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Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
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incorporate by reference all that contained in the Orders to support a finding of notice to Mirch
as to what was up for inquiry in that matter. Couglin adopts that approach herein and
incorporates by reference all of his filings in the Nevada Supreme Court since 8/20/11,
particularly those in 60838 (especially that of 6/10/12, 6/18/12, and 8/13/12) and all of those in
61901, 60302, 61383, 54844, 60331, etc.).
Conclusion:
Please consider those issues set forth in more detail in the attachments.
Dated this November 23rd, 2012:
__________________________
Zachary Barker Coughlin
- 2/4 -
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ALTER OR AMEND
ALL ORDERS SO FAR BY NNDB, SBN, PANEL, OR BOARD, AND NOTICE OF IRREGULARITIES OF
PROCEEDINGS THUS FAR and SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE TO WHATEVER
EXTENT COUGHLINS SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CONTEST SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, PROCESS,
SERVICE OF PROCESS, SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT, ETC.,ETC., HAS BEEN RUN OVER
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proof of service/certificate of mailing
i zach coughlin hereby declare that i Iax Iiled (in accordance with the permission previously given me
by those with the requisite authority to so issue it) and placed this AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL
TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ALTER OR AMEND ALL
ORDERS SO FAR BY NNDB, SBN, PANEL, OR BOARD, AND NOTICE OF
IRREGULARITIES OF PROCEEDINGS THUS FAR and SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED
ANSWER OR RESPONSE TO WHATEVER EXTENT COUGHLINS SPECIAL
APPEARANCE TO CONTEST SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, PROCESS, SERVICE OF
PROCESS, SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT, ETC.,ETC., HAS BEEN RUN OVER in the
mail with postage, and or transmitted a digital copy to all oI those who have either expressly or
implicitly agreed to service via digital transmission (plus Pat "Salieri" King told me the SBN takes
anything I Iile and provides a stamped copy to all 5 member oI the Panel immediately and that I could
rely on that), in the mail Ior pickup...
dated november 23rd, 2012.
zach coughlin
respondent
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AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ALTER OR AMEND
ALL ORDERS SO FAR BY NNDB, SBN, PANEL, OR BOARD, AND NOTICE OF IRREGULARITIES OF
PROCEEDINGS THUS FAR and SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE TO WHATEVER
EXTENT COUGHLINS SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CONTEST SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, PROCESS,
SERVICE OF PROCESS, SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT, ETC.,ETC., HAS BEEN RUN OVER
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index to exhibits:
1. exhibit 1: various relevant materials two thousand, two hundred and twenty Iive (2,2025) pages, bate stamped
- 4/4 -
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ALTER OR AMEND
ALL ORDERS SO FAR BY NNDB, SBN, PANEL, OR BOARD, AND NOTICE OF IRREGULARITIES OF
PROCEEDINGS THUS FAR and SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE TO WHATEVER
EXTENT COUGHLINS SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CONTEST SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, PROCESS,
SERVICE OF PROCESS, SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT, ETC.,ETC., HAS BEEN RUN OVER
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RE: response to grievance from NV Attorney
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org); Glenn Machado (GlennM@nvbar.org)
March 12, 2012
To: Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I am in receipt of your email below, requesting additional time to respond. Please be advised that
your response to the grievance, including the email letter below, become part of the record and may
eventually be reviewed by a disciplinary panel. With that said, it is important that we receive your
response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to
deliver your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 5:45 PM
To: Patrick King; Glenn Machado; David Clark
Subject: response to grievance from NV Attorney
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
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RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and email only to:
Reno Office: 775 329 0522
Las Vegas Office: 702 385 2878
DavidC@nvbar.com, PatrickK@nvbar.com, GlennM@nvbar.com
March 9, 2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar Counsel King
sent me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set forth. Mr. King wrote,
"please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the date of this letter."
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I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just received this
mailing from you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to that. Further, I hope I
can demonstrate to you and the State Bar of Nevada that circumstances at least somewhat
beyond my control have prevented me from receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent
fashion. These circumstances resulted in two different Domestic Violence Protection Orders
being granted to me against my former housemates by Master Edmondson of the Second
Judicial District Court in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the electricity to my location
was interrupted from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept payment from
me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the individuals
against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining electrical
service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection orders were issued
interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has taken some time to get the
USPS Postal Inspectors to release my mail to me and or allow me to receive mail at my
location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Glenn
Machado a written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help me in remaining aware of
any correspondence being sent me from the State Bar while I work to get my mailbox situation
settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado that
"I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who I ultimately wound up getting
Protection Orders against, and they have interfered with my ability to receive my mail with
absolute certainty (I have received much of my mail, and have pending
correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno, NV to obtain a permanent and newly
rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster
agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, he will then
allow me to get a mailbox key made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see
how much longer I must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I
am an electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am writing
to ask that any correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of Nevada may have
for me or may have mailed to me be, if possible, copied to me via my fax number or email
address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously, and I hope I
am afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
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Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
Contact
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 9:09 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
March 16, 2012
Zachary Coughlin
Dear Zach,
Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill. From
your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be. Please call me
ASAP so that we can take the appropriate action to help you and to stop these
types of disturbing complaints.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384
RE: Contact
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 2:42 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Zach,
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Thank you for your email. I really need for you to call me. Please call me so we can setup a time to
meet.
Thank you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel 7753281384
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 1:40 PM
To: Patrick King; clarkd@nvbar.org; Glenn Machado
Subject: RE: Contact
Mr. King,
I have not sent you my Reply to the Grievance. You gave me until today, and I am
finishing it up. Additionally, I was subject to what I believe is a wrongful eviction
yesterday, and would like additionaly time to respond to Richard HIll's grievance,
which he appears to be filing on behalf of various third parties, and his associate,
who doesn't bother to sign it. Basically, Mr. HIll constantly seeks to leverage courts,
police, and now, Bar Counsel, to further his nefarious approach to litigation, rather
than roll up his sleeves and find some law in favor of his positions and apply actual
facts to them, rather than make up things or quote to third parties and other hearsay (I
never made contact with or touched Mr. Hill, I never climbed on anyone's truck, Mr.
Hill is not a licensed mental health professional, yet he sounds like a walking DSM-
IV when he writes of me). I will submit something to you today in response to Hill's
grievance, with the caveat that I am requesting more time, in part due to the fact that
the Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies have just yesterday, minutes before my
hearing in Judge Beesley's courtroom, unlawfully stormed into my location at 1422
E. 9th St, #2, with guns drawn and pointed at me, without previously identifying
themselves as law enforcement in any way, and demanding I grab a few things in a
couple minutes and leave. This unlawful eviction was pursuant to an eviction
hearing held that morning by Reno Justice Court Judge Jack Shroeder, the
same Judge who screamed at me "do you want to go to jail" when I attempted to
address in any way whatsoever Richard Hill's abuse of process in getting a Order of
Protection from Judge Schroeder in a scant 40 minutes, and having me arrested on
1/12/12 (two days before Hill's grievance was sent to you), at the extension
hearing on January 31, 2012, where Hill admitted he didn't have a good reason for
seeking an extension and withdrew his application. I wanted to address Hill's abuse
of process for the record, Judge Schroeder decided to scream at me instead. It was
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reminscent of Judge Nash Holmes telling me, on the record, in Reno Municipal Court
case 11 TR 26800 that she would have me arrested and placed in jail if I said Richard
G. Hill's name one more time. I cross examined RPD Sargent Tarter about whether
he had a retaliatory motive in ticketing me outside Hill's office on 11/15/11 after Hill
refused to give me my driver's license, and I reported to Sargent Tarter that RPD
Officer Chris Carter had admitted to taking bribes from Richard Hill.
Actually, there is some footage of the "terror" Richard G. Hill was exposed to that
necessitated him seeking a Protection Order (the "RPD made him" do it, honest):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBu9zflGALE
I don't know why Sargent Sifre (whom makes more money than a District Court
Judge) should be so upset with lawyers like me, who work in the foresclosure
defense field (you might see if Geof Giles, Esq. thinks I am quite the "Yosemite
Sam" caricature of a cartoon villian that Richard G. Hill paints me to be, or if
Thomas J. Hall thinks that much of Rich and his "tactics", which are like those of a
malignant frat boys armed with daddy's pleadings). After all, Sargent Sifre has
benefitted from foresclosure defense work:
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2011/01/29/nevada-dist-court-quiet-title-viable-sifre-
v-wells-fargo-bank/
Regardless, I have not "ghostwritten" any pleadings for Mr. Gessin or anybody else.
I am listed as attorney of record on adversary proceedings for Gessin, though the
only things I ever filed for him clearly indicated that I was not appearing as attorney
of record and that the Answers to the Complaints in those two adversary proceedings
were being submitted on an "unbundled services" arrangement. The bankruptcy
court nonetheless listed me as attorney of record and I have been and am in the
process of having that changed. I have communicated with clerk Holly Estes and
filing office supervisore Debbie Gallagher in those regards.
I need more time to research and investigate the other allegations Hill makes, though
I do not wish you to infer and admission on my part to any allegation by Hill.
I have researched this service of eviction Order issues extensively, it relates to the
Hill matter, and I believe the WCSO and Hill are not following the law.
I am not sure why you wrote what you did at 9:09 am this morning considering you
granted me until 3:00pm today to file my response, which I intend to along with a
request for more time to supplement it:
From:Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org); Glenn Machado (GlennM@nvbar.org)
March 12, 2012
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To: Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I am in receipt of your email below, requesting additional time to respond. Please be advised that
your response to the grievance, including the email letter below, become part of the record and may
eventually be reviewed by a disciplinary panel. With that said, it is important that we receive your
response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to deliver
your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 5:45 PM
To: Patrick King; Glenn Machado; David Clark
Subject: response to grievance from NV Attorney
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and email only to:
Reno Office: 775 329 0522
Las Vegas Office: 702 385 2878
DavidC@nvbar.com, PatrickK@nvbar.com, GlennM@nvbar.com
March 9, 2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel
Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar
Counsel King sent me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set
forth. Mr. King wrote, "please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10)
days from the date of this letter."
I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just
received this mailing from you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to
that. Further, I hope I can demonstrate to you and the State Bar of Nevada that
circumstances at least somewhat beyond my control have prevented me from
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receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent fashion. These circumstances resulted
in two different Domestic Violence Protection Orders being granted to me against my
former housemates by Master Edmondson of the Second Judicial District Court in
FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the electricity to my location was interrupted
from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept payment from me for
services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the individuals
against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining
electrical service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection
orders were issued interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has
taken some time to get the USPS Postal Inspectors to release my mail to me and or
allow me to receive mail at my location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar
Counsel Glenn Machado a written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help
me in remaining aware of any correspondence being sent me from the State Bar
while I work to get my mailbox situation settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel
Machado that "I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who I
ultimately wound up getting Protection Orders against, and they have interfered with
my ability to receive my mail with absolute certainty (I have received much of my
mail, and have pending correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno, NV
to obtain a permanent and newly rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have
been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him
proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, he will then allow me to get a mailbox key
made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see how much longer I
must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I am an
electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am
writing to ask that any correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of
Nevada may have for me or may have mailed to me be, if possible, copied to me
via my fax number or email address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously,
and I hope I am afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation
than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin"
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: lstuchell@washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov;
cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; jboles@callatg.com; bbuckley@lacsn.org; daolshan@yahoo.com;
jsoderlund@nlslaw.net; jdelikanakis@swlaw.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
jbosler@washoecounty.us; bdogan@washoecounty.us; mechols@maclaw.com; mclarkson@puc.nv.gov
Subject: Evictions RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 12:14:01 -0800
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by
Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was
unoccupied at the time.
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Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;
kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in
the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the
Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
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compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and
practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
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Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the
days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham
v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did
not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on
November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and
Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue
letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting
plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...
Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
"Substituted service
When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal service, many
jurisdictions allow for substituted service. Substituted service allows the process
server to leave service documents with another responsible individual, called a
person of suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult or a teenager. Under
the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be made at the abode or dwelling of
the defendant.[4] California, New York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States
jurisdictions require that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed
to the recipient.[5] Substituted service often requires a serving party show that
ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has been made to attempt to
make personal service by delivery, and that substituted service will reach the party
and effect notice.[5]"
I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person in person, not that
a person named Machem went and posted a notice on a door, personally himself. See,
I think you guys are thinking of the "person" in the word personally as applying to
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the server, when in all instances I have ever seen it used in the law, the "person" part
of "personally" applies to the person being served. Help me out here, Mary.
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
1897&parid=root
Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is required of eviction
orders prior to the WCSO or whoever does it, being able to conduct a lockout?
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html
NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c) Default
Judgments: Defendant Not Personally Served. When a default judgment shall have
been taken against any party who was not personally served with summons and
complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, and who has not
entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice to the adverse party,
upon motion made within 6 months after the date of service of written notice of entry
of such judgment, may vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal
representatives to answer to the merits of the original action. When, however, a party
has been personally served with summons and complaint, either in the State of
Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, the party must make application to be relieved
from a default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the party, or
for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b)
of this rule.
Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve people things....and
sign Affidavits under penalty of perjury and stuff, and you are telling me you believe
"personally served" can included situations where the person was not there?
Okay.....You do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint need to be "personally
served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to see that person and serve it on
them (I don't think they have to take the paper, they don't need to agree to accept
service, but Machem does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is
swearing under penalty of perjury that he "personally served" somebody. Usually
"personally served" is only done in the case of the first thing filed (unless there is an
IFP) in a case, the Summons and Complaint. Thereafter, typically, people just effect
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"substituted service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal service" is
only required for serving the pleadings that start a case, the Summons and Complaint.
Wow....Okay, so this is my whole point, these state sponsored lockouts under color
of state law should not be being done so fast, unless you guys "personally serve" the
tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect "substituted service" which,
under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2) (and NRCP, not JCRCP is
applicable to eviction matters according to NRS 118A) the tenant cannot be deemed
to have received or constructively received the Order until the 3 days for mailing has
passed.
Personal service by process server
Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party named on the
summons, complaint or petition. In most lawsuits in the United States, personal
service is required to prove service. Most states allow substituted service in almost all
lawsuits unless you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other business entity; in
those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in hand) the documents to
the "Registered Agent" of a business entity. Some states (Florida) do not require that
the documents actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other
states, the documents must be visible to the person being served, i.e., not in a sealed
envelope. If the individual refuses to accept service, flees, closes the door, etc., and
the individual has been positively identified as the person to be served, documents
may be "drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service of process
has been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly 100 years, primarily because
it guarantees actual notice to a defendant of a legal action against him or her.
Personal service of process remains the most reliable and efficacious way to both
ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process requirements of notice
to a defendant and the opportunity to be heard. [2]^ The National Law Review: The
Continuing Relevance of Personal Service of Process
And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order, much like in the
case of Coughlin's that was dismissed where the Washoe County Sheriff's didn't
manage to get the "personal service" of the Summons and Complaint done in time, or
"sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell you that "actual notice" is
not a substitute for compliance with the service requirements.
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Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of an opportunity to
game the system and swoop in with lockout then assert a bunch of hooey about NRS
118A.460 "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the
tenant's personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill insisted on throwing away the
last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she died 2 years ago in the town
dump. He and his contractor lied about so many things, including the fact that they
used my own damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then
submitted a bill to the court in an exhibit for $1,060 for "securing" the property
(which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's "reasonable storage moving and
inventorying expenses" like it is required to...further, the charged me $900 a month
for storage and sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121
River Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home law office there,
then how is it someone could be trespassing if they are being charged the full rental
value for "use and occupancy of the premises"? Further, even if it was a storage
situations, there are sections of NRS 118A devoted to evicting someone from a
storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a custodial arrest
where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez admit they never issued a warning
to me or asked me to leave prior to conducting a custodial arrest (which required
$800 of bail, great!, and 3 days in jail, no less). This is especially poor form where
Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes from Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer
Carter did not say that to me, go ahead and sue me, my man....I'm waiting.....that's
what I thought.
He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass situation to me when
you are arresting me and causing a google search result for my name to show an
arrest....that's damaging the only thing I have of monetary value (my professional
reputation and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are putting me in cuffs, bro.
And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to properly query Hill as to whether he
had sent me, prior to the trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the
property, a value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and occupancy"
of the premises. And Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too busy chortling and filling out the
Criminal Complaint to bother setting them straight, despite my cues, I guess.
Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let Casey Baker, Esq.
prepare the Order, which means faithfully put to writing what the Judge announced,
not attempt to steal $2,275 for your Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate
neurosurgeon client by slipping in something the judge never said, ie, that the
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neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order the tenant to pay
into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow" deposit required to preserve the right
to litigate habitability issues. Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually
did not have the jurisdiction to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno, that's a
Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of its own JCRCP 83 requires the RJC
to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court first....period.). Okay,
so, to take it a step even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275 won't
be released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as security for
Coughlin's cost on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP 73...". But wait, doesn't that
mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt'
that was a security that large must be for? Because the "Appeal Bond" is set by
statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that much of Coughlin's cash
must have been for the "Supersedeas Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of
Eviction in NRS 40.380 and 40.385.
I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force the landlord, his
attorneys and the RJC to choose between viewing Coughlin as a residential tenant
whose rent is less than $1,000, and whom therefore is only required to post a measly
supersedeas bond of $250 (and remember, a supersedeas bond equals a stay of
eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view Coughlin as a
commercial tenant, which would allow charging a higher supersedeas bond (except
for that pesky part about his rent being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do
so, his rent being only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey
Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this summary eviction proceeding under a No Cause
Eviction Notice, which is not allowed against a commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict
a commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set forth in NRS 40.253
unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a 30 Day Non Payment of Rent
Notice To Quit, which they didn't because they "are just taking the path of least
resistance here, Your Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious
"can you believe this guy?" laughter and head shaking...).
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the
execution of the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute
and file with the court or justice the defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with two
or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not
be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the
judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will
pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the
property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the
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appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in
the case shall be stayed.
So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try Coughlin on the
trespass charge for which he endured a custodial arrest and for which old Richard
Hill is still filing Motion's to Show Cause on in the appeal of the summary eviction
matter in CV11-03628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City Attorney's Office have
some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy, besotted, encumbered,
or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because Coughlin has a really good wrongful
arrest cause of action against the Reno Police Department, could it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get those Summons
and Complaints served in that one case Coughlin was suing his former employer in,
the one where Coughlin was granted an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which
required the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve the Summons and
Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days Coughlin spent in jail on
the arrest shown in the youtube video above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed
videotaped a scene where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a green
dress. What's that? It is? They did do that? Really? No...What? They also forced him
to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in the guise of some ridiculous
"procedure" necessary to insure Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they retaliated against
him for failing to answer their religious preference interrogation questions by placing
him in an icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him medical care despite his
plaintive cries for help, while wearing a thin t-shirt? Wow. They didn't jam a taser
needle in his spine for extended periods of time, though, did they? Your kidding!
Whats next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD ordered a custodial
arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was peacefully filming, from a
public spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent contractor Phil Howard destroying and
taking to the town dump items of enormous sentimental value to Coughlin that he
was prevented from retrieving from the property during the scant time he was
allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he knew not, because, despite,
ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060 bill for "securing" the back porch (with screws
facing the outside, inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left in the window facing the
sidewalk near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but duct tape
It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place, Everybody!"),
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Coughlin's former home law office was burglarized on December 12, 2011 while
Richard G. Hill was holding its contents (including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files,
like the ones for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.), asserting his "lien". A lien for
"storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as the charge for "full use
and occupany" was. However, that $900 a month for "storage" also included another
$1,060 charge for "securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the
basement...neither of which seem to have much to do with the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying" expenses such a lien is provided for under NRS
118A.460....). Jeez, your probably going to tell me Sargent Sigfree ordered another
custodial arrest on Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's applications for Protections
Orders against based upon the battery and assaults that his former housemates
committed. Because, Sargent Sigfree thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call
when he returns home at night and his dog has mysteriously disappeared, and his
housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely, Coughlin, a former
domestic violence attorney would have nothing helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's
expert opinion that "animal abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010,
Sarge) and that its, rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent Sigfree was
"trying to help" Coughlin by arresting him, again, and necessitating the $1,500 bail
associated with the gross misdemeanor charge, "Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent
Sigfree told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations where you are
victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that regard.
But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any electrical service
for the past week since those with the Protection Orders against them cancelled the
service and NV Energy shut it off, without providing any notice to Coughlin, right.
Nevermind. But...but surely when NV Energy shut of the power to Coughlin's home
law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad faith "inspection" with
videographer of Coughlin' s home law office that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very
necessary one day before Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did
not leave the back gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed off, Coughlin's
beloved mountain bike suddenly missing (the one the parents of his girlfriend of 5
years gave him)? Well, NV Energy is probably not retaliating against Coughlin for
complaining about that by refusing him electric service for the past seven days, you
would have to assume....
NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to
NRS 40.253:
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1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the
appellate court without independent action. A tenant of commercial property may
obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a supersedeas bond in the
amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.
2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for
a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In
all cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall
not dismiss or quash the proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings
have been conducted substantially according to the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters
of form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon
such terms as may be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the
allegations in the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the idea that you guys
don't know NRCP 4 through 6 like the back of your hand, but....hell, maybe you
don't. But, clearly the language in NRS 40 about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant
from the property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order" do not apply where the
Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the Hearing and litigated the
matter. Especially where, as here the lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was
rather renewed. This is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a
holdover tenant's lease for a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose
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I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is cutting
corners on the whole "personally served" thing (just so a landlord could get what they
want quicker), just like I would hate for people to think the Reno Municipal Court is
letting the bottom line get in the way of providing that whole Sixth Amendment
Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility thing. And, hey, if the RMC
denies an indigent attorney the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel, the finds him
guilty of NRS 22.030, Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence of the Court,
and the puts him in cuffs when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing him to 3 days in
jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's no big deal, right, I mean, the RMC
technically kept its promise that the underyling charge, though technically it could
result in incarceration would not...because the incarceration was for a whole dang
different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of the Court....and so what if
the whole zealous advocate thing and the denying the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel thing and the Summary Contempt thing don't go so well together....Or if 6
court employees had to stay til 9pm getting paid overtime at the RMC to get 'r done...
NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons
attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon Individuals. In all
other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the
defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same: Other Service. (1)
Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to methods of personal service, when
the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed
from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear, by
affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, and it shall appear, either by
affidavit or by a verified complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against the
defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that the defendant is a
necessary or proper party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that
the service be made by the publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is
based on the fact that the party on whom service is to be made resides out of the
state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall be a sufficient showing
of such fact if the affiant shall state generally in such affidavit that at a previous time
such person resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating
the latest date known to affiant when such party so resided there); that such place is
the last place in which such party resided to the knowledge of affiant; that such party
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no longer resides at such place; that affiant does not know the present place of
residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that affiant does not
know and has never been informed and has no reason to believe that such party now
resides in this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that such party still
resides and remains out of the state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a
sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant. This rule shall apply to all
manner of civil actions, including those for divorce"
I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my damages for the
wrongful eviction, illegal lockout, whether its the landlord, his attorney, or the
Sheriff's Office. Your money is always good with me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by
Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was
unoccupied at the time.
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
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From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;
kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in
the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the
Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and
practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
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large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the
days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham
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v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did
not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on
November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and
Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue
letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting
plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say
about this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS
40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy
Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on
November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is
defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different
understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or,
perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally
serve" every tenant it wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three
days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that
frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every disagreement about
habitability that a tenant brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some
landlord's get. In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the
habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill
High School graduate landlord balked and complained then hired and attorney four
days into a dispute.....at which point the rules against contacting represented parties
prevented much in the way of real settlement discussion, particularly where opposing
counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing
settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the
Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the citizen tenants of Washoe
County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES
INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT
WHEN HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC
REV2011-001708 ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT
OF SERVICE). YOU NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF
THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There
simply is not anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary
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Eviction Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless
of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the
affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the
motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or
118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my
November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why
didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's
attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
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by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as
required by NRS 40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last
20 incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO
is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to lock out the
citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested
for trespassing on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and
therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to
do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting,
whether Richard Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the
full rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the
"reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord
under a personal property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret
such a bill as Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself,
which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their
Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the locks...and
so the Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite
the Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money under a "rent
escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability issues in a
summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253(6)'s express
dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice court gets such
a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44, published and
approved by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC
applies all these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver
themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service notice of a summary
eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's Answer or
Affidavit in response to an eviction Notice, rather than the service requirements of
such notice following NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in the RJC
everything is sped up imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the NV. S. Ct ruling in
Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate personal liability against the Court and or
Judges themselves for so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la Mausert's in
Solano County, I believe, in California, would be very interesting...Still haven't heard
anything from the Reno PD about the various complaints I have filed with them in
writing related to the wrongful arrests, excessive force and other misconduct
committed against me, though they did arrest me the other day for calling
911incident to some domestic violence for which I was granted to Extended
Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent Sigfree ordered that
arrest, as he did two days prior when he ordered a custodial arrest of me for
"jaywalking".
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Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the
following one:
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
We're sorry the following problem was found during review
of your submitted report T11005956:
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER
THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S
SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a
"Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the existence of
such an RPD Officer...
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE
OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED."
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What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD
(a couple of which asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked
why RDP Officer Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where Richard Hill signed a
Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for
the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for the
"use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS 118A.460
may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord,
though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was arrested twice by the
Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.
Actually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's
license. He refused to provide it to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called
the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state issued
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind
of useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up,
he went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter
telling me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia
(Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the
wrong way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was
not headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over,
then he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer
Carter admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh,
well, anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role.
But upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him
money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent
immediately informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was
sure that was not happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away
his comments about Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing
them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a
license attorney getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in
that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada
under SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license
to practice law, or worse...) is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too
quick to dismiss my reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the RPD
Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I
complained of, and I don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take RPD
Officer Carter at his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for
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jaywalking (by a trainee RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of
$160 emptied my bank account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully
filming from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had
submitted bills in courts records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage
moving and inventorying" found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my
own plywood at the property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the
screws holding up the plywood exposed to exterior of the property where anyone
could easily unscrew them, and also leaving in a window unit ac secured only by
ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in
$8,000 at least of my personal property being burglarized from my former home law
office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal
property found therein (and my client's files, which arguably are not even my
property, but rather, the client's property). Hill went on to place what he believes to
be my social security number in court records, on purpose, despite his signing an
Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case (attaching a two
page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his contractor Phil Howard both
committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the
contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under penalty of
perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie he makes (he makes me
out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human being in his filings
when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services
where they went behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and
banged on window extremely loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging
on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big
equipment saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ132q2O7DY
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck
baring his personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car,
handcuffed, outside my former law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the
1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal
Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the
names of prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at
my arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my defense attorney and
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filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest
reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist
with Nevada Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as
"associated with" their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers
face against fee sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out
of defending my case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that
being required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw
from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the
same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's
Office, which defends actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its
Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest
lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all of
the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
So, that's what attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom
most recently was employed with the Reno City Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his
squad car last summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles.
He veered across the road and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did
some other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred
right in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told
me I was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one
NV Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
despite my bike actually having such a light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him
a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising
some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on
1/12/12. But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some
sense into Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had
me arrested and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days
later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were
laughing menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been
chased up to my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something
I had to do because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost
earnings due to all these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned
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above...also these housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of
my tires were slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property
stolen, coffee thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc.,
etc...And despite the housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal
abuse being listed amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told
me he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like,
where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a
laugh to his fellow RPD Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force
against me. I guess he was helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor
with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-Trial
Services to forever deny me an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set forth
in statute (30 year resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice
law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a surprise to me that
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of her
witnesses or that her fellow Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to
me about whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had any
documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the month before my
arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent productions of discovery tend to
indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did have those materials at the time. I
could be wrong about some of this...But that would require and awful lot of
coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the
electronic Communications Privacy Act 18 U S C 2510-2521 and may contain
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confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not
the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and
that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the
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product, or other applicable privilege.
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Contact
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 16:10:24 +0000
March 16, 2012
Zachary Coughlin
Dear Zach,
Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill.
From your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be.
Please call me ASAP so that we can take the appropriate action to help
you and to stop these types of disturbing complaints.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384
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RE: more on the way
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 3:15 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Zach,
I would appreciate it if you would simply call me.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel 7753281384
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 3:00 PM
To: Patrick King; David Clark; Glenn Machado
Subject: more on the way
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
RE: Gessin ghostwriting issue
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 9:28 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
Goof Morning Mr. Coughlin,
Yes, I did suggest some urgency in having a meeting with you. I would like to have an opportunity to sit
down and talk with you. Please let me know if you are agreeable to meet with me on an informal basis
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so we can talk about the process that has been initiated.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 3281384.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 3:25 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: Gessin ghostwriting issue
Dear Mr. King,
I do not understand. I provided you a ton of information and documentation in my Response to Hill's
grievance, and, after emailing me six hours prior to the deadline to do so saying you already received
my Response (which you had not, and which I had informed you that you had not but would be
recieving it), you know call and or write me less than a day after receiving my voluminous Response and
want to meet urgently. This sends a strong message that you did not put much time into analyzing my
response, which would tend to indicate such a meeting would lack traditional due process protections,
would it not? I have already been attacked by a Character and Fitness Committee member while he
owned the Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas, and where the Committee promised to get me the
names of "three attorneys who will handle your case on a pro se basis" but where only one name was
provided, and that name wound up being and attorney would extracted soem approximately $7,000 i his
fees and the fees of a gambling addiction specialist (both of whom admitted to being extremely close
personal friends of Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, Esq. who then owned the
Spearmint Rhino strip club. Next, Christiansen and Sanft bungled several deadlines and client
confidences related to extremely sensitive information, whereupon, finally, Director of Admissions
Eichman made the unilateral decision to refrain from submitting my case for review, despite her receipt
of my Request for Reconsideration. Finally, Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly Huff wrote me explaing
that I had failed to provide their office with the Request for Reconsideration that I sent it on 9/15/03,
despite my having fax confirmation proof of this and despite a subsequent copy of the file provided by
Christiansen's office proving they had recieved such a Request, and that is was received by them on
9/15/03. I do not mean to be standoffish, Mr. King, but it is what it is. How Ms. Eichman's rationale for
her action is different than what any attorney might say upon blowing some deadline or otherwise
having a client's file fall behind a filing cabinet for a couple years, is really not at all clear to me.
As to my official address with the State Bar and receiving my mail, the USPS is likely going to be sued
for the handling of my mail, should it become clear that any client matters where prejudiced in light of
what has been deplorable conduct by the station involved.
Further, as to Hill's Motion for Order To Show Cause, please see the attached copy of Hill's application
for an Order of Protection, then compare it to Hill's other filings wherein he suddenly backs off his
assertion that I was "climbing on the contractor's truck". Hill lied when he wrote that. I did not climb
on anybody's truck. Hill merely did not want me to film all that he was throwing away, especially given
that he was throwing away unique items that had both monetary and sentimental value and because he
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had no good reason for refusing to allow me to take those items other than spite and an attempt to get
me to sign away my security deposit, which Hill still has not returned. Further, Hill is not licensed under
the FDCPA as a debt collector yet attempts to so practice, as such, this grievance should focus on that
as well. Hill needs to answer for his lies about me allegedly "making contact" with him, about me
allegedly "climbining on the contractors truck", about his abusing the TPO process to gain advantage in
a litigation (ie, to prevent evidence collection and discovery), about his abuse of process in seeking to
get me arrested and signing a criminal complaint where service of the evictio order was insufficient, and
regardless, Hill had vitiated its import anyway by billing me for the same amount as the "full use and
occupancy" (and I have a video of Hilll admitting to this and his firms 11/10/11 letter admits to that as
well. Further, as for his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as it relates to an alleged contempt on my
part in failing to abide by the 1/11/12 Order from in CV11-03628, well, NRCP 6(e) requires that 3 days
for mailing be accorded even for electronic filings. As such, any activity on my part of 1/12/12 clearly is
irrelevant as service was not effectuated at that point and there is not allegation that any "personal
service" was undertaken. That being the case, here is another basis for grievance against Hill,
especially his continually filing documents not based in fact or law, as here.
Some more regarding Hill's grievance. Hill clearly attempts to mislead when he suggest that the
Supplemental I filed in the Carpentier's foreclosure defense matter was incorrectly filed there. Clearly, I
intended to file it there and the attached email I sent to Hill explains clearly why I copied him on it
(because I foresaw Hill filign a Bar grievance for "ex parte communications" based upon some idea that
arguments made in one case that bare some connection to another case would be a basis for Hill crying
foul, and, as seen in Hill's "ghostwriting" grieviance, its a very low standard for crying foul that Richard
has, which is typical of all the most feckless attorneys. That email indicated to Hill and his staff:
One, I would like to reserve my objection to "Good Samiritan" Richard G. Hill purporting to file
grievances on behalf of the public in general or Mr. Gessin, or whoever it is Richard is doing this for. I
suspect Richard is doing this for the same reason he does so many other things: to keep opposing
counsel busy with responding to all spineless paper pushing that Richard G. Hill is so very well known for
throughout Northern Nevada legal circles. Nonetheless, important issues are brought up in Mr. Hill's
grievance. To a great extent, I foresaw these issues long ago and attempted to address them
appropriately. I often get clients who are on their third or fourth attorney. Mr. Gessin was one such
client. By that time they all want to sue their former attorneys, and feel quite burned by the fees they
have paid. Mr. Gessin was a good example of this and he wished to proceed on an unbundled services
arrangement, or a flat fee per motion/opposition/pleading basis, etc. From the very, very long time
that went by between my passing the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination and being admitted to practice
in March of 2005, the issue of the legality of ghostwriting for pro se litigants was something I was
somewhat aware of, but I don't believe I ever did. I am somewhat disappointed that I was not
industrious enough to get anywhere close to doing such a thing but mostly I was just so demoralized by
not having a license and from the rape that the character and fitness committee and Kelly, and
Christiansen and Eichman et al committed upon me that I mostly just worked for Thomas J. Hall, Esq.
for about $0.89 per hour (just kidding, I love Tom) doing legal research in the Washoe County Law
Library while the librarians glared at me and let me know how very disappointed they were that I, or
any member of the public, really, had interrupted their solitude.
So now it seems there is a tough situation where, on one hand, as a now licensed attorney, there is
some taboo to "ghostwriting" (necessitating such lucrative activities as responding to grievances filed by
opposing counsel like Richard G. Hill, Esq.....and I sure hope you will countenance the grievances I am
filing against Hill, Christiansen, Sanft, Kevin Kelly, Eichman, etc, with the same seriousness that your are
taking Richard G. Hills. I notice Richard G. Hill, Esq. has a funny way of being able to get the police
(and some others that I probably shouldn't mention) to take his complaints just a little bit more seriously
than they take others. I would also like to file a grievance against all three of the public defenders I
have been appointed in the trespass case in Reno Municipal Court for 11 CR 26405, Lew Taitel, Roberto
Puentes, and Keith Loomis. Each have thoroughly failed to zealously advocate on my behalf, with
Loomis calling my arguments vis a vis the procedural requirements for serving eviction orders in
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thoroughly contested summary eviction proceedings "frivolous" despite being provided the attached 22
page memorandum detailing those arguments and despite the procedures requiring as much set forth in
the Anvui decision of the Nevada Supreme Court. I would also like to file a greivance against Deputy
Reno City Attorney Ormaas for her blase indication that she cared not about any admission of bribery on
the part of Reno Police Officer Chris Carter, and that she would not be following up on that, even where
it bared some relation to the citation in 11 TR 26800 issued by Sargent Tarter, for which I cross
examined Sargent Tarter as to whether he did so in retaliation for my reporting Officer Carters
admission of accepting bribes from Richard G. Hill. Instead, I believe Deputy City Attorney Ormaas and
City of Reno Marshal Hiney (the spelling might be a bit off) conspired to have Judge Nash Holmes have
me arrested for summary contempt in Order to obtain my cell phones, which upon information and
belief, Ormaas and Hiney believe might contain "evidence" of misconduct on both of their parts. Hiney
attempted to serve me Notice of Hearing on Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the
Richard G. Hill, Esq. eviction matter (one of three instances of "triple jeopardy" Hill has me facing
here....this Bar grievance, the criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405, and, actually, multiple Orders to Show
Cause (one in the Trial Court in RJC Rev201--001708 and one in the associated Appeal in CV11-
03628). However, the actual Affidavit of Service that the WCSO filed for the Notice of Hearing Marshal
Hiney attempted to serve me (please inquire with Chief Marshal Roper, perhaps?) was actually signed by
the same WCSO Deputy Machem that swore, under oath, in his 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service in the
eviction case RJC REv2011--001708 that he "personally served" the Order of Summary Eviction. The
attached 22 page memorandum sent to various individuals and the admission of WCSO Civil Section
Supervisor Liz Stuchell that, in their mind, "personally served" can mean a lot of things that it has never
meant in any legal settings, is provided for background. I also wish this to begin a grievance against
Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts for what I believe may be several violations on her part of the
rules relative to prosecutorial misconduct, especially those involving suborning perjury, including that of
Officer Kameron Crawfor saying in 11 CR 22176, that I did not provide him my drivers license, and
therefor issuing me a citation would not be an option, but rather, my failure to provide my driver's
license buttressed his proable cause finding justifying a search incident to arrest. However, Roberts, in
11 CR 22176 and later on appeal in CR11-2064, had in her possession Wal-Mart AP video from the
interrogation room clearly showing me providing Officer Kameron Crawford my driver's license and other
evidence supports a finding that he had it (including dispatch reports and the information culled by
Officer Kameron from the driver's license and placed on the arrest report, which Officer Crawford later
lied about, saying he got that information at the WCSO, which is clearly contrary to established protocol
and privacy policies). One more grievance against Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens for
lying to me on the phone about whether the City of Reno had the arrest report from the September 9,
2011 arrest at Wal-mart from the Reno Sparks Indian Colony in 11 CR 22176. I wish for all of these
grievances to go forward now, but I may provide supplementary materials in support thereof later.
Additionally, she has the "purchased receipt" that showed it had the very UPC number that both
Frontino and Crawford swore under oath that it did not.
Barrie Althoff, Limiting the Scope of Your Representation: When Your Client Wants, or Can Afford, Only
Part of You, Washington State Bar News (Jun. 1997).
Anthony P. Capozzi, Responding to the Pro Per Crisis, California Bar Journal (Feb 2004).
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics,
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2007).
Kim Prochnau, Slicing the Onion: Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules Make It Easier for
Private and Non-Profit Legal Practitioners to Provide "Unbundled" Legal Services, Washington State Bar
News (Apr. 2003).
Bradley A. Vauter, Unbundling: Filling the Gap, Michigan Bar Journal, Vol. 79, at 1688 (2000).
Books and Reports
Caught in the Middle: 2003 Report and Recommendations of the North Carolina Bar Association Pro Se
Task Force (Dec. 2003).
Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in the New Hampshire Courts, New
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Hampshire Supreme Court Task Force on Self-Representation (Jan. 2004).
Ethics Issues Regarding the Concept of Unbundled Legal Services (Memorandum), Rob Bare, Nevada
State Bar (Mar. 31, 1999).
Family Law Limited Representation Risk Management Materials, Limited Representation Committee,
California Commission on Access to Justice (January 12, 2004).
Handbook on Limited Scope Legal Assistance, ABA Section of Litigation (2003).
Pro Se Litigants: The Challenge of the Future, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department Pro
Se Committee Report (Dec. 1999).
Report and Recommendations on "Unbundled" Legal Services, Commission on Providing Access to Legal
Services for Middle Income Consumers, New York State Bar Association (Dec. 2002).
Report of the Unbundled Legal Services Special Committee II, Florida Bar Association (Jul. 26, 2002).
Report on Limited Scope Legal Assistance with Initial Recommendations, Limited Representation
Committee of the California Commission on Access to Justice (Oct. 2001). Appendix
Self Represented Litigants in the Virginia Court System, Supreme Court of Virginia Pro Se Litigation
Planning Committee, Enhancing Access to Justice Report (Sept. 2002).
Unbundling Legal Services: A Guide to Delivering Legal Services a la Carte, Forrest S. Mosten, American
Bar Association (2000).
Cases
Melvin Finance, Inc. v. Artis, 157 N.C. App. 716, 2003 WL 21153426 (N.C.App.)
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover
costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney agreed to file responsive pleadings and
negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant
received notice of a scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither
defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an arbitration award was entered for
the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the limited representation attorneys failure to appear at the hearing amounted to
excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found that since the defendant
received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited
representation attorneys conduct did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was
affirmed.
Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994)
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual
and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff enters limited appearance on behalf of his official
capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity.
Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities.
Entering such limited appearance is not competent and zealous representation as required by ethical
rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting
of documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants
unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater
latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys
by statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation of pro se status in
violation of ethical rules.
Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules
of a federal court by lending some assistance to friends, family members, and others with whom she
shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro
se litigant's pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents.
Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present legal arguments with the actual or
constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in
extensive, undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without
professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
Sharp v. Sharp, 2006 WL 3088067 (Va.Cir.Court)
Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se
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during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery, but then hired an attorney who appeared in a
limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the
attorney could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorneys appearance qualified him as
official "attorney of record". The court found that it was not bound by agreements made between client
and attorney and that a court may "require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical
constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct". The court found that the attorney could make a
motion to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the court had ultimate discretion
in granting the withdrawal.
Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal.App. 4th 441 (2000)
In a lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel of record requested that another firm make a "special appearance" at a
summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice
suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an
attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance
represents the clients interests and has a professional attorney-client relationship with the client.
Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true "special
appearance".
Court Rules
Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81, expressly permits limited appearances and governs attorney
withdrawal.
Arizona
Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 9(B), governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in
family law proceedings.
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 5.2, governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in
vulnerable adult exploitation actions. California
California Family and Juvenile Rules 5.71, governs application to be relieved as counsel.
California Civil Rule 3.36, governs notice and application to be relieved as attorney.
Colorado
Colorado Rule of County Court 311(b), requires lawyers to disclose assistance in document preparation
but clarifies that such disclosure does not create an entry of appearance.
Delaware
Delaware Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), governs limited appearance, service and attorney
withdrawal in family law matters.
Florida
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.040, governs Limited Appearance, Withdrawal or
Limiting Appearance, Scope of Representation, Preparation of Pleadings or Other Documents, Notice of
Limited Appearance, and Service.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.750, governs the operation of self-help programs within family
courts.
Iowa
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
z RCP 1.404(3), expressly permitting limited appearances so long as the court is notified;
z RCP 1.404(4), governing termination of limited appearance;
z RCP 1.423, requiring lawyers who prepare pleadings in limited representation to sign them and
clarifying that signing a pleading does not constitute an appearance;
z RCP 1.442(2), establishing the requirements for service on attorney who has made a limited
appearance.
Maine
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c), explicitly allows limited representation and allows a lawyer to
file a limited appearance if the client consents in writing.
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Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governs limited appearances.
Missouri
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16 (c), governs attorney withdrawal for limited representation.
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 55.03, permits a lawyer to draft pleadings without disclosure and
clarifies appearance and withdrawal of attorney in limited representation.
Nebraska
Nebraska RPC 501.2, governs limited representation, attorney assisted document preparation and
attorney withdrawal.
Nevada
Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Rule 5.28 requires signed
pleadings, notice of the limited representation to the court and governs the procedure for withdrawal.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
z RCP 3, requiring that pleadings and communication be furnished to both client and limited
representation attorney until withdrawal of limited appearance;
z RCP 17, governing appearance, attorney withdrawal and document preparation assistance.
New Mexico
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct 16-303(E), requires lawyer to disclose scope of
representation to court.
Utah
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 74(b), governs attorney withdrawal following limited appearance.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75, expressly permits limited appearances after client consents in writing.
Vermont
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 79.1(1), governs appearance, withdrawal and service.
Vermont Rule of Family Procedure 15(h) governs limited appearances, withdrawal and service in family
law matters.
Washington
Washington Civil Rule 4.2, expressly permits a limited entry of appearance.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 4.2, governs limited appearances.
Washington Civil Rule 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented
party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the
self-represented party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule 70.1, expressly allows limited appearances in litigation.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 70.1, expressly allowing limited appearances in litigation.
Wisconsin
Milwaukee County Family Division Rule 5.6 expressly permits limited appearances.
Wyoming
The Uniform Rules of the District Court of the State of Wyoming, Rule 102 governs appearance and
withdrawal for unbundled representation.
Ethics Opinions
Los Angeles Cnty Bar Ass'n Prof. Resp. and Ethics Comm. Ethics Op. 483
An attorney may limit the attorney's services by agreement with a pro per litigant to consultation on
procedures and preparation of pleadings to be filed by the client pro per. A litigant may be either self-
represented or represented by counsel, but not both at once, unless approved by the court. In order for
attorney to specially appear on behalf of the litigant before the court for a limited purpose, the attorney
should comply with all applicable court rules and procedures of the particular tribunal.
Delaware State Bar Assn Op 2006-1
A lawyer may be required to perform beyond the term of a limited scope representation agreement if
the Court requested, or the Clients circumstance warranted such action. In most circumstances, an
agreement to withdraw from representation would not violate any ethics requirement as long as the
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lawyer provides adequate advice to Client concerning the scope of representation. In family court, the
Courts permission may be needed to withdraw from simple divorce petitions in certain circumstances.
D.C. Bar Op. 330 (2005)
Unbundling of legal services is permissible under D.C. Rule 1.2 ( c ), provided the client is fully informed
of the limits on the scope of the representation and these limits do not prevent the provision of
competent service. If a party is proceeding pro se, opposing counsel should treat that party as
unrepresented unless and until that counsel receives reasonable notice of representation from the party
or her lawyer.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n Prof. Conduct Comm. Op. 849 (1983; Affirmed 1991)
An attorney may agree in advance with his or her client to limit the scope of the attorney's
representation and draft pleadings without appearing or taking any part in any of the proceeding itself,
provided that the client gives his or her fully informed consent to such limitation of employment and the
attorney takes whatever steps may be necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights.
Maine State Bar Ethics Opinion No. 89 (1988)
A lawyer is not required to sign a complaint or enter an appearance as counsel of record when
representation is solely limited to preparation of the complaint.
Missouri Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. 940161
It is impermissible for a lawyer to draft responsive pleadings to an unrepresented opposing party in a
divorce. However, a lawyer may draft an entry of appearance if the lawyer includes a letter indicated
that he or she represents the opposing party and that the unrepresented party should obtain counsel.
New York State Bar Ass'n Op. 613 (1990)
A lawyer who does not appear as counsel of record for a pro se litigant may prepare responsive
pleadings and demands for financial disclosure, provided the lawyer investigates the matter adequately.
North Carolina State Bar RPC 114 (1991)
Legal services attorneys may provide legal advice and drafting assistance to pro se litigants without
appearing as counsel of record. If court approved pleading forms exist, attorneys may make them
available to individuals wishing to proceed pro se.
Bd. of Prof. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Op. 2005-F-151
Attorneys may offer limited representation through a pro se clinic if they obtain clients consent,
preferably in writing. Attorneys may draft proceedings for clients, if the attorney notifies the Court that
counsel has assisted a pro se litigant. The phrase "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel" is
recommended for inclusion on such pleadings in a prominent manner. Attorneys who draft proceedings
need not appear and represent the client.
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm. Op. 08-01 (2008)
A lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing before tribunals pro se and help them
prepare written submissions without disclosing or ensuring the disclosure to others of the nature or
extent of such assistance. Undertaking to provide limited legal help does not generally alter any other
aspect of the attorneys professional responsibilities to the client.
As to the ghostwriting, its tough, because, for clients who want to pay very little (after, say, in Gessin's
case he paid McKenna allegedly $15K to wind up with an Order from an Arbitrator and District Court
Judge denying a Trial De Novo based upon a bad faith failure to participate in litigation in one case, then
in the other, Gessin paid Hill something like $20K only to be slammed car crash style into settlement by
Hill's advice when Gessin couldn't stomach paying anymore of HIll's fees, settling for the amount
originally sought by Mr. Hall's client). So, clients like that want a deal, want to pay piece meal or go the
unbundled route, but filing all those Motions to Withdraw, and Proposed Orders, and Affidavits, add to
the costs where the fee is not really being increased any. There is much literature dealing with this:
Please accept this as a supplement to the grievance filed by Richard Hill, Esq. My recollection of my
involvement with Gessin is that I filed two Answers to very similar Adversary Complaints in NVB and two
Motions to Dismiss in those same cases, involving the two women represented by Glade Hall, Esq., both
on an "unbundled services" basis, and the pleadings themselves indicated the were filed as
an "unbundled service". This was my first filign in NVB, and I was not registered or trained as an
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electronic filer at that point. Further, Gessin hired me to provide other unbundled services, inlcuding
writing (and, to my understanding at the time, filing under my own signature) something in the vein of a
NRCP Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment from judgments in cases involving the same two
women Taitano ne Moore, and Rissone, both, again, represented by Glade Hall, Esq.
It may be the case that Richard Hill is correct that I was goign against some rule or law by sending one
demand letter to Glade Hall concerning an outstanding $500 sanction aware. I believe I drafted an
Order To Show Cause for this, but am not sure it was filed by me. About the time I provided Gessin my
signed final draft of that and a few other closely related motions, he pretty much wanted to part ways, I
believe. I think this was around mid-November and there was some issues with Richard HIll withholding
my client files, some of which may have included Gessin's, then Hill would say he would give me my
client files without any demands or lien needing satisfying prior to doing so, and that he would do the
same with my wallet and identification, but then he would change his mind and demand what to me
seems that I satisfy a rent distraint that has been outlawed by NRS 118A.520 (though there is a very old
BK case, circa 1980 or so that may suggest such distraints are still permissible against commercial
tenants, and my hybrid, home law office situation, plus the fact that I do still have a business license for
Zachary Coughlin's Memory Foam Mattresses (something I started during the 4 years I was hoping to
get a law license and finding employment very, very difficult to obtain, during which Mike Rowe wrote
me stern letters, Pete Christiansen and Mike Sanft -ignored me and shewed me to their legal assistant
Kelly Huff, and Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann made the unilateral decision to ignore the
Request for Reconsideration of my Application for Admission that I timely submitted on 9 15 03 in
connection with the end of the deferment period set forth in the Court's December 2002 Order....) and
at least some research and development was ongoing in that regard. Whether I was a commercial or
residential tenant was an important issue in the eviction matter and the mixed use of the property likely
only made the statute all the more difficult to interpret.
However, I do recall that Gessin told me he withdrew his bankruptcy, so that may negate Hill's assertion
that I was wrongful in sending a demand letter to Hall regarding the old sanction and or filing a Motion
for Order To Show Cause. Gessin is a crafty guy, though I am not sure I entirely share Hill's view of
him. However, Hill apparently received about $20-25K in attorney's fees from Gessin in a case that the
plaintiff was only seeking about $25K in to begin with, and upon Gessin ceasing to be willing to pay Hill
and Baker for more litigating, they promptly suggested he settle for something near $30K (which, of
course, was upsetting to Gessin, in a manner that is similar to how Dr. Merliss seems to feel in the
eviction matter). But, to be fair to Hill, those parties likely bare some responsibility for choosing to take
the risky path that is litigation.
Gessin also became a registered efiler about the time he basically terminated my representation of him.
My email to Gessin below shows that I was somewhat suspicious of the fact that he seemed to all the
sudden want to go our separate ways after I had been working on these very involved (to me at the
time they seemed really involved) NRCP 60(b) Motions, and it is ironic, somewhat that Hill accuses me
of ghostwriting because my email to Gessin essentially anticipates that, and, to some extent, my later
filing Notices of Appearance as Attorney of Record in several of Gessin's various cases involving these
two women was done to attempt to counteract any appearance of that. Gessin seemed upset that I
filed those appearances, and actually got very pushy about me trying to undo them, and eager to avoid
prejudicing his ability to file timely 60(b) motions, I undertook to do what I could to make it so he could
file on his own (ie, having an Attorney of Record on one's case often results in the filing office refusing
to let them file anything on their own...).
On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 I wrote to John Gessin's email address the following:
"To: John Gessin <jd.gman@yahoo.com>
John,
Here is Van Lydegraf's voice message. Again, I have not talked to him and I forwarded you the only email or
writing I ever sent him. I am leaning towards filing an Errata on your cases today to get it so I am not attorney
of record. Which do you prefer? I am not sure which would accomplish your goals quicker, but keep in mind,
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RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
I believe a Motion to Withdraw is the typical thing, not a Notice of Withdrawal? Have you found any research
in this regard? Please indicate in writing which you prefer or the preferred manner you would like to see me
pursue accomplishing your goals, which, to my understanding, include being in pro per on this case. I sense
you are uncomfortable, but please know I maintain extremely high fidelity to my clients, unbundled or
otherwise, okay? I am unsure how me filing the 60b's etc would have been much different with respect to
what you seem upset about...did you never intend for me to file? Were you looking for a "ghost writer"? I
was not of the understanding that I was being hired as a "ghostwriter" and I do recall some indication that such
a thing is either prohibited or discouraged by the Rules of Professional Responsibility....Regardless, the most
important thing is to avoid prejudicing your case, and I feel I have made great efforts to achieve that. If you
want to file something, just do it, don't wait for any withdrawal, etc. I will make all reasonable efforts to see
that you are allowed to file whenever and whatever you want, and not be weighed down by any attorney of
record designation.
Sincerely,"
I currently have a Motion to Withdraw pending in the two Adversary Proceedings where I believe I was
incorrectly listed as Attorney of Record for Gessin.
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Wed 3/21/12 11:35 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice
law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if
there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions
without the benefit of actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
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RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've
been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone
if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of
material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one
hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply
to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters or why
Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by making
completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 10:50 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
Good Morning Mr. Coughlin,
I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please
come see me as soon as you can.
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Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 2:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it
deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If you can give me some time, it
would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing
important work that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to
this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally questionable manner in
which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD
Sargents more than District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human
beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me.
My representation is very important to his life. He is a committed father who has
been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received
something like $500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that
less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and
myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me some time to tend to the immediate
need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy"
abuse of process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's
interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the phone or meet in person. My
two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC
Judge Nash Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me
by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all reasonable steps to counter that,
including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's
online portal days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The
Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS Golden Valley Station
supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play
judge and jury incident to a complicated eviction process that I have recently been
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litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada Management
and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western
Nevada Management knew of and orchestrated, and received approval from the Park
Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E. 9th
St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at
Park Terrace. For some reason, when her boss found out about this, she started
crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned.
This was litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I
filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these things, yet they want to turn
right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction
despite the facts not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc.,
etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to
explain why this week or the immediate future would prevent a hardship for me with
regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my
respect for you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the
realities faced by businesses subject to summary evictions where the non payment of
rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS
40.253, but for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in
three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me
facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of processes, etc. I have a hearing on that
this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey
blow a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos
(whom had to admit under oath, that he had previously "lost" other student's papers
in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by
Anderson and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also,
Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's paper in that 2002 Cyber Law
course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote
me asking for "another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he
went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about etc., clearly implying he
did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social
security number, etc. (he had a student in the class who worked for his firm,
he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was utilized in
every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing
that the State Bar of Nevada had allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of
the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has ever
been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in
Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney Pete Christiansen (and so did not
appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom
was referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns
the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the time. I believe in Senator
Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process
too.
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Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice law. I would like to
meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benefit of
actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and
we've been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can
talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot.
Bye "
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RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great
deal of material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take
you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a
Reply to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters
or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me
by making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 10:17 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy emails and
apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the
State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also
from Judges from different Courts. These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law. As I have explained to you, I will make the
evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office. I will not send
you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
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required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the
information you have submitted.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining
professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
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misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney,
acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify
debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that
debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors.
11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the various
grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary of the content
of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and telephone communciatiosn
with Richard Hill or anyone with his office. Further, please state whether Casey
Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to create
"busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 10:56 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Please come to see me and I will show you the letter and documents from the Court.
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Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed
or alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof
related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only
now bringing up.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy emails and
apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the
State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also
from Judges from different Courts. These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law. As I have explained to you, I will make the
evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office. I will not send
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you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the
information you have submitted.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
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16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct
defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where
attorney, acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify
debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known,
that debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by
debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the
various grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary
of the content of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and
telephone communciatiosn with Richard Hill or anyone with his office.
Further, please state whether Casey Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill
asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to
create "busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
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RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 12:08 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
March 23, 2012
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Just moments ago I received an email letter from the Clerk of the Court in
Department 3. She said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes
and were demanding and argumentative. Apparently I will be receiving a report
from the Marshals. As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However,
my primary responsibility is to protect the public and the administration of
justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required
of the profession. It appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to
get you assistance that may protect your license to practice law. I would sure
appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that
may help you through this difficult time.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed
or alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof
related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only
now bringing up.
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Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy emails and
apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the
State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also
from Judges from different Courts. These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law. As I have explained to you, I will make the
evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office. I will not send
you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the
information you have submitted.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
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From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct
defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where
attorney, acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify
debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known,
that debtors did not
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sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by
debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the
various grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary
of the content of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and
telephone communciatiosn with Richard Hill or anyone with his office.
Further, please state whether Casey Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill
asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to
create "busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
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where to pay and how much
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 10:44 PM
To: plongoni@charter.net
Dear Ms. Longoni,
I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this appeal
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176. Further,
I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide specific detailed
instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or
exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete
this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named
recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
no reply from Transcriptionist
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
000080
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file:///R|/...1%20email%20to%20ballardd@reno.gov%20regarding%20longoni%2022176%2026800%200204%200435.htm[11/16/2012 4:21:20 PM]
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the address to
which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is the email address filing
office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for sending correspondence and
filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the email address I was provided for RMC
"official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a "return to sender/failed transmission" message when
I wrote to the email address provided for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the
forwarded email below that I sent to Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her
regarding my recent messages to her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I must
get the transcript through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC. Please
confirm that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the official
transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept any
filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11 CR22176 2I
or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I paid into the court. If
this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure that my appeal goes forward,
please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I am able to use any other
transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact information, please provide such in
writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
000081
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confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or
exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
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this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named
recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: plongoni@charter.net
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,
I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this appeal
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176. Further,
I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide specific detailed
instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or
exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete
this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named
recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
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note: Coughlin's
property
lists his
driver's
license
despite RSIC
Officer
Crawford's
testimony
11/30/11
11CR22176
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Tribal Police not allowed to arrest for misdemeanors FW:
Case No. RCR2011-063341
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 8:40 AM
To: homerj@reno.gov (homerj@reno.gov); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org);
hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov (hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov); robertsp@reno.gov
(robertsp@reno.gov); kadlicj@reno.gov (kadlicj@reno.gov); fflaherty@dlpfd.com
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org
(tsusich@nvdetr.org); wongd@reno.gov (wongd@reno.gov); ormaasa@reno.gov
(ormaasa@reno.gov); bonyr@reno.gov (bonyr@reno.gov); skauc@reno.gov (skauc@reno.gov);
davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); drakej@reno.gov (drakej@reno.gov); je@eloreno.com
(je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com
(mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com)
How exactly is it that both City Attorney Pamela Roberts, Esq. and Chris Hazlett-
Stevens, Esq. did not violate RPC 3.8 or otherwise prosecute for arrests that were not
lawful
in RMC 11 CR 22176 (Indian Tribe police custodial arrest for misdemeanor? Not
lawful under NRS 171.1255, and even if they were RPD, which they are not, its not like
they charge Coughlin with something other than petty larceny a la NRS 171.136(2)...
Further, can you provide me an indication of how it was lawful for RSIC Officer's
Kameron Crawford or Donnie Braunworth to arrest me on 9/9/11 (and Wal-Mart's
Thomas Frontino made explicitly clear in his testimony at trial on 11/30/11 that neither
he nor any of Wal-Mart's staff in any way effected a custodial arrest of Coughlin on that
date) for a misdemeanor given the following:
NRS 171.1255 Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police officer employed by Indian
tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or a
person employed as a police officer by an Indian tribe may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant
delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officer or agents presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officer
or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or agent has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
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(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor
by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person
for a public offense, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested
is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace officer finds evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
2. Such an officer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense committed on that
reservation or colony; or
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or agent is in fresh
pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by the officer or agent to have committed a felony
within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to commit, any
criminal offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 171.156.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 452)
While Ormaas made sure to get judicial notice taken of jurisdiction in 11 TR 26800, it doesn't seem
Pamela Roberts, Esq. did in the Indian Colony Wal-Mart matter...Why is that, Pam? Tribal land? Never
determined if Coughlin had even an ounce of tribal blood? RSIC Officers not entitled to make custodial
arrests for misdemeanors, even, apparently, one's committed right in their presence? So, even if
Coughlin did refuse to provide his driver's license (which has been proven to be a lie, and perjury
suborned by Pam Roberts as to the testimony of Wal-Mart's Frontino and the RSIC Officer's Crawford
and Braunworth via police reports, dispatch recordings (AND PLEASE BE ADIVSED, AS ITS WITHIN THE
2 YEARS, THAT THE CITY OF RENO, THE SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER FOR ECOMM OR WASHOE
COUNTY, OR WHOEVER IT IS THAT HANDLES THE RSIC DISPATCH CALLS, IT ON A LITIGATION HOLD
NOTICE. COUGHLIN DEMANDS (AND THE DISPATCH/ECOMM SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER WILL GET
ITS NRS 174.345 SUBPOENA IN THE MAIL FOR A MISDEMEANOR SOON ENOUGH) THAT THE
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS MAINTAIN ANY AND ALL RECORDINGS, LOGS, OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION
OR MEDIA IN ANY WAY CONNECTED TO ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER,
ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE ARREST OF 9/9/11 AT THE RSIC WAL-MART IN RENO NEVADA
NEAR GLENDALE AND W. 2ND ST.
So, all these arrests by the RSIC police of alleged shoplifters at Wal-Mart...Sling Bla...er, Officer
Braunworth testified that there was lots of them (sounds like Wal-Mart and the RSIC have the whole
"find a way to get a search incident to arrest" thing down part, while avoiding any wrongful arrest
liability against the deep pocket tenant Wal-Mart by avoiding any "shopkeeper's privilege" type citizen's
arrests (or trying to use just as much intimidation and coercion as Frontino and the gang can muster,
while seeking to claim not to have effected a citizen's arrest later in court, given setting the RSIC up to
handle those types of lawsuits is arguably a better long term loss mitigation approach for these long
term business partners, Wal-Mart and their partner/landlord the RSIC.
So, please enlighten me. How is it these RSIC Officers are making all these custodial arrests for simple
misdemeanors? And just where in the audio transcript of the Trial (you might want to have RMC house
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transcriptionist Pam Longoni finally get around to making a transcript and providing it to Coughlin, as
the handouts the RMC itself provides defendants baring Longoni's and the RMC's "down
payment"/transcript hostage rules are tantamount to extortion in violation of NRS 189.030. Then there
is the bit about the RMC and or other discovering over $700K was "missing", and the attempts to chalk
it up to "data entry" errors. Please get that transcript to me right away, and transcripts of every other
hearing I have ever had in the RMC, including the one on or around February 2nd, 2012 or so where
RMC court appointed defender Roberto Puentes successfully argued for an Order Granting His
Withdrawal (five Withdrawals by court appointed counsel of Coughlin, four via an Order Granting a duly
filed Motion (though these guy's Motions wouldn't pass my 7th grade English Class's bi-weekly writing
assignment in my days at Swope Middle School) and Hon. W. Gardner starts to divulge, only after
Coughlin's prompting, bit by bit some of the patent conflicts that should have prevented him from ever
ruling on a single motion in that case 11 CR 26405. With such lack of vigor from the RMC's court
appointed defense counsel, could a class action lawsuit agains them, the RMC, and or the City of Reno
be a possibility someday? Certainly is a nice lil side gig $7K a month those guys get...and all these
prosecutions and trips to jail this year certainly have afforded an opportunity to see the "operation" up
close.
Also, you know, as to lots of these arrests, like say the July 3rd, 2012 arrest by RPD Officer Alan
Weaver and now Sargent Brian Dye in 12 CR 12420 (wherein two RMC court appointed counsel have
already sought and obtained Orders Granting Their Withdrawal, one, by Keith Loomis, one by Henry
Sotelo, the latter in violation of the stay in NRS 178.405) the legitimacy of effecting a custodial arrest is
completely suspect considering:
ARREST: BY WHOM AND HOW MADE
NRS 171.124 Arrest by peace officer or officer of Drug Enforcement Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a peace officer or an
officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney General of the United States
for that purpose may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officers presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officers
presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor
by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person
for a public offense, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the
person so named or described.
2. A peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney
General of the United States for that purpose may also, at night, without a warrant, arrest any person
whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing to have committed a felony or gross misdemeanor,
and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appears that a felony or gross misdemeanor
has not been committed.
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So back to the Wal-Mart RSIC arrest...the charge sheet doesn't say Coughlin was arrested for anything
other than petty larceny....but:
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at
any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the
public and:
(1) There is a warrant of arrest against the person; and
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting
officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person
makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;
(e) When the offense charged is battery that constitutes domestic violence pursuant to NRS 33.018 and
the arrest is made in the manner provided in NRS 171.137;
(f) When the offense charged is a violation of a temporary or extended order for protection against
domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS 33.017 to 33.100, inclusive;
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
(h) When the person voluntarily surrenders himself or herself in response to an outstanding warrant of
arrest.
So, on exactly what basis was the July 3rd, 2012 arrest made by the RPD? The police report says the
arrest was made for "disturbing the peace", yet the only allegation of anything remotely in the "officer's
presence" relates to the minor traffic citation the City of Reno is clinging to in attempts to mitigate the
Sec. 1983 damages here. However, the RPD admits at least one vehicle was between their's and
Coughlin's and Sooudi et al (besides making an incomprehensibly stupid decision to briefly file an
amended complaint for trespassing where even the RPD was smart enough to realize that was a poor
choice given Coughlin still had lease at Northwind, and thus a pat claim of right defense to any trespass
allegation absent something like the manufactured protection order that RPD Officer Weaver coerced
Milan Krebs into obtaining, just like Weaver attempted to get Superior Storage's Matt Grant to do,
shortly after Weaver, in full view of Welch, Sargent Miller, and other RPD Officer's, on September 21st,
000096
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2012, threatened to come up with yet another fraudulent "failure to secure a load on one's vehicle"
arrest of Coughlin). So, even though Weaver and Dye are stuck with their statements in the written
reports, wherein they allege to have arrest Coughlin for "disturbing the peace" only to then tack on
"citations" for the two traffic offenses (and the "proof of insurance" citation, even after Officer Weaver
admits to being provided a high definition pdf picture on a 5 inch smart phone screen with a policy
number, etc., only to be amplified by the July 5th, 2012 bail hearing racket tearing (a tennis reference
for Jill Drake, Esq.,... for shame, really Jill, really, really unimpressed).
Please remit a certified check for $450,000 in satisfaction of these torts committed upon Coughlin,
under color of law.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: homerj@reno.gov; complaints@nvbar.org; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov;
kadlicj@reno.gov; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; patrickk@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org
Subject: RE: Case No. RCR2011-063341
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 20:36:27 -0800
couldn't open them, and I don't accept service of anything form you... See Allison
Ormaas comments on 3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 with respect to your offices violation of
the RMC Rules to the extent there is not difference technologically anymore between
an email and a fax:
Rule 5: Motions/Pleadings by Facsimile
A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions/pleadings filed in person at the court shall also apply to motions/pleadings filed by
facsimile, except as otherwise specified in this rule.
B. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile will only be accepted through the clerk's office (775-334-3824).
C. Except by prior court approval, a motion/pleading by facsimile shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages in length, including the cover sheet
and exhibits. A document shall not be split into multiple transmissions to avoid the page limitation.
D. Each transmitted page shall bear sequential numbers in the transmission.
E. All persons are eligible to use motion/pleading-by-facsimile procedures.
F. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet which must include the persons name, address, fax
number and telephone number.
G. All facsimile motions/pleadings filed by an attorney must include the attorney's name, the firms name, address, fax number and
telephone number. In addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously displayed on the cover sheet.
H. All motions /pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service. Service may be accomplished by facsimile when
the receiving party is a governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving party. If service of the
motion/pleading is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day allowance for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
I. A defense attorney filing a motion/pleading in the first instance must also file a proper authorization to represent.
J. Any motion /pleading received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day shall be filed on the following court day.
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Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must
state the reason therefore and whether or not any continuance has previously been sought or granted.
Further, Please consider Pamela Roberts attempts to mislead the Court and opposing counsel where (despite Rich HIll getting a
continuance agree to by then court appointed defense counsel Lew Taitel, whose business partners Coughlin was suing in CV11-03015
and or CV11-03126, Taitel agreed to a continuance, in violation of Coughlin's speedy trial right, where Hill needed to go on a six week
vacation in 11 cr 26405) Roberts at first agreed, in writing, to a continuance in response to Coughlin's request for one in 11 CR 22176, but
then retaliated against Coughlin's pointing out her RPC 3.8 violations on the day of Trial, 11/30/12 by refusing the stipulate to a continuance
an blaming it on the Court.
Pursuant to RMCR Rule 5(H), the City Attorney's Office does not have my consent to service via any means
other than the traditional snail mail, usps, or personal service. And I am not currently included amongst those
who are "attorneys", so you are stuck with that. Your office on the other hand, fits within both the
'governmental agency" and "attorney exceptions"...someone needs to tell Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. that
becuase he has lied numerous times, on the record about not being served where he has been. Take, for
instance
Further, does your office represent any of the RMC's court appointed defenders? Taitel, in 11 CR 26405, failed
to follow RMC Rules in withdrawing from representation:
Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same
with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court
may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
Further, these RMCR's seem to change out of the blue, is there some record of what changes were made and when?
Hazlett-Steven's lies, in part, helped secure a dismissal of my appeal in cr12-1262 (the appeal of the Richard G. Hill eviction trespass
case). Also, you will want to query the RMC's D2 and Lisa Gardner as to why Coughlin has a confirmation of delivery of his timely under
NRS 189.010 Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 26405, yet D2 failed to file it, and the appeal in cr12-1262 was dismissed in light of the combination
of both asserting, in one way or another, that the Notice of Appeal was not received in a timely manner. The delivery confirmations say
otherwise.
Please remit $250,000 in the form of a certified check to the address below within 10 days in settlement of these torts. SBN, please
provide to me the grievance number associate with this new grievance that is created upon the successful transmission of this email.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
000098
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utbound fax report
Inbox x
Jun 27
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 08:54:28 PM on 2012-06-27.
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
This message was intended for renoattorney@gmail.com. Want to control which emails you receive from Voxox?
Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in the Settings/Preferences window. Voxox by
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Jun 27
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 09:16:58 PM on 2012-06-27.
Jun 28
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 08:13:34 AM on 2012-06-28.
Jun 28
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 09:04:24 AM on 2012-06-28.
Jun 28
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 3ad3f15b-3a33-4863-a6cd-7934ec8f8b32general693298 ( 17753343859).
Voxox noreply@voxox.com
to me
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000161
Outlook Print Message
Close Print
where to pay and how much
no reply from Transcriptionist
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 10:44 PM
To: plongoni@charter.net
Dear Ms. Longoni,
I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this appeal
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176.
Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide
specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product
or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete
this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named
recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
000162
Outlook Print Message
Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the address to
which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is the email address
filing office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for sending correspondence and
filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the email address I was provided for RMC
"official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a "return to sender/failed transmission" message when
I wrote to the email address provided for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the
forwarded email below that I sent to Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her
regarding my recent messages to her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I
must get the transcript through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC.
Please confirm that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the
official transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept any
filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11 CR22176 2I
or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I paid into the court. If
this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure that my appeal goes forward,
please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I am able to use any other
transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact information, please provide such in
writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
000163
Outlook Print Message
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product
or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete
this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named
recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: plongoni@charter.net
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,
I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this appeal
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176.
Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide
specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent
responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product
or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited
and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete
this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named
recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
000164
Outlook Print Message
000165
Outlook Print Message
Close Print
RE: arraignment
From: Dogan, Biray (BDogan@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Fri 2/24/12 4:29 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Your case has been continued. I will send the new court date by mail.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 6:36 AM
To: Dogan, Biray
Subject: arraignment
'Sup Biray,
I went and got the arraignment done today....Judge Pearson informed me we have a
mandatory 2/27 1:30 STATUS Conference RJC with in rcr12-065630
However, I already had a "Trial" set in bench trial 11 tr 26800 RMC (ticket number 544281) 1pm feb 27th Judge
Holmes (talk to cashiers) right of way stop sign, can you get a continuanc brokered on the status conference.
Judge Pearson said you are my attorney of record in this matter, though you haven't been communicating with me
much far as I can tell and you guys hung up on me last we spoke.
Hope to hear from you, amigo,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
000166
000167
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000184
****** IMPORTANT NOTICE - READ THIS INFORMATION *****
PROOF OF SERVICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
A filing has been submitted to the court RE: CV11-03628
Judge: PATRICK FLANAGAN
Official File Stamp: 02-08-2012:16:34:48
Clerk Accepted: 02-08-2012:16:35:22
Court: Second Judicial District Court - State of Nevada
Case Title:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. MATTHEW
MERLISS (D7)
Document(s) Submitted: Ord to Show Cause
Filed By: Kathryn Sims
You may review this filing by clicking on the
following link to take you to your cases.
This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.
If service is not required for this document (e.g., Minutes), please disregard the below language.
The following people were served electronically:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ. for ZACH
COUGHLIN
CASEY BAKER, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
RICHARD HILL, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
The following people have not been served electronically and must be served by traditional
means (see Nevada electronic filing rules):
000185
F I L E D
Electronically
02-10-2012:01:49:40 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2758134
000186
000187
000188
F I L E D
Electronically
02-10-2012:01:49:40 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2758134
000189
000190
000191
****** IMPORTANT NOTICE - READ THIS INFORMATION *****
PROOF OF SERVICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
A filing has been submitted to the court RE: CV11-03628
Judge: PATRICK FLANAGAN
Official File Stamp: 02-10-2012:13:49:40
Clerk Accepted: 02-10-2012:13:50:37
Court: Second Judicial District Court - State of Nevada
Case Title:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. MATTHEW
MERLISS (D7)
Document(s) Submitted: Notice of Entry of Ord
- **Continuation
Filed By: RICHARD HILL, ESQ.
You may review this filing by clicking on the
following link to take you to your cases.
This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.
If service is not required for this document (e.g., Minutes), please disregard the below language.
The following people were served electronically:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ. for ZACH
COUGHLIN
CASEY BAKER, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
RICHARD HILL, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
The following people have not been served electronically and must be served by traditional
means (see Nevada electronic filing rules):
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Document Code:
Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney Ior Pro Se Attorney PlaintiII Denied Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
CITY OF RENO;
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
ZACH COUGHLIN;
DEFENDANT.
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Case No: 11 TR 26800
Dept No: 3
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; MOTION TO RETURN
PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED BY RENO MUNICIPAL COURT AND ITS
MARSHALS; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR AMEND SUMMARY
CONTEMPT ORDER
COMES NOW, DeIendant, Zach Coughlin, by and through himselI and Iiles the above title
document on his own behalI.
The undersigned means to show nothing but respect Ior this Court, especially considering
Your Honor holds the honor oI being one oI the Iirst 100 women ever admitted to practice law in our
state, 75th. See Exhibit 1. Like Your Honor, my Iather has a background in Iootball (he played
Iullback Ior Tulane Irom 1964-1968, on scholarship Irom Dayton, Ohio). One thing that we don't see
in Iootball too much is a team hiring a liIetime oIIensive coordinator to be the team's deIensive
- 1 -
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; MOTION TO RETURN PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED
BY RENO MUNICIPAL COURT AND ITS MARSHALS; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR AMEND
SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER
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Document Code:
Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney Ior Pro Se Attorney PlaintiII Denied Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
IN THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
CITY OF RENO;
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
ZACH COUGHLIN;
DEFENDANT.
)
)
)
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Case No: 11 TR 26800
Dept No: 3
MOTION TO RETURN CELL PHONES; MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY
CONTEMPT ORDER; AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER
COMES NOW, DeIendant, Zach Coughlin, by and through himselI and Iiles the above title
document on his own behalI. I am not messin' with 75. To be 75 meant one had to be 100 times
better than one's Iellow male attorneys seeking admission to the Nevada Bar at the time. I was
Iortunate enough to work around Karen D. Dennison, Esq. Ior a very, very short time, so I know what
incredible talent and Iortitude those Iirst 100 possess. http://nsla.nevadaculture.org/index.php?
optioncomcontent&taskview&id744&Itemid418
Personally, I hate to even begin to argue against anything 75 might lean towards. However,
"my back is to the wall, I gotta brawl", so I do that. When I obvioulsy have to, which is not clear to
- 1 -
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; and MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE HOWARD;
NOTICE OF INSUFFICIENTY OF RECORD ON APPEAL
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
TO:
City oI Reno Marshal Division
ATTN: ChieI Marshal Roper and Marshal Dayton
Iaxed to: (775) 334-3824
March 19, 2012,
Dear ChieI Marshal Roper and Marshal Dayton,
A WCSO Deputy inIormed me that my property was being held in evidence, including a
Ilip phone style cell phone, and an HTC g2 smartphone in addition to a micro sd
memory card, and an electric shaved, according to that Deputy. However, now it
appears once again your oIIice has the property. Marshal Harley was accusatory during
the search incident to the summary contempt arrest, making allegations Ior which he had
not basis in Iact. Further he was abusive and hostile. Please place a copy oI this written
complaint in his employment Iile. Additionally, he clearly whispered into Deputy City
Attorney Ormaas's ear during the Trial in 11 TR 26800, then was evasive regarding what
he whispered. Additionally, Marshal Harley was evasive regarding whom told him to
serve me and whome provided the document (connected to a Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
matter no less, much like the summary contempt Iinding). Subsequently, WCSO Deputy
Machem Iiled a sworn aIIidavit indicating that he personally served me that very
document that Marshal Harley attempted to serve me while I was communicating with
Deputy City Attorney Ormaas, who indicated she did not care about any admissions oI
bribery by Richard G. Hill, Esq., to the City oI Reno Police incident to an arrest in 11
CR 26405, in the RMC, a case wherein Hill signed a criminal trespass complaint against
me. The citations in 11 TR 26800 were purported to be in retaliation Ior my reporting
this admission oI bribery to Sargent Tarter outside Richard Hill's oIIice on 11/15/11
when I appeared there to retrieve my wallet, driver's license, client Iiles, etc. aIter being
released Iorm jail incident to the 11/12/12 custodial arrest Ior trespass (because a citation
1/2
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just wouldn't do). Please see the attached 22 page explication oI these matters, placing it
along with these correspondence in Marshal Harley's personnel and employment Iiles.
I would like a written response detailing the chain oI custody oI all the property Ior all
times since the arrest, and itemized listing oI the property, and an indication oI when, iI
ever, I will be inIormed oI why it is being held and when, iI ever, it will be returned to
me, and and indication oI what exactly has been done with this property, including
whether an viewing or copying oI the contents has been undertaken or will remain in
anyone's possession other than mine.
Sincerely,
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
2/2
000225
F I L E D
Electronically
03-30-2012:04:14:37 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2859996
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Outlook Print Message
Close Print
Due Process concerns related to the "grievances"
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sat 3/24/12 1:28 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
4 attachments
3 23 12 FAX TO BAR COUNSEL PATRICK KING NEVADA BAR.pdf (55.3 KB) , 3 19 12 fas to
rmc marshals regarding property wcso.pdf (40.0 KB) , Pages from mary barker rmc 11 tr
26800 order denying motion for return of bond.pdf (508.2 KB) , notice of appeal 11 tr
26800 rmc and Motion for reconsideration set aside etc.pdf (2.6 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
PO Box 60952
RENO, NV 89506
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
TO: Patrick King, Esq.
State Bar of Nevada Assistant Bar Counsel
sent via email to: PatrickK@nvbar.org
March 23, 2012
Dear Assistant Bar Counsel King,
I have a few question I would like to respectfully submit to you. What have you done to ascertain whether the
Marshal's have a vested interest in discrediting me? I would like you to forward me all communications from
anyone in Department Three. I would like for you to obtain a copy of the hearing today, wherein Judge Flanagan
concluded the hearing by quoting to something I wrote (it was the only thing he mentioned after indicating that he
wished to speak to the attorney's in this matter after dismissing the witness, the lying contractor for Richard G.
Hill, Phil Stewart, who has offered perjured testimony numerous times on Mr. Hill's and his client's behalf. Judge
Flanagan quote something I wrote in a filing in 11 TR 26800, where the Judge, Dorothy Nash Holmes, a lifetime
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Outlook Print Message
prosecutor and or warden of a prison (or something along those lines) had me arrested and confiscated my
property, including a smart phone (and a smart phone these days could store the entire contents of a law firm's
files and a law library in one), my less advanced cell phone, my premium electric shaver and other items. My car
was towed during the summary 5 day jail stay Judge Nash Holmes found appropriate, costing me $300 to get it out
of the lot (also lost a client that would have brought in a substantial amoutn of money, by my standards anyway).
A $100 bail was paid to get me out of jail on the fourth day (thus avoiding a fifth day) and accepted by the RMC,
yet, I was not released and the RMC has decided to keep the money anyways.
Yesterday I went to the RMC to pick up a copy of the audio transcript of the 2/27/12 Trial in that matter 11 TR
26800. After asking some questions of filing office supervisor Donna Ballard and a front counter clerk named
Daniel, wherein both agree with me that some of the ways things were done done at the Reno Municipal Court
lacked transparency, a system of checks and balances, and other fundamental notions of due process and fair play,
all of the sudden, two beefy City of Reno Marshals in their mid 20's decided, unilaterally, it seems, to ask me to
leave, as Ms. Ballard certainly had expressed nothing in the way of discontent with our conversation, nor had
Daniel. While I was leaving I could clearly hear Marshal Thompson lying extensively into his radio, trying to
manufacture some sort of report of a scene were there had been none, other than that put on by the City of Reno
Marshals, whom have lied extensively about whether or not they ever took possession of a micro sd card incident
to the full body all pockets, belligerent, accusatory search they performed incident to the summary contempt
finding and arrest of 2/27/12. I request that you ask for a copy of Marshal Harley's employment file from BOTH
the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals Division and see if they put in my letter and complaint in that regard.
Or, do you "find that the burden of proof in the various grievances I have filed with you has not been met, that all
the evidence needed for a conviction has not been presented to your lap with a bow? Did Mr. Hill present such
proof, meeting such a burden. Clearly, the only thing you provided to me from Mr. Hill was an EXCERPT of his
1/14/12 letter to you, which reference numerous shadowy previous phone calls between the two of you (are you
Mr. Hill's hand picked Bar Counsel, or was this case assigned randomly? Does Mr. Hill get to pick which RPD
Sargents and Officers show up for his calls for help? Have you made any inquiry to ascertain this. Why does
Richard Hill constantly file a peremptory challenge anytime he is assigned to Judge Adam's Department 6,
apparently? Did the innuendo and hearsay Richard G. Hill, Esq. Mentioned in his unsigned, unsworn letter to you
of 1/14/12 provide you sufficient proof to meet the clear and convincing evidence stand you indicate that the
grievances I filed did not? How do the copies of electronic correspondences between myself, State Bar of Nevada
Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman, Peter Christiansen, Esq., and Michael Sanft, Esq.,'s legal assistant Kelly
Huff, wherein she explicitly admits to her firm committing malpractice in my case, fail to provoke even a scintilla
of investigation into a grievance from or the State Bar of Nevada?
And the impropriety implicated by Kevin Kelley's conduct, and Mr. Christiansen's later lying under oath at the
June 2002 Character and Fitness Committee hearing for which he feels he satisfied the $5,000 he received in
payment (well, okay, he did file an 8 page pre-hearing brief that rehashed factual recitations from various previous
filings of the Committee, then did manage to cite to the Claiborne case, which concerned a former judge, not an
applicant for admission to the bar, and he did fail to subpoena percipient witness Mark Tratos, or any of the
relevant faculty from Boyd School of Law, and he did screw up the affidavits of the students witnessing me
turning in the hard copy of the paper, and his office did forward a correspondence about alcoholism to the State
Bar despite an express indication by the client atop of it that said not to do so, and his office did mistate whether
they ever turned in the second Consent Agreement send with confirmation to them on September 27
th
, 2004 in a
November 2004 email, so....wait, are you really saying there isn't enough there for a grievance FROM A CLIENT
FILING ONE AGAINST HE WHO WAS COMPENSATED $5,000 TO REPRESENT HIM (THOUGH
CHRISTIANSEN LIED UNDER OATH AND SAID IT WAS ON A PRO BONO BASIS, IN ACCORD WITH
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY STRIP CLUB SPEARMINT RHINO OWNING CHARACTER AND
FITNESS COMMITTEE MEMBER KEVIN KELLEY, ESQ., WHOSE BEST FRIEND WAS THE
PSYCHOLOGIST THE APPLICANT WAS STEERED TO IN THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS)? BUT, YOU
ARE SAYING PURSUING A GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND, APPARENTLY, FORMAL HEARING
INCIDENT TO THE ATTEMPT TO FILE A GRIEVANCE BY A KNOWN SCANDALOUS OPPOSING
ATTORNEY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., AGAINST MYSELF, IN A MATTER FOR WHICH I AM NOT AN
ATTORNEY OF RECORD (PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGATNS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT RECEIVE
ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE SELLERS CASE, SO HOW CAN THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BE APPLIED TO ANY OF MY CONDUCT IN A CASE WHERE I AM A PRO
SE LITIGANT?)? It sure is curious how you find sufficient proof to pursue Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s grievance
against me, yet, you claim that all the grievances I filed do not warrant any sort of investigation on your part. Very
curious, indeed...
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You wrote: "As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to protect
the public and the administration of justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards
required of the profession. It appears that you are not."
I would like you to specify in detail exactly what forms the basis of your assertions in those a statements, as
heretofore you seem to rely upon only the unsigned, unsworn, hearsay cited to by Richard G. Hill and some
apparent grievances filed by judges, to which you have not previously informed me of or offered any proof
thereof, despite your incorrect assertion that you have done so. If you, as you wrote that you did, previously
provide any indication or documentation in support of these "grievances" filed by Judges, please provide support
therefor in explicit written detail with supporting documentation and proof service.
You further wrote, and I seek explication and specificity with regard to details and attribution incident to the
allegations therein contained that:
" I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances against you. You
claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal
research." Would you say, Mr. King, that you would very much prefer it if I had done NO legal research prior to
meeting with you?
You go on to write "You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the State Bar. As
I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from Judges from
different Courts."
That statement casts extreme doubt upon everything you have said to me, Mr. King, and everything you will say to
me. Please provide the requested proof of any grievances against me that came from "Judges from different
Courts". You do realize, Sir, that some "Judges in Different Courts" have pulled drivers over recently and
impersonated a highway patrol officer, and that some Clerks of Court have embezzled $250,000 from the public
fisc? And, just to be clear, you truly do not find anything worthy of a grievance per Mr. Taitel's curious
appearance/disappearance as attorney of record, failure to do a conflicts check, failure to subsequently disclose
such a failure and the tangible harm it has done to me vis a vis my suing Nevada Court Services and his sharing
an office, receptionist, and being listed on the Nevada Court Services web site as "associated with" their business
entity? Didn't Mr. Taitel have a recent ethics investigation pursuant to some run for judicial office?
Also, Judge Nash Holmes indicated at trial, and this is a direct quote, that she "doesn't care about corruption, or
bribery, retaliation, or police misconduct"...well, that is as close to a direct quote as I can make given the fact that
the RMC, just yesterday refused to provide me a copy of the audio transcript from the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR
26800, presided over by Judge Nash Holmes, after a length disappearance by her immediately before calling my
case, and after hearing all the other matters on that stacked docket, and after denying my request for a continuance
but granting Deputy City Attorney Allison Ormaas's request for one to "speak" with Reno Police Department
Sargent Tarter, whose cross examination formed the basis for my arrest and incarceration incident to the summary
contempt finding. The cross examination focused on whether Sargent Tarter had retaliated against me for reporting
the bribery admission by RPD Officer Chris Carter (he admitted Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes him) to Sargent
Tarter while at the scene of my attempts to get Richard G. Hill to turn over my client's files and my wallet and
state issued identification. If you want to put your name on the line over this, Mr. King, and you think we still live
in a world with very little transparency, who am I to tell you any different.
You further wrote: "These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather clearly puts into question your
competence to practice law." Please narrow down which parts of which grievances you feel so implicate my
competence, in explicit written detail.
You further wrote: "As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you
come to inspect them at my office." Mr. King, please indicate when it was and in what form or method you
communicated this offer to "make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at
my office"? Please further explain why on earth I would only be allowed to inspect them at your office and how
that does not create and overly bullying and intimidating scenario departing entirely from fundamental notions of
due process. Please just fax and email (both please) the entire contents of all these materials to me. I am likely
suing the USPS and some of its local postal inspectors and or station supervisors under the Federal Tort Claim Act
and while I have taken every prudent step to ensure the timely delivery of my mail (I have a ton of evidence and 000236
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documentation in support of this), I am EXPLICITLY indicating to you that I wish for you to fax and email me all
of these materials rather than send them through the mails (USPS, UPS, Fed-Ex, etc, etc.).
You then wrote: "I will not send you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being
compromised. " I am appalled that you would write this, and offended really. Please email and or fax them to me.
I have communicated with the USPS and my change of address has been processed (there was a delay through no
fault of my own) and if you refuse to send these to me via email or fax, the go ahead and mail them to my new PO
BOX, though taking that tact will likely only make your conduct throughout this proceeding further suspect. Such
as when you wrote:
" As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an ethical violation that
could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof required in disciplinary matters.
As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the information you have submitted. " Please indicate
how, exactly, Richard G. Hill's grievance met such a standard of proof where the one's I submitted did not.
Further, while you have indicated that I have not responded to your request to meet with you (which is not the
case), you only just, for the first time, today, even mentioned anything about any judges filing or corresponding
anywith with or to you, and you have failed to provide any documentation of such or copies thereof sufficient to
satisfy my Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation, etc. Please do so.
Sincerely,
/S/
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Just moments ago I received an e-mail letter from the Clerk of the Court in Department 3. She
said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes and were demanding and
argumentative. Apparently I will be receiving a report from the Marshals. As Assistant Bar
Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to protect the public
and the administration of justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards
required of the profession. It appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to get you
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assistance that may protect your license to practice law. I would sure appreciate the
opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that may help you through this
difficult time.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed or alleged a
grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof related to these apparent
communications from judges that you are only now bringing up.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
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F I L E D
Electronically
08-28-2012:04:32:12 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 3180815
000239
000240
000241
000242
1? W?1L1Y1 LL L L1 L PL
LL1P1Y L1 AbHL1, b1A11 L1 P1NAOA
LD bLI bHHP bH, HDL, DN b505
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LDutl LSF. 11 LH 20405 2
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L1. 0/2/10
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BLNLH R1AL JULL LARUNLR L 1ur, Apr 10,2012 8:00
11/1JlZ11 LHA LLYA1D 1 1M M LL1H
11/14lZ11 LA DH AYYL1D: A1] 4T5 b. AH1DLLD AD1, b11 1A HDL, DAA 851
YMLD (TT5} JZZ-ZZTZ
YAb AL AYYHLA1A J Wb LH LLDAL1DL L1H ALHD bL MA M/bM
1 MA A L M DLbbAH 1DLHA1LD HL M LL1H L Abb1b L1 1M L1H LAb.
1 1b MH LHH MA M AL-DA DAD AYYL1D A LA DH L
HYHbD M1/MH 1D AD AD A YHLL1DLb LD M1b AH 1D M HDL 1D1L1YA LL1H.
1 1b 1HMH LHH MA M DAD LLY A 1DADL1A 1D[11H AYY1LA1LD AD
A H[11H L YA b LH HYHbDA1LD M LA DH. M1b LHH 1
HA1D 1D L LH b1A LDMb HL LA 'b A. 1D M D MA M1b LHH AY1Hb,
M DAD 1b b11 AD 1YA 1DADL1A 1D[11H AYY1LA1LD LH HLLDb1HA1LD.
1 M DAD MAb 1Dbbb MA M/bM L1 1W L MA 1Dbbb YHbD, LH
L1 1W L 1bL1bb M Db L M1blMH LAb, M DAD 1b LLDAL M1b/MH
ALHD.
11/14lZ11 M DAD AYYAH, Ab AYA1D M1b/MH H1LMb M J1L AD 1D1LA MA
M/bM 1DHbLL M LLY.
11lJlZ11 LA DH AYYL1D: HLHL Y1Db; 41 H1L bH (Y.L. LA Z4Z1) HDL, DAA
855 YMLD (TT5) T8-TT
YAb AL AYYHLA1A J Wb LH LLDAL1DL L1H ALHD bL MA M/bM
1 MA A L M DLbbAH 1DLHA1LD HL M LL1H L Abb1b L1 1M L1H LAb.
1 1b MH LHH MA M AL-DA DAD AYYL1D A LA DH L
HYHbD M1lMH 1D AD AD A YHLL1DLb LD M1b A H 1D M HDL 1D1L1YA LL1H.
1 1b 1HMH LHH MA M DAD LLY A 1DADL1A 1D[I1H AYY1LA1LD ADO
A H[11H L YA b LH HYHbDA1LD M LA DH. M1b LHOH 1
HA1D 1D L LH b1A LDMb HL LA 'b A. 1D M D MA M1b LHH AY1Hb,
M DAD 1b b11 AD 1YA 1DADL1A 1D[11H AYY1LA1LD LH HLLDb1HA1LD.
1 M DAD MAb 1Dbbb MA M/bM L1 1W L MA 1Dbbb YHbD, LH
L1 1W L 1bL1bb M Db L M1b/MH LAb, M DAD 1b LLDAL M1blMH
ALHD.
DAD: LL1LM1D, AHWH
Yag8 1 o1
818nuan 1naS: Yn a8: JllZ1Z aa a8: JllZ1Z
000243
11//111 LA DH H: b A
b MH LHH MA M LA DH H HL MblMH AbbLDD L Mb
LAb-
1/1/111 LA DH AYYLD] WM LLb: V4 L1 H b1 A, HDL, DAA V11
YMLD {) -111
YAb AL AYYHLAA Wb LH LLDALDL L1H ALHD bL MA M/bM
MA A L M DLbbAH DLHALD HL M LL1H L Abbb L1 M L1H LAb.
b
MHT LHH MA M ALY-DA DAD ALD A LA DH L
HYHbD MlMH D AD AD A YHLLDLb LD Mb AH D M HDL 1DLYA LL1H.
b 1HMH LHH MA M DAD LLY A DADLA D[1H AYYLALD AD
A H[1H L YA b LH HYHbDALD M LA DH. Mb LHH
HAD D L LH bA LDMb HL LA 'b A. D M D MA Mb LHH AYHb,
M DAD 1b b1 AD 1YA DADLA D[1H AYYLALD LH HLLDbHALD.
M DAD MAb Dbbb MA M/bM L1 W L MA Dbbb YHbD, LH
L1 W L bL1bb M Db L Mb/MH LAb, M DAD 1b LLDAL M1b/MH
ALHD.
1/1/111 LA DH H: YH LHAD LLD MAHDL
b MH LHH MA M LA DH H HL Mb/MH AbbLDD L Mb
LAb.
1/1/111 YHbD D LL1H LH M L L HDL: J HAW LH M Db: HLHL Y1Db
Lhdfgc !. .1.1 - HbYAbbDL !LP0. 111V11 YKJ0.
Jd LdyS.
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DAD: LL1LMD, ZALMAH AHWH Ag8ncjP: 11-111 LL1H LAb P: 11 LH 14 1I
Yag8 1 o1
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000244
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KLNLLPJLP. LK KJMLK PLKNPJLP, LLPJPLJ JlL bLPJLPLL LLN!lPPLL YPLLY lLL^JLL LP JlL KbJ
LLLK L JlL KLPL N\P!L!^L LLKJ, LPL bLJl b!LKK^ bJ, KLPL, PN (775) +-ZZV.
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000259
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000260
egualized, In
As Mr. ]oshI has ouered to pay mese debt, he shall
2 solely and separauly responIble for th payment of $,7J.0to 5t.Mary's
3 and $0.0to Rema
4 m. Debt - There was no doumenm presented as to
me debt owIng to AshIk ^anaby (sp7) for buying plane tIckets for the ]oshI famly.
b urther, as me ony evIdence provIded regardIng me $,00.00debt to Rod and Meen
Fowler IndIcates saId debt was Incmred for the benefIt of Mr. |oshI's mother. As
Mr. ]oshi has agreed to mke on both of these debL, they shah henceforth be his sole and
9 separa responsibity.
10 n. General Debt - There was no evIdence other than
J J tesumonial evIdence to establIsh communIty debL. As w.]oshI has offered to pay any
12 remaIning commumty debt in his name dat Is hereafter ouLtandIng saId debt shall be
J3 the sole and separate responsIbIlIty of Mr. ]oshi.
14 The Court notes N.]oshI has lIkely Incurred an unegual distrIbutIon of me
1 communIty debt In thIs case. The Court hnds hIs teumonial acguIescence at nal to take
1b on this debt Is a compellIng reason to make an ungua| dIstrbutIon of the comunIty
17 debl
l J
19 The smtutory mandate for alimony is mt It b ]ust and eguItable.
20 !?.15(!)(a). AlImony Is an uItable award to serve the poslecree needs and
21 rIghL of the former spouse. !!2 Mev. 2 P.2d !6 (!). Although
22 pot-decree income need not
O
000261
1
!ursuant IKb !25.!50(8), mere are (!!) me court shal| consider in
7 awarding
w. |ohi presented no in support oI her reguest Ior alimony omer than
4 her own testimona| that she raued me had
educahonal opportuniues, and put her dreams on hold while married. w.|oshi ttiIied
tht she is healthy and D always worked. 1here was no to any oI th
7 Iactors in IK5 !?.!50(8) in Ms. |oshi's presentation and in support oI an
8 awmd oI spousal support.
V 1he Court IinOs that the parti prendy ea approimately the same amount,
10 Ms. |oshi eam $2,458 per monm and N. |ohi eaned approximate|y $J,!25 Qmonth
1 1 in , but teshIied he i s working subsmntia|ly less i n 2O and has Iued Ior
1Z unemployment benmits the bgnning oI March 200. lK5 !25.!50(8)(a) 1e
pardes have been mared 2! yeam and Ns. |oshi has always been employo dunn that
14 hme. lK5 !25.!50(8)(d) . Ms. |oshi obtained a collee degree prior to mrriae and
15 Mr. ]os has a hh school degee. lK5 !25.!50(8)(h)). Both parues are healthy and
1 able to work. IK5 !?.!50(8)(k)).
17 Based upon the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court dos not
1D blieve w.|osh is entitled to an award oI alimony.
1V 4. !ees
7 1hs Court en|oys disceuon to award attomey `5 Iees in a divorce acuon.
7 lKb !?.!50(J); !!4 lev. 5 !.Zd 52 (!8).) pursuant to
77 lK5 !8.0!0(2)(b), the court D aumori to order
000262
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Hotmail Print Message
Close Print
RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of
11/1/2011
From: Stuchell, Liz (LStuchell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Tue 2/07/12 11:40 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Cc: Kandaras, Mary (mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us)
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a
copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com;
jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
lstuchell@washoecounty.us mkandara@da.washoecounty.us
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
000302
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I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service filed
by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order Granting
Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent was not
alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow deposit
was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of eviction was
not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS
fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in the
foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and witness
the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the
Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and
practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27
th
, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
000303
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county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno
Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not
basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The
above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the
Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To
require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint
within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP
5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not
shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days for
mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect
when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November
24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30,
2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order
to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional
three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say about
this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS 40.400
Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil 000304
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Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem
alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on November 1,
2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is defined in a rather
impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different understanding of the
definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or, perhaps the Sheriff's
Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it
wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in NRCP
6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that frustration as an incentive
not to jump to litigating every disagreement about habitability that a tenant brings to
them. You may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get. In my case, I offered
to fix basic things that clearly implicated the habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and
the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill High School graduate landlord balked and
complained then hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the rules
against contacting represented parties prevented much in the way of real settlement
discussion, particularly where opposing counsel has continuously demonstrated a
complete indifference to pursuing settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours
at?). I just don't think the Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the
citizen tenants of Washoe County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss
or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES
INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT WHEN
HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC REV2011-001708
ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE). YOU
NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF THAT I WAS
SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There simply is not
anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary Eviction Orders are
to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3,
regardless of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord 000305
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of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall
hold a hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the
tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall
schedule a hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after
the filing of the motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion
and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other
process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my
November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why
didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's
attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as
required by NRS 40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last 20
incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
000306
Hotmail Print Message
40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO
is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to lock out the
citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested
for trespassing on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and therefore
he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to do...." Both
Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting, whether Richard
Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the full rental value
of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord under a personal
property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret such a bill as Hill's
withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself, which was not
"personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their Affidavit of
Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the locks...and so the
Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite the
Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money under a "rent
escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability issues in a
summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253(6)'s express
dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice court gets such a
rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44, published and approved
by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC applies all
these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver themselves to the
filing office to submit to personal service notice of a summary eviction hearing within,
like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit in response to an
eviction Notice, rather than the service requirements of such notice following NRCP 6
(days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in the RJC everything is sped up
imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis
clearly contemplate personal liability against the Court and or Judges themselves for
so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la Mausert's in Solano County, I believe,
in California, would be very interesting...Still haven't heard anything from the Reno
PD about the various complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the
wrongful arrests, excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though
they did arrest me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for
which I was granted to Extended Protection Orders against my former
housemates....old Sargent Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he
ordered a custodial arrest of me for "jaywalking". 000307
Hotmail Print Message
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the
following one:
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
We're sorry the following problem was found during review
of your submitted report T11005956:
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS
REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR
AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a
"Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the existence of
such an RPD Officer...
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE
OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED."
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD
(a couple of which asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked
why RDP Officer Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where Richard Hill signed a
Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for
the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for the
"use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS 118A.460
may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord,
though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was arrested twice by the
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Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.
Actually, upon being release from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's
license. He refused to provide it to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called
the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state issued
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind of
useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up, he
went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter telling
me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia (Hill's
office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the wrong
way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was not
headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over, then
he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer Carter
admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh, well,
anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role. But
upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him money
to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent immediately
informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was sure that was not
happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away his comments about
Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing them as sarcasm, a
joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a license attorney
getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in that attorney being
required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada under SCR 111, etc., and
possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license to practice law, or worse...)
is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too quick to dismiss my
reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the RPD Sargent who called me
on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I complained of, and I
don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take RPD Officer Carter at his
word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to arrest whom Hill says to
arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for jaywalking (by a trainee
RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of $160 emptied my bank
account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully filming from a public spot
Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had submitted bills in courts
records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage moving and inventorying"
found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my own plywood at the property to 000309
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board up the back porch (curiously leaving the screws holding up the plywood
exposed to exterior of the property where anyone could easily unscrew them, and also
leaving in a window unit ac secured only by ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk
by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in $8,000 at least of my personal property
being burglarized from my former home law office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while
Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal property found therein (and my client's
files, which arguably are not even my property, but rather, the client's property). Hill
went on to place what he believes to be my social security number in court records, on
purpose, despite his signing an Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was
not the case (attaching a two page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his
contractor Phil Howard both committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting
that I had climbed on the contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly,
whether under penalty of perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie
he makes (he makes me out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human
being in his filings when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services
where they went behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and
banged on window extremely loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging on
the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big equipment
saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ132q2O7DY
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck
baring his personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car,
handcuffed, outside my former law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the
1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal Court
in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the names of
prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at my
arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my defense attorney and
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest reports,
ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist with Nevada 000310
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Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as "associated with"
their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers face against fee
sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out of defending my
case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that being required by
the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw
from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the
same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's
Office, which defends actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its
Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest
lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all of
the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
So, that's what attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom
most recently was employed with the Reno City Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his
squad car last summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles.
He veered across the road and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did
some other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred right
in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told me I
was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one NV
Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
despite my bike actually having such a light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him
a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising some
Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on 1/12/12.
But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some sense into
Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had me arrested
and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days later, on
January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were laughing
menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been chased up to 000311
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my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something I had to do
because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost earnings due to all
these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned above...also these
housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of my tires were
slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these changed the locks
at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property stolen, coffee
thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc., etc...And despite the
housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal abuse being listed
amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told me he was arresting
me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like, where I am a victim, and
that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a laugh to his fellow RPD
Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force against me. I guess he was
helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor with a $1,500 bail, especially
where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-Trial Services to forever deny me
an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set forth in statute (30 year resident,
entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I
guess it should not be too much of a surprise to me that Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of her witnesses or that her fellow
Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to me about whether or not the
Reno City Attorney's Office even had any documentation related to my arrest or
whether it would in the month before my arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent
productions of discovery tend to indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did
have those materials at the time. I could be wrong about some of this...But that would
require and awful lot of coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law;
landlord tenant case
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain
confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on
the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain
information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended
recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the
contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone
other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
From: Stuchell, Liz (LStuchell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Mon 12/05/11 12:32 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Mr. Coughlin,
Per your demand stated in the e-mail received from you on November 7
th,
all document packets that were provided by
you were assembled and served by November 16
th
. Affidavits of Service were sent to your new address that you
provided on November 30
th
. Affidavits with case numbers were sent directly to the court. Last week copies of those
were sent to you free of charge. You also will receive original Affidavits of Service of documents that did not have case
numbers.
Any further inquiries should be made to our Civil Attorney, Mary Kandaras at the District Attorneys Office.
Liz Stuchell
WCSO Civil Section
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2011 2:53 AM
To: Silva, Roxanna; Stuchell, Liz
Subject: RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
Dear Ms. Stuchell and Ms. Silva,
I don't mean to be a jerk, I am under inordinate stress right now (not that that is anybody's problem but mine).
The citation below would tend to indicate that your office might, MIGHT, have a duty to photocopy the 000313
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electronic versions I sent and serve them in a manner that the opposing attorneys will not respond to by filing
"Motions to Dismiss" based upon illegibility or bad copying/printing. They object to the 9 pages per page
stuff...In an ideal world your office would serve one page per page of these things, after you print them out,
etc...If you can do that, I would of course be extremely grateful, if you can't, I am of course let to scratch and
claw my way through this lawsuit like every other thing in my life as an IFP who can seemingly be curbstomped
by the older richer attorneys whenever they feel like it (and who have some dubious help in doing so). One
interesting thing is that one of the employment cases, etierh cv11-01955 or cv11-01986 (whichever was filed on
June 27th with an IFP) has to be served within 120 days of WHEN? The docket seems to suggest the Complaint
in that IFP case was only entered on or around August 11th, 2011, which would obvioulsy changed the 120 days
calculation, however, whether the filing date relates back to the IFP is something I have never been able to get a
clear answer on anywhere....
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an
agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that
any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This
message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney
work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that
any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this
information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt
by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable
privilege.
Subject: RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2011 08:52:29 -0800
From: RSilva@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
You and I are the only ones who got this. Is he asking us to serve more docs?
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2011 6:37 AM
To: Silva, Roxanna; Stuchell, Liz
Subject: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
"The defect in service (that the photocopy of the complaint provided was too
faint) was not attributable to the plaintiff, but to court personnel, who are
responsible for making copies of the initial pleadings for IFP litigants".
McKENZIE v. AMTRAK M OF E, 777 F.Supp. 1119.
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Please serve a full, one page per page copy of each complaint to each defendant in all of
the matters for which I have provided you IFP proof, summons, and complaints.
PLEASE NOTE I HAVE A NEW ADDRESS.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not
the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you
have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the
contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and
may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you
are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted
to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in
error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any
copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client,
work product, or other applicable privilege.
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Close Print
WLS
From: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org) You moved this message to its current
location.
Sent: Wed 5/06/09 9:38 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Zach,
You are correct about the letter being delivered on April 20
th
, I misread my timeline. My decision is limited to the
hearing conduct. You have proffered nothing that indicates that the way you acted in court is in any way related to any outside
event. Your 50 page motion for reconsideration before Judge Gardner has not linked your conduct in any way to an outside
event. You have refused to give me a time and date to meet once again, and I will issue my determination tomorrow morning
at 9:00 am.
Access to your computer materials, will be made at a convenient time and place with our office manager, executive
director or designee and our computer specialist present. This is a business computer, and without further research I will not
give you access to it privately. You have been given a tape of the two Joshi hearings. To date, you have not agreed to meet
at any time and place to discuss these hearings; and you have not specifically requested any identified items, documents etc.
that were related to your conduct in this hearing. Your series of questions about the Board is irrelevant. The Board delegated
this matter to me to handle as a personnel matter.
-Paul
000326
F I L E D
Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2711293
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IAW OFF|CE
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J Howcvcr, thc captIon ot thc documcnt, as wc as most ot its contcnt, IndIcatcs that hc
2 pcrhaps intcndcd to hc It In thc LuQ8nl!8t . uU8S 1nG!ng casc (Casc No. C\O8-
3 O1)O@). On intormatIon and bcict, thc documcnt cndcd up bcIng actuay hcd In thc
4 Lut8n|!8t casc.
b 21. Ot partIcuar notc to thIs Court, howcvcr, Is thc hrst six pagcs ot Coughins
"suppcmcnta rcpy, whcrcIn CoughIn dcscrIbcs, In somc dctaI, thc cvcnts ot January 12,
7 2O12.
22. On Janua 1), 2O12, Coughin hcd two documcnts In this casc. Lach
9 documcnt was cntitcd `OppositIon to MotIon tor Attorncy's Ic.` Thcrc Is not, and has
J 0 ncvcr bccn, any motion tor attorncy's tccs hcd in this casc In this court. CoughIn's
JJ opposItIon Is a tugItIvc documcnt, It vioatcs Kuc 11 and Ncvada KIC j. : (mcritorious
J2 contcntion), and shoud bc strickcn by thc coun. It Is ony worth mcntonIng hcrc bccausc
J3 it coutaIns thc samc -pagc rant about thc cvcnts ot January 12, 2O12 as docs hIs caricr
J4 "suppcmcnta rcpy. `
Jb 2j. Kctcrcncc is madc to thc dccaratIon ot IhIip Btcwan, attachcd hcrcto as
J LXHIBIT _ .
J7 2q. Rctcrcncc is madc to thc DccaratIon ot Kichard G. HI, Lsg., aHachcd
J hcrcto as LXHIBIT .
J9
20 1. Rctcrcncc is madc to NRB 22.O1O: "Thc toowIng acts or omIssions sha bc
2J dccmcd contcmpts: . . . . Disobcdicncc or F055tc0 tO uU uW wrIt, OF00F, ruc
22 or proccss issucd by thc court or judgc at chambcrs. (Lmphasis addcd.)
23 2. Rctcrcncc Is madc to NRB 22.OjO(2), which provIdcs: "2. It a contcmpt Is
24 not commIttcd in thc immcdiatc \cw and prcscncc ot thc court or judgc at chambcrs, an
2b amdavit must bc prcscntcd to thc court or judgc ot thc tacts constItuting thc contcmpt, or
2 a statcmcnt ot thc tacts by thc mastcrs or arbitrators.
27
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000331
LW OFF|CE
R|CHARD G. H|LL
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2 On Dcccmbcr 2:, 2O::, Judgc 5tcrrazza ot thc Kcno Justicc Court cntcrcd an
3 ordcr that, among othcr things, aowcd Mcriss to disposc ot anything ch at thc Iropcrty
4 ahcr :OO p.m. on Iriday, Dcccmbcr 2j, 2O::. 88 LXHIBIT 2. On January ::, 2O:2, this
b Court dcnicd Coughins motion tor a tcmporary rcstraining ordcr, and, in so doing,
amrmcd Judgc 5tcrrazzas prcvious ordcr. 88 LXHIBIT j. Whcn Mcriss attcmptcd to
compy with thc courts ordcrs, Coughin attcmptcd to p rcvcnt him trom doing so.
Coughin cvcn attcmptcd to trauducnty cnist thc poicc to aid him in his chorts to thwart
9 this Courts and thc Kcno Justicc Court's dircctivcs. Coughins actions constitutc contcmpt
J0 ot court undcr NK5 22.O:O(j). Thc amdavits contcmpatcd by NK5 22.OjO(2) arc attachcd
JJ hcrcto 3 LXHIBIT and LXHIBIT . Thc torm ot thc ordcr Mcriss 3K thc court to cntcr
J2 is attachcd hcrcto as LXHIBIT .
J3 WHLKLIOKL, Mcriss prays tor an ordcr ot this court rcguiring dctcndant,
J4 ZCHAKY BAKILK COUGHLIN, to appcar and show causc why hc shoud not bc hcd in
Jb contcmpt ot this court undcr NK5 22.O:O(j) tor his rcsistancc to this court's awtuy
J cntcrcd ordcr; and tor such othcr, turthcr and additiona rcict as sccms just to thc court
J7 in thc prcmiscs.
J AFRTON OtSORDI IO NB RQM.OO
J9 Thc undcrsigncd docs hcrcby amrm that thc prcccding documcnt docs not
20 contain thc socia sccurity numbcr ot any pcrson.
k
2J DATLD this day ot January, 2O:2.
22
23
24
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27
KICHAKD G. HILL, LTD.
CA5LY . BA
KICHAKD G.
2 Iorcst 5trcct
Kcno, Ncvada 8@O@
Attorncys tor Iaintih
|ost Oic 0ox 2551
2 HBRC, Novada 896O6
(776) 340-O888
Fax(775) 348-O868
000332
|AW OFF|CE
RICHARD C. H|!|
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Iursuant to NKCI (), I hcrcby ccrti] that I am an cmpoycc ot KICHAKD G.
3 HILL, L1D., and that on ot January, 2O12, I dcpositcd in thc Unitcd Btatcs mai
4 at Kcno, Ncvada, in a scacd cnvcopc, postagc prcpaid, a truc and corrcct copy ot thc
b torcgoing b0cOU0 OtOU OV LV00V tO bUOW LuU50 to:
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F I L E D
Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
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Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
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000343
F I L E D
Electronically
03-30-2012:04:14:37 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2859996 1
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hIS CSc IS H QQc IOm bcHO JuSlICc LOuIl (bJL) dd IHVOVcS lhc SU I
cVIClIOH O lcHHl, IHlI ZFLFb` Ll\L1 (LOu_hIH), uHdcI bb LhQlcI +.
LuIIcHly DcOIc lhIS LOuIl Ic lhIcc mllcIS, O WhICh hVc DccH Hy DIIccd Hd SuDmIllc
OI dcCISIOH.
hc ISl mllcI IS LOu_hIHS ul|un Cndcr PKC Jz(J lu mcnd ur ukc dd|l|unu
|nd|ng8 u[ ucl, ur, lcd |n lhc llcrul|vc, ul|un Cndcr PKC JV lu llcr ur mcnd lh
ZZ Crdcr Lcny|ng ul|un lu rcvcnl L|8pu8ul u[ cr8unul rupcr{. hc ScCOHd mllcI I
Z ccHdHl FL Lb1bbS (cIISS ) ul|un [ur cuvc lu |lc n8wcr|ng Dr|c[ |
Z+ !xcc88 u[ |vc ugc8. hc lhIId Hd H mllcI IS lhc QIlIcS ppcllulc Dr|cj, IHCudIH
ZJ LOu_hIHS Cpcn|ng Dr|c[0d cIISSS n8wcr|ng Dr|cj hIS LOuIl WI ddIcSS cCh O lhcS
Z mllcIS IH D.
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Thc partcs arc !amIar wth thc !acts and proccduraI hstory of ths casc. Thus, ths Court wII rcctc ncthcr th
!acts nor proccduraI hstory unIcss dong so s ncccssary to ths Court's dctcrmnaton.
1
000344
1 L a00 L
Z Jhc OD]cCl O LOu_hIHS ul|un Dcd OH JHuIy , Z1Z QQcIS lO Dc lhIS LOuIl
Crdcr dlcd JHuIy 11, Z1Z. 1H lhl Crdcr, lhIS LOuIl dcHIcd LOu_hIHS cmcI_cHCy IcQucS
+ OI lcmQOIIy IcSlIIHIH_ OIdcI. LOu_hIH mdc lhc IcQucSl HcI Jud_c bcIIZZ O bJ
J cHlcIcd H Crdcr OH cCcmDcI Z1, Z11, IH WhICh hc OIdcIcd. (1) LOu_hIH lO Qy +. l
cIISS OI SlOI_c O hIS QcISOH QIOQcIly DclWccH OVcmDcI 1, Z11 Hd OVcmDcI 1, Z11
Hd (Z) LOu_hIH Sh hVc CCcSS lO lhc QIcmIScS HOm V. .m. lO J. Q.m.
cCcmDcI ZZ, Z11 Hd cCcmDcI Z, Z11 lO IcmOVc hIS QcISOH QIOQcIly.
V LOu_hIH CImS lhIS LOuIlS JHuIy 11, Z1Z Crdcr IS CcIy IHCCuIlc lO lhc cXlcH
M IS QuIQOIlS lO DHd lhl lhc uHdcISI_Hcd mdc Hy _IccmcHl lO WIVc hIS ScCuIIly dcQOSIl I
11 cXChH_c OI ddIlIOH CCcSS lO lhc QIOQcIly. (1. Ol. l Q. 1Z.) 1H ddIlIOH, LOu_hIH VcI
1Z COuDSc OI cIISS mIScd lhIS LOuIl Dy CImIH_ LOu_hIH WS QcImIllcd lO IcmOVc QcISOH
1 QIOQcIly HcI J . Q.m. LOu_hIH HhcI c_cS COuHSc OI cIISS DOIdcd uQ lhc QIcmIScS
1+ IHSl j cd| ChIH Hd QdOCK OH lhc DCK _lc, Hd lcI llcmQlcd lO Dc SuIl OI lhc dISQOS
1J COSlS O IcmOVIH_ lhc QIOQcIly, O WhICh QIcVcHlcd LOu_hIH IOm IcmOVIH_ lhc IlcmS IH lh
1 DISl QCc. (1. Ol. l Q. 1+.) LOHScQucHly, LOu_hIH COHlcHdS lhIS LOuIlS Crdcr ShOud D
1 mcHdcd OI lcIcd uHdcI bL JZ OI JV lO IHCudc lhcSc c_lIOHS S ddIlIOH DHdIH_S O
1 Cl.
1V LOHVcIScy, IH hIS Cppu8|l|un Dcd OH cDIuIy , Z1Z cIISS VcIS LOu_hIH IS l
Z IlICulc WhICh 1HdIH_S hc WHlS mcHdcd uHdcI bL JZ. LVcH I LOu_hIH dId IlICul
Z1 SuCh DHdIH_S, hOWcVcI, cIISS COHlcHdS IcIc uHdcI bL JZ(D) IS HOHclhccSS uHVIDc l
ZZ LOu_hIH DcCuSc lhIS LOuIlS Crdcr dId HOl COHlIH DH ]ud_mcHl, S lhl Iuc IcQuIIcS.
Z bImIIy, cIISS COHlcHdS LOu_hIH IS HOl cHlIlcd lO IcIc uHdcI bL JV(c) DcCuSc H
Z+ ]ud_mcHl hS cVcI DccH cHlcIcd Dy lhIS COuIl IH lhIS CSc, SO lhcIc IS HO ]ud_mcHl OI lhIS COuIl l
ZJ lcI OI mcHd. (c. lQQH l Q. Z.) 1H ShOIl, cIISS COHlcHdS LOu_hIHS ul|un CKS H
Z cVIdcHlIIy DSIS, IS HOHScHSc . . . Dcd OHy lO dcy lhIS mllcI Hd dIIVc uQ ccS, Hd I
Z COmQclcy dcVOId O Hy mcIIl WhlSOcVcI, lO lhc cXlcHl Il IS cVcH dcCIQhcIDc.
Z
Z
000345
1 lQQH l Q. 1, Z.) 1H ICl, cIISS CImS LOu_hIH ShOud Dc SuD]cCl lO
Z VcXlIOuS IlI_lIOH lClICS. (c1 lQQH l Q. .)
FHcI IcVIcWIH_ lhc QIlIcS QcdIH_S Hd lhc cXhIDIlS llChcd lhcIclO, Hd Hc
+ IcVIcWIH_ lhIS LOuIlS JHuIy 11, Z1Z Crdcr, lhIS LOuIl hS _cHcd IIOm LOu_hIHS u/|u
J CcIlIH ddIlIOH HdIH_S OI ICl lhl LOu_hIH COHlcHdS ShOud Dc IHCudcd Dy mcHdmcHl O
lcIlIOH IH lhIS LOuIlS Crdcr. \lImlcy, hOWcVcI, lhIS LOuIl HdS lhc Crdcr I
uHDcHdDc OI uHlcIDc uHdcI lhc bucS LOu_hIH CIlcS DcCuSc SId Crdcr dOcS HOl COHlI
H QQcDc ]ud_mcHl, OI dISQOSIlIOH lhl IcSOVcS OI lhc QIlIcS CImS.
V bImmOHS L V. bID 1HC., Z+ .d 11, 11 (cV. Z11
1 (cXQIHIH_ ]uIISdIClIOH lO COHSIdcI H QQc IIOm lhc dISlIICl COuIl dcQcHdS OH WhclhcI lh
11 dISlIICl COuIl hS cHlcIcd H ]ud_mcHl), cc V. LN 11 cV. +Z+, +Z, VV .Z
1Z +1, +1 (Z) (dcHIH_ H ]ud_mcHl S ]ud_mcHl lhl dISQOScS OI lhc ISSuc
1 QIcScHlcd IH lhc CSc, Hd cVcS HOlhIH_ IOI lhc HluIc COHSIdcIlIOH OI lhc COuIl, cXCcQl IO
1+ QOSl-]ud_mcHl ISSucS SuCh d llOHcyS IccS Hd COSlS.). FS COHScQucHCc, lhIS LOuIl Hd
1J IcIcI uHdcI bL JZ OI JV IS uHVIDc lO LOu_hIH.
1 FlhOu_h bImmOHS Hd L N IHVOVc QQcS lO lhc cVd buQIcmc LOuIl IIOm lh
1 dISlIICl COuIl, lhIS LOuIl HdS lhc ]uIISdIClIOH QIIHCIQcS HHOuHCcd IH lhOSc CScS SO QQy l
1 lhc dISlIICl COuIl WhcH lhc dISlIICl COuIl COHSIdcIS QQcS IIOm lhc ]uSlICc COuIlS, S Wc
1V WhcH lhc dISlIICl COuIl COHSIdcIS mOlIOHS uHdcI bL JZ OI JV, S Wc hVc IH lhIS CSc.
Z hcIcIOIc, lhIS LOuIl COHCudcS LOu_hIHS ul|un Cndcr PKC Jz(J lu mcnd ur uk
Z1 dd|l|unul |nd|ng8 u[ ucl, ur, lcd |n lhc llcrul|vc, ul|un Cndcr PKC JV lu llcr O
ZZ mcnd lhc Crdcr Lcny|ng ul|un lu rcvcnl L|8pu8ul u[ cr8unul rupcr{ IS .
2 caVc 0 c tc 0 XccSS 0 Vc
Z+ 1H I_hl OI lhc VOumIHOuS IcCOId IH lhIS CSc (WhICh cXCccdS Z, Q_cS), IHCudIH
ZJ cH_lhy DIIcIS cd Dy LOu_hIH,
2
lhIS LOuIl HdS _OOd CuSc cXISlS lO _Hl cIISS cVc lO
Z
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Ths Court acknowIcdgcs McrIss's compIant that CougIn has voIatcd thc pagc Imts contancd n Orders o
ths Court, as wcII as thc IocaI ruIcs. Howcvcr, pursuant to ths Court's Iongstandng poIcy of consdcrng cascs L
thc mcrts, as opposcd to dsmssng thcm for proccduraI rcasons, ths Court wII ovcrIook such voIatons n th
pacuIar casc.
000346
1 H HSWcIIH_ DIIc IH cXCcSS O 1Vc Q_cS. 1H ddIlIOH, lhIS LOuIl dcHIcS cIISSS mOlIOH l
Z SlIIKc lhc cXCcSS mlcII 1cd Dy LOu_hIH Hd SO dcHIcS cIISSS IcQucSl OI cVc lO Dc
SuQQcmcHl DIIc lO mccl lhc I_umcHlS COHlIHcd IH lhl cXCcSS mlcII.
+ tcS
J FS mcHlIOHcd QIcVIOuSy, lhIS CSc IHVOVcS lhc SU Iy cVIClIOH O LOu_hIH IOm 1Z1
bIVcI bOCK blIccl, bcHO, N VJ1 (lhc IOQcIly). FHcI lWO hcIIH_S IH bJL IH WhIC
LOu_hIH c_cd dccHScS O hDIlDIIly, IclIlIOH, Hd dISCIImIHlIOH, Jud_c bcIIZZ
d]ud_cd LOu_hIH SU IIy cVIClcd IOm lhc IOQcIly QuISudl lO bb +.ZJ() Dy Crdc
V dlcd lClODcI Z, Z11. bQcCIDCy, Jud_c bcIIZZ OuHd cIISS QIOQcIy lcImIHlc
1 LOu_hIHS lcHHCy Hd lhcIcHcI QIOQcIy ScIVcd LOu_hIH WIlh HOlICc O uHWH dclIHcI.
11 Jud_c bcIIZZ HIlhcI OuHd LOu_hIH Icd lO QIcScHl Hy cVIdcHCc lhl cIISS Clcd IH H
1Z QIOhIDIlcd, dISCIImIHlOIy, OI IclIlOIy ShIOH S c_cd Dy LOu_hIH, OI OlhcIWISc.
1 (bcIIZZ, J., LSc O. bLNZ11-1, lCl. Z, Z11.)
1+ FS IcSul, LOu_hIH WS OIdcIcd lO VClc lhc QIcmIScS Dy lClODcI 1, Z11 l J.
1J Q.m. LOu_hIH Icd lO dO SO. c SO Icd lO IcmOVc hIS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S. LOHScQucHly
1 cIISS SOu_hl QcISOH QIOQcIly IcH OI SlOI_c O LOu_hIHS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S IH lh
1 IOQcIly IOm lhc QcIIOd O OVcmDcI 1, Z11 lO OVcmDcI 1, Z11. LOu_hIH Dcd mOlIO
1 lO COHlcSl lhc IcH. lH cCcmDcI Z1, Z11, Jud_c bcIIZZ OIdcIcd LOu_hIH lO Qy lO cIIS
1V +. S II Hd IcSOHDc COmQcHSlIOH OI cIISSS SlOI_c O hIS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S.
Z (bcHZZ, J., LSc O. bLNZ11-1, cC. Z1, Z11.) Jud_c bcIIZZ SO _IHlc
Z1 LOu_hIH CCcSS lO lhc IOQcIly lO IcmOVc hIS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S Dy cCcmDcI Z, Z11
ZZ J . Q.m. LOu_hIH Icd lO dO SO. FS IcSul, cIISS hIIcd COHlIClOI lO dISQOSc O
Z LOu_hIHS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S. LOu_hIH QQccd.
Z+ LOu_hIH Dcd hIS Cpcn|ng Dr|c[ (1IIc1) OH cDIuIy , Z1Z.
4
cIISS Dcd hI
ZJ n5cr|ng Dr|c[ (bcSQOHSc) OH cDIuIy Z+, Z1Z. hIS LOuIl lOOK lhc mllcI uHdc
Z
Z
Z
8cc notc 2, McrIss madc ths rcqucst n !oomotc l4 o! hs Answering Brief dscusscd ia.
Ths pIcadng rcpIaccd Opening BricJCoughIn prcvousIy Icd two days carIcr. ConscqucntIy, ths Court wI
ucat ths brc! as thc opcratvc pIcadng. H addton, on Fcbruary 7, 2012 CoughIn Icd a Supplement l
Appellants Opening Brief to whch hc attachcd cxhbt contanng a CD o! audo rccordngs.
+
000347
1 SuDmISSIOH OH cDIuIy Z, Z1Z. hIS lIdcI HOW OOWS. FS QIcImIHIy mllcI, hOWcVcI
Z lhIS LOuIl HOlcS Il IS lhc ISSuc O SummIy cVIClIOH Hd lhc Judgc bcIIZZS lClODcI Z, Z11
Crdcr lhl QIcScHly COHCcHS lhIS LOuIl.
5
+ blHdId O bcVIcW
J lH CIVI QQcS IOm ]uSlICc COuIlS lO dISlIICl COuIlS, CSc muSl HOl Dc lIIcd HcW.
JLbL Z(C). hclhcI OH QQc l lhc cVd buQIcmc LOuIl HOm dISlIICl COuIl, OI O
QQc l dISlIICl COuIl IOm ]uSlICc COuIl, OWcI COuIlS HdIHgS WI HOl Dc dISluIDcd O
QQc uHcSS lhcy Ic CcIy cIIOHcOuS Hd Ic HOl DScd OH SuDSlHlI cVIdcHCc. LIDcIHI V
V 11 cV. 1Z1, 1Z+, J .Zd J+, J+Z (1VV+).
1 jF|H OIdcI gIHlIHg SummIy cVIClIOH uHdcI bb +.ZJ() ShDud Dc IcVIcWcd O
11 QQc DScd uQOH lhc SlHdId OI IcVIcW O H OIdcI gIHlIHg SU Iy ]udgmcHl uHdcI bL
1Z J DcCuSc lhcSc QIOCccdIHgS Ic HOgOuS. L V. L.. L, 1Z cV. Z1Z
1 Z1J, 1 .d +J, + (Z). bU Iy ]udgmcHl IS QIOQcI OHy I HO gcHuIHc ISSuc O
1+ mlcII Cl cXISlS Hd lhc mOVIHg QIly IS cHlIlcd lO ]udgmcHl S mllcI O W. EV. b. L!V
1J . J(C) Scc OOd V. 1Z1 cV. Z+, ZV, 1Z1 .d 1Z, 1ZV (ZJ). h
1 mOVIHg QIly DcIS lhc IHIlI DuIdcH O QIOVIHg lhcIc IS HO gcHuIHc ISSuc O mlcII Cl. IH
1 V. 1V cV. Z1, Z-Z, J .Zd JJ, J (1VV).
1 lHCc lhc mOVIHg QIly SlIScS lhIS DuIdcH, hOWcVcI, lhc DuIdcH ShIHS lO lhc HOHmOVIH
1V QIly lO ShOW lhc cXISlcHCc O gcHuIHc ISSuc O mlcII Cl. d. l Z. hIc lhc QcdIHg
Z Hd lhc IcCOId muSl Dc COHSlIucd IH lhc Ighl mOSl VOIDc lO lhc HOHmOVIHg QIly, lhc QIl
Z1 muSl dO mOIc lhH SImQy ShOW lhcIc IS SOmc mclQhySIC dOuDl S lO lhc OQcIlIVc ClS
ZZ OOd, 1Z1 cV. l ZV. O VOId hVIHg SummIy ]udgmcHl cHlcIcd gIHSl Il, lhc QIly muSl
Z
Z+
ZJ
Z
Z
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L appcaI, CougIn's Brief spans !orty-scvcn pagcs ad contans scvcraI aIIcgatons and cIams. Many o! thcs
cIams touch upon coIIatcraI ssucs Ikc, !or cxampIc, aIIcgcd rcIatonshps bctwccn McrIss's counscI and Ia
cn!orccmcnt, aIIcgcd unconsttutonaI acts o! cty cmpIoyccs undcr MoncII v. o! Soc. 4J \.8. 5
(l78), and McrIss' s aIIcgcd dsntcrcst n compIants hom pcopIc Ikc CoughIn and othcrs assocatcd wt
CoughIn. As such, ths Court wII not addrcss thcsc ssucs. In addton, bccausc CoughIn !aIcd to tmcIy Ic h
notcc o! appcaI rcgardng thc pcrsonaI propcrq Icn, scc NR8 40.25J(8), and bccausc CoughIn's notcc o! appca
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000351
60302: Case View
Disclaimer: The information and documents available here should not be relied upon as an
official record of action.
Only filed documents can be viewed. Some documents received in a case may not be
available for viewing.
Some documents originating from a lower court, including records and appendices, may not
be available for viewing.
For official records, please contact the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nevada at (775) 684-
1600.
Case Information: 60302
Short Caption:
COUGHLIN VS. WASHOE
LEGAL SERVICES
Classification:
Civil Appeal - General -
Other
Related
Case(s):
60317, 60838, 60975
Lower Court
Case(s):
Washoe Co. - Second
Judicial District -
CV1101896
Case Status: Briefing Reinstated
Disqualifications: Hardesty
Panel
Assigned:
Panel
Replacement:
To SP/Judge: SP Status: Exempt
Oral Argument:
Oral
Argument
Location:
Submission Date:
How
Submitted:
+ Party Information
+ Due Items
Docket Entries
Date Type/Subtype Description Pending Document
02/27/2012
Filing Fee - Filing Fee
Waived
Appeal Filing fee waived. In
Forma Pauperis.
02/27/2012
Notice of Appeal
Documents - Notice of
Appeal
Filed Notice of Appeal. Appeal
docketed in the Supreme Court
this day. (Docketing statement
mailed to counsel for appellant.)
12-06119
02/27/2012
Other - Disqualification of
Justice
Justice James W. Hardesty
disqualified from participation
in this matter. Disqualification
Reason: Voluntary Recusal.
Issued Notice of Referral to
Settlement Program. This
000352
Outlook Print Message
file:///R|/...0a%20NEW%20temp/5%201%2009%20elcano's%20pelcano@washoelegalservices.org%200435%2060302.htm[11/23/2012 1:16:39 AM]
Close Print
WLS
From: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org) You moved this message to its current
location.
Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Cc: Kathy Breckenridge (kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com)
1 attachment
ltrCoughlin2ndDraft.doc (30.5 KB)
Letter attached.
000353
Dear Zach,
I have been authorized by the Board to handle this matter.
1. Your current suspension was a result of the order entered by Judge Gardner in
the Joshi matter;
2. Suspension means that you are no longer to participate as a lawyer in any case
assigned to you by WLS until further notice. You may appear on your own
behalf to litigate the order of sanctions entered by Judge Gardner. If any
lawyer contacts you about a WLS case you must refer them to Caryn
Sternlicht or Marc Ashley;
3. According to the Courts order, you were sanctioned for arguing incessantly,
being unprepared, making sarcastic and derogatory remarks to the Court, and
for rude and disrespectful conduct. You were personally fined $934 as a result
of this conduct;
4. I could not evaluate your conduct at trial until I received the tape of the
hearing; this tape was promptly ordered, and was finally received on
Thursday, April 23
rd
. I have not yet reviewed this tape in its entirety.
5. You have requested a copy of your personnel file. This has been made
available to you;
6. We have delivered a copy of the tape of the Joshi matter to you;
7. You requested a formal response to your complaint concerning Rhonda. This
was investigated by me within 48 hours of your complaint. There is no
question that your office behavior (which included yelling, and calling her a
hall monitor, etc.) upset her, and as a direct result she made a comment to you.
She was counseled as to the type of language she used, and specifically told
that even though she was upset this language (bite me) was not appropriate
for the workplace. I did not realize you wanted a formal response to this
incident. Please consider this your formal response. I am unaware of any
specific written complaints other than the one you made to me about Rhonda.
Please provide me with copies of all other written complaints sent by you to
me prior to the entry of Judge Gardners order. Please make sure they are
dated. I will review them and indicate to you what the disposition of those
matters may be.
000354
8. Counseling for difficulties in office interaction had already been scheduled
when I received Judge Gardners order. You did not appear for the mandatory
meeting at which I announced this counseling;
9. We have received a copy of a 50 page motion for reconsideration you filed in
the Joshi matter. I will review this in its entirety. If there is any other written
material you want me to review in determining whether or not your
employment should continue with WLS you must provide it to me by 5:00 pm
Monday, May 4
th
. I will be happy to pick up any such material at a reasonable
time and place if you are not comfortable emailing it to me.
Based on the forgoing I will be taking the following action:
1. I will review the tape in the Joshi matter, your fifty page motion for
reconsideration and any other written material you provide to me. If your conduct
was as represented by Judge Gardner you will be terminated. This termination
will be based exclusively on the manner in which you conducted this hearing, and
will not be related to any ultimate outcome regarding the sanctions order. WLS
can not maintain an employment relationship with a lawyer who argues
incessantly, appears unprepared and makes sarcastic and derogatory remarks to
the court, and otherwise conducts his or her case in a rude and disrespectful
manner. This determination will be made by me by 10:00 am Wednesday
morning, May 6, 2009.
2. If the hearing tape does not justify Judge Gardners order WLS will require you to
participate in the previously referred to employee counseling pursuant to the
directives of our industrial psychologist. This counseling is currently going on
with other employees at WLS. The counselor will determine the extent to which
you will participate and maintain a case load. You will maintain your employment
status, and will receive pay and benefits throughout this course of counseling.
3. If you wish to discuss any resolution of this matter between now and Wednesday
morning at 10 am I will be available to meet with you at any convenient time and
place, including this weekend. You may bring any person you would like to a
resolution discussion. I will come alone unless you request otherwise.
This has been sent to you by email. Please advise me as to the address to which a hard
copy of this transmittal should be delivered.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
000355
60302: Case View
Case Search
Participant Search
02/27/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice
of Referral to Settlement
Program
appeal may be assigned to the
settlement program. Timelines
for requesting transcripts and
filing briefs are stayed.
12-06121
02/27/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice
to File Case Appeal
Statement/Civil
Issued Notice to File Case
Appeal Statement/Civil. Due
date: 10 days.
12-06126
02/27/2012
Settlement Notice -
Notice: Exemption from
Settlement Program
Issued Notice: Exemption from
Settlement Program. It has been
determined that this appeal will
not be assigned to the
settlement program.
Appellant(s) 15 days transcript
request form; 120 days opening
brief:
12-06222
03/09/2012
Order/Incoming - District
Court Order
Filed District court order. Copy
of Order Denying Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed
in district court on 3/8/2012 and
Case Appeal Statement or, Pled
in the alternative, Motion for
Extension of Time to Correct
Deficiencies in Appeal Papers.
Y 12-07769
03/26/2012
Motion - Motion to
Dismiss Appeal
Filed Motion to Dismiss
Appeal.
12-09480
03/26/2012
Notice/Incoming - Notice
of Appearance
Filed Notice of Appearance
(Brian A. Gonsalves appearing
on behalf of respondent Crisis
Intervention Services).
12-09496
04/09/2012
Motion - Response to
Motion
Filed Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.
12-11097
04/13/2012
Notice of Appeal
Documents - Case Appeal
Statement
Filed Case Appeal Statement. 12-11962
04/16/2012
Motion - Reply to
Response
Filed Reply in Support of
Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
12-12020
05/31/2012 Order/Procedural - Order
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal
in Part. We dismiss this appeal
as to CIS, only. Appellant shall
have 11 days from the date of
this order to file and serve his
(1) transcript request form or
certificate that no transcript will
be requested, and (2) docketing
statement.
12-17190
06/14/2012
Transcript Request -
Certificate of No
Transcript Request
Filed Certificate of No
Transcript Request.
12-18622
06/14/2012
Docketing Statement -
Docketing Statement
Filed Docketing Statement. 12-18740
000356
60302: Case View
06/27/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice
to File Opening Brief and
Appendix
Issued Notice to File Opening
Brief and Appendix. Due Date:
15 days.
12-20249
07/13/2012
Notice/Incoming - Notice
of Appearance
Filed Notice of Appearance
(Joseph Garin and Shannon
Nordstrom of Lipson Neilson
Cole Seltzer & Garin appearing
on behalf of respondents).
12-22194
07/13/2012
Motion - Motion to
Dismiss Appeal
Filed Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss Appeal.
Y 12-22195
07/25/2012 Motion - Motion
Filed Motion for Permission to
File Opening Brief After
Deadline has run and
Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.
Y 12-23543
07/26/2012
Motion - Response to
Motion
Filed Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss (and request for 15
days extension to file opening
brief and appendix).
Y 12-23572
07/31/2012
Motion - Response to
Motion
Filed Response to Plaintiff's
Motion for Permission to File
Opening Brief After Deadline
Has Run and Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss.
Y 12-24165
08/03/2012
Motion - Reply to
Response
Filed Reply in Support of
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
Appeal.
Y 12-24569
000357
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000500
Docket 60838 Document 2012-18962
000501
000502
000503
000504
000505
000506
000507
000508
000509
000510
000511
000512
000513
000514
000515
000516
000517
000518
000519
DECLARATION PURSUANT TO NRS 53.045 BY ZACH COUGHLIN ON 11/23/12: I ZACH COUGHLIN HEREBY
SWEAR UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT CLERK OF COURT OF THE SBN PETERS/SBN/NNDB/PANEL GAVE ME PERMISSION TO
FAX FILE IN THIS MATTER UPON WHICH I REASONABLY RELIED, AND THEY FURTHER SWORE THE 8/23/12 CERTIFIED
MAILING WOULD NEVER BE USED A PROOF OF SERVICE UNDER SCR 109 AND FURTHER THEY INDICATED THAT I
WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM OR WITNESS FEES AND THAT, EVEN THOUGH
MY LAW LICENSE IS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED, I WAS ACCORDED THE THE POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS
_______________________
NOTE: EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE PLACING MY DECLARATION ON TOP OF PETERS AFFIDAVIT AND EASE OF COMPARING
ZACH COUGHLIN, RESPONDENT
000520
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YOUR LABEL NUMBER SERVICE STATUS OF YOUR ITEM DATE & TIME LOCATION FEATURES
70102780000354296264 Delivered November 17, 2012, 12:44 pm RENO, NV 89506 Certified Mail
Notice Left November 08, 2012, 4:56 pm RENO, NV 89512
Arrival at Unit November 08, 2012, 6:39 am RENO, NV 89506
Processed through
USPS Sort Facility
November 08, 2012, 1:10 am RENO, NV 89510
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RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
From:Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 4:25 PM
000609
Outlook Print Message
To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
You have already had two bail hearings. You are out on bail now. I decline to file a new request for a bail hearing.
I will be out of town on vacation from Friday August 10 and will return on Monday Aug. 20. That makes attendance at a bail hearing problematic and
unlikely to be heard before your trial.
I do think the complaint fails to allege the charge of disturbing the peace. I will make the motion to dismiss it at the time of trial.
The fact that the officer did not observe you committing a misdemeanor means he was not entitled to arrest you. You have a civil claim
against RPD and the officer. That does not mean the charge of DTP is subject to dismissal.
I will review the case involving Mr. Krebs and his request for a temporary protective order.
I need your description of what happened on the 3
rd
of July. Will you provide it?
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?
-----Original Message-----
From: Keith Loomis
Sent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMT
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the
things you believe are necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing
the peace. I still need that description.
Keith Loomis
000610
Outlook Print Message
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest
for distrubing the peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to
Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the
officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to
making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so
refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.
The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was
basing his decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin
one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.
NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
000611
Outlook Print Message
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing
confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me
competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit
and for the proof of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge
may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf
copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail
was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence,
and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license
prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.
Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading
in that the allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed
by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that
protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO
appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs,
perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he
returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid
right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of
Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada
Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not
possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray
admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see
Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer,
whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent
rationale for doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this
case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at
any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting
extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they
threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory
video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the
police reports I filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or
recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC,
Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under
NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP 60(b)(4),
any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
000612
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(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation
or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the
police incident reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am
only sending them in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 ( (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
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6/11/12
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To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Mon 6/11/12 4:10 PM
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Mon 6/11/12 4:11 PM
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Your report has been approved supplemental report and the permanent number of the case is
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000617
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RE: respectfully submitted
From:Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Wed 8/08/12 2:43 PM
To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Zach:
I reviewed the file in the Krebs protective order application. It is interesting in that there is not one reference by Mr. Krebs to a belief that you were
trying to provoke him to engage in violence or a violation of law. Those appear to be solely the words of Office Weaver.
I subsequently received your 100 page e-mail and do not intend to review it at length as most of the material appears irrelevant. What I
gather from it is that you are once again not happy with my representation and want me to withdraw. I think there is merit to that request. It appears
that our relationship has broken down and that you are asking me to engage in conduct that will result in violations of the rules of professional
conduct. Those include Rules 3.1, 3.2 , 4.4 and possibly others. I also fundamentally disagree with some of your requested actions in that so far you
have refused to provide your description of what happened on July 3, 2012 with Mr. Krebs. It also appears that your repeated demands are making my
representation unreasonably difficult. It would be helpful; if I can represent in the motion to withdraw that you are willing to waive the 60 day rule for
trial, so that a new attorney can be appointed to represent you and have enough time to prepare your case. Please respond whether you will agree to
that waiver. If not I will simply file the motion without the representation and hope for the best.
Keith Loomis
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 11:01 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: FW: respectfully submitted
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.gov
Subject: respectfully submitted
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 16:41:49 -0700
Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,
I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in
person on June 6, 2012 regarding the assault I was the victim of at the hands of maintenance staff
member Luke of Northwind Apartments on June 5th, 2012, and the attempts at unlawful entry
committed by Northwind Manager Dwayne Jakob on or about June 4, 2012.
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I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law
and police work, vis a vis criminal/civil matters and the fine distinctions that sometimes arise. I
didn't see anything in there on Officer Weavers fine hypothetical regarding entry without
permission when a burglary may be occurring. That situation probably does not come up that
often because hardly anybody but the police would be brave enough to enter such a dangerous
situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they
are interesting to me and may be to you and in no way wish for so attachign these to be
interpreted as a criticism of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Motion to Withdraw
From:Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Fri 8/10/12 11:07 AM
To: Zach Coughlin (ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com)
1 attachment
SKMBT_C35312081011000.pdf (164.4 KB)
Motion to Withdraw is attached
Keith Loomis
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--Forwarded Message Attachment--
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RE: motion for continuance
From:Pamela Roberts (robertsp@reno.gov)
Sent: Wed 11/16/11 5:12 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Mr. Coughlin, you should have already received a notice regarding the availability of discovery and request for reciprocal discovery. You just need to call
ahead at 334-2050 and arrange to pick it up. You are entitled to copies of all the reports and witness statements and video we may have on this case. Since
I am not calling any additional witnesses that are not already mentioned in the reports/statements, I am not obligated to send you an additional list of
witnesses. I am also not obligated to do any further investigation or interviews. Pam Roberts.
-----Original Message-----
From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: <robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:35:48 -0800
Subject: RE: motion for continuance
Ms. Roberts,
Thanks for your reply. Please ascertain from Walmart whether any Walmart employees had, previous to
this incident, made any threats respecting maliciously having the accused banned from Walmart's incident
to a disagreement over Walmart staff and managers curious practice of "forgetting" their return policy,
despite some individuals having worked there over 10 years....Further, I believe it relevant and part of your
duty to provide exculpatory information to ascertain whether the RSIC police officer made statements
wherein he attempted to coerce a consent to an impermissible search and further buttressed his probable
cause finding to conduct a search incident to arrest, expressly, in words, to the accused, upon the accused's
failure to consent to such a search.
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Please provide a list of any witnesses you intend to call at trial, including a summation of the matters the
will testify to, in addition to producing a copy or making available for reproduction any documentation,
audio, video, or other materials intended to be used in any way at trial.
Thank You,
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800
From: robertsp@reno.gov
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: motion for continuance
Mr. Coughlin, we were closed on Friday and I have just read your email. If you have not received confirmation from the Court that your trial date has been
continued, you will need to appear this afternoon at 1:00 pm in Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at that time
and if we are unable to resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I won't object. However, it is the Court's decision to grant
your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time, so the Court is not required to appoint you an
attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor case.
I hope your housing situation improves. See you this afternoon. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.
-----Original Message-----
From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: <robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800
Subject: motion for continuance
Dear Counselor Roberts,
I believe you are the prosecutor for the case against me, State v. Coughlin, which I believe is still set for
trial on November 14th, I think at 1pm. I am not totally sure that there is a duty to serve you on such a
thing, but I filed a Motion for Continuance and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel sometime within
about the last 10 days, I would say. I believe I attempted to copy you on it, but have recently been evicted
and its been a very difficult time in terms of coordinating paperwork, etc., etc. I apologize for any
inconvenience this may have cause you. I am unsure of whether the November 14th trial is still set to take
place. I believe fairness dictates that it be continued to a later date. I have request counsel but have yet to
receive any, or wait, I was denied a request to receive counsel because Judge Howard said there is not a
6th amendment right to counsel where, even though jail time is technically a possibility, the state does not
anticipate seeking jail time...or something like that, however, I found some cases that say I should still get
counsel appointed, especially where I show I am indigent, and I believe I qualify as indigent rather easily.
Can and would you agree to a continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this prior to filing my
Request for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence in this case and feel any sort of conviction,
especially one involving any sort of theft based charge, would work a terrible injustice and greatly
damage my reputation and employment prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain
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WLS
From:Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org)You moved this message to its current location.
Sent: Wed 5/06/09 9:38 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Zach,
You are correct about the letter being delivered on April 20
th
, I misread my timeline. My decision is limited to the hearing conduct. You have
proffered nothing that indicates that the way you acted in court is in any way related to any outside event. Your 50 page motion for reconsideration before
Judge Gardner has not linked your conduct in any way to an outside event. You have refused to give me a time and date to meet once again, and I will
issue my determination tomorrow morning at 9:00 am.
Access to your computer materials, will be made at a convenient time and place with our office manager, executive director or designee and our
computer specialist present. This is a business computer, and without further research I will not give you access to it privately. You have been given a tape
of the two Joshi hearings. To date, you have not agreed to meet at any time and place to discuss these hearings; and you have not specifically requested
any identified items, documents etc. that were related to your conduct in this hearing. Your series of questions about the Board is irrelevant. The Board
delegated this matter to me to handle as a personnel matter.
-Paul
FW: Mr. King's assertion in his 3/16/12 letter
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sat 11/03/12 3:00 AM
To: togninim@reno.gov (togninim@reno.gov); joey.hastings@washoecounty.us (joey.hastings@washoecounty.us);
joey.orduna@washoecounty.us (joey.orduna@washoecounty.us); david.hardy@washoecounty.us
(david.hardy@washoecounty.us); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com);
mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org
(complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com)
4 attachments
11cr26405 puentes 041012_20120410-0903_01cd16f8c3aa49b0.mp3 (5.1 MB) , 11CR26405 050812 Loomis_20120508-
1104_01cd2d0a627f5f90.mp3 (15.1 MB) , 5 11 09 wls elcano washoe legal services dismissal letter citing Judge Linda
Gardner's Order sole cause 26405 26800 00696.pdf (902.5 KB) , 5 6 09 email from wls ed elcano 26405 60302 garnder
01955 10896 60302 26800 60317 54844 dd.pdf (15.3 KB)
Dear Judge Hardy, Chairman Susich, Clerk of Court Orduna Hastings, Bar Counsel, and Ms. Tognini, and Members of the Panel,
It is plain from my interactions with Patrick King that the irony of Richard G. Hill, Esq's allegations of my "ghostwriting" are
richest when considering the apparent "ghost-grievancing" going on here, especially with respect to the genesis of NG12-0435,
the grievance consisting of Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning a domestic violence attorney
$1,000, personally, where failed to follow Judge Linda Gardner's orders to seek to intimidate his battered spouse immigrant client
into accepting the marital settlement agreement offer of one John Springgate, Esq. (a chimera of sorts where Mr. Springgate's 000629
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client would agree to be responsilbe for a collection of third party credit card debt for which he was the sole signatory and for
which even under and extremely unlikely "doctrine of the neccessaires, assuing my client lost on a "waste of marital assets",
approach, my client, Ms. Joshi, would be very unlikely to ever face judgment or execution in connection with such third party
credits card debts. I failed to cave to Judge Linda Gardner's bullying demands, and even where she yelled at me and my client in
the impromptu "settlement conference" she decided to hold 10 minutes before the Trial (Judge Linda Gardner yelled at me to
"shut up" in front of my client, then proceeded to tell Ms. Joshi "don't listen to your attorney!" in an angry, hostile, and
belligerent tone), and instead cited to an ALR article that presents the position I took as the majority viewpoint in American
jurisprudence with respect to the duty of a domestic obligation not being permissibly set off with a mere debt, particularly a third
party unsecured credit card debt, such as those for which Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory. Apparently Judge Gardner agreed
with John Springgate's whining about how he "needed to be able to know how much to charge for his time" or something along
those lines (Mr. Springgate indicated that Coughlin's failing to immediately accept Springgate's settlement offer was screwing up
Springgate's whole profit margin, and therefore contrary to the orderly administration of justice, or something along those lines,
at which point Springgate moved for sanctions (despite not having served a 21 day safe harbor filing ready NRCP 11 motion),
which, in John's words was tantamount to "sending a shot across your bow", a bloodsport sort of analogy one might expect from
a semi-professional fencer like Mr. Springgate. I was fired from Washoe Legal Services and told by its Executive Director that
the decision was based solely on Judge Linda Gardner's Order....which was odd given she and Master Edmondson and at least
one other judge had given Elcano positive reviews of my work less than two months prior to that. Elcano, though, did, at the
time of reporting those positive reviews mention that he goes "way back" with Linda Gardner, and that "she owes" him because
"he did her a big favor a long time ago", etc., etc.
Anyways, Bar Counsel King has recently indicated that he was completely unaware that Linda Gardner is the sister of the RMC
Judge William Gardner who refused to recuse himself from the criminal trespass conviction I sustained incident to a custodial
arrest at my former home law office, wherein the opposing counsel Richard G. Hill, Esq., has been caught lying on tape
regarding whether any warning was given to me to leave, and whether the RPD identified themselves as law enforcement and
issued a lawful order to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking down a door to a "basement" that was, according to Hill's
associate, not even a part of the property (or included in the part of the property contained within any exterior doors to the
premises.
Despite the statements of RMC Judge Gardner in the audio cds that King himself finally admitted to me to possessing and
receiving from RMC Judge Nash Holmes (after several instances of King lying about his willingness to allowing me to review
the materials Judge Nash Holmes and others slipped to the SBN, King finally was forced to turn over at least a few of those
items. Included amongst them were the hearings before Judge William Gardner on 4/10/12 and 5/8/12 wherein RMC Judge
William Gardner admits that his sister is none other than Family Court Judge Linda Gardner, and that his sister passed him her
April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin (which Coughlin filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging in 54844,):
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=22746
Washoe Legal Services fired Coughlin, citing Judge Linda Gardner's Order sanctioning Coughlin as the sole reason for its doign
so. Couglin sued WLS for wrongful termination, and Judge Elliot dismissed Coughlin's lawsuit without reaching the merits of
the Complaint, but then decided to sanction Coughlin for his lawsuit allegedly lacking "merit" anyways...go figure. Judge Elliot
also incarcerated Coughlin from April 19th, 2012-April 26th, 2012 based upon some fraudulent letter by Lake's Crossing, and
some Motion for Revocation of Bail made by DDA Zach Young at a time when NRS 178.405 forbid his making any motions
given that all proceedings must be stayed during the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation. Amazingly, in her
3/16/12 letter to the SBN, Judge Nash Holmes is still mentioning how she and the RMC are furiosly trying to set for Trial the
case stemming from teh custodial "jaywalking" arrest of Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 incidnet to the lies by Richard G. Hill,
Esq. to the RPD on that date. It is curious that that matter 11 CR 00696 was all of the sudden transferred to Judge Nash Holmes
on February 27th, 2012, the same day Judge Nash Holmes was purportedly made aware of the 2/27/12 Order for Competency
Evaluation of Coughlin in RCR2011-063341 (relative, at the very least, to the communications between Tognini and the WCPD,
at the very least). Additionally, Second Judicial District Chief Appeals Clerk denied Coughlin's 2/27/12 filing of a Motion for
Extension of Time to effectuate service in the wrongful termination lawsuit by Coughlin against Elcano (whom Judge Linda
Garnder "owes a big favor", according to Elcano) in CV11-01955 (before Judge Elliot).
Further, to the extent Judge Elliot's remanding Coughlin into custody to coerce his consent to divulging extremely private
medical information is somehow a contempt Order, then the "letter" or "evaluation under seal" of 4/18/12 by Lakes Crossing Dr.
Bill Davis and Dr. Sally Farmer must be in the form of an affidavit. It was not. Further, Coughlin called Dr. Davis from the
booking room at the jail and Dr. Davis attempted to weasel out of the consequences of his professional misconduct, done under
color of law, by alleging that he "didn't write the 4/18/12 letter filed with the Court" but merely signed it and was not responsible
for it being filed with the court. To the extent the assertions in that 4/18/12 letter are outright lies (they are...the letter indicates
Coughlin outright refused to provide basic medical information, which is not true, Coughlin indicated he would "need to check
his records" in response to one initial question, and then mentioned that some professional, particularly physicians, face an
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inability to obtain malpractice insurance if word gets out that they take anti-depressants. Somehow Dr. Davis and Dr. Farmer
interpreted such a statement to allow themselves to file a letter with the Court alleging that Coughlin "threatened one of the
evaluators with legal action". No wonder Lake's Crossing insists on doing a Terry Stop style "pat down" search on each and
everyone forced to go there by the Courts to get a Competency Evaluation (the RJC and WCPD have it set up so that one must
utilize the services of Lake's Crossing for any such evaluation) and maintain a strick ban on any sort of smart phones or cellular
phones within their evaluation rooms (how difficult it would be for Dr. Davis and Dr. Farmer to lie with seeming impunity, as
they did in their 4/18/12 "evaluation" filed with the Court in CR12-0376, should their subjects be readily able to reveal the
dishonesty of these evaluators via some recording impeachign their credibility. To the extent Judge Elliot found Coughlin in
contempt of court (which he apparently did in response to Coughlin inquiring into the scope and extent of such a Competency
Evaluation rather than submitting to a blank check inquest into his mental health and medical records incident to a retaliatory
Motion for Competency Evaluation on 2/27/12 by a public defender upset that Coughlin had criticized his failing to show up to a
court date even after that attorney, Biray Dogan had filed a Notice of Appearance and met with the client to discuss the case
RCR2012-065630, for over an hour and a half just one week previous to that missed court appearance, and where DDA Young
was clearly retaliating against Coughlin for Coughlin filing a Motion for Sanctions against Young just days previous to that in a
different case.
Regardkess. Marilyn Tognini is now being listed as a witness Coughlin intends to call at his November 14th, 2012 NNDB
hearing at the State Bar of Nevada Offices at 9 am, and any other person whom Judge Nash Holmes may be referring to in her
attached grievance against Coughlin (wherein she manages to allude to some hearsay about Coughlin living in his car despite the
fact that Coughlin was clearly still living at 1422 E. 9th St. at the time Judge Nash Holmes letter to the SBN was written,
3/14/12, even where Judge Nash Holmes feigns an inability to readily make contact with Coughlin, depsite neither she nor the
RMC calling, emailing or faxing Coughlin, or managing to mail the 2/28/12 Order to the address all other RMC Departments
then had for Coughlin. Regardless, that 3/14/12 grievance goes on to demonstrate Judge Nash Holmes profound lack of respect
for or knowledge of the dictates of NRS 178.405, or the legal principles, in general, related to refraining from proceeding with
prosecutions where the competency of the accused is in doubt in the mind of the trier of fact. Further, the SBN's Bar Counsel
Patrick King (whom, again, managed to just in the last couple weeks indicate that he was unaware that Judge William Gardner
and Judge Linda Gardner are brother and sister, or even related, despite King receiving from the RMC's Judge Nash Holmes a
box of materials that included multiple hearings in the criminal trespass proseuction of Coughlin that Judge William Gardner
(then RMC Administrative Judge, whom admitted to "at least one meeting" wherein he and the other RMC Judges discussed
Coughlin, along with Chief Marshal Roper, only for Judge Gardner to then attempt to say with a straight face that he "was not
sure whether he was" aware of this or that, or had any knowledge of the grievance Judge Nash Holmes filed against Coughlin
with the SBN (despite that 3/14/12 letter to the SBN by Judge Nash Holmes expressly purporting to be written on behalf of
herself and ALL the other RMC Judges, whose "full cooperation" she assures she can deliver to the SBN in seeking to discredit
Coughlin and in so doing assist the City of Reno in addressing the multiple wrongful arrests of Coughlin in the preceding
months.
Regardless, the communications between the Washoe County Public Defender and the RMC, including Ms. Tongini and Judge
Nash Holmes, and what exactly Judge William Gardner was made aware of, and what he passed from his sister, Judge Linda
Gardner, on to Judge Nash Holmes, and what Judge Nash Holmes passed onto Bar Counsel King is now of material relevance,
and brings into play the issue of the level of candor with opposing counsel King exhibits in his 4/19/12 correspondenc with
Coughlin when he purports to only have recieved Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order for Sanctions on 3/15/12 (and that
"5" in the "15" looks shaky, Pat), wherin King wrote: "It was sent to me by the clerk of the court at my request, pursuant to my
investigation." Which Clerk of Court, Mr. King? Clerk of Court Orduna Hastings? Then there is Judge Elliot dismissing Coughlin's lawsuit
against Washoe Legal Services, then incarcerating Coughlin between April 19th and April 26th, 2012 (during which time Richard G. Hill and
Casey Baker filed their Motion for Attorney's Fees of $40,050 incident to the appeal of a summary eviction in CV11-03628, which Coughlin's
former co-worker Judge Flanagan awarded Baker and Hill, after Judge Flanagan refused to recuse himself even where Coughlin pointed out
the necessity of his so doing. Then Judge Elliot denied Coughlin's appeal of RMC Judge Howard's conviction of Coughlin for "petty larceny of a
candy bar and some cough drops" in 11 CR 22176 (the sole basis for the current temporary suspension of Coughlin's law license, incident to a
trial where the Reno City Attorney Pamela Roberts offered perjured testimony from Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino and RSIC Officer Kameron
Crawford that Crawford was justified in conducting a custodial arrest and search incident thereto for an alleged misdemeanor offense,
occurring after 7 pm, outside the presence of the officer, in light of Coughlin failure to provide the officer his driver's license. City Attorney
Roberts had been provided by the RSIC a video tape showing Coughlin providing Crawford his driver's license, and Coughlin's booking
inventory sheet lists his drivers license (despite Officer Crawfords sworn testimony that Coughlin did not have one on his person at the time,
even where Wal-Mart's video shows Crawford copying down Coughlin's information off the driver's license Coughlin provided to Offier
Crawford, and where Wal-Mart admits that it did not effect a citizen's arrest of Coughlin, and therefore NRS 178.1255 required an application
of the exclusionary rule to any partial package of "cough drops" found in Coughlin's pockets upon a search incident to arrest (and even that is
not all that necessary to prove Coughlin's innocence given that the RSIC Officer and Wal-Mart's Frontino testified incorrectly that the receipt
for the $83.82 worth of groceries that Coughlin selected and paid after his allegely consuming a "candy bar and some cough drops" while
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Outlook Print Message
shopping, did, in fact have an entry for that exact UPC of Duract Cough Melts ("cough drops"), contrary to the sworn testimony of both Wal-
Mart's Frontino and the RSIC's Crawford). But none ofthat mattered much to Judge Elliot, as he denied Coughlin's appeal based on some civil
statute related to a litigant being required to pay for a transcript up front, even where, in criminal matters, the RMC is required to transmit the
record on appeal and order the production fo the transcripts within 10 days of the filing of a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to NRS 189.010-030,
regardless of whether the criminal defendant pays for the transcript up front. See CR12-1018 for other instances of teh RMC and its "exclusive
trancriptionist" Pam Longoni perpetuating a fraud on the public (the RMC indicates Longoni is the only transcriptionist they will allow, and
demand that she be paid up front....Longoni hung up on Coughlin multiple times and otherwise prejudiced Coughlin's appeal by refusing to
prepare his transcript even where Coughlin would pay up front for the transcripts, in CR11-2064. Judge Elliot then dismissed Coughlin's appeal
of the criminal trespass conviction by Judge William Gardner in CR12-1262 where the RMC and Lisa Wagner failed to file the 6/28/12 Notice of
Appeal Coughlin has confirmation that the RMC and City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens recieved, though both maintain a dubious position counter
to such irrefutable proof.
Additionally, one of the aspects of Richard G. Hill's grievance with the SBN against Coughlin, memorialized in NG12-0204 (one of the three greivances forming
Mr. Kings SCR 105 SBN v. Couglin Petition) alleges some sort of "ghostwriting" on Coughlin's part for a former client of Coughlin's John Gessin. This is plainly
not true, though some confusion may have arisen given the fact that at about the time Gessin and Couglin parted ways, Gessin apparently paid for and signed
up for an E-flex account (apparently non-attorneys may do so?). Hill's allegations respecting Gessin are baseless and ironic given the fact that Coughlin filed
Notice of Appearance as Gessin's attorney in various matters, and even sent Gessin a correspondence wherein he warns Gessin that he will not tolerate any
appearance of ghostwriting (what can an attorney do when a client pays him money, drafts of NRCP 60(b) Motions are worked up extensively over a period of
time, then the client decides he wants to part ways, and takes with him those drafts? File a Notice of Appearance so there is at least some paper trial?). It would
be helpful to addressing Hill's allegations vis a vis "ghostwriting" for Gessin if the Second Judicial District Court would present or allow for inspection anything it
may have tending to shed light on such allegations.
Here is one correspondence Coughlin sent then client John Gessin refuting the allegations that Hill made to the SBN in his attached 1/14/12 grievance against
Coughlin (attached to the SBN King's 2/14/12 letter to Coughlin):
"Subject: NOTICES OF APPEARANCES
John, Let me know whats going on, i got a new temporary address and phone number. theres is some
ghostwriting taboos, so...if you want me to withdraw thats fine, whatever, its all good
Zach Coughlin, Esq."
Further, in her 10 4 12 order in 11 TR 26800, Judge Nash Holmes continues to refuse to allow Coughlin to appeal a final appealable order convicting
him of "summary criminal contempt", even though Judge Holme's Order specifically relies upon alleged conduct, and an essential element thereof, not
occuring in here "immediate presence", and where there is no Affidavit by her Marshal (Judge Nash Holmes states on the record in 11 TR 26800 that an
RMC Marshal (apparently Marshal Harley) followed Coughlin into the restroom during a break in the Trial Judge Nash Holmes begrudingly granted
Coughlin (though she ordered him to leave his yellow note pad in the courtroom?) whereupon Marshal Harley played Peeping Tom through a bathroom
stall and alleges to have spied Coughlin "dissassembling a smartphone", which Judge Nash Holmes took as an opportunity to find "by clear and
convicing" evidence that Coughlin "lied" "under oath" in response to her impromptu, sua sponte, interrogation of Coughlin immediately following that
bathroom break (and soon after RMC Marshal Harley (who violated the "courthouse sanctuary" dictates against serving Coughlin Judge Flanagan's
Order to Show Cause for a 3/23/12 Hearing on Richard G. Hill's Motion in the eviction appeal in CV11-03628 while Coughlin and City Attorney Ormaas
where haggling over plea details immediately prior to the traffic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 (incident to Coughlin being told to leave Hill's office
upon arriving their to retrieve his keys, wallet, and driver's license, and client's file upon being released from three days in jail incident to a criminal
trespass complaint Hill signed against Coughlin, which the RPD committed misconduct in subjecting Coughlin to a custodial arrest for, especially in
light of the video taped admission of Sargent Lopez and the matrials presented in Coughlin's recent filings in 61901 and 11 CR 26405). RMC Marshal
Harley took it upon himself to aid WCSO Deputy Machen in filing a false Affidavit of Service in Harley's handing Coughlin, on behalf of Hill, a
document Hill paid the WCSO to serve on Coughlin (an how unseemly and bullying to attempt to serve it at the traffic citation trial, appearance of
impartiality and impropriety be damned, Caplow, regardless.). And City Attorney Ormaas may have been whispering in Harley's ears given her
apparent concern or her responses to Coughlin asking her, shortly before the trial commenced, if she planned to follow up on or in any way document
the admissions to accepting bribes from Richard Hill made by the officer effecting the custodial criminal trespass arrest, RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr.
(whom will apparently attest that he was jesting, though its not clear what is funny about arresting an attorney for trespass at his former home law
office where the WCSO admits it lied in filing an Affidavit of Service attesting to having "personally served" Coughlin such an Eviction Order.
I appreciate this opportunity to clarify my subpoena.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
000632
Outlook Print Message
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: Mr. King's assertion in his 3/16/12 letter
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 21:29:10 +0000
April 19, 2012
Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
A screening panel of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Panel met on Tuesday April 10, 2011 to address the grievances filed against you. The panel
directed me to proceed to a formal disciplinary hearing. As such, I will be preparing a formal Complaint.
I understand from the e-mail below, that you do not believe you should have been found guilty of the theft at Wal-Mart and that you should not
have been found in contempt of Court. However, it must concern you that you were found in contempt of Court by more than one Judge in two different
trials. You wanted to know how I learned of or obtained a copy of Judge Gardners Order after trial that was filed in 2009. It was sent to me by the clerk
of the court at my request, pursuant to my investigation.
It would help me and perhaps yourself, if you would respond and explain why you were convicted of theft and why you were held in contempt of
Court. You may be well served to explain what remedial measures you are taking to make sure you do not repeat the conduct complained about. I cannot
give you legal advice. However I can suggest you cooperate with Bar counsels investigation and that you respond specifically to the allegations contained
in Judge Holmes and Richard Hills grievance letters to the office of Bar Counsel.
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 5:41 PM
To: Patrick King; David Clark; Glenn Machado
Subject: Mr. King's assertion in his 3/16/12 letter
Dear Bar Counsel,
One thing that I am not sure I have ever pointed out, is that my then live in girlfriend of over 4 years stole about 2 months worth of my portion of our rent from
me (our arrangement was I would give her the money, she would forward it on to the landlord) in the period between May-July 2011. I sacrificed a great deal
and paid lots of her tuition, and she broke up with me and moved out on or around May 18th, 2011, about 3 days after we hosted her entire family for her
graduation from UNR. I did not know about her stealing my portion of the rent or failing to pay her own portion until August 2011, as the landlord was on an
extended vacation and failed to communicate any deficiency in the rent until mid-August, 2011, and the eviction in RJC REV2011-001708 from my former home
law office ensued within less than a week of his communicating this deficiency. He and his counsel, Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker pursued a No Cause
Notice of Eviction because there was a wealth of support for me contention that habitability issues, fix and deduct, and the landlord's failure to cure, in addition to
personal property damage done by the landlord's landscaping crew and a provision in the lease holding the landlord liable for such, indicated it would "be the path
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Outlook Print Message
of least resistance" to simply seek a No Cause Eviction. The only problem in their attempt to circumvent the law (even though they still threatened to seek back
rent in another forum after getting their No Cause, summary eviction) was the fact that the Lease Agreement specifically allowed for me to have a commercial law
office there, and NRS 40.253 makes impermissible a summary eviction against a commercial tenant unless the non-payment of rent is Notice, which, of course
Baker and Hill chose not to do....and it was about the time that Hill started to understand that his "wrong site surgery" for his neurosurgeon landlord client might
subject Hill and his firm to some malpractice liability, that Hill started writing letters to bar counsel attempting to start some grievance on behalf of Gessin (whom
Hill did not find so objectionable when Gessin was Hill's client and Hill was milking over $20K from Gessin) for "ghostwriting" even though I was listed as Attorney
of Record on several different Gessin cases, etc., etc.
Anyway, I deny guilt on each an every allegation made against me by Hill, Judge Nash Holmes, and whoever else has filed a grievance or complaint and also with
respect to any criminal charge against me, including that which resulted in a conviction in 11 CR 22176, which, I think will ultimately reveal was replete with
prosecutorial misconduct, lying by the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, and lying by the two RSIC police officers, in additional to abuse of discretion and other
errors by Judge Howard.
I am writing to report that I did not receive Mr. King's 3/16/12 letter until a substantial time after it was sent. The postmark on that 3/16/12 letter from Assistant
Bar Counsel King (please see attached picture of the letter and envelope) indicates it was mailed 3/16/12, and the letter indicates it was not faxed to me (despite
my numerous written requests that such a practice be done in consideration of the problems I have encountered in the USPS violations of the Federal Torts
Claims Act and incident to the domestic violence I have been subjected to, in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187, which included interference with my mail).
I timely filed an Official Change of Address with the USPS. Additionally, I made numerous appearances at both the Golden Valley USPS Station and the Downtown
Reno Post Office in and attempt to make every diligent effort to receive my mail. I have been threatened by and lied to by the supervisors of the Golden Valley
Station USPS Station. I had a hearing related to a landlord tenant dispute on 3/15/12 (which makes Judge Nash Holmes assertion, in her 3/14/12 letter that I was
living in my car at that time rather suspect, given my home law office was located at the property which was the subject of that hearing and which I was still
located at on 3/14/12...of course, Judge Nash Holmes provides no attribution for such hearsay in her extremely reckless assertion) in RJC REV2012-00374 (the
matter for which Gayle Kern sent a property manager who lacked even a law license to litigate on her behalf, or on that of the HOA which Kern has now decided
to appear for, despite her being listed a the PTTHOA Resident Agent for sometime and despite Kern being a named party in the lawsuit in RJC Rev2012-000374.
My point is, I did not receive Mr. King's mailing of 3/16/12, in a timely manner, and as such, I am requesting more time to respond to it. Additionally, I note that
Mr. King, in that 3/16/12 letter, writes "I am enclosing with this letter copies of a grievance letter, from the Municipal Court and a copy of an Order from District
court....I will make available for your review and inspection the supporting documents and audio recordings."
However, as I have previously written, Mr. King has not made "available for (my) review and inspection the supporting documents and audio recordings". I wish
to have a copy of all such "supporting documents and audio recordings", and failing a copy being provided, I wish to be allowed the access to conduct a "review
and inspection" of "the supporting documents and audio recordings" that Mr. King promised to afford me. At no time has Mr. King ever allowed me such access.
In addition, Mr. King now informs me that he has opened a grievance on behalf of Judge Linda M. Gardner, incident to a Order for Sanctions she entered in April
2009. Mr. King has refused to indicate to me who submitted this Order for Sanctions or otherwise provided it to Bar Counsel as a Complaint or Grievance or
otherwise. I believe someone necessarily must file the complaint or grievance. Further, I believe I am entitled to know whom that is, and when such was filed.
Additionally, Mr. King has, so failed to provide a copy or any access to any purported complaint by the City of Reno Marshal's division incident to my accessing
justice, or attempting to, on March 22nd, 2012. I am again requesting that I be so provided as much.
I filed an Official USPS Change of Address on March 12, 2012, in anticipation of a change of address incident to a landlord tenant hearing set for March 15th,
2012, and further, in response to hostility, retaliation, lies, and threats made by the USPS Golden Valley Station supervisors Buck Hyde, Terri James, and a "Ms."
Passot. Some mail, like Mr. King's 3/16/12 letter to me, was eventually forwarded to me (Mr. King's letter has 3 different yellow stickers affixed, one atop the
other, on it by the USPS), however, some mail, like several Orders of the Reno Municipal Court, were not forwarded on to me, but rather, apparently, returned to
the Reno Municipal Court. Nonesuch Orders were returned to the RMC in time for Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 letter to Mr. King, as such, I have no idea what
Judge Nash Holmes is referring to when she describes difficulty contacting me (the attempts by Judge Nash Holmes and the RMC apparently did not included
either email or fax or a phone call, however....).
There has been little rhyme or reason as to what mailings the USPS simply returned to the sender (such as a mailing from the RMC dated 3/14/12) and which
mailings it ultimately forwarded on to me (at my then PO BOX 60952, please note, I have a new PO BOX, that I intened to keep for a substantial period of time, it
is PO BOX 3961, Reno 89505...), such as a 3/13/12 mailing from the Reno Justice Court, which was forwarded on to my then PO BOX 60952 (albeit that envelope
has 3 yellow stickers stacked atop each other as well, the farthest one down indicating a forwarding date of 3/21/12, then next sticker indicating a hold, and the
final sticker atop the stack indicating a forwarding date of 3/28/12....).
I stayed in a weekly motel for an extended period of time following my November 2011 No Cause eviction from my former home law office, and there was
difficulties in filing a Change of Address incident to that given that the Address being changed from was permanently assigned to a business, a motor lodge.
Further, some problem cause Bank of America to temporarily deny my attempts to change my address on file online, and rather require that I mail Bank of
America a signed letter requesting as much, all the way to Florida. That resulted in delays in filing an online Change of Address with the USPS, given the USPS
demands the online changes be made with one's own debit card, and that they debit card bare the same billing address as the location one is filing a change of
address from, or else, the USPS, will process such a request, but it will add 7-10 days to tohe processing time. I chose that option given mailign a letter to Bank
of America in Florida would have taken just as long. IN the interim I went to the Golden Valley USPS Station and explained these circumstances and the
supervisor, beyond calling me a "squatter" in advance of the hearing in RJC REv2011-000374 (and refusing to divulge whom had been providing information to
them resulting in such a prejudicial view of my tenancy at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512), informed me that while my Change of Address to my then PO Box
60952 was being processed, my mail would be held at the Golden Valley Station and that I could retrieve it there for the next 7-10 days. When I returned in the
following days, a supervisor named Buck Hyde literally assaulted me, and he and two other supervisors there, Terri James and "Ms. Passot" informed me they
were "Feds" and didn't have to put up with any crap from an attorney related to state laws like NRS 118A.190, though they couldn't cite specifically to any section
of Title 39 of U.S. Code justifying their refusal to allow me a mailbox key to my former home law office at 1422 E. 9th St. #2.
Sincerely,
000634
Outlook Print Message
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 3961, RENO, NV, 89505, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
convicting attorney of summary criminal contempt during pendency of Order
for Competency Evaluation
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sat 11/03/12 3:14 AM
To: togninim@reno.gov (togninim@reno.gov); joey.hastings@washoecounty.us (joey.hastings@washoecounty.us);
joey.orduna@washoecounty.us (joey.orduna@washoecounty.us); david.hardy@washoecounty.us
(david.hardy@washoecounty.us); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com);
mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org
(complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com)
5 attachments
11TR26800 RMC 031412_20120312-1033_01cd003b8f0851d0.wmv (10.3 MB) , 10 25 12 61901 opposition (1)
FILESTAMPED 61901 SCR 111(4) In Re Coughlin.pdf (225.1 KB) , 61901 10 29 12 amendedemmental.pdf (230.2 KB) ,
Patrick King sbn grievance letter of 3 16 12 and Judge Nash Holmes greivance of 3 14 12 rmc 11 TR 26800.pdf (575.8
KB) , exhibit 1 with cover page part 1 of 3 61901 10 25 12 filing.pdf (8.0 MB)
togninim@reno.gov; joey.hastings@washoecounty.us; joey.orduna@washoecounty.us; david.hardy@washoecounty.us; patrickk@nvbar.org;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org;
tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
RE: convicting attorney of summary criminal contempt during pendency of
Order for Competency Evaluation
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/04/12 12:34 AM
To: togninim@reno.gov (togninim@reno.gov); joey.hastings@washoecounty.us (joey.hastings@washoecounty.us);
joey.orduna@washoecounty.us (joey.orduna@washoecounty.us); david.hardy@washoecounty.us
(david.hardy@washoecounty.us); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com);
mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org
(complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com)
Dear SBN,
I have set my email to add to my blocked sender list any "bounce back" or error messages that might be sent me
in response to your antiquated email system having any sort of file size limitations resulting in a rejection of a
transmission that pretty much an old free gmail or hotmail account could accept. So, your on notice of that and
your apparent purposeful Luddite stance (reminds me of "Investigator" Peters mentioning how reluctant she is
to investigate anything) is not something I will be receiving any notice of so you might want to adjust your
email system accordingly.
I have an idea, how about you implement a "salary size limitation" on your paychecks until you cease pursuing
outdated and dubious plausible deniability constructs?
000635
Outlook Print Message
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: togninim@reno.gov; joey.hastings@washoecounty.us; joey.orduna@washoecounty.us; david.hardy@washoecounty.us; patrickk@nvbar.org;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org;
je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Subject: convicting attorney of summary criminal contempt during pendency of Order for Competency Evaluation
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2012 03:13:58 -0700
togninim@reno.gov; joey.hastings@washoecounty.us; joey.orduna@washoecounty.us; david.hardy@washoecounty.us; patrickk@nvbar.org;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org;
tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach Coughlin has shared a folder with you
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 11/06/12 9:46 AM
To: skent@skentlaw.com
Exhibit 1 to 11 3 12
Supplement to
Coughlin's List of
View photos
You are invited to view Zach's album. This album has
147 files.
031209 part 2 of 2 dv08-01168 54844 01955 01896 60302 60317 ng12-0435 26405
031209 part 1 of 2 dv08-01168 54844 01955 01896 60302 60317 ng12-0435 26405
0223121 PTTHOA 1 of 2 RJC Rev2012-000374.asf
0223121 PTTHOA 2 of 2 RJC rev2012-000374.asf
122011 rjc rev2011-001708 part 1 seg 2 of 2 hearing on motion to contest personal property lien merliss v coughlin1.wmv
122011 rjc rev2011-001708 part 1 seg 1 of 2 hearing on motion to contest personal property lien merliss v coughlin1.wmv
122011 rjc rev2011-001708 part 2 seg 2 of 2 hearing on motion to contest personal property lien merliss v coughlin1.wmv
122011 rjc rev2011-001708 part 2 seg 1 of 2 hearing on motion to contest personal property lien merliss v coughlin1.wmv
031709 dv08-01168 54844 cv11-01955 cv11-01896 60302 60317 Joshi divorce trial Judge L Gardner coughlin mandamus wls 08h24m39s.wmv 000636
Outlook Print Message
031709 dv08-01168 54844 cv11-01955 cv11-01896 60302 60317 Joshi divorce trial Judge L Gardner coughlin mandamus wls 08h17m06s.wmv
from blse 6 29 12 15 wcso machen and northwind moment of arrest and ncs.mp4
071612 rjc rcr2011-063341 rcr2012-065630 rcr2012-067980 dogan bosler leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso Trial continued coughlin.wmv
082712 coughlin2 plea bargain hearing rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso.wmv
031709 dv08-01168 54844 cv11-01955 cv11-01896 60302 60317 Joshi divorce trial Judge L Gardner coughlin mandamus wls 10h22m12s.wmv
082712coughlin3 plea bargain hearing rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso.wmv
082712 coughlin1 plea bargain hearing rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso.wmv
082912 coughlin1 RJC RCR2011-063341 iPhone Trial Leslie Young Bosler rpd rmc wcso Duralde Goble Zarate testimony.wmv
082912 coughlin2 RJC RCR2011-063341 iPhone Trial Leslie Young Bosler rpd rmc wcso Duralde Goble Zarate testimony.wmv
082912coughlin3 RJC RCR2011-063341 iPhone Trial Leslie Young Bosler rpd rmc wcso Duralde Goble Zarate testimony.wmv
090512coughlin3 rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso duralde.wmv
Share your files with
(No Subject)
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 11/06/12 9:46 AM
To: (skent@skentlaw.com) (skent@skentlaw.com); (mike@tahoelawyer.com) (mike@tahoelawyer.com);
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net) (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); (patrickk@nvbar.org) (patrickk@nvbar.org); (fflaherty@dlpfd.com)
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); (davidc@nvbar.org) (davidc@nvbar.org); (complaints@nvbar.org) (complaints@nvbar.org);
(tsusich@nvdetr.org) (tsusich@nvdetr.org); (je@eloreno.com) (je@eloreno.com); (cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
11 5 12 SUPPLMENTSAL TO 0204.pdf
Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 4:13 AM
To: (skent@skentlaw.com) (skent@skentlaw.com); (mike@tahoelawyer.com) (mike@tahoelawyer.com);
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net) (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); (patrickk@nvbar.org) (patrickk@nvbar.org); (fflaherty@dlpfd.com)
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); (davidc@nvbar.org) (davidc@nvbar.org); (complaints@nvbar.org) (complaints@nvbar.org);
(tsusich@nvdetr.org) (tsusich@nvdetr.org); (je@eloreno.com) (je@eloreno.com); (cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
from:
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St. 000637
Outlook Print Message
Reno, NV 89512
tel and fax 949 667 7402
I do not consent to service or notice of anything electronically in this proceeding, but I do appreciate being copied on such things via email
and fax)
Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
please find attached 88 page Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or Otherwise Challenge Sufficiency of Service
and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of Intent to Take Default and DoWSoE; and Preserving for Appeal Objection to All other Due Process
Violations; and UNDER PROTEST...RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT
submitted for filing with the State Bar of Nevada on November 9th, 2012
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
11 9 12 response under protest 0204 and various motions and notices 0204 etc.pdf
FW:
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 7:50 AM
To: skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com);
davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org
(tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
3 attachments
10 31 12 0204 Pre Hearing Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgement and Memorandum of Law (Responsive
Pleading).pdf (10.4 MB) , 10 31 12 subpoena on peters and waiver of service.pdf (541.5 KB) , ex x harris silverman
coughlin garin 0204 11 11 12.pdf (9.8 MB)
Nice to see my friend Steve back in the game. And the SBN stipping to a dismissal of its SCR 116 appeal rights...
Please find attached the file stamped versions of the 10 31 12 subpoena duces tecum for which SBN Laura Peters signed a waiver
of service or similar
and the 10 31 12 Pre Hearing Motion to Dismiss Summary Judgment/Memorandum of Law (Response)
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 11:28:12 -0700
From: silverman@silverman-decaria.com
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: re: FW: please find enclosed my Petition under SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR111(7)
I think this is waaaaay too complex and detailed. Give them a procedural history and whether there is a final judgment in the crim case and point out that your
temporary suspension is akin to a permanent death of your practice. Or, if true, say you fucked up and/or were fucked up from lack of drugs and you are sorry
and you now have access to your meds and are ok. I can't think this pleading is going to help you much...it is too long, repetitive and does not seem to deal with
why the temp suspension is sijmply wrong or harsh. If you can't make your case in 3-5 pp, you can't make your case in 35. You do seem to be a good lawyer,
however. At bottom, Steve Harris took hundreds of thousands of dollars and had no temp suspension; you stole a candy bar (at worst). WTF.
000638
Outlook Print Message
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Tribal Police not allowed to arrest for misdemeanors FW: Case No. RCR2011-
063341
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 8:40 AM
To: homerj@reno.gov (homerj@reno.gov); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov (hazlett-
stevensc@reno.gov); robertsp@reno.gov (robertsp@reno.gov); kadlicj@reno.gov (kadlicj@reno.gov); fflaherty@dlpfd.com
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org);
wongd@reno.gov (wongd@reno.gov); ormaasa@reno.gov (ormaasa@reno.gov); bonyr@reno.gov (bonyr@reno.gov);
skauc@reno.gov (skauc@reno.gov); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); drakej@reno.gov (drakej@reno.gov);
je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com
(mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); skent@skentlaw.com
(skent@skentlaw.com)
How exactly is it that both City Attorney Pamela Roberts, Esq. and Chris Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. did not violate
RPC 3.8 or otherwise prosecute for arrests that were not lawful
in RMC 11 CR 22176 (Indian Tribe police custodial arrest for misdemeanor? Not lawful under NRS 171.1255,
and even if they were RPD, which they are not, its not like they charge Coughlin with something other than
petty larceny a la NRS 171.136(2)...
Further, can you provide me an indication of how it was lawful for RSIC Officer's Kameron Crawford or
Donnie Braunworth to arrest me on 9/9/11 (and Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino made explicitly clear in his
testimony at trial on 11/30/11 that neither he nor any of Wal-Mart's staff in any way effected a custodial arrest
of Coughlin on that date) for a misdemeanor given the following:
NRS 171.1255 Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police officer employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an
Indian tribe may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officer or agents presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officer or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person for a public offense, and the officer or agent
has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the
peace officer finds evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
2. Such an officer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense committed on that reservation or colony; or
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or agent is in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably
believed by the officer or agent to have committed a felony within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to
commit, any criminal offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
000639
Outlook Print Message
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 171.156.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 452)
While Ormaas made sure to get judicial notice taken of jurisdiction in 11 TR 26800, it doesn't seem Pamela Roberts, Esq. did in the Indian Colony
Wal-Mart matter...Why is that, Pam? Tribal land? Never determined if Coughlin had even an ounce of tribal blood? RSIC Officers not entitled
to make custodial arrests for misdemeanors, even, apparently, one's committed right in their presence? So, even if Coughlin did refuse to provide
his driver's license (which has been proven to be a lie, and perjury suborned by Pam Roberts as to the testimony of Wal-Mart's Frontino and the
RSIC Officer's Crawford and Braunworth via police reports, dispatch recordings (AND PLEASE BE ADIVSED, AS ITS WITHIN THE 2
YEARS, THAT THE CITY OF RENO, THE SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER FOR ECOMM OR WASHOE COUNTY, OR WHOEVER IT IS
THAT HANDLES THE RSIC DISPATCH CALLS, IT ON A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE. COUGHLIN DEMANDS (AND THE
DISPATCH/ECOMM SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER WILL GET ITS NRS 174.345 SUBPOENA IN THE MAIL FOR A MISDEMEANOR
SOON ENOUGH) THAT THE CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS MAINTAIN ANY AND ALL RECORDINGS, LOGS, OR OTHER
DOCUMENTATION OR MEDIA IN ANY WAY CONNECTED TO ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER,
ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE ARREST OF 9/9/11 AT THE RSIC WAL-MART IN RENO NEVADA NEAR GLENDALE AND W.
2ND ST.
So, all these arrests by the RSIC police of alleged shoplifters at Wal-Mart...Sling Bla...er, Officer Braunworth testified that there was lots of them
(sounds like Wal-Mart and the RSIC have the whole "find a way to get a search incident to arrest" thing down part, while avoiding any wrongful
arrest liability against the deep pocket tenant Wal-Mart by avoiding any "shopkeeper's privilege" type citizen's arrests (or trying to use just as
much intimidation and coercion as Frontino and the gang can muster, while seeking to claim not to have effected a citizen's arrest later in court,
given setting the RSIC up to handle those types of lawsuits is arguably a better long term loss mitigation approach for these long term business
partners, Wal-Mart and their partner/landlord the RSIC.
So, please enlighten me. How is it these RSIC Officers are making all these custodial arrests for simple misdemeanors? And just where in the
audio transcript of the Trial (you might want to have RMC house transcriptionist Pam Longoni finally get around to making a transcript and
providing it to Coughlin, as the handouts the RMC itself provides defendants baring Longoni's and the RMC's "down payment"/transcript hostage
rules are tantamount to extortion in violation of NRS 189.030. Then there is the bit about the RMC and or other discovering over $700K was
"missing", and the attempts to chalk it up to "data entry" errors. Please get that transcript to me right away, and transcripts of every other hearing
I have ever had in the RMC, including the one on or around February 2nd, 2012 or so where RMC court appointed defender Roberto Puentes
successfully argued for an Order Granting His Withdrawal (five Withdrawals by court appointed counsel of Coughlin, four via an Order Granting
a duly filed Motion (though these guy's Motions wouldn't pass my 7th grade English Class's bi-weekly writing assignment in my days at Swope
Middle School) and Hon. W. Gardner starts to divulge, only after Coughlin's prompting, bit by bit some of the patent conflicts that should have
prevented him from ever ruling on a single motion in that case 11 CR 26405. With such lack of vigor from the RMC's court appointed defense
counsel, could a class action lawsuit agains them, the RMC, and or the City of Reno be a possibility someday? Certainly is a nice lil side gig
$7K a month those guys get...and all these prosecutions and trips to jail this year certainly have afforded an opportunity to see the "operation" up
close.
Also, you know, as to lots of these arrests, like say the July 3rd, 2012 arrest by RPD Officer Alan Weaver and now Sargent Brian Dye in 12 CR
12420 (wherein two RMC court appointed counsel have already sought and obtained Orders Granting Their Withdrawal, one, by Keith Loomis,
one by Henry Sotelo, the latter in violation of the stay in NRS 178.405) the legitimacy of effecting a custodial arrest is completely suspect
considering:
ARREST: BY WHOM AND HOW MADE
NRS 171.124 Arrest by peace officer or officer of Drug Enforcement Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration
designated by the Attorney General of the United States for that purpose may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officers presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officers presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to
have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor by the person arrested.
000640
Outlook Print Message
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person for a public offense, and the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
2. A peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney General of the United States for that purpose
may also, at night, without a warrant, arrest any person whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing to have committed a felony or gross
misdemeanor, and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appears that a felony or gross misdemeanor has not been committed.
So back to the Wal-Mart RSIC arrest...the charge sheet doesn't say Coughlin was arrested for anything other than petty larceny....but:
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:
(1) There is a warrant of arrest against the person; and
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for
another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is
committed;
(e) When the offense charged is battery that constitutes domestic violence pursuant to NRS 33.018 and the arrest is made in the manner provided in
NRS 171.137;
(f) When the offense charged is a violation of a temporary or extended order for protection against domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS
33.017 to 33.100, inclusive;
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
(h) When the person voluntarily surrenders himself or herself in response to an outstanding warrant of arrest.
So, on exactly what basis was the July 3rd, 2012 arrest made by the RPD? The police report says the arrest was made for "disturbing the peace",
yet the only allegation of anything remotely in the "officer's presence" relates to the minor traffic citation the City of Reno is clinging to in
attempts to mitigate the Sec. 1983 damages here. However, the RPD admits at least one vehicle was between their's and Coughlin's and Sooudi et
al (besides making an incomprehensibly stupid decision to briefly file an amended complaint for trespassing where even the RPD was smart
enough to realize that was a poor choice given Coughlin still had lease at Northwind, and thus a pat claim of right defense to any trespass
allegation absent something like the manufactured protection order that RPD Officer Weaver coerced Milan Krebs into obtaining, just like Weaver
attempted to get Superior Storage's Matt Grant to do, shortly after Weaver, in full view of Welch, Sargent Miller, and other RPD Officer's, on
September 21st, 2012, threatened to come up with yet another fraudulent "failure to secure a load on one's vehicle" arrest of Coughlin). So, even
though Weaver and Dye are stuck with their statements in the written reports, wherein they allege to have arrest Coughlin for "disturbing the
peace" only to then tack on "citations" for the two traffic offenses (and the "proof of insurance" citation, even after Officer Weaver admits to
being provided a high definition pdf picture on a 5 inch smart phone screen with a policy number, etc., only to be amplified by the July 5th, 2012
bail hearing racket tearing (a tennis reference for Jill Drake, Esq.,... for shame, really Jill, really, really unimpressed).
Please remit a certified check for $450,000 in satisfaction of these torts committed upon Coughlin, under color of law.
Sincerely,
000641
Outlook Print Message
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: homerj@reno.gov; complaints@nvbar.org; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; patrickk@nvbar.org;
tsusich@nvdetr.org
Subject: RE: Case No. RCR2011-063341
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 20:36:27 -0800
couldn't open them, and I don't accept service of anything form you... See Allison Ormaas comments on
3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 with respect to your offices violation of the RMC Rules to the extent there is not
difference technologically anymore between an email and a fax:
Rule 5: Motions/Pleadings by Facsimile
A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions/pleadings filed in person at the court shall also apply to motions/pleadings filed by facsimile, except as otherwise specified
in this rule.
B. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile will only be accepted through the clerk's office (775-334-3824).
C. Except by prior court approval, a motion/pleading by facsimile shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages in length, including the cover sheet and exhibits. A document shall not
be split into multiple transmissions to avoid the page limitation.
D. Each transmitted page shall bear sequential numbers in the transmission.
E. All persons are eligible to use motion/pleading-by-facsimile procedures.
F. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet which must include the persons name, address, fax number and telephone number.
G. All facsimile motions/pleadings filed by an attorney must include the attorney's name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone number. In addition, the
attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously displayed on the cover sheet.
H. All motions /pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service. Service may be accomplished by facsimile when the receiving party is a
governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving party. If service of the motion/pleading is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day allowance
for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
I. A defense attorney filing a motion/pleading in the first instance must also file a proper authorization to represent.
J. Any motion /pleading received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day shall be filed on the following court day.
Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must state the reason therefore and whether
or not any continuance has previously been sought or granted.
Further, Please consider Pamela Roberts attempts to mislead the Court and opposing counsel where (despite Rich HIll getting a continuance agree to by then court appointed
defense counsel Lew Taitel, whose business partners Coughlin was suing in CV11-03015 and or CV11-03126, Taitel agreed to a continuance, in violation of Coughlin's speedy
trial right, where Hill needed to go on a six week vacation in 11 cr 26405) Roberts at first agreed, in writing, to a continuance in response to Coughlin's request for one in 11 CR
22176, but then retaliated against Coughlin's pointing out her RPC 3.8 violations on the day of Trial, 11/30/12 by refusing the stipulate to a continuance an blaming it on the Court.
Pursuant to RMCR Rule 5(H), the City Attorney's Office does not have my consent to service via any means other than the traditional snail mail,
usps, or personal service. And I am not currently included amongst those who are "attorneys", so you are stuck with that. Your office on the
other hand, fits within both the 'governmental agency" and "attorney exceptions"...someone needs to tell Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq.
that becuase he has lied numerous times, on the record about not being served where he has been. Take, for instance
Further, does your office represent any of the RMC's court appointed defenders? Taitel, in 11 CR 26405, failed to follow RMC Rules in
withdrawing from representation:
Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on the motion or set a
hearing.
Further, these RMCR's seem to change out of the blue, is there some record of what changes were made and when?
Hazlett-Steven's lies, in part, helped secure a dismissal of my appeal in cr12-1262 (the appeal of the Richard G. Hill eviction trespass case). Also, you will want to query the RMC's
D2 and Lisa Gardner as to why Coughlin has a confirmation of delivery of his timely under NRS 189.010 Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 26405, yet D2 failed to file it, and the appeal in
000642
Outlook Print Message
cr12-1262 was dismissed in light of the combination of both asserting, in one way or another, that the Notice of Appeal was not received in a timely manner. The delivery
confirmations say otherwise.
Please remit $250,000 in the form of a certified check to the address below within 10 days in settlement of these torts. SBN, please provide to me the grievance number associate
with this new grievance that is created upon the successful transmission of this email.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
utbound fax report Inbox x
Voxox noreply@voxox.com Jun 27
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 08:54:28 PM on 2012-06-27.
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
This message was intended for renoattorney@gmail.com. Want to control which emails you receive from Voxox?
Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in the Settings/Preferences window. Voxox by
TelCentris, Inc. is located at 10180 Telesis Ct., San Diego, CA 92109.
Voxox noreply@voxox.com Jun 27
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 09:16:58 PM on 2012-06-27.
Voxox noreply@voxox.com Jun 28
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 08:13:34 AM on 2012-06-28.
Voxox noreply@voxox.com Jun 28
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 09:04:24 AM on 2012-06-28.
Voxox noreply@voxox.com Jun 28
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 3ad3f15b-3a33-4863-a6cd-7934ec8f8b32general693298 ( 17753343859).
000643
Outlook Print Message
Your Fax was delivered @ 09:05:24 AM on 2012-06-28.
000644
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000646
response to grievance from NV Attorney
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/09/12 5:44 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org
1 attachment
3 9 12 fax to State Bar of Nevada Bar Counsel requesting extension of time to respond to
Richard G. Hill, Esq. grievance.pdf (61.6 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and email only to:
Reno Office: 775 329 0522
Las Vegas Office: 702 385 2878
DavidC@nvbar.com, PatrickK@nvbar.com, GlennM@nvbar.com
March 9, 2012,
Page 1 of 147 http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=dfc328a6-141c-443...
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.... http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.... 3/23/2012
000647
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar Counsel King
sent me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set forth. Mr. King wrote,
"please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the date of this letter."
I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just received this
mailing from you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to that. Further, I hope I
can demonstrate to you and the State Bar of Nevada that circumstances at least somewhat
beyond my control have prevented me from receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent
fashion. These circumstances resulted in two different Domestic Violence Protection Orders
being granted to me against my former housemates by Master Edmondson of the Second
Judicial District Court in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the electricity to my location
was interrupted from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept payment from
me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the individuals
against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining electrical
service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection orders were issued
interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has taken some time to get the
USPS Postal Inspectors to release my mail to me and or allow me to receive mail at my
location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Glenn
Machado a written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help me in remaining aware of
any correspondence being sent me from the State Bar while I work to get my mailbox situation
settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado that
"I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who I ultimately wound up getting
Protection Orders against, and they have interfered with my ability to receive my mail with
absolute certainty (I have received much of my mail, and have pending
correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno, NV to obtain a permanent and newly
rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster
agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, he will then
allow me to get a mailbox key made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see
how much longer I must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I
am an electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am writing
to ask that any correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of Nevada may have
for me or may have mailed to me be, if possible, copied to me via my fax number or email
address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously, and I hope I
am afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
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RE: Contact
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:39 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; clarkd@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
1 attachment
THE 2 11 12 email to WCSO RPD Reno City Attorney Hill NPUC Hill et al b.pdf (137.8 KB)
Mr. King,
I have not sent you my Reply to the Grievance. You gave me until today, and I am
finishing it up. Additionally, I was subject to what I believe is a wrongful eviction
yesterday, and would like additionaly time to respond to Richard HIll's grievance,
which he appears to be filing on behalf of various third parties, and his associate,
who doesn't bother to sign it. Basically, Mr. HIll constantly seeks to leverage courts,
police, and now, Bar Counsel, to further his nefarious approach to litigation, rather
than roll up his sleeves and find some law in favor of his positions and apply actual
facts to them, rather than make up things or quote to third parties and other hearsay (I
never made contact with or touched Mr. Hill, I never climbed on anyone's truck, Mr.
Hill is not a licensed mental health professional, yet he sounds like a walking DSM-
IV when he writes of me). I will submit something to you today in response to Hill's
grievance, with the caveat that I am requesting more time, in part due to the fact that
the Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies have just yesterday, minutes before my
hearing in Judge Beesley's courtroom, unlawfully stormed into my location at 1422
E. 9th St, #2, with guns drawn and pointed at me, without previously identifying
themselves as law enforcement in any way, and demanding I grab a few things in a
couple minutes and leave. This unlawful eviction was pursuant to an eviction
hearing held that morning by Reno Justice Court Judge Jack Shroeder, the
same Judge who screamed at me "do you want to go to jail" when I attempted to
address in any way whatsoever Richard Hill's abuse of process in getting a Order of
Protection from Judge Schroeder in a scant 40 minutes, and having me arrested on
1/12/12 (two days before Hill's grievance was sent to you), at the extension
hearing on January 31, 2012, where Hill admitted he didn't have a good reason for
seeking an extension and withdrew his application. I wanted to address Hill's abuse
of process for the record, Judge Schroeder decided to scream at me instead. It was
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reminscent of Judge Nash Holmes telling me, on the record, in Reno Municipal
Court case 11 TR 26800 that she would have me arrested and placed in jail if I said
Richard G. Hill's name one more time. I cross examined RPD Sargent Tarter about
whether he had a retaliatory motive in ticketing me outside Hill's office on 11/15/11
after Hill refused to give me my driver's license, and I reported to Sargent Tarter that
RPD Officer Chris Carter had admitted to taking bribes from Richard Hill.
Actually, there is some footage of the "terror" Richard G. Hill was exposed to that
necessitated him seeking a Protection Order (the "RPD made him" do it, honest):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBu9zflGALE
I don't know why Sargent Sifre (whom makes more money than a District Court
Judge) should be so upset with lawyers like me, who work in the foresclosure
defense field (you might see if Geof Giles, Esq. thinks I am quite the "Yosemite
Sam" caricature of a cartoon villian that Richard G. Hill paints me to be, or if
Thomas J. Hall thinks that much of Rich and his "tactics", which are like those of a
malignant frat boys armed with daddy's pleadings). After all, Sargent Sifre has
benefitted from foresclosure defense work:
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2011/01/29/nevada-dist-court-quiet-title-viable-sifre-
v-wells-fargo-bank/
Regardless, I have not "ghostwritten" any pleadings for Mr. Gessin or anybody else.
I am listed as attorney of record on adversary proceedings for Gessin, though the
only things I ever filed for him clearly indicated that I was not appearing as attorney
of record and that the Answers to the Complaints in those two adversary proceedings
were being submitted on an "unbundled services" arrangement. The bankruptcy
court nonetheless listed me as attorney of record and I have been and am in the
process of having that changed. I have communicated with clerk Holly Estes and
filing office supervisore Debbie Gallagher in those regards.
I need more time to research and investigate the other allegations Hill makes, though
I do not wish you to infer and admission on my part to any allegation by Hill.
I have researched this service of eviction Order issues extensively, it relates to the
Hill matter, and I believe the WCSO and Hill are not following the law.
I am not sure why you wrote what you did at 9:09 am this morning considering you
granted me until 3:00pm today to file my response, which I intend to along with a
request for more time to supplement it:
From:Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org); Glenn Machado (GlennM@nvbar.org)
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March 12, 2012
To: Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I am in receipt of your email below, requesting additional time to respond. Please be advised that
your response to the grievance, including the email letter below, become part of the record and may
eventually be reviewed by a disciplinary panel. With that said, it is important that we receive your
response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to deliver
your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 5:45 PM
To: Patrick King; Glenn Machado; David Clark
Subject: response to grievance from NV Attorney
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and email only to:
Reno Office: 775 329 0522
Las Vegas Office: 702 385 2878
DavidC@nvbar.com, PatrickK@nvbar.com, GlennM@nvbar.com
March 9, 2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar Counsel King
sent me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set forth. Mr. King wrote,
"please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the date of this letter."
I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just received this
mailing from you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to that. Further, I hope I
can demonstrate to you and the State Bar of Nevada that circumstances at least somewhat
beyond my control have prevented me from receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent
fashion. These circumstances resulted in two different Domestic Violence Protection Orders
being granted to me against my former housemates by Master Edmondson of the Second
Judicial District Court in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the electricity to my location
was interrupted from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept payment from
me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th 2012 incident to one of the individuals
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000652
against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining electrical
service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection orders were issued
interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has taken some time to get the
USPS Postal Inspectors to release my mail to me and or allow me to receive mail at my
location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Glenn
Machado a written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help me in remaining aware of
any correspondence being sent me from the State Bar while I work to get my mailbox situation
settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado that
"I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who I ultimately wound up getting
Protection Orders against, and they have interfered with my ability to receive my mail with
absolute certainty (I have received much of my mail, and have pending
correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno, NV to obtain a permanent and newly
rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster
agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, he will then
allow me to get a mailbox key made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see
how much longer I must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I
am an electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am writing
to ask that any correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of Nevada may have
for me or may have mailed to me be, if possible, copied to me via my fax number or email
address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously, and I hope I
am afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin"
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
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000653
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: lstuchell@washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov;
cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; jboles@callatg.com; bbuckley@lacsn.org; daolshan@yahoo.com;
jsoderlund@nlslaw.net; jdelikanakis@swlaw.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
jbosler@washoecounty.us; bdogan@washoecounty.us; mechols@maclaw.com; mclarkson@puc.nv.gov
Subject: Evictions RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 12:14:01 -0800
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served
by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence
was unoccupied at the time.
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;
kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
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000654
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being
a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me
the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served"
in compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom
and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
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situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b)
Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or
an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon
the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter
was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period
commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...
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Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
"Substituted service
When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal service, many
jurisdictions allow for substituted service. Substituted service allows the process
server to leave service documents with another responsible individual, called a
person of suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult or a teenager. Under
the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be made at the abode or dwelling of
the defendant.[4] California, New York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States
jurisdictions require that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed
to the recipient.[5] Substituted service often requires a serving party show that
ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has been made to attempt to
make personal service by delivery, and that substituted service will reach the party
and effect notice.[5]"
I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person in person, not that
a person named Machem went and posted a notice on a door, personally himself.
See, I think you guys are thinking of the "person" in the word personally as applying
to the server, when in all instances I have ever seen it used in the law, the "person"
part of "personally" applies to the person being served. Help me out here, Mary.
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
1897&parid=root
Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is required of eviction
orders prior to the WCSO or whoever does it, being able to conduct a lockout?
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html
NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c) Default
Judgments: Defendant Not Personally Served. When a default judgment shall have
been taken against any party who was not personally served with summons and
complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, and who has not
entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice to the adverse party,
upon motion made within 6 months after the date of service of written notice of entry
of such judgment, may vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal
representatives to answer to the merits of the original action. When, however, a party
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000657
has been personally served with summons and complaint, either in the State of
Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, the party must make application to be relieved
from a default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the party, or
for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b)
of this rule.
Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve people things....and
sign Affidavits under penalty of perjury and stuff, and you are telling me you believe
"personally served" can included situations where the person was not there?
Okay.....You do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint need to be "personally
served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to see that person and serve it on
them (I don't think they have to take the paper, they don't need to agree to accept
service, but Machem does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is
swearing under penalty of perjury that he "personally served" somebody. Usually
"personally served" is only done in the case of the first thing filed (unless there is an
IFP) in a case, the Summons and Complaint. Thereafter, typically, people just effect
"substituted service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal service" is
only required for serving the pleadings that start a case, the Summons and
Complaint. Wow....Okay, so this is my whole point, these state sponsored lockouts
under color of state law should not be being done so fast, unless you guys
"personally serve" the tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect
"substituted service" which, under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2)
(and NRCP, not JCRCP is applicable to eviction matters according to NRS 118A)
the tenant cannot be deemed to have received or constructively received the Order
until the 3 days for mailing has passed.
Personal service by process server
Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party named on the
summons, complaint or petition. In most lawsuits in the United States, personal
service is required to prove service. Most states allow substituted service in almost
all lawsuits unless you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other business entity;
in those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in hand) the documents
to the "Registered Agent" of a business entity. Some states (Florida) do not require
that the documents actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other
states, the documents must be visible to the person being served, i.e., not in a sealed
envelope. If the individual refuses to accept service, flees, closes the door, etc., and
the individual has been positively identified as the person to be served, documents
may be "drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service of
process has been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly 100 years, primarily
because it guarantees actual notice to a defendant of a legal action against him or her.
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Personal service of process remains the most reliable and efficacious way to both
ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process requirements of notice
to a defendant and the opportunity to be heard. [2]^ The National Law Review: The
Continuing Relevance of Personal Service of Process
And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order, much like in the
case of Coughlin's that was dismissed where the Washoe County Sheriff's didn't
manage to get the "personal service" of the Summons and Complaint done in time, or
"sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell you that "actual notice" is
not a substitute for compliance with the service requirements.
Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of an opportunity to
game the system and swoop in with lockout then assert a bunch of hooey about NRS
118A.460 "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the
tenant's personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill insisted on throwing away the
last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she died 2 years ago in the town
dump. He and his contractor lied about so many things, including the fact that they
used my own damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then
submitted a bill to the court in an exhibit for $1,060 for "securing" the property
(which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's "reasonable storage moving and
inventorying expenses" like it is required to...further, the charged me $900 a month
for storage and sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121
River Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home law office there,
then how is it someone could be trespassing if they are being charged the full rental
value for "use and occupancy of the premises"? Further, even if it was a storage
situations, there are sections of NRS 118A devoted to evicting someone from a
storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a custodial arrest
where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez admit they never issued a warning
to me or asked me to leave prior to conducting a custodial arrest (which required
$800 of bail, great!, and 3 days in jail, no less). This is especially poor form where
Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes from Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer
Carter did not say that to me, go ahead and sue me, my man....I'm waiting.....that's
what I thought.
He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass situation to me when
you are arresting me and causing a google search result for my name to show an
arrest....that's damaging the only thing I have of monetary value (my professional
reputation and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are putting me in cuffs, bro.
And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to properly query Hill as to whether
he had sent me, prior to the trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the
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property, a value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and occupancy"
of the premises. And Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too busy chortling and filling out the
Criminal Complaint to bother setting them straight, despite my cues, I guess.
Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let Casey Baker, Esq.
prepare the Order, which means faithfully put to writing what the Judge announced,
not attempt to steal $2,275 for your Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate
neurosurgeon client by slipping in something the judge never said, ie, that the
neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order the tenant to pay
into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow" deposit required to preserve the right
to litigate habitability issues. Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually
did not have the jurisdiction to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno, that's a
Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of its own JCRCP 83 requires the RJC
to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court first....period.). Okay,
so, to take it a step even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275 won't
be released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as security for
Coughlin's cost on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP 73...". But wait, doesn't that
mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt'
that was a security that large must be for? Because the "Appeal Bond" is set by
statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that much of Coughlin's cash
must have been for the "Supersedeas Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of
Eviction in NRS 40.380 and 40.385.
I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force the landlord, his
attorneys and the RJC to choose between viewing Coughlin as a residential tenant
whose rent is less than $1,000, and whom therefore is only required to post a measly
supersedeas bond of $250 (and remember, a supersedeas bond equals a stay of
eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view Coughlin as a
commercial tenant, which would allow charging a higher supersedeas bond (except
for that pesky part about his rent being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do
so, his rent being only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey
Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this summary eviction proceeding under a No Cause
Eviction Notice, which is not allowed against a commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict
a commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set forth in NRS 40.253
unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a 30 Day Non Payment of Rent
Notice To Quit, which they didn't because they "are just taking the path of least
resistance here, Your Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious
"can you believe this guy?" laughter and head shaking...).
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the
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execution of the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute
and file with the court or justice the defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with two
or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not
be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the
judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will
pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the
property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the
appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in
the case shall be stayed.
So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try Coughlin on the
trespass charge for which he endured a custodial arrest and for which old Richard
Hill is still filing Motion's to Show Cause on in the appeal of the summary eviction
matter in CV11-03628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City Attorney's Office have
some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy, besotted, encumbered,
or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because Coughlin has a really good wrongful
arrest cause of action against the Reno Police Department, could it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get those Summons
and Complaints served in that one case Coughlin was suing his former employer in,
the one where Coughlin was granted an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which
required the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve the Summons and
Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days Coughlin spent in jail on
the arrest shown in the youtube video above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed
videotaped a scene where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a
green dress. What's that? It is? They did do that? Really? No...What? They also
forced him to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in the guise of some
ridiculous "procedure" necessary to insure Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they
retaliated against him for failing to answer their religious preference interrogation
questions by placing him in an icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him medical
care despite his plaintive cries for help, while wearing a thin t-shirt? Wow. They
didn't jam a taser needle in his spine for extended periods of time, though, did they?
Your kidding! Whats next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD
ordered a custodial arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was
peacefully filming, from a public spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent contractor Phil
Howard destroying and taking to the town dump items of enormous sentimental
value to Coughlin that he was prevented from retrieving from the property during the
scant time he was allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he knew
not, because, despite, ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060 bill for "securing" the
back porch (with screws facing the outside, inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left
in the window facing the sidewalk near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but
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duct tape
It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place, Everybody!"),
Coughlin's former home law office was burglarized on December 12, 2011 while
Richard G. Hill was holding its contents (including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files,
like the ones for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.), asserting his "lien". A lien for
"storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as the charge for "full use
and occupany" was. However, that $900 a month for "storage" also included another
$1,060 charge for "securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the
basement...neither of which seem to have much to do with the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying" expenses such a lien is provided for under NRS
118A.460....). Jeez, your probably going to tell me Sargent Sigfree ordered another
custodial arrest on Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's applications for Protections
Orders against based upon the battery and assaults that his former housemates
committed. Because, Sargent Sigfree thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call
when he returns home at night and his dog has mysteriously disappeared, and his
housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely, Coughlin, a former
domestic violence attorney would have nothing helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's
expert opinion that "animal abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010,
Sarge) and that its, rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent Sigfree was
"trying to help" Coughlin by arresting him, again, and necessitating the $1,500 bail
associated with the gross misdemeanor charge, "Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent
Sigfree told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations where you are
victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that regard.
But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any electrical service
for the past week since those with the Protection Orders against them cancelled the
service and NV Energy shut it off, without providing any notice to Coughlin, right.
Nevermind. But...but surely when NV Energy shut of the power to Coughlin's home
law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad faith "inspection" with
videographer of Coughlin' s home law office that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very
necessary one day before Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did
not leave the back gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed off, Coughlin's
beloved mountain bike suddenly missing (the one the parents of his girlfriend of 5
years gave him)? Well, NV Energy is probably not retaliating against Coughlin for
complaining about that by refusing him electric service for the past seven days, you
would have to assume....
NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to
NRS 40.253:
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1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the
appellate court without independent action. A tenant of commercial property may
obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a supersedeas bond in the
amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.
2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it
becomes due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new
proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant
to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In
all cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall
not dismiss or quash the proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings
have been conducted substantially according to the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters
of form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon
such terms as may be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the
allegations in the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the idea that you guys
don't know NRCP 4 through 6 like the back of your hand, but....hell, maybe you
don't. But, clearly the language in NRS 40 about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant
from the property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order" do not apply where the
Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the Hearing and litigated the
matter. Especially where, as here the lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was
rather renewed. This is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a
holdover tenant's lease for a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose.
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I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is
cutting corners on the whole "personally served" thing (just so a landlord could get
what they want quicker), just like I would hate for people to think the Reno
Municipal Court is letting the bottom line get in the way of providing that whole
Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility thing. And,
hey, if the RMC denies an indigent attorney the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel,
the finds him guilty of NRS 22.030, Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence
of the Court, and the puts him in cuffs when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing
him to 3 days in jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's no big deal, right, I
mean, the RMC technically kept its promise that the underyling charge, though
technically it could result in incarceration would not...because the incarceration was
for a whole dang different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of the
Court....and so what if the whole zealous advocate thing and the denying the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel thing and the Summary Contempt thing don't go so
well together....Or if 6 court employees had to stay til 9pm getting paid overtime at
the RMC to get 'r done...
NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons
attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon Individuals. In all
other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the
defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same: Other Service. (1)
Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to methods of personal service, when
the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed
from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear, by
affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, and it shall appear, either
by affidavit or by a verified complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against the
defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that the defendant is a
necessary or proper party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that
the service be made by the publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is
based on the fact that the party on whom service is to be made resides out of the
state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall be a sufficient showing
of such fact if the affiant shall state generally in such affidavit that at a previous time
such person resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating
the latest date known to affiant when such party so resided there); that such place is
the last place in which such party resided to the knowledge of affiant; that such party
no longer resides at such place; that affiant does not know the present place of
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residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that affiant does not
know and has never been informed and has no reason to believe that such party now
resides in this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that such party still
resides and remains out of the state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a
sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant. This rule shall apply to all
manner of civil actions, including those for divorce"
I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my damages for the
wrongful eviction, illegal lockout, whether its the landlord, his attorney, or the
Sheriff's Office. Your money is always good with me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served
by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence
was unoccupied at the time.
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;
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kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being
a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me
the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served"
in compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom
and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
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inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b)
Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or
an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon
the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter
was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period
commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
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Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say
about this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS
40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy
Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on
November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is
defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different
understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or,
perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally
serve" every tenant it wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three
days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that
frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every disagreement about
habitability that a tenant brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some
landlord's get. In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the
habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill
High School graduate landlord balked and complained then hired and attorney four
days into a dispute.....at which point the rules against contacting represented parties
prevented much in the way of real settlement discussion, particularly where opposing
counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing
settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the
Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the citizen tenants of Washoe
County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES
INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT
WHEN HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC
REV2011-001708 ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT
OF SERVICE). YOU NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF
THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There
simply is not anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary
Eviction Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless
of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the
affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
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truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the
motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my
November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why
didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's
attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as
required by NRS 40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last
20 incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO
is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to lock out the
citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested
for trespassing on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent
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Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and
therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to
do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting,
whether Richard Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the
full rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the
"reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord
under a personal property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret
such a bill as Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself,
which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their
Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the
locks...and so the Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6,
and despite the Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money
under a "rent escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability
issues in a summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253
(6)'s express dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice
court gets such a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44,
published and approved by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not,
rather, the RJC applies all these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to
deliver themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service notice of a
summary eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's
Answer or Affidavit in response to an eviction Notice, rather than the service
requirements of such notice following NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other
words, in the RJC everything is sped up imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the
NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate personal liability against
the Court and or Judges themselves for so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a
la Mausert's in Solano County, I believe, in California, would be very
interesting...Still haven't heard anything from the Reno PD about the various
complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the wrongful arrests,
excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though they did arrest
me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for which I was
granted to Extended Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent
Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he ordered a custodial
arrest of me for "jaywalking".
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the
following one:
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
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Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
We're sorry the following problem was found during review
of your submitted report T11005956:
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER
THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S
SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a
"Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the existence of
such an RPD Officer...
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE
OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED."
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD
(a couple of which asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked
why RDP Officer Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where Richard Hill signed a
Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill
for the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for
the "use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS
118A.460 may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a
landlord, though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was arrested twice by the
Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.
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Actually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's
license. He refused to provide it to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called
the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state issued
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind
of useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up,
he went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter
telling me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia
(Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the
wrong way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was
not headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over,
then he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer
Carter admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh,
well, anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role.
But upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him
money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent
immediately informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was
sure that was not happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away
his comments about Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing
them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a
license attorney getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in
that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada
under SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license
to practice law, or worse...) is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the
too quick to dismiss my reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the
RPD Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter
that I complained of, and I don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take
RPD Officer Carter at his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for
jaywalking (by a trainee RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail
of $160 emptied my bank account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully
filming from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had
submitted bills in courts records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage
moving and inventorying" found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my
own plywood at the property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the
screws holding up the plywood exposed to exterior of the property where anyone
could easily unscrew them, and also leaving in a window unit ac secured only by
ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in
$8,000 at least of my personal property being burglarized from my former home law
office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal
property found therein (and my client's files, which arguably are not even my
property, but rather, the client's property). Hill went on to place what he believes to
be my social security number in court records, on purpose, despite his signing an
Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case (attaching a two
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page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his contractor Phil Howard both
committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the
contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under penalty of
perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie he makes (he makes me
out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human being in his filings
when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services
where they went behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and
banged on window extremely loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging
on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big
equipment saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ132q2O7DY
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck
baring his personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car,
handcuffed, outside my former law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the
1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal
Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the
names of prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check)
at my arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my defense attorney and
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest
reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist
with Nevada Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as
"associated with" their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers
face against fee sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out
of defending my case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that
being required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw
from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the
same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's
Office, which defends actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its
Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest
lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all of
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the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
So, that's what attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom
most recently was employed with the Reno City Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his
squad car last summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles.
He veered across the road and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did
some other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred
right in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told
me I was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one
NV Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
despite my bike actually having such a light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him
a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising
some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on
1/12/12. But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some
sense into Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had
me arrested and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days
later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were
laughing menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been
chased up to my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something
I had to do because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost
earnings due to all these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned
above...also these housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of
my tires were slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property
stolen, coffee thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc.,
etc...And despite the housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal
abuse being listed amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told
me he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like,
where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a
laugh to his fellow RPD Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force
against me. I guess he was helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor
with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-
Trial Services to forever deny me an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set
forth in statute (30 year resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to
practice law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a surprise to
me that Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of
her witnesses or that her fellow Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied
to me about whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had any
documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the month before my
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000674
arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent productions of discovery tend to
indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did have those materials at the time. I
could be wrong about some of this...But that would require and awful lot of
coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the
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product, or other applicable privilege.
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Contact
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 16:10:24 +0000
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000675
Character and Fitness, Kevin Kelly, Pete Christiansen,
Patrice Eichman
March 16, 2012
Zachary Coughlin
Dear Zach,
Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill. From
your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be. Please call me
ASAP so that we can take the appropriate action to help you and to stop these
types of disturbing complaints.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:48 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
Dear Bar Counsel,
I write respectfully asking an inquiry be conducted into whether Kevin
Kelly indicated at my June 2002 hearing that 3 pro bono attorney's
name would be provided to me, but that only one was, Peter S.
Christiansen, and that, despite Christiansen saying he was doing my
case on a pro bono basis, he was paid at least $5,000, and pretty much
the only work he or his office did was attend the June 2002 hearing, and
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more on the way
that Christiansen and Kelly are very, very close, and that they sent me
to a psychologist who specializes in gambling addictions (I have never
really even gambled) who cost approximately another $2,000....Then
Ms. Eichman failed to submit my application for admission or my
Request For Reconsideration (sent to her and Christiansen's office on
September 15th, 2003, as confirmed by my fax records, in additional to
being mailed to them) to the Nevada Supreme Court. There are
numerous other issues that deserve a grievance there, including whether
Christiansen supervised the newly licensed Sanft in any way, whether a
writing wherein I addressed alcoholism was forward to the Bar despite
the express dictate that it not be, whether second Consent Agreement
sent to the Christiasens on 9/27/04 was ever forwarded to the Bar.
Additionally, Mike Rowe wrote very stern letters to me basically telling
me not to follow up on things, whereupon my attorney's and Ms.
Eichman failed to follow up on things, essentially tying my hands in the
matter. I intend to supplement this grievance with additional matters
soon, but wish it to begin now.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 2:59 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
5 attachments
hill is lying about thinking I accidentally filed the wrong thing in carpentier case.pdf (45.4 KB) ,
CV11-03628-2633891 (Reply...).pdf (164.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2625640 (Mtn for TRO).pdf (153.5
KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (171.6 KB) , CR11-2064-2682479
(Supplemental ...).pdf (153.7 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
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000677
supplement to Richard Hill thing
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 3:14 PM
To: glennm@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; patrickk@nvbar.org
15 attachments
final motion to dismiss 11 cr 26405 3 3 12.pdf (698.4 KB) , hill is lying about thinking I
accidentally filed the wrong thing in carpentier case.pdf (45.4 KB) , 3 16 12 fax to wcso re
eviction park terrace hill etc.pdf (1761.7 KB) , CV11-03628-2633891 (Reply...).pdf (164.9 KB) ,
CV11-03628-2625640 (Mtn for TRO).pdf (153.5 KB) , 6.4.10 letter to Hall from Casey Baker
describing same things Richard HIll does.pdf (57.1 KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Exhibit 2).pdf
(130.1 KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (171.6 KB) , CR11-2064-2682479
(Supplemental ...).pdf (153.7 KB) , from nv supreme court website on eviction stay packet
instructions.pdf (28.0 KB) , Eviction Procedure - Washoe County Sheriff's Office - 911 Parr Blvd,
Reno, Nevada.pdf (80.9 KB) , CV11-03628_2750229 Machem up to his old tricks again.pdf (26.9
KB) , What Every Civil Litigator Needs to Know About Criminal Law.pdf (122.8 KB) , 3 7 12 11 TR
26800 rmc NOTICE OF APPEALS ETC MOTION.pdf (1301.3 KB) , JOHN TARTER
TransparentNevada year city failed to report.pdf (25.7 KB)
Dear Bar Counsel,
Material in this supplement also serves to fulfill my own RPC 8.3 duty with respect
to the misconduct of any other attorney's (or those who are licensed as attorneys but
maybe are employed in some alternate capacity currently) whose conduct in these
materials is so deserving. I will try to phone into Mr. King as he requested, though
Judge Nash Holmes recently converted my phones to the Reno Municipal Court after
they were booked into property at the Washoe County Jail, who thereafter made
several contradictory statements as to whether the City of Reno Marshals came and
took those and other items out of secured property or evidence and did what they
may or whether such materials remained with the Jail and or whether the Jail actually
even considers whether there might be a conflict of interest in releasing such
property to these Marshals or the RMC. One thing I do know is that I did not offer
those materials into evidence and am not sure Judge Nash Holmes should be doing
so on my behalf, or on behalf of the prosecutor. When I say prosecutor, I should
clarify, I mean Deputy City Attorney Ormaas, and not Judge Holmes.
I have other materials I will be providing to supplement this and other grievances in
short order.
Sincerely,
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000678
Gessin ghostwriting issue
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 3:24 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
19 attachments
THE 2 11 12 email to WCSO RPD Reno City Attorney Hill NPUC Hill et al b e.pdf (137.8 KB) , 1 13
12 email to Hill copying Hill on Supplemental filed in Carpentier case to avoid any ex parte
allegations.pdf (78.9 KB) , 1 13 12 email to Hill copying Hill on Supplemental filed in Carpentier
case to avoid any ex parte allegations.htm (12.5 KB) , CV11-03628-2658302 (Mtn Ord to Show
Cause).pdf (88.0 KB) , CV11-03628-2688476 (Opening Brief).pdf (99.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2690815
(Opening Brief).pdf (358.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2690998 (Mtn for Extension of Time).pdf (102.5
KB) , CV11-03628-2696056 (Ord to Show Cause).pdf (62.0 KB) , CV11-03628-2697022
(Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (63.1 KB) , CV11-03628-2704374 (Reply to in Opposition).pdf (133.1
KB) , CV11-03628-2704375 (Reply to in Opposition).pdf (129.8 KB) , CV11-03628-2728621
(Motion ...).pdf (50.8 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Answering Brief).pdf (178.6 KB) , CV11-03628-
2728630 (Exhibit 1).pdf (239.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 2).pdf (178.1 KB) , CV11-
03628-2728630 (Exhibit 3).pdf (183.2 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 4).pdf (492.6 KB) ,
CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 5).pdf (431.4 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 6).pdf (225.1 KB)
Dear Mr. King,
I do not understand. I provided you a ton of information and documentation in my Response to Hill's
grievance, and, after emailing me six hours prior to the deadline to do so saying you already received my
Response (which you had not, and which I had informed you that you had not but would be recieving it),
you know call and or write me less than a day after receiving my voluminous Response and want to meet
urgently. This sends a strong message that you did not put much time into analyzing my response,
which would tend to indicate such a meeting would lack traditional due process protections, would it
not? I have already been attacked by a Character and Fitness Committee member while he owned the
Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas, and where the Committee promised to get me the names of
"three attorneys who will handle your case on a pro se basis" but where only one name was provided,
and that name wound up being and attorney would extracted soem approximately $7,000 i his fees and
the fees of a gambling addiction specialist (both of whom admitted to being extremely close personal
friends of Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, Esq. who then owned the Spearmint
Rhino strip club. Next, Christiansen and Sanft bungled several deadlines and client confidences related
to extremely sensitive information, whereupon, finally, Director of Admissions Eichman made the
unilateral decision to refrain from submitting my case for review, despite her receipt of my Request for
Reconsideration. Finally, Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly Huff wrote me explaing that I had failed to
provide their office with the Request for Reconsideration that I sent it on 9/15/03, despite my having fax
confirmation proof of this and despite a subsequent copy of the file provided by Christiansen's office
proving they had recieved such a Request, and that is was received by them on 9/15/03. I do not mean
to be standoffish, Mr. King, but it is what it is. How Ms. Eichman's rationale for her action is different
than what any attorney might say upon blowing some deadline or otherwise having a client's file fall
behind a filing cabinet for a couple years, is really not at all clear to me.
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As to my official address with the State Bar and receiving my mail, the USPS is likely going to be sued for
the handling of my mail, should it become clear that any client matters where prejudiced in light of what
has been deplorable conduct by the station involved.
Further, as to Hill's Motion for Order To Show Cause, please see the attached copy of Hill's application
for an Order of Protection, then compare it to Hill's other filings wherein he suddenly backs off his
assertion that I was "climbing on the contractor's truck". Hill lied when he wrote that. I did not climb on
anybody's truck. Hill merely did not want me to film all that he was throwing away, especially given that
he was throwing away unique items that had both monetary and sentimental value and because he had
no good reason for refusing to allow me to take those items other than spite and an attempt to get me
to sign away my security deposit, which Hill still has not returned. Further, Hill is not licensed under the
FDCPA as a debt collector yet attempts to so practice, as such, this grievance should focus on that as
well. Hill needs to answer for his lies about me allegedly "making contact" with him, about me allegedly
"climbining on the contractors truck", about his abusing the TPO process to gain advantage in a litigation
(ie, to prevent evidence collection and discovery), about his abuse of process in seeking to get me
arrested and signing a criminal complaint where service of the evictio order was insufficient, and
regardless, Hill had vitiated its import anyway by billing me for the same amount as the "full use and
occupancy" (and I have a video of Hilll admitting to this and his firms 11/10/11 letter admits to that as
well. Further, as for his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as it relates to an alleged contempt on my part
in failing to abide by the 1/11/12 Order from in CV11-03628, well, NRCP 6(e) requires that 3 days for
mailing be accorded even for electronic filings. As such, any activity on my part of 1/12/12 clearly is
irrelevant as service was not effectuated at that point and there is not allegation that any "personal
service" was undertaken. That being the case, here is another basis for grievance against Hill, especially
his continually filing documents not based in fact or law, as here.
Some more regarding Hill's grievance. Hill clearly attempts to mislead when he suggest that the
Supplemental I filed in the Carpentier's foreclosure defense matter was incorrectly filed there. Clearly, I
intended to file it there and the attached email I sent to Hill explains clearly why I copied him on it
(because I foresaw Hill filign a Bar grievance for "ex parte communications" based upon some idea that
arguments made in one case that bare some connection to another case would be a basis for Hill crying
foul, and, as seen in Hill's "ghostwriting" grieviance, its a very low standard for crying foul that Richard
has, which is typical of all the most feckless attorneys. That email indicated to Hill and his staff:
One, I would like to reserve my objection to "Good Samiritan" Richard G. Hill purporting to file
grievances on behalf of the public in general or Mr. Gessin, or whoever it is Richard is doing this for. I
suspect Richard is doing this for the same reason he does so many other things: to keep opposing
counsel busy with responding to all spineless paper pushing that Richard G. Hill is so very well known for
throughout Northern Nevada legal circles. Nonetheless, important issues are brought up in Mr. Hill's
grievance. To a great extent, I foresaw these issues long ago and attempted to address them
appropriately. I often get clients who are on their third or fourth attorney. Mr. Gessin was one such
client. By that time they all want to sue their former attorneys, and feel quite burned by the fees they
have paid. Mr. Gessin was a good example of this and he wished to proceed on an unbundled services
arrangement, or a flat fee per motion/opposition/pleading basis, etc. From the very, very long time that
went by between my passing the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination and being admitted to practice in
March of 2005, the issue of the legality of ghostwriting for pro se litigants was something I was
somewhat aware of, but I don't believe I ever did. I am somewhat disappointed that I was not
industrious enough to get anywhere close to doing such a thing but mostly I was just so demoralized by
not having a license and from the rape that the character and fitness committee and Kelly, and
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Christiansen and Eichman et al committed upon me that I mostly just worked for Thomas J. Hall, Esq. for
about $0.89 per hour (just kidding, I love Tom) doing legal research in the Washoe County Law Library
while the librarians glared at me and let me know how very disappointed they were that I, or any
member of the public, really, had interrupted their solitude.
So now it seems there is a tough situation where, on one hand, as a now licensed attorney, there is some
taboo to "ghostwriting" (necessitating such lucrative activities as responding to grievances filed by
opposing counsel like Richard G. Hill, Esq.....and I sure hope you will countenance the grievances I am
filing against Hill, Christiansen, Sanft, Kevin Kelly, Eichman, etc, with the same seriousness that your are
taking Richard G. Hills. I notice Richard G. Hill, Esq. has a funny way of being able to get the police (and
some others that I probably shouldn't mention) to take his complaints just a little bit more seriously than
they take others. I would also like to file a grievance against all three of the public defenders I have
been appointed in the trespass case in Reno Municipal Court for 11 CR 26405, Lew Taitel, Roberto
Puentes, and Keith Loomis. Each have thoroughly failed to zealously advocate on my behalf, with Loomis
calling my arguments vis a vis the procedural requirements for serving eviction orders in thoroughly
contested summary eviction proceedings "frivolous" despite being provided the attached 22 page
memorandum detailing those arguments and despite the procedures requiring as much set forth in the
Anvui decision of the Nevada Supreme Court. I would also like to file a greivance against Deputy Reno
City Attorney Ormaas for her blase indication that she cared not about any admission of bribery on the
part of Reno Police Officer Chris Carter, and that she would not be following up on that, even where it
bared some relation to the citation in 11 TR 26800 issued by Sargent Tarter, for which I cross examined
Sargent Tarter as to whether he did so in retaliation for my reporting Officer Carters admission of
accepting bribes from Richard G. Hill. Instead, I believe Deputy City Attorney Ormaas and City of Reno
Marshal Hiney (the spelling might be a bit off) conspired to have Judge Nash Holmes have me arrested
for summary contempt in Order to obtain my cell phones, which upon information and belief, Ormaas
and Hiney believe might contain "evidence" of misconduct on both of their parts. Hiney attempted to
serve me Notice of Hearing on Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the Richard G. Hill, Esq.
eviction matter (one of three instances of "triple jeopardy" Hill has me facing here....this Bar grievance,
the criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405, and, actually, multiple Orders to Show Cause (one in the Trial
Court in RJC Rev201--001708 and one in the associated Appeal in CV11-03628). However, the actual
Affidavit of Service that the WCSO filed for the Notice of Hearing Marshal Hiney attempted to serve me
(please inquire with Chief Marshal Roper, perhaps?) was actually signed by the same WCSO Deputy
Machem that swore, under oath, in his 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service in the eviction case RJC REv2011--
001708 that he "personally served" the Order of Summary Eviction. The attached 22 page memorandum
sent to various individuals and the admission of WCSO Civil Section Supervisor Liz Stuchell that, in their
mind, "personally served" can mean a lot of things that it has never meant in any legal settings, is
provided for background. I also wish this to begin a grievance against Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts for what I believe may be several violations on her part of the rules relative to prosecutorial
misconduct, especially those involving suborning perjury, including that of Officer Kameron Crawfor
saying in 11 CR 22176, that I did not provide him my drivers license, and therefor issuing me a citation
would not be an option, but rather, my failure to provide my driver's license buttressed his proable cause
finding justifying a search incident to arrest. However, Roberts, in 11 CR 22176 and later on appeal in CR
11-2064, had in her possession Wal-Mart AP video from the interrogation room clearly showing me
providing Officer Kameron Crawford my driver's license and other evidence supports a finding that he
had it (including dispatch reports and the information culled by Officer Kameron from the driver's license
and placed on the arrest report, which Officer Crawford later lied about, saying he got that information
at the WCSO, which is clearly contrary to established protocol and privacy policies). One more grievance
against Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens for lying to me on the phone about whether the
City of Reno had the arrest report from the September 9, 2011 arrest at Wal-mart from the Reno Sparks
Indian Colony in 11 CR 22176. I wish for all of these grievances to go forward now, but I may provide
supplementary materials in support thereof later. Additionally, she has the "purchased receipt" that
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showed it had the very UPC number that both Frontino and Crawford swore under oath that it did not.
Barrie Althoff, Limiting the Scope of Your Representation: When Your Client Wants, or Can Afford, Only
Part of You, Washington State Bar News (Jun. 1997).
Anthony P. Capozzi, Responding to the Pro Per Crisis, California Bar Journal (Feb 2004).
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Vol.
20, No. 3 (Summer 2007).
Kim Prochnau, Slicing the Onion: Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules Make It Easier for Private
and Non-Profit Legal Practitioners to Provide "Unbundled" Legal Services, Washington State Bar News
(Apr. 2003).
Bradley A. Vauter, Unbundling: Filling the Gap, Michigan Bar Journal, Vol. 79, at 1688 (2000).
Books and Reports
Caught in the Middle: 2003 Report and Recommendations of the North Carolina Bar Association Pro Se
Task Force (Dec. 2003).
Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in the New Hampshire Courts, New Hampshire
Supreme Court Task Force on Self-Representation (Jan. 2004).
Ethics Issues Regarding the Concept of Unbundled Legal Services (Memorandum), Rob Bare, Nevada State
Bar (Mar. 31, 1999).
Family Law Limited Representation Risk Management Materials, Limited Representation Committee,
California Commission on Access to Justice (January 12, 2004).
Handbook on Limited Scope Legal Assistance, ABA Section of Litigation (2003).
Pro Se Litigants: The Challenge of the Future, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department Pro Se
Committee Report (Dec. 1999).
Report and Recommendations on "Unbundled" Legal Services, Commission on Providing Access to Legal
Services for Middle Income Consumers, New York State Bar Association (Dec. 2002).
Report of the Unbundled Legal Services Special Committee II, Florida Bar Association (Jul. 26, 2002).
Report on Limited Scope Legal Assistance with Initial Recommendations, Limited Representation
Committee of the California Commission on Access to Justice (Oct. 2001). Appendix
Self Represented Litigants in the Virginia Court System, Supreme Court of Virginia Pro Se Litigation
Planning Committee, Enhancing Access to Justice Report (Sept. 2002).
Unbundling Legal Services: A Guide to Delivering Legal Services a la Carte, Forrest S. Mosten, American Bar
Association (2000).
Cases
Melvin Finance, Inc. v. Artis, 157 N.C. App. 716, 2003 WL 21153426 (N.C.App.)
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover
costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney agreed to file responsive pleadings and
negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant
received notice of a scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither
defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an arbitration award was entered for
the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the limited representation attorneys failure to appear at the hearing amounted to
excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found that since the defendant
received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited
representation attorneys conduct did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was
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affirmed.
Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994)
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual
and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff enters limited appearance on behalf of his official
capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity.
Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities.
Entering such limited appearance is not competent and zealous representation as required by ethical
rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting of
documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants
unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater
latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys
by statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation of pro se status in violation
of ethical rules.
Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules
of a federal court by lending some assistance to friends, family members, and others with whom she
shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro
se litigant's pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents.
Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present legal arguments with the actual or
constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in
extensive, undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without
professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
Sharp v. Sharp, 2006 WL 3088067 (Va.Cir.Court)
Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se
during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery, but then hired an attorney who appeared in a
limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the
attorney could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorneys appearance qualified him as
official "attorney of record". The court found that it was not bound by agreements made between client
and attorney and that a court may "require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical
constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct". The court found that the attorney could make a motion
to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the court had ultimate discretion in
granting the withdrawal.
Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal.App. 4th 441 (2000)
In a lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel of record requested that another firm make a "special appearance" at a
summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice
suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an
attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance
represents the clients interests and has a professional attorney-client relationship with the client.
Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true "special
appearance".
Court Rules
Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81, expressly permits limited appearances and governs attorney
withdrawal.
Arizona
Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 9(B), governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in
family law proceedings.
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 5.2, governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in vulnerable
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adult exploitation actions. California
California Family and Juvenile Rules 5.71, governs application to be relieved as counsel.
California Civil Rule 3.36, governs notice and application to be relieved as attorney.
Colorado
Colorado Rule of County Court 311(b), requires lawyers to disclose assistance in document preparation
but clarifies that such disclosure does not create an entry of appearance.
Delaware
Delaware Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), governs limited appearance, service and attorney
withdrawal in family law matters.
Florida
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.040, governs Limited Appearance, Withdrawal or Limiting
Appearance, Scope of Representation, Preparation of Pleadings or Other Documents, Notice of Limited
Appearance, and Service.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.750, governs the operation of self-help programs within family
courts.
Iowa
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
z RCP 1.404(3), expressly permitting limited appearances so long as the court is notified;
z RCP 1.404(4), governing termination of limited appearance;
z RCP 1.423, requiring lawyers who prepare pleadings in limited representation to sign them and
clarifying that signing a pleading does not constitute an appearance;
z RCP 1.442(2), establishing the requirements for service on attorney who has made a limited
appearance.
Maine
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c), explicitly allows limited representation and allows a lawyer to
file a limited appearance if the client consents in writing.
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governs limited appearances.
Missouri
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16 (c), governs attorney withdrawal for limited representation.
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 55.03, permits a lawyer to draft pleadings without disclosure and clarifies
appearance and withdrawal of attorney in limited representation.
Nebraska
Nebraska RPC 501.2, governs limited representation, attorney assisted document preparation and
attorney withdrawal.
Nevada
Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Rule 5.28 requires signed
pleadings, notice of the limited representation to the court and governs the procedure for withdrawal.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
z RCP 3, requiring that pleadings and communication be furnished to both client and limited
representation attorney until withdrawal of limited appearance;
z RCP 17, governing appearance, attorney withdrawal and document preparation assistance.
New Mexico
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct 16-303(E), requires lawyer to disclose scope of representation
to court.
Utah
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 74(b), governs attorney withdrawal following limited appearance.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75, expressly permits limited appearances after client consents in writing.
Vermont
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 79.1(1), governs appearance, withdrawal and service.
Vermont Rule of Family Procedure 15(h) governs limited appearances, withdrawal and service in family
law matters.
Washington
Washington Civil Rule 4.2, expressly permits a limited entry of appearance.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 4.2, governs limited appearances.
Washington Civil Rule 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented
party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the
self-represented party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule 70.1, expressly allows limited appearances in litigation.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 70.1, expressly allowing limited appearances in litigation.
Wisconsin
Milwaukee County Family Division Rule 5.6 expressly permits limited appearances.
Wyoming
The Uniform Rules of the District Court of the State of Wyoming, Rule 102 governs appearance and
withdrawal for unbundled representation.
Ethics Opinions
Los Angeles Cnty Bar Ass'n Prof. Resp. and Ethics Comm. Ethics Op. 483
An attorney may limit the attorney's services by agreement with a pro per litigant to consultation on
procedures and preparation of pleadings to be filed by the client pro per. A litigant may be either self-
represented or represented by counsel, but not both at once, unless approved by the court. In order for
attorney to specially appear on behalf of the litigant before the court for a limited purpose, the attorney
should comply with all applicable court rules and procedures of the particular tribunal.
Delaware State Bar Assn Op 2006-1
A lawyer may be required to perform beyond the term of a limited scope representation agreement if
the Court requested, or the Clients circumstance warranted such action. In most circumstances, an
agreement to withdraw from representation would not violate any ethics requirement, as long as the
lawyer provides adequate advice to Client concerning the scope of representation. In family court, the
Courts permission may be needed to withdraw from simple divorce petitions in certain circumstances.
D.C. Bar Op. 330 (2005)
Unbundling of legal services is permissible under D.C. Rule 1.2 ( c ), provided the client is fully informed
of the limits on the scope of the representation and these limits do not prevent the provision of
competent service. If a party is proceeding pro se, opposing counsel should treat that party as
unrepresented unless and until that counsel receives reasonable notice of representation from the party
or her lawyer.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n Prof. Conduct Comm. Op. 849 (1983; Affirmed 1991)
An attorney may agree in advance with his or her client to limit the scope of the attorney's
representation and draft pleadings without appearing or taking any part in any of the proceeding itself,
provided that the client gives his or her fully informed consent to such limitation of employment and the
attorney takes whatever steps may be necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights.
Maine State Bar Ethics Opinion No. 89 (1988)
A lawyer is not required to sign a complaint or enter an appearance as counsel of record when
representation is solely limited to preparation of the complaint.
Missouri Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. 940161
It is impermissible for a lawyer to draft responsive pleadings to an unrepresented opposing party in a
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divorce. However, a lawyer may draft an entry of appearance if the lawyer includes a letter indicated that
he or she represents the opposing party and that the unrepresented party should obtain counsel.
New York State Bar Ass'n Op. 613 (1990)
A lawyer who does not appear as counsel of record for a pro se litigant may prepare responsive
pleadings and demands for financial disclosure, provided the lawyer investigates the matter adequately.
North Carolina State Bar RPC 114 (1991)
Legal services attorneys may provide legal advice and drafting assistance to pro se litigants without
appearing as counsel of record. If court approved pleading forms exist, attorneys may make them
available to individuals wishing to proceed pro se.
Bd. of Prof. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Op. 2005-F-151
Attorneys may offer limited representation through a pro se clinic if they obtain clients consent,
preferably in writing. Attorneys may draft proceedings for clients, if the attorney notifies the Court that
counsel has assisted a pro se litigant. The phrase "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel" is recommended
for inclusion on such pleadings in a prominent manner. Attorneys who draft proceedings need not
appear and represent the client.
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm. Op. 08-01 (2008)
A lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing before tribunals pro se and help them
prepare written submissions without disclosing or ensuring the disclosure to others of the nature or
extent of such assistance. Undertaking to provide limited legal help does not generally alter any other
aspect of the attorneys professional responsibilities to the client.
As to the ghostwriting, its tough, because, for clients who want to pay very little (after, say, in Gessin's
case he paid McKenna allegedly $15K to wind up with an Order from an Arbitrator and District Court
Judge denying a Trial De Novo based upon a bad faith failure to participate in litigation in one case, then
in the other, Gessin paid Hill something like $20K only to be slammed car crash style into settlement by
Hill's advice when Gessin couldn't stomach paying anymore of HIll's fees, settling for the amount
originally sought by Mr. Hall's client). So, clients like that want a deal, want to pay piece meal or go the
unbundled route, but filing all those Motions to Withdraw, and Proposed Orders, and Affidavits, add to
the costs where the fee is not really being increased any. There is much literature dealing with this:
Please accept this as a supplement to the grievance filed by Richard Hill, Esq. My recollection of my
involvement with Gessin is that I filed two Answers to very similar Adversary Complaints in NVB and two
Motions to Dismiss in those same cases, involving the two women represented by Glade Hall, Esq., both
on an "unbundled services" basis, and the pleadings themselves indicated the were filed as
an "unbundled service". This was my first filign in NVB, and I was not registered or trained as an
electronic filer at that point. Further, Gessin hired me to provide other unbundled services, inlcuding
writing (and, to my understanding at the time, filing under my own signature) something in the vein of a
NRCP Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment from judgments in cases involving the same two
women Taitano ne Moore, and Rissone, both, again, represented by Glade Hall, Esq.
It may be the case that Richard Hill is correct that I was goign against some rule or law by sending one
demand letter to Glade Hall concerning an outstanding $500 sanction aware. I believe I drafted an Order
To Show Cause for this, but am not sure it was filed by me. About the time I provided Gessin my signed
final draft of that and a few other closely related motions, he pretty much wanted to part ways, I believe.
I think this was around mid-November and there was some issues with Richard HIll withholding my client
files, some of which may have included Gessin's, then Hill would say he would give me my client files
without any demands or lien needing satisfying prior to doing so, and that he would do the same with
my wallet and identification, but then he would change his mind and demand what to me seems that I
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satisfy a rent distraint that has been outlawed by NRS 118A.520 (though there is a very old BK case, circa
1980 or so that may suggest such distraints are still permissible against commercial tenants, and my
hybrid, home law office situation, plus the fact that I do still have a business license for Zachary
Coughlin's Memory Foam Mattresses (something I started during the 4 years I was hoping to get a law
license and finding employment very, very difficult to obtain, during which Mike Rowe wrote me stern
letters, Pete Christiansen and Mike Sanft -ignored me and shewed me to their legal assistant Kelly Huff,
and Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann made the unilateral decision to ignore the Request for
Reconsideration of my Application for Admission that I timely submitted on 9 15 03 in connection with
the end of the deferment period set forth in the Court's December 2002 Order....) and at least some
research and development was ongoing in that regard. Whether I was a commercial or residential
tenant was an important issue in the eviction matter and the mixed use of the property likely only made
the statute all the more difficult to interpret.
However, I do recall that Gessin told me he withdrew his bankruptcy, so that may negate Hill's assertion
that I was wrongful in sending a demand letter to Hall regarding the old sanction and or filing a Motion
for Order To Show Cause. Gessin is a crafty guy, though I am not sure I entirely share Hill's view of him.
However, Hill apparently received about $20-25K in attorney's fees from Gessin in a case that the plaintiff
was only seeking about $25K in to begin with, and upon Gessin ceasing to be willing to pay Hill and
Baker for more litigating, they promptly suggested he settle for something near $30K (which, of course,
was upsetting to Gessin, in a manner that is similar to how Dr. Merliss seems to feel in the eviction
matter). But, to be fair to Hill, those parties likely bare some responsibility for choosing to take the risky
path that is litigation.
Gessin also became a registered efiler about the time he basically terminated my representation of him.
My email to Gessin below shows that I was somewhat suspicious of the fact that he seemed to all the
sudden want to go our separate ways after I had been working on these very involved (to me at the time
they seemed really involved) NRCP 60(b) Motions, and it is ironic, somewhat that Hill accuses me of
ghostwriting because my email to Gessin essentially anticipates that, and, to some extent, my later filing
Notices of Appearance as Attorney of Record in several of Gessin's various cases involving these two
women was done to attempt to counteract any appearance of that. Gessin seemed upset that I filed
those appearances, and actually got very pushy about me trying to undo them, and eager to avoid
prejudicing his ability to file timely 60(b) motions, I undertook to do what I could to make it so he could
file on his own (ie, having an Attorney of Record on one's case often results in the filing office refusing to
let them file anything on their own...).
On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 I wrote to John Gessin's email address the following:
"To: John Gessin <jd.gman@yahoo.com>
John,
Here is Van Lydegraf's voice message. Again, I have not talked to him and I forwarded you the only
email or writing I ever sent him. I am leaning towards filing an Errata on your cases today to get it so
I am not attorney of record. Which do you prefer? I am not sure which would accomplish your goals
quicker, but keep in mind, I believe a Motion to Withdraw is the typical thing, not a Notice of
Withdrawal? Have you found any research in this regard? Please indicate in writing which you prefer
or the preferred manner you would like to see me pursue accomplishing your goals, which, to my
understanding, include being in pro per on this case. I sense you are uncomfortable, but please
know I maintain extremely high fidelity to my clients, unbundled or otherwise, okay? I am unsure
how me filing the 60b's etc would have been much different with respect to what you seem upset
about...did you never intend for me to file? Were you looking for a "ghost writer"? I was not of the
understanding that I was being hired as a "ghostwriter" and I do recall some indication that such a
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Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Print
z copying you to avoid any ex parte accusations
thing is either prohibited or discouraged by the Rules of Professional Responsibility....Regardless, the
most important thing is to avoid prejudicing your case, and I feel I have made great efforts to
achieve that. If you want to file something, just do it, don't wait for any withdrawal, etc. I will make
all reasonable efforts to see that you are allowed to file whenever and whatever you want, and not
be weighed down by any attorney of record designation.
Sincerely,"
I currently have a Motion to Withdraw pending in the two Adversary Proceedings where I believe I
was incorrectly listed as Attorney of Record for Gessin.
Close
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 1/13/12 7:41 AM
To:
rhill@richardhillaw.com; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; sgallagher@richardhillaw.com;
knielsen@richardhillaw.com; shill@richardhillaw.com
Attachments:
1 attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO OPPOSITION CV08-01709 1 13 12.pdf (162.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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000688
supplement to response to grievance
hello from Zach Coughlin
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From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 4:05 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
1 attachment
rcp 2012-000018 D3 Hill v Coughlin Protection Order back.pdf (22.6 MB)
Dear Mr. King,
Please see attached.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 3/21/12 8:30 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've
been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone
if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of
material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one
hour to appropriately review, so....
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000689
RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply
to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters or why
Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by making
completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 2:01 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Mr. King,
I did not categorically characterize all "allegations" in any way, so there has been no
statement from me as to whether they are "serious" or not. I do prefer doing things
in writing. Ms. Eichman wanted to talk on the phone in 2003 when it came time to
explain why she failed to honor the documents I submitted in response to her express
instructions to so submit. I met with Jon Bailey in 2002 and found it to be an
appalling experience. Lots of people taking up for Mark Tratos, despite a wealth of
evidence to suggest he was playing games with my career to feed his own ego. Lots
of faux offense taking at my pointing that out by Bailey and Mike Rowe. Tratos was
a millionaire at the time. I was riding a ten speed for transportation and had just
finished law school.
I would like to know what you have done with the various grievances I filed? Are
you meeting with the attorneys against whom I have filed a grievance? I am looking
for indications from you that this process will be conducted in a fair manner with
sufficient due process protections. I was evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County
Sheriffs on 3/15 (this is the standard practice of the WCSO and had nothing to do
with anything I did, I was compliant and docile when the Sheriff's broke into my
location with guns drawn in their attempts to carry out the service of process of a
Summary Eviction Order and a lockout...). I have hearings this week, etc. I can
meet with you anytime the week of April 23rd, through April 27th, 2012. When are
you available?
Sincerely,
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000690
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice
law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if
there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions
without the benefit of actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've
been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone
if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Page 45 of 147 http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=dfc328a6-141c-4...
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000691
RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of
material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one
hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply
to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters or why
Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by making
completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 2:02 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Mr. King,
I am preparing a Supplemental Response to the grievance and will have it to you as
soon as possible, though it may take a few weeks.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
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000692
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice
law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if
there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions
without the benefit of actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've
been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone
if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of
material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one
hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply
to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters or why
Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by making
completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Page 47 of 147 http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=dfc328a6-141c-4...
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000693
RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 2:30 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it
deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If you can give me some time, it
would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing
important work that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to
this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally questionable manner in
which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD
Sargents more than District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human
beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me.
My representation is very important to his life. He is a committed father who has
been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received
something like $500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that
less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and
myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me some time to tend to the immediate
need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple
jeopardy" abuse of process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect
my client's interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the phone or meet in
person. My two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an
Order by RMC Judge Nash Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has
retaliated against me by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all reasonable
steps to counter that, including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public
address on the Bar's online portal days ago, but for which I still do not see a change
reflected. The Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS Golden
Valley Station supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon
themselves to play judge and jury incident to a complicated eviction process that I
have recently been litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western
Nevada Management and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior
liability, etc., etc. Western Nevada Management knew of and orchestrated, and
received approval from the Park Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I
rented from live at the 1422 E. 9th St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn
Badalato, then a property manager at Park Terrace. For some reason, when her boss
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000694
found out about this, she started crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc..
Then she apparently resigned. This was litigated in an interruption of essential
services (electricity) complaint I filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted
these things, yet they want to turn right around and disclaim an responsibility for
anything, pursue a summary eviction despite the facts not lining up with the Glazier
case sufficient to allow such, etc., etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to
explain why this week or the immediate future would prevent a hardship for me with
regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my
respect for you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the
realities faced by businesses subject to summary evictions where the non payment of
rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS
40.253, but for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in
three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me
facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of processes, etc. I have a hearing on that
this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon
Bailey blow a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark
Tratos (whom had to admit under oath, that he had previously "lost" other student's
papers in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed
by Anderson and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos.
Also, Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's paper in that 2002 Cyber
Law course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos
wrote me asking for "another copy of your paper", which implies he received one.
Then he went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about etc., clearly
implying he did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading"
social security number, etc. (he had a student in the class who worked for his firm,
he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was utilized
in every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing
that the State Bar of Nevada had allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of
the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has ever
been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in
Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney Pete Christiansen (and so did not
appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee,
whom was referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly,
whom owns the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the time. I believe in
Senator Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance
process too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
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000695
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice
law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if
there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions
without the benefit of actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've
been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone
if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of
material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one
Page 50 of 147 http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=dfc328a6-141c-4...
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000696
RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply
to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters or why
Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by making
completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 12:29 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Thank Mr. King,
I will. Things are coming together quickly though I have faced many
obstacles. I may have mentioned this already, but I did file a Motion to
Withdraw in the two Gessin Adversary Proceedings in NVB. However,
in the meantime, as I understand it, I have a duty to represent Mr.
Gessin, even despite his indications that he doesn't necessarily want me
to, that doing so is unnecessary (he apparently is in the process or
already has had his main BK case withdrawn, though I pointed out to
him, that does not necessarily make moot the adversary
proceedings...). It has been a good lesson in how very important that
attorney of record designation is. However, I did learn a lot of lessons
about that with Mr. Christiansen as my attorney in 2002-2004, along
with the extent to which a proper, detailed fee agreement setting forth in
explicit detail the scope of one's representation is very, very important.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
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000697
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2012 17:51:20 +0000
Good Morning Mr. Coughlin,
I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please
come see me as soon as you can.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 2:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it
deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If you can give me some time, it
would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing
important work that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to
this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally questionable manner in
which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD
Sargents more than District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human
beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me.
My representation is very important to his life. He is a committed father who has
been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received
something like $500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that
less than minimum wage, etc..
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000698
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and
myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me some time to tend to the immediate
need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy"
abuse of process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's
interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the phone or meet in person. My
two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC
Judge Nash Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me
by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all reasonable steps to counter that,
including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's
online portal days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The
Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS Golden Valley Station
supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play
judge and jury incident to a complicated eviction process that I have recently been
litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada Management
and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western
Nevada Management knew of and orchestrated, and received approval from the Park
Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E. 9th
St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at
Park Terrace. For some reason, when her boss found out about this, she started
crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned.
This was litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I
filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these things, yet they want to turn
right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction
despite the facts not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc.,
etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to
explain why this week or the immediate future would prevent a hardship for me with
regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my
respect for you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the
realities faced by businesses subject to summary evictions where the non payment of
rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS
40.253, but for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in
three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me
facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of processes, etc. I have a hearing on that
this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey
blow a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos
(whom had to admit under oath, that he had previously "lost" other student's papers
in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by
Anderson and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also,
Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's paper in that 2002 Cyber Law
course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote
me asking for "another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he
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000699
went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about etc., clearly implying he
did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social
security number, etc. (he had a student in the class who worked for his firm,
he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was utilized in
every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing
that the State Bar of Nevada had allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of
the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has ever
been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in
Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney Pete Christiansen (and so did not
appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom
was referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns
the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the time. I believe in Senator
Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process
too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice law. I would like to
meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benefit of
actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
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000700
Change of Address
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and
we've been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can
talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot.
Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great
deal of material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take
you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a
Reply to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters
or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me
by making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 1:46 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Dear Mr. King,
Please note my new address. I attempted to change this online at the
Bar's online portal several days ago, yet it still has not updated. My
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000701
does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
new mailing address is:
PO BOX 60952
RENO NV 89506
Also, as I mentioned to you in a previous written correspondence, I did write to Bar Counsel
previously in an attempt to fulfill my duties under SCR 111. At least one of the allegation in
Mr. Hill's greivance related to a criminal charge that has yet to be adjudicated. Is it your's or the
Bar's position that I must reply to or otherwise defend myself in this grievance setting prior to
having an opportunity to do so in the case wherein such a charge is found itself? If it is, can you
provide some citation to the authority for such a position?
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 9:12 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
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FOIA REQUEST; Motion to Dismiss Grievance for lack of
standing
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney, acting in bad
faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify debtors'
completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that debtors did
not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors. 11
U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the various
grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary of the content
of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and telephone communciatiosn
with Richard Hill or anyone with his office. Further, please state whether Casey
Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to create
"busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 9:30 AM
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000703
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Dear Mr. King,
Please accept and respond to this FOIA REQUEST seeking for you to produce any
and all documentation and or a summary of any correspondence, written or otherwise
(including the many telephone calls referenced in Hills 1/14/12 letter to you) from
Richard HIll or anyone with his office, or anyone else, EVER, in any way involving
me, in connection with ANY matter.
I am focusing on 24. The role of retained counsel; in generalNegotiations with
bar counsel... and wish to meet with you soon. I have to prepare for and attend
several hearings in the coming days, and will update you as to my availability in
short order. This is also a Motion to Dismiss the grievance Hill filed for a lack of
standing, and for failure to state a valid claim. Further, please note, that I previously
contact Bar Counsel Clark and Assitant Bar Counsel Machado, via written
communication and telephone to comply with my obligation under SCR 111. Any
other reports by Hill are not to the point where I have a SCR 111 Obligation (other
than perhaps a summary contempt Order against me from 2/27/12, for which I have
provided written indication of to you in my response to Hill's grievance, though I do
not believe that Order falls within the purview of SCR 111.
I wish to register my objection to the fact that Richard Hill did not sign his
"grievance". I do not believe he even has standing to file a greivance. He was never
my client. Under RPC 8.3, I do not believe a "greivance" is the appropriate means of
fulfilling such a duty, nor do I believe Richard Hill (or Casey Baker, Esq. whom he
purports to speak for and file on behalf of) have a good faith basis in making any
complaint of any sort, and rather, are impermissibly attempting to circumvent the
process of my having my day in court with respect to any outstanding criminal
charges (particularly where non involved contact with any clients, and none are
felony charges). Please provide some indication in writing of your stance in this
regard.
21. The role of retained counsel; in generalPlan of action
A thorough review of the file is a vital prerequisite to an effective plan of action, which,
ideally,
should be outlined immediately upon the conclusion of the interview with the accused
attorney. A
typical plan of action might be as follows:
[] Reduce all fee considerations to writing
If a proper understanding between counsel and client concerning attorney's fees for the
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000704
representation
has not been arrived at in the initial interview, it should be immediately settled and
reduced
to writing.[25]
[] Establish a fund for costs
A fund for costs normally will include enough money for a refund of the client's fees, court
transcripts, if necessary, and incidental expenses such as photocopying costs and long
distance
calls. Ninety percent of all grievances can be settled with a fund of $1,000 or less. Thus, it
becomes
obvious that most disciplinary actions against attorneys are unnecessary and could have
been easily avoided by their early retention of a competent lawyer. While the accused
cannot
settle the matter, an objective attorney, acting in the best interest of the accused, usually
can.
[] Communicate with bar counsel
Counsel must remember that the investigating bar attorney is usually in private practice,
prominent
in his field and very busy. His sole desire is to have the matter disposed of fairly and
promptly, so that he can tend to his own practice. Early and diplomatic communication
with him
is often an important first step toward settling the grievance.
[] If permissible, talk to the complainant
If the complainant is not represented by an attorney, he should be promptly interviewed.
However, the complainant should not be contacted by telephone; the defense attorney
should visit
him in person. If the canons of ethics permit, the conversation should be taped, provided
counsel
bears in mind that many states provide that taping a conversation without the knowledge
of the
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person being taped is illegal and a violation of ethical standards. Most attorneys prefer to
conduct
the interview with the tape recorder in plain sight. The best method the author has found
to get the
complainants to open up is to simply say: "I need to hear your side of the story, I need to
find out
what really happened. You folks may be totally correct, and if so, I need to know that, to
advise
my client."
If possible, and particularly if the defense attorney is a notary public, a sworn statement
should
be taken, preferably in the handwriting of the complainant, as to all the facts and details
of the
complaint. If possible, alternatives for settlement should be included in the statement.
A checklist of questions, compiled from the accused attorney's file will be helpful. The
more detail
counsel can bring out, the better. Counsel should not hesitate to let relatives give their
version
of what the complainant has said to them. Often such version will not only be at variance
with the truth, but it may vary from complainant's later version.
A determination should be made as to whether the complainant is mentally stable and
whether
he will be an effective witness before the committee. The cross-examination should be
drawn up
from the tapes or from the notes taken of the interview.
[] Meet and talk with the prosecutor
The meeting should not be tape-recorded, as most prosecutors will object to such activity
as devious.
In any case, attorneys should be able to deal with one another on a professional basis. All
the
possibilities should be explored with the prosecutor. A determination should be made as to
whether
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000706
the case would be accepted for criminal prosecution taking into consideration the amount
of
money involved.
If the matter is due to be presented to the grand jury, and the prosecutor is not agreeable
to a delay
in presenting it, defense counsel should consider writing a letter to the grand jury since
this can be
helpful in delaying the proceedings. There is danger in writing such a letter, however.
Federal
grand juries should not be contacted, since to contact them directly is a violation of federal
law,
and in some cases, state law. Research may be required to determine if counsel may
approach the
local grand jury.
Occasionally, the attorney-client can avoid an indictment against him by making some
sort of refund.
Where this is the case, a brief delay may be afforded defense counsel to allow him to
discuss
the matter with his client. Counsel, of course, should take full advantage of such delay.
With
an indictment pending, he should advise his client strongly that standing on principle is
futile.
22. The role of retained counsel; in generalHandling related malpractice and criminal
charges
Where a claim of malpractice has not been formally presented against the client but
circumstances
indicate that one will be, counsel should communicate with the client's legal malpractice
insurance
carrier and notify it of a potential malpractice claim. This is necessary to satisfy the
requirement in
most policies that the company be notified in the event the insured attorney is in
possession of information
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000707
which reasonably leads him to believe that a malpractice claim may be filed against him.
The provision is designed to allow the malpractice insurance carrier as much time as
possible to investigate
a potential claim even though it might not result in a malpractice suit.[26]
A charge of malpractice can be expected to follow when a grievance complaint successfully
shows dereliction of duty on the part of the attorney. However, an attorney representing
the complainant
occasionally will file a malpractice suit against the attorney before the grievance is heard,
hoping thereby to benefit by using the pressure of the disciplinary proceeding to improve
his bargaining
position in the malpractice action. This may actually be unethical on his part since an
attorney
may not use the threat of criminal, or even quasi-criminal action to settle related civil
litigation.
Therefore, since the grievance complaint is considered quasi-criminal in some
jurisdictions,[27] it
would follow that an attorney should not take advantage of the grievance process to settle
his civil
suit for malpractice against the accused attorney.
Although insurance counsel will be concerned mainly with settlement of the malpractice
claim,
counsel for the accused attorney should point out that a good result in the grievance
hearing will
make settlement of the malpractice suit easier. Some insurance attorneys are sympathetic
and may
agree to use some of their client's resources to settle the grievance as well as the
malpractice suit. Of
course, counsel can expect that the client's malpractice insurance will be cancelled even if
the accused
attorney prevails.
Up until recent times, most people did not consider a conviction of driving while
intoxicated a
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000708
crime of moral turpitude, particularly where there was no incident connected thereto that
caused loss
of life, serious injury, or property damage to a third person. Similarly, simple negligence
in driving
leading to a collision or possession of a small amount of marijuana has not been
considered moral
wrongdoing. Grievance committee members take a similar attitude, being concerned not
with the
moral principles involved, but only with preventing a recurrence of the incident.[28]
During the course of the investigation, the probabilities of criminal litigation will become
obvious.
Actual criminal prosecution is the exception, however. Nonetheless, if defense counsel feels
that
a criminal investigation is likely to result in an indictment, then the possibility of an
agreed to resignation
from the bar in exchange for no prosecution should be considered.[29]
Cooperation in the form of a client interview should not be given to a criminal
investigator. This
does not, of course, mean that defense counsel should be discourteous or uncooporative in
supplying
documents that are easily obtainable at the county clerk's office. It is simply better
practice to not permit
the attorney-client to be interviewed by a criminal investigator, for the probabilities of the
client
becoming rude and hostile are very high.
If the accused attorney has a good explanation, or has made full restitution, or has
otherwise acted
equitably, defense counsel might consider communicating with the grand jury.[30]
However, this
course of action is hazardous for two reasons. First, in all federal investigations it is a
crime to communicate
or attempt to communicate with the grand jury. The same effect can be had by simply
writing
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a letter to the Assistant United States Attorney handling the grand jury presentment and
request-
ing that the client be permitted to appear before him and the grand jury for questioning,
in the hopes
of preventing an indictment. Of course, he cannot be compelled to appear before the
grand jury unless
either full or use immunity is granted; but since most of such appearances would be on a
"request"
basis, he would thus waive his Fifth Amendment rights, and his statements before the
grand
jury would be admissible at a criminal trial.
The obvious danger of the client's testifying before the grand jury is that the he may make
serious
admissions during the course of the questioning. Thus, it goes without saying that before a
grand jury
appearance, the accused attorney should be thoroughly prepared and should confer often
with counsel,
who in most states is not allowed to be present in the grand jury room with his client. Such
conferences
should be reasonable, and should not be held after each question.
Of course, the district attorney usually has the power not to permit the appearance of the
client
before the grand jury; but in most cases, he will welcome it. If he intends to indict
regardless of the
testimony, then the statements of the accused attorney are recorded under oath and his
story can be
investigated. The prosecutor can, if this grand jury does not indict, present the same
information to
the next grand jury, without the presence of the accused. On the other hand, if the
prosecutor is truly
fair minded, an appearance by the client may explain any ambiguous points,
and preclude an indictment.
[Top of Section]
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24. The role of retained counsel; in generalNegotiations with bar counsel
Quite often bar counsel will be a well-known practicing attorney with a large, prominent law
firm, that is, an attorney who can afford to take time off for bar-related activities. He is likely to
be
middle-aged, wealthy, conservative, and quite busy with his own private practice. He is also
unlikely
to be sympathetic to an unrepresented accused attorney, and will find it difficult to understand
the
problems of young, sole practitioner, for he customarily represents corporate clients, insurance
companies,
and banks. He will probably do no divorce or criminal work, and he is likely to be highly
specialized
in his own practice.[31] His goal will be to dispose of the matter as painlessly and as quickly
as possible, and he will resent lack of cooperation or a hostile attitude. By the time retained
counsel
enters the case, the accused attorney may have had two or three bitter confrontations with this
attorney,
and he may have given him no cooperation nor shown any contrition. The attitude of the
investigating
attorney is likely to be guarded, if not hostile.[32]
The considerable powers of bar counsel should be understood: he has the authority to file formal
charges and set the case for hearing, or he may dispose of it without further investigation. He
may sit
on a case indefinitely, or he can see that it is thoroughly prosecuted, even getting assistance of
the attorney
general's office or the local district attorney. Indeed, occasionally bar counsel may coordinate
his efforts with the local United States Attorney or district attorney for the purpose of
prosecuting a
particular attorney for perjury or for some breach of fiduciary duty. He may even suggest to the
district
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attorney that the case be presented to a grand jury.
It is therefore obvious that early in the case, retained counsel must communicate, in a friendly
way with the committee's attorney. He should first determine whether the client has offended
him and
make necessary apologies, although this courtesy will not always fall on receptive ears. If bar
counsel
is irreversibly opposed to the client because of personal animosity, however, he may be
amenable to
replacement by another attorney. This should be requested in a tactful way.
As a general rule, the committee's counsel will be pleased to suggest prompt methods of
settlement.
If he makes specific suggestions, they should be complied with if at all possible. This is true
even where they resolve doubts in matters of equity in favor of the complainant. The
investigator has
the power to see that his wishes are enforced. Concrete steps should be proposed and efforts
made to
determine the bar counsel's attitude toward possible rehabilitation through Alcoholics
Anonymous or
psychotherapy treatment or whatever is appropriate of a medical or educational nature.
Everything that should obviously be done should be done promptly. For example, if a refund of
a
few hundred dollars is clearly in order, it should be done speedily. It is wise to coordinate such
efforts
with the committee's staff personnel.
Sometimes a proposed written agreement for an immediate specific refund, or attendance at
ethics
seminars or remedial courses, to be completed within a given period of time, will be favorably
received.
Trickery or failing to live up to agreements made are almost certain to have bad results.
Therefore it is particularly important that any restitution promised be promptly paid.
Occasionally,
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the curative action is simplicity itself, and a request for a letter of apology to the complainant or
the
immediate turning over of a file to substitute counsel should be promptly complied with.
However,
the most important points to make with the investigating bar attorney, where there is no defense
under
the facts of the case, are contrition, cooperation, and corrective measures.
There will be cases, however, where the client has committed no wrongful act and is innocent. It
should be explained to the bar attorney that innocence will be the defense and that it will be
vigorously
pursued. Weaknesses in the complainant's case, his or her past criminal or psychiatric history
should be pointed out, and an inquiry made as to what steps are necessary to settle the matter
under
those circumstances.
In some jurisdictions, the investigating bar attorney is a full-time employee of the state bar
association,
the attorney general's office or an employee of the local judicial district. The approach in that
case will probably be somewhat different. Whereas the committee member participating in the
investigation
is seldom compensated for his work, counsel employed by a state bar association or the attorney
general's office always is. The only exception would be a "special prosecutor" appointed to
handle a particular, and usually quite spectacular, case. This is rare, but when it does occur, it
usually
involves a political figure or a judge.
An investigating attorney who is employed full time to investigate and prosecute grievances will
be harder to deal with. He is less likely to be sympathetic to the accused attorney, particularly if
he
has a record of prior disciplinary action. Nonetheless, most of these grievance committee
prosecutors
have more than enough work, and they tend to concentrate their efforts on the worst offenders,
those
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who have been least cooperative, or those who have offended them.
Retained counsel can expect closer cooperation with federal criminal or state and local district
attorney
investigators if the investigating committee attorney is a state or bar association employee.
Committee counsel acts as the prosecutor, and he may have had considerable experience
working
with the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or comparable state
office,
and he may have been a former prosecutor himself. If such an investigating attorney is handling
the
matter, a quick determination must be made of the probability of criminal prosecution, and
possibly
serious, adverse tax consequences.[33]
Regardless of whether the investigating attorney is a committee member or a state bar or
attorney
general's employee, the duty of all investigating or prosecuting attorneys is the same: to do
justice.
They are bound by the code of professional responsibility just as others are. Regrettably, they do
not
seem to enjoy hearing that from defense counsel, and reminding them of their ethical duties will
be
irritating. Nonetheless, most of these investigating attorneys have a heavy workload, and they
do tend
to concentrate their efforts on those attorneys who are the most obnoxious, the most infamous,
and
the least cooperative.
Retained defense counsel must also make an early determination on whether to supply evidence
that may build part of a criminal prosecution in the hopes of gaining leniency before the bar
association
at the risk of more severe detriment to his client if criminal charges are formally pursued. Such
decisions are never easy.
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In any event, it is generally good practice at the beginning of representation for an attorney-
client
accused of professional misconduct to contact the grievance or hearing committee's counsel and
advise
him that he may expect full cooperation from counsel and the client, any undelivered file will be
forwarded immediately to the former client or substitute counsel, an informal or formal reply, as
appropriate,
will be promptly submitted, and some inquiry about settlement or some other disposition of
the matter will be made without the filing of formal charges.
25. The role of retained counsel; in generalSettlement or disposition without hearing;
form
of release
Settlement is the ideal goal in every case. Seldom can any good come from having a hearing.
Even though the accused attorney claims complete innocence, the committee members may
wonder
why the matter was not disposed of earlier. They are quite aware of the fact that such matters
do not get to the hearing stage without the recommendation of the investigating bar attorney,
who
must have found evidence of wrongdoing to justify filing formal charges. Thus, the defense is
faced with a suspicion of some act of misconduct. Logically, therefore, the goal of avoiding a
hearing is the most desirable one, and the approach taken should be one that is least likely to
lead
to a hearing. It makes little sense to set one's goal for a hearing when the use of diplomacy can
avoid it. Settlement is possible only up to a point prior to the hearing, however. Once the
hearing
commences, it is usually too late for the accused attorney to settle with the complainant. The
most
satisfactory and beneficial settlements are those reached within two weeks of the filing of the
complaint.
The potential for various settlement possibilities are plentiful, but, unfortunately, they are
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usually
predicated on a commodity in short supply for most attorneys: money. Often it will be necessary
for the client to contact family members and give promissory notes for loans in order to bargain
with cash that may be easily replaced, rather than his license, which cannot.
It should be noted that while it is unethical conduct to "buy off" complaining witnesses, nearly
all
states provide that if the district attorney either approves or encourages a civil settlement, then
disciplinary proceedings may be avoided. Retained counsel must make certain he violates none
of
the canons of ethics himself. The key to avoiding trouble is to be open and candid with all
concerned.
Retained counsel should immediately make clear to the accused attorney that he is to take no
action
whatever following representation, and a careful inquiry should be made to determine what
action he has taken to date. Invariably, steps will have to be taken to straighten out the harm that
he may already have done.
The single most important ingredient for success is the attitude of the accused attorney. If the
grievance committee receives the impression that he is merely interested in a "dodge" to avoid
the
consequences of his acts, then great difficulty can be expected. If on the other hand the accused
is
genuinely contrite, both in his words and his actions, few committees are likely to take severe
action,
even in serious cases. On the other hand, some attorneys may attempt some sort of cover-up.
They may lie to the committee or may otherwise do great disservice to their own cause when
they
are not represented.
It should always be kept in mind that a contrite attitude by the accused attorney is a difficult one
for a grievance committee to resist, particularly when it is coupled with a clear and definite plan
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of corrective action.
Contrition, however, must always be coupled with cooperation, and cooperation must always be
coupled with corrective action. Should one of these elements be missing, a good result cannot
be
expected. Once defense counsel takes the client firmly in hand, directs a corrective-action
program,
and, most importantly, establishes and maintains a good relationship with bar counsel, he
may expect good results, even in serious cases.
The key task for the retained attorney is to coordinate the defensive effort with the goal toward
receiving
for the accused the least amount of punishment. For example, the investigating attorney
for the grievance committee should be informed that the money in dispute has been returned,
and
that the young attorney is facing considerable trouble with the district attorney's office for the
drunk-driving, collision, and the marijuana possession. It may be appropriate in such case, to
suggest
that the committee take no action until the criminal matter is exposed of.
If the client is uninsured, and many will be, defense counsel should seek to settle as much of the
case as he can by the mere payment of money as opposed to disciplinary proceedings. This, of
course, does not mean fraudulent claims should be paid. If the claimant comes into the hearing
room with unclean hands, having attempted to extort an unfair cash settlement, the committee is
entitled to know. However, in the given fact situation, there is a claim for a large sum of money
the complainant allegedly lost in profit from the sale of the piece of property. A full
investigation
may be required. Did the complainant have full title to the property, free and clear? Was there a
bona fide written offer? Did the complainant have the right to sell the property without the
approval
of other heirs? A malpractice carrier must certainly know the answer to these questions before
parting with any money.
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The district attorney's office should be approached with a similar offer: "Because of the DWI
and
marijuana case, the accused attorney is in trouble with the grievance committee. If a civil
settlement
with the persons who sustained damage in the car wreck can be reached, would the district
attorney be willing to dismiss the case?" Where changes of misconduct involve theft, it is best
to
make the district attorney aware of settlement negotiations and secure his participation to avoid
potentially serious problems in a related criminal proceeding.
The person most important to an overall settlement will be the investigating attorney. The key to
success is to decide at an early stage upon a specific, reasonable, and achievable course of
action,
and to stick with it. If promises for payment of damages or refunds to clients are made, they
must
be honored, to avoid displeasure of the grievance committee. Plans should be made to raise the
necessary funds, and an overall plan to solve all the problems of the accused attorney in one
settlement,
if possible, should be made. These plans often include requiring attendance at Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, psychotherapy with a psychiatrist or clinical social worker, or, in cases
of
negligence or extreme ignorance, attendance at legal ethics classes, continuing legal education
programs, or other remedial or curative activities. In such cases, the sooner the corrective action
is undertaken, the more likely good results can be had. Many of the best plans are implemented
months before the hearing.
Persuading the investigating bar attorney to propose a solution acceptable to all the parties is
tantamount
to a successful defense. Throughout the attempts at settlement, the bar attorney should be
informed of the status of negotiations, and the position of the accused attorney should be shown
as one of reasonableness. If the investigating attorney is made aware that the complainant is
seeking
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thousands of dollars when he lost only a few hundred, he very well may suggest that only the
few hundred be refunded, and may agree to a dismissal of the grievance.
Set forth below is a suggested form of release by the complainant on receipt of the amount
agreed
to in settlement:
Form of release:
RELEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ____________,[complainant] of ____________[address], in consideration of the sum
of
____________[amount of settlement] to me in hand paid by ____________[attorney], the
receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged and conferred, and recognized as adequate by these presents,
for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, release and forever discharge the said
____________[accused attorney] of and from all manner of debts, demands, obligations,
liabilities,
suits, and causes of action, whatever, against him, the said ____________[accused attorney],
in my own right, at the time of executing these presents.
[Date, subscription, and other formal parts omitted.]
Dismissal of the hearing should always be a part of any settlement, and all offers should be
made
known to the investigating attorney and subject to his approval. This will insure his good will;
only rarely will he interpose an objection. However, the defense attorney should not take up too
much of bar counsel's time. Bar counsel is usually busy with his private practice; he has his own
cases to handle. He will not appreciate lengthy discussions with the defense attorney over
strategy
or the petty details of the looked for solution.
Many jurisdictions provide for a "letter of caution," which is sometimes nothing more than an
informal
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"if-it's true-you-should-not have-done-it." In other words, the bar is simply pointing out
that the accused attorney is on thin ice, has gotten the attention of the grievance committee, and,
while the matter may not be serious enough for full inquiry, his conduct could and should
improve.
In some jurisdictions, the investigating attorney himself has the authority to issue a letter
of caution.[34]
In some jurisdictions, previous letters of caution may be used to enhance punishment, in others
they may not. In some cases the letter of caution may be issued without a complete
investigation,
based only on the complaint of the former client and the answer of the accused. A letter is
frequently
issued when the accused attorney is not cooperative as to a minor inquiry. Often the lack
of cooperation is the central theme of the letter of caution. Nonetheless, the letter of caution
falls
into the milder end of the discipline range provided by law, and many attorneys can withstand
receiving
the letter with only modest wear on their nerves. Usually the issuing of the letter is the
end of the matter.
When Bates v. Arizona Bar Association[35] was decided by the United States Supreme Court,
many advertising taboos fell for the legal profession. The limits which the advertising must
observe,
rather than all advertising, then became the issue. While advertising under certain circumstances
was held to be proper by the United States Supreme Court, it did not approve of solicitation.
Where advertising leaves off and solicitation begins is unclear in many cases.
Attorneys who advertise seem to have far more grievances lodged against them than lawyers
who
do not. Because of the conservative nature of the members of the grievance committee, it is
usually
best to attempt to settle an advertising grievance by ceasing an activity that is questionable. If
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an advertising violation goes to the grievance committee, harsh punishment may follow.
However, because the law is uncertain as to legal advertising, some grievance committees might
be willing to forego discipline if the accused attorney agrees to discontinue the activities
disapproved
of. There is a question whether such agreements are enforceable, but because of the uncertain
state of the law it should be assumed that they are enforceable. The agreements should be
drawn up with specificity to indicate the extent of advertising that will be allowed.
28. Formal charges
[Cumulative Supplement]
Formal charges of professional misconduct should not be recommended by bar counsel
without
notifying the attorney who is accused of unethical or illegal conduct.[43] The notice need
not be given
immediately, however; it can await the outcome of the bar's investigation into the
allegations.[44]
Following the investigation, the proceedings may be disposed of, without formal charges
being
filed, in one of three ways[45] all of which require the recommendation of bar counsel and
the concurrence
of the chairman of the grievance or hearing committee.[46] (1) The proceedings may be
dismissed
if there is insufficient probable cause to believe misconduct has occurred.[47] (2) An
admonition
may be issued if there is probable cause to believe that misconduct has occurred but the
problem
is minor and isolated.[48] (3) Probation can be imposed, with or without an admonition, if
there is
probable cause to believe misconduct has occurred for which probation is appropriate.[49]
Furthermore,
if there is a civil or criminal proceeding pending in which the respondent is a party and
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which
involves the same subject matter (conduct), the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed if
that is appropriate.[
50] A stay will be appropriate where the respondent will suffer prejudice in the pending
proceeding should the disciplinary action proceed immediately and where the grievance
committee
hearing may be expedited by evidence adduced in the criminal or civil matter.[51]
Formal proceedings against the accused attorney are warranted where there is probable
cause to
believe misconduct has occurred which is neither minor nor isolated and probation is not
appropriate
or where the respondent does not agree to a recommendation of admonition or probation.
[52] The
charges are prepared by bar counsel who is required to file with the disciplinary board
and serve on
the respondent a written statement of the charges giving a fair and adequate notice of the
nature of the
alleged misconduct.[53] Once the formal charges are filed, the proceedings are no longer
confidential
and are open to the public except for deliberations of the hearing committee, disciplinary
board or
court and information the hearing committee has ordered kept confidential.[54] After the
charges
have been filed, the matter is referred to a specific grievance or hearing committee.[55]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
No due process errors occurred during the grievance committee proceedings investigating
an attorney's
behavior, where attorney alleged that notice of the hearing was untimely and charges
against
him were vague, because grievance committee proceedings are principally investigatory
and comparable
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to proceedings before a grand jurythey are nonadversarial and there is no right of
confrontation
or cross-examination; the attorney under investigation is not entitled to a bill of
particulars until
the grievance committee completes its investigation. In this context, at a reasonable time
before a
finding of probable cause is made, the attorney will be advised of the conduct under
investigation and
the rules which may have been violated; in addition, the attorney must be given all
materials considered
by the committee and an opportunity to make a written statement regarding the alleged
misconduct
under R Reg Fla Bar 3-7.4(g). In any event the notice actually given was sufficient where
the
attorney received notice of the rules allegedly violated 13 days before the hearing was
scheduled, and
he was represented by counsel at the hearing and had an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses. The
Florida Bar v. Swickle (1991, Fla) 589 So 2d 901, 16 FLW S737, later proceeding (US) 117
L Ed 2d
101, 112 S Ct 929, supp op (US) 118 L Ed 2d 203, 112 S Ct 1552.
Evidence supported the finding of panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys
that attorney
engaged in illegal conduct, as an aggravating factor for purposes of imposing discipline,
even
though criminal charges were not filed against attorney; attorney admitted that he
exposed himself to
administrative assistant for district court, statute defined lewd and lascivious behavior as
"publicly
exposing a sex organ or exposing a sex organ in the presence of a person who is not the
spouse of the
offender and who had not consented thereto," administrative assistant was not attorney's
spouse, and
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the American Bar Association's (ABA) standards did not require that an attorney be
charged or convicted
by law enforcement before his or her conduct could be considered illegal. West's K.S.A.
213508(a)(2). In re Depew, 237 P.3d 24 (Kan. 2010).
Discipline of attorney who engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice
and
placed personal interests above those of clients would be limited to censure where medical
evidence
showed he suffered from mild neurological dysfunction due to cerebral aneurysm at time
of misconduct,
years of exemplary practice preceded affliction, he acknowledged misconduct, and he
demonstrated
willingness to take appropriate steps to prevent recurrence. Re Kiley (1991, 4th Dept) 170
App Div 2d 90, 572 NYS2d 601.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
29. Response; form
[Cumulative Supplement]
Within a prescribed period of time following service of the formal charges, the respondent
should
file a written reply or answer with the board or committee and serve a copy of it on bar
counsel.[
56] Allegations that are not disputed should be admitted to narrow the issues at the
hearing and
denials of fact should be separately stated. Moreover, if the respondent chooses to refuse
to answer
an allegation on constitutional or other grounds, the ground of such refusal should be
explicitly
asserted.[57] Counsel should note that the failure to answer the charges timely may be
treated as an admission of their truth.[58]
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It should be kept in mind that the reply itself is admissible in both civil, criminal, and
disciplinary
proceedings. The records of the grievance committee themselves are not usually subject to
discovery
proceedings, as they are almost always allowed to be secret by statute. However, the
accused
will be required to send a copy of the reply to the complainant, which may be introduced,
in
evidence at a subsequent civil trial for malpractice, or at a criminal proceeding.
Many jurisdictions require that the reply be sworn to, and some provide that failure to file
a
timely reply is in itself grounds for disciplinary proceedings. At the very least, the failure
to file a
timely reply will irritate the investigating attorney and the committee, and this conduct
will be reported
to the committee and may be viewed as lack of cooperation. Where failure to reply is in
and of itself an admission that all charges are true and correct, the statement of charges
alone can
be the basis for disciplinary proceedings.
A good deal of thought and effort must go into the reply, and a well-drafted answer may
result in
no further action by the investigating attorney. For example, legal research into the
various issues
may result in finding cases that exonerate the defendant in the particular fact situation. A
motion
to dismiss should then be filed with the answer, citing the appropriate authority. In
preparing the
reply, counsel should attach to a motion to dismiss photocopies of important favorable
cases or a
brief in support. If no research is offered, none will be done by the committee on behalf of
the client.
An amazing number of attorneys are unaware of the fact that there has been considerable
litigation
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over the years regarding what is and what is not unethical conduct, and formal published
ethics
opinions have been issued by many committees for decades. There is a wealth of authority
that
can be cited. Moreover, most state bar associations have on file advisory opinions from
their ethics
committees. These can sometimes be of immense use, especially where the accused
attorney
actually may have relied upon a prior ethics opinion in trying to conform his behavior to
the right
canon. The problem is that advisory opinions may not be binding, and authority from
other states
or jurisdictions may be cited only as persuasive authority. Finally, the American Bar
Association
has issued numerous opinions over the years, and provides materials that may be
purchased for
ethics law research. The bar association's opinions carry considerable weight.[59]
Generally, there is no required form for a reply. A typical and acceptable method is to go
through
the allegations and admit those that should be admitted, to identify those as to which
corrective
action has been taken (such as returning the file to the client or to his new attorney), to
deny those
that should be denied and to deny for lack of information or belief other allegations as
appropriate.
A reply similar to answering requests for admissions or interrogatories may be
appropriate.
The second part of the reply should consist of a brief on the issue of whether the conduct
complained
of is (a) a crime or act of moral turpitude; or (b) conduct that normally would subject the
accused to disciplinary action.
Based on the factual background of the article, an appropriate response to formal charges
might
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be composed as follows:
[Caption of forum, title of case and other formal parts omitted.]
ANSWER TO FORMAL CHARGES
1. The allegations of paragraphs ____________ of the formal charges are admitted.
2. The allegations of paragraphs ____________ are denied without qualification or
reservation.
3. In response to the remaining allegations, respondent cannot admit or deny the truth of
the allegations
for lack of sufficient information and belief. He therefore denies those allegations subject,
however, to the following factual statement, which is offered in defense of the formal
charges and
in mitigation of punishment as to any charges and allegations found to be true:
a. I was formally the attorney for the complainant. I advised him at the time I accepted the
case
that I would also need a contractual relationship with his two sisters, and he has never had
them
contact me. I felt uneasy with probating the will without the participation of the two
sisters, and I
did not know how to get in touch with them. He gave me a retainer of $500. Attached
herewith
please find a photocopy of the check for $500, which I have sent to his new counsel since
he has
now made arrangements for another attorney.
b. I admit that I did not return his file to him when he first requested it because I did not
know I
was required to do so. I have apologized to the complainant with an explanation. [Attach
copy of
letter.]
c. I admit sending the letter to the complainant referred to in his complaint as I
mistakenly
thought that I was entitled to hold the file until I had been compensated for the time I had
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spent
on the case. I was mistaken as to my obligations, and I have stated my regret for any
inconvenience
this has caused the complainant.
d. ____________[Other statements as appropriate].
[Date, subscription, and other formal parts omitted.]
Particularly when the defense attorney has not been permitted much time to prepare a
reply, or the
accused attorney has filed his own reply, an amended reply may be appropriate. In most
cases,
there are no bar rules to prevent this. Occasionally the grievance committee will frown on
very
late replies, especially those filed just before the hearing.
The best use of the amended reply is to bring to the committee's attention legal precedents
not
previously shown to them, and particularly any legal authority that the defense attorney
feels is
compelling. [] Practice Hint: The money to fund any costs or refunds should be placed in
the defense
attorney's trust account, and a written statement from the accused attorney should be
taken
granting the attorney full and exclusive power to disperse the money in settlement of the
case, in
his discretion.
Virtually all jurisdictions require that a written answer to the grievance be filed within a
certain
time limit. Most jurisdictions allow a minimum of 7 days, and some allow up to a
maximum of
60. Nearly always the time by which a reply must be filed is included in the notice of
formal
charges. In many cases, however, with as much as 30 or 40 hours of investigating and
preparation
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to do, a timely answer cannot be made. Rather than filing a late answer, it is always
appropriate to
call the investigating attorney and ask for an extension of time in which to file the answer.
It
nearly always will be granted. Indeed, this may be a wise consideration in most cases. The
bar association
grievance committee is anxious to have the accused attorney submit to their authority
and control. Resisting it invariably results in its taking a harsher stance. Therefore, a
request for a
delay in filing a response has the advantage of allowing a more thorough investigation that
will
produce a better and more detailed reply and in letting the committee know that the
accused attorney
has submitted himself to their committee's jurisdiction.
A case may present itself where the complainant seeks a large and unjustified refund from
the accused
attorney or otherwise seeks to take unfair advantage of him. This is not uncommon,
particularly
among "con men," who may have succeeded in this ploy in the past. The interview with
the
accused attorney will sometimes reveal that the complainant is an accomplished liar who
is adept
at adjusting his testimony to accomplish his goal. In such cases, a vague answer to the
grievance
may be advantageous.
As a general rule, the committee does not like the holding back of information, but neither
does it
like its offices being used for purposes of extortion. Further, the majority of virtually all
committees
is made up of lawyers, and they are likely to appreciate good tactics. There are exceptions,
however, and prudent practice requires that the appropriate approach be taken.
[] Case Illustration: A client paid his attorney a flat fee for defense in a fraud case. When
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the litigation
was satisfactorily concluded, the client demanded half of the fee back, claiming that the
attorney had told him that he expected to lose, that that fee would include the costs of an
appeal,
and that if the case was won at the trial stage he would give him a 50 percent refund.
Defense
counsel investigated the matter after the demand was first made but before the grievance
was
filed, and checked the complainant's litigation records at the courthouse, discovering that
other attorneys
had defended the complainant in fraud actions as well. He contacted them and learned
that two had been approached along the same lines; one paid back half of the money to
avoid a
grievance, and the second made a small adjustment in the fee. A purposely vague answer
was
filed, and, at the hearing, the complainant was allowed to tell his story to the committee
and
cross-examination solidified it. Then, to the surprise of the complainant, the two attorneys
against
whom he had made the same threat several years before were presented as witnesses.
Since there
were two witnesses to the attorney's employment agreement, the attorney and his
secretary, and a
signed written contract that provided as the attorney stated, the fundamentals for
presentation of a
perjury charge existed and the record was turned over to the appropriate authorities. The
complainant's
protests that his previous extortions were privileged communications were overruled by
the committee.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
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Attorney who on 3 separate occasions refused to cooperate in committee's investigation of
client
complaints, until it became necessary to procure subpoena directing his appearance for
examination
under oath, would be censured despite mitigating factor that he was in midst of
terminating longstanding
marriage during period in question, since failure to cooperate in investigation of alleged
misconduct constitutes misconduct in and of itself, and warrants discipline. Re Feit (1989,
3d Dept)
156 AD2d 810, 549 NYS2d 829.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
30. Motion to dismiss; illustrative forms
The scope of motions to dismiss grievances is limited only by the ingenuity and experience
of the
defense attorney. They can take practically any form, but should, if possible, be supported
with
case citations and a brief in support. Forms for two typical motions, (a) motion to dismiss
on the
ground of res judicata, and (b) a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, are set forth
below:
MOTION TO DISMISS (RES JUDICATA)
[Caption of tribunal, title of case and other formal parts omitted.]
TO THE HONORABLE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE:
NOW COMES ____________, the Respondent in this action, and would show the
committee as
follows:
I.
The complaint of ____________, complainant in this cause, is substantially the same as
was
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found in her suit for legal malpractice against the respondent filed on ____________,
20___, and
tried to a jury on ____________, 20___. The jury made findings entirely favorable to the
defendant
in that cause (respondent herein) and the court entered a judgment for the defendant and
taxed
all costs against the plaintiff (complainant herein) and said costs have yet to be paid.
II.
Copies of the plaintiff's pleadings, the defendant's answer, and a certified copy of the
judgment in
that cause are attached herewith as respondent's Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", and are
herein incorporated
for all purposes by reference.
III.
Respondent urges that virtually all issues presented to this committee were presented in
____________ court, and resolved by the rules of evidence and that the respondent was
shown as
a matter of law to have been guilty of no professional misconduct.
IV.
The complainant herein attempts a collateral attack upon that final judgment (Exhibit
"C") which
should not be permitted as a matter of law. Respondent respectfully urges that
administrative
hearings such as those held by the grievance committee may not attack facts conclusively
established
in court.
V.
Further, respondent respectfully submits that the grievance committee should not set itself
up in a
position above the courts and should not disregard the findings already made.
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WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent prays that this grievance be
forthwith
dismissed with prejudice and for all other further relief to which he may show himself to
be justly
entitled.
[Date, subscription, and other formal parts omitted.]
As a general rule, the committee is interested in hearing only from an attorney who has
discovered
unethical conduct, law enforcement authorities, the victim of the unethical conduct, but
no others. In a surprisingly large number of cases, friends, neighbors or, particularly in
divorce
cases, relatives of the person they see as aggrieved will attempt to interpose their will. If
tactfully
handled, these cases can often be dismissed quite early.
As a practical matter, there are no formal requirements for "standing." Anyone aware of
unethical
behavior may report it to the grievance committee. However, most committees receive
complaints
from third parties that generate unnecessary work for them, and, as a general rule, they
are not
sympathetic to interlopers. They wish to hear from the client or a person who claims to
have been
victimized by the attorney.
MOTION TO DISMISS (LACK OF STANDING)
[Caption of tribunal, title of case and other formal parts omitted.]
TO THE HONORABLE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE:
NOW COMES ____________, respondent, by and through his attorney of record, and
shows as
follows:
I.
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Respondent represented ____________, a citizen of Mexico, in litigation against
____________,
a citizen of the United States. Respondent had an attorney/client relationship with
____________
[plaintiff], and pursued the matter vigorously. Copies of the pleadings filed against the
defendant
in that case prepared by respondent are attached herewith as Exhibit "A" and
incorporated for all
purposes.
II.
The defendant in that case filed an answer, a copy of which is attached herewith as Exhibit
"B"
and incorporated herein for all purposes.
III.
Respondent proceeded to take depositions and to prepare for trial but, because of
distances, was
unable to maintain close contact with the plaintiff, his client.
IV.
The complainant in this cause is a friend of the plaintiff. The plaintiff often stayed at her
home
while visiting in the United States. Gradually the plaintiff seemed to lose interest in the
litigation,
and stopped paying attorney's fees to respondent. The complainant then attempted to
usurp the
perogatives of the plaintiff, at first by carrying messages to the respondent, then by taking
independent
action, and then by attempting to exercise her independent judgment as to how the case
should be handled.
V.
In time, a dispute arose between the complainant, who had no legal right to interfere in
the lawsuit,
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and the respondent, who respectfully suggested to her that he preferred to do business
with
his client only and that legal matters and questions of strategy should be left to the
plaintiff and
the respondent. To this, the complainant took great exception.
VI.
Respondent then filed a motion to withdraw, giving the plaintiff sufficient time to make
other arrangements
for counsel. The motion for and order permitting withdrawal as attorney of record is
attached herewith as respondent's Exhibit "C," and incorporated herein for all purposes.
VII.
Nonetheless, the complainant continued to assert her wish to control the litigation and the
obligation
of the respondent to represent what had come to be, in her mind, her case. Respondent
refused
to communicate with her, and returned the file to his client in Mexico.
VIII.
Complainant refused to accept the court's order permitting withdrawal, and she has
continued to
call the respondent to insist upon a full accounting of all money expended, or an
explanation as to
why the case has not been tried.
IX.
Respondent has never had an attorney-client relationship with the complainant, and he
respectfully
suggests that she lacks standing to bring a complaint on charges of professional
misconduct
against him.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the respondent in this case respectfully
requests that
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the complaint of this complainant be dismissed with prejudice, and the further prays for
all such
relief, both general and equitable, to which he may show himself to be justly entitled.
[Date, subscription, and other formal parts omitted.]
31. Discovery
[Cumulative Supplement]
For a limited period following the filing of an answer, both bar counsel and the respondent
should
be afforded reciprocal discovery of matters not privileged.[60] During this period there
should be a
mutual exchange of (1) names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant
facts, (2)
non-privileged information and evidence relevant to the charges or the respondent, and
(3) other material
that may be shown to be relevant and material. Protective orders should be available to
prevent
unwarranted discovery.[61]
While many of the state bar enabling acts make no specific provision for discovery, as a
general
rule, a meeting with the investigating attorney will produce all the discovery necessary to
prepare for
the hearing. Furthermore, not only has the accused attorney an absolute right to a copy of
the complaint
lodged against him, and to all later amended complaints, but in most states, the accused
has a
right to a list of the witnesses who will appear against him, and in many states the bar
rules provide
that a summary must also be given of their expected testimony. The accused attorney also
will have
subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses, including hostile witnesses, police
officers
and court personnel.[62]
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In a particularly serious case, where the state rules of criminal procedure provide for little
in the
way of discovery, and if it appears that the loss of the accused attorney's law license is all
but certain,
the defense attorney may choose to make the tactical choice of using the grievance
proceeding as a
discovery tool for the upcoming criminal trial. This is particularly true when an
indictment has been
returned without the opportunity to conduct a preliminary hearing as provided by federal
law, or an
"examining trial" provided by a code of criminal procedure in most states.
If such a move is made, the defense attorney will often choose to have his client invoke his
Fifth
Amendment rights, and he will not testify. He cannot be compelled to testify if there is
criminal litigation
pending. If a disbarment suit is pending, his deposition can usually be taken, and his
refusal to
be deposed can be used against him at the disbarment trial, but not at a criminal trial. The
exercise of
the Fifth Amendment right may not be used for impeachment.[63]
If the defense attorney's strategy is along those lines, he should request that the committee
postpone
its decision until after the criminal trial is completed. Even though the request will seldom
be
granted, it can do no harm to ask. If the request for a delay of the grievance proceedings is
granted
until after the criminal trial, and there is an acquittal, this outcome should be brought to
the attention
of the committee immediately.
In most jurisdictions, even though the investigating bar attorney may not have an absolute
right to
pre-hearing discovery, cooperation with him is usually best. However, such cooperation
does not require
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the defense attorney to build the prosecution's case, and extensive cooperation may very
well
result in that being done. Thus, defense counsel must walk a fine line between proceeding
so as to irritate
the committee by refusing to turn over documents, or cooperating and hoping that the
matter
will not be prosecuted. It is always a difficult choice.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Attorney was not entitled to invoke privilege against self-incrimination when ordered to
file list
of all monetary sanctions imposed against him by any federal court since sanctions were
public orders
and attorney did not explain how information could incriminate him. In re Maurice (1995,
CA7)
73 F3d 124.
57. Conviction of crime
[Cumulative Supplement]
Many states provide for automatic disbarment upon proof of a felony conviction. The
term "conviction"
tends to have a very broad application. Some states provide for automatic disbarment in
the
case of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude, and, in others, for all felonies. Crimes
of moral
turpitude include all crimes of theft, but there is some question as to whether it includes
the frequently
encountered crimes of income tax evasion and nonfiling of returns. There are cases that
have
decided both ways.[36]
Some states do not specifically provide for disbarment in case of a misdemeanor
conviction, even
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if it does involve moral turpitude. Nonetheless, most grievance committees will take
considerable interest
in the situation where an attorney suffers such a conviction. Since the bar rules vary
greatly
from one state to another, only an examination of the statutes and rules in one's
jurisdiction can answer
the questions likely to come up concerning the sanctions that may be imposed.
The bar association ordinarily is required to be notified whenever a lawyer is convicted of
a serious
crime, such as a felony or an offense involving moral turpitude.[37] The investigating bar
attorney
will then prepare a proposed order of interim suspension and will notify the attorney
when the
matter will be be presented to the court,[38] and will file formal charges against the
attorney based on
the conviction.[39] Since an interim suspension is not a formal disposition of the
accusation formal
charges need to be filed, but they should not be heard until all avenues of appeal of the
criminal conviction
have been exhausted.[40]
When presented with the interim order of suspension for a conviction of serious crime, the
court
will immediately suspend the attorney regardless of the pendency of an appeal.[41] A
certified copy
of the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence that the lawyer has committed the
crime
charged, and the sole issue at the hearing is the nature and extent of the discipline to be
imposed.[42]
If the lawyer has been convicted of a minor offense, the bar association will treat notice of
the conviction
like it would the receipt of any other complaint against an attorney.[43]
The respondent may be able to consent to being disciplined while disciplinary proceedings
are
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pending if he admits the truth of the charges in writing.[44] He may then, if he desires,
save time and
further trauma by stipulating to specified discipline.[45] Thus, if the charges are admitted
in writing,
counsel and the client should be able to agree on the nature and extent of the discipline
imposed, subject
to the approval of the hearing committee, and, ordinarily, also subject to review by the
disciplinary
board and the court.[46]
The criminal law of many states often contains various types of non-final adjudication and
punishments.
The titles of these punishments include "deferred adjudication," "conditional discharge,"
"unimposed probation," "probation," and others. The attitude of the grievance committee
members
should not be based upon the type of punishment method out in criminal court. In all
probability, the
grievance committee can still take action against the attorney during this interlocutory
period. As a
general rule, if an attorney is under any kind of restraint by a court, whether the
judgment is final or
not, the committee is apt to regard it as "probation" and take action consistent with
suspension or disbarment.
A federal suspended sentence is a final conviction for most purposes, including grievance
procedings.[47]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Two-year suspension from practice of law, with credit for time served under interim
felony suspension
but with reinstatement conditioned on completion of federal supervised release, was
appropriate
for attorney who engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law based
on
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his conviction for transportation and importation of obscene matters; although mitigating
factors included
lack of prior discipline, cooperation in disciplinary proceedings, and evidence of good
character,
Supreme Court also considered severity of attorney's crime as measured by 15-month
prison term
and three years of supervised release. 18 U.S.C.A. 1462(a); BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a,
d, e);
Code of Prof.Resp., DR 1-102(A)(6) (2006). Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Malley, 935 N.E.2d
5 (Ohio
2010).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
58. Diversion-type programs
[Cumulative Supplement]
An increasing number of states are taking a very enlightened approach: they are
requiring the accused
attorney, if he is to avoid disbarment or suspension, to promptly take continuing legal
education
or remedial courses concerning legal ethics that are designed to teach the to attorney to
avoid the
type of activity that resulted in his appearance before the grievance committee. A frequent
requirement
is attendance at state bar ethics programs. Other typical requirements are law school
courses on
legal ethics or other academic work to correct deficiencies.
Usually these corrective action programs are in lieu of discipline; that is, if the attorney
will agree
to participate, a decision or sanctions may be postponed for a given period of time,
normally one
year.
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Another proposal, seldom applied, has been to allow the attorney to resign from the bar
but require
him to retake the state bar examination as his "punishment.". If he passes, he may be
relicensed.
This normally requires a period of study, participation in a bar review course, and other
remedial
work that may go a long way toward solving his problems.[48]
Where alcohol has been a factor in the misconduct of the accused attorney, a committee
may occasionally
postpone a determination until after restitution has been made or an agreed alcohol abuse
treatment program has been completed, as the case may be. Often the hearing will be put
off for as
little as two weeks, and sometimes for as much as a year or two, to see how the accused
progresses.
Committees are reluctant to require specific programs, but when a specific program is
required, the
most frequent one is a hospitalization program or membership and active participation in
Alcoholics
Anonymous.[49]
[] Case Illustration: In a recent case in Illinois,[50] an alcoholic attorney, who had
converted his
client's funds, made restitution, claimed that he had been rehabilitated, and showed that
he was regularly
attending meetings of Alcoholics Anomymous. Taking the view that the accused attorney's
alcoholism
was a physical and mental impairment that substantially hampered his ability to practice
law
competently, but was not an indication of his moral weakness, the court reduced from 30
months to 6
months the disciplinary board's recommended suspension period as a reward for his effort
to overcome
his impairment, on condition, however, that he continue attending regular meetings of
Alcoholics
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Anonymous or of a lawyer's assistance program under a probationary supervision for an
indefinite
period both before and after his suspension. The court added that if the accused attorney
had remained
an active alcoholic it would have disbarred the attorney, particularly if it were not shown
that
alcoholism contributed to his wrongdoing.
Occasionally a "suspended suspension" is imposed, conditioned upon the attorney not
being arrested
for anything, including driving while intoxicated, public intoxication, or any alcoholic-
related
episode for a given period, sometimes for as long as five years.
The action of the bar in these programs is commendable, for without seeking punishment,
they are
requiring treatment. Their attitude can only be praised, as it both protects the public and
insures treatment.
The typical grievance committee, however, is usually less sympathetic to narcotics use and
thus to
enrollment in a narcotics abuse program. Normally, when the attorney has reached this
stage with a
narcotics problem, he also has a criminal prosecution pending. The defense may be
reluctant, under
such circumstances, either to admit to narcotics use or to offer evidence of the
respondent's willingness
to rehabilitate, since such evidence may well be available to use at the criminal trial. The
criminal
trial, of course, should be given higher priority than the grievance proceeding.
Nonetheless, some
committees will take an enlightened view and will postpone proceedings until the
attorney's narcotics
problem is solved.
It is only to be expected that certain drug problems are likely to be met with more
sympathy than
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others. Use of marijuana is one thing, but use of cocaine, methamphetamines or heroin is
another; and
in the latter case, little sympathy can be expected from committee members. Indeed, in
most narcotics
cases, the committee will be hearing the disciplinary matter after a conviction has been
had in the
criminal trial court, and the best that defense can expect to do for the client is to have his
suspension
run concurrent with a probation or prison term.
It is becoming more common, however, for grievance committees to suspend imposition of
punishment
pending completion of psychiatric treatment or hospitalization. This enlightened view has
been slow in coming, under the theory that the first consideration of the bar should be
protection of
the public.
Many state bar acts provide for suspension of an attorney during a disabling illness or for
transfer
to inactive status in case of a disability.[51]
Virtually all the cases involving diversion programs are the result of problems related to
mental
illness or alcoholism. An agreed psychiatric treatment program may be permitted in cases
with a high
rate of recovery, such as a reactive depression or manic-depressive disease, but permanent
suspension
pursuant to statute for illness or disability is likely to continue for those disorders which
carry a poor
prognosis, such as schizophrenia. Counsel should take note and not prove too much.
Committees are
primarily interested in protecting the public. For example, when the misconduct charged
is minor and
will result in a short suspension, counsel must take into consideration that proof of a
serious mental
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000744
illness in defense or mitigation may lead to an indefinite suspension for mental or
emotional disability.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Monitored probation: Reinstatement to practice of law was warranted conditioned on attorney
being monitored by a mental health professional who would report to Character and
Fitness Committee,
where attorney complied with order of suspension, attorney possessed sufficient
professional
capabilities and qualifications to practice law, attorney showed by clear and convincing
evidence that
he was of good and moral character and that his readmission would not be a detriment to
legal profession,
but Committee expressed concern about potential pressures that attorney would
encounter upon
re-entry into profession. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.510(2). Bowling v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 54
S.W.3d
160 (Ky. 2001); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client 61.
Where an attorney neglected five cases of clients seeking relief in bankruptcy and suffered
from
alcoholism and depression, the attorney is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for
two years,
but the suspension is stayed and he is placed on probation under the following conditions:
monitoring
by an attorney, biannual report by psychiatrist, compliance with disciplinary rules, and
participation
in the Ohio Lawyer's Assistance Program and in alcohol abuse counseling. Cincinnati Bar
Ass'n v.
Wolosin, 71 Ohio St. 3d 611, 646 NE2d 455.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
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59. Reprimand
[Cumulative Supplement]
The mildest form of sanction is an admonition or informal reprimand, sometimes called a
public
reprimand. Ordinarily, it is imposed by the bar attorney or bar counsel with a consent of
the respondent
and without the filing of formal charges.[52] It is a private form of discipline, although a
summary
may be published in a bar publication without identifying the accused attorney. It is
recorded,
moreover, and may be offered as evidence of past discipline on the issue of punishment in
subsequent
disciplinary proceedings against the admonished lawyer.[53] A formal reprimand is
imposed by the
court after formal charges have been filed in cases of relatively minor misconduct.[54]
This type of
discipline exists in various forms in nearly all states. Often, no record of the Admonition is
kept. Although
some record may be retained by the committee, the action is not made public. Normally,
this
course of action is taken when full restitution has been made and the accused attorney has
been both
cooperative and contrite and gives sincere assurances to the committee that no future
recurrences are
likely. It falls into the milder end of the punishment spectrum and should be considered as
a relatively
desirable one in the context of negotiation. In other words, counsel may wish to suggest an
informal
reprimand to the bar to chasten the accused, without harming him financially or publicly.
Often these
informal reprimands are issued to older and highly regarded members of the bar who
have breached a
canon of ethics by an unintentional act from which they did not profit financially.
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A formal reprimand is in the nature of public disgrace. It is occasionally coupled with a
requirement
for restitution, and is sometimes only given in lieu of a suspension if full restitution and a
corrective
course, such as continuing legal education or a new bookkeeping system is adopted by the
accused.
Usually the formal reprimand is published in a state bar journal, and copies of the
reprimand
are sent to the judges and administrative officers and magistrates in the district.
The effect of a formal reprimand can be devastating to some individuals. Suicide by the
accused
attorney prior to the reprimand being published is not unheard of. On the other hand,
some attorneys
seem to not mind the public reprimand at all. The notoriety does not seem to bother them,
and they
regard the sanction as a mild one. These are the attorneys the grievance committee can
expect to hear
from again.
A judicial reprimand normally occurs when the attorney is guilty of contempt or some
other
breach of ethics in the presence of the court, such as destroying evidence or harassing a
witness. In
these cases, the only record that is normally kept is in the contempt proceedings
themselves. The
types of contempt are actual and constructive contempt, and civil and criminal contempt.
A full discussion
of these subjects is beyond the scope of this article. Occasionally a judge will notify the
grievance committee of the breach and occasionally will instruct the grievance committee
to take appropriate
action. In such cases, the lawyers on the committee, ever anxious to please the court, can
be
expected to take firm and prompt action against the attorney in question.
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In a few states, the complainant must file suit to discipline the attorney if he does not agree
to the
committee's action, or the attorney must file suit to set aside discipline imposed by the
committee.
This is the rule in Texas and a few other states. In such cases, after a trial, the judge (not
the jury) is
required to announce what discipline should be ordered. Generally, if it has gotten this
fare, hopes of
a mere judicial reprimand are generally gone, but occasionally a court will impose this
type of punishment
and the lawyer who is prosecuting the case will agree to it. It is a matter of public record,
and
constitutes a significant disgrace for the attorney in question. Actual judicial reprimands
are fairly
rare, and most judges go through their entire career without ever ordering one.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Attorney would be publicly reprimanded for neglect of client's business where letter of
mitigation
attested to "substantial personal and emotional difficulties," including financial
hardships, foreclosure
of family residence, and stress of relocating family and practice. People v. Smith (1988,
Colo) 757
P2d 628.
Review Panel reprimand was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorney's lack of
diligence in
client's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, which lack of diligence exposed client to injury, i.e.,
the bankruptcy
complaint was dismissed but the bankruptcy court later reinstated it and terminated
attorney's
representation of client; in mitigation, the attorney's misconduct was not a cause of client's
loss of her
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home two years later for failure to make payments, attorney had practiced bankruptcy
law for over 15
years, he had no history of discipline, and since the filing of the disciplinary grievance he
had filed
numerous bankruptcy complaints without objection. State Bar Rules and Regulations,
Rule 4102(d),
Rules 1.3, 3.2. In re Robinson, 288 Ga. 30, 701 S.E.2d 142 (2010).
Where attorney failed to file income tax return for three year period, court, in finding that
failure
was caused by either negligence or ignorance and that attorney had otherwise
unblemished professional
reputation, held that such action warranted censure. Re Towles (1983) 98 Ill 2d 179, 74 Ill
Dec
625, 456 NE2d 127.
Public reprimand was warranted due to attorney's violation of the rules of professional
conduct by
intentionally withholding documents from client given the absence of a prior disciplinary
record for
attorney, the fact that he did not have a dishonest or deceitful motive in regards to his
client in withholding
the documents, and the fact that client was not harmed by his actions. Md.Rule 16812,
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.4(a). Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland
v. Edib,
415 Md. 696, 4 A.3d 957 (2010).
See Petition for Disciplinary Action against Wylie (1991, Minn) 464 NW2d 720, supra 9
Probation.
Public reprimand was appropriate sanction for attorney who violated professional
conduct rules
relating to communication in his representation of client in personal-injury action, and
who also
failed to inform client that attorney did not maintain professional liability insurance,
where attorney
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had a long career with no previous disciplinary action. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 1.4;
Code of
Prof.Resp., DR 1104(A) (2006). Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Godles, 2010-Ohio-6274, 943
N.E.2d 988
(Ohio 2010).
Public reprimand of attorney was warranted, in attorney disciplinary case in which
attorney admitted
misconduct and cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), where
attorney, in
a series of real estate transactions, prepared an inaccurate Department of Housing and
Urban Development
(HUD) statement, disbursed funds prematurely, unreasonably delayed in filing deeds, and
failed to respond to clients' requests for information, in violation of the professional rules.
Appellate
Court Rule 407, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 4.1, 5.3, 8.4(a, e). In re
Martin, 389
S.C. 467, 699 S.E.2d 695 (2010).
Public reprimand, conditioned upon attorney's completion of 10 ethicsapproved
continuing legal
education (CLE) credits within 12 months and, within 60 days, his payment of costs for
attorney disciplinary
proceeding, was appropriate sanction for attorney's representation of criminal defendant
in
matter for which he previously had attorneyclient relationship with victim, who shared
sensitive information
regarding alleged sexual assault by defendant; attorney's failure to recognize ethical issues
involved reflected lack of awareness of or attention to his clients' rights and his
responsibilities as
lawyer to guard sensitive information. SCR 20:1.9(a). In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against
Kostich, 2010 WI 136, 793 N.W.2d 494 (Wis. 2010).
Public reprimand and order to pay restitution were appropriate sanctions for attorney's
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misconduct
in failing to communicate with client about the status of his criminal case, failing to
explain a matter
to the extent necessary to permit client to make informed decisions, failing to take steps
reasonably
practicable to protect client's interests, and failing to refund an unearned fee. SCR 20:1.4
(a, b),
20:1.16(b, d) (2005). In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blise, 2010 WI 34, 782 N.W.2d
407
(Wis. 2010).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
60. Suspension
[Cumulative Supplement]
Many committees completely disregard the great financial and emotional cost that the
client has
already suffered and order a suspension from practice for a specific time. The minimum
suspension is
usually 30 days, and the maximum normally is three to five years. In many states, the
maximum time
is fixed by statute.[55]
About the best an attorney can hope for, if he has been convicted of a crime and placed
under a
suspended sentence or on probation, is to have the time affixed by the court run
concurrently with the
time of his suspension. For example, should the respondent be given six months probation
for driving
while intoxicated, a common punishment would be a suspension to run concurrently with
the probation
time. Some states permit probation on the suspension, based upon future good behavior.
[56]
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Often the committee is unwilling to settle for a mere suspension and will insist on
disbarment.
This is particularly true in cases where the accused attorney has been sent to prison. Some
states require
disbarrment by statute in case of conviction for any felony, or for any crime of moral
turpitude.
Others require suspension during probation.
The conditions for readmission sometimes can be bewildering. Occasionally, the
suspension will
last only as long as the accused attorney needs to complete a course in ethics at a local law
school, or
to obtain a divorce. Such cases usually involve some degree of emotional illness. Very often
a condition
precedent to reinstatement after suspension in the bar is complete restitution. Such a
sentence always
causes great financial hardship to the attorney in question.
The order of suspension normally will include language to preclude the attorney from
offering or
giving legal advice except for himself and forbids him from sharing offices with attorneys
or holding
himself out to be an attorney during the period of the suspension. If the order of
suspension is not
honored by the disciplined attorney, subsequent disbarment is certain.
Occasionally a governmental office, the United States' Attorney's Office, the Internal
Revenue
Service, the district attorney's office or the grievance committee may have a very strong
case, but
may be willing to drop criminal and disbarment proceedings in exchange for an agreed
suspension.
Normally the minimum suspension period is 15 days, and the maximum is likely to be five
years.
Sometimes reapplication or a retaking of the bar examination is required for
reinstatement. An agreed
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suspension from practice should always be considered when the prosecutor has a very
strong case,
particularly where criminal prosecution is possible.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Attorney who continued to practice law following court order of suspension was not
entitled to attorney
fees for cases on which he and his associates worked after suspension order, since order
was
not ambiguous, there was no evidence that he acted in good faith, and he ignored language
of disciplinary
rule and of only reported federal case on point. Cooper v. Texaco, Inc. (1992, CA5 La) 961
F2d 71.
Failure of attorney to file probation reports with state bar while on professional probation
arising
from misconduct warranted imposition of outright suspension and revocation of
professional probation.
Potack v. State Bar (1991) 54 Cal 3d 132, 284 Cal Rptr 335, 813 P2d 1365, 91 CDOS 6674,
91
Daily Journal DAR 10141.
Six-month suspension was warranted for attorney who violated Bar Rules regarding
conflicts of
interest, providing competent representation, and prohibiting conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. West's
F.S.A. Bar
Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.4(b), 4-1.7(b), 4-8.4(c, d). The Florida Bar v. Shankman, 41 So. 3d 166
(Fla. 2010).
Three year suspension was warranted for attorney who engaged in misconduct by
representing
clients with unwaivable conflicts of interest and making misrepresentations to client.
West's F.S.A.
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Bar Rules 41.7(a), 41.9(a), 41.16(a)(1), 44.1(a), 48.4(c). The Florida Bar v. Scott, 39
So. 3d
309 (Fla. 2010).
Three-year suspension, with reinstatement on conditions, was warranted for attorney
whose conduct
in representing client charged with violation of municipal ordinance, filing numerous
frivolous
appeals and petitions for certiorari or habeas corpus, telling client to stop requesting
information
about the representation, continuing the representation after client had discharged him
and without informing
client that he was continuing to file motions and petitions in the matter, refusing to
respond
to discovery requests, and refusing to cooperate in disciplinary investigation, violated
rules requiring
attorney to provide competent representation, abide by client's decision concerning
objectives of representation,
keep client reasonably informed, not continue representation in the event of a significant
risk of conflict of interest, not continue representation if discharged by client, and not
assert a claim
or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. State Bar Rules and Regulations, Rule
4102(d),
Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.4, 1.7(a), 1.16(a), 3.1. In re Millard, 288 Ga. 449, 704 S.E.2d 779 (2011).
Three month suspension from the practice of law was warranted, in disciplinary action in
which
attorney filed a petition for voluntary discipline prior to the filing of a formal complaint
against attorney,
where attorney, who suffered from emotional distress bordering on depression at the time
of the
incidents at issue due to a personal child support case, did not have a dishonest or selfish
motive and
acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct. In re Polk, 288 Ga. 63, 701 S.E.2d 161
(2010).
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Six-month suspension was warranted for attorney whose failure to timely respond to a
court order
and discovery requests resulted in default judgment against clients, who did not inform
clients of de-
fault judgment, and who stated falsely during disciplinary process that the litigation was
resolved by
settlement, where attorney had two prior instances of discipline. State Bar Rules and
Regulations,
Rule 4102(d), Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.4(a)(4); State Bar Rules and Regulations, Rule 4103.
In re
Hardwick, 288 Ga. 60, 701 S.E.2d 163 (2010).
Attorney's commission of mortgage fraud and entry of guilty plea to felony offense
warranted
two-year suspension from practice of law, with reinstatement conditioned upon
consultation with
State Bar Law Office Management Program, agreement to implement Program's
directives in connection
with the reestablishment of law office, and attendance of first Ethics School conducted by
Office
of General Counsel after date of reinstatement. West's Ga.Code Ann. 168102(2), 16
8105(a).
In re Suttle, 288 Ga. 14, 701 S.E.2d 154 (2010).
Indefinite suspension without possibility of reinstatement for 12 months was warranted
for attorney
who, among other things, failed to timely file both federal and state income tax returns.
Committee
on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Asso. v. Bertelli (1988, Iowa) 422
NW2d
175.
Three-year suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in driving
under the influence
of alcohol (DUI), committing aggravated battery, driving recklessly, and leaving the scene
of
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resulting accident, where attorney caused both personal injury and property damage.
Sup.Ct.Rules,
Rule 226, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(b). In re Frahm, 241 P.3d 1010 (Kan. 2010).
Indefinite suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney who waived oral argument
before the
Court of Appeals without client's knowledge or authorization, failed to diligently and
promptly represent
his clients, failed to adequately communicate with clients, repeatedly accepted fees and
failed
to perform the work that he was paid to perform, failed to reduce contingency fee
agreement to writing,
failed to properly account for and refund unearned fees, failed to file timely written
response to
eight disciplinary complaints, and failed to properly notify two clients following his
suspension from
practice of law. Sup.Ct. Rules, Rule 207(b), 218(a); Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of
Prof.Conduct,
Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a, d), 1.15(b), 1.16, 8.1(b). In re Thomas, 241 P.3d 104 (Kan.
2010).
Two-year suspension, as opposed to indefinite suspension, was appropriate sanction for
attorney's
misconduct that included conviction for attempt to obstruct a police officer's official duty,
falsely
telling police officers that interviewee whom attorney accompanied to interview had
rewound and recorded
over tape of interview, and not making reasonable efforts to correct misunderstanding of
interviewee
that attorney was representing him, where attorney lacked prior disciplinary record and
had
good reputation among peers in county bar. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 4.3
, 8.4(bd). In re Millett, 241 P.3d 35 (Kan. 2010).
One-year suspension from the practice of law was warranted in attorney disciplinary case,
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where
attorney subjected five administrative assistants for district court to sexual harassment,
and he attempted
to minimize the seriousness of his conduct, in violation of the professional rules.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(d, g). In re Depew, 237 P.3d 24
(Kan. 2010)
.
Attorney's conduct in agreeing to represent client in grandchild visitation dispute and
medical
malpractice action, only to neglect each separate action and ignore client despite receipt of
upfront
payment of fees in the amount of $1,650, coupled with her failure to respond to bar
complaint, warranted
one-year suspension from practice of law and order requiring attorney to pay client
restitution
of all unearned fees. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Whitlock, 324 S.W.3d 415 (Ky. 2010).
Attorney's conduct in continuing to practice law during disciplinary suspension, by
representing
client in a domestic case, coupled with his failure to respond to informational requests
during ethics
investigation, in violation of professional rules, warranted one-year suspension from
practice of law.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 8.1(b). Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v.
Grider, 324 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2010).
Suspension of 60 days was warranted for attorney whose conduct, in failing to contact
client or
keep him advised of deadlines or court events, failing to return paperwork to client, failing
to timely
file paperwork in Social Security disability appeal, resulting in dismissal of appeal, failing
to respond
to discovery in personal injury case, resulting in dismissal of case with prejudice, and
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failing to respond
to bar complaint, violated rules requiring attorney to act with reasonable diligence, keep
client
reasonably informed, return client materials, and requiring attorney to respond to
disciplinary authorities.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1(b). Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Bryant, 318 S.W.3d 96 (Ky. 2010).
Suspension of 181 days, requiring a reinstatement by the Supreme Court before
resumption of
practice and a review by Character and Fitness Committee of an application for
reinstatement, was
warranted for attorney who failed to return an unearned $1,000.00 retainer after being
suspended
from practice and who failed to respond to Bar complaint, where attorney had three prior
suspensions
and a prior public reprimand. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules
1.16(d), 8.1(b);
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 3.505(1), 3.510(1). Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Leadingham, 317 S.W.3d
583 (Ky.
2010).
Ninety-day suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in
misrepresenting to
the grantor of a mortgage that had been assigned to attorney's client that he had prepared
a mortgage
release and sent it to client, duplicating this lie to Bar Counsel on two separate occasions,
and improperly
withdrawing fund from his trust account by drawing a check payable to cash, where
attorney
had no duty to draft mortgage release for the grantor, attorney did not aggravate offense
involving
check payable to cash by misusing those funds for personal financial gain, attorney
conceded wrongdoing
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before Court of Appeals and appeared willing to take responsibility for his actions, and
attorney
assisted his counsel in procuring the necessary mortgage release from his client. Md.Rule
16609
(b); Md.Rule 16812, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 4.1(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.4(c, d). Attorney
Grievance
Com'n of Maryland v. Brown, 415 Md. 269, 999 A.2d 1040 (2010).
Attorney's mental and emotional state due to marital problems would be mitigating factor
in discipline,
but attorney would nevertheless be suspended from practice for indefinite period for
allowing
statute of limitations to run, delaying return of funds, failing to keep sufficient funds in
trust account
to pay obligations, and failing to cooperate with investigators. Re Tessler (1990, Mo) 783
SW2d 906.
One-year suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in offering
discounted
legal fees to three female bankruptcy clients and a family member of another client in
exchange for
sexual favors of various kinds, considering that none of the grievants accused attorney of
forcing
them to endure any unwanted physical contact or even attempting to do so, none felt
sufficiently pressured
that she even considered giving in, none sought therapy or treatment to overcome the
experience,
none suggested the incidents were traumatic, none pursued criminal charges, nothing
suggested
the grievants were especially vulnerable or more in distress because of the nature of their
legal matters
than were other categories of clients, and attorney had a prior history of disciplinary
infractions.
In re Witherspoon, 203 N.J. 343, 3 A.3d 496 (2010).
Attorney diagnosed with "major depressive disorder without psychosis" would be
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suspended
pending determination of capacity to defend herself against charges of neglect, failing to
respond to
inquiries from client and opposing counsel, and failure to cooperate with Bar
investigation. Re Wunderlich
(1988, 3d Dept) 141 App Div 2d 971, 530 NYS2d 636, motion gr (3d Dept) 149 App Div 2d
809, 540 NYS2d 340.
Two-year suspension with one year stayed, conditioned upon no further violations, two
years of
monitored probation upon attorney's return to practice, and eight hours of continuing
legal education
in law-office management were warranted as sanction for attorney's conduct, failing to
appear or appearing
tardily for hearings before municipal court, leaving one hearing early despite judge's
specific
instruction to remain, resulting in multiple contempt citations against attorney, and failing
to respond
to letters from disciplinary authorities, in violation of rules requiring reasonable diligence
in representing
a client, prohibiting undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal,
prohibiting
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, prohibiting conduct that
adversely reflects
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law, and cooperation with a disciplinary investigation.
Rules
of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 3.5(a)(6), 8.4(d, h); Government of the Bar Rule V(4)(G).
Mahoning
County Bar Ass'n v. Sakmar, 2010-Ohio-5720, 938 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio 2010).
Indefinite suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney who was convicted of three
counts of
theft based on stealing approximately $22,000 from three banks, who failed to notify any
Ohio disciplinary
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authority of his conviction, and who failed to respond to disciplinary investigation. Rules
of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 8.1(b), 8.3(a), 8.4(b). Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Newman, 2010-Ohio-
5034, 937
N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 2010).
Two-year suspension from practice of law, with one year stayed on conditions, was
appropriate
sanction for attorney who prepared trust document for elderly client naming attorney's
own children
as beneficiaries, obtained loan from same client without advising her of risks of making
unsecured
loan and failed to repay loan, and in another matter received checks for fees from a
guardianship account
without first obtaining approval from probate court, where only mitigating circumstance
was
lack of prior disciplinary record, while aggravating factors included a pattern of
misconduct involving
multiple offenses of taking advantage of an elderly and vulnerable client for personal gain.
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 3.4(c), 8.4(d, h); Government of the Bar Rule V(4)(G);
BCGD
Proc.Reg. 10(B); Code of Prof.Resp., DR 1102(A)(5, 6), 5101(A)(1, 2), 5104(A) (2006).
Disciplinary
Counsel v. Shaw, 2010-Ohio-4412, 935 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 2010).
Two-year suspension, with one year stayed on conditions, was warranted for attorney
whose conduct,
failing to remit to his employer law firm over $7,000 in fees, resulting in a conviction for
theft,
violated rules prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's
honesty or trustworthiness, prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation,
prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and prohibiting
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conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rule
8.4(bd, h). Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 2010-Ohio-3300, 931 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio
2010).
Two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed, instead of entirely stayed two-
year
suspension, was appropriate sanction for attorney who, by using crack cocaine, violated
disciplinary
rules barring conduct prejudicial to administration of justice and conduct adversely
reflecting on fitness
to practice law; despite such mitigating factors as lack of prior disciplinary record,
absence of
dishonest or selfish motive, and cooperation in disciplinary proceeding, mitigating factor
of a chemical
dependency was absent, and aggravating factors included attorney's terminating
participation in
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) and failure to appreciate seriousness of his
conduct.
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(d, h). Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, 2010-Ohio-1811, 927
N.E.2d
598 (Ohio 2010).
Six-month stayed suspension was appropriate for attorney who violated disciplinary rules
by representing
a client's daughter, without daughter's knowledge or consent, in action by creditor to
recov-
er debt on credit card issued to client in daughter's name without her knowledge; 12-
month stayed
suspension recommended by parties was predicated in part on charges that had been
dismissed,
harsher sanction than public reprimand was justified because client's daughter had to
employ counsel
to vacate judgment for creditor and also had wages garnished, and mitigating factors
included lack of
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prior disciplinary record, lack of dishonest or selfish motive, and full cooperation in
investigation.
Rules of Prof. Cond., Rules 1.7(a)(2), 1.16(a)(1), 5.4(c), 8.4(d). Disciplinary Counsel v.
Mamich,
2010-Ohio-1044, 928 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 2010).
One-year actual suspension, as opposed to a stayed suspension, was appropriate sanction
for attorney
who testified falsely that he had not removed certain files or information from his office, in
his
former law firm's action to enjoin alleged violation of the nonsolicitation and
nondisclosure covenant
of his employment agreement, and who destroyed firm documents to conceal his
possession of them;
mitigating factors of a lack of prior discipline and a good reputation were outweighed by
aggravating
factors including a pattern of misconduct involving multiple instances of lying and
misrepresentation
under oath, as well as attorney's refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of his conduct.
Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.4(a), 8.4(c, d, h); BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v.
Robinson,
933 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio 2010).
Two-year suspension, with one year conditionally stayed, was appropriate sanction for
attorney
who engaged in misconduct by submitting false and fraudulent billing for her appointed-
counsel services.
Code of Prof.Resp., 1102(A)(4, 5, 6), 2106(A) (2006). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush, 933
N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 2010).
Indefinite suspension, and requirement that prior to reinstatement attorney provides
proof to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that he is mentally fit to return to the practice of
law, was appropriate
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sanction for attorney who recklessly filed court documents containing unfounded
accusations
against two judges, misused his power as an attorney to issue subpoenas to further his
personal
agenda, misused his authority as a notary public, and accused three judges and a
prosecutor of engaging
in improper ex parte communications; mitigating fact that attorney had no prior
disciplinary record,
made full and free disclosure to the board, and was professional, respectful, and
cooperative
during disciplinary proceedings did not outweigh the aggravating effect of having
demonstrated a dishonest
and selfish motive, abusing his position as a lawyer, making false and dishonest
accusations
against judges and prosecutors, and providing false and dishonest explanations of his
actions. Code of
Prof.Resp., DR 1102(A)(4 to 6), 7106(A) (2006); Government of the Bar Rule IV(2);
Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 3.1, 3.5(a)(6), 8.2(a), 8.4(c, d). Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127
Ohio St. 3d
436, 2010-Ohio-6241, 940 N.E.2d 952 (2010).
Suspension from practice of law for two years, with final six months stayed on condition
that, attorney
make full accounting and full restitution to affected clients and return all client files within
90
days of suspension, was warranted as sanction for attorney's misconduct in failing to act
on behalf
clients, respond to clients, or refund unearned fees to clients; as factors in aggravation,
attorney acted
with a selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, caused harm to vulnerable
clients, and initially
failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation, but in mitigation, attorney had no
disciplinary
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record, relinquished his bankruptcy court electronic case filing privileges and complied
with other
bankruptcy sanction orders, and ultimately cooperated in the disciplinary process. Rules
of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(3, 4), 1.15(d), 1.16(e), 8.4(d, h). Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn.
v. Gresley,
127 Ohio St. 3d 430, 2010-Ohio-6208, 940 N.E.2d 945 (2010).
Attorney's conduct in failing to participate in the discovery process and by failing to
respond to a
motion for default judgment resulted in a judgment in excess of $330,000 against her
clients and in
failing to timely prosecute a second client matter which resulted in the dismissal without
prejudice of
that client's complaint warranted one-year suspension of license to practice law with six
months
stayed based on certain conditions. Code of Prof.Resp., DR 6101(A)(3) (2006); Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.16(c, d), 3.4(c). Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 127
Ohio St. 3d
97, 2010-Ohio-4832, 936 N.E.2d 938 (2010).
Attorney's mishandling of his personal injury client's funds warranted suspension from
the practice
of law for one year with entire year stayed, conditioned upon his continued treatment for
depression
due to his father's death by a psychologist/psychiatrist for duration of suspension, where
misconduct
was an isolated incident in his nineteen years of practice and attorney settled accounts of
client's
medical bills, showed remorse, and cooperated fully with investigation. New York DR 9-
102(A),
(B)(3, 4). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer, 89 Ohio St. 3d 321, 731 N.E.2d 643 (2000); West's
Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client 58.
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While Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court may
properly
consider attorney's mental illness at the time of alleged misconduct as a mitigating factor
in determining
what sanction should be imposed, the mental illness provisions for summary suspension
are not
intended to be used by attorney in a disciplinary action to avoid suspension for violations.
Government
of the Bar Rule V, 7. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Komarek, 84 Ohio St. 3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62
(1998).
Attorney's misconduct in mishandling clients' trust account funds in violation of rules of
professional
conduct warranted two year suspension from the practice of law, where attorney
disbursed settlement
sums to her clients, but in many cases failed to make full payments to third party medical
providers, a client was unable to apply for credit due to a tax lien placed by a medical
provider due to
attorney's actions, and another client did not receive settlement funds, and attorney had
prior disciplinary
history, though attorney fully accepted responsibility for her actions. Appellate Court
Rule
407, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15, 8.4(a, d, e); Appellate Court Rule 413,
Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, Rule 7(a)(1, 6). In re Hardee-Thomas, 706 S.E.2d 507 (S.C. 2011).
Attorney's admitted misconduct in three separate disciplinary matters, each involving a
general
failure to diligently protect the rights of his clients and mismanagement of his caseload
over a period
in which he worked for two separate law firms, resulting in, for example, dismissal of a
personal injury
action by operation of statute of limitations, preventing a client from appealing an order
denying
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postconviction relief, and a failure to properly account for unearned fees in other cases,
warranted
two-year suspension from practice of law. In re Holcombe, 697 S.E.2d 600 (S.C. 2010).
Attorney's admitted misconduct in two disciplinary matters, in one case failing to
diligently pursue
postconviction relief matter while neglecting his duty to communicate with his client or his
family,
and in another case mismanaging his client trust accounts by commingling personal funds
with
client funds resulting in bounced check, warranted two-year suspension from practice of
law, retroactive
to date of interim suspension, resulting in a nine-month remaining term, conditioned upon
attorney's
completion of legal ethics and law practice accounting training, in addition to various
steps
towards treatment of his severe depression. In re Ginn, 697 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2010).
Definite suspension of two years, plus restitution, was warranted as a sanction for attorney
who
entered Agreement for Discipline by Consent, admitting misconduct in failing to keep
clients reasonably
informed of the status of litigation, failing to hold unearned client funds in trust account,
failing
to return unearned fees to client, failing to respond to client requests for information,
failing to appropriately
terminate client representation, and failing to respond to a lawful demand for information
from disciplinary authority. In re Moody, 387 S.C. 352, 692 S.E.2d 906 (2010).
In attorney disciplinary proceedings for misconduct arising from mishandling of client
funds, appropriate
sanction was retroactive two-year suspension where unethical conduct stemmed from poor
judgment brought on by manic depressive depressed episode and medical evidence
showed attorney
was recovering from depressed episode through treatment with antidepressant drug. Re
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Howle (1988)
294 SC 244, 363 SE2d 693.
One-year suspension from practice of law was appropriate sanction for attorney's
misconduct in
connection with his representation of multiple clients, including providing dilatory
responses relating
to client matters, using worthless check drawn on unapproved trust account to reimburse
client for
unearned fees, repeatedly failing to maintain his trust account properly, tendering
worthless checks to
United States Court of Appeals, failing to file appeal for client or inform her of his
oversight, filing
of frivolous appeals, practicing law while his license was suspended, and failing to notify
clients and
tribunals that his license was suspended; in aggravation, victims were vulnerable, and
attorney had
prior disciplinary offense, selfish motive by failing to return unearned fees, pattern of
neglect and
dilatory conduct constituting multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of
conduct,
and indifference to making restitution to clients. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 8, Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules
1.3, 1.4(a, b), 1.15(a), 4.4(a), 8.1(b). Flowers v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 314
S.W.3d
882 (Tenn. 2010).
Attorney's misconduct in affiliating himself with a nonlawyer who gave legal advice in
connection
with a living trust scam targeted at seniors warranted two-year suspension from practice
of law;
although disbarment was presumptive sanction, attorney attempted to remediate the
harm caused by
his misconduct, such that disbarment was not necessary to protect the public or educate
other lawyers.
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In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Shepard, 239 P.3d 1066 (Wash. 2010).
Four-month suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in billing the
State
Public Defender for work he did not actually perform, continuing to practice law after
receiving notice
of his administrative suspension for failing to comply with his continuing legal education
requirements,
willingly misleading a sitting judge about whether or not he had a valid law license, failing
to refund unearned fees, and failing to respond to the Office of Lawyer Regulation, where
attorney
committed these ethical violations while overextended professionally and trying to
maintain his
practice during the break-up of his legal partnership. SCR 20:1.16(d), 20:3.3(a)(1), 20:8.4
(c),
22.03(2), 31.10(1); . In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3, 793
N.W.2d 884
(Wis. 2011).
Two-year suspension from the practice of law was warranted as sanction for attorney who
stipulated
to committing professional misconduct by his conviction for possession of narcotic drugs
and
felony bail jumping; attorney had prior disciplinary history and engaged in a pattern of
misconduct,
and attorney admitted his misconduct, expressed remorse, and was undergoing voluntary
drug treatment
and monitoring. SCR 20:8.4(b). In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Compton, 2010 WI
112,
787 N.W.2d 831 (Wis. 2010).
31 AMJUR TRIALS 633 Page 152
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
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000769
RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 10:38 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed
or alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof
related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only
now bringing up.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy emails and
apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the
State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also
from Judges from different Courts. These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law. As I have explained to you, I will make the
evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office. I will not send
you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
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As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the
information you have submitted.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
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FOIA Request RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file
a grievance
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining
professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney,
acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify
debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that
debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors.
11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the various
grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary of the content
of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and telephone communciatiosn
with Richard Hill or anyone with his office. Further, please state whether Casey
Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to create
"busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 4:57 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
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3 attachments
State Bar of Nevada Character and Fitness Committee Grievance Christiansen Eichman, Kevin
Kelly Mike Sanft for Bar Counsel.pdf (379.4 KB) , Character and Fitness Committee Member
Kevin Kelly, ESq..htm (6.4 KB) , Reno's Hawkins, Ormaas & van Winkle - Biggest Little Act in the
World Babelation ormaas.htm (72.0 KB)
Dear Mr. King,
this is a subpoena and a FOIA Request, requesting that you send to me, in writing,
via email and fax a copy of any documentation (such as a copy of the email from
Department 3 you mentioned in your last email, in addition to these
"communications from judges" that you only mentioned for the first time today, yet
claim to have noticed me of in the past). You see, this is exactly why is would be
disadvantageous to communciate with you on the telephone (something you and I
have never done). When I began asking Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman (a
licensed attorney) uncomfortable questions related to her breach of her duties and
negligence (if not more) between 2001-2005, she didn't want to correspond in
writing anymore, but preferred talkign on the phone...
Please add the attached materials to my grievance against Eichman, Michael Sanft,
Kevin Kelly of the C&F Committee and both Peter Christiansen's (father and son).
I believe you may have violated my Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by failing to
copy me on and or inform me of your communications with judges prior to your
email of today, wherein you incorrectly mention that you previously did so, which
you did not. I think it might be appropriate for you to recuse yourself from this
matter given some of your ommissions and conduct thus far.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012
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000773
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Just moments ago I received an email letter from the Clerk of the Court in
Department 3. She said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes
and were demanding and argumentative. Apparently I will be receiving a report
from the Marshals. As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However,
my primary responsibility is to protect the public and the administration of
justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required of
the profession. It appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to get
you assistance that may protect your license to practice law. I would sure
appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that
may help you through this difficult time.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed
or alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof
related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only
now bringing up. In your March 23, 2012 email to me you wrote: " As I
have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from
Judges from different Courts." This is not true. That is the first you ever communicated
anything like that to me, unless you can point to something in the written record between
us. With respect to your refusal to pursue any of the grievances I filed, please indicate
specifically what about Mr. Hill's grievance met the standard you cite to, as well as specifically,
for each attempted filing of a grievance, indicate where mine failed to meet that standard,
with details and specifics, and an indication of any research of investigation you conducted in
that regard.
Sincerely,
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000774
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy emails and
apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the
State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also
from Judges from different Courts. These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law. As I have explained to you, I will make the
evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office. I will not send
you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the
information you have submitted.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
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000775
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct
defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where
attorney, acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify
debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known,
that debtors did not
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000776
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by
debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the
various grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary
of the content of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and
telephone communciatiosn with Richard Hill or anyone with his office.
Further, please state whether Casey Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill
asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to
create "busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Wednesday, March 06, 2002
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
COLUMN: John L. Smith
Spearmint Rhino owners expanding empire with British
invasion
Whether you consider topless cabarets acceptable adult
diversions or shadowy dens of iniquity, you have to admit the
Spearmint Rhino club has one catchy name
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It's probably safe to say its patrons are unlikely to confuse it
with other topless joints, and surely that's the way Spearmint
Rhino's owners like it. It turns out developing brand loyalty is
important, whether you're selling breakfast cereal or babes and
boobs.
It must be working. These days, the Spearmint Rhino empire is
rapidly expanding. From clubs in California, to one in Las
Vegas, the company has created something of an American
invasion in England, where majority owner John Gray has
opened six clubs with plans for up to 100 more.
With that kind of expansion in mind, there's talk that
Spearmint Rhino might begin selling stock as a publicly traded
company. It makes you wonder what those stockholder
meetings might look like. I'm willing to bet they'd be well
attended.
In Las Vegas, the club operates with a somewhat confused
ownership status. Admittedly, I'm the one confused.
Although it is listed on the company's Web site as one of
several Spearmint Rhino clubs, the Las Vegas cabaret is
officially not owned by Gray, but by local attorney Kevin
Kelly, Gray's long-time partner Thomas Nabarrette, and
Mumtaz Ali. When asked about the ownership issue, and the
fact the Las Vegas club was listed on the Gray-owned
company Web site, Kelly said it was possible Nabarrette had
worked out an agreement with his friend to advertise the club
on the Internet.
Makes sense, but it doesn't exactly explain why the only
reference to the topless company on the secretary of state's
Web site lists Gray as secretary and treasurer of The Spearmint
Rhino Worldwide Inc. The Las Vegas club is owned by K-Kel
Inc., which lists Kelly and Ali as officers, but not Nabarrette.
No matter. The Las Vegas Spearmint Rhino officially is not
owned by Gray. Which is probably a good thing considering
Gray's controversial past, which was recently profiled by
reporters Adrian Gatton and Paul Lashmar in the Independent
newspaper of London.
The story caught the topless entrepreneur attempting to rewrite
his personal history. In the Feb. 17 article, Gray was quoted
briefly denying his criminal past -- he has a couple convictions
in California for making a false statement to win a military
contract and bouncing checks -- before fessing up to reporters.
The boss also failed to explain why he once used several
aliases, including Johnny Win, John Luciano, and John
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000778
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Free kindle reader for pc when you sample Southern Fury Alaskan... | 6 days 6 hours
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Luciano Gianni.
Gray served six months in jail, according to the newspaper,
and emerged with plans to expand his topless bar empire. Next
stop, Las Vegas. Although that move officially did not work
out, and Gray's name is not listed on the local paperwork, it did
not deter him from hopping overseas, where he has taken
England by storm as the sole director of Spearmint Rhino
Companies of Europe Ltd. According to the Independent,
Gray's clubs are popular with businessmen and a favorite site
for office parties.
Possibly standing in the way of his expansion plans in England
are those pesky background details, which he apparently didn't
disclose in much detail to licensing authorities.
A year ago, police reported that, in their opinion, "activity
within the club, intentionally or otherwise, borders on offenses
of prostitution and permitting the keeping of a brothel."
In Las Vegas, police have uttered similar phrases for decades.
Every few years, an undercover vice unit compiles enough
evidence of whispered propositions and backfields in excessive
motion to make headlines and a few arrests. Beyond a little
embarrassment and some attorney fees, the club owners are
rarely ruffled.
It's probably only a coincidence that the topless operators
perennially rank among the top donors to local political
campaigns, showering thousands of dollars on favorite
candidates and maintaining close contact with their public
official friends thereafter.
Somehow, Gray didn't officially make the grade in Las Vegas.
Hey, our loss is England's gain.
John L. Smith's column appears Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday
and Sunday. E-mail him at Smith@lvrj.com or call him at 383-
0295.
This story is located at:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-
2002/news/18241452.html
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Reno's Hawkins, Ormaas & van Winkle -
Biggest Little Act in the World
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000780
It is government and its officials and employees who are REQUIRED to prove the guilt of a
charge and conviction. That RELIEVES the one charged of ANY burden to PROVE his or her
innocence. Government employees are held to a HIGHER standard. A people are either FREE
from their government (from each other) or they are controlled subjects of a government and its
public employees that illegally or unethically parcels out freedom as it sees fit. NEVER
underestimate others bad experiences. The structure of an expose, a complaint, a whistle-
blower, is ALWAYS the story of how the birds came HOME to roost. Happenings and ideology
that previously would never have been disseminated are now readily found with a simple
Google search. A Google search is just a search for a person's credentials AND integrity.
Here's more NEGATIVE publicity about Nevada. Here's MORE of why others now like to call
Nevadans, Renoites and Washoe County residents rednecks, hicks, goat-ropers, stupid, morons,
douche-bags, illiterate, alcoholics, lazy, shiftless, druggies, racist, sexist, thieves, incompetent,
fraudsters, asleep-at-the-wheel, corrupt, and on and on. Nevada's, Reno's and Washoe County's
public officials and public employees give them AMPLE reason to . Like
here.. The effects of negative publicity on Nevada, Reno and Washoe County have
rarely been on the radar of its legislators and governors . or even mayors, city and county
employees, police officers, attorneys, judges, sheriffs, district attorneys, county commissioners,
police chiefs, city councils.
Why is that? That was Dennis Myers at the Reno News & Review who first wrote that. With so
MANY people now running OUT of Nevada, Dennis observation and complaint remains valid.
Why dont Nevada, Reno, Washoe County public officials and public employees take in to
account negative publicity to Nevada? How does Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno
Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle pay their community
and neighbors back for the damage each has done to the reputation of their neighbors and
community?
The result of any expose is that individuals and organizations are suddenly finding their
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000781
previously hidden illegal, corrupt, unethical, lazy, or immoral behaviors, and their secrets,
avarice, cravings, or even mistakes, suddenly and rightfully very publicly front and center.
Integrity, or its' lack, is immediately exposed in a simple Google search.
Technology is a common ground for sharing viewpoints, both pro and con. As more people are
tuned in to the electronic age it has become increasingly more difficult for the bad practices of
any business and its owners, managers and employees, no matter how remote or small their
marketplace is, to continue without being noticed, as was the case. People of all levels and of
experience share their opinions concerning the various pluses and minuses of various businesses
and its owners, managers and employees. Many businesses, owners, managers and employees
are just not coming out well in these news group discussions.
Because Due Process is A Constitutional Issue, a civil RIGHT, and one of the oaths ALL public
officials AND public employees take is to uphold and protect the Constitution, ALL public
officials AND public employees are held to a HIGHER standard, fiduciary. In this case it is
clear Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and
Reno Judge Jim van Winkle each FAILED to exercise reasonable care, each VIOLATED
several laws, EACH violated their fiduciary duties and, each displayed INappropriate conduct.
To the tune Youre a Mean One Mr. Grinch here its youre a Mean One Reno Police Officer
Jay Hawkins, Youre a Mean One Reno City Attorney Alison Ormaas and, Youre a Mean One
Reno Municipal Court Judge Jim Van Winkle.
In America, there is a legal presumption of innocence until proven guilty. If there is any HINT
of presumption of guilt then Due Process is NOT followed and civil rights are violated. For civil
charges or convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a clear and convincing
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance is 50.000001% or more. For criminal charges or
convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a clear and convincing beyond a
reasonable doubt of the evidence.
The maxim that the King can do no wrong has no place in our American system of government.
In America, its Semper pro Populus. That means Fiduciary Duties, Color of Law and Public
Service governs those on the public dole as Jay Hawkins, Alison Ormass and Jim van Winkle.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jay Hawkins RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of
$132,088.14.
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000782
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Alison Ormaas RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum
of $77,903.25.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jim Van Winkle RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering
sum of $187,668.36.
Fiduciary duties are ethical or legal duties one party has to another. Broadly, these duties
include duties of loyalty and duties of care to OTHERS. A PUBLIC official and PUBLIC
employee has ANOTHER fiduciary duty to act in CITIZEN's benefit because citizens are the
beneficiary NO public official OR public employee can simply sit back and watch the
beneficiary, you the citizen fall into greater difficulty or hardship.
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Submitted by Citizen Jane Speaks on Wed, 05/25/2011 - 5:40pm
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Only in
Submitted by Retired Professor on Fri, 08/26/2011 - 7:26pm.
Only in Reno.
Today I was swimming on my back during the public posted lap swim hours at Northwest Pool
when two eleven-year-old boys threw a weighted grenade at me then came into my lane. That
frightened me. It was also disturbing my peace and harassing me. I reminded them as I had
when they had done the same thing earlier this summer, that this time is for the public posted
lap swim. These two eleven-year-old boys smirked and smugly informed me the lifeguards
there had told them they could. That offended my sense of personal dignity and my sense of
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000783
safety. They then again threw a weighted grenade at me. These two eleven-year-old boys set
upon me in a hostile and aggressive way with a weapon. Already a physically disabled veteran,
I had a reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact such as my eye
being taken out, my nose broken or teeth broken by this leaded grenade.
The City of Reno lifeguards were careless as they failed to supervise these boys which City of
Reno manager Justin Klatt told me later the City of Reno assumes with the children at the city
pool. City of Reno manager Justin Klatt informed me of this when he refused to give me the
boys' names or parent contact info. The two eleven-year-old-boys' behavior and City of Reno
employees carelessness and failure to supervise these boys caused me apprehension and
mental / emotional distress.
City of Reno manager Justin Klatt told me that the weighted grenades, a foreseeable weapon at
the public pool when used unsupervised by children, are okay at the City of Reno Northwest
Pool. These weighted grenades are not ever okay when they are thrown at others. These two
eleven-year-old-boys' behavior and employees at the City of Reno Northwest Pool was
unreasonable due to the foreseeable harm these weighted grenades could do when used by
children who are not being properly supervised.
The City of Reno and its employees owe a duty of care to those who will use its products and
services such as its public pools, so as to render itself and its employees accountable for
negligent / careless work. I was swimming during the posted lap swim when these boys,
whether they did it it intentionally or not, attacked and frightened me with a weighted grenade,
after smugly informing me the lifeguards there said it was okay.
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Reno Police Officer Jay
Submitted by Exploited Renoite on Mon, 08/22/2011 - 6:18pm.
Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno
Judge Jim van Winkle are also Conspicuous Consumptionists AND thieves of tax dollars NOT
theirs.
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City of Reno Manager Julee
Submitted by Exploited Renoite on Mon, 08/22/2011 - 6:16pm.
City of Reno Manager Julee Conway and City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson are
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000784
also Conspicuous Consumptionists AND Thieves of Tax Dollars NOT Theirs.
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It was I think three years
Submitted by Exploited Renoite on Mon, 08/22/2011 - 6:05pm.
It was I think three years ago that Fred Wolf saved his wife's life at the City of Reno Northwest
public pool. The City of Reno lifeguard, Mike Freeman was awol and Fred and a couple of the
swimmers saved Jean Wolf. Only in Reno does one get promoted for dereliction of duty, being
awol and endangering another's life. Yet that is exactly what City of Reno Supervisor Joseph
Wilson did, he promoted City of Reno employee Mike Freeman. For which City of Reno
Manager Julee Conway promoted City of Reno employee Joe Wilson. In 2009, City of Reno
Manager Julee Conway was paid tax dollars of $173,125.00 with a fully funded benefits
package. How many in the private sector are getting that sweetheart of a deal? In 2010, it got
even sweeter at $187,025.19, an 8% increase / tax funded raise during The Great Recession.
How many in the private sector are getting that sweetheart of a deal and an 8% raise? In 2009,
City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson was paid tax dollars of $89,339.90 with a fully funded
benefits package. In 2010, that went to $98,247.91 for a 10% tax funded raise during The Great
Recession. We Renoites are being bled to death / exploited by our City of Reno public
employees!
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Social order rests upon the
Submitted by Marian on Sun, 08/21/2011 - 7:22pm.
Social order rests upon the stability and predictability of conduct of which keeping promises is
a large item. Roscoe Pound.
Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson are Reno, Nevada attorneys. Thomas and Cheryl
Hanneman went to see them in Counselor Mitchell Wright and Counselor Kent Hansons
capacity as attorneys. They chose Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson because
Counselor Mitchell Wright advertised himself as a real estate attorney, and Counselor Kent
Hanson is a former Nevada State Deputy Attorney General for the Nevada Real Estate Division.
According to the Hannemans, when they showed up for their appointment, Counselor Kent
Hanson told them the secretary had just walked out. Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent
Hanson offered to trade their legal services for Mrs. Hanneman immediately starting as their
secretary. The Hannemans accepted. Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson immediately
hired an independent real estate expert for a written review.
The Hannemans soon found out why the former secretary had walked out. Counselor Mitchell
Wright and Realtor wife were having an on-going drama. Counselor Mitchell Wrights wife is
Karen Wright, a Reno Sparks Association of Realtors Realtor with Prudential Nevada Real
Estate What is it with the off-the-wall character of real estate agents Prudential Nevada Real
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Estate hires?
Instead of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson doing as they had promised, legal
services for the Hannemans, they were involved in a high drama. That drama was tearing apart
their lives, destroying their legal practices, screwing their legal clients, and endangering the
safety of the tenants and visitors to the building where their law offices are at.
Mrs. Mitchell Wright drove by the front of the legal offices in their truck. Mr. Mitchell Wright
saw that and he went running out the front door. Mrs. Mitchell Wright parked the truck in back
and came in the back door. She went directly to her husbands office and started packing up
stuff. Mr. Mitchell Wright walked in and their yelling and swearing at each other was heard
throughout the building and parking lot.
Mrs. Mitchell Wright got into the drivers seat of their truck and started the engine. Her husband
tried to open the door but found it locked. He reached in through the open window trying to
unlock the door. Mrs. Mitchell Wright closed the window trapping her husbands arm. She
drove off with her husband trotting along side while they continued yelling and swearing at each
other. That was quite the site as Counselor Mitchell Wright wears ill-fitting dark suits as he has
a large stomach, and very high-heeled cowboy boots.
Counselor Kent Hanson then came running out the back door of the law offices yelling for Mrs.
Hanneman and the receptionist to call 911! Reno lawyer Kent B. Hanson then went running
after the truck dragging his colleague Mitchell Wright. By that time, most of the neighborhood
heard and saw what was going on.
Counselor Mitchell Wright then fell as his arm was released. Counselor Kent Hanson helped
him back to the office.
Counselor Mitchell Wright, a Mormon, was swearing what a sick bitch she is and Counselor
Kent Hanson, also a Mormon, was urgently asking, Mitch, Mitch where are your guns?! What
about your guns?!
This drama in various forms continued. Counselor Mitchell Wright missed filing deadlines and
court dates. Guns were waved around. A divorce was out there. A restraining order was out
there. Any client of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson or any other attorney in
the building that came in for their cases only heard about Mitch and Karen Mitchells drama.
The receptionist and other tenants in the building complained to the landlord. The landlord was
forced to threaten eviction of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson.
Then Reno lawyer, attorney, Counselor Mitchell Wright was observed with his pants down, on
top of his Prudential Nevada Realty Reno Sparks Association of Realtors wife on top of his law
office desk.
Seems the Mitchells were either going for each others throats or their crotches.
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Image problem for Reno?
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Submitted by El G on Wed, 08/17/2011 - 5:52pm.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's City Attorney Alison Ormaas is involved in
fraud, steering, bullying, intimidation, perjury, incompetence, trampling on civil rights,
stupidity, laziness, and being a mean one. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is
not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong with you?
Reno understands that Reno's City Attorney Alison Ormaas does not need to be weighed down
by all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, she is
City Attorney Alison Ormaas and she has her life to lead.
So what if City Attorney Alison Ormaas is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires
burning? City Attorney Alison Ormaas is not going to spank and choke herself. So what if City
Attorney Alison Ormaas needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do
bullet shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank City Attorney Alison Ormaas for reminding us what it means to be
Renoites. I hope Reno City Attorney Alison Ormaas's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the
future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the
wheels of the bus is right, I am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray
that Elton John will eulogize her, and City Attorney Alison Ormaas with yet another version of
that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even
Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real
world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just what City Attorney
Alison Ormaas has done.
Is it still sarcasm when I have to explain it?
El G, that's with one G.
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Image problem for Reno?
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000787
Submitted by El G on Wed, 08/17/2011 - 5:50pm.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's police officer Jay Hawkins is involved in fraud,
steering, bullying, intimidation, perjury, incompetence, trampling on civil rights, stupidity,
laziness, and police brutality. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a
problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong with you?
Reno understands that Reno's police officer Jay Hawkins does not need to be weighed down by
all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, he is
police officer Jay Hawkins and he has his life to lead.
So what if police officer Jay Hawkins is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires
burning? police officer Jay Hawkins is not going to spank and choke himself. So what if police
officer Jay Hawkins needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet
shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank police officer Jay Hawkins for reminding us what it means to be
Renoites. I hope Reno police officer Jay Hawkins's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the
future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the
wheels of the bus is right, I am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray
that Elton John will eulogize her, and police officer Jay Hawkins with yet another version of
that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even
Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real
world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just what police officer
Jay Hawkins has done.
Is it still sarcasm when I have to explain it?
El G, that's with one G.
z Login or register to post comments
Image problem for Reno?
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000788
Submitted by El G on Wed, 08/17/2011 - 5:48pm.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's judge James van Winkle is involved in fraud,
steering, bullying, intimidation, trampling on civil rights, stupidity, laziness, and asleep in court.
Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada.
What's wrong with you?
Reno understands that Reno's judge James van Winkle does not need to be weighed down by all
this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, he is judge
James van Winkle and he has his life to lead.
So what if judge James van Winkle is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires
burning? judge James van Winkle is not going to spank and choke himself. So what if judge
James van Winkle needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet
shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank judge James van Winkle for reminding us what it means to be Renoites.
I hope Reno judge James van Winkle's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the future state of
our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is
right, I am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray
that Elton John will eulogize her, and judge James van Winkle with yet another version of that
candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky
Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real world
and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just what judge James van
Winkle has done.
Is it still sarcasm when I have to explain it?
El G, that's with one G.
z Login or register to post comments
Image problem for Reno?
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000789
Submitted by El G on Wed, 08/17/2011 - 5:11pm.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's Lawyer now Reno judge Bridget Robb-Peck, is
involved in fraud, steering, bullying, perjury, intimidation, filing false documents, sewer
service, and having opposing counsel's client's U.S. mail forwarded to her office where she then
tells the Postal Inspector who tracked down the mia mail, why no, I never let anyone know the
opposing counsel's client's U.S. mail was forwarded to my office. Why should I? Maybe all that
is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong
with you?
Reno understands that Reno's Lawyer now Reno judge Bridget Robb-Peck does not need to be
weighed down by all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly.
After all, she is Reno's lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck and she
has her life to lead.
So what if lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck is hanging out
banging Reno while keeping these fires burning? Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's
judge Bridget Robb-Peck is not going to spank and choke herself. So what if Reno's Lawyer
Bridget Robb Peck needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet
shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck,
for reminding us what it means to be Renoites. I hope lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's
judge Bridget Robb-Peck's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the future state of our town. If
throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is right, I am
scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray
that Elton John will eulogize her, and lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget
Robb-Peck with yet another version of that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn,
your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has
seen the true ugliness of the real world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is
by doing just what Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck has
done.
Is it still sarcasm when I have to explain it?
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000790
El G, that's with one G.
z Login or register to post comments
Bonnie S. Weber wears her
Submitted by Broother on Tue, 08/09/2011 - 5:38pm.
Bonnie S. Weber wears her religion, Christianity, on her political sleeve these what last 30
years. It is obvious that sinning is the part part of redemption for Christian dissimulator and
Washoe County Commissioner incompetent Bonnie S. Weber. Same for the other Christian
Washoe County Commissioners. Mortal sin removes the presence of Christ in the sinners soul.
It not only hurts the sinner, but also hurts those affected by the sinner's desecration. Christians
are required to judge one another (1 Corinthians 5:12-13; John 7:24). In these several past year's
bad economy, these unholy pay raises of our elected officials and appointed public employees
are sins. Sin is a master to whom one becomes enslaved (John 8:34). Only the truth will set one
free (John 8:32). Sin is blinding (John 9:39-41). The consciences reprimands are harder to hear
the more one sins (cf. Hebrews 3:12-13). Positive influences and opportunities are removed
when one disregards the longsuffering and goodness of God (cf. Luke 8:12; Romans
1:20,21,24,26,28; 2:4-5). Only humble submission and sincere and total obedience to Jesus
Christ will remedy one's sins. And that's ;) no urban legend.
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Sin is the breaking of God's law. When you sin, you offend God because it is His law that you
have broken. God's laws reflect the moral purity of His nature. Therefore, God's Law is a
reflection of the character of God. God's law is not arbitrary a it is based on God's holiness.
Greed, which these sacrilegious pay raises are, and the profane obesity of so many of our
elected public officials and appointed public employees, are the mortal sin of taking more than
your fair share because they break God's Law. The mortal sin of gluttony does not just have to
do with overeating, of which so many of our obese elected public officials and appointed public
employees obviously do. The mortal sin of gluttony is excess, taking / using more than your fair
share, in anything like these unholy pay raises. A mortal sin is an act or thought which turns
one away from God and turns one toward something ungodly instead like these self-serving
unholy pay raises and being obese. When someone chooses mortal sin, they freely choose to
forfeit heaven and choose hell. And that's ;) no urban legend.
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The sins of Sodom and Gomorrah were rape, inhospitably, hatred of strangers and making
slaves of guests. Christ said, Wisdom 19:13, the sin of Sodom was a "bitter hatred of strangers"
and "making slaves of guests who were benefactors." The "making slaves of guests who were
benefactors" is exactly what these blasphemous pay raises are. Our elected public officials and
appointed public employees have made unholy slaves of us with their profane pay raises to
themselves.
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Proverbs 28:7 declares, He who keeps the law is a discerning son, but a companion of gluttons
disgraces his father. Proverbs 23:2 proclaims, Put a knife to your throat if you are given to
gluttony.
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Appetites are an analogy of one's ability to control oneself. If one is unable to control their
appetites, they are unable to control behaviors such as lust, covetousness, anger. See
Deuteronomy 21:20, Proverbs 23:2, 2 Peter 1:5-7, 2 Timothy 3:1-9, and 2 Corinthians 10:5.)
The ability to say no to anything in excess, which these pay raises and obesity clearly are,
self-control is one of the fruits of the Spirit common to all believers (Galatians 5:22). And
that's ;) no urban legend.
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There are several reasons why greed and gluttony are deadly sins.
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Greed and gluttony signs of mistrust of God. They are expressions of doubt that God will
provide all that you need. You are disbelieving Jesus when He promises that God will provide
everything you need (Luke 12:22-31).
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Greed and gluttony promotes crime. More crimes have been committed due to greed and
gluttony than any other deadly sin. Greed and gluttony drives people to steal, lie and kill in
order to acquire more.
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Greed and gluttony are the pinnacles of selfishness. Greed and gluttony ruin marriages,
destroy friendships, and divide families all in the selfish pursuit of gratifying ones self. Greed
and gluttony are the opposite of charity, generosity and love any Christian virtue. One's greed
and gluttony disregard all other people and animals and puts falsely high importance on the self:
they are forms forms of self-worship.
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One that sins lives to please self rather than God.
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"I am going to do things my way and that's it - period." This is the sin to control situations in
order to have one's way to live or do as they please rather than as God pleases.
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--
Rebellion is going off the set standard and disrupting the harmony between God and man. It is
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going against the normal use of things that God has given to man.
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A refusal to submit to God and His word concerning excess, such as don't be filled with wine
and food or pay raises, but be filled with the Spirit.
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-
Where there is excess to one or more, there is waste of God's Law. And that's ;) no urban
legend.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;
Appellant.
vs.
MATT MERLISS, MD; MATTHEW J.
MERLISS LIVING TRUST;
Respondents
.
)
)
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Supreme Court No: 60331
District Court No: CV11-03628
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO PAY FILING FEE
Appellant Coughlin submits this Motion on his own behalI requesting the above titled relieI.
FACTS
1. The Trial Court in RJC Rev2011-001708 granted Coughlin's Motion to Proceed on Appeal
IFP.
LAW
NRAP RULE24.PROCEEDINGS IN FORMA PAUPERIS
(a) LeavetoProceedonAppealinFormaPauperis.
(1) MotionintheDistrictCourt.Except as stated in Rule 24(a)(3), a party to a district court
action who desires to appeal in Iorma pauperis shall Iile a motion in the district court. The party
shall attach an aIIidavit that:
- 1/5 -
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO PAY FILING FEE
Electronically Filed
Aug 27 2012 09:17 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 60331 Document 2012-26942
000794
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(A)shows in the detail prescribed by Form 4 in the Appendix oI Forms the party`s
inability to pay or to give security Ior Iees and costs;
(B)claims an entitlement to redress; and
(C)states the issues that the party intends to present on appeal.
(2) ActionontheMotion.II the district court grants the motion, the party may proceed on
appeal without prepaying or giving security Ior Iees and costs. II the district court denies the
motion, it must state its reasons in writing.
(3) PriorApproval.Apartywhowaspermittedtoproceedinformapauperisinacivil
districtcourtactionmayproceedonappealinformapauperiswithout Iurther authorization,
unless the district courtbeIore or aIter the notice oI appeal is IiledcertiIies that the appeal is not
taken in good Iaith or Iinds that the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in Iorma pauperis and
states in writing its reasons Ior the certiIication or Iinding.
(4) NoticeofDistrictCourt`sDenial.The district court clerk shall immediately notiIy the
parties and the Supreme Court when the district court does any oI the Iollowing:
(A)denies a motion to proceed on appeal in Iorma pauperis;
(B)certiIies that the appeal is not taken in good Iaith; or
(C)Iinds that the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in Iorma pauperis.
(5) MotionintheSupremeCourt.A party may Iile a motion to proceed on appeal in Iorma
pauperis in the Supreme Court within 30 days aIter service oI the notice prescribed in Rule 24(a)
(4). The motion shall include a copy oI the aIIidavit Iiled in the district court and a copy oI the
district court`s statement oI reasons Ior its action. II no aIIidavit was Iiled in the district court, the
party shall include the aIIidavit prescribed by Rule 24(a)(1).
(b) Reserved.
(c) LeavetoUseOriginalRecord.A party allowed to proceed on appeal in Iorma pauperis
may request that the appeal be heard on the original record without reproducing any part.
Any Order by the District Court certiIying that Coughlin is not otherwise entitle to proceed in Iorma pauperis di
dnot suIIiciently state the rationale, or a supportable rationale Ior such a certiIication in writing, in any sort oI detail
suIIicient to statisIy the above rule Further, it is unconconstitutional to deny parties an opprotunity to appeal such denails
under NRS 12.015.
Dated this day 26th day oI August, 2012.
RespectIully Submitted By:
LAWOFFICEOFZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN,ESQ.
ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN,ESQ.
NevadaBarNo.9473
P.O.Box3961
Reno,NV89505
Telephone:775.338.8118
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APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO PAY FILING FEE
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Fax:949.667.7402
ProseAppellant
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APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR AN EXTENSION OF
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PROOFOFSERVICE
I am a resident oI the State oI Nevada, over the age oI eighteen years. My business address is
PO BOX 3961. On August 26th, 2012, the Iollowing document(s) were served on the party(ies)
below:
APPELLANT'SMOTIONTOPROCEEDINFORMAPAUPERIS
X By United States Mail- a true copy oI the document(s) listed above Ior collection and mailing
Iollowing the Iirm's ordinary business practice in a sealed envelope with postage thereon Iully prepaid
Ior deposit in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada addressed as set Iorth below unless the recipient
can technically be served electronically, then they were so served electronically.
X By Facsimile Transmission - the transmission was reported as complete and without error. A
copy oI the transmission report, properly issued by the transmitting machine, is attached to the hard
copy. The names and Iacsimile numbers oI the person(s) served are as set Iorth below.
RICHARDG.HILL,ESQ.
652ForestSt.
Reno,Nevada89509
Telephone:(775)348-0888
Fax:(775)348-0858
AttorneyforRespondentMerliss
ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN,ESQ.
ProseAppellant
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INDEXTOEXHIBITS
1.EXHIBIT1:DRAFTOFAPPELLANT'SOPENINGBRIEFAPPELLANTWISHESTO
HAVEFILEDthirtysix(36)pages
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APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO PAY FILING FEE
000798
Docket 60331 Document 2012-26942
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN; )
)
Appellant. )
) Supreme Court No: 60331
vs. )
)
MATT MERLISS, MD; MATTHEW J. District Court No: CV11-03628
MERLISS LIVING TRUST;
Respondents
.
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF SET FORTH HEREIN
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
LAW OFFICE OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
Pro Se Appellant
RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.
652 Forest St.
Reno, Nevada 89509
Telephone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Attorney for Respondent Matthew 1. Merliss
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;
Appellant.
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
Supreme Court No: 60331
MATT MERLISS, MD; MATTHEW J.
MERLISS LIVING TRUST;
District Court No: CV11-03628
Respondents
The undersigned counsel oI record certiIies that the Iollowing are persons and entities as
described in NRAP 26.1(a) and must be disclosed. These representations are made in order that
judges oI this court may evaluate possible disqualiIication or recusal. Counsel oI record Ior Appellant
Zachary Barker Coughlin aka Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq., certiIies that Appellant is an individual
with no corporate parents, private or public, and no stock evidencing an ownership interest in
Appellant, other than Appellant, no other party aIIiliated with Appellant has an interest in the
outcome oI this case. The only law Iirm or attorney to appear Ior Appellant in this appeal and
proceedings below is Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
RespectIully Submitted By:
LAW OFFICE OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................... 5
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 5
A. BrieI Nature OI The Case ........................................................................................ 5
B. Procedural History OI The Case .............................................................................. 5
C. Relevant Facts .......................................................................................................... 6
D. Standard oI Review..................................................................................................6
III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 6
A. Summary OI The Argument ......................................... 6
B. THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN ISSUING/UPHODLING A SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER IN THE FACE OF ESTABLISHED LEGAL DEFENSES, CLEAR
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
DEFICIENCIES, MISTAKES OF LAW, ETC., ETC. .................................7
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 15
V. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................ 17
VI. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING...................................................................... 20
didn't get to Iile Reply to Respondent's Answering BrieI oI 2 24 12 because RMC Judge Nash
Holmes (whom Iiled grievance against Coughlin with State Bar Iormign the basis oI pending SCR
117 Disability Petition) Iinding Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" second aIter Coughlin
testiIied that a RPD Sargent lied in connecdtion with Couighlin being issued three traIIic citations
immediately aIter being told by the RPD to leave Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law oIIice, where Coughlin
went to request Irom Hill the return oI Coughlin's driver's license and wallet and client Iiles Iollowing
Coughlin spending three days in jail pursuant to Hill's having the RPD arrest Coughlin Ior criminal
trespass at the Iormer law oIIice, despite a Iraudulent AIIidavit oI Service by the WCSO Machen
claiming he "personally served" the Eviction Order, Iailure ot comply with NRCP 6(e), NRS 40.400,
and where the RPD OIIicer arresting Coughlin admitted to Coughlin that he took bribes Irom Hill
(that RPD OIIicer may have been being sarcastic or not, but arresting an attorney Ior criminal trespass
incident to an eviction Irom his home law oIIice is hardly time to make jokes)...Coughlin served a 5
day jail stay, incident to that traIIic citation Trial beIore Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800,
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wherein, at one point, Judge Nash Holmes stated to Coughlin, "II you say Richard Hill's name one
more time I am going to put you in jail Ior contempt!"
n a later case in which oIIicers assisted a landlord in a dispute with a tenant, the court Iound that
they were not entitled to qualiIied immunity on a Ialse arrest claim. In Radvansky v. Olmsted Falls,
#03-3798, 395 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2005), police arrested a man...Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, #91-
6516, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) involved a Iamily that lived in a mobile home that they owned, which stood
on rented land in a trailer park. While Iormal eviction proceedings were pending, the owners oI the
land and their agent proceeded to Iorcibly evict the tenants. At the request oI the landlord`s agent,
deputies Irom the SheriII`s Department were there at the eviction. The Iamily claimed that the
deputies knew that the eviction was illegal and that there was no eviction order Irom a court, but that
they reIused to take their complaint Ior criminal trespass or interIere with the eviction process. They
allegedly told the Iamily that it was 'between the landlord and the tenant.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Cases
Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007).
Pine v. Leavitt, 1968, 445 P.2d 942, 84 Nev. 507.
Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, Inc., 1990, 792 P.2d 14, 106 Nev. 265, rehearing denied.
Tschabold v. Orlando, 1987, 737 P.2d 506, 103 Nev. 224.
Gomez v. Independence Management oI Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009)
Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 368 (D.C.1993)
Edwards, supra note 18, 130 U.S. App. D.C. at 141, 397 F.2d at 702
Hollins v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 760 A.2d 563, 579-80 (D.C.2000)
Hamilton v. Howard University, 960 A.2d 308, 315-16 (D.C.2008); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 386 (D.C.2002); Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571.
Bantz. v. Montgomery Estates, Inc. 163 Wis.2d 973, 978, 473 N.W.2d 506,508 (Ct.App. 1991)
State Industrial Ins. Sys. v. United Exposition Servs. Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30 (1993).
Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 1962, 369 P.2d 676, 78 Nev. 69,
Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 2002, 57 P.3d 82, 118 Nev. 706,
Sarpy v. de la Houssaye, 217 So.2d 783 (La.App., 1969).
NGA #2 Ltd. Liability Co. v. Rains, 1997, 946 P.2d 163, 113 Nev. 1151.
Walker v. American Bankers Ins. Group, 1992, 836 P.2d 59, 108 Nev. 533.
Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421,724 P.2d 749 (1986).
In re America, 252 P.3d at 693 (citing Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 228).
Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007).
NJCRCP 76A.
Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 138 P.3d 525 (2006).
Gibelliniv. Klindt, HONev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added).
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Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332,335,353 P.2d 458 (1960).
Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d 542,544-545
(Nov. 4, 2010)
Statutes/Rules/Law Reviews
NRCP 6(e)
NRS 40.400
NRS 118A.355...
NRAP RULE8
NJCRCP 72A.
NRS 118A.490
JCRCP 110
JCRLV 44,
NRS 40.253(6).
NRS 118A.490
NRCP Rule 11
NRS 69.050
NRS 7.085
NRS 118A.510
118A.290
NRS 118A.360
NRS 118A.380
NRS 118A.210
NRS 108.475
NRS 40.760
See Kimberly E. O'Leary, The Inadvisability oI Applying Preclusive Doctrines to Summary
Evictions, 30 U. Tol. L. Rev. 49, 72 (1998) ("|T|he realities oI landlord-tenant practice make the use
oI preclusive doctrines in these actions especially problematic."); Rosemary Smith, Locked Out: The
Hidden Threat oI Claim Preclusion Ior Tenants in Summary Process, 15 SuIIolk J. Trial & App.
Advoc. 1, 25 (2010).
Gagliardi v. Williams, 834 F.2d 81 (1986).
Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 256, 71 P .3d 495 (2003)
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11, June, 1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308,
Jeremy D. Spector.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: Amongst the issues in this appeal is whether the Reno Justice
Court erred in granting a summary eviction oI appellant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN")
by its Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary Eviction ("FFCL&O") dated
December 27, 2012. See Record on Appeal ("ROA") at Vol. II, pp. 75-80. EXHIBIT 1 hereto, and,
whether the District Court in CV11-03628 similarly erred in Iailing to upholding the Summary
Eviction Order and ruling, by its Order oI June 25th, 2012 in CV11-03628 in Iavor oI Respondent
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MATT MERLISS' s ("Merliss") Motion for Attorneys Fees, awarding $42,050 in attorney's Iees against a
pro se litigant Ior an appeal oI a Summary Eviction Oraer..
1. Whether the lower court erred in Iinding, as a matter oI law, that Appellant tenant had
raised no legal deIense whatsoever and granted summary eviction pursuant to NRS 40.253 where
Appellant established a material issue oI Iact or law in meeting the summary judgment standard vis a
vis the deIenses oI retaliation and habitability, and Iurther where tenant plead and established that he
was a commercial tenant (p. 240 oI ROA, Tenant's Answer identiIies rental as "PlaintiII's home law
oIIice", etc...and that Respondent Iailed to allege the non-payment oI rent, and impermissibly Iorced
Appellant to make a "rent escrow deposit" with the Lower Court. ?
2. Whether the District Court committed an error oI law when it continued to hold a "Trial"
despite Iailing to accord the Notice Ior a Trial called Ior by JCRCP 110?
whether the RJC Filing OIIice handing Coughlin a Notice oI Appeal Iorm in response to his
speciIic request Ior one to appeal in this particular summary eviction proceeding vitiates any
attorney's Iee award, to whatever extent one is permissible anyways, given the $15.00 limitation
preprinted on that RJC Notice oI Appeal Iorm.
3. Whether the District Court and Justice Court erred in ruling that, since Coughlin's retaliation
deIense was based , in part, on alleged "habitability" issues, the court was within its jurisdiction when it
required him to deposit, pursuant to NRS 40.355(5), the amount oI rent Coughlin claimed he had withheld Ior
those reasons, beIore he would be allowed to substantiate them with evidence, even where the Reno Justice
Court has not published and had approved a corollary to JCRLV 44, and thus, under JCRCP 84, may not so
require a rent escrow deposit, in violation oI NRS 40.253(6).5
4. Whether, whats good Ior the goose is good Ior the gander, ie, iI Respondent can beneIit
Irom Coughlin being Iorced to deposit a "rent escrow" into the RJC (even where Respondent did not
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plead the non-payment oI rent), was it permissible Ior the Lower Courts to prevent Coughlin Irom
bringing his counterclaims pursuant to NRS 118A.490?
5. Whether a pro se attorney litigant can recover attorney's Iees under an NRCP Rule 11
sanctions Motion.
6. Whether the Lower Court was divested oI jurisdiction upon the Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal
eceived" in docket on October 18th and Iiled October 19th, 2011) in the interim between
(marked "r
the Summary Eviction Hearing on October 12th, 2012 and the "Trial" on October 25th, 2011
7. Does Rule 11 apply to a Summary Eviction notice under the 'causing to be Iiled language
attached to Irivolous litigation constraints in cases like that Iound in the 834 F.2d 81 Gagliardi v.
Williams (1986).
8. Can a pro se litigant, who happens to be an attorney licensed in the state where the action is
brought, be sanctioned under NRS 7.085, even where some prohibition may apply against an attorney
representing himselI receiving attorney's Iees? Is that not an untenable situation where someone like
Baker can 'have it both ways? Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 256, 71 P .3d 495
(2003), but, see: NOTE. Awaraing Attorneys Fees to Pro Se Litigants Unaer Rule 11, June, 1997, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 2308, Jeremy D. Spector.?
9. Whether attorney's Iees sanctions are recoverable under NRS 69.050 and or NRS 7.085 on
an appeal Iroma Summary Eviction Order.
10. Whether Respondent's attorneys impermissibly redacted portions oI their bills submitted
alogn with and Motion Ior Attorney's Fees Sanctions, and whether Respondent need have "actually
incurred" such bills Ior the purposes oI recovering them under a sanctions Motion (particularly, iI
Respondent had actually engaged counsel on a Ilat Iee basis or otherwise would not actually be
subject to collection Ior any such bills incurrea).
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11. Whether, by invoking a habitability/retaliation NRS 118A.510 and 118A.290 deIense in a
No Cause Summary Eviction subjects a tenant a requirement to deposit "rent escrow" with a Justice
Court a la NRS 118A.355?
12. Whether it was reversible error Ior the Lower Court to apply NRS 118A.355(5) and
require tenant in Summary Eviction to make rent escrow deposit where Justice Court had yet to
"establish by local rule a mechanism by which tenants may deposit rent withheld...", in violation oI
both NRS 40.253(6), and JCRCP 83, especially where no corollary to LVJCR Rule 44 did not exist in
the Reno Justice Court at the time, and especially where tenant was denied his right to pursue
counterclaims under NRS 118A.490 and where tenant had already appropriately Iixed and deducted
such amounts under NRS 118A.360 and 118A.380?
13. Whether is was reversible error to award Respondnet a pro rata award Ior "storage" costs
under NRS 118A.460 that was oI a value equal to the amount previously charged Ior "Iull use and
occupancy", under NRS 118A.210, especially where tenant was then subject to custodial arrest and
conviction Ior criminal trespass, despite the import oI NRS 108.475: Use oI storage space Ior
residence prohibited; eviction; nature oI Iacility; eIIect oI issuance oI document oI title Ior property;
and NRS 40.760: Summary eviction oI person using space in Iacility Ior storage as residence, and
where Respondent Iailed to respond to appropriately respond to tenant's requests Ior an opportunity to
retreive his personal property.
14. Whether the Lower Court erred in reIusing to allow tenant to pursue counterclaims (even
those expressly permitted under the Lease Agreement with regard to the landscaper's property
damage) under NRS 118A.490:
"Actions based upon nonpayment oI rent: Counterclaim by tenant; deposit oI rent
with court; judgment Ior eviction.
1. In an action Ior possession based upon nonpayment oI rent or in an action Ior
rent where the tenant is in possession, the tenant may deIend and counterclaim Ior
any amount which the tenant may recover under the rental agreement, this chapter, or
other applicable law."
15. Whether NRS 118A.355 is even implicated (assuming the Iailure oI the RJC to create a
local rule is not dispositive) to the extent Appellant invoked NRS 118A.360 appropriately multiple
times over the tenancy, which exceeded one year, and Ior amounts up to those allowed under that
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section and where any bar to litigating habitability Iound in NRS 118A.355(5) does not extend to
those proceeding under other sections oI 118A, such as 118A.360, 118A.390, and 118A.510?
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Brief Nature of The Case: This is an appeal Irom an Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County, order granting summary eviction in Iavor oI Respondent Matthew Joel Merliss, MD.
The Honorable Patrick Flanagan presided.
B. Procedural History of The Case: The Lease Agreement ("LEASE") Ior the home at 121
River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY") can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT
6 hereto. There was one hearing on October 13th, 2011 and a Trial on October 25th, 2011. The Iirst
hearing was on October 13, 2011, and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation oI that hearing that was
reIerred to as a Trial, noticed as a Trial, in writing by the RJC, occurred on October 25, 2011, and
lasted several hours. The purpose oI the Iirst hearing was to be a summary eviction proceeding an see
iI a genuine issue oI meterial Iact or law existed, ie, to "determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency
oIthe tenant's and the landlord's aIIidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal deIense as to the
alleged unlawIul detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer". On October
13th, 2011 PlaintiII, represented by CASEY BAKER, ESQ. DeIendant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN
appeared Ior a Summary Eviction hearing beIore Judge SFERRAZZA. Hearing held. Tenant's Motion
to Continue Denied. II tenant posts rent oI$2,275.00 by 9:00 am, Monday (so says the Docket at page
2 oI ROA, Vol. 1. Coughlin did so deposit pretty much all the money in the world available to him as
such a rent escrow. Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling a Notice oI Appeal on October 18th, 2011, which
the RJC Iiled on October 19th, 2011, divesting it oI jurisdiction when consiering the RJC also had
more than enough oI Coughlin's money to cover any Iees, bonds, etc. Then, Respondent arranged Ior
another one oI his ex parte "lets get an Order allowing us to barge in an inspect a law oIIice
unnoticed" deals. October 26th, 2011 Motion to Set Aside Eviction Order Iiled. mm SUBMITTED
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and DENIED. November 1, 2011 Emergency Appeal and Motion to Stay Eviction Iiled and
SUBMITTED. Letter requesting last hour oI CD Iiled., November 3rd, another Notice oI Appeal
Iiled. ROA, Vol. 1, page 2.
Coughlin Iiled a whole diIIerent appeal in Irom that Justice Court case, which may well make
CV!1-03628 completely void: CV11-03051 ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS ET AL (D1)
19-OCT-2011
C. Relevant Facts: The relevant Iacts are those Irom the Complaint. CV11-
01896.. Those Iacts, which must be accepted as true, are as Iollows:
1. Contrary to the assertion in Repondent's Answering BrieI in CV11-03628 at page 5 (ie, that
"Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any argument that NRS Chapter 118A does not apply by basing his entire
defense (retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged were violations oI that chapter...." (Coughlin Note: one,
there is more to the deIense, and two, Coughlin didn't say 118A didn't apply, just that NRS 40.253 is not
permissible against commercial tenant's where the non-payment oI rent is not pled, particularly Ior the events
under which this matter rose at the times oI relevant import and consdering what law then applies).
Respondent continued: "Additionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the argument below, it cannot
Iorm the basis Ior any relieI on appeal..." But, the Iact is, Coughlin did raise that argument, in his October
17th, 2011 Iiling (see page 97-99 oI ROA, Vol. 1), and at the hearing, and in other Iilings. It is Respondent
who nows must Iact the Iact that his Iailure to raise his arguments in opposition to that position put Iorth by
Appellant bar him Irom now so doing. (See Respondent's Opposition, Iailing to so counter Coughlin's
argument, at page 108, ROA, Vol.1). But "|p|arties `may not raise a new theory Ior the Iirst time on appeal,
which is inconsistent with or diIIerent Irom the one raised below.'" Dermody v. City oI Reno, 113 Nev. 207,
210, 931 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1997) (quoting Powers v. Powers, 105 Nev. 514, 516, 779 P.2d 91, 92 (1989)). This
rule is not meant to be harsh, overly Iormalistic, or to punish careless litigators. Rather, the requirement that
parties may raise on appeal only issues which have been presented to the district court maintains the eIIiciency,
Iairness, and integrity oI the judicial system Ior all parties. Boyers v. Texaco ReIining and Marketing, Inc., 848
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F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir.1988). This is the case becaue Coughlin plead and established that he was a
commercial tenant even beyond the October 17th, 2011 Iiling....(p. 240, 248 oI ROA, Vol. 1,
Tenant's Answer identiIies rental as "PlaintiII's home law oIIice", etc...:"especially in light oI the
recent bad Iaith attempts to inspect with recording equipment plaintiff's home law office hours aIter
having the power shut oII at plaintiff's home law office where landlord had, apparently, a delinquent
utility bill assigned to the property tenant rents, and where no notice was provided to tenant oI the
impending interruption oI essential services, causing attorney tenant Coughlin's law practice
damages." Additionally, at page 11 oI the Answering BrieI, Respondent admits that the REntal
Agreement permitted Coughlin's commercial use oI the property, regardless oI Respondent's attempts
to make arguments in the record based upon what Respondent's think some witness who never
testiIied might have said had she done so.... Also, in the ROA Vol 2. page 86-110, 125, 130-135.
Coughlin put into the record and evidence prooI related to a City oI Reno housing/building code
ordinance being violated by the overly tall weed growth in the law at the Iormer home law oIIice
(Iurther, under Anvui, complicated issues oI contractual interpreation not well suited to summary
judgment). "Reno City Charter reIerence; Reno Municipal Code (20 rages)- Authority to adopt
uniIorm codes, ~ 2.110. Sec. 14.04.100. - International ReSidential Code. The 2006 Edition oI the
International Residential Code including Appendix Chapters G and H Copyright 2006 by the
International Code Council marked as "Exhibit C"; together with such changes to the Residential
Code, as are necessary to make the same applicable to the conditions in the city which arc marked
"Exhibit B"; all oI which is adopted by reIerence and incorporated herein and made a part hereoI as iI
set Iorth in Iull. (Ord. No. 6092, ~ 3, 2-11-09)". Further, the ROA, Vol 1. at pages 209 -230 presents
photographic evidence put into the record by Coughlin supporting his habitability, retaliation, and
other claims, including photos oI the overgrown weeds and toxic mold on the insulation, the perosnal
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property oI Coughlin's damaged by Respondnent's agent (Ior which Respondnet is expressly liable
under the Lease Agreement), crumbling steps, broken window, etc., etc. Additionally, emails
between Coughlina and Merliss conIirming the habitability notice and Iailure to cure and submission
oI itemized bills to Respondent are Ioudn therein at ROA Vol 1. page 248.. Evidence supporting the
urine sludge wax toilet ring problem, page 98 ROA, vol. 1. Further, the record is complete with these
emails between Appellant and Respondent at ROA, Exhibits A-I and 1-9, pages 107-115. and
Especially Tenant's Exhibit 8 at pages 158-172 oI ROA, Exhibits A-I and 1-9, which clearly reveal
that Respodent was notice on all the various issues alleged and Iailed to adequately cure or responde
thereto, and ultimately, retaliated against Coughlin Ior pointing that out and asserting the rent
deductions he was entitled to or damages pursuant to the Lease Agreement, particularly when
reviewing the audio cd oI the cross examination Io Merliss that will be provided to this Court.
2. On page 242-243 oI the ROA, Vol. 1, in his Tenant's AIIidavit Coughlin alleges that: "3 In an
email to the exact address listed Ior Richart Hill, Esq. at nvbar.org and Irom which an email was
received, Zach Coughlin sent to Richard Hill, Esq. (the attorney whom both Hill and Merliss directed
tenant to, in writing, Iorward all Iuture correspondences) date August 17
th
, 2011 (21 day harbor beIore
Iiling Motion Ior Sanctions on September 6, 2011), the tenant wrote 'HopeIully Matt has copied you
on all our previous correspondences...but knowing Matt, he probably has Iorgotten about them or
doesn't realize they were ever delivered, etc. Anways, I probably have copies oI all oI them, many oI
which are notices to Iix things, etc., ...We are both attorneys and I wish to do my part to avoid getting
into court and looking like we haven't done the leg work necessary to pin down the areas oI
contention and eliminate doubt with regard to things that are easily established, such as the written
notices I have sent Matt that have gone without response, Ior things like, a broken window, broken
sprinkler system, fallen insulation, etc. Further, Matt approved things like repairing the
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crumbling front steps, etc. He provided directions such as "get two estimates and choose the
cheapest one and deduct it Irom the rent..." Well, repairing crumbling steps is not super cheap. Matt
seems to have Iorgotten about these written deals entirely... where does that leave Matt's estimate oI
what I owe? The steps have been repaired. As has the garbage disposal and other items. The
window is still broken, Matt never responded to requests Ior the cost oI noxious weed ordinance
Iine avoiding landscaping the previous season (I would, Ior now, take the same $350 I agreed to this
season, which is surely less than Matt paid the crew oI 4 men to service the neighboring house Ior 8
hours recently) with jagged edges of glass exposed, and an entryway with grip strips and wooden
planks that are in disrepair. I have a law oIIice to run and cannot both pay rent and be the pro bono
handyman Ior the absentee landlord while he is oII traveling to Amsterdam and Bangkok. I made a
very reasonable oIIer to Matt to Iix it. I made an incredibly reasonable oIIer to Matt to have the
seasonal noxious weed ordinance Iine avoiding weeding taken care oI Ior $350, which he
enthusiastically agreed to, then a landscaping crew promptly came and ripped up a faux grass
installation that had cost me a great deal of time and money to put in place, then refused to put
that personal property back on my rental property at all, leaving it on the sidewalk and in the
street. 700 square Ieet oI Iaux grass (actually high density woolen green carpet that is Iar more
expensive than simple "astroturI") is not something you want to just leave out in the street, and it is
deIinitely something you don't want to have to move and install twice, especially while your landlord
is apparently so well oI that he can agree to a a $350 rent deduction Ior the exact same thing he later
hires a landscaping crew to do while he is in the Phillipeans, again.... Coughlin alerted landlord on
several occasions oI a serious problem with insulation that had Iallen in the basement under the
house, Irom the ceiling, and in some cases, onto ground, which did not have a vapor barrier and thus
cultivated some mold on the insulations. Coughlin incurred $500 expense in removing the
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offending fallen mold ridden insulation and dealing with higher heating and air conditioning
costs as a result, thereby entitling Coughlin to such a rent deduction of $500 at the very least, iI
not more in associated damages, some oI which are likely unknown at this point due to Merliss's
inattentive nature as a landlord..." See page 242-243 oI the ROA, Vol. 1.
3. ROA Vol 1, p. 244: "On August 26, 2011, the Baker received a telephone call Irom
Coughlin. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Coughlin mentioned, aIter painstakingly polite
attempts to get Baker to actually converse with his client and ascertain whether or not the amounts
Merliss was alleging were owed, were in Iact, owed , and to otherwise diligently review all the
written materials sent between landlord and tenant to ascertain the validity oI those debts and the
likely deIenses thereto, in accordance with Baker's responsibilities as a lawyer representing Merliss,
and that, should Baker Iail to do so, tenant might be Iorced to Iile a Rule 11 sanctions motion against
the Baker and Merliss iI Merliss did not retract the aIorementioned notices or otherwise agree to some
extension oI time devoted to avoiding the waste oI judicial resources. Coughlin urged Baker to be
careIul representing Merliss, noting that Merliss had been rather absent minded as a landlord, was
apparently not very detail oriented, and oIten gave oII an air oI entitlement as iI to say 'you, tenant,
are my pro bono property manager and shall handle all the little details oI having things Iixed,
arranging Ior inspections and estimates, etc, that is, iI you are lucky enough to receive a response
Irom me at in regard to the various little people problems you Ieel I should address, as I am oIt out oI
the country, in places like Bangkok and Amsterdam, and really can't be bothered with anything more
than having you pay my mortgage entirely and thank me Ior the hospitality I have oIIered you in
allowing you to do so. Coughlin noted to Baker that such clients oft-times get attorney's in
trouble, particularly with regard to Rule 11 violations, especially when a litigation involves
something of such primary importance to a litigant as his home/office. Coughlin queried Baker
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as to what, exactly, Baker had done to veriIy that the debts Merliss was alleging were 'based in law
or Iact. Baker was curiously evasive and or non responsive in the various questions Coughlin posed
in this respect when he was not displaying a complete an utter lack oI knowledge with regard to the
disputes between landlord and tenant, including whether his client had agreed to any rent deductions,
had been made aware oI any property damage caused by the landlord's agents or employees, had
Iailed to cure any habitability issues his client had been inIormed oI in writing Ior a period over 14
days since past, etc..."
4. ROA, Vol. 1, p 245: "8. Tenant Coughlin has been damaged personally, proIessionally, and
economically, and emotionally by DeIendant's actions. 9. Coughlin alerted Green Action, Darlene
Sharpe and Landlord Merliss oI the property damage done to Coughlin's personal property by Green
Action in or around June, 2011. The Lease Agreement between Coughlin and Merliss speciIies that
Merliss will be liable Ior property damage he causes to tenant's property."
5. Tenant's AIIidavit, ROA, Vol. 1, p 245: "Coughlin obtained the directed estimates Ior the
repair oI the crumbling stairs/steps/risers at the home/oIIice's entryway steps. Following Merliss's
instructing yielded a cost oI $1,250 Ior the repair oI the stairs. A $350 rent deduction Ior one seasons
oI noxious weed ordinance was agreed to in writing by Merliss, another was agreed to implicitly Ior a
total yard work rent deduction oI $750. This is all detailed in painstakingly clear emails to and Irom
the landlord and tenant attached to the original Tenant's Answer. Similarly, the disposal repair came
to $125. Coughlin's law practice, and liIe in general, has been adversely impacted a great deal by
Merliss's misdeeds as a landlord. Somehow, however, globe trottin' CaliIornian With a Trust Fund
Merliss thinks Coughlin has exhibited an 'attitude oI entitlement in this situation. Merliss has
curiously reIrained Irom holding all non white males at all involved in this action accountable Ior
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their acctions, including Iormer co-tenant, Green Action Lawn Service, and Darlene Sharpe. This
may entail a housing discrimination claim..."
6. Contrary to the assertions oI Respondent's Counsel in Respondent's BrieI in CV11-03628,
Coughlin did in Iact invoke NRS 118A.490 in his Tenant's AIIidavit, at p.262, ROA, Vol. 1.
(Respondent's Answering BrieI, page 8, in CV11-03628: " Coughlin complains that it was reversible
error Ior the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490. He does not cite to anywhere in the ROA to support his
allegation that that statute was ever applied by the court."
7. Tenant provided respondent Iix and deduct notices and itemized statements under NRS 118A.290,
118A.360, and NRS 118A.380, 118A.390, and 118A.510. CITE TO ROA regarding mold (insulation heating
and Iilth), toilet ring plumbing (Iilth and plumbing), back door lock, broken window, crumbling stairs, weed
ordinance, criminal law violations oI landscapers...
8. At one hearing, RJC Judge SIerrazza admitted, on the record, that the RJC Judges had a meeting in
response to arguments brought up by Coughlin concerning the lack oI an established local rule vis a vis NRS
118A.355(5), and NRS 40.253(6), admitting that no such rule, technically, had been promulgated, published,
and approved by the Nevada Supreme Court.
9. Coughlin clearly preserved his objection to the lower court exceeding the jurisdiction accord it
under NRS 40.253(6) at ROA, Vol. 1, p 95-96, clearly invoked NRS 118A.290 (page 98 oI ROA,
Vol.1), Respodent clearly only served a 5 day unlawIul detainer notice oI the No Cause Eviction
variety and thereIore Iailed to allege non-payment oI rent against this commercial tennant (p. 269
ROA Vol.1) and Coughlin clearly pled that he was a commercial tenant (p. 160-164, 196, 240, ROA
Vol. 1, and page 9-11, ROA Vol. 2, and as set Iorth previously above). It is patently dishonest an
violative oI the Rules oI ProIessional conduct regarding candor to a tribunal and Iairness to opposing
counsel Ior Respondent's counsel to suggest they are blind sided by the argument that this summary
evicdtion involved a commercial tenant. However, Respondnent's counsel does just that in its
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Answering BrieI in CV11-03628 (p. 6 oI that Answering BrieI): "3. Granting a no-cause summary
eviction against a "commercial" tenant Coughlin now argues that he was a "commercial" tenant, and
thereIore not subject to summary eviction. He Iirst raised this argument in his "opposition to motion
Ior order to show cause," which he Iiled on December 5, 2011, six weeks aIter the eviction was
granted 31. ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261. (That is not true Coughlin raised the issue in the Justice
Court case, both in the hearing and in his Iiling oI October 17th, 2011, plead as a commercial tenant,
and cited to the law Iorbidding the use oI summary eviciton procedures against commercial tenants
where the non-payment oI rent is not noticed or alleged...Iurther NRCP 60(b)(4) will allow Ior
challenging the Eviction Order as void Ior lack oI subject matter jurisdiction (NRS 40.400 makes
NRCP applicable). Merliss addressed it in his reply Iiled the Iollowing day.32 First, Coughlin has
the law wrong. Summary evictions are available against a tenant oI any property that is subject to
NRS Chapter 118A, which Merliss' property unquestionably was.33 (well, actually, not against
commercial tenant's where the non-payment oI rent is not pled or noticed, as here).
And, actually, and this is awesome, really, Coughlin did in Iact raise the whole issue oI NRS
40.253 Iorbidding the use oI a summary eviction procedure against a commercial tenant where the
non-payment oI rent is not alleged in his Emergency Motion Iiled October 17th, 2011, page 99, ROA,
Vol. 1: "In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to lile a summary or I011l1al eviction action.
However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be used. For instance.
summary eviction is not available for: 2) Eviction of commercial tenants for other than
nonpayment of rent (See NRS 40.254) Using location for a "commercial" law practice, you Iiled
a no cause, ie, "Ior other than nonpayment oI rent. not based in law or Iact, Rule 11, plus this escrow
thing gets put asunder." Plus, at page 108-115 oI the ROA Vol. 1, Respondent Iailed to ever address
Coughlin's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed under a summary eviction statute
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against a commercial tenant where the non-payment oI rent was not notice or pled....So, under Polk,
Respondent's Iailure to Iile any opposition to that argument is taken as an admission. At some point,
Court's sua sponte chipping in arguments on behalI oI this tag team oI Respondent's attorney's and
their phalanx oI legal assistants who make enough to push Mercedes SL600 sport couples equipped
with V12 engines, when considering all that is in opposition to lil' ol crazy Zach Coughlin's legal
dribble....well, it all just seems kind oI unIair, doesn't it. Also, page 259 oI Vol. 4. oI the ROA makes
clear that Coughlin preserved his arguments related to the voidness oI any summary eviction order
where the "service" thereoI was as deeply Ilawed as the attempted service in this matter oI such an
Order.
10. Page 97-98 oI the ROA, Vol. 1 show Coughlin established materials issues respecting the
discrimination claim and retaliation Ior reporting criminal law violations and code violations: "also
complained about the workers he was hiring, noxious weed ordinance, mold inIestation, window is
essential service, saIety hazards, oh, and the landscaping crew came on my property and committed
the taking and carrying away oI property which was mine, that is arguably tantamount to theIt, so I
complained oI a criminal law. Hiring unlicensed and or undocumented workers is similarly a
violation. Insulation is an essential service and a habitability issue."....Also, Page 9-12, ROA Vol. 2:
"NRS l 18a.510 prevents Dr. Merliss Irom relaliating against the undersigned Ior seeking redress Ior
these complaints the undersigned is protection Irom retaliation Ior reporting include: criminal
mayhem, destruction oI property, toxic mold inIestation, insuIIicient and damaged insulation, a
broken window that has exposed sharp shards oI glass remaining attached to the caulking, broken
kitchen sink disposal, a Iallen ceiling light Iixture. Additionally, a washing machine that twice
Ilooded the living room carpet, when repaired by and Ilooded again by "
Antonio" (who did not clean up the water that Ilooded the Iloors, the undersigned did, with the
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undersigned's wet/dry shopvac in addition to placing Iour Ians out to dry the Iloors and prevent
molding oI the carpet and its underlayment),...additional protected complaints included crumbling
stairs to the Iront entrance oI the home law oIIice, rotting wood and peeling grip strips on the wooden
deck directly beIore the Iront door, crumbling brick steps in the backyard, extreme noxious weeds
sprouting up on both properties owned by Dr. Merliss (which also create extremely painIul goatheads
dried out weed carcasses that are real hazard to dog's paws). Dr. Merliss remarked in writing about
how much more he like dealing with the undersigned's Iormer co-tenant,...(who took Coughlin's share
oI the Final two months she lived at the residence and Iailed to Iorward it on to Dr. Merliss, but who
did subsequently arrange to make payments with Dr. Merliss, an interesting double dipping scenario
being created whereby Dr. Merliss could potentially recoup much more than he Ieels he is owed).
(Former Co-Tenant) is halI Mexican, ...the undersigned has made a protected complaint that he is
being discriminated against on the basis oI his inclusion in several protected class, ie, his race,
national origin, and sex, where Dr. Merliss Iinds (Coughlin's Iormer Co-Tenant) a Iresh breeze, he
Iinds the undersigned an "entitled" thorn in his side, "keeping him away Irom the important work he
is doing in his medical practice." Similarly, Dr. Merliss is unable to hold Darlene Sharpe, a Iemale,
or the Green Action Lawn Service crew and its owner, all Hispanic, accountable Ior the property
damage they caused and which ms. sharpe encouraged, despite the Iact that the Green Action Lawn
Service crew was aware oI the lawn carpeting at the undersigned's residence prior to making their bid
to work on the landscaping/weeds at that residence. That crew was well aware oI the lawn carpeting
Irom the entire day 6 oI them spent weeding the house Dr. Merliss owns next door to the
undersigned's residence ... the Green Action crew admitted to Coughlin (and Coughlin was
prevented from submitting video and audio recordings into the record by 1udge Sferrazza,
despite the salient importance to Coughlin's counterclaims any statements they made would have as to
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whether Dr. Merliss is responsible Ior or ratiIied the property damage to coughlin careIul wool green
law carpet installation, which was laid, cut, and notched around the house and exterior Ience in a very
exacting manner, only to be converted by the green action crew and leIt in the street and sidewalk
near the house, creating a theIt hazard and exigent situation in which the undersigned's law practice
suIIered economic damages and Coughlin was required to take immediate action to mitigate the
damages." Further, the retaliation and discrimination claim is preserved and supported a ROA Vol. 2,
page 13: "The time-line oI Coughlin's written complaints, established in excruciating detail in the
attached chronological collection oI time stamped emails between landlord and tenant clearly
establishes a retaliatory motive and intent on Dr. Merliss's part. indeed, Dr. Merliss on numerous
occasions reIerred to the undersigned as "entitled". A retaliatory animus is clearly evinced in such
statements, and as such the actual damages allowed under nrs 118A should be granted..."
11. Coughlin clearly preserved Ior appeal his objection to being denied the right to assert
counterclaims within the summary eviction proceeding, much less within the "Trial" oI October 25th,
2011. See. ROA, Vol. 1, page 133-136. See Kimberly E. O'Leary, The Inadvisability oI Applying
Preclusive Doctrines to Summary Evictions, 30 U. Tol. L. Rev. 49, 72 (1998) ("|T|he realities oI
landlord-tenant practice make the use oI preclusive doctrines in these actions especially
problematic."); Rosemary Smith, Locked Out: The Hidden Threat oI Claim Preclusion Ior Tenants in
Summary Process, 15 SuIIolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 25 (2010).
D. Standard of Review
"|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based
upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these
proceedings are analogous. Anvui. Purpose oI summary judgment rule is not to deprive litigants oI
their right to trial on merits iI they really have issues to try. NRCP 56(c). Pine v. Leavitt, 1968, 445
P.2d 942, 84 Nev. 507; Summary judgment is drastic remedy. NRCP 56(c). Pine v. Leavitt, 1968, 445
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P.2d 942, 84 Nev. 507. Documentary evidence, hearing and determination on a motion for
summary judgment, documentary evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and all of the nonmoving party's statements must be accepted as true and a
district court may not pass on the credibility of affidavits. Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, Inc., 1990,
792 P.2d 14, 106 Nev. 265, rehearing denied. Genuine issue oI material Iact precluding grant oI
summary judgment in Iavor oI employer ...presented by employer's evidence that employee was
injured in a Iight ... and testimony by the injured employee... Tschabold v. Orlando, 1987, 737 P.2d
506, 103 Nev. 224.
Trial court's jurisdiction in summary proceeding Ior eviction oI a tenant was divested, and
jurisdiction oI court oI appeal attached, upon timely Iiling oI appeal bond, and trial court thereaIter
had no jurisdiction in matter except as to certain matters not pertinent to appeal and to test surety on
appeal bond. Sarpy v. de la Houssaye, 217 So.2d 783 (La.App., 1969); Mack-Manley v. Manley,
122 Nev. 849, 138 P.3d 525 (2006).
Gomez v. Independence Management oI Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009): "In 19.
We have said in another context that a claim oI 'a retaliatory motive is a question oI Iact Ior the jury
(or the judge in a non-jury trial), and, like other types oI claims in which motive or intent is in issue,
is not well suited to disposition on a motion Ior summary judgment. Arthur Young & Co. v.
Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 368 (D.C.1993) (reIerring to a claim oI retaliatory action under the
DCHRA); see Edwards, supra note 18, 130 U.S. App. D.C. at 141, 397 F.2d at 702 ('The question oI
permissible or impermissible purpose is one oI Iact Ior the court or jury). We have said the same
thing about claims oI discrimination, see, e.g., Hollins v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 760 A.2d
563, 579-80 (D.C.2000), but we have, on occasion, upheld a trial court grant oI summary judgment in
Iavor oI a deIendant accused oI discrimination. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Howard University, 960 A.2d
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308, 315-16 (D.C.2008); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 386
(D.C.2002); Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571. We thereIore do not Ioreclose the possibility that, on a properly
supported record, the trial court may dispose oI a deIense oI retaliatory eviction at the summary
judgment stage. When the statutory presumption oI retaliatory action has been triggered, however, the
record would have to establish, under the standards that govern summary judgment, that the landlord
has rebutted it by clear and convincing evidence." Whether a particular set oI Iacts gives rise to a
legal deIense is a question oI law. See Bantz. v. Montgomery Estates, Inc. 163 Wis.2d 973, 978, 473
N.W.2d 506,508 (Ct.App. 1991) (whether Iacts IulIill a particular legal standard is a question oI law).
Questions oI law are reviewed de novo. State Industrial Ins. Sys. v. United Exposition Servs. Co., 109
Nev. 28, 30 (1993). A motion Ior summary judgment may be supported not only by the pleadings but
by discovery procedures, demand Ior admissions, aIIidavits and depositions. NRCP 56. Dredge Corp.
v. Husite Co., 1962, 369 P.2d 676, 78 Nev. 69, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 39, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L.Ed.2d
61. On a motion Ior summary judgment, non-moving party's statements must be accepted as true, all
reasonable inIerences that can be drawn Irom the evidence must be admitted, and neither the trial
court nor Supreme Court may decide issues oI credibility based upon the evidence submitted in the
motion or the opposition. Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 2002, 57 P.3d 82, 118 Nev. 706,
rehearing denied, reconsideration en banc denied, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 82, 540 U.S. 817, 157
L.Ed.2d 34. In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, evidence must be viewed in light
most Iavorable to party against whom summary judgment is sought, and Iactual allegations, evidence,
and all reasonable inIerences in Iavor oI that party must be presumed correct. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
56(c). NGA #2 Ltd. Liability Co. v. Rains, 1997, 946 P.2d 163, 113 Nev. 1151. In considering
motion Ior summary judgment, district courts must construe evidence presented in light most
Iavorable to party against whom summary judgment is sought; all oI nonmovant's statements must be
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accepted as true, and district courts may not pass on credibility oI aIIidavits. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
56(c). Walker v. American Bankers Ins. Group, 1992, 836 P.2d 59, 108 Nev. 533. "Evidence
supported Iinding that landlord's eviction oI tenant was retaliatory Ior her complaints concerning
persistent plumbing problems and condition oI common areas. n.r.s. 118a.510. Paullin v. Sutton, 102
Nev. 421,724 P.2d 749 (1986).
III. ARGUMENT; A. Summary Of The Argument:
The lower court erred when it issued an order oI summary eviction. Coughlin presented
suIIicient evidence to raise the legal deIense oI habitability and retaliation, and ambiguous questions
oI Lease interpretation. Coughlin also presented ample evidence oI a genuine legal dispute between
the parties centering on the interpretation oI what constituted damages caused by "agents" oI the
landlord (Ior which the Lease Agreement calls Ior the landlord's liability, which engendered a
retaliatory eviction here upon a rent oIIset being properly asserted) under the lease. Once this legal
deIense was raised, the lower court should have declined to issue a summary eviction order under
NRS 40.253.
B. THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN ISSUING/UPHODLING A SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER IN THE FACE OF ESTABLISHED LEGAL DEFENSES, CLEAR
1URISDICTIONAL DEFECTS, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
DEFICIENCIES, MISTAKES OF LAW, ETC., ETC.
'10.SUBLEASING: Resident may not assign, sublet, or transIer his interest, no any part
thereoI without prior written consent oI management, which will not be unreasonably withheld.
Resident further may use the premises for any commercial enterprise, but not for any purpose
which unlawful.
'11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises is limited to 2 adults ? Children, and shall be used
Ior a residence and Ior other purposes....
'13. UTILITIES: Resident agrees to pay Ior the Iollowing utilities: Gas x Electricity x Oil, Light
x, Heat x, Energy x, Other, Resident's responsibility Ior these begins at the commencement oI
this agreement. See attached transIer oI account Addendum (note: there is no such TransIer oI
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Account Addendum attached to the Lease Agreement). Utilities not payable by the Resident will be
paid by the Management.
Further, ambiguity exists with respect to Sections 3 and 20 oI the Lease Agreement and state
law concerning retaliation and the voiding oI lease terms that are unconcionable. As such, the import
oI Section 20 is vitiated in light oI Section 3 and the retaliatory conduct oI the landlord. That being
the case, NRS 40.360(3)'s dictates that 5 days elapse Irom entry oI order (Ior leases that have not
terminated by their terms) made this order and the lockout void and present reversible error, as well
as a lack oI subject matter jurisdiction.
'20 TERMINATION: This Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be terminated by
either party within 30 days oI the deIined termination date (reIer to Paragraph 2), or any time
thereaIter by giving the other party not less than thirty (30)day prior notice in writing or as otherwise
allowed by the laws oI the State oI Nevada (ReIer to Paragraph 1 and 9 Ior monetary liabilities).
Amibiguity suIIicient to deIeat summary judgment was argued and supported by evidence
(includign RMC Code on a noxious weed ordinance, weed height, and pictures clearly showing the
weeds exceeded the permissible weed heights, in conjunction with the Iollowing Lease Agreement
section:
'22 MAINTENANCE, REPIARS, OR ALTERATIONS:...Tenant will irrigate and maintain any
surrounding grounds, including lawns and shrubbery, if they are for the tenant's exclusive
use. ... Owner will be responsible for the cost of any retrofitting required by governmental
agencies.
Respondent put on absolutely no evidence, authority, or argument, really, that the weeds
should be considered tenant's problem in light oI the above. Regardless, Respondent waived any such
claim by agreeing to pay Tenant to do the weeding, only Respondent or his 'property manager
messed that up by also hiring Green Action Lawn Service to do the same (and Respondent actually
testiIied under oath that he paid that crew $2,000 to do the same thing he paid Appellant $350 to
do...). The only problem is that landscaping crew damaged Appellant's personal property and cause
lost business, proIits, and consequential damages, all supported by testimony and documentary
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evidence. And the Lease Agreement makes Respondent liabile Ior such, or at least suIIicient
ambiguity exists in that regard to preclude the summary judgment on that issue the Trial Court made:
'23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time or through any other cause
which renders the premises untenantable, either party will have the right to terminated this Agreement
as the date on which the damage occurs.
Written notice oI termination will be give to the other party within IiIteen (15) days aIter occurrence oI such damage.
Should such damage or destruction occur as the result oI negligence oI Tenant, or his/her invitee, then only the Owner will
have the right to terminate. Should this right be exercised by her Owner or Tenant, the rent in the current month will be
prorated between the parties as oI the date the damage occurred. Any prepaid rent and unused security deposit will be
reIunded to Tenant. II this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner will prompt;y repair the premises and there will be a
proportionate reduction oI rent until the premises are repaired and ready Ior Tenant's occupancy. The proportionate
reduction will be based on the extent which repairs interIere with Tenant's reasonable use oI the premises.
-2. Whether the tenancy was 'expired or 'terminated such that NRS 40.360(3) would be
implicated? The Lease Agreement is actually strongly in support oI a Iinding contrary to that made
by Judge SIerrazza, where, at Subsection 3 it reads:
'3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes properly
agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly basis after the initial term. A 30 day
written notice to vacate must be issued by the Resident prior to vacating anytime during or
aIter the initial term oI this agreement. IF improper notice or no notice to vacate is given
by Resident, Resident is liable Ior prorated rent until lawIul termination and Management
may deduct this Irom the Security Deposit on hand, or collect any money due by other
lawIul means.
The Lease Agreement expressly provides that Appellant could use the premises Ior any
purpose. Further, the previous tenant used the premises Ior a commercial purpose (a drug and alcohol
rehabilitation counseling service, Basic Addiction Services), and the zoning Ior the premises allows
Ior the same. There did exists some ambiguity with respect to whose responsibility it was to tend to
the 'noxious weed ordinance violating (and Ior which a proper habitability complaint was made
under NRS 118A.290, and Appellant testiIied that he reported to 'Reno Direct the violation oI RMC
three-times yearly weeds, as the Lease Agreement states that 'the tenant shall take care oI the lawn
and surrounding premises. However, the term 'lawn traditionally connotes grass. There was no
grass at the premises, rather a poor mixture oI dirt and diIIuse decomposed granite. Clearly, the
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Lease Agreement is not clear with respect to whose responsibility it was to pay Ior or to tend to weed
care. Another instance oI ambiguity in the Lease Agreement as issue in this matter related to whether
the tenancy 'terminated upon the expiration oI one year or whether the Lease Agreement
automatically renewed.
Additionally, Appellant respectIully submits that the October 27
th
, 2011 Order is not in
compliance with Nevada Law inasmuch as it calls Ior execution oI the eviction within 24 hours oI
service oI it. NRS 40.360 states that "When the proceeding iI Ior an unlawIul detainer aIter the deIault
in the payment oI rent, and the lease agreement under which the rent is payable has not by its terms
expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until the expiration oI 5 days aIter entry oI
the judmgent...." 'NRS 40.360 (3). Execution and enIorcement. When the proceeding is Ior an
unlawIul detainer aIter deIault in the payment oI the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the
rent is payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until the
expiration oI 5 days aIter the entry oI the judgment, within which time the tenant, or any subtenant, or
any mortgagee oI the term, or other party interested in its continuance, may pay into court Ior the
landlord the amount oI the judgment and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisIied and the
tenant be restored to the tenant`s estate; but, iI payment, as herein provided, be not made within the 5
days, the judgment may be enIorced Ior its Iull amount and Ior the possession oI the premises. In all
other cases the judgment may be enIorced immediately. So, to the extent the RJC chose to read into
Respondent's case what was not plead or argued (the RJC seemed to want to create a non-payment oI
rent Order where such a claim was not plead, in which case, turnabout is Iair play, and the October
27
th
, 2011 Order is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction in that is goes against the dictates oI NRS 40.360 (3)
regarding execution and enIorcement. Further, NRCP 62(d), NRS 40.385, and NRAP 7 provide that
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execution oI an Order shall be stayed pending appeal as long as a bond or equivalent security in the
sum oI $250 to cover costs oI appeal is Iled with the district court. The RJC held on to $2,275 oI
Appellants money, more than enough to cover the $250 appeal bond and any reasonable supersedeas
bond (and NRS 40.385 strongly asserts that a supersedeas bond oI only $250 was all required oI
Appellant where his rent was less than $1,000, as here). Appellant may obtain a stay pending appeal
by complying with the provisions oI NRS 40.385. This statute (at the relevant time in question)
provided that iI an appeal is taken Irom an order oI summary eviction entered pursuant to NRS
40.253, "a stay oI execution may be obtained by Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI
$250 to cover the expected costs on appeal." NRS 40.385(1). The statute Iurther provides that iI the
subject lease is Ior commercial property and the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the district court "may,
upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to
be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal." Id. Judge SIerrazza's November 7, 2011 Order,
purporting to release to Appellant what had earlier been classiIied as satisIying both the appeal bond
and supersedeas bond, in addition to resetting the amount such a supersedeas bond would entail to an
impermissibly high Iigure, outside the jursidiction available to the RJC where the Appellant's rent was
under $1,000, and also where the appellant was a commercial tenant and non-payment oI rent was not
alleged.
NRS 118A.360 :" the tenant may deduct from his or her rent the
actual and reasonable cost or the fair or reasonable value of the work, not
exceeding the amount specified in this subsection."
NRS 118A.380 Failure of landlord to supply essential items or services.
1. II the landlord is required by the rental agreement or this chapter to supply
heat, air-conditioning, running water, hot water, electricity, gas, a functioning
door lock or another essential item or service and the landlord willIully or
negligently Iails to do so, causing the premises to become unIit Ior habitation, the
tenant shall give written notice to the landlord speciIying the breach. II the
landlord does not adequately remedy the breach, or use his or her best eIIorts to
remedy the breach within 48 hours, except a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday,
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aIter it is received by the landlord, the tenant may, in addition to any other
remedy:
(a) Procure reasonable amounts of such essential items or services during
the landlord`s noncompliance and deduct their actual and reasonable cost
from the rent;
(b) Recover actual damages, including damages based upon the lack oI use oI
the premises or the diminution oI the Iair rental value oI the dwelling unit;
NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit.
1. The landlord shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit
in a habitable condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable iI it violates provisions
of housing or health codes concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness
for habitation of the dwelling unit or if it substantially lacks:
(a) EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior
walls, including windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing facilities which conformed to applicable law when installed
and which are maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:
(1) Under the control oI the tenant or landlord and is capable oI producing
hot and cold running water;
(2) Furnished to appropriate Iixtures; and
(3) Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable
law and maintained in good working order to the extent that the system can be
controlled by the landlord...
(d) Adequate heating facilities which conIormed to applicable law when
installed and are maintained in good working order....
(g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlord`s
control at the time oI the commencement oI the tenancy in every part clean,
sanitary and reasonably Iree Irom all accumulations oI debris, filth, rubbish,
garbage, rodents, insects and vermin.
(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair.
(i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other Iacilities and appliances, including
elevators, maintained in good repair iI supplied or required to be supplied by the
landlord."
Coughlin presented evidenc Iound in the ROA and Exhibits as set Iorth herein that
present a material issue oI Iact as to the above statutory sections and the emails and testimony and
other circumstances indicate relatiation and discrimination.
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C. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to...
IV. CONCLUSION: The Lower Courts committed reversible error by summarily evicting
Coughlin's in a manner that denied Coughlin a multitude oI statutorily required protections, while at
the same time, impermissibly remixing the law to the utter beneIit oI landlord and his counsel.
Dated this day 26th day oI August, 2012, RespectIully Submitted By:
LAW OFFICE OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
Pro se Appellant
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ENDNOTES
1.See FFCL&O at 1
2.NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, ~3.
3.See FFCL&O at 3, ~9 et seq. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA, Vol. V, pp. 194-198.
4.NRS 40.253(6).
5.ROA, Vol. I, p. 153.
6.ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233.
7.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33.
8. Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007).
1.Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
2.NJCRCP 76A.
3.Gibelliniv. Klindt, HONev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added).
4.NJCRCP 72(c).
5.Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332,335,353 P.2d 458 (1960).
6. Anvui.
7. NRS 40.253
8.CI., Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d 542,544-545 (Nov. 4, 2010)
9.CI., NJCRCP 74(b).
18.Id.
1.See NRS 40.253(6).
2.ROA, Vol. I, p. 153.
1.See, NJCRCP 104 ("Prior to the holding oI a hearing Ior summary eviction, the justice shall determine the method oI
service oI notice oI the hearing on both parties.")
1.NRS 40.253(6).
2. NRS 40.253
3.Accord, Lee v. GNLVCorp., 116 Nev. 424,427,996 P.2d 416 (2000) (the important inquiry is on "what the order or
judgment actually does, not on what it is called.")(emphasis in original).
4.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 230-233.
5.NRS 1 18A.355(l)(d). ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
27.Id.
1.See FFLC&O at ~~11-11.1.
2. Anvui.
30. FFCL&O at ~~12-12.l.
1.ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261.
2.See, "Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings," at 2
3.NRS 40.254.
4.See FFCL&O beginning at ~9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
5.Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123 Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007).
6.Schuck. ROA, Vol. VI, p.183.
37. Schuck.
1.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 153-160.
2.ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2, 22-23.
40. ROA, Vol. III, p. 5. 4!. Reno Newspapers, Inc.
1.ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275.
2.NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456 P.2d 436 (1969).
3.NJCRCP 73A(a).
4.ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85, 2.
5.ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4, 27.
47. Marcuse.
1.ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.
2.ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27
3.ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.
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4.CI., Schuck.
5.ROA, Vol. II, p. 85.
6.CI., Schuck
1.CI., Schuck.
2.CI., Gibellini.
56. NJCRCP 76A, Reno Newspaper, Inc.; NRS 40.253(6). "
CV11-03051 ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS ET AL (D1) 19-OCT-2011 03:06 PM AIIidavit ...
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: AFFIDAVIT OF POVERTY (DEFENDANT) - NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM RENO JUSTICE COURT19-OCT-2011 03:06 PM Request Ior Submission
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS (DEFENDANT) (PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH
COUGHLIN DATE SUBMITTED: 10/19/2011
19-OCT-2011 05:06 PM Mtn Proceed Forma Pauperis COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM RENO JUSTICE COURT 01-NOV-2011 03:29 PM Motion ... COUGHLIN,
ZACHARY Entry: AMENDED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 01-NOV-2011 03:29 PM Request Ior Submission
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: DOCUMENT TITLE: AMENDED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS (NO PAPER
ORDER) PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE SUBMITTED: 11/01/11
SUBMITTED BY: DJ DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:08-NOV-2011 10:19 AM Ord Deny in
Forma Pauperis; 08-NOV-2011 10:25 A 08-NOV-2011 02:38 PM Ex-Parte Mtn... COUGHLIN,
ZACHARY Entry: EX PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY AND SET ASIDE SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER 3-NOV-2011 04:51 PM Mtn Proceed Forma Pauperis COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
Entry: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF IFP; OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO
PROCEED INFORMA PAUPERIS08-DEC-2011 12:03 PM Ord Denying Motion Entry: Transaction
2634258 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-08-2011:12:04:1320-DEC-2011 05:09 PM Ord Denying
Motion Entry: FOR RECONSIDERATION OF IFP; OR ALTERNATIVELY MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPER
Regarding the inspection oI the premises just prior to the lockout (and NRS 40.253(6) does not allow
such an Order, yet, again Judge SIerrazza does some yoga Ior Richard Hill, Esq., despite the October
27
th
, 2011 hearing not being notice Ior a Motion Ior Inspection), Respondent's eviction was
retaliatory, with Respondent lawyering up, ceasing communication with Appellant less than 24 hours
aIter Appellant asserted his rights under the Lease Agreement to notice oI such inspection or entry by
the landlord or his agents...:
'25. INSPECTION: Resident agrees to grant management the right to enter the premise as all
reasonable times and Ior all reasonable purposed including showing to the perspective residents,
buyers, loan oIIicers or insurance agents or others with lawIul business therein and Ior east one
maintenance inspection each month. In accordance with NRS requirements, Managements agrees to
give Resident twice the twenty (24) hour notification requirement for entry.
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'28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident or any other
person or to any property occurring on the premises or any part thereoI, or in common ares thereoI,
unless such liability is based on the negligent acts or omission of management, his agent, or
employee, but Resident will not agree to hold management harmless Irom any claims Ior damages
iI caused by the negligent acts or omissions oI the Resident or his guests.
Yet, Baker and Hill wasted everybody's time and money subpoening handymen and others to
testiIy about their attempts to enter the premises with less than 24 hours notice given. Further,
Section 28 oI the Lease Agreement makes clear that Respondent bore liability Ior the torts and or
property destruction oI Green Action Lawn Service upon Appellant's property, and associated
damages, or at least provides enough support to beat a summary judgment motion. The Trial Court
ruled otherwise and doing so was reversible error. Further, video evidence was introduced wherein
the supervisor Ior Green Action Lawn Service admits to taking orders Irom Darlene Sharpe oI
Dickson Realty vis a vis Respondent's wishes and intentions.
Further the 10/27/11 Order Ior Summary Eviction is void in that is attempts to undue that
which was agreed to in the Lease Agreement:
'30. TENANCY TERMINATION:. Resident shall allow Management to inspect the premises in
the Resident's presence to verify the condition of premises and contents....32. INSURANCE: It
is agreed that TENANT may obtain RENTERS INSURANCE AS LANDLORD'S or his Agent's
insurance supplements cover oI TENANT'S Property.
Appellant was aIIorded no such opportunity.
Further, Appellant alleged violations oI NRS 118a.510's anti-retaliation dictate. Respondent's
testimony was extremely unconvincing. In Iact, he contradicted himselI several times and was Iorced
to admit that he did receive the May 14, 2010 email and high resolution photographs Irom Appellant
detailing the moldy insulation (which qualiIies, according the the Trial Court, as a habitability issue
under NRS 118a.Appellant alleged discrimination in this matter and Respondent Iailed to rebut the
presumptions such allegations created:
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V. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE: I hereby certiIy that this brieI complies with the
Iormatting requirements oI NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeIace requirements oINRAP 32(a)(5) and the type
style requirements oINRAP 32(a)(6) because:
|x| This brieI has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeIace using OpenOFIice in 12 Times
New Roman; I Iurther certiIy that this brieI complies with the page- or type- volume limitations oI
NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts oI the brieI exempted by RAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is either:
| | Proportionately spaced, has a typeIace oI 14 points or more and contains words; or
| | Monospaced, has 10.5 or Iewer characters per inch, and contains words or lines oI text; or |X|
Does not exceed 30 pages
Finally, I hereby certiIy that I have read this appellate brieI, and to the best oI my knowledge,
inIormation, and belieI, it is not Irivolous or interposed Ior any improper purpose. I Iurther certiIy that
this brieI complies with all applicable Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure, in particular, NRAP
28( e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brieI regarding matters in the record to be supported
by a reIerence to the page oI the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be Iound. I
understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brieI is not in
conIormity with the requirements oI the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure.
Dated this day 24th day oI August, 2012.
RespectIully Submitted By:
LAW OFFICE OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
Pro se Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident oI the State oI Nevada, over the age oI eighteen years. My business address is
PO BOX 3961. On August 26th, 2012, the Iollowing document(s) were served on the party(ies)
below:
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
X By United States Mail- a true copy oI the document(s) listed above Ior collection and mailing
Iollowing the Iirm's ordinary business practice in a sealed envelope with postage thereon Iully prepaid
Ior deposit in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada addressed as set Iorth below.
X By Facsimile Transmission - the transmission was reported as complete and without error. A
copy oI the transmission report, properly issued by the transmitting machine, is attached to the hard
copy. The names and Iacsimile numbers oI the person(s) served are as set Iorth below.
RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.
652 Forest St.
Reno, Nevada 89509
Telephone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Attorney for Respondent Merliss
I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Pro se Appellant
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DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGLIN IN SUPPORT OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT
1. This Declaration is made pursuant to the provisions oI NRS 53.045, I am presently in the State oI
Nevada and I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
2. Declarant is the PlaintiII in the above title action.
3. Declarant avers that the Iactual statements set Ior above in the Ioregoing document are, to the
best oI his knowledge and understanding, accurate.
4. I, Zach Coughlin, am available to testiIy, iI necessary, as to these matters. I declare under penalty
oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
Dated this August 26th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant
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Electronically Filed
Oct 05 2012 09:42 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 60838 Document 2012-31435
000836
laura
Laura LauraLaura
000837
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
In Re Matter oI:
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
.
)
)
)
)
)
)
Supreme Court No: 60838
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR
COUNSEL AND, POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY
COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN`S SCR 102(4)(d)
PETITION IN CASE 61426
COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and Iiles the above named
document and moves this Court, or the Board, Panel, Bar Ior the relieI requested herein. This Iiling
is Iurther based upon the papers and pleadings on Iile herein and in the companion case beIore the
Nevada Supreme Court in 60838 and 61426.
FACTS
1. Patrick King, Esq., Bar Counsel oI the North, and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich
continue to display an alarming lack oI appreciation Ior due process, basic Iairness, and other notions
oI Iair play and substantial justice...and now seeks to subvert the express ruling oI the Nevada
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
Electronically Filed
Oct 05 2012 09:40 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 60838 Document 2012-31434
000838
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Supreme Court in its June 7th, 2012 Order by turning the Hearing that has already been set (as
conIirmed by the SBN's Laura Peters, in writing) Ior September 25th, 2012 into a "due process combo
pack express package" wherein all the various matters set Iorth in King's Complain shall also be
addressed, despite the Order by the Nevada Supreme Court and the text oI SCR 111 very clearly
indicating the "sole purpose" oI the hearing will be to determine the punishment Ior the one criminal
conviction contained in Bar Counsel's SCR 111 petition oI May 10, 2012 in 60838 and where an
"immediate hearing" is Iurther required in light oI Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition Iiled, and
unopposed by the SBN in 61426.
2. SBN Clerk oI Court oI the Laura Peters has assured Coughlin that no service oI any SBN v
Coughlin Complaint has been eIIected as oI this date and that Coughlin is in no danger oI deIaulting
Ior Iailure to answer any such Complaint. However, Clerk oI Court Peters indicated to Coughlin that
she did not Iile Coughlin's September 17th, 2012 Motion to Dismiss in light oI directions Irom Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq., and Iurther, NNDB Chairman, J. Thomas Susich has made similar
indications oI the extent to which King is attempting to circumvent procedural rules attendant to these
matters and cause Coughlin Iurther damages and delay, particularly with regard to the dictates oI SCR
116. The scheduling oI the hearing is the domain oI the NNDB and is not to be handed oI to the
prosecutor here, Bar Counsel Pat King. Peters, King, and Clark have all admitted that King and
Clark are seeking to circumvent the procedural rules and Order related to the scheduling and holding
oI the hearing in response to the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order in 60838 and with regard to the
"immediate hearing" required upon Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 Petition in SCR 61426, which Bar
Counsel has Iailed to Oppose, and Ior which, thereIore, Coughlin is entitled to the relieI he therein
sought, ie, the dissolution oI the temporary suspension oI his license to practice law.
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000839
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3. By and Order oI the Nevada Supreme Court on June 7th, 2012 Coughlin's constitutionally
protected property right, his law license, was temporarily suspended: "Pursuant to SCR 111,
temporary suspension and reIerral to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an
attorney has been convicted oI a "serious" crime, which includes theIt. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly,
pursuant to SCR 111(8), we reIer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI
a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
oI the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend
attorney Zachary B. Coughlin Irom the practice oI law in Nevada, pending Iinal disposition oI the
disciplinary proceedings."
4. In a written communication Irom SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peters on July 26th, which
was cc'd to Bar Counsel Patrick King, Clerk Peters wrote: " Mr. Coughlin: I have been contacted by
Tom Susich oI the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I understand that you would like to schedule
a Iormal hearing in your matter. I have gathered some available dates in September and October let
me know what will work Ior you: September 25, 26 or 27 October 15, 16, 17, 18, 30 or 31 Thank you,
Laura Peters". In an written correspondence Irom Coughlin to Clerk oI Court Ior the SBN Peters:
"Subject: Hearing... Dear Ms. Peters, Please set the hearing date as soon as possible Ior any matter
involving me that has been reIerred to the bar or the disciplinary panel. thanks Zach Coughlin". The
SBN's Peters responded, in writing, on August 17th, 2012, to Coughlin: "RE: Hearing...Zach: How
about September 25th, work Ior you?". Coughlin responded to Peters, in writing, on August 17th,
2012: "That works thanks" with a copy oI Peter's correspondence oI August 17th, 2012 setting Iorth
the September 25th, 2012 Hearing date. Coughlin wrote to NNDB Chairman J. Thomsas Susich, Esq.
on September 11th, 2012 indicating, in writing: " The hearing is set Ior... Hearing date... I look
Iorward to our Hearing on September 25th, 2012. Zach Coughlin".
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000840
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4.1 Upon inIormation and belieI, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR
105 Complaint being Iiled, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) ConIidentiality: "5. Temporary
suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar Iiles a petition with the supreme court Ior
the temporary suspension oI an attorney beIore a Iormal complaint is Iiled in the underlying
disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as confidential. II the court grants the
petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry oI the order granting the petition. If the
court denies the petition, then the matter shall remain confidential until a formal complaint is
filed or the matter is otherwise concluded."
5. On September 11th, 2012, in a telephone conversation with Coughlin, SBN Clerk oI Court
conIirmed that the hearing previously noticed, set, and schedule Ior September 25th, 2012 was "still
scheduled" and "on the calendar". During that conversation, Clerk oI Court Peters admitted that
"there is a hearing set Ior the 25th (oI September), we set that just on the SCR 111 Petition. Now
there is a Complaint and I think that Pat and David want to combine it, I didn't know that at the time
that I set your hearing date." Coughlin then asked Peters "So, the hearing is still set on the
calendar?". Peters responded "on the calendar it is". Then Peters indicated that "as soon as the
Hearing was set, they (Pat King and David Clark) said 'oh, wait, wait, we want to combine it with the
Complaint's Hearing as well, so they Iiled a Complaint and I served it on you." when I set your
hearing (Ior September 25th, 2012), I did not know that David (Bar Counsel David Clark) and Pat
(Pat King) wanted to combine that (hearing on the SCR 111 and SCR 102(4)(d) Petitions in 60838
and 61426) with a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint the SBN has been threatening to Iile against
Coughlin)".
6. Bar Counsel King has continually reIerred to Coughlin, as a "Iormer attorney", oIten when
speaking directly to Coughlin, and has Iurther mentioned to Coughlin that Coughlin has been
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000841
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"disbarred", while speaking in a mock devastated tone when mentioning the sadness King would
himselI Ieel iI Coughlin lost his law license, which echoed the venomous chill in the air when David
Clark recalled to Coughlin, regretIully about that one time an attorney committed suicide beIore Clark
got a chance to prosecute him, and that regret, to be clear, was due to missing the chance to prosecute
that attorney prior to the suicide. King is apparently unaware that disbarments were made irrevocable
in Nevada in 2008 or the Iact that one is still "an attorney" during a temporary suspension oI one's law
license.
7. Coughlin appeared at the northern oIIicer the State Bar Ior the calendared, agreed upon,
noticed, and set September 25, 2012 Hearing notice to him and the NNDB's Chairman Susich and
required by this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order and SCR 111(8). While Coughlin sat waiting in the
lobby out walked Clerk oI Court Peters and Bar Counsel Patrick King, King holding a stack oI papers
then handing them to Clerk Peters, and King whom greeted Coughlin and entere a conversation that
when approximately like this:
King: Zach.
Clerk Peters: I am supposed to hand you this Complaint.
King: Your're served (motioning to Clerk Peters to hand Coughlin the stack oI papers). You are
oIIicially served. She's the Court Clerk. You're served.
Coughlin: Aw.. I think one has to be served by a non-party under SCR 109.
King: No, you're served ,she's the Clerk oI Court, so take it. She's serving you, your are oIIicially
served and so I will issue a deIault judgment against you iI you don't accept it.
Peters: I mailed it out.
Coughlin: Is my hearing going to be held right now?
King: First, take this.
Coughlin: What about my Hearing that's what I'm here Ior right now.
King: First, take this.
Coughlin I think you actually can't serve people when they are showing up Ior a Hearing.
King yes I can absolutely can,
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000842
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Coughlin: I have cases that say you can't.
King: I absolutely can things don't go your way because you don't accept responsibility (King grabs
the stack oI papers Irom Peters and attempt to insert them into Coughlin's suit jacket aIter pulling the
middle button on Coughlin's blazer away Irom Coughlin's torso, whereupon King gives up on that
approach). I'll drop it at your Ieet here your served (King bends down and places the stack oI papers
on top oI Coughlin dress shoes).
Coughlin you are a party though it has to be a non-party that's the law
King: Zach. don't play games!
Coughlin: It's not a game, Pat, it's the law.
Peters: Zach, please?
Coughlin: Where is my hearing?
King: Hi Paula where you witness that I'm serving or that rather Laura is serving Zach Coughlin with
the Complaint.
Paula: Sure? (looking bewildered beyond all measure).
King Here is this, take it, take it, Zach.
Coughlin: We go to have my hearing today?
King: First order oI business is Ior you to accept the Complaint
Coughlin: For you may be Pat, but you're not the one who hasn't had a law license last Iour months
over a candy bar so.
King are going to take the complaint it's a Iormal complaint I'm been a deIault you him him. You can
pretend you didn't get it else is take a deIault
Coughlin: Pat I Iiled a motion to dismiss. Seems like you are trying to put Clerk oI Court Peters in
kind oI a bad spot.
King No, you haven't Iiled it it's been rejected,
Coughlin: By who, the prosecutor? The prosecutor rejected it, Pat?
King: Listen the Clerk oI Court Peters rejected it because it doesn't say what it's dismissing. You are
not even acknowledging that you have been served so take the Complaint and then you can answer it.
You're been served right now
Coughlin: well I guess you're Iree to argue that, that you a party that is serving me.
King: No, the Court clerk is serving you. Your at the State Bar oIIice being served with a Complaint
Coughlin I I've got cases this the you can serve a criminal deIendant when they show up to a civil
proceeding
King: This is State Bar.
Coughlin: Oh, I get it. We're playin' prison rules, huh? Like in that movie The Cable Guy when Jim
Carrey is playing pickup ball and says "Oh, we're playing prison rules" to the guys who just Iouled
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000843
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him so hard? I guess, we are "playin' 'prison rules'" down here at the State Bar, huh? Are we going to
have my hearing today? Because the Hearing is limited in scope and purpose, right?
King: Zach listen to the Court Clerk.
Coughlin: Okay.
Peters: when you and I talked about the date Ior September 25 that was a tentative thing I have not
Iormally notice that I never did
King: Because you did not answer the complaint because you did not answer the complaint by me
explain Mr. Coughlin the suspension that you receive Irom the Supreme Court which is their order
saIety oI a problem with the Supreme Court.
Coughlin I did with the SCR 102(4)(d) Petition? Why didn't you answer that, Pat? Now, I win on
that on deIault, too?
King: That's the Supreme Court they suspended you pending...pending a disciplinary Complaint
which is what that is (motioning to a stack oI papers King had earlier laid at Coughlin's Ieet).
Coughlin: So this is a new Complaint Iiling?
King know the suspension is pending the disciplinary action that I bring. I have not Iiled any
disciplinary action they suspended you pending disciplinary action him this is disciplinary and him
(motioning to the stack oI papers on the ground).
Coughlin: SCR 111(8) and the Supreme Court's order said that the hearing is limited to the sole
purpose oI determining Mr. Coughlin's punishment Ior that upon which the SCR 111 Petition was
brought.
King: it does not say that, it says 'pending a disciplinary action by the State Bar'
Coughlin: I am talking about the "hearing beIore the Disciplinary Panel" under SCR 111(8) and the
Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, that is diIIerent than some hearing Under an SCR 105 Complaint. That
the whole import oI the language in SCR 111(8), which the Court quotes exactly in its June 7th, 2012
Order Ior Temporary Suspension oI Law License where it reads, "the supreme court shall"..."reIer the
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing
panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the discipline to be imposed".
King: Listen to me, I am trying to help you. That Complaint (pointing at the stack oI papers on the
ground) is the Complaint that we will have the Hearing on...
Coughlin: We are having a Hearing today, and iI we don't, you deIault, and I get my license back.
King: II you answer that Complaint, then..you will have the right to appear at a Hearing and argue
your case to the Disciplinary Panel. II you do not Iile a VeriIied Answer to the Complaint, then we
will move Iorward, and proceed on a deIault basis, and the Panel may accept every allegation in the
Complaint as true.
Coughlin: So you reIused to Iile the Motion to Dismiss I submitted Ior Iiling?
King: What Motion to Dismiss?
Coughlin: The one Clerk Peters said you told her not to Iile.
King: I didn't tell...I don't tell the Court Clerk what to do...
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000844
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Coughlin: I sent it to you Pat. What Motion to Dismiss?
King: What are you asking to be dismissed? It doesn't say what you are asking to be dismissed. You
can't have it both ways, Zach.
Coughlin: Pat, do you have a case number,? Do you have a case number on that, on that, Pat?
King: Pick it up and read it. Pick it up and read it.
Coughlin: I can wait around her a little while longer Ior you to get my Hearing going, but at some
point I think I would be justiIied in assuming you are reIusing to proceed with or hold the Hearing
you set and noticed, so...you might want to get Chairman Susich or somebody down here and get this
Hearing, here, happenin', Pat.
LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT
A state cannot exclude a person Irom the practice oI law in a manner or Ior reasons that
contravene the due process or equal protection clauses oI the Fourteenth Amendment. 105. Due
process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings concerning his or her
conduct.|FN1| Due process in disciplinary proceedings requires that the attorney be given notice oI
the proceeding and an opportunity to deIend at a hearing, and that the proceeding be essentially Iair.
|FN2| Due process requires that, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the attorney must be notiIied
oI clear and speciIic charges and must be aIIorded an opportunity to anticipate, prepare, and present a
deIense.|FN3| The precise procedural protections oI due process vary, depending upon the
circumstances, because due process is a Ilexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.|FN4|
An attorney is not denied due process where he or she voluntarily leaves the hearing with Iull
knowledge that the proceedings will continue in his or her absence.|FN5| There is no denial oI due
process where an attorney is served with a complaint and requests Ior admissions beIore the bar Iiles
the complaint in the supreme court where the rules do not require that the complaint be Iiled beIore it
is served.|FN6| In addition, an attorney's due process rights are not violated, even though the attorney
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000845
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is not allowed to attend a grievance committee meeting, iI the attorney is served with notice oI the
bar's charges and is aIIorded an opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard.|FN7|
A statute providing Ior automatic disbarment oI an attorney Ior conviction oI an oIIense involving
moral turpitude does not violate due process iI the attorney has notice oI the disbarment proceedings,
and is able to present his or her position to the board on proIessional responsibility and argue that his
or her crimes did not involve moral turpitude.|FN8|
What is important is that the disciplinary board's recommendations put the attorney on notice oI the
charges he or she must answer to the satisIaction oI the court.|FN9| As to the discipline imposed, due
process requires that an attorney Iacing discipline be permitted to explain the circumstances oI the
alleged oIIense and to oIIer testimony in mitigation oI any penalty
to be imposed.|FN10|
Where the evidence at the hearing discloses misconduct not charged in the original notice, the bar
may move to amend the notice to conIorm to the prooI, but iI no such motion is made, the attorney
may be disciplined only Ior the misconduct alleged in the original notice.|FN11|
An attorney may be temporarily suspended without a pre-suspension hearing where the risk oI
erroneous deprivation is minimized by provisions allowing the attorney to continue his or her existing
practice Ior a speciIied time and allow Ior immediate hearing and prompt resolution oI the matter.
|FN12|
Due process requires a court to provide notice and opportunity to be heard to an attorney prior
to imposing a liIetime ban on the attorney's pro hac vice status in the court's local division.|FN13|
Attorney suspended Irom practice oI law was not deprived oI due process by state court
disciplinary procedure, as would warrant imposition oI diIIerent discipline in reciprocal discipline
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000846
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proceeding, Ior attorney's ethics violation in misleading lower court in underlying inheritance action
by Iiling motion to withdraw Iunds consigned in lower court Ior client, but Iailing to disclose that
client had died and misstating that there were no minors involved, since attorney had Iull notice and
opportunity to be heard in state court disciplinary proceeding. In re Oliveras Lopez De Victoria, 561
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009).
Attorney was not denied due process at presentment beIore trial court in disciplinary
proceeding by admission oI complainant's testimony at earlier hearing beIore reviewing committee;
complainant was unavailable, and attorney had a Iull and Iair opportunity to and in Iact did cross
examine complainant at hearing beIore review committee. Statewide Grievance Committee v.
Johnson, 108 Conn. App. 74, 946 A.2d 1256 (2008), certiIication denied, 288 Conn. 915, 954 A.2d
187 (2008).
Attorney was properly notiIied oI disciplinary proceeding, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
proceed, where hearing notiIication was sent by both regular and certiIied mail to attorney's last
address on Iile with the Clerk oI Appellate Courts and both mailings were returned, marked "not
deliverable as addressed," and same notice was mailed to Colorado address that attorney had listed in
a responsive pleading in a prior disciplinary action, and that notice was also returned, marked "return
to sender." Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 215. In re Lober, 241 P.3d 81 (Kan. 2010).
Attorney had no due process right to jury trial in discipline proceeding, even though license to
practice law was a property right. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. In re Gargano, 460 Mass. 1022, 957
N.E.2d 235 (2011).
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000847
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Supreme Court observes due process in exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over an attorney, but
disciplinary proceedings are not encumbered by technical rules and Iormal requirements. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. In re Disciplinary Action against Garcia, 792 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 2010).
Attorney's conviction Ior two misdemeanor counts oI theIt warranted immediate suspension oI
attorney's license under disciplinary rule authorizing immediate suspension pending Iinal disposition
oI disciplinary proceeding predicated upon conviction Ior serious crime. In re Disciplinary Action
Against Fisher, 2008 ND 151, 754 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 2008).
The standards oI due process in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are not equal to those in a
criminal matter. Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St. 3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d
467 (2008). |FN1| The Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). |FN2| Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, 1871 WL 14737 (1871); Jaen v. Coca-Cola Co., 157 F.R.D. 146,
31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 178 (D.P.R. 1994). |FN3| In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160
Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d 859 (2007). |FN4| Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.
2006). |FN5| Colangelo v. State Bar, 53 Cal. 3d 1255, 283 Cal. Rptr. 181, 812 P.2d 200 (1991).
|FN6| The Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1993). |FN7| The Florida Bar v. Committe,
916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1098, 126 S. Ct. 1890, 164 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2006).
|FN8| In re Krouner, 920 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 2007). |FN9| Zauderer v. OIIice oI Disciplinary Counsel
oI Supreme Court oI Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 85 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1985). |FN10| The
Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). |FN11| Edwards v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 28,
276 Cal. Rptr. 153, 801 P.2d 396 (1990). |FN12| In re Lamm, 116 N.C. App. 382, 448 S.E.2d 125
(1994), decision aII'd, 341 N.C. 196, 458 S.E.2d 921 (1995). |FN13| Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 873, 126 S. Ct. 381, 163 L. Ed. 2d 167 (2005).
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000848
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SCR Rule 119. Additional rules oI procedure.
1. Record. The record oI a hearing shall be made available to the attorney at the attorney`s expense
on request made to bar counsel. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83
S. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1963).
2. Time limits not jurisdictional. Except as is otherwise provided in these rules, time is
directoryand not jurisdictional. Time limitations are administrative, not jurisdictional. Failure to
observe directory time intervals may result in contempt of the appropriate disciplinary
board or hearing panel having jurisdiction, but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary
investigation or proceeding.
3. Other rules oI procedure. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada RulesoI Civil
Procedure and the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary cases.
The undersigned (Coughlin) submitted to the Supreme Court oI Nevada's electronic Iiling
system an Opposition to Bar Counsel's petition on or about May 24
th
, 2012, as an original matter
given the online system would not allow Iilings in the case itselI (60838). The Clerk's OIIice
reIused to Iile, mark as received, or, apparently, in any way make the Justices oI this Court away oI
the Opposition. Only aIter the undersigned reputation has been sullied by news outlets Iar and wide
(an article appeared in papers in at least three diIIerent cities, separated by the vast expanse oI our
state) did the Clerk's OIIice allow Coughlin to Iile something in an attempt to tell his side oI the
story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child custody, Ioreclosure deIense,
bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be suspended, even temporarily..
SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS....NRCP 5(e), Filing With the
Court DeIined: 'The Iiling oI pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules
shall be made by Iiling them with the clerk oI the court....The clerk shall not refuse to accept for
filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form
as required by these rules or any local rules or practices. NRCP 5(e). Coughlin is not
accused oI stealing $755,000 candy bars Irom a client yet he was temporarily suspended and his
suspension has now lasted over Iour months. Only aIter the undersigned reputation has been sullied
by news outlets Iar and wide (an article appeared in papers in at least three diIIerent cities, separated
- 12/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000849
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by the vast expanse oI our state) did the Clerk's OIIice allow Coughlin to Iile something in an
attempt to tell his side oI the story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child
custody, Ioreclosure deIense, bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be
suspended, even temporarily...
It is the oIIicial duty oI the clerk oI a court to record (Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court, 2011 WL 1620587 (Ky. 2011). |FN2| ) or Iile all the papers in a cause presented by the
parties, and to indorse the correct date oI the Iiling on them. Estate oI Johnson v. Ciarpelli, 71
A.D.3d 1482, 896 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dep't 2010); In re Simmonds, 271 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.
Waco 2008)The duty is purely ministerial (Benson v. District Clerk, 331 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (writ oI habeas corpus) and the clerk may not refuse to perform except on the order
of the court. Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 988 A.2d 1 (2010); In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783
(Tex. App. Waco 2008).
It is important to note that Coughlin has already had a very important attempted Iiling
rejected by the Clerk oI the Supreme Court oI Nevada, and now Bar Counsel Patrick King, Esq. is,
according to Clerk oI Court oI the State Bar oI Nevada, Laura Peters, telling her not to Iile somethign
Coughlin has submitted Ior Iiling.
Further, Coughlin served his SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in SCR 61426 and his SCR111(10)
Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension upon both Bar Counsel Ior the North, Patrick King and
Bar Counsel Ior all oI Nevada and the main Southern OIIice oI the SBN, David Clark on August
13th, 2012, with both consenting to waive any personal service by a non party rule under SCR 109,
and Iurther, where Clerk oI Court Laura Peters signed a "Notice oI Receipt" oI those documents that
also bore a heading that it was a "ProoI oI Service". See attached in Exhibit 1. So, the SBN wants to
- 13/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000850
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deem Peters "not a party" suIIicient to serve Coughlin with something requiring personal service, but
does not want Peters to be deemed "a party" suIIicient that her signature attesting to a "Notice oI
Receipt" eIIectuates any SCR 102(4)(d) requirement that a "Petition shall be served on Bar
Counsel"? Or, the SBN has just Iailed to timely respond to Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 SCR
102(4)(d) Petition in 61426 and his SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension in
60838, both served on the SBN and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich that very day, August 14th,
2012.
Rule 104(3). State bar counsel....
'3. A grievance against bar counsel or bar counsel`s staff shall be investigated at the direction
oI the president oI the state bar and heard by the board oI governors. A decision oI the board oI
governors against bar counsel may be appealed to the supreme court under the Nevada Rules oI
Appellate Procedure.
SCR 105(2):. 'Commencement oI Iormal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced by bar counsel Iiling a written complaint in the name oI the state bar. The complaint
shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the charges against him or
her and the underlying conduct supporting the charges. A copy oI the complaint shall be
served on the attorney and it shall direct that a veriIied response or answer be served on bar
counsel within 20 days oI service; the original shall be Iiled with bar counsel`s oIIice. The time to
respond may be extended once by the chair Ior not more than 20 days Ior good cause or upon
stipulation oI the parties. In the event the attorney Iails to plead, the charges shall be deemed
admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who Iails to respond within the time provided may
thereaIter obtain permission oI the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, iI Iailure to Iile is
attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
The SBN has admitted, via Clerk oI Court Laura Peters, that not only has the SBN
agreed to and already set Ior hearing the reIerral to the Board called Ior in the Nevada Supreme
Court`s June 7
th
, 2012 Order Temporarily Suspending Coughlin`s License to Practice Law, but also
that any SBN v. Coughlin Complaint Bar Counsel Pat King wishes to throw together at the last
minute in an attempt to skirt the limits oI the jurisdiction granted the Board in the Court`s June 7
th
,
2012 Order, given King`s stated intention to attempt to make a 'combo-hearing out oI the Hearing
called Ior in that Order, despite its 'sole purpose language and the same Iound in SCR 111(8), in
- 14/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000851
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addition to the Iact that given Coughlin`s Petition in 61426, under SCR 102(4)(d), requires an
immediate hearing, and that Petition was duly served on August 13
th
, 2012, both on the Board via
Chairman Susich and both oIIices oI the SBN, via Clark and King, and Peters personal receipt
thereoI, which the SBN has still Iailed to respond to (much less challenge the reconsideration motion
in 60383, etc. (who is talking about who`s competence, again?)...
Further, it is a virtual certainty, given Pat King`s established modes., that any such
Complaint he Iiles, upon it being properly served and not insuIIicient due to illegibility oI the
photocopies oI any exhibits (take it Irom me given 60302 and 60317, I know...) will be wholly
insuIIicient in that it will in no way comply with SCR 105(2), and so, as a preemptive measure,
please be advised that any such Complaint ought take particular care to state who brought what
grievance, and avoid conclusory assertions about something 'lacking legal merit or otherwise
broadly 'demonstrating incompetence.
Further, any assertions by the SBN that sending such a Complaint via certiIied mail,
especially where a phone call to SBN Clerk oI Court Peters on September 14
th
, 2012 yield her giving
Coughlin the SBN`s word that given the SBN`s apparent attempt to serve Coughlin via CertiIied
mail some Complaint Pat King apparently Iollowed through on in his promise to thrown together
haphazardly in hopes oI deIeating any due process accorded the hearing on September 25
th
, 2012,
would not require a response at least until the SBN receives back as unclaimed some second
attempted certiIied mailing under SCR 109.
Proceedings instituted a long time aIter the commission oI the act complained oI are
regarded with disIavor. In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970). Bar Counsel is
purportedly, and ever so conveniently seeking delay Coughlin`s procedural rights to a hearing on the
- 15/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000852
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temporary suspension oI his law license (which has already lasted longer than the NNDB`s
punishment Ior an attorney who admitted to misappropriating about 755,000 candy bars, Irom his
clients, during the course oI his duties as an attorney rather than, allegedly, on a Saturday night at a
Wal-Mart an in no way connected to the practice oI law, and under circumstances that indicate the
conviction stemmed Irom a proceedign wholly devoid oI due process, and where the appeal thereto
was improperly dismissed based upon a Iailure oI the RMC to order the transcripts produced within
10 days (the District Court cited to a civil statute in blaming Coughlin Ior Iailing ot point to a
transcript in his Appeal BrieI where the RMC`s practice oI demanding indigent deIendants use one
and only one court approved transcriptionist and pay her up Iront is violative oI Nevada law.
Since it is essential that the bar and the public perceive the process oI the discipline oI an
attorney as Iair, orderly, and rational, and implicit in this perception is the timely and eIIicient
resolution oI complaints. In re Grossman, 448 Mass. 151, 859 N.E.2d 423 (2007). A delay in
bringing disciplinary proceedings against an attorney it is to be placed into context as a
mitigating factor to be balanced against a number of aggravating factors. In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash. 2D 81, 985 P.2d 328 (1999).
The purpose oI the attorney disciplinary process is not to punish the oIIender|FN4| but to
protect the public. Attorney Grievance Com'n oI Maryland v. GoII, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554 (2007),
reinstatement granted, 2007 WL 2128391 (Md. 2007). The principal reason Ior attorney discipline is
to preserve the conIidence oI the public in the integrity and trustworthiness oI lawyers in general. In
re Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2007) Attorney discipline is designed to protect the public, the legal
proIession, and the legal system and to deter other attorneys Irom engaging in unproIessional
conduct. In re Non-Member oI State Bar oI Arizona, Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 300, 152 P.3d 1183
- 16/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000853
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(2007). Thus, the judgment of a disciplinary proceeding must be fair to the attorney. The
Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).
The purpose oI the temporary suspension oI a lawyer is more than disciplinary; it is also
intended to prompt a response to the board's inquires so the disciplinary action may proceed in a
timely and inIormed Iashion. Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 2010).
Upon inIormation and belieI, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR 105
Complaint being Iiled, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) ConIidentiality: "5. Temporary
suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar Iiles a petition with the supreme court
Ior the temporary suspension oI an attorney beIore a Iormal complaint is Iiled in the underlying
disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as conIidential. II the court grants the
petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry oI the order granting the petition. II the court
denies the petition, then the matter shall remain conIidential until a Iormal complaint is Iiled or the
matter is otherwise concluded." In early May 2012 Coughlin received a disturbing phone call Irom a
client wherein the exact same inIormation regarding some purported "taking away your right to
practice in (REDACTED) Court" was mentioned by the client, despite not such deprivation oI
Coughlin's right to practice in said (REDACTED) Court ever being mentioned by anyone other than
Bar Counsel Pat King (whom reIerenced such a non-existent Order to Coughlin and ChieI Bar
Counsel David Clark during an inIormal three hour meeting Coughlin had with those Bar Counsel in
Reno on August 13th, 2012, while serving the SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR 111(10) Iilings by Coughlin).
King is simply wrong, recklessly and negligently so, and in violation oI SCR 111. King needs to
stop behaving like a Iall semester Ireshman high school girl with no selI esteem taken by every
letterman walking past her wearing a Iootball jersey to school on a Friday game day, eager to be
- 17/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000854
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accepted by the "in crowd" with the "juice" in Nevada legal circles (and overly willing to be used Ior
even the most loathsome oI chores, like, say a SCR 117 Petition Ior a Judge whom had Coughlin
arrested Ior "criminal summary contempt), and, rather, IaithIully uphold the duties oI his OIIice, as
the integrity oI the legal proIession in this State requires it. No such "Order" was ever entered by the
(REDACTED) Court, and it is obvious that King had improper communications with Coughlin's then
client.
Such an anticipated SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint, according to King, will be based
largely upon Coughlin allegedly wearing "pajama bottoms" to the Reno Municipal Court Iiling
counter one day while inquiring about a parking ticket or some other non-sensensical high school
jibberish, will contain more oI the same reckless and lacking in Ioundation mentions oI "breaking
into" the Iormer law oIIice and "broken locks" despite the Iact that no Iactual support exists Ior such
an allegation, there were no "broken locks" ever mentioned by anyone (and iI Hill is willing to make
up Iinding a "bag oI weed and crack pipe" along with describing what Hill's own videos show to be
vitamins as a "large quantity oI pills", then you know Richard G. Hill, Esq. would have been all over
any "broken locks" at the Iormer home law oIIice, yet, there simply were none, not that that would
stop Pat King or J. Thomas Susich Irom cobbling together such an allegation in the SCR 117 Petition
in 60975) along with something about Coughlin being subject to a custodial arrest Ior "jaywalking"
by the Reno Police Department while Coughlin was Iilming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew
loading up a dump truck with items oI personal property then located in Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice (the arrest occurred shortly aIter Coughlin discovered that Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, had
used Coughlin's own distinctive plywood to "secure" or "board up the property" in December 2011,
Ior which the landlord was ultimately awarded costs, $1,060 oI which were based upon Stewart's
invoice Ior "securing the property", which included the cost oI plywood, and "Iixing a leak in the
- 18/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000855
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basement" despite NRS 118A.460 only allowing costs Ior "moving, storing, and inventorying" a
tenant's personal property), which Coughlin was unable to remove during the scant 13 hours he was
aIIorded to do so by the Reno Justice Court's Order Iollowing a Hearing on Coughlin's November
16th, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Hearing was not set or conducted with the
"10 days" required by NRS 40.253(7)-(8) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. needed to go on a six-week
vacation shortly aIter Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 Iiling (in a matter now on appeal in SCR
60331 and 61838, wherein, somehow, a commercial tenant, Coughlin (whom was both running a law
practice and Coughlin Memory Foam, a Ioam mattress business Irom his home, which was
previously utilized Ior commercial purposes by a drug and alcohol rehabilitation counseling business
and is zone Ior mixed use purposes) was summarily evicted based upon a No Cause Eviction Notice
only (ie, the non-payment oI rent was neither noticed, pled, nor argued by the landlord) despite the
clear dictate against the use oI summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants not based
upon the non-payment oI rent (Bench Book stuII) set Iorth in NRS 40.253. The December 21st,
2011 Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien actually required
Coughlin to pay the exact same amount oI rent Ior 17 days (November 1 to November 17th, 2011),
$480 (ie, pro-rated Irom the $900 per month rental agreement) as Coughlin would have under a "Iair
rental value", Ior the "Iull use and occupancy oI the premises" despite the Iact that Hill somehow
signed a Criminal Complaint Ior Trespass Against Coughlin, on November 13th, 2011 despite any
Summary Eviction Order not being served in accordance with NRS 40.400 (and thereIore NRCP 5
and 6(e) vis a vis the "within 24 hours" oI "receipt" oI the lockout order, and, thereIore, any such
lockout that had occured being rendered a nullity or pursuant to a void Order) and where the Washoe
County SheriII's OIIice Civil Process Service Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in writing that the
AIIidavit oI Service Iiled November 7th, 2011 by Deputy Machen, attesting to having "personally
- 19/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000856
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served" the Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011, was, in Iact, purportedly merely posted
to the door oI Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice while Coughlin was not home, at which point a Soldal v.
Cook County violating illegal lockout occurred. In a February 7th, 2012 written correspondence to
Coughlin, Stuchell wrote: "Mr. Coughlin, Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that
day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy oI the Order to the residence. The
residence was unoccupied at the time. Liz Stuchell, Supervisor WCSO Civil Section". The text oI
NRS 40.253 speaks to service oI Lockout Orders: 'The court may thereupon issue an order directing
the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the
order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by
October 27th, 2011 (though not mailed to Coughlin until aIter the November 1, 2011 lockout had
allegedly already occured). That language is only Iound in situations inapplicable to the one incident
that in the summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and
NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections oI NRS 40 where this 'within 24 hours language occurs, and
those situations only apply where, in: 40.253(3)(b)(2): ' 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1
or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: .. (2) That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order
providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order and, 40.253(5)(a): '5. Upon
noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI
complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
home or commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000857
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remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order. The way these summary eviction
proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates
Nevada law. There is not basis Ior eIIectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in
this case. The requirements attendant to serving Summary Eviction Orders and conducting lockouts
are Iound in NRS 40.253 in two sections containing the 'within 24 hours oI receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did Iile
an AIIidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not oIten seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get
up and get out 'within 24 hours oI 'receipt oI the order (what does that even mean? The use oI
terms like 'rendition, 'rendered, 'notice oI entry, 'pronounced, is absent here, and this 'receipt
oI the order language is something rarely Iound elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must Iile a Complaint within 90
days oI 'receipt oI a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which Iollows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in
imputing receipt oI such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a 'constructive
notice standard that relies upon the days Ior mailing extension oI time Ior items served in the
mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reIlect when the plaintiII received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006,
based on three days Ior mailing aIter excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim
under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiII must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90
days oI receipt oI a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(I)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (granting plaintiII an
additional three days Ior mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... Further, as seen in the Anvui case, there is
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000858
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some argument respecting not eIIecting a lockout Ior at least 5 days where a lease has not expired by
its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.
However, in his January 20th, 2012 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. did not get all bogged down in legal research and stuII, instead he just pointed out:
"FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction Lockout
Order) was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department
in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time,
thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property." Hill went on to lie again
in that January 20th, 2012 Motion when he equated his oIIer to let Coughlin get some oI the
personalty Coughlin was unable to remove, due largely to Hill Iailing to remove the chain link
padlock Irom the backyard gate that Hill had only just installed in time Ior the 13 hours Coughlin had
to remove his property in exchange Ior Coughlin waiving his rights to the $700 damage deposit
Coughlin provided upon moving in, where Hill spins it: "12. On Friday, December 23, 2011,
Coughlin had a crew oI helpers, and made progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin Iailed to remove all oI
his belongings Irom the Property. Coughlin Iailed to remove his things despite having been given
additional time to do so aIter the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order oI December 21,
2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired." Apparently, to Hill, at least one has " Iailed to remove all oI his
belongings Irom the Property. Coughlin Iailed to remove his things despite having been given
additional time to do so" where Hill threatens to have one arrested Ior criminal trespass or larceny (oI
their own stuII, arguably) iI one is on the property one minute past 5 p.m., unless one waives any
right to their damage deposit (which neither Hill nor the Landlord eve did return, nor did they
comply with the requirement that they provide an itemized statement indicating an application
- 22/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000859
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thereoI justiIying such a Iailure to return such deposit within 30 days....and Hill does not want to get
into whether his conduct is violative oI the FDCPA or whether he is licensed a as debt collector). In
that Motion, Hill continued on: "13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court Ior a
temporary restraining order to prevent Merliss Irom disposing oI the items he (Coughlin) had
abandoned on the Property. Coughlin's motion was Iully brieIed, and the Court entered its order
denying the motion on January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy oI this Court's January 11,2012
order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. 14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with
EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property
and disposing oI the abandoned items still remaining there. 15. Early that aIternoon, while the
contractor was hauling the Iirst oI several loads oI abandoned property to the transIer station (dump)
Ior disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in traIIic and attempted to prevent him Irom carrying
out his task. 16. SpeciIically, Coughlin stood in Iront oI the contractor's vehicle in an eIIort to
prevent him Irom proceeding to the transIer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor.
Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and Ialsely told
them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to run him over.
Coughlin's acts were speciIically calculated to prevent the contractor Irom disposing oI the
abandoned property, and to Irustrate and interIere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January
11, 2012 order. 17. When Mr. Hill oI the undersigned's oIIice was notiIied oI the Ioregoing, he went
to the transIer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was
then allowed to proceed. 18. However, beIore the contractor could return to the River Rock Property,
Coughlin was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and
yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction oI the
police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") again~t Coughlin Irom the Reno
- 23/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000860
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Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a result oI his antics at
the transIer station and the Property."
The thing is, and Coughlin would sure like to get the 911 tapes (or, more likely, with Hill, any
recordings that may exist oI Hill calling somebody in particular he may have had in mind with the
RPD) oI calls by Coughlin (and iI Wal-Mart can call 911 over a candy bar, or a skater board over an
iPhone he seems to have set down on the concrete ground in downtown Reno, then skaterboarded oII
some 100 yards away Ior suIIiciently long period oI time to seem to have been pretty much the only
person not to have heard somebody who picked it up threaten to throw it is in the river iI it went
unclaimed can call 911 (and make up a bunch oI lies on the spot Ior the purpose oI manipulating the
police into assuages the skateboarders own negligence vis a vis the iPhone) is it unreasonable Ior
Coughlin to call 911 upon happening, totally by chance, to cross paths with Hill's contractor while
driving, catching site oI a huge dump truck Iull oI Coughlin's personal property headed towards the
town dump? Hill admits the Order denying Coughlin's Motion Ior a TPO (and hey, Iamily heirlooms
are pretty Iungible, right? Who needs a TPO Ior that? And its not like the landlord could just accept
rent in the meantime, or that the property still remains unrented to this day, some 11 months aIter the
lockout, and apparently, some $60,000 worth oI attorney's Iees paid to Hill Ior a two bedroom home
that appraises at around $90,000 currently, iI that. And Hill's Iantastic legal work ("wrong site
surgery" and all) was surely worth the risk oI a wrongIul eviction lawsuit (and check out those
potential damages under Winchell v. SchiII, 124 Nev. 938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008), not that the loss oI a
patent attorney's career could amount to all that much). Regardless, its not all that colorable Ior Hill
to allege Coughlin was violating some Order entered on January 11th, 2012 by Coughlin's conduct oI
January 12th, 2012 when NRCP 6(e) provides that 3 days Ior mailing is to be accorded to account Ior
the service oI Iilings, even Iilings electronically served on registered eIilers like Coughlin. Its
- 24/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000861
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similar to Hill wanting a criminal trespass arrest where NRCP 6(e)'s three days Ior mailing where no
personal service was accomplished (by way oI NRS 40.400) and Hill's et al did not even comply with
the constructive service requirements oI mailing the summary eviction lockout order prior to Hill's
breaking into Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on November 1st, 2011, with the help oI the
WCSO, in violation oI Soldal v. Cook County where Coughlin was not accorded the "24 hours"
cushion aIter Coughlin's "receipt" oI the lockout order mentioned in this Court's own packets on the
service oI Lockout Orders, which Hill himselI attached as a subsequent exhibit recently...It gets
Iunnier. The civil division oI the Justice Court and the SheriII's OIIice think that whole "within 24
hours" language in NRS 40.253 means "within 24 hours" oI the SheriII's "receipt" oI the Order Irom
the Justice Court...While other's think it is "within 24 hours" oI the tenant's receipt oI the Order Irom
the SheriII...and this Court's oIIicial Iorms and instructions seem to imply that "at least 24 hours"
Irom "receipt" oI the lockout Order must be accorded to a tenant. Who knows? But, it is not clear,
as Hill suggests, that the "usual custom and practice oI the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice" is black
letter law upon which Bar grievances, custodial criminal trespass arrests, multiple Motion Ior Order
To Show Cause, tens oI thousands oI dollars in attorney's Iees sanctions against a pro se appellant,
etc. are warranted. Somehow the District Court Iound a way to sanction Coughlin with $40,050
worth oI attorney's Iee in that appeal oI the summary eviction without holding a single hearing, well,
other than the Hearing on Hills Order to Show Cause, which was denied when Coughlin destroyed
Hill's contractor Phil Stewart on cross-examination. (Really, Phil? Really? You could Iell "a
depression" in your 2 ton loaded to capacity dump truck upon Coughlin allegedly "climbing up on
it", though you indicated you had already "alighted Irom the vehicle", but, wait, you could see
Coughlin's head above the tailgate walls in your rear view mirror (which doesn't seem to be there on
any the many videos oI the events oI that day. And even iI such a mirror where present on Stewart's
- 25/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000862
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truck, that doesn't really explain how all the personalty stacked up so high in the truck bed (replete
with specialized add-on high stack retaining walls) wouldn't obscure any purported view oI
Coughlin's head high above the area above the specialize hydraulic dump truck's tailgate, conIirming
Stewart's mere suspicion that Coughlin climbed on his truck. Coughlin swears under oath he did not
climb on Stewart's truck. Hill needed a little "Iact" to spice up his Motion to Show Cause just
enough, and "Coughlin climbed up on the truck" was "just the ticket", and Stewart did not mind
going along Ior the ride, so long as... And none oI the many videos Irom that day actually show any
oI the Yosemite Sam cartoon villian type behavior Hill attributes to Coughlin in his wonderIully
imaginative Motion Ior Order to Show Cause and or Application Ior Order oI Protection concerning
the events involved in the jaywalking custodial arrest Hill had Coughlin subjected to on January
12th, 2012.
Much like Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, Ilat out lying in an aIIidavit when he swore
Coughlin "climbed up on" his truck, Hill similarly lied in an aIIidavit about Coughlin, apparently
while "engraged" making "physical contact" with Hill. On Page 2 oI Hill's AIIidavit attach to his
Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, January 20th, 2012, Hills attests: "5. On Friday, December 23,
2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We overlooked the chain on the back gate.
There was nobody at the house when we were there. At approximately noon, my staII inIormed me
that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the oIIice screaming that he could not get in the back yard.
When I Iinished the meeting I was in, I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin
had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We leIt. When we
returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove oII in a small U
-Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside .ground Iloor was mostly
cleared oI all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, but there was still a lot oI
- 26/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000863
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"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove
anything and everything outside, iI they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had
taken oII the hinges beIore we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the
morning.
That is really interesting. Compare the above to the Iollowing excerpt Irom page 3 oI Hills
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition in CV11-03628, the appeal oI the summary eviction Order: "12. While
at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than one occasion, screamed proIanities at
Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him.
At least the audio oI this incident was captured on tape. 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and his agents additional, unfettered, and
unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any remaining items." Whereas in his
January 20th, 2012 sworn Declaration Hill goes so Iar as to indicate Coughlin "made physical
contact" (which is a damn lie anyways), in Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s NRCP 11 signed
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition, HIll's associate Baker will only go so Iar as to say that Coughlin, "at
one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him." Baker was standing directly
next to Hill during the interacation wherin Hill swore, under penalty oI perjury, that Couglhin "made
physical contact" with Hill). Sounds like Casey Baker, Esq. was not quite willing to "spice up" the
story line as Hill himselI was. Casey probably did not have enough reason to sign on to the lies
about Coughlin "climbing on" the contractor's truck. In Hill's Application Ior a Protection Order
against Coughlin Hill slips up and claims that Coughlin was "climbing on the contractor's truck,
picking through the contents" back at Couglin's Iormer home law aIter the interaction at the "transIer
station" (town dump), whereas Hill's contractor indicated in his AIIidavit that the alleged "climbing"
on his truck occurred at the "transIer station". However, both Hill and his contractor, Phil Stewart
- 27/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000864
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indicate that the Reno Police Department "requested" that Hill Iiled a Protection Order Application
against Coughlin. II that is true, its improper. The RPD can provide individuals inIormation about
seeking one, but when the RPD goes a step Iurther and starts urging individuals to Iile protection
order applications, or, as has recently been the case with RPD OIIicer Alan Weaver and Sargent
Oliver Miller, whom, upon inIormation and belieI, urged Northwind's apartment maintenance man
Milan Krebs to sign a Iraudulent criminal complaint against Coughlin Ior "disturbing the peace" on
July 3rd, 2011, and again urged Superior Mini Storage's Matt Grant to sign a similar baseless
"disturbing the peace" criminal Complaint against Coughlin on approximately September 21st, 2012
then there is more than a little indication that the RPD is out oI control and attempting to incite
members oI the public to sign Iraudulent criminal complaints based upon a retaliatory animus by the
RPD towards Coughlin. OIIicer Weaver and Sargent Dye showed up to an unnoticed July 5th, 2012
bail hearing Ior Coughlin, presided over by Judge Linda Gardner's brother RMC Judge William
Gardner (whom received Coughlin's timely Notice oI Appeal oI the criminal trespass conviction,
under NRS 189.010, yet Iailed to Iorward it on to the District Court, which somewhat recently
dismissed Coughlin's appeal in that matter, wherein Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver testiIied under
oath, with City Attorney Jill Drake singing backup, the the eIIectd that, despite bail only being valid
based upon one reason in Nevada (to secure the deIendant's attendance at trial) the "public health and
saIety" dictated increasing the cash required to bail out Couglin TENFOLD, Irom a bondable $1,415
to a CASH ONLY $3,000. Consequently, upon Judge Gardner so impermissibly raising Coughlin's
bail, alleging a "public health and saIety" rationale Ior so doing, Couglin was Iorced to spend 18 days
in jail, wherein the opportunity to timely contest the $40,050 attorney Iees award to Richard Hill
incident to the summary eviction appeal ran, all while Coughlin was denied any opportunity to access
justice or Iile documents Irom jail, and where Coughlin sustained signIicant damages, Iinancial and
- 28/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000865
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otherwise, and where the jail reIused to transport Coughlin to a hearing on a landlord tenant matter
wherein he was a named party. The extent to which local law enIorcement is willing to play "kick
the can" with an attorney, particularly where Bar Counsel Pat King is so willing to join the chorus, is
troubling, and indicates the judiciary need issue a clarion call out to announce the extent to which
such misconduct can not, and will not, be tolerated. Such a retaliatory animus towards Coughlin by
the RPD is likely due to his September 7th, 2011 Complaint with respect to a wrongIul, retaliatory,
and Iraudulent arrest by RPD OIIicer Nicholas Duralde, which was accompanied by extortionate
threats by RPD OIIicer Ron Rosa that iI Coughlin didn't cooperate they would "call the Nevada Bar
and let them know how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' Ior ya?" While
Duralde testiIied that he did not hear or recall Rosa's coercive threats to Coughlin just prior to the
arrest, the Iact that Duralde echoed those threats by saying "Now, I can arrest you Ior larceny. Now,
I can do a search incident to arrest. How's that?" tends to undermine Duralde's contention that "he
doesn't recall" hearing anything like what OIIicer Rosa was capture on tape saying to Coughlin just
prior to the arrest. Upon making a Fourth Amendment violating arrest completely lacking in
probable cause, and smugly "joking" to Coughlin about the "beneIits" associated with charging
Coughlin with a "Ielony", (at the time oI the August 20th, 2011 arrest, the Ielony larceny amount
limit was $250 and above) compared to a misdemeanor (under some halI baked "grand larceny" oI an
allegedly lost or mislaid or abandoned three year old iPhone 3G that the alleged victim testiIied was
only then worth "about $80-100" on eBay or Craigslist), ie, search incident to custodial arrest
possible where probable cause lacking to arrest, or even reasonable suspicion missing to do a pat
down, where alleged crime occured outside oIIicer's presence, aIter 7 p.m., and no citizens arrest
immediately eIIectuated, particularly where Coughlin himselI made a 911 call prior to OIIicer's
arriving and where video Irom minutes prior to oIIicer arriving reveal Coughlin suggesting the 8-12
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000866
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hostile late teens to early twenties skater boarders relax, stay peaceIul, reIrain Irom assaulting and
battering Couglin, and wait Ior the police arrive so a lawIul, peaceIul resolution could be attained
(with Coughlin even cautioning the youths about a then recent tragic death occurring not Iar Irom
that location).
Further Hill just Ilat out lies in his January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Motion Ior
Emergency Restraining Order. Well, he did tell the truth when he wrote, on page 3: "11. On Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel Ior Merliss neglected to remove the padlock to the back gate oI the
property." That is true, he did do that, and it did prevent Coughlin Irom removing all his property
during the scant 13 hours Coughlin had to move it. But, when Hill swears, on page 3, that:
"Coughlin's access to the house itselI was never hindered.:" he is just "sippin' drank" or something,
as, obviously Iailing to remove a lock on a gate gonna tend to have that eIIect, now...and when Hill
swears: " 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and
his agents additional, unIettered, and unlimited access to the outside oI the property to remove any
remaining items. The only condition placed on that access was that Coughlin's helpers agreed to
replace the gate on its hinges as best they could. Coughlin and his agents Iailed to remove the
remainder oI Coughin's property Irom the yard that night, and Iailed to put the gate back on the
hinges." Coughlin was never made aware oI any such "oIIer" by Hill, and, even iI he had been, hey,
it's the "outside oI the property", Rich, people generally put their valuables insiae, you know?
Then the HIll prevarication and obIuscation express kicks into overdrive, when, in his
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition he continues on: "C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay Coughlin
claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385, although he has not
provided any prooI in support oI his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct
copy oI the justice's court's docket as oI December 19, 2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a
- 30/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000867
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Iiling Iee Ior his appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount oI $216.00." Well, actually, Judge
SIerrazza waived the Justice Court's $24.00 Iiling Iee, and the $216.00 represents the District Court's
Iiling Iee, and its not really clear whether that date is when the check was cashed by the District
Court, or whether the Justice Court held on to the check Ior quit4e awhile beIore shipping it along
with the ROA to the District Court, etc., etc. Hill continues: "It is entirely unclear Irom the Iollowing
entries oI that docket whether or when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385."
That might, technically be true, Rich, to the extent that you wrote it on January 3rd, 2012, and are
sneakily indicating that you are looking at an old docket Irom the Justice Court Irom December 19th,
2012, even though Coughlin made a big deal to you and the Justice Court, in writing, that he was
depositing the $250.00 supersedeas bond mentioned in NRS 40.385, on December 22nd, 2011, a Iact
which Hill himselI mentions in his own Iilings...So, kind oI a lack oI candor to the tribunal there to
make all this argument based upon some old docket and the extent to which it Iails to reveal or
"make clear" matters to which Hill had ready written notice oI via his own e-Flex account and
service oI Iilings upon him connected thereto, in addition to Coughlin's Iaxes, emails, and there
might have even been a service oI a Notice oI Posting Supersedeas Bond (need to check on that
more), etc. in connection with the depositing on December 22nd 2012, the $250 required Ior a stay
during appeal oI a summary eviction in NRS 40.385. And, actually, Hill slipped up a bit there, in
light oI the Iollowing: And, actually, Hill, in his January 20th, 2012 Iiling, admitted that Coughlin
sent him that December 22nd, 2011 email notiIying him oI the posting oI the $250 supersedeas bond
seeking a stay, when he admits, on page 3: "11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided
access to the Property on Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the
undersigned and 1udge Sferrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a
stay, and to return to and continue in possession of the Property. 1udge Sferrazza quickly
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000868
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responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied." Found in
Exhibit 1 is the December 22nd email to Hill's OIIice that alerts them to the posting oI $250 ,
speciIied as a "supersedeas bond", with a citation to NRS 40.385:
Hill's January 3rd, 2012 Opposition continues, on page 8: "Even iI Coughlin eventually paid
some amount toward an appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do
that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The
lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to Iind that statute and
pay any money to the court, he had been locked out oI the property Ior six weeks. As such, any
request Ior a stay was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
or personal". Oddly, Anvui saw a stay granted aIter a lockout was conducted, and Hill (RPC 3.1
"meritorious contention" issues) cites to no legal authority Ior his contention that "to stay the eviction
during this appeal...a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posed, prior to the
lockout." Citation? None.
Despite Hill's strange approach oI not actually indicating that his oIIice did not get an
December 22nd, 2011 email notiIying them oI the posting oI $250 Ior a supersedeas bond seeking a
stay under NRS 118A.385 (but rather, Hill Iocuses on what one cannot glean Irom looking at a dated
docket...), Hill's OIIice was made aware oI such matters, in writing, in the Iollowing December 22nd
email to Hill's OIIiee: "...Further, this is all moot at this point as I have Iiled a Supersedeas Bond of
$250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay of eviction and am entitled to
return to the property and continue in possession. The statute sets the Supersedeas Bond
(which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a
commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the No
Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000869
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impermissible, as Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants
where only a No Cause Eviction Notice is filed. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker
cannot have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order of December 21, 2011 is just that, and
Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reflects
that. NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained
by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. In an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property Ior which
the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a
showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal.
A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the
clerk oI that court as the surety's agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety's liability upon the
bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may be released, on motion
in the appellate court without independent action. 2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises
that are the subject oI the appeal during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in
the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
due. II the tenant Iails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary
eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
Esq.".
Oh, and Hill and Stewart admit to this in a video. Richard Hill's contractor, Ior some strange
reason, removed a ladder Coughlin owns Irom the property, preventing Coughlin's access to the attic
upon his being allowed that scant 13 hours to remove his property (and the attic had been renovated
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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to allow Ior storage oI a considerable amount oI property. II Coughlin was Hill he would have called
the RPD to report the "larceny" oI his ladder by Hill, in a RICO thing with his contractor. But Hill
escaped prosecution that time, over they whole ladder deal. It never was made clear why the
contractor removed the ladder Irom the property, other than, perhaps, like the applying oI a lock to
the backyard gate, make it even more unlikely that Coughlin would be able to remove all he needed
to, especially given the limited Iunds Ior moving vehicles and hired help, in the scant 13 hours
allowed under the December 21st, 2012 Order.
Things have just gotten too ridiculous where an attorney's license gets placed in jeopardy Ior
saying "Wow" in court (or King threatens to buttress an SCR 105 Complaint upon such scandalous
behavior while the RPD can violate the Fourth Amendment while making threatening, coercive
statements and smugly, menacingly joking to an arrestee (whom dared ask iI the oIIicer actually had
reasonable suspicion to conduct such an evasive Terry Stop style weapons check pat down on one
whom himselI called 911 to report an attack by skater youths, while holding his Pekingness and
bicycle, which the skaters were trying to rob the attorney oI when they weren't "jokingly" making
sudden attempts to reach into the attorney's pockets) about overcharging an arrest to get around the
dictates against conducting a custodial arrest and search incident thereto Ior some ill supported petty
larceny oI an iPhone, allegedly occuring aIter 7 pm, outside the oIIicer's presence, based upon some
"lost, mislaid, or abandoned" property Iact pattern worthy oI a law school Iinal exam where someone
Iinds an iPhone on the ground in downtown Reno, oIIers it up to the denizens oI a downtown skate
plaze shortly beIore midnight on a Saturday, then threatens to "throw it in the river" iI someone does
not claim it immediately, which eventually leads to an attorney being attacked by a group oI youthIul
skateboards making up every lie they can think oI to prevent any inIerence that said iPhone was
abandoned and or rescued Irom waste or destruction or that assaulting and battering one who does
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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not immediately turn over an iPhone to a hostile, violent group oI 8 to 12 late teens early twenties
skaterboards yelling things like "give us the phone Iaggot". Further, in Nevada, a larcenous intent
must exist at the time one takes possession oI lost or mislaid property. "A taking with the intention
oI returning the property, or a taking without the intent to permanently deprive the owner oI his
property, will not amount to larceny, even though the perpetrator, aIter gaining possession oI the
property, Iormed that intent. State v. CliIIord, 14 Nev. 72, 33 Am.Rep. 526; State v. Ward, 19 Nev.
297, 10 P. 133; Robinson v. GoldIield Merger Mines Co." Harvey v. State, 78 Nev. 417, 422-23, 375
P.2d 225, 227-28 (1962) |78 Nev. 417, Page 420| , 46 Nev. 291, 213 P. 103. The requirement that the
original taking and the Ielonious intent coexist in point oI time was properly mentioned in the written
instructions given in the instant case. Moreover, we recognize that the question oI whether the
property was originally taken with such intent is one oI Iact, the determination oI which is to be
made Irom a consideration oI all the circumstances preceding, attending and Iollowing the taking oI
the property. State v. Cudney, 47 Nev. 224, 218 P. 736.
There has already been testimony in such a pending criminal matter against an attorney the
the attorney did not attempt to Iurtively or immediately Ilee the scene where he was allegedly Iree
handed such an iPhone, and where the Witness Statements conveniently leIt out the whole bit about
the man holding the phone up and threatening to "throw it in the river" (an an admission by several
hostile witnesses that that did occur was caught on videotape) and, not only that, but actually lied an
indicated these witnesses "personally eye witnessed" the attorney just walk up and "grab" the iPhone
oII the ground, etc. Oh, also, the whole arrest was caught on tape too, as were the moments prior
thereto, and the alleged victims are clearly shown lying to 911 operators about someone "socking a
minor" to engender a more rapid and urgent police response. Never mind that the alleged "socking"
was actually Ilinching went an 18 year old, along 8-12 oI his hostile and aggressive Iriends
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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attempting to rob the attorney oI his bicycle and or dog, made a "joking" and sudden movement
intended to make the attorney think the 18 year old was "reaching in" the attorney's pockets...Add to
that the Iact that they OIIicer announced to the attorney within seconds oI arriving on seen that he
was going to conduct a search incident to arrest, and only later made up a bunch oI pretextual
rationale to support conducting a Terry Stop pat down, then a search incident to arrest, while alleging
the attorney's question as to, whether the oIIicer had a suIIicient basis to conduct such a pat down or
search incident to arrest, without anything more to support a larceny probable cause analysis than an
allegation that one possessed an iPhone that was purportedly leIt on the ground, whereupon that
person called 911 upon being attacked by a group oI 8-12 immediately aIter Iailing to instantly
adhere to their threatening demands to consent to a search on one's pockets, accompanied by a touch
oI assault and battery to boot, and some hate speech. Such is not supportable, particularly where
merely penaing Ior denying one due process required under the law, and particularly SCR 102(4)(d)
and SCR 111(8) and SCR 111(10).
The Iact that the criminal trespass custodial arrest occurred at a time when Coughlin still had
not received back the $2,275 "rent escrow" the Reno Justice Court Iorced Coughlin to deposit with
the RJC in that very summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" (all while Coughlin was, at least according
to Hill, supposed to hire movers and rent a U-Haul and otherwise have suIIicient Iunds to conduct a
large scale move oI a home law oIIice aIter having just gone Irom zero to expert on landlord tenant
law litigating a "Trial" Ior a law oIIice tenant in a matters oI days...). Coughlin made such a deposit
or $2,275 "rent escrow" with the RJC on October 17th, 2011 (aIter the October 13th, 2011 summary
eviction hearing in Rev2011-001708 wherein the RJC Judge ruled that Coughlin "had established a
material issue oI Iact" as to retaliation and habitability (and perhaps discrimination, that is not clear)
and set a "Trial" (but only iI Coughlin deposited $2,275 in a "rent escrow" account with the RJC by
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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October 17th, 2011) Ior October 25th, 2011 (despite a "Trial" under JCRCP 109 requiring 20 days to
respond to a Complaint, under NRS 40.251, ie, a plenary unlawIul detainer action with all the
attendant due process trimmings). Further, the Summary Eviction Order stemming Irom the October
25th, 2011 "Trial" (it was noticed as a "Trial" in writing by the Court, reIerred to as a Trial by the
Court) and the accompanying criminal trespass conviction stemming thereIrom are likely void do to
the Iact that Coughlin Iiled, on October 18th, 2011 a Notice oI Appeal (on a Iorm that, by the way,
indicated McLaughlin's exposure Ior any attorney's Iee award would be limited to $15.00, much less
the $40,050 ultimately entered against Coughlin in an attorney's Iee sanction in CV11-03628 by
Judge Patrick Flanagan. That Notice oI Appeal Iorm was provided to Coughlin by a Clerk oI the
RJC in response to a speciIic request by Coughlin Ior the Iorm to appeal the Order stemming Irom
his October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and the Iorms on the RJC web site at the time,
under a heading oI "Notice oI Appeal" linked to that same Iorm, and did not in any way speciIy such
Iorm to only apply to appeals oI small claims actions). Coughlin's Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal oI
that October 13th, 2011 Order Iollowing the summary eviction proceeding, under Mack v. Mack-
Manley, divested any jurisdiction oI the RJC to hold such a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, and any
such "Trial" was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction anyway, NRCP 60(b)(4) in light oI the dictates oI NRS
40.253(6) ("shall make no Iurther Order" upon the Justice Court Iinding tenant had established a
genuine issue oI material Iact, which Judge SIerrazza indicated Coughlin had in his Order Iollowing
the October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and again, on the record, during the October
25th, 2011 Trial, Judge SIerrazza again stated that he set the matter Ior "Trial" upon his making a
"Iinding that Coughlin established a genuine issue oI material Iact", which, under Anvui, and NRS
40.253(6), prevented Judge SIerrazza Irom making any Iurther order, and the lack oI a corollary to
Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 in the RJC, along with the dictates against unwritten/not approved
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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by the Nevada Supreme Court and counter to express statutory mandates in NRS 118A and NRS 40
"house rules" set Iorth in JCRCP 83 should have prevented Iorcing Coughlin to make any "rent
escrow" deposit oI $2,275 right in the middle (actually aIter it should have ended) oI a summary
eviction proceeding.
JCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS
Each justice or justice court in a township with more than one justice, by
action oI a majority oI the justices thereoI, may Irom time to time make and
amend the rules governing its practices not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies oI rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not
become effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and
publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules.
Further, any "Trial" in that summary eviction matter, and thereIore any
criminal trespass arrest based upon any Iailure to properly adhere to some
improperly served Lockout Order stemming thereIrom, is also void in light
oI the noncompliance with JCRCP 109: SETTING OF TRIAL IN
ACTIONS
"(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20 calendar
days aIter service oI summons and complaint."
To continue the temporary suspension oI Coughlin's constitutionally protected
(under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law license is a "property right") law license
based upon conjecture, hearsay, Pat King's "innocent" mistakes about "Iacts" and
various orders so terribly subject to being Iound void under NRCP 60(b)(4), etc. and a
criminal trespass conviction similarly suspect, particularly where Coughlin's Iilings
Further, Judge SIerrazza admitted that the RJC did not have a rule Ior Iorcing
Coughlin to make such a "rent escrow" deposit at the time such was ordered on
October 13th, 2011 in the summary eviction proceeding. And even iI the RJC did
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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have such a rule speaking to "deposits" with the RJC, JCRRT Rule 2 makes clear that
such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":
JCRRT Rule 2. Application oI Rules. Except as otherwise provided by
statue, these rules apply to all civil proceedings Iiled in Reno Township
except small claims and landlord tenant matters.
Oh, and Hill still managed to get Coughlin subject to the November 13th, 2011 custodial
arrest (ie custodial have someone with color oI law make you strip naked and spread your buttocks
search incident to arrest, and even apparently allow a complete copying and, some times "erasing" oI
one's smart phone, separate micro sd data card, or laptop pursuant to such a "search incident to
arrest"...like what occurred on February 27th, 2012 incident to the traIIic citation trial beIore RMC
Judge Nash Holmes (whom told Coughlin she would have him arrested iI he said Richard G. Hill's
name one more time) in 11 TR 26800 2I stemming Irom the three traIIic citations RPD Sargent John
Tarter called in a diIIerent RPD OIIicer to issue Coughlin incident to Coughlin being told to leave
Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law oIIice where Coughlin had gone (upon being released Irom jail on
November 15th, 2011) to retrieve his keys, wallet, state issued identiIication and client's Iiles Irom
Hill, whom reIused to provide such items to Coughlin, upon Coughlin being bailed oI jail aIter
spending three days there in connection with the criminal trespass arrest connected to the criminal
Complaint signed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. At that February 27th, 2012 traffic citation Trial in RMC
11 TR 26800 (and not even some juicy reckless driving thing, just a plain old "Iailure to come to a
complete stop at a stop sign/CaliIornia Roll/Boulevard Stop traIIic ticket"), Coughlin was sentenced
to Iive days jail, denied a stay (despite being a practicing attorney with actual clients depending upon
him) by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes seconds aIter Coughlin testiIied that RPD Sargent Tarter
"lied" during his testimony concerning what Coughlin's purported to be a retaliatory issuance oI
multiple traIIic citations incident to Coughlin repeating to Tarter what may have been a sarcastic
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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repose to Coughlin by RPD OIIicer Chris Carter during the criminal trespass arrest Irom Coughlin's
Iormer home law oIIice just days prior, when Coughlin queried Carter iI he, too, was on Hill's
payroll. In Judge Nash Holmes written February 28th, 2012 Order Finding DeIendant in Contempt
oI Court and Imposing Sanctions (a Iive day immediate trip to jail, and a Iailure to release Coughlin
aIter the Iourth day despite the RMC accepting and Iailing to return $100 Coughlin's mother
deposited with the RMC upon an agreement being made to so release Coughlin at the end oI the
Iourth day...which was not adhered to), Judge Nash Holmes somehow Iound it Iair to impose the
Iollowing upon a pro se indigent criminal deIendant (much in line with the RMC's prerecorded
arraignment videos which basically attempt to scare any and all out oI even darign to represent
themselves beIore the RMC, especially where Keith Loomis, Esq. and the boys down there provide
such a ready lubricant to the, uh, justice the RMC dispenses: "The court had the deIendant sworn at
the beginning oI the trial, stating that the court has Iound that most selI-represented deIendants tend
to testiIy a great deal as they cross- examine opposing witnesses, so the deIendant would be under
oath Irom the start, too. exhibits were marked or admitted." That practice apparently is read to
provide support Ior some contention that Coughlin violated some RPC while appearing as a pro se
criminal deIendant in a traIIic citation Trial, where Coughlin's smart phone and micro sd card were
searched incident to his arrest Ior "summary contempt committed in the Court's presence" and
"booked into evidence" where they stayed Ior some 37 days, and where returned to Coughlin with all
the data erased, but not beIore lots oI contradictory statements were made by the SheriII's OIIice, the
City oI Reno Marshal's, the RMC, the Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice, and the Washoe
County Detention Facility regarding the chain oI custody oI that smart phone and data card, whether
it was removed Irom the evidence room at the jail and transported back to the RMC on February
28th, 2012, whether a micro sd card was even included in the property so inventoried then booked
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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into evidence, and whether that micro sd card was released to an associate oI Coughlin or kept with
the smart phone Ior those 37 days. Curiously, in Judge Nash Holmes March 30th, 2012 Order
Releasing Property, that Order indicates: "IT IS ORDERED that the Washoe County SheriIIs OIIice
shall release to the DeIendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, three items taken Irom him on
February 27, 2012 at Washoe County Regional Detention Facility during his booking Ior
incarceration pursuant to the imposition oI a 5-day jail sentence Ior Contempt oI Court in the above-
entitled case, to wit: one Samsung Cell Phone; one T-Mobile Cell Phone; and one Braun Electric
Razor, as identiIied in Case Number WC 12-1805 and reIerred to under Control # C-47951."
That's the thing, though. There were Iour items, not three. Marshal Harley, whom made sure
he was the one doing the lookin' through oI the pockets and pattin' down oI the body and all that, he
made a big deal about how the micro sd card was not in the smart phone. Actually, Marshal Harley
pretty much rendered an Order convicting Coughlin oI this and that in conjunction with his
conducting the search incident to arrest oI Coughlin. The Iourth was a micro sd card, capable oI
holding an entire libraries worth oI books on it in digital Iormat. While the smart phone was
returned, with the micro sd data card inserted into it, it was not Iound that way during the "search
incident to arrest". The micro sd card was not inserted into the phone. Such a micro sd card can be
inserted into a Ilash drive adapter, into a digital camera, into a lot oI things, not necessarily one's
smart phone. And the Washoe County Regional Detntion Facility did not return the phone
immediately in compliaince with the Order, but rather indicated that the Washoe County District
Attorney OIIice had to give permission and or get to possess the materials Iirst, with "Maddy" oI the
WCSO indicating Coughlin need contact Mary Kandaras oI the WCDA's OIIice.
Eventually, aIter 37 days, the smart phone and micro sd card were returned to Coughlin with
all the date therein erased, but not beIore Judge Nash Holmes entered an Order accusing Coughlin,
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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vaguely, oI lying (not getting all that speciIic though with respect to just what it was Coughlin was
apparently "lying" about, but some reIerence was made to rules related to the media and court
proceedings...and then a laundry list copy and pasted Irom teh RPC oI all the purported violations oI
various RPC's that Coughlin was Iound to have committed "by clear and convincing
evidence"...including such vague and entirely devoid oI any explication or Iactual rulings that
Coughlin was guilty oI demonstrating a "lack oI Iairness to opposing counsel" or "prolonging
proceedings", etc...Coughlin did report to City Attorney Allison Ormaas during a brieI plea
bargaining session immediately beIore the Trial that RPD OIIicer Carter made a statement (perhaps
said sarcastically while arresting an attorney Ior criminal trespass where the RPD reIused to issue a
citation or identiIy themselves as law enIorcement prior storming in Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice's
"basement", where a stay is mandated under NRS 118A.380, where one's rent is less than $1,000 and
damages awarded are nil, Ior no more than a $250 deposit, at a time when Coughlin had yet to be
returned the $2,275 impermissible "rent escrow" deposit Iorced upon him in a summary eviction) that
"Richard Hill pays me a lot oI money so I arrest who he says to arrest and do what he says to do"
upon Coughlin asking Carter iI he, too, was on Richard G. Hill's payroll. It appears that at some
point, perhaps while they were whispering in each other's ears (as Coughlin noted on the record
during the Trial in 11 TR 26800) during the Trial that Marshal and City Attorney Ormaas were
aIraid Coughlin may have some evidence oI Ormaas's admitting to Coughlin that she was in no way
going to Iollowing up on an statements by an RPD OIIicer that may tend to present and admission oI
accepting some improper beneIit in exchange Ior committing oIIicial misconduct under color oI law,
or otherwise document such inIormation. The RMC's Marshal Harley seemed to be upset about the
possibility that Coughlin may have some evidence oI Harley purporting to personally serve Coughlin
the Order to Show Cause in CV11-03628 (and Machen's AIIidavit oI Service Iiled March 8th, 2012
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
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indicates Machen "personally served" Coughlin, which not the case, as apparently Machen did not
want to wait around Ior a Iew minutes Ior Coughlin's bargaining session with City Attorney Ormaas
to end, which means Machen was cutting a corner, which is something courts and local law
enIorcement punish ordinary citizens Ior every day in Washoe County. When Marshal Harley began
to realize Coughlin's questions to him were revealing some questionable issue (so, you don't know
whoat WCSO Deputy handed you this Order to Show Cause? You have no idea? You didn't
recognize him at all? Did he "personally serve" me it, or did you, Marshal Harley? Why is this even
being personally served? And why while I am attending court on a totally unrelated matter? Is that
proper? Is that somewhat hostile and done in an attempt to embarass Coughlin at the courthouse? Is
that appropriate? Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally
served"? Have not Iound one yet...Especially where Coughlin was a registerd eIiler at the time, and
thereIore, likely had already been deemed served. Where the subsequent AIIidavit oI Service theIore
indicated it was actually the same WCSO Deputy Machen having "personally served" such Notice on
Coughlin, along with some impromptu questioning oI Harley as to whether such service was being
done bas To the extent City oI Reno Marshal Harley barged in to that bargaining session purporting
to personally serve Coughlin Notice oI a Hearing and or Order to Show Cause in connection with
Hill's Motion Ior Order to Show Cause in the appeal oI the summary eviction matter (which resulted
in a quadruple jeopardy cocktail courtesy oI Hill, based largely upon the same acts which resulted in
Coughlin being arrested Ior "jaywalking", and Hill getting a TPO, and Bar Counsel Pat King making
a Iederal case oI Hill's January 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin submitted to the SBN, wherein
Hill leads oII with an allegation that Coughlin was "ghostwriting Ior" someone Ior whom Coughlin
was listed as attorney of recora. Huh? Then Hill went to "comply with his RPC 8.3 obligation" by
reporting the conviction underpinning the current temporary suspension (something Coughlin
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000880
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himselI reported in compliance with SCR 111 prior to any knowledge oI Hill's having done so, not
that Bar Counsel bothered to mention that in its SCR 111 Petition, something this Court made note oI
a lack thereoI in its June 7th, 2012 Order).
Incidentally, RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitted during a videotaped interview that neither
she nor her Iellow oIIice, Carter, identiIied themselves as law enIorcement while calling to Coughlin
at the basement door prior to the landlord opening it, nor requested or warned Coughlin to leave the
property prior to arresting him Irom criminal trespass Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on
November 13th, 2011...despite Hill testiIying under oath that they did so identiIy themselves prior to
the landlord opening the "basement" door and that the RPD OIIicer did issue a warning to leave to
Coughlin or otherwise provide Coughlin a chance to heed such a warning prior to eIIecting a
custodial arrest. What makes that even more troubling is the Iact that Hill provided the City oI Reno
prosecutors video oI pretty much all events other than the "knock and identiIy themselves" as law
enIorcement Hill purports the RPD did (even where RPD Sargent Lopez indicates neither she nor
OIIicer Carter did so identiIy themselves prior to the basement door being opened by the landlord).
Amongst the videos that Hill Iilmed on November 13th, 2011 that Hill did manage to provide to City
oI Reno prosecutors was a video oI Coughlin asking OIIicer Carter and Sargent Tarter, prior to the
point oI arrest, why, iI they Ielt he was trespassing, they wouldn't simply issue a citation in lieu oI
making a custodial arrest. Hill's own video establishes that Hill's testimony during the criminal
trespass matter is extremely problematic respecting whether the RPD identiIied themselves prior to
the landlord opening the door and whether the RPD issued Coughlina warning to leave and
opportunity to heed it prior to eIIecting a custodial criminal trespass arrest. Hill had Coughlin
arrested Ior criminal trespass, even where Coughlin had to pay Ior "storage" the same amount, $480
as the Lease Agreement required Ior "Iull rental value Ior Iull use and occupancy oI the premises"
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000881
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Ior 17 days oI "storage" oI Coughlin's personal property, and even where NRS 108.475 and NRS
40.760 indicate a summary eviction is required where one is "using a storage Iacility as a residence"
(iI that was the case, which has not been established), not a criminal trespass arrest, particularly
where RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, in violating Soldal v. Cook County, expounded to Coughlin upon
his learned views on "service" oI eviction orders like some modern day Friedenthal. Then there is
the Iact that Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice was robbed oI approximately $8,000 worth oI
personalty on December 12th, 2011 (during the six week wait Ior a Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien, again, because, according to Hill, the RJC was going to postpone
setting any such hearing until Hill's six week vacation was over, despite the statutory dictate that
such a hearing be set within 10 days oI Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 Iiling oI a Motion to
Contest Personal Proeprty Lien). The December 21st, 2011 Order on Coughlin's Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien required Coughlin to rush into his Iormer home law oIIice, and take in the
specter oI it having been torn asunder and robber, with a chortling Richard G. Hill, Esq. standing on
Iilming the occasion, and quickly throw together an "inventory oI anything lost, stolen or damaged",
then hop over to Kinko's or some wi-Ii and email the RJC with such an inventory, copying Hill in the
process. Even though the statutes in Nevada are amongst the harshest towards tenants compared to
the other 49 states, the RJC, Washoe County SheriII's OIIice, Reno Police Department, and landlords
like Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss, MD (a Chico, Ca. based neurosurgeon whom graduated Irom Beverly
Hills HS) and their attorney (or, their unauthorized practice oI law committing "eviction consulting
and process service" company, like Nevada Court Services) really go the extra mile in making
Nevada a very dangerous, and perhaps, lethal, place to be a tenant. Oh, and the Judge Iinding
Coughlin guilty oI the Reno Municipal Code's version oI criminal trespass, RMC Judge William
Garnder, Iound support Ior the "when on property with an intent to vex and annoy" the owner oI a
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000882
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property version oI criminal trespass where the Judge and prosecution also maintained that Coughlin
was "secretly" going on the property (apparently Coughlin was haunting the subconscious oI the
property owner where the prosecution did not have support Ior the "Iailed to leave aIter being warned
to do so" version oI criminal trespass in RMC 8.10.010 is also the brother oI the Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions oI Coughlin incident to Coughlin's service Ior
legal aid organizations Washoe Legal Services as a domestic violence attorney was cited as the "sole
reason" Ior Washoe Legal Service Iiring Coughlin, and which Iormed the basis Ior Coughlin's
Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus challenging said Order Ior Sanctions in 54844 and whom admitted,
on the record, in the case Ilowing Irom Coughlin's criminal trespass arrest, in RMC 11 CR 26405,
that he "passed along" to his Iellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes "his own sister's" over three years old
Order Ior Sanctions ($1,000 attorney's Iee award personally payable by Coughlin under NRS 7.085
despite Coughlin's citing to an ALR article demonstrating the position he maintained to be the
majority viewpoint in Amercian jurisprudence, ie, no setting oII "duty" such as alimony Ior
unsecured third party credit card debt where other spouse is sole signatory. A Iar Ilung doctrine oI
the necessaries threat by various unsecured debt holders, where none oI the debts are likely large
enough to engender much litigation, hardly makes vexatious a Iailure to agree to John Springgate's
proposed marital settlement agreement
. RMC Judge William Gardner reIused to recuse himselI Irom Coughlin's criminal trespass trial
despite acknowleding that he was aware that his passing on his sister's 2009 Order Ior Sanctions to
Judge Nash Holmes had resulted in a grievance being Iiled with the SBN, based upon his sister's
Order Ior Sanctions, upon Judge Nash Holmes Iorwarding said Order onto the SBN. Bar Counsel
King issued that "grievance" based upon Judge Linda Gardner's 2009 Order Ior Sanctions its own
case number, yet has continued to reIuse to speciIy how that case came to be, who Iiled the grievance
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000883
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based upon that Order, or in any other way indicated that such grievance came to be other than an
immaculate conception oI sorts.
Speaking oI RMC Judge Nash Holme's submission oI grievances and complaints to the SBN
immediately aIter Coughlin, unsuccessIully sought to invoke his right to appeal the "criminal
summary contempt" Order Judge Nash Holmes rendered on February 27th, 2011 in the Trial Ior a
traffic citation, in Coughlin's March 7th, 2012 Iiling in 11 TR 26800 oI a Notice oI Appeal (which
despite the dictates oI NRS 189.010, .020, .030, and .060 and ATTY GEN. OPINION NO. 79-4
Criminal Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 and 189.020 (1979). The RMC has
continued to Iail to transmit Coughlin's appeal oI the criminal summary contempt Order to the
District Court. Further, Coughlin's own Washoe County Public DeIender Biray Dogan, Esq.
Then, Mr. King alleged he would point towards some pending criminal investigation as a
basis Ior a Compliant. Tell that to the indicted on Iederal compaign violation charges attorney's the
SBN is not commenting on.
Somehow, the District Court managed to Iind it equitable to sanction Coughlin $40,050 in
attorney's Iees in the appeal oI that summary eviction matter, and the judge making that ruling was
previously a member oI the same law Iirm as Coughlin, yet reIused to recuse himselI Irom the
matter. Bar Counsel King has also previously threatened (while attempting to coerce Coughlin's
assent to some snake potion SCR 117 deal when King is not busy attempting to Iabricate a SCR 105
"inIormal meeting" with Coughlin out oI a purported oIIer by King to actually let Coughlin even
view (not copy though) or "see the materials submitted along with the grievances", despite the Iact
that King stormed away Irom the Bar's Northern OIIice conIerence room seconds into Coughlin
reviewing such materials, along with all such materials being stuIIed back into their box, upon it
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000884
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becoming clear that Coughlin wished to view the materials prior to being interrogated by King other
otherwise have King deem the occasion an "inIormal meeting" under SCR 105). King seeks to
prolong a temporary suspension incident to a thoroughly deIrocked "candy bar petty larceny"
conviction (and the dismissal oI the appeal was based upon an impermissible applciation oI NRS
189.030 and NRS 4.410(2) wherein a civil statue speaking to paying up Iront Ior a transcript was
applied to justiIy dismissal a criminal appellants appeal (a growing in Nevada's courts as seen in a
similar case included in Exhibit 1) as a justiIication Ior placing a temporary suspension on Coughlin
throughout a lengthy potential SBN v Coughlin Complaint proceeding (that will be, according to
King, based upon penaing criminal charges, Coughlin wearing "pajama pants" to a Municipal Court
Iiling counter while checking on a traIIic ticket, some alleged video oI someone swearing in a police
oIIicer's presence, a non-existent/CGI-ish "Order" by a (REDACTED) Court Judge that only exists in
the mind oI Pat King (who is known Ior being rather sloppy and lazy like that, you know, when it
comes to due process and people's way oI making a living, and constitutionally protected property
rights, while bringing his dog to work to hang out in the Bar's Northern OIIice's lobby, a Great Dane,
which, admittedly, is a magniIicently regal animal, though it was not in the December 2012 Animal
Law issue like Coughlin's Pekingnese Jackson Pawluck). "Patty Ice" knows Coughlin loves him.
However, it is inappropriate Ior King to seek to prolong Coughlin's temporary suspension so
unreasonably, where, especially, King has maintained he intends to seek a "combo-hearing" that will
largely be based upon a Complaint that alleges Coughlin has penaing criminal charges: Where the
only relevant Iactual allegation contained in Disciplinary Board's aIIidavit, Iiled in support oI its
petition Ior attorney's temporary suspension Irom the practice oI law, was that a criminal indictment
had been Iiled against the attorney, this sole allegation, without more, was insuIIicient to justiIy
summary suspension and the immediate imposition oI temporary restrictions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000885
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102, subd. 4(a), 111, subd. 1. Matter oI Monteiro, 1984, 684 P.2d 506, 100 Nev. 440. Coughlin has
not been indicted on Iederal election law/campaign contribution violations. The charges Coughlin
does currently Iace say a lot more about the prosecutors than they do about Coughlin, and the Iact
that a June 7th, 2012 email Irom Coughlin to a prosecutor was Iollowed Iour hours later by a
suspension oI this Court, signed by three Justices, one oI whom has previously recused himselI Irom
Coughlin's case appeal oI the dismissal oI Coughlin's wrongIul termination lawsuit against Washoe
Legal Services, 60302 (and granted, the Justice reIerenced has longstanding ties to and altruistic
interactions with legal aid entities throughout the state...) provides a Iurther reason Ior this Court to
consider, en banc, Coughlin's various requests to have the temporary suspension oI his law license
dissolved (Coughlin Iiled a Motion Ior Resconsideation oI the Temporary Suspension on June 11th,
2012 in light oI the Nevada Supreme Court's Iailure to Iile Coughlin's May 24th, 2012 attempt at
Iiling an Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition in 60838, in violation oI NRCP 5(e), and a August 13th,
2012 SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in 61426, in addition to a SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve the
Temporary Suspension oI the same date in 60838.
As to the reasonableness oI allowing Bar Counsel's attempt to subvert procedural SCR's
based upon penaing criminal cases, the RJC docket in RCR2011-063341 is incorrect in that it Iails to
detail the extent to which DDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 by Iiling, with a Iile stamp time
oI 2:55 pm an Opposition to DeIendant's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel despite the Iact that DDA
Young and Coughlin's public deIender Biray Dogan, in RCR2012-065630 met in a clandestine status
conIerence on February 27th, 2012 at 1:30 pm, despite the Iact that on February 24th, 2012 (and the
Iiles documents this as well) that very MSC was continued until March 29th, 2012 in light oI a
scheduling conIlict attendant to the Iact that Coughlin had a traIIic citation trial involving Coughlin
in the RMC on that very day, February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 set Ior 1:00 pm. Bar Counsel
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000886
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King has threatened to Iile a SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint based upon a Iiling by Coughlin
incident to the deIense oI a "misuse oI 911 or emergency services", a charge that presents DDA
Young with the diIIicult tasks oI prosecuting one Ior (and some guessing is required here as DDA
Young is taken to not speciIying much oI anything in the inIormation in his Complaints) calling 911
to report Iear oI the police and or a Iailure by a 911 operator to accord such an allegation any
legitimacy...which explains why DDA Young seeks to conspire with Coughlin's public deIender
Dogan to amend such a charge to a "resisting arrest" simple misdemeanor, down Irom a gross, and
thereby leverage the threat oI a conviction oI a crime that actually, upon a conviction, would invoke
a SCR 111(6) "serious oIIense) Petition by Bar Counsel) criminal matter that has been pending since
Coughlin was subject to a custodial arrest on January 14th, 2012 at his then shared residence with
two individuals Irom whom he rented a room, and against which he was ultimately awarded Orders
oI Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. The same RPD Sargent, Paul SiIre, who ordered a
trainee, OIIicer Leedy, to eIIect a custodial arrest oI Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 at Coughlin's
Iormer law oIIice ordered Coughlin arrested again less than 48 hours later Ior the "misuse oI
emergency services" incident to Coughlin calling 911 to report the sudden disappearance oI his dog,
in the context oI weeks oI attacks by his two Iormer housmates (slashed tires, Iurniture thrown in the
street, death threats, being chased up the stairs by a man with a 10 inch butcher kniIe yelling threats,
having hot coIIee thrown on him, interIerence with his mail, etc., etc.), and despite the Iact that NRS
33.018 does deIine "domestic violence" to include violence against one's pets or animals. Sargent
SiIre indicated to Coughlin upon bringing 7 other RPD OIIicers to "respond" to Coughlin 911 call
upon the violent roomates making menacing statements and gestures in response to the
disappearance oI Coughlin's dog, that it was merely a "matter Ior animal control" and that SiIre was
arresting Coughlin because "you keep placing yourselI in situations where you are a victim", and
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000887
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despite that statement being captured on tape, DDA Zach Young continues to prosecute that case.
DDA Young and Coughlin's public deIender did seek to prevent Coughlin Irom becoming aware oI
their attempts to "reduce" that gross misdemeanor to one that woula invoke an SCR 111(6) "serious
crime" Petition by Bar Counsel iI a conviction is procured, as just because a charge is conveniently
reduced to "resisting arrest", and thereIore a "lesser oIIense" (gross misdemeanor versus
misdemeanor) does not mean the impact on one's liIe would be less, especially in light oI SCR 111.
Dogan Iailed to apprise Coughlin oI DDA Young attempt to so amend the Complaint in that Matter
in his July 31st, 2012 Iiling in RCR2012-065630, despite Coughlin previously demanding notice oI
any and all Iilings by either side. Sandwiched between the two arrests in 48 hours by RPD Sargent
SiIre, was an intervening pull over by the same RPD OIIicer whom wrongIully arrested Coughlin on
August 20th, 2011 in RCR2011-063341, Nicholas Duralde, along with 5 other cops assisting Duralde
in notiIying Coughlin that his license plate was suddenly missing, shortly aIter Coughlin was
released Irom jail, on January 13th, 2012, incident to a "jaywalking" arrest. Coughlin attempted to
submit a written complaint to the RPD regarding the retaliatory, coercive, pretextual conduct by RPD
OIIicer's Duralde and Ron Rosa, which the RPD rejected on September 7th, 2011)(and unless the
Ninth Circuit has a jewel somewhere that was missed, no matter how backwards and ignorant an
arrest is, how pretextual or baseless, even Ior "jaywalking", the police can copy, view, and search
one's laptop or smart phone (even a practicing attorney advocating on a client's behalI who gets
arrested Ior summary contempt committed in a the presence oI a Judge: Some courts have relied on
the Supreme Court`s holdings in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) to hold that oIIicers can search arrestees` cell phones incident to
arrest, concluding that they are part oI the arrestee`s 'person. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501
(Cal. 2011); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Young, 278 F.
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000888
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Appx. 242 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007).15
Robinson and Edwards, decided nearly 30 years ago, should be read narrowly in light oI the more
recent holdings in Chadwick and Gant. Searches oI the person are distinguishable Irom searches oI
electronic data stored in devices carried by the person, making Chadwick and Gant more directly
applicable).
Judge Nash Holmes has admitted in writing to communications with those involved in that
clandestine, unnoticed, violating oI attorney client privilege, February 27th, 2012 MSC in RCR2012-
065630 involving Dogan and DDA Young. However, that did not, apparently, despite the dictates oI
NRS 178.405, stop Judge Nash Holmes Irom continuing on with the traIIic citation Trial minutes later
in 11 TR 26800, wherein she sentenced Coughlin's to 5 days in jail, and denied a stay to Coughlin
despite his then representing client's as a lawyer in time sensitive matters, Iinding Coughlin's guilty oI
"summary criminal contempt" (which Coughlin had to report to the United States Patent and
Trademark OIIice and State Bar oI Nevada as a SCR 111 criminal conviction). Curiously, the Order
Ior Competency Evaluation was signed by Judge CliIton, but the RJC's Iile and docket therein
indicate that Judge Schroeder presided over the 2/27/12 1:30 pm Status ConIerence, despite the Iact
that the Iiles indicates such a conIerence was reset, on 2/24/12 to 3/29/12 (RJC Judge Schroeder
stated to Coughlin at the January 31st, 2012 Hearing on Extending the Stalking and Harassment
Protection Order Richard G. Hill, Esq received within 40 minutes oI Iiling it, on January 12th, 2012,
"do you want to go to jail" upon Coughlin attempting to broach the subject oI whether, perhaps, Hill
was abusing the TPO process to aid in preventing opposing counsel Irom collectin evidence in
support oI a damages analysis incident to a wrongIul eviction lawsuit, particularly one oI a "wrong
site surgery" variety Ior Hill's neurosurgeon client, in that Hill utilized a summary eviction
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000889
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proceeding against a commercial tenant not based upon the non payment oI rent...ie, a "wrong site
surgery" to make an analogy Hill's neurosurgeon client might easily grasp.
As to the purported "summary criminal contempt" Order by Judge Nash Holmes, it is not clear
there is such a "misdemeanor crime" in Nevada. That February 28th, 2012 Order read: "The court
Iinds that the deIendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt Ior the
court, and in the presence oI the court, Ior purposes oI disrupting and delaying the proceedings and
dishonoring the rule oI law and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor oI criminal contempt, a
violation oI RS 22.0 I O. Good cause appearing thereIore, the Iollowing sanctions are imposed: IT IS
ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the deIendant be incarcerated at the Washoe County
Regional Detention Facility Ior the term oI Iive (5) days, Iro m the time he was taken into custody on
this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced Ior any reason...."
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The Iollowing acts or
omissions shall be deemed contempts: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial
duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reIerence or
arbitration, or other judicial proceeding. 2. A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct
or violent disturbance in the presence oI the court, or in its immediate vicinity,
tending to interrupt the due course oI the trial or other judicial proceeding. 3.
Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers. 4. Disobedience oI a subpoena duly served, or reIusing to
be sworn or answer as a witness. 5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody
oI an oIIicer by virtue oI an order or process oI such court or judge at chambers. 6.
Disobedience oI the order or direction oI the court made pending the trial oI an
action, in speaking to or in the presence oI a juror concerning an action in which the
juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or interIering
with such juror with the intent to inIluence the verdict. 7. Abusing the process or
proceedings oI the court or Ialsely pretending to act under the authority oI an order
or process oI the court.
In Judge Nash Holmes February 28th, 2012 Order Finding DeIendant in Contempt oI Court
and Imposing Sanctions, the Order reads: "9) deIendant's lying to the court in response to direct
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000890
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questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings". No evidentiary support or
other allegation have been made by Judge Nash Holmes to support that Iinding. Further, that Order
seems to take an overly narrow view oI what is permissible subject Ior cross-examining a police
oIIicer, and at one point, Judge Nash Holmes stated, on the record, that she does not "care about
retaliation, or bribery, or corrutpion" or words substantially similar to that eIIect, and the Order itselI
suggests Judge Nash Holmes Iinds those subject wholly irrelevant to a criminal prosecution,
regardless oI the vast body oI case law devoted to retaliatory arrests, witness bias, materials not
oIIered to prove the truth oI the matter asserted, but rather the witness's state oI mind, etc., etc. That
Order included the Iollowing: "deIendant's repeatedly injecting allegations oI bribery, perjury, and
police retaliation into the matter aIter the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himselI
to i sues pertaining to the Iacts oI the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) deIendant's repeatedly trying to insert
"Richard Hill" into his questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the
proceedings and the deIendant had been ordered to stop discussing that...deIendant's continually
accusing the court oI denying him the right or ability to ask questions...deIendant' s Iailing and
reIusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to stop
repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
mischaracterizing the testimony. During that proceeding Judge Nash Holmes asked Coughlin "Are
you recording this proceeding?". Coughlin preIaced his answer with an assertion that he a a
Constitutional Right now to be coerced into answering such sua sponte interrogation, but answered
truthIully that he was not recording the proceeding at the time that question was posed to him by
Judge Nash Holmes, though, to be sure, the RMC was recording the proceeding, it is a part oI the
public record, and Coughlin surely now has no means oI conIirming what exactly may have been on
his smart phone or micro sd data card given both were returned to him damaged and with all the data
- 54/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000891
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previously therein erased, though likely not beIore his privacy had been raped by various local law
enIorcement entitites perusing the contents therein under some "search incident to arrest" approach.
In a letter/complaint/grievance to the SBN Irom the RMC's Judge Nash Holmes, dated March
12th, 2012, it is written: "We are setting that case Ior trial and attempting to serve him at the most
recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he may be living
in his vehicle somewhere....It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending
on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public DeIender in February...
and they stated that they represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC...You will have the Iull
cooperation oI myselI, the other judges, and the staII oI Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit oI this
matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himselI as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the
staII and even our pro temp judges on the most simple traIIic and misdemeanor matters. I do think
this is a case oI some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our
IT person was ill and could not make the copies oI the audios oI Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today,
and I Ielt it was important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered by the State
Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
appointments with clients. I do not know iI that was true, but iI so, he could be causing serious harm
to the practice oI law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's Ireedom or property
interests...." Such concern Ior Coughlin's client's "Ireedom or property interests" did not result in
Judge Nash Holmes according any real consideration to issuing a stay oI any sort to Coughlin prior to
the immediate and unIathomably unexpected summary 5 day jail sentence incident to a traIIic citation
Trial over a CaliIornia Roll/Boulevard Stop. Why, in a letter date February 14th, 2012, when
Coughlin was still living at his Iromer E. 9th St. address, Judge Nash Holmes would have "heard he
(Coughlin) may be living in his vehicle somewhere" is curious, though not at all out oI line with
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000892
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Coughlin's past experience with the some individuals at the RMC and the City oI Reno Marshals.
Coughlin has no idea what "pro tem" Judges he ever had any interactions with at the RMC oI an
import whatsoever. The passage wherein Judge Nash Holmes apologizes Ior "taking two days to get
this package to you" implies a previous communication with the SBN, though hopeIully not the sort
oI attempts to drum up complaints where none should reasonably issue like that see with the RPD's
OIIice Weaver and Sargent Miller, or in the apparent exorting Richard Hill by the RPD to Iile a
protection order against Coughlin. Further, Judge Nash Holmes went on to issue what are likely void
"double jeopardy" violating Orders subsequent to Coughlin Iiling a notice oI appeal on March 8th,
2012 oI the Contempt Iinding. It is improtant to note, the February 28th, 2012 Order Finding
DeIendant in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions, which purports to issue a conviction Ior
"misdemeanor criminal contempt" was never received by Coughlin, despite it purportedly being
mailed to Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice address at a time that the RMC had Coughlin's then E.
9th St. address, and despite Coughlin having a change oI address on Iile with the USPS at that time
(though there were issues with getting the USPS to process or recognize that incident to the domestic
violence against Coughlin on E.9 9th St.). Regardless, Coughlin only ever Iirst even saw the
February 28th, 2012 Contempt Order, and probably even then did not realize it purported to issue
"misdemeanor criminal contempt" conviction (Coughlin still has some conIusion as to the distinction
between criminal and civil contempt and a reading oI the NRS 22.010 cited does little to alleviate that
conIusion, though Coughlin has gathered various ALRs and AmJurs on the appealability oI summary
contempt Iindings and does not belive Judge Nash Holmes Order is suIIiciently speciIic under the
Houston decision (Judge Pomeranz, handcuIIs, etc). Further, Bar Counsel King has gone on to
threaten Coughlin extensively with the use oI sections oI subsequenttly issued Orders by Judge Nash
Holmes that purport to make Iindings "by clear and convicing" evidence oI various violations oI
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000893
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RPCs Ior conduct that Judge Nash Holmes already entered an Order on February 28th, 2012. That is
double jeopardy and or law oI the case, and not a proper basis Ior delaying the hearing required under
SCR 111(8), etc. The SBN and King can have it iI they want it with Coughlin, but they ought to
have to do it in compliance with the rules, period, rather than have King get down on all Iours an
surreptiously crawl behind a standing Coughlin's knees, only to have whoever give Coughlin a swiIt
push to the torso, causing him to topple over backwards. And the SBN should be prevented Irom
doing its bit where it shows Coughlin a Ilower, prompts him to smell it, then manipulates some
apparatus built into what is actually a phony Ilower that sprays water in Coughlin's Iace. And then
there is the cans oI mixed nuts the SBN gave Coughlin that actually contained projectile conIetti sorts
oI material.
Hill applied Ior a TPO against Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 when Hill noticed Coughlin
peaceIully Iilming Irom the public sidewalk at Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice Hill's crew
throwing into a dump truck the property that Coughlin was unable to remove in the scant 13 hours
accorded him in the Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property line, on
December 24th, 2011, especially where Hill placed a chain link and padlock on the backyard gate to
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, making removing many, many items unIeasible. Hill Iailed to
remove the chain link padlock until only a couple hours remained to move a great deal oI property,
and said padlock was only placed on that back yard gate in the one or two days immediately prior to
the time allowed to remove property....Further, despite billing Coughlin some $1,060 Ior "securing
the property" (one would think paying $460 under NRS 118A.460 Ior "storage" oI personalty might
include "securing" it, but no, it would not...and Hill's contractor saved on expenses incident to such
"securing" by using Coughlin's own plywood to board up the back porch. Speaking oI the extent to
which Judge Nash Holmes continued on to conduct the Trial in 11 TR 26800 despite the 2/29/12
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000894
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Order Ior Competency Evaluation signed by Judge CliIton and Iile stamped 1:31 pm, despite the
statutory dictate that "the other departments" "shall suspend any other proceedings relating to the
deIendant until to deIendant is determined to be competent", Iound in NRS 178.405, DDA Young
himselI violated NRS 178.405 in that his 2/29/12 Opposition to DeIendant's Motion to Appear as Co-
counsel bares a Iile stamp oI 2:55 pm. Please correct the docket in this regard, as well as revising it to
reIlect all oI Coughlin's Iilings, which were all Iile stamped, yet are not indicated on the docket,
especially the Notice oI Appearance Coughlin Iiled, while Coughlin was still a licensed attorney, in
addition to any Substitutions oI Counsel Coughlin Iiled so very long ago (no matter what DDA
Young tries to argue about how "untimely" Coughlin's attempts to be rid oI the public deIenders
obstructive presence are).
Additionally, there is a clear retaliatory animus evince by both Dogan and DDA Young's
participation in the Feburary 27th, 2011 "clandestine" Status ConIerence where Coughlin's Iiling oI
February 17th, 2011 in that same case RCR20120-065630 That February 14th, 2012 Iiling by
Coughlin in RCR2012-065630 was attached by Pat King and or J. Thomas Susich in the SCR 117
Petition in 60975 (and King has repeatedly threatened to attach it to or reIerence it in the SCR 105
Complaint he keeps hyping in an ill advised attempt to get Coughlin to sign up Ior a SCR 117 trip)
and reIerenced by Judge Nash Holmes in her various Orders and written complaint to the SBN when
she cites Coughlin with "quoting lyrics to rock songs" in a Iiling was critical oI Dogan's work as a
public deIender Ior Coughlin, especially where Dogan was attorney oI record and Iailed to appear Ior
a hearing...Never mind that the only lyrics to any songs that were quoted by Coughlin in any Iilings
so Iar was the quotation to a rap song in the February 17th, 2012 Iiling in the case that Dogan
representea Coughlin on in Reno Justice Court, RCR2012-065630, wherein an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation was entered at 1:31 pm on February 29th, 2012, whereupon, shortly
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000895
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aIterwards, Judge Nash Holmes continued on to hold the traIIic citation Trial Irom which the
"summary criminal contempt" charge underpinning most oI Bar Counsel King's SCR 117 Petition
and Irom which most oI King's threats oI a SBN v Coughlin Complaint seem to rely (to the extent
such a Complaint would rely on anything other than King's typical legal drivel, which continually
Iails to cite to any legal authority whatsoever and evinces the work oI a man entirely unIamiliar with
Lexis, Westlaw, AmJur., ALR, ProoI oI Facts, or any other bastion oI actual lawyering. The lyric
Coughlin quoted in that February 17th, 2012 Iiling (which was necessitated by the Iact that Dogan
Iailed to appear Ior a court date on February 13th, 2012 Ior which he and Coughlin had, when they
met in person and spoke Ior over an hour about the case on or about February 7th, 2012 agreed
Dogan would appear on Coughlin's behalI and that Dogan was already "attorney oI record" in the
matter and assigned to the case) was quoted merely as a commentary on the spiritual choices one is
Iaced with various local power brokers and their agents are behaving like goons: "Okay, your a goon,
what's a goon to a goblin?". Hardly a rationale Ior pulling some lawyers ticket, Mr. King. Nor Ior
submitting a complaint questioning a lawyers competency to the SBN.
SCR Rule 111(8). Attorneys convicted oI crimes.
"8.ReIerral to disciplinary board. Upon receipt oI a petition Iiled under
subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a
serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule, refer the matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing
before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the
extent of the discipline to be imposed..."
SCR Rule 102(2). Types oI discipline:
Misconduct is grounds Ior: "2. Suspension by the supreme court. A suspension of
6 months or less shall not require proof of rehabilitation; a suspension oI more
than 6 months shall require prooI oI rehabilitation to be demonstrated in a
reinstatement proceeding under Rule 116...."
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000896
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Given that the Board and the SBN are and have eIIectively denied Coughlin a timely hearing
called Ior by the Court's Order and SCR 111(8), and now have Iailed to provide an "immediate
hearing" pursuant to Coughlin's Iiled and served SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in case number 61426.
SCR Rule 116. Reinstatement: "1. Order oI supreme court required. An
attorney suspended as discipline Ior more than 6 months may not resume
practice unless reinstated by order oI the supreme court. 2.Procedure Ior
reinstatement. Petitions Ior reinstatement by a suspended attorney shall be
Iiled with bar counsel's oIIice, which shall promptly reIer the petition to the
chair oI the appropriate disciplinary board. The chair shall promptly reIer the
petition to a hearing panel, which shall, within 60 days aIter reIerral, conduct
a hearing. ...
4. Tender oI costs in advance. Petitions Ior reinstatement under this rule
shall be accompanied by an advance cost deposit oI $1,000 to cover
anticipated costs oI the reinstatement proceeding."
The 60 days mentioned above only Iurther highlights the potential Ior a contempt Iinding
where the SBN and Board have Iailed to schedule a hearing Ior this matter despite Coughlin Iiling an
Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition, or at least submitting an Opposition as early as May 24th, 2012,
and eventually getting the Court to Iile something in that vein on June 10th, 2012, which has remain
unchallenged by Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel appears rather busy with other things, and any such
overburdened condition will only be exacerbated by a protracted involvement with Coughlin, who
can rake it a little iI anyone hasn't noticed yet. King's close and prolonged involvement with Richard
G. Hill, Esq. (the were opposing counsel on one oI the biggest cases oI either oI their careers, the
March 2012 reported decision in Milsner v Carstarphen)
CONCLUSION
Please dissolve the temporary suspension oI Coughlin's law license and require the SBN to
remit whatever compensation to Coughlin this Court Ieels is just, and or, in the alternative, require the
SBN and NNDB or Panel to immediately set Ior Hearing (very soon) a Hearing limited to the dictates
- 60/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000897
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set Iorth in SCR 111(8) and this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, ie, determining the punishment Ior the
candy bar issue, which arguably has been more than served already given the Iour months length oI
the suspension and other peripheral matters.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security
number oI any person.
Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 53.045 that,
to the best of my knowledge, the information contained herein is true and
correct.
RespectIully submitted this: October 2
nd
, 2012,
/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
- 61/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000898
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ProoI oI Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing
document to all registered electronic Iilers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver oI the application oI NRCP as set Iorth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy oI the Ioregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set Iorth in SCR 109:
Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar oI Nevada
Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas , NV 89104
Phone Number: 702-382-2200
Fax number: 702-385-2878
J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone Number: 775-284-9533
Fax number: 775-284-9513
Dated this October 2nd, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
- 62/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
000899
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
In Re Matter oI:
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Supreme Court No: 61901
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61901, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61901; or
IN THE ALTERNATIVE; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO VACATE JUDGEMENT;
HABEUS CORPUS; ARREST OF JUDGMENT,
COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and Iiles the above named
document and moves this Court, or the Board, Panel, Bar Ior the relieI requested herein. This Iiling
is Iurther based upon the papers and pleadings on Iile herein and in the companion case beIore the
Nevada Supreme Court in 60838 and 61426.
FACTS
1.When Coughlin was in the quasi-"basement" (it isn't a room Iit Ior habitation or use under the
Housing Code (only one exit, ceiling are about 5 Ieet high in most places, Iloor was dirt when
Coughlin Iirst rented it, but he Iixed it up very nicely over time and it certainly looked like someone
could have been living in there well prior to the eviction, but Judge Gardner ruled all that stuII about
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
Electronically Filed
Oct 24 2012 12:09 p.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 61901 Document 2012-33724
000900
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"using it as a residence" was irrelevant, except Ior the Iact he mentioned it in his Order and Hazlett let
it creep into his closing arguments....) there was not any voices calling to him (certainly the videos
Iilmed by Hill and Merliss, propounded to the City and the court appointed deIenders who reIused to
subpoena Merliss despite Hill's and the RPD's obvious motive and bias...show that neither Hill nor
Merliss, as conIirmed by Hill's Trial testiony, made any verbal incantations to Coughlin, but rather,
retreated upstairs to wait Ior the RPD...) prior to what was ultimately revealed to be the RPD arriving.
As shown with a lot more indicia oI reliability than Hill's lie Iilled June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at
trial, in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration, Hill Iails to assert that the RPD "identiIied themselves
as law enIorcement" and issued a lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement (which is not necessarily
lawIul, even iI they identiIy themselves as law enIorcement, iI they were not given the authority to
issue it by someone having such authority, and its not clearl that either Merliss or Hill did...).
Regardless, the RPD deIinitely DID NOT "identiIy themselves as law enIorcement" prior to Merliss
kicking the door down. Rather, it is telling that in HIll's November 21st, 2011 Declaration he merely
mentions the RPD attempting to (see this dissected in glorious detail in the attached Bar grievance)
"coax Coughlin to emerge Irom the basement". And the RPD did just that. Only, they didn't identiIy
themselves as law enIorcement at any time prior to the door being kicked down. So, iI you are
Coughlin, and you have a real strong claim oI right deIense to any allegation oI trespass, then just
hearing some random voices "coaxing" him to talk to them like they are therapists or some other crap
like that is not tantamount to a "lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement" or warning to leave the
premises else be cited or arrested Ior criminal trespass. (Hill told Coughlin he was billing him the
same $900 a month as when Coughlin was there under a lease allowing Ior "Iull use an occupancy";
any eviction order was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, Coughlin was entitled to a stay Coughlin had yet
to receive back Irom the RJC the "rent escrow" $2,275 that Judge SIerrazza, on October 27t, 2011,
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000901
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announced would be held onto by the RJC as Coughlin's "bond on appeal" (meaning the supersedeas
bond, as appeal bond's are set statutorily at $250 in such matters and supersedeas bond's are the ones
teh RJC typically makes in an amount worth "three month's rent" (ie, the RJC can't keep the money
Ior the stay, and call it that, and deny the stay...its like calling it a summary eviction hearing, but
ruling on more than possession, then ruling Coughlin established a genuine issue oI material Iact and
noticing the October 27th, 2011 date as a "Trial" in writing (Baker says on the record in that case "the
use oI the term "Trial" was unIortunate, Your Honor....", then ordering an impermissible rent escrow
deposit...not giving the 20 days to respond to a Complaint called Ior by JCRCP 109....basically giving
HIll and Merliss all the beneIits oI the quick and easy summary eviction proceeding (Coughlin was
precluded Irom making counterclaims or bringing in third party deIendants like Dickson Realty or
NV Energy or Green Action Lawn Service, etc), and Coughlin none oI the procedural protections oI a
plenary unlawIul detainer, while also attempting to aIIor HIll and Merliss the beneIits oI a plenary
unlawIul detainer (awarding back rent, attorney's Iees, landlord was able to bring a summary eviction
proceeding against a commercial tenant based only on a No Cause Notice, verboten under NRS
40.253...). Further, and this is shown on the videos Hill and Merliss Iilmed, the RPD at no time gave
Coughlin a warning to leave where Coughlin could have heeded it and leIt, or otherwise been issue a
citation in lieu oI a custodial arrest. The RPD wanted to make the big rich landlord and attorney
happy here, and neither the RPD (which was mad at Coughlin Ior Iiling a police misconduct
complaint incident to the wrongIul August 20th, 2011 arrest oI Coughlin that ain't lookin' good Ior the
State now that Coughlin got WCPD Jim Leslie booted Irom the case in RCR2011-063341) nor Hill or
Merliss were going to be satisIied with just issuing Coughlin a "warning" to leave the premises, as
they Iigure Coughlin would just heed any such warning....The RPD and Merliss/HIll were all jacked
up on revenge powder and wanted Coughlin arrested. Dr. Merliss is practically Irothing at the mouth
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000902
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(demanding "more eye contact!" Irom Coughlin in the video "Zach's arrest 0010" just beIore Dr.
Merliss commits a crime in lying to the RPD in response to Coughlin's querying those there as to who
warned him against trespassing and when, whereupon Dr. Merliss lies in order to get Coughlin
arrested, and Hill co-signs it:
Richard G. Hill, Esq. (opposing counsel in the civil eviction case Irom which this criminal trespass
trial stems) testiIied, under oath, that the Reno Police Department identiIied themselves as law
enIorcement and issued a lawIul order to leave prior to the RPD entering the door that Hill's client
Merliss kicked down after such identiIication and issuance oI a lawIul order or warning to leave the
premises was issued by the RPD. Additionally, beyond the impermissible extent to which RMC D2
Judicial Assistant Lisa Wagner Iailed to Iile Coughlin's June 28th, 2012 Notice oI Appeal (Iax Iiling
allowable under RMC Rules, any Order by Judge Gardner to the contrary spoke to pre-trial Motions
only), the Washoe County Detention Center impermissibly reIused to timely Iile Coughin's additional
Notice oI Appeal in a timely Iashion while Coughlin was wrongIully incarcerated incident to a
wrongIul arrest by the RPD, buttressed upon an impermissible bail increase (supported in Judge
Gardner's rationale by a "public health and saIety" rationale not providing a basis Ior bail under
Nevada Law), at an unnoticed impromptu bail hearing on July 5th, 2012 wherein the RMC and court
appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. coerced Irom Coughlin an impermissible invasion oI
Coughlin's medical records under extremely coercive circumstances made worse by the Iraud
committed upon the court by RPD Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver (the arrest in that matter 12 CR
12420 was pretextual and Iraudulent, and compounded by Sargent Oliver Miller and OIIicer Weaver
subsequent misconduct incident to another Soldal v. Cook County violation on their part involving
Coughlin and Superior Mini Storage in an RJC eviction matter stemming Irom police misconduct by
Miller and Weaver on or about September 22nd, 2012.
- 4/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000903
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There was an Order For Competency Evaluation by Judge CliIton in RCR2012-065630
entered February 27th, 2012, and the Order in CR12--0376 adjudging Coughlin competent and
remanding jurisdiction back to the lower court was not entered until May 9th, 2012, yet Loomis and
Hazlett-Stevens persisted in seeking to ramrod the criminal trespass case in RMC 11 CR 26405
through...and both were well aware oI the February 27th, 2012 Order Ior Competency Evaluation and
the import oI NRS 178.405, requiring the suspension oI all proceedings during the pendency oI such
an Order, made applicabel via NRS 5.010 and the various rationale set Iorth in the attached materials.
Further, the RMC Iailed to Iile the timely Notice oI Appeal I submitted Ior Iiling on June 28th, 2012,
and which was served by delivering to the City Attorney's OIIice on June 27th, 2012 (timely within
10 days under NRS 189.010) resulting in the dismissal oI the appeal. The Iraud oI the WCSO, RPD,
City Attorney and others prevented Coughlin Irom having an appropriate chance to Iile as complete
and thorough a Motion Ior New Trial as he intended, including a wrongIul arrest on June 28th, 2012,
the WCDC denying Coughlin even a phone call Ior no reason Ior 20 hours, until aIter the RMC had
closed on Friday, June 29th, 2012, and then another wrongIul arrest on July 3rd, 2012 by the RPD,
with an impermissibly bail increase by the same Judge William Gardner whom should have recused
himselI Irom the June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405 in the RMC, violating oI most provision
Iound in the NRS related to bail.
Transcript oI video taken by Hill and Merliss propounded to City Attorney: Zach's arrest
010.mp4
RPD OIIicer Carter (Carter): Come on, get on up here, this is stupid. Come on, okay, well
bring your dog with you. (Carter and Sargent Lopez walk Irom the stairway to the
"basement", up the stairs through the back door oI the house, through the kitchen, past
Hill, whom is Iilming with his handheld video camera, Iollowed by Coughlin holding his
Pekingnese dog (Ieatured in the December 2012 Nevada Lawyer Animal Law issue) where
a sitting landlord Merliss is on the couch in the living room, whereupon Coughlin is
directed to sit in the chair next to the couch and the police begin questioning Coughlin as
Hill joins them in the living room.
- 5/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000904
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Carter: Why are we going through all this headache? Huh? This is where you say
something!
Coughlin: What do you want to know?
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I don't agree to be Iilmed, Rich.
Richard HIll (Hill): Nobody asked you.
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I'll have to talk to my lawyer
Sargent Lopez: Do you have some place or body to take the dog?
Coughlin: Yeah.
Lopez: somebody we can call Ior the dog?
Coughlin: Why?
Lopez: Because, you are gonna probably go to go to jail.
Coughlin: Why? For what?
Lopez: Trespassing.
Coughlin: Where?
Carter: Here.
Lopez: Here, you have been evicted.
Coughlin: hhhhhmmnI.
Carter: hhhhmmmnI.
Hill: You also have breaking and entereing...
Carter:No...we have trespassing, that's all we have.
Coughlin: Well, iI you Ieel I am trespassing, couldn't you just tell me to leave?
Carter: We tried....we actually Ieel that your are playing games...
Lopez: You were told not to come back....um, uh RETURN!, uh, um..and that's ,
that's ....when, um, you were told to leave and not to come back
Hill: I told you.
Coughlin: Who told me to leave?
Hill: Me.
Coughlin: When?
Merliss: We told you to leave, Zach! I deserve some eye contact, Zach!
Carter: You sittin' over there splittin' hairs? (to Coughlin).
Hill: We changed the locks!
Merliss: You sorry about all oI this?
Coughlin: I am sorry that you are upset, Dr. Merliss.
Merliss: You are sorry, Zach? You know how much you have cost me, Ior nothing?
$20,000! You are going to be arrested!
Hill: You're gonna be arrested!
Coughlin: Excuse me, I'm sorry, I don't believe that they have established that I was
warned or served...
Carter: I don't believe that we need to establish that...we are not in court anymore! M'kay?
Coughlin: Well, you have to have probable cause to arrest me...
Carter: I do have probable cause to arrest you, and iI you don't like it my name will be on
your arresting sheet..
Coughlin: I understand, sir.
- 6/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000905
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Carter: Okay, why don't you stand up and put your hands behind your back.
Lopez: What can we do with the dog (reIering to Coughlin's dog, Jackson Pawluck).
Merliss: I have two dogs, Zach.
Coughlin: What are you talking about taking him back to Chico?
Merliss: Yeah.
Coughlin:I would rather just my Iamily get the dogs.
Merliss: Okay, then call your Iamily Irom jail! This isn't your dog's Iault, Zach! You did
this! Your dog is not responsible Ior this!
Carter: (whispering in the background to Richard Hill while Merliss hold Coughlin's
Pekingnese dog in his hands, standing two Ieet Irom Coughlin's Iace) breaking and
entering is (unintelligible)
Hill: No, breaking and entering would be better because its a Ielony...
Carter: Look, Rich, come on...he's trespassing...
Hill: Alright, let's start with that...
Carter: That's all we have...
Hill: Well, you can't blame a guy Ior trying...I don't do any criminal work...
Sargent Lopez gets caught trying to play along with the lie that Merliss and Hill try to get
over, and all oI this is reiterated by Carter's statement that "we actually Ieel that you are playing
games"...which suggests that Merliss, Hill, and the RPD are playing a game oI their own...And
Carter's other statement to Coughlin ("you're sittin' over there splittin' hairs" certainly betrays the Iact
that Carter knows Coughlin has a point here, ie, that the RPD is making a very, very suspect arrest Ior
trespassing where neither the RPD, nor Hill, nor Merliss told Coughlin to leave or warned him against
a trespass charge at any time on that day, and that they only other "warnings" Hill or Merliss could
possibly argue here relate to civil eviction notices that were not served appropriately, and that do no
warn one against a criminal trespass charge (and Hazlett's reinterpretation oI the October 27th, 2011
Order attempts to mislead the court in his tortuous eIIort to make the language therein say something
it simply does not) one where they want to arrest an attorney who has either angered them by
complaining oI police misconduct recently (Coughlin Iiled a complaint with the RPD on September
7th, 2011, and more shortly thereaIter) or by contesting a summarey eviction oI a commercial tenant
where the non-payment oI rent was not plead (Ior good reason, Merliss's case was really bad on
- 7/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000906
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retaliation, habitability issues, and all the set-oIIs or Iix and deducts that had acrued, not to mention
the property damage caused by his negligence in agreeing to a weed maintenance arrangment with
Coughlin (that Coughlin chose to address through articial grass coverings oI the dirt lawn) while also,
apparently, agreeing to a deal with Green Action Lawn Care (which came to the law oIIice and tore
up the articiIical grass installation Coughlin had spent at least 3 days and hundreds oI dollars
meticulously installing, and threw it in the street, then reIused to put it back, all oI which Merliss is
responsible Ior under paragraph 23 oI the Standard Rental Agreement, which, by the way, allows Ior
Coughlin's commercial use oI the premises, and given the Hill Iailed to plead the non-payment oI rent
(because there was advantages to proceeding that way, or so Hill thought) the whole summary
eviction order that Merliss had just apparently paid Hill $20,000 to procure was likely void in light oI
the Iact that the RJC mixed too many plenary unlawIul detainer hallmarks in Iavor oI the landlrod
into what it later remixed as a "summary eviction proceeding" suIIicient to make void Ior lack oI
jurisdiction the October 25th, and October 27th, 2011 Orders, and Iurther, the October 13th, 2011
Order was void under NRS 40.253(6) to the extnet is purported to rule on more than possession (ie, it
ordered a rent escrow deposit oI the last $2,275 Coughlin had to his name, then held on to that, and
proceeded to expect Coughlin to hire a team oI movers and rent a u-Haul and pay Ior a new place, or
at least storage, all within days oI the conclusion oI an exhausting six weeks oI preparation Ior what
was essentiall y an unlawIul detainer Trial-lite, rather than a mere summary eviction proceeding.
Additionally, Coughlin's Iiling oI a notice oI appeal on October 18th, 2011 divested the RJC oI
jurisdiction, even Iurther making suspect the October 27th, 2011 Order Hill and Merliss so cling to.
Add to that the Iact that the "receipt" oI the Order beyond the "within 24 hours" allowable under the
statute, by the WCSO, in relation to the November 1, 2011 4:30 pm lockout (Baker testiIied to
October 28th, 2011, though some clariIication may be in order there (not that a relevancy objection
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000907
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wouldn't have been sustained by Judge Gardner anywhere that Coughlin sought to inquire into aspects
oI civil landlord tenant law bearing on service, notice, constructive service, and void Ior lack oI
jurisdiction or claim oI right issues (however, City Attorney Hazlett got the green light on anything he
wanted or needed to poach Irom civil eviction law during the criminal trespass trial, and even where
Coughlin's objection to Hazlett's tacky "you were living there" type questions was sustained, that
didn't prevent Judge Gardner Irom relying on the "you were living there" accusations in his order, nor
did it stop Hazlett Irom going there on closing argument, all misconduct requiring a new trial (and
timeliness oI the motions arguments are undone by the RPD and WCSO two Irauduluent arrests oI
Coughlin shortly aIter the June 18th, 2012 trial in RMC 11 CR 26405, compounded by a bail increase
by Judge Gardner that is just not supportable.
Further evidence oI the Iraud the RPD, Merliss and Hill were successIul in perpetrating this
wrongIul arrest is Hill's statement: "we changed the locks!" in response to Coughlin querying him as
to who warned him against a trespass charge and when? To the extent the RPD, Merliss and Hill then
(in sworn testimony, Carter's Supplemental Declaration, and other materials, including Hill's
November 21st, 2011 Declaration and Baker's Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property
Lien that Declaration is an exhibit to) Iraudulently assert that they identiIied themselves as law
enIorcement and issued a lawIul order or warning to leave prior to the door being kicked down, they
should Iace criminal prosecution. Its either them or, some might say, somebody else here should be
Iacing some misconduct allegations...And please be sure to remember that Reno City Attorney
Hazlett-Stevens had all these videos and still put on all that perjured testimony....And, a review oI
Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss and the Criminal Complaint signed by Hill reveal that the inIormation
in the Complaint does not support a probable cause analysis to satisIy Hazlett's RPC 3.8 duty, and
should have been dismissed. There is no mention oI an "warning" legally suIIicient to support a
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000908
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criminal trespass prosecution. That Complaints rads "That said deIendant on or about Nov. 13, 2011
in the City oI Reno, State oI Nevada at 121 River Rock st. the deI. Iound on the properly aIter being
evicted, all oI which is a violation oI 8.1 oI the Reno Municipal Code. I thereIore request that said
DeIendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare upon inIormation and belieI under penalty
oI perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the Ioregoing is true and correct to the best oI my
knowledge". And it is signed by Richard Hill, Esq., oppossing counsel in a summary eviction matter
that was then on appeal in CV11-03628. Why didn't RPD Carter or Lopez sign it, especially iI what
Carter asserts in his unsworn Supplemental Declaration is true? Regardless, Carter nevers avers that
he issued Coughlin a warning to leave, and the City Attorney's certainly did not want Carter or Lopez
showing up to be cross-examined, Ior they would have been completely exposed. Upon inIormation
and belieI, the licensed attorney had served on Carter and Lopez an attorney's subpoena, that was or
should have been served upon them by Coughlin having it delivered to the Iront desk oI the RPD
downtown headquarters. Coughlin moved Ior a continuance upon their Iailure to show, and one
should have been granted. Regardless, the Iact that RPD Carter had Richard Hill sign the Complaint
says it all... Carter and Lopez know they did not issue Coughlin as lawIul order to leave, or provide
Coughlin any such chance to heed such a warning, nor did they identiIy themselves as law
enIorcement prior to Merliss kicking the door down ("we think you are playing games" "you're
splitting hairs over there" and the Iact that these RPD knew they weren't on solid enough ground to be
kicking anything down says it all). Further, Carter's probable cause sheet lies where it indicates
"DeIendant was Iound inside the house aIter being serve". Coughlin was "under" the house in an
enclosure that never had a lock and that is not technically even a "basement" given the 5 Ioot ceiling
and the Iact that it has one exit door, and had a dirt Iloor beIore Coughlin laid a vapor barrier and
carpet down there (there was a bed there, a nice Tempurpedic one Ior over a year, the whole things
- 10/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000909
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was decked out, and HIll admits as much, there was 14 luxury sedan 14 way power car seats,
Coughlin is a tinkerer patent attorney and its nobody's business what he collects, and he is no more a
"hoarder" than Richard Hill with his Iourteen Porsches). Further, upon inIormation and belieI,
prosecutorial misconduct was committed by the City Iailing to turn over exculpatory dispatch logs,
audio tapes oI dispatch calls and 911/rpd calls by Hill and between teh oIIicers and
dispatch/emergency services, particularly to the extent they shed light on Hill and Merliss' lies
regardin their having warned Coughlin to leave that day.
Let's compare Hill's assertions in the video above, with his written witness statement in
the police report, and Hill's November 21st, 2012 Declaraton (attached to Baker's equally
suspect Opposition to Coughlin's Personal Property Lien of that date in R1C Rev2011-001708,
and with Hill's 1anuary 14th, 2012 grievance letter against Coughlin to the SBN:
-1/14/12 greivance against Coughlin in Letter to Patrick King, Esq. 1anuary 14, 2012 Page 3:
"Someone had been in there since I had last been in several days before. Dr. Merliss discovered
that the baselnent door was barricaded (not locked) fronl the inside. The Reno Police
Department was summoned. They tried to coax whoever was in the basement out, without
success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down, it "vas discovered that Mr. Coughlin had
broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested and is presently facing criminal trespass
charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no. 11 CR 26405 21."
Transcript oI video: Zach's arrest 011.mp4:
Carter: (continuing his conversation with Hill) Rich, when and where was he served the
paperwork?
Hill: Um...on November 1st, I believe...
Coughlin: Where was I served?
Hill: They put it on the Iront door because you ran away (odd, given Baker testiIied Hill
was not there on November 1st with the WCSO Deputies conducting the lockout, and
Coughlin was at the Washoe County Law Library)
Carter: The paper was leIt on the 1st?
Coughlin: Sir, OIIicer, I don't believe you've established that I was served...
- 11/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000910
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Carter: That doesn't matter.
Coughlin: Or that I receivea any Lockout Order.
Hill: (chortle, chortle) Note taken.
Carter: So, October 1st, you believe?
Hill: No, November 1st.
Coughlin: By who?
Hill: Washoe County SheriII...
Coughlin: Was it in person?
Lopez; It doesn't need to be in person, actually...
Hill: You knew you were evicted! You were in Court!. You heard what the Judge said!
Carter: They just tape this stuII to the Iront door...
Hill: And you took it down oII the Iront door!
Carter: Allegealy...
Coughlin: I am not corroberating anything you are accusing me oI.
Hill: That's Iine,
Carter you don't need to....When was he supposed to be out?
Hill: by the 1st...(at this point Dr. Merliss takes the video camera Irom Rich and starts
doing some weird zoom in close up camera work oI Coughli's wrists and hands in
handcuIIs, with an inescapable homeoerotic bondage type physician control Ireak air to it
all)
Carter: (to Hill) come on, we'll do that in the car....
Carter: Hey, Rich, do you have his social security number?
Hill: Yeah, out in my car. (Coughlin then makes a phone call by having Sargent Lopez
hold a phone up to his head, trying to arrange Ior someone to care Ior his dog)
Merliss: You need to call her, Zach, about the dog!
Coughlin: You aren't an OIIicer, are you Dr. Merliss?
Merliss: I am not going to take care oI your dog?
Coughlin: (to Carter) its kind oI disrespectIul Ior him to be jumping in where an oIIicer...
Carter: Well it's disrespectIul Ior you to be here. You are not the victim, here!
Hill: Ha!
But, actually, the United States Supreme Court, in Soldal v. Cook County, might beg to diIIer
with Judge Carter's analysis...Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 R.I.,1980 Where execution, which
was issued on May 23, specified that it was valid for 20 days, landlord and constable acted
unlawfully in evicting tenant on the execution on 1une 13, and landlord and constable had
thereby subjected themselves to liability for trespass.State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 Vt.,1995 There
was suIIicient evidence to prove that deIendant, an apartment manager, entered tenant's residence
knowing he was not licensed or privileged to do so to sustain trespass conviction, although deIendant
stated he entered tenant's residence to make sure heat was on, given tenant's testimony that
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000911
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deIendant's only acts with respect to the heat was to disconnect the heat, deIendant made clear he was
there to evict tenant, and deIendant pushed open door while tenant was attempting to keep it shut,
knocking over her child in the process.
And it is in OIIicer Carter's Supplemental Declaraton where his lying really shines through,
especially aIter viewing the videos Iilmed by Merliss and Hill, which Iorm a nice counterpoint to the
remixed chronology oI events and statements (with a tough oI just Ilat out imagining things by
Carter) Iound in that writing oI Carters, which reads in relevant part: "Matthew has been to the house
several times over the past week and has observed evidence oI someone coming and going. Today he
was at the house and Iound the basement door to be locked Irom inside. Matthew contacted Richard
who responded and called the police. Sgt Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced
loudly "Reno Police" and called out Ior Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response.
Matthew decided he would kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway oI the basement and
Iound Zachary standing at the rear oI the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and
eventually did so. Zachary came upstairs and instantly started arguing his legal standing in the house,
asking me "hypothetically speaking" type questions. He then told me I was making a Ialse arrest due
to the Iact that I am on Richard Hill's payroll and he was going to sue me. I tried to explain to Zachary
that he was served eviction papers and he asked me what I could do about it iI he hypothetically didn't
get them. He then told me that he had worked a deal with Matthew to continue paying rent and that
the legal eviction was no longer valid. I again tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an
order Iorcing him to leave the property and all he did was cite civil case law to me (I'm unsure iI any
oI the cases he was rambling on about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to
Zachary not believing he has done anything wrong that the Iact he believes he still has standing there
is reasonable grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. ThereIore he did not qualiIy Ior a
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000912
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misdemeanor citation. Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalI and signed a criminal
complaint."
State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392, City Attorney Hazlett managed to Iind just about the only
one case in American jurisprudence that Iound an evicted tenant guilty oI trespass, but that case is
inapplicable to this one, becuase in the instant case, no express indication exists in the record that
tenant was "told not to return to the property", which was a requirement in Lovins, and where the
City's citation and Judge Gardner's reliance thereupon is predicated upon more than mere service or
"constructive service" (and while Judge Gardner's Order speciIically Iound Coughlin had
"constructive service" oI the eviction order, and, apparently, thereIore, suIIicient warning to support
a criminal trespass charged (despite Judge Gardner ruling irrelevant Coughlin's evidence, testimony,
and legal argument directed to just what rules apply in order to Iigure out iI one has been
"constructively served" an eviction order in Nevada in light oI AB226, the testimony beIore the
Committee on the Judiciary on March 31st, 2011, etc., etc. and the dicates oI NRS 40.400, NRCP
6(e), and NRCP 5(b)(2) vis a vis NRS 40.253(5). Tenn.Crim.App.,2009 SuIIicient evidence
supported deIendant's conviction Ior criminal trespass. The evidence showed that deIendant worked
and lived on the homeowner's Iarm property. The homeowner's termination oI deIendant and
subsequent eviction notice ordering him oII the property indicated that the homeowner's did not want
the deIendant on their property. DeIendant indicated he knew that he was not welcome on the
property. Thus, when the deIendant repeatedly drove onto the homeowner's property yelling at them,
he had already been expressly told not to return to the property. State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392.
But any timeliness arguments are further undone by the newly discovered evidence
aspect, and here is one part of it. RPD Officer Travis Warren was there in 1anuary 2012 at a
RPD response to Coughlin's 911 call regarding domestic violence against him by his then
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IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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housemates on E. 9th St.. Warren was there to witness Coughlin video record Lopez and goad
her into admitting that the RPD neither identified themselves as law enforcement or issued
Coughlin a lawful warning or order to leave. And Sargent Lopez has some integrity, so it is and
was difficult for her to play along with Hill and Merliss' fraudulent non-sense. But, add on to
the the fact that Coughlin only just discovered this weekend that RPD Warren and another
officer, and two social worker types met secretly with Coughlin's father, local family
practionern at Coughlin's medical practice's office at some point in the last six months or so.
This likely violates Palmer v. Pioneer, and further underscores the impermissible conflicts that
exist here, made worse by the violations of NRS 178.405 where convenient for various parties
involved here. Further, Dr. Coughlin is Reno City Attorney 1ohn Kadlic's longtime personal
physician and Dr. Coughlin (known as "the 1udge Whisperer" in some circles for being
involved in interventions with numerous local judges over the last 25 years(in addition to his
work with the Impaired Physicians Committee and other diversion programs) has in the past
demonstrated a complete and utter incapability to grasp the concept of boundaries when it
comes to his son, Zach Coughlin, calling up Deans of law schools (Coughlin was deposed by the
State Bar of California regarding an ill advised call by Dr. Coughlin to then Dean of UNLV"s
Boyd School of Law, Richard Morgan, in 2007), State Bars, etc., etc., and offering his various
contradictory diagnosis, all of which tend to border on Munchausen by Proxy at times (a slight
exaggeration, perhaps), though he is a wonderful father otherwise, and a very good man,
however, he is, like all doctors, deeply jealous of any lawyer and wishing he could be one, as is,
apparently, Dr. Merliss (who tried to take over 1udge Sferrazza's court room with an
impromptu cross examination of Coughlin while Merliss was on the witness stand). And,
needless to say, they are both complete and utter control freaks of the highest order. Dr.
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IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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Coughlin married the daughter of the neurosurgeon in Morelli v. Morelli (Dr. Coughlin's sister
in law is a lawyer who sued her physician father, and that published opinion is oft cited for
some third party beneficiary point of law incident to marital settlement agreements in Nevada).
So, adding up the behind the scenes sabotage of Coughlin's life, his ability to defend in this
matter (or even get to trial with the video exhibits or proof of subpoenaing the various material
witness (Merliss, Sargent Lopez, Officer Carter, the latter two being under supboena by the
City of Reno and therefore, Coughlin arguably deserved a continuance in response to his
request given their failure to appear, to the extent Coughlin's attempts at subpoenaing them did
not technically comply with applicable rules (which Coughlin si not even sure of given the
arrest, bail, withhold medications, violat Soldal v. Cook Co., get no love from the 1ustice Court,
rinse and repeat Washoe County and the City of Reno, WCSO, RPD, RMC, R1C, City
Attorney's Office, SBN, Richard Hill, and WCDA Office have had Coughlin on in the last 14
months or so....
Regardless, justice dictates at least a hearing on this Motion for New Trial, and or to
Vacate 1udgement, or Arrest 1udgment, etc... RPD Officer Carter, Sargent Lopez, Officer
Warren and a few others (Officer Weaver, Sargent Dye, Sargent Miller) need to answer some
question, under oath...and Richard Hill and Casey Baker have a lot of 'splainin' to do...and add
to that Dr. Merliss. Otherwise...Some of the "peculiarities" attendant to this and other trials
involving Coughlin in the RMC shall, perhaps, get a bit more retrospection...
Bagwell v. 1amison, 25 S.C.L. 249, S.C.App.L.,1840 In trespass against a bailiff, for
levying under a distress warrant alleged to be void, defendant justified by plaintiff's admissions
that rent was due. Acknowledgments by the landlord, deceased, of partial satisfaction, were
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admitted in reply. State v. Riddell, 21 P.3d 128 Or.App.,2001 In prosecution for criminal
trespass in the second degree, defendant should have been allowed to attack underlying
exclusion order that precluded him from appearing in courthouse square, which defendant
contended was invalid on ground that it prohibited his constitutionally protected activity of
expressive ~freeze modeling in a public area. Hayes v. State, 79 S.E. 761 Ga.App.,1913 A
tenant who in good faith claims possession of land under a bona fide claimant of title and right
of possession cannot be convicted of trespass. O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999
The statutory offense of criminal trespass requires a willful trespass; thus, one who enters or
stays upon another's land under a bona fide claim of right cannot be convicted of
trespass.O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999 A ~bona fide claim of right, which
may serve as a defense to a trespass charge, is a sincere, although perhaps mistaken, good faith
belief that one has some legal right to be on the property; the claim need not be one of title or
ownership, but it must rise to the level of authorization.
The proposed amendment was not the type of an amendment which should have been
allowed under Section 157 of the 1ustice Court Act. A summary proceeding is a statutory
remedy and the petition must be strictly construed. The service of a proper notice against a
tenant holding over, is a jurisdictional fact, which must be properly `805 pleaded and proved. If
the notice is defective or insufficient, the proceeding falls. The notice cannot be amended upon
the trial and no facts can be included as a jurisdictional ground for the proceeding, which are
not included in the original notice. Under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law Section
8585 of the Unconsolidated Laws as amended by the Laws of 1951 and the regulations of the
Temporary State Housing Rent Commission thereunder, the facts constituting the nuisance are
additional requirements of a notice to a tenant holding over. The facts upon which the landlord
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bases his claim of nuisance, are jurisdictional and a summary proceeding cannot be successfully
maintained without full compliance with the statute. A jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by
amendment. Ferber v. Apfel, 113 App.Div. 720, 99 N.Y.S. 215. If the judgment in this case
rested upon a verdict of a jury, I would consider the reception of the evidence of loud and
profane language by the tenants and the submission of that issue to a jury under the present
circumstances, reversible error. However, the Trial Court, in his decision finds, that the tenants
maintained a clothesline approximately five feet from the ground across the rear of the
premises in such a position that it was hazardous and dangerous to the landlords and to the
members of his family who were obliged to pass this clothesline in walking from the garage to
the rear entrance of the portion of the premises occupied by the landlords. He also finds, that
the tenants persisted in maintaining the clothesline in this location contrary to the wishes of the
landlords. In his decision, the Trial Court calls attention to the... N.Y.Co.Ct. 1952 Blozevich v.
Tasber 116 N.Y.S.2d 801
Tenant's failure to raise notice issue in his initial dismissal motion or to plead it with
specificity in his answer did not relieve landlord of its trial burden to establish compliance with
statutory requirements for notice to cure in summary eviction
proceeding.N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2006. W 54-7 LLC v. Schick 14 Misc.3d 49, 829 N.Y.S.2d 399,
2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 26499
Is was reversible error to rule as irrelevant Coughlin's materials on a "claim of right"
defense: License from the owner to access the premises, within meaning of statutory affirmative
defense against prosecution for criminal trespass, is satisfied by showing license from any
owner or other person authorized to license access to the premises. West's Neb.Rev.St. 28-
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522. State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011). Further, see NRS 40.760 and
108.475.
At the time of Coughlin's arrest, he was a licensed attorney. It would not be reasonable
to expect one to litigate, basically, a plenary unlawful detainer Trial (remixed and
recharacterized as a summarey eviction proceeding over half way through) then expect them to
move out practially overnight, and expect a USPS change of address to adequately allay any
concerns about that attorney's mail being forward in time to avoid any damage to his client's
cases. It is unreasonable to suggest that the RPD can then tackle some attorney stepping foot on
the property to get his mail. And where 1udge Garner ruled all the nonsense about pajamas
(don't look like pajamas in the videos to me, Chris, or Rich) and slippers and "you were living
there (in a civil pleading HIll admits that the stuff in the basement was probably there well
before the eviction, then HIll goes on to ponder about Coughlin preferring to "spider hole"
himself in the basement, even prior to the eviction...Hill has continually demeaned Coughlin
throughout these matters and caused his client to needlessly incur fees).
Further, 1udge Gardner's Order of Conviction was so thin, he almost immediately
started to reach for guidance given by the legistlature or city counsel of something regarding
posting at intervals of this or that...there was zero testimony or evidence about the posting of no
trespassing signs...and zero testimony or citation to the effect that post an eviction notice is
tantamount to posting a no trespassing sign. They are legally distinct.
VIOLATIONS OF NRS 178.405 AND NRS 5.010 BY RENO CITY ATTORNEY AND
WASHOE COUNTY PROSECUTORS AND RMC AND WCPD COURT APPOINTED
DEFENDERS
September 8th, 2011 Order for Competency Evaluation by 1udge Schroeder in RCR2011-
063341
September 9th, 2011: Coughlin arrested at Wal-Mart in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny
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IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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October 10th, 2011: Coughlin arraigned in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny charge
October 26th, 2011 (or a short time after depending upon entry of order) 1udge Sferrazza
declares Coughlin competent in RCR2011-063341
February 27th, 2012: file stamped at 1:31pm in RCR2012-065630 1udge Clifton signs an Order
for Competency evaluation of Coughlin
-February 27th, 2012: despite being present at the "clandestine status conIerence" (Dogan's client
Coughlin was noticed, in writing, that it had been reset to March 29th, 2012) DDA Young Iiled an
Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel on 2/27/12 at 2:55
pm in a companion case that he was also prosecuting, RCR2011-063341 in violation oI NRS 178.405.
In her March 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin, Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications
in this regard between her and the Washoe County Public DeIender's OIIice.
-February 27th, 2012: At 3:00 pm, despite the communications she admits to with the WCPD, Judge
Nash Holmes holds a trial where Coughlin is Iorced to appear as an indigent criminal deIendant
proceeding with selI representation in 11 TR 26800, which is suspened upon Judge Nash Holmes
Iinding Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" seconds aIter he testiIies that RPD Sargetn Tarter
lied in connection with a retaliatory traIIic citations incident to Tarter telling Coughlin to leave the
law oIIice oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. on November 15th, 2012 aIter Coughlin was released Irom 3 days
in jail incident to a criminal trespass custodial arrest upon Hill lying to oIIicers and signing a criminal
complaint in 11 CR 26405 Ior criminal trespass on November 13th, 2012. Tarter ordered Coughlin to
leave aIter Hill reIused to give Coughlin his state issued drivers license or identiIication, his hard
drives/client's Iiles, his keys, or his wallet.
-Judge Nash Holmes proceeds to Iile numerous Orders
-March 5th, 2012: in RMC 11 CR 26405, the criminal trespass case Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice the CertiIied Copy oI Docket done by the Judicial Assistant, D2's Lisa Wagner, who couldn't
quite seem to Iind or remember the Iact that Coughlin Iaxed in a Notice oI Appeal on June 28th,
2012, and her Iailure to docket that led to the dismissal oI Coughlin's appeal in CR12-1262, despite
Coughlin having electronic conIirmation oI receipt oI that Iax delivering his Notice oI Appeal to the
RMC and to City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens (whom coyly tries to assert he didn't get it or the paper
copy Coughlin personally delivered to the oIIices oI the City Attorney within the 10 days set Iorth in
NRS 189.010) Trial date set Ior April 10, 2012 by Court.
-05 March 2012: Notice OI Appearace As Co-Counsel And Motion To Dismiss Iiled deIendant. 20
March 2012: Order #1 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 13,February 2012 signed Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Order #2 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 5, March 2012 signed by Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Motion To Strike DeIendant's Motion To Dismiss Complaint Iiled by Deputy City
Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. RMC 11 CR 26405
-10 April 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior trial with counsel Keith Loomis, Judge William Gardner
presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several pre-trial motions
were heard. An Order Suspending Proceedings was signed. All proceedings suspended until the
question oI competence is determined. Case Status Hearing scheduled Ior 8, May 2012. RMC 11 CR
26405. See attached emails demonstrating the knowledge oI and complicity between the Washoe
County Public DeIenders, the court appointed Reno Municipal Court deIenders, the City oI Reno
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
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Prosecutors, Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice, RMC, RJC, and both court's Iiling oIIice's
staII and administrators respecting the existence oI these Orders Ior Competency Evaluation and the
brazen violation oI NRS 178.405 and NRs 5.010 by these individuals. Further, on April 19th, 2012,
DDA Young again violated NRS 178.405 where he moved to have Coughlin remanded to custody
(whereupon Coughlin could again have his medication suddenly withheld Irom him, all while RMC
Judge Nash Holmes seeks to leverage jail staII to get Coughlin to sign some waiver oI his medical
records privacy rights and where WCPD Biray Dogan announces conIidential HIPAA protected
medical inIormation relating to his client Coughlin into the public record, in Iront oI 40 members oI
the public gathered in D10, a transgression which WCPD Jeremy Bosler later reIused to seek to
ameliorate or strike Irom the record in any manner whatsoever).
-May 7th, 2012 in RCR2011-063341 WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by
attempting TO HOLD A TRIAL in that matter during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency
directored towards Goodnight's client, Coughlin. Goodnight manages to jam Coughlin into an ill-
advised Mental Health Court sign-up in MH12-0032, which ends badly when the MHC's Reno
Biondo commits Iraud in asserting that Coughlin was removed Irom the MHC Ior "Iailing to
Iollowing MHC policies" similar to the arguments put Iorth by Sharon Dollarhide, despite the MHC,
and perhaps Goodnight too, having given Coughlin a list oI medications it prohibits, and a contract
Ior entry into the MCH, aIter having inIormed Coughlin he was accepted into the MCH upon entering
the contract. The MCH subsequently threatened Coughlin with incarceration Ior taking a medication
is only aIter the Iact objected to, then, upon having the bargained Ior consieration, oIIer and
acceptance pointed out to it, the MCH lied and disparaged Coughlin to the RJC and others, causing
Coughlin reputational damage, and Coughlin's case was remanded to the RJC at a later date. During
this period oI time, D10 Judge Elliot Iorced Coughlin back into custody at the WCDC, where
Coughlin has been denied his medication every single one oI his 10 trips to jail this year, with no
titration down oI dosing whatsoever, even where Coughlin was willing and able to arrange Ior
delivery oI the medication at his own expense, etc.
-08 May 2012: Case Status hearing held beIore Judge William Gardner. Present on behalI oI the City
was Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Ior the deIense Keith Loomis and deIendant
Zachary Coughlin. DeIendant was Iound to be competent. DeIendant's motion to remove Keith
Loomis as counsel granted. Trial date set by the court Ior June 18,2012. RMC 11 CR 26405.
Strangely, despite Coughlin still being subject to an as yet to be ruled upon Order For
Competency evaluation and despite Coughlin having just the previous day been accepted into
Mental Health Court and the R1C case RCR2011-063341 transferred there, RMC 1udge
William Gardner jammed Coughlin both into proceeding without the Sixth Amendment Right
To Counsel and into some trial setting, even though NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 forbids it, and
even though 1udge Gardner admitted to being aware of 1udge Nash Holmes, his fellow RMC
1udge, seeking to have Coughlin's law license taken away based upon a SCR 117 Disability
Petition (1udge Nash Holmes, in her March 14th, 2012 letter/grievance to the State Bar of
Nevada, wherein she purports to speak for 1udge William Gardner and managed to pass on to
the SBN the April 2009 Order For Sanctions by 1udge William Gardner's Family Court
1udge Linda Gardner, that 1udge William Gardner passed to 1udge Nash Holmes after
receiving from his sometime in the first quarter of 2012). Incidentally, Coughlin was
previously a domestic violence attorney at Washoe Legal Services until Family Court 1udge
Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin $1,000 personally for the arguments
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
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he made in representing a domestic violence victim in a divorce trial were cited by WLS
Executive Director Paul Elcano as the "sole reason" for Coughlin being fired. Coughlin filed a
Petition for Writ of Mandamus in respone to that Order with the Nevada Supreme Court in
54844. Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal for insufficient service of process of
his wrongful termination case against Washoe Legal Services on February 27th, 2012, and that
matter is currently on appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in 60302. Oh, and Reno City
Attorney 1ohn Kadlic is a patient of Zach Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy Coughlin, and the
City of Reno and or the RPD have sought to pressure Coughlin's parents into having him
"committed", despite the fact that the numerous (about 8-10 ish) wrongful arrests Coughlin has
been subjected to this year (most of which violate Soldal v. Cook County and have been
captured on video tape, amazingly) all kind oI give Mr. Kadlic a bit motivation to quiet and or
discredit Coughlin (and and arrest on June 28th, 2012 by the WCSO and various instances this year
where Iraudulent AIIidavits oI Service by the WCSO have been involved in arrests oI Coughlin give
the WCDA OIIice its own motivations).
Given that this trial setting and denial oI Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel occurred
during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin that the RMC, Judge
William Gardner, court appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. and City Attorney's Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. were well aware oI, the Iollowing are void: O5 June 2012: Notice OI
Appearance As Counsel ; Motion To Dismiss; Motion To Suppress; Motion For A Continuance OI
Trial And TransIer To Mental Health Court Iiled by deIendant. 18 June 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior
trial pro-per, Judge William Gardner presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-
Stevens. Several pre-trial motions were heard. Motion to Continue Iiled by deIendant denied. Motion
to Dismiss Iiled by deIendant denied. Motion to Suppress denied. Motion to Recuse denied. Motion
to TransIer to Mental Health Court denied. Case tried on its merits and the DeIendant was Iound
guilty oI the charge oI Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.010. .."'Y25'2012 The DeIendant was
sentenced as Iollows: Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.0 10. : Time Served (3 days at usual $100
a day, and a $310.00 Iine Ior a total oI $610 raked in by the RMC on a Iirst oIIense trespass charge
where typically the Iine is $305. Also, Richard G. Hill, Esq. lied under oath at that June 18th, 2012
criminal trespass Trial where he testiIied that the RPD identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and
issued a lawIul order or warning Ior Coughlin to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking
down a door to a quasi "basement" under the Iormer law oIIice. The videos oI the arrest Iilmed by
Hill demonstrate that Coughlin was never given an opportunity to heed any warning to leave given
that day prior to a custodial arrest being eIIectuated, contrary to the Supplemental Declaration by
RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr. RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez subsequently admitted that the RPD neither
identiIied themselves as law enIorcement nor issued a lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement prior
to landlord Merliss kicking down the basement door on November 13th, 2012. WCSO Civil
Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in an email to Coughlin that Deputy Machen's November 7th,
2011 AIIidavit oI Service swearing to have "personally served" the RJC REV2011-001708 Summary
Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011 was "incorrect" in that to Machen "personally served" means
"posting it to the door when no one is home. However, given NRS 40.400 makes applicable NRCP
5(b)(2) and 6(e) to summary evictions (even those that are noticed by the RJC, in writing, as a "Trial"
and even where, at the October 13th, 2011 "summary eviction proceeding" the RJC ruled that
Coughlin "had met his burden oI establishing there is a genuine issue oI material Iact concerning his
retaliatory eviction deIense" and the matter was then "set Ior trial on October 25th, 2011 provided
Coughlin deposits $2,275 into the court's rent escrow account", all oI which violates JCRCP Rule 109
and NRS 40.253(6)) the lockout Deputy Machen oversaw on November 1st, 2011 was based upon a
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
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void Eviction Order and Decision oI October 25th, 2011 and an October 27th, 2011 Findings oI
Fact...that Hill's associate Baker testiIied as to having apparently provided receipt thereoI to the
WCSO on October 28th, 2011, and which RJC ChieI Civil Clerk Karen Stancil indicates were
transmitted to the WCSO via Iax according to the usual custom and practice oI the RJC...meaning, the
WCSO Iailed to eIIectuate a lockout "within 24 hours" oI "receipt" oI either oI those
Orders...meaning Hill and Merliss were trespassing on November 13th, 2011, not Coughlin, and they
brought the RPD along Ior the ride, whereupon the RPD eIIected a wrongIul arrest (based upon lies
by neurologist Merliss and his attorney Hill to the eIIect that they warned Coughlin to leave that day
prior to the RPD showing up, which is clearly show to be Ialse by the videos Iilmed by Hill and
Merliss themselves and Hill's subsequent testimony at the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial in 11
CR 26405).
May 9th, 2012: Order finding Coughlin competent in CR12-0376, by 1udge Elliot of
Department 10 resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competency Evaluation signed by
R1C 1udge Clifton and file stamped at 1:31 pm on that date.
September 5th, 2012: Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin by 1udge Sferrazza in
RCR2011-063341
October 2, 2012: WCPD Leslie and Dogan and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by swapping the
October 15th, 2012 Trial continuation/Competency Hearing Date in RCR2011-063341 with
RCR2012-065630, and setting/stipulating to a new hearing on October 22nd, 2012, and resetting the
Trial date to November 19th, 2012, but not beIore attempting to cram RCR2012-067980 onto the
calendar with RCR2012-063341 Ior October 22nd, 2012 (and Leslie and Dogan lied to Coughlin
about whether "mandatory status conIerence" was held on August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-065630,
and RCR2012-067980, the latter at which Leslie set a Trial date oI September 18th, 2012 despite his
legal assistant Linda Gray admitting to Coughlin that Coughlin was provided no notice whatsoever oI
the August 6th, 2012 hearing date in those cases. Also, Dogan and Leslie again violated NRS
178.405 on October 2nd, 2012 where tehy reset Ior October 30th, 2012 a Motion Hearing on DDA
Young's impermissible Motion to Amend the Complaint in RCR2012-065630 (six months aIter the
arrest, no speciIic Iacts pled in either to support either charge, really). Further, Dogan Iailed to alert
Coughlin in any way to the Iact that, in his July 31st, 2012 Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint,
DDA Young attempted to, in violation oI RPC 3.8, amend the "misue oI emergency services" charge
(where Coughlin is accused oI using 911 to report police misconduct) to a charge that would provide
the District Attorney more leverage against Coughlin, a retaliatory prosecution, Ior a crime that would
damage Coughlin's law license given the import oI SCR 111(6), despite DDA Young lacking
probable cause to so amend his charge. Dogan and Young previously conspired to retaliate against
Coughlin incident to their "clandestine status conIerence" oI February 27th, 2012, which just so
happened to be the date that Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal in his case against Washoe Legal
Services 60302 and the date that Judge William Gardner transIerred jurisdiction Irom RMC D1 Judge
Dilworth to RMC D3 Judge Nash Holmes in 12 CR 000696, a case where Coughlin was subject to a
custodial arrest Ior jaywalkign on January 12th, 2012 incident to Coughli's peaceIully Iilming Richard
G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew Irom a public sidewalk, disposing oI property leIt at Coughlin's
Iormer home law oIIice due to Hill locking a gate thereto during the time Coughlin was aIIorded to
- 23/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000922
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remove such property and where Hill had boarded up on oI the entrances to the property as well, in
addition to remove the only ladder to the upstairs attic/storage space at the property. On February
27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 Judge Nash Holmes told Coughlin she would have him thrown in jail iI he
mentioned Richard G. Hill's name one more time. On January 31st, 2012, at an extension hearing on
the TPO Richard Hill received against CoughlinI or Coughlin's alleged jaywalking on January 12th,
2012, RJC Judge Schroeder roared at Coughlin "do you want to go to jail!" when Coughlin broached
the subject oI Hill's abuse oI process. Judge Schroeder is listed in the RJC docket as presiding over
the February 27th, 2012 "clandestine status conIerence" that ultimately resulted in Judge CliIton
signing the Order Ior Competency Evaluation. It is unclear iI any actual hearing beIore a judge even
took place that day, however.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: NRS 176.515 ARREST OF
JUDGMENT NRS 176.525 Arrest oI judgment: NRS 176.565 Clerical mistakes. Clerical
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders. The RMC Iailed to Iile Coughlin June 28th, 2012 Notice oI Appeal, and that
resulted in the appeal cr12-1262 being dismissed. NRS 178.589 Use oI Iacsimile machine. The Reno
Municipal Court has sought to apply rules to Coughlin it does not apply to others, even where NRS
178.608 and NRS 178.610 Iorbid it Irom doing so. Further, Coughlin's rights to Iile the best Motion
Ior New Trial that he could and to ensure that the RMC did in Iact Iile his June 28th, 2012 Notice oI
Appeal were prejudiced by an impermissibly bail increase by Judge Gardner, unnoticed (Coughlin did
not have an attorney oI record at the time and was not appropriately noticed as to the July 5th, 2012
impromptu bail hearing at which the RPD committed Iraud, and Iurther, the "saIety oI other persons
and oI the community" argument does not accord the RPD the right to violate Soldal v. Cook County.
NRS 178.498 Amount. II the deIendant is admitted to bail, the bail must be set at an amount which in
the judgment oI the magistrate will reasonably ensure the appearance oI the deIendant and the saIety
oI other persons and oI the community, ...having regard to: 1. The nature and circumstances oI the
oIIense charged; 2. The Iinancial ability oI the deIendant to give bail; 3. The character oI the
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000923
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deIendant; and 4. The Iactors listed in NRS 178.4853. NRS 178.499 Increase in amount. 1. At any
time aIter a district or Justice Court has ordered bail to be set at a speciIic amount, and beIore
acquittal or conviction, the court may upon its own motion or upon motion oI the district attorney and
aIter notice to the deIendant`s attorney oI record or, iI none, to the deIendant, increase the amount oI
bail Ior good cause shown. 2. II the deIendant has been released on bail beIore the time when the
motion to increase bail is granted, the deIendant shall either return to custody or give the additional
amount oI bail A 2012 published and publicly disseminated Reno Municipal Court Bail Schedule
indicates criminal trespass under teh RMC 8.10.010 Trespassing carries a Iine oI $ 305. Coughlin's
Iirst oIIense criminal trespass charge incident to a civil eviction was Iined $610 by Judge William
Gardner, twice the normal amount, considering the three days oI incarceration Coughlin served
(typically credited at $100 a day) and the $310 "Iine" that Judge Gardner kept Irom Coughlin's cash
bail Ior the RMC. Another indication oI the impropriety oI Iailing to recuse himselI.
Further, Loomis and Puentes deprived me oI my right to supboena witnesses to deIend myselI
in RMC 11 CR 26405, a criminal trespass matter resulting in a criminal trespass conviction on June
18th, 2012, which I reported to Bar Counsel in compliance with SCR 111. SBN Bar Counsel King
has the audio Irom two oI the pre-trial hearings and I am attaching the audio oI the trial or linking to it
herein. It demonstrates the Iact that Dr. Merliss was a percipient, material eye witness (in Iact Dr.
Merliss lied to the RPD in eIIectuating this wrongIul arrest, and Sargent Marcia Lopez has admitted
to me, contrary to RPD OIIicer Chris Carter's police report and Richard Hill's June 18th, 2012 sworn
testimony and Casey Baker, Esq's (whom was not even there on November 13th, 2011) NRCP Rule
11 violating (given he possessed the video's taken by Dr. Merliss and his supervisory attorney,
Richard G. Hill, Esq, which were propounded to the Reno City Attorney's OIIice and which both
Loomis and Puentes had, which Iurther demonstrate their culpability. There is a suggestion that these
- 25/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000924
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"contract" court appointed deIenders put their own proIit motive above their client's rights to
subpoena witnesses and gather evidence to deIende their cases (similar to the reIusals by WCPD Jim
Leslie, Loomis reIused to procure and provide the audio oI two extremely relevant court proceedings
in the RJC, necessary to the deIense oI RMC case, which led to 18 days wrongIul incarceration oI me
Irom July 3, 2012 to July 21st, 2012 in RMC 12 CR 12420. The two RJC matters are the Milan
Krebs TPO hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287 (particularly necessary to the deIense oI that matter, in
addition to the matter Leslie represent me on incident to a wrongIul June 28th, 2012 arrest by the
WCSO in RCR2012-067980, incident to a Iraudulently procurred Summary Eviction Order
(stemming Irom the Iraudulent Declaration oI Personal Service by license process server Robert Wray
Ior Nevada Court Services, which was committing the unauthorized practice oI law (deeming
themselves an "eviction consulting and process service company" in RJC rev2012-001048, where
Wray lied about "personally serving" me a June 14th, 2012 5 day unlawIul detainer notice (he tried to
break and enter my rental #29, which had not windows and which had a locked Iront door at the time
that he and Northwind Apartments Manager Duane Jakob attempted to break and enter and committ
another trespass (as they had done previously, when they Iailed to get the City oI Reno Code
EnIorcement to do their bidding in seeking to subvert the summary eviction process, and where the
RPD, though making threats to arrest me Ior criminal trespass violative oI Soldal v. Cook County,
was taking too long to "help" Northwind out. WCPD Leslie Iailed to inIorm me or notiIy me in any
way as to the Iact that the WCDA Iiled, on August 23rd, 2012, a document listing Jakob as a witness
it intends to call in its prosecution oI me in RCR2012-067980. Further, WCPD Biray Dogan Iailed to
inIorm me in any way oI the Iact that, on July 31st, 2012, DDA Young Iiled a Motion to Amend
Criminal Complaint wherein he, lacking a RPC 3.8 probable cause basis to do so, seeks to amend his
charge in RCR2012-065630 to a charge that would invoke, upon a conviction, the reporting
- 26/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000925
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requirements oI SCR 111(6), rather than maintain the diIIicult task oI prosecuting one Ior "misue oI
911" where 911 was allegedly utilized to report police misconduct, whereupon 911 operators
purportedly eIused to document such a complaint or report in any way. Additionally, Henry Sotelo,
similar to Loomis, reIused to procure and provide to his client, Coughlin (once Loomis received his
second Order granting his withdrawal as court appointed counsel Ior Coughlin, once in RMC 11 CR
26405 (now a SCR 111(4) petition, Iiled by Bar Counsel against Coughlin on October 15th, 2012)
and again in RMC 12 CR 12420 (Loomis also reIused to send a request Ior discovery or subpoena
duces tecum to the City oI Reno or RPD Ior the various police reports Sargent Dye and OIIicer
Weaver reIerence during an impermissible, unnotice, impromptu bail hearing (wherein Jill Drake,
Esq. committed proIessional misconduct) on July 5th, 2012 (at which RMC Judge Gardner again
Iailed to recuse himselI despite the pending grievances Iiled on his behalI by Judge Nash Holmes,
NG12-0434 and NG12-0435, the latter oI which resulted Irom Judge W. Gardner's sister passing to
him, her brother, her April 2009 Order AIter trial sanction Coughlin, to RMC Judge Nash Holmes,
whom Iiled it on March 14th, 2012 with Bar Counsel, along with her admission to to communications
with the WCPD's OIIice, which the WCPD'S OIIice, including Bosler, Dogan, and Leslie, have
reIused to comment on to Coughlin in any way, aside Irom Leslie's dubious assertion that he is
completely unaware oI such.
Regardless, given the import oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010, the June 18th, 2012 Trial in
RMC 11 CR 26405 should have never taken place, should have never been set on May 8th, 2012
(particularly where the 2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation in RCR2012-065630, to which
Loomis admits to have been aware oI, was not ruled upon by D10 ("Tiburon" prinout sua sponte
gathered by Judge Gardner aside, where Loomis didn't manage to get one, though he did argue that an
unoIIicial online "docket" was somehow capable oI providing judicial notice oI an Order Finding
- 27/39 -
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000926
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Coughlin competent on May 8th, 2012, which is clearly violative oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010).
Additionally, it is preposterous to Iind that Coughlin was able to make the decision to proceed
without Loomis or other court appointed, Sixth Amendment satisIying representation, on May 8th,
2012, given the Order by D10 in CR12-0376 Iinding Coughlin competent did not get signed and
entered until May 9th, 2012. This is reminiscent oI DDA Young Iiling an Opposition to Coughlin's
Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel in RCR2011-063341 aIter the entry oI the 2/27/12 Order Ior
Competency Evaluation by Judge CliIton in RCR2012-065630 (though the docket lists Judge
Schroeder as presiding over that "clandestine" status conIerence, so deemed in light oI Coughlin
being notice in writing that it had been vacated to March 29th, 2012, in light oI the scheduling
conIlict presented by the RMC 11 TR 26800 traIIic citation trial set Ior 1:00 pm on 2/27/12 beIore
Judge Nash Holmes, which she held anyways, despite the dictates oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010
and the communicatiosn Judge Nash Holmes admits to in the March 14th, 2012 grievance she Iiled
on behalI oI all RMC Judges (including pro tempore ones) on March 14th, 2012, and Ior which Judge
William Gardner admits to being aware oI, as does City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, whom makes
ridiculously mincing arguments respecting the diIIerence in being "competent" to practice law versus
being "competent" to stand trial, even where he was aware oI RCR2012-065630 and CR12-0376.
Further, upon inIormation and belieI, Hazlett-Stevens demonstrates a lack oI candor to tribunals
where he argues he was not "served" documents that he recieved via email and or Iax where the RMC
Rules allow Ior such transmissions to constitute service upon "governmental attorneys". I reserve my
right to supplement this grievance Iurther at a later date. Additionally, Mr. Sotelo violated NRS
178.405 and NRS 5.010 on September 30th, 2012 where he Iiled a Motion to Withdraw as Coughlin's
Counsel oI Record in 12 CR 12420 during a period in which a September 5th, 2012 (though it might
be Iile stamped September 7th, 2012) Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in RCR2011-
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000927
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063341 was entered (and which the RMC, City Attorney Sooudi, and RMC deIender Sotelo
recognized as requiring a stay oI a Motion Hearing in 12 CR 12420 on September 18th, 2012...).
Sotelo compounds his misconduct by making spurious and vague allegations against his then client
Coughlin in that Motion alluding to some "repugnant" course he alleges Coughlin wishes to maintain,
though, predictably, Sotelo Iails to provide any support Ior his egregiously prejudicial statement,
damaging oI his client's interests and deIense, all while violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010.
Further, given the correspondences admitted to between Puentes and Loomis with the Washoe
County Public DeIender's OIIice, and in light oI the Iact that both Loomis and Puentes are employed
by the RMC, the various Orders Ior Competency Evaluation Iiled since the Iirst one oI September
8th, 2011 regarding Coughlin, in RCR2011-063341, vitiate the import oI all subsequently void Orders
predicated upon any part oI any proceeding not stayed during the pendency oI such an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation. That means, the conviction in RMC 11 CR 22176 underpinning the SCR
111(6) petition in 60838 resulting in Coughlin's current temporary suspension oI his law license, is
necessarily void, particularly where the arraignment took place at a time (October 10th, 2011) when
Coughlin's competency was put into question, particularly where RMC deIender Lew Taitel,
appointed at Coughlin's court ordered deIense counsel beginning on November 19th, 2011, was aware
oI the pending Order Ior Competency Evaluation in RJC RCR2011-063341 at the time oI the
November 30th, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176. resulting in Coughlin's conviction Ior petty
larceny. Included in such misconduct is Pamela Robert, Esq., City oI Reno prosecutor as well, in
addition to her coworker Allison Ormaas, particularly where she appeared and oIIered argument both
at the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800 in the RMC, but as well as the February 12th, 2012 continuation
oI that Trial. In that regard, all oI Judge Nash Holmes purported Orders, including those Iinding
Coughlin "by clear and convincing evidence" to be guilty oI "summary criminal contempt" and other
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000928
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violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct incident to the traIIic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 on
2/27/12 that Judge Nash Holmes, despite the mandates oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010,
transmogriIied into a disciplinary proceeding against a pro se attorney indigent criminal deIendant
denied his Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel in a proceeding wherein jail time was ultimately
ordered, are also void, to the extent they are not already void given the divesting oI her jurisdiction
incident to Coughlin Iiling, on March 7th, 2012, a Notice oI Appeal oI that summary contempt order
as rendered (especially where the March 28th,2 2012 written Order by Judge Nash Holmes was
mailed to an address Ior Coughlin that the RMC knew was no longer good).
The Summary Eviction Order incident to a "Trial" (that's what the notice says it is, and that is
what Judge SIerrazza characterized it as on both October 13th, and October 25th, 2011, contrary to
Baker's assertions, in addition to Baker's misrepresenting the Iact that Judge SFerrazza also ruled that
Coughlin met the "summary judgment" standard required oI him already at the October 13th, 2011
"proceeding", and thereby, with the Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal by Coughlin on Octobe 18th, 2011,
the RJC was divested oI jurisdiction to hold a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, to the extent it lacked
jurisdiction to begin with in Iailing to comply with JCRCP 109 respecting the number oI days to
respond to a "Complaint" incident to an unlawIul detainer "Trial" and the notice requirements
incident thereto, much less the unlawIul Iorced rent escrow depositing, or the denial oI a stay, even
where the RJC held onto the $2,275 "rent escrow" deposit" under the auspices oI holding is as
Coughlin's 'bond on appeal" (necessarily meaning the "superseadeas bond, given the appeal bond is
statutorily set as $250 and only a supersedeas can be adjudicate in such a manner to be "three times
the monthly rent"...never mind the Iact that, given Coughlin's monthly rent was under $1,000, NRS
118A.385 dictates such a "supersedeas bond" be $250, unless the Court Iind's Coughlin a commercial
tenant, but in that case, given the non-payment oI rent was not pled, a summary eviction is verboten
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000929
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under NRS 40.253 anyways, so...NRCP 60(b)(4) void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, and thereIore, to the
extent the criminal trespass conviction does not Ialter on any oI these numerous other grounds...it
shall there as well.
2. Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling with the RMC, both in person in June 27th, 2012 and by Iax
on June 28th, 2012 a Notice oI Appeal, timely under NRS 189.010, which Coughlin also timely
served on the City oI Reno via personally delivering it to their oIIice and emailing and Iaxing to the
City Attorney as well, all timely. Coughlin in person attempt to Iile on June 27th, 2012 was rejected,
though he beat the "on a timer" locking oI the door to the court house prior to 5:00 pm attested to by
the WCSO. Coughlin Iax Iiled the Notice Appeal to Judge Gardner's Iax number as held out to the
public by the RMC and on the www.nvbar.org website (and has electronic conIirmation oI a
successIul transmission thereoI) on June 28th, 2012 (Coughlin was prevented Irom Iiling in person on
June 28th, 2012 a Notice oI Appeal due to a wrongIul arrest in RCR2012-067980 by the WCSO
based upon a Iraudulent aIIidavit oI service by Nevada Court Services (which is partners with RMC
deIender Lew Taitel, Esq.) licensed process server Robert Wray, and a deIective 5 day unlawIul
detainer notice, violative oI NRS 40.253 (which required such a notice to list the court to Iile a
Tenant's AIIidavit) in that it listed the wrong court to Iile a Tenant's AIIidavit in the 6/14/12 Notice
by citing Sparks Justice Court (to which Coughlin submitted such a Tenant's AIIidavit, along with
several "heads up" calls to the RJC and a 6/26/12 email to the WCSO and RJC alerting them to the
jurisdictional deIiciencies and concomitant voidness oI any RJC lockout order stemming Irom such a
deIective notice. (see Exhibit 1), Hill also testiIied that Merliss had not been at the 121 River Rock
property in the week preceding the arrest, despite OIIicer Carter's report indicating Hill or Merliss
told him otherwise. Coughlin was prevented Irom presenting his case at the June 18th 2012 trial in
light oI Iraud by the Mental Health Court (which went back on a written contract with Coughlin), an
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000930
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wrongIul imprisonment by Judge Elliot incident to an April 19th, 2012 hearing in CR12-0376
(incident to Iraud by Lake's Crossing's psychologists Sally Farmer, Ph.D. and Bill Davis, Ph.D. in an
April 18th, 2012 letter Iiled with D10 in that matter, in addition to the Iraud committed by the MHC's
Reno Biondo in lying about the reasoning Ior Coughlin's being removed Irom the MHC in MH12-
0032. Regardless, Coughlin was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by City Attorney
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, and RMC contract court appointed deIenders Lew Taitel (whom
violated RMC rules in Iailing to speciIy the rationale Ior his withdrawal, in addition to Iailing to own
up to his proIessional misconduct in taking on Coughlin's representation at a time when conIlict
existed in light oI Coughlin Iiling suit against Taitle's business partners, Nevada Court Services, in
CV11-03051 on October 19th, 2011), Roberto Puentes and Keith Loomis, with Loomis and the RMC
D2 violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in Iailing to abide by statutory dictates respecting the
staying oI proceeding during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation (the RMC and
D2, in addition to Loomis were well aware oI the clandestine status conIerence between WCPD Biray
Dogan and DDA Zach Young, communicated to and or joined in on by RMC Judge Nash Holmes, as
admitted to in her March 14th, 2012 grievance to the State Bar oI Nevada, Iiled on behalI oI D2's
Judge William Gardner and his sister Judge Linda Gardner (whom's April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions
now Iorms the basis Ior an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin in NG12-0435, which was Iiled by
Judge Nash Holmes on behalI oI Judge William Gardner and his sister, Washoe District Family Court
Judge Linda Gardner along with the NG12-0434 grievance RMC Judge Nash Holmes Iiled on behalI
oI all RMC Judges against Coughlin on March 14th, 2012.
3. Further Washoe County SheriII's OIIice Iiled Ialse aIIidavit, by Deputy Machem, alleging
Coughlin was "personally served" eviction Sorder, however WCSO IA Supervisor Liz Stuchell has
admitted in writing (see her email to Coughlin in Exhibit 1) that "personally served", to the WCSO
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000931
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civil division, means just taping a notice to a door when no one is home, and Stuchell conIirmed in
writing that WCSO Deputy Machem indicated to her that no one was home at 121 River Rock when,
on November 1, 2011, he perIormed a lockout on Coughlin's law oIIice and alleges he posted the
Order Ior Summary Eviction on Coughlin's door.
Nevada Revised Statutes Section 176.515 - Procedure in Criminal Cases New trial
NRS 178.394 No person to be compelled to be witness against himselI or herselI in
criminal action, or to be unnecessarily restrained. By the RMC in Judge Nash Holmes and possibly
through Judge Gardner reIusing to provide Coughlin appropriate court appointed counsel, and then
reIusing to allow Coughlin to selI represent without making everything he says as a deIense attorney
or on his own behalI subject to being declared testimonial, and necessarily sworn under oath,
Coughlin ws deprived his rights under the FiIth Amendment and the above statute. Regardless, it is
unreasonable to expect Coughlin to Ieel anything other than terriIied to make arguments on his own
behalI (particularly those exposign this police misconduct) where the two previous RMC trial he was
Iorced to appear pro se in resulted in summary contempt convictions and incarcerations (which he had
to report the USPTO and SBN).
The City Iailed to put on any evidence that anybody (not the Reno Justice Court, not the
WCSO, not opposing counsel Hill or Baker, etc) actually mailed Coughlin a copy oI the Order oI
Summary Eviction prior to the illegal lockout oI November 1, 2011, thereIore making any such
lockout a legal nullity, and void, and a trespass, actually, done under color oI state law 42 USC Sec
1983, see Lynn v Desiderio....however, NRCP is made applicable to landlord tenant matters in
Nevada, and thereIore, substituted or constructive service is required (ie, 3 days Ior mailing where
personal service is not done). ThereIore, Richard Hill and Merliss were the trespassers, in addition to
the Reno Police Department OIIicer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez, whom admitted to
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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Coughlin that RPD OIIicer Chris Carter and Richard Hill and Dr. Merliss lied when they allege that
she and OIIicer Carter identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and issued Coughlin a lawIul order
or warning to leave prior to Merliss kicking the "basement" door down on November 13th, 2011, and
where Hill and OIIicer Carter allege Coughlin was given any chance to leave in response to any such
warning or that Coughlin indicated he was reIusing to take the RPD upon on any such chance to heed
any such warning. This is clearly proven by the videos Hill and Merliss took, propounded to City
Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, indicative oI proIessional misconduct on his part in oIIering perjured
testimony at trial that he knew to be Ialse, and Iurther Iailing to propound exculpatory dispatch and
911/RPD recordings revealing the extent to which Hill and Merliss are shown lying in the videos
propounded wherein they lie in asserting that they warned Coughlin oI a criminal trespass charge
prior to Coughlin's arrest on November 13th, 2011. Further, where both RJC Civil Division
Supervisor Karen Stancil and Casey Baker (in his June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at Trial) indicate
that pursuant to Baker's admitted October 28th, 2011 transaction with the WCSO and Stancil's
admission as to the "usual pattern and practice" oI the RJC vis a vis the transmission and, thereIore,
receipt oI the Eviction Decision and Order oI October 25th, 2011 and the Findings oI Fact,
Conclusions oI Law and Order oI Summary Eviction oI October 27th, 2011 in REV2011-001708
(City's Exhibits 1 through 3) by the wCSO occurred too soon here, and thereIore these "Lockout
Orders" were stale, invalid, void, and ineIIective Ior all purposes. A claim oI right deIense is
particularly prevailing in this regard, and the admission by Hill at Trial that he communicated to
Coughlin that he was charging the same "Iair market value Ior Iull use and occupancy", some $900
per month, to Coughlin that was regularly charged under the Standard Rental Agreement makes clear
reversible error occurred where a relevancy objection was sustained directed to such a claim oI right
deIense. Further, Hazlett-Steven's and Baker demonstrated a lack oI candor to the tribunal where they
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000933
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assert the October 27th, 2011 Order indicated "shall" or some other language suIIicient to support
their contentions where it did not.
Judge William Gardner oI the Reno Municipal Court reIused to recuse himselI despite having
worked Ior the Reno City Attorney's OIIice just 2 years prior to this case, and despite his own sister,
Second Judicial District Court Family Judge Hon. Linda Gardner being involved in a State Bar
grievance against Coughlin based upon her Order Ior Sanctions against Coughlin three years prior in
a divorce trial. Coughlin Iiled a Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus challenging Judge Linda Gardner's
Order Ior Sanctions. Coughlin was Iired Irom his job at Washoe Legal Services, according to WLS
Executive Director Paul Elcano, strictly because oI Judge Linda Gardner's sanctions against
Coughlin. http://caseinIo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID22746
Please see attached the May 2009 letter Irom WLS inIorming Coughlin oI his Iiring in light oI
Judge Linda Gardners April 2009 Order Ior sanctisn in the Joshi divorce case.
Hazlett misleads the court in citing to State v. Nichols 106 Nevada 651, 790 9P. 2D 550
(1990) was purely dicta and should not oI been relied upon by this court in reaching its decision to
issue a conviction here that case, McNichols, dealt with the lawIulness oI a search by the state and
involve a criminal conviction Ior possession oI a controlled substance it simply did not involve
trespass incident to a civil eviction oI a tenant by landlord any discussion oI addiction and McNichols
related to a Ioreclosure was dicta no actual trespassers statute (in Iact, there is nothing in the opinion
to distinguish between whether a civil trespass or criminal trespass is distinguished in that dicta) was
cited to and use oI the term trespass was as a term oI art there was no distinction whether it was a
civil trespass or criminal trespass and McNichols and no real discussion by the court as to whether the
service requirements are met ,
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000934
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Further grounds Ior new trial are revealed in the extent to which Judge Gardner is bullying
Coughlin throughout the trial to avoid key areas oI inquiry, to shorten, limit, and narrow every aspect
oI everything, and in going back on his pre lunch attestations about limiting the scope oI cross, aIter
"giving you an hour to think about it", Judge Gardner commences the post lunch resumption oI th
Trial with an entirely new stance on the matter, wherein he is clearly attempting to prevent Coughlin
Irom putting testimonial evidence on the record with the threat oI yet another summary contempt
incarceration or worse (and clearly, given Judge Nash Holmes hit piece in 11 TR 26800 and the work
put in by Judge Howard, the RMC Judges are willing to put on a real show just in case their message
hasn't been heard loud enough.
This is a Iormal Complaint against all three oI the RMC public deIenders I had represent me
on that matter, Taitel, Puentes, and Loomis. Please place a copy oI this in their
employment/personnel/independent contractor Iiles and indicate whether the court appointed counsel
the RMC contracts with must pay out oI pocket (or out oI their $7k a month Irom the RMC Ior
subpoena Iees, as none oI my court appointed counsel so Iar have complied with a single request on
my part to procure and provide to me audio recordings oI hearings (please produce to me the audio
Irom the entire morning oI July 5th, 2012 (I was called up several times) Ior 12 CR 12420, actually,
please produce the audio Ior any and all court dates I have ever had at the RMC, including the one on
November 14th, 2011 where I was brought to court while in custody, but not brought in Ior the Trial
in 11 CR 22176, through no Iault oI my own, but Ior which Judge Howard later relied upon in
denying my Motion to Continue the November 30th, 2011 Trial date in that matter, which was
denied, the same day Department 2 granted the City's request to continue the criminal trespass matter
in 11 CR 26405 because Richard G. Hill, Esq., was going to be on vacation Ior six weeks (Taitel
never told me about the Motion to Continue, then violated RMC Rules by Iailing to speciIiy, in a
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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written motion, the reason Ior his withdrawal...though it was likely because when Taitel took on my
case and got my social security number in my Iile on or around November 19th, 2011...I had Iiled an
IFP and proposed Complaint against Taitel's business partners, Nevada Court Services, on October
19th, 2011 in CV11-03051....though Taitel's replacement, Puentes, admitted he has similar conIlicts.
Regardless, all oI these court appointed deIenders have continually reIused to subpoena ANY
witnesses on my behalI, including PERCIPIENT EYE WITNESSES TO MATERIAL FACTS IN
DISPUTE. Such as whether the RPD identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and or issued a
lawIul order or warning to leave the property prior to the landlord kicking the door down to the
"basement" and the RPD arresting me, and whether, subsequent to the door being kicked down,
whether the RPD or landlord issued a warning to leave and or sought to issue a citation in lieu oI a
custodial arrest, which they did not, though OIIicer Carter lied about it in his police report (though the
video Hill Iilmed oI the incident betrays that), and Hill and Merliss lied about it on the video, though
Hill didn't lie in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration in the eviction matter, but Hill went on to lie on
the stand on June 18th, 2012 at the Trial in 11CR26405. 1833 Associates v. Frying Carpets Co., Inc.,
594 N.Y.S.2d 121 N.Y.City.Civ.,1992 Summary proceeding is intended as speedy means oI
recovering possession oI real property because either rent has not been paid or tenant is holding over
aIter expiration or termination oI lease term and is not an alternative to plenary action Ior money nor
is it a substitute Ior proper application Ior provisional remedy or declaratory judgment, not available
in civil court. Guidetti v. Moroze, 423 N.Y.S.2d 140 N.Y.Co.,1979 Although action seeking recovery
oI possession oI leased property Ior nonpayment oI rent and to collect said rent was properly inserted
as summary action, the owner's sale converted the summary proceeding Ior collection oI unpaid rent
into a plenary action Ior same. RPAPL 701 et seq. Velazquez v. Thompson, 451 F.2d 202
C.A.2.N.Y.,1971 Primary purpose oI summary eviction proceedings is to enable landlords to regain
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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possession quickly and inexpensively and thereby avoid plenary action Ior ejectment and its incident
delays which prompted landlords to short circuit judicial process by resort to selI-help
CONCLUSION
Please expunge this SCR 111(4) petition and the SCR 105 Complaint currently stemming
Irom this wrongIul eviction and or grant this Motion Ior New Trial or Vacate the Judgement oI
Conviction and or reinstate Coughlin's appeal and apprise D10 in CR12-1262 oI Coughlin's timely
Iiling a notice oI appeal on June 28th, 2012 and timely serving the City Attorney.
DeIendant/Appelant Coughlin hereby respectIully requests all Orders, Convictions, Judgments,
Contempt Findings, etc, be amended, set aside, etc.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number oI any person. And I declare the bit about RPD OIIier Travis Warren and
others is true to the best oI my knowledge under NRS 53.045. The rest? Well, one, tape dont lie.
Two, iI Hazlett don't have to sign a declaration in putting in all his unsworn hearsay pajama-centric
tacky testimony, I shouldn't have ta.
DATED this October 24th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
DeIendant
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
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ProoI oI Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing
document to all registered electronic Iilers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver oI the application oI NRCP as set Iorth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy oI the Ioregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set Iorth in SCR 109:
Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar oI Nevada
Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas , NV 89104
Phone Number: 702-382-2200
Fax number: 702-385-2878
J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone Number: 775-284-9533
Fax number: 775-284-9513
Dated this October 24th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
000938
Due Process concerns related to the "grievances"
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sat 3/24/12 1:28 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
4 attachments
3 23 12 FAX TO BAR COUNSEL PATRICK KING NEVADA BAR.pdf (55.3 KB) , 3 19
12 fas to rmc marshals regarding property wcso.pdf (40.0 KB) , Pages from mary
barker rmc 11 tr 26800 order denying motion for return of bond.pdf (508.2 KB) ,
notice of appeal 11 tr 26800 rmc and Motion for reconsideration set aside
etc.pdf (2.6 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
PO Box 60952
RENO, NV 89506
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
TO: Patrick King, Esq.
State Bar of Nevada Assistant Bar Counsel
sent via email to: PatrickK@nvbar.org
March 23, 2012
Dear Assistant Bar Counsel King,
I have a few question I would like to respectfully submit to you. What have you
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done to ascertain whether the Marshal's have a vested interest in discrediting me? I
would like you to forward me all communications from anyone in Department
Three. I would like for you to obtain a copy of the hearing today, wherein Judge
Flanagan concluded the hearing by quoting to something I wrote (it was the only
thing he mentioned after indicating that he wished to speak to the attorney's in this
matter after dismissing the witness, the lying contractor for Richard G. Hill, Phil
Stewart, who has offered perjured testimony numerous times on Mr. Hill's and his
client's behalf. Judge Flanagan quote something I wrote in a filing in 11 TR 26800,
where the Judge, Dorothy Nash Holmes, a lifetime prosecutor and or warden of a
prison (or something along those lines) had me arrested and confiscated my
property, including a smart phone (and a smart phone these days could store the
entire contents of a law firm's files and a law library in one), my less advanced cell
phone, my premium electric shaver and other items. My car was towed during the
summary 5 day jail stay Judge Nash Holmes found appropriate, costing me $300 to
get it out of the lot (also lost a client that would have brought in a substantial
amoutn of money, by my standards anyway). A $100 bail was paid to get me out of
jail on the fourth day (thus avoiding a fifth day) and accepted by the RMC, yet, I
was not released and the RMC has decided to keep the money anyways.
Yesterday I went to the RMC to pick up a copy of the audio transcript of the
2/27/12 Trial in that matter 11 TR 26800. After asking some questions of filing
office supervisor Donna Ballard and a front counter clerk named Daniel, wherein
both agree with me that some of the ways things were done done at the Reno
Municipal Court lacked transparency, a system of checks and balances, and other
fundamental notions of due process and fair play, all of the sudden, two beefy City
of Reno Marshals in their mid 20's decided, unilaterally, it seems, to ask me to
leave, as Ms. Ballard certainly had expressed nothing in the way of discontent with
our conversation, nor had Daniel. While I was leaving I could clearly hear Marshal
Thompson lying extensively into his radio, trying to manufacture some sort of report
of a scene were there had been none, other than that put on by the City of Reno
Marshals, whom have lied extensively about whether or not they ever took
possession of a micro sd card incident to the full body all pockets, belligerent,
accusatory search they performed incident to the summary contempt finding and
arrest of 2/27/12. I request that you ask for a copy of Marshal Harley's employment
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file from BOTH the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals Division and see if they
put in my letter and complaint in that regard.
Or, do you "find that the burden of proof in the various grievances I have filed
with you has not been met, that all the evidence needed for a conviction has not
been presented to your lap with a bow? Did Mr. Hill present such proof, meeting
such a burden. Clearly, the only thing you provided to me from Mr. Hill was an
EXCERPT of his 1/14/12 letter to you, which reference numerous shadowy
previous phone calls between the two of you (are you Mr. Hill's hand picked Bar
Counsel, or was this case assigned randomly? Does Mr. Hill get to pick which RPD
Sargents and Officers show up for his calls for help? Have you made any inquiry
to ascertain this. Why does Richard Hill constantly file a peremptory challenge
anytime he is assigned to Judge Adam's Department 6, apparently? Did the
innuendo and hearsay Richard G. Hill, Esq. Mentioned in his unsigned, unsworn
letter to you of 1/14/12 provide you sufficient proof to meet the clear and
convincing evidence stand you indicate that the grievances I filed did not? How do
the copies of electronic correspondences between myself, State Bar of Nevada
Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman, Peter Christiansen, Esq., and Michael
Sanft, Esq.,'s legal assistant Kelly Huff, wherein she explicitly admits to her firm
committing malpractice in my case, fail to provoke even a scintilla of investigation
into a grievance from or the State Bar of Nevada?
And the impropriety implicated by Kevin Kelley's conduct, and Mr. Christiansen's
later lying under oath at the June 2002 Character and Fitness Committee hearing for
which he feels he satisfied the $5,000 he received in payment (well, okay, he did file
an 8 page pre-hearing brief that rehashed factual recitations from various previous
filings of the Committee, then did manage to cite to the Claiborne case, which
concerned a former judge, not an applicant for admission to the bar, and he did fail
to subpoena percipient witness Mark Tratos, or any of the relevant faculty from
Boyd School of Law, and he did screw up the affidavits of the students witnessing
me turning in the hard copy of the paper, and his office did forward a
correspondence about alcoholism to the State Bar despite an express indication by
the client atop of it that said not to do so, and his office did mistate whether they
ever turned in the second Consent Agreement send with confirmation to them on
September 27
th
, 2004 in a November 2004 email, so....wait, are you really saying
there isn't enough there for a grievance FROM A CLIENT FILING ONE
AGAINST HE WHO WAS COMPENSATED $5,000 TO REPRESENT HIM
(THOUGH CHRISTIANSEN LIED UNDER OATH AND SAID IT WAS ON A
PRO BONO BASIS, IN ACCORD WITH THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE
BY STRIP CLUB SPEARMINT RHINO OWNING CHARACTER AND
FITNESS COMMITTEE MEMBER KEVIN KELLEY, ESQ., WHOSE BEST
FRIEND WAS THE PSYCHOLOGIST THE APPLICANT WAS STEERED
TO IN THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS)? BUT, YOU ARE SAYING PURSUING
A GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND, APPARENTLY, FORMAL HEARING
INCIDENT TO THE ATTEMPT TO FILE A GRIEVANCE BY A KNOWN
SCANDALOUS OPPOSING ATTORNEY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.,
AGAINST MYSELF, IN A MATTER FOR WHICH I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY
OF RECORD (PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGATNS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT
RECEIVE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE SELLERS CASE, SO
HOW CAN THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BE APPLIED TO
ANY OF MY CONDUCT IN A CASE WHERE I AM A PRO SE LITIGANT?)?
It sure is curious how you find sufficient proof to pursue Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s
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grievance against me, yet, you claim that all the grievances I filed do not warrant
any sort of investigation on your part. Very curious, indeed...
You wrote: "As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my
primary responsibility is to protect the public and the administration of justice by
insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required of the
profession. It appears that you are not."
I would like you to specify in detail exactly what forms the basis of your assertions
in those a statements, as heretofore you seem to rely upon only the unsigned,
unsworn, hearsay cited to by Richard G. Hill and some apparent grievances filed by
judges, to which you have not previously informed me of or offered any proof
thereof, despite your incorrect assertion that you have done so. If you, as you wrote
that you did, previously provide any indication or documentation in support of these
"grievances" filed by Judges, please provide support therefor in explicit written
detail with supporting documentation and proof service.
You further wrote, and I seek explication and specificity with regard to details and
attribution incident to the allegations therein contained that:
" I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the
grievances against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have
time to write lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal research." Would you say,
Mr. King, that you would very much prefer it if I had done NO legal research prior
to meeting with you?
You go on to write "You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against
you. Not only does he have standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he
may have an ethical obligation to report to the State Bar. As I have explained to
you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from Judges
from different Courts."
That statement casts extreme doubt upon everything you have said to me, Mr. King,
and everything you will say to me. Please provide the requested proof of any
grievances against me that came from "Judges from different Courts". You do
realize, Sir, that some "Judges in Different Courts" have pulled drivers over recently
and impersonated a highway patrol officer, and that some Clerks of Court have
embezzled $250,000 from the public fisc? And, just to be clear, you truly do not
find anything worthy of a grievance per Mr. Taitel's curious
appearance/disappearance as attorney of record, failure to do a conflicts check,
failure to subsequently disclose such a failure and the tangible harm it has done to
me vis a vis my suing Nevada Court Services and his sharing an office, receptionist,
and being listed on the Nevada Court Services web site as "associated with" their
business entity? Didn't Mr. Taitel have a recent ethics investigation pursuant to some
run for judicial office?
Also, Judge Nash Holmes indicated at trial, and this is a direct quote, that she
"doesn't care about corruption, or bribery, retaliation, or police misconduct"...well,
that is as close to a direct quote as I can make given the fact that the RMC, just
yesterday refused to provide me a copy of the audio transcript from the 2/27/12
Trial in 11 TR 26800, presided over by Judge Nash Holmes, after a length
disappearance by her immediately before calling my case, and after hearing all the
other matters on that stacked docket, and after denying my request for a
continuance but granting Deputy City Attorney Allison Ormaas's request for one to
"speak" with Reno Police Department Sargent Tarter, whose cross examination
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formed the basis for my arrest and incarceration incident to the summary contempt
finding. The cross examination focused on whether Sargent Tarter had retaliated
against me for reporting the bribery admission by RPD Officer Chris Carter (he
admitted Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes him) to Sargent Tarter while at the scene of
my attempts to get Richard G. Hill to turn over my client's files and my wallet and
state issued identification. If you want to put your name on the line over this, Mr.
King, and you think we still live in a world with very little transparency, who am I to
tell you any different.
You further wrote: "These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law." Please narrow down
which parts of which grievances you feel so implicate my competence, in explicit
written detail.
You further wrote: "As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and
exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office." Mr. King,
please indicate when it was and in what form or method you communicated this
offer to "make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect
them at my office"? Please further explain why on earth I would only be allowed to
inspect them at your office and how that does not create and overly bullying and
intimidating scenario departing entirely from fundamental notions of due process.
Please just fax and email (both please) the entire contents of all these materials to
me. I am likely suing the USPS and some of its local postal inspectors and or station
supervisors under the Federal Tort Claim Act and while I have taken every prudent
step to ensure the timely delivery of my mail (I have a ton of evidence and
documentation in support of this), I am EXPLICITLY indicating to you that I wish
for you to fax and email me all of these materials rather than send them through the
mails (USPS, UPS, Fed-Ex, etc, etc.).
You then wrote: "I will not send you reports or document, especially since you claim
your mail is being compromised. " I am appalled that you would write this, and
offended really. Please email and or fax them to me. I have communicated with the
USPS and my change of address has been processed (there was a delay through no
fault of my own) and if you refuse to send these to me via email or fax, the go
ahead and mail them to my new PO BOX, though taking that tact will likely only
make your conduct throughout this proceeding further suspect. Such as when you
wrote:
" As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to
show an ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
which is the standard of proof required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time
we have not opened any files based on the information you have submitted. " Please
indicate how, exactly, Richard G. Hill's grievance met such a standard of proof
where the one's I submitted did not. Further, while you have indicated that I have
not responded to your request to meet with you (which is not the case), you only
just, for the first time, today, even mentioned anything about any judges filing or
corresponding anywith with or to you, and you have failed to provide any
documentation of such or copies thereof sufficient to satisfy my Sixth Amendment
Right to Confrontation, etc. Please do so.
Sincerely,
/S/
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Just moments ago I received an e-mail leer from the Clerk of the Court in Department
3. She said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes and were demanding
and argumentave. Apparently I will be receiving a report from the Marshals. As
Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to
protect the public and the administraon of jusce by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are
complying with standards required of the profession. It appears that you are not. I
believe that there are ways to get you assistance that may protect your license to
pracce law. I would sure appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources
and assistance that may help you through this dicult me.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
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This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed or
alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof related to
these apparent communications from judges that you are only now bringing up.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Character and Fitness, Kevin Kelly, Pete Christiansen, Patrice Eichman
RE: more on the way
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:48 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
Dear Bar Counsel,
I write respectfully asking an inquiry be conducted into whether Kevin Kelly indicated at my June 2002 hearing
that 3 pro bono attorney's name would be provided to me, but that only one was, Peter S. Christiansen, and that,
despite Christiansen saying he was doing my case on a pro bono basis, he was paid at least $5,000, and pretty
much the only work he or his office did was attend the June 2002 hearing, and that Christiansen and Kelly are
very, very close, and that they sent me to a psychologist who specializes in gambling addictions (I have never
really even gambled) who cost approximately another $2,000....Then Ms. Eichman failed to submit my
application for admission or my Request For Reconsideration (sent to her and Christiansen's office on September
15th, 2003, as confirmed by my fax records, in additional to being mailed to them) to the Nevada Supreme
Court. There are numerous other issues that deserve a grievance there, including whether Christiansen supervised
the newly licensed Sanft in any way, whether a writing wherein I addressed alcoholism was forward to the Bar
despite the express dictate that it not be, whether second Consent Agreement sent to the Christiasens on 9/27/04
was ever forwarded to the Bar. Additionally, Mike Rowe wrote very stern letters to me basically telling me not
to follow up on things, whereupon my attorney's and Ms. Eichman failed to follow up on things, essentially tying
my hands in the matter. I intend to supplement this grievance with additional matters soon, but wish it to begin
now.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Saved: Fri 3/16/12 5:18 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
Dear Mr. King,
I understand that, Sir, and I mean you no disrespect and look forward to getting to know you.
However, Ms. Eichman preferred if I would simply call her to once I started asking tougher
questions in 2003-2004. My deferment period ended in September 2003 and I followed all the
instructions provided by anyone with the State Bar of Nevada regarding how I might get my
Application for Admission considered by the Nevada Supreme Court, and I have iron clad proof
this. Mr. Christiansen (both Peter S. and Peter J considering his father had a supervisory
responsibility at the time), and Mr. Sanft (it is laughable to have transferred the responsibility of my
admission's case to Sanft two weeks after he was admitted ot practice, just out of law school, and
regardless, the file, which has been copied and delivered to those who know what to do with it
should I mysteriously "disappear" anytime soon, indicates that Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly
Huff was the only one "practicing law" on my behalf, and not even very well.
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RE: Gessin ghostwriting issue
The Spearmint Rhino has an involvement in this matter as well.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: more on the way
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 22:17:04 +0000
Dear Zach,
I would appreciate it if you would simply call me.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel 775-328-1384
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 3:00 PM
To: Patrick King; David Clark; Glenn Machado
Subject: more on the way
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 9:28 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
Goof Morning Mr. Coughlin,
Yes, I did suggest some urgency in having a meeng with you. I would like to have an opportunity to sit down and talk with you. Please let me know if you
are agreeable to meet with me on an informal basis so we can talk about the process that has been iniated.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 3:25 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: Gessin ghostwriting issue
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Dear Mr. King,
I do not understand. I provided you a ton of information and documentation in my Response to Hill's grievance, and, after emailing me six hours prior to the
deadline to do so saying you already received my Response (which you had not, and which I had informed you that you had not but would be recieving it), you
know call and or write me less than a day after receiving my voluminous Response and want to meet urgently. This sends a strong message that you did not
put much time into analyzing my response, which would tend to indicate such a meeting would lack traditional due process protections, would it not? I have
already been attacked by a Character and Fitness Committee member while he owned the Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas, and where the Committee
promised to get me the names of "three attorneys who will handle your case on a pro se basis" but where only one name was provided, and that name wound
up being and attorney would extracted soem approximately $7,000 i his fees and the fees of a gambling addiction specialist (both of whom admitted to being
extremely close personal friends of Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, Esq. who then owned the Spearmint Rhino strip club. Next,
Christiansen and Sanft bungled several deadlines and client confidences related to extremely sensitive information, whereupon, finally, Director of Admissions
Eichman made the unilateral decision to refrain from submitting my case for review, despite her receipt of my Request for Reconsideration. Finally,
Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly Huff wrote me explaing that I had failed to provide their office with the Request for Reconsideration that I sent it on
9/15/03, despite my having fax confirmation proof of this and despite a subsequent copy of the file provided by Christiansen's office proving they had recieved
such a Request, and that is was received by them on 9/15/03. I do not mean to be standoffish, Mr. King, but it is what it is. How Ms. Eichman's rationale for
her action is different than what any attorney might say upon blowing some deadline or otherwise having a client's file fall behind a filing cabinet for a couple
years, is really not at all clear to me.
As to my official address with the State Bar and receiving my mail, the USPS is likely going to be sued for the handling of my mail, should it become clear that
any client matters where prejudiced in light of what has been deplorable conduct by the station involved.
Further, as to Hill's Motion for Order To Show Cause, please see the attached copy of Hill's application for an Order of Protection, then compare it to Hill's other
filings wherein he suddenly backs off his assertion that I was "climbing on the contractor's truck". Hill lied when he wrote that. I did not climb on anybody's
truck. Hill merely did not want me to film all that he was throwing away, especially given that he was throwing away unique items that had both monetary and
sentimental value and because he had no good reason for refusing to allow me to take those items other than spite and an attempt to get me to sign away my
security deposit, which Hill still has not returned. Further, Hill is not licensed under the FDCPA as a debt collector yet attempts to so practice, as such, this
grievance should focus on that as well. Hill needs to answer for his lies about me allegedly "making contact" with him, about me allegedly "climbining on the
contractors truck", about his abusing the TPO process to gain advantage in a litigation (ie, to prevent evidence collection and discovery), about his abuse of
process in seeking to get me arrested and signing a criminal complaint where service of the evictio order was insufficient, and regardless, Hill had vitiated its
import anyway by billing me for the same amount as the "full use and occupancy" (and I have a video of Hilll admitting to this and his firms 11/10/11 letter
admits to that as well. Further, as for his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as it relates to an alleged contempt on my part in failing to abide by the 1/11/12
Order from in CV11-03628, well, NRCP 6(e) requires that 3 days for mailing be accorded even for electronic filings. As such, any activity on my part of 1/12/12
clearly is irrelevant as service was not effectuated at that point and there is not allegation that any "personal service" was undertaken. That being the case,
here is another basis for grievance against Hill, especially his continually filing documents not based in fact or law, as here.
Some more regarding Hill's grievance. Hill clearly attempts to mislead when he suggest that the Supplemental I filed in the Carpentier's foreclosure defense
matter was incorrectly filed there. Clearly, I intended to file it there and the attached email I sent to Hill explains clearly why I copied him on it (because I
foresaw Hill filign a Bar grievance for "ex parte communications" based upon some idea that arguments made in one case that bare some connection to
another case would be a basis for Hill crying foul, and, as seen in Hill's "ghostwriting" grieviance, its a very low standard for crying foul that Richard has, which
is typical of all the most feckless attorneys. That email indicated to Hill and his staff:
One, I would like to reserve my objection to "Good Samiritan" Richard G. Hill purporting to file grievances on behalf of the public in general or Mr. Gessin, or
whoever it is Richard is doing this for. I suspect Richard is doing this for the same reason he does so many other things: to keep opposing counsel busy with
responding to all spineless paper pushing that Richard G. Hill is so very well known for throughout Northern Nevada legal circles. Nonetheless, important issues
are brought up in Mr. Hill's grievance. To a great extent, I foresaw these issues long ago and attempted to address them appropriately. I often get clients who
are on their third or fourth attorney. Mr. Gessin was one such client. By that time they all want to sue their former attorneys, and feel quite burned by the fees
they have paid. Mr. Gessin was a good example of this and he wished to proceed on an unbundled services arrangement, or a flat fee per motion/opposition
/pleading basis, etc. From the very, very long time that went by between my passing the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination and being admitted to practice in
March of 2005, the issue of the legality of ghostwriting for pro se litigants was something I was somewhat aware of, but I don't believe I ever did. I am
somewhat disappointed that I was not industrious enough to get anywhere close to doing such a thing but mostly I was just so demoralized by not having a
license and from the rape that the character and fitness committee and Kelly, and Christiansen and Eichman et al committed upon me that I mostly just worked
for Thomas J. Hall, Esq. for about $0.89 per hour (just kidding, I love Tom) doing legal research in the Washoe County Law Library while the librarians glared at
me and let me know how very disappointed they were that I, or any member of the public, really, had interrupted their solitude.
So now it seems there is a tough situation where, on one hand, as a now licensed attorney, there is some taboo to "ghostwriting" (necessitating such lucrative
activities as responding to grievances filed by opposing counsel like Richard G. Hill, Esq.....and I sure hope you will countenance the grievances I am filing
against Hill, Christiansen, Sanft, Kevin Kelly, Eichman, etc, with the same seriousness that your are taking Richard G. Hills. I notice Richard G. Hill, Esq. has a
funny way of being able to get the police (and some others that I probably shouldn't mention) to take his complaints just a little bit more seriously than they
take others. I would also like to file a grievance against all three of the public defenders I have been appointed in the trespass case in Reno Municipal Court
for 11 CR 26405, Lew Taitel, Roberto Puentes, and Keith Loomis. Each have thoroughly failed to zealously advocate on my behalf, with Loomis calling my
arguments vis a vis the procedural requirements for serving eviction orders in thoroughly contested summary eviction proceedings "frivolous" despite being
provided the attached 22 page memorandum detailing those arguments and despite the procedures requiring as much set forth in the Anvui decision of the
Nevada Supreme Court. I would also like to file a greivance against Deputy Reno City Attorney Ormaas for her blase indication that she cared not about any
admission of bribery on the part of Reno Police Officer Chris Carter, and that she would not be following up on that, even where it bared some relation to the
citation in 11 TR 26800 issued by Sargent Tarter, for which I cross examined Sargent Tarter as to whether he did so in retaliation for my reporting Officer
Carters admission of accepting bribes from Richard G. Hill. Instead, I believe Deputy City Attorney Ormaas and City of Reno Marshal Hiney (the spelling might
be a bit off) conspired to have Judge Nash Holmes have me arrested for summary contempt in Order to obtain my cell phones, which upon information and
belief, Ormaas and Hiney believe might contain "evidence" of misconduct on both of their parts. Hiney attempted to serve me Notice of Hearing on Motion for
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Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the Richard G. Hill, Esq. eviction matter (one of three instances of "triple jeopardy" Hill has me facing here....this Bar
grievance, the criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405, and, actually, multiple Orders to Show Cause (one in the Trial Court in RJC Rev201--001708 and one in the
associated Appeal in CV11-03628). However, the actual Affidavit of Service that the WCSO filed for the Notice of Hearing Marshal Hiney attempted to serve
me (please inquire with Chief Marshal Roper, perhaps?) was actually signed by the same WCSO Deputy Machem that swore, under oath, in his 11/7/11 Affidavit
of Service in the eviction case RJC REv2011--001708 that he "personally served" the Order of Summary Eviction. The attached 22 page memorandum sent to
various individuals and the admission of WCSO Civil Section Supervisor Liz Stuchell that, in their mind, "personally served" can mean a lot of things that it has
never meant in any legal settings, is provided for background. I also wish this to begin a grievance against Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts for what I
believe may be several violations on her part of the rules relative to prosecutorial misconduct, especially those involving suborning perjury, including that of
Officer Kameron Crawfor saying in 11 CR 22176, that I did not provide him my drivers license, and therefor issuing me a citation would not be an option, but
rather, my failure to provide my driver's license buttressed his proable cause finding justifying a search incident to arrest. However, Roberts, in 11 CR 22176
and later on appeal in CR11-2064, had in her possession Wal-Mart AP video from the interrogation room clearly showing me providing Officer Kameron
Crawford my driver's license and other evidence supports a finding that he had it (including dispatch reports and the information culled by Officer Kameron from
the driver's license and placed on the arrest report, which Officer Crawford later lied about, saying he got that information at the WCSO, which is clearly
contrary to established protocol and privacy policies). One more grievance against Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens for lying to me on the
phone about whether the City of Reno had the arrest report from the September 9, 2011 arrest at Wal-mart from the Reno Sparks Indian Colony in 11 CR
22176. I wish for all of these grievances to go forward now, but I may provide supplementary materials in support thereof later. Additionally, she has the
"purchased receipt" that showed it had the very UPC number that both Frontino and Crawford swore under oath that it did not.
Barrie Althoff, Limiting the Scope of Your Representation: When Your Client Wants, or Can Afford, Only Part of You, Washington State Bar News (Jun. 1997).
Anthony P. Capozzi, Responding to the Pro Per Crisis, California Bar Journal (Feb 2004).
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se
Litigants, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2007).
Kim Prochnau, Slicing the Onion: Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules Make It Easier for Private and Non-Profit Legal Practitioners to Provide
"Unbundled" Legal Services, Washington State Bar News (Apr. 2003).
Bradley A. Vauter, Unbundling: Filling the Gap, Michigan Bar Journal, Vol. 79, at 1688 (2000).
Books and Reports
Caught in the Middle: 2003 Report and Recommendations of the North Carolina Bar Association Pro Se Task Force (Dec. 2003).
Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in the New Hampshire Courts, New Hampshire Supreme Court Task Force on Self-Representation
(Jan. 2004).
Ethics Issues Regarding the Concept of Unbundled Legal Services (Memorandum), Rob Bare, Nevada State Bar (Mar. 31, 1999).
Family Law Limited Representation Risk Management Materials, Limited Representation Committee, California Commission on Access to Justice (January 12,
2004).
Handbook on Limited Scope Legal Assistance, ABA Section of Litigation (2003).
Pro Se Litigants: The Challenge of the Future, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department Pro Se Committee Report (Dec. 1999).
Report and Recommendations on "Unbundled" Legal Services, Commission on Providing Access to Legal Services for Middle Income Consumers, New York State
Bar Association (Dec. 2002).
Report of the Unbundled Legal Services Special Committee II, Florida Bar Association (Jul. 26, 2002).
Report on Limited Scope Legal Assistance with Initial Recommendations, Limited Representation Committee of the California Commission on Access to Justice
(Oct. 2001). Appendix
Self Represented Litigants in the Virginia Court System, Supreme Court of Virginia Pro Se Litigation Planning Committee, Enhancing Access to Justice Report
(Sept. 2002).
Unbundling Legal Services: A Guide to Delivering Legal Services a la Carte, Forrest S. Mosten, American Bar Association (2000).
Cases
Melvin Finance, Inc. v. Artis, 157 N.C. App. 716, 2003 WL 21153426 (N.C.App.)
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney
agreed to file responsive pleadings and negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant received notice of a
scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an
arbitration award was entered for the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the defendant claimed the
limited representation attorneys failure to appear at the hearing amounted to excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found
that since the defendant received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited representation attorneys conduct
did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was affirmed.
Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994)
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff
enters limited appearance on behalf of his official capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity.
Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities. Entering such limited appearance is not competent and
zealous representation as required by ethical rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting of
documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed
liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys by
statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation of pro se status in violation of ethical rules.
Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules of a federal court by lending some assistance to
friends, family members, and others with whom she shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro se
litigant's pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents. Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present
legal arguments with the actual or constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in extensive,
undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
Sharp v. Sharp, 2006 WL 3088067 (Va.Cir.Court)
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Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery,
but then hired an attorney who appeared in a limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the attorney
could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorneys appearance qualified him as official "attorney of record". The court found that it was not bound
by agreements made between client and attorney and that a court may "require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical constraints of the
Rules of Professional Conduct". The court found that the attorney could make a motion to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the
court had ultimate discretion in granting the withdrawal.
Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal.App. 4th 441 (2000)
In a lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel of record requested that another firm make a "special appearance" at a summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of
counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an
attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance represents the clients interests and has a professional
attorney-client relationship with the client. Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true "special appearance".
Court Rules
Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81, expressly permits limited appearances and governs attorney withdrawal.
Arizona
Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 9(B), governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in family law proceedings.
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 5.2, governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in vulnerable adult exploitation actions. California
California Family and Juvenile Rules 5.71, governs application to be relieved as counsel.
California Civil Rule 3.36, governs notice and application to be relieved as attorney.
Colorado
Colorado Rule of County Court 311(b), requires lawyers to disclose assistance in document preparation but clarifies that such disclosure does not create an
entry of appearance.
Delaware
Delaware Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), governs limited appearance, service and attorney withdrawal in family law matters.
Florida
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.040, governs Limited Appearance, Withdrawal or Limiting Appearance, Scope of Representation, Preparation of
Pleadings or Other Documents, Notice of Limited Appearance, and Service.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.750, governs the operation of self-help programs within family courts.
Iowa
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
RCP 1.404(3), expressly permitting limited appearances so long as the court is notified;
RCP 1.404(4), governing termination of limited appearance;
RCP 1.423, requiring lawyers who prepare pleadings in limited representation to sign them and clarifying that signing a pleading does not constitute an
appearance;
RCP 1.442(2), establishing the requirements for service on attorney who has made a limited appearance.
Maine
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c), explicitly allows limited representation and allows a lawyer to file a limited appearance if the client consents in
writing.
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governs limited appearances.
Missouri
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16 (c), governs attorney withdrawal for limited representation.
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 55.03, permits a lawyer to draft pleadings without disclosure and clarifies appearance and withdrawal of attorney in limited
representation.
Nebraska
Nebraska RPC 501.2, governs limited representation, attorney assisted document preparation and attorney withdrawal.
Nevada
Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Rule 5.28 requires signed pleadings, notice of the limited representation to the
court and governs the procedure for withdrawal.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
RCP 3, requiring that pleadings and communication be furnished to both client and limited representation attorney until withdrawal of limited
appearance;
RCP 17, governing appearance, attorney withdrawal and document preparation assistance.
New Mexico
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct 16-303(E), requires lawyer to disclose scope of representation to court.
Utah
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 74(b), governs attorney withdrawal following limited appearance.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75, expressly permits limited appearances after client consents in writing.
Vermont
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 79.1(1), governs appearance, withdrawal and service.
Vermont Rule of Family Procedure 15(h) governs limited appearances, withdrawal and service in family law matters.
Washington
Washington Civil Rule 4.2, expressly permits a limited entry of appearance.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 4.2, governs limited appearances.
Washington Civil Rule 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented party's representation of facts.
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Washington Civil Rule 70.1, expressly allows limited appearances in litigation.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 70.1, expressly allowing limited appearances in litigation.
Wisconsin
Milwaukee County Family Division Rule 5.6 expressly permits limited appearances.
Wyoming
The Uniform Rules of the District Court of the State of Wyoming, Rule 102 governs appearance and withdrawal for unbundled representation.
Ethics Opinions
Los Angeles Cnty Bar Ass'n Prof. Resp. and Ethics Comm. Ethics Op. 483
An attorney may limit the attorney's services by agreement with a pro per litigant to consultation on procedures and preparation of pleadings to be filed by the
client pro per. A litigant may be either self-represented or represented by counsel, but not both at once, unless approved by the court. In order for attorney to
specially appear on behalf of the litigant before the court for a limited purpose, the attorney should comply with all applicable court rules and procedures of the
particular tribunal.
Delaware State Bar Assn Op 2006-1
A lawyer may be required to perform beyond the term of a limited scope representation agreement if the Court requested, or the Clients circumstance
warranted such action. In most circumstances, an agreement to withdraw from representation would not violate any ethics requirement, as long as the lawyer
provides adequate advice to Client concerning the scope of representation. In family court, the Courts permission may be needed to withdraw from simple
divorce petitions in certain circumstances.
D.C. Bar Op. 330 (2005)
Unbundling of legal services is permissible under D.C. Rule 1.2 ( c ), provided the client is fully informed of the limits on the scope of the representation and
these limits do not prevent the provision of competent service. If a party is proceeding pro se, opposing counsel should treat that party as unrepresented unless
and until that counsel receives reasonable notice of representation from the party or her lawyer.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n Prof. Conduct Comm. Op. 849 (1983; Affirmed 1991)
An attorney may agree in advance with his or her client to limit the scope of the attorney's representation and draft pleadings without appearing or taking any
part in any of the proceeding itself, provided that the client gives his or her fully informed consent to such limitation of employment and the attorney takes
whatever steps may be necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights.
Maine State Bar Ethics Opinion No. 89 (1988)
A lawyer is not required to sign a complaint or enter an appearance as counsel of record when representation is solely limited to preparation of the complaint.
Missouri Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. 940161
It is impermissible for a lawyer to draft responsive pleadings to an unrepresented opposing party in a divorce. However, a lawyer may draft an entry of
appearance if the lawyer includes a letter indicated that he or she represents the opposing party and that the unrepresented party should obtain counsel.
New York State Bar Ass'n Op. 613 (1990)
A lawyer who does not appear as counsel of record for a pro se litigant may prepare responsive pleadings and demands for financial disclosure, provided the
lawyer investigates the matter adequately.
North Carolina State Bar RPC 114 (1991)
Legal services attorneys may provide legal advice and drafting assistance to pro se litigants without appearing as counsel of record. If court approved pleading
forms exist, attorneys may make them available to individuals wishing to proceed pro se.
Bd. of Prof. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Op. 2005-F-151
Attorneys may offer limited representation through a pro se clinic if they obtain clients consent, preferably in writing. Attorneys may draft proceedings for
clients, if the attorney notifies the Court that counsel has assisted a pro se litigant. The phrase "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel" is recommended for
inclusion on such pleadings in a prominent manner. Attorneys who draft proceedings need not appear and represent the client.
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm. Op. 08-01 (2008)
A lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing before tribunals pro se and help them prepare written submissions without disclosing or ensuring
the disclosure to others of the nature or extent of such assistance. Undertaking to provide limited legal help does not generally alter any other aspect of the
attorneys professional responsibilities to the client.
As to the ghostwriting, its tough, because, for clients who want to pay very little (after, say, in Gessin's case he paid McKenna allegedly $15K to wind up with
an Order from an Arbitrator and District Court Judge denying a Trial De Novo based upon a bad faith failure to participate in litigation in one case, then in the
other, Gessin paid Hill something like $20K only to be slammed car crash style into settlement by Hill's advice when Gessin couldn't stomach paying anymore of
HIll's fees, settling for the amount originally sought by Mr. Hall's client). So, clients like that want a deal, want to pay piece meal or go the unbundled route,
but filing all those Motions to Withdraw, and Proposed Orders, and Affidavits, add to the costs where the fee is not really being increased any. There is much
literature dealing with this:
Please accept this as a supplement to the grievance filed by Richard Hill, Esq. My recollection of my involvement with Gessin is that I filed two Answers to very
similar Adversary Complaints in NVB and two Motions to Dismiss in those same cases, involving the two women represented by Glade Hall, Esq., both on an
"unbundled services" basis, and the pleadings themselves indicated the were filed as an "unbundled service". This was my first filign in NVB, and I was not
registered or trained as an electronic filer at that point. Further, Gessin hired me to provide other unbundled services, inlcuding writing (and, to my
understanding at the time, filing under my own signature) something in the vein of a NRCP Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment from judgments in cases
involving the same two women Taitano ne Moore, and Rissone, both, again, represented by Glade Hall, Esq.
It may be the case that Richard Hill is correct that I was goign against some rule or law by sending one demand letter to Glade Hall concerning an outstanding
$500 sanction aware. I believe I drafted an Order To Show Cause for this, but am not sure it was filed by me. About the time I provided Gessin my signed
final draft of that and a few other closely related motions, he pretty much wanted to part ways, I believe. I think this was around mid-November and there was
some issues with Richard HIll withholding my client files, some of which may have included Gessin's, then Hill would say he would give me my client files
without any demands or lien needing satisfying prior to doing so, and that he would do the same with my wallet and identification, but then he would change
his mind and demand what to me seems that I satisfy a rent distraint that has been outlawed by NRS 118A.520 (though there is a very old BK case, circa 1980
or so that may suggest such distraints are still permissible against commercial tenants, and my hybrid, home law office situation, plus the fact that I do still
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RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
have a business license for Zachary Coughlin's Memory Foam Mattresses (something I started during the 4 years I was hoping to get a law license and finding
employment very, very difficult to obtain, during which Mike Rowe wrote me stern letters, Pete Christiansen and Mike Sanft -ignored me and shewed me to
their legal assistant Kelly Huff, and Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann made the unilateral decision to ignore the Request for Reconsideration of my
Application for Admission that I timely submitted on 9 15 03 in connection with the end of the deferment period set forth in the Court's December 2002
Order....) and at least some research and development was ongoing in that regard. Whether I was a commercial or residential tenant was an important issue
in the eviction matter and the mixed use of the property likely only made the statute all the more difficult to interpret.
However, I do recall that Gessin told me he withdrew his bankruptcy, so that may negate Hill's assertion that I was wrongful in sending a demand letter to Hall
regarding the old sanction and or filing a Motion for Order To Show Cause. Gessin is a crafty guy, though I am not sure I entirely share Hill's view of him.
However, Hill apparently received about $20-25K in attorney's fees from Gessin in a case that the plaintiff was only seeking about $25K in to begin with, and
upon Gessin ceasing to be willing to pay Hill and Baker for more litigating, they promptly suggested he settle for something near $30K (which, of course, was
upsetting to Gessin, in a manner that is similar to how Dr. Merliss seems to feel in the eviction matter). But, to be fair to Hill, those parties likely bare some
responsibility for choosing to take the risky path that is litigation.
Gessin also became a registered efiler about the time he basically terminated my representation of him. My email to Gessin below shows that I was somewhat
suspicious of the fact that he seemed to all the sudden want to go our separate ways after I had been working on these very involved (to me at the time they
seemed really involved) NRCP 60(b) Motions, and it is ironic, somewhat that Hill accuses me of ghostwriting because my email to Gessin essentially anticipates
that, and, to some extent, my later filing Notices of Appearance as Attorney of Record in several of Gessin's various cases involving these two women was done
to attempt to counteract any appearance of that. Gessin seemed upset that I filed those appearances, and actually got very pushy about me trying to undo
them, and eager to avoid prejudicing his ability to file timely 60(b) motions, I undertook to do what I could to make it so he could file on his own (ie, having an
Attorney of Record on one's case often results in the filing office refusing to let them file anything on their own...).
On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 I wrote to John Gessin's email address the following:
"To: John Gessin <jd.gman@yahoo.com>
John,
Here is Van Lydegraf's voice message. Again, I have not talked to him and I forwarded you the only email or writing I ever sent him. I am leaning towards filing an Errata on
your cases today to get it so I am not attorney of record. Which do you prefer? I amnot sure which would accomplish your goals quicker, but keep in mind, I believe a Motion
to Withdraw is the typical thing, not a Notice of Withdrawal? Have you found any research in this regard? Please indicate in writing which you prefer or the preferred manner
you would like to see me pursue accomplishing your goals, which, to my understanding, include being in pro per on this case. I sense you are uncomfortable, but please know I
maintain extremely high fidelity to my clients, unbundled or otherwise, okay? I am unsure how me filing the 60b's etc would have been much different with respect to what you
seem upset about...did you never intend for me to file? Were you looking for a "ghost writer"? I was not of the understanding that I was being hired as a "ghostwriter" and I do
recall some indication that such a thing is either prohibited or discouraged by the Rules of Professional Responsibility....Regardless, the most important thing is to avoid
prejudicing your case, and I feel I have made great efforts to achieve that. If you want to file something, just do it, don't wait for any withdrawal, etc. I will make all
reasonable efforts to see that you are allowed to file whenever and whatever you want, and not be weighed down by any attorney of record designation.
Sincerely,"
I currently have a Motion to Withdraw pending in the two Adversary Proceedings where I believe I was incorrectly listed as Attorney of Record for Gessin.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 10:50 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
Good Morning Mr. Coughlin,
I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please come see me as soon as you can.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
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From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 2:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If
you can give me some time, it would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing important work
that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally
questionable manner in which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD Sargents more than
District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me. My representation is very important to his
life. He is a committed father who has been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received something like
$500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me
some time to tend to the immediate need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy" abuse of
process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the
phone or meet in person. My two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all
reasonable steps to counter that, including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's online portal
days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS
Golden Valley Station supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play judge and jury incident to a
complicated eviction process that I have recently been litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada
Management and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western Nevada Management knew of and
orchestrated, and received approval from the Park Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E.
9th St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at Park Terrace. For some reason, when her
boss found out about this, she started crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned. This was
litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these
things, yet they want to turn right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction despite the facts
not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc., etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to explain why this week or the immediate future
would prevent a hardship for me with regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my respect for
you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the realities faced by businesses subject to summary
evictions where the non payment of rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS 40.253, but
for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of
processes, etc. I have a hearing on that this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey blow
a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos (whom had to admit under oath, that he had
previously "lost" other student's papers in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by Anderson
and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also, Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's
paper in that 2002 Cyber Law course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote me asking for
"another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about
etc., clearly implying he did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social security number, etc. (he
had a student in the class who worked for his firm, he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was
utilized in every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing that the State Bar of Nevada had
allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has
ever been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney
Pete Christiansen (and so did not appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom was
referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the
time. I believe in Senator Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
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RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegaons against you are serious and put into queson your competence to pracce law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the
allegaons and see if there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Oce of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benet of actually geng to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such
as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've been sharing some emails. I would like
to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of material in response to Hill's
grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply to Opposition, though I don't really
know what in the hell that matters or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by
making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 12:29 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
Thank Mr. King,
I will. Things are coming together quickly though I have faced many obstacles. I may have mentioned this
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already, but I did file a Motion to Withdraw in the two Gessin Adversary Proceedings in NVB. However, in the
meantime, as I understand it, I have a duty to represent Mr. Gessin, even despite his indications that he doesn't
necessarily want me to, that doing so is unnecessary (he apparently is in the process or already has had his main
BK case withdrawn, though I pointed out to him, that does not necessarily make moot the adversary
proceedings...). It has been a good lesson in how very important that attorney of record designation is.
However, I did learn a lot of lessons about that with Mr. Christiansen as my attorney in 2002-2004, along with
the extent to which a proper, detailed fee agreement setting forth in explicit detail the scope of one's
representation is very, very important.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2012 17:51:20 +0000
Good Morning Mr. Coughlin,
I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please come see me as soon as you can.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 2:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If
you can give me some time, it would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing important work
that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally
questionable manner in which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD Sargents more than
District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me. My representation is very important to his
life. He is a committed father who has been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received something like
$500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me
some time to tend to the immediate need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy" abuse of
process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the
phone or meet in person. My two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all
reasonable steps to counter that, including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's online portal
days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS
Golden Valley Station supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play judge and jury incident to a
complicated eviction process that I have recently been litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada
Management and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western Nevada Management knew of and
Hotmail Print Message http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=b39...
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000955
orchestrated, and received approval from the Park Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E.
9th St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at Park Terrace. For some reason, when her
boss found out about this, she started crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned. This was
litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these
things, yet they want to turn right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction despite the facts
not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc., etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to explain why this week or the immediate future
would prevent a hardship for me with regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my respect for
you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the realities faced by businesses subject to summary
evictions where the non payment of rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS 40.253, but
for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of
processes, etc. I have a hearing on that this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey blow
a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos (whom had to admit under oath, that he had
previously "lost" other student's papers in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by Anderson
and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also, Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's
paper in that 2002 Cyber Law course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote me asking for
"another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about
etc., clearly implying he did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social security number, etc. (he
had a student in the class who worked for his firm, he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was
utilized in every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing that the State Bar of Nevada had
allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has
ever been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney
Pete Christiansen (and so did not appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom was
referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the
time. I believe in Senator Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegaons against you are serious and put into queson your competence to pracce law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the
allegaons and see if there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Oce of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benet of actually geng to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
Hotmail Print Message http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=b39...
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000956
FOIA Request RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such
as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've been sharing some emails. I would like
to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of material in response to Hill's
grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply to Opposition, though I don't really
know what in the hell that matters or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by
making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 4:57 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
3 attachments
State Bar of Nevada Character and Fitness Committee Grievance Christiansen Eichman, Kevin Kelly Mike Sanft for Bar
Counsel.pdf (379.4 KB) , Character and Fitness Committee Member Kevin Kelly, ESq..htm (6.4 KB) , Reno's Hawkins,
Ormaas & van Winkle - Biggest Little Act in the World Babelation ormaas.htm (72.0 KB)
Dear Mr. King,
this is a subpoena and a FOIA Request, requesting that you send to me, in writing, via email and fax
a copy of any documentation (such as a copy of the email from Department 3 you mentioned in your
last email, in addition to these "communications from judges" that you only mentioned for the first
time today, yet claim to have noticed me of in the past). You see, this is exactly why is would be
disadvantageous to communciate with you on the telephone (something you and I have never done).
When I began asking Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman (a licensed attorney) uncomfortable
questions related to her breach of her duties and negligence (if not more) between 2001-2005, she
didn't want to correspond in writing anymore, but preferred talkign on the phone...
Please add the attached materials to my grievance against Eichman, Michael Sanft, Kevin Kelly of
the C&F Committee and both Peter Christiansen's (father and son).
I believe you may have violated my Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by failing to copy me on and
or inform me of your communications with judges prior to your email of today, wherein you
incorrectly mention that you previously did so, which you did not. I think it might be appropriate for
you to recuse yourself from this matter given some of your ommissions and conduct thus far.
Sincerely,
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000957
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Just moments ago I received an e-mail leer from the Clerk of the Court in Department 3. She said that you appeared
wearing pajamas over your clothes and were demanding and argumentave. Apparently I will be receiving a report from the
Marshals. As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to protect the public and
the administraon of jusce by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required of the profession. It
appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to get you assistance that may protect your license to pracce law. I
would sure appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that may help you through this
dicult me.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed or alleged a grievance. Please provide any
documentation or proof related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only now bringing
up. In your March 23, 2012 email to me you wrote: " As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came
not only from Mr. Hill but also from Judges from dierent Courts." This is not true. That is the rst you ever
communicated anything like that to me, unless you can point to something in the wrien record between us. With
respect to your refusal to pursue any of the grievances I led, please indicate specically what about Mr. Hill's
grievance met the standard you cite to, as well as specically, for each aempted ling of a grievance, indicate
where mine failed to meet that standard, with details and specics, and an indicaon of any research of
invesgaon you conducted in that regard.
Sincerely,
Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeng with you to discuss the grievances against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with
me, yet you have me to write lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to le a grievance against you. Not only does he have standing to le a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may
have an ethical obligaon to report to the State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from
Judges from dierent Courts. These grievances, and the evidence aached with them, rather clearly puts into queson your competence to pracce law.
As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my oce. I will not send you reports
or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submied appears to show an ethical violaon that could be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof required in disciplinary maers. As such, at this me we have not opened any les based on the
informaon you have submied.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
Hotmail Print Message http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=b39...
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and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney, acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the various grievances I filed recently in addition to
providing a detailed summary of the content of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and telephone
communciatiosn with Richard Hill or anyone with his office. Further, please state whether Casey Baker is part of the
grievance, as Hill asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to create "busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Wednesday, March 06, 2002
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
COLUMN: John L. Smith
Spearmint Rhino owners expanding empire with British
invasion
Whether you consider topless cabarets acceptable adult
diversions or shadowy dens of iniquity, you have to admit the
Spearmint Rhino club has one catchy name.
It's probably safe to say its patrons are unlikely to confuse it
with other topless joints, and surely that's the way Spearmint
Rhino's owners like it. It turns out developing brand loyalty is
important, whether you're selling breakfast cereal or babes and
boobs.
It must be working. These days, the Spearmint Rhino empire is
rapidly expanding. From clubs in California, to one in Las
Vegas, the company has created something of an American
invasion in England, where majority owner John Gray has
opened six clubs with plans for up to 100 more.
With that kind of expansion in mind, there's talk that Spearmint
Rhino might begin selling stock as a publicly traded company.
It makes you wonder what those stockholder meetings might
look like. I'm willing to bet they'd be well attended.
In Las Vegas, the club operates with a somewhat confused
ownership status. Admittedly, I'm the one confused.
Although it is listed on the company's Web site as one of
several Spearmint Rhino clubs, the Las Vegas cabaret is
officially not owned by Gray, but by local attorney Kevin
Kelly, Gray's long-time partner Thomas Nabarrette, and
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Mumtaz Ali. When asked about the ownership issue, and the
fact the Las Vegas club was listed on the Gray-owned company
Web site, Kelly said it was possible Nabarrette had worked out
an agreement with his friend to advertise the club on the
Internet.
Makes sense, but it doesn't exactly explain why the only
reference to the topless company on the secretary of state's
Web site lists Gray as secretary and treasurer of The Spearmint
Rhino Worldwide Inc. The Las Vegas club is owned by K-Kel
Inc., which lists Kelly and Ali as officers, but not Nabarrette.
No matter. The Las Vegas Spearmint Rhino officially is not
owned by Gray. Which is probably a good thing considering
Gray's controversial past, which was recently profiled by
reporters Adrian Gatton and Paul Lashmar in the Independent
newspaper of London.
The story caught the topless entrepreneur attempting to rewrite
his personal history. In the Feb. 17 article, Gray was quoted
briefly denying his criminal past -- he has a couple convictions
in California for making a false statement to win a military
contract and bouncing checks -- before fessing up to reporters.
The boss also failed to explain why he once used several
aliases, including Johnny Win, John Luciano, and John Luciano
Gianni.
Gray served six months in jail, according to the newspaper, and
emerged with plans to expand his topless bar empire. Next
stop, Las Vegas. Although that move officially did not work
out, and Gray's name is not listed on the local paperwork, it did
not deter him from hopping overseas, where he has taken
England by storm as the sole director of Spearmint Rhino
Companies of Europe Ltd. According to the Independent,
Gray's clubs are popular with businessmen and a favorite site
for office parties.
Possibly standing in the way of his expansion plans in England
are those pesky background details, which he apparently didn't
disclose in much detail to licensing authorities.
A year ago, police reported that, in their opinion, "activity
within the club, intentionally or otherwise, borders on offenses
of prostitution and permitting the keeping of a brothel."
In Las Vegas, police have uttered similar phrases for decades.
Every few years, an undercover vice unit compiles enough
evidence of whispered propositions and backfields in excessive
motion to make headlines and a few arrests. Beyond a little
embarrassment and some attorney fees, the club owners are
rarely ruffled.
It's probably only a coincidence that the topless operators
perennially rank among the top donors to local political
campaigns, showering thousands of dollars on favorite
candidates and maintaining close contact with their public
official friends thereafter.
Somehow, Gray didn't officially make the grade in Las Vegas.
Hey, our loss is England's gain.
John L. Smith's column appears Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday
and Sunday. E-mail him at Smith@lvrj.com or call him at
383-0295.
This story is located at:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-2002/news/18241452.html
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
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Reno's Hawkins, Ormaas & van Winkle - Biggest Little Act in the World
Alison M. Ormaas
attorney
biggest
city
Deputy
James
Jay Hawkins
Jim van Winkle
Judge
little
Officer
police
Politics
reno
It is government and its officials and employees who are REQUIRED to prove the guilt of a charge and conviction. That RELIEVES the one charged of
ANY burden to PROVE his or her innocence. Government employees are held to a HIGHER standard. A people are either FREE from their
government (from each other) or they are controlled subjects of a government and its public employees that illegally or unethically parcels out freedom
as it sees fit. NEVER underestimate others bad experiences. The structure of an expose, a complaint, a whistle-blower, is ALWAYS the story of how
the birds came HOME to roost. Happenings and ideology that previously would never have been disseminated are now readily found with a simple
Google search. A Google search is just a search for a person's credentials AND integrity.
Here's more NEGATIVE publicity about Nevada. Here's MORE of why others now like to call Nevadans, Renoites and Washoe County residents
rednecks, hicks, goat-ropers, stupid, morons, douche-bags, illiterate, alcoholics, lazy, shiftless, druggies, racist, sexist, thieves, incompetent, fraudsters,
asleep-at-the-wheel, corrupt, and on and on. Nevada's, Reno's and Washoe County's public officials and public employees give them AMPLE reason to
. Like here.. The effects of negative publicity on Nevada, Reno and Washoe County have rarely been on the radar of its legislators and
governors . or even mayors, city and county employees, police officers, attorneys, judges, sheriffs, district attorneys, county commissioners, police
chiefs, city councils.
Why is that? That was Dennis Myers at the Reno News & Review who first wrote that. With so MANY people now running OUT of Nevada, Dennis
observation and complaint remains valid. Why dont Nevada, Reno, Washoe County public officials and public employees take in to account negative
publicity to Nevada? How does Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle pay
their community and neighbors back for the damage each has done to the reputation of their neighbors and community?
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The result of any expose is that individuals and organizations are suddenly finding their previously hidden illegal, corrupt, unethical, lazy, or immoral
behaviors, and their secrets, avarice, cravings, or even mistakes, suddenly and rightfully very publicly front and center. Integrity, or its' lack, is
immediately exposed in a simple Google search.
Technology is a common ground for sharing viewpoints, both pro and con. As more people are tuned in to the electronic age it has become increasingly
more difficult for the bad practices of any business and its owners, managers and employees, no matter how remote or small their marketplace is, to
continue without being noticed, as was the case. People of all levels and of experience share their opinions concerning the various pluses and minuses of
various businesses and its owners, managers and employees. Many businesses, owners, managers and employees are just not coming out well in these
news group discussions.
Because Due Process is A Constitutional Issue, a civil RIGHT, and one of the oaths ALL public officials AND public employees take is to uphold and
protect the Constitution, ALL public officials AND public employees are held to a HIGHER standard, fiduciary. In this case it is clear Reno Police
Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle each FAILED to exercise reasonable care, each
VIOLATED several laws, EACH violated their fiduciary duties and, each displayed INappropriate conduct.
To the tune Youre a Mean One Mr. Grinch here its youre a Mean One Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Youre a Mean One Reno City Attorney
Alison Ormaas and, Youre a Mean One Reno Municipal Court Judge Jim Van Winkle.
In America, there is a legal presumption of innocence until proven guilty. If there is any HINT of presumption of guilt then Due Process is NOT
followed and civil rights are violated. For civil charges or convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a clear and convincing
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance is 50.000001% or more. For criminal charges or convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a
clear and convincing beyond a reasonable doubt of the evidence.
The maxim that the King can do no wrong has no place in our American system of government. In America, its Semper pro Populus. That means
Fiduciary Duties, Color of Law and Public Service governs those on the public dole as Jay Hawkins, Alison Ormass and Jim van Winkle.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jay Hawkins RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of $132,088.14.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Alison Ormaas RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of $77,903.25.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jim Van Winkle RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of $187,668.36.
Fiduciary duties are ethical or legal duties one party has to another. Broadly, these duties include duties of loyalty and duties of care to OTHERS. A
PUBLIC official and PUBLIC employee has ANOTHER fiduciary duty to act in CITIZEN's benefit because citizens are the beneficiary NO public
official OR public employee can simply sit back and watch the beneficiary, you the citizen fall into greater difficulty or hardship.
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Submitted by Citizen Jane Speaks on Wed, 05/25/2011 - 5:40pm
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
001681
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Formal request for names of those on my Screening Panel`
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: RE: Opposition
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2011 10:42:25 -0700
Just go ahead and review the laws directed to when and how often the property tax
information must be provided to renters.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
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review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
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This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged,
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notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of
this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by
anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, we inform you
that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written to
be used, and cannot be used, by any person for the purpose of (i) avoiding tax-related penalties or (ii) promoting, marketing
or recommending to another person any transaction or matter addressed in this communication.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 11/22/12 12:39 PM
To: tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org); schornsby@nvdetr.org (schornsby@nvdetr.org);
patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); eifert.nta@att.net
(eifert.nta@att.net); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); davidc@nvbar.org
(davidc@nvbar.org); fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com
(fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com)
I am writing to formally request the names of those who were on the Screening Panel
incident to the current SCR 105 SBN v. Coughlin Complaint in ng12-0204, etc.
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Rule 105. Procedure on receipt of complaint.
1. Investigation.
(a)
Investigation and screening panel review. Investigations shall be initiated and conducted by bar counsel or
bar counsel's staff or other investigative personnel at bar counsel's direction prior or pursuant to the
opening of a grievance file. At the conclusion of an investigation of a grievance file, bar counselshall
recommend in writing dismissal with or without prejudice, referral to diversion or mentoring pursuant to
Rule 105.5, a letter of caution, a private reprimand, or the filing of a written complaint for formal hearing.
The recommendation shall be promptly reviewed by a screening panel. A screening panel shall consist of
three members of the disciplinary board, appointed by the chair in accordance with Rule 103(6). Two of the
three reviewers must be members of the bar. By majority vote they shall approve, reject, or modify the
recommendation, or continue the matter for review by another screening panel
Given the Board's inclusion of numerous individuals with patent conflicts (DDA Kandaras (intimately
involved in the opposition's causes in a number of matters, including the apparent search and seizure of my
smart phone and micro sd card incident to summary "misdemeanor of criminal contempt" Order (that
cited to a non summary civil contempt statue in NRS 22.010, yet attempted to utilized the summary nature
of NRS 22.030 (only without complying with the Affidavit requirement for conduct not in the "immediate
presence" of Judge Nash Holmes, all while purporting to be a criminal misdemeanor charge a la NRS
199.340 (very creative, and very, very duplicitous to boot coming from a Judge...and add to that an attempt
to further Bar Counsels SCR 111(5) aims by including the "find by clear and convincing evidence" burden
of proof standard necessary to prove an ethical violations of the RPD in a disciplinary hearing setting....
Then there is Richard Hill's best friend, David Hamilton being on the Board (and SBN King has curiously
redacted nearly any mention of Hill in his 8/23/12 Complaint (for which there remains no return of service
filed in the Disciplinary File (and any attempt by the SBN to assert that the certified mailing of 8/23/12 is
sufficient is fraudulent, see Coughlin's recent sworn Affidavit or Declaration under penalty of perjury as to
the SBN, Panel, and NNDB's representations in that regard, especially in light of SCR 105(4). Further is
is fraudulent and displays a lack of candor to assert that SCR 106 provides insulation from subpoena where
it speaks merely to causes of action, and any immunity therein surely has its limits, otherwise Pat King
would probably go biting Respondent's in their jugular's like the vampire he is.
Also, please formally provide me a copy of any rules of procedure or other applicable policies, practices,
rules, procedures, or dictates adopted by the Panel and or the NNDB or SBN that attach to these
disciplinary proceedings, such as the one of 11/14/12 (and the 45 days from the Panel's designation will run
real soon, so to get a non-void for lack of jurisdiction Disciplinary Hearing set and noticed, the SBN, Panel,
and NNDB is hereby advised to take note of that fact and proceed accordingly. Further, Coughlin objects
to the SBN, Panel, and Board's depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser in this
quasi-criminal setting, particularly where the SBN still refuses to divulge the complainant in the NG12-0435
grievance, or which Clerk of Court or whoever it was that forwarded that April 2009 Order to the SBN.
And to the extent the Complaint has been curiously disinfected to redact mention of Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
allegations in Hill's 1/14/12 unsigned grievance letter to the SBN (while they waited to hear back on their
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Judge Howard and Cassandra Jackson want to explain
Milsner v Carstarphen case from the Nevada Supreme Court) attached to the SBN's 2/14/12 letter to
Coughlin (which King fraudulently attempted to assert at the 11/14/12 Hearing that Coughlin somehow
failed to respond to, or to respond timely, particularly where the bate stamped Disciplinary File as late
provided by King on 11/8/12 (in violation of SCR 105(2)(c)) is a textbook case of fraudulent ommission and
obfuscation....see the "Folders" for each grievance (the folder listing Linda Gardner as the grievance filer is
particularly interesting considering is consists only of a online blog entry about prosecutorial misconduct,
and given that Linda Gardner and her brother, the one who refused to recuse himself from the criminal
trespass matter where Richard G. Hill signed the Complaint and the RPD has admitted to fraud incident
thereto on tape, 11 CR 26405, are both lifelong prosecutors.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 11/22/12 12:56 AM
To: je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); davidc@nvbar.org
(davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); eifert.nta@att.net
(eifert.nta@att.net); mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); patrickk@nvbar.org
(patrickk@nvbar.org); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); skauc@reno.gov (skauc@reno.gov);
robertsp@reno.gov (robertsp@reno.gov); hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov (hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov);
wongd@reno.gov (wongd@reno.gov)
6 attachments
DistCtOrder_REDACTED cr12-1018 longoni transcript defective.pdf (141.4 KB) , 12 16 11 email to
plongoni@charter.net longoni and 12 21 11 email to ballardd@reno.gov regarding longoni 22176
26800 0204 0435.pdf (22.7 KB) , 10 9 12 Affidavit of Laura Peters 0204 never sent to Coughlin no
proof of service, yet file stamped.pdf (1516.8 KB) , 12 15 11 22176 2064 Order by Howard on
transcript costs.pdf (92.8 KB) , 12 15 11 22176 ROBERTS NOTICE OF DENIAL OF SERVICE.pdf
(110.8 KB) , 11 16 12 skau grievance materials combined 0204 063341.pdf (1943.8 KB)
How RMC handouts and agreements with Pam Longoni are not violating NRS 189.030
and NRS 4.14(a)
RCA Skau wants to explain his lies about the judge authorize service by email for an
unnoticed hearing where Skau sought to argue email service was insufficient when it
came to his people...Then RCA Hazlett-Stevens want to explain his mysterious claims 001684
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to have not received the Notice of Appeal in cr12-1262 or why he puts on perjured
testimony by Richard G. Hill, Esq., RCA Pam Roberts would like to explain the same
for 11 cr 22176. RCA Allison Ormaas wants to explain what she was whispering in
RMC Marshal Harley's ears on 2/27/12 and whether it was about the same failure to
chart follow up on, or report RPD Chris Carter's admission that "Richard Hill pays me a
lot of money, so I arrest who he says to and do what he says to do...", just like Reno
City Attorney Chief Criminal Deputy Dan Wong explained he was surely not going to
do to when Coughlin made the same report to him on 1/19/12....
SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters wants to explain how she approved fax filing for
Coughlin on 9/11/12, and how her Affidavit of 10/9/12 wound up in the Disciplinary
file only made available to Coughlin 5 days before the hearing (with thousands of pages
of filler and duplicates to hide the little it contained...which in the case of Linda
Gardner's grievance, was a mysterious printout from a blog and no more...no cover
letter, no nothing...and Kings email where he purports that the "Clerk of Court" sent
him the Order still has not been clarified, though Joey Orduna Hastings, Clerk of Court
of the Second Judicial District Court wants to indicate whether she sent it to the SBN,
or, more likely, the Clerk of Court of one of the Muni Court Departments (probably
Judge Nash Holmes' in D3, considering her 3/23/12 email to the SBN about Coughlin's
clothing choices to check on a traffic citation at a munic court filing office window...)
who got ahold of District Court Judge Linda Gardners April 2009 Order when Judge
L. Gardner passed it to her brother, RMC William Gardner, who refused to recuse
himself from Coughlin's criminal trespass case based upon Richard Hill's Complaint,
but did manage to pass his sister's Order around to his fellow Judges and hold meetings
with them about how to get back at Coughlin for pointing out things they do that violate
due process rights and other laws. Like those requiring a stay of proceedings when a
defendants competency is brought into question. DDA Young is great at violating
those laws, and bossing Judge Sferrazza around in court, demanding he take into
custody anyone who doesn't do just exactly what DDA Young wants and or give just
exactly the answer he is looking for....
Pat King, Laura Peters and David Clark want to explain how their statements and
corresponence with Coughlin respecting his right to issue subpoenas and waiver of
witness fees of fees for subpoena duces tecums departed remarkably from the sudden
about face on that issue when the Motions to Quash started coming in, though the
Disciplinary Hearing of 11/14/12 went on just they same, right....
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Outlook Print Message
Dear Panel, SBN, and Mr. Garin, and Ms. Nordstrom and RMC Chief Marshal Roper,
and Marshal Joel Harley,
Bailiff John Reyes wants to explain his views on how "its not a Fourth Amendment
violation if the person was guilty of the crime you suspected him of committing when
you did the search" and how its acceptable "subterfuge" for Reyes to help ol Jimmy
Sleazy, WCPD Jim Leslie by muscling over indigent criminal defendants for him when
Leslie can't be bothered upholding the Sixth Amendment, whereupon Reyes comes to
Jimmy's rescue and tells Coughlin, Leslie at his side, that "I'm going to put my foot up
your ass..." Reyes watches defendants get put in jail for months day in day out for doing
less than that....
Steve Tuttle wants to explain why the RJC didn't respond to Coughlin's requests for
information on the transmission of the Eviction Order in rjc 2011-001708 to the
Washoe County Sheriff's Office.
Liz Stuchell and Deputy Machen, and Roxy Silva want to explain all the false affidavits
of service he files, and Maureen and Roxy's assertions that the "receipt" of the eviction
Order in NRS 40.253 was at 8:05 am on 11/1/11 in rjc Rev2011-001708 (Sheriff must
effect the lockout "within 24 hours of receipt of the Order"...and Casey Baker, Esq.
wants to explain his testimony of 6/18/12 when he explained what he did with the
Sheriff's Office on October 28th, 2011...and Reno Carson Messenger service want to
explain why their receipt shows they delivered the lockout order to the WCSO at 4:45
pm on 10/31/12, while the locksmith swears the lockout was not effected until a couple
minutes to 5 pm, and definitely not sooner than 4:48 pm, despite Machens 11/1/11
Affidavit of Service (that his supervisor Stuchell had to admit was false in that it alleged
"personal service" where the WCSO admits no one was home (and the locksmith totally
refutes Hill's testimony of 6/18/12 "they tried to serve it to you but you ran away..."
(really, Rich, becaue Casey didn't testify to that, but he did say that you weren't even
there that day, so what do you base that sworn allegations on Rich, besides your desire
to mitigate your liability for all your misdeeds there?).
Chief Marshal Roper and Joel Harley wanted to explain some of the things Judge Nash
Holmes got "confused" on in her "sworn testimony"...which is shaping up to look at lot
like the unsworn hearsay testimony of a Judge in the In Re Mirch case that resulted in a
disbarment, which in Nevada, are irrevocable as of 2008. To be clear, Judge Nash
Holmes testified falsely at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing in a number of ways. The
attached audio from the Hearing and Judges Nash Holmes various Orders (which reveal
001686
Outlook Print Message
a disturbing attempt to mix and match various civil and criminal contempt statutes,
some plenary, some summary, and add the transmogrification of a "simple traffic
citation Trial" into some sort of Summary Disciplinary Hearing...which SBN Bar
Counsel Pat King is only too happy to sign on to, eager to kick back and rely on SCR
111(5) after having fed Judge Nash Holmes the instruction to make sure to copy and
paste as many sections of the Rules of Professional Conduct into an "Order" that is sure
to point out the burden of proof necessary for a "ethical violation" finding in a
Disciplinary Hearing setting. The only thing less transparent than this awkward attempt
by Bar Counsel and Judge Nash Holmes to get 'r done was the brother and sister act by
Judge William Gardner and his sister Judge Linda Gardner, complimented, of course,
by that oh so suspicious looking "5" in the SBN's "received" stamp of Judge L.
Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin, which Washoe Legal Services's Paul
Elcano cited as the sole reason for Coughlin's firing (and which begat the Mandamus
Petition against L. Gardner in 54844, the wrongful termination suit against WLS in
60302, the criminal trespass conviction in 11 CR 26405 that Judge W. Gardner refused
to recuse himself from, etc., etc.
WCPD Biray Dogan and DDA Zach Young wanted to explain their violations of NRS
178.405 and the communications with RMC Judge Nash Holmes regarding the 2/27/12
Order for Competency Evaluation that should have prevented her from even holding the
Trial (the one that occurred right after RMC Marshal Harley served a civil eviction
appeal document on behalf of the process server Richard G. Hill, Esq. hired to serve
Coughlin the Order to Show Cause in cv11-03628 that Coughlin had already received
in connection with his being the attorney of record and an e-filer on that matter...see
Caplow).
RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Chris Carter wish to address the panel about
their misconduct in 11 CR 26405 and the extent to which Richard Hill and his client,
Dr. Matt Merliss misled them, especially vis a vis the attached filings in 11 CR 26405
and 61901.
Sargent Paul Sifre had some thoughts on the custodial jaywalking arrest and Sifre v.
Wells Fargo, LLC. Officers Wesley and Look wanted to weigh in on that too..
RPD Officer Nick Duralde and his wife, ECOMM/911 dispatcher Jessica Duralde (who
was working that night of the 8/20/11 arrest that started a year in which Coughlin was
arrest 10 times, including a custodial arrest for jaywalking on 1/12/12 then another one 001687
Outlook Print Message
for "misuse of 911" even though Coughlin received two protection orders in FV12-
00187, and -00188), with Officer Duralde pulling Couglin over in the middle of the
night upon his walking to his car after being released from jail on a 15 degree night on
1/13/12, where five other RPD Officers helped Officer Duralde with the pressing matter
of the sudden disappearance of Coughlin's license plate...), (all suspiciously close in
time to Coughlin filing a complaint against Duralde and the RPD on 1/7/12 with the
RPD) wanted to weigh in on the misconduct attendant to Duralde's testifying that
dispatch reported to himself and RPD Officer's Alaksa and Rosa that night about "a
possible fight" thus supporting their reponse and the associated Terry Stop weapons
check frisk pat down and custodial arrest for a misdemeanor allegedly occuring outside
their presence after 7 pm:
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:
(1) There is a warrant of arrest against the person; and
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another
alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is
committed;
(e) When the offense charged is battery that constitutes domestic violence pursuant toNRS 33.018 and the arrest is made in the manner
provided in NRS 171.137;
(f) When the offense charged is a violation of a temporary or extended order for protection against domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS
33.017 to 33.100, inclusive;
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
(h) When the person voluntarily surrenders himself or herself in response to an outstanding warrant of arrest.
The RSIC Victoria Oldenburg wants to talk to the Panel about how the RSIC and Wal-
Mart are in a long term business partnership where the 2nd St. Wal-Mart is on tribal
land rented out by the RSIC and patrolled by its tribal officers, who admit to routinely
making misdemeanor petty theft/shoplifting custodial arrest (Officer Kameron
Crawford and Donnie Braunworth have been trained in all the neato "he didn't give me
all the information necessary to issue a citation" explanations (including Crawfords
lying under oath that Coughlin didn't provide his driver's license to him on September
9th, 2011, especially where Wal-Mart's Frontino admits he did not make a citizen's
arrest, nor did any Wal-Mart employee) even where such misdemeanor arrests by tribal
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officers are forbidden under NRS 171.1255.. Reno City Attorney too would like a
chance to explain how she prosecutes cases based upon arrests by tribal officers for
misdemeanor where Nevada law expressly prevents misdemeanor arrests by tribal
officers under NRS 171.1255.
I was forced to cross examine/interact with a represented party at the 11/14/12
Disciplinary Hearing, and the SBN and Panel's violations of SCR 105 contributed
greatly to my failure to alert Mr. Garin prior to that. I think out of fairness I and Mr.
Garin/Ms. Nordstrom should be provided transcripts from the 11/14/12 Hearing.
NRS 171.1255Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police
officer employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an Indian tribe may make an
arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officer or agents presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not
in the officer or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or
agent has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross
misdemeanor by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or
described person for a public offense, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause to
believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace officer finds
evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
2. Such an officer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense
committed on that reservation or colony; or
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(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or
agent is in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by the officer or agent
to have committed a felony within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has
committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense within those boundaries in the
presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to
it in NRS 171.156.
Washoe Legal Services Paul Elcano and State Bar of Nevada's Coe Swobe's contacts
with my father, Palmer v. Pioneer, etc.
So, this is the Elcano approach...he gets an email on 4/19/12 that is a written
employment law centered complaint from an employee...and he has the employee
suspended within days thereafter...then claims to have not received the email, then
adopts some Duluth Model "Power and Control" wheel co-opting or leveraging of
"treatment" or armchair psychiatry...
Elcano, McGeorge '78. Nash Holmes, McGeorge '79. Beesley, McGeorge '79. Stephen
Kent, McGeorge '80. RMC Judge Howard (Wal-Mart conviction resulting in 6/7/12
temporary suspension in 60838), McGeorge '81. Loomis, McGeorge '82 (twice
Coughlin's RMC court appointed counsel, allowed to withdraw with pay both times,
refused to advocate in any way). Gammick, McGeorge '82. Springgate, McGeorge '85
(opposing consel in ng12-0435 asking for sanctions in divorce case closing argument).
Kandaras, McGeorge '91 (Deputy District Attorney involved in warrantless seizure of
Coughlin's smart phone. DDA Z. Young, McGeorge '04. Hazlett-Stevens, McGeorge,
'06.
What do you call it when Judge Nash Holmes testifies, on 11/14/12 that she questioned
Coughlin about "recording devices" and or whether he was recording BEFORE the one
restroom break, purposefully changing the order of the questioning and the restroom
break to suggest some furtive activity on Coughlin's part, which Judge Nash Holmes
then further attempted to amplify in her assertion that Marshal Joel Harley was ordered
to follow Coughlin into the restroom and that a Marshal asserted to her that Coughlin
"disassembled a recording device" in the restroom and "hid a part or portion of it in the
restroom"
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Fraud on the court Conduct of counsel in omitting portion of deposition when
deposition is read into record, and giving impression that entire document is being
proffered, resulting in buttressing of his party's position is fraud on the court warranting
the imposition of sanctions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 172, 172, subd. 1(a, d). Sierra Glass &
Mirror v. Viking Industries, Inc., 1991, 808 P.2d 512, 107 Nev. 119, rehearing denied.
It is categorically false for Judge Nash Holmes to assert, in the audio record on 3/12/12 the order of events
and when she asked Coughlin her questions about recording, considering when a restroom break took place
an exactly what it is she asked Couglin and when, and what his responses were, and when some allegations
by "the Marshal" were made, what they consisted of, etc.. on 3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 the audio transcript
reads 7 minutes into the audio record the RMC provided the SBN:
Judge Nash Holmes (Nash): It appears to me in this case that the defendant is suffering
from some extreme form of mental illness. during the trial I asked the defendant
attorney repeatedly if he was recording the proceedings he denied that vehemently a few
times and then he quote took the fifth a few other times and then he requested to be
excused to go to the bathroom and the Marshal later reported to me that while the
gentleman was in the bathroom he disassembled a recording device in his pocket and
took the memory out of it and it was later found in that, uh, by the Marshal no one else
had gone into the bathroom and that was retrieved and it was put into his possession at
the Sheriff's office and when they booked him into jail for the contempt charge that was
booked into evidence and I asked the Sheriff's office to hold that into evidence. I believe
he has violated Supreme Court Rule 229(2)(B) which was amended by ADKT 440,
August 1st, 2011...."
One Coughlin did not do anything of the sort indicated by Judge Nash Holmes (by way of
unattributed hearsay, like her car sleeping allegations in her 3/14/12 letter re Coughlin to the
SBN) above.
NRS 178.405 should have prevented anything said or done by Judge Nash Holmes following
her statement at the 7 minute mark that "It appears to me in this case that the defendant is
suffering from some extreme form of mental illness." Further, that which Judge Nash Holmes
had communicated to her prior to the start of Trial on 2/27/12 in 11 tr 26800 needs to be
testified to under oath, rather than have Bar Counsel assert to half baked "can't ask the judge
about her mental processes" loophole, as he has done.
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Here is the actual statements made, verbatim, from the certified audio transcript of the 2/27/12
"simple traffic citation Trial" stemming from Coughlin going to Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s office
to get his driver's license, wallet, keys, and client's files following a custodial arrest for
trespass (see RPD Sargent Lopez and Officer Carter's explanations thereof in 11 CR 26405
and 61901) and three days spent in jail, upon being released therefrom on 11/15/12...and at the
Trial on that traffic citation issued by RPD Sargent John Tarter, RMC Marshal Joel Harley,
just before Trial (when Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be found and WCPD Biray Dogan and
DDA Zach Young were getting an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in rcr2012-
065630 at 1:31 pm...and the 11 TR 26800 Trial starting late, not at 1 pm as noticed, but at 3
pm....with RMC W. Gardner admitting to meetings being held amongst the RMC Judges
wherein they brainstormed ways of combating Coughlin's championing of due process rights
for the disenfranchised...
City Attorney Ormaas sure could be made to explain her statements on the record regarding
whether the citation or report in 11 tr 26800 contained any mention of retaliation, given she
was looking right at it and given what she said in court. Also, the whispering with Marshal
Harley, and the bits about Coughlin reporting to Ormaas what RPD OFficer Carter said to
Coughlin in 61901, and Ormaas's responses thereto on 2/27/12, and Dan Wong, ditto at an
earlier hearing on that matter...
Simply put, there was no questioning by Judge Nash Holmes of Coughlin as to whether he was
recording anything or whether he possessed a "recording device" until AFTER the one and only
restroom break Judge Nash Holmes mentions on the audio record. And that sua sponte interrogation
of Couglin occured IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESTROOM BREAK, A BREAK IN WHICH
JUDGE NASH HOLMES REFUSED TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO TAKE HIS YELLOW LEGAL
PAD WITH HIM AND WHICH OCCURED AFTER COUGHLIN MADE A VERBAL
PRESERVATION ON THE RECORD OF THE WHISPERING IN EACH OTHER'S EARS BY
CITY ATTORNEY ALLISON ORMAAS AND MARSHAL HARLEY (WHO SEEMED A BIT
UPSET ABOUT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS COUGHLIN ASKED THEM IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE THE TRIAL (DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WHERE JUDGE NASH HOLME'S
ASSISTANT INDICATED, ON THE RECORD IN ONE OF THE OTHER CASES ON THAT
STACKED DOCKET, THAT Judge Nash Holmes just couldn't be found, and how odd that
was...which is odd, considering what was going on in 11 cr 22176, 11 cr 26405 12 cr 00696 and 11 tr
26800, and rcr2012-065630 and rcr2011-063341 at the time (lots of reasons for and indications that
local law enforcement and prosecutors and public defenders were non too happy with Coughlin...and
consider the 2/24/12 email vacating the 2/27/12 status conference between young and dogan that
neither YOung nor Dogan wish to testify about...but which seems to have been held anyways after a
written communication of its being reset was transmitted to Coughlin by Dogan, wherein, during the
time Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be found (maybe she was at one of the group meetings amongst
Judges about Coughlin that RMC Administrative Judge William Gardner referenced on the record in
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11 CR 26405? Interesting the Notice of Appeal in 60302 was filed that same day too, 2/27/12) Dogan
got his ORder for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 (apparently in retaliation
for Coughlin's filing of 2/21/12, and DDA Zach Young was still smarting from a filing by Coughlin
of approximately 11/28/12, which resultd in Young promptly amending his complaint in rcr2011-
063341 to add a charge that was duplicative, even where YOung failure to allege theft or
possessing/receiving "from another' under Staab makes his so charging Coughlin in that iPhone case
a RPC 3.8 violation, which is YOung's specialty, apparently. That, and violating NRs 178.405, which
YOung did by filing in rcr2011-063341 with a stamp of 2:55pm a fugitive document of his own, an
Opposition to Coughlin's or the WCPD Motion to Appear as CoCounsel on 2/27/12...nevermind
YOung tried to hold a TRIAL on 5/7/12 in that case despite the Order finding Coughlin competent in
cr12-0376 didn't even get signed and entered until 5/9/12...ditto the Trial seeting of 5/8/12 in RMC
11 cr 26405, the criminal trespass case. NOt much respect for nrs 178.405 (including within NRs
5.010) here in Northern nevada..
Coughlin didn't received the 2/28/12 Contempt ORder in 11 tr 26800 until July 2012...but did file a
Notice of Appeal 3/7/12...despite "summary criminal contempt" being a final appealable order, Judge
Nash HOlmes continues to refuse to follow NRS 189.010-050 (so Coughlin has to type the transcript,
yay....
It is true that contempt committed in a trial courtroom can under some circumstances be punished
summarily by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 . But adjudication by a
trial judge of a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court cannot be likened to the
proceedings here. For we held in the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt before a "one-
man grand jury" could not be summarily tried. [349 U.S. 133, 138] The power of a trial judge to
punish for a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open ... In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257.
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Coughlin violated in both 11 cr 22176 and 11 tr 26800, also
orders no sufficiently detailed or capable of being known how to comply with, not sufficient warning,
violate Houston v Eighth Judicial District (Nev.).
See, this is why In Re Oliver and Cooke require all elements of "summary criminal contempt" occur
" in the "immediate presence" of the Court. Maybe Marshal Harley and some other Marshal have
misled Judge Nash HOlmes, or maybe something worse is going on here....but what Judge Nash
HOlmes said on the recording is entirely misleading an inaccurate, if not an outright lie (again,
maybe not a lie by Judge Nash Holmes, maybe she is repeating a lie, but regardless her reliance on
unattributed hearsay is distrubing an inappropriate, particulary where she not only purports to issue a
"summary criminal contempt" conviction against an attorney, but also where Judge Nash Holmes
appears to try to transmogrify what she sees as "a simple traffic citation trial" into a full blown SCR
105 disciplinary hearing where she is both Bar Counsel and the Panel...That Marshal needs to sign an
affidavit, under NRS 22.020 and Judge Nash HOlmes ought to have to put something on the record,
under oath, in response to Coughlin's recent subpoena (and SBN Pat King wishes to let Judge Nash
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HOlmes phone in her testimony, and it probably won't even be sworn testimony, but rather just some
musings by Judge Nash Holmes purporting to make "rulings" finding "by clear and convincing
evidence" all sorts of things outside her jurisdiction) on 11/14/12, on, Partick O. King, SBN Bar
Counsel has also filed Motion to Quash the Subpoenas Coughlin attempted to have served on
Marshal Joel Harley, Marshal Deighton, Judge Nash HOlmes, Judge William Gardner, Judge
Gardners Administrative Assistant Lisa Wagner, who can't quite find the NOtice of Appeal Coughlin
faxed to her (allowable under the RMC Rules) on June 28th, 2012 in 11 CR 26405 (the appeal was
dismissed under an NRS 189.010 analysis by Judge Elliot, whom also got Coughlin appeal of the 11
cr 22176 conviction resulting in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary suspension Order in cr11-2064, which
was denied based upon a civilpreparation of transcript down payment rule, in that criminal appeal,
where the RMC has a thing in place with this Pam Longoni that violates Nevada law in that it
refused to give Coughlin the audio cd of the trial for some time, insisting only Longoni would be
allowed to transcribe it, and that the transcript's preparation would absolutely not start until a down
payment was made. Plus, even where Coughlin caved to the payment demands..Longoni repeatedly
hung up the phone on him and otherwise ignored his communications (there may be an issue of the
email Longoni holding out to the public issuing a "bounceback"...but she needs to sign an affidavit as
to whether she put Coughlin on a blocked list, and upon information and belief, Coughlin faxed his
request to the number the RMC held out for her on her behalf too...
In her March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN (now NG12-0434, and perhaps,
NG12-0435 (stamped as "received" by the SBN from the "Clerk of Court" of some still unnamed
Court (I'd bet its from the RMC Clerk of Court, whom King purported to have certified documents
from a Court she doesn't even work for at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing...but then again, Panel
Chair Echeverria allow WLS's Elcano to certify documents just because he claimed to have watched
a tape of a hearing, where Elcano is neither a licensed attorney, nor does he work for any Court....),
depending upon whom you ask and what King means by "Clerk of Court"...because in King's 3/23/12
email to Coughlin he apparently identifies Ms. Marilyn Tognoni as "Clerk of Court of Department
3"...whoever, wouldn't it be Second Judicial District Court Clerk of Court Joey Orduna Hastings that
would need to send Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin to
the SBN's King for King now apparent contention that the NG12-0435 "ghost grievance" consisting
of Judge L. Gardner's April 2009 Order was not filed by the RMC Judges? Oh, Clerk of Court
Orduna Hastings? Do you have anything to say about this? Judge Nash Holme's 3/14/12 grievance to
bar counsel reads:
"
Re: Zachary Barker Coughlin, Nevada Bar No. 9473
Dear Mr. Clark:
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This letter constitutes a formal complaint of attorney misconduct and/or disability against Zachary Barker
Coughlin. The accompanying box of materials demonstrates some of the problems with the practice of this attorney being
experienced by myself and the other three judges in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be
a simple traffic citation case are self-explanatory and are included, together with copies of massive documents Me.
Coughlin has faxfiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings of two of my hearings in this matter are also included.
He failed to appear for the second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on our Department I judge
being out for surgery. We have multiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and can't seem to locate him between cases very
easily. We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9
th
St. #2
Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address for his
mother, however, as she recently posted part of a fine for him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr.Coughlin late last year that is now on appeal to the Second
Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a matter currently pending in his court with Mr.
Coughlin as the defendant. I have enclosed some copies of documents from those matters, in chronological order, simply
because they appear to demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staff also made you
some audio tapes of Coughlin in the him and him and him and him and him and him and him him and I will him and
him and him and him and him in Departments 2 and 4 so you can hear for yourself how this attorney acts in court. You
can see his behavior in my traffic citation case does not appear to bean isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant
was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed for Contempt of Court and
they stated that they represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other information on that.
You will have the full cooperation of myself, the other judges, and the staff of Reno Municipal Court in your
pursuit of this matter. Mr.Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the staff and
even our pro temp judges on the most simple traffic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a caseof some urgency,
and I apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies of
the audios of Mr.Coughlin's hearings until today, and I felt it was important that the audios be included in the materials
to be considered by the State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
appointments with clients. [ do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious harm to the practice of
law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests. "
Maybe it would be best if the RMC focused less on offering unsworn hearsay testimony that is
easily proven to be patently false at Disciplinary Hearings (to the extent one is allowed to offer
such proof, which Panel Chair Echeverria invariably rules is "not relevent" and King smugly
basks in his SCR 111(5) vacation with his "Clerk of Court" Laura Peters...whose lies about
SCR 105(4) resulted in Panel Chair Echeverria quashing all subpoenas Coughlin issued, 001695
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Report Selection Criteria
Case ID: DV08-01168
Docket Start Date:
Docket Ending Date:
Case Description
Case ID: DV08-01168 - ASHWIN JOSHI VS. BHARTI JOSHI (D14)
Filing Date: Tuesday , July 01st, 2008
Type: DO - DIVORCE - NO CHILDREN
Status: CLOSED - Case Closed
Related Cases
FV08-01910
Case Event Schedule
No case events were found.
Case Parties
Seq # Assoc Expn Date Type ID Name
6 3,10 Plaintiff/Counter-Deft @1144868 JOSHI, ASHWIN
Address: unavailable Aliases: none
7 11,12 Defendant
Counterclaimant
@1144866 JOSHI, BHARTI
Address: unavailable Aliases: none
9 Judge D14 GARDNER, HONORABLE
LINDA
Address: P. O. BOX 30083
RENO NV 89520
Aliases: none
10 6 Attorney 4391 Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn
R.
Address: WASHOE LEGAL
SERVICES
Aliases: Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn R
001696
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
299 South Arlington
Avenue
Reno NV 89501
11 7 Attorney 4391 Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn
R.
Address: WASHOE LEGAL
SERVICES
299 South Arlington
Avenue
Reno NV 89501
Aliases: Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn R
14 Real Party in Interest 9473 Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Address: P. O. Box 3961
Reno NV 89505
Aliases: none
Docket Entries
Filing Date Description Name Monetary
01-JUL-2008
08:50 AM
**Civil Cover Sheet
Entry: none.
01-JUL-2008
08:51 AM
$Complaint-Divorce No Children
Entry: none.
01-JUL-2008
08:51 AM
** Summons Issued
Entry: none.
01-JUL-2008
08:53 AM
Financial Declaration ...
Entry: SHORT FORM FINANCIAL DECLARATION ASHWIN JOSHI
01-JUL-2008
08:55 AM
**Payment Receipted
001697
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
03-OCT-2008
03:53 PM
Heard-Not Settled
Entry: JTAYLOR, CLERK; CD
10-OCT-2008
09:32 AM
***Minutes
Entry:
10/3/08: Case Management Conference - Transaction 405010 - Approved By: NOREVIEW
: 10-10-2008:09:33:20
10-OCT-2008
09:38 AM
** Notes ...
Entry: FILE RETURNED TO FILING OFFICE; JT
15-OCT-2008
10:10 AM
** Notes ...
Entry: CMC NOT ON RECORD CALLED ADVICE ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN JA
17-DEC-2008
04:18 PM
Notice to Set
Entry: NOTICE TO SET TRIAL: JANUARY 7, 2009 @ 10:30
07-JAN-2009
09:36 AM
Application for Setting
Entry: 1/2 DAY TRIAL
25-FEB-2009
02:50 PM
Pre-Trial Order
Entry: none.
05-MAR-2009
09:26 AM
Trial Statement - Defendant Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: none.
11-MAR-2009
04:56 PM
Trial Statement - Plaintiff Springgate, Esq., John P.
001698
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Entry:
TRIAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF - Transaction 644213 - Approved By: TPRINCE : 03-
12-2009:07:20:23
12-MAR-2009
05:00 PM
Heard ...
Entry:
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE NOT ON RECORD; TRIAL COMMENCED ON THE
RECORD-JAVS, NOT CONCLUDED, CONTINUED TO 3/17/09. PLAINTIFF PRESENT
WITH COUNSEL. DEFENDANT PRESENT WITH COUNSEL. RM 4; MCA
17-MAR-2009
11:11 AM
Under Advisement
Entry:
PLAINTIFF WAS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL; DEFENDANT WAS PRESENT WITH
COUNSEL; JAVS RM 4; MCA
09-APR-2009
10:41 AM
** Notes ...
Entry:
CD BURNED HEARING DATE 03-12-2009 & 03-17-2009 REQUESTED BY ZACHARY B.
COUGHLIN CALLED FOR PICK UP 03-17-2009/JA
13-APR-2009
09:23 AM
Order ...
Entry: AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 706269 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 04-13-2009:09:24:06
13-APR-2009
03:21 PM
Notice of Entry of Ord Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 708197 - Approved By:
ASMITH : 04-13-2009:15:37:59
23-APR-2009
04:13 PM
** Notes ...
Entry:
CD BURNED HEARING DATE 03-12-2009 & 03-17-2009 REQUESTED BY MARC
ASHELEY AND TODD TORVINEN CALLED FOR PICK UP 04-23-2009/JA
29-APR-2009
09:53 AM
Request for Submission Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn R.
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: STIPULATION AND ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME PERIOD FOR
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PARTY SUBMITTING: CARYN STERNLICHT, ESQ
DATE SUBMITTED: 04/29/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
001699
INTERESTING TO NOTE WLS DOESN'T REQUEST CD UNTIL AFTER 4/19/09
WRITTEN COMPLAINT BY COUGHLIN-NOTE BY ZC
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
29-APR-2009
04:48 PM
Request for Hearing Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
REQUEST FOR ADJUSTMENT OF FILING DATE OR EXTENSION OF TIME -
Transaction 741585 - Approved By: MPURDY : 04-29-2009:17:02:19
30-APR-2009
03:35 PM
Mtn for Reconsideration Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION ; REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
RESPOND - Transaction 744344 - Approved By: ASMITH : 04-30-2009:16:09:49
30-APR-2009
04:31 PM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
30-APR-2009
04:39 PM
Stip and Order...
Entry: TO ENLARGE TIME PERIOD FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
12-MAY-2009
12:03 AM
Notice of Appeal Supreme Court Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
ORDER AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 765327 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-12-
2009:09:36:43
12-MAY-2009
12:15 AM
Notice of Appeal Supreme Court Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
ORDER AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 765328 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-12-
2009:09:38:37
13-MAY-2009
01:13 PM
Opposition to ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION - Transaction 769905 - Approved
By: MPURDY : 05-13-2009:13:33:42
13-MAY-2009
01:13 PM
Mtn to Strike... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry: Transaction 769905 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-13-2009:13:33:42
001700
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
13-MAY-2009
04:10 PM
** Case Reopened
Entry: none.
13-MAY-2009
04:11 PM
Ex-Parte Mtn... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DEFENDANT'S EMERGENCY MOITON FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME AND ORDER
GRANTING EMERGENCY REQUEST TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS
13-MAY-2009
04:11 PM
Request for Submission Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: DEFENDANTS EMERGENCY MOTION ORDER SHORTENING
TIME PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/13/09
SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
13-MAY-2009
04:23 PM
Request for Submission Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PARTY SUBMITTING:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/13/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE
RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
13-MAY-2009
04:27 PM
Motion ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN
FORMA PAUPERIS
13-MAY-2009
04:27 PM
Request for Submission Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/13/09
SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
13-MAY-2009
04:28 PM
Amended Notice of Appeal Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: none.
001701
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
13-MAY-2009
04:28 PM
Case Appeal Statement Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL ONLY
14-MAY-2009
03:33 PM
Notice ... Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: OF SUBSTITUTION OF STAFF COUNSEL
14-MAY-2009
04:48 PM
Supreme Ct Deficiency Notice
Entry: FOR NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 5/12/09 TRANSACTION #765328
14-MAY-2009
04:49 PM
Supreme Ct Deficiency Notice
Entry: FOR NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 5/12/09 TRANSACTION #765327
14-MAY-2009
04:49 PM
Supreme Ct Deficiency Notice
Entry:
FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 5/13/09. NO FEES PAID, ZACHARY
COUGHLIN, ESQ., FILED FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS FOR HIMSELF IN THIS
CASE.
15-MAY-2009
12:10 AM
Amended ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
AMENDED CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR
OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Transaction 774264 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-15-
2009:07:52:03
15-MAY-2009
12:11 AM
Amended ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL; OR ALTERNATIVELY PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDAMUS OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Transaction 774265 - Approved
By: MPURDY : 05-15-2009:07:53:39
15-MAY-2009
09:19 AM
Supreme Ct Deficiency Notice
Entry: none.
001702
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
15-MAY-2009
09:37 AM
Certificate of Clerk
Entry: FOR 1ST 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES
15-MAY-2009
09:38 AM
Certificate of Transmittal
Entry: FOR 1ST 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES
15-MAY-2009
09:39 AM
Certificate of Clerk
Entry: FOR 2ND 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES
15-MAY-2009
09:39 AM
Certificate of Transmittal
Entry: FOR 2ND 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES
15-MAY-2009
09:40 AM
Certificate of Clerk
Entry: FOR 5/13/09 JOINT AMENDED APPEAL, NO FEES
15-MAY-2009
09:41 AM
Certificate of Transmittal
Entry: FOR 5/13/09 JOINT AMENDED APPEAL
15-MAY-2009
09:41 AM
Certificate of Clerk
Entry: FOR 5/15/09 SECOND AMENDED APPEAL & AMENDED CASE APPEAL STATEMENT
15-MAY-2009
09:51 AM
Certificate of Transmittal
Entry: FOR 5/15/09 SECOND AMENDED APPEAL & AMENDED CASE APPEAL STATEMENT
19-MAY-2009
12:00 PM
Ord Deny in Forma Pauperis
Entry: ON BEHALF OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ.
001703
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
20-MAY-2009
11:40 PM
Reply... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: REPLY TO OPPOSITION
21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Ord Denying ...
Entry:
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION - Transaction 785777 - Approved By: NOREVIEW :
05-21-2009:11:35:08
21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
21-MAY-2009
03:03 PM
Supreme Court Receipt for Doc
Entry:
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833 RECEIPT FOR DOCUMENTS (INCLUDES ALL 4
NOTICE OF APPEALS)
21-MAY-2009
03:04 PM
**Supreme Court Case No. ...
Entry: SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833
21-MAY-2009
04:06 PM
Request for Submission Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, & DECREE OF
DIVORCE PARTY SUBMITTING: JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED:
5/22/09 SUBMITTED BY: CPARSLEY DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
001704
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
26-MAY-2009
02:03 PM
Request for Submission
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: REPLY TO OPPOSITION PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY
COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/26/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED
JUDGE OFFICE:
26-MAY-2009
03:09 PM
Supreme Court Notice
Entry: SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833 NOTICE TO PAY SUPREME COURT FILING FEE
27-MAY-2009
09:58 AM
Motion ... Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE
27-MAY-2009
01:28 PM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
27-MAY-2009
01:45 PM
Request for Submission Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
MOTION TO STRIKE THE NOTICE(S) OF APPEAL - Transaction 795498 - Approved By:
MPURDY : 05-27-2009:15:13:37 DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO STRIKE THE
NOTICE(S) OF APPEAL PARTY SUBMITTING: JOHN SPRINGGATE, ESQ DATE
SUBMITTED: 05/27/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
01-JUN-2009
04:41 PM
Supreme Court Receipt for Doc
Entry: SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833
03-JUN-2009
04:35 PM
$Notice/Appeal Supreme Court
Entry:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN ESQ. ( FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED MAY 13,
2009 )
04-JUN-2009
09:29 AM
**Payment Receipted
Entry:
001705
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
A Payment of -$34.00 was made on receipt DCDC237460.
08-JUN-2009
08:55 AM
Opposition to Mtn ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE - Transaction 818528 -
Approved By: MPURDY : 06-08-2009:09:24:39
08-JUN-2009
10:29 AM
**Supreme Court Appeal Bond
Entry: none.
08-JUN-2009
10:52 AM
$Def 1st Appearance - DV
Entry:
MOTION TO TREAT SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL OR PLED IN THE
ALTERNATIVE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AS A PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS ONLY AND NOT A NOTICE OF APPEAL
08-JUN-2009
10:57 AM
Mtn to Strike...
Entry: none.
08-JUN-2009
11:01 AM
Opposition to Mtn ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
08-JUN-2009
11:06 AM
**Payment Receipted
Entry: A Payment of -$88.00 was made on receipt DCDC237754.
08-JUN-2009
11:53 AM
Request for Submission Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
STRIKE PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 06/08/09
SUBMITTED BY: MRYBKA DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
08-JUN-2009
12:18 PM
Request for Submission
001706
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO STRIKE PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN,
ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 06/08/09 SUBMITTED BY: MRYBKA DATE RECEIVED JUDGE
OFFICE:
08-JUN-2009
03:45 PM
***Minutes
Entry: RE: 3 12 09 - Transaction 820893 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 06-08-2009:15:47:27
08-JUN-2009
04:16 PM
Request for Submission Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE PARTY
SUBMITTING: MARC ASHLEY, ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 6/9/09 SUBMITTED BY:
ASIMPSON DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
09-JUN-2009
02:59 PM
Reply... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
REPLY ON MOTION TO STRIKE - Transaction 824177 - Approved By: MPURDY : 06-09-
2009:15:33:59
09-JUN-2009
02:59 PM
Request for Submission Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO STRIKE - Transaction 824177 - Approved By: MPURDY
: 06-09-2009:15:33:59 PARTY SUBMITTING: JOHN SPRINGGATE, ESQ. DATE
SUBMITTED: 6/9/09 SUBMITTED BY: ASIMPSON DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
09-JUN-2009
02:59 PM
Opposition to Mtn ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE - Transaction 824177 - Approved By: MPURDY :
06-09-2009:15:33:59
10-JUN-2009
03:04 PM
***Minutes
Entry: re: 3 17 09 - Transaction 827393 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 06-10-2009:15:14:02
17-JUN-2009
04:23 PM
Affidavit of Resident Witness Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry: Transaction 842514 - Approved By: MPURDY : 06-17-2009:16:31:09
001707
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
19-JUN-2009
09:57 AM
Decree of Divorce
Entry: Transaction 846216 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 06-19-2009:10:01:39
19-JUN-2009
10:02 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
19-JUN-2009
10:04 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
19-JUN-2009
10:23 AM
** Notes ...
Entry:
E-FILED DECREE OF DIVORCE; NOTIFIED JOHN SPRINGGATE'S OFFICE OF SAME
BY TELEPHONE
19-JUN-2009
11:51 AM
Decision With Hearing
Entry: none.
19-JUN-2009
11:52 AM
** Case Reopened
Entry: none.
22-JUN-2009
08:48 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
22-JUN-2009
02:12 PM
Notice of Entry of Decree Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE
OF DIVORCE - Transaction 851165 - Approved By: ASMITH : 06-22-2009:14:47:32
15-JUL-2009
02:34 PM
Ord Denying Motion
001708
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Entry:
TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART - Transaction
899705 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 07-15-2009:14:37:24
15-JUL-2009
02:35 PM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
15-JUL-2009
02:36 PM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
15-JUL-2009
02:37 PM
** Case Closed
Entry: none.
20-JUL-2009
02:51 PM
Notice of Entry of Ord Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART - Transaction 909119 - Approved By: ASMITH
: 07-20-2009:15:10:12
22-JUL-2009
09:32 AM
Stipulation ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry: STIPULATION TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE
23-JUL-2009
04:17 PM
Order ...
Entry:
TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Transaction 920637 - Approved By: NOREVIEW :
07-23-2009:16:19:47
23-JUL-2009
04:23 PM
** Notes ...
Entry:
ORDER TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE EFILED; COUNSEL TO RECEIVE
ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION
24-JUL-2009
02:13 PM
Notice of Entry of Ord Springgate, Esq., John P.
001709
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Entry: Transaction 922926 - Approved By: AZION : 07-24-2009:14:19:03
04-AUG-2009
03:02 PM
Mtn Ord to Show Cause Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT - Transaction 945045 -
Approved By: ASMITH : 08-04-2009:15:22:54
28-SEP-2009
02:39 PM
Supreme Ct Ord Dismis Appeal
Entry:
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833 - Transaction 689 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 09-
28-2009:14:40:14
28-SEP-2009
02:41 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 698 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 09-28-2009:14:42:10
01-OCT-2009
04:23 PM
Withdrawal of Counsel Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: none.
14-OCT-2009
11:54 AM
Withdrawal of Counsel Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
JOHN P SPRINGGATE, ESQ/ASHWIN JOSHI - Transaction 1099490 - Approved By:
ASMITH : 10-14-2009:12:06:21
14-OCT-2009
12:15 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 1099556 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 10-14-2009:12:19:28
07-DEC-2009
02:27 PM
**Supreme Court Case No. ...
Entry: SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 54844
07-DEC-2009
02:58 PM
Supreme Court Order Denying
Entry:
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS; SUPREME COURT CASE
NO. 54844 - Transaction 1192001 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-07-2009:14:58:18
001710
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
07-DEC-2009
02:58 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 1192004 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-07-2009:14:59:05
08-DEC-2009
11:53 AM
Supreme Ct Accept - eFile Doc
Entry: Transaction 1193850 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-08-2009:12:01:15
08-DEC-2009
12:07 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 1193888 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-08-2009:12:09:43
28-DEC-2009
12:30 PM
Motion ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
MOTION FOR RETURN OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND - Transaction 1230075 - Approved
By: AZION : 12-28-2009:12:33:01
28-DEC-2009
12:33 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 1230080 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-28-2009:12:33:46
30-DEC-2009
04:45 PM
Supreme Ct Not/Lieu/Remittitur
Entry:
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 54844 - Transaction 1235784 - Approved By: NOREVIEW
: 12-30-2009:16:46:19
30-DEC-2009
04:47 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 1235800 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-30-2009:16:48:49
12-JAN-2011
11:01 AM
Family Court Info Sheet
Entry: Transaction 1962601 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 01-12-2011:11:03:19
12-JAN-2011 Proof of Electronic Service
001711
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
11:05 AM
Entry: Transaction 1962657 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 01-12-2011:11:07:04
05-JUL-2011
12:15 PM
** Case Reopened
Entry: none.
05-JUL-2011
12:17 PM
Request for Submission Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
MOTION FOR RETURN OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND (NO PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) -
Transaction 2325502 - Approved By: MCHOLICO : 07-05-2011:12:28:59 PARTY
SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE SUBMITTED: 7/5/11 SUBMITTED BY:
MCHOLICO DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
05-JUL-2011
12:29 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 2325513 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 07-05-2011:12:30:15
23-AUG-2011
11:59 AM
Order ...
Entry:
TO RETURN BOND - Transaction 2424815 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 08-23-
2011:12:00:24
23-AUG-2011
11:59 AM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.
23-AUG-2011
12:00 PM
** Case Closed
Entry: none.
23-AUG-2011
12:01 PM
Proof of Electronic Service
Entry: Transaction 2424818 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 08-23-2011:12:01:37
30-AUG-2011
12:30 PM
**Trust Disbursement SITE DEFINED TRUST DEPOSIT,
001712
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Entry: A Disbursement of $250.00 on Check Number 19067
31-AUG-2011
12:51 PM
** Notes ...
Entry:
4 CD'S BURNED FOR HEARINGS 03/12/09 & 03/17/09 REQUESTED BY DEBORAH
PRINGLE / PAUL ELCANO CALLED FOR PU - ME
001713
Outlook Print Message
Close Print
amjur
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 3/10/09 10:26 AM
To: zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org; dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 300
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated September 2008
State and Local Taxation
Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., and Jane E. Lehman, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.
Part Four. Exemptions from Taxation
XV. Persons, Property, and Organizations Exempt from Taxation
D. Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious, and Other Like Associations, Institutions, and Organizations
2. Character, Ownership, or Use of Property
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
300. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 241.1(3), 241.1(4)
A.L.R. Library
Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55
A.L.R. 3d 430.
There are basically three types of charitable exemption schemes:
1. based solely on the ownership of the property;[FN1]
2. based solely on the use of the property;[FN2]
3. a combination of ownership and use, so that the property must both be owned by a charitable
organization and used for an exempt purpose.[FN3]
Thus, ordinarily, property belonging to an institution which has been granted tax exemption is not
exempt from taxation unless such property is used for the purposes for which that institution was
established.[FN4] If use is the test, ownership alone is not sufficient.[FN5]
When use alone is the test, the character of the owner may illuminate the purposes for which the
property is used and should not be excluded from consideration.[FN6] Under the use test, when an
owner derives no income or benefit from his property, but allows another to use it for a charitable
purpose, the property is exempt.[FN7]
When both ownership and use are required, although there is authority to the contrary,[FN8] the
same entity need not be the owner and user provided that a tax exempt entity owns the property and
another entity operates it for an exempt use.[FN9] However, a private owner is not exempt merely
because he leases his property to a non-profit entity for charitable use.[FN10] 001714
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[FN1] Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club of Morristown, 124 N.J. 605, 592 A.2d 216
(1991) (for property owned by historical society).
[FN2] Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of State of Ala. v. Norred,
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992); Connolly v. County of Orange, 1 Cal. 4th 1105, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
857, 824 P.2d 663, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1089 (1992), as modified, (Mar. 26, 1992); West
Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982); Highland Park Owners, Inc. v.
Tracy, 71 Ohio St. 3d 405, 644 N.E.2d 284 (1994) (Ohio has two statutes, with more
rigorous use restrictions when the property is not owned by a charity).
[FN3] Kunes v. Samaritan Health Service, 121 Ariz. 413, 590 P.2d 1359 (1979); United
Church of Christ v. Town of West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 539 A.2d 573 (1988); York Rite
Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Board of Equalization of Chatham County, 261 Ga.
558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 849 P.2d 83 (1993); Chicago Patrolmen's
Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 215 Ill. Dec. 655, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996);
Carroll Area Child Care Center, Inc. v. Carroll County Bd. of Review, 613 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
2000); In re University of Kansas School of Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a
Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County, Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999);
Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977); City of Lewiston v.
Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209 (Me. 1996); Supervisor of Assessments of
Baltimore County v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 764 A.2d 821 (2001); Ladies Literary Club v. City
of Grand Rapids, 409 Mich. 748, 298 N.W.2d 422 (1980); Hattiesburg Area Senior Services,
Inc. v. Lamar County, 633 So. 2d 440 (Miss. 1994); United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n of Greater
Kansas City v. Ross, 789 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1990); Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of
Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999); Housing Partnership v. Town of
Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189 (1996); Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Tp., 95 N.J.
503, 472 A.2d 517, 42 A.L.R.4th 591 (1984) (for general charitable exemption); Hapletah v.
Assessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 N.Y.2d 244, 582 N.Y.S.2d 54, 590 N.E.2d 1182 (1992);
Riverview Place, Inc. v. Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448
N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989); True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino, 91 Ohio St. 3d 117, 742
N.E.2d 638 (2001); Alpha Gamma Zeta House Ass'n v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization, 1998
SD 101, 583 N.W.2d 167 (S.D. 1998); Methodist Hospitals of Memphis v. Assessment
Appeals Com'n, 669 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1984); Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v.
Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000); Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County
Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W. Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998); Deutsches Land, Inc. v.
City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN4] McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 18 S. Ct. 242, 42 L. Ed. 614 (1898); People ex rel.
Nelson v. Rockford Masonic Temple Bldg. Ass'n, 348 Ill. 567, 181 N.E. 428, 83 A.L.R. 768
(1932); Salvation Army v. Town of Standish, 1998 ME 75, 709 A.2d 727 (Me. 1998); St.
James Educational Institute v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 185, 26 N.E. 636 (1891); Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Board of County Com'rs, 122 Neb. 586, 241
N.W. 93, 81 A.L.R. 1166 (1932).
[FN5] Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary v. People of State of Illinois ex rel.
Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 23 S. Ct. 386, 47 L. Ed. 641 (1903); People ex rel. Goodman v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 388 Ill. 363, 58 N.E.2d 33, 157 A.L.R. 851 (1944); State v.
Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 20 N.W.2d 673, 168 A.L.R. 274 (1945); Riverview Place, Inc. v.
Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989);001715
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Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN6] West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982).
[FN7] Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of State of Ala. v. Norred,
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992).
[FN8] Immaculate Heart of Mary High School Inc. v. Anderson, 96 Idaho 226, 526 P.2d 831
(1974).
[FN9] Christ the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church v. Mathiesen, 81 Cal. App. 3d 355, 146
Cal. Rptr. 321 (1st Dist. 1978); Sisters of Good Shepherd of City of Washington, D.C. v.
District of Columbia, 746 A.2d 310 (D.C. 2000); In re University of Kansas School of
Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County,
Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999); St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v.
Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865, 412 N.E.2d 921 (1980); Case W. Res. Univ. v.
Tracy, 84 Ohio St. 3d 316, 703 N.E.2d 1240, 131 Ed. Law Rep. 491 (1999) (by statute);
Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v. Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000).
[FN10] Lincoln Street, Inc. v. Town of Springfield, 159 Vt. 181, 615 A.2d 1028 (1992).
Computer equipment that was owned by a credit corporation, leased to a nonprofit taxpayer,
and used for educational purposes was not exempt from property taxes. Fleet Credit Corp. v.
Frazier, 726 A.2d 452 (R.I. 1999).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. Volumes 33-34B 2008 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR STATELOCL 300
END OF DOCUMENT
84 C.J.S. Taxation 334
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated June 2008
Taxation
Francis C. Amendola, J.D., Elizabeth M. Bosek, J.D., John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Nicole Fox,
J.D., Heidi J. Henle, J.D., John Kimpflen, J.D., Anne Knickerbocker, J.D., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Stephen
Lease, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Daniel O'Brien, J.D., Kevin Schroder, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D.
IV. Exemptions
C. Particular Exemptions
4. Charitable, Educational, and Religious Institutions
b. Charitable and Benevolent Institutions
(3) Use of Property
Topic Summary References
334. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
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West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2337
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2338
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2341
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2344
Under constitutional or statutory provisions requiring, in various terms, charitable use of property in
order for it to be exempt, such use is a prerequisite to exemption. The dominant use of property is
controlling on the question of exemption.
Under a statute broadly exempting from taxation all property belonging to charitable or benevolent
institutions, such property is entitled to exemption regardless of the purposes for which it is used.[FN1]
Where, however, the constitution or statute in some form refers to charitable use of the property in the
grant of exemption, such use is a prerequisite to exemption from taxation.[FN2] The original purpose
will not control, nor does property need not be irrevocably committed to a particular exempt purpose to
qualify for an exemption;[FN3] it is the use of the property during the current tax year for which the
assessment is made which determines the right to exemption.[FN4] Where a corporation was chartered
for charitable or benevolent purposes, a general exemption applies only to property used for the
purpose for which it was created.[FN5]
Under laws exempting property used for charitable purposes, the use made of the property is the
sole test of exemption.[FN6] Where property is not used for such purposes, it will not be exempt
although intended for future use of a charitable character,[FN7] or owned by a charitable
institution.[FN8] Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption of property used exclusively
for charitable purposes, the test of whether property is so used is the use to which it is in fact
dedicated,[FN9] or the significance of the questionable activity compared to the total activity on the
property.[FN10] "Use" is a question of fact,[FN11] and must be made on a case by case basis.[FN12]
Under such a provision it must appear that the property is so held as to be dedicated to public, instead
of private, advantage or gain, and that it is devoted to the public use.[FN13] The determination that a
religious institution owns real property does not foreclose the possibility that the property is being used
exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN14]
Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption from taxation of property "used exclusively
for charitable purposes," the use to which property is put is the criterion by which to determine
whether it is exempt from taxation,[FN15] and any institution, whether charitable or noncharitable, may
receive the tax exemption if it uses the property exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN16] Where the
use of property is wholly for the promotion and advancement of learning, science, and the useful arts,
that use is deemed charitable.[FN17]
Under laws exempting property owned by charitable institutions and used for charitable purposes,
ownership is not the sole test of exemption,[FN18] but use is the dominant factor[FN19] or
criterion[FN20] on which exemption is based, and property held by such institutions is not exempt
unless used for charitable purposes.[FN21] In such case, it is the dominant,[FN22] or immediate and
primary[FN23] use which is controlling. So, the fact that a corporation performs many charitable
functions does not render its realty exempt where the dominant use thereof is noncharitable.[FN24]
Under statutes exempting from taxation real property of a corporation organized exclusively for
charitable or benevolent purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereon one or more of such
purposes, the test of exemption is whether the property is used exclusively for carrying out thereon one
or more of the purposes of the institution's incorporation,[FN25] and in order to be exempt it is
essential that the property be in use[FN26] and be used for such purposes.[FN27]
Rental housing.
In some jurisdictions, the use of lands for private homes for individuals,[FN28] or for low-rent
housing of persons of limited income,[FN29] do not entitle the owner of the property to exemption from
the payment of real estate taxes, but in other jurisdictions housing authorities may be exempt as
charitable organizations.[FN30] The renting of property for commercial use or for the purposes of a
private dwelling is not a charitable use.[FN31]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
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To qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting land used for public, pious or charitable
purposes from property taxation, a property must be dedicated unconditionally to public use, the
primary use of the property must directly benefit an indefinite class of persons who are part of the
public, and must also confer a benefit on society as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons
directly served, and the property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. MacDonough-
Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 834 A.2d 25 (Vt. 2003).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] S.D.In re Dakota Wesleyan University, 48 S.D. 84, 202 N.W. 284 (1925).
A.L.R. Library
Tax exemption of property used by fraternal or benevolent association for clubhouse or
similar purposes, 39 A.L.R. 3d 640.
[FN2] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
Actual use
N.C.Appeal of North Carolina Forestry Foundation, Inc., 35 N.C. App. 414, 242 S.E.2d 492
(1978), review allowed, 295 N.C. 260, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978) and judgment aff'd, 296 N.C.
330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
Declaration of purpose
The use to which an institution's property is put, rather than the declaration of purpose
found in its charter or articles of incorporation, determines whether its property is exempt.
Ga.Camp v. Fulton County Medical Soc., 219 Ga. 602, 135 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
[FN3] UtahCorporation of Episcopal Church in Utah v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 919 P.2d 556
(Utah 1996).
[FN4] N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M.
114, 500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN5] N.Y.North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 422
N.Y.S.2d 1, 397 N.E.2d 693 (1979).
[FN6] Ga.Thomas v. Northeast Georgia Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, 241 Ga. 291,
244 S.E.2d 842 (1978).
Under construction
IowaSouth Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review of Cass County, 257 Iowa
1302, 136 N.W.2d 488 (1965).
Use for declared purpose of institution
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966). 001718
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[FN7] OhioZindorf v. Otterbein Press, 19 Ohio Op. 105, 6 Ohio Supp. 65, 1940 WL 316
(B.T.A. 1940), aff'd, 138 Ohio St. 287, 20 Ohio Op. 366, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941).
A.L.R. Library
Prospective use for tax-exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption, 54 A.L.R. 3d
9.
[FN8] Tex.Baptist Memorials Geriatric Center v. Tom Green County Appraisal Dist, 851
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App. Austin 1993), reh'g overruled, (May 19, 1993) and writ denied, (Nov.
3, 1993).
[FN9] Minn.Concordia College Corp. v. State, 265 Minn. 136, 120 N.W.2d 601 (1963).
[FN10] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
[FN11] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
[FN12] Colo.Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM Intern., 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997) ,
as modified on denial of reh'g, (July 28, 1997).
[FN13] S.D.Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 1137 v. Pennington County, 1997 SD 80, 566
N.W.2d 132 (S.D. 1997).
Essential government use test rejected
Vt.American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 151 Vt. 103, 557 A.2d
900 (1989).
[FN14] OhioTrue Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy, 87 Ohio St. 3d 48, 716 N.E.2d 1154
(1999).
[FN15] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
[FN16] OhioOlmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy, 77 Ohio St. 3d 393, 674 N.E.2d 690
(1997).
[FN17] OhioBattelle Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 35 Ohio Op. 9, 73 N.E.2d
88 (1947).
[FN18] Ind.Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 145 Ind. App. 522,
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
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[FN19] Mo.Franciscan Tertiary Province of Missouri, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 566
S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978).
Purpose of use
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966).
[FN20] UtahFriendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272
(1971).
[FN21] Ill.North Shore Post No. 21 of Am. Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 230 N.E.2d
833 (1967).
Seasonal use sufficient
Me.Green Acre Baha'I Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d 581 (1954).
[FN22] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
Substantial and primary use
N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M. 114,
500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN23] W.Va.Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W.
Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998).
[FN24] Ind.Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 145 Ind. App. 522,
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
[FN25] N.Y.Wantagh-Levittown Community Ambulance Corps. v. Board of Assessors of
Nassau County, 56 Misc. 2d 545, 289 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup 1968).
[FN26] N.Y.Young Women's Christian Ass'n of City of New York v. City of New York, 217
A.D. 406, 216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927).
[FN27] N.D.Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Board of County Com'rs,
Ramsey County, 219 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1974).
[FN28] OhioGoldman v. Friars Club, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 185, 48 Ohio Op. 147, 107 N.E.2d
518 (1952).
[FN29] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
[FN30] N.H.Housing Partnership v. Town of Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189
(1996).
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[FN31] UtahFriendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272
(1971).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
CJS TAXATION 334
END OF DOCUMENT71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 280
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated September 2008
State and Local Taxation
Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., and Jane E. Lehman, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.
Part Four. Exemptions from Taxation
XV. Persons, Property, and Organizations Exempt from Taxation
B. Public Bodies and Property
2. Character and Purpose of Use
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
280. Requisite that property be devoted to public use
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 213, 217
Forms
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by public body not devoted to public use. 22B Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 105.
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by private corporation but devoted to public use not exempt. 22B
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 106.
In many jurisdictions, statutory or constitutional provisions are in force exempting from taxation
property held by public bodies and devoted to public use.[FN1] In these jurisdictions, while there is
apparent authority otherwise,[FN2] the question of the exemption of property ordinarily depends upon
the use to which the property is put, rather than upon its ownership,[FN3] and property of a
municipality which is held for purely private purposes and used for profit and gain may be taxed in the
same manner as the property of individuals or private corporations.[FN4] Of course, public property is
exempt from taxation if used for a predominantly public purpose and only incidentally for a private
purpose.[FN5]
Under some authority, the property must be devoted to a governmental function.[FN6] When a state
agency acts outside its authorized governmental purposes, then its immunity from taxation is not
automatic.[FN7] Thus, where a city owned property which it leased to the United States Postal Service,
the use was not exempt as the delivery of mail laid outside the obligations of the city.[FN8]
Property owned by a municipality but devoted to a use which is entirely proprietary in its nature, or
leased to private individuals, is not public property devoted exclusively to a public purpose and may not
be exempted from taxation.[FN9] Whenever public property is used by a private citizen for a private
purpose that use prevents exemption, unless the use is incidental and de minimis.[FN10] However,
when the lease is determined to serve a public purpose, the property may remain exempt. Use of
exempt property by a private party under a lease agreement does not defeat the exemption if the
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private party's use is the public use underlying the exemption.[FN11] Thus property leased to a private
venture to establish an airport,[FN12] to provide airport parking,[FN13] to provide traveler services in
an airport,[FN14] to provide parking at a sports and entertainment complex,[FN15] for electrical
generation,[FN16] and a lease of public property pursuant to an industrial bond act[FN17] have all
been held exempt because a public purpose was served thereby.
Practice Guide: Where public property is leased to a private party for a profit making
enterprise, the test of whether the property should be taxable turns not on who the legal
owner is, but on who has the most significant incidents of legal ownership.[FN18]
Although public use does not necessarily require public access,[FN19] it is frequently observed that
a use which excludes the general public does not serve a public purpose.[FN20] This is particularly so
when use is restricted to a limited group of members.[FN21] Thus a parking lot providing free parking
only to the agency's employees did not constitute a public use.[FN22]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
City-owned ice skating rink did not qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting from taxation
any public property used exclusively for a public purpose, where ice rink was leased to ice facilities
development and management firm, which hoped to profit from its operation of ice rink, firm made
more than 57% of its income from operation of rink by private rental of rink, city agreed that
employees at rink would not be treated as public employees while lease was in effect, and under lease
firm was entitled to any tax rebates. R.C. 5709.08. Parma Hts. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 463, 2005-
Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998 (2005).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Slay v. Louisiana Energy and Power Authority, 473 So. 2d 51 (La. 1985); Columbus
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St. 3d 496, 739 N.E.2d 783 (2001).
[FN2] Town of Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 2 S.E.2d 463 (1939).
[FN3] Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Equalization of Crittenden County, 330 Ark. 767,
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sachem's Head Ass'n v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford,
190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24
N.E.2d 937, 129 A.L.R. 469 (1940); City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County,
490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437
(1994); Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976); Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. 1997); City of Harrisburg v.
School Dist. of City of Harrisburg, 551 Pa. 295, 710 A.2d 49, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 252 (1998);
Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990); International Water Co. v. Town of
Holland, 161 Vt. 584, 641 A.2d 347 (1993); State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander, 882
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN4] Robinson v. Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Mfg. Co., 128 Ark. 550, 194 S.W. 870, 3
A.L.R. 1426 (1917); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437 (1994); Interwest Aviation v.
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN5] Dade County v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973); City of
001722
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Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Whitehouse v.
Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995); International Water Co. v. Town of
Holland, 161 Vt. 584, 641 A.2d 347 (1993); State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander, 882
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN6] City of Providence v. Killoran, 447 A.2d 369 (R.I. 1982) (does not include a recreation
area).
[FN7] Delaware County Solid Waste Authority v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
534 Pa. 81, 626 A.2d 528 (1993).
[FN8] City of Oskaloosa v. Board of Review of City of Oskaloosa, 490 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa
1992).
[FN9] Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Equalization of Crittenden County, 330 Ark. 767,
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 375 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1979) (traveler
services at airport); Tri-County Public Airport Authority v. Board of County Com'rs of Morris
County, 245 Kan. 301, 777 P.2d 843 (1989); Anoka County v. City of St. Paul, 194 Minn.
554, 261 N.W. 588, 99 A.L.R. 1137 (1935); Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN10] Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995).
[FN11] Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976).
[FN12] Dade County v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973); City of
Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992) (including on-
site living quarters for airport manager).
[FN13] Matter of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981).
[FN14] Charleston County Aviation Authority v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416
(1982).
[FN15] Metropolitan Sports Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn.
1997).
[FN16] Taylor v. Davenport, 281 S.C. 497, 316 S.E.2d 389 (1984).
[FN17] Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990).
[FN18] Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222
(Utah 1987). 001723
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[FN19] City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992).
[FN20] City of Fayetteville v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 540, 899 S.W.2d 57, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 1185
(1995).
[FN21] Holiday Island Suburban Imp. Dist. No. 1 of Carroll County v. Williams, 295 Ark. 442,
749 S.W.2d 314 (1988) (use restricted to property owners in district); Sachem's Head Ass'n
v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford, 190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983)
(recreational area).
[FN22] State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Kinney, 68 Ohio St. 2d 195, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 434,
429 N.E.2d 1069, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 1265 (1981).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. Volumes 33-34B 2008 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR STATELOCL 280
END OF DOCUMENT
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From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 3/10/09 10:26 AM
To: zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org; dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 300
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated September 2008
State and Local Taxation
Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., and Jane E. Lehman, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.
Part Four. Exemptions from Taxation
XV. Persons, Property, and Organizations Exempt from Taxation
D. Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious, and Other Like Associations, Institutions, and Organizations
2. Character, Ownership, or Use of Property
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
300. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 241.1(3), 241.1(4)
A.L.R. Library
Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55
A.L.R. 3d 430.
There are basically three types of charitable exemption schemes:
1. based solely on the ownership of the property;[FN1]
2. based solely on the use of the property;[FN2]
3. a combination of ownership and use, so that the property must both be owned by a charitable
organization and used for an exempt purpose.[FN3]
Thus, ordinarily, property belonging to an institution which has been granted tax exemption is not
exempt from taxation unless such property is used for the purposes for which that institution was
established.[FN4] If use is the test, ownership alone is not sufficient.[FN5]
When use alone is the test, the character of the owner may illuminate the purposes for which the
property is used and should not be excluded from consideration.[FN6] Under the use test, when an
owner derives no income or benefit from his property, but allows another to use it for a charitable
purpose, the property is exempt.[FN7]
When both ownership and use are required, although there is authority to the contrary,[FN8] the
same entity need not be the owner and user provided that a tax exempt entity owns the property and
another entity operates it for an exempt use.[FN9] However, a private owner is not exempt merely
because he leases his property to a non-profit entity for charitable use.[FN10] 001725
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[FN1] Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club of Morristown, 124 N.J. 605, 592 A.2d 216
(1991) (for property owned by historical society).
[FN2] Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of State of Ala. v. Norred,
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992); Connolly v. County of Orange, 1 Cal. 4th 1105, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
857, 824 P.2d 663, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1089 (1992), as modified, (Mar. 26, 1992); West
Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982); Highland Park Owners, Inc. v.
Tracy, 71 Ohio St. 3d 405, 644 N.E.2d 284 (1994) (Ohio has two statutes, with more
rigorous use restrictions when the property is not owned by a charity).
[FN3] Kunes v. Samaritan Health Service, 121 Ariz. 413, 590 P.2d 1359 (1979); United
Church of Christ v. Town of West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 539 A.2d 573 (1988); York Rite
Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Board of Equalization of Chatham County, 261 Ga.
558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 849 P.2d 83 (1993); Chicago Patrolmen's
Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 215 Ill. Dec. 655, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996);
Carroll Area Child Care Center, Inc. v. Carroll County Bd. of Review, 613 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
2000); In re University of Kansas School of Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a
Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County, Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999);
Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977); City of Lewiston v.
Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209 (Me. 1996); Supervisor of Assessments of
Baltimore County v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 764 A.2d 821 (2001); Ladies Literary Club v. City
of Grand Rapids, 409 Mich. 748, 298 N.W.2d 422 (1980); Hattiesburg Area Senior Services,
Inc. v. Lamar County, 633 So. 2d 440 (Miss. 1994); United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n of Greater
Kansas City v. Ross, 789 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1990); Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of
Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999); Housing Partnership v. Town of
Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189 (1996); Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Tp., 95 N.J.
503, 472 A.2d 517, 42 A.L.R.4th 591 (1984) (for general charitable exemption); Hapletah v.
Assessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 N.Y.2d 244, 582 N.Y.S.2d 54, 590 N.E.2d 1182 (1992);
Riverview Place, Inc. v. Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448
N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989); True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino, 91 Ohio St. 3d 117, 742
N.E.2d 638 (2001); Alpha Gamma Zeta House Ass'n v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization, 1998
SD 101, 583 N.W.2d 167 (S.D. 1998); Methodist Hospitals of Memphis v. Assessment
Appeals Com'n, 669 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1984); Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v.
Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000); Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County
Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W. Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998); Deutsches Land, Inc. v.
City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN4] McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 18 S. Ct. 242, 42 L. Ed. 614 (1898); People ex rel.
Nelson v. Rockford Masonic Temple Bldg. Ass'n, 348 Ill. 567, 181 N.E. 428, 83 A.L.R. 768
(1932); Salvation Army v. Town of Standish, 1998 ME 75, 709 A.2d 727 (Me. 1998); St.
James Educational Institute v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 185, 26 N.E. 636 (1891); Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Board of County Com'rs, 122 Neb. 586, 241
N.W. 93, 81 A.L.R. 1166 (1932).
[FN5] Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary v. People of State of Illinois ex rel.
Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 23 S. Ct. 386, 47 L. Ed. 641 (1903); People ex rel. Goodman v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 388 Ill. 363, 58 N.E.2d 33, 157 A.L.R. 851 (1944); State v.
Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 20 N.W.2d 673, 168 A.L.R. 274 (1945); Riverview Place, Inc. v.
Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989);001726
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Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN6] West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982).
[FN7] Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of State of Ala. v. Norred,
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992).
[FN8] Immaculate Heart of Mary High School Inc. v. Anderson, 96 Idaho 226, 526 P.2d 831
(1974).
[FN9] Christ the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church v. Mathiesen, 81 Cal. App. 3d 355, 146
Cal. Rptr. 321 (1st Dist. 1978); Sisters of Good Shepherd of City of Washington, D.C. v.
District of Columbia, 746 A.2d 310 (D.C. 2000); In re University of Kansas School of
Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County,
Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999); St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v.
Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865, 412 N.E.2d 921 (1980); Case W. Res. Univ. v.
Tracy, 84 Ohio St. 3d 316, 703 N.E.2d 1240, 131 Ed. Law Rep. 491 (1999) (by statute);
Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v. Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000).
[FN10] Lincoln Street, Inc. v. Town of Springfield, 159 Vt. 181, 615 A.2d 1028 (1992).
Computer equipment that was owned by a credit corporation, leased to a nonprofit taxpayer,
and used for educational purposes was not exempt from property taxes. Fleet Credit Corp. v.
Frazier, 726 A.2d 452 (R.I. 1999).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. Volumes 33-34B 2008 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR STATELOCL 300
END OF DOCUMENT
84 C.J.S. Taxation 334
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated June 2008
Taxation
Francis C. Amendola, J.D., Elizabeth M. Bosek, J.D., John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Nicole Fox,
J.D., Heidi J. Henle, J.D., John Kimpflen, J.D., Anne Knickerbocker, J.D., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Stephen
Lease, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Daniel O'Brien, J.D., Kevin Schroder, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D.
IV. Exemptions
C. Particular Exemptions
4. Charitable, Educational, and Religious Institutions
b. Charitable and Benevolent Institutions
(3) Use of Property
Topic Summary References
334. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
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West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2337
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2338
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2341
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2344
Under constitutional or statutory provisions requiring, in various terms, charitable use of property in
order for it to be exempt, such use is a prerequisite to exemption. The dominant use of property is
controlling on the question of exemption.
Under a statute broadly exempting from taxation all property belonging to charitable or benevolent
institutions, such property is entitled to exemption regardless of the purposes for which it is used.[FN1]
Where, however, the constitution or statute in some form refers to charitable use of the property in the
grant of exemption, such use is a prerequisite to exemption from taxation.[FN2] The original purpose
will not control, nor does property need not be irrevocably committed to a particular exempt purpose to
qualify for an exemption;[FN3] it is the use of the property during the current tax year for which the
assessment is made which determines the right to exemption.[FN4] Where a corporation was chartered
for charitable or benevolent purposes, a general exemption applies only to property used for the
purpose for which it was created.[FN5]
Under laws exempting property used for charitable purposes, the use made of the property is the
sole test of exemption.[FN6] Where property is not used for such purposes, it will not be exempt
although intended for future use of a charitable character,[FN7] or owned by a charitable
institution.[FN8] Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption of property used exclusively
for charitable purposes, the test of whether property is so used is the use to which it is in fact
dedicated,[FN9] or the significance of the questionable activity compared to the total activity on the
property.[FN10] "Use" is a question of fact,[FN11] and must be made on a case by case basis.[FN12]
Under such a provision it must appear that the property is so held as to be dedicated to public, instead
of private, advantage or gain, and that it is devoted to the public use.[FN13] The determination that a
religious institution owns real property does not foreclose the possibility that the property is being used
exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN14]
Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption from taxation of property "used exclusively
for charitable purposes," the use to which property is put is the criterion by which to determine
whether it is exempt from taxation,[FN15] and any institution, whether charitable or noncharitable, may
receive the tax exemption if it uses the property exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN16] Where the
use of property is wholly for the promotion and advancement of learning, science, and the useful arts,
that use is deemed charitable.[FN17]
Under laws exempting property owned by charitable institutions and used for charitable purposes,
ownership is not the sole test of exemption,[FN18] but use is the dominant factor[FN19] or
criterion[FN20] on which exemption is based, and property held by such institutions is not exempt
unless used for charitable purposes.[FN21] In such case, it is the dominant,[FN22] or immediate and
primary[FN23] use which is controlling. So, the fact that a corporation performs many charitable
functions does not render its realty exempt where the dominant use thereof is noncharitable.[FN24]
Under statutes exempting from taxation real property of a corporation organized exclusively for
charitable or benevolent purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereon one or more of such
purposes, the test of exemption is whether the property is used exclusively for carrying out thereon one
or more of the purposes of the institution's incorporation,[FN25] and in order to be exempt it is
essential that the property be in use[FN26] and be used for such purposes.[FN27]
Rental housing.
In some jurisdictions, the use of lands for private homes for individuals,[FN28] or for low-rent
housing of persons of limited income,[FN29] do not entitle the owner of the property to exemption from
the payment of real estate taxes, but in other jurisdictions housing authorities may be exempt as
charitable organizations.[FN30] The renting of property for commercial use or for the purposes of a
private dwelling is not a charitable use.[FN31]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
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To qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting land used for public, pious or charitable
purposes from property taxation, a property must be dedicated unconditionally to public use, the
primary use of the property must directly benefit an indefinite class of persons who are part of the
public, and must also confer a benefit on society as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons
directly served, and the property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. MacDonough-
Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 834 A.2d 25 (Vt. 2003).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] S.D.In re Dakota Wesleyan University, 48 S.D. 84, 202 N.W. 284 (1925).
A.L.R. Library
Tax exemption of property used by fraternal or benevolent association for clubhouse or
similar purposes, 39 A.L.R. 3d 640.
[FN2] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
Actual use
N.C.Appeal of North Carolina Forestry Foundation, Inc., 35 N.C. App. 414, 242 S.E.2d 492
(1978), review allowed, 295 N.C. 260, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978) and judgment aff'd, 296 N.C.
330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
Declaration of purpose
The use to which an institution's property is put, rather than the declaration of purpose
found in its charter or articles of incorporation, determines whether its property is exempt.
Ga.Camp v. Fulton County Medical Soc., 219 Ga. 602, 135 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
[FN3] UtahCorporation of Episcopal Church in Utah v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 919 P.2d 556
(Utah 1996).
[FN4] N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M.
114, 500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN5] N.Y.North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 422
N.Y.S.2d 1, 397 N.E.2d 693 (1979).
[FN6] Ga.Thomas v. Northeast Georgia Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, 241 Ga. 291,
244 S.E.2d 842 (1978).
Under construction
IowaSouth Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review of Cass County, 257 Iowa
1302, 136 N.W.2d 488 (1965).
Use for declared purpose of institution
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966). 001729
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[FN7] OhioZindorf v. Otterbein Press, 19 Ohio Op. 105, 6 Ohio Supp. 65, 1940 WL 316
(B.T.A. 1940), aff'd, 138 Ohio St. 287, 20 Ohio Op. 366, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941).
A.L.R. Library
Prospective use for tax-exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption, 54 A.L.R. 3d
9.
[FN8] Tex.Baptist Memorials Geriatric Center v. Tom Green County Appraisal Dist, 851
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App. Austin 1993), reh'g overruled, (May 19, 1993) and writ denied, (Nov.
3, 1993).
[FN9] Minn.Concordia College Corp. v. State, 265 Minn. 136, 120 N.W.2d 601 (1963).
[FN10] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
[FN11] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
[FN12] Colo.Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM Intern., 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997) ,
as modified on denial of reh'g, (July 28, 1997).
[FN13] S.D.Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 1137 v. Pennington County, 1997 SD 80, 566
N.W.2d 132 (S.D. 1997).
Essential government use test rejected
Vt.American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 151 Vt. 103, 557 A.2d
900 (1989).
[FN14] OhioTrue Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy, 87 Ohio St. 3d 48, 716 N.E.2d 1154
(1999).
[FN15] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
[FN16] OhioOlmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy, 77 Ohio St. 3d 393, 674 N.E.2d 690
(1997).
[FN17] OhioBattelle Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 35 Ohio Op. 9, 73 N.E.2d
88 (1947).
[FN18] Ind.Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 145 Ind. App. 522,
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
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[FN19] Mo.Franciscan Tertiary Province of Missouri, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 566
S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978).
Purpose of use
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966).
[FN20] UtahFriendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272
(1971).
[FN21] Ill.North Shore Post No. 21 of Am. Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 230 N.E.2d
833 (1967).
Seasonal use sufficient
Me.Green Acre Baha'I Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d 581 (1954).
[FN22] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
Substantial and primary use
N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M. 114,
500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN23] W.Va.Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W.
Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998).
[FN24] Ind.Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 145 Ind. App. 522,
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
[FN25] N.Y.Wantagh-Levittown Community Ambulance Corps. v. Board of Assessors of
Nassau County, 56 Misc. 2d 545, 289 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup 1968).
[FN26] N.Y.Young Women's Christian Ass'n of City of New York v. City of New York, 217
A.D. 406, 216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927).
[FN27] N.D.Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Board of County Com'rs,
Ramsey County, 219 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1974).
[FN28] OhioGoldman v. Friars Club, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 185, 48 Ohio Op. 147, 107 N.E.2d
518 (1952).
[FN29] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
[FN30] N.H.Housing Partnership v. Town of Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189
(1996).
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[FN31] UtahFriendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272
(1971).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
CJS TAXATION 334
END OF DOCUMENT71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 280
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated September 2008
State and Local Taxation
Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., and Jane E. Lehman, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.
Part Four. Exemptions from Taxation
XV. Persons, Property, and Organizations Exempt from Taxation
B. Public Bodies and Property
2. Character and Purpose of Use
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
280. Requisite that property be devoted to public use
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 213, 217
Forms
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by public body not devoted to public use. 22B Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 105.
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by private corporation but devoted to public use not exempt. 22B
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 106.
In many jurisdictions, statutory or constitutional provisions are in force exempting from taxation
property held by public bodies and devoted to public use.[FN1] In these jurisdictions, while there is
apparent authority otherwise,[FN2] the question of the exemption of property ordinarily depends upon
the use to which the property is put, rather than upon its ownership,[FN3] and property of a
municipality which is held for purely private purposes and used for profit and gain may be taxed in the
same manner as the property of individuals or private corporations.[FN4] Of course, public property is
exempt from taxation if used for a predominantly public purpose and only incidentally for a private
purpose.[FN5]
Under some authority, the property must be devoted to a governmental function.[FN6] When a state
agency acts outside its authorized governmental purposes, then its immunity from taxation is not
automatic.[FN7] Thus, where a city owned property which it leased to the United States Postal Service,
the use was not exempt as the delivery of mail laid outside the obligations of the city.[FN8]
Property owned by a municipality but devoted to a use which is entirely proprietary in its nature, or
leased to private individuals, is not public property devoted exclusively to a public purpose and may not
be exempted from taxation.[FN9] Whenever public property is used by a private citizen for a private
purpose that use prevents exemption, unless the use is incidental and de minimis.[FN10] However,
when the lease is determined to serve a public purpose, the property may remain exempt. Use of
exempt property by a private party under a lease agreement does not defeat the exemption if the
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private party's use is the public use underlying the exemption.[FN11] Thus property leased to a private
venture to establish an airport,[FN12] to provide airport parking,[FN13] to provide traveler services in
an airport,[FN14] to provide parking at a sports and entertainment complex,[FN15] for electrical
generation,[FN16] and a lease of public property pursuant to an industrial bond act[FN17] have all
been held exempt because a public purpose was served thereby.
Practice Guide: Where public property is leased to a private party for a profit making
enterprise, the test of whether the property should be taxable turns not on who the legal
owner is, but on who has the most significant incidents of legal ownership.[FN18]
Although public use does not necessarily require public access,[FN19] it is frequently observed that
a use which excludes the general public does not serve a public purpose.[FN20] This is particularly so
when use is restricted to a limited group of members.[FN21] Thus a parking lot providing free parking
only to the agency's employees did not constitute a public use.[FN22]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
City-owned ice skating rink did not qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting from taxation
any public property used exclusively for a public purpose, where ice rink was leased to ice facilities
development and management firm, which hoped to profit from its operation of ice rink, firm made
more than 57% of its income from operation of rink by private rental of rink, city agreed that
employees at rink would not be treated as public employees while lease was in effect, and under lease
firm was entitled to any tax rebates. R.C. 5709.08. Parma Hts. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 463, 2005-
Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998 (2005).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Slay v. Louisiana Energy and Power Authority, 473 So. 2d 51 (La. 1985); Columbus
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St. 3d 496, 739 N.E.2d 783 (2001).
[FN2] Town of Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 2 S.E.2d 463 (1939).
[FN3] Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Equalization of Crittenden County, 330 Ark. 767,
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sachem's Head Ass'n v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford,
190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24
N.E.2d 937, 129 A.L.R. 469 (1940); City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County,
490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437
(1994); Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976); Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. 1997); City of Harrisburg v.
School Dist. of City of Harrisburg, 551 Pa. 295, 710 A.2d 49, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 252 (1998);
Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990); International Water Co. v. Town of
Holland, 161 Vt. 584, 641 A.2d 347 (1993); State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander, 882
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN4] Robinson v. Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Mfg. Co., 128 Ark. 550, 194 S.W. 870, 3
A.L.R. 1426 (1917); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437 (1994); Interwest Aviation v.
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN5] Dade County v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973); City of
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Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Whitehouse v.
Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995); International Water Co. v. Town of
Holland, 161 Vt. 584, 641 A.2d 347 (1993); State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander, 882
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN6] City of Providence v. Killoran, 447 A.2d 369 (R.I. 1982) (does not include a recreation
area).
[FN7] Delaware County Solid Waste Authority v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
534 Pa. 81, 626 A.2d 528 (1993).
[FN8] City of Oskaloosa v. Board of Review of City of Oskaloosa, 490 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa
1992).
[FN9] Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Equalization of Crittenden County, 330 Ark. 767,
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 375 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1979) (traveler
services at airport); Tri-County Public Airport Authority v. Board of County Com'rs of Morris
County, 245 Kan. 301, 777 P.2d 843 (1989); Anoka County v. City of St. Paul, 194 Minn.
554, 261 N.W. 588, 99 A.L.R. 1137 (1935); Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN10] Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995).
[FN11] Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976).
[FN12] Dade County v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973); City of
Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992) (including on-
site living quarters for airport manager).
[FN13] Matter of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981).
[FN14] Charleston County Aviation Authority v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416
(1982).
[FN15] Metropolitan Sports Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn.
1997).
[FN16] Taylor v. Davenport, 281 S.C. 497, 316 S.E.2d 389 (1984).
[FN17] Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990).
[FN18] Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222
(Utah 1987). 001734
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[FN19] City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992).
[FN20] City of Fayetteville v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 540, 899 S.W.2d 57, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 1185
(1995).
[FN21] Holiday Island Suburban Imp. Dist. No. 1 of Carroll County v. Williams, 295 Ark. 442,
749 S.W.2d 314 (1988) (use restricted to property owners in district); Sachem's Head Ass'n
v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford, 190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983)
(recreational area).
[FN22] State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Kinney, 68 Ohio St. 2d 195, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 434,
429 N.E.2d 1069, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 1265 (1981).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. Volumes 33-34B 2008 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR STATELOCL 280
END OF DOCUMENT
(C
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001735
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Close Print
i'll be right there for issakson
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 3/10/09 10:11 AM
To: coughlin@washoelegalservices.org; dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
55 A.L.R.3d 430 (Originally published in 1974)
American Law Reports
ALR3d
The ALR databases are made current by the weekly addition of relevant new cases.
Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-
exempt body
Maurice T. Brunner, LL.B.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Article Outline
Index
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
Research References
ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Preliminary Matters
1[a] IntroductionScope
1[b] IntroductionRelated matters
1[c] IntroductionClassification of exemption provisions
2 Summary and comment
II General considerations
3 Generally
4 Strict or liberal construction
5[a] Effect of lease provisionsGenerally
5[b] Effect of lease provisionsProvisions as to obligation for taxes
III Ownership as test of exemption
6 Generally; 99-year lease
7 Provisions exempting property "owned" by tax-exempt body
8 Provisions exempting property "belonging to" tax-exempt body
9 Provisions exempting property "of" tax-exempt body
10 Provisions exempting property "held" by tax-exempt body
11 Provisions exempting property "set apart for" tax-exempt purposes
12 Provisions exempting property "founded and endowed by" tax-exempt body
13 Provisions exempting "public property," "church property," etc
IV Use as test of exemption
14[a] Provisions exempting property "used for" tax-exempt purposesGenerally
14[b] Provisions exempting property "used for" tax-exempt purposesView that payment of rent
requires denial of exemption 001736
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14[c] Provisions exempting property "used for" tax-exempt purposesProvision exempting
property gratuitously occupied
15[a] Provisions exempting property but excepting therefrom property leased or used for profit
Generally
15[b] Provisions exempting property but excepting therefrom property leased or used for profit
Property not leased for profit
16 Provisions exempting property which is leased
INDEX
Ad valorem taxation property 8, 15[a]
"Belonging to" tax-exempt body 8
Business corporation 10
Charitable purposes 13, 14[a], 16
Charter exemption 6
Chattel real 6
Church property, provisions exempting 13
Classification of exemption provisions 1[c]
Comment 2
Commercial transaction 5[a], 10
Economic advantage from lease 14[b]
Educational institution 6, 11, 14[a]
Fee simple owner 6
"Founded and endowed by" tax exempt body 12
Fraternal holding corporation 14[a]
General considerations 3- 5
Good faith, release transaction entered in 3
Government, exemption of land leased to 8
Gratuitously occupied property 14
"Held by" tax-exempt body 10
Improvements 5[a], 9
Individual owners, property in name of 9
Increase in profit or benefit by owner from leased property 5[b]
Introduction 1
Lease, specific provisions of 3, 5, 16
Liberal construction 4
License fee 7
Limiting use of property 5[a]
Municipality, property leased to 4, 14
Ninety-nine year lease 6
Nominal rent 7, 10, 14[b]
Nonprofit corporation 8, 14[b], 15[b]
Obligation for taxes, provisions as to 5[b]
"Owned by" tax-exempt body 7
Ownership as test of exemption 6- 14
Particular type of exempt institution 3
Practical ownership under long term lease 9
Preliminary matters 1, 2
Private property used for public purposes 13, 14[a]
Profitable transactionm 5[a], 9, 14- 16
"Property of" tax-exempt body 9
Public corporation 9
Public property, provisions exempting 13, 14
Public service corporations 9
Real property tax paid by tenant as part of rent 5[b]
Related matters 1[b]
Religious organization 7, 14
Reserved land by Federal Government 8
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Tex
Dallas v Cochran (1914, Tex Civ App) 166 SW 32, error ref.
Wyo
Commissioners of Cambria Park v Board of County Com'rs (1946) 62 Wyo 446, 174 P2d 402.
[FN23] Havens v Alameda County (1916) 30 Cal App 206, 157 P 821; State v Chamberlain
(1893) 55 NJL 292, 26 A 913.
[FN24] Ill
People ex rel. Goodman v University of Illinois Foundation (1944) 388 Ill 363, 58 NE2d 33,
157 ALR 851
La
State ex rel. Cunningham v Board of Assessors (1898) 52 La Ann 223, 26 So 872
Minn
State v Bell (1890) 43 Minn 344, 45 NW 615
Ohio
Humphries v Little Sisters of Poor (1876) 29 Ohio St 201, supra 8 (denying exemption for
want of ownership)
Tex
Dallas v Cochran (1914, Tex Civ App) 166 SW 32, error ref.
Va
Board of Supervisors v Medical Group Foundation, Inc. (1964) 204 Va 807, 134 SE2d 258.
[FN25] Cleveland State University v Perk (1971) 26 Ohio St 2d 1, 55 Ohio Ops 2d 1, 268
NE2d 577, 55 ALR3d 422.
[FN26] Commissioners of Cambria Park v Board of County Com'rs (1946) 62 Wyo 446, 174
P2d 402.
[FN27] State v North Star Research & Development Institute (1972) 294 Minn 56, 200 NW2d
410, holding that a nonprofit corporation operating a research center, and intended to
stimulate the economy of a region by enabling small businesses to have access to a center
for research, and supported by contributions from profitmaking businesses, was not a
"corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit" so as to be liable for tax on
real estate occupied and leased by it from a public school district.
[FN28] State v North Star Research & Development Institute (1972) 294 Minn 56, 200 NW2d
410, holding that a corporation which successively leased school land for terms of 2 years
and 11 months and 2 years and 9 months without option to renew took a risk in signing
short leases and legitimately "avoided" and did not "evade" the tax imposed.
[FN29] Havens v Alameda County (1916) 30 Cal App 206, 157 P 821.
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[FN30] People ex rel. Carr v Chicago (1926) 323 Ill 68, 153 NE 725; People ex rel. Harding v
Chicago (1929) 335 Ill 450, 167 NE 79; Dallas v Cochran (1914, Tex Civ App) 166 SW 32,
error ref.
In Church of Epiphany v Raine (1889) 10 Ohio Dec Reprint 449, 21 WL Bull 180, exemption
was allowed for a house used exclusively for public worship under a perpetual lease, the
court not discussing the proviso "if not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit."
[FN31] State v Bell (1890) 43 Minn 344, 45 NW 615, supra 13.
See also State ex rel. Cunningham v Board of Assessors (1898) 52 La Ann 223, 26 So 872,
stating that there was no feature of a lease in this case.
[FN32] See Cleveland State University v Perk (1971) 26 Ohio St 2d 1, 55 Ohio Ops 2d 1, 268
NE2d 577, 55 ALR3d 422.
[FN33] Riverside Military Academy, Inc. v Watkins (1944) 155 Fla 283, 19 So 2d 870, later
app 156 Fla 398, 23 So 2d 386.
[FN34] Commissioners of Cambria Park v Board of County Com'rs (1946) 62 Wyo 446, 174
P2d 402.
[FN35] Commissioners of Cambria Park v Board of County Com'rs (1946) 62 Wyo 446, 174
P2d 402.
[FN36] State v North Star Research & Development Institute (1972) 294 Minn 56, 200 NW2d
410, stating that such a nebulous definition would result in the conclusion that for all
practical purposes, the legislature intended no exemption for such corporations.
Section 15[b] Footnotes:
[FN37] State v Chamberlain (1893) 55 NJL 292, 26 A 913 (stating that the test of exemption
is not ownership of the property, but is use and the payment of rent); Bancroft v Magill
(1903) 69 NJL 589, 55 A 103.
[FN38] People ex rel. Goodman v University of Illinois Foundation (1944) 388 Ill 363, 58
NE2d 33, 157 ALR 851 (declaring that the phrase "with a view to profit" modifies both the
word "leased" and the word "used" in the statute); Board of Supervisors v Medical Group
Foundation, Inc. (1964) 204 Va 807, 134 SE2d 258.
Section 16 Footnotes:
[FN39] Galvin v Masonic Toledo Trust (1973) 34 Ohio St 2d 157, 63 Ohio Ops 2d 242, 296
NE2d 542; Yates v Milwaukee (1896) 92 Wis 352, 66 NW 248; Milwaukee v Shoup Voting
Machine Corp. (1972) 54 Wis 2d 549, 196 NW2d 694 (charter exemption of property leased
for convenience of inhabitants of city extended to voting machines leased with option to
purchase, applying the rental payment to purchase price).
[FN40] Morgan v Watts (1970) 255 SC 212, 178 SE2d 147 (exemption of property leased to
001739
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and operated by the state Public Service Authority apparently intended to continue
exemption formerly enjoyed by property of privately owned electric cooperatives).
[FN41] Yates v Milwaukee (1896) 92 Wis 352, 66 NW 248, recognizing that for some
purposes, such as enforcement of the assessment, an assessment may be regarded as a
tax; and also holding that an amendment of the statute so as to exempt the premises from
"taxation and from any and all special taxes and assessments for the year 1891" did not
exempt the property from an assessment for an improvement constructed in the previous
year, certificate for which was issued in January of 1891, before the amendment became
effective.
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
55 A.L.R.3d 430
END OF DOCUMENT
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From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 3/10/09 10:17 AM
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Windows Live: Keep your life in sync. Check it out.
ALR
1. Comment Note: Availability of Tax Exemption to Property Held on Lease from Exempt Owner
2. Construction of Exemption of Religious Body or Society from Taxation or Special Assessment
3. Prospective Use for Tax-Exempt Purposes as Entitling Property to Tax Exemption
4. When is Property Owned by State or Local Governmental Body Put to Public Use So as to be
Eligible for Property Tax Exemption
Am.Jur.2d
5. State and Local Taxation, Public Bodies and Property, Character and Purpose of Use,
Requisite That Property be Devoted to Public Use
6. State and Local Taxation, Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious, and Other Like Associations,
Institutions, and Organizations, Character, Ownership, or Use of Property, Generally
Am.Jur. Proof of Facts
7. Violation of Restrictive Covenant
Bogerts Trusts & Trustee
8. The Administration of Charitable Trusts, Liabilities Arising from Contract or Property
Ownership
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From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 3/16/09 4:08 PM
To: zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
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1
1. In re Marriage of Nigorizawa,
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2009 WL 596736,
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and
8.1110, 8.1115), Cal.App. 2 Dist., March 10, 2009 (NO. B204900)
...re Siragusa (9th Cir.1994) 27 F.3d 406 Siragusa involved a
dissolution action that resulted in an award of alimony and a
property settlement that were reduced to a money judgment
before the husband's bankruptcy discharged his property
settlement obligations to the wife. Siragusa held that the money
judgment that resulted from the property settlement was a debt
discharged in bankruptcy (under a former version of the statute),
but alimony was not discharged under bankruptcy law and could
subsequently be modified...
...re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120 arose in the same
posture as Siragusa, in that the husband's property settlement
obligation was discharged in a bankruptcy action five years after
the settlement was entered. After discharge of the property
settlement debt, the wife obtained an order for a modification of
spousal support, and the husband appealed. The Court of Appeal
held that the family law court could not simply substitute spousal
support......
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2
2. Murphy v. Murphy,
17 Neb.App. 279, 759 N.W.2d 710, Neb.App., December 02, 2008
(NO. A-08-007)
...k. State Court Proceedings. A postbankruptcy alimony modification
violates the discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code when the
spouse seeking modification of alimony is merely attempting to
reinstate a discharged property settlement obligation, rather than
seeking a modification based on changed circumstances. [12] 51
Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities
Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(3) k.
Benefit/Detriment Analysis. Nonspousal support...
...Modification of Decree: Alimony. A postbankruptcy alimony
modification violates the discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code
when the spouse seeking modification of alimony is merely
attempting to reinstate a discharged property settlement obligation
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rather than being a modification based on changed circumstances. 8.
Bankruptcy: Debtors and Creditors: Divorce. Nonspousal support
obligations or debts incurred in the course of a marital dissolution
proceeding are not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless
discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse...
...debt that Christi was ordered to pay in the approximate amount of
$7,800. However, after the decree, Christi filed for bankruptcy and
the Citibank debt was discharged by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
Consequently, that creditor pursued Matthew, and he ultimately
settled such debt by a payment of $4,300, for which he sought
credit against child support via this modification proceeding.
Matthew had a 14-year career with the Douglas County sheriff's
office, but in February 2006, an investigation concerning......
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3
3. Wilson v. Wilson,
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 2580931, 2008 -Ohio- 3195, Ohio App. 9 Dist.,
June 30, 2008 (NO. 05CA0078)
...indebtedness on the first and second mortgage * * * [t]he court
further orders that the balance assumed is in the nature of support
or maintenance but is not modifiable absent the agreement of
the parties. The marital obligations to pay the balances [sic] is an
integral part of the support obligations imposed hereunder and
therefore these debts are not dischargable [sic] in bankruptcy
under sections 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) of the U .S. Bankruptcy
Code. The trial court adopted the......
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4
4. Yager v. Fox,
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2008 WL 2246041, Minn.App., June 03,
2008 (NO. A07-691)
...not required. See, e.g., Marden v. Marden, 546 N.W.2d 25, 27, 29
(Minn.App.1996) (stating, in the context of modifying child
support to account for a support obligor's discharge of debt in
bankruptcy which made the support recipient liable for the debt,
that [u]nder these circumstances, substantially undisputed by [the
obligor], separate findings of the children's needs appear to be
unnecessary to support the support modification); Abbott v.
Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 867-68 (Minn.App.1992) (stating, in the
context of reversing the denial, without......
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5
5. Philopena v. Philopena,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2008 WL 2252547, Conn.Super., May 13, 2008
(NO. FA074105715S)
...20, 2007 is incorporated herein and shall continue to be an
obligation of the defendant until such time as the debts involved
therein are paid in full or discharged by operation of bankruptcy
001743
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or operation of law. 5. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $1.00
per year alimony for eight years, modifiable as to amount only
when the defendant is no longer under any support obligation for
said child and/or the......
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6
6. In re Erlich,
384 B.R. 123, Bkrtcy.W.D.Pa., March 25, 2008 (NO. BK.05-37026
BM, ADV. 06-2172 BM)
...11, 2006, reducing debtor's child support obligation to $711 per
month due to the emancipation of his older daughter. The reduced
payment was for the support of his younger daughter only. The
adversary action has been tried and is now ready for decision. -
ANALYSIS - When debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code provided in part as follows: (a) A discharge
under section 727 does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt- (15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is
incurred by the debtor in the course of a......
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7
7. In re Marriage of Rathbun,
752 N.W.2d 32, 2008 WL 375447, (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, Iowa App., February 13, 2008 (NO. 07-
1225)
...reduced her work hours, citing health reasons. Sue's IPERS
retirement account was valued at $43,197. In 2006 Sue filed for
bankruptcy and discharged approximately $36,000 in debts. She
also sold her home and moved into an apartment. She claimed
monthly expenses of $2200. The district court's June 21, 2007
modification order denied James's petition but modified the
alimony so it would terminate at James's death. On June 28, 2007,
James filed a motion for enlarged or amended findings......
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8
8. Rogers v. Rogers,
51 Va.App. 261, 656 S.E.2d 436, Va.App., February 12, 2008 (NO.
0608-07-1)
...business expenses from prior year with current types of business
expenses in determining whether there was change in circumstance
warranting modification of spousal support; (2) trial court could
consider former husband's pending bankruptcy discharge that
would shift debt to wife in determining whether there was change
of circumstances warranting modification; (3) trial court could not
assume that...
...order endorsed by counsel or the parties. [3] 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
Permanent Alimony 134k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree
134k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Trial court could
consider former husband's pending bankruptcy discharge that
would shift debt to wife in determining whether there was change
001744
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of circumstances warranting modification of husband's spousal
support obligation. [4] 51 Bankruptcy 51IV Effect of Bankruptcy
Relief; Injunction and Stay 51IV(A) In General 51k 2363 Protection
Against...
...court may not order a lump sum spousal support award to
compensate a non-debtor spouse for the other spouse's discharge
of marital obligations in bankruptcy; this would re-create a debt
discharged under federal bankruptcy laws and impermissibly
intrude upon federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. [5] 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
Permanent Alimony 134k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree
134k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Where a material
change in circumstances due to bankruptcy occurs, a court may
modify a spousal support order. [6] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2
Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k 3365 Property
Distribution and Alimony, Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(2)
Property Distribution or......
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9
9. In re Munck,
Not Reported in B.R., 2007 WL 4354418, Bkrtcy.D.Kan., December
07, 2007 (NO. 02-41690)
...Child Support Services to Reopen Case to Determine
Dischargeability,FN 1 and Debtors' Motion for Show Cause Order.FN
2 YoungWilliams Child Support Services is seeking to reopen this
case, which was closed on January 27, 2006, for the purposes of
determining whether a debt owed to JoAnn McGuire FN 3 was
discharged in this bankruptcy. Debtors are seeking an order to
show cause why the West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, Bureau of Child...
...the Secretary of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services (Kansas SRS), by and through Carl G. Wheeler,
YoungWilliams Child Support Services (YoungWilliams) Staff
Attorney, moved to reopen this bankruptcy case to determine the
dischargeability of the debt owed to Ms. McGuire.FN 20 [ FN20.]
Although YoungWilliams' role and standing in this proceeding is
contested by Debtors, at a......
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10
10. In re Chiappone,
Not Reported in B.R., 2007 WL 4178510, Bkrtcy.D.Conn., November
21, 2007 (NO. 05-34871LMW, ADV.PRO. 05-3181LMW)
...account in modifying these obligations. see also Siragusa v.
Siragusa (In re Siragusa), 27 F.3d 406 (9th Cir.1994) (Alimony
modification based on debtor's discharge in bankruptcy of
approximately a $1.2 million property settlement obligation did not
violate the discharge injunction, where nothing in the record
suggested that the divorce court was attempting......
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11
11. Meeks v. Meeks,
964 So.2d 185, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1972, Fla.App. 2 Dist., August 17,
2007 (NO. 2D06-4505)
...Fla. 2d DCA 1981) Bankruptcy law concerning the dischargeability
of obligations created in dissolution of marriage judgments is
complex. The bankruptcy code allows certain debts to be
excepted from bankruptcy discharge, including some domestic
support obligations. 11 U.S.C. 523(a) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005).
Prior to the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy code, true
support obligations owing to a spouse or family member were
generally not dischargeable, but obligations relating to equitable
distribution were dischargeable......
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12
12. In re Zeitchik,
369 B.R. 900, 57 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 324, Bkrtcy.E.D.N.C., June
15, 2007 (NO. 05-09769-8-RDD, 06-00169-8-RDD-AP)
...death or remarriage, whether payments were in lump sum or
periodic, direct or indirect nature of payee, any waiver of
maintenance, whether obligations were modifiable, location of
paragraphs containing these obligations within marital settlement
agreement, and tax treatment of obligations. 11 U.S.C.(2000 Ed.)
523(a)(5) [4] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or
Separation 51k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(2......
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13
13. In re Aprea,
368 B.R. 558, Bkrtcy.E.D.Tex., April 25, 2007 (NO. 06-40493)
...441, 448 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2006) [7] In this case, the debtor used
unsecured credit to finance his living expenses prior to bankruptcy
and now seeks to discharge those debts. The debtor provides
complete or nearly complete financial support for his fiance, and
his amended Schedule J shows that he anticipates spending more
than $700 a month on food and recreation. The debtor leases a......
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14
14. In re Cavaluzzi,
364 B.R. 363, Bkrtcy.E.D.Mo., March 19, 2007 (NO. 06 4037 659, 05
60826 705)
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...Adversary No. 06-4037-659. March 19, 2007. Background Attorney
who represented Chapter 7 debtor's former wife in prepetition
child-support modification proceedings initiated by debtor, as well
as on appeal, filed adversary complaint to determine the
dischargeability of her debt for attorneys fees. Holdings The
Bankruptcy Court, Kathy A. Surratt-States , J., held that: (1)
plaintiff's attorneys fees were in the nature of maintenance and......
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15
15. Corder v. Corder,
231 S.W.3d 346, Tenn.Ct.App., November 30, 2006 (NO. W2005-
01711-COA-R3CV)
...on the advice of his attorney at the time. The parties ultimately
agreed that, if Father were not permitted to reduce his child
support payments, he owed $4,172 plus 12% statutory interest,
which Mother calculated to be $7,657.69.FN 4 [ FN4.] Father
acknowledged that he had filed bankruptcy. He said that he received
an order of discharge from bankruptcy on January 9, 2002, from
an Oregon bankruptcy court. His debts related to child support
were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Father sought to
introduce into evidence a letter from his former attorney to Mother's
attorney, dated July 9, 2001, which related to Father's reduction in
child support payments and the reasons therefor. The trial court
found that the letter constituted inadmissible hearsay and disallowed
it. Father then......
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16
16. In re Voepel,
Not Reported in B.R., 2006 WL 2686894, Bkrtcy.D.Ariz., September
18, 2006 (NO. 02:04 19548 GBN, 02:05 00133)
...any alimony or child support obligations. He does wish to
discharge non-alimony and non-support obligations created by the
amended decree. Accordingly, the alimony and child support
obligations established in the decree will not be discharged in the
bankruptcy case. Defendant's closing brief at 1. 5. Section
523(a)(15) of the bankruptcy code provides that a Chapter 7
discharge does not discharge a debt that does not constitute
alimony or support, but is incurred in the course of a divorce, unless
(A) debtor does......
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17
17. Robison v. Robison,
Not Reported in S.E.2d, 2006 WL 2251632, Va.App., August 08,
2006 (NO. 0551-06-4)
...1990) On February 14, 2005, the trial court entered an amended
decree of divorce ratifying, affirming and incorporating the parties'
amended property, custody, and support settlement agreement
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(APCSSA). The APCSSA set forth husband's obligation to repay wife
for any future settlement paid to Monarch Homes, Inc. (Monarch)
for a debt that was found non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy
petition filed by husband. Paragraph 56(G) of the APCSSA provided,
in pertinent part: In the event that Former Wife......
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18
18. House v. House,
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2006 WL 1519656, 2006 -Ohio- 2776, Ohio
App. 11 Dist., June 02, 2006 (NO. 2005-L-075)
...portion of the parties' mortgage payments during the pendency of
the divorce case was an order to pay a marital debt that should
have been discharged in bankruptcy. She also questions why the
temporary support order was not modified when she moved back
into the marital home, also during the pendency of the divorce case.
We find no abuse......
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19
19. Taylor v. Taylor,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 1391293, Conn.Super., May 02, 2006
(NO. FA000436771S)
...on marital home was intended by the parties to be in the nature of
support and maintenance, rather than a property distribution, and
thus, it was not dischargeable in bankruptcy, where the
dissolution judgment tied ex-husband's obligation to pay mortgages
to alimony by including a provision that alimony could be modified
if he failed to meet obligation, and the parties later decided that ex-
husband would make direct payments to ex...
...on the arrearage, and consider counsel fees. In view of this
conclusion, the court defers decision on the motion for
modification of alimony. [ FN1.] The defendant filed for
bankruptcy on October 11, 2005. Although recent revisions to the
bankruptcy code have changed the language of the exemption to
dischargeability for debts owed to former spouses, those
provisions of the new law apply only to cases filed on or after
October 17......
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20
20. In re Andrus,
338 B.R. 746, 55 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1266, Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich., March
14, 2006 (NO. 05-86582, 05-5863)
...Law. Bankruptcy acknowledgement in judgment of divorce, which
purported to recognize that husband, in event that he later filed for
bankruptcy relief, would not be able to discharge his alleged
non-modifiable support debt to make series of payments to his
former wife in amount that was precisely equal to net amount owed
001748
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by......
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21
21. Collett v. Collett,
270 Neb. 722, 707 N.W.2d 769, Neb., December 09, 2005 (NO. S-
04-850)
...Divorce or Separation 51k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(1) k. In General. Generally, a
bankruptcy discharge does not discharge the debtor from any
debt for a domestic support obligation. Syllabus by the Court 1.
Modification of Decree: Alimony: Appeal and Error. An appellate
court entrusts the modification of an alimony award to the
discretion of the trial court and reviews the trial court's decision de
novo on the record for...
...time of the decree, or that were accomplished by the mere
passage of time, do not justify a change or modification of an
alimony award. Pope v. Pope, supra; Desjardins v. Desjardins, 239
Neb. 878, 479 N.W.2d 451 (1992) Shan characterizes the change in
circumstances upon which the modification order was based as the
bankruptcy discharge of the First National Bank debt and the
impact of that discharge on Kimberly. Brief for appellant at 12.
Shan argues that these circumstances were within...
...distinguishable from In re Fluke, 305 B.R. 635 (Bkrtcy.D.Del.2004)
, in that the original decree did include an award of alimony and
the postbankruptcy modification of that award was sought on the
basis of a material change in circumstances. Other courts addressing
this scenario have rejected arguments that modification of
alimony is merely a repackaging of debts discharged in
bankruptcy and thus prohibited by federal law, if the party seeking
modification is able to demonstrate an actual change in financial......
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22
22. Casey v. Casey,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2005 WL 1971887, Conn.Super., July 27, 2005
(NO. FA010342634S)
...of the property orders entered in subparagraphs N, O, and P. It is
the intent of this order that a discharge in bankruptcy by the
plaintiff does not constitute payment of the property orders and
that such a discharge would constitute a substantial change in
circumstances for which the defendant would have the right to seek
a modification of the alimony order. This order terminates upon
the death of the plaintiff or the defendant or upon the remarriage of
the defendant......
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23. Reineke v. Reineke,
699 N.W.2d 859, 2005 ND 132, N.D., July 13, 2005 (NO. 20050006)
001749
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23
...Background: In proceedings for divorce, the District Court Burleigh
County South Central Judicial District Bruce A. Romanick , J.,
entered second amended judgment increasing wife's spousal
support award. Wife appealed. Holdings: The Supreme Court
VandeWalle , C.J., held that: (1) remand was required to permit
reconsideration of amount and duration of modification of spousal
support incident to husband's discharge of mortgage debt in
bankruptcy, and (2) trial court was not required, on remand, to
reconsider case law guidelines applicable to awards and
modifications of spousal support. Reversed and remanded.
Sandstrom , J., concurred in result. West Headnotes [1] 134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
Permanent Alimony 134k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree
134k 245(1) k. Power and Authority. District court has continuing
jurisdiction to modify a spousal support arrangement. N.D.C.C. 14-
05-24.1 [2] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or
Separation 51k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(1) k. In General...
...wife's appeal from trial court's amendment of judgment in action
for divorce, to permit reconsideration of amount and duration of
modification of former husband's spousal support obligation
incident to his discharge of mortgage debt in bankruptcy, as well
as explanation of court's rationale, where increase in payments
ordered in amended judgment exceeded former husband's monthly
obligation...
...payments ultimately left former wife with deficit. [5] 134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
Permanent Alimony 134k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree
134k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Trial court was not
required, in modifying spousal support by reason of former
husband's discharge in bankruptcy of mortgage debt with readily
ascertainable value, to reconsider case law guidelines applicable to
awards and modifications of spousal support. Brenda A.
Neubauer Neubauer & Oster , Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and
appellant. Ronald K. Reineke, pro se, Mandan, N.D., defendant and
appellee. VANDE WALLE , Chief Justice. [ 1] Frances Michels
appealed a second amended judgment that increased her
spousal-support award. Michels argues the increase is insufficient
to fulfill her enhanced burden to satisfy debt discharged in
bankruptcy by her ex-husband, Ronald Reineke. We reverse the
second amended judgment and remand for further proceedings to
reconsider the......
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24
24. In re Henderson,
324 B.R. 302, Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky., April 11, 2005 (NO. 04-1016, 03-
11535)
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...254(2) k. Modification or Vacation. Kentucky domestic relations law
limits the circumstances under which a divorce decree provision on
maintenance and property dispositions may be modified. KRS
403.250 [2] 51 Bankruptcy 51I In General 51I(C) Jurisdiction 51k
2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or Concurrent Jurisdiction 51k 2060 1 k.
In General. While the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine issues of dischargeability under the discharge exception
for nonsupport divorce debt, including a determination of what is in
the nature of a property settlement or in the nature of maintenance,
alimony......
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25
25. Casey v. Casey,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2595842, Conn.Super., October 18,
2004 (NO. FA01-0342634S)
...of the property orders entered in subparagraphs N, O, and P. It is
the intent of this order that a discharge in bankruptcy by the
plaintiff does not constitute payment of the property orders and
that such a discharge would constitute a substantial change in
circumstances for which the defendant would have the right to seek
a modification of the alimony order. This order terminates upon
the death of the plaintiff or the defendant or upon the remarriage of
the defendant......
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26
26. Koropatkin v. Koropatkin,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2442408, Conn.Super., October 06,
2004 (NO. FA990720780)
...an alimony order. Soon after the defendant's Motion to Modify was
denied, he took the extraordinary step of filing for bankruptcy and
attempting to discharge that debt by naming the defendant as a
creditor.FN 1 The defendant's failure to meet the payments ordered
in the original dissolution judgment has caused a substantial change
in the parties' circumstances warranting a modification of the
$1.00 per year alimony. This the parties have stipulated to. The
defendant has continued to pay the plaintiff's health and automobile
insurance. He has......
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27
27. Mijango v. Mijango,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2361789, Conn.Super., September
28, 2004 (NO. FA030349577S)
...the event the plaintiff does not pay the $25,000 as ordered. It is
the intent of this order that a discharge in bankruptcy by the
plaintiff does not constitute the payment of the $25,000 property
order and that such a discharge would constitute a substantial
change in circumstances for which the defendant would have the
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right to seek a modification of the alimony order. D. BY WAY OF
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT 1. The court enters an order of joint
physical custody of the......
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28
28. Mijango v. Mijango,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2439722, Conn.Super., September
28, 2004 (NO. FA030349577S)
...the event the plaintiff does not pay the $25,000 as ordered. It is
the intent of this order that a discharge in bankruptcy by the
plaintiff does not constitute the payment of the $25,000 property
order and that such a discharge would constitute a substantial
change in circumstances for which the defendant would have the
right to seek a modification of the alimony order. D. BY WAY OF
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT 1. The court enters an order of joint
physical custody of the......
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29
29. Braswell v. Braswell,
881 So.2d 1193, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D2070, Fla.App. 3 Dist.,
September 15, 2004 (NO. 3D02-2993, 3D02-2853, 3D03-1615)
...$23 million to be in the nature of support for purposes of an
injunction, it would not deem the payments support for purposes
of modification. [9] [10] Another characteristic to consider is that
support is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, while obligations
under a property settlement agreement may be dischargeable.
See De Lapouyade v. De Lapouyade, 711 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA
1998) Here, paragraph 13 of the parties......
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30
30. In re Skaja,
313 B.R. 198, W.D.Tex., August 16, 2004 (NO. SA-03-CA-1221-XR)
...was suffering from no physical ailments, and ex-wife's need to
have debtor make such payments in order to avoid reduction in
assets available for her support. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
523(a)(5) [12] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or
Separation 51k 3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions
51k 3367(1) k. In General. (Formerly 51k3348.5 Statutory......
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31
31. Birt v. Birt,
208 Ariz. 546, 96 P.3d 544, Ariz.App. Div. 1, August 12, 2004 (NO.
1CA-CV 03-0258)
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...change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in
alimony). 28 State and federal courts have held that a
bankruptcy discharge of debts allocated in part to one of the
parties to the divorce can constitute a change of circumstances to
permit a modification of the property allocation, alimony and child
support. Alyson F. Finkelstein, A Tug of War: State Divorce Courts
Versus Federal Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts Resulting from
Divorce, 18...
...v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 440-41 (Minn.App.1987) (discharge
amounted to change of circumstances permitting state court to
modify maintenance and child support awards); In re Marriage
of Beardslee, 922 P.2d at 1131-33 (court could modify property
allocation after bankruptcy discharge). 29 Consistent with this
view, the Ninth Circuit held that when an ex-husband obtained a
bankruptcy discharge of......
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32
32. Riebe v. Riebe,
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2004 WL 1095024, Minn.App., May 18,
2004 (NO. A03-1388)
...marriage dissolution judgment proceeding, pro se appellant
appears to seek relief from the district court's order denying his
motion for modification of his maintenance obligation because he
claims he is unable to pay and because the bankruptcy court
discharged his debts. Appellant also alleges unspecified procedural
irregularities in the district court proceedings. Because the district
court did not commit procedural errors...
...incarcerated during that time. While incarcerated, he injured his
shoulder and knee. Since his release, appellant has made only one
maintenance payment, and he moved to modify the
maintenance order on the grounds that his debts to respondent
had been discharged in bankruptcy and that his physical disability
prevented him from paying maintenance. He submitted a report from
an orthopedic surgeon indicating that......
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33
33. In re Marriage of Koedam,
680 N.W.2d 377, 2004 WL 242908, (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, Iowa App., February 11, 2004 (NO. 03-
0084)
...Vault Company and now owns and operates it. Following
dissolution of the parties' marriage each party separately sought and
secured discharge in bankruptcy of their extensive personal
debts, largely credit card debts. Their pre-trial stipulation in this
modification action, relied on by the trial court in modifying child
support, shows that Christine's net monthly income is about $2,115
and Scott's is about $1,806. Christine is engaged to marry Jason......
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34
34. In re Fluke,
305 B.R. 635, 51 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1042, Bkrtcy.D.Del., February
10, 2004 (NO. 00-01364 PJW)
...obligation was discharged. Id. He paid the alimony judgment but
she filed a motion in divorce court to have the property settlement
modified, citing the discharge of the property settlement in
bankruptcy as a changed circumstance. Id. The alimony
modification was granted and the husband was required to pay
$7,500 per month until the wife remarried or the death of...
...made by the bankruptcy court in In re Ladak: We caution against
reading our holding as a case where the discharge of debts in
bankruptcy may prohibit a state court from modifying a divorce
decree concerning spousal maintenance or child support because
of a material change in circumstances. There is no ongoing
maintenance obligation flowing from Debtor to Respondent to
modify here. 205 B.R. at 712 ORDER For the reasons set forth in
the Court's Memorandum Opinion of this date, Charles......
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35
35. In re Whitnall,
305 B.R. 854, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-1381, Bkrtcy.E.D.Wis., January
16, 2004 (NO. 02-31285-JES, 02-2430)
...Internal Revenue Code has elements of maintenance in[sic] a
property division, but avoids some of the pitfalls of both.
Maintenance is amendable based upon a change of
circumstances. Property divisions are dischargeable in
bankruptcy. This is allowed by the Internal Revenue Code and is a
combination of maintenance and property division which eliminates
both......
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36
36. Shiever v. Allen,
60 Mass.App.Ct. 1104, 799 N.E.2d 158, (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, 2003 WL 22801588, Mass.App.Ct.,
November 25, 2003 (NO. 01-P-1777)
...because the husband's income and the children's needs had
increased, there was no material change in circumstances which
warranted a reduction in the husband's child support obligation
(A.I-6). The husband did not appeal from that judgment (see docket
entries). On August 25, 1999, the wife filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Massachusetts, and discharged $62,999.80 in personal debt (A.I-
29, 31), including the wife's October 2, 1998, obligations with
respect to the marital debt. On August 8, 2000...
...alleging, as changes in circumstances, the wife's remarriage and
the benefit she receives from her new spouse's income, and the
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discharge in bankruptcy of the wife's personal debt (A.I-23-
25).FN 1 The husband requested that his support obligation be
reduced from $600 a week to $232.56 a week due to [the wife's]
decreased debt and subsequent significant increase in...
...the husband framed in his notice of appeal the issue to be
considered by this court with respect to the modification action:
Reduction in child support for the plaintiff Alan Shiever on the
basis of: (1.) Uvonne (Shiever) Allen's marriage to Ronald Allen;
(2.) Uvonne (Shiever) Allen's discharge in bankruptcy including
elimination of $26,353.68 representing her 50% marital debt liability
per the Judgment of October 2, 1998 and the $62,999.80 of total
debt; (3.) Uvonne (Shiever) Allen's current......
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37
37. In re Brown,
302 B.R. 637, Bkrtcy.N.D.Iowa, November 24, 2003 (NO. 01-9181-C,
01-02347-C)
...51k3348.5 Inability to pay exists, of kind sufficient to permit the
discharge of divorce-related debt not in nature of support, if
excepting debt from discharge would reduce debtor's income to
below a level necessary for support of debtor and debtor's
dependents. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(15)(A) [8] 51
Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities
Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(2) k.
Ability to......
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38
38. In re Retort,
300 B.R. 411, Bkrtcy.W.D.Pa., October 23, 2003 (NO. 01-23056 BM)
...not sign agreement until months after attorney had begun
providing such services; and (2) debtor's obligation to attorney was
postpetition debt, of kind that was not discharged. Vacated West
Headnotes [1] 51 Bankruptcy 51VII Claims 51VII(E) Determination
51k 2921 k. In General. Attorney who had represented Chapter 7
debtor at child support modification hearing had valid claim
against debtor for legal fees owing under terms of attorney fee
contract between them, though debtor......
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39
39. Atwater v. Delaine,
155 Ohio App.3d 93, 799 N.E.2d 216, 2003 -Ohio- 5501, Ohio App. 8
Dist., October 16, 2003 (NO. 82191)
...the trial court erred in issuing its order clarifying an earlier order
because the clarifying order had the effect of modifying the
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spousal support provision of the divorce decree, a provision that
the parties had agreed, and the court ordered, unmodifiable. { 13}
Our conclusion today does not jeopardize the authority of the
bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of Danny's
debt to Michele under Section 523(a)(5), Title 11, U.S.Code. Under
that provision, support obligations owed to a former spouse......
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40
40. Hendricks v. Hendricks,
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2003 WL 21911163, Minn.App., August 12,
2003 (NO. C2-02-2101, C2-02-2132)
...$2,424.88. The decree also provided that [n]either party shall
discharge in bankruptcy his or her obligation to * * * pay joint
debts. * * * Should either party discharge in bankruptcy * * *
any joint debt of the parties assumed by one of the parties, such
discharge shall constitute a basis upon which the other party may
move the court to modify the maintenance provision (if any)
and/or seek an additional property award if that party is held liable
for the discharged debt......
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41
41. In re Marriage of Knopff,
Not Reported in P.3d, 118 Wash.App. 1002, 2003 WL 21907639,
Wash.App. Div. 1, August 11, 2003 (NO. 51093-2-I)
...expenses paid by the father. The automatic stay in bankruptcy
does not apply, however, to proceedings for the establishment or
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance or support.
11 U.S.C. sec. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) And bankruptcy does not
discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such
spouse......
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42
42. In re Ingalls,
297 B.R. 543, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., August 04, 2003 (NO. 02-72357, 02-
7186)
...that is not in nature of support will be dischargeable, on inability-
to-pay theory, if payment of debt would reduce debtor's income
below that necessary for support of debtor and debtor's
dependents. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(15)(A) [19] 51
Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities
Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(2) k.
Ability to Pay. (Formerly 51k3348.5......
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43
43. In re Cunningham,
294 B.R. 724, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., May 29, 2003 (NO. 02-92319, 02-9077)
...Bankruptcy No. 02-92319. Adversary No. 02-9077. May 29, 2003.
Chapter 7 debtor brought adversary proceeding for determination of
dischargeability of his obligation to former spouse. The
Bankruptcy Court, Gerald D. Fines , Chief Judge, held that portion
of judgment debt which represented Chapter 7 debtor's arrearage
under child support order entered by divorce court, as modified by
later state court order, was nondischargeable in bankruptcy as being
in nature of support, notwithstanding that, at time judgment......
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44
44. In re Blair,
291 B.R. 514, 175 Ed. Law Rep. 270, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3101,
2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3958, 9th Cir.BAP (Ariz.), March 27, 2003
(NO. 01-02315-PHX-GBN, AZ-02-1168-RYPB, 01-00147-PHX)
...Because we are reversing the Order on other grounds, we need
not reach this issue. Further, ECMC contends that the bankruptcy
court's partial discharge was improper because it arbitrarily
reduced the Debts. While we do not reach that issue here, we
agree that the Record does not show sufficient analysis to support
the 50% reduction of the Debts. See Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438 The
undue hardship exception in 523(a)(8) requires the bankruptcy
court to discharge only that portion of the debt that would
otherwise impose undue hardship. We recognize that by accepting a
bankruptcy court's equitable power to grant a partial......
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45
45. Loveday v. Loveday,
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 1465770, 2003 -Ohio- 1431, Ohio
App. 7 Dist., March 24, 2003 (NO. 02 BA 13)
...The Common Pleas Court, Belmont County, overruled her
objections and denied her motions to hold husband in contempt and
to modify spousal support. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals
DeGenaro , J., held that wife's failure to appear at husband's
bankruptcy proceedings did not waive her ability to challenge
dischargeability of husband's marital debts in subsequent
proceeding in domestic court. Reversed and remanded. West
Headnotes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property...
...her objections to a magistrate's decision and denied her motions
to hold Defendant-Appellee, Gary Loveday, in contempt and to
modify the award of spousal support. That decision also overruled
Gary's motion to hold Vicki in contempt. The trial court found Vicki's
failure to challenge the dischargeability of certain marital debts in
Gary's bankruptcy proceedings prevented her from challenging the
dischargeability of those debts in a later proceeding in state court.
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46
46. Benjamin v. Benjamin,
858 So.2d 270, Ala.Civ.App., March 21, 2003 (NO. 2010892)
...all of her expenses and repay the loan. The wife correctly notes
that this court has held that a husband's discharge in bankruptcy
of an alimony-in-gross award and the marital debts he was required
to assume pursuant to the divorce judgment can be a material
change of circumstances warranting a modification of periodic
alimony. See Thornburg v. Thornburg, 628 So.2d 885, 887
(Ala.Civ.App.1993) see also Smith v. Smith, 741 So.2d 420......
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47
47. In re Bucher,
289 B.R. 699, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., February 12, 2003 (NO. 02-7221, 02-
73165)
...show an inability to pay divorce-related debt not in nature of
support, by demonstrating that payment of debt would reduce
debtor's income below that necessary for support of debtor and
his/her dependents, then court's inquiry is at an end, and debt is
discharged. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(15)(A) [3] 51
Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities
Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(3......
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48
48. In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague,
105 Cal.App.4th 215, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv.
285, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 323, Cal.App. 4 Dist., January 09,
2003 (NO. G030108)
...added.) In In re Siragusa, supra, 27 F.3d 406, the wife filed a
motion in state court to have alimony modified based upon her
ex-husband's prior bankruptcy discharge of a property
settlement obligation. Id. at p. 407.) The husband's bankruptcy
had been discharged and no bankruptcy proceeding was pending
when the wife filed the state court motion. After the state court
modified alimony, the husband filed a new complaint in
bankruptcy court alleging the modification violated the standing
injunction of title 11 United States Code section 524 , which prohibits
creditors from attempting to collect debts that were discharged in
bankruptcy. Ibid. The bankruptcy court dismissed the husband's
complaint, deferring, in the interest of comity, to the state court's
determination on......
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49
49. In re Gilpin,
287 B.R. 921, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., December 26, 2002 (NO. 02-72247, 02-
7160)
...Marital debt not in nature of support will be dischargeable on
inability to pay theory, if paying the debt would reduce debtor's
income below that necessary for support of debtor and debtor's
dependents. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(15)(A) [5] 51
Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities
Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(2) k.
Ability to Pay. (Formerly 51k3348.5......
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50
50. In re McKinnis,
287 B.R. 245, Bkrtcy.E.D.Mo., December 06, 2002 (NO. 01-4375-
293, 01-49642-293)
...of necessities, where debtor-husband had significantly greater
earning capacity at time of parties' divorce, and wife had agreed to
reduction in debtor's maintenance and child support payments
in exchange for his assuming responsibility for marital debts.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5) [11] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2
Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k 3366 k. Effect of State
Law. (Formerly 51k3349 Determination of whether obligation
contained in......
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From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 3/16/09 4:13 PM
To: zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
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1
1. N.R.S. 125.150
West's Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated Title 11. Domestic
Relations Chapter 125. Dissolution of Marriage Divorce 125.150.
Alimony and adjudication of property rights; award of attorney's fee;
subsequent modification by court
...denied. Divorce 247 District court may consider spouse's
discharged property settlement obligation as changed circumstance
in ruling on motion for modification of alimony; modification of
alimony award based on discharged property settlement obligation
does not recreate debt discharged under federal bankruptcy
laws. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5) Siragusa v. Siragusa,
1992, 843 P.2d 807, 108 Nev. 987 rehearing...
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2
2. In re Siragusa,
27 F.3d 406, 31 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 890, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,965,
C.A.9 (Nev.), June 20, 1994 (NO. 92-16788)
...No. 92-16788. Argued and Submitted March 18, 1994. Decided
June 20, 1994. Debtor brought action claiming that state court's
modification of alimony based on Bankruptcy Court's discharge
of property settlement violated discharge injunction. The United
States District Court for the District of Nevada Lloyd D. George ,
Chief Judge, affirmed the bankruptcy court's...
...In General 51 k 2363 Protection Against Discrimination or
Collection Efforts in General; Fresh Start. 51 k 2364 k. Discharge
as Injunction. Alimony modification based on debtor's discharge
in bankruptcy of approximately $1.2 million property settlement
obligation did not violate discharge injunction, where nothing in
record suggested that divorce court was attempting to reinstate
property...
...court stayed enforcement of the judgment for one week, and in
the interim, Dr. Siragusa filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition for the primary purpose of obtaining a discharge of the
approximately $1.2 million still owed on the property settlement.
Under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5) , alimony debts are not
dischargeable. Therefore, the bankruptcy court required Dr.
Siragusa to pay Ms. Siragusa $7,500 a month until the alimony
arrearages that had been reduced to judgment in state court were
paid. However, because debts stemming from property
settlements are dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
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727 , on May 4, 1988, the bankruptcy court discharged Dr.
Siragusa's property settlement obligation. Dr. Siragusa paid off the
alimony arrearages as scheduled and one day prior to the final
payment date, on August 31, 1990, Ms. Siragusa filed a motion in
divorce court to have the alimony modified, citing the discharge
of the property settlement in bankruptcy as a changed
circumstance. A Nevada divorce court referee granted the alimony
modification, ordering Dr. Siragusa to pay his ex-wife $7,500 per
month until the earlier of Ms. Siragusa's remarriage or the...
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3
3. In re Marriage of Nigorizawa,
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2009 WL 596736,
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and
8.1110, 8.1115), Cal.App. 2 Dist., March 10, 2009 (NO. B204900)
...re Siragusa (9th Cir.1994) 27 F.3d 406 Siragusa involved a
dissolution action that resulted in an award of alimony and a
property settlement that were reduced to a money judgment
before the husband's bankruptcy discharged his property
settlement obligations to the wife. Siragusa held that the money
judgment that resulted from the property settlement was a debt
discharged in bankruptcy (under a former version of the statute),
but alimony was not discharged under bankruptcy law and could
subsequently be modified...
...re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120 arose in the same
posture as Siragusa, in that the husband's property settlement
obligation was discharged in a bankruptcy action five years after
the settlement was entered. After discharge of the property
settlement debt, the wife obtained an order for a modification of
spousal support, and the husband appealed. The Court of Appeal
held that the family law court could not simply substitute spousal
support...
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4
4. In re Voepel,
Not Reported in B.R., 2006 WL 2686894, Bkrtcy.D.Ariz., September
18, 2006 (NO. 02:04 19548 GBN, 02:05 00133)
...any alimony or child support obligations. He does wish to
discharge non-alimony and non-support obligations created by the
amended decree. Accordingly, the alimony and child support
obligations established in the decree will not be discharged in the
bankruptcy case. Defendant's closing brief at 1. 5. Section
523(a)(15) of the bankruptcy code provides that a Chapter 7
discharge does not discharge a debt that does not constitute
alimony or support, but is incurred in the course of a divorce, unless
(A) debtor does...
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5
5. Birt v. Birt,
208 Ariz. 546, 96 P.3d 544, Ariz.App. Div. 1, August 12, 2004 (NO.
1CA-CV 03-0258)
001761
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...change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in
alimony). 28 State and federal courts have held that a
bankruptcy discharge of debts allocated in part to one of the
parties to the divorce can constitute a change of circumstances to
permit a modification of the property allocation, alimony and child
support. Alyson F. Finkelstein, A Tug of War: State Divorce Courts
Versus Federal Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts Resulting from
Divorce, 18...
...v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 440-41 (Minn.App.1987) (discharge
amounted to change of circumstances permitting state court to
modify maintenance and child support awards); In re Marriage
of Beardslee, 922 P.2d at 1131-33 (court could modify property
allocation after bankruptcy discharge). 29 Consistent with this
view, the Ninth Circuit held that when an ex-husband obtained a
bankruptcy discharge of...
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6
6. In re Marriage of Knopff,
Not Reported in P.3d, 118 Wash.App. 1002, 2003 WL 21907639,
Wash.App. Div. 1, August 11, 2003 (NO. 51093-2-I)
...expenses paid by the father. The automatic stay in bankruptcy
does not apply, however, to proceedings for the establishment or
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance or support.
11 U.S.C. sec. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) And bankruptcy does not
discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse...
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7
7. In re Blair,
291 B.R. 514, 175 Ed. Law Rep. 270, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3101,
2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3958, 9th Cir.BAP (Ariz.), March 27, 2003
(NO. 01-02315-PHX-GBN, AZ-02-1168-RYPB, 01-00147-PHX)
...Because we are reversing the Order on other grounds, we need
not reach this issue. Further, ECMC contends that the bankruptcy
court's partial discharge was improper because it arbitrarily
reduced the Debts. While we do not reach that issue here, we
agree that the Record does not show sufficient analysis to support
the 50% reduction of the Debts. See Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438 The
undue hardship exception in 523(a)(8) requires the bankruptcy
court to discharge only that portion of the debt that would
otherwise impose undue hardship. We recognize that by accepting a
bankruptcy court's equitable power to grant a partial...
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8
8. In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague,
105 Cal.App.4th 215, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv.
285, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 323, Cal.App. 4 Dist., January 09,
2003 (NO. G030108)
...added.) In In re Siragusa, supra, 27 F.3d 406, the wife filed a
motion in state court to have alimony modified based upon her
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ex-husband's prior bankruptcy discharge of a property
settlement obligation. Id. at p. 407.) The husband's bankruptcy
had been discharged and no bankruptcy proceeding was pending
when the wife filed the state court motion. After the state court
modified alimony, the husband filed a new complaint in
bankruptcy court alleging the modification violated the standing
injunction of title 11 United States Code section 524 , which prohibits
creditors from attempting to collect debts that were discharged in
bankruptcy. Ibid. The bankruptcy court dismissed the husband's
complaint, deferring, in the interest of comity, to the state court's
determination on...
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9
9. In re Marriage of Lynn,
101 Cal.App.4th 120, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611, 02 Cal. Daily Op. Serv.
7408, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9320, Cal.App. 5 Dist., August 13,
2002 (NO. F038161)
...marital settlement agreements (MSAs) upon discharge of
obligations thereunder in bankruptcy was inapplicable; (2) trial court
abused its discretion in modifying support without considering all
relevant factors; and (3) trial court abused its discretion in directing
former husband to pay former wife's attorney fees without
considering statutory factors. Reversed
West Headnotes [1] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts
Arising from Divorce or Separation 51 k 3365 Property Distribution
and Alimony, Maintenance, or Support...
...to her. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 524 [4] 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k 230
Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Court in a
dissolution action may consider the discharge in bankruptcy of
one spouse's property settlement debt as a factor in determining
whether to modify that spouse's support obligation. [5] 134
Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k
255 k. Conclusiveness of Adjudication. (Formerly 134k11.5 205...
...of marital settlement agreements (MSAs) upon discharge of
obligations thereunder in bankruptcy did not apply to former wife's
request for modification of spousal support to recover amount of
property settlement discharged in former husband's bankruptcy,
where parties' MSA did not include spousal support provision. West's
Ann.Cal.Fam.Code 3592 [12] 134 Divorce 134V Alimony,
Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k 230 Permanent
Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree 134 k
245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Trial court was not required
to disregard discharge in bankruptcy of former husband's
property settlement debt to former wife in determining former
husband's obligation to pay spousal support merely because statute
governing modification of marital settlement agreement (MSA)
upon discharge of obligation thereunder in bankruptcy did not apply
to spousal support under facts...
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10
10. Lee v. Lee,
996 P.2d 389, 2000 MT 67, Mont., March 16, 2000 (NO. 98-716)
...former wife for marital property she sold after it had been
awarded to husband in dissolution decree did not retroactively
modify former husband's accrued maintenance obligation; (5)
district court could require former wife to reimburse former husband
for joint credit card debts, even though those debts had been
discharged as to former wife in bankruptcy proceeding; (6)
former wife was not entitled to offset against amount she owed
husband $5,000 received by husband in settlement...
...the maintenance awarded to her under the 1996 decree, and is
not precluded from bringing a timely action to upwardly modify this
maintenance as expressly provided in the 1996 decree. 51
Further, the District Court offset Lee's obligation to pay joint credit
card debts, which resulted from the discharge of these debts in
Johnson's bankruptcy proceedings. The court added $3,055 to the
judgment in Lee's favor. Lee contends this offset was proper, due to
the...
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11
11. In re Cervantes,
229 B.R. 19, Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,907, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 748,
98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 993, 3 Cal. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 62, 9th Cir.BAP
(Cal.), December 31, 1998 (NO. 97-5046, NC-97-1822-RYKME, 96-
56831-JRG)
...that had accrued at time assignment was executed; assigned
support rights became obligation owed to state by individual
responsible for support. Social Security Act, 456(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 656(a) ; 402(a)(26), as amended, 42
U.S.C.(1994 Ed.) 602(a) (26). [5] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2
Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51 k 3365 Property
Distribution and Alimony, Maintenance, or Support 51 k 3365(2)
Property Distribution or...
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12
12. Boutte v. Nears,
50 Cal.App.4th 162, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv.
7802, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,923, Cal.App. 3 Dist., October 23,
1996 (NO. C020606)
...attorney's fees were ordered as supplemental child support based
on the fact that the issue before the Court was child support
modification. DISCUSSION I Nears raises three arguments for
reversal of the court's supplemental child support order: (1) the
order, which was intended to convert a debt dischargeable in
bankruptcy (attorney fees) into a nondischargeable debt (child
support), was an impermissible attempt by a state court to
circumvent federal bankruptcy law (see In re Marriage of...
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13
13. Siragusa v. Siragusa,
108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,035, Nev.,
December 03, 1992 (NO. 22043)
...Court held that: (1) district court's order adopting domestic
relations referee's recommendation is appealable; (2) district court
had jurisdiction to modify alimony award; and (3) husband's
property settlement obligation that had been discharged in
bankruptcy could be considered as changed circumstance in
ruling on motion for modification of alimony. Affirmed
West Headnotes [1] 134 Divorce 134IV
Proceedings 134IV(O) Appeal 134 k 179 k. Presentation and
Reservation in Lower Court...
...247 k. Commencement and Termination. Judgment for alimony
arrearages extends supporting spouse's alimony obligations for
period of judgment, and these alimony obligations are modifiable
until expiration of term specified in judgment. [6] 51 Bankruptcy
51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)1
In General 51 k 3342 k. Effect of State Law in General.
Determination of whether obligation is dischargeable in...
...Rights of Parties. District court may consider spouse's discharged
property settlement obligation as changed circumstance in ruling
on motion for modification of alimony; modification of alimony
award based on discharged property settlement obligation does not
recreate debt discharged under federal bankruptcy laws.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5) Graziadei & Cantor , Las Vegas,
for appellant. Shinehouse & Duesing Joshua Landish , Las Vegas...
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14
14. In re Hutchins,
113 B.R. 1, Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., April 10, 1990 (NO. SB 89-06418 DN,
SB 89-0419 DN)
...discharged as to the supporting spouse and Debtor David M.
Hutchins. However, she has at least two alternatives: (1) declare
bankruptcy herself to discharge the debts; and/or (2) seek a
modification of the periodic support obligations for the future so
that the state court can rectify any disadvantages she has suffered
because of the changes...
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15
15. In re Marriage of Jones,
242 Mont. 119, 788 P.2d 1351, Mont., March 19, 1990 (NO. 89-429)
...and Cross-Appellant. No. 89-429. Submitted on Briefs Dec. 21,
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1989. Decided March 19, 1990. Action was brought to modify
former husband's maintenance obligation. The Fourth Judicial
District Court, Missoula County John Henson , J., awarded spousal
maintenance, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Barz , J.,
held that award of maintenance to former wife, following
bankruptcy discharge of former husband's property settlement
obligation, was not abuse of discretion, notwithstanding fact that
husband had acquired new obligations since divorce. Affirmed and
remanded...
...See also 97 B.R. 36 West Headnotes [1] 134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k 230
Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(3) k. Application, Bill, or Petition, and Hearing
Thereof. Award of maintenance to former wife, following
bankruptcy discharge of former husband's property settlement
obligation, was not abuse of discretion, notwithstanding fact that
husband had acquired new obligations since divorce. [2] 134
Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k
230 Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(3) k. Application, Bill, or Petition, and Hearing
Thereof. District court was entitled to...
...failing to pay the court ordered maintenance and child support
payments. On May 22, 1989, Kenneth filed a motion for
modification of spousal maintenance after the bankruptcy court
discharged Rita's $43,594 property judgment. The District Court
entered an order dated June 13, 1989, finding in pertinent part that
Kenneth owed $8,000 in...
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16
16. In re Kullgren,
109 B.R. 949, Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., January 05, 1990 (NO. SA 88-02244
JR, SA 88-0489 JR)
...Courts; Proceedings in General 51II(C) Costs and Fees 51 k 2182
Grounds and Circumstances 51 k 2185 k. Dischargeability
Determinations; Consumer Debt Issues. Award of fees and costs to
debtors under Bankruptcy Code provision justifying such award
when unsuccessful dischargeability complaint is brought in
connection with consumer debt was warranted, where neither
original nor amended complaint showed any factual support for
filing. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(d) [6] 170A Federal Civil
Procedure 170AXX Sanctions 170AXX(B) Grounds for Imposition...
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17
17. In re Marriage of Myers,
54 Wash.App. 233, 773 P.2d 118, 58 USLW 2026, Wash.App. Div. 3,
May 23, 1989 (NO. 9097-3-III)
...230 Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Upward
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modification of ex-wife's spousal maintenance was supported by
the facts; although there was a dispute over ex-husband's earning
ability at time of dissolution, his actual income later increased and
his financial condition was also considerably improved by
bankruptcy which resulted in a discharge of many of his debts.
Jerry Sorlien, Atty. at Law, Moses Lake, for appellant. Ronald
McAdams, McAdams, Ponti & Junke, Walla Walla, for respondent.
SHIELDS, Judge. Edward R. Myers appeals a modification of
spousal maintenance in the decree of dissolution of his marriage to
Mary Jean Myers. The primary question presented is whether the
court...
...failing to comply with it. That motion was denied by the court
because Mr. Myers' obligation to pay the parties' debts was part of
the property division. Mr. Myers was discharged of the debts in
bankruptcy. Mrs. Myers then brought this motion to modify
spousal maintenance, introducing evidence of collection efforts and
lawsuits filed against her over the discharged debts. She also
introduced evidence the Buick...
...five year period for which maintenance was awarded. Mr. Myers
contends the court erred in considering any evidence relating to
debts he discharged in bankruptcy as a basis for modifying
spousal maintenance. He summarizes his argument as follows: The
ex-husband was granted relief from liability on the debts of the
parties...
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18
18. In re Edwards,
91 B.R. 95, Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., April 15, 1988 (NO. LA 86-22518-NCA,
LA 88-00139-NCA)
...violation of the supremacy clause of the constitution. It is possible
to readjust the relative position of the spouses by modification of a
spousal support order, taking into consideration the amount of
property obligations discharged by one spouse in bankruptcy.
There is nothing in the provisions of Civil Code 4812 nor in the
legislative history behind it to suggest...
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19
19. In re Marriage of Williams,
157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 203 Cal.Rptr. 909, Cal.App. 5 Dist., June 29,
1984 (NO. CIV. 7116, F000447)
...of creditor to offset mutual debt make it clear that offset cannot
be used to revive in state court proceeding debt which is already
discharged in bankruptcy; setoff provisions are applicable only in
bankruptcy court. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 524 553 [8] 134
Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k
230 Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(1) k. Power and Authority. 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property...
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...for support of spouse in event that obligations for property
settlement to spouse or support of spouse were discharged in
bankruptcy, intended to redress inequities which could result from
bankruptcy discharge of community debts assigned to one
spouse to extent it was possible to do so within limitations imposed
by supremacy of bankruptcy law, by, e.g., permitting modification
of spousal support order, but legislature did not intend to go
beyond scope of bankruptcy law to reach and modify final property
settlements...
...wife pursuant to property division of marital dissolution decree
were made periodically did not convert property division into
provision for alimony, support, or maintenance which could be
modified following wife's discharge in bankruptcy of her
corresponding debt to husband and increase in his liabilities by
discharging debts which decree ordered her to pay. Bankr.Code, 11
U.S.C.A. ...
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20
20. In re Shaver,
40 B.R. 964, D.Nev., September 30, 1983 (NO. 82-157, CV-R-83-
135-ECR, 82-192)
...In General. (Formerly 51k3348.5 51k421(5) Payments to be made
by debtor to his former wife pursuant to agreement incorporated in
amended divorce decree constituted alimony which was not
dischargeable in bankruptcy, where debt was payable in
installments over substantial period of time, obligation was to
terminate at wife's death, division of property and...
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21
21. In re Marriage of Clements,
134 Cal.App.3d 737, 184 Cal.Rptr. 756, Cal.App. 1 Dist., July 09,
1982 (NO. CIV. 48201)
...appellant. Merrill, Thiessen & Gagen, P.C., Danville, for
respondent. MILLER, Associate Justice. In this case we examine the
discharge of a debt by the federal bankruptcy court when the
bankrupt spouse was required to make payments on the
discharged obligation as part of a property settlement agreement
ordered by a state family law court. The precise question presented
by this appeal is whether the court below erred in reducing the
bankrupt spouse's monthly support to reflect payments ultimately
made on the discharged obligation by the non-bankrupt spouse
who remained personally liable on the community debt. We
conclude that no error was made. William and Marlene Clements
were married in 1955. Their marriage was dissolved by...
...William. Civ.Code, 4358.) Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act
provides that the liability of a codebtor of the bankrupt is not
discharged by the bankrupt's discharge. 11 U.S.C. 524(e).
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Because this debt had been assigned to Marlene as part of the
equal division of community property, on February 9, 1978, William
obtained an order from the trial court allowing him to reduce
Marlene's spousal support in direct proportion to the payments he
was making to C.I.T. Financial. Marlene's spousal support payments
of $1,000 per month...
...court thereupon reinstated the trial court's order allowing William
to deduct any payments made on the C.I.T. obligation from
Marlene's support. [2] [3] The Bankruptcy Act as amended in
1978 ( 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5)) and its predecessor ( 11 U.S.C.
35(a)(7))
4
provide that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all provable debts except debts due to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance
for, or support of such...
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22
22. Myhers v. Myhers,
6 Cal.App.3d 855, 86 Cal.Rptr. 356, Cal.App. 2 Dist., April 23, 1970
(NO. CIV. 35012)
...effective 1 January 1970.) Appellant argues that since the weekly
payments were non-modifiable they amounted to a division of
property and hence became a liability dischargeable in
bankruptcy. However, we see no necessary connection between
modifiability and dischargeability. Prior to entering the separation
agreement, Freda, like any wife, had a potential right to an
allowance for support and maintenance, an allowance which would
be (1) modifiable by the courts, and (2) non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Under the separation agreement she gave up her right
to a...
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23
23. Roberts v. Roberts,
261 Cal.App.2d 424, 68 Cal.Rptr. 59, Cal.App. 1 Dist., April 23, 1968
(NO. CIV.24417)
...Authority. With respect to property settlement agreements which
contain pure or severable provisions for periodic payments in the
nature of alimony, such payments may be modified by subsequent
court order and may not be discharged in bankruptcy. West's
Ann.Civ.Code, 139 ; Bankr.Act, 17, sub. a(2), 11 U.S.C.A.
35(a) (2) [2] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or
Separation 51 k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support...
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24
24. Fernandes v. Pitta,
47 Cal.App.2d 248, 117 P.2d 728, Cal.App. 3 Dist., October 09, 1941
(NO. CIV 6567)
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...Bankruptcy Act, section 35 found on pages 177 and 178 of Title
11 U.S.C.A . That section provides in part: A discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, except * * * for alimony due or to become due, or for
maintenance or support of wife or child. [2] In the Dunbar case,
supra, it was held that liability for the support and maintenance
of children, even though reduced to judgment, is not provable in a
bankrupt proceeding so as to release the debtor therefrom. This
exception to the...
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25
25. Lewis v. Roberts,
267 U.S. 467, 45 S.Ct. 357, 37 A.L.R. 1440, 69 L.Ed. 739, U.S.Ala.,
March 16, 1925 (NO. 284)
...for the support of herself and their minor children under a final
decree of absolute divorce was not a provable debt which was
released by the bankrupt's discharge. The ground of the decision
was that the court could look into the proceedings to determine the
nature of the liability which had been reduced to judgment; that a
decree awarding alimony was not in any just sense a debt which
had been put into the form of a judgment, but rather...
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26
26. Egbers v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
98 Wash. 531, 167 P. 1073, Wash., October 17, 1917 (NO. 13949)
...law gives them as against the husband and father. The foregoing
decisions hold that no allowances in the way of alimony, whether
they be subject to modification or not so subject, are barred by a
bankrupt's discharge, since they are not provable debts under
the act of 1898. The Bankruptcy Act of 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c.
487, 32 Stat. 797), which...
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what i wanted
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 3/16/09 3:58 PM
To: dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
87 A.L.R.4th 353 (Originally published in 1991)
American Law Reports
ALR4th
The ALR databases are made current by the weekly addition of relevant new cases.
Divorce: court's authority to institute or increase spousal support award after discharge of
prior property award in bankruptcy
Gavin L. Phillips, J.D.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Article Outline
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
Research References
ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Preliminary Matters
II Institution of Support Award
III Increase in Support Award
I Preliminary Matters
1[a] IntroductionScope
1[b] IntroductionRelated matters
2[a] Summary and commentGenerally
2[b] Summary and commentPractice pointers
II Institution of Support Award
3 In absence of reservation of jurisdiction by trial court
III Increase in Support Award
4 Discharge of property settlement debt to dependent spouse
5 Discharge of joint debt to third party
6 Apportionment of debt as condition for waiver of support award by dependent spouse
Research References
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
United States
11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5). See 2[b]
11 U.S.C.A. 524. See 4
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Ninth Circuit
Emelity, In re, 251 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000) 4
Tenth Circuit
Danley, In re, 14 B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1981) 2[b], 5
Alabama
Smith v. Smith, 741 So. 2d 420 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) 4
California
Clements, In re Marriage of, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1st Dist. 1982) 5
Williams, In re Marriage of, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 203 Cal. Rptr. 909 (5th Dist. 1984) 5
Indiana
Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) 2[b], 5
Minnesota
Coakley v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 87 A.L.R.4th 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 2[b], 4
Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 3
Nevada
Siragusa v. Siragusa, 108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992) 4
Rhode Island
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500 (R.I. 1985) 2[b], 3, 6
Utah
Beckstead v. Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Utah 1983) 4
Washington
Myers, In re Marriage of, 54 Wash. App. 233, 773 P.2d 118 (Div. 3 1989) 5
Wisconsin
Eckert v. Eckert, 144 Wis. 2d 770, 424 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1988) 4
Wyoming
Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1986) 2[b]
Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1994) 4
I. Preliminary Matters
1[a] IntroductionScope
This annotation collects and discusses the reported cases in which the courts have addressed the
issue of whether a court granting a judgment, decree, or order of absolute divorce[FN1] has the power
subsequently to institute a spousal support[FN2] award or to increase a spousal support award[FN3]
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where the property award[FN4] obligation of the payor spouse is discharged in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding.
A number of jurisdictions may have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative
enactments bearing upon this subject. Since these are discussed herein only to the extent that they are
reflected in the reported cases within the scope of this annotation, the reader is advised to consult the
appropriate statutory or regulatory compilations.
1[b] IntroductionRelated matters
Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
2[a] Summary and commentGenerally
Although the concepts of equitable division of marital property and alimony or support are related in
that equitable distribution statutes seek to replace the concept of postmarital support through alimony
with one of postmarital stability through a just distribution of marital property and assets,[FN5] debts
owed to a former spouse of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such former
spouse are excepted from discharge in bankruptcy while a liability of the debtor to the former spouse
which is pursuant to an award of property and not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support is
dischargeable.[FN6] Thus, where an obligation to a former spouse pursuant to a property award of the
divorce court has been discharged in the bankruptcy of the payor spouse, the divorce court may be
requested to institute a support award or to modify an existing support award to the dependent former
spouse on the grounds that the discharge of the obligation resulted in a substantial change in the
financial circumstances of the dependent former spouse, raising the issue of the authority of the court
to initiate or to modify such an award after the court has handed down the final divorce decree.
A divorce may be rendered that permanently relieves a spouse from liability to pay alimony in any
sum. Such, of course, is the effect of a divorce decree that expressly provides against alimony. There is
authority, moreover, for the view that the same relief from alimony is obtained where a decree could
have awarded, but did not award, alimony and does not contain a reservation of a right to award
alimony subsequently.[FN7]
On the other hand, a trial court that does not make any award of alimony when granting a divorce
has the power to reserve to the dependent spouse the right to apply for alimony at a future date.[FN8]
In a case in which the court has power or authority to award permanent alimony, whether it should be
allowed in the particular case is a matter of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised with reference to
established principles and in view of all the circumstances of that particular case,[FN9] including the
needs of the dependent spouse and the financial ability of the payor spouse.[FN10] But it has been
held that, in the absence of an initial award of support or the reservation of jurisdiction by the court
with regard to the issue of support in a divorce case, the divorce court did not have jurisdiction to
institute an award of support to the dependent spouse where a property settlement award to the
dependent spouse was subsequently discharged in the bankruptcy of the payor spouse ( 3).
A decree granting permanent alimony payable periodically is a final judgment to which the doctrine
of res judicata applies, and although the statute may authorize a modification of the decree, the
petitioner, in the absence of fraud or concealment in or at the time of the procurement of the decree
and to avoid the res judicata effect of the decree must show a substantial change in the material
circumstances since the decree was entered.[FN11] One of the chief grounds for modification of an
allowance of alimony is a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties.[FN12] For
example, some courts have held that the discharge, in a bankruptcy proceeding, of a property
settlement debt of the payor spouse to the dependent spouse constituted such a material change in the
financial circumstances of the parties so as to permit the divorce court to make an upward modification
of the support award to the dependent spouse ( 4).
Where a joint debt of the parties to a marital dissolution was apportioned to the payor spouse as
part of the division of marital property and the debt was subsequently discharged in the payor's
bankruptcy, leaving the dependent spouse liable to the third-party creditor, the authority of the divorce
court to award an upward modification in the support to the dependent spouse has been upheld ( 5).
Furthermore, the authority of the court to order the payor spouse to indemnify the dependent spouse
for liability to third-party creditors for joint debts which were discharged in the payor's bankruptcy
proceeding has been upheld as a modification of an alimony award where the dependent spouse had
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waived the right to alimony in the divorce on condition that the debt be apportioned to the payor
spouse ( 6).
2[b] Summary and commentPractice pointers
There is authority to the effect that a state court has concurrent jurisdiction with a bankruptcy court
to determine whether a debt is exempt from discharge as a debt owed to a spouse or former spouse
for alimony, maintenance, or support under 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5), and thus, the dependent spouse
may bring a contest to dischargeability of a debt in either an appropriate state court or in the
bankruptcy court. Where an evidentiary hearing has been held in the bankruptcy court with both parties
represented, counsel for the payor spouse could argue that it is inappropriate for the state court to re-
examine the dischargeability of the listed debts. But counsel for the dependent spouse could argue that
the state court in such a case is not precluded from re-examining the award of support made to the
dependent spouse in the initial divorce decree to determine if the discharge of a debt owed to the
dependent spouse in the bankruptcy of the payor spouse constitutes such a change in the financial
circumstances of the parties so as to justify an upward modification of the support award.[FN13]
Where there has been no formal decree of support to a dependent spouse in a marital dissolution
case but the payor spouse has been ordered by the trial court to make a payment to a third-party
creditor, counsel for the dependent spouse could argue that the ordering of payment in such a manner
is the equivalent of a decree for support when petitioning the court for a modification of support after
the payor spouse has obtained a discharge of the debt in a bankruptcy proceeding.[FN14]
Where a dependent spouse files a petition in state court to modify an award of support subsequent
to the grant of a judgment of dissolution of marriage, counsel for the dependent spouse can request in
the petition that the modification, if granted, be made retroactive to the date of the filing of the
petition.[FN15] Furthermore, where the dependent spouse files a petition for modification of a divorce
decree with respect to support, counsel for the payor spouse can file an answer and counterclaim for
modification to the petition rather than make an oral motion for modification on the date of hearing of
the petition.[FN16]
Where the dependent spouse has made a petition for a modification of a support award to the court
on the ground that the discharge of a property award in bankruptcy of the payor spouse constitutes
changed circumstances and the modification is denied without an opinion, counsel for the dependent
spouse can argue on appeal that the lower court should have made detailed findings as to the changed
circumstances, such as the increase in the income of the obligor spouse as a result of the discharge in
bankruptcy and the corresponding reduction in assets and income of the obligee spouse.[FN17]
In the event that a state court grants a modification of a support award as a means of redressing a
change in the circumstances of the parties as the result of a bankruptcy discharge of a property
settlement of the payor spouse, if, in the payor spouse's perception, the balance is not properly struck,
or if some penalty for noncompliance is imposed which seems inappropriate to the payor spouse, it may
be appropriate for counsel for the payor spouse to appeal the decision in the state court system and
not attempt a lateral shift to the federal bankruptcy court system, because the bankruptcy court will not
reopen a closed case in order to afford relief from a state court order entered after the bankruptcy has
closed.[FN18]
II. Institution of Support Award
3. In absence of reservation of jurisdiction by trial court
It was held by the court in the following case that, in the absence of an initial award of support or
the reservation of jurisdiction by the court with regard to the issue of support in a marital dissolution
case, the court did not have jurisdiction to institute an award of support to the dependent spouse
where a property settlement debt of the payor spouse to the dependent spouse was subsequently
discharged in bankruptcy.
In Stolp v Stolp (1986, Minn App) 383 NW2d 409, the court held that a trial court, which, in its
original judgment of divorce, did not award spousal maintenance nor reserve jurisdiction to award it in
the future, had no jurisdiction to make an award of maintenance subsequent to the divorce where a
spouse had discharged a property settlement debt in bankruptcy. Thus, the court reversed the trial
court, noting that the statutes authorize a divorce court to grant maintenance if the spouse seeking it
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lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him or her, to provide for his or her
reasonable needs and to reserve the issue of maintenance for future determination. The court observed
that, if alimony is granted in accordance with the terms of the statutory requirements, a divorce court
retains jurisdiction to modify the decree at a later time, but where, as in this case, the decree did not
specifically reserve jurisdiction of the issue of alimony for determination at a later date, no such
jurisdiction can later be claimed.
See Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500, 6, in which the waiver of alimony by the
dependent spouse in return for the allocation of a joint debt to the payor spouse is treated by the court
as an award in the nature of alimony.
III. Increase in Support Award
4. Discharge of property settlement debt to dependent spouse
[Cumulative Supplement]
In the following cases, the courts held that the discharge of a property settlement obligation of the
payor spouse in a bankruptcy proceeding constituted such a change in the financial circumstances of
the parties to a divorce as to permit the divorce court to make an upward modification in the support
award to the dependent spouse.
The court in Coakley v Coakley (1987, Minn App) 400 NW2d 436, 87 ALR4th 339, upheld the
authority of the trial court to review maintenance and support awards and adjust them accordingly
where a property award to the dependent spouse was discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding of the
payor spouse, because, according to the court, the payor spouse had been released from his debt
obligations and had thereby done damage to the financial circumstances of the dependent spouse. The
court observed that a trial court retains its jurisdiction to amend maintenance and child support awards
as the circumstances might require; that an obligation to pay maintenance or child support may be
modified upon a showing that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred that makes the
original order unreasonable and unfair; and that the trial court's determination must be supported by
findings that reveal its consideration of the factors listed in the statute. The court found that the trial
court made detailed findings including the fact that the property settlement payment awarded by the
divorce court to the dependent spouse and the liability of the payor spouse on nonhomestead debts
that were to be satisfied from the sale of the marital homestead were discharged in the bankruptcy
relief afforded to the payor spouse.
See Beckstead v Beckstead (1983, Utah) 663 P2d 47, in which the court affirmed a trial court's
authority to modify a decree for alimony in a divorce case where the former wife's share of the
proceeds from the sale of the marital home was reduced by the amount of a mortgage, the proceeds of
which had been loaned to the parties' daughter; the wife received in return the daughter's obligation to
the parties for the loan they had made to her; and the daughter's debt was subsequently discharged in
bankruptcy. The court found that the bankruptcy discharge had denied the wife a portion of the
proceeds which it was contemplated she would receive from the home and that the property settlement
was inextricably involved with the alimony award.
In Eckert v Eckert (1988, App) 144 Wis 2d 770, 424 NW2d 759, CCH Bankr L Rptr 72334, the court
held that the payor spouse's discharge in bankruptcy of his property division obligation to the
dependent spouse in a marital dissolution constituted a change in financial circumstances of the parties
which justified the divorce court's exercise of its discretion under the statute to make an upward
modification of the dependent spouse's maintenance award where the court found that, following a
bankruptcy discharge, the payor spouse no longer had a legal obligation to pay a property division
equalization payment, a predivorce debt, or court-ordered contribution to the dependent spouse's
attorney's fees. The court stated that a revision of a divorce judgment to alter maintenance payments
could be made only upon a showing of a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the
parties; that the first step in a substantial change analysis is a factual inquiry, and the second step
requires a conclusion of law as to whether the changed circumstances are substantial; and that, when
modifying maintenance and its duration, a court could consider everything having a legitimate bearing
on the present and prospective matters relating to the lives of the divorcing parties.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
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Cases:
Ex-husband's Chapter 7 discharge, which relieved him of any obligations upon property settlement
award entered by state divorce court, did not preclude divorce court from modifying its alimony award
based upon "changed circumstances," such as discharge of property settlement debt. Bankr. Code, 11
U.S.C.A. 524. In re Emelity, 251 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000).
Increase in former wife's debt as result of former husband's bankruptcy was sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant upward modification of former husband's alimony obligation, and did not
violate Bankruptcy Code even though former wife's financial problems resulted from discharge of former
husband's alimony in gross obligation in bankruptcy proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 741 So. 2d 420 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999).
In post-divorce proceeding, court did not err in modifying husband's alimony obligation by
continuing it beyond term called for in decree where original decree called for husband to make alimony
payments to wife of $3,000 per month for sixty months, where decree also required husband to pay
wife $1.250 million over fifteen years for her share of community property interest in husband's medical
practice, where husband fell behind in his payments and his property settlement obligation was later
discharged in bankruptcy although his alimony obligation was not, where court properly considered
discharged obligation as "changed circumstance" justifying modification in that discharge of obligation
had changed both husband's and wife's financial circumstances, and where modification of alimony
award based upon discharged property settlement obligation did not re-create debt discharged under
federal bankruptcy laws. Siragusa v Siragusa (1992) 108 Nev 987, 843 P2d 807, CCH Bankr L Rptr
75035.
Significant body of law consistently supports treatment of post-divorce bankruptcy discharge of
obligation under divorce decree as change of circumstances justifying modification of maintenance.
Richardson v Richardson (1994, Wyo) 868 P2d 259 (citing annotation).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
5. Discharge of joint debt to third party
The courts in the following cases held or recognized that the trial court had the authority to modify
a support award to the dependent spouse where a joint debt of the parties, which was apportioned to
the payor spouse, was subsequently discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding of the payor spouse
leaving the dependent spouse liable to the third-party creditor.
The court in In re Marriage of Clements (1982, 1st Dist) 134 Cal App 3d 737, 184 Cal Rptr 756, a
case which involved the discharge in bankruptcy of joint debt obligations apportioned to one spouse,
stated in dictum that the statute had been amended to specifically provide that the divorce court might
consider a discharged property settlement as a change that might justify modification of spousal
support. The court observed that proper grounds might always be presented for the purpose of
modifying or revoking an award of spousal support under the statute; but the applicant must show the
economic situation of the parties had changed, since it is the economic relation which is to be affected
by a proposed modification.
To the same effect see In re Marriage of Williams (1984, 5th Dist) 157 Cal App 3d 1215, 203 Cal
Rptr 909, in which the court reviewed the legislative history of the statute and determined that it was
designed specifically to redress the type of inequity which arises in a case where one spouse, having
accepted assignment of certain of the community debts, subsequently discharges those debts in
bankruptcy and leaves the other spouse exposed to individual liability in derogation of an equal division
of the community property. However, the court rejected the suggestion that the legislature intended to
or believed it could reach and modify final property settlements, notwithstanding the inequities which
result from discharges in bankruptcy of community debts or other property settlement obligations.
See Kruse v Kruse (1984, Ind App) 464 NE2d 934, in which the court held that the trial court did not
commit error when it found that the discharge in bankruptcy of the payor spouse resulted in a
substantial and continuing change of circumstances that justified an upward modification in the child
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support award made when the parties were divorced, where the trial court had found that the payor
spouse's weekly paycheck deductions were reduced due to his bankruptcy; that the bankruptcy
proceeding discharged the payor spouse from the court-ordered payment of the second mortgage on
the family home and from payment of the loan on the van used by the dependent spouse as
transportation for herself and the children; that the second mortgagee sued to foreclose on the family
home and had received judgment; and that the resulting increased costs for suitable housing and the
loss of the van which the dependent spouse needed to maintain her employment were a substantial
change in circumstances affecting the children's needs.
In Re Danley (1981, F BC DC NM) 14 BR 493, 5 CBC2d 296, CCH Bankr L Rptr 68361 (applying
New Mexico law), the bankruptcy court held that the discharge in bankruptcy of community debts
assigned to the payor spouse was such a changed circumstance as to permit state court action to
modify the support award; the court found that it was clear from the decision of the divorce court that
payment by the payor spouse of the community debts was a significant factor in the initial spousal
support award and that jurisdiction was reserved by the divorce court to deal with any changed
circumstance. Furthermore, the court found that the use of the sum of the discharged debts as a
measure of the change in support, while it frustrated to some extent the federal policy of a fresh start
for debtors discharged in bankruptcy, was properly understood as an exception to discharge for a
support obligation.
The court in Re Marriage of Myers (1989) 54 Wash App 233, 773 P2d 118, upheld the trial court's
consideration of the bankruptcy discharge of debts, which became the sole obligation of the dependent
spouse under a marital dissolution decree, in an upward modification of the spousal maintenance
awarded under the decree. The creditors had pursued the dependent spouse for satisfaction of the
debts after the discharge of the payor spouse. The court noted that the ultimate decision to modify
maintenance must be based upon a substantial change in the needs of the spouse receiving
maintenance and the ability of the other spouse to pay. The court cited In re Marriage of Clements
(1982, 1st Dist) 134 Cal App 3d 737, 184 Cal Rptr 756, this section, as authority for the proposition
that bankruptcy is one of many facts to consider in a modification of spousal maintenance.
6. Apportionment of debt as condition for waiver of support award by dependent spouse
In the following case, the court upheld the authority of the trial court to order the payor spouse to
indemnify the dependent spouse, as a support award, for liability to third-party creditors whose debts
were discharged in the payor spouse's bankruptcy proceeding where the dependent spouse had waived
the right to support in the divorce case in return for the apportionment of the debts to the payor
spouse.
The court in Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500, affirmed a trial court judgment that the
payor spouse indemnify the dependent spouse as to certain joint debts incurred during the course of
their marriage, where the judgment was based upon a finding by the trial court that the dependent
spouse's waiver of alimony was conditioned upon the payor spouse's agreement to assume the debts.
The court stated that the trial court was entitled to modify the previous alimony decree where it had
found that (1) the initial indemnification was in the nature of alimony, and (2) there had been a change
in circumstances since the original decree by the discharge of the debts in bankruptcy; and that, while
the discharge in bankruptcy of the debts was final as to the relationship between the payor spouse and
third-party creditors, it was not as to the relationship between the payor spouse and the dependent
spouse.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Divorce 234
West's Key Number Digest, Divorce 245(1)
West's Key Number Digest, Divorce 245(2)
West's Key Number Digest, Divorce 245(3)
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A.L.R. Library
Index to Annotations, Alimony
Index to Annotations, Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Index to Annotations, Divorce and Separation
Index to Annotations, Property Settlements
Index to Annotations, Separate Property
Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification of Divorce DecreeEarly
Retirement, 36 A.L.R.6th 1
Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification of Divorce Decree
Prospective Retirement, 110 A.L.R.5th 237
Excessiveness or inadequacy of lump-sum alimony award, 49 A.L.R.5th 441
Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments,
11 A.L.R.5th 259
Power to modify spousal support award for a limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to
extend the term or make the award permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180
Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of trial court's property awardmodern cases, 56 A.L.R.4th 12
Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of combined property division and spousal support awards
modern cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 14
Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce or separation
as affected by fairness or adequacy of those termsmodern status, 53 A.L.R.4th 161
Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as permanent alimony following divorce, 28
A.L.R.4th 786
Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded for alimony and child support combined, 27
A.L.R.4th 1038
Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as temporary alimony, 26 A.L.R.4th 1218
Validity and enforceability of escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support,
19 A.L.R.4th 830
Divorce: power of court to modify decree for alimony or support of spouse which was based on
agreement of parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520
Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance, or support, 52 A.L.R.3d 156
Obligation under property settlement agreement between spouses as dischargeable in bankruptcy, 74
A.L.R.2d 758
Domestic divorce decree without adjudication as to alimony, rendered on personal service or equivalent,
as precluding later alimony award, 43 A.L.R.2d 1387
Trial court's jurisdiction as to alimony or maintenance pending appeal of matrimonial action, 19 A.L.R.2d
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703
Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for modification of decree for
alimony or maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10
Retrospective modification of, or refusal to enforce, decree for alimony, separate maintenance, or
support, 6 A.L.R.2d 1277
Creditor's right to have bankruptcy discharge of individual debtor revoked, vacated, and set aside, 138
A.L.R. Fed. 253
Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under 523(a)(5)
of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403
Legal Encyclopedias
Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 685, 689, 690, 692, 696, 699, 702-703, 710-713, 715-717
Treatises and Practice Aids
Bankruptcy Service, L. Ed. 7:118-7:120
Bankruptcy Service, L. Ed. 22:75
Trial Strategy
Modification of Spousal Support Award, 32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 491
Spousal Support on Termination of Marriage, 32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 439
Forensic EconomicsUse of Economists in Cases of Dissolution of Marriage, 17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts
2d 345
Wife's Ability to Support Herself, 2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 99
Alimony, 1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 452
Defense Against Wife's Action for Support, 17 Am. Jur. Trials 721 48-49
Separate Maintenance Proceedings, 7 Am. Jur. Trials 121 91-92
Forms
1 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Alimony Agreements 17:21-17:26, 17:71-17:86, 17:88
8A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Divorce and Separation, Forms 386, 474, 513-515, 517, 671,
792-793, 811-813, 816-817, 821-825
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Additional References
Boolean Search Query: property or debt w/12 discharg! w/10 bankrupt! w/35 (modif! or amend! or
reopen! or reduc!) w/8 (alimony or support or maintenance)
Section 1[a] Footnotes:
[FN1] Temporary alimony or support during periods of separation or divorce a mensa et
thoro are beyond the scope of this annotation.
[FN2] This annotation includes cases which deal with an award of spousal support, whether
described as support, alimony, or maintenance.
[FN3] Awards of "alimony in gross" or "lump-sum alimony," insofar as these represent
property distributions even though payable in installments, are excluded from the annotation,
which is concerned solely with spousal support awards not representing a property
distribution.
[FN4] This annotation includes cases in which the court allocates to one spouse as part of
the property division a joint debt of the parties to a third-party creditor.
Section 2[a] Footnotes:
[FN5] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 872.
[FN6] Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy 801, 802.
[FN7] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 685.
[FN8] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 689.
[FN9] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 625.
[FN10] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 642.
[FN11] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 711.
[FN12] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 712.
Section 2[b] Footnotes:
[FN13] Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500.
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[FN14] Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500.
[FN15] Kruse v Kruse (1984, Ind App) 464 NE2d 934.
[FN16] Macy v Macy (1986, Wyo) 714 P2d 774.
[FN17] Coakley v Coakley (1987, Minn App) 400 NW2d 436, 87 ALR4th 339.
[FN18] Re Danley (1981, F BC DC NM) 14 BR 493, 5 CBC2d 296, CCH Bankr L Rptr 68361
(applying New Mexico law).
Westlaw. 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
87 A.L.R.4th 353
END OF DOCUMENT
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motion for reconsideration and appeal in Joshi
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 4/19/09 8:11 PM
To: dpringle@washoelegalservices.org; zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
Hi Deb,
please calendar the motion for reconsideration and the appeal in Joshi. Get Bharti a copy of this ALR
section I pasted below. Judge Gardner wanted more discovery sent out.
Basically, I believe Judge Gardners decision is quite wrong. I have the ALR's to prove it. There is case
law that says that say, if we had won on the alimony but lost on the property settlement in the sense
that Bharti was stuck with half the community debt, Ashwin could not use Bharti's failure to pay those
credit cards as a reason to set off his alimony payments less that amount. Basically courts protect
support obligations at the expense of contractual obligations.
26[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for other purposesSetoff not allowed
The court in each of the following cases determined that an offset against an arrearage of alimony for payments to
various third parties on behalf of a former spouse, including tuition and sums spent in satisfaction of a bank loan
or credit card charges, would not be permitted.
The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So 2d 99, refused to allow
as an offset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support several noncomplying expenditures by the
husband, including the payment of the children's tuition, a community debt, when the amount expended could be
recovered by him at the time of the settlement of the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant
to the spouses' agreement. A request by the wife that the husband make such payments during a later time period
was found irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses for herself and the
children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg (1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d
329, would not permit an offset against postdivorce permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half
of the credit card charges. The husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child support during
the period in which the charges were made, but was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the wife
made the charges without the his permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges were for expenses
for which the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither spouse intended such a credit when the
husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the offset apparently based on the lack of evidence of an
agreement between the parties.
In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the facts of which are more fully stated in
22[a], the court disallowed credit against past-due permanent alimony for pre-award payments made on
veterinarian and cable television bills when those items could not be considered necessary for the wife's support,
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310, which provided for the retroactive effect of such awards subject to credit for any
support provided.
Credit card charges for the purchase of luggage and an airline ticket by the wife immediately prior to separation,
which apparently fell to the husband to pay, were not offset against arrears in alimony pendente lite by the court in
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Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir) 535 So 2d 1317, the facts of which are more fully discussed in 24[b],
when the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning of LSA-C.C. art. 1893, the statutory setoff
provision.
Although affirming the lower court's postponement of a decision respecting the husband's right to credit until the
divorce trial because this aspect of the decision was not appealed, the court in Keff v Keff (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App
Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a judgment requiring the husband to pay the full amount of the claimed
arrears in temporary maintenance and child support would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoff
for amounts paid by him for attorney's fees owed by the wife. The court noted that the husband neither moved for
relief of the support order, nor proffered any reason for his neglect, and his unilateral reduction of support was
improper.
The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581, concluded that a husband's
payment of the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce, could not be offset against arrears in
(temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his wife.
And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the court refused to credit a
husband with voluntary payments made on behalf of his wife for "club and other items" toward the sum of money
owed by him for maintenance and child support under a pendente lite order.
In Locke v Locke (1893, NY) 71 Hun 363, 24 NYS 1129, it was decided that a husband could not subtract the sum
paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment entered against both spouses as cosigners of a promissory note on behalf
of their son from a delinquent installment of alimony. It appeared that the wife recovered a decree against her
husband awarding alimony, and thereafter, at the request of the couple's adopted son, made a promissory note
payable to the order of the son, which was endorsed by the son and by the husband, and discounted by a bank with
the son realizing all of the proceeds. The son, as well as the wife, defaulted on the payment of the note, and the
bank recovered a judgment against all of the parties for the amount of the note. The judgment was paid in full by,
and assigned to, the husband, but he could not collect anything from the wife or the son because they were both
insolvent. The husband subsequently defaulted on a semiannual payment of alimony and the wife applied for leave
to issue execution against the husband for alimony due. In response, the husband contended that the amount of the
judgment should be set off against the wife's claim. The court held that the husband was not entitled to set off the
judgment against the decree of alimony under the circumstances, saying that alimony, the object of which was to
continue the husband's duty to support his wife after the divorce, might be held liable only to satisfy a debt
contracted for her support with a creditor who had naturally relied upon it as a means of payment. In this context,
the court pointed out that had no divorce decree been granted against the husband, he would not, as husband, have
been liable to pay the note which his wife signed for their son and, hence, such note was not a debt that could be
collected from her alimony by either the bank or the husband, its assignee.
11 A.L.R.5th 259 (Originally published in 1993)
American Law Reports
ALR5th
The ALR databases are made current by the weekly addition of relevant new cases.
Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments
Claudia Catalano, J.D. 001783
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When faced with the issue of the propriety of reducing the amount of support available for the needs of a divorced
spouse in order to set off her indebtedness to her former spouse, many courts have looked to the particular
circumstances involved and attempted a resolution which avoided an injustice to either party. The power of the
court to order an offset of a spouse's debt against accrued installments of support owed to her, in some
jurisdictions, however, has been questioned. One recent case to consider whether a prohibition against the
retroactive modification of the support order limited the court's authority to offset a debt against accumulated
support is Taylor v Ellenbecker (1991, SD) 471 NW2d 587, 11 ALR5th 1002in which the court found that the
statutory provision at issue curtailed such modification, and refused to eliminate a husband's child support
arrearage by allowing a setoff of the value of services he performed in remodeling and repairing his former wife's
residence. This annotation gathers those cases which discuss whether a spouse obligated to pay alimony or child
support is entitled to offset a debt owed to him by his former spouse or credit payments made to others on her
behalf against accrued support payments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Article Outline
Index
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
Research References
ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Preliminary Matters
1[a] IntroductionScope
1[b] IntroductionRelated annotations
2[a] Background and summaryGenerally
2[b] Background and summaryPractice pointers
II General Principles
3[a] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetGenerally
3[b] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that support
obligation is not ordinary "debt"
3[c] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that debt of parent
and child support obligation are not cross demands
3[d] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that offset against
child support must provide support to child, generally
3[e] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetDetermination that offset must provide
support to child alone
3[f] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that spouses' offset
agreement impairing child's right to support is unenforceableimpairment found
3[g] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetImpairment not found
4 View that supporting spouse should strictly comply with court order
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5[a] View that support recipient's control of support funds is consideration in determining other spouse's right to
setoffControl found or supported permitting setoff
5[b] View that support recipient's control of support funds is consideration in determining other spouse's right to
setoffControl not found which would permit setoff
6 View that court has no authority to permit setoff of supported spouse's debt against accrued support payments
7 View that court has no authority to permit setoff of supported spouse's debt which was discharged in
bankruptcy
8 View that offset allowed against support obligation where equity demands
III Particular Factors Affecting Offset
9 Compulsion of circumstances
10[a] Spouses' agreement to offset, generallyAgreement found or supported permitting setoff
10[b] Spouses' agreement to offset, generallyAgreement not found which would permit setoff
11 Together with substantial compliance with child support decree
12[a] Supported spouse's conductConduct found permitting setoff
12[b] Supported spouse's conductConduct not found which permitted setoff
13 Retroactive application of support award
14 Liquidity of supporting spouse's claim
15 Time at which supporting spouse's claim arose
IV Particular Determinations
A Alimony
16 Claim arising from supported spouse's noncompliance with divorce decree, or debt owed directly to
supporting spouse under terms of decree
17 Contract claim by supporting spouse for funds or value of services or property advanced to supported spouse
18[a] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff allowed
18[b] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff not allowed
19[a] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to automobileSetoff allowed
19[b] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to automobileSetoff not allowed
20[a] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff allowed
20[b] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff not allowed
21[a] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to residence of supported spouseSetoff allowed
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22[a] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff allowed
22[b] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff not allowed
23 Payments made by supporting spouse relating to other real property
24[a] Payments made by supporting spouse for medical care, clothing, or the likeSetoff allowed or supported
24[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for medical care, clothing, or the likeSetoff not allowed
25 Payments made by supporting spouse on joint income tax deficiency
26[a] Payments made by supporting spouse for other purposesSetoff allowed
26[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for other purposesSetoff not allowed
27[a] Undisclosed types of debt or indirect paymentsSetoff allowed
27[b] Undisclosed types of debt or indirect paymentsSetoff not allowed
B Child Support
28[a] Claim arising from supported spouse's noncompliance with divorce decree, or debt owed directly to
supporting spouse under terms of decreeSetoff allowed
28[b] Claim arising from supported spouse's noncompliance with divorce decree, or debt owed directly to
supporting spouse under terms of decreeSetoff not allowed
29[a] Contract claim by supporting spouse for funds or the value of services or property advanced to the
supported spouseSetoff allowed
29[b] Contract claim by supporting spouse for funds or the value of services or property advanced to the
supported spouseSetoff not allowed or supported
30[a] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff allowed
30[b] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff not allowed
I. Preliminary Matters
1[a] IntroductionScope
This annotation[FN1] collects and discusses cases in which a court considered whether a spouse obligated to pay
alimony[FN2] or child support may be permitted[FN3] to set off against a delinquency in support a debt owed to
him by the supported spouse,[FN4] or offset indirect payments made to a third party on behalf of the supported
spouse.[FN5] This annotation deals with cases discussing the request for an offset brought pursuant to or arising
from a matrimonial action instituted by either spouse.[FN6] The discussion is limited to cases in which support
was alleged to be in arrears or owing from the spouse obligated to pay it, but the accrued sum may have resulted
from the retroactive application of the support award.
A number of jurisdictions have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments directly
bearing upon this subject. These provisions are discussed herein only to the extent and in the form that they are
reflected in the court opinions that fall within the scope of this annotation. The reader is consequently advised to
consult the appropriate statutory or regulatory compilations to ascertain the current status of all statutes discussed
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herein, including those listed in the Jurisdictional Table of Cited Statutes and Cases.
1[b] IntroductionRelated annotations
Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
2[a] Background and summaryGenerally
It can be generally said that the determination of whether an offset should be allowed against accumulated support
depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case, the courts of many jurisdictions balancing certain general
principles against the particular factors that might lead to an injustice for the spouse obligated to pay support if the
offset were denied. Several basic principles have been espoused which argue against the allowance of an offset,
most of which can be attributed to the promotion of consistency in enforcement orders, the unique nature and
purpose of the support obligation (and the avoidance of an injustice to the spouse to whom support is owed), or the
concept of finality as to accrued payments. It has been contended that these principles are merely expressions of a
more general rule that the spouse obligated to pay support is not entitled to a setoff as a matter of law, and are not
necessarily in conflict with the position that a situation might arise in which equitable considerations would permit
a setoff.[FN7] Such appears to be the case in most, but not all, jurisdictions.
At least one jurisdiction seems to demand "strict" compliance with the support order, since the single court to
address the issue of a credit against delinquent support for noncomplying payments on behalf of a wife expressed
this opinion, and did not limit its decision to the circumstances of the case ( 4). The special nature and purpose of
the support obligation owed by a divorced spouse to her former spouse and child will be a consideration affecting
the court's determination of the propriety of an offset in most instances ( 3[a]). For example, in several
jurisdictions in which the courts have determined that the support obligation is a "duty" and not a "debt," it has
been held that a setoff of an ordinary debt should not permitted as a matter of right against the support obligation
( 3[b]). The determination that any debt owed to the noncustodial parent and the obligation owed by him to the
child were not cross demands has precluded the setoff of that debt against a child support obligation ( 3[c]). In
other instances in which an offset against a child support obligation was sought, several jurisdictions have ruled
that the offset was impermissible based on the determination that it did not provide support to the child ( 3[d]) or,
occasionally, that it did not benefit the child alone ( 3[e]), which opinion apparently would prohibit a setoff in
any situation included within the scope of this annotation. In those cases in which the supporting spouse
contended that the spouses agreed to an offset against child support, a determination that the agreement, which not
in the best interest of the child, was unenforceable, has precluded the requested offset ( 3[f]), although some
courts, finding no impairment to the child's right to support, have permitted such a setoff ( 3[g]). Certain courts,
embracing the principle that the spouse to whom support is paid is entitled to disburse support monies as she sees
fit, have allowed ( 5[a]) or denied ( 5[b]) an offset based upon whether the supported spouse controlled the
funds at issue, or whether the supporting spouse usurped this right. A view also expressed is that the allowance of
an offset against accrued support installments amounts to a retroactive modification of past-due judgments beyond
the power of the court ( 6). And, one court has maintained that it had no authority to enter a judgment offsetting
against accrued support a spouse's payment of debts avoided in bankruptcy by the other spouse ( 7).
There appears to be no general rule as to when circumstances may require that a spouse be given an offset against
his support obligation, despite these general principles. And, it should be noted that in a few jurisdictions, there is
no indication that an offset considered by the court to retroactively modify the decree will be permitted under any,
or at least most, circumstances. Some courts, however, have expressed the view that an exception may be made to
allow a setoff or "credit" when equitable considerations demand ( 8). Courts have held that setoff was allowed
where a compulsion of circumstances necessitated an indirect payment of support to the wife's creditors ( 9).
Setoff has been permitted by courts when the spouse obligated to pay support was in arrears merely as the result
of the retroactive effect of the decree ( 13). In many cases, the existence of an agreement by the spouses to a
mode of payment other than that called for in the support decree ( 10[a]), together with proof of substantial
compliance with the spirit and intent of the decree in cases involving an offset against delinquent child support (
11), are factors considered by the courts to permit setoff. Consequently, where no agreement between the spouses
was found concerning the offset against support, setoff has been denied ( 10[b]). In deciding whether an offset
against accrued support payments was appropriate, a few courts have found certain other behavior by the
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supported spouse which justified ( 12[a]) or did not justify ( 12[b]) the grant of the setoff. And, factors which
have influenced the courts to deny an offset against accrued support payments were the unliquidated nature of the
claim to be setoff, in one jurisdiction ( 14), and the time that the claim underlying the requested setoff arose (
15), in many instances, the courts objecting to the setoff of a claim which pre-existed the support decree.
Courts have been faced with a determination of whether particular types of debts owed to the spouse obligated to
pay support, or indirect payments made by him on behalf of the spouse to whom support is owed, may be offset
against a support arrearage. Again, no general rules can be formulated as to whether the offset will be permitted.
An offset against accrued support based on the allegation that the spouse to whom support was directed to be paid
was not in compliance with the divorce decree (usually a provision of the property settlement) has been allowed
against past-due alimony ( 16) and child support ( 28[a]), but in many more instances has been denied against
child support ( 28[b]), the courts usually grounding their decision in the principle that the debt of the custodial
parent was not the debt of the child, or that the child's right to the support had vested. Generally, a setoff based on
the claim that a spouse breached an agreement other than the separation agreement or property settlement
agreement, or was unjustly enriched by the value of services provided to her has not been permitted against
accrued alimony ( 17) or child support ( 29[b]), but was permitted in one instance against delinquent child
support ( 29[a]), the court finding an injustice if credit was not given. A setoff based on the claim that a spouse
appropriated funds or property not allocated by the decree, usually community property, generally has been denied
against accrued alimony ( 18[b]) and child support ( 30[b]). In a few instances, however, such a setoff has been
permitted against alimony, usually to reduce the amount found owing due to the retroactive effect of the award (
18[a]), and one court has suggested that an offset against back child support might be permissible on equitable
grounds if it were shown that the custodial spouse used the funds misappropriated by her for the support of the
children ( 30[a]).
Whether or not a spouse is entitled to credit against arrearages for indirect payments made to others on behalf of
his former spouse also depends to a large extent upon the particular circumstances surrounding the case. The
request for an offset against accrued support for payments relating to jointly held property, which was not the
residence of the spouse or child, has not yet met with success ( 23, 34), nor has the request for an offset against
an arrearage in alimony for payments toward a joint income tax liability ( 25). Courts have shown some
reluctance in permitting expenditures associated with the provision of a car for the spouse's use to reduce a child
support arrearage ( 31[b]), but a credit for such payments has been granted ( 31[a]). An offset against arrears in
alimony or both alimony and child support usually will be permitted ( 19[a], 20[a], 31[a]) or denied ( 19[b],
20[b]) based on whether an agreement existed between the spouses as to the offset of the automobile-related
payments and a benefit was received by the spouse. The same circumstances have generally influenced the court to
grant ( 21[a], 22[a]) or deny ( 21[b], 22[b]) an offset for payments associated with the spouse's and child's
residence against past-due alimony, or child support ( 32[a], 32[b], 33[a], 33[b]), or other necessities, such as
medical care, against arrears in alimony ( 24[a], 24[b]) or child support ( 35[a], 35[b]). Some courts have
refused an offset when the obligation associated with an automobile ( 20[b]) or residence ( 22[b], 33[b]) was
incurred prior to the divorce and, thus, the payment benefited the spouse obligated to pay support as well. Courts
have also determined the propriety of an offset against accrued alimony ( 26[a], 26[b]) or child support ( 36[a],
36[b]) for payments made by the supporting spouse to others for miscellaneous purposes, such as to satisfy the
supported spouse's credit card debt, or for debts or payments the nature of which was undisclosed by the court (
27[a], 27[b], 37), again the results depending to a great extent on the individual circumstances. It should be noted,
however, that in only one instance a claim for money owed by the supported spouse, the nature of which was
unclear, was set off against alimony, under circumstances in which the supporting spouse also owed a separate
equity award to his former spouse which might have been reduced as an alternative ( 27[a]).
2[b] Background and summaryPractice pointers
Possibly because many of the exceptions found to justify a setoff against an accrued support obligation are more
clearly applicable to an offset of this nature, counsel should be aware that a court may be more sympathetic to an
offset which can be categorized as one for the indirect payment of support to others on behalf of the support
recipient, rather than merely as a "debt" owed from that spouse to the one obligated to pay support. Note that in
some instances the same request for a setoff may be classified as either. For example, the request to offset the
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husband's payment of a mortgage on the marital home against a support obligation was permitted when seen as a
request to "credit" an indirect payment to a third party to provide shelter for the wife and child,[FN8] and denied,
in part, when categorized by the court as a request by the husband for contribution of the wife's share of a pre-
existing joint obligation.[FN9]
Counsel also should be alerted to the fact that an early determination of whether the spouse's underlying claim,
upon which the defense of setoff is based, is related to the issues raised in the matrimonial action brought by his
former spouse, alleging nonpayment of support, may avoid later difficulty. A claim of offset arising from the
separation or property settlement agreement is certainly a related claim, and at least one court has ruled that such a
claim, in a controversy which concerned a husband's subsequent request for the setoff of one-half of the proceeds
from the sale of the marital home pursuant to a separation agreement, was a compulsory counterclaim the assertion
of which was limited to the time and forum of the wife's action for alimony arrearages.[FN10] Some claims are
more obviously unrelated to the issues raised in an action to enforce a support decree. It has held that an action to
show cause is not the proper forum in which to bring a counterclaim against the supported spouse based on an
unrelated tort action. For example, where a husband sought to offset damages for the alienation of the affections
of his son in response to his wife's action for delinquent child support, a court held that the proper subject matter in
an action to enforce a prior judgment is limited to the subject of that judgment, dismissing the counterclaim
without prejudice to the husband.[FN11]
In a case involving a finer distinction, it was also held that a court erred in broadening the issues raised in a
contempt proceeding to include whether a constructive trust arose from the predivorce sale of the supporting
spouse's property not mentioned in the divorce decree, upon his request for a credit for the proceeds of that sale
against accrued alimony and child support payments.[FN12]
The spouse obligated to pay support may opt to bring a subsequent suit upon the denial of the requested offset in
the matrimonial action. Several courts have suggested this as an alternate avenue of recovery.[FN13] The viability
of the husband's claim, should the domestic relations court express an opinion on its merits or fail to state that its
determination is without prejudice to the supporting spouse's independent action, is unclear. It should be noted that
in one instance, a court has held that a husband could not maintain a later action in tort and contract against his
wife, the proceeds of which he admittedly intended to use to set off an alimony judgment, under the rule of res
judicata, based on an earlier action in which the court held that it was without statutory authority to modify an
alimony judgment by setting aside the past-due installments.[FN14]
Another court, however, has held that a lower court's order denying a setoff for a promissory note payable by the
wife to the husband as a defense to the wife's action to recover a child support arrearage could not act as a bar to
the husband's subsequent action for recovery on the note, when it was clear to the court that the validity of the note
was not, nor could it possibly have been, directly in issue and fully litigated in the original action.[FN15]
Should the spouse ordered to pay support be denied the requested offset against accrued installments, he might
consider moving for a modification of his current obligation. Counsel should be aware that several courts have
been inclined to the view that, while the requested setoff against accrued and past-due support payments was
impermissible, the circumstance of the supported spouse's indebtedness to the supporting spouse might warrant
such a modification.[FN16]
At least one court has viewed a spouse's "obstinate disobedience" of the divorce decree in refusing to pay marital
debts assigned to her under that decree, forcing the spouse obligated to pay her support also to assume those debts,
to constitute a change in conditions such as would justify modification of the maintenance award.[FN17]
Moreover, where the supporting spouse, as a co-debtor, has been required to pay even a single community
obligation due to his former spouse's discharge of that debt in bankruptcy, such a factor has been considered by
some courts to be a change of circumstances sufficient to support modification. It has been held that the material
change in the economic status of the parties, when the spouse to whom the support had been awarded significantly
reduced her indebtedness through bankruptcy, and the nonbankrupt spouse had increased obligations to be met,
may indicate a change in the ability to pay support so as to authorize the reduction in the amount of support
payments.[FN18].
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Of course, there is no express duty imposed upon a court to set off an outstanding debt against a future support
obligation. One court found no abuse of discretion in the determination that a husband, who wished to set off
funds expended by him to satisfy a deficiency judgment against both spouses which arose upon the foreclosure
sale of the marital residence, failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances, when the record did not
reveal a substantial reduction in the husband's earnings.[FN19]
And, a modification of a child support obligation will require a determination of whether the requested offset is in
the best interest of the children. It has been pointed out that the court's paramount concern is to protect the
economic welfare of the child, within the confines of the parents' financial capability, not to balance through setoff
a creditor-debtor relationship between the parents.[FN20]
Other restrictions may apply. It has been pointed out a spouse, who was denied the statutory right to set off
payments he made on an alleged joint federal income tax liability against past-due alimony installments, might not
move for a modification of his future support obligation unless he were not in contempt for failing to make past-
due payments, despite the suggestion that modification might otherwise be justified.[FN21]
Moreover, it has been suggested by one court that the concept of a "setoff" against a future child support
obligation, due to the variability of the amount of the payments and the court's continued involvement, was
inappropriate when a statutory offset provision contemplated a single judgment in which conflicting claims are
offset and only the difference between the two judgments paid.[FN22]
II. General Principles
3[a] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetGenerally
Courts universally have embraced the position that the unique nature or purpose of the support obligation owed to
the former spouse or child must be considered in any determination as to whether a setoff would be permitted
against that obligation.[FN23]Ala
Ryan v Ryan (1960) 271 Ala 243, 123 So 2d 102, 100 ALR2d 919
Anonymous v Anonymous (1983, Ala App) 428 So 2d 109
Dodd v Dodd (1991, Ala App) 588 So 2d 476
Cal
Keck v Keck (1933) 219 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300
Avila v Leonardo (1942) 53 Cal App 2d 602, 128 P2d 43
Williams v Williams (1970, 1st Dist) 8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754
Parsons v Parsons (1990, 4th Dist) 220 Cal App 3d 79, 269 Cal Rptr 356, op withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 1990
Cal LEXIS 3278
Colo
Hall v Hall-Stradley (1989, Colo App) 776 P2d 1166
Fla
Chappell v Chappell (1971, Fla App D4) 253 So 2d 281
Rankin v Rankin (1972, Fla App D3) 268 So 2d 573
Hinton v Reynolds (1983, Fla App D4) 442 So 2d 1111
Ga
Attaway v Attaway (1941) 193 Ga 51, 17 SE2d 72
Farmer v Farmer (1978) 147 Ga App 387, 249 SE2d 106
Ill
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Schmitt v Woods (1979, 5th Dist) 73 Ill App 3d 498, 29 Ill Dec 498, 392 NE2d 55
Ind
Re Marriage of Honkomp (1978) 178 Ind App 68, 381 NE2d 881
Iowa
Picht v Henry (1961) 252 Iowa 559, 107 NW2d 441
Re Marriage of Mills (1989, Iowa App) 441 NW2d 416
La
Re Andras (1982, La App 4th Cir) 410 So 2d 328
Hamilton v Hamilton (1982, La App 1st Cir) 421 So 2d 291
Feazell v Feazell (1984, La App 3d Cir) 445 So 2d 143
Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162 (Pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310)
Hawkins v Hawkins (1991, La App 3d Cir) 592 So 2d 843, companion case (La App 3d Cir) 592 So 2d 852
Mont
Haaby v Haaby (1974) 165 Mont 475, 529 P2d 1387
Hadford v Hadford (1981) 194 Mont 518, 633 P2d 1181
Re Marriage of Good (1984) 213 Mont 269, 691 P2d 1337
NY
Haubrich v Haubrich (1944) 267 App Div 872, 46 NYS2d 506
Dorfman v Dorfman (1947) 191 Misc 227, 77 NYS2d 267
Lefkowitz v Lefkowitz (1959) 7 Misc 2d 958, 186 NYS2d 925
Vought v Vought (1959) 22 Misc 2d 356, 195 NYS2d 521
Palmer v Palmer (1966) 52 Misc 2d 610, 275 NYS2d 978
Locke v Locke (1893, NY) 71 Hun 363, 24 NYS 1129
ND
Bosch v Bosch (1972, ND) 197 NW2d 673
Tenn
Oliver v Oczkowicz (1990, Tenn App) 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 354
Tex
Re McLemore (1974, Tex Civ App Dallas) 515 SW2d 356
Medrano v Medrano (1991, Tex App San Antonio) 810 SW2d 426
Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38
Wyo
Broyles v Broyles (1985, Wyo) 711 P2d 1119
Macy v Macy (1986, Wyo) 714 P2d 774
It was held in Attaway v Attaway (1941) 193 Ga 51, 17 SE2d 72, that a judgment for alimony, being based upon
the obligation imposed by law upon a husband to support his wife, could not be extinguished or satisfied by setting
off a judgment in the husband's favor and against his wife for the value and hire of an automobile, when "the set
off would mean nothing in the way of such support." Restating its position, the court maintained the principles of
setoff were not applicable to a case involving alimony.
Because the paramount importance of protecting the rights of children upon divorce dictated that amounts payable
as child support take precedence over any personal obligation between those parents, the court in Schmitt v Woods
(1979, 5th Dist) 73 Ill App 3d 498, 29 Ill Dec 498, 392 NE2d 55, remarked that child support payments are exempt
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from a setoff resulting from the personal debt of one of the parents.
And, it was decided in Locke v Locke (1893,NY) 71 Hun 363, 24 NYS 1129, that a husband, who had satisfied a
judgment entered against both spouses as cosigners of a bank note procured for their son, could not subtract the
sum paid from past-due alimony, the court saying that alimony, the object of which was to continue the husband's
duty to support his wife after the divorce, might be held liable only to satisfy a debt contracted for her support
with a creditor who had naturally relied upon it as a means of payment. The court apparently concluded that the
bank was not such a creditor, nor was the husband, as its assignee.
3[b] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that
support obligation is not ordinary "debt"
The courts in the following cases, recognizing the view that the nature of the support obligation must affect a
determination of the propriety of the setoff requested, held that the setoff was precluded because the "duty" to
support is not an ordinary "debt."
Deciding, in an equity action, that a decree for alimony in favor of a wife against her former husband was not a
"debt" due from the husband to her, within the scope of a statutory provision for setoff, but an obligation imposed
on him by law to support or maintain her, the court in Ryan v Ryan (1960) 271 Ala 243, 123 So 2d 102, 100
ALR2d 919, held that the wife's alleged indebtedness to him was not available to satisfy or extinguish the decree
for alimony. In reaching its determination, the court examined Statute 350, Title 7, Code of 1940, which
provided that mutual debts, liquidated or unliquidated, demands not sounding in damages merely, subsisting
between parties at the commencement of a suit may be set off one against the other, concluding that alimony was
not a debt within the meaning of the statute, but a duty. The court stressed that alimony was not to be considered a
property settlement upon the dissolution of a marriage, but had as its sole object the support and maintenance of
the wife, and that the offset of a pre-existing debt, owed either to the husband or another creditor, would deprive
the wife of such support contrary to public policy. The court added that the mere existence of mutual demands did
not authorize an equity court to set them off against each other, absent allegations showing an intervening equity
which rendered it necessary to protect the demand to be set off, but did not consider whether allegations of the
wife's insolvency and her nonresidence showed such an intervening equity.
The court in Keck v Keck (1933) 219 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300, reversed an order which in effect allowed a husband to
offset a pre-existing judgment debt in his favor against accrued alimony owed his former wife, saying that alimony
was founded on the marital duty of a husband to support his wife and not an ordinary debt, and the two demands
did not by operation of law compensate and discharge one another under California Code of Civil Procedure
440. Consequently, the court decided that the husband could not, in the manner of an ordinary judgment debtor, as
a matter of right, and by motion, avail himself of the remedy provided for by the statute. The judgment against the
wife, who had been appointed as guardian of her husband for a period of years during the marriage, arose as the
result of a settlement of guardianship accounts.
Upon the wife's order to show cause, the court in Williams v Williams (1970, 1st Dist) 8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal
Rptr 754, ruled that a husband could not automatically setoff, under California Code of Civil Procedure 440, his
former wife's portion of a net deficit resulting from the operation of a community property apartment house
against either alimony or child support arrearages for the reason that a support obligation was not an ordinary debt
but rather was a court-imposed marital duty. The husband had made none of the support payments provided for in
a divorce decree, but managed, by agreement, the apartment house, discharging the loss incurred in its operation
by paying taxes, trust deed payments, and for repairs and improvements, subsequently arguing that the past-due
support obligations and the apartment house deficit were "cross demands" within the purview of the Code which
should be deemed satisfied so far that they were equal.
And, although the award of attorney's fees on behalf of the husband was found to be an error and, thus, the wife
did not owe the amount of the award, the court in Parsons v Parsons (1990, 4th Dist) 220 Cal App 3d 79, 269 Cal
Rptr 356, op withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 1990 Cal LEXIS 3278 (without explanation), held that the very nature
of child support, an obligation due to the child and paid to the custodial parent only as a conduit for the
disbursement of that support, did not permit a setoff against accrued child support for amounts owed for other
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things, such as the fees.
In Rankin v Rankin (1972, Fla App D3) 268 So 2d 573, the court thought that the holding in Chappell v Chappell
(1971, Fla App D4) 253 So 2d 281, 25, together with the general law that alimony is "something more" than an
ordinary debt required a reversal of the trial court's order allowing the husband to set off against delinquent
alimony payments possible business debts incurred in maintaining properties that the spouses held in
common.[FN24]
According to the court in Bosch v Bosch (1972, ND) 197 NW2d 673, it was proper to refuse a husband the
statutory right to set off against past-due alimony installments payments he made on an alleged joint obligation for
federal income tax liability, reduced to judgment subsequent to the parties' divorce, when alimony was not a
"debt" within the meaning of the statute. The husband contended that his request for a setoff was permitted under
Section 28-20-33 N.D.C.C., which allowed the setoff of "mutual final judgments," and Section 09-01-08
N.D.C.C., which entitled a party to a joint obligation to contribution from the other parties for sums paid in excess
of his share of the debt. Upon finding that the parties' stipulations and divorce judgment provided for the payment
of alimony, and did not merely concern a property settlement, the court stressed that a setoff would deprive the
wife of the purpose of the judgment, that is, support, and that a support obligation, imposed by law, might not be
extinguished by a claim in the husband's favor because it was not a debt within the meaning of the statutes.
In Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38, the court refused to offset arrearages in
child support by imputed rentals due the husband for the time the wife was in wrongful possession of his separate
real property, stating that child support payments are a unique obligation and, consequently, the two demands were
not due in the same capacity or right, or "mutual."
Persuaded by decisions from other jurisdictions which were compatible with the court's longstanding position that
the welfare of the child is the primary concern in cases involving child support, the court in Broyles v Broyles
(1985, Wyo) 711 P2d 1119, refused to offset past-due child support payments by the amount of a damages award
in favor of the husband, in part, for the reason that the support obligation was not an ordinary debt, but a court-
imposed parental duty. The decisions cited by the court included Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th
Dist)) 672 SW2d 38, this subsection, and Gaines v Gaines (1978, Ky App) 566 SW2d 814, a decision in which the
court found that the "offset," or suspension of payment, of the amount awarded as child support in the divorce
decree by the amount a father was ordered to pay to reduce the mother's portion of a marital debt, until the debt
was satisfied, was improper.
3[c] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that debt of
parent and child support obligation are not cross demands
Recognizing the principle that the specific purpose of the child support obligation must be considered, the courts in
the cases reported below held that a debt owed by the custodial parent to her former spouse and that spouse's
obligation to support their child were not demands between the same parties such as might be offset against one
another.
In Avila v Leonardo (1942) 53 Cal App 2d 602, 128 P2d 43, where a husband sought to set off a claim against his
former wife for breach of her agreement to hold him harmless from liability for child support against accrued child
support, the court ruled that such an action would not be permitted, in part, because the claims were not cross
demands by the same parties.
And, in Williams v Williams (1970, 1st Dist) 8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754, the court held that a husband
could not set off, by operation of law, his former wife's portion of a net deficit resulting from the operation of
community property apartment house against overdue child support payments, influenced in significant part, by the
view that child support is not the type of cross demand "by one party against the other" contemplated by California
Code of Civil Procedure 440, which deemed such demands compensated so far as they were equal. The court
pointed out that the obligation resulting from the deficit was that of the wife only and not the child, and the child
support obligation, even if considered a debt, was due to the child rather than the wife, a mere conduit for the
disbursement of the funds. The court added that to allow the offset and, thus, the use of child support funds to
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maintain property held in common by the husband and wife, would frustrate both public policy and the support
order.
In response to a husband's attempt to set off a judgment he obtained against his former wife as the result of her
violation of his visitation rights against child support arrearages which he owed, the court in Hall v Hall-Stradley
(1989, Colo App) 776 P2d 1166, concluded that a parent who owes a duty of child support may not offset his
obligation against a personal judgment against the custodial parent based on the public policy concept that the
beneficial interest in the support belongs to the child.
It was contrary to law to allow credit against support payments for amounts that had been garnished from the
husband's wages for the payment of a marital debt for which the wife was made responsible under the dissolution
decree, according to the court in Re Marriage of Honkomp (1978) 178 Ind App 68, 381 NE2d 881, when support
allowances for the benefit of minor children are received by the custodial parent in a fiduciary-like capacity which
does not permit the setoff against support payments of a debt owed to the husband by the wife in her individual
capacity.
See also, in this context, Jenkins v Jenkins (1991, Ind App) 567 NE2d 136, in which the court, in denying the
setoff, recognized that, because a custodial parent acts as a conduit only and in a fiduciary capacity when receiving
child support payments on behalf of the child, the payor cannot withhold support payments to offset a debt owed
by the custodial parent to the payor, although the primary issue before the court, whether a property settlement
debt owed to the wife by the husband might be satisfied from a surplus in child support paid by him, is not
addressed by this annotation.
Although the credit claimed by the husband against back child support, arising from his former wife's failure to
return the husband's portion of a joint income tax return, was denied primarily because it did not substantially
comply with the child support requirement of the divorce decree, the court in Hadford v Hadford (1981) 194 Mont
518, 633 P2d 1181, also expressed the opinion that the wife's retention of the husband's one-half of the refund was
purely a property settlement dispute between the husband and wife which should not affect a separate child
support obligation imposed on the husband.
It was not error to deny a credit against accrued child support payments owed by the husband for a personal loan
allegedly owed to him by the wife (the custodial parent) which was unrelated to the support order, according to the
court in Oliver v Oczkowicz (1990, Tenn App) 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 354, when to do so would amount to
requiring the children to pay the debts of the custodial parent.
Pointing out that the two demands were not owing between the same parties, nor in the same capacity or right,
and, consequently not "mutual," the court in Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38,
would not offset arrearages in child support by imputed rentals due the husband for the time the wife was in
wrongful possession of his separate real property.
Finding the reasoning in Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38, this subsection,
persuasive, the court in Broyles v Broyles (1985, Wyo) 711 P2d 1119, ruled that a setoff was not permitted against
a child support deficiency in the amount of a damages award in favor of the husband as a consequence of the
wife's failure to pay certain obligations as required by the terms of the property settlement agreement, when the
award arose from the husband's payment of the wife's debts, and not those of the child. The primary concern of the
court was the welfare of the child, whose independent right to support was not to be impaired by equitable
adjustments between his parents. The court apparently embraced the position that there was no conceivable reason
why a portion of a parent's debt should be allowed as a setoff against child support.
But, on the other hand, the courts in the following cases ruled that under certain circumstances an obligation owed
by the supported spouse might be set off against the support obligation owed to the child.
The court in Picht v Henry (1961) 252 Iowa 559, 107 NW2d 441, apparently rejected a wife's position that child
support due to be paid by her former husband was not her property and not subject to her individual obligation,
arising under the terms of the property settlement, to pay her husband a certain sum of money from the proceeds
of the sale of the marital home. The court stated that such an argument overlooked the fact that the husband was
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not a stranger from whom the children's right to support must be protected, as was an ordinary creditor. Where
both spouses had an equal duty to support the children, the court seemed to view the request for setoff as similar
to a controversy between spouses as to how, or from which assets, the expense should be apportioned between
them, the resolution of which depended upon equity and the welfare of the children. In allowing the requested
setoff, the court found no jeopardy to that welfare in the case before it.[FN25]
And see Krause v Krause (1987, Butler Co) 35 Ohio App 3d 18, 518 NE2d 1221, in which the court held that it
was permissible to set off the wife's current child support obligation, ordered upon a change of the child's custody,
against the husband's arrearages, when the payments involved the same parties and arose out of the same right to
child support. The court added that equity dictated that before the husband received any child support payments
from the wife, he must satisfy the arrearage incurred from his violation of a court order by refusing to pay the
support.
3[d] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that offset
against child support must provide support to child, generally
The courts in the cases found below, expressing or recognizing the view that the special nature or purpose of the
child support obligation was relevant to whether an offset should be permitted, denied an offset against child
support when it was not shown that the amount in question actually provided support to the child.
The court indicated in Anonymous v Anonymous (1983, Ala App) 428 So 2d 109, a case in which the request for
credit for several expenditures made by a husband on behalf of his former wife and children against both alimony
and child support arrearages was denied, that the key factor in its determination as to the propriety of a credit
against child support was whether the sum contributed to the actual support of the child. The court was influenced,
in refusing to credit against alimony the payments on a car provided to the wife, that the sums gave the appearance
of being in the nature of gifts rather than payment for necessities.
However, on the other hand, in Haygood v Haygood (1991, Ala App) 581 So 2d 870, reh overr (Ala App) 1991
Ala Civ App LEXIS 241 and cert den, without op (Ala) 1991 Ala LEXIS 742, mortgage payments made on the
residence of the husband, in which the former wife and children resided during a period of reconciliation were
found to be properly credited against delinquent child support, when the court viewed the payments as rental
payments on behalf of the children.
And, upon the wife's appeal of the reduction of a child support arrearage owed by her former husband, in Dodd v
Dodd (1991, Ala App) 588 So 2d 476, the court concluded that it was error to allow the husband credit for
payment of the wife's expense in moving the family to another state after the couple's divorce, when the children's
ongoing basic needs were not met by the expenditure. Although there was some evidence that the spouses had
agreed to the credit, the focus of the court's inquiry was whether the expenses clearly could be categorized as
essential to basic child support. According to the court, however, it was not error to approve even gratuitously
expenses if this test was met.
And, although the court did not demand that the funds at issue be used to support the children, see, Hinton v
Reynolds (1983, Fla App D4) 442 So 2d 1111, in which the court expressed the opinion that an equitable basis for
some setoff or credit for the husband on his child support obligation might well be demonstrated if shown that his
former wife actually used all or part of the funds misappropriated from him for support of the children.
See also Oliver v Oczkowicz (1990, Tenn App) 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 354, in which the court would not permit
credit against accrued child support payments for a personal loan owed by the custodial parent to the noncustodial
parent which was "unrelated to the support order." It should be noted, however, that it is unclear from the decision
whether the court meant by this language a debt unrelated to the provision of necessaries to the children, or a debt
not arising under the terms of the court order.
Upon the husband's petition for habeas corpus arising from his confinement pursuant to an order finding him in
contempt for failure to pay child support, the court in Re McLemore (1974, Tex Civ App Dallas) 515 SW2d 356,
rejecting the husband's challenge to the validity of the commitment order based on the court's failure to give him 001795
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credit for money expended by him for the benefit of his former wife, stated that the support order in question had
directed payments to be made monthly for the benefit of the children and, consequently, expenditure solely for the
benefit of the wife would not exonerate him from his liability to pay child support.
Construing Tex. Fam.Code 14.41(a),(c) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991), the court in Medrano v Medrano (1991,
Tex App San Antonio) 810 SW2d 426, held it was error to grant an offset to reduce a child support arrearage owed
by a husband for expenditures other than those for "actual support to the child." The wife had brought a suit
against the husband for failure to make child support payments, and challenged credits given against the amount
allegedly owed for sums paid by the husband toward a note payable by the wife, for the purchase of her car, or the
value of her use of the husband's car. The statute stated in pertinent part that a judgment for unpaid child support
may be subject to a counterclaim or offset for reimbursement for actual support provided to the child by the spouse
obligated to pay support. It was clear to the court that the offset allowed was outside the quoted language of the
provision, although noting that the wife's statement that the offset was based on expenses other than those
necessary for the child's support was not challenged by the husband.
24[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for medical care, clothing, or the likeSetoff not allowed
In the following cases, it was determined that a spouse would not be allowed to offset against delinquent alimony
payments expenditures made to others for the benefit of his former spouse to provide medical care, clothing, or
other necessities.
The court in Viser v Viser (1962) 243 La 706, 146 So 2d 409ovrld on other grounds by Miller v Miller (La) 321 So
2d 318, rejected the husband's claim for a credit against accrued alimony pendente lite for payments on
merchandise, including clothing and furniture, purchased and charged to him by his wife prior to the alimony
decree, perceiving no legal basis for deducting these costs from the alimony fixed by the court. The wife had
purchased the items the day before her departure from the marital home. The husband had paid or agreed to pay to
satisfy the accounts for the merchandise, and two of the accounts had been reduced to judgment against him.
While the court agreed that the availability of the merchandise was relevant to the alimony rate insofar as it
reduced the wife's needs, this issue was not before it, but only the amount due under the previous alimony
judgment.[FN65]
Credit card charges for the purchase of clothes by the wife immediately prior to leaving the couple's home, which
the husband was seemingly obliged to pay, were not allowed as a credit against arrears in alimony pendente lite by
the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir) 535 So 2d 1317. The claim for reimbursement of the charges
was treated in the same manner as that for funds allegedly withdrawn from a community bank account by the wife,
the court saying that an offset based on a disputed and "unliquidated" community claim should be resolved upon
partition and settlement of the community property regime, rather than as a defense to a claim for unpaid alimony,
relying upon Hartley v Hartley (1977, La) 349 So 2d 1258, 18, and citing LSA-C.C. art. 1893, the statutory
setoff provision.
In Taplinger v Taplinger (1967, 1st Dept) 29 App Div 2d 530, 285 NYS2d 888, more fully discussed in 20[a],
the court disallowed a credit against delinquent temporary alimony for amounts paid by the husband, prior to the
rendition of any support order, to maintain health insurance for the wife's benefit.
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To go out Monday April 20th
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 4/19/09 8:03 PM
To: ldavenport@washoelegalservices.org; dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
1 attachment
Alien vs Sponsor immigration research.docx (367.5 KB)
Hi Deb and Lidia,
At the last hearing in Davenport I believe Judge Hardy said (and this is not in the minutes but could still
be held against us) that our discovery requests (including the subpoena duces tecum to the lender's
involved in Richard's residential purchases--we seek a copy of the loan applications to establish he is
lying about his income to the court) need to go out by Monday, April 20th, 2009, or else we will be
stopped from seeking these materials or even introducing them into evidence. Nik Palmer was told to
be cooperative in helping us ascertain who to send these subpoenas to (see if you can figure out just
based on the discovery already provided or the recorders website). I hope you have gotten a check
from Robin to do this. We don't always have a lot of time to send these out and that is why we need
to speed up the process for getting a check from Robin. Lidia, if a check from Robin is not ready, I
suggest you go get a money order for $25 for each subpoena that needs to go out and we can get you
reimbursed.
I am attachign some very, very informative law review articles I uncovered recently and I suggest you
get very familar with these, Lidia. Also, see the minutes the court posted on the 15th...they direct Lidia
to provide something like the last four months of bank statements related to the rents she receives on
her parents condo (which is in her name). Lidia, I suggest you try to figure out what it is Judge Hardy
wanted from you and give it him to the best of your ability and if that's not possible, then just write a
short affidavit explaining why (Deb can help format it). Deb, call me tomorrow when these subpoena
are ready to go out and I can come in and sign them.
PS- Deb, the sub duces tecum's need to go out in Kearns as well.
Lidia, as I wrote you before, you need to get a copy of the last hearing before Hardy and meticulously
right down every direction he gave to either party and make sure they get done. You need to do this.
Deb, check her work. Deadlines were mentioned that did not make it into the minutes and we will still
be held to them nonetheless.
Thank You,
Zach
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RE: WLS receipt of my complaint April 19th, 2009
From: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org) You moved this message to its current
location.
Sent: Mon 4/27/09 9:32 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach,
Call Coe
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2009 11:12 PM
To: kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com; toddtorvinen@sbcglobal.net; Paul Elcano
Subject: WLS receipt of my complaint April 19th, 2009
Please see my complaint below, sent last Sunday and received according the the electronic receipt of delivery
provided by my electronic mail carrier.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: pelcano@washoelegalservices.org; mashley@washoelegalservices.org
Subject: The email you were sent last Sunday
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2009 23:02:20 -0700
Dear Paul,
Here is the email you were sent last Sunday. My account shows that it was received by you.
Please place a copy of this in my employment file.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: pelcano@washoelegalservices.org; zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
Subject: PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2009 19:52:41 -0700
THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED FOR PAUL ELCANO ONLY, PLEASE DO NOT READ UNLESS YOU ARE THE INTENDED
RECIPIENT.
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Paul Elcano, Executive Director
Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
April 15
th
, 2009
Dear Paul,
I wish to make another formal complaint alleging a hostile work environment that includes harassment, sexual harassment, workplace
bullying, discrimination and other prohibited conduct directed towards due to my race, gender, religion, national origin, political affiliation,
sexual orientation, and age.
I have been harassed, sexually harassed, and discriminated against by employees of Washoe Legal Services on many occasions. This is
ongoing. I have informed you and others at our workplace of this harassment many times. Some, but not all, of the prohibited behavior
directed towards me includes inappropriate sexually charged comments, racially charged comments, gender discrimination, screaming, the
use of disparaging and foul language, bullying, and intimidation. Much of this conduct has focused on my gender, sexual orientation, national
origin, political affiliation or viewpoint, race and other immutable characteristics. This conduct has continued to occur and is presently
ongoing. Marc Ashley, Karen Sabo, and John Sasser were definitely made aware of this by me in one of our sit down meetings and I
informed them of my wish to file a formal complaint at that time, though I do not believe my request was followed up on. I recently filed a
formal complaint approximately two months ago but have yet to hear back from anyone with Washoe Legal Services regarding that
complaint.
I am in no way going to detail every single inappropriate or prohibited act by a Washoe Legal Services employee directed at me in this
communication. It is my firm desire that we all just get along, serve our clients well, and make efficient use of the grants bestowed upon us,
and I would hate to see anyone lose their job without a real opportunity to address these issues. This inappropriate conduct has included a
variety of activities, not all of which I will be able to fully detail in this complaint but will be able to provide details at an appropriate time.
I would like a copy of this and my other complaints placed in my employment file. I request that the formal complaint and grievance process
begin soon.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Subject:
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2009 08:58:08 -0700
From: pelcano@washoelegalservices.org
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com; toddtorvinen@sbcglobal.net
Dear Zach,
For some reason your e-mail did not come through on my computer so I just received it yesterday from a board
member. This matter was referred to the Board independently, not by me, and as a result they are handling it. Because of this
situation I am not to be communicating directly with you. The purpose of this communication is to clarify my status and
address a misunderstanding about your personal belongings. You are free to pick up any personal affects you want. We only
request that you do so outside of business hours and with me and a board member present. Arrangements to do so, and all
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further communication about this matter should be made to our Board President Kathy Breckenridge at
Kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.comwith a copy to Todd Torvinen at toddtorvinen@sbcglobal.net. If they instruct you differently then
you should follow their instructions.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
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WLS
From: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org) You moved this message to its current
location.
Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Cc: Kathy Breckenridge (kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com)
1 attachment
ltrCoughlin2ndDraft.doc (30.5 KB)
Letter attached.
001801
Dear Zach,
I have been authorized by the Board to handle this matter.
1. Your current suspension was a result of the order entered by Judge Gardner in
the Joshi matter;
2. Suspension means that you are no longer to participate as a lawyer in any case
assigned to you by WLS until further notice. You may appear on your own
behalf to litigate the order of sanctions entered by Judge Gardner. If any
lawyer contacts you about a WLS case you must refer them to Caryn
Sternlicht or Marc Ashley;
3. According to the Courts order, you were sanctioned for arguing incessantly,
being unprepared, making sarcastic and derogatory remarks to the Court, and
for rude and disrespectful conduct. You were personally fined $934 as a result
of this conduct;
4. I could not evaluate your conduct at trial until I received the tape of the
hearing; this tape was promptly ordered, and was finally received on
Thursday, April 23
rd
. I have not yet reviewed this tape in its entirety.
5. You have requested a copy of your personnel file. This has been made
available to you;
6. We have delivered a copy of the tape of the Joshi matter to you;
7. You requested a formal response to your complaint concerning Rhonda. This
was investigated by me within 48 hours of your complaint. There is no
question that your office behavior (which included yelling, and calling her a
hall monitor, etc.) upset her, and as a direct result she made a comment to you.
She was counseled as to the type of language she used, and specifically told
that even though she was upset this language (bite me) was not appropriate
for the workplace. I did not realize you wanted a formal response to this
incident. Please consider this your formal response. I am unaware of any
specific written complaints other than the one you made to me about Rhonda.
Please provide me with copies of all other written complaints sent by you to
me prior to the entry of Judge Gardners order. Please make sure they are
dated. I will review them and indicate to you what the disposition of those
matters may be.
001802
8. Counseling for difficulties in office interaction had already been scheduled
when I received Judge Gardners order. You did not appear for the mandatory
meeting at which I announced this counseling;
9. We have received a copy of a 50 page motion for reconsideration you filed in
the Joshi matter. I will review this in its entirety. If there is any other written
material you want me to review in determining whether or not your
employment should continue with WLS you must provide it to me by 5:00 pm
Monday, May 4
th
. I will be happy to pick up any such material at a reasonable
time and place if you are not comfortable emailing it to me.
Based on the forgoing I will be taking the following action:
1. I will review the tape in the Joshi matter, your fifty page motion for
reconsideration and any other written material you provide to me. If your conduct
was as represented by Judge Gardner you will be terminated. This termination
will be based exclusively on the manner in which you conducted this hearing, and
will not be related to any ultimate outcome regarding the sanctions order. WLS
can not maintain an employment relationship with a lawyer who argues
incessantly, appears unprepared and makes sarcastic and derogatory remarks to
the court, and otherwise conducts his or her case in a rude and disrespectful
manner. This determination will be made by me by 10:00 am Wednesday
morning, May 6, 2009.
2. If the hearing tape does not justify Judge Gardners order WLS will require you to
participate in the previously referred to employee counseling pursuant to the
directives of our industrial psychologist. This counseling is currently going on
with other employees at WLS. The counselor will determine the extent to which
you will participate and maintain a case load. You will maintain your employment
status, and will receive pay and benefits throughout this course of counseling.
3. If you wish to discuss any resolution of this matter between now and Wednesday
morning at 10 am I will be available to meet with you at any convenient time and
place, including this weekend. You may bring any person you would like to a
resolution discussion. I will come alone unless you request otherwise.
This has been sent to you by email. Please advise me as to the address to which a hard
copy of this transmittal should be delivered.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
001803
PAGE 1
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W. 12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89503
775 338 8118
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
May 4th, 2009
Dear Executive Director Elcano,
I have yet to receive a copy of my employment file. I would like such a copy to include any allegations that
have been made against me, whether by WLS employees, clients, or some other party or entity. Please
provide such a copy. I do not have a copy of my employment, contrary to what is indicated in Mr. Elcano's
recent letter, there seems to be some confusion in that regard. Regardless, it seems as though it is not that
burdensome a request to provide another copy should WLS have attempted some prior delivery of such a
copy. Please mail the copy of my employment and personnel file to me at:
945 W. 12th St.
Reno, NV 89509
Or, alternatively, if it is in a digital format, email it to me at this account. Please place a copy of this
correspondence and the attachments herein in my employment file. Please see the email from Mr. Proctor
regarding a potential meeting on Monday, May 4
th
.. After Mr. Elcano's note of May 1, 2009, I am left with the
impression that the meeting with Mr. Proctor is no longer sought. Is this the case? Nonetheless, at this late
date it is difficult to be available for any meeting today given the doubt cast by Mr. Elcano's letter upon whether
such a meeting will take place. If Mr. Proctor or Mr. Torvinen (to the extent that both are, in fact, on the
Washoe Legal Services Board of Directors- I have not been provided a list of individuals whom comprise the
Board despite repeated written requests) wish to reschedule this meeting, please let me know. Mr. Proctor
has indicated that I am not allowed to have representation with me at any such meeting.
I have received a number of conflicting messages from WLS, regarding various issues, including the
status of who is making the decision on my suspension, who instituted it in the first place and why, and who will
be handling any subsequent matters related to it. Please provide some clarification. With regard to Mr.
Elcano's instruction that I must provide any and all materials called for by his recent note, that is not possible as
WLS has impeded me from accessing many of these materials. Please take this letter as my formal
request to be provided access to my office, files, and computer for the purposes of preparing both
my response in the Joshi Bharti Request for Reconsideration (for which I have asked for additional
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time to respond) as well as any subsequent Reply or Appeal. Further, these materials are necessary
to respond to Mr. Elcano's demands. I am available to come to WLS and make such copies today,
Monday after 7:00 p.m. , or Tuesday May 5
th
between 2-4 p.m. And 6-8 p.m. Please let me know if some
other time will work for WLS.
Additionally , I am requesting additional time to appropriately secure the correct representation to
protect my interests in these matters. Further, I must point out that I do not know what Mr. Elcano is referring
to regarding any sort of counseling that was announced with regard to the Domestic Violence staff. This is the
first I have heard of it.
Please see attached a copy of the the Motion for Reconsideration with two Exhibits attached that I
filed in the Bharti Joshi divorce matter. Also, I am attaching a correspondence I have previously sent WLS
attorneys detailing some of my concerns in other cases. Please note that the version actually filed with the
Court likely differs substantially from any rough draft you may have received a copy of. My preparation of this
Request for Reconsideration was greatly derailed by the lack of access I was afforded by WLS to the file, my
work product, records of correspondences with the client and opposing counsel, Outlook files, Tasks notes,
emails, etc. It was only by a stroke of luck that I had copies of the emails that ultimately formed Exhibits 1 and
2. There is certainly other documents that would make great exhibits but I have yet to be provided any copies
by WLS of these materials, despite my written requests for access and or copies. To simply provide a video of
the trial (provided by Mr. Ashley at 4:00 p.m. the day the Request for Reconsideration fell due) is insufficient.
I will reiterate here my request that WLS provide copies to me, or allow me to make, copies of all the
materials referenced above and any other materials that would prove useful with regard to defending myself.
May I have permission to discuss these matters with the client? feel it is necessary to adequately defend
myself, and, perhaps, in order to protect the client's interests (please see the discussion on the Santiago case
infra).
It is important to check the file for many things. For instance, did Mr. Springgate actually send out
discovery requests, as he stated at trial. There is no record of that on CourtConnect or eFile. If Mr.
Springgate merely provided documents pursuant to Rule 16.2, and included a sentence requesting I do the
same, that arguably does not rise to the level of a discovery request (such as a Request for Admission, etc.)
contemplated by the Court in its Order after Trial. It is also important to check with the staff and my emails to
them to determine whether any directions I gave them with regard to sending out discovery requests were
followed or whether either the paralegal or any person asserting that they are a paralegal were able to perform
any of the legal research or tasks that I delegated to them. I wish to expressly state here that I do not disclaim
any privacy right I have with respect to my computer, emails, or any other matter, including materials contained
within my office. My preference is to be granted access to my office for the purpose of making copies of the
appropriate documents and files. It would be most prudent, however, for WLS to assume I have such
documents (though I make no claim to here) and a system of inventorying exactly what is in my office, and on
my computer, such that any suspicious subsequent system failure, theft, or otherwise which may destroy any
such files will be looked on by any court or trier of fact that may subsequently become involved in this matter
with serious consternation.
It may also be important to note that an attorney trying this case may have sent out every discovery
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request known to man, but if that attorney had not tracked down the authority that I did, which is set forth in
my Motion for Reconsideration and was reference in court at trial, he likely would have done no better than I
did, and arguably, would have cost Ms. Joshi her shot at forcing the Judge in this case to do something that
would have put Ms. Joshi in a much better position than that which she would have enjoyed had she accepted
the settlement.
To merely review the tape of the trial as if that is sufficient to determine how appropriate my actions
were is not supportable. Does WLS have any information as to what the Settlement Conference was like?
Have you asked Ms. Joshi? Does she feel as though she was being railroaded into accepting the settlement
without so much as a case or two in support of why it made sense? I certainly have not been asked my take on
the Settlement Conference, but, briefly, I can tell you that I found it unduly coercive. Do you think an attorney
has a right to make or respond to objections at trial to preserve issues for appeal? Is there clearly established
legal precedent in Nevada to support the assertion that evidence of domestic violence is inadmissible for any
purposes related to either alimony, community property, and or debt distributions? Is there precedent for the
position that one can or can not use a shared debt to a third party creditor as a basis for set off with regard to
alimony? This case contains an assortment of legal issues, the resolution of which is potentially precedent
making. These issues are ones that would make fine grounds for an appeal, nearly all detailed in my Motion
for Reconsideration.
I would like to point WLS to Caryn Sternlicht's work in substituting in for me as counsel in the Brenda
Santiago Objection to Master's Recommendations. Judge Gardner issued the original Master's
Recommendation. My review of the attached documents does not show any sort of agreement being entered
into, by me or my client, with regard to turning over her vehicle to her abuser. My review does show and
Objection I filed pursuant to WDCR 24 wherein I cite a measured overview of the various approaches taken
in the states with regard to the disposition of vehicles in these types of matters, particularly where the failure to
own a vehicle may have an impact on the victim's safety.
Ms. Sternlicht apparently took the stance that WLS had agreed to this deal to which we were
objecting and that, since she felt there was no Nevada law on point (which does happen from time to time in a
state without an intermediate level Court of Appeals to contribute to the body of precedent practitioners are
able to take direction from) she was refusing to argue on behalf of her client, Ms. Santiago. Ms. Sternlicht
indicated that Ms. Santiago did not wish to seek an Appeal after the denial of the Objection to Master's
Recommendation.. Imagine if the attorney in Brown v. Board of Education had taken this approach.
I must point out that I am particularly loathe to say anything that might appear critical of Ms. Sternlicht
because I have first hand knowledge and experience with regard to exactly how difficult the job she does is,
how emotionally taxing it is, how, unlike the vast majority of attorney's positions, it involves actual risk of
violence or retaliation on a daily basis in dealing with extremely volatile individuals. After one has worked in
either Ms. Sternlicht's or my position for some time, and peered around corners and darkened parking lots
wondering if some adverse party (be it one with a known violent criminal past, known psychiatric disorder,
known ability as a distance sharpshooter, known use of mind altering substances, known chemical dependency,
etc.) is out there waiting to exact revenge for some perceived slight, only then would one truly be able to make
something close to a reasoned and objective evaluation of the work done by Ms. Sternlicht and myself.
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Indeed, given the recent NRS 7.085 tax against myself, one may be hesitant to argue with Ms. Sternlicht's
choice not to pursue the recovery in Santiago. However, a look at the authority on point is in order.
Further, "NRS 33. NRS 33.030 Contents of order; interlocutory appeal.
1. The court by a temporary order may...
(g) Order such other relief as it deems necessary in an emergency situation...
2. The court by an extended order may grant any relief enumerated in subsection 1 and:
(c) Order the adverse party to...
(3) Pay for the support of the applicant or minor child..." (Emphasis added).
A reading of NRS 33 would seem to yield some authority for letting Ms. Santiago keep the car that
was in her possession at that time, a car which had a DMV registration with her name on it along with the
adverse party's, and a car for which Ms. Santiago had entered into evidence at the Extended Protection Order
hearing a copy of the loan agreement for the car wherein both party's signatures were represented under the
heading of "buyers". What a reading of NRS 33 does not seem to support is for the Master to enter
an Order that demands Ms. Santiago turn over this car to the party against whom she was just
granted an EPO within 3 hours of the EPO being entered. At the least it would seem that an EPO is not
the appropriate forum for someone whom had just had an EPO entered against him (and where accusations of
rape and violence were broached) to be given relief from the court with regard to the ownership and
possession of a vehicle that is arguably co-owned by the parties.
How Ms. Sternlicht decided that NRS 33 and, supposedly Rule 11 did not allow her to advocate on
behalf of Ms. Santiago is not something I can entirely understand.
Even if there is no specific statutory authority for economic relief, there may still be a strong argument
for granting the use of personal property, directing to continue paying for transportation and child care
expenses, utilities/or other household expenses, or including language that prohibits defendant from transferring,
selling or encumbering property in which the survivor has an interest.
Most state statutes contain catch-all provisions that allow courts to grant other relief necessary or
appropriate to survivors in protection order proceedings. Nevada arguably has two such provisions, NRS
33.030(1)(g) and NRS 33.030(2)(c)(3).
One law review is particularly instructive in this respect. It notes that a. Rights to Use of Personal
Property: If rights to personal property are not specifically established as part of the civil protection order,
these items of property can present an arena for continuing conflict. 857 Twenty-six state statutes specifically
state that the issuance of a civil protection order does not affect title to personal property, 858 a notion upheld
in case law. 859 Seventeen state statutes stipulate that the court can grant exclusive possession of personal
property in the protection order, 860 and eighteen states and the District of Columbia provide that the order
can determine who has the right to use certain property. 861 Some statutes delineate clearly that checkbooks,
862 keys and personal effects, 863 household furniture, 864 and cars 865 are among the items of personal
property which can be disposed of in the order. Case law consistently supports this approach. 866 The court
in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald 867 ruled that the petitioner may obtain personal property from respondent, even if a
divorce decree has already addressed property issues. 868 The majority of jurisdictions have realized that
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enabling the courts to resolve questions about usage of personal property in a civil protection order removes
arenas of potential conflict by preventing the parties from having to contact each other in order to retrieve their
belongings, or to discuss an unresolved and controversial property matter. Reduction in contact between the
parties combined with resolution of issues that could become controversial can help prevent future violence.
21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 937-938.
.n857 Orloff & Klein, supra note 26, at 87; Browne, supra note 10, at 1080-81.
.n858 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(9) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4(II) (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29b(9) (West
Supp. 1993); N.M. Stat. Ann. section 40-13-5(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); Va. Code Ann. section 16.1-253.1A
(Michie Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. section 35-21-105(d) (1988).
.n859 See, e.g., Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fam. Ct. 1984); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d
767 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1979).
.n860 Cal. Fam. Code section 2035 (West 1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993);
Ga. Code Ann. section 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Kan. Stat.
Ann. section 60-3107(a)(9) (Supp. 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 46:2135(A)(2), (4) (West 1982); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766(1)(D) (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. section 518B.01.6 (West
Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section 455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-
B:4I(b)(1) (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29(b)(9) (West 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50B-3(a)(8)
(1989); N.D. Cent. Code section 14-07.1-02.4.f (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section
3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson Supp. 1992); S.C. Code Ann. section 20-4-60(c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. section71.11(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992); see also Model Code, supra note 15, sections 305,
306.
.n861 Cal. Fam. Code section 2035 (West 1994); D.C. Code Ann. section 16-1005(c) (1989), Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766(1) (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. section 518B.01.6(a) (West Supp.
1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section 455.050 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4I(a)(5)
(1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29b (West Supp. 1993); N.M. Stat. Ann. section 40-13-5 (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50B-3(a) (1989); N.D. Cent. Code section 14-07.1-02.4f (Supp.
1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
section71.11(d) (West Supp. 1993); see also Model Code, supra note 15, sections 305, 306.
.n862 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section
455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993).
.n863 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section
455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993).
.n864 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766.1.D (West Supp. 1992); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
section 173-B:4(I)(b)(1) (1990).
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.n865 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. section 25.35.010(8) (restraining a defendant from entering plaintiff's car or
propelled vehicle); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 46:2135(A)(2) (West 1982); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann.
section 4-506(d)(9) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section 455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4(I)(b)(1) (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:2529(b)(9) (West 1992); N.D. Cent.
Code section 14-07.1-02.4.f (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson Supp.
1992); see also Model Code, supra note 15, sections 305, 306.
.n866 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that trial court in
the domestic abuse proceeding was not precluded from addressing the request for the return of wife's
belongings, even if the divorce decree had granted relief); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (involving protection order which divided personal property between the parties); Jane Y. v.
Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (holding that court could order the removal of family dog
where the dog was trained to attack the wife); Smart v. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that temporary protection order can give wife exclusive use of marital home and order husband to
remove his personal effects from the home and turn over his key to the police); Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390
N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (involving divorce action where lower court entered an order in adult abuse
proceeding which divided property). But see Cooley v. Cooley, Ohio App. LEXIS 4996 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
12, 1993) (stating that permanent property division is not allowed in a protection order).
.n867 406 N.W.2d at 52.
.n868 Id. at 54.
.n869 Cal. Fam. Code section 2035 (West 1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949 (Supp. 1993); 750
ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Ind. Code Ann. section 34-4-5.1-5 (West Supp. 1993); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. section 403.750(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 46:2135(A)(4)
(West 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766(1)(D) (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. section
518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. section 93-21-13(2)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat.
section 455-050.3(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993); Mont. Code Ann. section 40-4-121(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4I(a)(5) (1990); N.M. Stat. Ann. section 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1992);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, section 2.1(g)
(1992); S.C. Code Ann. section 20-4-60(c)(4),(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
section71.11(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. section 35-21-105(a)(v) (1988).
Arguably, monetary relief is proper and necessary to the protection and restoration of the victim. It is
proper to hold defendant accountable. The victim of domestic violence should not be forced to choose
between her personal safety and economic survival. Additionally, venue is proper. Referral to an alternate
forum will cause unnecessary delay and deny the victim an effective remedy. Because economic dependence
and severe financial stress on abused individuals can so great an impact a survivors choice to stay or leave an
abusive relationship and because economic abuse by batterers is often an aspect of the power and control over
their lives, stronger legal advocacy for economic safety
and restitution is important to the economic empowerment of battered individuals and the goal of assuring that
people may live free of violence and oppression by their intimate partners.
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Attorneys and advocates, together with their clients, should carefully evaluate the economic costs of
past abuse and future survival so that clients needs are assessed comprehensively and articulated to the court.
The economic relief available through a protection order may be an essential temporary mechanism to ensure
safety and promote economic justice for the survivor.
Lastly, I wish to point out that I am not ratifying or agreeing that Mr. Elcano's letter's
description of any of the events described in it are in accord with my recollection. There are a
number of things I would not be able to agree with.
WLS has asked that I provide copies of all other written complaints sent by you to me prior to the
entry of Judge Gardners order. Please make sure they are dated. I will review them and indicate to you what
the disposition of those matters may be. In that regard, I request that WLS provide me copies of any emails
received by WLS wherein I communicated these complaints. These emails should be dated, as all emails
typically are, providing electronic proof of delivery. Mr. Elcano has previously written me to indicate that he
did not receive the email for which I have electronic confirmation of receipt dated April 19
th
, 2009. I was
suspended the following day. Additionally, I am not sure how the date of entry of Judge Gardner's Order
comes into play. Please provide WLS's stance on when my suspension was communicated to me, comparing
the date of that communication to the date of WLS's receipt of my various personnel complaints. Doing so
will help me prepare the responses that have been requested.
Mr. Elcano notes that counseling for difficulties in office interaction had already been scheduled when I
received Judge Gardners order. You did not appear for the mandatory meeting at which I announced this
counseling. I only became aware of this upon reading Mr. Elcano's May 1, 2009 letter. Please provide an
indication and proof of when such a meeting was announced and to the extent the purpose of the meeting was
explained.
I need additional time to more fully indicate the various circumstances that underpin my previous
written complaints to WLS. Some, but certainly not all of my concerns, are set forth in more detail below:
Caryn Sternlicht, Esq., domestic violence attorney, WLS:
Caryn Sternlicht has indicated to me that I am not capable of working as a domestic violence
attorney due to the fact that I am a male. Ms. Sternlicht spent the first six months that I worked at
Washoe Legal Services telling me on a daily basis how very disappointed she was that I was hired, how
vehemently she was against my hiring. She indicated that I should quit my job in light of this. Additionally, Ms.
Sternlicht has announced to a domestic violence clinic that I observed, conducted by WLS, that domestic
violence is when a man harms a woman. This clinic was attended by two men, men who were seeking legal
services resulting from being victim's of domestic violence. Ms. Sternlicht went on to point out that there is no
such thing as domestic violence resulting from a woman harming a man. The two men in the clinic seemed
nonplussed, disappointed, and hurt by these statements. One of these men stated, hello? I am right here.
This is ridiculous. I had previously indicated to both Ms. Sternlicht and Ms. Zandra Lopez (as well as Karen
Sabo, Marc Ashley, John Sasser, and Melissa Mangiaracina) that I strongly objected to any statements or
literature given out by WLS that expressed the position that men could never be victim's of domestic violence.
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I feel this violates the Equal Protection Clause, amongst other laws of our state and country.
Ms. Sternlicht has sexually harassed, harassed, and discriminated against myself and others throughout
the time I have been at WLS. She has made my position one in which I am subjected to a hostile work
environment on a a repeated, systematic, and continual basis, and her actions are motivated by my race,
gender, sexual orientation, national origin, age and other immutable characteristics, as well as characteristics
such as political affiliation or viewpoint, perceived disability, and other inappropriate basis for her behavior. It
is quite normal to hear Ms. Sternlicht speaking quite loudly and repeatedly, at WLS, such comments (whether
directed to me in conversation or merely said out loud in a booming voice for all at WLS to hear) as:
all the little girls at that middle school like to give the boys bl*wj*bs in the bathroom while their friends stand
lookout for teachers, it is terrible, it is totally disgusting
I keep getting all these emails that are about penis's, making your penis larger, do this or that with your penis
(this sentiment was expressed on a weekly, and almost daily, basis, particularly when my office was located
five feet outside of Ms. Sternlicht's always open office door, and was often made at considerably more
decibels than less the more mundane statements Ms. Sternlicht made throughout the day.
Irish people are drunks and all these drug addicts and drunks are just such pathetic, awful people
(This theme was particularly articulated shortly after Mr. Elcano had asked a WLS employee if he could tell
Ms. Sternlicht about various private issues related to that employee)
Germans are evil
He (referring to an adverse party) likes to get these oriental women and marry them and or have children with
them. It is sick, he is such a disgusting little pervert, having this fetish for asian women, picking the same type
of woman over and over, all these men do this type of thing and it is completely vile and disgusting (this theme
was repeated quite often).
Ms. Sternlicht also took to the practice of calling me into her office to loudly berate and yell at me for
twenty to thirty minutes at a time over the most minor details of our jobs or our personal interaction, including
my request that she help clarify some of the issues for which she had asked me to help her do some research
on, which related to social security issues involved in a divorce matter. I was doing this research in an effort to
help Ms. Sternlicht out, as she apparently found her case load of 18 clients to be overwhelming. This included
a practice where, upon my saying anything in even the most calm voice, Ms. Sternlicht would say don't you
yell at me, how dare you raise your voice at me!,quit threatening me, or back off, hiss, get the hell away
from me, back off! It was truly a bewildering experience. Ms. Sternlicht often let me know that I had to put
up with anything she said or did because she was untouchable in light of the protected classes she was a
member of. Additionally, Ms. Sternlicht announced at an attorney's Inner Circle meeting that someone was
leaving little curly pubic hairs in the bathroom, near the toilet. The comments are particularly interesting in light
of other comments made by Ms. Sternlicht denouncing U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.
It will take quite a bit more time and ink to detail all the inappropriate behavior Ms. Sternlicht has
directed at just me, and which was clearly motivated by my race, religion, gender, political affiliation, national
origin, and my membership in other protected classes.. I will not reveal all of it or even fully detail that which I
am revealing here, but will be available to at a later date, at an appropriate time.
Melissa Mangiaracina, child advocacy attorney, WLS:
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Ms. Mangiaracina was a member of the three person panel (for which Ms. Mangiaracina was replaced
by Karen Sabo, Esq., to bring the total of avowed, card carrying liberals on this panel to four out of four)
convened for the purposes of working with the domestic violence unit. At one of the lengthy and exhausting
interviews with this panel that I was called to (my participation in these interviews totaled approximately over
20 face to face hours with this three attorney panel and was characterized by ultra political brow beating,
coercion, intimidation, and abuse of process), Ms. Mangiaracina was in attendance with a glass of water that
bared an emblem depicting then-President George W. Bush with the inscription reading Present Dick of the
United States. I referenced this glass to Ms. Mangiaracina and mentioned that I found it offense, for a variety
of reasons, including, but not limited to, those based on gender and political beliefs and or affiliations. She
brought this same glass to a subsequent additional lengthy meeting between myself and this three attorney
panel, despite my informing her in front of Mr. Sasser and Mr. Ashley, of how troubling I found her display to
be.
WLS office manager Robin Kunce indicated to me, in a staff meeting, that no one, other than Paul
Elcano, was receiving reimbursement for their monthly personal cell phone bill. Subsequently, Ms. Kunce,
upon further questioning by myself, admitted, in front of multiple members of WLS staff, that Ms. Mangiaracina
had received reimbursement from WLS for her own personal monthly cell phone bill. Shortly before this
happened I had presented the question in a staff meeting attended by Mr. Elcano, Mrs. Kunce, and Ms.
Mangiaracina whether anyone at WLS was receiving reimbursement from WLS for using their own personal
cell phone in the course of their employment. Ms. Kunce indicated that no one was receiving such
reimbursement. Ms. Mangiaracina was silent in this regard.
WLS had a group of cell phones and lines that it apparently paid for on a monthly basis. Ms.
Mangiaracina gave me the old phone she had been provided by WLS. I asked WLS if I could instead use my
personal cell phone, thus obviating the need to carry two cell phones everywhere, and cancel the line that WLS
was currently paying for use of the cell phone given to me, and instead receive reimbursement from WLS for
approximately the same amount it was costing WLS for the line Ms. Mangiaracina gave me. My requests,
several of which were written were alternately not responded and denied.
Karen Sabo, Esq.:
Karen Sabo made a statement to me upon my leaving the restroom at WLS. The button on my pants
had accidentally come undone immediately after I had buttoned it d exited the restroom. Ms. Sabo, in a smug
and intimidating tone that also contained the usual degree of hostility in her voice that all her communications to
me have contained, told me that I better make sure I buttoned by pants before I left the restroom. On a
different date, upon leaving the restroom, Ms. Sabo, glared at me, and in front of Rhonda Harrison, called out
to me to inquire as to whether I had left the toilet seat up again (though I no of not one instance where I had
before). I went back to check to see whether I had (as was my wont in many regards, to be extremely
cautious not to offend any of the various groups so well represented at WLS), ascertained that I had indeed
put the toilet seat down, and informed Ms. Sabo of this. Ms. Sabo's conduct as part of the three attorney
panel (she replaced Ms. Mangiaracina) was continually hostile, abusive, threatening, mean spirited, racist,
sexist, extremely political, and coercive.
During one attorney's meeting (Inner Circle is the term used for it at WLS, apparently in homage to the
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television show Survivor Ms. Sabo commented on the then controversy related to Judge Schumacher's
acceptance of some large campaign contribution upon signing some document agreeing to recuse herself from
any potential eminent domain proceeding involving the firm making the campaign contribution. Ms. Sabo
expressed disbelief as to how anyone could possibly infer that Judge Schumacher's doing so might somehow
affect the Court's vote on any matter. Ms. Sabo indicated a complete lack of comprehension as to how this
could affect the total votes in favor or against an issue, or how the ratio of votes for or against an issue could
be at all influenced by such a recusal.
Melissa Mangiaracina indicated to me, at a legal services picnic and in front of our fellow WLS
attorney Karen Palmer that Karen Sabo had ordered Paul Elcano to place Ms. Mangiaracina in the large office
on the second floor near the kitchen upon WLS moving to 299 S. Arlington. This office is one of only six that
have a door in the half of the building currently occupied by WLS. Ms. Mangiaracina indicated that Ms. Sabo
told Mr. Elcano that there would be no discussion as to whether or not this was where Ms. Mangiaracina
would be placed. Ms. Mangiaracina was reportedly placed their for a variety of reasons, including the fact
that this office, with a door and windows that could be shuttered, would allow Ms. Mangiaracina to breastfeed
her newborn child on those days that she brought this child to work with her upon her return from four months
of paid pregnancy leave from an employer with less than 50 employees. Prior to this date, I had repeatedly
made my concerns known to Mr. Elcano, Robin Kunce, WLS office manager, and others at WLS that I felt
quite strongly that I needed a door on my office in order to maintain attorney client confidentiality and establish
a comfort zone for victims of domestic violence to recall to me extremely personal and painful memories of the
suffering they had experienced at the hand's of their abusers (which was necessary for a variety of reasons,
including assessing potential client's eligibility for services pursuant to the grants that fund WLS activities). I
further stated that I needed a door given the extremely hostile work environment I was subjected to on a daily
basis.
I had indicated to these individuals these concerns I had and pointed out that the child advocacy
attorneys seemed to seldom be in the office anyway, as their positions apparently required them to go outside
the office to meet with the children they represent and interact with various government agencies (a practice for
which they apparently receive reimbursement for their gas mileage every month-my requests to WLS for
information related to the amount of reimbursement they received were denied- it is unclear whether Ms.
Mangiaracina, who lives approximately 40 minutes away, each way, from WLS is reimbursed by WLS for her
commute to the office, which can occur several times a week). Given the infrequency with which the child
advocacy attorneys were actually in the office, and the fact that they never have clients or other parties visit
them at the office due to the characteristics of their jobs, I stated that I felt strongly that it made sense for me to
have an office with a door, in much the same way that Caryn Sternlicht has an office with a door. My request
was not granted.
It has been announced at WLS, by Mr. Elcano that domestic violence attorneys will not be reimbursed
for their parking expenses when they attend court. It has also be announced by WLS that the child advocacy
attorney have two paid parking passes next to the court house for their use in attending court. Ms. Sabo had
earlier made the statement that the move from 650 Tahoe St. to 299 S. Arlington Avenue was something she
was entirely in favor of given the much shorter walking distance required of her in going to court should the
move occur.
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Paul Elcano, Executive Director, WLS:
Mr. Elcano has, on numerous occasions, indicated that I am held to a much higher standard than other
employees, whether attorneys or otherwise at WLS, given that I am a white male. Mr. Elcano has expressed
to me that I am to wear a suit and tie to the office daily, establishing a dress code that was applied only to
myself. I indicated some hesitance to submitting to this direction, citing the yoga clothes and athletic wear that
Sarah Class, a child advocacy attorney who apparently still works part-time at WLS (though she may still be
enrolled on WLS health insurance and may still be credited the same number of years worked for WLS for
seniority, pay raises, and other purposes, as those attorneys who work full time and who have not left for
extended Family Medical Leave Act type absences from an employer with less than 50 employees) and
teaches yoga. I further mentioned that Sarah Class's daily wardrobe additionally consisted of clothes seemed
more in line with what a mid-career Stevie Nicks might wear as opposed to the traditional garb commonly
seen on attorneys. Mr. Elcano indicated to me that I need not concern myself with such matters, rather, that I
should do as he said and wear a suit and tie to work everyday. I have done so, save for 'casual Fridays', when
I occasionally were something less formal. However, on the very few 'casual Fridays' that I have worn
anything anywhere near as informal the clothes worn by other attorneys and staff Monday through Thursday,
Mr. Elcano has taken to glancing at me up and down in disapproval and making comments with respect to the
inappropriateness of my polo shirt or new New Balance running shoes, indicating that I am held to a higher
standard in that I am not a member of a protected class.
In this same regard, I had pointed out to Mr. Elcano that Caryn Sternlicht seemed to wear whatever
she pleased to the office, often times looking like one might expect one to look on a Sunday afternoon at
home. I further pointed out that Zandra Lopez commonly came to work, no matter what day, in extremely low
cut and cleavage revealing clothes, sequin studded jeans, ultra casual attire, and other items more commonly
associated with one's off hours. I additionally pointed out that Larry Belasco, a child advocacy attorney a
WLS whom had reportedly left the domestic violence unit after being unable to withstand the assault on his
senses caused by working with Ms. Sternlicht, often came to work on casual Fridays wearing very old and
ratty tennis shoes, an old t-shirt, and jeans to compliment his long shaggy haircut. Mr. Elcano reiterated that I
was held to a higher standard and not treated in a manner similar to my similarly situated peers. He expressed
pressures exerted on him by various individuals and entities, including the Committee to Aid Abused Women,
Tahoe Women's Services, Caryn Sternlicht, Karen Sabo, the WLS Board of Directors, and others to the
effect that I needed to be held to a higher standard and that I was essentially on a zero tolerance standard for
any behavior that did not comport sufficiently with the political correctness and specific leftist political leanings
called for in one working in my current position. Similarly, Mr. Elcano has on approximately 30 occasions
inquired with me as to whether I have paid off a consumer credit card debt that I owed (but disputed strongly),
a debt which came up in conversation pursuant to some question Mr. Elcano had asked me. I indicated to Mr.
Elcano that I did not appreciate being continually reminded of this debt, and that I found it inappropriate for
him to berate me repeatedly with regard to the existence of the debt. Mr. Elcano indicated that he would be
taking no action with respect to various debts Zandra Lopez reportedly owes to various WLS employees for
emergency personal loans after the existence of these debts was pointed out to Mr. Elcano.
I inquired with Mr. Elcano with regard to WLS trying to help in some way pay off the large student
loans attorneys, such as myself, incurred on the path to becoming an attorney. Mr. Elcano indicated that this
was a narrow and small issue that only affected a very few people and that he is more concerned with raising
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everybody's salary. I pointed out to Mr. Elcano that the price of tuition to even a state law school, such as the
one I attended, had risen, since 1975 by 350% percent in comparison the increase in the consumer price index
during that same period, and that, therefore, a much large burden was being bared by individuals such as
myself in this regard, and that any attempt to raise salaries for everyone including those individuals, such
attorneys Sasser, Sabo, Sternlicht, Elcano, Ashley, who graduated from law school prior to this steep and
exponential tuition increase of the last 30 years were disproportionately benefited by a WLS focus on securing
a pension plan for employees compared to any efforts at law loan repayment assistance. I pointed out that it
might be best to try for both. Mr. Elcano gave a confusing response that seemed to indicate it was better not
to get any help from the federal government in this regard because doing so might be done at the expense of
raising salaries in other areas.
Nonetheless, I, as a WLS attorney currently make just barely enough to not qualify for the very
ineffective law loan repayment assistance program offered by our Federal Government. Additionally, I pointed
out that there is an abundance of scholarship in the legal field for minorities and women, and a very, very few
for white males. Further, the grading system used in today's ultra-left law schools (where studies show it is
quite common for a full 85% percent of the faculty to self identify as ardent liberal democrats) are increasingly
subjected to the political motivations of the faculty given these grades (which Mr. Elcano often cites as
examples of the sterling qualifications of various attorneys at WLS, such as Ms. Class and Mrs. Mangiaracina).
Mr. Elcano notably leaves me out of such discussions with regard to the notable qualifications of WLS, made
in staff meetings and otherwise, despite my being ranked 10
th
in my class in law school, passing the bar
examination after the second year of law school (this is almost never accomplished -passage rates for
individuals taking the bar after the second year of law school indicate a 10% passage rate), being a National
Merit Finalist, a member of my school's law review, a licensed patent attorney, and a former litigation associate
a Nevada's third largest law firm Holland & Hart, ne' Hale Lane, or the fact that I passed the June 2001
Nevada bar examination and have gained a great deal of legal experience since that time, in and out of a legal
services setting, for which WLS benefits from on a daily basis).
Additionally, current federal law only allows for loan forgiveness of law student loans after one accrues
25 years of service in a legal aid setting (during the 25 years there is a reduced payment schedule offered to
those earning less than $45,000 annually, any amount still owing after 25 years would be forgiven-it is
important to note that the $45,000 or less annual requirement is difficult to qualify for in that married individuals
income is determined by combining the income of each spouse, a marriage penalty, so to speak). Congress
should enact legislation or the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education should amend existing
regulations governing the income-contingent repayment option of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program by (1) permitting forgiveness sooner than 25 years after a borrower begins repaying loans and (2)
eliminating or reducing the marriage penalty. The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option for Law
Student Loans, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 733, 771-72 (2001). See also, Philip G. Schrag, Repay as You Earn: the
Government's Flawed Program to Help Students Have Public Interest Careers, (2002). However, even if
I did qualify for this program, the law is still greatly flawed, with only 1% of law students ever achieving
complete loan forgiveness upon 25 years of service, despite Congress's expectation when the law was put into
effect that approximately 30% of those with loans would take advantage of the program. The Clark County
Bar Association currently has a program that pays legal services attorneys student loans. Washoe County has
no such program.
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Additionally, at the time of my hiring at WLS and reiterated by WLS on several occasions (including at
a staff meeting) I was promised a substantial raise would be granted upon my completion of one year of
service in the domestic violence unit. To this date, I have worked at Washoe Legal Services since September
2007 and have yet to receive a raise. I have had most, if not all, of my requests for reimbursement (which
included itemized receipts and detailed reports regarding the items at issue) with regard to various items I
purchased in connection with my employment denied or ignored completely (sometimes despite numerous
written inquiries). I purchased, with my own money, a screen for my computer that reduced glare and strain on
one's eyes. My impetus for getting such a screen stemmed from noticing that approximately six secretaries and
or paralegals at WLS had recently been purchased such a screen by WLS. This screen is particularly useful
for those individuals who, like me, look directly at a computer screen for up to 8 hours a day.
Also among the items I have sought reimbursement or approval for but have yet to be granted approval
(or, in many cases, any response whatsoever) by WLS are a cell phone, a cell phone calling plan, a cell phone
Internet plan (it can be quite useful to look up precedent or other pertinent information at the court or check
email using a Blackberry), a trip to a CLE seminar (after watching Caryn Sternlicht go on trips while I have
been at WLS to legal education events in Las Vegas, Colorado, Minnesota, and elsewhere, all entailing hotel
and travel expenses on top of the tuition costs associated with these events; and watching Zandra Lopez go on
trips, that I know of, all expenses paid, to San Francisco and Las Vegas; after seeing Renee Kelly go to a
seminar, on WLS funds, to Florida; seeing Mrs. Kavitha Basavaraj go to San Diego for a seminar; seeing
Karen Palmer going on a WLS funded trip to a seminar in New Orleans just three weeks after she started
working at WLS, and on and on; after all of this I have been told by WLS that I will not be able to go on any
trips for continuing legal education, that WLS will not pay for me to go. My one and only trip while at WLS
consisted of going to the Family Law Conference in Ely-which, admittedly is a great event- and staying in a
$45 a night motel compared to the $150 hotel Zandra Lopez was reimbursed for in her recent trip to a seminar
in San Francisco, which may or may not have been or paralegals, something which Zandra Lopez may or may
not be). It is important to note that Robin Kunce, WLS's Office Manager was fronted the money to go to a
National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA) convention in New Orleans in the last year with the express
stipulation that she repay WLS the money or funds used to make these payments. No indication, that I know
of, has been given as to whether Ms. Kunce made such a payment.
What does seem clear is that Ms. Kunce may provide more benefit to WLS if she were to concentrate
more on being an Office Manager, and perhaps attending seminars related to that type of position. I provided,
in writing, Ms. Kunce with a wealth of support for my assertions that WLS should cease buying 53A HP ink
Cartridges from Office Max at a price of $90 (a special discounted price which WLS only gets because of
Ms. Kunce's industry and foresight in obtaining a contract with Office Max that yields a discount based on
purchasing a large volume annually. This special arrangement is apparently the exact same one offered to
anyone off the street who walks into an Office Max and signs up for their Frequent Buyers Club whereby,
upon paying some nominal yearly fee, such as $10, one gets a 10% discount off of Office Max's incredibly
inflated prices) when the exact same name brand cartridge could be purchase at www.Amazon.com and other
sites for $45, further mentioning that a completely usable and compatible, though non-name brand, cartridge
could be purchased at this same site for $30. Additionally, I pointed out to Ms. Kunce that one can refill these
cartridges for $9 a cartridge using an ink refill kit. Indeed, Ms. Kunce cites a rebate of $3.00 that WLS
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receive upon returning an empty 53A ink cartridge to Office Max, only to stand firm in her assertion that these
cartridges can not be refilled in any way that will not result in damage to the printers we use. One wonders
what Ms. Kunce believes Office Max is doing with the empty ink cartridge WLS receives $3.00 for (on
account of WLS's specially negotiated contract, which yields a special discount rate) upon returning these
empty cartridges to Office Max?
Ms. Kunce cited concerns related to damaging the printer with regard to using the refill kits, despite
pages of documentation provided to her indicating that this could be done without causing any damage.
Nonetheless, the compatible cartridges did not present such concerns, however, Ms. Kunce made a
completely disproven assertion that these compatible cartridges are only available from Japan and that the
shipping involved counteracted the $60 cost savings benefit, thereby contradicting her earlier statements that
the $90 price for the 53A cartridges were the determined by her, after much researching, to be the best
available on the market. This is patently not true. Ms. Kunce has shown a consistent pattern of offering one
rationale for doing something, only to change that rationale upon being shown proof that the previous rationale
she offered was untrue, inconsistent with other statements made by her, or an outright misrepresentation. This
is the case with regard to Ms. Kunce's statements concerning the rationale for why the unused half of the
building at WLS has been heated to 81 degrees around the clock for the entirety of the time for which WLS
has leased the building. Ms. Kunce has indicated, as has Renee Kelly, that there is no off switch for the
heater that heats the unused half of the building at WLS. Ms. Kunce later seemed to contradict herself in
asserting that her office would not be heated if the heater in question was just turned off completely (and
thereby yielded a savings of approximately $400 per month to WLS) because Ms. Kunce's office would likely
not get heated if this heater was just turned off. Ms. Kunce vaguely cited to Federal Law as a reason why
some alternate means of heating her office (which is arguably the only one located on the unused side of the
building at WLS), such as a space heater, using a sweater, or otherwise could not be used instead of heating
approximately 2,000 empty square feet of office building.
Ms. Kunce has also offered confusing and inconsistent rationale for why WLS, an entity with 23
employees, is apparently paying excess of $30,000 per year for phone service. WLS is apparently paying for
a 60 block of lines. It appears that every single employee at WLS has their very own seven digit, dedicated
phone line. How this can possibly be more cost effective than utilizing extensions like the majority of the rest of
workplaces in the United States do, is not clear, nor has any attempt to clarify this situation with Ms. Kunce
been met with anything other than resistance and misdirection. Additionally, phone lines are often sold in
blocks of 20 lines, as well as in blocks of 60 lines. Why it would not be less costly for WLS to be on a 20
block plan, instead of the 60 block plan it currently is on is not clear, despite attempts to discuss this with Ms.
Kunce and despite providing Ms. Kunce with pages and pages of documentation in support of these
objectives. What is clear is that Ms. Kunce is a former employee of the telephone company. Additionally, Ms.
Kunce points to issues with the new phone system for the rationale in having Jessica Garzae, part-time
receptionist at WLS (and whom is apparently, according to Caryn Sternlicht and Renee Kelly, doing so much
extra work in doing intakes for the domestic violence unit-despite the fact that this is the sole contribution made
by Zandra Lopez that I am aware of- that she really deserves a raise and a promotion, irregardless of the
fact that Ms. Garzae is absent from her job so much that real problems have stemmed from having various
attorney's assistants/secretaries/paralegals, including oftentimes Deborah Pringle, cover for Ms. Garzae by
going up to the receptionist's desk for hours at a time, that Marc Ashley, consumer rights and landlord tenant
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attorney at WLS, has pointed out this out in Inner Circle meetings.
Ms. Garzae has taken to telling me to wash my dishes when she encounters me in WLS's kitchen,
despite the fact that I always have washed my own dishes at WKS, and despite the fact that Ms. Garzae is
also paid monthly to provide custodial services to WLS. My pointing this out has resulted in Ms. Sabo making
comments to me that are directed to my height and gender and the inappropriateness of speaking to Ms.
Garzae in a manner that results in making eye contact with Ms. Garzae; Ms. Sabo apparently would prefer that
I direct my gaze at my shoes and slump over in defeated submission whenever I make any contribution to the
discourse at WLS and that any actions by me that run counter to that will result in Ms. Sabo declaring that I
was towering over someone and being very, very intimidating, barreling down the hallways and stomping
around. Ms. Sabo apparently vehemently disagrees with my printing off any materials whatsoeverwith which
she holds an opinion or political viewpoint that runs counter to the sentiments or statistics expressed in the
printed materials, even where these materials relate to domestic violence work.
Mr. Elcano indicated that to me that the substantial raise he promised me after one year worth of
service at WLS was due in part to the substantial difficulty he had encountered in getting any attorney to remain
working in the domestic violence unit on account of the extremely hostile work environment created and
maintained by Caryn Sternlicht, in combination with the ultra demanding and emotionally wrought nature of
domestic violence work in general. Robin Kunce asked me if I had any law school loans and indicated that
WLS would make best efforts to help pay those in some way. I completed one year of service, successfully
implementing a number of changes to the structure of the domestic violence unit which arguably has brought
this unit in line with the law regulating the unauthorized practice of law in that situations of inappropriate
delegations of authority to Zandra Lopez, who may or may not be a paralegal, were eliminated. Further
evidence of my success in my time at WLS is set forth in the 300-400% increase in the case load taken on by
the attorneys in the domestic violence unit.
When I started at WLS, Caryn Sternlicht and Larry Belasco each maintained approximately 14-22
cases at any one time. Many of these case would go on for months. I have maintained a case load (after
getting myself up to speed in the area, suffering through a hostile work environment courtesy of Caryn
Sternlicht and Zandra Lopez, dealing with an exhausting and abusive in-house three attorney panel seemingly
bent on using as much face time with me as possible, while, at the same time, being as upsetting and
intimidating as possible, addressing vexatious complaints from various political entities in the community, and
constantly being subjected to an invidious double standard reminiscent of that which was imposed by various
academics throughout much of my youth) that varies between 55 and 85 cases at any one time. These current
case load statistics are in addition to providing additional services to those not taken on as clients. Whether
these statistics are being accurately inputted by someone at WLS is debatable.
And this caseload number is much lower than I would prefer, as the constant passive aggressive
complaints of Zandra Lopez (who claims to be, but may or may not be a paralegal or having any sort of
training or experience in that regard, and for whom I have documented proof in the form of emailed admissions
that she called in sick to work 30 times in a nine month period) and Deborah Pringle, my legal assistant (who
has recently become a certified paralegal and who was sent on an all expense paid trip to the Family Law
Conference in Ely, though she and Renee Kelly apparently left at noon on the conference's second day) with
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regard to being incredibly overworked. Deborah and Zandra have a well established habit and practice of
coming into my office and announcing that they were here till 8 at night three nights last week working extra
and unpaid hours, and how they came in on the weekend to work many, many extra hours or to make up for
some extended period of time during the week for which they were not able to be present at work. This is a
constant at WLS coming from Zandra and Deborah. Deborah does clearly work harder than Zandra, though
Deborah complains five times as much and takes many, many smoke breaks when she is not busy going to
Karen Sabo and alerting Ms. Sabo as to whether I showed up for court with enough time to spare or whether
I was not in the office and accounted for for an odd hour or two in some recent week. When I walked
upstairs and glanced at empty office after empty office devoid of any child advocacy attorney and asked why
Ms. Pringle does not feel the need to point this out, Rhonda Harrison asks what I am even doing upstairs
anyway, pointing out that I do not belong there and am not welcomed there. Upon my inquiring as to whether
she was the hall monitor, Ms. Harrison responds with bite me. Mr. Elcano received a written complaint from
myself in this regard, though I never was interviewed concerning Ms. Harrison's statements and was given no
indication by anyone at WLS that anything had come of my complaint.
Literally nothing one tells Ms. Pringle can be expected to be anything other than announced via
megaphone for all to hear. She and Zandra Lopez engage in constant gossip and office politicking. Ms.
Pringle seemingly does not understand that my time as an attorney is extremely limited. She does not seem to
grasp that should I engage in small talk with Ms. Pringle for over an hour a day, in the same way that she and
Ms. Sternlicht or Mr. Belasco did, I will likely not sufficiently perform my job in a manner that lives up to the
higher standard Mr. Elcano and others have communicated to me that I am to be held to.
There are other matters pertinent to the overall situation at WLS that I simply have not been afforded
enough time or access to put forth in this communication. I ask that I be provided additional time to do so.
Lastly, I have concerns with respect to how the grants that fund WLS, in general, and the domestic
violence work at WLS, in particular, are being administered. I wish to express my complaints that I have been
denied access to the text of these grants and their associated files for the purposed of determining WLS
compliance with the dictates of the grants. I am afraid grant moneys received for doing domestic violence
work may be being used for other, potentially inappropriate purposes. I will reiterate here my request to be
provided a copy of all the grants received relevant to my work in the field of domestic violence. I have made
written and verbal complaints to supervisors and attorneys at WLS with regard to my belief that some
individuals, including Zandra Lopez, may be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. I have provided
legal authority packets for Ms. Lopez, Mr. Ashley, Mr. Sasser, Ms. Sabo, and Mrs. Mangiaracina in this
regard and made my best efforts to prevent any such unauthorized practice of law from taking place. I am
afraid this activity may still be ongoing. Further, I believe I may currently be facing some retaliatory
actions against me by WLS for my stepping forward and voicing my concerns and complaints with regard to
the grant related issues highlighted above and with regard to the unauthorized practice of law mentioned herein.
Additionally, I have made complaints, that I will reiterate here, to WLS regarding the completely spurious
accusation levied against me by Zandra Lopez. I have not received any communication from WLS related to
this inappropriate conduct of Ms. Lopez or follow up regarding my complaints. Further, I believe that some
grant applications, including those related to learning how to turn off a heating system that has been heating an
unused half of the building at WLS to 81 degrees around the clock may be inappropriate. I wish to have an
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opportunity to comment on this more fully at some future point in time.
I feel that it may be appropriate for Mr. Elcano to recuse himself from any position of
judgment with respect to my conduct in connection with the Order levying attorney's fees against me
in the Joshi divorce matter. Mr. Elcano has previously indicated to me that he and Judge Gardner are very
close friends and that he helped her out with something very, very important at some point a long time ago. I
certainly do not mean to imply anything that might impugn the character of either Judge Gardner or Mr. Elcano,
as they are both two of the most respected figures in Nevada's legal community; however, in this situation is
might be appropriate to relieve Mr. Elcano of the decision making responsibility given this apparently close
association with an entity intimately involved in the Order assessing the sanctions which apparently underpin the
suspension involved in this matter.
Further, WLS has already indicated, and Mr. Elcano has confirmed this, that this situation is no longer
in Mr. Elcano's hands, that it has become a matter for the Board of Director's of WLS (these statements may
have been contradicted by Mr. Elcano's May 1, 2009 letter to me). Suddenly, the Board has appeared to
cease having any involvement in this situation. I request here that my various personnel/employment complaints
be provided to WLS's Board of Directors and that the Board take appropriate action to address my
personnel/employment complaints, as it appears that Mr. Elcano may be having an inappropriate level of
coercion placed upon him by various sources in regard to these matters. I request that a copy of this
correspondence and the Exhibits attached to it are provided to the Board of Directors. I further request here,
in writing, that I be provided a copy of any complaints and or statements made about me or against me by
person or entity that have been communicated or disseminated to WLS's Board of Directors or an agent
thereof. Please provide these items at your earliest convenience and in accordance with all applicable laws. I
know from past experiences that Ms. Sabo, Mr. Sasser, and Mr. Ashley are either not familiar with, or do not
believe in the Sixth Amendments Right of Confrontation, but I certainly am and do.
I request that a copy of this correspondence/complaint/personnel complaint be placed in my
personnel/employment file and that I be provided an updated copy of that file, addressed to myself, via mail,
to:
945 W. 12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89509
Lastly, I request that WLS provide the WLS Board of Directors a copy of the lengthy letter I wrote after
conducting, extensively, all the relevant research used in formulating that letter, or Appeal to the State Board of
Equalization (though the letter was signed by Mr. Elcano) as proof the work I perform for WLS and the level
of commitment I approach that work with. I request that I be provided a copy of that document as well. As I
am currently suspended, WLS will necessarily need someone other than myself to follow up with the State
Board of Equalization. If this is not the case, please communicate this to me, in writing, and I will do so.
Please see attached to this document the following items:
1.Motion for Reconsideration in Joshi divorce matter
2.Exhibits 1 and Exhibit 2 for Motion for Reconsideration in Joshi
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3.Five (5) .pdf files in the Brenda Santiago EPO matter: EPO, Objection to Master's Recommendation,
Order Denying Objection, Master's Recommendations, Minutes
Sincerely,
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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INDEX TO APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: Notice oI Filing oI Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus
APPENDIX B: Motion and AIIidavit in Support oI Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
APPENDIX C: AIIidavit oI Zach Coughlin in Support oI Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus
APPENDIX D: Petition Ior Writ oI Mandate
APPENDIX E: Order AIter Trial
APPENDIX F: Petitioner Coughlin's Request Ior Reconsideration with Exhibits 1 and 2
APPENDIX G: Petitioner Coughlin's Reply to Opposition with Exhibit 1
APPENDIX H: Order Denying Request Ior Reconsideration
APPENDIX I: Order Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
APPENDIX J: Findings oI Fact Conclusions oI Law and Decree oI Divorce
001822
NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
When a writ petition is directed to a lower court, the writ petition to the Supreme Court must be
accompanied by a notice oI Iiling oI writ petition that is served on all parties to the proceedings oI the lower
court, and Iiled in the lower court as well (NRAP 21(a)(1)). A Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus has been Iiled
with respect to the sanctions set Iorth in the District Court's Order AIter Trial in DV08-01168.
Dated this: 26th day oI October, 2009: