrativ e guidelines, petitioner cannot be f aulted f or erroneous application of the law. Payment may be said to hav e been made by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a "doubtf ul or difficult question o f law."Since it is a past error that is being corrected, no vested right may be said to hav e arisen nor any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code may be said to hav e resulted by virtue of the correction.
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Case Title: GR No.: Date: Petitioner:
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING VS. NLRC G.R. No. 113856 September 7, 1998 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (SMTFM-UWP), its officers and Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JOSE G. DE VERA and TOP FORM MANUFACTURING PHIL., INC. Ponente: ROMERO, J. Facts:
members
Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. At the collective bargaining negotiation, the parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic issues. Union proposed that any future wage increase given by the government should be implemented by the company across -the-board or non-conditional. Management requested the union to retain this provision since their sincerity was already proven when the P25.00 wage increase was granted across-the-board. On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01 granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers. This was followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990 providing for a P12.00 daily increase in salary. As expected, the union requested the implementation of said wage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board basis. Private respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.The union, through its legal counsel, demanded that it should "fulfill its pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-board wage increases to all employees under the wage orders." The union reiterated that it had agreed to "retain the old provision of CBA" on the strength of private respondent's "promise and assurance" of an across-the-board salary increase should the government mandate salary increases. Several conferences between the parties notwithstanding, private respondent adamantly maintained its position on the salary increases it had granted that were purportedly designed to avoid wage distortion. Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC alleging that private respondent's act of "reneging on its undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor practice through bargaining in bad faith." It charged private respondent with acts of unfair labor practices or violation of Article 247 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically "bargaining in bad faith," and prayed that it be awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages. In its position paper, the union added that it was charging private respondent with "violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code."
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Private respondent, on the other hand, contended that in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the existence of a wage distortion" that would arise from such implementation.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent violated Article 100 Of the Labor Code of the Philippines, by refusing to grant an across-the-board wage increase. Held: The alleged discrimination in the implementation of the subject wage orders does not inspire belief at all where the wage orders themselves do not allow the grant of wage increases on an acrossthe-board basis. That there were employees who were granted the full extent of the increase authorized and some others who received less and still others who did not receive any increase at all, would not ripen into what the complainants termed as discrimination. That the implementation of the subject wage orders resulted into an uneven implementation of wage increases is justified under the law to prevent any wage distortion. What the respondents did under the circumstances in order to deter an eventual wage distortion without any arbitral proceedings is certainly commendable. The alleged violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as Article XVII, Section 7 of the existing CBA as herein earlier quoted is likewise found to have no basis in fact and in law. No benefits or privileges previously enjoyed by the employees were withdrawn as a result of the implementation of the subject orders. Likewise, the alleged company practice of implementing wage increases declared by the government on an across-the-board basis has not been duly established by the complainants' evidence. The complainants asserted that the company implemented Republic Act No. 6727 which granted a wage increase of P25.00 effective July 1, 1989 on an across-the-board basis. Granting that the same is true, such isolated single act that respondents adopted would definitely not ripen into a company practice. It has been said that "a sparrow or two returning to Capistrano does not a summer make."
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Case Title: PAG ASA STEEL WORKS VS. CA GR No.: G.R. 166647 Petitioner: PAG-ASA STEEL WORKS, INC. Repondents: COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SIXTH DIVISION and PAG-ASA STEEL WORKERS UNION (PSWU) Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J. Facts: Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of steel bars and wire rods while Pag-Asa Steel Workers Union is the duly authorized bargaining agent of the ran-and-file employees. RTWPB of NCR issued a wage order which provided for a P 13.00 increase of the salaries receiving minimum wages. The Petitioner and the union negotiated on the increase. Petitioner forwarded a letter to the union with the list of adjustments involving rank and file employees. In September 1999, the petitioner and union entered into an collective bargaining agreement where it provided wage adjustments namely P 15, P 25, P 30 for three succeeding year. On the first year, the increase provided were followed until RTWPB issued another wage order where it provided for a P 25.50 per day increase in the salary of employees receiving the minimum wage and increased the minimum wage to P 223.50 per day. Petitioner paid the P 25.50 per day increase to all of its rank-and-file employees .On November 2000, Wage Order No. NCR-08 was issued where it provided the increase of P 26.50 per day. The union president asked that the wage order be implemented where petitioner rejected the request claiming that there was no wage distortion and it was not obliged to grant the wage increase. The union submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration where it favored the position of the company and dismissed the complaint. The matter was elevated to CA where it favored the respondents. Issue: Whether or not the company was obliged to grant the wage increase under the Wage Order as a matter of practice. Held: Company is not obliged to grant the wage increase. It is submitted that employers unless exempt are mandated to i mplement the said wage order but limited to those entitled thereto. A perusal of the record shows that the lowest paid employee before the implementation of Wage Order #8 is P 250.00/day and none was receiving below P 223.50 minimum. This could only mean that the union can no longer demand for any wage distortion adjustment. The provision of wage order #8 and its implementing rules are very clear as to who are entitled to the P 26.50/day increase i. e., "private sector workers and employees in the National Capital Region receiving the prescribed daily minimum wage rate of P 223.50 shall receive an increase of Twenty- six Pesos and Fifty Centavos ( P 26.50) per day," and since the lowest paid is P 250.00/day the company is not obliged to adjust the wages of the workers. The provision in the CBA that "Any Wage Order to be implemented by the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board shall be in addition to the wage increase adv erted above" cannot be interpreted in support of an across-
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the - board increase. Wage Order No. NCR 08 clearly states that only those employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage increase prov ided therein,and not all employees across the board as respondent Union would want petitioner to do. Considering wage, petitioner is not obliged to grant the wage increase to them. Moreov er, to ripen into a company practice that is demandable as a matter of right, the giving of the increase should not be by reason of a strict legal or contractual obligation, but by reason of an act of liberality on the part of the employer. Hence, even if the company continuously grants a wage increase as mandated by a wage order or pursuant to a CBA, the same would not automatically ripen into a company practice.
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Case Title: DARVIN VS. GR No.: G.R. No. Date: July 13, 1998 Petitioner: IMELDA DARVIN Respondents:HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Ponente: ROMERO,J
CA 125044
Facts: Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment. Held: Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as: ...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code. Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so. In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.
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By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities. At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably prove the accuseds authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Courts duty, and the accuseds right, to proclaim his innocence.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983 ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS (AGW); PNB-FEMA BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA AT KAWANI NG MWSS (AGW); BALARA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); GSIS WORKERS ASSOCIATION (AGW); SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); PVTA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS AND OFFICE WORKERS (AGW); , petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB); METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS and SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS); GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS); SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS); PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (PVTA) PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE (PNC); POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), FACTS: In 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a motion pursuant to P.D. No. 851 that requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that, employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. The petitioners contend that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851 included other types of employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types of employers from the requirement. ISSUE: Whether or not the private sectors or of government-owned and - controlled corporations and government agencies, are thereunder obligated to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a month, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24th of every year? HELD: It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not the collective bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from management that determine how much the workers in government-owned or controlled corporations may receive in terms of salaries, 13th month pay, and other conditions or terms of employment. There are government institutions which can afford to pay two weeks, three weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their budgetary appropriations. Here as in other countries, government salaries and wages have always been lower than salaries, wages, and bonuses in the private sector. However, civil servants have no cause for despair. Service in the government may at times be a sacrifice but it is also a welcome privilege. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 is, therefore, a correct interpretation of the decree. It has been implemented and enforced from December 22, 1975 to the present; the petitioners have shown no valid reason why it should be nullified because of their petition filed six and a half years after the issuance and implementation of the rule. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (EXCEPTIONS) G.R. No. 155059 April 29, 2005 AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE DAILY RATED EMPLOYEES UNION, Petitioner, vs.AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE CO., INC. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. FACTS: American Wire and Cable Co., Inc., is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of wires and cables. Two unions in this company, the American Wire and Cable Monthly-Rated Employees Union and Cable Daily-Rated Employees Union. In 2001, an action was filed before the NCMB of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) by the two unions for voluntary arbitration. They alleged that, without valid cause, suddenly and unilaterally withdrew and denied certain benefits and entitlements which they have long enjoyed, which are the ff: Service Award; 35% premium pay of an employees basic pay for the work rendered during Holy Monday, Holy Tuesday, Holy Wednesday, December 23, 26, 27, 28 and 29; Christmas Party; and Promotional Increase. A promotional increase was asked by the petitioner for fifteen of its members who were given or assigned new job classifications. The new job classifications were in the nature of a promotion, necessitating the grant of an increase in the salaries of the said 15 members. In 2001, a Submission Agreement was filed by the parties for Voluntary Arbitration, Angel A. Ancheta. Decision was rendered in favor of the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by both unions and was denied for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of violating Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended, when the benefits/entitlements given to the members of petitioner union were withdrawn? HELD: ART. 100. PROHIBITION AGAINST ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS. The petitioner submits that the withdrawal of the private respondent of the 35% premium pay for selected days during the Holy Week and Christmas season, the holding of the Christmas Party and its incidental benefits, and the giving of service awards violated Article 100 of the Labor Code. The grant of these benefits was a customary practice that can no longer be unilaterally withdrawn by private respondent without the tacit consent of the petitioner. The benefits in question were given by the respondent to the petitioner consistently, deliberately, and unconditionally since time immemorial. As such, it cannot be withdrawn from the petitioner at respondents whim and caprice, and without the consent of the former. The benefits given by the respondent cannot be considered as a "bonus" as they are not founded on profit. Even assuming that it can be treated as a "bonus," the grant of the same, by reason of its long and regular concession, may be regarded as part of regular compensation. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 06 March 2002 and 12 July 2002, respectively, which affirmed and upheld the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator, are hereby AFFIRMED.
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Alexander O. Guevarra, Jr. 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. 72616-17 March 8, 1989 FRAMANLIS FARMS, INC., ELOISA SYCIP and LINCOLN SYCIP, petitioners vs.HON. MINISTER OF LABOR, MANILA, respondent GRIO-AQUINO, J.: FACTS: In 1980, 18 employees of the petitioners filed against their employer, alleging that in 1977 to 1979 they were not paid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) minimum wage, 13th month pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay. In their answer to the amended complaint, petitioners alleged that the private respondents were not regular workers on their hacienda but were migratory or pakyaw workers who worked on-and-off and were hired seasonally, or only during the milling season, to do piece-work on the farms, hence, they were not entitled to the benefits claimed by them. They also alleged that under the decrees, the living allowance shall be paid on a monthly, not percentage, basis depending on the total assets or authorized capital stock of the employer, whichever is higher and applicable. They admitted that their total assets and authorized capital stock exceeded P2 million. However, in 1977 they had applied for exemption under PDs 525 and 1123 but no ruling has been issued by the Ministry of Labor on their application. The claims for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, social amelioration bonus and underpayment of minimum wage were not controverted. With respect to the complainants' other claims, the petitioners submitted only random payrolls which showed that the women workers were underpaid as they were receiving an average daily wage of P5.94 only, although the male workers received P10 more or less, per day. ISSUE: Whether or not the employees are entitled to their thirteenth month pay. HELD: The respondents argued that they substantially complied with the law by giving their workers a yearly bonus and other non-monetary benefits amounting to not less than 1/12th of their basic salary, in the form of:1.a weekly subsidy of choice pork meat for only P9.00 per kilo and later increased to P11 per kilo in March 1980, instead of the market price of P10 to P15 per kilo; 2.free choice pork meat in May and December of every year; and 3.free light or electricity; 4.all of which were allegedly "the equivalent" of the 13th month pay. Unfortunately, under Section 3 of PD No. 851, such benefits in the form of food or free electricity, assuming they were given, were not a proper substitute for the 13th month pay required by law. The failure of the Minister's decision to identify the pakyaw and non-pakyaw workers does not render said decision invalid. The workers may be identified or determined in the proceedings for execution of the judgment. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (EXCEPTIONS) G.R. No. 111744 September 8, 1995 LOURDES G. MARCOS, ALEJANDRO T. ANDRADA, BALTAZARA J. LOPEZ AND VILMA L. CRUZ, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., respondents. FACTS: Petitioners were regular employees of respondent, but they were dismissed In 1990 when their positions were declared redundant. A special redundancy benefit was paid to them, which included payment of accrued vacation leave and fifty percent of unused current sick leave, special redundancy benefit, equivalent to three months salary for every year of service; and additional cash benefits, in lieu of other benefits provided by the company or required by law. Before the termination of their services, petitioner Marcos had been in the employ of private respondent for more than twenty years, Andrada, more than twenty-five years, Lopez, exactly thirty years, Cruz, more than twenty years. They claimed that they should receive their respective service awards and other prorated bonuses which they had earned at the time they were dismissed. NLRC held that either was there any unwritten agreement between complainants and respondent upon separation, which entitled the former to other remunerations or benefits. On the contrary, they voluntarily accepted the redundancy benefit package; otherwise, they would not have been separated from employment. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NLRC committed reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in affirming the validity of the "Release and Quitclaim" and, consequently, that petitioners are not entitled to payment of service awards and other bonuses. HELD: A bonus is not a gift or gratuity, but is paid for some services or consideration and is in addition to what would ordinarily be given. 25 The term "bonus" as used in employment contracts, also conveys an idea of something which is gratuitous, or which may be claimed to be gratuitous, over and above the prescribed wage which the employer agrees to pay. While there is a conflict of opinion as to the validity of an agreement to pay additional sums for the performance of that which the promise is already under obligation to perform, so as to give the latter the right to enforce such promise after performance, the authorities hold that if one enters into a contract of employment under an agreement that he shall be paid a certain salary by the week or some other stated period and, in addition, a bonus, in case he serves for a specified length of time, there is no reason for refusing to enforce the promise to pay the bonus, if the employee has served during the stipulated time, on the ground that it was a promise of a mere gratuity. In the case at bar, equity demands that the performance and anniversary bonuses should be prorated to the number of months that petitioners actually served respondent company in the year 1990. This observation should be taken into account in the computation of the amounts to be awarded to petitioners. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez is REINSTATED.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR. 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. 100167 March 2, 1995 ISALAMA MACHINE WORKS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION FACTS: In 1987 both petitioner and respondent entered into a collective bargaining agreement. Following the signing of the CBA, the union made repeated demands on the corporation, allegedly to no avail, for it to comply with the CBA provisions, i.e., to furnish the workers with safety shoes and free company laminated IDs and, in general, to improve the employees' working conditions. In 1987, the corporation paid the workers the 13th month pay based on the average number of days actually worked during the year. The union, private respondent Henry Baygan, demanded that the 13th month pay should, instead, be made on the basis of a full one month basic salary. The corporation countered that its own computation of the 13th month pay accorded with the CBA provisions and Presidential Decree No. 851. The union filed a notice of strike alleging the commission of unfair labor practice and CBA violation by the corporation. After several conferences. Petitioner submits that private respondents cannot claim good faith in staging their strike since the attention of both parties had been called by the conciliator at the hearings before the NCMB to the "non-strikeable" character of the 13th month pay. Private respondents continue to claim. ISSUE: Whether or not 13th month pay should be considered a strikeable issue? HELD: In this case, the real reason for the strike is clearly traceable to the unresolved dispute between the parties on 13th month pay differentials under Presidential Decree No. 851, i.e., the proper manner of its application and computation. The Court does not see this issue, given the aforequoted provisions of the law and its implementing rules, to be constitutive of unfair labor practice. Petitioner tells us that it can no longer accept the strikers due to its decision to close down its operations on account of damages and losses it has incurred because of the strike, and that Golden Engineering, which has taken over the business, is presently owned by one Alfredo Chan and not Charlie Chan of petitioner corporation. 11 This claim raises factual issues which evidently are still awaiting resolution by the NLRC in the motion for execution now pending before it. It is there, not here, where these issues can be finally resolved. This case arose in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715; accordingly, the back salaries of the dismissed employee should be limited to three years, without deduction or qualification, following the rule in Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC are AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the back salaries ordered to be paid should be limited, without deduction or qualification, to only three (3) years. No costs.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (EXCEPTIONS) G.R. No. L-24632 October 26, 1968 LEXAL LABORATORIES and/or JOSE ANGELES, Manager, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES WORKERS UNION-PAFLU (Lexal Laboratories Chapter) and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. FACTS: Lexal to reinstate Guillermo Ponseca, a dismissed employee, to his former position "with full back wages from the day of his dismissal up to the time he is actually reinstated without loss of his seniority rights and of such other rights and privileges enjoyed by him prior to his lay-off." CIR, confirming the report of its Chief Examiner and Economist, ruled in its order of February 16, 1965 that Ponseca was entitled to back wages from November 5, 1958 when he ceased reporting for work, to November 24, 1963 a day prior to his reinstatement on November 25, 1963. Petitioners vigorously objected to the inclusion of the P4.00 per diem in the computation of Ponseca's back wages because the latter "did not actually spend for his meals and lodgings for he was all the time in Manila, his station." CIR brushed this contention aside. Whereupon, petitioners appealed to this Court from the order of February 16, 1965 and the resolution of May 22, 1965. ISSUE: Whether or not Guillermo Ponseca is entitled of back wages? HELD: It would seem to us that per diem is intended to cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.4 Lexal concedes that whenever its employee, Guillermo Ponseca, was out of Manila, he was allowed a per diem of P4.00 broken down as follows: P1.00 for breakfast; P1.00 for lunch; P1.00 for dinner; and P1.00 for lodging. Ponseca during the period involved did not leave Manila. Therefore, he spent nothing for meals and lodging outside of Manila. Because he spent nothing, there is nothing to be reimbursed. Since per diems are in the nature of reimbursement, Ponseca should not be entitled to per diems. For the foregoing reasons, the order of February 16, 1965, and the resolution of May 22, 1965, both of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 2002-ULP, entitled "National Chemical Industries Workers UnionPAFLU (Lexal Laboratories Chapter), Complainant, versus Lexal Laboratories and Jose Angeles, its Manager, Respondents", are hereby modified; and Judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner Lexal Laboratories to pay Guillermo Ponseca, by way of net backpay, the sum of P2,697.00. No costs. So ordered.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. L-59743 May 31 1982 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner, vs.ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents. FACTS: In 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. The decision having become final and executory entry of judgment was made. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. ISSUE: Whether or not under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay? HELD: CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month's pay. When this agreement was forged on November 30,1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including the distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper employees (in addition to mid- year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices. The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (EXEPTIONS) G.R. No. 101761. March 24, 1993. NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NBSR SUPERVISORY UNION, (PACIWU) TUCP, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, a corporation controlled by the Government. The Batangas refinery was privatized in 1992. Private respondent union represents the former supervisors of the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar. In 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees, from rank-and-file to department heads. The JE Program was designed to rationalize the duties and functions of all positions. They used to be paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay pursuant to the provisions of Articles 87, 93 and 94 of the Labor Code as amended. In 1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union, which was organized pursuant to Republic Act NO. 6715 allowing supervisory employees to form their own unions, as the bargaining representative of all the supervisory employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery. Two years after the implementation of the JE Program, in 1990, the members of herein respondent union filed a complainant with the executive labor arbiter for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code. Respondent National Sugar refineries Corporation is hereby directed to pay the said penalties. On appeal, in a decision promulgated In 1991 by its Third Division, respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter on the ground that the members of respondent union are not managerial employees, therefore, they are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay. ISSUE: Whether or not the members of respondent union are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay? Whether or not supervisory employees, as defined in Article 212 (m), Book V of the Labor Code, should be considered as officers or members of the managerial staff under Article 82, Book III of the same Code, and hence are not entitled to overtime rest day and holiday pay? HELD: The distinction made by respondent NLRC on the basis of whether or not the union members are managerial employees, to determine the latter's entitlement to the questioned benefits, is misplaced and inappropriate. It is admitted that these union members are supervisory employees and this is one instance where the nomenclatures or titles of their jobs conform with the nature of their functions. Hence, to distinguish them from a managerial employee, as defined either under Articles 82 or 212 (m) of the Labor Code, is puerile and in efficacious. The controversy actually involved here seeks a determination of whether or not these supervisory employees ought to be considered as officers or members of the managerial staff. The distinction, therefore, should have been made along that line and its corresponding conceptual criteria.Promotion of its employees is one of the jurisprudentially-recognized exclusive prerogatives of management, provided it is done in good faith. In the case at bar, private respondent union has miserably failed to convince this Court that the petitioner acted implementing the JE Program. There is no showing that the JE Program was intended to circumvent the law and deprive the members of respondent union of the benefits they used to receive. WHEREFORE, the impugned decision and resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission promulgated on July 19, 1991 and August 30, 1991, respectively, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered and adopted with grave abuse of discretion, and the basic complaint of private respondent union is DISMISSED.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. 114280 July 26, 1996 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (ALPAP), respondents. FACTS: Refusing to pay its pilots their thirteenth month pay for unfair labor practice was filed against Philippine Airlines by the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of ALPAP and ordered PAL to pay its pilots belonging to ALPAP their thirteenth month pay from 1988 to 1990. Disputing PAL's contention, ALPAP argued that the payment of the year-end bonus cannot be equated within the thirteenth month pay since the payment of the former is conditional in character and not fixed in its amount, while that of the thirteenth month pay is mandatory in character and definite in its. Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which in turn affirmed with modifications the decision of the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: Whether or not PAL can claim the exception provided under the law by equation the year-end bonus with the payment of the thirteenth month pay deserves a very close scrutiny in this case? HELD: It appears that the rationale for the grant of the year-end bonus by PAL coincides with the nature of the bonus which can be equated with the payment of a thirteenth month pay. However, notwithstanding the above disquisitions, the peculiar circumstances in this case wavers against the outright application of the rule preventing the imposition of a double burden against the employer who is already paying the equivalent of the thirteenth month pay, and hereby exempt PAL from granting both benefits of a year-end bonus and a thirteenth month pay to its pilots. The inclusion of a provision for the continued payment of the year-end bonus in the 1988-1991 CBA of ALPAP and PAL belies the latter contention that the grant of the year-end bonus was intended to be credited as compliance with the mandate to pay the pilots a thirteenth month pay.As early as said date, PAL was therefore fully aware that it was legally obliged to grant all its rank and file employees a thirteenth month pay. Moreover, there is no rational basis for withholding from the members of ALPAP the benefit of a year-end bonus is addition to the thirteenth month pay, while the same being granted to the other rank and field employees of PAL. WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petitions, the same are hereby DENIED and the Resolutions of public respondent NLRC promulgated on November 23, 1993 and February 28, 1994 are hereby AFFIRMED.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. 110068 November 11, 1993 PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION - TUPAS, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Duplicators, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of foreign-made copying machines and related consumables. In petitioner's employ are salesmen who are paid a fixed or guaranteed salary plus commissions, which commissions are computed on the selling price of the duplicating machines sold by the respective salesmen. Private respondent union, for and on behalf of its member-salesmen, asked petitioner corporation for payment of 13th month pay computed on the basis of the salesmen's fixed or guaranteed wages plus commissions. Petitioner corporation refused the union's request. Respondent, union thereupon instituted a complaint against petitioner corporation for payment of the demand of its salesmen-members for 13th month pay. After submission of the parties' respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dated 24 October 1989 directing petitioner corporation to pay 13th month pay to its salesmen computed in accordance with the requirements of Explanatory Bulletin No. 86-12. ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriate mode of computation of the 13th month pay of the employees who receive a fixed or guaranteed salary plus sales commissions? HELD: In the instant case, there is no question that the sales commissions earned by salesmen who make or close a sale of duplicating machines distributed by petitioner corporation constitute part of the compensation or remuneration paid to salesmen for serving as salesmen, and hence as part of the "wage" or "salary" of petitioner's salesmen. Indeed, it appears that petitioner pays its salesmen a small fixed or guaranteed wage; the greater part of the salesmen's wages or salaries being composed of the sales or incentive commissions earned on actual sales closed by them. To recapitulate, the 13th month pay of employees paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus sales commission must be equivalent to onetwelfth (1/12) of the total earnings (fixed or guaranteed wage-cum-sales commissions) during the calendar year. Considering that petitioner has excluded from the computation of the 13th month pay the sales commissions earned by its individual salesmen, we believe and so hold that petitioner must be held liable to pay for the deficiency. WHEREFORE, petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission in rendering its decision dated 17 November 1992, the petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. L-49774 February 24, 1981 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (CAGAYAN COCA-COLA PLANT), petitioner, vs.Hon. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor and CAGAYAN COCA-COLA FREE WORKERS UNION, respondents. FACTS: In 1977, Coca-Cola Free Workers Union, private respondent herein, filed a complaint against San Miguel Corporation, petitioner, alleging failure or refusal of the latter to include in the computation of 13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials. An Order 3 dated February 15, 1977 was issued by Regional Office No. X where the complaint was filed requiring herein petitioner San Miguel Corporation to pay the difference of whatever earnings and the amount actually received as 13th month pay excluding overtime premium and emergency cost of living allowance. Herein petitioner appealed from that Order to the Minister of Labor in whose behalf the Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued an Order affirming the Order of Regional Office No. X and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not in the computation of the 13th-month pay under Presidential Decree 851, payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials should be considered? HELD: The all-embracing phrase "earnings and other remuneration" which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves. Maternity premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays pays for regular holidays and night differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-month they, were not so excluded, it is hard to find any "earnings and other remunerations" expressly excluded in the computation of the 13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be Idle and with no purpose. It is likewise clear that premium for special holiday which is at least 30% of the regular wage is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular wage or basic salary. For similar reason it shall not be considered in the computation of the 13thmonth pay.WHEREFORE, the Orders of the Deputy Labor Minister dated June 7, 1978 and December 19, 1978 are hereby set aside and a new one entered as above indicated. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on February 14, 1979 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Alexander O. Guevarra, Jr. 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (EXCEPTIONS) G.R. No. 88168 August 30, 1990 TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J. FACTS: In 1986, the Union, filed a letter-complaint against TRB claiming that first; the management of TRB per memo paid the employees their HOLIDAY PAY, but has withheld from the Union the basis of their computation. Second, the computation in question has allegedly decreased the daily salary rate of the employees. Third, the diminution of benefits being enjoyed by the employees since time immemorial mid-year bonus, from two (2) months gross pay to two (2) months basic and year-end bonus from three (3) months gross to only two (2) months.. Fourth, the refusal by management to recall active union members from the branches which were being transferred without prior notice, solely at the instance of the branch manager. IN its answer to the union's complaint, TRB pointed out that the NLRC, not the Bureau of Labor Relations, had jurisdiction over the money claims of the employees. NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the employees. A motion for reconsideration was filed by TRB but it was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. There is merit in the petitioner's contention that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ordering it to pay mid-year/year-end bonus differential for 1986 to its employees. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of diminution of benefits? HELD: A bonus is "a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver which the recipient has no right to demand as a matter of right", "It is something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient." The granting of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which cannot be forced upon the employer "who may not be obliged to assume the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the employee's basic salaries or wages". It is clear from the above-cited rulings that the petitioner may not be obliged to pay bonuses to its employees. Private respondent's contention, that the decrease in the midyear and year-end bonuses constituted a diminution of the employees' salaries, is not correct, for bonuses are not part of labor standards in the same class as salaries, cost of living allowances, holiday pay, and leave benefits, which are provided by the Labor Code. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is modified by deleting the award of bonus differentials to the employees for 1986. In other respects, the decision is affirmed. Costs against the respondent union.
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ALEXANDER O. GUEVARRA, JR 2011-0128 ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS (THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY) G.R. No. L-60337 August 21, 1987 UNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS (A DIVISION OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION), petitioner, vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FACTS: In 1972, the petitioner and the Universal Corn Products Workers Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The COMPANY agrees to grant all regular workers within the bargaining unit with at least one (1) year of continuous service, a Christmas bonus equivalent to the regular wages for seven (7) working days.The agreement had a duration of three years. On account however of differences between the parties with respect to certain economic issues, the collective bargaining agreement in question expired without being renewed. In 1979, the parties entered into an "addendum" stipulating certain wage increases covering the years from 1974 to 1977. Simultaneously, they entered into a collective bargaining agreement for the years from 1979 to 1981. Like the "addendum," the new collective bargaining agreement did not refer to the "Christmas bonus" theretofore paid but dealt only with salary adjustments. According to the petitioner, the new agreements deliberately excluded the grant of Christmas bonus with the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 851. It further claims that since 1975, it had been paying its employees 13th-month pay pursuant to the Decree. For failure of the petitioner to pay the seven-day Christmas bonus for 1975 to 1978 inclusive, in accordance with the 1972 CBA, the union went to the labor arbiter for relief. In his decision, the labor arbiter ruled that the payment of the 13th month pay precluded the payment of further Christmas bonus. The union appealed to NLRC. The NLRC set aside the decision of the labor arbiter appealed from and entered another one, "directing respondent company [now the petitioner to pay the members concerned of complainants union their 7-day wage bonus in accordance with the 1972 CBA from 1975 to 1978. ISSUE: Whether or not the Christmas bonus can be considered as 13th month pay? HELD: The collective bargaining agreement accords a reward, in this case, for loyalty, to certain employees. This is evident from the stipulation granting the bonus in question to workers "with at least one (1) year of continuous service is a purpose not found in P.D. 851. It is claimed, however, that as a consequence of the impasse between the parties beginning 1974 through 1979, no collective bargaining agreement was in force during those intervening years. Hence, there is allegedly no basis for the money award granted by the respondent labor body. The fact, therefore, that the new agreements are silent on the seven-day bonus demanded should not preclude the private respondents' claims thereon. The 1972 agreement is basis enough for such claims for the whole writing is instinct with an obligation, imperfectly express. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision of the public respondent NLRC promulgated on February 11, 1982, and its Resolution dated March 23, 1982, are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on May 19, 1982 is LIFTED.
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Marc Aerone Paul P. Imperio 2011-0147 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The Respondent works as a painter, making ad billboards and murals for the motion pictures shown at the Empress, Supreme and Crown Theaters, the Petitioner was the general manager of these theaters. The petitioner denied that the respondent was his employee, he asserted that the respondent was an independent contractor who did his work according to his methods and that he was paid on a fixed piece-work basis. Issue: Was the contention of the petitioner tenable? Held: The court found no merits on the contention of the petitioner. Payment by result is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of employee-employer relationship. It is a method of computing compensation, not as basis for determining the existence or absence of employer-employee relationship. Rolando Y. Tan vs Leovigildo Lagarama 151228 August 15, 2002 Rolando Y. Tan LEOVIGILDO LAGRAMA and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Mendoza
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Case Title: Avelino Lambo v NLRC and JC Tailor Shop GR No.: 111042 Date: October 26, 1999 Petitioner: AVELINO LAMBO and VICENTE BELOCURA Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and J.C. TAILOR SHOP and/or JOHNNY CO Ponente: Mendoza Facts: Petitioners Avelino Lambo and Vicente Belocura were employed as tailors by private respondents J.C. Taylor Shop on September 10, 1985 and March 3, 1985 respectively. They worked from 8:00 am to 7:00 pm daily including Sundays and holidays. They are paid in a piece-work basis, according to the style of suits they made. Regardless of the number of pieces they finished in a day they are given a daily pay of at least 64.00php Issue: Are the petitioners considered Regular Employees even if they are under piece-work basis? Held: Yes. The court declared that they are regular employees. The mere fact that they were paid on a Piece-rate basis does not negate their status as a regular employees of the private respondents. Because the private respondent exercised control over the work of petitioners, as tailors working in the companys premises from 8:00 am to 7:00 pm. The court also distinguished the two categories of employees paid by result, first are those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer and second are those whose time and performance are unsupervised. Piece Rate Workers
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Case Title: Makati Haberdashery, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission
GR No.: 83380-81 Date: November 15, 1989 Petitioner: MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC., JORGE LEDESMA and CECILIO G. INOCENCIO Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CEFERINA J. DIOSANA (Labor Arbiter, Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region), SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SANDIGAN)-TUCP and its members, JACINTO GARCIANO, ALFREDO C. BASCO, VICTORIO Y. LAURETO, ESTER NARVAEZ, EUGENIO L. ROBLES, BELEN N. VISTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESTRABO, VEVENCIO TIRO, CASIMIRO ZAPATA, GLORIA ESTRABO, LEONORA MENDOZA, MACARIA G. DIMPAS, MERILYN A. VIRAY, LILY OPINA, JANET SANGDANG, JOSEFINA ALCOCEBA and MARIA ANGELES Ponente: Fernan Facts: The individual complainants have been working for petitioner Makati Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basteros and plantsadoras. They are paid on a piece-rate basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they are given a daily allowance of three pesos, provided they report for work before 9:30 am daily. They are also required to work from 9:30 am up to 6:00 pm or 7:00 pm from Monday to Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays. The respondents claim that they are under paid, deprived of their overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive pay, 13th month pay, and benefits provided for under Wage Orders Nos. 1,2,3,4 and 5.o To counter the claims the petitioner denies the presence of Employer-Employee Relationship. Issue/s: 1. Were the respondents entitled to their claims? 2. Does the Employer-Employee Relationship Exist? Held: The essential Employer-Employee Relationship exist, the power of control by the petitioner is present. On the other issue, the respondents are entitled to the benefits they are claiming. Except service incentive pay because as piece-rate workers being paid at a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of time consumed in the performance thereof, they fall under one of the exceptions stated in Implementing Regulations, book 3, Labor Code.
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Case Title: Labor Congress of the Philippines v NLRC, Empire Food Products et al. GR No.: 123938 Date: May 21, 1998 Petitioner: LABOR CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) for and in behalf of its members, ANA MARIE OCAMPO, MARY INTAL, ANNABEL CARESO, MARLENE MELQIADES, IRENE JACINTO, NANCY GARCIA, IMELDA SARMIENTO, LENITA VIRAY Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EMPIRE FOOD PRODUCTS, its Proprietor/President & Manager, MR. GONZALO KEHYENG and MRS. EVELYN KEHYENG Ponente: Davide Jr. Facts: The 99 petitioners in this case were rank-and-file employees of Empire Food Products. They filed complaints for money claims and violations of Labor Standards Laws. They are paid on a piece-rate basis, working as repackers, they were paid a certain amount for every thousand pieces of cheese curls and other products repacked. They are seeking for backwages and other statutory benefits from the respondent. Issue: What are the statutory benefits granted to the petitioner as piece-rate employees? Held: The court declared that the petitioners are entitled to; Holiday Pay Premium Pay 13th Month Pay Service Incentive Leave The court laid down 3 factors that led them to rule, granting the petitioners claim. That they were regular employees, although piece-rate workers, first is that their task as repackers of food was necessary in the usual business of the private respondent, second the petitioners worked throughout the year, and third, the length of time that petitioners worked for the private respondent.
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Case Title: Bernardo Jimenez v NLRC, Pedro Juanatas GR No.: 116960 Date: April 2, 1996 Petitioner: BERNARDO JIMENEZ and JOSE JIMENEZ, as Operators of JJ's TRUCKING Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PEDRO JUANATAS and JUANATAS Ponente: Regalado Facts: On June 29, 1990, herein private respondent Pedro and Fredelito Juanatas, father and son, filed a claim for unpaid wages/commissions, separation pay and damages against JJ's Trucking and/or Dr. Bernardo Jimenez. Said respondents, as complainants therein, alleged that in December, 1987, they were hired by herein petitioner Bernardo Jimenez as driver/mechanic and helper, respectively, in his trucking firm, JJ Trucking. They were assigned to a ten-wheeler truck to haul soft drinks of Coca-Cola Bottling Company and paid on commission basis, initially fixed at 17% but later increased to 20% in 1988. Private respondents further alleged that for the years 1988 and 1989 they received only a partial commission of P84,000.00 from petitioners' total gross income of almost P1,000,000.00 for the said two years. Consequently, with their commission for that period being computed at 20% of said income, there was an unpaid balance to them of P106,211.86; that until March, 1990 when their services were illegally terminated, they were further entitled to P15,050.309 which, excluding the partial payment of P7,000.00, added up to a grand total of P114,261.86 due and payable to them; and that petitioners' refusal to pay their aforestated commission was a ploy to unjustly terminate them. Issue: Who has the burden of proof to ascertain payment of wages? Held: Where the employee alleges non-payment of wages, the employer has the burden to prove payment. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
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Case Title: Virginia G. Neri v NLRC, Far East Bank & Trust Company and Building Care Corporation GR No.: 97008-09 Date: July 23, 1993 Petitioner: VIRGINIA G. NERI and JOSE CABELIN Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) and BUILDING CARE CORPORATION Ponente: Bellosillo Facts: Respondents are sued by two employees of Building Care Corporation, which provides janitorial and other specific services to various firms, to compel Far Bast Bank and Trust Company to recognize them as its regular employees and be paid the same wages which its employees receive. Building Care Corporation (BCC, for brevity), in the proceedings, established that it had substantial capitalization of P1 Million or a stockholders equity of P1.5 Million. Thus the Labor Arbiter ruled that BCC was only job contracting and that consequently its employees were not employees of Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC, for brevity). On appeal, this factual finding was affirmed by respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity). Nevertheless, petitioners insist before us that BCC is engaged in "labor-only" contracting hence, they conclude, they are employees of respondent FEBTC. Issue: Was claim of the petitioner that BCC is engaged in Labor-only contracting? Held: The court is on the contrary, the BCC is not engaged in Labor-only contracting. BCC cannot be considered a labor-only contractor because it has substantial capital. The court also stated to factors that will determine labor-only contracting first is the person supplying workers does not have substantial capital the second is the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer.
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Case Title: Manila Waters Company Inc. vs Herminio D. Pena GR No.: 158255 Date: July 8, 2004 Petitioner: MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC. Respondent: HERMINIO D. PENA, ESTEBAN B. BALDOZA, JORGE D. CANONIGO, JR., IKE S. DELFIN, RIZALINO M. INTAL, REY T. MANLEGRO, JOHN L. MARTEJA, MARLON B. MORADA, ALLAN D. ESPINA, EDUARDO ONG, AGNESIO D. QUEBRAL, EDMUNDO B. VICTA, VICTOR C. ZAFARALLA, EDILBERTO C. PINGUL and FEDERICO M. RIVERA Ponente: Ynares-Santiago Facts: When MWSS contracted with Manila Water Co. to manage the water distribution system in Metro Manila East Zone, the MWC absorbed some MWSS employee. But 121 contractual collectors of MWSS were not absorbed but retained on contractual basis only. A few months later these collectors formed the Association Collectors Group Inc. (ACGI) which MWC contracted to collect water charges. When the contract was terminated after fourteen months, the collectors filed a complaint of illegal dismissal against MWC which, for its part, argued that the employer was ACGI not MWC. Issue: Is Held: No. The court declared that it is a Labor-only contractor and the collectors have remained employees of MWC because the latter has not relinquished control over them. The court noted that, first, ACGI had no substantial capital and secondly, the work was directly related to the principal business or operation of MWC; and lastly ACGI did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from MWCs control supervision and MWC required the workers to report daily and their attendance was strictly checked by MWC. Considering the facts, the court concluded that ACGI was not an independent contractor. Association Collectors Group Inc. a legitimate contractor?
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Case Title: San Miguel Corporation v Aballa et al. GR No.: 149011 Date: June 28, 2005 Petitioner: San Miguel Corporation Respondent: Aballa et al. Ponente: Carpio-Morales
Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Sunflower) entered into a one-year Contract of Service and such contract is renewed on a monthly basis until terminated. Pursuant to this, respondent Prospero Aballa et al. rendered services to SMC. After one year of rendering service, Aballa et al., filed a complaint before National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that they be declared as regular employees of SMC. On the other hand, SMC filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Notice of Closure due to serious business losses. Hence, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of SMC. Aballa et al. then appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal finding that Sunflower is an independent contractor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRCs decision on the ground that the agreement between SMC and Sunflower showed a clear intent to abstain from establishing an employer-employee relationship. Issue: Whether or not Aballa et al. are employees of SMC Held: The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer, except only as to the results of the work. In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose, i.e.,to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor, only for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. The Contract of Services between SMC and Sunflower shows that the parties clearly disavowed the existence of an employer-employee relationship between SMC and private respondents. The language of a contract is not, however, determinative of the parties relationship; rather it is the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. A party cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract, the character of its business, i.e., whether as labor-only contractor or job contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of and determined by the criteria set by statute. What appears is that Sunflower does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials to qualify it as an independent contractor. On the other hand, it is gathered that the lot, building, machineries and all other working tools utilized by Aballa et al.in carrying out their tasks were owned and provided by SMC.
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And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to Aballa et al. was directly related to the aquaculture operations of SMC. As for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly related to the principal business of the employer has been jurisprudentially recognized. Furthermore, Sunflower did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, SMC, its apparent role having been merely to recruit persons to work for SMC. All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the existence of an employer-employee relationship between SMC and Aballa et al. Since Aballa et al. who were engaged in shrimp processing performed tasks usually necessary or desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC, they should be deemed regular employees of the latter and as such are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. They should thus be awarded differential pay corresponding to the difference between the wages and benefits given them and those accorded SMCs other regular employees.
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Case Title: Philippine Banks of Communication v NLRC GR No.: L-66598 Date: December 19, 1986 Petitioner: PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS Respondent: THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE ARBITER TEODORICO L. DOGELIO and RICARDO ORPIADA Ponente: Feliciano
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search Inc. (CESI) entered into a letter agreement dated January 1976 under which (CESI) undertook to provide "Tempo[rary] Services" to petitioner Consisting of the "temporary services" of eleven (11) messengers. The contract period is described as being "from January 1976." The petitioner in truth undertook to pay a "daily service rate of P18, " on a per person basis. Attached to the letter agreement was a "List of Messengers assigned at Philippine Bank of Communications" which list included, as item No. 5 thereof, the name of private respondent Ricardo Orpiada. He rendered messengerial services to the bank within its premise, together with others doing similar job. In or about October 1976, the bank requested CESI to withdraw Opriadas assignment because his service were no longer needed. He filed a complaint against the bank for illegal dismissal and failure to pay the 13th month pay. During the arbitration the Bank impleaded CESI as additional respondent. Both the bank and CESI maintained that CESI (and not the bank) was Opriadas employer. Issue: Whether or not an Employer-Employee relationship existed between the bank and private respondent Opriada. Held: The Court held that, in the circumstances 'instances of this case, (CESI) was engaged in "laboronly" or attracting vis-a-vis the petitioner and in respect c Ricardo Orpiada, and that consequently, the petitioner bank is liable to Orpiada as if Orpiada had been directly, employed not only by (CESI) but also by the bank. It may well be that the bank may in turn proceed against (CESI) to obtain reimbursement of, or some contribution to, the amounts which the bank will have to pay to Orpiada; but this it is not necessary to determine here.
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Case Title: Tabas et al vs California Manufacturing Company GR No.: L-80680 Date: January 26, 1989 Petitioner: DANILO B. TABAS, EDUARDO BONDOC, RAMON M. BRIONES, EDUARDO R. ERISPE, JOEL MADRIAGA, ARTHUR M. ESPINO, AMARO BONA, FERDINAND CRUZ, FEDERICO A. BELITA, ROBERTO P. ISLES, ELMER ARMADA, EDUARDO UDOG, PETER TIANSING, MIGUELITA QUIAMBOA, NOMER MATAGA, VIOLY ESTEBAN and LYDIA ORTEGA Respondent: CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., LILY-VICTORIA A. AZARCON, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and HON. EMERSON C. TUMANON Ponente: Sarmiento Facts: Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for reinstatement and payment of various benefits against California Manufacturing Company. The respondent company then denied the existence of an employeremployee relationship between the company and the petitioners. Pursuant to a manpower supply agreement, it appears that the petitioners prior their involvement with California Manufacturing Company were employees of Livi Manpower service, an independent contractor, which assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers." The agreement provides that: California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over Livi's workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform Californias obligation" It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis"; that cost of livin g allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to California at cost "; and that "payroll for the preceeding week [shall] be delivered by Livi at California's premises." Issue: Whether the petitioners are California's or Livi's employees? Held: There is no doubt that in the case at bar, Livi performs "manpower services", meaning to say, it contracts out labor in favor of clients. We hold that it is one notwithstanding its vehement claims to the contrary, and notwithstanding the provision of the contract that it is "an independent contractor." The nature of one's business is not determined by self-serving appellations one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law. The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latter's own business. In this connection, we do not agree that the petitioners had been made to perform activities 'which are not directly related to the general business of manufacturing," California's purported "principal operation activity. " The petitioner's had been charged with "merchandizing promotion or sale of the products of [California] in the different sales outlets in Metro Manila including task and occasional price tagging," an activity that is doubtless, an integral part of the manufacturing business. It is not, then, as if Livi had served as its (California's) promotions or sales arm or agent, or otherwise, rendered a piece of work it (California) could not have itself done; Livi, as a placement agency, had simply supplied it with the manpower necessary to carry out its (California's) merchandising activities, using its (California's) premises and equipment. Neither Livi nor California can therefore escape liability, that is, assuming one exists. Petition granted
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INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR Case Title: Mafinco Trading Corp. vs Ople GR No.: L-37790 Date: March 25, 1976 Petitioner: MAFINCO TRADING CORPORATION Respondent: THE HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor, The NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION RODRIGO REPOMANTA and REY MORALDE Ponente: Aquino
Facts: Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, a firm based at Malabon, Rizal, appointed petitionerMafinco as its sole distributor of Cosmos soft drinks in Manila.Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. Months later, Mafinco terminated the peddling contract with Repomanta and Moralde. Consequently, Repomanta and Moralde, through their union, filed a compliant with the NLRC, charging the general manager of Mafinco for illegally dismissing them. Mafinco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent contractors. It stressed that there was termination of the contract not a dismissal of an employee. Issue: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner Mafinco and private respondents Repomanta and Moralde. Held: The Supreme Court held that under the peddling contracts, Repomanta and Moralde werenot employees of Mafinco but were independent contractors as found by the NLC and its fact finder and by the committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to look into the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. A contract whereby one engages to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by the manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers, shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third persons, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of the soft drinks is not a contract of employment.
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Case Title: GR No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts:
INSULAR LIFE INSURANCE CO., LTD. V NLRC 84484 November 15, 1989 INSULAR LIFE INSURANCE CO., LTD. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MELECIO BASIAO Narvasa
Insular Life (company) and Basiao entered into a contract by which Basiao was authorized to solicit for insurance in accordance with the rules of the company. He would also received compensation, in the form of commissions. The contract also contained the relations of the parties, duties of the agent and the acts prohibited tohim including the modes of termination. After 4 years, the parties entered into another contract an Agency Managers Contract and to implement this end of it, Basiao organized an agency while concurrently fulfilling his commitment under the first contract. The company terminated the Agency Managers Contract. Basiao sued the company in a civil action. Thus,the company terminated Basiaos engagement under the first contract and stopped payment of his commissions. Issue: Whether or not Basiao had become the companys employee by virtue of the contract, thereby placing his claim for unpaid commissions Held: No. Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for in the Insurance Code. These rules merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it. Its aim is only to promote the result, thereby creating no employer-employee relationship. It is usual and expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its commission agents in selling its policies which prescribe the qualifications of persons who may be insured. None of these really invades the agents contractual prerogative to adopt his own selling methods or to sell insurance at his own time and convenience, hence cannot justifiable be said to establish an employer-employee relationship between Basiao and the company. The respondents limit themselves to pointing out that Basiaos contract with the company bound him toobserve and conform to such rules. No showing that such rules were in fact promulgated which effectivelycontrolled or restricted his choice of methods of selling insurance. Therefore, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an independent contractwhose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action.Wherefore, the complain of Basiao is dismissed.
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Marc Aerone Paul P. Imperio 2011-0147 Case Title: RHONE-POULENC AGROCHEMICALS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. NLRC GR No.: 102633-35 Date: JANUARY 19, 1993 Petitioner: RHONE-POULENC AGROCHEMICALS PHILIPPINES, INC. Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, URCISIO A. ORAIN, and PAULINO G. ROMAN Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
Facts: The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of agro-chemicals. Its business operations involve the formulation, production, distribution and sale in the local market of its agro-chemical products. On January 1, 1988, as a consequence of the sale by Union Carbide, Inc. of all its agricultural-chemical divisions worldwide in favor of Rhone-Poulenc Agrochemie, France, the petitioner's mother corporation, the petitioner acquired from Union Carbide Philippines Far East, Inc. the latter's agro-chemical formulation plant in Namayan, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. In 1987, prior to the sale, Union Carbide had entered into a contract with CSI for the latter's supply of janitorial services. During the transition period, Union Carbide continued to avail itself of CSI's janitorial services. Thus, petitioner Rhone-Poulenc found itself sharing the Namayan plant with Union Carbide while the factory was being serviced and maintained by janitors supplied by CSI. Midway through the transition period, Union Carbide instructed CSI to reduce thenumber of janitors working at the plant from eight (8) to seven (7). Private respondent Paulino Roman, one of the janitors, was recalled by CSI onFebruary 15, l988 for reassignment. However, Roman refused to acknowledge receipt of the recall memorandum. On March 9, 1988, Union Carbide formally notified CSI of the termination of their janitorial service agreement, effective April 1, 1988, citing as reason the global buy-out by Rhone-Poulenc, Agrochemie, France of Union Carbides Inc.'s agro-chemical business. CSI thereafter issued a memorandum dated March 20, 1988 to the seven remaining janitors assigned to the Namayan plant, including respondent Urcisio Orain, recalling and advising them to report to the CSI office for reassignment. Like Roman, the janitors refused to acknowledge receipt of the recall memorandum. Meanwhile, in anticipation of the March 31, 1988 pull-out by Union Carbide, the petitioner started screening proposals by prospective service contractors. RhonePoulenc likewise invited CSI to submit to its Bidding Committee a cost quotation of its janitorial services. However, another contractor, the Marilag Business and Industrial Services, Inc. passed the bidding committee's standards and obtained the janitorial services contract.9.On April 1, 1988, the eight janitors reported for work at the Namayan plant but were refused admission and were told that another group of janitors had replaced them. These janitors then filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, payment of 13thmonth salary, service leave and overtime pay against Union Carbide, Rhone-Poulenc and CSI.
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Issue/s: 1 2. 3. Whether or not the janitors were employees of Union Carbide Whether or not the CSI is a labor only contractor Whether or not petitioner absorbed the janitors in its workforce
Held: The court held that the petition is meritorious. In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of employees (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct although the latter is the most important element. There is no employer-employee relationship between Union Carbide and the respondent janitors. The respondents themselves admitted that they were selected and hired by CSI and were assigned to Union Carbide. CSI likewise acknowledged that the two janitors were its employees. The janitors drew their salaries from CSI and not from Union Carbide. CSI exercised control over these janitors through Richard Barroga, also a CSI employee, who gave orders and instructions to CSI janitors assigned to the Namayan plant. Moreover, CSI had the power to assign its janitors to various clients and to pull out as it had done in a number of occasions, any of its janitors working at Union Carbide. As to whether CSI is engaged in labor-only contracting or in job contracting, applying the test prescribed by the Labor Code and the implementing rules, the court finds sufficient basis from the records to conclude that CSI is engaged in job contracting. Without regard to the third issue, even if the janitors were, indeed, employees of Union Carbide or that CSI is a labor-only contractor, thus making Union Carbide a direct employer of these janitors, petitioner Rhone-Poulenc, as purchaser of Union Carbide's business is not compelled to absorb these janitors into its workforce. An innocent transferee of a business establishment has no liability to the employees of the transferor to continue employing them.
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Marc Aerone Paul P. Imperio 2011-0147 Case Title: ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., v WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION GR No.: L-26341 Date: November 27, 1968 Petitioner: ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., Respondent: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO Ponente: Castro Facts: At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record. According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Issue: Whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. Held: The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts. This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means
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of ingress and egress. Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises. There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federalquestion arises. The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work ,in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 ALANO VS. ECC G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 Petitioner: GENEROSO Respondent: EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION Ponente: J. GUTTIERREZ, JR.
ALANO
Facts: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12) Issue: Whether or not the death of Dedicacion de Vera can be compensable. Held: In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 ESCARIO ET.AL. VS. NLRC G.R. No. 124055 June 8, 2000 Petitioners: ROLANDO E. ESCARIO, NESTOR ANDRES, CESAR AMPER, LORETO BALDEMOR, EDUARDO BOLONIA, ROMEO E. BOLONIA, ANICETO CADESIM, JOEL CATAPANG, NESTOR DELA CRUZ, EDUARDO DUNGO ESCARIO REY, ELIZALDE ESTASIO, CAROLINO M. FABIAN, RENATO JANER, EMER B. LIQUIGAN, ALEJANDRO MABAWAD, FERNANDO M. MAGTIBAY, DOMINADOR B. MALLILLIN, NOEL B. MANILA, VIRGILIO A. MANIO, ROMEO M. MENDOZA, TIMOTEO NOTARION, FREDERICK RAMOS, JOSEPH REYES, JESSIE SEVILLA, NOEL STO. DOMINGO, DODJIE TAJONERA, JOSELITO TIONLOC, ARNEL UMALI, MAURLIE C. VIBAR, ROLANDO ZALDUA, RODOLFO TUAZON, TEODORO LUGADA, MAURING MANUEL, MARCIANO VERGARA, JR., ARMANDO IBASCO, CAYETANO IBASCO, LEONILO MEDINA, JOSELITO ODO, MELCHOR BUELA, GOMER GOMEZ, HENRY PONCE, RAMON ORTIZ, JR., ANTONIO MIJARES, JR., MARIO DIZER, REYNANTE PEJO, ARNALDO RAFAEL, NELSON BERUELA, AUGUSTO RAMOS, RODOLFO VALENTIN, ANTONIO CACAM, VERNON VELASQUEZ, NORMAN VALLO, ALEJANDRO ORTIZ, ROSANO VALLO, ANDREW ESPINOSA, EDGAR CABARDO, FIDELES REYES, EDGARDO FRANCISCO, FERNANDO VILLARUEL, LEOPOLDO OLEGARIO, OSCAR SORIANO, GARY RELOS, DANTE IRANZO, RONALDO BACOLOR, RONALD ESGUERA, VICTOR ALVAREZ, JOSE MARCELO, DANTE ESTRELLADO, MELQUIADES ANGELES, GREGORIO TALABONG, ALBERT BALAO, ALBERT CANLAS, CAMILO VELASCO, PONTINO CHRISTOPHER, WELFREDO RAMOS, REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ, RAZ GARIZALDE, MIGUEL TUAZON, ROBERTO SANTOS, AND RICARDO MORTEL Respondent: EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION Ponente: J. GUTTIERREZ, JR.
Facts: Petitioners are merchandisers of respondent company. They withdraw stocks from the warehouse , fix the prices, price-tagging, displaying the products and inventory. They were paid by the company through an agent to avoid liability. They claim that they were under the control and supervision of the company. They asked for regularization of their status. They were then given notice of their termination. The company denied any employer-employee relationship. They claim that they used an agent or independent contractors to sell the merchandise. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was an employeremployee relationship. The NLRC set aside the decision and said that there was no such relationship. The agent was a legitimate independent contractor. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are employees of the company. Held: The Court ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship and that petitioners are employees of the agent. The agent is a legitimate independent contractor. Labor-only contractor occurs only when the contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job for a principal. The labor-only contractor doesnt have substantial capital or investment and the workers recruited perform activities directly related to the principal business of the employer. There is permissible contracting only when the contractor carries an independent business and undertakes the contract in his own manner and method, free from the control of the principal and the contractor has substantial capital or investment. The agent, and not the company, also exercises control over the petitioners. No documents were submitted to prove that the company exercised control over them. The agent hired the petitioners. The agent also pays the petitioners, no evidence was submitted showing that it was the company paying them and not the agent. It was also the agent who terminated their services. By petitioning for regularization, the petitioners concede that they are not regular employees.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No. 77959 January 9, 1989 Petitioner: RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. Respondents: THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and UNITED RCPI COMMUNICATIONS LABOR ASSOCIATION (URCPICLA)FUR Ponente: J. REGALADO
Facts: On May 4, 1981, petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business, filed with the National Wages Council an application for exemption from the coverage of Wage Order No. 1. The application was opposed by respondent United RCPI Communications Labor Association (URCPICLA-FUR), a labor organization affiliated with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR). On May 22, 1981, the National Wages Council disapproved said application and ordered petitioner to pay its covered employees the mandatory living allowance of P2.00 daily effective March 22, 1981. As early as March 13, 1985, before the aforesaid case was elevated to this Court, respondent union filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, asserting therein its claim to 15% of the total backpay due to all its members as "union service fee" for having successfully prosecuted the latter's claim for payment of wages and for reimbursement of expenses incurred by FUR and prayed for the segregation and remittance of said amount to FUR thru its National President. On October 24, 1985, without the knowledge and consent of respondent union, petitioner entered into a compromise agreement with Buklod ng Manggagawa sa RCPI-NFL (BMRCPI-NFL) as the new bargaining agent of oppositors RCPI employees. Thereupon, the parties filed a joint motion praying for the dismissal of the decision of the National Wages Council for it had already been novated by the Compromise Agreement re-defining the rights and obligations of the parties. Respondent Union on November 7, 1985, countered by opposing the motion and alleging that one of the signatories thereof BMRCPI-NFL is not a party in interest in the case but that it was respondent Union which represented oppositors RCPI employees all the way from the level of the National Wages Council up the Supreme Court. Respondent Union, therefore, claimed that the Compromise Agreement is irregular and invalid, apart from the fact that there was nothing to compromise in the face of a final and executory decision. Director Severo M. Pucan issued an Order dated November 25, 1985 awarding to URCPICLAFUR and FUR 15% of the total backpay of RCPI employees as their union service fees, and directing RCPI to deposit said amount with the cashier of the Regional Office for proper disposition to said awardees. Despite said order, petitioner paid in full the covered employees on November 29, 1985, without deducting the union service fee of 15%. In an order dated May 7, 1986, NCR officer-in-charge found petitioner RCPI and its employees jointly and severally liable for the payment of the 15% union service fee amounting to P427,845.60 to private respondent URCPICLA-FUR and consequently ordered the garnishment of petitioner's bank account to enforce said claim. Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an order on August 18, 1986 modifying the order appealed from by holding petitioner solely liable to respondent union for 10% of the awarded amounts as attorney's fees. Issue: Whether or not public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding the petitioner solely liable for "union service fee to respondent URCPICLA -FUR.
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Held: No. Attorney's fee due the oppositor is chargeable against RCPI. The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees because it compelled the complainant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim. (Cristobal vs. ECC) It is undisputed that oppositor (private respondent herein) was the counsel on record of the RCPI employees in their claim for EC0LA under Wage Order No. 1 since the inception of the proceedings at the National Wages Council up to the Supreme Court. It had, therefore, a valid claim for attorney's fee which it called union service fee. As is evident in the compromise agreement, petitioner was bound to pay only 30% of the amount due each employee on November 30, 1985, while the balance of 70% would still be the subject of renegotiation by the parties. Yet, despite such conditions beneficial to it, petitioner paid in full the backpay of its employees on November 29, 1985, ignoring the service fee due the private respondent. Worse, petitioner supposedly paid to one Atty. Rodolfo M. Capocyan the 10% fee that properly pertained to herein private respondent, an unjustified and baffling diversion of funds. Finally, petitioner cannot invoke the lack of an individual written authorization from the employees as a shield for its fraudulent refusal to pay the service fee of private respondent. Be that as it may, the lack thereof was remedied and supplied by the execution of the compromise agreement whereby the employees, expressly approved the 10% deduction and held petitioner RCPI free from any claim, suit or complaint arising from the deduction thereof. When petitioner was thereafter again ordered to pay the 10% fees to respondent union, it no longer had any legal basis or subterfuge for refusing to pay the latter. We agree that the Labor Code in requiring an individual written authorization as a prerequisite to wage deductions seeks to protect the employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and consent. However, for all intents and purposes, the deductions required of the petitioner and the employees do not run counter to the express mandate of the law since the same are not unwarranted or without their knowledge and consent. Also, the deductions for the union service fee in question are authorized by law and do not require individual check-off authorizations.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 APODACA VS. NLRC G.R. No. 80039 April 18, 1989 Petitioner: ERNESTO M. Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE M. MIRASOL INTRANS PHILS., INC. Ponente: J. GANCAYCO
APODACA and
Facts: Petitioner was employed in respondent corporation. On August 28, 1985, respondent Jose M. Mirasol persuaded petitioner to subscribe to 1,500 shares of respondent corporation at P100.00 per share or a total of P150,000.00. He made an initial payment of P37,500.00. On September 1, 1975, petitioner was appointed President and General Manager of the respondent corporation. However, on January 2, 1986, he resigned. On December 19, 1986, petitioner instituted with the NLRC a complaint against private respondents for the payment of his unpaid wages, his cost of living allowance, the balance of his gasoline and representation expenses and his bonus compensation for 1986. Petitioner and private respondents submitted their position papers to the labor arbiter. Private respondents admitted that there is due to petitioner the amount of P17,060.07 but this was applied to the unpaid balance of his subscription in the amount of P95,439.93. Petitioner questioned the set-off alleging that there was no call or notice for the payment of the unpaid subscription and that, accordingly, the alleged obligation is not enforceable. In a decision dated April 28, 1987, the labor arbiter sustained the claim of petitioner for P17,060.07 on the ground that the employer has no right to withhold payment of wages already earned under Article 103 of the Labor Code. Upon the appeal of the private respondents to public respondent NLRC, the decision of the labor arbiter was reversed in a decision dated September 18, 1987. The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay his unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of the corporation and that the set-off of said obligation against the wages and others due to petitioner is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Issue: Does the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) have jurisdiction to resolve a claim for non-payment of stock subscriptions to a corporation? Assuming that it has, can an obligation arising therefrom be offset against a money claim of an employee against the employer? Held: First, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to determine such intra-corporate dispute between the stockholder and the corporation as in the matter of unpaid subscriptions. This controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Second, assuming arguendo that the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over the said subject matter under the circumstances of this case, the unpaid subscriptions are not due and payable until a call is made by the corporation for payment. Private respondents have not presented a resolution of the board of directors of respondent corporation calling for the payment of the unpaid subscriptions. It does not even appear that a notice of such call has been sent to petitioner by the respondent corporation. What the records show is that the respondent corporation deducted the amount due to petitioner from the amount receivable from him for the unpaid subscriptions. No doubt such set-off was without lawful basis, if not premature. As there was no notice or call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions, the same is not yet due and payable. Lastly, assuming further that there was a call for payment of the unpaid subscription, the NLRC cannot validly set it off against the wages and other benefits due the petitioner. Article 113 of the Labor
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Code allows such a deduction from the wages of the employees by the employer, only in three instances, to wit: ART. 113. Wage Deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except: (a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance; (b) For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to checkoff has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and (c) In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. The petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the NLRC dated September 18, 1987 is set aside and another judgment is rendered ordering private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of P17,060.07 plus legal interest computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on December 19, 1986, with costs against private respondents. An obligation arising from non-payment of stock subscriptions to a corporation cannot be offset against a money claim of an EE against an ER.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY EMPLOYEES VS. NLRC G.R. No. 102636 September 10, 1993 Petitioners: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALUand ANTONIO V. Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2nd Division) and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY Ponente: J. VITUG
TUCP BALINANG
Facts: Metrobank entered into a CBA with Petitioner, granting a P900 increase in wages. Subsequently, a law was passed increasing the minimum wage. Metrobank classified employees into those receiving less than 100 per day and those receiving more. Those receiving more were not covered by the implementation of the new law but only the increase as agreed upon in the CBA. Petitioners argue that the method of implementation created a wage distortion within the employees of Metrobank because the differences in the salaries of the employee classifications were substantially reduced. Issue: Whether or not there was wage distortion? Held: There was wage distortion. Wage Distortion means a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contradiction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR VS. NLRC G.R. No. 103586 July 21, 1994 Petitioner: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES (DAVAO PLANT) Ponente: J. FELICIANO Facts: Between 1 November 1983 and 1 November 1984, Wage Orders Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were promulgated increasing the statutory minimum wages of workers with differing increases being specified for agricultural plantation and non-agricultural workers. As a result of the implementation of such wage orders and the increases brought about by the effectivity of the CBA, there was no more significant differential between regular and non-regular/newly regularized employees. Meantime, while the above wage developments were unfolding, the Company experienced a work output slow down. The Company directed some 205 workers to explain the reduction in their work output. The workers failed to comply and they were accordingly issued notices of dismissal by the Company. As a response to its decreasing productivity levels, the Company suspended operations on 16 August 1984. Operations were resumed on 14 September 1984; the Company, however, refused to take back the 205 dismissed employees. Petitioner Union then went on strike alleging a lock-out on the part of the Company and demanding rectification of the wage distortion. The case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory conciliation. On 19 June 1985, the Union and the Company reached an agreement with respect to the lock-out issue. The agreement, which was approved by the NLRC En Banc, granted the 205 employees "financial assistance" equivalent to thirty (30) days' separation pay. This left unresolved only the wage distortion issue. On 11 November 1987, the NLRC En Banc rendered a decision which in effect found the existence of wage distortion and required the Company to pay a P1.00 wage increase effective 1 May 1984. On motion for partial reconsideration filed by the Company, the above quoted portion of the NLRC En Banc's decision was reconsidered and set aside by the NLRC Fifth Division. The Fifth Division of the NLRC in effect found that while a wage distortion did exist commencing 16 June 1984, the distortion persisted only for a total of fifteen (15) days and accordingly required private respondent company to pay "a wage increase of P2.00 per day to all regular workers effective June 16, 1984 up to June 30, 1984 or a total of fifteen (15) days." The rest of the decision of 11 November 1987 was left untouched. Issue: Whether a wage distortion occured due to the implementation of Wage Orders? Held: We believe and so hold that the re-establishment of a significant gap or differential between regular employees and casual employees by operation of the CBA was more than substantial compliance with the requirements of the several Wage Orders (and of Article 124 of the Labor Code). That this reestablishment of a significant differential was the result of collective bargaining negotiations, rather than of a special grievance procedure, is not a legal basis for ignoring it. The NLRC En Banc was in serious error when it disregarded the differential of P3.60 which had been restored by 1 July 1985 upon the
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ground that such differential represented negotiated wage increases which should not be considered covered and in compliance with the Wage Orders. The Wage Orders referred to above had provided for the crediting of increases in wages or allowances granted or paid by employers within a specified time against the statutorily prescribed increases in minimum wages. In relation, NLRC in its Resolution dated 11 November 1987, provided some elaboration of the notion of wage distortion: As used herein, a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. From the above quoted material, it will be seen that the concept of wage distortion assumes an existing grouping or classification of employees which establishes distinctions among such employees on some relevant or legitimate basis. This classification is reflected in a differing wage rate for each of the existing classes of employees. The wage distortion anticipated in Wage Orders Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 was a "distortion" (or "compression") which ensued from the impact of those Wage Orders upon the different wage rates of the several classes of employees. Thus, distortion ensued where the result of implementation of one or another of the several Wage Orders was the total elimination or the severe reduction of the differential or gap existing between the wage rates of the differing classes of employees. The Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION VS. NLRC G.R. No. 108556 November 19, 1996 Petitioner: MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, and the MANILA MANDARIN HOTEL Ponente: C. J. NARVASA Issue: On October 30, 1986, the Manila Mandarin Employees Union, as exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Manila Mandarin Hotel, Inc., filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch a complaint in its members' behalf to compel MANDARIN to pay the salary differentials of the individual employees concerned because of wage distortions in their salary structure allegedly created by the upward revisions of the minimum wage pursuant to various Presidential Decrees and Wage Orders, and the failure of MANDARIN to implement the corresponding increases in the basic salary rate of newly-hired employees. The relevant Presidential Decrees and Wage Orders were invoked during the said trial. On January 15, 1987, the UNION filed its Position Paper amplifying the allegations of its complaint and setting forth the legal bases of its demands against MANDARIN; and on March 25, 1987, it filed an Amended Complaint presenting an additional claim for payment of salary differentials to the union members affected, allegedly resulting from underpayment of wages. The Labor Arbiter eventually ruled in favor of the UNION, however it was later reversed by the Commission. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not wage distortion exists. Held: There was no wage distortion that existed. Wage distortion is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. A review of the records convinces this Court that respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that no wage distortion was demonstrated by the UNION.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 CAGAYAN SUGAR MILLING CO., VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET.AL. G.R. No. 128399 January 15, 1998 Petitioner: CAGAYAN SUGAR MILLING COMPANY Respondents: SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, DIRECTOR RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, SR., and CARSUMCO EMPLOYEES UNION Ponente: J. PUNO Facts: On September 12 and 13, 1994, labor inspectors from the DOLE Regional Office examined the books of petitioner to determine its compliance with the wage order. They found that petitioner violated the wage order as it did not implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees. During the hearing at the DOLE Regional Office for the alleged violation, petitioner maintained that it complied with Wage Order No. RO2-02 as it paid the mandated increase in the minimum wage. In an Order dated December 16, 1994, public respondent Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr. ruled that petitioner violated Wage Order RO2-02 by failing to implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees. He ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency in the salary of its employees in the total amount of P555,133.41. On January 6, 1995, petitioner appealed to public respondent Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing. On the same date, the Regional Wage Board issued Wage Order No. RO2-02-A, amending the earlier wage order. On October 8, 1996, the Secretary of Labor dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Order of Regional Director Martinez, Sr. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On February 12, 1997, private respondent CARSUMCO EMPLOYEES UNION moved for execution of the December 16, 1994 Order. Regional Director Martinet, Sr. granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. On March 4, 1997, petitioner moved for reconsideration to set aside the writ of execution. On March 5, the DOLE regional sheriff served on petitioner a notice of garnishment of its account with the Far East Bank and Trust Company. On March 10, the sheriff seized petitioner's dump truck and scheduled its public sale on March 20, 1997. On April 3, 1997, this Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the writ of execution. On July 16, upon petitioner's motion, the TRO was amended by also enjoining respondents from enforcing the Decision of the Secretary of Labor and conducting further proceedings until further orders from this Court. Issue: Wage Order RO2-02 is null and void for having been issued in violation of the procedure provided by law and in violation of petitioner's right to due process of law. Held: Art. 123. Wage Order. Whenever conditions in the region so warrant, the Regional Board shall investigate and study all pertinent facts, and, based on the standards and criteria herein prescribed, shall proceed to determine whether a Wage Order should be issued. Any such Wage Order shall take effect after (15) days from its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation in the region. The record shows that there was no prior public consultation or hearings and newspaper publication insofar as Wage Order No. RO2-02-A is concerned. In fact, these allegations were not denied by public respondents in their Comment. Public respondents' position is that there was no need to comply with the legal requirements of consultation and newspaper publication as Wage order No. RO2-02-A
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merely clarified the ambiguous provision of the original wage order.
Public respondents insist that despite the wording of Wage Order RO2-02 providing for a statutory increase in minimum wage, the real intention of the Regional Board was to provide for an across the board increase. Hence, they urge that petitioner is liable for merely providing an increase in the statutory minimum wage rates of its employees. The contention is absurd. Petitioner clearly complied with Wage Order RO2-02 which provided for an increase in statutory minimum wage rates for employees in Region II. It is not just to expect petitioner to interpret Wage RO2-02 to mean that it granted an across the board increase as such interpretation is not sustained by its text. Indeed, the Regional Wage Board had to amend Wage Order RO2-02 to clarify this alleged intent. In sum, we hold that RO2-02-A is invalid for lack of public consultations and hearings and nonpublication in a newspaper of general circulation, in violation of Article 123 of the Labor Code. We likewise find that public respondent Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the findings of Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr. that petitioner violated Wage Order RO2-02. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Secretary of Labor, dated October 8, 1996, is set aside for lack of merit.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 ECOP VS. NWPC G.R. No. 96169 September 24, 1991 Petitioner: EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondents: NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION AND REGIONAL TRIPARTITE WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY BOARD-NCR, TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES Ponente: J. SARMIENTO
Facts: On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration, so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed. On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR-01-A amending Wage Order No. NCR-01, as follows: Section 1. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day. ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission. On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. Issue: The Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) is questioning the validity of Wage Order No. NCR-01-A dated October 23, 1990 of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, National Capital Region, promulgated pursuant to the authority of Republic Act No. 6727. Held: The Commission noted that the increasing trend is toward the salary-cap method, which has reduced disputes arising from wage distortions (brought about, apparently, by the floor-wage method). Precisely, Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn. The petition is DENIED.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE VS. DRILON G.R. No. 81144 May 7, 1990 Petitioner: MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE Respondents: HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE FACULTY AND PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION (MCFPA) Ponente: C.J. FERNAN Facts: Petitioner is a private educational institution duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and operating in Meycauayan, Bulacan. On January 16, 1987, its board of trustees recognized the Meycauayan College Faculty and Personnel Association as the employees union in the Meycauayan College. Prior to said recognition or on July 17, 1983, petitioner and the union, then headed by Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, entered into a collective bargaining agreement for 1983-1986. Article IV thereof provides: SALARY SCALE IV. 4.0 ANG ANTAS NG PAGPAPASUWELDO SA MGA GURO SA MATAAS NA PAARALAN AY UMAALINSUNOD SA PARAAN NG PAGRARANGGONG KALAKIP NITO BILANG "TAKDA" AT AYON PA RIN SA SUMUSUNOD NA HALAGA NG PAGPAPASUWELDO (IPATUTUPAD SA AO-ESCOLAR 1983-1986): PAGSUBOK A (1-3 TAON) P51.50 KLASE 1 (4-5 TAON) P52.00 (6-8 TAON) P53.00 KLASE II (9-12 TAON) P54.00 KLASE III (13-14 TAON) P57.00 KLASE IV (15-17 TAON) P60.00 KLASE V (18-21 TAON) P63.00 (22 PATAAS) P70.00 When the collective bargaining agreement was entered into, the following presidential decrees were in effect: (a) P.D No. 1389 dated May 29, 1978 adjusting the existing statutory minimum wages; (b) P.D. No. 1713 dated August 18, 1980 providing for an increase in the minimum daily wage rates and for additional mandatory living allowances, and ; (c) P.D. No. 1751 dated May 14, 1980 increasing the statutory daily minimum wage at all levels by P4.00 after integrating the mandatory emergency living allowance under P.D. Nos. 525 and 1123 into the basic pay of all covered workers. Wage Order No. 2 increasing the mandatory basic minimum wage and living allowance was also issued on July 6, 1983 just before the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into. During the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement, the following were issued: (a) Wage Order No. 3 dated November 7, 1983 increasing the minimum daily living allowance in the private sector;
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(b) Wage Order No. 4 dated May 1, 1984 integrating as of said date the emergency cost of living allowances under P.D. Nos. 1614, 1634 and 1713 into the basic pay of covered workers in the private sector; (c) Wage Order No. 5 dated June 11, 1984 increasing the cost of living allowance of workers in the private sector whose basic salary or wage is not more than P1,800 a month; and (d) Wage Order No. 6 dated October 26, 1984 increasing the daily living allowances. The union admits herein that its members were paid all these increases in pay mandated by law. It appears, however, that in 1987, shortly after union president Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, who held the managerial position of registrar of the college, had turned over the presidency of the union to Mrs. Fe Villarico, the latter unintentionally got a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and discovered that Article IV thereof had not been implemented by the petitioner. Consequently, on March 27, 1987, the union filed with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. III in San Fernando, Pampanga, a notice of strike on the ground of unfair labor practice alleging therein violation of the collective bargaining agreement particularly the provisions of Article IV thereof on salary scale. Issue: Whether increases in employees' salaries resulting from the implementation of presidential decrees and wage orders, which are over and above the agreed salary scale contracted for between the employer and the employees in a collective bargaining agreement, preclude the employees from claiming the difference between their old salaries and those provided for under said salary scale. Held: Non-compliance with the mandate of a standards law or decree may give rise to an ordinary action for recovery while violation of a collective bargaining agreement may even give rise to a criminal action for unfair labor practice. And while the relief sought for violation of a standard law or decree is primarily for restitution of unpaid benefits, the relief sought for violating a CBA is ordinarily for compliance and desistance. Moreover, there is no provision in the aforecited Presidential Decrees providing that compliance thereto is sufficient compliance with a provision of a collective bargaining agreement and vice-versa. As correctly ruled by public respondent, a collective bargaining agreement is a contractual obligation. It is distinct from an obligation imposed by law. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Beneficiaries thereof are therefore, by right, entitled to the fulfillment of the obligation prescribed therein. Consequently, to deny binding force to the collective bargaining agreement would place a premium on a refusal by a party thereto to comply with the terms of the agreement. Such refusal would constitute an unfair labor practice.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE VS. ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE WORKERS ASSOCIATION G.R. No. 155609 January 17, 2005 Petitioner: ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE Respondents: ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE WORKERS ASSOCIATION (SAMAHAN) Ponente: J. PANGANIBAN Facts. Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit Catholic educational institution while respondent is a legitimate labor organization which is currently the official bargaining representative of all employees of petitioner except the faculty and consultants of the Graduate School, managerial employees and those who occupy confidential positions. Respondent has an existing CBA with petitioner for the period from June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2004. For the SY 2000-2001, petitioner increased its tuition fees for all its departments. Based on petitioners computation, the incremental proceeds from the tuition fees increase for SY 2000-2001 is P1,560,942.74, 85% of which is equivalent to P1,326,801.33. Consequently, respondent averred that 85% of P4,906,307.58, which is P4,170,360.59 should have been released to its members as provided for in their CBA effective June 1, 2000. Issue: How should the 70%-30% tuition fee increase be allocated? Held: The law allows an increase in school tuition fees on the condition that 70 percent of the increase shall go to the payment of personnel benefits. Plainly unsupported by the law or jurisprudence is petitioners contention that the payment of such benefits should be based not only on the rate of tuition fee increases, but also on other factors like the decrease in the number of enrollees; the number of those exempt from paying the fees, like scholars; the number of dropouts who, as such, do not pay the whole fees; and the bad debts incurred by the school. The financial dilemma of petitioner may deserve sympathy and support, but its remedy lies not in the judiciary but in the lawmaking body. The law plainly states that 70 percent of the tuition fee increase shall be allotted for the teaching and the nonteaching personnel; and that the payment of other costs of operation, together with the improvement of the schools infrastructure, shall be taken only from the remaining 30 percent. The law does not speak, directly or indirectly, of the contention of petitioner that in the event that its total tuition income is lesser than that in the previous year, then the whole amount of the increase in tuition fee, and not merely up to 30 percent as provided by law, may be used for the improvement and modernization of infrastructure and for the payment of other costs of operation.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 COCOFED ET. AL. VS. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO G.R. No. 982767 February 15, 1995 Petitioners: COCOFED (Kalamansig) and/or CRISPIN ROSETE Respondents: HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. MELENCIO Q. BALANAG, Director IV, DOLE, Regional XII, Cotabato City, Ponente: J. Romero
Facts: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation operates petitioner COCOFED (Kalamansig), a coconut plantation utilized as a demonstration farm for replanting and/or training area for coconut farmers, located in Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat. On November 15, 1988, a complaint inspection was conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment, Region XII, Cotabato City in response to complaints filed by two of petitioner's employees, Alex Edicto and Delia Pahuwayan. The inspection revealed that petitioner was guilty of underpayment of wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and 13th month pay. Accordingly, notice of inspection results was issued: requiring petitioner to effect restitution or correction within five (5) days from notice. Summary Petitioner submitted its position paper claiming that it should be classified as an establishment with less than 30 employees and with a paid-up capital of P500,000.00 or less as evidenced by the assessment of the municipal treasurer. Moreover, complainants worked for less than eight hours, a minimum of four and maximum of six. A three (3) year actual payrolls from March 1985 to February 1989 showing the daily actual payment made by the respondent to involved workers are substantial evidence against the mere memorandum issued by the respondents on the matter. Further, such payrolls submitted by respondents are not mere summaries of daily efforts of workers but these are daily records showing workers actual daily rate. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was justified in paying an amount less than the statutory minimum wage. Held: Petitioner would have us overturn the factual finding of public respondents that its employees are daily paid workers. This we are unable to do for the payrolls submitted by it support the latters' position. Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but finality. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the records which show that petitioner's employees worked for less than eight hours. Finally, there would have been no need for petitioner to make an offer increasing the wage to P45.00 per day if complainants were indeed piece rate workers, as it claimed and if their wages were not underpaid, as found by public respondents. The petition is DISMISSED.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO., INC. VS. DRILON G.R. No. 82849 August 2, 1989 Petitioner: CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) Respondents: SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND CEBU OXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COACVEA) Ponente: J. GANCAYCO
Facts: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. 1) For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 - P200 to each covered employee. 2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987 - P 200 to each covered employee. 3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 - P300 to each covered employee. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, in sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon completion of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows: 1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00); and 2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00). Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. Held: The issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements, is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with it. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be
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credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. The petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under the said Act.
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Jabines, Ines H. 2011 0151 ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO DELA SERNA, ET.AL. G.R. No. 87439 February 21, 1990 Petitioner: ODIN SECURITY AGENCY Respondents: HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, in his capacity as Undersecretary, Department of Labor and Employment, HON. LUNA C. PIEZAS, in his capacity as Regional Director (DOLE), National Capital Region and SERGIO APILADO, MAMERTO GENER, ARMANDO YUMUL, HERMINIGILDO BARGAS, MARCIANO BOLOCON, WILLIAM ADAMI, ANTONIO PUBLICO, LEOPOLDO SAAVEDRA, WARLITO ILAGA, JOVANY SERATO, DANIEL MINGLANA, JOSE MIRANDA, JR., ANASTACIO SANTILLAN, ROLANDO FERNANDEZ, NICANOR FEREAS, FRANCISCO VERZOSA, PLARIDEL ELORIA, APSIN PAGAYAO, JAIME DORADO, GUILLERMO ELLARES, ARTURO FACTOR, DANIEL FERUISH, CRISOSTOMO FONSECA, JERRY GA, FRANCISCO GUINSATAO, SIXTO LIPER, ALLAN MANALLA, GEORGE ORQUESTA, WILFREDO QUIROZ, BENJAMIN UY, EDWIN ORDONA and DEMETRIO TORRES Ponente: J. GRIO-AQUINO Facts: On July 8, 1986, a complaint was filed by Sergio Apilado and fifty-five (55) others charging the petitioner Odin Security Agency, underpayment of wages, illegal deductions, non-payment of night shift differential, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday work, rest days and Sundays, service incentive leaves, vacation and sick leaves, and 13th-month pay. When conciliation efforts failed, the parties were required to submit their position papers. Private respondents alleged in their position paper that their latest monthly salary was P1,600; that from this amount, petitioner deducted P100 as administrative cost and P20 as bond; that they were not paid their premium pay and overtime pay for working on the eleven (11) legal holidays per year; and, that since private respondents were relieved or constructively dismissed, they must also be paid backwages. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that on July 21, 1986, some 48 security guards threatened mass action against it. Alarmed by a possible abandonment of post by the guards and mindful of its contractual obligations to its clients/principals, petitioner relieved and re-assigned the complaining guards to other posts in Metro Manila. Those relieved were ordered to report to the agency's main office for reassignment. Only few complied, so those who failed to comply were placed on "AWOL" status. Petitioner claimed it complied with the Labor Code provisions, and in support thereof, it submitted the "Quitclaim and Waiver" of thirty-four (34) complainants. It further alleged that complainants who rendered over-time work as shown by their time sheets were paid accordingly; that service incentive leaves not availed of, night shift differential, rest days, and holidays were paid in cash. Earlier, on October 21, 1986, seventeen (17) complainants repudiated their quitclaim and waiver. They alleged that management pressured them to sign documents which they were not allowed to read and that if such waiver existed, they did not have any intention of waiving their rights under the law. Petitioner in its reply argued that complainants were estopped from denying their quitclaims on the ground of equity; that being high school graduates, complainants fully understood the document they signed; and that complainant's allegation of coercion or threat was a mere afterthought. Later, six (6) of the seventeen (17) complainants who repudiated their quitclaims again executed quitclaims and waivers. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?
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Held: The petition has no merit. The petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers (Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237). Since petitioner herein participated in the hearings, submitted a position paper, and filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was not denied due process. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction, to escape a penalty. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. (p. 5, Decision.) The petition is dismissed and the orders dated March 23, 1988 and March 13, 1989 of the Undersecretary of Labor are hereby affirmed.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: ADMIRALTY REALTY VS NLRC GR NO: GR NO. 112043 Date: May 18, 1999 Petitioner: ADMIRALTY REALTY COMPANY INC. Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANGELINA M. BALANI Ponente: PARDO, J.: FACTS: On July 1976, Admiral Hotel hired Angelina M. Balani as Cost Controller. She occupied and served in that position for fifteen (15) years. On June 21, 1991, petitioner, through Managing Director Ma. Victoria A. Concepcion, issued a memorandum. On the memorandum issued it was stated that Mrs. Balani committed the following; 1. ENTERTAIN MANY PERSONAL VISITORS DURING OFFICE HOURS. 2. PHONE IS USED A LOT ON PERSONAL CALLS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH HOTEL BUSINESS. 3. MAKING A BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY TO CO-EMPLOYEES. On June 22, 1991, respondent replied thereto, denying the charges leveled against her. On June 25, 1991, respondent submitted a letter of resignation, effective at the close of office hours of June 30, 1991. On June 28, 1991, petitioner accepted the resignation with deep regret. On June 29, 1991, the personnel officer of the hotel issued a certificate of clearance to the effect that respondent, who was leaving Admiral Hotel effective June 30, 1991, by reason of resignation, had been cleared of obligations and/or accountabilities. On July 16, 1991, respondent received the sum of ten thousand eight hundred ninety eight pesos and ten centavos (P10,898.10) for her salary, overtime, vacation and sick leave, 13th month pay and participation in service charges. ISSUE: Whether the termination of Mrs. Balani was due to her resignation or it was a constructive dismissal on the part of the admiralty realty company. HELD: We agree with the petitioner. The Court is convinced that this is a case of voluntary resignation. Respondent claims that she was constructively dismissed from her office as its location was transferred from under the steps of the stairs to the kitchen. Such transfer caused her mental torture which forced her to resign. However, it was not shown that her transfer was prompted by ill will of management. Indeed, the manager of the hotel swore that the transfer affected not only the Cost Control office but also other offices.
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The transfer involved only a change in location of the office. It does not involve a change in petitioner's position. Even a transfer in position is valid when based on sound judgment, unattended by demotion in rank or diminution of pay or bad faith. With respect to the memorandum requiring the private respondent to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for violations of hotel rules, we find that the memorandum was not unreasonable nor an act of harassment that left petitioner with no choice but to resign. There is no showing that petitioner was coerced into resigning from the company. On the contrary, respondent resigned without any element of coercion attending her option. She voluntarily resigned from employment and signed the quitclaim and waiver after receiving all the benefits for her separation. To allow respondent to repudiate the same will be to countenance unjust enrichment on her part. "The Court will not permit such a situation."
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: APEX MINING VS NLRC GR NO. 94951 April 22, 1991 APEX MINING COMPANY INC. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLICITA CANDIDO GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent Sinclita Candido was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month. On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988. ISSUE: Whether Sinclitica Candido is a domestic helper or a regular employee. HELD: The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee. Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended. Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent abandoned her work. This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that because of an accident which took place while private respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular
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employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Pettitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: On May 20, 1995, private respondents filed a letter complaint in the Regional Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, Cebu City, against petitioner Rose Shipping Lines and its Proprietor/Manager Vicente Atilano docketed as LSED Case No. 055-85. The letter complaint alleged violations by petitioner of labor standard laws on minimum wages, allowances, 13th month pay and overtime pay. Acting on the letter complaint, the Office of the Regional Director ordered a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer to conduct a complaint inspection on July 22, 1985 at the establishment of petitioner in Cebu City. However, no actual inspection was effected because the owner, petitioner Mr. Vicente Atilano, allegedly on a business trip to Manila, and his employees declined to allow the inspection in his absence. Respondent Regional Director subsequently summoned the parties to conciliation conferences the first of which was held on August 5, 1985 where only the complainants (private respondents herein) appeared. The conference was then rescheduled to August 16, 1985 and on that meeting both the parties were represented. Another hearing was held on August 21, 1985 and there the private respondents submitted their position paper elaborating and documenting their claims. Petitioner did not file any position paper. Issue: Whether or not the public respondents have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Held: The lack of inspection was cured when the Regional Director called the parties to several conferences, petitioner could have presented whatever he had in his books and records to refute the claims of private respondents; petitioner did not do so and his failure must be deemed a waiver of his right to contest the conclusions of the Regional Director on the basis of the evidence and records actually made available to him. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Atilano vs Dela Cruz GR NO. 82488 February 28, 1990 Vicente Atilano / Rose Shipping Lines Dionisio C De la Serna, Adriran Lomuntad, and company Feliciano, J:
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioners wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate. She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher. On January 14, 1982, at nine oclock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, needless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home. Issue: Whether Belarmino is entitled to death benefits. Held: The government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents employees compensation commission and the government service insurance system are ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the award, and costs of suit. Belarmino vs Employees Compensation Commission GR NO. 90204 May 11, 1990 Manuel Belarmino Employees Compensation Commission GRINA AQUINO, J:
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL INC. VS MINISTER OF LABOR GR NO: GR NO. 74621 Date: February 7, 1990 Petitioner: BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL INC. Respondent: MINISTER OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW Represented by EDUARDO A. AFUAN Ponente: PARAS, J.: FACTS: Petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor and Employment acted without, or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in failing to hold: A) That the Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion in asserting exclusive jurisdiction and in not certifying this case to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on the merits; B) That the Regional Director erred in not ruling on the counterclaim raised by the respondent (in the labor case, and now petitioner in this case); C) That the Regional Director erred -in skirting the constitutional and legal issues raised. This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on September 21, 1984 with the Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of the private respondents (281 hospital employees) directly, in the total amount of P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over money claims of workers concurrent with the Labor Arbiter. HELD: Based on the foregoing considerations, it is our shared view that the findings of the labor regulations officers may not be deemed uncontested as to bring the case at bar within the competence of the Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. Considering further that the aggregate claims involve an amount in excess of P5,000.00, We find it more appropriate that the issue of petitioner hospital's liability therefor, including the proposal of petitioner that the obligation of private respondents to the former in the aggregate amount of P507,237.57 be used to offset its obligations to them, be ventilated and resolved, not in a summary proceeding before the Regional Director under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, but in accordance With the more formal and extensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the amount of the employer's liability is not quite a factor in determining the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. However, the power to order compliance with labor standards
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provisions may not be exercised where the employer contends or questions the findings of the labor regulation officers and raises issues which cannot be determined without taking into account evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, as in the case at bar. Viewed in the light of RA 6715 and read in consonance with the case of Briad Agro Development Corp., as reconsidered, We hold that the instant case falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. Curative statutes have long been considered valid in our jurisdiction, as long as they do not affect vested rights. In this case, We do not see any vested right that will be impaired by the application of RA 6715. Inasmuch as petitioner had already paid the claims of private respondents in the amount of P163,047.50 pursuant to the decision rendered in the first complaint, the only claim that should be deliberated upon by the Labor Arbiter should be limited to the second amount given by the Regional Director in the second complaint together with the proposal to offset the obligations. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Director dated April 12, 1985, is SET ASIDE. The case is REFERRED, if the respondents are so minded, to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings. SO ORDERED.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation vs National Labor Relations Commission GR NO. 122876 February 17, 2000 Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), CFWMAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA CHENIVER DECO PRINT TECHNIC CORPORATION, EDGARDO VIGUESILLA Quisumbing, J:
Ponente: Facts:
Petitioner is a duly organized corporation operating its printing business in Visita St., Barangay Sta. Cruz, Makati. Private respondent CFW-Magkakaisang Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Cheniver Deco Print Technic Corporation is a registered labor union affiliated with the Confederation of Free Workers (CFW). Private respondent Edgardo Viguesilla and twenty two (22) others are members of aforesaid union and former employees of petitioner. The records disclose that on June 5, 1992, petitioner informed its workers about the transfer of the company from its site in Makati to Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Petitioner decided to relocate its business in view of the expiration of the lease contract on the premises it occupied in Makati and the refusal of the lessor to renew the same. Earlier, the local authorities also took action to force out petitioner from Makati because of the alleged hazards petitioner's plant posed to the residents nearby. In view of the impending transfer, petitioner gave its employees up to the end of June 1992 to inform management of their willingness to go with petitioner, otherwise, it would hire replacements. Issue: Whether the wage differential should be given different and independent from monetary benefits? Held: Petitioner's contention that private respondents resigned from their jobs, does not appear convincing. As public respondent observed, the subsequent transfer of petitioner to another place hardly accessible to its workers resulted in the latter's untimely separation from the service not to their own liking, hence, not construable as resignation.7 Resignation must be voluntary and made with the intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied with an act of relinquishment. 8 Indeed, it would have been illogical for private respondents herein to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint. 9 As to petitioner's assertion that private respondents resorted to forum shopping, the same deserves scant consideration. As noted by the Solicitor General, private respondents' claims in this case are based on underpayment of wages, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. On the other hand, the other cases separately filed in different fora by Danilo Canares, Aurelia Gabucan, Dexter Mitschek and Ruel Viray involved different issues which are distinct and have no bearing on the case at bar.10 The case pursued by Canares is for diminution of salary on account of his demotion which was decided in his favor with finality by this Court; 11 Gabucan's case involves reinstatement to her job; Mitschek's case pertains to diminution of his salary; and Viray's complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus, there is no basis for petitioner's forum shopping charge as the instant case and the others do not raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. 12
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Lastly, petitioner alleges that claims of other private respondents have already been paid upon the enforcement of the order dated February 26, 1992 in case number NRC-00-9112-CI-001. This is not correct. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the aforesaid order refers to the enforcement of Wage Order No. NCR-02 mandating P2.00 wage increase.13 Certainly, the wage differential received by private respondents by virtue of the mandated wage increase is different from the monetary benefits herein being claimed by private respondents. Hence, public respondent cannot be faulted for grave abuse of discretion on this score. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed RESOLUTIONS of public respondent are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Felonila Alegre's deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A.. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer.t On account of her husband's death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, 2 the appellate court reversed the ECC's decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre's death was workconnected and, therefore, compensable. Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. Issue: May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered compensable? Held: Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE GR No. 128524 April 20, 1999 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE ROMERO, J.;
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died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-theclock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he had already complied with the duty detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Felonila Alegre's deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A.. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer.t On account of her husband's death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, 2 the appellate court reversed the ECC's decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre's death was workconnected and, therefore, compensable. Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. Issue: May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered compensable? Held: Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE GR No. 128524 April 20, 1999 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE ROMERO, J.;
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died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-theclock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he had already complied with the duty detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz signed a shipboard employment contract with petitioner Troodos Shipping Company as principal and petitioner Intertrod Maritime, Inc., as agent to serve as Third Engineer on board the M/T "BREEDEN" for a period of twelve (12) months with a basic monthly salary of US$950.00. Private respondent eventually boarded a sister vessel, M/T "AFAMIS" and proceeded to work as the vessel's Third Engineer under the same terms and conditions of his employment contract previously referred to. On 26 August 1982, while the ship (M/T "Afamis") was at Port Pylos, Greece, private respondent 3 requested for relief, due to "personal reason." The Master of the ship approved his request but informed private respondent that repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty (30) days notice in view of the Clause 5 of the employment contract so that a replacement for him (private respondent) could be arranged. On 30 August 1982, while the vessel was at Port Said in Egypt and despite the fact that it was only four (4) days after private respondent's request for relief, the Master "signed him off" and paid him in cash all amounts due him less the amount of US$780.00 for his repatriation expenses, as evidenced by the wages account signed by the private respondent. On his return to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board (NSB)(now POEA) charging petitioners for breach of employment contract and violation of NSB rules and 6 regulations. Private respondent alleged that his request for relief was made in order to take care of a Filipino member of the crew of M/T "AFAMIS" who was hospitalized on 25 August 1982 in Athens, Greece. However, the Master of the ship refused to let him immediately disembark in Greece so that the reason for his request for relief ceased to exist. Hence, when the Master of the ship forced him to step out in Egypt despite his protestations to the contrary, there being no more reason to request for relief, an illegal dismissal occurred and he had no other recourse but to return to the Philippines at his own expense. In its Answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the allegations of the complainant and averred that the contract was cut short because of private respondent's own request for relief so that it was only proper that he should pay for his repatriation expenses in accordance with the provisions of their employment contract. The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not complainant's termination is illegal. INTERTROD MARITIME, INC. and TROODOS SHIPPING CO. vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ERNESTO DE LA CRUZ GR NO. 81087 June 19, 1991 INTERTROD MARITIME, INC. and TROODOS SHIPPING CO. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ERNESTO DE LA CRUZ PADILLA, J:
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POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision was reversed. Issue: Whether or not complainant's termination is illegal. Held: Private respondent claims that his request for relief was only for the reason of taking care of a fellow member of the crew so much so that when he was not allowed to disembark in Port Pylos, Greece, the reason no longer existed and, therefore, when he was forced to "sign off" at Port Said, Egypt even when he signified intentions of continuing his work, he was illegally dismissed. 15 We sympathize with the private respondent; however, we cannot sustain such contention. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment." 16 The employer has no control over resignations and so, the notification requirement was devised in order to ensure that no disruption of work would be involved by reason of the resignation. This practice has been recognized because "every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits by adopting a device or means designed towards that goal." 17 Resignations, once accepted and being the sole act of the employee, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. In the instant case, the Master had already accepted the resignation and, although the private respondent was being required to serve the thirty (30) days notice provided in the contract, his resignation was already approved. Private respondent cannot claim that his resignation ceased to be effective because he was not immediately discharged in Port Pylos, Greece, for he could no longer unilaterally withdraw such resignation. When he later signified his intention of continuing his work, it was already up to the petitioners to accept his withdrawal of his resignation. The mere fact that they did not accept such withdrawal did not constitute illegal dismissal for acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation was their (petitioners') sole prerogative. Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, as in this case, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them. Furthermore, the employment contract also provides as follows: 4. That all terms and conditions agreed herein are for a service period of twelve (12) months provided the vessel is in a convenient port for his repatriation, otherwise at Master's discretion, on vessel's arrival at the first port where repatriation is practicable provided that such continued service shall not exceed three months. 18 Under the terms of the employment contract, it is the ship's Master who determines where a seaman requesting relief may be "signed off." It is, therefore, erroneous for private respondent to claim that his resignation was effective only in Greece and that because he was not immediately allowed to disembark in Greece (as the employer wanted compliance with the contractual conditions for termination on the part of the employee), the resignation was to be deemed automatically withdrawn.
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The decision of the NLRC is therefore set aside. To sustain it would be to authorize undue oppression of the employer. After all, "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor 19 self-destruction of the employer." WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 11 December 1987 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of then POEA Administrator Patricia Sto. Tomas dated 20 December 1983 is REVIVED. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old. Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was serviceconnected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth. Issue: Whether the surviving spouse of Flordeliza Sarmiento is entitled to the death benefits herein in question with the GSIS? Held: We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that: SALIVARY GLANDS Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections. The common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral hygiene. The latter promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence of sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another cause of a Jose Sarmento vs Employees Compensation Commission GR NO. L-65680 May 11, 1989 JOSE B. SARMIENTO EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power Corporation) GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
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painful salivary gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct stone). The submandibular glands are most commonly affected. Pain and swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of artificial dentures because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with which dentures may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and viscosity of the submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are removed by manipulation or excision. Autoimmune sialosis is the MikulicsSjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al., The Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096). Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma: Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas, especially of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and intraparotid lymph nodes are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics. Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the skin and the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause of facial palsy. Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few tumours, however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery, but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing to the regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In the case of the submandibular gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions are incised a chronic sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254) Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting her illness. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Maternity Childrens Hospital vs Secretary of Labor GR NO. 78909 June 30, 1989 MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO, President THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DlRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X MEDIALDEA, J.
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government. Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-78, Rollo). On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86. On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints (p. 98, Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1985, November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for inspection. On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, deficiency on wage and ecola as verified and confirmed per review of the respondent payrolls and interviews with the complainant workers and all other information gathered by the team, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Regional Director, this office, that Antera Dorado, President be ORDERED to pay the amount of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY SIX & 01/100 (P654,756.01), representing underpayment of wages and ecola to the THIRTY SIX (36) employees of the said hospital as appearing in the attached Annex "F" worksheets and/or whatever action equitable under the premises. (p. 99, Rollo) Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and
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enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code. Held:
The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over the individual members/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance by, such firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an award resulting from a violation of labor legislation by such establishment, the entire members/employees should benefit therefrom. As aptly stated by then Minister of Labor Augusto S. Sanchez: . . It would be highly derogatory to the rights of the workers, if after categorically finding the respondent hospital guilty of underpayment of wages and ECOLAs, we limit the award to only those who signed the complaint to the exclusion of the majority of the workers who are similarly situated. Indeed, this would be not only render the enforcement power of the Minister of Labor and Employment nugatory, but would be the pinnacle of injustice considering that it would not only discriminate but also deprive them of legislated benefits. . . . (pp. 38-39, Rollo). This view is further bolstered by the provisions of Sec. 6, Rule II of the "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards cases in the Regional Offices" (supra) presently enforced, viz: SECTION 6. Coverage of complaint inspection. A complaint inspection shall not be limited to the specific allegations or violations raised by the complainants/workers but shall be a thorough inquiry into and verification of the compliance by employer with existing labor standards and shall cover all workers similarly situated. (Emphasis supplied) However, there is no legal justification for the award in favor of those employees who were no longer connectedwith the hospital at the time the complaint was filed, having resigned therefrom in 1984, viz: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Jean (Joan) Venzon (See Order, p. 33, Rollo) Rosario Paclijan Adela Peralta Mauricio Nagales Consesa Bautista Teresita Agcopra Felix Monleon Teresita Salvador Edgar Cataluna; and 10. Raymond Manija ( p.7, Rollo) The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in cases of separated employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner (p. 54, Rollo) is not applicable as said article is in aid of the enforcement power of the Regional Director; hence, not applicable where the employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is already separated from the service. His claim is purely a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
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Petitioner has likewise questioned the order dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional Director in that it does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award is based. We invite attention to the Minister of Labor's ruling thereon, as follows: Finally, the respondent hospital assails the order under appeal as null and void because it does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the awards were based. Contrary to the pretensions of the respondent hospital, we have carefully reviewed the order on appeal and we found that the same contains a brief statement of the (a) facts of the case; (b) issues involved; (c) applicable laws; (d) conclusions and the reasons therefor; (e) specific remedy granted (amount awarded). (p. 40, Rollo) ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that time.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Philippine Global Communications vs Ricardo de Vera GR NO. 157214 June 7, 2005 Philippine Global Communications Ricardo de Vera GARCIA, J.
Petitioner Philippine Global Communications, Inc. (PhilCom), is a corporation engaged in the business of communication services and allied activities, while respondent Ricardo De Vera is a physician by profession whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of its employees. At the crux of the controversy is Dr. De Veras status vis a vis petitioner when the latter terminated his engagement. It appears that on 15 May 1981, De Vera, via a letter dated 15 May 1981,3 offered his services to the petitioner, therein proposing his plan of works required of a practitioner in industrial medicine, The parties agreed and formalized respondents proposal in a document denominated as RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT 4 which will be for a period of one year subject to renewal, it being made clear therein that respondent will cover "the retainership the Company previously had with Dr. K. Eulau" and that respondents "retainer fee" will be at P4,000.00 a month. Said contract was renewed yearly. 5 The retainership arrangement went on from 1981 to 1994 with changes in the retainers fee. However, for the years 1995 and 1996, renewal of the contract was only made verbally. The turning point in the parties relationship surfaced in Decem ber 1996 when Philcom, thru a letter6 bearing on the subject boldly written as "TERMINATION RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT", informed De Vera of its decision to discontinue the latters "retainers contract with the Company effective at the close of business hours of December 31, 1996" because management has decided that it would be more practical to provide medical services to its employees through accredited hospitals near the company premises. Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exist between petitioner and respondent, the existence of which is, in itself, a question of fact. Held:
Respondent takes no issue on the fact that petitioners business of telecommunications is not hazardous in nature. As such, what applies here is the last paragraph of Article 157 which, to stress, provides that the employer may engage the services of a physician and dentist "on retained basis", subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe. The successive "retainership" agreements of the parties definitely hue to the very statutory provision relied upon by respondent. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.26 As it is, Article 157 of the Labor Code clearly and unequivocally allows employers in non-hazardous establishments to engage "on retained basis" the service of a dentist or physician. Nowhere does the law provide that the physician or dentist so engaged
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thereby becomes a regular employee. The very phrase that they may be engaged "on retained basis", revolts against the idea that this engagement gives rise to an employer-employee relationship. With the recognition of the fact that petitioner consistently engaged the services of respondent on a retainer basis, as shown by their various "retainership contracts", so can petitioner put an end, with or 27 without cause, to their retainership agreement as therein provided. We note, however, that even as the contracts entered into by the parties invariably provide for a 60-day notice requirement prior to termination, the same was not complied with by petitioner when it terminated on 17 December 1996 the verbally-renewed retainership agreement, effective at the close of business hours of 31 December 1996. Be that as it may, the record shows, and this is admitted by both parties, 28 that execution of the NLRC decision had already been made at the NLRC despite the pendency of the present recourse. For sure, accounts of petitioner had already been garnished and released to respondent despite the previous 29 Status Quo Order issued by this Court. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the 60-day notice requirement has become moot and academic if not waived by the respondent himself. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 21 December 1998 decision of the labor arbiter is REINSTATED.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau. The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost. A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision. Issue: Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. Held: In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. Thus in the case of 139 SCRA 270 citingCristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, We ruled as follows: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, (103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and ZAIDA G. RARO vs EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM GR NO. L-58445 April 27, 1989 ZAIDA G. RARO Employees Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
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the working conditions petitions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid., p. 277). In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 1 Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exist For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is my humble opinion that this petition should be GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission should be SET ASIDE and another should be rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended.
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Jao, Harris D. 2010-0083 Case Title: GR NO: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: SEAFDEC AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country. On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits. On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits. Upon petitioner SEAFDEC AQDs failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorneys fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC . Issue: Whether NLRC has jusrisdiction over the said case. Held: Respondent NLRCs citation of the ruling of this court in Lacanilao vs De Leon to justify its assumption of jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary, the court in said case explained why it took cognizance of the case. WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine Government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center Aquaculture Department vs National Labor Relations Commission and Juvenal Lazaga GR NO. 86773 February 14, 1992 Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center Aquaculture Department National Labor Relations Commission NOCON, J:
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: GSIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROSA BALAIS G.R. No.: G.R. No. 117572 Date: January 29, 1998 Petitioner: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Respondents: The Hon. Court Of Appeals and Rosa Balais Ponente: J. Romero Facts: On December 17, 1989, Rosa Balais suddenly experienced chills, followed by loss of consciousness. She suffered from Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm, otherwise known as stroke. Even if Balais had undergone an operation, she could not perform her duties well so she was forced to retire early from the government service on March 1, 1990 at the age of sixtytwo (62) years old. On March 13, 1990, private respondent filed a claim for disability benefits with the GSIS. However, the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department which evaluated her claim found no basis to alter its findings. The results of the physical examination did not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability. Issue: Whether or not the ailment of Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm is considered as a permanent total disability. Held: A person's disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. The ruling also stressed out that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity." Permanent total disability can be the "lack of ability to follow continuously some substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life." Balais retired at the age of 62 because of her impaired physical condition. This shows that her disability is permanent and total. The petition is denied and the challenged decision of the Court Of Appeals is affirmed.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: MANUZON VS. ECC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 88573 Date: June 25, 1990 Petitioner: Consorcia F. Manuzon Respondents: Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Mindanao State University (MSU), Marawi City Ponente: J. Gancayco Facts: Petitioner's late husband started his government service as a national language researcher in December 1957 at the Institute of National Language. Later he transferred to the Mindanao State University in Marawi City as an instructor in June 1974. He rose to become assistant professor. In October 1982, he was diagnosed with Hemiparesis, otherwise known as paralysis. On June 17, 1987, he died of acute Myocardial Infraction. Petitioner Manuzon requested the GSIS for a continued pension. She was granted additional pension up to January of 1988 only. GSIS denied Manuzons request stating that her husband's death due to Myocardial Infraction was evaluated not compensable having occurred 4- years after his retirement from the service. Moreover, his retirement no longer established an employer-employee relationship. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits of her late husband. Held: Petitioners late husband was compelled to retire from the service because of disability that was work-oriented. Permanent total disability means incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. The Employees Compensation Commission denied petitioner's claim because the cause of death, Myocardial Infraction, came four and one half years after his retirement caused by work-oriented paralysis arising from cerebrovascular attack. He had to retire because of paralysis caused by that cardio vascular attack when he was an assistant professor. He died after his compulsory retirement due to total disability, caused by cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. The disease was work-oriented because of the nature of his employment as a professor. Death benefits must be granted to the primary beneficiaries who became disabled because of causes that are work-oriented. The rule applies even if that disabled person later dies because of the same cause or related cause. The decision is reversed. The heirs of Mr. Manuzon are entitled to the benefits they are claiming.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Respondent Sanico was a former employee of John Gotamco and Sons. He worked in as wood filer from 1986 until he was separated from employment on December 31, 1991 due to Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB). Sanico filed with the Social Security System (SSS) a claim for compensation benefits but SSS denied the claim on the ground of prescription. The SSS ruled that under Article 201 of the Labor Code, a claim for compensation shall be given due course only when the same is filed with the System three (3) years for the time the cause of action accrued. In Sanicos case, the SSS reckoned the threeyear prescriptive period on September 21, 1999, when his PTB first became manifest. Issue: Whether or not respondents claim for compensation benefit had already prescribed when he filed his claim. Held: Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but rather on the loss of an employees earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for. It does not mean absolute helplessness. The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be reckoned from the time the employee lost his earning capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to his illness and not when the same first became manifest. Sanicos employment was terminated on December 31, 1991 due to his illness then he filed his claim for compensation benefits on November 9, 1994. Accordingly, Sanicos claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 201 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the petition is dismissed. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION VS. E. SANICO G.R. No. 134028 December 17, 1999 Employees Compensation Commission (Social Security System) Edmund Sanico J. Kapunan
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: SUANES VS. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION G.R. No.: L- 42808 Date: January 31, 1989 Petitioner: Rosario Vda. De Suanes Respondents: The Workmens Compensation Commission and The Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways) Ponente: J. Feliciano Facts: Artemio A. Suanes was a government employee. From 1933 to 1970, he served as market collector, municipal councilor, and a construction capataz of the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH), Batangas Provincial Office. He was holding his current position as a construction capataz when he died of Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular Accident in June 21, 1973. Rosario, the surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes, filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU) a claim for compensation under the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended). BPH controverted the claim because it had been filed against the wrong party. It should be filed on the Provincial Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas, not in BPH. Issue: Whether or not petitioner had a valid claim for death benefits. Held: The petitioner's original claim named the BPH as the decedent's employer. However, in her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, petitioner designated the Republic of the Philippines as the respondent, which refers to the Bureau of Public Highways. Thus, the BPH and the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas are both governmental offices and both are embraced in the term Republic of the Philippines,' for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The funds of the BPH and the fund of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, are equally government funds. Artemio's ailment entered in the course of his employment either with the BPH or the Office of the Batangas Provincial Engineer. It is well settled that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, petitioner is accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causation between the illness and the employment in view of the legal presumption that said illness arose out of the decedent's employment. The decision is reversed. The petitioner is given reimbursement for the doctors, medical and hospital bills incurred in connection with the decedent's last illness, in addition to any other applicable death benefits.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: PHIL. FEDERATION OF CREDIT COOPERATIVES, INC. VS. NLRC G.R. No.: GR. No. 121071 Date: December 11, 1998 Petitioners: Phil. Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. and Fr. Benedicto Jayoma Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission (First Division) and Victoria Abril Ponente: J. Romero Facts: Victoria Abril was employed by petitioner Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. (PFCCI) from 1982 to 1988 as a Junior Auditor/Field Examiner. She went on leave when she gave birth to a baby girl but upon her return, she discovered that a certain Vangie Santos had been permanently appointed to her former position. She, nevertheless, accepted the position of Regional Field Officer with a probationary period of six (6) months. After that, her employment was terminated. She then filed a complaint of illegal dismissal against PFCCI. Issue: Whether or not respondent Abril is considered as a regular employee and thus entitled to the security of tenure under labor laws. Held: There are three kinds of employees: (a) regular employees or those whose work is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer; (b) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (c) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees. Abril already rendered at least one year of service which makes her a regular employee. Moreover, this entitles her to the security of tenure guaranteed under the Constitution and labor laws. She also completed the probationary period which makes her a regular employee and dismissing her is illegal. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: DE LEON VS. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 70705 Date: August 21, 1989 Petitioner: Moises de Leon Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and La Tondea Ponente: C.J. Fernan Facts: Petitoner de Leon was employed by private respondent La Tondea Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the Maintenance Section. After a service of more than one (1) year, de Leon requested that he be included in the payroll of regular workers. However, La Tondea dismissed de Leon which compelled him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is only a casual worker and not a regular employee. Held: Petitioner was not a mere casual employee but a regular employee. It can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. The petition is granted.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: VIOLETA VS. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 119523 Date: October 10, 1997 Petitioners: Isabelo Violeta and Jovito Baltazar Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission and Dasmarias Industrial and Steelworks Corporation Ponente: J. Regalado Facts: Petitioners Isabelo Violeta and Jovito Baltazar were former employees of Dasmarias Industrial and Steelworks Corporation (DISC). They were hired from one project to another from 1980 to 1992. Upon their separation, petitioners executed a quitclaim wherein they declared that they have no claim against DISC. Contending that they are already regular employees who cannot be dismissed on the ground of completion of the particular project where they are engaged, petitioners filed two separate complaints for illegal dismissal DISC. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are only casual workers and not regular employees. Held: Although the appointment contracts of petitioners specified fixed terms or periods of employment, the fact that they were hired and transferred from one project to another made both petitioners nonproject employees who cannot be terminated by reason alone of the completion of the project. The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. Project employees are those workers hired (1) for a specific project or undertaking, and (2) the completion or termination of such project or undertaking has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee. Petitioners are then regular employees and not project employees as said by NLRC. Petitioners dismissal could not be justified by the completion of their items of work. Therefore, the petition is granted.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondents: Ponente: Facts: Petitoner Romares worked at PILMICOs Maintenance/Projects/Engineering Department performing maintenance work, particularly the painting of company buildings, maintenance chores, and sometimes operating company equipment. He was hired, terminated and rehired again for three times in a span of more than three (3) years from September 1989 to January 1983. He performed the same functions at work. However, he was illegally dismissed. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is only a casual worker and not a regular employee. Held: There are two kinds of regular employees: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment. Therefore, the petition is granted. ROMARES VS. NLRC G.R. No. 122327 August 19, 1998 Artemio J. Romares National Labor Relations Commission and PILMICO Foods Corporation J. Martinez
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: PHILIPPINE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 122122 Date: July 20, 1999 Petitioners: Philippine Fruit and Vegetable Industries, Inc. and Mr. Pedro Castillo Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Philippine Fruit and Vegetables Workers Union- Tupas Local Chapter Ponente: J. Kapunan Facts: Philippine Fruit and Vegetable Industries, Inc. (PFVII) is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of fruit and vegetable purees for export. On September 5, 1988 herein private respondent Philippine Fruit and Vegetable Workers Union-Tupas Local Chapter, for and in behalf of 127 of its members, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal with damages against petitioner corporation. Private respondent alleged that many of its complaining members started working for PFVII in January or February 1983 until their dismissal on different dates in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. Petitioner Pedro Castillo is the former President and General Manager of petitioner PFVII. Petitioners further argue that PFVII operates on a seasonal basis and the complainants who are members of respondent union are seasonal workers because they work only during the period that the company is in operation. Its operation starts only in February and ceases by the end of the same month when the supply is consumed. It then resumes operations at the end of April or early May, depending on the availability of supply and ceases operation in June. The severance of complainants' employment from petitioner corporation was a necessary consequence of the nature of seasonal employment; and since complainants are seasonal workers as defined by the Labor Code, they cannot invoke any benefit. Issue: Whether or not respondents are seasonal employees whose employments ceased during the offseason due to no work and not due to illegal dismissal. Held: Regular and Casual Employment- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employers, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph; provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. An employment shall be deemed regular where the employee: a) has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; or b) has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he is employed. The work of complainants as seeders, operators, sorters, slicers, janitors, drivers, truck helpers, mechanics and office personnel is without doubt necessary in the usual business of a food processing company like petitioner PFVII.
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While it may be true that some phases of petitioner company's processing operations is dependent on the supply of fruits for a particular season, the other equally important aspects of its business, such as manufacturing and marketing are not seasonal. The fact is that large-scale food processing companies such as petitioner company continue to operate and do business throughout the year even if the availability of fruits and vegetables is seasonal. Therefore, the petition is reversed with respect to the union members, who did not adduce evidence in support of their claims.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: E. GANZON, INC., VS. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 123769 Date: December 22, 1999 Petitioner: E. Ganzon Inc. Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Rene Permaran, Nerio Valenzuela, Rodrigo Prado, Mario Plaquia, Ernesto Mateo, Rommel Naadat, Artemio Agosto, Salvador Urbanozo, Cesar Castillo, and Ponciano del Rosario Ponente: Bellosillo, J. Facts: E. Ganzon, Inc., is engaged in the construction business. It manufactures its own building materials, and all kinds of aluminum and concrete products. Respondents said that during the period of their employment from 1984 to 1991, insurance premiums were deducted from their salaries without their consent, and they were not given overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, five (5) days incentive leave pay despite having rendered services for more than a year, vacation/sick leave pay and 13th month pay. Valenzuela, Rodrigo Prado, Mario Plaquia, Ernesto Mateo, Rommel Naadat, Artemio Agosto, Salvador Urbanozo, Cesar Castillo, and Ponciano del Rosario Petitioner E. Ganzon Inc. countered that the complainants were all contractual, project, temporary or casual employees as evidenced by their employment contracts expressly providing that the acceptance of their services was based on the need for their skill such that upon completion of the project and/or when reduction of the workforce was necessary, their services would be terminated. Their employment contracts were renewed every three (3) months. Issue: Whether or not respondents are contractual or project employees, as borne by their respective employment contracts. Held: Article 280 of the Labor Code states that written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. Determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
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Therefore, respondents are declared regular employees of E. Ganzon, Inc. They are likewise declared to have been illegally dismissed. The petitioner is ordered to reinstate them without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to grant them full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time compensation was withheld from them up to actual reinstatement.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: LAZO VS. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION G.R. No.: G.R. No. 78617 Date: June 18, 1990 Petitioner: Salvador Lazo Respondents: Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Ponente: Padilla, J. Facts: Petitioner Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On June 18, 1986, he rendered an overtime duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of June 19, 1986. On his way home, the passenger jeepney he was riding on turned turtle due to the slippery road; he then sustained injuries. He filed a claim for disability benefits but GSIS denied for the reason that he was not at his work place performing his duties when the incident occurred. Issue: Whether or not the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. Held: The petitioner was asked to go on overtime since the reliever did not arrive. He did not deviate from his usual, regular homeward route. The Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident. As embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. Therefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and set aside.
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Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: INTERTROD MARITIME INC. VS. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 81087 Date: June 19, 1991 Petitioner: Intertrod Maritime Inc. and Troodos Shipping Co. Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Ernesto de la Cruz Ponente: J. Padilla Facts: On May 10, 1982, respondent de la Cruz signed a shipboard employment contract with petitioners Troodos Shipping Company and Intertrod Maritime, Inc. to serve as Third Engineer and boarded the sister vessel, M/T "AFAMIS". On August 26, 1982, while the M/T "Afamis" was at Port Pylos, Greece, private respondent requested for relief, due to a "personal reason." The Master of the ship approved his request but him respondent that repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty (30) days notice in view of the Clause 5 of the employment contract so that a replacement for him could be arranged. Four days after private respondent's request for relief, the Master "signed him off". The Master of the ship forced him to step out in Egypt despite his protests and he had no other recourse but to return to the Philippines at his own expense. Petitioners said that the contract was cut short because of private respondent's own request for relief; it was proper that he should pay for his repatriation expenses in accordance with the provisions of their employment contract. Issue: Whether or not respondent de la Cruzs termination is illegal. Held: Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment." Once resignation is accepted, it may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. In this case, the Master had already accepted the resignation and, although the private respondent was being required to serve the thirty (30) days notice provided in the contract, his resignation was already approved. When he later signified his intention of continuing his work, it was already up to the petitioners to accept his withdrawal of his resignation. The mere fact that they did not accept such withdrawal did not constitute illegal dismissal for acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation was the petitioners' sole prerogative. Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. Therefore, the petition is granted. Maranatha M. Manginsay 2011-0043 Case title: G.R. No.: Date: MANILA BROADCASTING CO. VS. NLRC G.R. No. 121975 August 20, 1998
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Petitioner: Manila Broadcasting Company Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Ricardo Olairez, and Samuel L. Bangloy Ponente: J. Mendoza Facts: Respondent Bangloy was a production supervisor and a radio commentator of the DZJC-AM radio station in Laoag City. The radio station is owned by petitioner Manila Broadcasting Company. He applied for leave of absence for 50 days, from March 24 to May 13, 1992 in order to run for Board Member in Ilocos Norte under the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) but lost. He tried to return to work, but was not allowed by petitioner on the ground that his employment had been terminated. He was later informed that he could not be re-employed because: 1) there is a company policy considering any employee who runs for public office resigned. 2) A maximum of 30 days only is allowed for leave. 3) Although R.A. No. 6646 requires radio commentators who file certificates of candidacy to go on leave during the campaign period, private respondent was not required to take such leave as production supervisor hence he could not have taken a leave for said position. 4) The private respondents leave was not in accordance with R.A. No. 6646 which allows leave of absence only from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy until the day of the election. Issue: Whether or not respondent Bangloy was illegally and unjustly dismissed. Held: Under Art. 282(a) of the Labor Code, an employee may be dismissed for willful disobedience of the lawful orders of his employer in connection with his work. To justify the dismissal of an employee on this ground, it must be shown that his conduct was willful and that the order violated (1) is reasonable and lawful, (2) is known to the employee, and (3) pertains to the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. Respondent claims that when he filed his application for leave, he was not aware of the company policy considering employees who file certificates of candidacy for elective public office as resigned. The policy is also not written. Respondent believed in good faith that notwithstanding the company policy in question, he could go on leave without resigning in order to run for a seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Considering that at the time of his dismissal, he had been in the company for six (6) years, dismissal would be too severe. Suspension for one month would be a sufficient penalty for his unauthorized absences. Therefore, the decision is affirmed.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 ABAYA VS ECC GR No: L-64255 Date: Aug. 19, 1989 Petitioner: Evaristo Abaya Jr. Respondent: Employees Compensation Commission Ponente: Cruz, J. FACTS: Petitioner Abaya retired as a principal teacher at the age of 60 on after serving the government in various capacities for 38 and a half years. He applied with GSIS for medical services, appliance and supplies and permanent total disability benefits under basis of cardiovascular disease and cerebral encephalopathy secondary to hypertension. However, his application was denied for the grounds that his ailment was not an occupational disease. Upon appeal to the ECC it was sent back to the GSIS for reception of additional evidence showing that the applicant's illness was work-connected. Thereafter, the GSIS delivered to the petitioner a check in the amount of P l,218.25, representing his permanent partial disability benefits for the period from October 15,1975, to March 1976. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner appealed once again to the ECC, which this time sustained the GSIS. He was then referred to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners disability is permanent total? HELD: YES. Sec. 2 Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation states that: Sec. 2. Disability(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(c) A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. In the case, the petitioner opted to retire when he was only 60 years of age although he was entitled to continue during good behavior for five more years. It indicates that he was no longer able to cope with his work because of his illness and therefore falling under the category of Sec. 2 (b) of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation which is Permanent Total Disability. The appealed decision is reversed.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 ALU TUCP VS. NLRC GR No: 109902 Date: August 2, 1994 Petitioner: ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: Alan Barinque, with 13 others, namely: Engr. Alan G. Barinque, Engr. Darrell Lee Eltagonde, Eduard H. Fookson, JR., Romeo R. Sarona, Russsell Gacus, Jerry Bontilao, Eusebio Marin Jr., Leonido Echavez, Bonifacio Mejos, Edgar S. Bontuyan, Jose G. Garguena Jr., Osias Dandasan, and Gerry Fetalvero, Respondent: NLRC and National Steel Corporation Ponente: Feliciano, J. FACTS: Petitioners were employed by respondent NSC in connection with its Five Year Expansion Program for varying lengths of time when they were separated from NSC's service. They filed complaints at NLRC for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits. The Labor Arbiter declared the petitioners as regular project employees. It is said that those in such classification shall continue their employment as such for as long as the project exists and who shall be entitled to the salary of a regular employee. Both parties appealed the decision, which was later affirmed with modifications by the NLRC. The petitioners invoked Article 280 of the Labor Code arguing that they are regular employees due to the reason that their jobs were necessary and essential to NSC's business and that they had rendered services for 6 years already. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are project employees. HELD: YES. Article 280 of the Labor Code states that: Regular and Casual Employment The provisions of the written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, and employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. The component projects embraced in the Five Year Expansion Program were different from the regular business of NSC. There was nothing in the facts to prove that the petitioners were hired for other purposes. Also, the petitioners service to NSC of more than six years should qualify them as regular employees are without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one year does not detract from their status as project employees. Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 CEBU MARINE BEACH RESORT VS NLRC GR No. 143252 Date: Oct. 23, 2003 Petitioner: Cebu Marine Beach Resort, Ofelia Perez, Tsuyoshi Sasaki Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Ric Rodrigo Rodriguez, Manulito Villegas, Lorna G. Igot Ponente: Sandoval-Guttierez, J. FACTS: On January 1990, Cebu Marine Beach Resort started operations with the recruitment of its employees including petitioners Rodriguez, Villegas and Igot and became fully operational on March 1990. The respondents had to undergo a special training in Japanese customs, traditions, and discipline, as well as hotel and resort services. This special training was supervised by petitioner Sasaki. On May 24, 1990, Sasaki suddenly scolded respondents and hurled brooms, floor maps, iron trays, fire hoses and other things at them. Respondents staged a walk-out as a sign of protest and gathered in front of the resort. The former reacted by shouting at them to go home and never to report back to work. Thus the employees filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch at Cebu City a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against petitioners. On May 28, 1990, the company through its acting general manager Pelaez sent letters to respondents requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from employment on the grounds of abandonment of work and failure to qualify with the standards for probationary employees. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision date March 23, 1993 dismissing respondents complaint but directing them to immediately report back to work. On June 28, 1994, NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision, declaring that the respondents were dismissed illegally and ordering their reinstatement with payment of full back wages from May 24, 1990 up to their actual reinstatement or in lieu thereof, the payment of their respective separation pay from May 24, 1990 up to the date they were supposed to be reinstated, as well as attorneys fees. On February 28, 1995, the NLRC issued a Resolution declaring that the back wages shall correspond only to the period from May 24, 1990 (the date of their dismissal) until March 23, 1993 (when they were ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter), subject to the deduction of their earnings from other sources during the pendency of the appeal. On March 22, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. On November 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC that the back wages should be computed from the date of the dismissal of private respondents until the finality of this Decision without deduction from earnings during the pendency of the appeal and the award of separation pay must be equivalent to one-half months salary for every year of service commencing likewise on the date of the dismissal of private respondents until the finality of this Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was done.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner company? HELD: NO. Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code states that Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. In the case, petitioners terminated respondents probationary employment on the grounds of persistent abandonment despite being asked to explain why they should not be terminated and failure to qualify for the positions for which they were employed. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment which obviously were made known to him. Thus, assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 5, 1999 and April 18, 2000 are hereby affirmed with modification.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 DE LA CRUZ JR VS NLRC GR No: 145417 Date: Dec. 11, 2003 Petitioner: Florencio M. De la Cruz Jr. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Shemberg Marketing Corporation, Ernesto Dacay Jr. Ponente: Corona, J. FACTS: On May 27, 1996, petitioner de la Cruz Jr. was hired by Shemberg Marketing Corporation as senior sales manager. On September 14, 1996, the management decided to terminate his services. The only reason De la Cruz was told by HR manager Llanto was that it had something to do with the drop in the companys sales and further attempts to negotiate were not entertained. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, back wages, 13th month pay and damages against Shemberg, Dacay, Jr. and Llanto. Shemberg answered by explaining that De la Cruz was terminated for his failure to meet the required company standards and for loss of trust and confidence. On August 25, 1997, the labor arbiter ruled that de la Cruz was illegally dismissed and granted his claim for separation pay, back wages and unpaid wages totaling P438,750. Other claims and the cases against respondents Dacay, Jr. and Llanto are dismissed for lack of merit. The NLRC dismissed an appeal dated May 13, 1998. On July 9, 1999, the NLRC partially granted the motion for reconsideration and modified its previous resolution ordering respondent to pay de la Cruz P23,900. De la Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the NLRC on November 19, 1999. De la Cruz elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed for lack of merit. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied on September 8, 2000. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed and thus should be awarded his separation pay, back wages and unpaid wages? HELD: NO. Article 281 of the Labor Code expresses that Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards, made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. In the case, petitioner was only employed for 4 months, thus still being considered as under probationary employment. As a probationary employee, he enjoyed only temporary employment status. This meant that he was terminable anytime, permanent employment not having been attained in the meantime. The employer could well decide he no longer needed the probationary employees services or his performance fell short of expectations, etc. As long as the termination was made before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the employer was well within his rights to sever the employer-employee relationship. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 ESCORPIZO VS UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO GR No. 121962 Date: Apr. 30, 1999 Petitioner: Esperanza C. Escorpizo, University of Baguio Faculty Education Workers Union Respondent: University of Baguio and Virgilio Bautista, National Labor Relations Commission Ponente: Quisumbing, J. FACTS: On June 13, 1989, petitioner Escorpizo was hired by University of Baguio as a high school teacher. It was on March 18, 1991 when the university informed Escorpizo that her employment was being terminated at the end of the school semester for failure to pass the professional board examination for teachers (PBET). As her appeal to be given a second chance was considered, she was allowed to teach the next school year. Her continued employment was conditioned on her passing the PBET. Escorpizo failed again on the subsequent PBET and thus was not included in the list of those who will teach on the next school year. On June 8, 1992, Escorpizo passed the PBET. But on June 15, 1992, the university no longer renewed her contract of employment on the ground that she failed to qualify as a regular teacher. She filed on July 16, 1992 a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of back wages and reinstatement against the university. On June 22, 1993, the labor arbiter ruled that respondent university had a permissible reason in not renewing the employment contract but the labor official ordered the reinstatement of Escorpizo. An instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter is now done by the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not Escorpizo is still entitled to security of tenure? HELD: NO. Article 281 of the Labor Code expresses that the services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards, made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. Escorpizo was entitled to security of tenure during the period of her probation but such protection ended the moment her employment contract expired at the close of school year 1991-1992 and she was not extended a new appointment. No vested right to a permanent appointment had as yet accrued in her favor since she had not yet complied, during her probation, with the prerequisites necessary for the acquisition of permanent status. There was only an expiration of contract. Petition was dismissed.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 PHILIPPINE GRAND MOTOR PARTS CORP. VS MINISTER OF LABOR GR No: L-58958 Date: July 16, 1984 Petitioner: Grand Motor Parts Corporation Respondent: The Minister of Labor, The Regional Director, Ministry of Labor Region VI, and Narciso Belicena Jr. Ponente: Guerrero, J. FACTS: Respondent Belicena was the Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine Grand M otor Parts Corporations Iloilo Branch. Previously he was the Finance Officer of Warner, Barnes, & Co. During the period of his previous work he was induced to apply for the position of Branch Manager since they were scouting for one who is a CPA. He started working for the petitioner company on April 1 and it was only on Apr. 28 he resigned from his position in his previous workplace. After 4 months he was terminated and several allegations were made against the petitioner such as failure to submit promptly the monthly Income and Loss Statement, Comparative Projections & Actual Sales Report; the Comparative Performance Report dated 7/8/1980 on the operation of the Iloilo Branch for the month of June and May, 1980, the Cash Sales of the Iloilo Branch went down to P91,318.41 for June, 1980, as compared with the sales for the month of May, 1980 in the sum of P174,697.77; Belicena in violation of company policy and without clearance from the head office in Cebu, extended personal accounts in favor of 15 persons which as of November, 1980 produced delinquent accounts amounting to P18,435.80; and Belicena claimed lack of knowledge of the vehicular accident caused by a subordinate and failed to provide prompt administrative disciplinary action against the erring employee. They claimed that Balicena is only a probationary employee but the Regional Director and Minister of Labor ruled in favor of Balicena. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is a probationary employee? HELD: YES. Art. 282 of the Labor Code states that: Probationary Employment. Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. There was no written proof of Belicenas employment as regular Branch Manager. He assumed his work as of April 1 but resigned from his previous company on April 28. Therefore, if he was indeed appointed as regular and permanent then he would have resigned immediately from his previous company. But since he was not yet sure of his status in the petitioner corporation, he resigned on a later date. Also, Philippine Grand Motors Corporation and Warner, Barnes & Co were engaged in different nature of business so it was needed for respondent to undergo a probationary period to test his skills and qualifications. Petition was granted.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION VS NLRC GR No. 72222 Date: Jan 30, 1989 Petitioner: International Catholic Migration Commission Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Bernadette Galang Ponente: Fernan, J. FACTS: On January 24, 1983, Bernadette Galang was accepted as a probationary cultural orientation teacher by petitioner International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). Three months after, Galang was informed orally and in writing that her services were being terminated for her failure to meet the th prescribed standards of petitioner. The proportionate amount of her 13 month pay and the equivalent of her two week pay were received by her father on her behalf since she became ill during that period. On August 22, 1983, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against ICMC and hoping for reinstatement with back wages, exemplary and moral damages. Complaints were dismissed on October 8, 1983 but it was ordered that ICMC pay Galang the sum of P6000 as payment for the last three (3) months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. Both ICMC and Galang appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission. On August 22, 1985, the NLRC sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter and thus dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the award of salary for the unexpired three-month portion of the probationary period? HELD: NO. An order petitioner to pay private respondent her salary for the unexpired three-month portion of her six-month probationary employment when she was validly terminated during her probationary employment would be oppressive on the part of the employer. Failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code which states that Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Petition was thus granted.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 KIAMCO VS NLRC GR No: 129449 Date: Dec 11, 1998 Petitioner: Cisell A. Kiamco Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine National Oil Company, PNOC Energy Development Corporation Ponente: Bellosillo, J. FACTS: On July 1, 1992 private respondent PNOC hired petitioner Kiamco as a project employee in its Geothermal Agro-Industrial Plant Project. The contract stated that he was being hired by the company as a technician for a period of five months or up to the completion of the project. He was re-hired after two more periods. It was on October 1993 when Kiamco received a Memorandum from the administration department demanding an explanation from him on certain infractions he allegedly committed such as misconduct, AWOL, non-compliance of admin reporting procedure on accidents, and unauthorized use of company vehicles. A few days later, another Memorandum was sent placing him under preventive suspension pending further investigation. No investigation however was ever conducted. He attempted to go back to work but was prevented by security guards from entering the company premises. On May 27, 1994 private respondent PNOC-EDC reported to the Department of Labor and Employment that petitioner Kiamco was terminated on November 1 1993 due to the expiration of his employment contract and the abolition of his position. On April 25, 1994 Kiamco filed before the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal against the PNOC. It was dismissed on June 30, 1995 by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. Kiamco appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to public respondent NLRC which on September 27, 1996 reversed the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: HELD: NO. Article 280 of the Labor Code states that in Regular and casual employment The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed - for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. Also in Violeta v. NLRC it is stated that the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. As defined, project employees are those workers hired (1) for a specific project or undertaking, and (2) the Whether or not the petitioner is a regular employee and not a project employee?
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completion or termination of such project or undertaking has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee. Kiamco was correctly labeled by the NLRC as a project employee. The three (3) Contracts of Employment entered into by Kiamco clearly established that he was a project employee because (a) he was specifically assigned to work for a particular project, which was the Geothermal Agro-Industrial Demonstration Plant Project of private respondents, and (b) the termination and the completion of the project or undertaking was determined and stipulated in the contract at the time of his employment. However, the argument that petitioner could no longer be reinstated since he failed to substantiate the existence of the project is untenable. The burden of proving that petitioner Kiamco is not entitled to reinstatement rests on private respondent corporations. Being the employer, the private respondents would have in their possession the necessary documents and proof to show that the project had already been terminated. Earlier decision is thus modified and petitioner is reinstated to former position.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 LAO CONSTRUCTION VS NLRC GR No: 116781 Date: Sept.5, 1997 Petitioner: Tomas Lao Construction, LVM Construction Corporation, Thomas and James Developers (Phil.) Inc. Q. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Mario O. Labendia, Sr., Roberto Labendia, Narciso Adan, Florencio Gomez, Ernesto Bagatsolon, Salvado Babob, Paterno Bisnar, Cipriano Bernales, Angel Mabulay, Sr., Leo Surigao, and Roque Morillo Ponente: Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Private complainants were hired for various periods by petitioner as follows: (a) Roberto Labendia, general construction foreman, from 1971 to 17 October 1990 (b) Narciso Adan, tireman, from October 1981 to November 1990 (c) Florencio Gomez, welder, from July 1983 to July 1990 (d) Ernesto Bagatsolon leadman/checker, from June 1982 to October 1990 (e) Salvador Babon, clerk/timekeeper/paymaster, from June 1982 to October 1990 (f) Paterno Bisnar, road grader operator, from January 1979 to October 1990 (g) Cipriano Bernales, instrument man, from February 1980 to November 1990 (h) Angel Mabulay, Sr., dump truck driver, from August 1974 to October 1990 (I) Leo Surigao, payloader operator, from March 1975 to January 1978 (J) Mario Labendia, Sr. surveyor/foreman, from August 1971 to July 1990 (k) Roque Morillo, company watchman, from August 1983 to October 1990 On 1989 Andres Lao, Managing Director of LVM and President issued a memorandum requiring all workers and company personnel to sign employment contract forms and clearances which were issued on 1 July 1989 but antedated 10 January 1989. To ensure compliance with the directive, the company ordered the withholding of the salary of any employee who refused to sign. The contracts expressly described the construction workers as project employees. They were also required to explain why their services should not be terminated for violating company rules and warned that failure to satisfactorily explain would be construed as disinterest in continued employment with the company. NLRC RAB VIII dismissed the complaints lodged before but however granted each employee a separation pay of P6,435.00 computed at one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, uniformly rounded at five (5) years. The decision of Labor Arbiter Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr., was reversed on appeal by the Fourth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of Cebu City.
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ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were only project employees thus not entitled to security of tenure?
HELD: NO. The principal test in determining whether particular employees are project employees distinguished from regular employees is whether the project employees are assigned to carry out specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which are specified at the time the employees are engaged for the project. Project in the realm of business and industry refers to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of employer, but which is distinct and separate and identifiable as such from the undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. In the case the workers were initially hired for specific projects or undertakings of the company and hence can be classified as project employees. But the repeated re-hiring and the continuing need for their services over a long span of time have undeniably made them regular employees. The court held that where the employment of project employees is extended long after the supposed project has been finished, the employees are removed from the scope of project employees and considered regular employees. Thus petition was denied.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 MAGCALAS VS NLRC GR No. 100333 Date: Mar. 13, 1997 Petitioner: Hilario Magcalas, Porspero Marinda, Celso Gamalo, Epifanio Omega, Virgilio Campos, Antonio Llagas, Bernard Bendanillo, Shaldy Autencio, Ciriaco Reyes, Juanito de Leon, Edmundo Guzman, Alfredo Santos, Benedicto Dagcutan, Norbie Lopena, Ismale Alonzo, Elmer Baleta, Genito Dalmero, and Cesar Ledesma Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Koppel Inc. Ponente: Panganiban, J. FACTS: The complainants were all regular employees of Koppel Inc. (engaged in the business of installing air conditioning and refrigeration equipment) having rendered continuous services in various capacities ranging from lead man, tinsmith, trades helper to general clerk from a range of 1 years to 8 years. On August 30, 1988, all were dismissed without prior notice and that their dismissals were effected for no other cause than their persistent demands for payment of money claims. The respondents interposed the defense of contract/project employment. According to them, with the completion of their task on August 31, 1988 in their respective installation projects, the employment of the complainants expired as they had no more work to do. The employees now claim that they were illegally dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were regular workers under the contemplation of Art. 280 of the Labor Code? HELD: YES. A mere provision in the CBA recognizing contract employment does not sufficiently establish that petitioners were ipso facto contractual or project employees. Regular employees cannot at the same time be project employee since Article 280 of the Labor Code states that regular employees are those whose work is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer . The two exceptions following the general description of regular employees refer to either project or seasonal employees. The Court reiterates the rule that all doubts, uncertainties, ambiguities and insufficiencies should be resolved in favor of labor. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proof. This burden was not discharged in the present case. Petition was granted.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 PHIL. FEDERATION OF CREDIT COOPERATIVES, INC. VS NLRC GR No: 121071 Date: Dec 11, 1998 Petitioner: Phil. Federation of Credit Cooperatives Inc, Fr. Benedicto Jayoma Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Victoria Abril Ponente: Romero, J. FACTS: On September 1982, private respondent Abril was employed by petitioner Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. (PFCCI) and held different positions such as office secretary in 1985 and as cashier-designate for four months ending in April 1988. After resuming her position as office secretary, she went on leave until she gave birth. On November 1989 she returned but she discovered that she had been permanently replaced. She then accepted the position of Regional Field Officer as evidenced by a contract which stipulated that her employment status shall be probationary for a period of six months. Abril was allowed to work after the period until PFCCI presented to her another employment contract for a period of one year commencing on January 2, 1991 until December 31, 1991, after which period, her employment was terminated. On April 1, 1992, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent against PFCCI and on March 10, 1993 it was dismissed for lack of merit but ordered PFCCI to reimburse her the amount of P2,500 which had been deducted from her salary. On appeal, the said decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) stating that respondents are hereby directed to reinstate Abril to her position last held, which is that of a Regional Field Officer, or to an equivalent position if such is no longer feasible, with full back wages computed from January 1, 1992 until she is actually reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has become a regular employee entitled to security of tenure guaranteed under the Constitution and labor laws
HELD: YES. Article 281 of the Labor Code expresses that Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards, made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Having completed the probationary period and allowed to work thereafter, Abril became a regular employee regardless of the designations and may be dismissed only for just or authorized causes under Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as amended. Petition was dismissed.
Montilla, Rosalie M.
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2011-0038 PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI & AMUSEMENT CORP. VS CLAVE GR No: L-54136 Date: Dec. 21, 1983 Petitioner: Philippine Jai-Alai & Amusement Corporation Respondent: Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, Hon. Amado G. Inciong, Hon. Vicente Leogardo Jr., Rufino Cadatal Jr., Antonio Delgra Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J. FACTS: On February 2, 1976, petitioner hired plumber Cadatal and mason Delgra together with 30 other workers for a period of one month to continue even after that period should their services be needed further in the renovation work. This renovation was completed by the end of October 1976 but their services were still need for further projects. On November 17, 1976, private respondents received notice of termination effective November 29, 1976, but since minor repairs were still needed, they worked up to December 11, 1976 and were fully paid for their labor up to that date. On December 13, 1976, petitioner filed with the former Department of Labor a report of termination of the services of private respondents and 30 others, due to completion of the project. The report listed them as "casual emergency workers." A summary Order was issued on December 24, 1976 for reinstatement with full back wages. The Order of December 24, 1976 was affirmed in an Order dated July 13, 1977. This Order was in turn appealed to the Office of the President. The appeal was dismissed on January 25, 1979. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1979. On April 26, 1980, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to collect from petitioner corporation the total amount of 26,260.00, representing private respondents' full back wages. And, on June 5, 1980, a second Motion for Reconsideration dated April 24, 1980, was denied by respondent Clave, since only one such Motion is allowed and the grounds invoked were substantially the same as those previously raised. Respondents allege that they had been terminated without just cause. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are regular employees?
HELD: NO. Art 281 of the Labor Code states that: Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.
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The casual or limited character of private respondents' employment, therefore, is evident. They were engaged for a specific project or undertaking and fall within the exception provided for in Article 281 of the Labor Code, supra. Not being regular employees, it cannot be justifiably said that petitioner had dismissed them without just cause. They are not entitled to reinstatement with full back wages Thus previous decision is reversed and set aside.
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS INC VS. NLRC GR No: L-66119 Date: May 31, 1986 Petitioner: Sandoval Shipyards Inc. Respondent: Vicente Leogardo, Jr, Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment, Danilo dela Cruz, Rodrigo Villaruz, Rodrigo Perez, Aquilino Tabilon, Armando Esglanda, Manuel Medina, Freddie Abadiez, Feliciano Tolang, Alfredo dela Cruz, Nicolas Mariano, Vicente Cebuano, Rolando Roldan, Teodoro Roldan, Solomon Gemino, Mario Ricafort, Rolando Lopez, Angel Samson Ponente: Aquino, J. FACTS: The private respondents are all workers of petitioner Sandoval Shipyards Inc. engaged in the building and repair of vessels. According the petitioner, each vessel is a separate project and thus employment shall cease upon completion of a vessel. On the contrary, the private respondents claim that they are regular employees because the termination of one project does not mean the end of their employment since they can be assigned to unfinished projects. ISSUE: Whether or not the workers are project employees? HELD: YES. Policy Instructions No. 20 of the Secretary of Labor states that: Project employees are those employed in connection with a particular construction project. Non-project (regular) employees are those employed by a construction company without reference to any particular project. Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such termination. In the case, it cannot be said that even after the completion of one vessel the employment shall still continue because each vessel is a different project depending on the need of the client. The complaints for illegal layoff are dismissed
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Montilla, Rosalie M. 2011-0038 VICENTE VS ECC GR No: 85024 Date: Jan. 23, 1991 Petitioner: Domingo Vicente Respondent: Employees Compensation Commission Ponente: Sarmiento, J. FACTS: The petitioner Vicente was a nursing attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. After having more than 25 years in service and at 45 years old, he applied for optional retirement duet to his physical disability of osteoarthritis, hypertension, cardiomegaly, and left ventricular hypertrophy. The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service Insurance System an application for income benefits claim for payment. His application was granted but only for permanent partial disability compensation or for a period of nineteen months starting from August 16, 1981 up to March 1983. A motion for reconsideration granted him the equivalent of additional four months benefits. Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability Compensation Department Manager on November 6, 1986. He claims that he should be compensated no less than for permanent total disability. His request had been denied. His case was elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation Commission. On August 24, 1988, the respondent rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the GSIS Employees' Disability Compensation and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has permanent total disability? HELD: YES. Sec. 2 Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation states that: Sec. 2. Disability(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(c) A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. In the case, the petitioner's permanent total disability is established beyond doubt. The petitioner's application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments had been approved. The decision of the respondent Commission even admits that the petitioner retired from government service at the age of 45. Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. Optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service. The decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is set aside and another one is hereby entered declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 WORKPOOL EMPLOYEES AGUILAR CORP. v NLRC G.R. No. 116352 March 13, 1997 Petitioner: J. & D.O. AGUILAR CORPORATION Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROMEO ACEDILLO Ponente: ROMERO, J.
Facts: Private respondent Romeo Acedillo began working for petitioner in February 1989 as a helper-electrician. On January 16, 1992, he received a letter from petitioner informing him of his severance from the company allegedly due to lack of available projects and excess in the number of workers needed. He decided to file a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC after learning that new workers were being hired by petitioner while his request to return to work was being ignored. In reply, petitioner maintained that its need for workers varied, depending on contracts procured in the course of its business of contracting refrigeration and other related works. It contended that its workers are hired on a contractual or project basis, and their employment is deemed terminated upon completion of the project for which they were hired. Finally, petitioner argued that Acedillo was not a regular employee because his employment was for a definite period and apparently made only to augment the regular work force.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is a member of the work pool of employees of petitioner.
Ruling: Yes. It is immediately apparent that the issues raised in the instant petition are factual, dealing as they do with the appreciation of evidence by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. On this sole ground, the petition may justifiably be dismissed. However, a closer examination of the records and of the papers and pleadings filed doubly convinces the Court of the futility of this action. Petitioner is to be reminded that a project employee is one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season." The records reveal that petitioner did not specify the duration and scope of the undertaking at the time Acedillo's services were contracted. Petitioner could have easily presented an employment contract showing that he was engaged only for a specific project, but it failed to do so. It is not even clear if Acedillo ever signed an employment contract with petitioner. Neither is there any proof that the duration of his assignment was made clear to him other than the selfserving assertion of petitioner that the same can be inferred from the tasks he was made to perform. What is clear is that Acedillo's work as a helper-electrician was an activity "necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade" of petitioner, since refrigeration requires considerable electrical work. This
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necessity is further bolstered by the fact that petitioner would hire him anew after the completion of each project, a practice which persisted throughout the duration of his tenure. The petitioner admits that it maintains two sets of workers, viz., those who are permanently employed and get paid regardless of the availability of work and those who are hired on a project basis.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 Employer Obligation A.M. ORETA AND CO., INC. v NLRC G.R. No. 74004 August 10, 1989 Petitioner: A.M. ORETA & CO., INC. Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SIXTO GRULLA JR. Ponente: MEDIALDEA, J. Facts: Private respondent Grulla was engaged by Engineering Construction and Industrial Development Company (ENDECO) through A.M. Oreta and Co., Inc., as a carpenter in its projects in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The contract of employment, which was entered into June 11, 1980 was for a period of twelve (12) months. Respondent Grulla left the Philippines for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1980. On August 15, 1980, Grulla met an accident which fractured his lumbar vertebra while working at the jobsite. He was rushed to the New Jeddah Clinic and was confined there for twelve (12) days. On August 27, 1980, Grulla was discharged from the hospital and was told that he could resume his normal duties after undergoing physical therapy for two weeks. On September 18, 1980, respondent Grulla reported back to his Project Manager and presented to the latter a medical certificate declaring the former already fit for work. Since then, he started working again until he received a notice of termination of his employment on October 9, 1980. In December, 1981, respondent Grulla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of medical benefits, unpaid wages for the unexpired ten (10) months of his contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of medical expenses against A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc., and Engineering Construction and Industrial Development Co. (ENDECO) with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).lwph1.t The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc and ENDECO filed their answer and alleged that the contract of employment entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as one of the grounds for termination, violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the contractor; and that Grulla was dismissed because he has not performed his duties satisfactorally within the probationary period of three months.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has an employer obligation over private respondent. Ruling: Yes. The law is clear to the effect that in all cases involving employees engaged on probationary period basis, the employer shall make known to the employee at the time he is hired, the standards by which he will qualify as a regular employee. Nowhere in the employment contract executed between petitioner company and respondent Grulla is there a stipulation that the latter shall undergo a probationary period for three months before he can qualify as a regular employee. There is also no evidence on record showing that the respondent Grulla has been appraised of his probationary status and the requirements which he should comply in order to be a regular employee. In the absence of this requisites, there is
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justification in concluding that respondent Grulla was a regular employee at the time he was dismissed by petitioner. As such, he is entitled to security of tenure during his period of employment and his services cannot be terminated except for just and authorized causes enumerated under the Labor Code and under the employment contract. Anent the respondent Commission's finding of lack of due process in the dismissal of Grulla, the petitioner claims that notice and hearing are important only if the employee is not aware of the problems affecting his employment; that the same is not true in the instant case where respondent Grulla knew all along that he could no longer effectively perform his job due to his physical condition. We find that this contention has no legal basis. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal, while the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution. In the case at bar, respondent Grulla was not, in any manner, notified of the charges against him before he was outrightly dismissed. Neither was any hearing or investigation conducted by the company to give the respondent a chance to be heard concerning the alleged unsatisfactory performance of his work. In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of respondent Grulla violated the security of tenure under the contract of employment which specifically provides that the contract term shall be for a period of twelve (12) calendar months. Consequently the respondent Grulla should be paid his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract of employment which is ten (10) months.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 PROJECT EMPLOYMENT IMBUIDO v NLRC G.R. No. 114734 March 31, 2000 Petitioner: VIVIAN Y. IMBUIDO Respondent: . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SERVICES, INC. and GABRIEL LIBRANDO Ponente: BUENA, J Facts: Petitioner was employed as a data encoder by private respondent International Information Services, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the business of data encoding and keypunching, from August 26, 1988 until October 18, 1991 when her services were terminated. From August 26, 1988 until October 18, 1991, petitioner entered into thirteen (13) separate employment contracts with private respondent, each contract lasting only for a period of three (3) months. Aside from the basic hourly rate, specific job contract number and period of employment, each contract contains the following terms and conditions: "a. This Contract is for a specific project/job contract only and shall be effective for the period covered as above-mentioned unless sooner terminated when the job contract is completed earlier or withdrawn by client, or when employee is dismissed for just and lawful causes provided by law. The happening of any of these events will automatically terminate this contract of employment. In her position paper dated August 3, 1992 and filed before labor arbiter Raul T. Aquino, petitioner alleged that her employment was terminated not due to the alleged low volume of work but because she "signed a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of respondents," thus charging private respondent with committing unfair labor practices. Petitioner further complained of non-payment of service incentive leave benefits and underpayment of 13th month pay. On the other hand, private respondent, in its position paper filed on July 16, 1992, maintained that it had valid reasons to terminate petitioners employment and disclaimed any knowledge of the existence or formation of a union among its rank-and-file employees at the time petitioners services were terminated. Private respondent stressed that its business "relies heavily on companies availing of its services. Its retention by client companies with particular emphasis on data encoding is on a project to project basis," usually lasting for a period of "two (2) to five (5) months." Private respondent further argued that petitioners employment was for a "specific project with a specified period of engagement." According to private respondent, "the certainty of the expiration of complainants engagement has been determined at the time of their (sic) engagement (until 27 November 1991) or when the project is earlier completed or when the client withdraws," as provided in the contract. "The happening of the second event [completion of the project] has materialized, thus, her contract of employment is deemed terminated per the Brent School ruling." Finally, private respondent averred that petitioners "claims for non-payment of overtime time (sic) and service incentive leave [pay] are without factual and legal basis."
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner was a "regular employee," NOT a "project employee" as found by public respondent NLRC.
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Ruling: Yes. In the instant case, petitioner was engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, as admittedly, petitioner worked as a data encoder for private respondent, a corporation engaged in the business of data encoding and keypunching, and her employment was fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which had been determined at the time of her engagement, as may be observed from the series of employment contracts between petitioner and private respondent, all of which contained a designation of the specific job contract and a specific period of employment. However, even as we concur with the NLRCs findings that petitioner is a project employee, we have reached a different conclusion. In the recent case of Maraguinot, Jr. vs. NLRC, we held that "[a] project employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following concur: 1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after [the] cessation of a project; and 2) The tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer." The evidence on record reveals that petitioner was employed by private respondent as a data encoder, performing activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of her employer, continuously for a period of more than three (3) years, from August 26, 1988 to October 18, 1991 and contracted for a total of thirteen (13) successive projects. We have previously ruled that "[h]owever, the length of time during which the employee was continuously re-hired is not controlling, but merely serves as a badge of regular employment." Based on the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner has attained the status of a regular employee of private respondent.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 PROJECT EMPLOMENT MANANSANG v NLRC G.R. No. 97520 February 9, 1993 Petitioners: LETICIA MAMANSAG, MAXIMINIA DOREZA, MARILOU B. DAVID, SONIA G. TAN, URBINA G. TORREFRANCA, MYRA M. FRANEHE, NANCY S. CAPELLAN, GUILLERMA C. MENDOZA, CONCHITA C. SEVILLA, EDELINA S. CAMACHO, LELIA A. PEREZ, MARIE A. ARDILA, NONA FE C. CACANINDIN, GLORIA TIONGCO, MERIE OSIGAN, JULIETA T. FABIAN, SONIA E. DONES, LEONILA A. URBI, ESTER T. MIRANDA, LORNA R. NAVARRO, CHERILYN A. BATANG, MERISSA MARTINEZ, BELINDA P. RAMOS, DOLOR L. ENRIQUEZ, DOLLY CLAVEL, CORA UBEREZ, MARILYN RAMBOANGA, HELENITA T. BAGASBAS, TERESA D. BEUMEJO, ISABEL B. GALONGAN, HENRIETTA N. NAPILAN, ROSEMELY B. CASTILO, MYRNA M. VICENTE, NORA L. TUGBO, ROSARIO M. LAO, MYRNA L. PERVASDO, BUENA Y. BALPERMOSO, MILA ROLLEQUE, GLORIA CORAZON, LORELIE TORRES, ROSARIO F. ARCANYA, SEGUNDA S. MAGBUTAY, MA. JESIFINA GALAPON, MARISSA P. ALBERTO, LUZ R. CORTEZ, AZUCENA H. CORTEZ, MARY JANE B. NARAG, MYRNA F. DIMALAIWAN, ALTHEA G. BALIBOC, AVELINA F. TRINIDAD, ALFRENITA BARANGUELA Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION), CONSUMER PULSE INC. AND ROSARIO CHEW Ponente: NOCON, J Facts: Private respondent Consumer Pulse Inc. is engaged in the business of conducting market researches and public surveys on consumer products and services for its clients. Due to the very nature of its business, private respondent hired the services of petitioners as field interviewers whose job was to gather data on consumer products to be submitted to the office of private respondent for evaluation or analysis. In the course of petitioners' employment with private respondent company, petitioners were required by the latter to sign contracts specifying the name of the project and the duration of their employment. Sometime in February 1987, petitioners were called to a meeting by private respondent company's Human Resources Department Director, Thelma Baricawa, where they were told that they would be transferred to a sub-contractor who would be paying them directly. However, petitioners objected to this proposal as they are regular employees of private respondent. They likewise rejected the offer of Consumer Pulse, Inc. to become members of the Rosie Chew Foundation whose founder is private respondent Rosario Chew, a major stockholder of private respondent Consumer Pulse, Inc. Private respondents, however, deny having dismissed petitioners. Since their contract with petitioners was on a per project basis, their completion of the project resulted in the completion of their contract and automatic cessation of their employment. On the other hand, private respondent's Human Resources Department Director Thelma Baricawa denied having told petitioners that they would be transferred to a sub-contractor. What she told them was to upgrade the quality of their work and form themselves into a group of duly licensed job contractors or subcontractors since private respondent company would henceforth engage only the services of duly licensed contractors or sub-contractors to handle its job projects.
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Issue: Whether or not petitioners are project employees of private respondent.
Ruling: Yes. An examination of the petitioners contract of employment showed that they were hired by private respondent company for a specific project and the completion or termination of said project was determined at the start of their employment. Petitioners cannot be hired for an indefinite period of time and carried on the company's payroll even without projects to work, with without respondent company incurring financial losses. As field interviewers of private respondent company, the latter depends for its business on the contract it is able to obtain from its clients. Necessarily, the duration of the employment of its employees is not permanent but co-terminus with the projects to which they are assigned and from whose payrolls they are paid. The fact that petitioners worked for several projects of private respondent company is no basis to consider them as regular employees. By the very nature of their employer's business, they will always remain project employees regardless of the number of projects in which they have worked.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 LENGTH OF TIME MARAGUINOT v NLRC G.R. No. 120969 January 22, 1998 Petitioners: ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. and PAULINO ENERO Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) composed of Presiding Commissioner RAUL T. AQUINO, Commissioner ROGELIO I. RAYALA and Commissioner VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY (Ponente), VIC DEL ROSARIO and VIVA FILMS. Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J. Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Maraguinot, Jr. maintains that he was employed by private respondents on 18 July 1989 as part of the filming crew with a salary of P375.00 per week. About four months later, he was designated Assistant Electrician with a weekly salary of P400.00, which was increased to P450.00 in May 1990. In June 1991, he was promoted to the rank of Electrician with a weekly salary of P475.00, which was increased to P593.00 in September 1991. Petitioner Paulino Enero, on his part, claims that private respondents employed him in June 1990 as a member of the shooting crew with a weekly salary of P375.00, which was increased to P425.00 in May 1991, then to P475.00 on 21 December 1991. Sometime in May 1992, petitioners sought the assistance of their supervisor, Mrs. Alejandria Cesario, to facilitate their request that private respondents adjust their salary in accordance with the minimum wage law. In June 1992, Mrs. Cesario informed petitioners that Mr. Vic del Rosario would agree to increase their salary only if they signed a blank employment contract. As petitioners refused to sign, private respondents forced Enero to go on leave in June 1992, then refused to take him back when he reported for work on 20 July 1992. Meanwhile, Maraguinot was dropped from the company payroll from 8 to 21 June 1992, but was returned on 22 June 1992. He was again asked to sign a blank employment contract, and when he still refused, private respondents terminated his services on 20 July 1992. Petitioners thus sued for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not does the length of time that the petitioners were employed by respondent made them regular employees. Ruling: Yes. The length of time during which the employee was continuously re-hired is not controlling, but merely serves as a badge of regular employment. In the instant case, the evidence on record shows that petitioner Enero was employed for a total of two (2) years and engaged in at least eighteen (18) projects, while petitioner Maraguinot was employed for some three (3) years and worked on at least twenty-three (23) projects. Moreover, as petitioners tasks involved, among other chores, the loading, unloading and arranging of movie equipment in the shooting area as instructed by the cameramen, returning the equipment to the Viva Films warehouse, and assisting in the fixing of the lighting system, it may not be gainsaid that these tasks wer e vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. As regards the underscored phrase, it
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has been held that this is ascertained by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 PROJECT EMPLOYMENT PHIL. AIRLINES, INC. v NLRC G.R. No. 120506 October 28, 1996 Petitioner: PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO LINSANGAN, UNICORN SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and FRED BAUTISTA, et al., Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J. Facts: On 23 December 1987, private respondent Unicorn Security Services, Inc. (USSI) and petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) executed a security service agreement. USSI was designated therein as the CONTRACTOR. Among the pertinent terms and conditions of the agreement are as follows: (4) The CONTRACTOR shall assign to PAL an initial force of EIGHTY ONE (81) bodies which may be decreased or increased by agreement in writing . It is, of course, understood that the CONTRACTOR undertakes to pay the wages or salaries and cost of living allowance of the guards in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, the different Presidential Decrees, Orders and with the rules and regulations promulgated by competent authorities implementing said acts, assuming all responsibilities therefor. Xxx (10) The security guards employed by CONTRACTOR in performing this Agreement shall be paid by the CONTRACTOR and it is distinctly understood that there is no employee-employer relationship between CONTRACTOR and/or his guards on the one hand, and PAL on the other. CONTRACTOR shall have entire charge, control and supervision of the work and services herein agreed upon, and PAL shall in no manner be answerable or accountable for any accident or injury of any kind which may occur to any guard or guards of the CONTRACTOR in the course of, or as a consequence of, their performance of work and services under this Agreement, or for any injury, loss or damage arising from the negligence of or carelessness of the guards of the CONTRACTOR or of anyone of its employ to any person or persons or to its or their property whether in the premises of PAL or elsewhere; and the CONTRACTOR hereby covenants and agrees to assume, as it does hereby assume, any and all liability or on account of any such injury, loss or damage, and shall indemnify PAL for any liability or expense it may incur by reason thereof and to hold PAL free and harmless from any such liability. On 16 February 1990, PAL terminated the security service agreement with USSI without giving the latter the 30-day prior notice required in paragraph 20 thereof. Instead, PAL paid each of the security guards actually assigned at the time of the termination of the agreement an amount equivalent to their one-month salary to compensate for the lack of notice.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner became an indirect employer of guards herein supplied by private respondent.
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Ruling: No. The security service agreement between PAL and USSI provides the key to such consideration. A careful perusal thereof, especially the terms and conditions embodied in paragraphs 4 and 10 quoted earlier in this ponencia, demonstrates beyond doubt that USSI-and not PAL was the employer of the security guards. It was USSI which (a) selected, engaged or hired and discharged the security guards; (b) assigned them to PAL according to the number agreed upon; (c) provided, at its own expense, the security guards with firearms and ammunitions; (d) discipline and supervised them or controlled their conduct; and (e) determined their wages, salaries, and compensation; and (f) paid them salaries or wages. Even if we disregard the explicit covenant in said agreement that there exist no employer employee relationship between CONTRACTOR and/or his guards on the one hand, and PAL on the other all other considerations confirm the fact that PAL was not the security guards employer. Considering then that no employer-employee relationship existed between PAL and the security guards, the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the claim Article 217 of the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442), as amended, vests upon Labor Arbiter exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or house hold service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite. The Labor Arbiter cannot avoid the jurisdictional issue or justify his assumption of jurisdiction on the pretext that PAL was the indirect employer of the security guards under Article 107 in relation to Articles 106 and 109 of the Labor Code and, therefore, it is solidarily liable with USSI. We agree with the Solicitor General that these Articles are inapplicable to PAL under the facts of this case. Article 107 provides: ART. 107. Indirect employer. -- The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project. The preceding Article referred to, which is Article 106, partly reads as follows: ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. -- Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
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In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 PROJECT EMPLOYMENT PHIL. FRUITS AND VEGETABLES INDUSTRIES, INC. v NLRC G.R. No. 122122 July 20, 1999 Petitioners: PHILIPPINE FRUIT & VEGETABLE INDUSTRIES, INC. and its President and General Manager, MR. PEDRO CASTILLO Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and Philippine Fruit and Vegetable Workers UnionTupas Local Chapter Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Fruit and Vegetable Industries, Inc. (PFVII, for brevity) is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of fruit and vegetable purees for export. Petitioner Pedro Castillo is the former President and General Manager of petitioner PFVII. On September 5, 1988 herein private respondent Philippine Fruit and Vegetable Workers Union-Tupas Local Chapter, for and in behalf of 127 of its members, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and/or illegal dismissal with damages against petitioner corporation. Private respondent alleged that many of its complaining members started working for San Carlos Fruits Corporation which later incorporated into PFVII in January or February 1983 until their dismissal on different dates in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. They further alleged that the dismissals were due to complainants' involvement in union activities and were without just cause. The above arguments boil down to the issue of whether or not complaining members of respondent union are regular employees of PFVII or are seasonal workers whose employment ceased during the offseason due to the non-availability of work.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE SEASONAL EMPLOYEES WHOSE EMPLOYMENTS CEASED DURING THE OFF-SEASON DUE TO NO WORK AND NOT DUE TO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
Ruling: No. As culled from the records, it appears that herein 194 individual complainants are members of complainant union in respondent company which is engaged in the manufacture and processing of fruit xxx and vegetable purees for export. They were employed as seeders, operators, sorters, slicers, janitors, drivers, truck helpers, mechanics and office personnel. xxx
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By the very nature of things in a business enterprise like respondent companys, to our mind, the services of herein complainants are, indeed, more than six (6) months a year. We take note of the undisputed fact that the company did not confine itself just to the processing of tomatoes and mangoes. It also processed guyabano, calamansi, papaya, pineapple, etc. Besides, there is the office administrative functions, cleaning and upkeeping of machines and other duties and tasks to keep up (sic) a big food processing corporation. Under the above provision, an employment shall be deemed regular where the employee: a) has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; or b) has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he is employed. In the case at bar, the work of complainants as seeders, operators, sorters, slicers, janitors, drivers, truck helpers, mechanics and office personnel is without doubt necessary in the usual business of a food processing company like petitioner PFVII. It should be noted that complainants' employment has not been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of their appointment or hiring. Neither is their employment seasonal in nature. While it may be true that some phases of petitioner company's processing operations is dependent on the supply of fruits for a particular season, the other equally important aspects of its business, such as manufacturing and marketing are not seasonal. The fact is that large-scale food processing companies such as petitioner company continue to operate and do business throughout the year even if the availability of fruits and vegetables is seasonal.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 SPECIFIED PERIOD/FIXED TERM PUREFOODS CORP. v NLRC G.R. No. 122653 December 12, 1997 Petitioner: PURE FOODS CORPORATON Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RODOLFO CORDOVA, VIOLETA CRUSIS, ET AL. Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J. Facts: The private respondents (numbering 906) were hired by petitioner Pure Foods Corporation to work for a fixed period of five months at its tuna cannery plant in Tambler, General Santos City. After the expiration of their respective contracts of employment in June and July 1991, their services were terminated. They forthwith executed a Release and Quitclaim stating that they had no claim whatsoever against the petitioner. On 29 July 1991, the private respondents filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, General Santos City, a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner and its plant manager, Marciano Aganon. The petitioner submits that the private respondents are now estopped from questioning their separation from petitioners employ in view of their express conformity with the five-month duration of their employment contracts. Besides, they fell within the exception provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code which reads: [E]xcept where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that contracts with a specific period of employment may be given legal effect provided, however, that they are not intended to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure. They submit that the practice of the petitioner in hiring workers to work for a fixed duration of five months only to replace them with other workers of the same employment duration was apparently to prevent the regularization of these so-called casuals, which is a clear circumvention of the law on security of tenure. Issue: Whether or not private respondents are employed and that of having secured term/fixed term, by petitioner. Ruling: Yes. Private respondents activities consisted in the receiving, skinning, loining, packing, and casing-up of tuna fish which were then exported by the petitioner. Indisputably, they were performing activities which were necessary and desirable in petitioners business or trade. Contrary to petitioner's submission, the private respondents could not be regarded as having been hired for a specific project or undertaking. The term specific project or undertaking under Article 280 of the Labor Code contemplates an activity which is not commonly or habitually performed or such type of work which is not done on a daily basis but only for a specific duration of time or until completion; the services employed are then necessary and desirable in the employers usual business only for the period of time it takes to complete the project.
Page 383

The fact that the petitioner repeatedly and continuously hired workers to do the same kind of work as that performed by those whose contracts had expired negates petitioners contention that those workers were hired for a specific project or undertaking only. Now on the validity of private respondents' five-month contracts of employment. In the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, which was reaffirmed in numerous subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But, this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals. Brent also laid down the criteria under which term employment cannot be said to be in circumvention of the law on security of tenure: 1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or 2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter. The five-month period specified in private respondents employment contracts having been imposed precisely to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure should, therefore, be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. To uphold the contractual arrangement between the petitioner and the private respondents would, in effect, permit the former to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating the employees security of tenure in their jobs.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 SECURITY OF TENURE SOUTHERN COTOBATO v NLRC G.R. No. 121582 October 16, 1997 Petitioners: SOUTHERN COTABATO DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. or SODECO/LIBERTY CONSTRUCTION JOINT VENTURE/ELLA G. DEMANDANTE Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION, Fourth Division, and PEDRO RABINA, ALEXANDER YBA, BILLY BULFA, JOSE GERONILLA, ALFREDO SEIT, JUANITO DUEAS, RICHARD SILORIO, NENITO NALIPAY, ENIE DINOLAN, JOSE NICO ESPAOL, ROBERTO ALABATA, JOSE SUELTO, ARTEMIO VILAN, SENENIO B. SALACOT, JESUS BANQUERIGO, MOISES REPOLLO, WEBSTER SERION, RENATO DUE-AS, JAIME RODRIGUEZ, RAUL AGUSTIN, WELIJADO SALOMA, JOSEPH SALOMA, MELICIO DARING, JR., GUILLERMO ALMARIO, GUIL-BERT TIO, BENEGILDO ARABE, ROMULO SALACOT, MIGUELITO ORIOLA, ARTEMIO VILAN, JR., ARMANDO VILAN, ALBERT SUELTO, ALBERTO QUINQUELERIA, SIXTO TOLEDO, RODRIGO MARAVILLAS, RAMON SILORIO, HAROLD MIRAFLOR, DAVID RABINA, AL-FONSO DUENAS, ROBERTO FER-NANDO ALABATA, ANTONIO MONTEDERAMOS, JR., DANNY SEDILLO, PURIFICACION BAL-BUENA, WEBSTER SERION, JR., MARIANO SILORIO, BENITO MAG-SINO, and TOMAS ESPAOL Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J. Facts: Petitioners Southern Cotabato Development and Construction, Inc. (SODECO) and Liberty Construction entered into a joint venture for the construction of a road, funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), connecting the municipality of Sibulan in Negros Oriental and Bais City. Petitioner Ella G. Demandante was the Managing Director of SODECO. Private respondents, hired by SODECO as watchmen, survey aides, laborers and carpenters in connection with the road construction project, alleged that they were dismissed by Demandante when they asked for salary increases. They then sued for illegal dismissal and sought reinstatement with payment of wage differentials, overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and holidays, thirteenth month pay and damages with Regional Arbitration Branch VII of the NLRC. In their position paper, private respondents alleged that they were underpaid as petitioners paid a daily wage of merely P50 for the carpenters, P40 or P35 for the other workers, with the exception of Danny Sedillo and Purificacion Balbuena who earned P400 a month. Private respondents- watchmen also claimed that they were not paid their premium pay for working on their rest days or holidays, and for overtime of at least four hours which they were required to render daily. Private respondents further alleged that they signed petitioners copy of the payroll in triplicate, with the first page indicating the actual amount received and the second and third pages left blank and stapled closely to the first sheet.
Issue: Whether or not respondents were entitled to security of tenure and have they been unlawfully dismissed.
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Ruling: Yes. It is not disputed that private respondents were project employees. As such, they were entitled to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code for the duration of the project they were hired for, or the phases thereof to which they were assigned or in connection with which they rendered services. The length of their employment is determined by the completion of the task for which they were hired. In the instant case, hearings were conducted as the parties opted for hearing instead of a submission of the case based on position papers and supporting documents; and yet the respondents presented only their paymaster who is ostensibly not in a position to testify as to the legality of the dismissals. The respondents argued that the complainants, who were project employees, were laid-off upon the completion of the phases of the project to which they were assigned and yet, produced no notices thereof. As to the case of the watchmen, it unmistakably appears that they were illegally and unjustly dismissed. They were hired to watch the facilities, and the respondents later discharged them for the simple reason that they had to be replaced with licensed and armed guards. The respondents failed to show that the watchmen by their service contracts were hired for a definite period or up to their replacement by licensed and armed guards.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 ONE YEAR SERVICE TABAS v CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO. INC, G.R. No. L-80680 January 26, 1989 Petitioners: DANILO B. TABAS, EDUARDO BONDOC, RAMON M. BRIONES, EDUARDO R. ERISPE, JOEL MADRIAGA, ARTHUR M. ESPINO, AMARO BONA, FERDINAND CRUZ, FEDERICO A. BELITA, ROBERTO P. ISLES, ELMER ARMADA, EDUARDO UDOG, PETER TIANSING, MIGUELITA QUIAMBOA, NOMER MATAGA, VIOLY ESTEBAN and LYDIA ORTEGA Respondents: CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., LILY-VICTORIA A. AZARCON, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and HON. EMERSON C. TUMANON Ponente: SARMIENTO, J. Facts: Petitioners were, prior to their stint with California, employees of Livi Manpower Services, Inc. (Livi), which subsequently assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers" for the former firm pursuant to a manpower supply agreement. Among other things, the agreement provided that California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over [Livi's] workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform [Californias] obligation"; the Livi "is an independent contractor and nothing herein contained shall be construed as creating between [California] and [Livi] . . . the relationship of principal[-]agent or employer[-]employee'; that "it is hereby agreed that it is the sole responsibility of [Livi] to comply with all existing as well as future laws, rules and regulations pertinent to employment of labor" and that "[California] is free and harmless from any liability arising from such laws or from any accident that may befall workers and employees of [Livi] while in the performance of their duties for [California]. It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis"; that "[c]ost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to [California] at cost "; and that "[p]ayroll for the preceeding [sic] week [shall] be delivered by [Livi] at [California's] premises." The petitioners were then made to sign employment contracts with durations of six months, upon the expiration of which they signed new agreements with the same period, and so on. Unlike regular California employees, who received not less than P2,823.00 a month in addition to a host of fringe benefits and bonuses, they received P38.56 plus P15.00 in allowance daily. The petitioners now allege that they had become regular California employees and demand, as a consequence whereof, similar benefits. They likewise claim that pending further proceedings below, they were notified by California that they would not be rehired. As a result, they filed an amended complaint charging California with illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners had already incurred one year of service as employees of respondent. Ruling: Yes. The records show that the petitioners bad been given an initial six-month contract, renewed for another six months. Accordingly, under Article 281 of the Code, they had become regular employees-ofCalifornia-and had acquired a secure tenure. Hence, they cannot be separated without due process of law.
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California resists reinstatement on the ground, first, that the petitioners are not its employees, and second, by reason of financial distress brought about by "unfavorable political and economic atmosphere" "coupled by the February Revolution." As to the first objection, we reiterate that the petitioners are its employees and who, by virtue of the required one-year length-of-service, have acquired a regular status. As to the second, we are not convinced that California has shown enough evidence, other than its bare say so, that it had in fact suffered serious business reverses as a result alone of the prevailing political and economic climate. We further find the attribution to the February Revolution as a cause for its alleged losses to be gratuitous and without basis in fact.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 PROJECT EMPLOYMENT UY v NLRC G.R. No. 117983 September 6, 1996 Petitioner: RIZALINO P. UY Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division), FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DELA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ, ROLLY ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG, and NICANOR LABUEN Ponente: PUNO,J. Facts: Private respondents alleged in common that during their employment with petitioner, they rendered services in petitioner's construction projects and in his other businesses such as gasoline station, lumber and equipment yards; that their working hours were from 7:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. with a one to two-hour noon break for six days a week, from Monday to Saturday; that they worked during holidays but were paid only their daily wages; and that after their dismissal, petitioner hired new workers at wages lower that what they were receiving at the time they were dismissed. In his answer, petitioner denied having businesses other than his construction company. He alleged that private respondents were project employees; that they were hired by his foremen who paid them on a "pakyaw" or daily wage basis in a construction project; that after completion of a project, private respondents were free to find other jobs and engage in other sources of livelihood; that in fact, Felipe Magbanua and Nicanor Labuen were farmers who worked for petitioner only after the harvest season, Carlos dela Cruz worked for another businessman and was hired by petitioner only once in 1985, Remy Arnaiz worked for the National Irrigation Administration, Billy and Rolly Arnaiz were fishermen and Rolly was sometimes employed by the Department of Public Works and Highways, Domingo Salarda was a tricycle driver who also worked in a farm, and Julio Cahilig was a carpenter who worked for petitioner whenever his services were not contracted by other persons. Issue: WHETER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HEREIN ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES. DESPITE THEIR ADMISSIONS AND CORROBORATING EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THEY WORKED ON PROJECTS.
Ruling: No. Petitioner has not shown that private respondents were hired for a specific project the duration of which had been determined at the time of hiring. In fact, petitioner has not identified the specific project or undertaking or any phase thereof for which private respondents were hired. He failed to submit any document such as private respondents employment contracts and employment records that would show the dates of hiring and termination in relation to the particular construction project or the phases in which they were employed. More importantly, petitioner has not presented the termination reports required to be submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office every time his employees' services were terminated upon completion of a project.
Page 389

Even assuming that the contracts were admitted, they, at best, prove that petitioner was engaged in construction projects in the province of Antique and Region VI, and that his firm is capable of undertaking several major construction projects simultaneously contrary to petitioner's claims of being a modest provincial contractor. In two of these contracts, petitioner is referred to as "Rizalino P. Uy General Merchant." This description ironically supports private respondents' allegation that aside from his construction firm, petitioner was also engaged as in other businesses to which he assigned private respondents in-between projects. Clearly, private respondents were non-project employees. As mason, carpenter and laborer, they performed work necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioner, and are thus deemed regular employees. They were, however, dismissed without just cause and without proper notice and hearing. Their dismissal was illegal for which reason the respondent Commission correctly awarded them back wages and separation pay.
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PASCUA, JETTNER R. 2011-0095 PROJECT EMPLYMENT VILLA v NLRC G.R. No. 131552 February 19, 1999 Petitioner: ARSENIO V. VILLA Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), OCEAN-LINK CONTAINER TERMINAL CENTER, BENJAMIN S. TAN and VICTORIA ACORDA Ponente: PUNO, J. Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the July 4, 1997 Decision and the September 22, 1997 Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (First Division) which deleted the awards of reinstatement and backwages including attorneys fees made by the Labor Arbiter in favor of petitioner Arsenio V. Villa. First, we fastrack the facts which are well established. Private respondent Ocean Link Container Terminal Center Inc., is a private corporation engaged in the warehousing, shipping and delivery of goods. Private respondent Benjamin Chua is its President while private respondent Victoria Acorda is its general manager. Petitioner was absorbed by respondent company from his previous employer when the company was sold to the respondents. Petitioners services from 1991 up to May 1, 1993 was continued by the respondent company. From May 1, 1993, petitioner served as a checker in the warehouse of respondent company and his latest salary was P135.00 a day. On June 22, 1994, petitioner met an accident while in the course of performing his job. His left hand was pinned down by a crane and resulted in the deformity and total disability of his middle finger. He was given a month of sick leave which he extended for another month as his hand had not completely healed. Later, he discovered that respondent company terminated his services on August 27, 1994. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime, 13th month pay, differentials, and attorneys fees against the private respondents.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was lawfully discharged as an employee of respondent company. Ruling: No. In view of the failure and/or refusal of the complainant to explain his position/side in writing, the Respondent Corporation was left with no other alternative but to terminate for cause the employment of the complainant effective August 29, 1994. The date of termination of complainants employment is very significant because if complainants employment is indeed terminated on August 17, 1994 as ruled and declared in the Appealed Decision, then the Appealed Decision is not in error in its findings of facts and the Decision would have been in order.
Page 391

However, contrary to the findings in the Appealed Decision, complainants employment was terminated for cause on August 29, 1994 and upon due notice. Since the monetary award in favor of the complainant was anchored on the wrongful and baseless findings that complainant's employment was terminated on August 17, 1994 without notice and hearing, necessarily the monetary award has also no basis in fact and in law. That with respect to the award for the 13 month pay differential, complainant himself in one of the hearings admitted to have received said 13th month pay. As aforestated, public respondent NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by deleting the awards of reinstatement and backwages including attorneys fees. It ratiocinated, viz: An evaluative review of the case as borne out by the record reveals that the cause for complainants dismissal was due to repeated violation of company rules.
th
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: AGUILAR CORP v. NLRC G.R. No. 116352 March 13, 1997 J. & D.O. Aguilar Corporation National Labor Relations Commission and Romeo Acedillo J. Romero
Facts: Private respondent Romeo Acedillo began working for petitioner in February 1989 as a helperelectrician. On January 16, 1992, he received a letter from petitioner informing him of his severance from the company allegedly due to lack of available projects and excess in the number of workers needed. He decided to file a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC after learning that new workers were being hired by petitioner while his request to return to work was being ignored. In reply, petitioner maintained that its need for workers varied. It contended that its workers are hired on a contractual or project basis, and their employment is deemed terminated upon completion of the project for which they were hired. On June 17, 1993, Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring Acedillo's dismissal to be illegal, finding him to be a member of the regular work pool, and ordering petitioner to pay him backwages, 13th month pay, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, service incentive leave pay and underpayment of wages. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter decision. Its motion for reconsideration of the said decision having been rejected by the NLRC, petitioner filed the instant petition arguing that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Acedillo was a permanent worker and in affirming the labor arbiter's grant of monetary benefits to him. Issue: Whether respondent was a permanent or regular employee of the company. Held: Yes. The records reveal that petitioner did not specify the duration and scope of the undertaking at the time Acedillo's services were contracted. Neither is there any proof that the duration of his assignment was made clear to him other than the self-serving assertion of petitioner that the same can be inferred from the tasks he was made to perform. What is clear is that Acedillo's work as a helper-electrician was an activity "necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade" of petitioner. This necessity is further bolstered by the fact that petitioner would hire him anew after the completion of each project, a practice which persisted throughout the duration of his tenure. The petitioner admits that it maintains two sets of workers, viz., those who are permanently employed and get paid regardless of the availability of work and those who are hired on a project basis. This practice of keeping a work pool further renders untenable petitioner's position that Acedillo is not a regular employee. As was held in the case of Philippine National Construction Corporation v. NLRC,
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"Members of a work pool from which a construction company draws its project employees, if considered employees of the construction company while in the work pool, are non-project employees or employees for an indefinite period. If they are employed in a particular project, the completion of the project or any phase thereof will not mean severance of (the) employer-employee relationship."
Page 394

Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The root of the controversy at bar is an employment contract in virtue of which Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Some three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of termination of his services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. The Regional Director accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages. Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration. The Regional Director denied the motion and forwarded the case to the Secretary of Labor for review. The latter sustained the Regional Director. Brent appealed to the Office of the President. The Office dismissed its appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Secretary's decision, hence this petition. Issue: Whether respondent was a permanent employee of the company. Held: No. The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. Indeed, the Code did not come into effect until November 1, 1974, some three years after the perfection of the employment contract, and rights and obligations thereunder had arisen and been mutually observed and enforced. At that time, i.e., before the advent of the Labor Code, there was no doubt whatever about the validity of term employment. It was impliedly but nonetheless clearly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, 11 as amended by R.A. 1787. 12 Basically, this statute provided that In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer or the employee may terminate at any time BRENT SCHOOL v. ZAMORA G.R. No. 48494 February 5, 1990 Brent School, Inc., and REV. Gabriel Dimache, Ronaldo Zamora, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and Doroteo R. Alegre J. Romero
Page 395

the employment with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an employee by serving written notice on the employer at least one month in advance, or in the case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one-half month for every year of service of the employee, whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year. The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of employment without just cause, may hold the employee liable for damages. The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of employment without just cause, shall be entitled to compensation from the date of termination of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages corresponding to the required period of notice. There was, to repeat, clear albeit implied recognition of the licitness of term employment. RA 1787 also enumerated what it considered to be just causes for terminating an employment without a definite period, either by the employer or by the employee without incurring any liability therefor. Respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: CEBU ENGINEERING and DEVELOPMENT CO. v. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 118695 Date: April 22, 1998 Petitioner: Cebu Engineering and Development Company, Inc. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Jaime Perez Ponente: J. Bellosillo Facts: On November 1991 private respondent Jaime Perez was hired as clerk by Cebu Engineering and Development Company (CEDCO) and was assigned to the Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP) II. In the last week of May 1992, however, he was reassigned to MCDP III effective 1 June 1992. On 16 December 1992 respondent Perez was ordered by his supervisor Ms. Tudtud to drive an engineer and her team to the job site but Perez refused because the car could only be used by the President of the company or by one specifically authorized by him. On 23 December 1992 respondent Perez was summoned by Mr. Butalid, CEDCO Vice President for Administration and Finance and after a confrontation with Ms. Tudtud among others, Perez was given a notice of recall and a notice of termination at the same time. Resisting his recall and termination, Perez filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter's office. On 4 January 1994 the Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent's employment was not regular and was merely coterminous with the MCDP project. The Labor Arbiter however found the dismissal to be groundless and granted Perez back wages from the time of termination up to the time of completion of the project. Both parties appealed to the NLRC and on 17 November 1994 the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision on the status of Perez' employment and found him to be a regular employee, affirmed the finding of illegal dismissal and ordered his reinstatement. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition raising the issue of whether the NLRC among others committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding private respondent a regular employee. Issue: Whether private respondent was a regular employee of the company. Held: Yes. Private respondent belonged to a work pool from which CEDCO drew its employees and assigned them to different projects. He was not hired for a specific project. He was in fact a mainstay of the company. Contrary to petitioners claim, his services were not terminated on 30 November 1992 but he continued working after that. Hence, according to the law, on 1 December 1992, after a year of continuous work, he became a regular employee regardless of any contract to the contrary. It is in keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular employment attaches to the casual worker on the day immediately after the end of the first year of service.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally dismissed by the private respondent, the Henry Lei Trucking Company. The Labor Arbiter found for him and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission, which held that the petitioner's employment had expired under a valid contract. The private respondent rests its case on the agreement and maintains that the labor laws are not applicable because the relations of the parties are governed by their voluntary stipulations. The contract having expired, it was the prerogative of the trucking company to renew it or not as it saw fit. The agreement was supposed to have commenced on June 30, 1984, and to end on December 31, 1984. On December 22, 1984, however, the petitioner was formally notified by the private respondent of the termination of his services on the ground of expiration of their contract. Soon thereafter, on January 22, 1985, the petitioner filed his complaint. The petitioner claimed he started working for the private respondent on June 16, 1984, and having done so for more than six months had acquired the status of a regular employee. As such, he could no longer be dismissed except for lawful cause. Issue: Whether the petitioner was a regular employee of the company. Held: Yes. The factual finding of the Labor Arbiter that the petitioner was a regular employee of the private respondent was correct. The private respondent is engaged in the trucking business as a hauler of cattle, crops and other cargo for the Philippine Packing Corporation. This business requires the services of drivers, and continuously because the work is not seasonal, nor is it limited to a single undertaking or operation. Even if ostensibly hired for a fixed period, the petitioner should be considered a regular employee of the private respondent, conformably to Article 280 of the Labor Code. The agreement in question was null and void ab initio to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure. It appears from the records that all the drivers of the private respondent have been hired on a fixed contract basis, as evidenced by the mimeographed form of the agreement and of the affidavit. The private respondent's intention is obvious. There is no question that the purpose behind these individual contracts was to evade the application of the labor laws by making it appear that the drivers of the trucking company were not its regular employees. It is plain that the petitioner was hired at the outset as a regular employee. At any rate, even assuming that the original employment was probationary, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner had completed more than six month's service with the trucking company and so had acquired the status of a regular employee at the time of his dismissal. CIELO v. NLRC G.R. No. 78693 January 28, 1991 Zosimo Cielo National Labor Relations Commission, Henry Lei and/or Henry Lei Trucking J. Cruz
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: HIGHWAY COPRA TRADERS v. NLRC G.R. No. 108889 July 30, 1998 Highway Copra Traders and/or Gerson Dulang (owner-operator)/ Luzviminda Dulang National Labor Relations Commission- Cagayan de Oro, and David Empaynado J. Martinez
Facts: On May 15, 1986, petitioners employed David Empeynado as a general utility man. Private respondent, however, was not paid his full salary but was merely given cash advances. When he sought full payment thereof, petitioners informed him not to report for work starting January 12, 1987, and wait until he is re-hired which never happened. Thus, on December 16, 1987, he filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of regular salaries against petitioners. After hearing, the Labor Arbiter found that private respondent was merely a casual employee and accordingly dismissed his complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor Arbiters decision. When their motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari. Petitioners principally ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC for declaring private respondent a regular employee and thus, entitled to unpaid wages and other monetary benefits. They argue that private respondent performed tasks that were menial and not in any way connected with petitioners copra business and that he was hired only on a per need basis. Issue: Whether respondent is a regular employee of the company. Held: Yes. The factual milieu of this case undisputedly shows that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioners copra business. Article 280 of the Labor Code describes a regular employee as one who is either (1) engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he is employed. In this case, the nature of private respondents work as a general utility man was definitely necessary and desirable to petitioners business of trading copra and charcoal regardless of the length of time he worked therein. As such, he is a regular employee pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners further argue that private respondent was only engaged for a specific task, the completion of which resulted in the cessation of his employment. This is not correct. By "specific project or undertaking," Article 280 of the Labor Code contemplates an activity which is not commonly or habitually performed or such type of work which is not done on a daily basis but only for a specific duration of time or until completion in which case, the services of an employee are necessary and desirable in the employers usual business only for the period of time it takes to complete the project. Such circumstance does not obtain in this case.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. employed private respondent Virginia Camacho Quintia as Medical Director of its Research and Development department. The contract of employment provided for a term of one year from the date of its execution on March 19, 1983, subject to renewal by mutual consent of the parties at least thirty days before its expiration. When Quintias contract was about to expire, she was invited by Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City to be the chairperson of its pharmacology department. However, Pio Castillo, the president and general manager, prevailed upon her to stay, assuring her of security of tenure and because of this assurance, she declined the offer of Xavier University. Indeed, after her contract expired on March 19, 1984, she remained in the employ of petitioner. On July 10, 1986, Paz Wong replaced Quintia as head of the Research and Development department and two days later, received an inter-office memorandum officially terminating her services because of the expiration of her contract of employment. On January 21, 1987, private respondent filed a complaint, charging petitioner with illegal dismissal and praying that petitioner be ordered to reinstate private respondent and to pay her full back wages and moral damages. In a decision rendered on December 18, 1990, the Labor Arbiter found private respondent to have been illegally dismissed. He held that private respondent was a regular employee and not a project employee as provided in the Labor Code. Petitioner contends among others that the NLRCs reliance on Art. 280 is clearly contrary to this Courts decisions; that private respondents tasks are really not necessary and desirable to the usual business of petitioner and that that there is clearly no legal or factual basis to support respondent NLRCs reliance on the absence of a new written contract as indicating that respondent Quintia became a regular employee. hence this petition. Issue: Whether private respondent become a regular employee after the expiration of the written contract? Whether or not the one-year service of respondent made her into a regular employee of the petitioner? INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., v. NLRC G.R. No. 106331 March 9, 1998 International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., National Labor Relations Commission Fourth Division, and Dr. Virginia Camacho Quinta J. Mendoza
Held: Yes on both counts. Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which
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has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, it was held that although work done under a contract is necessary and desirable in relation to the usual business of the employer, a contract for a fixed period may nonetheless be made so long as it is entered into freely, voluntarily and knowingly by the parties. Applying this ruling to the case at bar, the NLRC held that the written contract between petitioner and private respondent was valid, but, after its expiration on March 18, 1984, as the petitioner had decided to continue her services, it must respect the security of tenure of the employee in accordance with Art. 280. Petitioners ground is that the ruling of the NLRC is contrary to the Brent School decision. He contends that Art. 280 should not be so interpreted as to render employment contracts with a fixed term invalid. But the NLRC precisely upheld the validity of the contract in accordance with the Brent School case. Indeed, the validity of the written contract is not in issue in this case. What is in issue is whether private respondent did not become a regular employee after the expiration of the written contract on March 18, 1984 on the basis of the facts pointed out by the NLRC, simply because there was in the beginning a contract of employment with a fixed term.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: MERCADO v. NLRC G.R. No. 79869 September 5, 1991 Fortunado Mercado, Sr., Rosa Mercado, Fortunado Mercado Jr., Antonio Mercado, Jose Cabral, Lucia Mercado, Asuncion Guevara, Anita Mercado, Marina Mercado, Juliana Cabral, Guadalupe Paguio, Brigida Alcantara, Emerlita Mercado, Romeo Guevara, Romeo Mercado and Leon Santillan National Labor Relations Commission Third Division Labor Arbiter Luciano Aquino, RABIII; Aurora L. Cruz; Spouses Francisco De Borja and Leticia De Borja; and Sto. Nio Realty, Incorporated J. Padilla
Respondent:
Ponente: Facts:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter. They were all allegedly dismissed on April 1979 from their employment. Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their "mandarols", that is, persons who take charge in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane production. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the private respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner. Both parties filed their appeal with the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC). Petitioners questioned respondent Labor Arbiter's finding that they were not regular and permanent employees of private respondent Aurora Cruz while private respondents questioned the award of financial assistance granted by respondent Labor Arbiter. The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the award for financial assistance to petitioners. In the present Petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the above-mentioned rulings. Petitioners contend that respondent Labor Arbiter and respondent NLRC erred when both ruled that petitioners are not regular and permanent employees of private respondents based on the terms and conditions of their hiring, for said findings are contrary to the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code. They submit that petitioners' employment, even assuming said employment were seasonal, continued for so many years such that, by express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code as amended, petitioners have become regular and permanent employees. Issue: Whether petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers.
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Held: No. A careful examination of the facts reveals that the findings of the Labor Arbiter in the case are ably supported by evidence. There is, therefore, no circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code should have been applied in their case presents an opportunity to clarify the afore-mentioned provision of law. A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season as in the present case. Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: On the night of September 3, 1983, while the vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas en route from Santos, Brazil to Port Said, Egypt, Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward, fatally stabbed the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez, during a quarrel, then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. An alarm was immediately raised, and the vessel turned to comb the surrounding area for Dublin. After some time his floating body was briefly sighted, but it disappeared from view even as preparations to retrieve it were being made, and was never seen again. There is no dispute that Dublin had been hired by NAESS Shipping, Philippines, Inc. (NAESS) to serve aboard the M/V DYVI PACIFIC under an employment contract which incorporated as part thereof the Special Agreement between the International Workers Federation (ITF) and NAESS Shipping (Holland) B.V. of Amsterdam, the mother company of NAESS (Philippines). Said Agreement bound NAESS to pay cash benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled therein. After answer was filed by NAESS denying liability on the ground that Pablo Dublin had taken his own life and that suicide was not compensable under the Agreement invoked, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position papers. Thereafter, the POEA rendered judgment for the complainant, holding Dublin's death compensable under said Special Agreement and ordering NAESS to pay complainant and her child compensation benefits. NAESS argues the thesis that suicide is not compensable under the employment contract of Pablo Dublin because said agreement did not constitute it the insurer of Dublin's life, that to allow the payment of death benefits in the particular circumstances of this case would amount to paying a price or reward for murder, and that the NLRC incurred in serious error in finding that there was no conclusive proof that Dublin had intentionally killed himself . Issue: Whether the payment of cash benefits to Dublins immediate next of kin of said crewman's death by suicide is compensable. Held: Yes. At first blush these arguments would seem to possess some merit. They fail, however, to stand closer scrutiny. There is no question that NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin's death while in its service, regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin's life. No law or rule has been cited which would make it illegal for an employer to assume such obligation in favor of his or its employee in their contract of employment. In view of what has already been stated, it makes no difference whether Dublin intentionally took his own life, or he killed himself in a moment of temporary aberration triggered by remorse over the killing of the second cook, or he accidentally fell overboard while trying to flee from imagined pursuit, which last NAESS SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., v. NLRC G.R. No. 73441 September 4, 1987 NAESS SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., National Labor Relations Commission and Zenaida R. Dublin J. Narvasa
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possibility cannot be ruled out considering the state of the evidence. The POEA and the NLRC had every reason to declare that there was lack of conclusive or credible proof that Dublin intentionally took his own life.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner Philippine Geothermal, Inc. is a U.S. corporation engaged in the exploration and development of geothermal energy resources as an alternative source of energy. Private respondents, on the other hand, are employees of herein petitioner occupying various positions ranging from carpenter to Clerk II, categorized as contractual employment, for a period ranging from fifteen (15) days to three (3) months. These contracts were regularly renewed to the extent that individual private respondents had rendered service from three (3) to five (5) years until 1983 and 1984 when petitioner started terminating their employment by not renewing their individual contracts. Thus, complainant union and herein respondent employees filed a case for illegal lockout and unfair labor practice. On March 3, 1987, Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the respondents and they are hereby declared regular and permanent employees and finding their dismissal from the service illegal, ordered to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with one year back wages without qualification or deduction. On Appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission on November 9, 1987 rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 9, 1988 for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was filed on April 22, 1988. Issue: Whether private respondents may be considered regular and permanent employees due to their length of service in the company despite the fact that their employment is on contractual basis. Held: Yes. In the recent case of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism, and Nationalism-Olalia vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, G.R. Nos. 77629 and 78791 promulgated last May 9, 1990, this Court classified the two kinds of regular employees, as: 1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and 2) those who have rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether continuous or broken with respect to the activity in which they are employed. Assuming therefore, that an employee could properly be regarded as a casual (as distinguished from a regular employee) he becomes entitled to be regarded as a regular employee of the employer as soon as he has completed one year of service. Under the circumstances, employers may not terminate the service of a regular employee except for a just cause or when authorized under the Labor Code. It is not difficult to see that to uphold the contractual arrangement between the employer and the employee would in effect be to permit employers to avoid the necessity of hiring regular or permanent employees indefinitely on a temporary or casual status, thus to deny them security of tenure in their jobs. Article 106 of the Labor Code is precisely designed to prevent such result. PHIL. GEOTHERMAL INC. v. NLRC G.R. No. 82643-67 August 30, 1990 Philippine Geothermal Inc. National Labor Relations Commission, Teodula C. Cuebillas , Armando Cilot, Mariano Corullo, Yolanda Cal, Efren Clerigo, Felicissimo Vargas, et al. J. Paras
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It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure." The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed "security of tenure" as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of the employee except for a just cause or when authorized by the Code."
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: PUREFOODS CORP., v. NLRC G.R. No.: G.R. No. 122653 Date: December 12, 1997 Petitioner: Purefoods Corporation Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Rodolfo Cordova, Violeta Crusis, et al. Ponente: J. Davide Facts: The private respondents (numbering 906) were hired by petitioner Pure Foods Corporation to work for a fixed period of five months at its tuna cannery plant in Tambler, General Santos City. After the expiration of their respective contracts of employment in June and July 1991, their services were terminated. On 29 July 1991, the private respondents filed before the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner and its plant manager, Marciano Aganon. On 23 December 1992, the Labor Arbiter handed down a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the private respondents were mere contractual workers, and not regular employees; hence, they could not avail of the law on security of tenure. The private respondents appealed from the decision to the NLRC and on 28 October 1994, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. However, on private respondents motion for reconsideration, the NLRC rendered another decision on 30 January 1995 holding that the private respondents and their co-complainants were regular employees. It declared that the contract of employment for five months was a clandestine scheme employed by [the petitioner] to stifle [private respondents] right to security of tenure and should therefore be struck down and disregarded for being contrary to law, public policy, and morals. Hence, their dismissal on account of the expiration of their respective contracts was illegal. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied the petitioner came to the Supreme Court contending that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The petitioner submits that the private respondents are now estopped from questioning their separation from petitioners employ in view of their express conformity with the five-month duration of their employment contracts. Besides, they fell within the exception provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code which reads: [E]xcept where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that contracts with a specific period of employment may be given legal effect provided, however, that they are not intended to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure. They submit that the practice of the petitioner in hiring workers to work for a fixed duration of five months only to replace them with other workers of the same employment duration was apparently to prevent the regularization of these so-called casuals, which is a clear circumvention of the law on security of tenure. Issue: Whether employees hired for a definite period and whose services are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer are regular employees. Held: Yes. The two kinds of regular employees are (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. In the instant case, the private respondents activities consisted in the receiving, skinning, loining, packing, and casing-up of tuna fish, which were then exported by the
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petitioner. Indisputably, they were performing activities, which were necessary and desirable in petitioners business or trade. Contrary to petitioner's submission, the private respondents could not be regarded as having been hired for a specific project or undertaking. The term specific project or undertaking under Article 280 of the Labor Code contemplates an activity which is not commonly or habitually performed or such type of work which is not done on a daily basis but only for a specific duration of time or until completion; the services employed are then necessary and desirable in the employers usual business only for the period of time it takes to complete the project. The fact that the petitioner repeatedly and continuously hired workers to do the same kind of work as that performed by those whose contracts had expired negates petitioners contention that those workers were hired for a specific project or undertaking only. The five-month period specified in private respondents employment contracts having been imposed precisely to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure should, therefore, be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. To uphold the contractual arrangement between the petitioner and the private respondents would, in effect, permit the former to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating the employees security of tenure in their jobs.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: SOUTHERN COTABATO v. NLRC G.R. No. 121582 October 16, 1997 Southern Cotabato Development and Construction Inc., or SODECO/Liberty Construction joint venture/Ella G. Amandante Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission Fourth Division, and Pedro Rabina, Alexander Yba, Billy Bulfa, Jose Geronilla, Alfredo Seit, Juanito Dueas, Richard Silorio, Nenito Nalipay, Enie Dinolan, Jose Nico Espaol, Roberto Alabata, Jose Suelto, Artemio Vilan, Senenio B. Salacot, Jesus Banquerigo, Moises Repollo, Webster Serion, Renato Dueas, Jaime Rodriguez, Raul Agustin, Welijado Saloma, Joseph Saloma, Melicio Daring Jr., Guillermo Almario, Guilbert Tio, Benegildo Arabe, Romulo Salacot, Miguelito Oriola, Artemio Vilan Jr., Armando Vilan, Albert Suelto, Alberto Quinqueleria, Sixto Toledo, Rodrigo Maravillas, Ramon Silorio, Harold Miraflor, David Rabina, Alfonso Dueas, Roberto Fernando Alabata, Antonio Montederamos Jr., Danny Sedillo, Purificacion Balbuena, Webster Serion Jr., Mariano Selorio, Benito Magsino, and Tomas Espaol Ponente: J. Davide Facts: Petitioners Southern Cotabato Development and Construction, Inc. (SODECO) and Liberty Construction entered into a joint venture for the construction of a road, connecting the municipality of Sibulan in Negros Oriental and Bais City. Petitioner Ella G. Demandante was the Managing Director of SODECO. Private respondents, hired by SODECO as watchmen, survey aides, laborers and carpenters in connection with the road construction project, alleged that they were dismissed by Demandante when they asked for salary increases. They then sued for illegal dismissal and sought reinstatement with payment of wage differentials, overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and holidays, thirteenth month pay and damages with the NLRC. Petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal. They alleged that private respondents were project employees whose work was coterminous with the phases of project to which they were assigned. The labor arbiter rules in favor of the workmen and awarded payment of their back wages and reinstatement. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, which, however, dismissed the appeal on 11 March 1993 for private respondents failure to appeal within the ten-day reglementary period. In its assailed Decision of 29 March 1995, the NLRC thus ruled the respondents [petitioners herein] are hereby ordered to pay the back wages of the petitioners. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but the NLRC denied their plea it in its resolution of 27 July 1995. Petitioners then filed this special civil action, asserting that the public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the private respondents were illegally dismissed. Issue: Whether the employees had security of tenure during their contract. Held: Yes. It is not disputed that private respondents were project employees. As such, they were entitled to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code for the duration of the project they were hired for, or the phases thereof to which they were assigned or in connection with which they rendered services. The length of their employment is determined by the completion of the task for which they were hired.
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It is settled that the burden of proving that an employee was dismissed with just cause rests upon the employer. The best evidence would have been the service contract of each complainant and the schedule of completion of the various phases of the construction project, which should have been in petitioners possession. However, petitioners failed to present even copies of these documents. Since private respondents were illegally dismissed, the NLRC committed no error in awarding full back wages to private respondents from the time they were dismissed up to the completion of the project or the phases thereof to which they were assigned, as the case may be, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner Adoracion Roxas is the president of St. Theresas School of Novaliches Foundation. She hired private respondent, Esther Reyes, on a contract basis, for the period from June 1, 1991 to March 31, 1992. However, private respondent commenced work on May 2, 1991. She went on a leave of absence from February 17 to 21 and from February 24 to 28, 1992, such leave of absence having been duly approved by petitioner Roxas. On March 2, 1992, private respondent reported for work, but she only stayed in her place of work from 6:48 to 9:38 a.m. Thereafter, she never returned. Respondent maintains that she was replaced. When she went back to work on February 20, 1992, she was replaced by Annie Roxas, daughter of petitioner Adoracion Roxas. She tried to contact her employer but the latter could not be found within the school premises. On March 25, 1992, petitioners sent private respondent a letter by registered mail, informing her that her contract, due to expire on March 31, 1992, would not be renewed. Prior thereto, or on March 3, 1992, to be precise, the private respondent instituted NLRC NCR Case against the herein petitioners for unfair labor practice based on harassment, illegal dismissal etc The Labor Arbiter came out with a decision reinstating respondent and awarding back wages. On December 7, 1993, after posting the necessary supersedeas bond, petitioners appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. Unfortunately for private respondent, she never interposed any appeal from NLRCs ruling, upholding the validity of her dismissal. It is therefore settled, beyond the reach of this courts power of review, that private respondents employment was validly terminated. Issue: Whether contract of employment with a fixed period is valid. Held: Yes. The court takes note of the undisputed fact that private respondent was employed on a contract basis. Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period provided the same is entered into by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employees duties. It goes without saying that contracts of employment govern the relationship of the parties. In this case, private respondents contract provided for a fixed term of nine (9) months, from June 1, 1991 to March 31, 1992. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy, is valid, binding and must be respected. It bears stressing that private teachers are subject to special rules with respect to requisites for their permanent employment and security of tenure, to wit: 1. He must be a full time teacher, ST. THERESAS SCHOOL v. NLRC G.R. No. 211955 April 15, 1998 St. Theresas School of Novaliches Foundation and Adoracion Roxas National Labor Relations Commission Esther Reyes J. Purisima
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2. He must have rendered at least three consecutive years of service; and, 3. Such service must be satisfactory. This is in accord with the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools issued by the then Department of Education.
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Alvin Pasicolan 2011-0089 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: TABAS v. CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO. INC. G.R. No. 80680 January 26, 1989 Danilo B. Tabas, Eduardo Bondoc, Ramon M. Briones, Eduardo R. Erispe, Joel Madriaga, Arthur M. Espino, Amaro Bona, Ferdinand Cruz, Federico A. Belita, Roberto P. Isles, Elmer Armada, Eduardo Udog, Peter Tiansing, Miguelita Quiamboa, Nomer Mataga, Violy Esteban and Lydia Ortega California Manufacturing Company Inc., Lily Victoria A. Azarcon, National Labor Relations Commission, and Hon. Emerson C. Tumanon J. Sarmiento
Respondent: Ponente: Facts:
On July 21, 1986, July 23, 1986, and July 28, 1986, the petitioners petitioned the National Labor Relations Commission for reinstatement and payment of various benefits, including minimum wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteen-month pay, and emergency cost of living allowance pay, against the respondent, the California Manufacturing Company. Petitioners were, prior to their stint with California, employees of Livi Manpower Services, Inc. (Livi), which subsequently assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers" for the former firm pursuant to a manpower supply agreement. It was stipulated that the assignment of workers to California should be on a "seasonal and contractual basis". The petitioners now allege that they had become regular California employees and demand, as a consequence whereof, similar benefits. California admits having refused to accept the petitioners back to work but deny liability therefore for the reason that it is not, to begin with, the petitioners' employer and that the "retrenchment" had been forced by business losses as well as expiration of contracts. It appears that thereafter, Livi re-absorbed them into its labor pool on a "wait-in or standby" status. The labor arbiter's decision, a decision affirmed on appeal, ruled against the existence of any employer-employee relation between the petitioners and California ostensibly in the light of the manpower supply contract and absolved Livi from any obligation because the "retrenchment" in question was allegedly "beyond its control." Issue: Whether the petitioners are California's or Livi's regular employees. Held: The petitioners are regular employees. Neither Livi nor California can escape liability that is, assuming one exists. The fact that the petitioners have been hired on a "temporary or seasonal" basis merely is no argument. A temporary or casual employee, under Article 281 of the Labor Code, becomes regular after service of one year, unless he has been contracted for a specific project. And we cannot say that merchandising is a specific project for the obvious reason that it is an activity related to the day-today operations of California. In the case at bar, Livi is admittedly an "independent contractor providing temporary services of manpower to its client." When it thus provided California with manpower, it supplied California with personnel, as if such personnel had been directly hired by California. The records show that the petitioners had been given an initial six-month contract, renewed for another six months. Accordingly, under Article 281 of the Code, they had become regular employees-of-California-and had acquired a secure tenure. Hence, they cannot be separated without due process of law.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 A PRIME SECURITY SERVICES, INC V. NLRC GR No. 107320 January 19, 2000 Petitioner: A Prime Security Services, Inc. Respondents: NLRC (2nd Division), Hon. Arbiter Valentin Guanio and Othello Moreno Ponente: J. Purisima Facts: Private respondent Othello Moreno alleged that he worked as a security guard for a year with Sugarland Security Services, Inc., a sister company of petitioner A Prime. On January 30, 1988, he was rehired as a security guard by the petitioner. He was assigned to the same post at the U.S. Embassy Building. According to him, he was forced by petitioner to sign new probationary contracts of employment for six (6) months. On August 1, 1988, his employment was terminated. He also claimed that during his employment, the amount of P20.00 per month was deducted from his salary allegedly for withholding tax and the salary he was receiving was only P2,187.00 a month contrary to the P2,410.17 stipulated in the PADPAO memorandum of agreement. On the other hand, A Prime countered that Othello Moreno was hired on January 30, 1988 on a probationary basis and he signed an authority to deduct from his salary any reimbursement for any loss or damage caused to properties of the client. Petitioner contended that he was given a copy of petitioners rules and regulations which provided that sleeping on post is punisha ble by warning, suspension and dismissal. He was caught sleeping on post on March 17, 1988, for which he was sent a memorandum giving him a last warning. On March 25, 1988, he figured in a quarrel with another security guard, which resulted in a near shootout. At the end of his probationary employment, he was given a psychological test and on the basis of the foregoing, petitioner told him that his probationary employment had come to an end as he did not pass the companys standard. Thus, he could not be hi red as a regular employee. Thus, Othello Moreno filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and underpayment of wages against petitioner A Prime. Labor Arbiter Valentin Guanio handed down a decision in favor of complainant. A Prime was ord ered to reinstate the complainant to his former position and accord to him the status of a regular employee, and to refund to the complainant the deduction it had made from his salary in the amount of P20.00 per month. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with a slight modification of setting aside the refund of the deductions from complainants salaries in the amount of P20.00 per month. Likewise, the backwages should in no case exceed the period of three (3) years. Hence, this petition. Issues: 1. Whether private respondents employment with A Prime Security Services, Inc. was just a continuation of his employment with Sugarland Security Services, Inc.; 2. Whether private respondent is a regular or probationary employee of petitioner; and 3. Whether private respondents dismissal is illegal. Held: 1. In the first issue, records show that the allegations of Moreno that Sugarland is a sister company of APrime and that the latter absorbed the security contracts and security guards of Sugarl and with the U.S. Embassy were neither denied nor controverted by the petitioner before Labor Arbiter Guanio. Under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule I of the Rules of NLRC, material averments in the complaint are deemed admitted when not specifically denied. 2. The Court holds that Othello Moreno became a regular employee upon completion of his sixmonth period of probation. He started working on January 30, 1988 and completed the said period of probation on July 27, 1988. Thus, at the time he was dismissed on August 1, 1988, he was already a regular employee with a security of tenure. He could only be dismissed for a just and authorized cause.
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Relative thereto, there is no basis for subjecting Moreno to a new probationary or temporary employment on January 30, 1988, considering that he was already a regular employee when he was absorbed by A Prime from Sugarland, its sister company. 3. Finally, on the issue of whether the dismissal of private respondent was unjust and illegal, the Court ruled in the affirmative. The dismissal of the private respondent was presumably based on the results of his behavioral and neuropsychological tests and on his violation of a company rule on sleeping on post. With respect to the behavioral and neuropsychological tests, a discrepancy was observed in the test results. In the first page of the Evaluation Report, the complainant was ruled as Steadiness and Endurance under pressureAverage. However, in the Summary page thereof, it states, Under pressure, he needs emotional support. Evidently, the evaluators mind was already preconditioned towards enforcing A Primes intent of terminating Othello Morenos employment, considering that the same was issued on the very day of his dismissal. Hence, Moreno was not given a chance to contest his dismissal and therefore, deprived of an opportunity to be heard. In relation to the private respondents violations of sleeping on post and quarrelling with a coworker, the infractions were merely first offenses not punishable by outright dismissal. As such, these are not deemed to be valid grounds for terminating the employment of private respondent. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED and NLRCs decision and resolution AFFIRMED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 BERNARDO V. NLRC GR No. 122917 July 12, 1999 Petitioners: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David p. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Celso M. Yazar, Alex G. Corpuz, Ronald M. Delfin, Rowena M. Tabaquero, Corazon C. Delos Reyes, Robert G. Noora, Milagros O. Lequigan, Adriana F. Tatlonghari, Ike Cabanducos, Cocoy Nobello, Dorenda Cantimbuhan, Robert Marcelo, Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia De Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Dindo Valerio, Zenaida Mata, Ariel Del Pilar, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura, Grace S. Pardo and Rico Timosa Respondents: NLRC and Far East Bank and Trust Company Ponente: J. Panganiban Facts: Private respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company employed the forty-three (43) deaf-mutes complainants as money sorters and counters under an "Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers" on various periods from 1988 to 1993. Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters were necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. Far East Bank, on the other hand, countered that petitioners were hired only as "special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank." Private respondent claimed that the complainants were informed from the start that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for "money sorters," whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need "but merely for humanitarian reasons." Respondent further explained that the "special position" of the petitioners no longer exists in private respondent bank after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts. Issue: Whether the petitioners have become regular employees. Held: The petition is meritorious. As provided in Art. 280 of the Labor Code, xxx an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer xxx. Undoubtedly, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. Based on records, twenty-seven (27) petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo should be deemed regular employees. The Court emphasizes the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. Wherefore, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 BUISER V. LEOGARDO, JR. GR No. L-63316 July 31, 1984 Petitioners: Iluminada Ver Buiser, Ma. Cecilia Rillo-Acua and Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan Respondents: Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Labor and Employment and GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY, CO. Ponente: J. Guerrero Facts: Petitioners were employed by the private respondent GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY COMPANY as sales representatives charged with the duty of soliciting advertisements for inclusion in the directory of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. Based on records, Buiser and Intengan entered into an "Employment Contract on Probationary Status" on May 26, 1980 with private respondent while Acua entered into the same employment contract on June 11, 1980. The Employment Contract on Probationary Status provided the provisions as follows: The company hereby employs the employee as telephone sales representative on a probationary status for a period of eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May 1980 to October 1981, inclusive. It is understood that during the probationary period of employment, the Employee may be terminated at the pleasure of the company without the necessity of giving notice of termination or the payment of termination pay. The Employee recognizes the fact that the nature of the telephone sales representative's job is such that the company would be able to determine his true character, conduct and selling capabilities only after the publication of the directory, and that it takes about eighteen (18) months before his worth as a telephone sales representative can be fully evaluated inasmuch as the advertisement solicited by him for a particular year are published in the directory only the following year. Relative thereto, the private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished by the petitioners. Failing to meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service by the company. Thus, petitioners filed with the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages, earned commissions and other benefits. The Regional Director dismissed the complaints of the petitioners, except the claim for allowances which private respondent was ordered to pay. On appeal, Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. Issue: Whether the 18-months probationary status is contrary to law, morals and public policy. Held: No. The 18-months probationary status is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980 to October, 1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills, experience or training. The petitioners failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them also constituted a just cause for their dismissal. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 DE LA CRUZ, JR. V. NLRC GR No. 145417 December 11, 2003 Petitioner: Florencio M. De la Cruz, Jr. th Respondents: NLRC (4 Division), Shemberg Marketing Corporation and Ernesto U. Dacay, Jr. Ponente: J. Corona Facts: On May 27, 1996, petitioner Florencio M. De la Cruz, Jr. was employed as senior sales manager of Shemberg Marketing Corporation. However, on September 14, 1996, petitioner was informed by Ms. Lilybeth Llanto, the HRD Manager, that his services were terminated due to the significant drop in the companys sales. Thus, he immediately requested for a meeting with Shembergs Vice President, Ernesto U. Dacay, Jr. but to no avail. His request to be furnished a 30-day written notice was also denied by the management. Thus, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, backwages, 13th month pay and damages against Shemberg, Ernesto Dacay, Jr. and Lilybeth Llanto. Respondents answered that petitioners dismissal was premised, among others, on the substantial drop in the companys sales and his unauthorized reimbursement of the plane tickets of his wife and child. Thus, petitioner was terminated for his failure to meet the required company standards and for loss of trust and confidence. Labor Arbiter Ernesto Carreon ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed and granted his claim for separation pay, backwages and unpaid wages. Upon the dismissal of the respondents appeal, they moved for reconsideration presenting additional evidence to support its claim. The NLRC partially granted the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by NLRC. He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, but was also dismissed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the petitioner was legally dismissed. Held: Yes. The petitioner was legally dismissed. Florencio M. De la Cruz, Jr. was holding a managerial position which required the full trust and confidence of his employer. Although he could exercise some discretion, it does not include acts for his own personal benefit. As found by the court a quo, he committed a transgression that betrayed the trust and confidence of his employer by reimbursing his familys personal travel expenses out of company funds. He also failed to present any persuasive evidence or argument to prove otherwise. Art. 281 of the Labor Code also provides xxx Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards, made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. xxx There is no dispute that as a probationary employee, he enjoyed only temporary employment status. The employer could well decide he no longer needed the probationary employees services or his performance fell short of expectations. The employer has the absolute right to severe the employeremployee relationship provided that the termination was made before the expiration of the six-month probationary period. In the case at bar, respondent Shemberg had good reason to terminate petitioners employment on the ground of dishonesty. Wherefore, the petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 ESCORPIZO V. UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO GR No. 121962 April 30, 1999 Petitioners: Esperanza C. Escorpizo and University of Baguio Faculty Education Workers Union Respondents: University of Baguio, Virgilio C. Bautista and NLRC Ponente: J. Quisumbing Facts: On June 13, 1989, petitioner Esperanza Escorpizo was employed by University of Baguio as a high school teacher. In order that a probationary teacher may be extended a regular appointment: (1) the faculty member must satisfactorily complete the probationary period of four semesters or two years, within which his performance shall be observed and evaluated to determine his competence and fitness to be extended permanent status; and (2) the faculty member must pass the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET). On March 18, 1991, respondent university informed Escorpizo that her employment was being terminated at the end of school semester in view of her failure to pass the PBET. Before the start of school year 1991-1992, she pleaded to be given another chance on the premise that she had just taken the PBET and hoped to pass it. Her request was favorably considered. Thus, she was allowed to teach during SY 1991-1992. Unfortunately, Escorpizo failed again. Undaunted, she took the examination for the third time in November 1991. On June 8, 1992, the results of PBET were released, and this time, Escorpizo finally passed the exam. However, on June 15, 1992, respondent university no longer renewed her contract of employment on the ground that she failed to qualify as a regular teacher. Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of backwages and reinstatement against University of Baguio. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent university had a permissible reason in not renewing Escorpizos employment contract. Nevertheless, the labor official ordered the reinstatement of Escorpizo but without backwages, and to extend her regular status. Due to the absence of the award for backwages, Escorpizo appealed to NLRC. It was dismissed and the latter affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Instead of filing the required motion for reconsideration, Escorpizo filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion against NLRC in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. Issue: Whether Esperanza Escorpizo was illegally dismissed. Held: No. Esperanza Escorpizo was not illegally dismissed, her contract merely expired. In the instant case, Escorpizo was entitled to security of tenure during the period of her probation but such protection ended the moment her employment contract expired at the close of school year 19911992 due to her failure to pass the PBET examination. Consequently, as respondent university was not under obligation to renew Escorpizos employment contract, her separation cannot be said to have been without justifiable cause. In fact, the services of an employee hired on probationary basis may be terminated when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. It should also be noted that the precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of the case. Moreover, the petitioners did not also comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certification was executed by the counsel of petitioners, which is not correct. Rather, it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal party. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED and NLRCs assailed resolution is AFFIRMED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 GRAND MOTOR PARTS CORP V. MOLE GR No. L-58958 July 16, 1984 Petitioners: Grand Motor Parts Corporation Respondents: The Minister of Labor, the Regional Director, Ministry of Labor, Region VI and Narciso Belicena Jr. Ponente: J. Guerrero Facts: Private respondent Narciso Belicena Jr. was the Branch Manager of Grand Motor Parts Corporation - Iloilo Branch. Prior to his employment in Grand Motor, he was the Finance Officer of Warner, Barnes, & Co. Allegedly, the then acting Branch Manager, Mr. Alfredo Cisneros, induced him to apply for the said position as the petitioner company was looking for a Certified Public Accountant. He applied for the job and was accepted. He started working for the petitioner company on April 1, 1980 and resigned from Warner, Barnes, & Co. only on April 28, 1980. However, he was terminated after working for the petitioner company for only four (4) months because of infractions alleged by the petitioner. To wit, he failed to submit promptly the monthly Income and Loss Statement, Comparative Projections & Actual Sales Report. The Cash Sales of the Iloilo Branch went down to P91,318.41 for June, 1980, as compared with the sales for the month of May, 1980 in the sum of P174,697.77. He also extended personal accounts in favor of fifteen (15) persons which as of November, 1980 produced delinquent accounts amounting to P18,435.80. Finally, Belicena claimed lack of knowledge of the vehicular accident caused by a subordinate and failed to provide prompt administrative disciplinary action against the erring employee. Issues: 1. Whether private respondent's employment as Branch Manager was probationary. 2. Whether private respondent was terminated for just cause. Held: 1. Yes. Private respondent's employment as Branch Manager was probationary. Given the fact that he had never been hired as manager, and the petitioner company and Belicenas former company are engaged in different kinds of business, it was necessary for Bel icena to undergo a period of probation to test his qualifications, skills and experience since managing is a new experience for him. 2. Yes. Private respondent was terminated for just cause. As stated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, a probationary employee may be terminated after six months for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee. In the case at bar, the petitioner has valid grounds to charge its Branch Manager with loss of confidence by reason of the overall performance he has demonstrated within the probationary period which showed that he is not qualified to be the regular or permanent Branch Manager of petitioner corporation in Iloilo City. In the last and ultimate analysis, the prerogative and judgment to hire employees under terms and conditions designed to achieve success in its business activities belongs to management which may not be unduly impaired, limited or restricted. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 HOLIDAY INN MANILA V. NLRC GR No. 109114 September 14, 1993 Petitioners: Holiday Inn Manila and/or Hubert Liner and Baby Disquitado Respondents: NLRC (2nd Division) and Elena Honasan Ponente: J. Cruz Facts: On April 15, 1991, Elena Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training as a telephone operator in Holiday Inn Manila for a period of three (3) weeks. On May 13, 1991, after the completion of her training, she was employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six (6) months ending on November 12, 1991. Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards. On November 8, 1991, Holiday Inn Manila notified her of her dismissal on the ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. Hence, Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal contending that she was already a regular employee at the time of her separation. Therefore, she was entitled to full security of tenure. The complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the NLRC which held that Honasan had become regular employee and so could not be dismissed as a probationer. NLRC ordered Holiday Inn Manila to reinstate Honasan to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with backwages without deduction and qualification. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether Elena Honasan was illegally dismissed. Held: Yes. Elena Honasan was illegally dismissed. She was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, to wit, (1) during her on-the-job training for three weeks and (2) during another period of six months. The Hotels system of double probation was a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees even after they shall have already passed probation. The petitioners had ample time to terminate Honasans services during her period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory. There is also no reason why the three-week period of on-the-job training should not be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation. Since she was accepted on April 15, 1991, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as of October 15, 1991. As a regular employee, she had acquired the protection of Art. 279 of the Labor Code stating as follows: Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The policy of the Constitution is to give the utmost protection to the working class when subjected to such maneuvers as the one attempted by the petitioners. The Supreme Court is fully committed to that policy and has always been quick to rise in defense of the rights of labor. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION V. NLRC GR No. 72222 January 30, 1989 Petitioner: International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) Respondents: NLRC and Bernadette Galang Ponente: C.J. Fernan Facts: On January 24, 1983, petitioner ICMC engaged the services of Bernadette Galang as a probationary cultural orientation teacher with a monthly salary of P2,000.00. Three months later, ICMC informed her, orally and in writing, that her services were being terminated for her failure to meet the prescribed standards as reflected in the performance evaluation conducted by her supervisors. As a result, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against ICMC with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages, exemplary and moral damages. Labor Arbiter Pelagio Carpio dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages, but ordered ICMC to pay Bernadette Galang the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last three (3) months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. Both parties appealed. Galang contended that her dismissal was illegal considering that it was effected without valid cause. On the other hand, ICMC countered that private respondent who was employed for a period of three (3) months could not rightfully be awarded P 6,000.00 because her services were terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. On August 22, 1985, the NLRC, by a majority vote of Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian, sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner ICMC filed the instant petition. Issue: Whether Bernadette Galang is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. Held: No. Private respondent Bernadette Galang is not entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. There is a justifiable basis for the reversal of NLRCs award of salary for the unexpired three month portion of Galangs six -month probationary employment in the light of its express finding that there was no illegal dismissal. Records show that Galang was found by ICMC to be deficient in classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. As provided for in Art. 281 of the Labor Code, xxx The services of an employee who has been engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. xxx The dissatisfaction of petitioner ICMC over her performance is a legitimate exercise of its prerogative to select whom to hire or refuse employment for the success of its program or undertaking. Thus, it was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC to order ICMC to pay Bernadette Galang her salary for the unexpired three-month portion of her six-month probationary employment when she was validly terminated. To sanction such action would not only be unjust, but oppressive on the part of the employer. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the NLRC is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered petitioner to pay private respondent her P6,000.00 salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 ORIENT EXPRESS PLACEMENT PHILIPPINES V. NLRC GR No. 124766 January 30, 1997 Petitioner: Orient Express Placement Philippines and Dominador Batenga, Jr. Respondents: NLRC, Hon. Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol and Ma. Luisa P. Collins Ponente: J. Hermosisima, Jr. Facts: Petitioner Orient Express employed respondent Ma. Luisa P. Collins as liaison officer tasked of dealing with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). During a meeting dated November 9, 1993, Dominador Batenga, Jr., the President and General Manager of Orient Express, confronted private respondent regarding the charge of exaction of excessive placement fees and was there and then dismissed shortly after explaining herself. Due to such incident, Collins filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, various monetary claims, damages and attorneys fees with the NLRC Arbitration Branch on November 17, 1993. Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol ruled in favor of Collins. Based on the documentary and testimonial evidence, he pointed out that it was Jose Batenga, cousin of Dominador Batenga, Jr., who acted as officer-in-charge of the ground floor of Orient Express who directed Collins to charge excessive placement fees and signed receipts thereof. Thus, there was no substantial evidence to prove the charge against Collins resulting to her reinstatement order and payment of backwages. Likewise, petitioner Orient Express violated Collins right to due process. Relative thereto, the Labor Arbiter also awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. On appeal by the petitioner Orient Express, NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that complainant was dismissed without due process. She was not afforded due notice and the chance to be heard. Yet, the NLRC deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees for lack of legal basis. Both petitioners and private respondent filed tardy motions for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. Issue: Whether the late filing of motion for reconsideration shall render the assailed order, resolution or decision of NLRC final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Held: Yes. As stated in Sec. 14, Rule VII, New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, in the absence of a motion for reconsideration timely filed within the ten-day reglementary period, the assailed order, resolution or decision of NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Nonetheless, private respondent also seeks to restore the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees deleted by the NLRC in its decision. To the same extent that the NLRC decision must be deemed to be final and executory as regards petitioner, the same is true as regards private respondent. Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is hereby dismissed.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 PHILIPPINE TOBACCO FLUE-CURING & REDRYING CORPORATION VS. NLRC GR No. 127395 December 10, 1998 Petitioners: Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corporation Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission, Ligaya Lubat, Mary Jane Estaris, Eufrecina Javier, Ofelia Plandez, Edgardo Formento, Crescencia Tiu, Ma. Victoria Leon, Gellen Eulalia, Aida Licudo, Lucina Luris, Erlinda Borce, Dominga Ayala, Carmelita Apanto, Aida Albaniel, Salvacion Sorio, Petronila Samson, Erlinda Caranay, Rosalie Tiu, Milagros Quismundo, Luz Dela Cruz, Vivian Derla, Irene Eniego, Vicenta Garcia, Yolanda Ignacio, Adoracion Ladera, Gloria Mendez, Leonila Mendoza, Rebecca Morales, Teresita Tiu, Emelita Quilano, Julieta Pedrigal, Antonia Reyes, Josefa Rosales, Francisca Tismo, Norma Aguirre, Carolina Aviso, Amelia Bautista, Rosa Borja, Apolonia Castillo, Carmelita Cayetano, Roselfida Centina, Patria Bustillo, Feliciad Cipriano, Marina Corpuz, Matilde Corpuz, Josefina Cuenza, Bienvenida De Guzman, Eugenia Dela Cruz, Maria Pineda, Panchita Narca, Crisanta Mulawin, Virginia Mengolio, Rosario Osma, Arceli Madrilejo, Cristopher Labador, Candelaria Lazona, Angelita Lestingyo, Carmelita Espiritu, Helen Estaris, Rosa Japson, Ardionela Lazona, Ariel Ultra, Reynante Tumbucon, Antenor Remollino, Alexander Remollino, Arnaldo Napalit, Macario Moriel, Joselito Licudo, Paterno Lavalla, Jerry Licudo, Cesar Samson, Eduardo Esguerra Jr., Ramises Centaran, Juan Bustillo, Rolando Albaniel, Reynaldo Aquino, Jaime Esguerra, Armando Japson, Fernando Esguerra, Carlito Eniego, Reynaldo Dayot, Marcelo Dayot, Rodolfo Cerbite, Artemio Boquilla, Pascual Aguja, Eric Aguja, Celestina Aquino, Reynaldo Barquin, Felomena Begonia, Rosita Bagonia, Regina Benitez, Edgardo Bergano, Rodolfo Borromeo, Ludivico Dalay, Ascilipiades Goyena, Remedio Goyena, Oscar Emnace, Gertrudes Guiao, Lolita Musne, Alberto Parama, Luningning Peralta, Amelia Ranches, Ernesto San Juan, Liwayway San Juan, Ricardo Triumfante, Lorena Torcido, Priscilla Villasin, Luzviminda Villegas, Rosile Versoza, Charito Isidro, Peter Labayne, and Shirley Lubat Ponente: J. Panganiban Facts: This involves two groups of seasonal workers, the Lubat group and the Luris group, respectively. The Lubat group is composed of petitioner's seasonal employees who were not rehired for the 1994 tobacco season. At the start of that season, they were merely informed that their employment had been terminated at the end of the 1993 season. They claimed that petitioner's refusal to allow them to report for work without mention of any just or authorized cause constituted illegal dismissal. Thus, they prayed for separation pay, back wages, attorney's fees and moral damages. On the other hand, the Luris group is made up of seasonal employees who worked during the 1994 season. On August 3, 1994, they received a notice informing them that, due to serious business losses, petitioner planned to close its Balintawak plant and transfer its tobacco processing and redrying operations to Ilocos Sur. Although the closure was to be effective September 15, 1994, they were no longer allowed to work starting August 4, 1994. Hence, they contended that they were also illegally dismissed and prayed for back wages. The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay complainant's separation pay differential plus attorney's fees in the total amount of P3,092,896.76. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. Nonetheless, both labor agencies held that the Luris and Lubat groups were entitled to separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every of service, provided that the employee worked at least one month in a given year.
Issues: 1. Whether the Lubat group was illegally dismissed. 2. Whether the Luris group was illegally dismissed. 3. How should the separation pay be computed?
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Held:
1. Yes. The petitioner illegally dismissed the members of the Lubat group when it refused to allow them to work during the 1994 season. The Supreme Court cited the case of Manila Hotel Company v. CIR , 9 SCRA 184, 186, September 30, 1963 , that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until reemployed. Based on the foregoing, it follows that the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and members of the Lubat group was not terminated at the end of the 1993 season. Rather, they were considered only on leave but still in the employ of petitioner from the end of the 1993 season until the beginning of the 1994 season. 2. Yes. The Luris group was illegally dismissed.
Serious business losses were not proven. The petitioner did not actually close its entire business. It merely transferred or relocated its tobacco processing and redrying operations. Moreover, it was also engaged in, among others, corn and rental operations, which were unaffected by the closure of its Balintawak plant. To justify retrenchment, the following should be considered: (1) the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis; (2) substantial loss must be reasonably imminent; (3) retrenchment must be reasonably necessary; and lastly (4) alleged losses must be proven by sufficient and convincing evidence. Art. 283 of the Labor Code also requires the employer to furnish both the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment a written Notice of Closure at least one month prior to closure. In the present case, the Notices of Termination were given to the employees on August 3, 1994, and the intended date of closure was September 15, 1994. However, the employees were in fact not allowed to work after August 3, 1994. Thus, the termination notices, though issued, violated the one month prior notice requisite.
3. The amount of separation pay is based on the amount of monthly salary and the number of years of service. Articles 283 and 284 both state in connection with separation pay that a fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year. In the case at bar, the amount of separation pay which respondent members of the Lubat and Luris groups should receive is one-half (1/2) their respective average monthly pay during the last season they worked multiplied by the number of years they actually rendered service, provided that they worked for at least six months during a given year. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of Respondent NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that private respondents are hereby awarded separation pay equivalent to one (1) month, or to one-half (1/2) month pay for each year that they rendered service, whichever is higher, provided that they rendered service for at least six (6) months in a given year. The separation pay to be awarded to members of the Luris group shall be taken from the amount which petitioner has already awarded to them, and any excess need not be refunded by the workers. The ten percent (10%) attorney's fees given by the NLRC and the labor arbiter shall be based on the award modified herein.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 PURE FOODS CORP V. NLRC GR No. 122653 December 12, 1997 Petitioner: Pure Foods Corporation Respondents: NLRC, Rodolfo Cordova, Violeta Crusis, et al., Ponente: J. Davide, Jr. Facts: The petitioner Pure Foods Corporation hired the private respondents (numbering 906) to work for a fixed period of five (5) months at its tuna cannery plant in Tambler, General Santos City. The respondents services were terminated after the expiration of their respective c ontracts of employment in June and July 1991. Thereafter, they executed a Release and Quitclaim stating that they had no claim whatsoever against the petitioner. On July 29, 1991, the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, General Santos City. Labor Arbiter Arturo Aponesto dismissed the complaint on the ground that the respondents were mere contractual employees. Thus, the termination of their services was justified. By way of appeal to NLRC Cagayan de Oro City dated October 28, 1994, the latter affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. However, on private respondents motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside the decision and held that the private respondents were regular employees. Therefore, petitioner contends that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Issue: Whether the private respondents are regular employees. Held: Yes. The private respondents are regular employees. Art. 280 of the Labor Code provide the two kinds of regular employees. To wit, (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. In the case at bar, the private respondents activities consisted in the receiving, skinning, loining, packing and casing-up of tuna fish which were necessary in petitioner business. Contrary to petitioners contention, the private respondents could not be regarded as having been hired for a specific project or undertaking. Under Art. 280 of the Labor Code, the term specific project or undertaking contemplates a type of work which is not done on a daily basis but only for a specific duration of time or until completion. The fact that the petitioner repeatedly and continuously hired workers to do the same kind of work as that performed by those whose contracts had expired negates the petitioners claim that those workers were hired for a specific project or undertaking only. The five-month period stated in the private respondents employment contracts should be struck down as it is contrary to public policy or morals by reason of circumventing the employees right to security of tenure. The scheme of the petitioner was apparently designed to prevent the private respondents and other casual employees from attaining the status of a regular employee. Since reinstatement is no longer possible due to the closure of the business, the proper remedy is the payment of separation pay and back wages. Wherefore, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification in the computation of separation pay and back wages.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 SAN MIGUEL CORP V. NLRC GR No. 125606 October 7, 1998 Petitioner: San Miguel Corporation Respondents: NLRC, 3rd Division and Francisco de Guzman, Jr. Ponente: J. Quisumbing Facts: Private respondent Francisco de Guzman, Jr. was hired as helper/bricklayer for a specific project of repair and upgrading of furnace C at San Miguel Corporations Manila Glass Plant in November 1990. His contract of employment provided that such temporary employment was for a specific period of approximately four (4) months. On April 30, 1991, he was able to complete the repair and upgrading of furnace C resulting to his termination of service because there was no more work to be done. On May 10, 1991, he was again hired for a specific job which involved the draining/cooling down of furnace F and the emergency repair of furnace E. This project was for a specific period of approximately three (3) months. After the completion of these tasks, his services were terminated at the end of July 1991. Then, on August 12, 1994, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque II dismissed the complaint for lack of merit sustaining petitioners argument that private respondent was a project employee. On appeal, public respondent NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters decision contending that San Miguel Corp failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that Francisco de Guzman, Jr. was dismissed for a just or authorized cause and after due process. Hence, this petition, based on the following grounds: 1. Respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in failing to rule that private respondent is a project or a fixed period employee. 2. Respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner violated private respondents security of tenure and that private respondent was illegally dismissed. 3. Respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that laches or silence or inaction for an unreasonable length of time did not bar private respondents claim. Issues: 1. Whether the private respondent is a project employee. 2. Whether he was legally terminated. Held: 1. Yes. The private respondent is a project employee. Following Article 280, whether one is employed as a project employee or not would depend on whether he was hired to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time his services were engaged for that particular project. Private respondent was engaged in the manufacture of glass for a total of seven (7) months only. Although the activity was necessary to enable the petitioner to continue manufacturing glass, the necessity arose only when a particular furnace reached the end of its life or operating cycle or as in the second undertaking, when a particular furnace required an emergency repair. 2. Yes. He was legally terminated. The undertakings, the duration and scope of which had been determined and made known to the private respondent at the time of his employment clearly indicated the nature of his employment as project employee. Thus, his services were terminated legally. Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of NLRC is hereby REVERSED and the judgment of Labor Arbiter REINSTATED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 SERVIDAD V. NLRC GR No. 128682 March 18, 1999 Petitioner: Joaquin T. Servidad Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), INNODATA Philippines Inc./INNODATA Corporation, Todd Solomon Ponente: J. Purisima Facts: Petitioner Joaquin T. Servidad was employed as a Data Control Clerk by respondent INNODATA on May 9, 1994. Sec. 2 of the contract states that the employment shall be effective for a period of one (1) year commencing on May 10, 1994 until May 10, 1995 unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions thereof. He shall be contractual for a period of six (6) months covering the period of May 10, 1994 to November 10, 1994, during which the employer shall serve a written notice should the latter opted to terminate his services. However, should he continue his employment beyond November 10, 1994, he shall become a regular employee upon demonstration of sufficient skill depending on his ability to meet the standards by the employer. Should he fail to demonstrate the ability to master his task during the first six months, he can be placed on probation for another six months after which he will be evaluated for promotion as a regular employee. On November 9, 1994, he was made to sign a 3-month probationary employment and an extended 3-month probationary employment effective until May 9, 1995. Then, he was dismissed from the service on May 9, 1995 on the ground of alleged termination of contract of employment. Hence, he filed an illegal dismissal complaint before the Labor Arbiter who rendered respondent INNODATA guilty of the charge and ordered to pay backwages and reinstatement of petitioner. On appeal thereto by INNODATA, the NLRC reversed the decision declaring that the contract between petitioner and private respondent was for a fixed term and the dismissal, at the end of his one year term agreed upon, was valid. Issue: Whether the contract of employment entered into by the parties is valid and enforceable. Held: No. The contract of employment entered into by the parties is NOT valid and enforceable. The tenor of the contract jeopardizes the right of the worker to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution given the fact that the private respondent had two (2) options of termination, either by reason of contract expiration or failure to meet work standards. It was also clear that the petitioner was hired as a regular employee at the outset. His job as a Data Control Clerk was directly related to the data processing and encoding business of INNODATA. Thus, his work was necessary to the business of the employer. Such scenario embeds the principle under Art. 280 of the Labor Code, which states that xxx an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer xxx . At any rate, even assuming that his employment was probationary, petitioner was anyway permitted to work beyond the first six-month period. Under Art. 281 of the Labor Code, an employee allowed to work beyond the probationary period is deemed a regular employee. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED, the questioned decision of NLRC is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated August 20, 1996, is REINSTATED.
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Quiones, Shirley Marie C. 2011-0114 YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION V. AVELINO GR No. L-43674 June 30, 1987 Petitioners: Ysmael Maritime Corporation Respondents: Hon. Celso Avelino, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Cebu and Spouses Felix C. Lim and Consorcia Geveia Ponente: J. Fernan Facts: On December 22, 1971, Rolando G. Lim, licensed second mate, was on board the vessel M/S Rajah when it sank near Sabtan Island, Batanes causing his death. The vessel was owned by Ysmael Maritime Corporation. Claiming that Lims untimely death was due to the negligence of petitioner, his parents Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia sued the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for damages on January 28, 1972. Ysmael Maritime Corporation alleged by way of affirmative defenses (1) that the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) that respondent-plaintiffs had received P4,160.00 from petitioner and had signed release papers discharging petitioner from any liability arising from the death of their son; (3) that most significantly, the respondents had already been compensated by the Workmens Compensation Commission for the same incident. Hence, they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of the complaint. Judge Avelino denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmens Compensation Act (WCA), and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee is exclusive of the other remedies available under the Civil Code. Held: As reiterated in Art. 173 of the Labor Code entitled Exclusive on Liability, it provides that xxx The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended and other laws. In the case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, GR No. L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, the third view on exclusivity rule states that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been done, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. Thus, both actions cannot be pursued simultaneously. In the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In an open court, respondent Consorcia Geveia admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. Therefore, it is clear that the respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. In the light of the Courts pronouncement in the Floresca case, respondent Judge Avelinos denial order of petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint is adjudged to be improper. Wherefore, the respondent Judge Avelinos orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
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Name: Julie Ann Q. Santos Student number: 2011-0031 ACESITE COPORATION HOLIDAY INN, JOHANN ANGERBAUER and PHIL KENNEDY, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABORS RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEO A. GONZALES, respondents GR number: G.R. no. 152308 Date: January 26, 2005 Petitioner: Acesite Corporation Holiday Inn, Johann Angerbauer and Phil Kennedy Respondent: National Labors Relations Commission and Leo A. Gonzales Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J: FACTS: Leo Gonzales was hired on October 18, 1993 as Chief of Security of Manila Pavillion Hotel. On January 1, 1995, Acesite Corporation took over the operations of Manila Pavillion and renamed it Holiday Inn Manila. Acesite retained Gonzales as Chief of Security of the Hotel. Starting on March 25, 1998, Gonzales claimed his available leaves consecutively until April 29, 1998. But when he asked for leave up to May 13, 1998 it was not approved, however, such notice was through a telegram where, it was alleged, by Gonzales, that such notice was received only after many days. Gonzales still does not report for work, and on May 5, 1998, Acesite reiterated that Gonzales should get back to work for urgent matters. On May 8, 1998, Gonzales went back to the Hotel to work but was blocked from entering the premises by his subordinate and it appears that on May 7, 1998, he was terminated from work on the ground of gross disobedience or insubordination. ISSUES: Whether or not there is gross disobedience/willful disobedience or insubordination on the part of Gonzales RATIONALE: Willful disobedience requires the ff: (a.) the employees assailed conduct has been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b.) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, Gonzalezs receipt of the telegram disapproving his application for emergency leave starting April 30, 1998 has not been shown. And it cannot be said that he disobeyed the May 5, 1998 telegram since he received it only on May 7, 1998. On the contrary, that he immediately went back to Manila upon receipt thereof negates a perverse attitude. There has been no just cause to dismiss Gonzales from employment. HELD: Petition denied. Acesite Corporation is ordered to pay Gonzales
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Name: Julie Ann Q. Santos Student number: 2011-0031 DANILO DIMABAYAO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISLAND BISCUIT INC. and CHENG SUY EH, respondents GR number: G.R. no. 122178 Date: February 25, 1999 Petitioner: Danilo Dimabayao Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Island Biscuit Inc. and Cheng Suy Eh Ponente: Bellosillo, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner was an employee of respondent Island Biscuit, Inc., which manufactures biscuits. On July 30, 1992, while petitioner was assigned to sort out rejects, with prior permission first obtained from his checker, he went to the comfort room to answer the call of nature and relieve himself, afterwhich he returned to his work place. But the manager, Cheng Suy Eh, was unhappy seeing petitioner away from his work station and immediately demanded from him a written explanation allegedly for abandoning his work. As a matter of policy, respondent company discourages its employees from going to the comfort room during working hours for sanitary or hygienic purposes as the company is engaged in the food business. He was suspended for 15 days for such reason. And on October 20, 1992, such occurrence happened again, but petitioner even asked his co-employee to take over his post while petitioner is in the comfort room. This time, petitioner was dismissed from his work on the grounds of willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties and abandonment of work. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners dismissal is valid RATIONALE: Willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee requires at least the ff: (1.) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude, and (2.) the order violated must have been r easonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Petitioners act of leaving his work place to relieve himself can hardly be characterized as abandonment, much less a willful or intentional disobedience of company rules since he was merely answering the call of nature over which he had no control. There was also no gross and habitual neglect of duties by petitioner, since he merely relieved himself which could not have constituted abandonment, neither could it have disrupted the operations of the company. DECISION: Petition GRANTED. Danilo Dimabayao be immediately reinstated to his former work.
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Name: Julie Ann Q. Santos Student number: 2011-0031 GOLDEN THREAD KNITTING INDUSTRIES, INC., GEORGE NG and WILFREDO BICO , petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABORS RELATIONS COMMISSION, GEORGE MACASPAC, MARY ANN MACASPAC, ROMULA ALBASIN, MELCHOR CACHUCA, GILBERT RIVERA and FLORA BALBINO , respondents GR number: G.R. no. 119157 Date: March 11, 1999 Petitioner: Golden Thread Knitting Industries, Inc., George Ng and Wilfredo Bico Respondent: National Labors Relations Commission, George Macaspac, Mary Ann Macaspac, Romula Albasin, Melchor Cachuca, Gilbert Rivera and Flora Balbino Ponente: Bellosillo, J: This is a consolidation of 4 complaints against the petitioners. FACTS: GENERAL FACTS: Private respondents, together with some of their co-worker, organized a Labor Union on the 1st week of May, and on July 1, 1992 the Union filed a petition for certification election. Certification Election is a secret ballot election among employees to ascertain their freely chosen representative for the purpose of collective bargaining. (Philippine Legal Dictionary) ISSUES: 4.) Whether private respondents shall be reinstated on their jobs; and 5.) Whether private respondents are entitled to holiday pay FACTS regarding the DISMISSAL of George Macaspac and Romulo Albasin: The 2 private respondents, who worked as printers and also union members, were barred from entering the company premises on July 6, 1992 on the ground of serious misconduct by slashing/destructing of several bundles of towels, one of the products produced by the petitioner company, with the use of razor on July 3, 1992. RATIONALE: As the Supreme Court reviews the record, it shows that the petitioners failed to give aforenamed respondents an opportunity to be heard. There was no investigation conducted, calling the attention of the 2 respondents to the charge against them and requiring them to explain and/or answer the same. In addition, the 2 respondents were also denied procedural due process, since not only petitioners failed to afford Macaspac and Albasin the benefit of hearing before termination, but also petitioners failed to comply with the requirement of notices. An established rule is that to effect a completely valid and unassailable dismissal, an employer must show not only sufficient ground but also proves the observation of the notice rule by giving an employee 2 notices: one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating his acts or omissions complaint against, and two, notice of the decision to dismiss. Macaspac and Albasin where summarily eased out of employment when they were refused entry into the company premises 3 days after allegedly slashing the bundles of towels. FACTS for Gilbert Rivera and Mary Ann Macaspac: On August 14, 1992, Union Vice Chairman Gibert Rivera, as artist, was dismissed from employment together with Union Secretary Mary Ann Macaspac on the ground of redundancy of positions, wherein the Design Section where they worked as artists became overmanned when the volume of work was drastically reduced. RATIONALE: The SC questioned petitioners exercise of management prerogative because it was not shown that Rivera and Macaspacs positions were indeed unnecessary, much les was petitioners claim supported by any evidence. It is not enough for the company to merely declare that it has become overmanned. It must produce adequate proof that such is actual situation in order to justify the dismissal of the affected employees for redundancy.
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Also, SC laid down the principle that in selecting the employees to be dismissed, these criteria must be used, such as but not limited to: (a) less preferred status (e.g temporary employee), (b) efficiency, and (c) seniority. The record shows that no criterion was adopted by petitioners in dismissing Rivera and Macaspac. Another procedural lapse committed by petitioners is the lack of written notice to the DOLE required under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The purpose of such notice is to ascertain the verity of the cause of termination of employment. FACTS for Flora Balbino: On August 5, 1992, Balbino was suspended, then on the same day terminated from her job as sewer, on the ground that she threatened the personnel manager and violated the company rules by removing her time card from the rack. RATIONALE: The utterances by an employee of obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior justify his dismissal for gross misconduct. The scornful attitude is also destructive of his co-employees morale. However, the dismissal will not be upheld where it appears that the employees act of disrespect was provoked by the employer. In this case, the SC believes that the dismissal was a harsh penalty, since Balbino was provoked by the baseless suspension imposed on her. In regards with Balbino taking the time card, no material damage was done since only her work performed on July 31 and August 3, 1992 was unpaid. Also, Balbino was denied procedural due process when she was summarily dismissed. FACTS for Melchor Cachuchas dismissal: The petitioners argue that Melchor was not dismissed but abandoned his employment on July 7, 1992. RATIONALE: The SC sustained NLRC that Cachucha did not abandoned his work considering that he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner on July 16, 1992 and disavowed any notice to return to work allegedly sent to him by petitioners. In addition, for abandonment to exist, it is essential that (1) the employee must have failed to report fro work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some over acts. The circumstance that Cachucha lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners on July 16, 1992 is incompatible with the charge of abandonment and confirms, actually, that he was refused entry in to the company premises.
GENERAL RATIONALE: The petitioners exercised their authority to dismiss without due regard to the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. In addition, in regards with whether private respondents are entitled to holiday pay, the dismissed workers distinctly set forth in their Position Paper that they were not remunerated for 10 regular holidays for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 and such claim stands undisputed. DECISION: Wherefore, petitioners are directed to reinstate private respondents to their former positions and to give private respondents their pay for 10 regular holidays for each year.
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Name: Julie Ann Q. Santos Student number: 2011-0031 CRISTONICO B. LEGAHI, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC., NORTHSOUT SHIP MGT., (PTE), LTD., SINGAPORE, GREGORIO V. DE LIMA, JR., TOR KARLSEN and PIONEER INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents GR number: G.R. no. 122240 Date: November 18, 1999 Petitioner: Cristonico B. Legahi Respondent: National Labors Relations Commission, United Philippine Lines, Inc., Northsouth Ship Mgt., (PTE), LTD., Singapore, Gregorio V. De Lima, Jr., Tor Karlsen and Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. Ponente: Kapunan, J. FACTS: Cristonico Legahi was hired as Chief Cook aboard M/V Federal Nord with a contract of employment for 10 months beginning October 9, 1992. Sometime in November 1992, petitioner was asked by the Shipmaster to prepare a victualling cost statement for the month of October, 1992. After learning that such preparation involves mathematical skills, as it would require estimation of food cost, value of stocks, etc., he intimated that he did not know how to do such work as it was not part of the duties of a chief cook. He was told that it was not a difficult job, and so Legahi complied. It happened again on December, cost for the month of November, and on January for the month of December. On 6th day of that same month, January, the Shipmaster asked petitioner to do a corrected victualling cost for December, but Legahi refused for he stated that he was busy doing his chores. On January 14, a committee was formed headed by the Shipmaster himself and read to Legahi his alleged offenses and thereafter dismissed from his work on the ground of serious and gross insubordination. ISSUE: Whether or not there is gross insubordination or willful disobedience on the part of Legahi RATIONALE: For willful disobedience to be considered as just cause for dismissal, the employees conduct must be willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, it was actually not petitioners duty to prepare the victualling statement. From the beginning, petitioner already stated that he did not know how to accomplish such statement, since he only came aboard to cook, and his refusal for that time, only because he was busy doing his chores, cannot be considered as being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. HELD: Wherefore, petition is Granted.
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Name: Julie Ann Q. Santos Student number: 2011-0031 ANICETO W. NAGUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents GR number: G.R. no. 120474 Date: August 12, 2003 Petitioner: Aniceto W. Naguit, Jr. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Manila Electric Company Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner was an employee of respondent MERALCO since August 11, 1959 until his dismissal on June 13, 1991, 32 years of service. On June 5, 1987, petitioner informed his supervisor that he would render overtime work on June 6, 1987, Saturday, and after finishing his field work on that day, he would proceed to Quezon to accompany his wife who was a principal sponsor to a kins wedding. On June 6, 1987, petitioner went at the office to work until 12:00 noon, then, he, together with his co-employee, Fidel Cabuhat, who drove for petitioner, proceeded to Quezon. A cash voucher for Cabuhat was prepared on account of petitioner for the alleged overtime work of Cabuhat on June 6, which voucher represents meal allowance and rental for jeep. More than 2 years later, petitioner received from the Legal and Investigation Staffs of MERALCO a letter informing him of Administrative hearings to be conducted in regards with his alleged violation: 1. Causing the reimbursement of transportation expense for Mr. Cabuhat for alleged work not actually rendered 2. Leaving of work assignment without permission from his superior After the hearings were conducted and results came out, petitioner was dismissed from his work. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners dismissal is valid RATIONALE: Petitioner, as and Administrative Officer, is covered by respondent MERALCOs policy pertaining to field personnel, particularly when he is designated to perform field assignments. MERALCOs policy for field personnel would be giving them considerations when given a project where they could leave early as long as their work has been satisfactorily done. In regards with the reimbursement for Cabuhat, petitioner committed dishonesty and breached MERALCOs trust when he released the reimbursement for Cabuhat since he knew that Cabuhat did not conduct any field work on June 6, 1987, but merely drove for him to Pagbilao, Quezon. And petitioners attempt at exoneration cannot be a defense since as a custodian of the petty cash fund, he had the duty to ascertain the circumstances which brought about any claim therefrom. However, dismissal is too harsh as a penalty; given his 32 years of service which he had no derogatory record. But he cannot be reinstated now that petitioner was over 60 years of age, the retirement age for MERALCO. DECISION: MERALCO is ORDERED to pay petitioner his retirement benefits from the inception of his service up to 60 years of age, in accordance with its retirement plan.
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Name: Julie Ann Q. Santos Student number: 2011-0031 PNOC-EDC, et. Al., petitioners, vs. FREDERICK V. ABELLA, respondent GR number: G.R. no. 153904 Date: January 17, 2005 Petitioners: PNOC-EDC, Nazario Vasquez, president; Marcelino Tongco, Acting Manager Project Operations & Manager, Project Development; Jesus Quevenco, Jr., Resident Manager, SNGP/PIPE; and Remegio B. Cornelio, Human Resource Officer, SNGP-PIPE Respondent: Frederick V. Abella Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: Frederick V. Abella started working for Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) on June 1, 1989. Less than one year later, or on April 20, 1990, Abella was informed that his employment with PNOC-EDC would be terminated effective May 21, 1990, due to a company-wide reorganization in regards to its Manpower Reduction Program, wherein the position of Security Assistant, Abellas position, had been abolished. Abella filed complaint and, when the results came, he was recalled to the company but to another position since his old position was abolished. As time passes, he was repositioned to the security department and then transferred to different sites. However, the directives, such as reporting immediately to one site and then immediately reporting back to the other, were disregarded or ignored by Abella stating that he was not reinstated to his former position as Security Assistant per Writ of Execution issued by the labor arbiter. Abella continue disregarding directives for transferring another until he received notice of termination on the ground of insubordination or willful disobedience. ISSUE: Whether or not there is insubordination or willful disobedience on the part of Abella. RATIONALE: Insubordination or willful disobedience must have: (a.) reasonable and lawful orders, regulations or instructions of the employer, (b.) sufficiently known to the employee, and (c.) in connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, respondent Abella was well informed of the orders of transfer and said orders were well in connection with the security functions of respondent. The reasonableness and lawfulness of an order depend on the circumstances availing in each case. Reasonableness pertains to the kind or character of directives and commands and to the manner in which they are made. The petitioners claim that the orders were well within their managerial prerogative to make. Review of records shows that there is a valid reason behind the transfer of Abella: due to the emergency need of the state of affairs in the geothermal plant/or other site of the company. In addition, the job description of Abella states reassignment from one place to another, depending on security needs and he also state that hes willing to accept a provincial assignment on his application for employment. Therefore, the dismissal is valid. HELD: Wherefore, petition is Granted.
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Name: Student number: Julie Ann Q. Santos 2011-0031
TEODORICO ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. VICTORY RICEMILL, respondent GR number: G.R No. 147572 Date: February 19, 2003 Petitioner: Teodorico Rosario Respondent: Victory Ricemill Ponente: Callejo, J. Facts: Petitioner Teodorico Rosario was a Truck Driver for the bussinessman Emilio Uy who was engaged in the business of milling palay under the business name Victory Ricemill from January 11, 1982 up to his dismissal on June 22, 1993. According to respondent, petitioner was guilty of insubordination when he refused to serve as a driver of Mr. Uy's son when the latter needed a driver. Also, once when Rosario was instructed to deliver 600 bags of cement to the Felix Hardware in Tuguegarao, Rosario delivered the same to one Eduardo Interior. And because of Rosario's tendency to disobey the order to him, Uy engaged the services of another driver. On June 21, 1993, Rosario, armed with a dagger, fought with the new driver and inflicted an injury on the latter, in addition, inflicted injuries on the head of another co-employee, when he intervened in the fight and tried to pacify the petitioner. Respondent terminated petitioner's employment for the latter's notorious acts of insubordination and the attempt to kill a fellow employee. This is an instant petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner's termination was for a just and lawful cause. Held: The findings that the petitioner is guilty of willful disobedience is based on substantial evidence and is not helped by the fact that he committed a crime against his co-worker. Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just caused for dismissal, have 2 requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Petitioner's conduct of not delivering the cement to Felix Hardware showed that he could not even be trusted with the task. Every employee is charged with the implicit duty of caring for the employer's property. Further, his hostile attitude towards his co-workers which eventually led him to inflict injuries cannot be countenanced. Wherefore, the decision of NLRC that petitioner's dismissal was valid is AFFIRMED.
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Name: Student number: Julie Ann Q. Santos 2011-0031
WESTIN PHILIPPINE PLAZA HOTEL, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEN RODRIGUEZ, respondents GR number: G.R No. 121621 Date: May 3, 1999 Petitioner: Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Len Rodriguez Ponente: Quisumbing, J. Facts: Len Rodriguez was continuously employed by petitioner Plaza Hotel from 1997 until 1993, the year Len was terminated. At first, he was hired as pest controller, then later posted as room attendant. Next he served as bellman, until he was finally assigned as doorman in 1981 and stayed in that position until his termination from employment. On December 1992, petitioner transferred Len from the position of doorman, a guest-contact position, to linen attendant, a non-guest contact position, on the ground of negative feedback on the services to hotel guests by Len but without a demotion in rank or pay. But petitioner continuously refused such transfer of position: he took a vacation leave until January 16, 1993 and, when he reported back to work, he still did not assume his post at the linen room but just stayed in the union room instead. On February 1993, petitioner terminated Rodriguezs employment on the ground of insubordination. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner is guilty of insubordination or not Rationale: Willful disobedience by the employee requires at least of the ff: (a.) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b.) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge. In addition, the Court recognizes and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges. The willfulness of Rodriguezs insubordination was shown by his continued refusal t o report to his new work assignment. Therefore, the dismissal was legal. Held: Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE GR NO. DATE PETITIONER RESPONDENT LEONORA PONENTE : GONZALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS : 36213 : JUNE 29,1989 : FELIX AND CARMEN GONZALES : HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DECEASED SPOUSES ANDRES AGCAOILE & AGCAOILE, substituted by LUCIA A. SISON : GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner leased a lot in the subdivision on which they built their house and, by tolerance of the subdivision owner, they cultivated some vacant adjoining lots. The Court of Agrarian Relations, as well as the Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs are not de jure agricultural tenants. Issue: The ruling is assailed in this appeal for certiorari. Held : There is no merit in the petitioners argument that inasmuch as residential commercial lots may be considered agricultural, an agricultural tenancy can be established on land in residential subdivision. The Krivenko decision interpreting the constitutional prohibition against transferring private agricultural land to individuals, corporations, or associations not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, save in the case of hereditary succession has nothing to do with agricultural tenancy. An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into residential subdivision. EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106
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CASE TITLE GR NO. DATE PETITIONER RICALDE AND RESPONDENT PONENTE : ALITA VS. CA : 78517 : FEBRUARY 27,1989 : GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN JR. & JESUS SR., PEDRO AND VICENTE ROLANDO SALAMAR : HON COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE , PAZ AND FE REYES : PARAS,J.:
FACTS: This is a petition seeking reversal of the CA on March 3,1987 affirming the judgement of the court a quo dtd April 29,1986, the dispositive portion are as follows; 1. Declaring the P.D. No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law, 2. Declaring the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and 3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants-petitioner, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulation issued by DAR. Thus on April 29,1986, the RTC issued the aforequoted decision prompting the defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied, on appeal the CA sustained the RTC judgement. Issue: WON the lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under PD 27. Held : PD 27 cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the Public Land Act No.141, the decision of the CA and RTC is hereby affirmed. EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106
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CASE TITLE GR NO. DATE PETITIONER T. BAYLON, ALDAY, RESPONDENT PARALEJO, PONENTE SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN AND VIRGILIO MAGPAYO : THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY : CORTES, J.: : SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS. CA : 85279 : JULY 28,1989 : SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
FACTS: On June 11,1987, the SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 09 ,1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. It appears that the SSSEA went to strike after the SSS failed to act on the union demands on certain job related issues and unfair labor practices. The court a quo, on June 11,1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The SSS filed an opposition, on July 22,1987, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding the strike illegal. As petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14,1988, petitioners filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the SC, the SC referred the case to COA. Upon motion of the SSS on Feb.06,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the DOLE on Jan.25,1989 and to maintain the status quo. The COA dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by the petitioners and held that since the strikers are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the SSS complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike. Issue: Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike and the RTC have jurisdiction?
HELD: SSS is one of such GOCC with original charter, having been created under R.A No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and covered by a memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. No reversible error having been committed by the COA, the petition is hereby denied.
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE : LUZ FARMS VS. SEC. OF DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM GR NO. : 86889 DATE : DEC. 04,1990 PETITIONER : LUZ FARMS RESPONDENT : THE HON. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM PONENTE : PARAS J,: FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Hon. Sec of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of RA no.6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 and in the promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under RA No.6657, insofar as the same apply herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of RA No.6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform L aw and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under RA No. 6657. Hence Luz Farms file a petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondent from enforcing the same. Issue: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sec 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA No. 6657, insofar as the said law, includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith. Held : Pettiton is granted , said sections and implementing rules are hereby declared null and void.
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE : REPUBLIC VS. CA GR NO. : 87676 DATE : December 20,1989 PETITIONER : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE RESPONDENT : THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION & THEIR MEMBERS PONENTE : GRINO AQUINO, J. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 88-44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review. This issue came about because although the NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order no. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks and later renamed as the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68 on Sept. 21,1967. By virtue of Executive Order No. 120 dated Jan. 30,1989, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department) of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission of Audit. On Sept. 10,1987, the Civil Service Commission notified NPDC that pursuant to E.O. No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Commission. Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holding supervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized. On March 20,1988, these unions staged a strike at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park and Pook ni Mariang Makiling , alleging unfair labor practises by NPDC. On March 21 of the same year, NPDC filed in the RTC in Manila, Branch III against the union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being government employees, have no right to strike although they may form a union. On March 24,1988, the RTC dismissed the complaint and lifted the restraining order for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order of the trial court. Issue: WON the NPDC is a government agency or private corporation, for this issue depends the right of its employee to strike. Held : In Jesus P. Perlas Jr. vs People, GR no. 84637-39, Aug.2,1989, we ruled that the NPDC is an agency of the government, not a GOCC. While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case a labor dispute between the employees and the government, that the Public Sector Labor Management Council not the DOLE shall hear the dispute. The petition for review is granted. The decision of the COA is hereby set aside.
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE GR NO. DATE PETITIONER RESPONDENT D. PONENTE : PEOPLE VS. GOCE : 113161 : AUGUST 29,1995 : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES : LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accussed. NELLY AGUSTIN, accussed-appelant. : REGALADO, J.:
FACTS: On Jan. 12,1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in a large scale against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accussed-appelant Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila Branch 5 for 8 persons in different occasions between May 1986 to June 25,l987. The victims are (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3)Rogelio Salada y Savillo (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvares y Velayo and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos. On Jan. 21,1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested. Hence on February 02,1989, the trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the accused. On Feb. 26,1993 Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque police. On March 08,1993, her counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested that it be set for hearing for the purpose of due process and for the accused to immediately have her day in court. Four of the complainant testified for the prosecution and all of the corroborated that indeed Nelly Agustin is involved in large scale illegal recruitment. Nelly denied any participation and that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple. On Nov. 19,1993, the trial court rendered judgement finding the herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentenced her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. Issue: WON the crime does not fall within the meaning of Art 13(b) in relation to Art 34 of the Labor Code? Held : The appealed judgement of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto, with cost against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE BANK ET AL GR NO. DATE PETITIONER RESPONDENT ESTER S. : LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT : 120319 : OCTOBER 06,1995 : LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK : ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY.
GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR PONENTE : ROMERO,J.: FACTS: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arise voluntary arbitration case to resolve the following issue: WON the LDB has violated the CBA provision and the MOA dated April 1994. On May 24,1995, without the LDBs position paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision that the bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion. Hence, LDB file a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her for enforcing the same. Issue: WON the SC has jurisdiction over the case? Held : The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls therefore within the contemplation of the term instrumentality in the Sec 9 of B.P. 129, likewise his decision is appealable to the CA in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No.1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. Accordingly, the Court resolved to refer the case to the CA.
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE GR NO. DATE PETITIONER RESPONDENT PONENTE : DARVIN VS. CA : 125044 : JULY 13,1998 : IMELDA DARVIN : HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES : ROMERO,J.:
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal in CA-GR No. 15624 dated Jan.31,1996, which affirmed in toto the judgement of the RTC Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite convicting the accused-appellant for simple illegal recruitment under Art 38 and Art 39, in relation to Article 13(b) of the Labor Code as amended. Sometime in March, 1992 Macaria Toledo met Darvin in the latters residence at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite, through the introduction of their common friends. In said meeting, Darvin convinced Toledo that by giving her Php 150,000.00, the latter can immediately leave for the U.S without any appearance before the U.S. Embassy. Thus on April 13,1992 Toledo gave Darvin the amount of P150,000.00 as evidence by a receipt stating that the amount of P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Airfare. However, when after a week, there was no word from Darvin and could not find the latter at her residence. Accused-appellant was then charged for estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite. In its judgement on june 17,1993 the Bacoor Cavite RTC found the accusedappellant guilty of the crime of simple illegal recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of estafa. Issue: WON the guilt of the accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt? Held : The SC find no sufficient evidence to prove the accused-appellant offered a job to private respondent and it is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the respondent work abroad. The appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside.
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EUGENIO P. CARREON 2011-0106 CASE TITLE GR NO. DATE PETITIONER RESPONDENT PONENTE : PEOPLE VS. PANIS : L-58674-77 : JULY 11,1990 : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES : HON. DOMINGO PANIS and SERAPIO ABUG : CRUZ,J:
FACTS: Four informations were filed on January 9,1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging Serapio Abug in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegal recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso of Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and Sept. 17,1981. Issue: The correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the Labor Code Held : The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned is the basic rule in Art 13(b) will constitute recruitment and the placement even if only one prospective worker is involved.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 CARMELITA V. SANTOS VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION GR No. 149416 Date: March 14, 2003 Petitioner: Carmelita V. Santos Respondent: San Miguel Corporation Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. FACTS: The antecedents facts are as follows which prompted the complaint and dismissal of Carmelita Santos: 4) On September 15, 1987, respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) appointed petitioner Carmelita V. Santos as Finance Director of its Beer Division for Luzon Operations. 5) On September 6, 1989, respondent's Cash Department issued a Memorandum prohibiting the encashment of personal checks at respondent's Plants and Sales Offices. 6) On January 10, 1991, respondent SMC, through its Cash Management Department, noticed that petitioner encashed her three (3) personal checks in various Metro Manila Sales Offices. 7) On January 24, 1991, respondent commenced an audit investigation of the personal checks encashed by petitioner at its sales offices. Pending the audit investigation, petitioner agreed to take a fifteen-day vacation leave from January 25 to February 14, 1991. 8) On January 29, 1991, petitioner received from respondent an inter-office memorandum requiring her to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against her in view of her unauthorized encashment of her three personal checks at respondent's sales offices. In a reply-memorandum dated January 31, 1991, petitioner admitted that she encashed three personal checks at respondent's sales offices but claimed that such act was not irregular since all personnel in respondent's Beer Division were allowed to encash their personal checks at any sales office upon clearance from the region management concerned. She stated that her encashment of personal checks had prior clearance. Meanwhile, respondent obtained a copy of the audit results and learned that aside from petitioner's reported encashment of three personal checks, she had previously encashed fifty (50) personal checks from June 13, 1989 to January 19, 1991 in varying amounts, from P1,500.00 to P20,000.00, which were not endorsed by the Sales Operations Manager or the Region Finance Officer. Additionally, petitioner encashed two other personal checks in the amounts of P150,000.00 on December 12, 1990, and P100,000.00 on December 27, 1990. After receiving such report, respondent SMC formed an Investigating Panel to conduct a full-blown investigation of petitioner's encashment of personal checks and to determine: (1) whether the region management gave prior consent to the transactions; (2) whether the person or persons who accepted or encashed the personal checks were in fact authorized to do so; (3) if there is any policy, procedure and/or accommodation for the encashment of personal checks and the extent/amount and frequency of such; and (4) the loss or damage accruing to respondent, if any. When the petitioner returned from her vacation leave, on or February 15, 1991, she found that
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she had been transferred from her room to a cubicle on the 19th Floor of the same building. There, spent each day doing nothing for no assignment was given to her. Subsequently, petitioner received two inter-office memoranda informing her of the commencement of an administrative investigation pertaining to her encashment of her personal checks and that she was relieved of her present assignment/position until the conclusion of the investigation.9 At the first investigative hearing on February 27, 1991, petitioner appeared but requested a postponement of five days to enable her to submit a supplemental letter to the Investigating Panel. On March 15, 1991, petitioner called the Investigating Panel by phone, expressing her doubts on its impartiality. Despite notice, she refused to attend subsequent hearings. The Investigating Panel considered her refusal as a waiver of her right to be heard and thus continued the investigation in her absence. On March 21, 1991, the Investigating Panel found her to have violated the policy reiterated in the Cash Management Department Memo dated September 6, 1989, the alleged practice permitting Payroll 2 personnel to encash their personal checks. In addition to this, the panel thought that what Santos did consitutes estafa. In lieu of the foregoing arguments, they recommend the termination of employment of the petitioner. In a memorandum dated April 5, 1991, respondent adopted the findings of the Investigating Panel and informed petitioner of her termination from employment for abuse of position as Finance Director. Five days before the end of the administrative investigation, or on March 15, 1991, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for constructive dismissal against respondent SMC and Ernesto S. Escalante, Chairman of the Investigating Panel. The complaint was later amended to illegal dismissal. On April 24, 1996, Labor Arbiter Dominador M. Cruz rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On June 30, 1999, the NLRC promulgated a decision reversing that of the Labor Arbiter. On July 4, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision annulling and setting aside that of the NLRC. ISSUE: 6.) Whether the respondent SMC dismissed the petitioner from employment without just cause and violated her right to due process. HELD: No. Under the Labor Code, a valid dismissal from employment requires that: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282(c) of the same Code provides that "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer. This ground should be duly established. Substantial evidence is sufficient as long as such loss of confidence is well-founded or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and her act rendered her unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of her position. As Finance Director, she is in charge of the custody, handling, care and protection of respondent's funds. The encashment of her personal checks and her private use of such funds, albeit for short periods of time, are contrary to the fiduciary nature of her duties. Prolonged practice of encashing personal checks among respondent's payroll personnel does not excuse or justify petitioner's misdeeds.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 CATHEDRAL SCHOOL OF TECHNOLOGY VS NLRC GR No: L-101438 Date: Petitioner: Cathedral School of Technology and Sr. Apolinaria Tambien, RVM Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Teresita Vallejera Ponente: Regalado, J.
FACTS: Sometime in February, 1981, private respondent Teresita Vallejera sought admission as an aspirant to the Congregation of the Religious of Virgin Mary (RVM), upon the recommendation of Archbishop Patrick Cronin. In order to observe the life of a religious, she came to live with the sisters of the congregation and received free board and lodging at the house of the nuns. During the period of her aspirancy and in return for her accommodations, she volunteered to assist as a library aide in the library section of the Cathedral School of Technology, an educational institution run by the RVM sisters. In return for her work as such, she was given a monthly allowance of P200.00. After spending years with the congregation, Vallejera had a change of heart and confessed to the sisters that she was no longer interested in becoming a nun. She pleaded, however, to be allowed to continue living with the sisters for she had no other place to stay in, to which request the sisters acceded and, in exchange therefor, she voluntarily continued to assist in the school library. On January 29, 1988, private respondent formally applied for and was appointed to the position of library aide with a monthly salary of P1,171.00. It was at around this time, however, that trouble developed. The sisters began receiving complaints' from students and employees about private respondent's difficult personality and sour disposition at work which even triggered the resignation of the chief librarian Heraclea Nebria. To clarify the differences, she was summoned to the Office of the Directress by herein petitioner Sister Apolinaria Tambien, RVM. Vallejera was also informed of the complainaints received by the directress about her. Private respondent resented the observations about her actuations and was completely unreceptive to the advice given by her superior. She reacted violently to petitioner's remarks and angrily offered to resign, repeatedly saying, "OK, I will resign. I will resign." Thereafter, without waiting to be dismissed from the meeting, she stormed out of the office in discourteous disregard and callous defiance of authority. On separate occasions thereafter, petitioners sent at least three persons to talk to and convince private respondent to settle her differences with the former. Private respondent, however, remained adamant in her refusal to submit to authority. On June 15, 1989, Sister Apolinaria sent a letter formally informing private respondent that she had a month from said date or until July 15, 1989 to look for another job as the school had decided to accept her resignation. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal deduction and underpayment of salary, overtime pay and service incentive pay. On July 19, 1989, she was prevented from entering the school premises by one Sister Virginia Villamino in view of her dismissal from the service as per the aforestated letter of June 15, 1989. Consequently, private respondent amended her complaint to include illegal dismissal. Conversely, private respondent contends that on February 11, 1981, she was hired as a library aide by petitioner school with a monthly salary of P200.00 but was provided with free board and lodging. Her salary was gradually increased so that by 1986, she was already receiving P1,171.00 per month and
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by June, 1988, her monthly salary was P1,386.00. Inexplicably, this was reduced to P1,227.00 in July, 1988, which amount she continued to receive until May 31, 1989, when it was raised to P2,316.00. However. private respondent alleges that on June 2, 1989, she was forced by petitioner school directress to tender her resignation but she refused. She was informed that her services would be terminated effective July 15, 1989 through the letter dated June 15, 1989. Private respondent nonetheless insists that she continued to report for work, but on July 17, 1989 and thereafter she could not find her daily time record, so she just requested a fellow employee to sign a piece of paper to show that she reported for work. On July 19, 1989 she was barred from entering the school due to the fact that she had already been dismissed. She requested that she be furnished a copy of the termination paper but she was told that the letter of June 15, 1989 served that purpose. Hence, her complaint for illegal dismissal. On May 21, 1990, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, holding that she was illegally dismissed for lack of due process, in that she was summarily dismissed without a hearing being conducted in order to afford her an opportunity to present her side. The complementary adjudication was to the effect that private respondent was not entitled to reinstatement with backwages, but the payment of separation pay was ordered as an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's decision. ISSUE: HELD: The repondent was LEGALLY dismissed. An evaluative review of the records of this case nonetheless supports a finding of a just cause for termination. The reason for which private respondent's services were terminated, namely, her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing with the people she closely works with in the course of her employment, is analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated under the Labor Code in Art.282: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual breach by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. This being so, there can be no award for backwages, for it must be pointed out that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where private respondent's dismissal is for just cause, as is the case herein, there is no factual or legal basis to order payment of backwages; otherwise, private respondent would be unjustify enriching herself at the expense of petitioners. Where the employee's dismissal was for a just cause, it would be neither fair nor just to allow the employee to recover something he has not earned or could not have earned. Neither can there be an award for separation pay. Whether the respondent is illegally dismissed.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 DANILO LEONARDO VS NLRC AND FUERTE VS AQUINO GR No: 125303 Date: June 16, 2000 Petitioner: Danilo Leonardo Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Reynaldos Marketing Corporation, et. al Ponente: de Leon, Jr., J. GR No: 126937 Date: June 16, 2000 Petitioner: Aurelio Fuerte and Danilo Leonardo Respondent: Raul T. Aquino, Victoriano R. Calaycay and Rogelio I. Ralaya, as Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division and Reynaldo's Marketing and/or Reynaldo Padua Ponente: de Leon., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Aurelio Fuerte was originally employed by private respondent REYNALDO'S MARKETING CORPORATION on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day. When he was appointed supervisor in 1988, his compensation was increased to P122.00 a day, augmented by a weekly supervisor's allowance of P600.00. On the other hand, DANILO LEONARDO was hired by private respondent on March 4, 1988 as an auto-aircon mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was increased to P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. From such time until he was allegedly terminated, he claims to have also received a monthly allowance equal to P2,500.00 as his share in the profits of the auto-aircon division. FUERTE alleges that on January 3, 1992, he was instructed to report at private respondent's main office where he was informed by the company's personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance would be withdrawn. For a short time, Fuerte reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination. On his part, Leonardo alleges that on April 22, 1991, private respondent was approached by the same personnel manager who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed a complaint for illegal termination. The case was heard by Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. On December 15, 1994, Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon, to whom the case was subsequently assigned, rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. To reinstate complainant Aurelio Fuerte, to the position he was holding before the demotion, and to reinstate likewise complainant Danilo Leonardo to his former position or in lieu thereof, they be reinstated through payroll reinstatement without any of them losing their seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowance and to their other benefits. On appeal, the respondent Commission modified the decision ordering the reinstatement of Fuerte but without any monetary claims and finding the complaint of Danilo Leonardo lack or merit, hence, dismissed.
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ISSUE: HELD: In Fuerte's case, private respondent claims that the latter was demoted pursuant to a company policy intended to foster competition among its employees. Under this scheme, private respondent's employees are required to comply with a monthly sales quota. Should a supervisor such as Fuerte fail to meet his quota for a certain number of consecutive months, he will be demoted, whereupon his supervisor's allowance will be withdrawn and be given to the individual who takes his place. When the employee concerned succeeds in meeting the quota again, he is re-appointed supervisor and his allowance is restored. Insofar as the action taken against Fuerte is concerned, private respondent's justification is wellillustrated in the record. He was unable to meet his quota for five months in 1991, from July to November of that year. Yet he insists that it could not possibly be so. He argues that he must have met his quota considering that he received his supervisor's allowance for the period aforesaid. Fuerte nonetheless decries his transfer as being violative of his security of tenure, the clear implication being that he was constructively dismissed. We have held that an employer acts well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay. The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith, and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal. Yet here, the transfer was undertaken beyond the parameters as aforesaid. The instinctive conclusion would be that his transfer is actually a constructive dismissal, but oddly, private respondent never denies that it was really demoting Fuerte for cause. It should be borne in mind, however, that the right to demote an employee also falls within the category of management prerogatives. This arrangement appears to us to be an allowable exercise of company rights. An employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in fact, non-compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than demotion. In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest. Neither can we say that Fuerte's actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. We have accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment. Hence, given that Fuerte may not be deemed to have abandoned his job, and neither was he constructively dismissed by private respondent, the Commission did not err in ordering his reinstatement but without backwages. In a case where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss. Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed.
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With regard to Leonardo, private respondent likewise insists that it never severed the former's employment. On the contrary, the company claims that it was Leonardo who abandoned his post following an investigation wherein he was asked to explain an incident of alleged "sideline" work which occurred on April 22, 1991. It would appear that late in the evening of the day in question, the driver of a red Corolla arrived at the shop looking for Leonardo. The driver said that, as prearranged, he was to pick up Leonardo who would perform a private service on the vehicle. When reports of the "sideline" work reached management, it confronted Leonardo and asked for an explanation. According to private respondent, Leonardo gave contradictory excuses, eventually claiming that the unauthorized service was for an aunt. When pressed to present his aunt, it was then that Leonardo stopped reporting for work, filing his complaint for illegal dismissal some ten months after his alleged termination. It must be stressed that while Leonardo alleges that he was illegally dismissed from his employment by the respondents, surprisingly, he never stated any reason why the respondents would want to ease him out from his job. Moreover, why did it take him ten (10) long months to file his case if indeed he was aggrieved by respondents. All the above facts clearly point that the filing of his case is a mere afterthought on the part of complainant Leonardo. Leonardo protests that he was never accorded due process. As testified to by Merlin P. Orallo, the personnel manager, he was given a memorandum asking him to explain the incident in question, but he refused to receive it. In an analogous instance, we held that an employee's refusal to sign the minutes of an investigation cannot negate the fact that he was accorded due process. We find no reason to disturb the Commission's ruling that Leonardo had abandoned his position.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 GREENHILLS PRODUCTS, INC. VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GR No: 123950 Date: February 27, 1998 Petitioner: Greenhills Products, Inc. and/or Jessie Yu Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission And Buenaventura F. Abajo Ponente: ROMERO, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Buenaventura F. Abajo was employed by petitioner Greenhills Products Inc. (GPI), a company engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan furnitures, as a laborer assigned at its Bending Department. Sometime in June 1988, he was allegedly offered by one Ruben Godornes, petitioner's Assistant Production/Preparation Manager, to be the president of a union which the company intended to organize which the former, however, refused. At the time, the existing collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and the then bargaining agent Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa was about to expire. During the 60-day freedom period from August 14 to October 14, 1988, respondent actively campaigned for the recognition of the Association of Labor Union (ALU) of which he was the local president. On September 3, 1988, respondent was summoned to appear before company owner and manager Jessie Yu's office to explain his unyielding stand to their offer. When respondent argued that the proposed union could not guarantee his members their security of tenure, Yu was infuriated and thereupon directed the latter to withdraw his membership with ALU which order was, however, disobeyed. In view of his unrelenting refusal, his services were terminated. He was made to sign a memorandum dated September 3, 1988, effecting his immediate severance therefrom, on grounds that his honesty, sincerity and loyalty to the company has become suspect. Petitioner, on the other hand, recounted that respondent was initially assigned at its Bending Department. Claiming that his performance was lackluster and that he has become a problem employee in view of his tardiness, he was transferred to the Parts Preparation Department where he allegedly continue to perform inefficiently. As penalty therefore, he was assigned as a stockman. On June 30, 1988, Godornes conducted an inventory of company properties and he reported that several furniture parts and samples entrusted to respondent were found missing. When confronted with the missing properties, the latter allegedly promised to produce them but later on allegedly refused to comment on the loss. Thus, for loss of trust and confidence, respondent was therefore dismissed from employment. In a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner, the labor arbiter rendered a decision dated December 7, 1993, in favor of Greenhills Products, Inc. The judgment was, however, reversed on appeal by the NLRC in its decision dated October 24, 1995,
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ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was justly dismissed because of the alleged loss of trust and confidence.
HELD: In the instant case, petitioner failed, not only to show cause for the alleged loss of confidence, but disregarded procedural and substantive due process as well. First, In the case at bar, respondent was not furnished with either of the two written notices required by law. There was no counsel to assist the respondent nor an actual hearing for him to defend himself. Second, guidelines for the doctrine of loss of confidence to apply are: (1) loss of confidence should not be simulated; (2) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified; (3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and (4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. The lost or missing furniture parts and samples have not been sufficiently established by evidence on record. Assuming in the remote possibility that some furniture parts were really lost or missing, there is no evidence on record to establish or pinpoint that the complainant was responsible for the said losses, except the general allegation of the respondent that the furniture parts stored in the stockroom are entrusted to the complainant. Also, this could be a part of the plan of the petitioner to cover up the respondent's termination on the account of his union activities. Again, the requirement that the dismissal of an employee due to loss of trust and confidence must be based on reasonable basis and supported by substantial evidence has not been met in the instant case. looked askance at ALU as a "troublemaker." When respondent opted to stay with ALU, petitioner dismissed him on trumped-up charges.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 HACIENDA DAPDAP VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GR No. 120556 Date: January 26, 1998 Petitioner: Hda. Dapdap I And/Or Lumbia Agricultural And Development Corporation Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission And National Federation Of Sugar Workers Food And General Trades (Nfsw-Fgt)/Pedro Barrientos Jr. Ponente: Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Sometime on March 1992 nine (9) workers of Hda. Dapdap I, a sugar farm in Victorias, Negros Occidental, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against its owner Magdalena Fermin with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in Bacolod City alleging that they had been working in the farm since 1977 but were unjustly terminated, without notice and without any valid ground, on 27 January 1992. The only reason for their dismissal was their refusal to return the 6-hectare lot given to them for cultivation under an "Amicable Settlement" dated 30 September 1986 in connection with an illegal dismissal case previously filed against the management of Hda. Dapdap I by its workers. In addition, complainants charged Magdalena Fermin with unfair labor practice for trying to bust the National Federation of Sugar Workers Food and General Trades (NFSW-FGT) Union which forged the 1986 "Amicable Settlement." On 7 September 1992 eight (8) of the original complainants withdrew from the complaint and returned to work on the ground that their misunderstanding with management was already settled. Pedro Barrientos Jr. was left as the sole complainant who amended the complaint on 30 March 1993 by impleading Lumbia Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADCOR), the real owner of Hda. Dapdap I, as co-respondent with its President Magdalena Fermin. LADCOR denied that complainant was terminated on 27 January 1992; on the contrary, it alleged that complainant voluntarily abandoned his work after 1 March 1992 to transfer to the adjacent farm of a certain Mr. Ramos. In addition, LADCOR alleged that it had a personality separate and distinct from its president, Magdalena Fermin, hence the latter could not be held personally liable for the alleged illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Merlin D. Deloria ruled in favor of complainant. LADCOR appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision in toto. ISSUE: HELD: No, the respondent did not abandoned his job, thus, he was illegally dismissed. The NLRC correctly applied the consistent ruling in labor cases that a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee like herein respondent who has been working at Hda. Dapdap I since 1977 and cultivating a substantial Whether the respondent abandoned his job and he was not illegally dismissed.
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portion of a 6-hectare lot therein for himself would just abandon his work in 1992 for no apparent reason. As quoted by the Court in Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, "To get a job is difficult; to run from it is foolhardy.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE VS NLRC GR No: 97239 Date: May 12, 1993 Petitioner: INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Nestor B. Micosa Ponente: Nocon, J.
FACTS: In 1977, International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), an international organization, hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states in a certain portion that: An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service. On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess. Later on, he was found guilty of homicide but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance. On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code. However, sometime on March 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide. On April 1990, Micosa informed the latter that he refused to resign from his job but Pascual insisted that the crome he committed involves moral turpitude which violates IRRI's Policy. Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him. Still, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990. On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal. On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the appealed decision. Issue: Whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment.
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Held: Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not a ground for dismissal. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent. Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that Micosa's service record is unblemished. Also, Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 JONERI ESCOBIN VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GR No: 118159 Date: April 15, 1998 Petitioner: Joneri Escobin, Rodolfo Rojas, Federico Laguyo, Gaspar Montejo, Rolando Caballes, Romeo Belarmino, Eliseo Codilla, Eleuterio Benitez, Elpidio Casinillo, Fernando Ablong, Prudencio Sacristan, Rodolfo Briones, Primitivo Calixto, Andres Fernando, Angel Avenido, Felix Guipitacio, Taracio Abilla, Antonio Patino, Antonio Helen, Nerio Canoy, Vicente Francisco, Teofilo Tura, Antonio Ledesma, Marcelino Hipolito, Benjamin Flores, Pablo Lascota, Wilfredo Cantay, Genaro Deliverio, Marciano Pioquinto, Federick Jimenez, Vicente Sm Lim, Luis Tubil, Angel Sumayo, Salvador Salcedo, Rigoberto Utod, Feliciano Salona, Geronimo Canete, Maximo Aquillon, Larry Turco, Sr., Porferio Garado, Perfecto Cuevas, Feliciano, Juanillo, Roberto Tucay, Sr., And Nicolas Amones, Jr. Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission, Peftok Integrated Services, Inc., Teodolfo E. Santos, And/Or Up-Ndc Basilan Plantations, Inc. Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS: The petitioners in this case are bona fide members of the Basilan Security Force Association hired by PISI in Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, to work as guards in UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc. premises, for the purpose of guarding and protecting plantation property and installations from theft, pilferage, robbery, trespass and other unlawful acts by strangers or third persons, and plantation employees, pursuant to an agreement between PISI and UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc. dated May 17, 1989. The complainants, residents of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, are heads of families, hired by PISI as security guards in and for plantation premises of UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc. While, Respondent PEFTOK Integrated Services, Inc., (PISI for short), is a duly licensed watchman and protective agency while respondent UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc. is a corporation duly organized in accordance with law, and the owner/possessor of lands principally planted to rubber, coconut, citrus, coffee, and other fruit trees in Lamitan, Province of Basilan. Respondent Teodolfo E. Santos is the general manager of PISI. In 1988, some of the complainants, namely: Gene Engracia, Andres Fernandez, Rolando C. Caballes, Larry Turco, Fernando E. Ablong, Sr. Constancio Silagan, Winifredo N. Obedencia, Federick Laguyo, Primitivo Calixto, Felix C. Guipitacio and Claudio Calixto were dismissed by PISI for insoburdination [sic] and grave misconduct, as a result of their refusal to ring the bell in the evening of May 25, 1988 while on duty in the premises of the plantation, but were later reinstated in an agreement forged between the parties at the initiative of Congressman Alvin Dans of Basilan Province. On June 1, 1990, respondent UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc. ordered the reduction of the contracted guards assigned in the plantation from seventy (70) to sixty-seven (67), in a letter addressed by Mr. Roman R. Yap to PISI. It was then repeated through a letter dated January 22, 1991 sent to Col. Raymundo C. Sobrevega, President of PISI, by Hector A. Quesada, President of UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc., PISI was advised to reduce further the guards from sixty-seven (67) to only ten, (10). Subsequently, thereafter, PISI issued Office Memorandum No. 4 dated February 6, 1991 placing the fifty-nine (59) affected guards under reserved or floating status effective February 1, 1991, subject to be posted or assigned upon notice.
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On February 12, 1991, PISI issued Office Order No. 5 amending Office Order No. 4 by deleting therefrom the names of S/G Calixto Florentino Paddit and Sergio Quimpo. Subsequently, on April 8, 1991, the guards placed on reserved or floating status were instructed by registered letter to report to PISI Head Office at Rm. 405, Sunrise Condominium, Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for posting to PISI clients within the Metro-Manila area not later than April 30, 1991. That complainants did not reply nor answer the letter sent them, prompting PISI to reinstate by way of another letter dated May 2, 1991, its order to complainants to report to PISI Head Office for posting, and to explain their failure to report as previously instructed. Still failing to receive a reply nor answer from the complainants despite receipt of said letters, PISI once more sent individual letters to complainants on May 29, 1991 ordering them to explain why no disciplinary action shall be taken against them for failing to comply with PISI's Order, at the same time, reiterating its previous Order for complainants to report to PISI Head Office for posting. Despite all these, complainants, for reasons known only to them, did not bother even sending a courtesy reply nor answer to PISI. Neither did they comply with the reiterated Order to report to their Head Office for posting. They did not also explain why they were unable to so comply with the Order.Thus, on June 28, 1991, they were dismissed on ground of insubordination or willful disobedience to lawful orders of their employer. Late in the day however, on July 1, 1991, complainants wrote PISI General Manager, Teodolfo Santos, saying they had no intention to abandon their employment, nor to defy fair, reasonable and lawful orders. In the same letter, they acknowledged receipt of all PISI's letters to them dated April 8 and May 2, 1991. After having been terminated, and during the arbitral proceedings below, complainants belatedly justified their inability to comply with PISI's Order to report to Head Office in Metro-Manila for posting, saying: they are residents of Basilan, have families of their own in Basilan, have never traveled beyond Visayas and Mindanao, not provided by PISI with fare money as they cannot, on their own, finance their travel from Basilan to Manila; that to comply with PISI's Order to report to Head Office for posting under said circumstances was absurd, to say the least. Complainants therefore, charged PISI with bad faith in issuing said Order. Petitioners filed at the Regional Arbitration Branch No. 09 in Zamboanga City a Complaint. against private respondents for illegal termination by way of constructive dismissal. After conciliation proceedings failed to settle the matter, the parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers. On February 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Rhett Julius J. Plagata rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners. On appeal, Respondent Commission reversed the labor arbiter holding that private respondent had no choice but to place petitioners and other security guards on floating status for lack of clients to which they could be immediately reassigned. The directive to report to Manila for posting was issued, because private respondent knew that it could place petitioners on reserve status for only six months. Petitioners' refusal to comply with said Order and their "wanton disregard of the order to explain their inability to . comply and obey lawful orders from their employer" constituted the "proximate cause for their dismissal." In according due process to petitioners, private respondent gave them ample time to explain why no disciplinary measures should be taken against them, but petitioners still refused to comply. Hence, private respondent was justified in dismissing petitioners.
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ISSUE: Whether the petitioners conduct amounted to clear insubordination and constituted willful disobedience, thus, justifies the dismissal of the petitioners.
HELD: It is true that petitioners failed to report to Manila and to respond to private respondent's letters, this is not the end-all and be-all of the matter. It m ust be noted that the petitioners live in Basilan, the time they were placed in a floating status means that they were not receiving their respective salaries. The respondents knew very well about the situation. Insisting the petitioners to travel all the way to Manila will cause them inconveniences since the employer will not shoulder any of their expenses. One of the fundamental duties of an employee is to obey all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the employer. Disobedience, to be a just cause for termination, must be willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. A willful or intentional disobedience of such rule, order or instruction justifies dismissal only where such rule, order or instructions is (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) connected with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. The assailed Resolution of Respondent Commission and the arguments of the solicitor general failed to prove these requisites.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 LIM VS NLRC GR No: 118434 Date: July 26, 1996 Petitioner: Sixta C. Lim Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: PEPSI, a manufacturer of concentrates to be sold to Pepsi-Cola Bottlers Co., Inc., has a workforce of only nineteen employees, the petitioner being one of them. PEPSI employed her on 15 June 1983, but she had been with the Pepsi Group since 1 January 1981 as a secretary for Pepsi Bottling Co. (Phil.), Inc. At the time of her dismissal, she held the position of Staff Accountant. As such, she assisted and worked closely with the Plant Accountant to carry out the accounting department's tasks necessary to ensure an accurate, timely, and coordinated compilation of data for each accounting transaction. As per company policy, PEPSI regularly evaluated its employees' performance. In the old assessment criteria, the petitioner got a very high grade. But on the latest assessment standard it seems to pull her assessment grade down. In response thereto, the petitioner wrote her superior, Mr. Wilbert Young, asking for a reevaluation of her performance appraisal as: (a) she was the first to be evaluated using the revised evaluation sheet; (b) the long unresolved discrepancies referred to were committed in 1989 while she was on maternity leave; (c) she did appreciate the importance of her reports, for which reason she even worked Saturdays to accomplish them; and (d) the delays were caused by the delay of the submission of data she needed to accomplish her reports. PEPSI conducted another appraisal 16 of the petitioner's performance for the period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1990. The petitioner received an overall rating of Below Target (BT). Unsatisfied, the petitioner wrote a letter on 4 March 1991 to Mr. Yasuyuki Mihara of PepsiCo, Inc., Japan. She pointed out that Mr. Young issued a memorandum asking the Plant Manger, Mr. Marianito Lucero, about her case without furnishing her a copy thereof, and that Messrs. Young and Lucero never discussed the matter with her. In response, Mr. Mihara sent her a telegram dated 22 March 1991 informing her that he understood her point and would discuss the matter with her superiors on his visit to the Philippines after his return from New York. PEPSI, however, did not wait for Mr. Mihara's visit. It asked the petitioner to voluntarily resign and offered to pay her termination benefits, but she refused. On 6 May 1991, the petitioner was verbally informed of her termination as an employee of PEPSI. On 15 May 1991, the petitioner received a Termination Letter from PEPSI's Marianito Lucero advising her of PEPSI's decision to terminate her services for "gross inefficiency effective 31 May 1991. ISSUES: Whether there is a just cause for her dismissal. Whether the respondent was not accorded with due process when the petitioner terminated her.
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HELD: The grade given to her cannot be a ground for dismissal and she was not accorded with due process. Prior to the issuance of the Termination Letter on 15 May 1991, PEPSI never called the petitioner's attention to any alleged "gross inefficiency" on her part. Likewise, she was never warned of possible disciplinary action due to any alleged "gross inefficiency." The evaluation report merely indicated her areas for improvement. Moreover, in PEPSI's brochure entitled "Managing Performance For the 34 90's," a BT rating does not merit dismissal from the service; as a matter of fact, the lower rating Significantly Below Target (SB) is not even a ground for termination of employment, but may only justify putting the employee "on probation and [telling him] that improvement is necessity." Also, PEPSI violated the petitioner's right to due process the heart of the employee's right to security of tenure which is guaranteed in full by no less than the Constitution.his right is implemented by the requirements of twin notice and hearing prescribed in Article 277 of the Labor Code, as amended, and in Sections 2 to 7, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which may be loosely considered as the proper charge; while the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The latter must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge, and ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. Non-compliance therewith is fatal as these requirements are conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 OANIA VS NLRC GR No: 97162-64 Date: June 1, 1995 Petitioner: Alfredo L. Oania, Aurelio S. Caluza and Santiago B. Biay Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and PHILEX Mining Corporation Ponente: Romero, J. FACTS: Petitioners Alfredo L. Oania, a welder, and Aurelio B. Caluza and Santiago B. Biay, miners, were employed by respondent Philex Mining Corporation in Pacdal, Tuba, Benguet. They were accused of mauling their co-worker, Felipe P. Malong, at the gasoline area within the company compound at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of May 21, 1986. Malong's injuries almost proved fatal were it not for the immediate medical attendance given him, both at the company clinic and at the Dr. Efraim Montemayor Medical Center in Baguio City. Private respondent conducted an investigation regarding the incident and arrived at the decision to terminate their employment on the ground that petitioners violated Article I, paragraph 1 of the company rules and regulations which states: Inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury on the job-site on company time or property for any reason, or attempting to inflict or inflicting bodily injury anywhere at anytime, in any dispute involving one's employment. On October 11, 1986, copies of the decision were served upon petitioners but they refused to receive them. Thereupon, Malong instituted a criminal complaint against petitioners before the provincial fiscal of Benguet. In due time, petitioners were charged with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 3681-R but later, Malong desisted from pursuing the criminal case. Armed with Malong's affidavit of desistance, petitioners sought reconsideration of their dismissal from employment, alleging that when the incident occurred, they were asleep. Because private respondent refused to take them back, petitioners filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter in Baguio City. On August 31, 1988, Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen rendered a decision holding that petitioners had been illegally dismissed from employment and directing private respondent to reinstate them to their former positions or substantially equivalent positions and to pay each of them one year's backwages. Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On 3 October 31, 1989, the NLRC rendered a decision finding that "there is prima facie evidence that the complainants injured physically a co-employee under circumstance(s) which constitute an infraction of specific company rules; and that the respondent had valid cause to terminate their employment." ISSUE: Whether alleged mauling a fellow employee within the company's premises constitutes a ground for dismissal as it violates the company's rule.
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HELD: The decision of the NLRC is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent is hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioners to their respective former positions or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and with backwages equivalent to three years computed from the time of their dismissal. Violation of a company rule prohibiting the infliction of harm or physical injury against any person under the particular circumstances provided for in the same rule may be deemed analogous to "serious misconduct" stated in Art. 282 (a) above. To repeat, however, there is no substantial evidence definitely pointing to petitioners as the perpetrators of the mauling of Malong.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 OSS SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES, INC., VS NLRC GR No: 112752 Date: February 9, 2000 Petitioner: OSS Security & Allied Services, Inc., Juan Miguel M. Vasquez and Ma. Victoria M. Vasquez Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Eden Legaspi Ponente: de Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS: Private respondent worked as a lady security guard of OSS Security Agency from June 16, 1986. On January 17, 1986 petitioner of acquired the assets and properties of OSS Security Agency and absorbed some of its personnel, including private respondent. As a lady security guard she was assigned to render security services to the different clients of petitioner.She was last assigned at the Vicente Madrigal Condominium II located in Ayala Avenue, Makati. In a memorandum dated July 30, 1991 addressed to petitioner's company President, retired General Honesta Isleta, the Building Administrator of VM Condominium II, Licerio E. Baguyong, complained of the laxity of the guards in enforcing security measures and requested for the reorganization of the men and women assigned to the building to instill more discipline and proper decorum by changing, if need be, some of the personnel, replacing, if possible, on a temporary basis, the women complement, to find out if it would improve the service. In compliance, petitioner issued an order on August 1, 1991 relieving private respondent and another lady security guard, Digna Suelan, of their assignment at VM Condominium II effective August 2, 1991 for reassignment to other units or detachments where vacancy exists. On August 3, 1991, petitioner issued an order which detailed private respondent to the Minami International Corporation in Taytay, Rizal from August 3 to September 2, 1991 to replace lady security guard Susan Tan who filed her vacation leave for August 1991. However, it appears that private respondent did not report for duty at her new assignment. On August 6, 1991 private respondent filed her complaint for under payment and constructive dismissal. On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo rendered his decision upholding private respondent's position and declared that private respondent's transfer was not sanctioned by law, hence illegal and tantamount to unjust dismissal. Private respondent then appealed the decision to the NLRC but it only affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether the transfer of assignment of private respondent Eden Legaspi as effected by petitioner OSS Security & Allied Services, Inc. was illegal tantamount to unjust dismissal.
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HELD: No, the transfer of assignment of private respondent Eden Legaspi as effected by petitioner OSS Security & Allied Services, Inc. was not illegal. Service-oriented enterprises, such as petitioner's business of providing security services, generally adhere to the business adage that "the customer or client is always right". To satisfy the interests, conform to the needs, and cater to the whims and wishes of its clients, along with its zeal to gain substantial returns on its investments, employers adopt means designed towards these ends. These are called management prerogatives in which the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose, takes from. Accordingly, an employer can regulate, generally without restraint, according to its own discretion and judgment, every aspect of business. In the employment of personnel, the employer can prescribe the hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work, subject only to limitations imposed by laws. Thus, the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of management prerogatives. However, a transfer amounts to constructive dismissal when the transfer is unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges. In the case at bench, nowhere in the record does it show that that the transfer of private respondent was anything but done in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK VS NLRC GR No: 114695 Date: July 23, 1998 Petitioner: Premiere Development Bank, Procopio C. Reyes, Pacita M. Araos and Renato Dionisio Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Teodora Labanda Ponente: Martinez., J.
FACTS: On August 8, 1985, Ramon T. Ocampo, a depositor of petitioner bank, issued a check in the amount of P6,792.66 in favor of and for deposit to the account of Country Banker's Insurance Corporation (CBISCO), also a depositor of petitioner bank. On the same day, after the check and the deposit slip were presented to respondent Teodora Labanda, who was employed as teller at petitioner's Taytay Branch, they were turned over to the Branch cashier for verification of the fund balance and signature of the drawer. There was a confirmation of the check and the same was accepted by Labanda for deposit to the current account of CBISCO. The check was posted by Manuel S. Torio, the Taytay Branch bookkeeper. But instead of posting it to CSISCO's account, the same was posted to the account of Ocampo treating it as "On-Us Check," that is, drawn against the Taytay Branch where the check was deposited. On January 13, 1986, the wife of Ocampo, together with the auditor from CBISCO, went to petitioner bank and complained to petitioner Dr. Procopio C. Reyes that her husband was being held accountable for the amount. It was only then that petitioner bank discovered the misposting of the check issued by Ocampo, resulting in the overstatement of his outstanding daily balance by P6,792.66. The overstatement remained undetected until Ocampo withdrew the money from the bank. Due to this incident, petitioner Pacita M. Araos sent a demand letter to private respondent requesting her to explain in writing the misposting and erroneous crediting of the subject check in issue as well as the circumstances surrounding the incident within three (3) days from receipt thereof, and in case she fails to do so, necessary action shall be taken against her. Petitioner Renato G. Dionisio, upon instructions of petitioner Reyes, sent the internal auditors of the bank to investigate and make a detailed report about the incident. On January 22, 1986, the auditors came out with a report finding private respondent Labanda and bookkeeper Torio primarily liable for the incident, for the following reasons: a) Firstly, there was no end-of-the-day independent balancing of cash and checks between Labanda and Torio, thus the former failed to notice the over-stated cash and understated check reflected in the latter's blotter posting tape ;b) Manuel Torio did not affix his initial on Labanda's blotter to indicate the balancing between them. These findings prompted petitioner Dionisio to send a letter to private respondent Labanda requiring her to shoulder 20% of the amount lost via salary deduction. Private respondent replied, objecting to such move, reasoning out that she is the breadwinner in the family. She further asked the bank to furnish her a copy of the audit report and requested for a full-dress investigation. For this reason, petitioners held in abeyance the salary deductions.
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On March 13, 1986, respondent Labanda was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation of the incident. She was requested to report on April 4, 1986 so that she can present her side of the story. Labanda then wrote a letter to petitioner Reyes requesting information on the duration of her suspension and at the same time asking for an expeditious investigation. In response thereto, she was informed that the period of her suspension shall last until the investigation is completed and a decision is made thereon. On the date of said inquiry, Labanda executed a statement.However, she manifested before Atty. Revelo during the inquiry that she will not sign any of the preliminary statements she made unless the same is with the consent and advice of her husband. She also told the inquiring officer that she could not inform petitioners of the dates when she would be available for investigation. On April 8, 1986, another letter was sent to respondent Labanda by petitioner Reyes informing the former that her refusal to sign or authenticate preliminary statements given on April 4, 1986 was a clear indication of her unwillingness to cooperate or an effort to hide something or suppress the truth. The dates of the hearing were rescheduled by petitioners several times. The first rescheduled hearing was on April 14, 1986 where private respondent sent her lawyer bringing with him a letter asking that she be given time to confer with her counsel for which she was given until April 23. Notices were sent to inform her of the rescheduled dates with warning that failure to attend the same shall be taken as a tacit admission of her liability and the case shall be resolved based on the evidence available. In the meantime, Bookkeeper Torio admitted liability and was allowed to resign. On April 7, 1986, petitioners received a letter from private respondent through her counsel demanding payment of actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for their alleged arbitrary, illegal and oppressive acts. 12Petitioners did not heed the demand. On May 23, 1986, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the court. Petitioners' subsequent motion to dismiss was denied. When their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which however dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the complaint with the labor arbiter. The decision became final and executory on July 30, 1987. On April 4, 1988, respondent Labanda filed an illegal dismissal case. After trial, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the labor case ruling that by filing of the complaint with the Regional Trial Court, the respondent on her own, terminated her employment with the Bank. She was not dismissed by her employer. However, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ruling that private respondent's indefinite preventive suspension amounted to constructive dismissal, thus, illegal and unjust. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a complaint for damages by respondent Labanda against the petitioners amounts to abandonment. HELD: Private respondent's preventive suspension is without valid cause since she was outrightly suspended by petitioner. As of the date of her preventive suspension on March 13, 1986 until the date when the last investigation was rescheduled on April 23, 1986, more than 30 days had expired. The NLRC correctly observed that the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period amounted to constructive dismissal.
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The High Court agrees with the NLRC and the Solicitor General that respondent Labanda did not abandon her job. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. An employee who merely took steps to protest her indefinite suspension and to subsequently file an action for damages, cannot be said to have abandoned her work nor is it indicative of an intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Her failure to report for work was due to her indefinite suspension. Petitioner's allegation of abandonment is further belied by the fact that private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of said complaint. On procedural considerations, respondent NLRC held that there was a violation by petitioner bank of the due process requirements under the Labor Code when it held that we also have not seen any effort of notifying complainant about her interest in her job by sending letters at her home address. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process which are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still has to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed. Moreover, the observation of the Solicitor General must be noted that to the records of this case will show that private respondent Labanda never intended to abandon her job. First, after her indefinite suspension, she requested that the "full-dressed" investigation be done at the quickest time possible, and appealed to petitioner Reyes to consider that she was the breadwinner in the family. Second, she actively fought for her right to security of tenure by filing first with the Regional Trial Court an action for damages, and later with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Also, private respondent Labanda's inability to report for work was not voluntary but was rather the result of her indefinite suspension, which in reality was a constructive dismissal. The foregoing considerations indubitably show that private respondent Labanda did not abandon her job but was illegally dismissed from employment without due process of law.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 SULPICIO LINES, INC., VS QUINCIANO GULDE GR No: 149930 Date: February 22, 2002 Petitioner: Sulpicio Lines, Inc. Respondent: Quinciano Gulde Ponente: Kapunan, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Quinciano Gulde and one Martin Manatad were employed as truck driver and truck helper of private respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI), respectively. Petitioner Gulde has been in the employ of SLI for thirteen (13) years until his termination from the company on October 9, 1996. Sometime on September 1996, when, Gulde and Manapat picked up private respondent SLIs cargoes from Nasipit Port delivery to its warehouse in Butuan City. It appears that two (2) persons by the name of Doming and Etat boarded their truck while they were in Nasipit. Manapat knew of the same since he was riding at the back of the truck. In his affidavit, Manatad related that while they were on their way to Butuan, Domeng and Etat slashed open the cargo where the basketballs were loaded. The two (2) were able to cart away four (4) basketballs when they are alighted from the truck at the time petitioner Gulde stopped at the house of one Benedicto Cagampang, a checker of SLI at Calao Street, near the Agusan Institute of Technology (AIT), to give to him his medicines. Manapat added that he did not do anything to stop Domeng and Etat for fear for his life because they have weapons. Manapat further stated that petitioner Gulde was not aware that the two (2) persons boarded their truck. Petitioner Gulde only knew of the same when Manapat told him that Domeng and Etat stole four (4) basketballs. Manapat likewise added that they no longer reported the incident to SLI because one Boy Oco, who has a cargo in their truck and was following them, saw the incident that when Gulde stopped at Calao Street, Oco proceeded to the SLIs warehouse and reported the incident to the warehouseman. Thereafter, SLI reported the incident to the police and petitioner Gulde and Manapat were investigated. On October 1, 1996, they were further investigated by the SLIs officers and on October 9, 1996, they were dismissed for having been found guilty of connivance with the two pilferers. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner finding that respondents dismissal from employment was valid. On appeal, the NLRC initially reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its decision of April 30, 1998, the NLRC declared that respondent was illegally dismissed and ordered petitioner to reinstate him. However, when petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reversed itself as it held that respondent's dismissal was valid for loss of trust and confidence.
ISSUE: Whether there was loss of trust and confidence in the case which constitute a just cause for the termination of the employment.
HELD: The case at bar does not constitute loss of trust and confidence to the employee. The basic requisite
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for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or trust and confidence. He must be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as custody handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work -related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue to work for the employer. In this case, contrary to the allegations of petitioner, there is no sufficient evidence to show that respondent conspired with the thieves in stealing four (4) pieces of basketball from petitioners truck.
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Toledo, Mary Rose O. 2011-0081 VITARICH CORPORATION VS NLRC GR No: 121905 Date: May 20, 1999 Petitioner: Vitarich Corporation, Danilo Sarmiento and Onofre Sebastian Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission and Isagani E. Recodo Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Isagani E. Recodo was hired by VITARICH, a feeds manufacturing corporation, as an Accounting Clerk in its office in Marilao, Bulacan. In 1979, he was promoted as Accounting Supervisor, then in 1986 as Sales Superintendent while assigned in Davao City. In 1988 he became the Sales Manager for Western Visayas based in Iloilo City with a monthly salary of P18,200.00. 2 As Sales Manager Recodo was supervised successively by three (3) division heads who were his immediate supervisors, namely, Dave Fernandez (1988-1989), Ben Cruz (1990-1992), and Onofre Sebastian (15 June 1992 up to Recodo's termination). 3 He also underwent several audit examinations in his line of work. In March 1991 VITARICH conducted an audit in Iloilo in response to a letter of a certain Espinosa pointing to anomalies in the backloading and arras transactions of Recodo. The evaluation of the audit team found no concrete evidence that Recodo was receiving direct commission from the backloading of the chartered vessel but faulted him for his inadequate exercise of internal control regarding the matter, and no evidence either that Recodo had been receiving a share in the arrastre since the shipper and the arrastre operators managed by the Espinosa family denied this. However, an unaccounted difference of P14,002.50 in the backloading profits surfaced. On 25 June 1992 another audit report was submitted detailing the accommodation of Mr. Elbert Jeanjacquet as a trade client whose account was 74% past due and unsecured yet was allowed as a contract grower for two thousand (2,000) chicken heads. The accounts of twelve (12) other customers granted extensions over and beyond the credit limit were further enumerated in the report. Except for two, all these accounts did not have any collaterals to secure them. On 6 June 1992 a cash audit generated these findings: (a) cash collections were diverted to defray the area's operational and administrative expenses as the revolving fund was consumed before its replenishment in the form of countersigned checks from Cebu came; (b) personal "vales" (cash advances) were disbursed from the revolving fund in violation of company policies; and, (c) payments to suppliers were taken from the revolving fund instead of being paid in checks. But, unlike in the first two audit examinations where no action was taken by VITARICH after receipt of the corresponding reports, Recodo this time was required to explain why he allowed the reported violations of company policies. In his letter of 11 August 1992 Recodo clarified that the alleged personal "vales" were actually for business expenses and for wages of employees and that the use of collections to dafay operational and administrative expenses was unavoidable particularly when the chartered vessel was on dock unloading feeds while the replenishment of the revolving fund was delayed. He further assured VITARICH that all transactions with stevedores, shipping lines, PAL and piece workers were all on C.O.D. basis.
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Admittedly, when petitioner Onofre Sebastian took over in June 1992 as Division head he was faced with a high volume of account receivables (A/R) accumulated during the time of Ben Cruz, his predecessor. To address the problem petitioner Sebastian and respondent Recodo conferred in the middle of July 1992 with the latter being instructed to cut down the accountabilities of Rex Cordova, a company salesman in Iloilo. Thereafter Recodo advised Cordova to reduce his technical credit extensions. In less than a month, the amount of account receivables was reduced from P800,000.00 to P205,000.00. However on 27 August 1992 Recodo was asked again to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why he should not be terminated for failure to ground Rex Cordova in accordance with the 4 August 1992 memorandum of vice president Onofre Sebastian. The other grounds cited for terminating Recodo were his failure to reduce Cordova's A/R driver, the allowance of extension of his credit line, as well as the misrepresentation of his outstanding 11 A/R. The memorandum of 4 August 1992 instructed Recodo to confirm all A/R drivers who were already two (2) weeks overdue to preclude any ghost deliveries and to ground all salesmen with A/R drivers who were already thirty (30) days old so that they could only resume deliveries after accounts were collected or payment arrangements were made. In his 5 September 1992 letter Recodo explained that only the first paragraph of the faxed memorandum was readable so he had it verified. He only learned its full context when he was negotiating for the security of Cordova's past accounts. Thus, he postponed grounding Cordova until 20 August 1992 in order to bring about positive results. The negotiation reduced Cordova's A/R driver from P800,000.00 to P250,000.00 as of 19 August 1992 which amount would be further lowered to P150,000.00 by September. The alleged misrepresentation in the figures given was not deliberate but was merely a mental lapse due to tension at work. After investigation, E.T. Enriquez, Head of Personnel, submitted his report on Recodo's alleged insubordination. Enriquez found that there was "no defensible ground for terminating (Recodo's) services." Nevertheless, VITARICH terminated Recodo on 15 October 1992 for violation of the 4 August 1992 Memorandum including policies on credit extensions and cash advances. On 13 October 1992, Recodo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of managerial incentive bonus and for moral and exemplary damages. Initially the complaint was directed against VITARICH and its president Danilo Sarmiento, but on 21 January 1993 vice president Onofre Sebastian was also included as respondent. On 23 June 1993 the Labor Arbiter adjudged VITARICH and its impleaded officers guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered them to pay Recodo seven (7) months back wages from November 1992 to May 1993 in the total amount of P418,600.00 plus 10% attorney's fees of P41,860.00. A separation pay of P291,200.00 was granted Recodo because reinstatement was no longer feasible in view of the strained relations between the parties. Moral and exemplary damages were not awarded since there was no finding of a valid reason to do so. For one to be entitled to theses damages, the manner in which the dismissal was made must be deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. In this case the Labor Arbiter found no proof that petitioners acted in bad faith when they dismissed Recodo from employment. The claim for management incentive bonus was likewise denied as the grant of a bonus is a management prerogative. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that although VITARICH justified the dismissal of Recodo by the audit reports on backloading, unauthorized credit extensions and cash disbursements and insubordination the company's dismissal letter was only anchored on insubordination without any mention of the past audits as bases thereof. Consequently, for want of prior notice, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
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lack of due process attended Recodo's termination. Nonetheless, the evidence of VITARICH relative to the charges of backloading and unauthorized transactions was examined. Thus, the Labor Arbiter reached the following conclusions: Firstly, there was no concrete evidence to support the claim that Recodo was receiving commissions or profited through hidden deals in the backloading transactions; nor did the company suffer any material loss as it even profited substantially therefrom. The Labor Arbiter noted that the transactions were undertaken upon the instructions of Recodo's supervisor, Dave Fernandez, hence, officially authorized by the company. Secondly, credit extension limits, unsecured accounts and disbursements of cash collection for operational and administrative expenses were already part of the system when petitioner Onofre Sebastian took the helm as division head and instructed Recodo to solve the problems. Lastly, the Labor Arbiter significantly found that Recodo's explanation to the charges imputed to him by VITARICH was sincere and reasonable and that any breaches in company policies he might have committed were only ordinary, not willful to warrant his dismissal. On appeal by VITARICH, the NLRC while finding a lack of due process in Recodo's dismissal reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision on the following rationale: (a) had the backloading transactions been properly handled by Recodo the profits would have been greater, hence, VITARICH suffered losses by such mismanagement; (b) although the backloading transactions were authorized by the division head, the proper handling thereof was the duty of Recodo and his failure to do so was enough basis for the company's loss of confidence in him; (c) violations of company policies were not mere carelessness since they were due to mismanagement by Recodo; (d) the non-grounding of salesman Cordova might have had a sincere and reasonable explanation but the very act of defying management's specific directives constituted a strong ground for its loss of trust and confidence; and, (e) Recodo's failure to require security for accounts and his allowing them to exceed the limit were contrary to accepted business practices and company policies. All told then, the series of infractions committed by Recodo were enough bases for his termination. Thus, in its 19 September 1994 decision, the NLRC set aside the judgment of the Labor Arbiter but awarded Recodo a P2,000.00 indemnity fee because he was terminated without due process. Upon motion for reconsideration by Recodo, the NLRC issued its assailed resolution of 18 July 1995 reversing its earlier decision. It acknowledged that its previous decision was flawed by surmises on the backloading transactions, conjectures on the credit line extensions and speculations on the grounding of Cordova. The resolution applied the time-honored doctrine that the Labor Arbiter, as a trier of facts, had the superior oppotunity to test the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of the documentary evidence submitted. It further upheld the findings and recommendations of the audit teams that failed to find the accusation that Recodo violated a number of company policies. On 14 August 1995 the NLRC denied a motion for reconsideration by VITARICH. ISSUE: HELD: The very inaction by VITARICH on every audit belies its posture that it had lost its trust and confidence in Recodo as a consequence of the audit results. That it did not even notify Recodo of any charge against him after each audit nor that it asked for any explanation from him therefor, only proves Whether VITARICH illegally dismissed Recodo.
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that the imputations of alleged company violations were nothing more than mere garnishings to the more relevant charge of insubordination. The records do not even show that VITARICH deemed it necessary to penalize Recodo, not even only to warn him of any infraction. In fact, except for the alleged insubordination, it did not include any other charge against him in the termination notice. Quite obviously, since the alleged insubordination could not stand on its own merit, VITARICH had to prop it up with charges that had already been forgotten, set aside and deemed inconsequential. Being a mere afterthought to justify its earlier action of terminating Recodo, the allegations of policy violations do not constitute just causes of dismissal on account of the lack of confidence contemplated in Midas Touch Food Corporation v. NLRC under which the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence are: (a) loss of confidence which should not be simulated; (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; (c) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and, (d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. Of the charge of insubordination, there is concrete evidence on record that Recodo was instructed by his superior to ground all all salesmen with due accounts; that Recodo delayed implementing the order and eventually grounded Cordova only after being made to explain his previous inaction. Apparently, there was a lawful, reasonable order to Recodo to support his actuations. While it may be true that there was a delay by Recodo in the implementation of his superior's order as regards Cordova's accounts, the question now to be resolved is whether the delay constitutes disobedience. The High Court already ruled in this matter in the past jurisprudences, to wit . . . willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: the employees assailed conduct must be willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: Batonhbacal Vs Associated Bank G.R. No.: 72977 Date: December 21, 1988 Petitioner: Bienvenido R. Batongbacal Respondent: Associated Bank And National Labor Relations Commission Ponente: Fernan, C.J Facts: Petitioner Bienvenido Batongbacal started his banking career as a manager of the Second Rizal Development Bank. He then transferred to Citizens Bank and Trust Company and was appointed as assistant vice-president and concurrently, as acting manager of the personnel department. Subsequently, Citizens Bank merged with Association Banking Corporation and later became known as Associated Bank. In the new bank, petitioner resumed his position as assistant vice president. Years later, he found out that his salary was very much below the standard remuneration of the banks other assistant vice presidents. He asked for the board to give him the accrued salary withheld from him but to no avail. Thereafter, as part of its streamlining measures, the management required all bank officers to submit their courtesy resignations. Petitioner did not submit his courtesy resignation. As a result, he received a letter from the Bank informing him that his resignation was accepted. Petitioner made repeated demands for the reconsideration of the banks decision to terminate his employment. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages in the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC ordered petitioners reinstatement with full back wages. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the bank appealed to the NLRC which ruled in favour of the legality of petitioners dismissal. Issue: WON respondent bank legally dismissed petitioner for refusing to tender his courtesy resignation. Held: No. Petitioners dismissal was effected through a letter accepting his resignation, even if petitioner did not actually submit such letter. It is clear from private respondents pleadings that it terminated petitioner for insubordination in view of his failure to comply with the order to submit his letter of courtesy resignation. However, the Court held that insubordination may not be imputed to one who refused to allow an unlawful order. Moreover, the Court held that the record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitioner.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Signowas employed in Meralco as supervisor-leadman since Jan 1963.In 1981, hesupervised the installation of electricity in de Laras house in Antipolo. DeLaras house was not yet within the required 30 meter distance from the Meralco facility hence he is not yet within the service scope of Meralco. As a work around, Signo had it be declared that a certain sarisari store nearer the facility be declared as de Laras so as to facilitate the installation. Evertything would have been smooth thereafter but due to fault of the PowerSales Division of Meralco, de Lara was not billed for a year. Investigation was conducted and Meralco found out the irregularity in Signos work on de Laraselectricity installation. Signo was dismissed on May 18, 1983. Signo filed a case for illegal dismissal and for backwages. The Lanor Arbiter ruled that though there is a breach of trust in the actuations of Signo dismissal is aharsh penalty as Signo has been employed for more than 20 years by Meralco andhas been commended twice before for honesty. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Meralco appealed. Issue: WON there has beendue process in the dismissal of Signo. Held: The SC sustained the decision of the NLRC. Well-established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer. Reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the award of back wages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent. Manila Electric Company vs NLRC 78763 October 24, 1996 Manila Electric Company National Labor Relations Commission & Apolinario Signo Hermosisima, Jr., J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. The contract was fixed for five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Alegre protested and argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. 6 The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as anapplication for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages. Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The School is now before this Court in a last attempt at vindication. That it will get here. Issue: WON the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term. Held: On one hand, there is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or fixedperiod employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule that regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. On the other hand, the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues to recognize, the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite period, and imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a contract, whatever its object, be it specie, goods or services, except the general admonition against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Under the Civil Code, therefore, and as a general proposition, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with pre-determined dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the BRENT SCHOOL vs. ZAMORA G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 Brent School vs. Zamora Narvasa, J
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face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner M. Ramirez Industries is a single proprietorship in Tungkop, Minglanilla, Cebu. It is engaged in the manufacture of handmade rattan baskets for export abroad, principally to Japan, and has in its employ from 400 to 500 employees. On April 1, 1986, Carolyn Alfonso and 260 other employees filed a complaint with the Regional Office No. VII of the Department of Labor in Cebu City, alleging nonpayment of minimum wage, living allowances and non-compliance with other labor standard laws against M. Ramirez Industries and/or Manny Ramirez, its proprietor. Accordingly, an inspection was conducted in the company premises on the same day by Labor Standard Officer Juanito Yallosa. After verifying the allegations of the complaint, the case was docketed as LSED Case No. 028-86. Meantime it appears that private respondents stopped working on April 8, 1986. On April 11, 1986, petitioner filed an ex parte motion to dismiss the case alleging voluntary desistance by private respondents. Attached to the motion was a letter, signed by 215 employees, affirming their decision to desist from proceeding with their claim against petitioner. The motion was set for conference on May 7, 1986. Both petitioner and private respondents were notified, but only private respondents appeared. Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that they were not signatories to the letter of affirmation supporting the motion to dismiss. The Regional Director denied petitioners motion in an order dated May 22, 1986, after finding that 90 per cent of the signatures in the letter were not those of the complainants, while complainants, whose signatures appeared in the letters, had been deceived into signing the letters. Issue: WON that the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Without acting on the motion, the Regional Director on July 18, 1986 ordered petitioner to pay private respondents the total amount of P430,901.75. Held: With respect to the first ground, petitioner contends that the case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, citing in support of its contention Art. 217 of the Labor Code, which, before its amendment by R.A. No. 6715 on March 21, 1989, provided: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. Ramirez Vs. The Honorable Secretary Of Labor And Employment 89894. January 3, 1997 M. Ramirez Industries and/or Manny Ramirez The Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment Regalado, J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Private respondent expressed shock over the termination of his employment. He complained that he would not have resigned from the Sycip, Gorres & Velayo accounting firm, where he was already a senior staff auditor, had it not been for the assurance of a continuos job by MMDCs Engr. Rodillano E. Velasquez. Private respondent requested that he be reimbursed the advances he had made for the company and be paid his accrued salaries/claims. The respondents are hereby ordered to pay the petitioner the amount of P37,132.25 corresponding to the latters unpaid salaries and advances: P5,400.00 for petitioners 13th month pay; P3,340.95 as service incentive leave pay; and P5,400.00 as separation pay. The respondents are further ordered to pay the petitioner 10% of the monetary awards as attorneys fees. Alleging abuse of discretion by the Labor Arbiter, the company and its co-respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal.[8]The motion/ appeal was forthwith indorsed to the Executive Director of the NLRC in Manila. Issue: WON having held illegal the termination of employment of private respondent Melvin D. Millena, has ordered petitioner MMDC, as well as its president (herein petitioner) and the executive vice-president in their personal capacities, to pay Millena his monetary claims. Held: A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Nevertheless, being a mere fiction of law, peculiar situations or valid grounds can exist to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. As a rule, this situation might arise when a corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to carry out similar other unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law. Santos Vs Nlrc G.R. No. 101699. March 13, 1996 Benjamin A. Santos, National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T. Aurellano and Melvin D. Millena Vitug, J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: Chua-Qua Vs. Clave G.R. No.: L-49549 Date: 30 August 1990 Petitioner: Evelyn Chua-Qua Respondent: Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, In His Capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, And Tay Tung High School, Inc. Ponente: Regalado, J Facts: Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner Evelyn ChuaCua had been employed in the said school as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by Evelyn Chua-Cua. In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on 24 December 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. The teacher Evelyn Chua-Cua was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua was just sixteen (16) years old. Consent and advice to the marriage was given by Bobby Cuas mother. Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on 10 January 1976. On 4 February 1976, the school filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school." Evelyn Chua-Cua was placed under suspension without pay. Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits were submitted by the school to bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." The school raised issues on the fact that Evelyn Chua-Cua stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open. This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of Evelyn Chua-Cua, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services. Issue: WON the suspension was illegal
Held: The case reached all the way to the Supreme Court. The high court ruled that termination of employment cannot be adjudged if the grounds are not substantiated. The court said: the avowed policy of the school in rearing its students should not be capitalized on, to defeat security of tenure, especially when there is no clear proof to establish a valid cause for dismissal. The court also faulted the school for failing to show that the teacher took advantage of her position to court her student. The court also dismissed the inappropriateness of a May-December affair in school. The court said: If the two eventually fell in love despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. The court also imparted that a teacher in her thirties falling in love with a teen-ager student should not automatically be deemed immoral. But definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality,
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the court noted. The court added that The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual social pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores. In the end, while the court ruled in favor of the teacher Evelyn Chua-Cua, and found her dismissal illegal, the court also recognized the strained relations between Evelyn Chua-Cua and the school. Reinstatement of Evelyn Chua-Cua would no longer be prudent, the court said. The court awarded Evelyn Chua-Cua three (3) years backwages and separation pay.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner was employed by Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc., as assistant mechanic. Petitioner drove private respondents truckto install a panel sign and accidentally sideswiped a ten year old girl whose injuries incurred hospitalization expenses of up to Php 19, 534. 45. Such amount was not reimbursed by insurance as petitioner had no drivers license at the time of the accident; therefore private respondent shouldered the expenses. Private respondent conducted an investigation where petitioner was given the opportunity to defend himself. Petitioner was then dismissed for violating the company rules and regulation for blatant disregard of established control procedures resulting in company damages. Issue: WON petitioner was validly dismissed. Held: Yes. Although petitioner contends that he was investigated simply for the offense of driving without a valid drivers license, it was clear that he was fully aware that he was being investigated for his involvement in the vehicular accident. It was also known to him that the accident caused the victim to suffer serious injuries leading to expenses which the insurance refused to cover. Due process does not necessarily require a hearing, as long as one is given reasonable opportunity to be heard. Despite petitioners 18 years of satisfactory service and that the infraction committed by him was his first offense; petitioners dismissal is justified by the company rules and regulations. In order to constitute wilful disobedience, the employees conduct must have been willful or intentional and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertains to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Such elements are attendant in the present case. Although an employee who is dismissed for just cause is not entitled to any financial assistance, due to equity considerations as this is petitioners first offense in 18 years of service, he is to be granted separation pay by way of financial assistance of months pay every year of service. Aparente, Sr. v. NLRC 117652 April 27, 2000 Rolando Aparente, Sr. National Labor Relations Commission, And Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. De Leon, Jr.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner, an employee of Respondent Corporation, was found by respondent Estrella to have committed certain acts in breach of the trust and confidence of his employer. On January 19, 1977, complainant offered to purchase some obsolete, defective and non-usable junk materials from respondent. The respondent agreed and issued a cash invoice for the purchase of the scrap items. When complainant tried to bring out these items he was accosted by respondent's security guard and in the course of the investigation, it was discovered that the items sought to be brought out by complainant weighed more than what he actually purchased. Furthermore, it was found out that the items were not junk since some parts were brand new and usable. As a consequence the respondent filed a case for qualified theft against complainant before the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The criminal complaint was however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, petition. Issue: WON the court erred in its decision Held: The purpose of the proceedings before the fiscal is to determine if there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution and conviction of the accused. In assessing the evidence before him, the fiscal considers the basic rule that to successfully convict the accused the evidence must be beyond reasonable doubt and not merely substantial. On the other hand, to support findings and conclusion of administrative bodies only substantial evidence is required. It does not follow that once the fiscal dismisses the complaint for qualified theft, respondent officials should also have decided in favor of petitioner. For one, the evidence presented before the two bodies may not be necessarily identical. Secondly, the appreciation of the facts and evidence presented is an exercise of discretion on the part of administrative officials over which one cannot impose his conclusion on the other. As the court has already ruled, "the conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not indispensable to warrant his dismissal, and the fact that a criminal complaint against the employee has been dropped by the fiscal is not binding and conclusive upon a labor tribunal. Lacorte Vs Inciong L-52034 September 27, 1988 Salvador Lacorte Hon. Amado G. Inciong In His Capacity As Deputy Minister Of Labor; Hon. Francisco L. Estrella Fernan, J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Private respondent GOMEZ was employed as a factory worker by STARLITE sometime in March 1981. On 22 June 1984, STARLITE dismissed him on the ground that he was caught attempting to steal one ballast costing P80.00. STARLITE reported the matter to the police on 19 July 1984, after grievance meetings failed to resolve the controversy. A criminal complaint was filed against GOMEZ, but the investigating fiscal dismissed the same saying that STARLITE failed to establish a prima facie case against GOMEZ. On 13 August 1983, private respondent GOMEZ filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against STARLITE. After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision on 15 January 1985 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. GOMEZ appealed the decision to the public respondent NLRC which in a decision dated 18 February 1987 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Issue: WON decision of the NLRC was rendered in grave abuse of discretion petitioner argues that the act of dishonesty of GOMEZ led petitioner to lose its trust and confidence in him and is more than sufficient to justify his dismissal. Private respondent GOMEZ appealed the decision to public respondent NLRC which, on 18 February 1987, reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, holding that the facts on record did not support the Labor Arbiter's conclusion. Held: The Court finds petitioner's contentions unmeritorious. At the outset, the Court finds it necessary to emphasize that contrary to the tenor of the Labor Arbiter's decision, a dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges levelled against him by his employer. The Court has laid down the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving the just cause of dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. In view of the finding that GOMEZ was dismissed illegally, STARLITE is obligated to reinstate GOMEZ to his former position or one reasonably equivalent thereto without loss of seniority rights, and to pay back wages for three years, without qualification or deduction. Starlite vs NLRC 78491 March 16, 1989 Starlite Plastic Industrial Corporation National Labor Relations Commission and Edgar Gomez Cortes, J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Rodolfo Quiambao was hired as officer-in-charge of private respondent Central Cement Corporations Tuguegarao Branch on December 1, 1982. Six months later, he was made permanent Branch Manager at a monthly salary of P2,500.00 with a monthly emergency cost of living allowance of P3 50.00 and a representation allowance of P200.00. Among other things, petitioner, together with William Kho, the Branch Cashier, was in charge of credit collections. He submitted monthly reports to the Central Office on the operations of the branch and the outstanding balances of its customers. He was also required to attend regular monthly meetings in the Central Office, together with the Vice President for Marketing and the Marketing Manager. In April 1984, a financial and performance audit made by the Central Office showed the Tuguegarao Branch of which he was the Manager to be in a state of disarray and chaos. On May 25, 1984, petitioner was suspended for an indefinite period for poor performance in extending credit to customers, violation of company rules and regulations and gross negligence. He was informed that a committee would be created to investigate him and that afterward he would be informed of the managements decision. As a result of further investigation petitioner was charged with estafa before the Provincial Fiscal of Tuguegarao, while a civil case for collection was brought against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The criminal complaint was dismissed by Acting Provincial Fiscal Alejandro de Guzman. Although on appeal to the Ministry of Justice the then Deputy Minister of Justice, now Associate Justice of this Court, Reynato S. Puno reversed the provincial fiscal and ordered the filing of an information for estafa against petitioner, the case was eventually dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao because of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear. The civil suit filed by Central Cement was likewise dismissed by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati for failure of Central Cement to prove its case against petitioner Quiambao. Issue: WON NLRC committed a grave abuse of its discretion Held: This case is to be distinguished from those cases in which it was held that the acquittal of the [ employee in the criminal case was not a bar to his dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence. The rulings in those cases were based on findings that the evidence in the criminal case was not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt but otherwise adequate to support a finding that there was substantial evidence that the employee was guilty. In contrast, in the case at bar, there is entire want of evidence to justify the dismissal of the petitioner. The NLRC merely relied on the fact that the Ministry of Justice found petitioner probably guilty of estafa. In fact, the NLRC found that the charges against him had not been substantiated. Moreover there was, in this case, no investigation by the private respondent. There was only a financial and performance audit conducted. The alleged state of disarray and chaos in the Tuguegarao Branch of the company had not been shown to have been caused by petitioner. Petitioner was served with a notice of indefinite preventive suspension on the ground that he violated company rules and regulations, extended credit to customers beyond the limit and neglected his Quiambao Vs Nlrc 91935 March 4, 1996 Rodolfo Quiambao National Labor Relations Commission and Central Cement Marketing Corp Mendoza, J.
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duties. But petitioner was not informed of these charges nor given the chance to be heard. On top of this, the NLRC found no evidence substantiating the charges. Nor is there evidence that he misappropriated funds of the company or extorted money from customers, as charged. As already stated, private respondent simply relied on the outcome of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the criminal case as basis for the dismissal of petitioner on this ground. That case was eventually dismissed by the RTC of Tuguegarao for failure of prosecution witnesses to testify, as was the civil case brought in the RTC of Makati, which found that it was not petitioner Quiambao but the companys cashier, Antonio Kho, who had misappropriated the money. With the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases and without any company investigation conducted to establish petitioners culpability, private respondents claim of loss of confidence became untenable. It was grave abuse of discretion for the NRLC to uphold petitioners dismissal.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Ernesto M. Ibias (respondent) was employed by petitioner SMC on 24 December 1978 initially as a CRO operator in its Metal Closure and Lithography Plant. Respondent continuously worked therein until he advanced as Zamatic operator. He was also an active and militant member of a labor organization called Ilaw Buklod Manggagawa (IBM)-SMC Chapter. According to SMC's Policy on Employee Conduct, absences without permission or AWOPs, which are absences not covered either by a certification of the plant doctor that the employee was absent due to sickness or by a duly approved application for leave of absence filed at least six (6) days prior to the intended leave, are subject to disciplinary action characterized by progressively increasing weight. Issue: WON the court of appeals decided the cases in a way not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, and in violation of the accepted rules on evidence and usual course of judicial proceedings. Held: The Court agrees with the tribunals below that SMC was unable to prove the falsification charge against respondent. Respondent cannot be legally dismissed on the basis of the uncorroborated and selfserving testimonies of SMC's employees. SMC merely relied on the testimonies of Marabe and Siwa, who both stated that respondent admitted to them that he falsified his medical consultation card to cover up his excessive AWOPs. For his part, respondent denied having had any knowledge of said falsification, both in his testimony during the company-level investigation and in his handwritten explanation. He did not even claim that he had not requested for, nor had been granted any sick leave for the days that the falsified entries were made. Siwa, being responsible for the medical cards, should take the blame for the loss and alleged tampering thereof, and not respondent who had no control over the same. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as a basis for judgment on the legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence for that matter, substantial evidence being sufficient. In the instant case, while there may be no denying that respondent's medical card had falsified entries in it, SMC was unable to prove, by substantial evidence, that it was respondent who made the unauthorized entries. Besides, SMC's (Your) Guide on Employee Conduct punishes the act of falsification of company records or documents; it does not punish mere possession of a falsified document. SMC acted well within its rights when it dismissed respondent for his numerous absences. Respondent was afforded due process and was validly dismissed for cause. San Miguel Corp. Vs NLRC 146121-22, April 16, 2008 San Miguel Corporation and Geribern Abella National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos and Ernesto Ibias Tinga, J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Accused Enriquez promised employment in Taiwan to at least 42 people. They were each asked to pay processing fees ranging from P3, 370 to P5, 000 for which no receipts were issued and to submit documents to facilitate their travel and subsequent deployment abroad. The POEA issued a certification showing the Enriquez is not licensed to engage in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. In her defense, Enriquez claimed that it was her common-law husband who was engaged in the business and she only acted as his secretary when she dealt with the complainants. She allowed him to establish his recruitment office at her residence. Enriquez claimed that she only helped her husband in the office for three months while he was looking for a secretary. Part of her duties then was to collect the documents submitted by the applicants and receive the money they paid as placement fees. Issue: WON the accused was guilty of illegal recruitment in large-scale Held: Yes. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large-scale can be summarized as follows: Case Digest on 1- Labor Law the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined in the Labor Code; Case Digest on 2- Labor Law the accused does not have a license or authority from the Secretary of Labor to recruit and deploy workers; and Case Digest on 3- Labor Law the accused commits the same unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. The theory of the defense unduly strains the credulity of the Court. The complainants positively identified Enriquez as the one who dealt directly with them from the time they inquired about the job prospects abroad until they complied with the requirements and followed up their applications. Worth reiterating is the rule that illegal recruitment in large-scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se, and that the fact alone that a person violated the law warrants her conviction. Any claim of lack of criminal intent is unavailing. Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121621 3 May 1999 Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel National Labor Relations Commission, Quisimbing, J.
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Cyruz P. Tuppal 2011-0134 Case Title: G.R. No. Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner was an employee since April 1981 of private respondent Philippine Commercial & International Bank (PCIB) as Foreign Remittance Clerk from 1987 to January 31, 1988 in the private respondent banks Ermita branch. On January 12, 1988, Faisal Al Shahab, a Jordanian national, went to respondent banks Ermita branch to claim a foreign remittance in the amount of US$2,000.00. Shahab paid P450.00 as commission charges as computed by petitioner. Upon re-computation, the correct amount of the charges amounted to onlyP248.75. On January 25, 1988, Shahab filed a formal complaint with the branch manager of the respondent bank regarding the over-charging of commission on foreign remittances, specifically mentioning petitioner as the one who attended to his withdrawals. The branch manager decided to pursue further investigation on the matter. Issue: WON NLRC erred in ruling that petitioner was not constructively and illegally dismissed Held: Well-settled is the rule that it is the prerogative of the employer to transfer and reassign employees for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business. An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in managing his business. The law recognizes certain rights collectively called management prerogative as inherent in the management of business enterprises. One of the prerogatives of management is the right to transfer employees in their work station. This Court has consistently recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges. The Court, as a rule, will not interfere with an employers prerogative to regulate all aspects of employment which includes among others, work assignment, working methods, and place and manner of work. The rule is well-settled that labor laws discourage interference with an employers judgment in the conduct of his business. In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds, i.e., that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Where the employer fails to overcome this burden of proof, the employees demotion shall no doubt be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. Castillo vs NLRC 104319. June 17, 1999 Carolina Castillo National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine Commercial & International Bank Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION (SMCEU) - PTGWO, respondents 99266 March 2, 1999 San Miguel Corporation NLRC Second Division, and SMCEU-PTGWO Purisima, J.
GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent Ponente
: : : : :
Facts 1. In July 1990, San Miguel Corporation streamlined its operations due to financial losses and shut down some of its plants declaring 55 positions as redundant. 2. Consequently, the respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the company. 3. The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties 1990 CBA. 4. During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level of the grievance procedure. 5. In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner informed respondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed; their services would be terminated on November 2, 1990. 6. The said meeting adjourned when Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union, declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock. 7. On November 7, 1990, respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of DOLE a notice of strike on the following grounds: a) bargaining deadlock; b) union busting; c) gross violation of CBA such as non-compliance with the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide respondent with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration award. 8. Petitioner on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike but the NCMB failed to act on the motion. 9. On December 21, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint with the respondent NLRC, praying for: (1) the dismissal the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of litigation. 10. NLRC dismissed the complaint. Issue 1. Whether or not NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioner SMC based on a dispute arising from abolition of position Held Abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized management prerogatives. In the absence of proof that the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, it is presumed that petitioner San Miguel Corporation acted in good faith. In fact, petitioner acceded to the demands of the private respondent union by redeploying most of the employees involved. In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent union are nonstrikeable. The issues which may lend substance to the notice of strike filed by the private respondent union are: collective bargaining deadlock and petitioners alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. These grounds, however, appear more illusory than real.
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Collective Bargaining Deadlock is the situation between the labor and the management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate. This situation is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five representatives each from the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in CBA, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioner SMC for the dismissal of the notice of strike, issuance of a temporary restraining order, and an order compelling the respondent union to settle the dispute under the grievance machinery of their CBA. The instant petition is denied.
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Name Student No. Case Title GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent Ponente : : : : : : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 FARLE P. ALMODIEL, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS., INC., respondents 100641 June 14, 1993 Farle P. Almodiel NLRC First Division, and Raytheon Phils., Inc. Nocon, J.
Facts 1. Almodiel is a CPA who was hired in October, 1987 as Cost Accounting Manager of respondent Raytheon Philippines. 2. As Cost Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out year and physical inventory; (2) formulate and issue out hard copies of Standard Product costing and other cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3) set up the written Cost Accounting System for the whole company. 3. On August 17, 1988, he recommended and submitted a Cost Accounting/Finance Reorganization, but was disapproved by the Controller. 4. However, he was assured by the Controller that should his position or department becomes untenable or unable to deliver the needed service due to manpower constraint, he would be given a three year advance notice. 5. In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was installed and used at the Raytheon subsidiaries worldwide and was adopted and installed in the Philippine operations. 6. As a consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting Manager allegedly entailed only the submission of periodic reports 7. On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of redundancy. 8. He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the same has been conveyed to the DOLE. 9. He was constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal. 10. Judgment is rendered declaring that complainant's termination on the ground of redundancy is highly irregular and without legal and factual basis, thus ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position with full back wages without lost of seniority rights and other benefits. 11. NLRC reversed the decision and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner the total sum of P100,000.00 as separation pay/financial assistance. Issue 1. Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid and justified the termination of petitioner on the ground of redundancy in the face of clearly established finding that petitioner's termination was tainted with malice, bad faith and irregularity Held Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code. There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, one month before, of the termination of his employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate superior. The controversy lies on whether bad faith, malice and irregularity crept in the abolition of petitioner's position of Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy.
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Petitioner claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from DOLE as required by law. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect that corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting were dispersed to other units in the Finance Department. Granting that his department has to be declared redundant, he claims that he should have been the Manager of the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general accounting, payroll and encoding. The Court said that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. The characterization of an employee's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. An employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business. The functions of a position simply added to the duties of another does not affect the legitimacy of the employer's right to abolish a position when done in the normal exercise of its prerogative to adopt sound business practices in the management of its affairs. The petition is dismissed.
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Name Student No. Case Title GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent Ponente : : : : : : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 WILTSHIRE FILE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NLRC and VICENTE T. ONG, respondents 82249 February 7, 1991 Wiltshire File Co., Inc. NLRC, and Vicente T. Ong Feliciano, J.
Facts 1. Ong was the Sales Manager of Wiltshire from 16 March 1981 up to 18 June 1985. 2. On 13 June 1985, upon Ongs return from a business and pleasure trip abroad, he was informed by the president of Wiltshire that his services were being terminated upon the ground of redundancy. 3. Ong filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that his position could not possibly be redundant because nobody the company was then performing the same duties. 4. Wiltshire alleged that the termination of Ongs services was a cost-cutting measure: that in December 1984, the company had experienced an unusually low volume of orders: and that it was in fact forced to rotate its employees in order to save the company. 5. Despite the rotation of employees, Wiltshire alleged that it continued to experience financial losses and Ongs position, Sales Manager of the company, became redundant. 6. During the proceedings, Wiltshire, in a letter addressed to the Regional Director of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, notified that effective 2 January 1987, Wiltshire would close its doors permanently due to substantial business losses. 7. The Labor Arbiter declared the termination of private respondent's services illegal. Issue 1. Whether or not Ongs dismissal was justified and not illegal Held Wiltshire maintains that it had been incurring business losses beginning 1984 and that it was compelled to reduce the size of its personnel force. Petitioner also contends that redundancy as a cause for termination does not necessarily mean duplication of work but a situation where the services of an employee are in excess of what is demanded by the needs of an undertaking. The Court declared that indeed petitioner had serious financial difficulties before, during and after the termination of the services of Ong. Turning to the legality of the termination of Ongs employment, the Court finds merit in Wiltshires basic argument. It is unable to sustain NLRC's holding that private respondent's dismissal was not justified by redundancy and hence illegal. Termination of an employee's services because of retrenchment to prevent further losses or redundancy, is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides as follows: Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation
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of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year. Termination of services for any of the above described causes should be distinguished from termination of employment by reason of some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the employee, in which case the applicable provision is Article 282 of the Labor Code This is not to say that the employee may not contest the reality or good faith character of the retrenchment or redundancy asserted as grounds for termination of services. The appropriate forum for such controversy would be the Department of Labor and Employment and not an investigation or hearing to be held by the employer itself. It is precisely for this reason that an employer seeking to terminate services of an employee or employees because of closure of establishment and reduction of personnel, is legally required to give a written notice not only to the employee but also to DOLE at least one month before effectivity date of the termination. In the instant case, Ong did controvert before the appropriate labor authorities the grounds for termination of services set out in Wiltshires letter to him. The Court resolved to grant due course to the petition. The decision of NLRC is set aside and nullified.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 EDGE APPAREL, INC., petitioner, vs. NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City; Regional Arbitration Branch No. 7, Cebu City; and JOSEPHINE ANTIPUESTO, NORINA ANDO, JULIET BAGUIO, APOLINARIA VELONTA, CORAZON PINO, and JOSEPHINE CAETE, respondents 121314 February 12, 1998 Edge Apparel, Inc NLRC Fourth Division Cebu City, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 7, Cebu City, and Josephine Antipuesto, Norina Ando, Juliet Baguio, Apolinaria Velonta, Corazon Pino and Josephine Canete Vitug, J.
GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent
: : : :
Ponente
Facts 1. Pursuing its retrenchment program, Edge Apparel dismissed private respondents from employment effective 03 September 1992. 2. Feeling aggrieved, Antipuesto, et al., consulted with the Regional Director of DOLE who opined that it would be best for them to receive the separation pay being offered by the corporation. His advice was heeded. 3. The subsequent receipt of their separation pay benefits, nevertheless, did not deter Antipuesto, et al., from later going through with their complaint for illegal dismissal against the corporation. The charge averred that the retrenchment program was a mere subterfuge used by Edge Apparel to give a semblance of regularity and validity to the dismissal of the complainants. 4. Edge Apparel countered that its financial obligations, amounting to about P8 Million, had begun to eat up most of its capital outlay and resulted in unabated losses, constraining the company to adopt and implement a retrenchment program. 5. Satisfied with the legality of the retrenchment program, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of Antipuesto, et al., against Edge Apparel. 6. Antipuesto, et al., appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to NLRC. In their appeal, Antipuesto, et al., claimed that the documents submitted by Edge Apparel to demonstrate its alleged losses had been "bloated" so as to reflect financial losses. 7. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is affirmed in all other respects. The respondents are ordered to pay the complainants an additional separation pay equivalent to 1/2 month pay for every year of service. 8. Edge Apparel filed a motion for a partial reconsideration of the above decision. NLRC denied the motion and ruled that the cause of termination of the employment of the complainants was redundancy. Issue 1. Whether or not NLRC erred in holding that the dismissal of private respondents is by redundancy since it was only their line of work which was phased out by Edge Apparel Held Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what would reasonably be demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant when it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions could be the result of a number of factors, such as the over hiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the dropping of a particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. An employer has no legal obligation to keep on the payroll employees more than the number needed for the operation of the business. Retrenchment, in contrast to redundancy, is an economic ground to reduce the number of employees. In order to be justified, the termination of employment by reason of retrenchment must be due to business losses or reverses which are serious, actual and real. Retrenchment is normally resorted to
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by management during periods of business reverses and economic difficulties occasioned by such events as recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations. It is an act of the employer of reducing the work force because of losses in the operation of the enterprise, lack of work, or considerable reduction on the volume of business. The payment of separation pay would be due when a dismissal is on account of an authorized cause. The amount of separation pay depends on the ground for the termination of employment. A dismissal due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy or disease entitles the worker to a separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. When the termination of employment is due to retrenchment to prevent losses, or to closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay is only an equivalent of one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In the above instances, a fraction of at least six (6) months is considered as one (1) whole year. The Court, accordingly, must sustain the position taken by the Labor Arbiter that private respondents should only be entitled to severance compensation equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service. In this case, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both concluded that there had been a valid ground for the retrenchment of private respondents. The elements needed for the retrenchment to be valid - i.e., that the losses expected are substantial; that the expected losses are reasonably imminent such as can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and that the imminent losses sought to be forestalled are substantiated -were adequately shown in the present case. In order to validly effect retrenchment, the employer must observe two other requirements: (a) service of a prior written notice of at least one month on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment, and (b) payment of the due separation pay. The NLRC, unfortunately, went further by holding that the dismissal of private respondents could likewise be considered to have been occasioned by redundancy since it was only private respondents' line of work which was phased out by petitioner. The Court held that here the NLRC has gravely abused its discretion. The appealed decision is modified by deleting the additional award of separation pay to private respondents decreed by the NLRC.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BASILIO G. DEL ROSARIO, REYNALDO C. CRUZ, CESAR C. DEL ROSARIO, VICTOR JOVENES, ANTONIA P. RAMIREZ, ARACELI C. CUZON, LIWAYWAY G. BALTAZAR, DAISY D. REYES, FEDERICO OWERA, and RODOLFO MANALO, respondents 122075 January 28, 1998 Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. NLRC, and Basilio G. del Rosario, Reynaldo C. Cruz, Cesar C. del Rosario, Victor Jovenes, Antonia P. Ramirez, Araceli C. Cuzon, Liwayway G. Baltazar, Daisy D. Reyes, Federico Owera, and Rodolfo Manalo Davide, Jr., J.
: : : : :
Facts 1. Private respondents are all regular employees of petitioner and its executive vice-president, Emilio Suntay III, having been employed for different positions on different dates and salaries. 2. Sometime in 1992, Suntay engaged the services of an external auditor, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado & Co., to conduct an audit of the financial affairs of the bank. 3. The audit started in August 1992 and in the course of the audit, it became evident that to be conducted effectively and to avoid possible tampering with, concealment or loss of records and interference, as initial findings of auditors disclosed that some of the bank employees were guilty of irregularities, it was necessary for all the bank employees to be preventively suspended during the audit but as an act of leniency, all of them, except the employees in the Money Shop, were given the choice of either voluntarily going on leave or being preventively suspended. 4. After 30 days, private respondents reported back to the bank but they were told by respondent Suntay that the audit was not yet over and so there was a need for them to extend their leave for another 30 days and they were told that their extended leave was with pay. 5. On 29 September 1993, the final audit report was released by the external auditor, and on October 23, 1993, respondents thru their counsel offered complainants to report back to work. 6. Private respondents refused to accept petitioners offer made during the mandatory conference on 23 October 1993 to take them back to work, the parties were required to submit their position papers. 7. Acts of petitioner which acts were effected in bad faith, constitute constructive illegal dismissal 8. Private respondents were dismissed on the grounds of abandonment, serious misconduct and irregularities, violation of regulations and gross neglect of duties as far as Basilio del Rosario and Daisy Reyes are concerned, and alleged abstraction thru manipulation of bank records in the case of Rodolfo Manalo. 9. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. is found guilty of illegally dismissing the private respondents.
Issue 1. Whether or not the private respondents were constructively dismissed Held While it may be true that the private respondents had chosen to go on leave for one month, the choice was not of their complete free will because the other alternative given by the petitioner was suspension. The threat of suspension thus became the proximate cause of the leave. It was a coerced option imposed by the petitioner. That the petitioner had in fact in mind private respondents suspension was finally made evident by its refusal to take them back after the expiration of the leave.
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The petitioner extended their leave for another month with a promise to pay them salaries. After the expiration of the "extended leave, the petitioner still refused to accept them back. Thus, the private respondents were constructively dismissed from 16 October 1992. The petition is dismissed.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 MARK ROCHE INTERNATIONAL AND/OR EDUARDO DAYOT and SUSAN DAYOT, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MARK ROCHE WORKERS UNION and WILMA PATACAY, EILEEN RUFON, LILIA BRIONES, BEATRIZ MANAGAYTAY, DELIA ARELLANO, ANITA MARCELO, RIO MARIANO, MARISSA SADILI, ESTRELLA MALLARI, DELIA LAROYA, and DIVINA VILLARBA, respondents 123825 August 31, 1999 Mark Roche International and/or Eduardo Dayot, and Susan Dayot Mark Roche Workers Union, and Wilma Patacay, Eileen Rufon, Lilia Briones, Beatriz Managaytay, Delia Arellano, Anita Marcelo, Rio Mariano, Marissa Sadili, Estrella Mallari, Delia Laroya and Divina Villarba Bellosillo, J.
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Facts 1. Petitioners Eduardo Dayot and Susan Dayot were President and Vice President, respectively, of their co-petitioner Mark Roche International, a corporation engaged in the garments business. Private respondents were employed as sewers of MRI. 2. On different dates private respondents filed separate complaints for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of overtime pay against petitioners. 3. Private respondents alleged that they usually worked eleven (11) to twelve (12) hours daily, except on Mondays during which they worked eight (8) hours, and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis amounting to P450.00 to P600.00 per week. 4. They likewise asserted that sometime in 1992 they were unable to avail of their SSS benefits, as they found out, the company did not remit their contributions to the SSS. 5. On 11 October 1992 private respondents sought the assistance of a labor organization which helped them organize the Mark Roche Workers Union. 6. On 14 October 1992 they registered the union with DOLE-NCR and on the same date filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Med-Arbitration Board. 7. On 27 October 1992 petitioners received a notice of hearing of the petition. 8. Apparently irked by the idea of a union within the company, petitioners ordered private respondents to withdraw the petition and further threatened them that should they insist in the organization of a union they would be dismissed. Unfazed, private respondents refused. 9. On 29 October 1992 they were discharged from work. 10. On 30 October 1992 private respondents amended their earlier complaints to include as additional causes of action their illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, non-payment of 13th month pay, underpayment for legal holidays, and for damages. 11. Petitioners countered that private respondents were not dismissed from work but voluntarily abandoned their jobs thereby paralyzing company operations. 12. Petitioners contended that private respondents incurred numerous absences without prior notice and clearance from their superiors as evidenced by several company memos sent to them. 13. It was only later that petitioners learned that private respondents absences were due to their preoccupation with the organization of a labor union. 14. On 3 March 1993 the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision declaring as illegal the constructive dismissal of private respondents. Issue Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the Labor Arbiter by declaring private respondents as having been constructively dismissed from their jobs
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Held Abandonment, as a just and valid ground for dismissal, means the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. There must be a concurrence of both the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it can be deducted that the employee has no more intention to resume his work. These are not obtaining in the instant case. No overt act was established by petitioners from which to infer the clear intention of private respondents to desist from their employment. The company memos submitted by petitioner could not be the basis of such intention since they referred to absences incurred by private respondents long before their dismissal. On the contrary, there is ample proof showing that private respondents were dismissed from their jobs for their refusal to withdraw their petition for certification election filed before the DOLE. The dismissal of private respondents was not a constructive dismissal but an illegal dismissal, and this is where both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter erred. Constructive dismissal or a constructive discharge has been defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. In the instant case, private respondents were not demoted in rank nor their pay diminished considerably. They were simply told without prior warning or notice that there was no more work for them. Evidently it was the filing of the petition for certification election and organization of a union within the company which led petitioners to dismiss private respondents and not petitioners' allegations of absence or abandonment by private respondents. The formation of a labor union has never been a ground for valid termination, and where there is an absence of clear, valid and legal cause; the law considers the termination illegal. The Court finds that private respondents were illegally dismissed - not merely illegally constructively dismissed.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 PHILIPPINE WIRELESS INC. (Pocketbell) and/or JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GOLDWIN LUCILA, respondents 112963 July 20, 1999 Philippine Wireless Inc. (Pocketbell) and/or Jose Luis Santiago NLRC, and Goldwin Lucila Pardo, J.
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Facts 1. On January 8, 1976, petitioner hired respondent Goldwin Lucila as operator/encoder. 2. On January 7, 1979, he was promoted as Head Technical and Maintenance Department of the Engineering Department. 3. On September 11, 1987, he was promoted as Supervisor, Technical Services of the same department. 4. On October 1, 1990, he was again promoted as Superintendent, Project Management. 5. On December 28, 1990, he tendered his resignation. 6. On December 3, 1991, he filed with the Arbitration Branch, National Labor Relations Commission, a complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal. 7. He alleged that he was constructively dismissed inasmuch as his promotion from Supervisor, Technical Services to Superintendent, Project Management is demeaning, illusory and humiliating. 8. The basis of his allegation was the fact that he was not given any secretary, assistant and/or subordinates. 9. On June 29, 1992, labor arbiter rendered a decision declaring that respondent actually resigned and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 10. On June 15, 1993, public respondent NLRC reversed the findings of the labor arbiter, and ordered respondents reinstatement with back wages or separation pay. 11. On August 27, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the National Labor Relations Commission denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated November 16, 1993. Issue 1. Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed from the petitioners employment Held The Court has held that constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resorted to whe n continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. In this particular case, respondent voluntarily resigned from his employment. He was not pressured into resigning. Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Respondent considered his transfer/promotion as a demotion due to the fact that he had no support staff to assist him in his work and whom he could supervise. There is no demotion where there is no reduction in position, rank or salary as a result of such transfer. In fact, respondent Goldwin Lucila was promoted three times from the time he was hired until his resignation from work. The petition is granted.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 PHILIPPINE JAPAN ACTIVE CARBON CORPORATION and TOKUICHI SATOFUKA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OLGA S. QUIANOLA, respondents 83239 March 8, 1989 Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation and Tokuichi Satofuka NLRC, and Olga S. Quianola Grino-Aquino, J.
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Facts 1. Quianola has been employed as Assistant Secretary/Export Coordinator in petitioner corporation since January 19, 1982. 2. She was promoted on May 20, 1983 to the position of Executive Secretary to the Executive Vice President and General Manager. 3. On May 31, 1986, for no apparent reason at all and without prior notice to her, she was transferred to the Production Department as Production Secretary, swapping positions with Ester Tamayo. 4. Although the transfer did not amount to a demotion because her salary and workload remained the same, she believed otherwise so she rejected the assignment and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. 5. The Labor Arbiter found, on the basis of the evidence of both parties, that the transfer would amount to constructive dismissal hence, her refusal to obey the transfer order was justified. 6. Judgment is rendered declaring Quianola's dismissal illegal and for respondents to reinstate her to her former position. 7. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the Commission approved the Labor Arbiter's decision. 8. The employer filed a petition for review. Issue 2. Whether or not the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and of the NLRC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that the private respondent was constructively and illegally dismissed as a result of her transfer even if she would have received the same salary rank, rights and privileges Held Quianola argued that she was dismissed without due process because she was not given the opportunity to be heard concerning the causes of her transfer. A constructive discharge is defined as: "A quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." In this case, Quianola's assignment as Production Secretary of the Production Department was not unreasonable as it did not involve a demotion in rank or a change in her place of work, nor a diminution in pay, benefits, and privileges. It did not constitute a constructive dismissal. It is the employer's prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees' qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to "ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An employee's right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal. The Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the private respondent's absence from work on June 2 to June 3, 1986 constituted an abandonment of her job in the company resulting in the forfeiture of the benefits due her.
Page 509

While she was guilty of insubordination for having refused to move out of her position, dismissal from the service would be a punishment for it, as her complaint for illegal dismissal was filed in good faith. The decision of the NLRC insofar as it orders the petitioner to reinstate the private respondent is affirmed, but she shall be reinstated to her position as Production Secretary of the Production Department of petitioner's corporation without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2nd Division), LABOR ARBITER JOSE DE VERA, and EDILBERTO CASTRO, respondents 114307 July 8, 1998 Philippine Airlines, Inc. NLRC Second Division, Labor Arbiter Jose de Vera, and Edilberto Casto Romero, J.
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Facts 1. Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner. 2. On March 12, 1984, respondent, together with co-employee Arnaldo Olfindo, were apprehended by government authorities while about to board a flight en route to Hongkong in possession of P39, 850.00 and P6, 000.00 respectively, in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265, as amended by CB Circular 383. 3. When informed of the incident, PAL required respondent to explain within 24 hours why he should not be charged administratively. 4. Upon failure of the latter to submit his explanation thereto, he was placed on preventive suspension effective March 27, 1984 for grave misconduct. 5. Respondent, through PALEA, sought not only the dismissal of his case but likewise prayed for his reinstatement, to which appeal, PAL failed to make a reply thereto. 6. Three years and six months after his suspension, PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter explaining that the period within which he was out of work shall serve as his penalty for suspension. 7. Upon his reinstatement, respondent filed a claim against PAL for back wages and salary increases granted under the CBA covering the period of his suspension which the latter, however, denied on account that under the existing CBA, an employee under suspension is not entitled to the CBA salary increases granted during the period covered by his penalty. 8. Judgment is rendered limiting the suspension imposed upon the complainant to one month, and the respondent to pay complainant his salaries, benefits, and other privileges from April 26, 1984 up to September 18, 1987 and to grant complainant his salary increases accruing during the period aforesaid. Issue 1. Whether or not an employee who has been preventively suspended beyond the maximum 30-day period is entitled to back wages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension Held Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the companys property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. Sections 3 and 4, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code respectively provides that the employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his coworkers, and that no preventive suspension shall last longer than 30 days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the workers It is undisputed that the period of suspension of respondent lasted for three (3) years and six months.
Page 511

PAL, therefore, committed a serious transgression when it manifestly delayed the determination of respondents culpability in the offense charged. PAL stated lamely in its petition that due to numerous administrative cases pending at that time, the Committee inadvertently failed to submit its recommendation to management. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days, after which period, the employee must be reinstated to his former position. If the suspension is otherwise extended, the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. The provisions of the rules are explicit and direct; hence, there is no reason to further elaborate on the same. PAL faults the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC for allegedly equating preventive suspension as remedial measure with suspension as penalty for administrative offenses. A distinction between the two measures was clearly elucidated by the Court in the case of Beja Sr. v. CA. Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case. The petition is dismissed.
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Name Student No. Case Title GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent Ponente : : : : : : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NLRC and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents 82511 March 3, 1992 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation NLRC, and Imelda Salazar Romero, J.
Facts 1. In May 1982, Salazar was employed by GMCR as general systems analyst. Also employed as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom Salazar was allegedly very close. 2. Sometime in 1984, GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership with Richard Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services, a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. 3. It likewise appeared that Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. 4. Consequently, GMCR placed Salazar under preventive suspension for one month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation, Salazar filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, after GMCR notified her in writing that she was considered dismissed in view of her inability to refute and disprove these findings. 5. After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner company to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full back wages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. She was also awarded payment for moral damages. 6. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the back wages to a period of two years and deleted the award for moral damages. Issue 1. Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal Held The inestigative findings, which pointed to Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. Preventive suspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. Thus, it is not correct to conclude that GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. The fault lay with Salazar when she ignored petitioner's memorandum giving her ample opportunity to present her side to the management. Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her
Page 513

complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy. But while the Court agrees with Salazar's preventive suspension, the Court holds that her separation from employment was not for cause. There being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well to full back wages. The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of back wages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. The assailed resolution of NLRC is affirmed. GMCR is ordered to reinstate Imelda Salazar and to pay her back wages equivalent to her salary for a period of two years only.
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Name Student No. Case Title GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent Ponente : : : : : : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 KWIKWAY ENGINEERING WORKS, petitioner, vs. NLRC AND ROSALINDA VARGAS, respondents 85014 March 22, 1991 Kwikway Engineering Works NLRC and Rosalinda Vargas Medialdea, J.
Facts 1. Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of fabrication of machine parts and allied works. 2. Vargas was formerly employed by petitioner as bookkeeper and secretary of its Cubao branch. As bookkeeper, it was her duty to fill up the check vouchers and indicate therein the name of the customer agent and the amount payable to each before they are presented to the agents for signing. 3. The newly designated branch manager of petitioner's Cubao branch discovered that several blank vouchers already contained the signatures of the mechanic agents. Thus, the branch manager confronted the branch cashier in charge of the vouchers, Marina Corpus, concerning the irregularity. 4. Corpus explained that Vargas was aware of this practice. When asked for an explanation about the matter, Vargas stated that the aforesaid procedure has been the practice in that office since the time of the former branch manager who had knowledge thereof. This was however later denied by the former manager of the Cubao branch office. 5. Vargas and Corpus were placed under preventive suspension for an indefinite period of time on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. 6. Soon, Vargas went to the head office upon instruction of petitioner, where she was informed of the result of the investigation. Petitioner offered her a chance to resign with separation pay, which she accepted. 7. However, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision directing the reinstatement of respondent Vargas to her former position with back wages. 8. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to NLRC. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Issue 1. Whether or not the dismissal of respondent Vargas was for a just and valid cause Held Petitioner contends that the nature of the position of Vargas, which involves the preparation of vouchers and handling of funds involves trust and confidence. It also maintains that Vargass acts of dishonesty as well as her active participation in violating and infringing company accounting procedure which allowed the cashier to personally misappropriate sums of money provide sufficient basis for dismissing respondent. Petitioner further submits that respondent Vargas was aware that her cashier Corpus was committing acts of dishonesty and misappropriation of company funds but she did not report the matter to her superiors in the company. Petitioner argues that the actuations of respondent Vargas were in violation of the company's code of conduct, which is punishable by dismissal. The rule is settled that if there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee has been guilty of breach of trust or that his employer has ample reason to distrust him, the labor tribunal cannot justly deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such employee More so in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies termination Vargas's position involves a high degree of responsibility requiring trust and confidence. Her position carries with it the duty to observe proper company procedures in the fulfillment of her job as it relates closely to the financial interests of the company.
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Despite the knowledge of the cashier's dishonesty, as a result of her failure to fill up the vouchers properly, Vargas still continued not to comply with the company operating procedure knowing fully well that her negligence is causing an opportunity for the cashier to commit fraud upon the company. Further, there was no effort on the part of respondent Vargas to report to petitioner the anomalies that are being committed by the cashier. Although it may be true that respondent Vargas has no direct participation in the cashier's acts of dishonesty concerning the funds of the office, Vargass non-performance of her duties is sufficient to breach the trust and confidence of her employer. The Court finds that the dismissal of respondent Vargas was for a just cause. For failure of the employer to comply with the requirements of due process in terminating the employees service, however, it shall be liable to indemnify the employee payment of damages. The petition is granted.
Page 516

Name Student No. Case Title GR Number Date Petitioner Respondent Ponente : : : : : : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 IMELDA DARVIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents 125044 July 13, 1998 Imelda Darvin Court of Appeals, and People of the Philippines Romero, J.
Facts 1. Macaria Toledo met Imelda Darvin in the latter's residence in Cavite, through the introduction of their common friends, Florencio Jake Rivera and Leonila Rivera. 2. Darvin allegedly convinced Toledo that by giving her P150,000.00, the latter can immediately leave for the United States without any appearance before the U.S. embassy. 3. Toledo gave Darvin the amount of P150,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt stating that the amount of P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Air fare. 4. After receiving the money, Darvin assured Toledo that she can leave within one week. However, when after a week, there was no word from Darvin, Toledo went to her residence to inquire about any development, but could not find Darvin. 5. Toledo filed a complaint with the Bacoor Police Station against Imelda Darvin. Upon further investigation, a certification was issued by POEA stating that Darvin is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 6. Darvin was then charged for estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite. 7. Cavite RTC found Darvin guilty of the crime of simple illegal recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of estafa. 8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue 1. Whether Darvin engaged in recruitment activities, as defined under the Labor Code Held To uphold the conviction of Darvin, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities; and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so. It is not disputed that Darvin does not have a license or authority to engage in recruitment activities. It must be shown that Darvin gave Toledo the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send her abroad for work such that the latter was convinced to part with her money in order to be so employed. The Court finds no sufficient evidence to prove that Darvin offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. The claim of the accused that the P150,000.00 was for payment of Toledos air fare and US visa and other expenses cannot be ignored because the receipt for the P150,000.00 stated that it was "for Air Fare and Visa to USA." Aside from the testimony of Toledo, there is nothing to show that Darvin engaged in recruitment activities. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of Toledo that she was offered by Darvin employment abroad, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures, to convict the latter. The appeal is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. Imelda Darvin is acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant 113161 August 29, 1995 People of the Philippines Nelly D. Agustin Regalado, J.
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Facts 1. An information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in RTC Manila. 2. A warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested. The trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the 3. On accused. learning of the whereabouts of the accused, one of the offended parties, Rogelio Salado, requested for a copy of the warrant of arrest. Eventually, Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paraaque police. 4. Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. 5. Representing herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed Salado a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. He learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave. He was 6. Ramona issued the Salado, corresponding wife of receipt. Rogelio, was persuaded by Agustin to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee. 7. Dionisio Masaya applied for a job in Oman with the Clover Placement Agency at Paraaque, the agency's former office address. Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial down payment for the placement fee, and in September of that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office once in a while to follow up his application. 8. Ernesto Alvarez was offered a job by Agustin as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman. Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the 9. Only placement Agustin agency. testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors in Paraaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover 10. Denying Placement any Agency. participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution.. 11. The trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Issue 1) Whether or not Agustin committed illegal recruitment and placement
Page 518

Held Agustin is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the Labor Code provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate; or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. All the accused in this case were not authorized to engage in any recruitment activity, as evidenced by a certification issued by POEA. It is Agustins defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to the Goce spouses. Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. She indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. Being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for Agustin to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity. There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. It is undisputed that Agustin gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents L-58674-77 July 11, 1990 People of the Philippines Domingo Panis, and Serapio Abug Cruz, J.
: : : : :
Facts Four informations were filed alleging that Serapio Abug, without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, operated a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses and promising employment in Saudi Arabia to four separate individuals, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted by the trial court. Issue Whether or not private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. Held Article 13(b) of P.D. 442: Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. The view of respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit. The proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring of workers. The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) would constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
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The interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen. The orders of the trial court are set aside and the four informations against the private respondent are reinstated.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 CAROLINA CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondents 104319 June 17, 1999 Carolina Castillo NLRC, and Philippine Commercial and International Bank Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
: : : : :
Facts Petitioner was an employee since April 1981 of PCIB as Foreign Remittance Clerk from 1987 to January 31, 1988 in the private respondent banks Ermita branch. On January 12, 1988, Faisal Al Shahab, a Jordanian national, went to respondent banks Ermita branch to claim a foreign remittance in the amount of US$2,000.00. Shahab paid P450.00 as commission charges as computed by petitioner. Upon re-computation, the correct amount of the charges amounted to only P248.75. On January 13, 1988, petitioner received a Memorandum: In line with the Banks policy on flexibility employee development. Another Memorandum dated January 13, 1988 was sent to petitioner reassigning her temporarily as Remittance Clerk-Inquiry. On January 21, 1988, petitioner filed with the NCR Arbitration Branch a complaint-affidavit for illegal dismissal asking for her reinstatement as Foreign Remittance Clerk Subsequently, petitioner received allegedly under protest, a Memorandum dated January 25, 1988 which states that as Remittance Clerk-Inquiry, her specific duties and responsibilities will be confined to handling of inquiring by phone, by walk-in clients over the counter and to assist the FX Supervisor-Inquiry & Investigation in verifying inquiries of correspondent banks, agencies, other banks and branches. She was instructed further to desist from performing functions of other staff positions particularly those of the Remittance Clerk-POP/Collection Items. On January 25, 1988, Shahab filed a formal complaint with the branch manager of the respondent bank regarding the over-charging of commission on foreign remittances, specifically mentioning petitioner as the one who attended to his withdrawals. The branch manager decided to pursue further investigation on the matter. On February 2, 1988, branch manager Gilbert Marquez issued a Memorandum to petitioner requiring her to explain within seventy-two hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. Petitioner did not submit a written explanation. Respondent bank deferred further action on the matter. In the meantime, trial ensued in the case for illegal dismissal earlier filed by petitioner and, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ruling that petitioner was constructively dismissed from her employment when she was transferred to the position of Remittance Clerk-Inquiry from her position of Foreign Remittance Clerk. On appeal, NLRC set aside the labor arbiters decision. It ruled that there was no demotion because the position to which she was being reassigned belongs to the same job level as her former position and both positions have the same rate of compensation. Issue Whether or not NLRC erred in ruling that petitioner was not constructively and illegally dismissed
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Held PCIB alleged that the reassignment of petitioner could not result in demotion as both positions of Foreign Remittance Clerk for Payment Order/Collection and Foreign Remittance Clerk for Inquiry are given the same weight in terms of duties and responsibilities and there was no diminution in rank, wages and other benefits. NLRC argued that it is the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges. One of the prerogatives of management is the right to transfer employees in their work station. This Court has consistently recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges. In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds, i.e., that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Where the employer fails to overcome this burden of proof, the employees demotion shall no doubt be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. In this case, NLRC upheld PCIBs contention that the remittance clerk payment order/collection item is given the same weight in terms of duties and responsibilities as that of a remittance clerk inquiry. It was established that both positions are remittance clerks under level S-S III and that these positions are of coequal footing, co-important and of the same level of authority and that the transfer did not entail any reduction of wages and other benefits. The respondent Commission sustained the position of the respondent bank that the duties of the second position include not only receiving the complaints of clients and the scope is wider in the sense that she can get access to some other records which are not being prepared by her and which also entitle her to communicate directly with higher officers of the bank. In her position paper, Castillo claims that her transfer to the position of Remittance Clerk-Inquiry was a demotion. This lacks factual basis since the transfer did not entail any reduction of wages and other benefits. As a matter of fact, had she accepted her new position, she would have assumed a bigger responsibility, a big departure from her former position where she merely did routine processing work. Neither did Ms. Castillos transfer result in constructive dismissal since she was transferred to a position which would have required her to do much more work than before. The petition is dismissed.
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Name Student No. Case Title : : : Ventura, Gerandel S. 2011-0118 WESTIN PHILIPPINE PLAZA HOTEL, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and LEN RODRIGUEZ, respondents 121621 May 3, 1999 Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel NLRC Third Division, and Len Rodriguez Quisumbing, J.
: : : : :
Facts On December 28, 1992, Rodriguez received a memorandum from the management transferring him from doorman to linen room attendant in the Housekeeping Department effective December 29, 1992. The position of doorman is categorized as guest-contact position while linen room attendant is a nonguest contact position. The transfer was taken because of the negative feedback on the manner of providing service to hotel guests by Rodriguez. Instead of accepting his new assignment, he went on vacation leave from December 29, 1992, to January 16, 1993. The President of the National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) appealed to management concerning private respondents transfer. Merceditas Santos, petitioners director for HRD, clarified that his transfer is merely a lateral movement and that there was no demotion in rank or pay. When he reported back to work, he still did not assume his post at the linen room notwithstanding reminders from HRD and even his union. Later on, he was given a memorandum asking him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for insubordination. In his reply, he merely questioned the validity of his transfer without giving the required explanation. On February 16, 1993, petitioner terminated private respondents employment on the ground of insubordination. Rodriguez filed with the DOLE which later endorsed to the NLRC for appropriate action a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The labor arbiter declared that the dismissal was legal. On appeal, NLRC reversed the judgment of the labor arbiter. In its decision, it declared that the intended transfer was in the nature of a disciplinary action and that there was no just cause in dismissing private respondent. Issue Whether or not the transfer of Rodriguez is a valid exercise of petitioners management prerogative Held The Court has recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges. This is a privilege inherent in the employers right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. An employees right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. Petitioner is justified in reassigning private respondent to the linen room. Petitioners right to transfer is expressly recognized in the collective bargaining agreement between the hotel management and the employees union as well as in the hotel employees handbook.
Page 524

The transfer order was issued in the exercise of petitioners management prerogative in view of the several negative reports vis--vis the performance of private respondent as doorman. It was a lateral movement as the positions of doorman and linen room attendant are equivalent in rank and compensation. On the issue of dismissal, under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, an employer may terminate an employment for serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. Disobedience to be a just cause for dismissal requires the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: (a) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and, (b) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge. In the present case, the willfulness of private respondents insubordination was shown by his continued refusal to report to his new work assignment. H was repeatedly reminded not only by management but also by his union to report to his work station but to no avail. His continued refusal to follow a legal order brought on the fit consequence of dismissal from his position for which management could not be justly faulted. The petition is granted.
Page 525

Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: AG & P United Rank and File Association vs. NLRC G.R. No. 108259 November 29, 1996 AG&P United Rank and File Association (AG&P Urfa) Reynaldo V. Reyes, Marcelino Adlit, Quintin Ong III, Teofilo C. Ramos, Felimon R. Valiente, Ma. Magdalena Magalong, Toribio B. de Leon, Severo C. Balbastro, Julio F. Montano, Conrado D. Mangaran, Jesus M. Canonigo, Sarah S. dela Pena, Anita A. Caintic, Asuncion L. Cordero, Jaime B. Sandoval, Oscar O. Gomez, Bonifacio A. Espiritu, Jesus E. Amarante, Ricardo M. Landayan, Faustino C. San Esteban, Francisco M. Manalo, Roland C. Tupalar, Ireneo T. Andan, Maria G. Guevarra, Erlina B. Sanchez, Saturnino C. Quinto, Deogenes F. Senorin, Oscar P. Palattao, Augusto A. Rius, Annie J. Napicol, Cecilia D. Fornaliza, Ananias S. Cahilig, Constancio R. Pelias, Juanito A. Pimentel, Rolando L. Holgado, Ramon M. Permicillo National Labor Relations Commission (First Division) and Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. J. Mendoza
Petitioners are officers and members of the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. They declared a strike on September 22, 1987 due to a deadlock in the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, the president of the respondent company announced the adoption of the company of several cost-cutting measures to forestall impending financial losses. Among these measures was so called redundancy program, which was implemented on March 1, 1988. The program resulted in the layoff of around 177 employees, some of whom were officers and members of the petitioner union. The affected employees were given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, for which they signed documents of waiver. However, on March 14, 1988, petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. After trial, Labor Arbiter Mendoza found the complaint to be without merit and accordingly dismissed it. He found the redundancy program necessary for the companys existence and considered private respondents practice of rehiring or reemploying dismissed employees under the said program as managerial prerogative. On appeal, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling. It found that the company did not incur losses but instead made substantial profits from 1983 to 1986. Consequently, it held private respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal of petitioners and ordered the company to reinstate the individual petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full back wages, plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorneys fees. On the other hand, on May 29, 1992, the First Division, to which the case was reassigned after the reorganization of the NLRC under R.A. No. 6715, reconsidered the decision of the Third Division and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed by the respondent company and the action by the latter constitutes unfair labor practice
Page 526

Held: No. Article 283 of the Labor Code mentioned retrenchment and redundancy as just causes for the closing of establishments or reduction of personnel. Redundancy exists when the services of an employee are in excess of what is required by an enterprise. Retrenchment on the other hand, is one of the economic grounds for dismissing employees and is resorted to primarily to avoid or minimize business losses. Private respondents redundancy program, while denominated as such, is more precisely termed retrenchment because it is primarily intended to prevent serious business losses. Thus, the Labor Code recognizes retrenchment as one of the authorized causes for terminating the employer-employee relationship and the decision to retrench or not to retrench is a management prerogative. In the case at bar, the company losses were duly established by the financial statements presented by both parties. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the redundancy program was actually a union-busting scheme of management, aimed at removing union officers who had declared a strike. The Court mentioned that this contention cannot stand in the face of evidence of substantial losses suffered by the company. Moreover, while it is true that the company rehired or reemployed some of the dismissed workers, it has been shown that such action was made only as company projects became available and that this was done in pursuance of the companys policy of giving preference to its former workers in the hiring of project employees. The rehiring or reemployment does not negate the imminence of losses, which prompted private respondent to retrench. Hence, there is substantial evidence supporting the decision of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to dismiss the case.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was hired as Cost Accounting Manager of Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable placement firm, John Clements Consultants, Inc. He started as a probationary or temporary employee and was subsequently given regularization. On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence of IRD Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the same has been conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he was constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region, NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment. On September 27, 1989, Labor Arbiter Daisy Cauton-Barcelona rendered a decision declaring that complainant's termination on the ground of redundancy is highly irregular and without legal and factual basis, thus ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position with full backwages without lost of seniority rights and other benefits. However, on March 21, 1991, the NLRC reversed the decision and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner the total sum of P100,000.00 as separation pay/financial assistance. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners termination from employment was just and valid Held: Yes. The respondent company was upheld in terminating the petitioners employment as it properly observed the requisites provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code. The petitioner was duly advised, one (1) month before, of the termination of his employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice and was issued a check for P54,863.00 representing separation pay. The Department of Labor and Employment was also served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and the implementing rules. Petitioner claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, which according to him was done in bad faith for he is more qualified than the one who succeed on his position. However, the Court repeatedly held that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. The characterization of an employee's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown. Thus, the fact that the functions of a position were simply added to the duties of another does not affect the legitimacy of the employer's right to abolish a position when done in the normal exercise of its prerogative to adopt sound business practices in the management of its affairs. ALMODIEL VS. NLRC G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993 Farle P. Almodiel National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), Raytheon Phils., Inc., J. Padilla
Page 528

Furthermore, the petitioner herein held a position which was definitely managerial in character; Raytheon had a broad latitude of discretion in abolishing his position. An employer has a much wider discretion in terminating employment relationship of managerial personnel compared to rank and file employees. The reason obviously is that officers in such key positions perform not only functions which by nature require the employer's full trust and confidence but also functions that spell the success or failure of an enterprise. It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the qualification and fitness of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. Hence, the termination of petitioner's employment was anchored on a valid and authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: ASIAN ALCOHOL CORP VS. NLRC G.R. No. 131108 March 25, 1999 Asian Alcohol Corporation National Labor Relations Commission, and Ernesto A. Carias, Roberto C. Martinez, Rafael H. Sendon, Carlos A. Amacio, Leandro O. Verayo and Ereneo S. Tormo, J. Puno
Ponente: Facts:
The Parsons family, who originally owned the controlling stocks in Asian Alcohol, sell their majority rights to Prior Holdings, Inc., because of mounting business losses. The Prior Holdings Inc. subsequently took over its management and operation the next month. Prior Holdings implemented a reorganizational plan and other cost-saving measures to prevent further losses. One hundred seventeen (117) employees out of a total workforce of three hundred sixty (360) were separated. Seventy two of them occupied redundant positions that were abolished due to redundancy, and of these positions, twenty one were held by union members, which the respondents are members, and fifty one by non-union members. In October, 1992, the respondents received their individual notices of termination effective November 30, 1992. They were paid the equivalent of one month salary for every year of service as separation pay, the money value of their unused sick, vacation, emergency and seniority leave credits, thirteenth (13 th) month pay for the year 1992, medicine allowance, tax refunds, and goodwill cash bonuses for those with at least ten (10) years of service. All of them executed sworn releases, waivers and quitclaims. They also all signed sworn statements of conformity to the company retrenchment program except for Verayo and Tormo. And they all tendered letters of resignation except for Martinez. However, on December 18, 1992, private respondents filed with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch VI, Bacolod City, complaints for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement with backwages, moral damages and attorneys fees. They alleged that Asian Alcohol used the retrenchment program as a subterfuge for the union busting. They claimed that they were singled out for separation by reason for their active participation in the union. They also asseverated that Asian Alcohol was not bankrupt as it has engaged in an aggressive scheme of contractual hiring. Acting on the complaints, the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints on the ground that the petitioner has incurred substantial losses prior to the implementation of its retrenchment program as supported by the documents presented and the pretense is untenable for the retrenchment includes the termination of service of members and non-union members. On the other hand, the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the petitioner to reinstate the respondents on the ground that retrenchment and/or redundancy has not been clearly proven for the positions formerly held by the respondents are now being occupied by casuals.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondents were illegally dismissed Held: No. The right of management to dismiss workers during periods of business recession and to install labor saving devices to prevent losses is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Article 283, retrenchment and redundancy are just causes for the employer to terminate the services of workers to preserve the viability of the business. In exercising its right, however, management must faithfully comply with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down law and jurisprudence.
Page 530

In the case at bar, private respondents never contested the veracity of the audited financial documents proffered by Asian Alcohol before the Executive Labor Arbiter. Neither did they object to their admissibility. The Court find that the reorganizational plan and comprehensive cost-saving program to turn the business around were not designed to bust the union of the private respondents. Retrenched were one hundred seventeen (117) employees. Seventy two (72) of them including private respondents were separated because their positions had become redundant. Redundancy exists when the service capability of the work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands on the enterprise. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing out of a service activity priorly undertaken by the business. For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites: Written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment Payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; Good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; Fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. In the case at bar, private respondents failed to proffer any proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner. Absent such proof, the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect more economic and efficient methods of production. Hence, the petition is granted. The decision made by the NLRC are annulled and set aside, thus, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is ordered reinstated.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner is an export-oriented corporation which is engaged in the manufacture of artificial flowers, for which it employs 400 employees. Due to losses it was suffering, petitioner contemplated on the possible retrenchment of employees. It submitted queries to the MOLE Office in La Union, and the latter replied that it was the company's prerogative to do so. Petitioner informed the MOLE Office that the Vinyl Section would be phased out due to shortage of orders and stiff competition. Petitioner also filed with the MOLE, a retrenchment program, for the phase-out of different sections of the company consisting of 130 employees (four were union officers and more than a majority were union-members). On September 1, 1986, private respondent union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner, consisting of dismissal of union members, discrimination and coercion of employees. The following day private respondent union staged a strike. The strikers formed stationary pickets, barricading all gates and entrances, preventing ingress and egress to the company premises. On September 4, 1986, petitioner filed a petition with the MOLE for the latter to assume jurisdiction over the strike. It grounded its petition on then Article 264 paragraph 9 of the Labor Code, which covers labor disputes affecting the national interest. The MOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directed the workers to return to work, while petitioner was on the other hand directed to accept the returning workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the work stoppage. At the same time, management was told to hold in abeyance its intended retrenchment measures. It created a committee composed of representatives from the MOLE and submitted a recommendation of a departmental-wide retrenchment based on the "first in, last out policy" be adopted. It authorized the petitioner to implement its retrenchment program only with respect to the Vinyl Department effective December 31, 1986. It further ordered petitioner to award a separation pay to workers adversely affected by the retrenchment program "equivalent to 1 month pay for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered one whole year". Private respondents went on strike anew, barricading and blocking all gates and entrances to and from the company's premises. As a consequence of the two strikes, petitioner entered into an Agreement with private respondent which they agreed to get back all retrenched employees of the Vinyl Department, provided they reported back to work on January 12, 1987. All returning retrenched employees were, before reporting for work, to return the separation pay received by them from the company. If an employee did not do so, he was to be considered to have accepted retrenchment. ISSUE: Whether or not the separation from service of the workers in petitioner's company is a result of retrenchment (and not redundancy) CAFFCO INTERNATIONAL LTD. VS. OFFICE MOLE G.R. No. 76966 August 7, 1992 CAFFCO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (Philippines Branch) herein represented by its General-Manager, JOSEPH C.K. TANG Office of the Minister-Ministry of Labor & Employment and the Caffco Employees Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations J. Bidin
Page 532

HELD: The court held that the company was exercising its prerogative of retrenchment in order to minimize business losses. It is said that when an employer decides to reduce the number of its personnel in order to prevent further losses, he is exercising his right to retrench employees to prevent losses in his business operations. On the other hand, where for purposes of economy, a company decides to reorganize its departments by imposing on employees of one department the duties performed by the employees of the other department, thus rendering unnecessary the job of the latter, the services of the employees whose functions are now being performed by the others, may be validly terminated on the ground of redundancy. The termination of employees will be valid if the intent of the employer in undertaking the change in operations is economic in relation either to profitability or protection of its investment. However, if the employer's intent is to discharge its employees for union activity, or to break an existing union, the proposed change shall be construed as an unfair labor practice. In the case at bar, the facts disclose that the change in operation intended by the petitioner, having complied with the three (3) requirements specified by law, is a valid retrenchment of the employees in the Vinyl Department to prevent losses. Thus, the retrenchment of the employees in the Vinyl Department was legal, and under the aforementioned provision of the Labor Code, they are entitled to a separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, and not, one (1) month pay for every year of service, as erroneously ruled by the MOLE in its Order dated December 22, 1987.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner was hired by the PRC for the position of Pollution Control Manager effective on 16 September 1977. His employment was made permanent on 16 March 1978. His contract of employment provides, inter alia, that his retirement date will be the day you reach your 60th birthday, but there is provision for voluntary retirement when you reach your 50th birthday. Sometime in the first week of November 1987, respondent George B. Ditching, who was then PRCs Personnel Administration Manager, informed petitioner about the companys plan to declare the position of Pollution Control and Safety Manager redundant. Ditching attempted to convince petitioner to accept the redundancy offer or avail of the companys early retirement plan. Petitioner refused and instead insisted on completing his contract as he still had about three and a half (3 ) years left before reaching the mandatory retirement age of sixty (60). On 15 June 1988, Jesus P. Javelona, PRCs Engineering Department Manager and petitioners immediate superior, formally informed the petitioner that the position of Safety and Pollution Control Manager will be declared redundant effective at the close of work hours on 15th July 1988. Petitioner was also notified that the functions and duties of the position to be declared redundant will be absorbed and integrated with the duties of the Industrial Engineering Manager. And as a result thereof, the petitioner will receive full separation benefits provided under the PRC Retirement Plan and additional redundancy payment under the scheme applying to employees who are 50 years old and above and whose jobs have been declared redundant by Management. Petitioner protested his dismissal. Subsequently, Bernardo N. Jambalos III sent a Notice of Termination to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) informing them that the petitioner was being terminated on the ground of redundancy effective 15 August 1988. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against the respondent. However, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that the dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of redundancy is valid. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal from employment of the petitioner is valid - ignoring the fact that petitioners position was never abolished but was merely given to another employee who was immediately designated as a replacement Held: No. Settled is the rule that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise; a position is redundant when it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as the over hiring of workers, a decreased volume of business or the dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. Redundancy in an employers personnel force, however, does not necessarily or even ordinarily refer to duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same position which the dismissed employee held prior to the termination of his services does not show that his position had not become redundant. ESCAREAL VS. NLRC G.R. No. 99359 September 2, 1992 Orlando M. Escareal National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Manuel P. Asuncion, Labor Arbiter, Philippine Refining Company, Inc., Cesar Bautista and George B. Ditching J. Davide, Jr.
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In the case at bar, respondent PRC had no valid and acceptable basis to declare the position of Pollution Control and Safety Manager redundant as the same may not be considered as superfluous by the express mandate of Article 283 of the Labor Code. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the services of the petitioner are in excess of what is reasonably required by the enterprise. Otherwise, PRC would not have allowed ten (10) long years to pass before opening its eyes to that fact; neither would it have increased the petitioners salary to P23,100.00 a month effective 1 April 1988. The latter by itself is an unequivocal admission of the specific and special need for the position and an open recognition of the valuable services rendered by the petitioner. Such admission and recognition are inconsistent with the proposition that petitioners positions are redundant. It cannot also be argued that the said functions were duplicative, and hence could be absorbed by the duties pertaining to the Industrial Engineering Manager. If indeed they were, and assuming that the Industrial Engineering department of the PRC had been created earlier, petitioners positi ons should not have been created and filled up. If, on the other hand, the department was created later, and there is no evidence to this effect, and it was to absorb the petitioners positions, and then there would be no reason for the unexplained delay in its implementation, the restructuring then should have been executed long before the salary increases in petitioners favor. That petitioners positions were not duplicitous is best evidenced by the PRCs recognition of their imperative need thereof, thi s is underscored by the fact that Miguelito S. Navarro, the companys Industrial Engineering Manager, was designated as Pollution Control and Safety Manager on the very same day of petitioners termination. Hence, the petitioners dismissal from employment is without valid cause and should be given his backwages and other benefits.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: GUERRERO. VS NLRC G.R. No. 119842 August 30, 1996 Venancio Guerrero, Norberto H. Escullar, Joaquin C. Samson, Emerito C. Dorado, Ireneo Consignado, Ruperto Refraccio, Antonio Fiesta, Jose M. Caguicla, Amado Salonga, Constancio Ambrad, Rolando N. Abenio, Rogelio E. Abenio, Romelito M. Arizobal, Teodoro M. Caamoan, Jr. National Labor Relations Commission, R.O.H. Auto Products Phils., Inc. and Goeff Kemp J. Puno
On March 24, 1992, members of the union in R.O.H. Auto Products Phils., Inc. went on strike. The petitioners, which are former employees of the company, however, did not participate in the strike. Respondent company allegedly sustained huge losses as the strike virtually paralyzed its operations and to prevent further losses, the company proposed to the non-striking employees a "financial assistance" in exchange for their resignation. It assured them priority in hiring when positions of equal stature and compensation become available. On April 24, 1992, the petitioners availed of respondent company's offer. They signed individual Quit Claim and Release deeds upon receipt of their separation pay. On May 3, 1992, the strike ended. The operations in respondent company resumed and all the striking employees returned to their posts. The petitioners offered to re-assume their former positions but respondent company refused to admit them. Hence, they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. However, respondents are ordered to pay each complainant an additional financial assistance equivalent to their one month salary, which was affirmed by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed when the respondent company refused to admit them to re-assume their former positions Held: Yes. While the law gives an employer the right to terminate the services of its employees to obviate or to minimize business losses, this right, however, may not be exercised arbitrarily or whimsically. According to Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requisites must concur in order for retrenchment to be valid, to wit: (1) necessity of the retrenchment to prevent losses and proof of such losses; (2) written notice to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least 1/2 month pay for every year or service, whichever is higher. In the case at bar, the respondent company did not satisfy the legal requirements for valid retrenchment. First, respondent company did not present sufficient evidence to prove the extent of its losses. To justify the employees' termination of service, the losses must be serious, actual and real, and they must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence. The respondent company alleged that the strike paralyzed its operations and resulted in the withdrawal of its clients' orders, it failed, however, to prove its claim with competent evidence which would show that it was indeed suffering from business losses so serious as would necessitate retrenchment or reduction of personnel. The rule is that not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by a company will justify retrenchment. The losses must be
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substantial and the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary to avert such losses. It also failed to prove that retrenchment was necessary to prevent further losses. There is no showing in this case that respondent company has taken other measures to abate the losses it sustained because of the strike. Thus, retrenchment must be exercised only as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees' livelihood. Retrenchment is justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient. Second, the respondent company did not follow the proper procedure for retrenchment under Article 283, which is to give written notices to both the employees/petitioners and the DOLE at least one month prior to the retrenchment. Nevertheless, this requisite is mandatory in nature as it is intended to protect the workers right to security of tenure. And last, petitioners' availment of the "financial assistance" given by respondent company did not estop them from questioning the legality of their separation from the company. Petitioners were constrained to accept whatever relief the respondent company offered at that time. Hence, the decision is reversed and set aside, with the order to respondents to reinstate the petitioners without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages minus the amount received by them as "financial assistance" upon their separation.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Lopez Sugar Corporation seeks the reversal of the decision of the NLRC which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in denying its application to retrench some of its employees. Petitioner applied for the retrenchment and force the retirement of its employees to prevent losses due to major economic problems, and as an exercise of its privilege under Article XI, Section 2 of its 1975-1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent Philippine Labor Union Association ("PLUA-NACUSIP"). On 3 January 1980, the Federation of Free Workers, as the certified bargaining agent of the rankand-file employees of the petitioner, filed with the Bacolod District Office of the MOLE a complaint for unfair labor practices and recovery of union dues. In said complainant, FFW claimed that the terminations undertaken by petitioner were violative of the security of tenure of its members and were intended to "bust" the union and hence constituted an unfair labor practice. FFW further argued that to justify retrenchment, serious business reverses must be "actual, real and amply supported by sufficient and convincing evidence." Petitioner averred that it is the companys prerogative to retrench since there are two major economic problems that the company is facing like the rising cost of production and the stoppage of its railway facilities, which when put together pose a very serious threat against the economic survival of the company. Petitioner argues that under the law, it has the right to reduce its workforce if made necessary by economic factors which would endanger its existence, and that for retrenchment to be valid, it is not necessary that losses be actually sustained. The existence of valid grounds to anticipate or expect losses would be sufficient justification to enable the employer to take the necessary actions to prevent any threat to its survival. The Labor Arbiter denied petitioner's application for clearance to retrench its employees on the ground that for retrenchment to be valid, the employer's losses must be serious, actual and real and must be amply supported by sufficient and convincing evidence. On appeal, the NLRC, finding no justifiable reason to disturb the decision of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether or not the companys application for retrenchment should be approved Held: No. The phrase "to prevent losses" means that retrenchment or termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be undertaken by the employer sometime before the losses anticipated are actually sustained or realized. It is not, in other words, the intention of the lawmaker to compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his employees until sometime after losses shall have in fact materialized; if such an intent were expressly written into the law, that law may well be vulnerable to constitutional attack as taking property from one man to give to another. It seems equally clear that not every asserted possibility of loss is sufficient legal warrant for reduction of personnel. In the nature of things, the possibility of incurring losses is constantly present, in greater or lesser degree, in the carrying on of business operations, since some, indeed many, of the factors which impact upon the profitability or viability of such operations may be substantially outside the control of the employer. Thus, the difficult LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION VS. FEDERATION FREE WORKERS G.R. No. 75700-01 August 30, 1990 Lopez Sugar Corporation National Labor Relations Commission and Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (PLUA-NACUSIP) J. Feliciano
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question is determination of when, or under what circumstances, the employer becomes legally privileged to retrench and reduce the number of his employees. First, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bona fide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question. Secondly, the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, thirdly, be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs than labor costs. An employer who, for instance, lays off substantial numbers of workers while continuing to dispense fat executive bonuses and perquisites or so-called "golden parachutes", can scarcely claim to be retrenching in good faith to avoid losses. To impart operational meaning to the constitutional policy of providing "full protection" to labor, the employer's prerogative to bring down labor costs by retrenching must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic means e.g., reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing efficiencies, trimming of marketing and advertising costs, etc. have been tried and found wanting. Lastly, but certainly not the least important, alleged if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. Hence, the petition prayed for by the petitioner was denied.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Moises B. Panlilio was recruited by Findstaff Placement Services (FPS) for employment in the Sheraton Hotel in Oman as Recreational Manager. His contract was for a period of two years with a monthly compensation of one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100.00). However, his services were terminated on the ground that his position had become redundant. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). After due trial, the POEA rendered a decision ruling that petitioner was illegally dismissed on the premise that the alleged redundancy of his position was not adequately proven. FPS filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission; however, it affirmed the POEA's decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Undaunted by another setback, FFS filed a motion for reconsideration. To petitioner's surprise and dismay, the NLRC reversed itself and rendered a new decision upholding the validity of his dismissal on ground of redundancy. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner is valid on the ground of redundancy Held: The dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of redundancy was not valid. FPS failed to present substantial evidence to justify the dismissal of the petitioner. The affidavits and documents it submitted do not prove the superfluity of petitioner's position. It does not explain the reason why petitioners position had become redundant, but only elucidated the fact that he was not a victim of any discrimination in effecting the termination. In fact, these documents do not even present the necessary factors which would confirm that a position is indeed redundant, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business or dropping of a product line or service activity. Thus, it is important for a company to have fair and reasonable criteria in implementing its redundancy program, such as but not limited to, (a) preferred status, (b) efficiency and (c) seniority. In the case at bar, unfortunately for FPS, such appraisal was not done. Hence, the decision of the NLRC was reversed and set aside and the decision of the POEA was reinstated. PANLILIO VS NLRC G.R. No. 117459 October 17, 1997 Moises B. Panlilio National Labor Relations (First Division) and Findstaff Placement Services, Inc. and Oman Sheraton Hotel, Inc. J. Romero
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: On January 8, 1976, petitioner Philippine Wireless Inc. hired respondent Doldwin Lucila as operator/encoder. Doldwin Lucila was promoted three times after his employment from the petitioner. He was promoted as Head Technical and Maintenance Department of the Engineering Department on January 7, 1979 and from that position, as Supervisor, Technical Services of the same department and on October 1, 1990, he was again promoted as Superintendent, Project Management. However, on December 28, 1990, he tendered his resignation. Subsequently, he filed with the Arbitration Branch, National Labor Relations Commission, a complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal. He alleged that he was constructively dismissed inasmuch as his promotion from Supervisor, Technical Services to Superintendent, Project Management is demeaning, illusory and humiliating as he was not given any secretary, assistant and/or subordinates. Acting on the complaint, Labor Arbiter Benigno Villarente Jr. rendered a decision declaring that respondent actually resigned and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and ordered respondents reinstatement with back wages or separation pay. Issue: Whether or not Doldwin Lucila was constructively dismissed from the petitioners employment Held: No. The Court held that constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. In the case at bar, Doldwin Lucila voluntarily resigned from his employment on December 28, 1990 and was not pressured into resigning. Furthermore, there is no demotion to be considered as he had no support staff support staff to assist him in his work and whom he could supervise. There is only demotion where there is a reduction in position, rank or salary as a result of such transfer. Hence, the petition is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is set aside and the decision of the Labor Arbiter is reinstated and affirmed. PHIL. WIRELESS INC. VS NLRC G.R. No. 112963 July 20, 1999 Philippine Wireless Inc. (Pocketbell) and/or Jose Luis Santiago National Labor Relations Commission and Goldwin Lucila J. Pardo
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: REVIDAD VS NLRC G.R. No. 111105 June 27, 1995 Rolando Revidad, Pablito Laluna, Rafael Angeles, Teodoro Rosario, Romeo Revidad, Jacinto Gruta, Jose Espaol, Florentino Locsin, Rogelio Paradero, Marcelino Derota, Armando Cabales, Benjamin Montesa and Raymond Vidal National Labor Relations Commission and Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. J. Regalado
Sometime in March, 1988, the respondent Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. terminated the services of 178 employees under a redundancy program. As a consequence, a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement was filed by herein petitioners and were subsequently decided in favor of of them. As a result of which, they were reinstated and assigned to the Batangas plant of private respondent. However, pursuant to Presidential Directive No. 0191 AG & P implemented and effected the temporary lay-off of some 705 employees. By reason thereof, the AG & P United Rank and File Association staged a strike. As an act of conciliation, the issue was resolved by the voluntary arbitrator where it was held that AG & P had the right to exercise its management prerogative to temporarily lay off its employees owing to the unfavorable business climate being experienced by the company consequent to the financial reverses it suffered from 1987 to 1991. On February 11, 1992, considering that petitioners were not being recalled by the AG & P management, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against AG & P before respondent commission. On August 24, 1992, Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro rendered judgment ordering the reinstatement of petitioners, with payment of full back wages, on the ground that AG & P failed to substantiate the alleged continuous losses it incurred in 1991 which resulted in the retrenchment of its operations. On appeal, public respondent NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter, and dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners termination from employment was just and valid Held: Yes. The temporary lay-off of the herein petitioners were valid and justified for having complied with the requisites set forth in Article 283 of the Labor Code, as it has been sufficiently and convincingly established that it was suffering financial reverses, the conclusions made by the voluntary arbitrator's were premised upon and substantiated by the audited financial statements and the proof of actual financial losses incurred by the company is not a condition sine qua non, for retrenchment. The reason of management's failure to recall the petitioners, their services shall be considered duly terminated and they shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The bare allegation that the dismissal of petitioners was a retaliatory move by the company after the former won in an earlier illegal termination case and by reason of which they were reinstated by the latter, without any supporting evidence to prove bad faith or ill motive on the part of the company, cannot stand against and is diametrically opposed to the findings in the voluntary arbitration proceedings. The exercise of AG & P's management prerogative to lay off employees was fair, reasonable and just and that it was neither oppressive, malicious, harsh, nor vindictive. Worse, it was there stated that the union, to
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which herein petitioners belonged, never imputed bad faith or ill motives in the selection of the employees to be temporarily laid off. Thus, the Court sets out the general standards in terms of which the acts of an employer in retrenching or reducing the number of its employees. First, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bona fide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question. Second, the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, thirdly, be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs than labor costs. And last, but certainly not the least important, alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. The reason for requiring this quantum of proof is apparent; any less exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination or services of employees. Hence, the law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights, which as such are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause with his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: SEBUGUERO VS NLRC G.R. No. 115394 September 27, 1995 Fe S. Sebuguero, Carlos Ong, Nene Manaog, Juanito Custodio, Crisanta Lacsam, Saturnino Gural, Wilma Baldera, Leonila Valdez, Fatima Potestad, Evangeline Agnado, Restituto Glorioso, Janese de los Reyes, Rodolfo Sanchez, Wilma Orbello, Daisy Pascua, and Alex Masaya National Labor Relations Commission, G.T.I. Sportswear Corporation and/or Benedicto Yujuico J. Davide Jr.
The petitioners were among the thirty-eight regular employees of GTI Sportswear Corporation, who were given "temporary lay-off" notices by the company, due to alleged lack of work and heavy losses caused by the cancellation of orders from abroad and by the garments embargo of 1990. Petitioners believe that their "temporary lay-off" was a ploy to dismiss them which resorted to by the company because of their union activities, and therefore was no valid ground. The 38 laid-off employees filed with the Labor Arbiter's office in the National Capital Region complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages under Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, and non-payment of overtime pay and 13th month pay. GTI denied the claim of illegal dismissal and asserted that it was its prerogative to lay-off its employees temporarily for a period not exceeding six months to prevent losses which according to them they communicated to the petitioners and the other complainants who were all offered severance pay. The Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. ordered that G.T.I. Sportswear Corporation is liable for constructive dismissal, underpayment of wages under NCR 01 and 02, and 13th-month pay differentials. The NLRC concurred with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that there was a valid lay-off of the petitioners due to lack of work, but disagreed with the latter's ruling granting back wages after 22 July 1991. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were validly dismissed on the ground of the companys prerogative for retrenchment Held: Retrenchment is used interchangeably with the term "lay-off." It is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee's and without prejudice to the latter which is resorted to by the management during the periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation. Simply put, it is an act of the employer of dismissing employees because of losses in the operation of a business, lack of work, and considerable reduction on the volume of his business. Article 283 of the Labor Code provides for the requisites that should be followed in order for the retrenchment to be valid. However, it speaks of a permanent retrenchment as opposed to a temporary lay-off as is the case here. There is no specific provision of law which treats of a temporary retrenchment or lay-off and provides for the requisites in effecting it or a period or duration therefor. The employees cannot forever be temporarily laid-off. Hence, in order to remedy this situation Article 286 may be applied but only by analogy to set a specific period that employees may remain temporarily laid-off or in floating status which is six months. The temporary lay-off wherein the employees likewise cease to work should also not last longer than six months. After six months, the employees should either be recalled to work or
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permanently retrenched following the requirements of the law, and that failing to comply with this would be tantamount to dismissing the employees and the employer would thus be liable for such dismissal. Thus, the constructive lay-off of the employees must be read concurringly with the requisites provided for in Articles 283 and 286 of the Labor Code. In the case at bar there is no showing that the company observed the requisites set for by law in order for the retrenchment to be valid, i.e., their compliance in the written notice to be given to the employees and the DOLE one month before the intended date of retrenchment. Consequently, with their failing to observe the rules, the petitioners herein were not validly dismissed by the GTI Company, and the latter was ordered to pay the petitioners their th 13 month pay, separation pay and indemnification for damages.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: On 7 March 1984, Isidro P. Olivar was hired by FEBROE, a foreign shipping company, through its local agent, Tierra International Construction Corporation, to work as shift supervisor in its Base Operating Support (BOS) project for the U.S. Navy in the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia. The respondent eventually left for Diego Garcia and assumed his position. His employment contract was renewed in 1985; the last renewal was on 8 May 1986. But on 1 October 1986, he was dismissed from employment, and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his return to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against petitioner and FEBROE, as the principal, for breach of employment contract, unfair labor practice and moral damages. Private respondent alleged that he was a victim of improper termination of employment thru gradual and systematic removal of high salaried employees. He averred that granting that there was a decrease in the volume or scope of work of FEBROE, his actual volume of work in the department where he was assigned had increased significantly as evidenced by the assignment of additional personnel in the same department. Petitioner denied having illegally dismissed the private respondent. Petitioner averred that FEBROE management undertook a comprehensive audit and evaluation of its entire work force with the end in view of promoting economy, efficiency and profitability in its operations, and to reduce personnel whose positions were considered redundant or surplusage and/or to re-assign personnel to other available useful positions. The POEA then rendered a decision holding that the termination of the private respondent from his employment was for an authorized cause. The reversed the POEA decision. Issue: Whether or not private respondents termination from employment is illegal Held: No. Termination of an employee's services because of a reduction of work force due to a decrease in the scope or volume of work of the employer is synonymous to, or a shade of termination because of redundancy under Article 283 (formerly 284) of the Labor Code. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. In fact, the notice given to the respondent stated that in case the private respondent qualifies for another position, he will be transferred to said other position. If not, he will be scheduled for are turn flight to his point of hire. Unfortunately, there was no other position available. It also appears that the respondent was not singled out and his termination was not arbitrary or malicious on the part of the employer because there are also other positions that were abolished, including both U.S. and Third TIERRA INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VS. NLRC G.R. No. 88912 July 3, 1992 Tierra International Construction Corporation National Labor Relations Commission, Sheriff of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and Isidro P. Olivar J. Padilla
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Country Nations (TCN) positions and was forced to leave the site. Thus, it is clearly stated that the law does not make any distinction between a technical and a non-technical position for purposes of determining the validity of termination due to redundancy. Neither does the law nor the stipulations of the employment contract involved require that junior employees should first be terminated. In redundancy, what is looked into is the position itself, the nature of the services performed by the employee and the necessity of such position. Therefore, the private respondent's termination from employment was for a valid or just cause.
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: On 7 March 1984, Isidro P. Olivar was hired by FEBROE, a foreign shipping company, through its local agent, Tierra International Construction Corporation, to work as shift supervisor in its Base Operating Support (BOS) project for the U.S. Navy in the British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia. The respondent eventually left for Diego Garcia and assumed his position. His employment contract was renewed in 1985; the last renewal was on 8 May 1986. But on 1 October 1986, he was dismissed from employment, and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his return to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against petitioner and FEBROE, as the principal, for breach of employment contract, unfair labor practice and moral damages. Private respondent alleged that he was a victim of improper termination of employment thru gradual and systematic removal of high salaried employees. He averred that granting that there was a decrease in the volume or scope of work of FEBROE, his actual volume of work in the department where he was assigned had increased significantly as evidenced by the assignment of additional personnel in the same department. The POEA then rendered a decision holding that the termination of the private respondent from his employment was for an authorized cause. The reversed the POEA decision stating that, petitioners position, being a technical one, can be the subject of redundancy only in the remotest possible manner after exhausting first other junior employees in complainant's department. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed based on his position, being a technical one Held: No. The law does not make any distinction between a technical and a non-technical position for purposes of determining the validity of termination due to redundancy. Neither does the law nor the stipulations of the employment contract here involved require that junior employees should first be terminated. In redundancy, what is looked into is the position itself, the nature of the services performed by the employee and the necessity of such position. The determination of the continuing necessity of a particular officer or position in a business corporation is management's prerogative, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of such so long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of management is shown. Hence, the private respondent's termination from employment was for a valid or just cause. TIERRA INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VS. NLRC G.R. No. 88912 July 3, 1992 Tierra International Construction Corporation National Labor Relations Commission, Sheriff of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and Isidro P. Olivar J. Padilla
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Czarina Marta AJ. Vergara 2011-0237 Case Title: G.R. No.: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Vicente T. Ong was the Sales Manager of Wiltshire File Co., Inc from 16 March 1981 up to 18 June 1985. On 13 June 1985, upon the respondent's return from a business and pleasure trip abroad, he was informed by the President of Wiltshire that his services were being terminated. The respondent tried to get an explanation from management of his dismissal but to no avail. The company's security guard handed him a letter which formally informed him that his services were being terminated upon the ground of redundancy. The respondent then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal alleging that his position could not possibly be redundant because nobody in the company was then performing the same duties. The petitioner alleged that the termination of respondent's services was a cost-cutting measure for the company had experienced an unusually low volume of orders and that it was in fact forced to rotate its employees in order to save the company. Despite the rotation of employees, petitioner alleged that it continued to experience financial losses and the respondent's position became redundant. Wiltshire, on the other hand, proposes that it would close its doors permanently due to substantial business losses. The Labor Arbiter then declared that the termination of the respondent's services was illegal. On appeal the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter which states that the main reason in terminating the services of Vicente Ong was redundant and not retrenchment. It also held that the termination was attended by malice and bad faith on the part of petitioner, considering the manner of ordering the respondent to pack up and remove his personal belongings from the office without having to explain the reasons behind the termination of his services. The petitioner contends that private respondent's dismissal was justified and not illegal because it had been incurring business losses beginning 1984 and they were compelled to reduce the size of its personnel force. Redundancy, for them, as a cause for termination does not necessarily mean duplication of work but a "situation where the services of an employee are in excess of what is demanded by the needs of an undertaking..." Issue: Whether or not the termination of the termination of the respondents services was illegal Held: No. First, the Court was satisfied that indeed the petitioner had serious financial difficulties before, during and after the termination of the services of private respondent for Wiltshire finally closed its doors and terminated all operations in the Philippines on January 1987, barely two (2) years after the termination of private respondent's employment. They are of the opinion that finally shutting down business operations constitutes strong confirmatory evidence of petitioner's previous financial distress because it was very difficult to suppose that Wiltshire would take the final and irrevocable step of closing down its operations in the Philippines simply for the sole purpose of easing out a particular officer or employee. Second, the letter informing the respondent of the termination of his services uses the word "redundant", having referred also by the company as having "incurred financial losses which fact has compelled it to resort to retrenchment to prevent further losses". Thus, retrenchment was necessary, WILTSHIRE FILE CO., INC. VS. NLRC G.R. No. 82249 February 7, 1991 Wiltshire File Co., Inc. National Labor Relations Commission and Vicente T. Ong J. Feliciano
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which retrenchment in turn resulted in the redundancy of private respondent's position. Redundancy in an employer's personnel force does not necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. It also does not mean that because no other person was holding the same position prior to the termination of his services his position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any well-organized business enterprise, it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person. Redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessarily for the operation of its business. In the case at bar, petitioner Wiltshire, in view of the contraction of its volume of sales and in order to cut down its operating expenses, effected some changes in its organization by abolishing some positions and thereby effecting a reduction of its personnel. Thus, the position of Sales Manager was abolished and the duties previously discharged by the Sales Manager simply added to the duties of the General Manager, to whom the Sales Manager used to report. It is of no legal moment that the financial troubles of the company were not of private respondent's making. Private respondent cannot insist on the retention of his position upon the ground that he had not contributed to the financial problems of Wiltshire. The characterization of private respondent's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of petitioners company. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Respondent Capulso filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of P50.00 per day for the period April to September 1989. Suddenly, Petitioners Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. (AZCOR) and Arturo Zuluaga who were respondents before the Labor Arbiter (Filipinas Paso was not yet a party then in that case) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between AZCOR and herein respondent. In the second week of February 1991, upon his doctors recommendation, Capulso verbally requested to go on sick leave due to bronchial asthma. It was diagnosed that his illness was directly caused by his job as ceramics worker where, (for lack of the prescribed occupational safety gadgets), he inhaled and absorbed harmful ceramic dusts. With the present of Ms. Emily Apolinaria, his supervisor approved the said request. After four months, Capulso went back to petitioner AZCOR to resume his work after recuperating from his illness; unfortunately, he was not allowed to do so by his supervisors who informed him that only the owner, Arturo Zuluaga, could allow him to continue in his job. Issue: Whether or not the private respondent suffered illegal dismissal from the petitioners Held: The petition is dismissed. The Court answered in the negative. In illegal dismissal cases like the present one, the onus of proving that the dismissal of the employee was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal with this, the petitioners failed in this regard. To constitute a resignation, it must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. In the instant case, the act of determination from the respondent proved the fact that Capulso signified his desire to resume his work when he went back to petitioner AZCOR after recuperating from his illness. Azcor Manufacturing Inc. v. NLRC G.R. 117963 February 11, 1999 Azcor Manufacturing Inc., Filipinas Paso and/or Arturo Zuluaga/Owner National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Candido Capulso Bellosillo, J.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: By 1989, the Rural Bank of Bangued dismissed three of its employees, namely, Paulino Balbalec, Juan Bolante and Rolando Beleno alleging that its workforce was being retrenched for losses suffered by respondent bank during the years 1984-1988. Based on the result of their termination, the petitioners filed an individually complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, reinstatement and backwages with the Cordillera Administrative Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. Petitioners alleged that they were singled out for dismissal after they refused to sign an agreement for determent of wage increases under Republic Act 6727, an agreement which all of respondent bank's other employees signed, with the sole exception of petitioners. On the other hand, respondent averred that retrenchment of its workforce was necessary to prevent business losses. It further alleged that said termination would not hamper its operations and denied that petitioners were singled out, claiming that the latter ranked last in seniority among its employees. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners are invalid Held: The Court found that petitioners were dismissed on the basis of a valid retrenchment. The law recognizes the right of every business entity to reduce its workforce if the same is made necessary by compelling economic factors which would endanger its existence or stability. The Court has authorized valid reductions in the workforce to forestall business losses, the hemorrhaging of capital, or even to recognize an obvious reduction in the volume of business which has rendered certain employees redundant. Thus, Article 283 of the Labor Code provides not only contemplates the termination of employment of workers or employees to minimize established business losses but also to prevent impending losses. However, retrenchment strikes at the very core of an individual's employment and the burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove economic or business losses with appropriate supporting evidence. After all, not every asserted potential loss is sufficient legal warrant for a reduction of personnel. Moreover, the findings by the NLRC established from both parties submissions, the bank encountered financial losses in the year of 1989, 1985, and 1986, in addition, the respondent bank was faced with a serious financial problem resulting from its considerable reduction of resources. Together with the NLRC, the Court come with an agreement that there is no dispute that the complainants were terminated by the respondent bank, this Commission is persuaded, however, by the evidence that their dismissal was carried out due to retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment as borne by its losses, decrease in resources as well as increase in past due loans. Retrenchment was rightfully undertaken in the case at bar by the employer/respondent rural bank before the anticipated losses are actually sustained or realized. Balbalec v. NLRC G.R. 107756 December 19, 1995 Paulino Balbalec, Juan Bolante and Rolando Beleno National Labor Relations Commission and The Rural Bank of Bangued Kapunan, J.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC G.R. 97846 September 25, 1998 Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. and Horacio Franco National Labor Relations Commission, Associated Labor Unions, Bonifacio Montilla, Jose Ybaez Jr., Bernardo dela Rama, Ildefonso Carredo, Roseto Canales, Fortunato Migabon Jr., and Heracleo Megabon Panganiban, J.
Ponente: Facts:
The respondents performed the functions of computer, sampler and scalers. They joined and became members of Associated Labor Unions, with Bonifacio Montilla as its local president. Upon campaigning for union membership, the treasurer of respondent firm Mr. Jose Mari Miranda called Montilla to his office and told him to withdraw his membership from the Associated Labor Unions or else they will not be hired at the start of the milling season and will be dismissed. As a consequence, notices of termination were sent to the respondents, informing them that their services will be terminated due to financial difficulties. While the said notices stated that their services will be terminated 30 days from date, they were not allowed to work within that 30 day period and Montilla was immediately replaced by a certain name Gavino Negapatan. The respondents alleged that their dismissal was sought due to their membership in union as they have not violated any company rules and regulations. Issue: Whether or not the retrenchment is in good faith Held: The petition is denied. Retrenchment is the termination of employment effected by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, seasonal fluctuations, and lack of work or considerable reduction in the volume of the employers business. Resorted to by an employer to avoid or minimize business losses, it is a management prerogative consistently recognized by this Court and allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The Court held that the "'loss' referred to in Article 283 cannot be just any kind or amount of loss; otherwise, a company could easily feign excuses to suit its whims and prejudices or to rid itself of unwanted employees. In the present case no financial statement or statement of profit and loss or books of account have been presented to substantiate the alleged losses. The Court agreed with the conclusion of the labor arbiter that the real motive behind the retrenchment must have been to discriminate against private respondents as a consequence of their membership in Respondent Union.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Catatista v. NLRC G.R. 102422 August 3, 1995 Antonio Catatista, Jaime Monserate, Francisco Elisan, Fernando de la Pea, Diego Tupas, Rosendo Monserate, Ernesto Sibunal, Dioscoro Hino-o, Aurelio Descatamiento, Lodovico dela Pea, and Dionisio Ballados National Labor Relations Commission and Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Romero, J.
Sometime in June 1984, private respondent decided to permanently stop and close its sugarcane operations in Hacienda Binanlutan due to low sugar prices which affected the viability and profitability of said hacienda and convert it instead into an ipil-ipil plantation. In view of such decision, management subsequently held a conference with all thirteen field workers to explain to them the reason for this move, as well as the computation of their termination pay. Three years after, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondent with the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally terminated from work resulting from the closure of Hacienda Binanlutan Held: The petition is hereby dismissed. The Court ruled that the requisites of a valid retrenchment are: (a) the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent; (b) the substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably imminent; (c) the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and (d) the alleged losses, if already incurred, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. The losses incurred are clearly substantial and sufficiently proven by means of an income statement of Hacienda Binanlutan and the financial statement of the company haciendas. Considering the losses suffered by private respondent, it is logical for it to implement a retrenchment program to prevent further losses. Priv ate respondents personnel reduction program was meant to reduce excessive labor cost in the company. Also, the Court held that private respondent was within its rights in closing Hacienda Binanlutan and in terminating the service of petitioners.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. NLRC G.R. 100092 December 29, 1995 Central Azucarera de la Carlota National Labor Relations Commission, Fourth Division, Cebu City and Reynaldo Decrepito Kapunan, J. Petitioner's Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing its Vice PresidentResident Manager to undertake and implement a comprehensive cost reduction program to address petitioner's financial difficulties "on account of huge financial losses suffered due to a big production shortfall in the last crop year which was further aggravated by the reduction of areas planted to cane in the district and the recent dry spell. As a consequence, private respondent Decrepito filed a complaint against petitioner alleging that the retrenchment program resorted to by the petitioner was not based on valid grounds. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal due to retrenchment of Decrepito was valid Held: The petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed. Art. 283 of the Labor Code allowed the employers to dismiss employees on economic grounds and retrenchment, to avoid or minimize business losses. Citing the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers wherein the so-called "four standards of retrenchment" are enumerated such as follows, (a) the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent; (b) the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (c) be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and (d) alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to present evidence that it was suffering from dire financial straits and from drastic business losses. Theres an accurate statement that the petitioner sent private respondent a memorandum regarding the retrenchment. However, this was given only five (5) days before the effectivity of said retrenchment. It was getting worse that the said notice of retrenchment was received by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only or after private respondent was dismissed. Such perfunctory "compliance" cannot be countenanced for it defeats the purpose of requiring notice in the first place.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The respondent Nikko employed the petitioner as Rooms Division Director. Soon then, General Manager Masakazu Tsuruoka issued the following inter-department memorandum announcing petitioners appointment. In the course of the petitioners employment, he encountered several difficulties to unite and control his managerial staff and several conflicts with his Senior Rooms Manager. Thereafter, Assistant General Manager Masao Yokoo issued a memorandum expressing concern over the dispute between petitioner and his managerial staff in the Rooms Division. In addition to the petitioners employment, there were several complaints regarding wrong key issuances and double check-in of guests in one room and the rooms in the hotel were often found dirty and unkempt. As a result, Mr. Tamiyasu Okawa issued a memorandum instructing Ms. Vicky Raquepo (Roomskeeping Manager) and Mr. Danilo Cabaluna (Housekeeping Manager) to conduct a daily inspection of the guestrooms and the public areas, due to the several complaints received by management. Afterwards, petitioner sent a memorandum of protest to Mr. Okawa alleging that the latters order for petitioner was a form of harassment to ease him out of his position also caused him serious anxiety. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner voluntarily resigned Held: The petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed. It must be emphasized as well that the petitioners are not ordinary laborers or rank-andfile personnel who may not be able to completely comprehend and realize the consequences of their acts. The petitioners are managerial employees holding responsible positions. Voluntary resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to dissassociate himself from his employement. From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the petitioner voluntarily resigned from the company for a valuable consideration. The quitclaim they executed in favor of the company amounts to a valid and binding compromise agreement. To allow the petitioners to repudiate the same will be to countenance unjust enrichment on their part. As testified by Ms. Aragon, in early April 1990, petitioner told her that he was thinking of resigning. At that time petitioner had not yet made up his mind. Apparently, he made his decision to voluntarily quit after the incident. Habana v. NLRC G.R. 121486 November 16, 1998 Antonio Habana The National Labor Relations Commission, Hotel Nikko Manila Garden, Masakasu Tsuruoka, Masao Yokoo, and Tamiyasu Okawa Kapunan, J.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Petitioner filed with the Bacolod District Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a combined report on retirement and application for clearance to retrench for alleging of the prevent losses due to major economic problems, and exercising its privilege under Article XI, Section 2 of its 1975-1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into between petitioner and private respondent Philippine Labor Union Association (PLUA-NACUSIP). In the complaint, the Federation of Free Workers claimed that the terminations undertaken by petitioner were violative of the security of tenure of its members and were intended to bust the union and hence constituted an unfair labor practice. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal were valid and justified Held: In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter found no sufficient and convincing evidence to sustain petitioners essential contention that it was acting in order to prevent substantial and serious losses. However, petitioner argued that under the law, it has the right to reduce its workforce if made necessary by economic factors which would endanger its existence, and that for retrenchment to be valid, it is not necessary that losses be actually sustained. Clearly, the dismissal was not justified. Under the provision of the Labor Code, the phrase "to prevent losses" means that retrenchment or termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be undertaken by the employer sometime before the losses anticipated are actually sustained or realized. Lopez Sugar Corp. v. Federation of Free Workers G.R. 75700-01 August 30, 1990 Lopez Sugar Corporation Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (PLUA-NACUSIP) and National Labor Relations Commission Feliciano, J.
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Marah Danielle D, Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: Private respondent Victorio T. Turing was a train operator of the light rail transit system of petitioner and was dismissed due to abandonment of work for having been absent without leave (AWOL) for a total of 10 days; after the incident, he applied for leave of absence for three days and after the expiration of his leave, Turing failed to report for work. And because of numbers of absences, the companys social worker went to his house but unfortunately she learned that Turing had gone to Calamba Laguna for the reason of domestic problems. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of abandonment of work Held: The resoulution of the NLRC is hereby affirmed. For abandonment of work to be a just and valid ground for dismissal, there must be a (a) deliberate and (b) unjustified refusal on the part of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. To warrant an abandonment, there must be (a) evidence (not only of the failure of an employee to report for work or his absence without valid or justifiable reason), but also of his intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The second element is the more (b) determinative factor, being manifested by overt acts. In this case, petitioner was declared guilty of illegal dismissal on the basis by the Labor Arbiter that the notice of termination addressed to complainant Turing showed that he was dismissed for abandonment of work for having incurred a total of 17 days of absence without official leave and after his explanation was found unmeritorious. Metro Transit Organization Inc. v. NLRC G.R. 119724 May 31, 1999 Metro Transit Organization Inc. National Labor Relations Commission and Victorio T. Turing Mendoza, J.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The petitioners are among the thirty seven (37) employees of Henry Lao at the Tiongsan Super Bazaar. They filed at the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against Henry Lao for illegal dismissal and claims for violation of labor standards pertaining to payment of wages. Afterwards, both petitioners and respondent appealed to the NLRC. It found the termination of petitioners employment to be due either to voluntary resignation or dismissals with just cause; however, it awarded separation pay to Victoria Santos. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was unavailing. Petitioners further alleged that their dismissals were oppressive and anti -social, complaining that it was off -tangent and immaterial for private respondent to discuss the theft and pricecutting of some employees of respondent bazaar because the offenses of some employees cannot be imputed against the petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners employment terminated due to resignation, abandonment, or illegal dismissal Held: The petition is GRANTED. Petitioners Pascua, Macanlalay, De Castro and Soriano are FOUND to have been illegally dismissed. In the first place, the petitioners were not even served a formal notice of dismissal. Citing Molave Tours Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., they argue that since resignation must be made with the intent of relinquishing ones office, the filing of their complaints for illegal dismissal is wholly incompatible with private respondents assertion that they voluntarily resigned. The Solicitor General contends that Petitioners Lilia Pascua, Victoria Santos and Susan C. De Castro resigned from their jobs; that Mimi Macanlalay voluntarily left private respondents employ; and that Petitioner Violeta Soriano was dismissed for just cause. In the present case, the Court is convinced that the answer is in negative, regarding the termination of the petitioners. Based on the evidence on record, the Court are more than convinced that petitioners did not voluntarily quit their jobs. Rather, they were forced to resign or were summarily dismissed without just cause; except in the case of Victoria L. Santos, who immediately took steps to protest their layoff and thus cannot, by any logic, be said to have abandoned their work. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the dismissal of an employee which the employer must validate has a twofold requirement: one is substantive, the other procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a just or an authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as amended); the rudimentary requirements of due process -- the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself -- must be observed as well. Pascua v. NLRC G.R. 123518 March 13, 1998 Lilia Pascua, Susan C. de Castro, Violeta M. Soriano and Victoria L. Santos National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) and Tiongsan Super Bazaar Panganiban, J.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Revidad v. NLRC G.R. 111105 June 27, 1995 Rolando Revidad, Pablito Laluna, Rafael Angeles, Teodoro Rosario, Romeo Revidad, Jacinto Gruta, Jose Espaol, Florentino Locsin, Rogelio Paradero, Marcelino Derota, Armando Cabales, Benjamin Montesa and Raymond Vidal National Labor Relations Commission and Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. Regalado, J.
The present controversy started when private respondent terminated the services of 178 employees, including herein petitioners, under a redundancy program. As a consequence, a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement was filed by herein petitioners. The said termination was pursuant to Presidential Directive No. 0191 issued on July 25, 1991 by the companys president and containing managements decision to lay off 40% of the employees due to financial losses incurred from 1989-1990 with this, the union of the employees staged a strike. Issue: Whether or not the en masse lay-off was valid and justified Held: The Decision appealed is hereby affirmed. Petitioners contend that their lay-off on September 17, 1991 cannot be justified by the losses suffered by AG & P from 1989 to 1990 since it had not been shown that such losses continued up to 1991. The Court found that the temporary lay-off of the petitioners is valid and justified, and that by reason of managements failure to recall them, their services shall be considered duly terminated and they shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. Also, convinced, that both the retrenchment program of private respondent and the dismissal of petitioners were valid and legal. Added to it, it follows that the employer bears the burden to prove his allegation of economic or business reverses with clear and satisfactory evidence, it being in the nature of an affirmative defense.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Reyes v. Court of Appeals G.R. 154448 August 15, 2003 Dr. Pedrito F. Reyes Court of Appeals, Phil. Malay Poultry Breeders, Inc. and Leong Hup Poultry Farm SDN, BHD., Mr. Francis T.N. Lau, President and Chairman of the Board and Mr. Chor Tee Lim, Director Ynares-Santiago, J.
Ponente: Facts:
Respondent Leong Hup Poultry Farms SDN. BHD (Leong Hup) of Malaysia, thru its Managing Director Francis T. Lau, appointed petitioner Pedrito F. Reyes as Technical/Sales Manager. Unfortunately, the respondent suffered losses which caused them to reduce production and retrench employees in Philmalay. Furthermore, petitioner confirmed his verbal notice of resignation, provided, that he be given the same benefits granted to retrenched and resigned employees of the company, consisting of separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service and the monetary equivalent of his sick leave and vacation leave. Issue: Whether or not the termination of petitioners employment caused by retrenchment or by voluntary resignation Held: The petition is granted. The Court found that petitioners dismissal from service was due to retrenchment, as supported by the evident from the termination letter sent by Philmalay to petitioner. The NLRC also correctly ruled that the car and insurance benefits are granted only during the course of employment; hence, they should not be part of petitioners separation package likewise in claiming for payment of rental for the reason that, it may constituted with a wrong standard. However, petitioner is entitled to the award of vacation leave as part of respondents retrenchment incentives.
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Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The 23 complainants were formerly working (as drivers, dispatchers and mechanic) with petitioner San Miguel Jeepney Service (SMJS), with services ranging from two to eight years. Petitioner SMJS had a contract with the U.S. Naval Base Facility located in San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales, to provide transportation services to personnel and dependents inside said facility. When the said contract expired on May 2, 1988, Galace, owner and general manager of SMJS, opted not to renew the existing contract nor bid on the new contract, due to financial difficulties, he having suffered a net loss the prior year. As a consequence, the services of the complainants were terminated and had already filed a complaint for non-compliance with the minimum wage law from 1980 onwards, plus non-payment of the 13th month pay, legal holiday pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay and separation pay. On the other hand, petitioners rejected any liability for the money claims. Issue: Whether or not SMJS is suffering from sliding income Held: The assailed Resolution of public respondent NLRC is hereby affirmed. Prior with the status of the petitioners, they were in misery because of sliding income also known as, decreasing gross revenues. What the law speaks of is serious business losses or financial reverses. Clearly, sliding incomes are not necessarily losses, much less serious business losses within the meaning of the law. Thus, it cannot justify the non-payment of separation pay. Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The present controversy was triggered by the inability of the respondent company to pay its workers certain benefits stipulated in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) starting on March 16, 1993. The CBA benefits (rice subsidy, incentive leave pay, hospitalization, t-shirts and safety shoes and incentive bonus) were withheld by management. A month after, the complainants alleged that their union represented by their president and vice-president, communicated with respondents for a renegotiation of their CBA but the same was rejected by the latter. Complainants stressed out that their dismissal was without just cause and in utter disregard of their right to due process and also asserted that the true intention of management was to bust their union which was very insistent on the renegotiation and renewal of their CBA with the respondent company. Somerville Stainless Steel Corporation v. NLRC G.R. 125887 March 11, 1998 Somerville Stainless Steel Corporation National Labor Relations Commission and Jerry Macandog, Reynaldo Miranda, Roberto Tagala, et al. Panganiban, J. San Miguel Jeepney Service v. NLRC G.R. 92772 November 28, 1996 San Miguel Jeepney Service and Mamerto Galace National Labor Relations Commission, Edelberto Padua, and 23 others Panganiban, J.
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Issue: Whether or not the retrenchment undertaken is valid Held: The petition is dismissed. Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of employees. Resorted to by an employer to avoid or minimize business losses. To prove its loss, petitioner presented only its financial statements including the gross income and net loss for the fiscal year that ended on December 31, 1992. The failure of petitioner to show its income or loss for the immediately preceding years or to prove that it expected no abatement of such losses in the coming years bespeaks the weakness of its cause. The financial statement for 1992, by itself, does not sufficiently prove petitioners allegation that it already suffered actual serious losses, because it does not show whether its losses increased or decreased. Marah Danielle D. Villarubia 2011-0470 Case Title: G.R. no: Date: Petitioner: Respondent: Ponente: Facts: The controversy started when the respondent was hired by the petitioner as nanny to one of his sons and later on employed as salesclerk of Willi Hahn Enterprises, soon after got promoted as Store Manager of its branch. While the petitioner conducted an Inventory Report, he discovered that its branch in Cebu incurred stock shortages and non remittanced with a total of almost P27, 000. Afterwards, the petitioner decided to terminate the services of Maghuyop, on which at that time, the latter caring her resignation, too. Maghuyop claimed that she was approached by certain persons who ordered her to close the shop and to provide a letter for thanking the Hahn spouses for all the benefits she received coming from the spouses, but the respondent disobey the order. Due to force, Tony Abu typed the resignation letter then later on haved her signature on it. As a consequence, respondent filed a complaint with the NLRC for alleging that she should be awarded backwages, separation pay which was withheld by Mr. Hahn Issue: Whether or not respondent voluntarily resigned as manager of the SM Cebu branch Held: The petition is granted. Based from the letter presented by the respondent, the Court found no merit in respondents claim that being a mere clerk, she did not realize the consequences of her resignation. The rule that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation is not applicable to the instant case. The filing of an illegal dismissal case by respondent was evidently a mere afterthought. It was filed not because she wanted to return to work but to claim separation pay and backwages. The failure of petitioner to pursue the termination proceedings against respondent and to make her pay for the shortage incurred did not cast doubt on the voluntary nature of her resignation and be deemed as an act of consideration being a close member of the household. Hence, the Court found, no reason to deviate from the conclusion of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that respondent, having tendered a voluntary resignation was not illegally dismissed. Willi Hahn Enterprises v. Maghuyop G.R. 160348 December 17, 2004 Willi Hahn Enterprises and/or Willi Hahn Lilia R. Maghuyop Ynares-Santiago, J.
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