Turney-High - Primitive War

PRIMITIVE
WAR
Its Practice and Concepts
By
HARRY HOLBERT TURNEY-HIGH
Professor of Anthropology and Sociology,
University of South Carolina
University of South Carolina Press , Columhia
1949
PRIMITIVE WAR
Its Practice and Concepts
By HARRY HOLBERT TURNEY-HIGH
Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, University of South Carolina
Generated on 2013-08-12 07:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015031976767 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA PRESS ' COLUMBIA 1949
ized by
Original from UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Copyright 1949 by the University of
South Carolina Press, Columbia. Printed
by the State Commercial Printing Com-
pany, Columbia.
G'N :'\1' i . T"i'
Copyright 1949 by the University of South Carolina Press, Columbia. Printed by the State Commercial Printing Com pany, Columbia.
DI Illze
by
Ori g i n a l from UNIVERSITY O F ICHIG N
To
u-'v1
10
Major General Ewart G. Plank
and
ClcOS
-;"'l S ..
Brigadier General Gordon C. Hollar
To MAJOR GENERAL EWART G. PLANK
and
BRIGADIER GENERAL GORDON C. HOLLAR
D 9 iz e
Ori g i n a l from U N IV ERSI TY O F I C H IG N
Preface
J WO CONSIDERATIONS ORIGINALLY LED TO THE STUDY OF WHICH THIS
volume is the product. First, considering the importance of war to
all peoples, it is surprising that such a small effort has been made to
analyze the complex among nonliterate folk. Anthropologists, sociolo-
gists, and other social scientists have largely confined their writing to
deprecating war rather than attempting to understand this behavior
pattern which has played such a tremendous role in human affairs.
Second, considering the qualitative and quantitative excellence of the
Preface
field literature of anthropology, several authors consider that it is time
to enter the generalizing phase of the science.
This work represents an effort to help correct the first defect. It
will at least raise questions which other students are encouraged to
Two
gfsts,
CONSIDERATIONS ORIGINALLY LED
TO
THE
STUDY
OF
WlDCH
THIS
solve, and it is hoped that the field ethnographers will be encouraged
volume is the product.
First, considering the importance of to Anthropologists, sociolo
to be more explicit in their treatment of their informants' military
all peoples, it is surprising that such a small effort has been made to analyze the complex. among ?_r:!.litete f.9Ik: and other social scientists have largely confined their writing to
behavior.
Civilized war will be discussed only briefly in Chapter I. The term
"civilization" refers to cultures with writing, metal-smelting, organized
commerce, civil government, city-building, tactical warfare, and such
complexes. The military practices of such peoples as the Pre-Colum-
deprecating war rather than attempting to understand this behavior pattern which has played such a tremendous role in human affairs. Second, considering the qualitative and quantitative excellence of the field literature of anthropology, several authors consider that it is time to enter the generalizing phase of the science. This work represents an effort to help correct the first defect. It will at least raise questions which other students are encouraged to solve, and it is hoped that the field ethnographers will be encouraged to be more explicit in their treatment of their informants' II1!litary
bian Peruvians, Maya, and Aztec, then, will not be discussed, as their
methods were basically modern and differed too little from our own.
This study, therefore, treats of nonurban societies without stone archi-
tecture and literate members. The term used here is nonliterate,
which actually approaches the popular meaning of "primitive" and
"uncivilized" in most instances.
The method of the study has been this: Every effort has been made
to forget opinions based on secondary, tertiary, and often quatenary
materials. Only descriptive field literature has been used. Every
book and monograph discovered by the author and his research staff
has been used or at least sampled. The works read exceed those cited
many times. If the reader finds that he would have preferred to have
vii
b.
Civilized war will be discussed only briefly in Chapter 1.
The term
"civilization" refers to cultures with writing, metal-smelting, organized

commerce, civil government, city-building, tactical warfare, and such complexes. The military practices of such peoples as the Pre-Colum bian Peruvians, Maya, and Aztec, then, will not be discussed, as their methods were basically modern and differed too little from our own. _This study, therefore, treats of nonurban societies without stone archi tecture and literate members. "uncivilized" in most instances. The method of the study has been this: Every effort has been made to forget opinions based on secondary, tertiary, and often quatenary materials. Only descriptive field literature has been used. Every book and monograph discovered by the author and his research staff has been used or at least sampled. many times. The works read exceed those cited vii If the reader finds that he would have preferred to have The term used here is nonliterate, which actually approaches the popular meaning of "primitive" and
D 9 iz e
c\
included some topics which are not, or to have others discussed with
more thoroughness, the author shares his wishes. He had to let the
recorded facts scream, whisper, or be silent. The condition of the
field literature made the latter necessary in many important phases.
The library research for this study was begun before the late war.
included some topics which are not, or to have others discussed with more thoroughness, the author shares his wishes. He had to let the recorded facts scream, whisper, or be silent. The condition of the field literature made the latter necessary in many important phases. The library research for this study was begun before the late war. As the year 1942 drew on, it became apparent that many of us would have to enter active military service. In order to obtain criticism of a part of the work, and mindful of the uncertainties of war, the author requested the Montana State University to mimeograph and dis tribute a portion of the work, which was done. The favorable charac ter of the resultant criticism suggested publication of this, the com plete study. Again, publication was delayed in light of the possibili ties of the theoretical position being weakened by field experience. Study of the manuscript after separation, however, showed that the recent European war only confirmed the original conclusions. There are three dangers into which this type of study might e,my fall, largely because of its limited Twentieth Century tradition. (First,) }t might be said that it tends to ignore the other patterns of culhire With -which warfare must certainly be linked. This work is meant to he a Shidy of warfare only, and does not pretend to be a general social - --It is hoped that other students will describe these anthroPOI linkages. Seco_n) \ one might suspect that th l!laterials hae been . lUl- arbitrary developmental pattern. The author has, pressed in - however, only followed where the descriptive literature has led. War fare is a relatively siple art, even if it has engaged some of the best minds in history. \ There are only a few ways in which war can be successfully waged.-The peoples who have discovered and practiced , _these simple principles have engaged in war properly so-called. others have_(ailed.-to_dQ_this and hae ed what is called "primitive war,' for lack of a better term. ffhird, one must always be cautious -of using value judgments when cOmparing nonliterate cultures with civilization. Field ethnographers often live so close to their inform ants that they develop feelings of local patriotism; anthropologists as a whole tend to constitute themselves a corps of sympathetic advo cates of all men without writing. Worthy as these sentiments are, they are value judgments themselves which the author gladly re nounces. But if any statement of his that a forged steel axe cuts down a given tree more efficiently than does a stone one be considered a value judgment, he must plead guilty, for he has made the experi mental test. If his statement that a social group practicing warfare
As the year 1942 drew on, it became apparent that many of us would
have to enter active military service. In order to obtain criticism of a
part of the work, and mindful of the uncertainties of war, the author
requested the Montana State University to mimeograph and dis-
tribute a portion of the work, which was done. The favorable charac-
ter of the resultant criticism suggested publication of this, the com-
plete study. Again, publication was delayed in light of the possibili-
ties of the theoretical position being weakened by field experience.
Study of the manuscript after separation, however, showed that the
recent European war only confirmed the original conclusions.
There are three dangers into which this type of study might easily
fall, largely because of its limited Twentieth Century tradition. (First,)
it might be said that it tends to ignore the other patterns of culture
with which warfare must certainly be linked. This work is meant to
be a study of warfare only, and does not pretend to be a general social
anthropology. It is hoped that other students will describe these
linkages. (Second,;one might suspect that the materials have been
pressed into an arbitrary developmental pattern. The author has,
however, only followed where the descriptive literature has led. War-
fare is a relatively simple art, even if it has engaged some of the best
minds in history. There are only a few ways in which war can be
>(^ successfully waged. The peoples who have discovered and practiced
these simple principles have engaged in war properly so-called; others
have failedjto do this and have practiced what is called "primitive
war,'' for lack of a better term. Iîrd, one must always be cautious
_ _
of using value judgments when comparing nonliterate cultures with
civilization. Field ethnographers often live so close to their inform-
ants that they develop feelings of local patriotism; anthropologists as
a whole tend to constitute themselves a corps of sympathetic advo-
cates of all men without writing. Worthy as these sentiments are,
they are value judgments themselves which the author gladly re-
nounces. But if any statement of his that a forged steel axe cuts down
a given tree more efficiently than does a stone one be considered a
value judgment, he must plead guilty, for he has made the experi-
mental test. If his statement that a social group practicing warfare
vni
viii
DI
Iz.e b
tactically can defeat a nontactical group of the same size and equal
armament is also a value judgment, he must also accept that charge.
History repeatedly has made this experimental test.
This work uses the term "principles" of war because warfare is man's
tactically can defeat a nontactical group of the same size and equal annament is also a value judgment, he must also accept that charge. History repeatedly has made this experimental test.
oldest apH mnsfr siirypssfiil srvial sHpnrp War is the first social science
to become truly scientific, for it is the first the practice of which lias
been reduced to a few simple principles which are true without re- - /
gard To time or place. This is so obvious that it is strange that it has
not been saioHJefore..
My thanks go to Professors Melville Herskovits and Ralph Linton
for their sound criticism of this volume. Professor Garvin Shallen-
berger brought a physicist's logic to bear upon the evidence. The late
Colonel Copley Enos, able cavalier, taught me my basic tactics. And
to become truly scientin_JQr it is the first the EracHce of which has Deen reduced to a few simple principles which are true_ithout re gard to time or place. Ih.!s so obvious tha!}t is strange that it has not been said befor.
_ -
oldest and most Sllccessful socia] science War is the first social science
This work uses the term "principles" of war because warfare is man's
many thanks to the other officers, noncommissioned officers, and en-
listed men of the American, British, and French armies who have con-
tinued my instruction in the art of war.
Finally, thanks are due to the Montana State University for per-
mission to use the material originally incorporated in the mimeo-
graphed study issued by them.
Harhy Holbert Turney-Hich
Columbia, South Carolina
April 22, 1949
My thanks go to Professors Melville Herskovits and Ralph Linton for their sound criticism of this volume. Professor Garvin Shallen berger brought a physicist's logic to bear upon the evidence. The late Colonel Copley Enos, able cavalier, taught me my basic tactics. And many thanks to the other officers, noncommissioned officers, and en listed men of the American, British, and French annies who have con tinued my instruction in the art of war.
Finally, thanks are due to the Montana State University for per
mission to use the material originally incorporated in the mimeo graphed study issued by them. HARRY HOLBERT TURNEy -HIGH
Columbia, South Carolina
April
22, 1949
ix
D 9 iz e
Contents
Part I. The Practice of Primitive War
CHAPTER PAGE
1. The Form and Function of Weapons 5
2. The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 21
3. Formations 39
4. Discipline and Command 61
5. The Functional Desiderata 1 91
6. Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 107
7. Battle Plans 123
Part II. The Concepts of Primitive War
Contents
PART I.
CHAPTER
8. The Socio-Psychological Motives 141
9. The Economic Motive 169
10. Military Values 187
The Practice of Primitive War

PAGE
______________________________________
11. Certain Military Attitudes 205
12. War and the Organization of Society 227
Bibliography 255
1.
2.
The Form and Function of Weapons
Index 267
XI
The Theory of War and the Military Horizon Formations
____________________________
21
39
3.
4. 5.
_ _ __________________________ ____________________________________________ _____________
Discipline and Command The Functional
__________
__________________________________________________ _
61
91
Desiderata
_________________________________________________________
6.
7.
Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise Ba ttle Plans
______________________________
107
123
______________________ ____________________________________ ____________________________
PART II.
The Concepts of Primitive War

________________________________________________
8.
The Socio-Psychological Motives The Economic Motive Miiitary Values
141
169
9.
10. 11. 12.
_______________________________ _______________________________
___ __ _ __ _ _______ _____ ______
_ _ ________ _____ _ ________ ____________________________
187 205 227 255 267
Certain Military A ttitudes
____________________________________________________________
War and the Organization of Society
________________________________________
Bib liography
Index
______________ _______________ __ ______ ____ ______________ ____ ______ _________ ________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
xi
D 9 iz e
WAR
PRIMITIVE
PRIMITIVE WAR
Part I
D 9 iz e
PART I
CHAPTER 1
iJINCE ARMAMENTS ABE PREEMINENT IN CIVILIAN THINKING, AND
since there is great virtue in being obvious, material, and familiar, the
average man's mind turns to weapons whenever war is mentioned.
The advantage of proceeding from the familiar to the unfamiliar sug-
gests using the topic of weapons as an introductory springboard to
this primer of primitive war.
The part which weapons play in war is far simpler than appears
at first glance. War is war, a social institution fulfilling a variety of
CHAPTER 1
motives, ending in many ways, evoking many emotions. The central
fact of miltary theory is that war is a sociologic device, and weapons
are merely tools used to facilitate its practice. The persistence with
which social scientists have confused war with the tools of war would
be no less than astounding did not their writing reveal, for the most
part, complete ignorance of the simpler aspects of military history and
theory, and an almost stubborn unwillingness to conceptualize war-
fare as the great captains have conceptualized itand still do. It
since there is great virtue in being obvious, material, and familiar, the average man's mind turns to weapons whenever war is mentioned. The advantage of proceeding from the familiar to the unfamiliar sug gests using the topic of weapons as an introductory springboard to this primer of primitive war. The part which weapons play in war is far simpler than appears at first glance. War is war, a social institution fulfilling a variety of The central motives, ending in many ways, evoking many emotions. are merely tools used to facilitate its practice.
INCE
ARMAM:ENTS
ARE
PREEMINENT
IN
CIVll.IAN
THINKING,
AND
would be very hard to find a noncommissioned officer in the pro-
fessional armies of the second rate powers who has been as confused
as most analysts of human society.
This civilian attitude has resulted in hundreds of museum cases
housing weapons from all over the world, cataloged, marked with
accession numbers, and uncomprehended. A digest of what is known
of the material culture of war would require a far larger volume
than this. Even the briefest catalog of such works would require
an impressive pamphlet. A list of monographs and articles dealing
with the way such weapons are held, how many fingers are used in
arrow-release, which foot is put forward in hurling the javelin, and
just which toes are dug into the ground during the process would
fact of miltary theory is that war is a sociologic device, and weapons The persistence with which social scientists have confused war with the tools of war would be no less than astounding did not their writing reveal, for the most part, complete ignorance of the Simpler aspects of military history and theory, and an almost stubborn unwillingness to conceptualize war would be very hard to find a noncommissioned officer in the pro fare as the great captains have conceptualized it-and still do. It
also require a fair amount of stationery. But what has this to do
Generated on 2013-08-13 08:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4235819 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
fessional armies of the second rate powers who has been as confused as most analysts of human society. This civilian attitude has resulted in hundreds of museum
cases
housing weapons from all over the world, cataloged, marked with accession numbers, and uncomprehended. A digest of what is known of the material culture of war would require a far larger volume than this. Even the briefest catalog of such works would require an impressive pamphlet. A list of monographs and articles dealing with the way such weapons are held, how many fingers are used
in
arrow-release, which foot is put forward in hurling the javelin, and just which toes are dug into the ground during the process would also require a fair amount of stationery. But what has this to do
D 9 iz e b
Ori g i n a l from U N I VE R S ITY O F ( L l FORN IA
6
6 Primitive War with war? Very little, for all such questions of the importance have
Primitive War
been solved since the opening of the Neolithic Age, and nothing
was added except minor improvements until the perfection of powder-
driven projectiles.
Placing a discussion of weapons at the forepart of this work, then,
with war? Very little, for all such questions of the importance have been solved since the opening of the Neolithic Age, and nothing was added except minor improvements until the perfection of powder driven projectiles. Placing a discussion of weapons at the forepart of this work, then, does not sign1Iylheir paramounf 1mportaIlCe: It IeflCcts a desire to discuss the fundamentals of the primitive armory, relegate them to their proper places, and then to proceed to warfare's more impor tant aspects.
\.-
does not signify their paramount importance. It reflects a desire to
discuss the fundamentals of the primitive armory, relegate them to
their proper places, and then to proceed to warfare's more impor-
tant aspects.
The theoretical summary of weapons can be briefly made: A man
wishes to do another bodily harm. Nature has provided the aggressor
with teeth7 nails, feetând Viands, together with muscles and a will
to drive these forcibly against the defender. Since the defender is
//
.
also equipped with a skin and skull of some toughness, as well as
a desire not to be hurt^ the aggressor's anatomical equipment is hardly
adequate. If the aggressor picks up a stone which is harder than his
fist, he can make a considerable impression upon the defender, pro-
ducing abrasions and contusions upon his surface, and perhaps re-
ducing his resistance and diminishing his will. If the aggressor chooses
a sharp stone, he can insert this into the dermal and muscular tissue
of the"deferider and injure him to the point of death.
The defender, unless caught by surprise, is hardly willing to re-
main and be pommelled. He may back away, or he may fight back.
Prudence enters into the aggressor's thinking. He finds it convenient
either to avoid the flailing arms of the defender or to overcome the
distance between himself and his foe faster and more safely than his
legs can carry him. No one has ever stressed the importance of
human prudence in the development of weapons, or perhaps it should
be said that no one has called enough attention to the aggressor's
The theoretical summary of weapons can be briefly made: A man wishes o do another bodily harm. Nature has provided the aggressor with !e ails,Jeet. and .Jlancls! together with m _ to drive these forcibly against the defender. Since the defender is also equipped with a skin and skull of some toughness, as well as a desire not to be hurt the aggressor's anatomical equipment is hardly adequate. If the aggressor piCks up a stone which is harder than his fist, he can make a considerable impr -upon the defender, pro ducing abrasions and contusions upon his surface, and perhaps re ducing his resistance and diminishing his will. If the aggressor chooses a sharp stone, he can insert this into the dennal and muscular tissue oftlie--Oe1eriaer and injure him to the point of death.
.fear. Should the aggressor put his sharpened stone on a stick, he
has a spear which not only will increase the leverage of his man-
piercing tool, but will enable him to stand at a safer distance and
poke his foe. This spear may also be hurled. Better yet, it may be
hurled with a bow as an arrow, the deadliest weapon man was to
know until late in the so-called Renaissance. If the aggressor seeks
protection by retiring to a safe distance, the range of the arrow (or
cannon or airplane) must be increased, while if he stands in a hole
the spear must then be made stronger to root him out of his rudi-
mentary engineering work. The projectilearrow, ballista, catapult,
or cannonmust have greater pdwefoF demolition. If the defender
distance between himself and his foe faster and more safely than his legs can carry him. No one has ever stressed the importance of human prudence in the development of weapons, or perhaps it should be said that no one has called enough attention to the aggre1ig}!"'s ..fe,aL Should the aggressor put his sharpened. stone on a stick, he has a spear which not only will increase the-leverage of his man piercing tool, but will enable him to stand at a safer distance and poke his foe. This spear may also be hurled. Better yet, it may be hurled with a bow as an arrow, the deadliest weapon man was to know until late -ill the so-caTIeclll.enaissance. If the aggressor seeks protection by retiring to a safe distance, the range of the arrow (or cannon or airplane) must be increased, while if he stands in a hole the spear must then be made stronger to root him out of his rudi mentary engineering work. The projectile-arrow, ballista, catapult, or cannon-must have greater power-ordemolition. If the defender
main and be pommelled. He may back away, or he may fight back. Prudence enters into the aggressor's thinking. He finds it convenient either to avoid the flailing arms of the defender or to overcome the
The defender, unless caught by surprise, is hardly willing to re
D 9 iz e b

The Form and Function of Weapons 7 puts his fortification on his own body in the form of defensive armor,
puts his fortification on his own body in the form of lefensive armor, the same process must be carried through. process. Biological and social scientists have long called attention to the licaJ nature of events in nature and in human affairs. Nothing illustrates this better than mankind's expenditure of genius on weapons. If the offense becom_ str, the defense replies by becoming .. . strong_Qu.g.h to vi.tiate the offense's weapons. The offense thinks " up new weapons or improves the old ones so that the defense's genius
..
the same process must be carried through. And so goes the circular
And so goes the circular
process.
Biological and social scientists have long called attention to the
cychcaL nature of events in nature and in human affairs. Nothing
"Illustrates this better than mankind's expenditure of genius on weap-
ons. If the offense becomes strong, the defense replies by becoming
strongênough to vitiate., the offense's^ weapons._ The offense thinks
"up new weapons or improves the old ones so that the defense's genius
must think up new defenses or be crushed out of existence. There is
nothing new nor old in this. The entire history and prehistory of --^|k
weapons is summarized in this cycle. Once" the offense-defense iH-
ventfve~eycle~ls conceptualized, one has mastered the first and most
important principle of armory.
One often encounters statements of this type: In former times
fighting was man to man, while today it is with long distance weap-
must think up new defenses or be crushed out of existence. There is nothing new nor old in this. Th ? tire history and prehistory of weapons is summarized in this cycle. O nce the offense-defense in
_ _
ons. This is pure nonsense, of course, as any soldier will agree.
Fighting has always been man to man, and still is. Fire weapons
efttivecycIeis conceptualized, one has mastered the first and most
'
only prepareHFdr The "shock^The closing with the enemy, and that
important principle of armory. In former times One often encounters statements of this type: fighting was man to man, while today it is with long distance weap ons. This is pure nonsense, of course, as any soldier will agree. Fighting has always been man to man, and still is. Fire weapons only prepare for the shock, the closing with the enemy, and that closing is man to man; that contact is the battle. military doctrine the world over. and need to harm his neighbor's body and determination. \Vhatever created that desire and need, or whenever it arose is no concern of ours at the present. The origin and perfection of weapons had the same origin as the rest of the material culture, pacific or otherwise. Man had and has deadly weapons provided by nature-the features of his anatomy. The same may be said of peaceful tools. Yet un aided nature would have left man with inadequate tools wherewith to carve himself a career upon this planet and weapons inadequate to carve his will upon his opponents. The economists have long pointed out that there is not enough desirable stuff in the world to satisfy every man's wanJs... and the appeal to force is an ancient method of distribution. _The rise of weapons is the rise of improving on nature, or better, the art of cooperatin,g with nature in order to make natural phenomena serve military motives." unaltered rock or simple unimproved stick are still lethal killers, but they are not, strictly speaking, weapons. A true weapon must exhibit purposive human workmanship. It must be a modification .The rise and perfection of weapons, then, sprang from man's desire This is standard
closing is man to man; that contact is the battle. This is standard
military doctrine the world over.
TJie rise and perfection of weapons, then, sprang from man's desire
and need to harm Els"neighbor's body and determination. Whatever
created that desire and need, or whenever it arose is no concern of
ours at the present. The origin and perfection of weapons had the
same origin as the rest of the material culture, pacific or otherwise.
Man had and has deadly weapons provided by naturethe features
of his anatomy. The same may be said of peaceful tools. Yet un-
aided nature would have left man with inadequate tools wherewith
to carve himself a career upon this planet and weapons inadequate
to carve his will upon his opponents. The economists have long
pointed out that there is not enough desirable stuff in the world to
satisfy every man's wants*, and the appeal to force is an ancient
method of distribution. The rise of weapons is the rise of improving
on nature, or better, the art oFcooperating with nature in order to
make natural phenomena serve military motives.j
An unaltered rock or simple unimproved stick are still lethal killers,
but they are not, strictly speaking, weapons. A true weapon must
exhibit purposive human workmanship. It must be a modification
An
D 9 iz e b
8
8 Primitive War -of somr natural object; in the terminology of anthropology, it must
Primitive War
some
- -m''
natm=al
be an artifact. A weaponr-like a tool, must be something material,
be an artifact.
_y " artificial, and purposive, lit is likewise a response to human needs,
and its chief function is to serve as an intermediary between the in-
artificial, and purposive.
A weapoq,--1ike a tool, must be something material, !. It is likewise a response to human needs,

-.
-
ehjeet,
in the terminology of anthropology, it must
telligence of the warrior and his desires.
and its chief function is to serve as an intermediary between the in telligence of the warrior and his desire; The economist says that human needs are indefinitely extensible, that they have never been completely satisfied, nor will they ever be. needs, then might not the material culture also be indefinitely ex seH? If material culture, then, is the corpus of the responses to human
The economist says that human needs are indefinitely extensible,
that they have never been completely satisfied, nor will they ever be.
If material culture, then, is the corpus of the responses to human
needs, then might not the material culture also be indefinitely ex-
tensible and capable of improvement, the only limit being nature it-
self? No generation like the present one, which ascribes almost
magical power to inventors and engineers, dares say what the limits
of invention may be. When one translates this into the specialized
field of weapons he meets staggering military potentialities. / Should
tensible and capable of improvement, the only limit being nature it magical power to inventors and engineers, dares say what the limits
this be so, the future looks black indeed save for this: War is pri-
marily a sociologic art, and the art of war improves so slowly that
No generation like the present one, which ascribes almost

When one translates this into the specialized War is pri
Alexander's principles of combat are still standard. The art of mak-
ing weapons changes rapidlythe art of handling the men who use
them changes much more sIowlyA/
of invention may be.
The other hopeful element has already been introduced. Weapons
field of weapons he meets staggering military potentialities. this be so, the future looks black indeed save for this:
I Should
and other cultural materials are responses to needs, but improved
weapons and tools create needs. Certainly we have civilian needs
of which our great-grandparents dreamed not. Every civilized family
marily a sociologic art, and the art of war improves so slowly that Alexander's principles of combat are still standard. .1I1e art of mak ing weapons changes rapidly-the art of handling the men who use them changes much more slo\vJ The other hopeful element has already been introduced. weapons and tools create needs. Weapons and other cultural materials are responses to needs, but improved of which our great-grandparents dreamed not. Certainly we have civilian needs Every civilized family
today considers the automobile a definite need. President Washing-
ton did not. Every commander today conceives of the tank as a
need. General Washington did not. New inventions make man dis-
cover a host of needs of which he had hitherto been unaware. One
certain need, which is called to mind by a new offensive invention or
improvement of an old one, is the need of a parrying defense, material
or tactical. Likewise, when the defense thinks out something new,
such as the improvement in castle building under Norman genius, the
offense has need of improved siege engines, and these responses to
needs do occur partially if given time. Therefore in calling attention
to the cumulative nature of invention and improvement in weapons,
let us also stress again the cyclical nature of offense-defense invention.
While the offense-defense cycle is the most hopeful element of war,
primitive or modern, it cannot be expected to function perfectly.
An offensive weapon completely effective against the ancient helmet
has yet to be invented, for it is still worn. A perfect defense against
certain need, which is called to mind by a new offensive invention or
cover a host of needs of which he had hitherto been unaware.
today considers the automobile a definite need. President Washing ton did not. Every commander today conceives of the tank as a need. General Washington did not. New inventions make man dis One
improvement of an old one, is the need of a parrying defense, material or tactical. Likewise, when the defense thinks out something new, such as the improvement in castle building under Norman genius, the offense has need of improved siege engines, and these responses to
needs do occur partially if given time. Therefore in calling attention to the cumulative nature of invention and improvement in weapons, While the offense-defense cycle is the most hopeful element of war, primitive or modern, it cannot be expected to function perfectly. An offensive weapon completely effective against the ancient helmet let us also stress again the cyclical nature of offense-defense invention.
has yet to be invented, for it is still worn.
A perfect defense against
D 9 iz e b
The Fonn and Function of Weapons

The Form and Function of Weapons 9 the Upper Paleolithic spear has yet to be devised, for its modern
equivalentthe bayonetis still an article of issue.
equivalent-the bayonet-is still an article of issue.
the Upper Paleolithic spear has yet to be devised, for its modem
Weapons, then, are the intermediaries between the aggressive hu-
man intelligence and its desires, and nature has given man powerful
weapons in his hands. How the mind helped produce human hands
and how the hands in turn established the superiority of the human
nervous system is one of the most fascinating problems of physical
weapons in his hands.
Weapons, then, are the intermediaries between the ,.aggressive hu i m n intel1ince and its desires, and nature has given man - powerful and how the hands in turn established the superiority of the human anthropology. flow the mind helped produce human hands
anthropology. From certain aspects it might be said that the bulk
of weapons, ancient and modern, are primarily auxiliaries and gx^
JejisinnB nf the hands The hands are the ministers of the mind, but
nervous system is one of the most faScinating problems of physical of weapons, ancient and modern, are primarily auxiliaries and J4The hands are the ministers of the mind, but From certain aspects it might be said that the bulk
unaided they would have left mankind defenseless in the face of hos-
tile nature and hostile humanity. While hands are quite sufficient to
squeeze the throats or gouge the eyes of our ill-wishers, especially the
tractable and pliant ones, there could have been no war based on un-
jeJ)siops of the bands
aided hands. Yet it is well to recall in this machine ageand machine-
gun agethat effective weapons can be simple. The bayonet is still
one of the most lethal weapons in the world.
Hard materials have always defeated the human hand, hence the
first tools observed in archeology are cutting tools. Now the body
of an agile opponent is quite hard enough to defeat the unaided hand,
tractable and pliant ones, there could have been no war based on un gun age-that effective weapons can be simple. one of the most lethal weapons in the world. aided hands. Yet it is well to recall in this machine age-and machine The bayonet is still
unaided they would have left mankind defenseless in the face of hos tile nature and hostile humanity. While hands are quite sufficient to squeeze the throats or gouge the eyes of our ill-wishers, especially the
so the first problem was to find piercing weapons, which may be
looked upon as extension of the primate finger nails and teeth. This
was effectively solved as soon as the spear and the arrow were known.
The problem was then basically solved as early as the Upper Paleo-
lithic Period. The modern piercing weapons, the bayonet point and
the bullet, may be morphologically different from the antique forms,
but functionally they are only derivatives of them.
In light of the paramount importance of tactical operations, the
form and structure of weapons are too secondary in significance to
merit full treatment in so short a volume as this. To all soldiers,
primitive and modern, the result is the important consideration.
Therefore in a brief discussion of the effectiveness of the armory, the
function alone has real validity. A functional classification of all
weapons without regard to time or place is very easy. The doctrine
of the present military powers has already made such a classification
and, fortunately, it is one which is just as applicable to nonliterate war-
riors as to those in the uniforms of the powers. This system divides
Weapons into the following categories, those of: (1) fire, (2) shock,
the bullet, may be morphologically different from the antique forms, but functionally they are only derivatives of them.
lithic Period.
The problem was then basically solved as early as the Upper Paleo
was effectively solved as soon as the spear and the arrow were known.
looked upon as extension of the primate finger nails and teeth.
of an agile opponent is quite hard enough to defeat the unaided hand, so the first problem was to find piercing weapons, which may be This
first tools observed in archeology are cutting tools.
Hard materials have always defeated the human hand, hence the Now the body
The modern piercing weapons, the bayonet point and
(3) mobility, and (4) protection.
form and structure of weapons are too secondary in significance to primitive and modern, the result is the important consideration. function alone has real validity. merit full treatment in so short a volume as this. To all soldiers,
In light of the paramount importance of tactical operation s, the
Therefore in a brief discussion of the effectiveness of the armory, the weapons without regard to time or place is very easy.
A functional classification of all
of the present military powers has already made such a classification riors as to those in the uniforms of the powers. This system divides into the following categories, those of: (1) fire, (2) shock, and, fortunately, it is one which is just as applicable to nonliterate war
The doctrine
wo
( 3)
mo ility, and
ili
(4) protection.
D 9 iz e b
10
10 Primitive War I
Primitive War
Weapons of fire are devices for getting at a distant enemy while
at the same time actually or wishfully remaining safe from his strik-
ing power. Fire weapons are therefore projectiles. The sling is an
:\
ancient and, if one is to judge by the results" of David's attack on
'--
I) ing power. e weapons are therefore projectiles.

Goliath,
an
Weapons of fire are devices for getting at a distant enemy while at the same time actually or wishfully remaining safe from his sbik The sling is an ancient and, if one is to judge by the results of David!s attack on effective fire weapon. The writers of classical antiquity were well aware of its value in delivering all kinds of fire. Caesar
Goliath, an effective fire weapon. The writers of classical antiquity
were well aware of its value in delivering all kinds of fire. Caesar
knew how effective the sling was even in prohibitive fire, in keeping
the enemy walls cleared of defenders so that the besiegers could come
up close to the enceinte.
knew how effective the sling was even in prohibitive fire, in keeping the enemy walls cleared of defenders so that the besiegers could come up close to the enceinte. The greatest fire weapon of all, from the Paleolithic Capsian until well into the age of firearms, was the arrow, a short spear driven by a spring. Since it is definitely known to have existed before the This is one more link in the The arrow and opening of the true New Stone Age, mankind has had adequate fire weapons from that early time onward. quate social contention that war is a SOciologic trait, one which had to aw_ait ade bow literature is vast and cannot be summarized here, and the use of the device will be mentioned time and again in the succeeding chap ters. Our own day is characterized by the great pedection of fire One should not The powder weapons, often to the befuddlement of the laity.
The greatest fire weapon of all, from the Paleolithic Capsian until
well into the age of firearms, was the arrow, a short spear driven by
a spring. Since it is definitely known to have existed before the
opening of the true New Stone Age, mankind has had adequate fire
weapons from that early time onward. This is one more link in the
contention that war is a sociologic trait, one which had to await ade-
quate SOCial r.rgani-7nt|pii rnmnunrl nnrl dfocjplinp The aiTOW and
bow literature is vast and cannot be summarized here, and the use of
the device will be mentioned time and again in the succeeding chap-
ters. Our own day is characterized by the great perfection of fire
weapons, often to the befuddlement of the laity. One should not
forget the part the bow and arrow have played in this. The powder
driven projectile is more than the functional successor of the arrow.
It is also the morphological descendant, inasmuch as the cross-bow,
org.wizati_commaIld,dis.cipline.
arlebest, arquebus, and similar derivatives of the simple bow had to
come first. The explosive power of powder was known long before
the musket became practical. The improved bow had to teach the
fire fighter the use of the stock to sustain great recoil, the sight, the
trigger, as well as the possibilities of great range and accuracy in fir-
ing a projectile along or through a barrel. After that the expansive
power of chemicals could be tamed in the musket.
forget the part the bow and arrow have played in this.
The blowgun would have taught the modernizing infantryman the
driven projectile is more than the functional successor of the arrow.
same lesson, but he was not aware of its existence or effectiveness.
This device, more of a hunting tool than a military weapon, consists
of a barrel of metal or reed into which a pellet is inserted and blown
with the breath against a distant object with great accuracy and range.
come first.
It is also the morphological descendant, inasmuch as the cross-bow, arlebest, arquebus, and similar derivatives of the simple bow had to the musket became practical. The explosive power of powder was known long before The improved bow had to teach the
The power of a gas under pressure with but one outlet has given
mankind many useful pacific tools and was known empirically to
the natives of the tropical forest of South America, southeastern
United States, Malaysia, and elsewhere. These nonliterate peoples
trigger, as well as the possibilities of great range and accuracy in fir power of chemicals could be tamed in the musket. ing a projectile along or through a barrel. After that the expansive
fire fighter the use of the stock to sustain great recoil, the sight, the
This device, more of a hunting tool than a military weapon, consists of a barrel of metal or reed into which a pellet is inserted and blown
with the breath against a distant object with great accuracy and range. The power of a gas under pressure with but one outlet has given mankind many useful pacifiC tools and was known empirically to the natives of the tropical forest of South America, southeastern United States, Malaysia, and elsewhere. These nonliterate peoples
same lesson, but he was not aware of its existence or effectiveness.
The blowgun would have taught the modernizing infantryman the
D 9 iz e b
The Fonn and Function of \eapons

The Form and Function of Weapons 11 could not appreciate the physics of the blowgun, and hence did not
11
develop the weapon as highly as they might have.
The increasing efficiency of fire weapons made infantry the princi-
could not appreciate the physics of the blowgun, and hence did not develop the weapon as highly as they might have. The increasing efficiency of fire weapons made infantry the princi pal arm for several centuries of modem warfare. Infantry's shock power was too feeble to fight mediaeval cavalry. An effective mediaeval infantry would have required too many specialists to be active against the knighthood. Its fire had to be handled by archers who were so busy learning their craft and carrying enough weapons that they could be nothing but fire troops. The same was also true of slingers. \Vhen adequate musketry arose, the infantry was able to minimize the cavalry's shock power before it reached the infantry line. \Vhen and if it did, the pike infantry could make a fair stand against the armored horseman. It is true that the perfection of the English long bow anticipated effective musketry. When a detach able point was added to the musket in the Eighteenth Century, the bayonet became standard infantry equipment, providing superb shock and fire power in one light weapon. The infantry battle line became the Queen of Battles, although it seems today about to return the crown to the cavalry in a new form. The spear or javelin hurled from the hand is a fire weapon en countered in many places and times. Its short range, low accuracy, and weight in carrying about in bulk make it infinitely inferior to the arrow. The last disadvantage was overcome by no people. Several devices were invented from time to time to increase the javelin's range and accuracy, such as the atlatl or dart-thrower known to the men of the Upper Old Stone Age, Australia, the Eskimo, Middle America, and elsewhere. Straps and thongs have also been added to the shaft to increase its accuracy and range by imparting a circular motion to its flight. There is a large literature on nonliterate man's attempts to overcome the fire inadequacy of the spear. A summary of such writ ing has been made by Krause.l
pal arm for several centuries of modern warfare. Infantry's shock
power was too feeble to fight mediaeval cavalry. An effective
mediaeval infantry would have required too many specialists to be
active against the knighthood. Its fire had to be handled by archers
who were so busy learning their craft and carrying enough weapons
that they could be nothing but fire troops. The same was also true
of slingers. When adequate musketry arose, the infantry was able
to minimize the cavalry's shock power before it reached the infantry
line. When and if it did, the pike infantry could make a fair stand
against the armored horseman. It is true that the perfection of the
English long bow anticipated effective musketry. When a detach-
able point was added to the musket in the Eighteenth Century, the
bayonet became standard infantry equipment, providing superb shock
and fire power in one light weapon. The infantry battle line became
the Queen of Battles, although it seems today about to return the
crown to the cavalry in a new form.
The spear or javelin hurled from the hand is a fire weapon en-
countered in many places and times. Its short range, low accuracy,
and weight in carrying about in bulk make it infinitely inferior to the
arrow. The last disadvantage was overcome by no people. Several
devices were invented from time to time to increase the javelin's range
and accuracy, such as the atlatl or dart-thrower known to the men of
the Upper Old Stone Age, Australia, the Eskimo, Middle America, and
elsewhere. Straps and thongs have also been added to the shaft to
increase its accuracy and range by imparting a circular motion to its
flight. There is a large literature on nonliterate man's attempts to
overcome the fire inadequacy of the spear. A summary of such writ-
ing has been made by Krause.1
A fire weapon of limited value is the throwing-stick or hurled war
club. The aboriginal Australians are famous for their manufacture,
perhaps too famous, since too much attention has been paid to the
boomerang, or throwing-stick which will more or less return to its
point of propulsion. This is primarily a hunting tool and one which
could not be of any value to fighting men arranged in a line. The
Australian throwing-stick which is not curved and will not therefore
1 F. Krause, "Sling Contrivances for Projectile Missiles," Annual Report, Smith-
sonian Institution, 1904 (Washington: 1905), pp. 619-639.
A fire weapon of limited value is the throwing-stick or hurled war club. The aboriginal Australians are famous for their manufacture, perhaps too famous, since too much attention has been paid to the
boomerang, or throwing-stick which will more or less return to its point of propulsion. This is primarily a hunting tool and one which could not be of any value to fighting men arranged in a line. The Australian throwing-stick which is not curved and will not therefore
F. Krause, "Sling Contrivances for Projectile Missiles," Annual sonian Institution, 1904 (Washington: 1905), pp. 619-639.
Report, Smith
D 9 iz e b
12
12 Primitive War
Primitive War
return to the hurler is a much better weapon. Many people have
used a heavier throwing club, a war club light enough to be thrown
return to the hurler is a much better weapon. Many people have used a heavier throwing club, a war club light enough to be thrown but heavy enough to crush, the Polynesians being the most successful. Throwing-sticks or clubs are really poor weapons. Only a powerful man can throw them far. No one can hurl them with the accuracy of the arrow or even the spear. They are too heavy for any fighter to carry many of them into battle. Their manufacture is expensive in time and skill. Worst of all, th eir slow movement and large bulk make them easy to see, their arc easy to predict, and therefore very easy to dodge. They must rely on the stunning capacity of their . weight, for their piercing power is nil. bullets, artillery projectiles, slings, grenades, bombs, javelins, and spears-are all effective auxiliaries, b ut should never,be relied upon by intelligent fighters for the main effort of the l?attl ,They should be used ill preparation f or the main egg_emeJlt, t_ b definite --moveme nt in the direction of the enemy, ac h!h m companied by a desire to incapacitate him by assault. Fire and move ment, as will be seen, constitute a most effective combination, and one which only courageous fighters can resist.
but heavy enough to crush, the Polynesians being the most successful.
Throwing-sticks or clubs are really poor weapons. Only a powerful
man can throw them far. No one can hurl them with the accuracy
of the arrow or even the spear. They are too heavy for any fighter
to carry many of them into battle. Their manufacture is expensive
in time and skill. Worst of all, their slow movement and large bulk
make them easy to see, their arc easy to predict, and therefore very
easy to dodge. They must rely on the stunning capacity of their
weight, for their piercing power is nil.
<5k^ weaponsarrows, bullets, artillery projectiles, slings, grenades,
bombs, javelins, and spearsare all effective auxiliaries, but should
nevt.be relied upon by intelligent fighters for the main effort of the
battle/JThey should be used in preparation for the main engagement,
which must be definite movement in the direction of the enemy, ac-
companied by a desire to incapacitate him by assault. Fire and move-
ment, as will be seen, constitute a most effective combination, and
--l 'i
one which only courageous fighters can resist.
Fire has the prime weakness often overlooked by civilian writers.
"
weapons-arrows,
Fire weapons may be able to drive an enemy from a position, and
often do; they may also be used defensively to minimize the strength
of an enemy assault before the moment of contact. Prohibitive fire
may also prevent an enemy from occupying a locality, but it is costly
and of limited effectiveness. In spite of all these virtues, fire troops
can take but can hold a position in the open only with difficulty.
Fire fighters may hold with effectiveness only behind natural or
artificial cover. Fire and fire only is hopeless if the enemy ever
makes contact.
Weapons of shock are the_crushers and piercers which are held in
the hand nf thfi assailant. Shock weaponsanTThe military instru-
ments par excellence. They are not only employed by courageous
fighters anxious to close with the enemy, deliver him a blow, and win
a decision, but they are the truly deadly ones. They win battles.
Following chapters will describe actions of some peoples who relied
exclusively on fire weapons and lacked the courage or perspicacity
to close with the foe in shock. Such actions neitlier won anything
nor settled anything. Perhaps they were not meant to. A fire fight
for its own sake is hardly more than an athletic contest. It is not with-
Fire has the prime weakness often overlooked by civilian writers. Fire weapons may be able to drive an enemy from a position, and often do; they may also be used defensively to minimize the strength of an enemy assault before the moment of contact. Prohibitive fire may also prevent an enemy from occupying a locality, but it is costly I and of limited effectiveness. In spite of all these virtues, fire troops can tak e but can hold a position in the open only with difficulty. Fire fighters may hold with effectiveness only behind natural or artificial cover . Fire and fire only is hopeless if the enemy ever , makes contact.
in any true war pattern; it is wastful of life since it is futile; it can
Weapons of shock are the_crushers and .Fercers which are -held in the hand of the assailant. Shock weapons are the military instru ments par excellence. They are not only employed by courageous fighters anxious to lose with the enemy, deliver him a blow, and win a decision, but they are the truly deadly ones. They win battles. Following chapters will describe actions of some peoples who relied exclusively on fire weapons and lacked the courage or perspicacity . to close with the foe in shock. Such actions neither won anything nor settled anythin g . Perhaps they were not meant to. A fire fight for its own sake is hardly more than an athletic contest. It is not with in any true war pattern; it is wastful of life since it is futile; it can
D 9 iz e b

The Form and Function of Weapons 13 scarcely be called fighting. It is shock or the threat of shock which
13
scarcely be called fighting.
It is shock or the threat of shock which The victor of a fire fight is a long
works one's will on the enemy. The victor of a fire fight is a long
works one's will on the enemy.
way from his objective; the victor in a shock fight is right there.
The war rlnh is primarily a shock weapon, a skull crasher, a bruiser,
way from his objective; the victor in a shock fight is right there. The_waf_club is primarily a shock weapon, a skull crasher, a bruiser, accomplishing its ends by stunning and killing the foe. It is a weapon requiring close contact, and therefore courage on the part of its as sailant. The deadliest shock weapons known to military history are the or
accomplishing its ends by stunning and killing the foe. It is a weapon
requiring close contact, and therefore courage on the part of its as-
sailant. The deadliest shock weapons known to military history are
the sword and the .gpean
The sword is a derivative of the war club; indeed, it is a war club
provided with a piercing point and sometimes with a cutting edge.
Several peoples who had not discovered the use of metals had war
and the ea:
clubs which were to all purposes swords. The Polynesians improved
the edges of their hard wooden war clubs with shark's teeth, ray's
The sword is a derivative of the war club; indeed, it is a war club provided with a pierCing point and sometimes with a cutting edge. Several peoples who had not discovered the use of metals had war clubs which were to all purposes swords. The Polynesians improved Certain Middle the edges of their hard wooden war clubs with shark's teeth, ray's tails, and other sharp objects provided by nature. obsidian. Americans enhanced the sharpness of their club edges by insets of Other plain wooden clubs and some stone ones on the North Pacific Coast of America were sharpened so that they were to all intents and purposes swords. The discovery of metal casting in the Bronze Age made the sword the great weapon of both infantry and cavalry until a few years ago when the General Staff took the saber from the cavalry. to cast a long weapon. It is regrettable that they ever did. The older A lesson bronze swords were quite short, for the smiths had not learned how which both nonliterate and civilized soldiers had a hard time learning and retaining is that it is not the edge of a shock weapon which is dangerous but the point. Anyone who tried to train cavalry recruits a few years back knows how hard it was to keep them from slashing. The only good function a cutting edge has is to enable the assailant to withdraw his weapon from the spasmodically grasping tissue of his victim. killing him. ful. A slashing blow is easily seen, dodged, or parried. It rarely hits a vital spot and therefore only wounds the enemy without He may be left not only alive but very angry and venge Any slashing blow leaves the body of the slasher without guard
tails, and other sharp objects provided by nature. Certain Middle
Americans enhanced the sharpness of their club edges by insets of
obsidian. Other plain wooden clubs and some stone ones on the
North Pacific Coast of America were sharpened so that they were to
all intents and purposes swords.
The discovery of metal casting in the Bronze Age made the sword
the great weapon of both infantry and cavalry until a few years ago
when the General Staff took the saber from the cavalry. The older
bronze swords were quite short, for the smiths had not learned how
to cast a long weapon. It is regrettable that they ever did. A lesson
which both nonliterate and civilized soldiers had a hard time learning
and retaining is that it is not the edge of a shock weapon which is
dangerous but the point. Anyone who tried to train cavalry recruits
a few years back knows how hard it was to keep them from slashing.
The only good function a cutting edge has is to enable the assailant
to withdraw his weapon from the spasmodically grasping tissue of
his victim. A slashing blow is easily seen, dodged, or parried. It
rarely hits a vital spot and therefore only wounds the enemy without
killing him. He may be left not only alive but very angry and venge-
ful. Any slashing blow leaves the body of the slasher without guard
unless he can cover with a shield, a miserable and clumsy substitute
for skill.
As the Bronze Age technicians increased their abilities in casting,
swords became longer and heavier and were transformed into cutters
and crushers, having all the flaws just mentioned. The reply to this
was the cast metal helmet, a false reply to a false threat. Many pre-
historic European Metal Age swords were so specifically designed as
unless he can cover with a shield, a miserable and clumsy substitute for skill.
As the Bronze Age technicians increased their abilities in casting,
swords became longer and heavier and were transformed into cutters
and crushers, having all the flaws just mentioned. The reply to this was the cast metal helmet, a false reply to a false threat. Many pre historic European Metal Age swords were so specifically designed as
D 9 iz e b
14
14 Primitive War cutters that they developed a flair towards the point end, the so-called
Primitive War
cutters that they developed a Hair towards the point end, the so-called pistiliform swords. This carried the typological development of the cutting sword to an absurdity not to be equalled until the heavily ar mored knight with his ponderous and clumsy war sword, mace, bee de-corbin, axe, etc., arose in the Middle Age. This latter soldier be came more of a blacksmith than a swordsman, breeding massive horses to carry him and his equipment about. The only good this did the world was to develop powerful percherons which later were to haul ice and coal through city streets. The ancient Italians con tinued and developed the folly of increasing the length and weight of the sword, especially over-weighting the weapon towards the point, which threw it out of balance. When they received a few thorough defeats from the Celt-Iberians of Spain who retained the earlier weapon, they readopted the short sword, much to the subsequent discomfiture of the Gauls and the Germans. While the Metal Age sword has passed out of existence as an ef fective military instrument, its Stone Age companion, thee is still in good favor. Call it spear, lance, pike, or bayoneted rifle, it has perhaps caused more human deaths than any other material invention of man. One occasionally hears veterans of the World War of 19141918, especially those from noncombatant units, deprecate the bay onet. Medical officers say that their hospitals were full of bullet wounded men, while they were seldom called upon to treat a bay onet wound. Such statements are compliments to the bayonet. Its victims did not require the services of the hospital squads but the burying party. It took the second World War to reduce its value, which decline may not be permanent. Mankind's cowardice, or wish for security if one prefers that, im pelled him to lengthen and over-weight the spear, just as he made a similar mistake with the sword. the greatest cost to their liberty.
pistiliform swords. This carried the typological development of the
cutting sword to an absurdity not to be equalled until the heavily ar-
mored knight with his ponderous and clumsy war sword, mace, bec-
de-corbin, axe, etc., arose in the Middle Age. This latter soldier be-
came more of a blacksmith than a swordsman, breeding massive
horses to carry him and his equipment about. The only good this
did the world was to develop powerful percherons which later were
to haul ice and coal through city streets. The ancient Italians con-
tinued and developed the folly of increasing the length and weight of
the sword, especially over-weighting the weapon towards the point,
which threw it out of balance. When they received a few thorough
defeats from the Celt-Iberians of Spain who retained the earlier
weapon, they readopted the short sword, much to the subsequent
discomfiture of the Gauls and the Germans.
While the Metal Age sword has passed out of existence as an ef-
fective military instrument, its Stone Age companion, the spear, is still
in good favor. Call it spear, lance, pike, or bayoneted rifle, it has
perhaps caused more human deaths than any other material invention
of man. One occasionally hears veterans of the World War of 1914-
1918, especially those from noncombatant units, deprecate the bay-
onet. Medical officers say that their hospitals were full of bullet-
wounded men, while they were seldom called upon to treat a bay-
onet wound. Such statements are compliments to the bayonet. Its
victims did not require the services of the hospital squads but the
burying party. It took the second World War to reduce its value,
which decline may not be permanent.
Mankind's cowardice, or wish for security if one prefers that, im-
pelled him to lengthen and over-weight the spear, just as he made a
similar mistake with the sword. The Greeks made this error with
the greatest cost to their liberty. They destroyed the fencing power
of the spear; made it a muscular feat to carry and handle it; made
the movement of the point very slow and predictable, and therefore
immobilized the pikemen. The Romans, of course, won the Battle of
Corinth. This point will be recalled in the discussion of African war.
One great African war chief, the Zulu King Chaka, saw this flaw
in the large spear and rectified it. Only the appearance of the white
man saved South Africa from becoming a Zulu empire.
If the motive power of the tribe was adequate, it was possible to
. combine shock weapons with the mobility principle. Some peoples
The Greeks made this error with They destroyed the fencing power
of the spear; made it a muscular feat to carry and handle it; made the movement of the point very slow and predictable, and therefore immobilized the pikemen. The Romans, of course, won the Battle of Corinth. This point will be recalled in the discussion of African war. One great African war chief, the Zulu King Chaka, saw this Haw in the large spear and rectified it. Only the appearance of the white man saved South Africa from becoming a Zulu empire. If the motive power of the tribe was adequate, it was possible to combine shock weapons with the mobility priciple. Some peoples
D 9 iz e b

The Form and Function of Weapons 15 used the war horse as a weapon, while our automotive civilization
15
used the w e as a weapon, while our automotive civilization has developed the nk. Fire power, mobility, shock, and protection have been sought in one weapon time and again by inventive warriors. The war elephant was a fairly successful effort, but this animal's im pulses towards self-preservation and his low confidence in the om niscience of men made him more of a liability than an asset. The modern tank is a similar attempt to combine all elements, and while it is a most useful instrument, perfection in the combination is still far away. The term mobility has no special meaning here. A mobile weapon's ... function is to enable the fighting man to get to the enemy, get around him, or get away from him faster than he could accomplish these ends with his own legs. From the Metal Ages onward the There might be horse has been the most notable weapon of mobility in land fighting, combining as he does shock power with mobility. the warrior does not change their morphology. it either a tool or a weapon. some objection to calling domestic animals weapons, inasmuch as It was said that the element of artificiality must be added to some natural object to make While one could hardly call a war horse Cavalry horses must be meticu an artifact, yet an artificiality is involved, albeit a psychological one. A simple horse is not a war horse. lously trained in order to make them chargers, beasts that will have sufficient confidence in their riders to plunge into fire, into a hail of projectiles, strike their riders' foes with their forefeet and stamp them, bite the right party with their vicious teeth, and otherwise coop erate intelligently with the cavalier in striking down opposition. When one has learned that the fundamental factor in equine psychology is self-preservation, as it is with all grazing, fleet, gregarious animals, he has gone far in his lessons in equitation, civil or military. When one appreciates that it takes much skill and patience to overcome this equine fear and to instill in the troop mounts a desire to combat the enemy, he will never say that the element of artificiality is absent and that the horse is not a weapon. The element of protection hardly seems consistent with valor, but valor requiring useless self-sacrifice is hardly military. To be sure, the best protection is to stay away from the enemy and do all of one's military exercise on the parade ground. "He who fights and runs away will live to fight another day," is not entirely stupid, and is also frequently necessary. "Discretion is ever the better part of valor,"
has developed the tank. Fire power, mobility, shock, and protection
have been sought in one weapon time and again by inventive warriors.
The war elephant was a fairly successful effort, but this animal's im-
pulses towards self-preservation and his low confidence in the om-
niscience of men made him more of a liability than an asset. The
modern tank is a similar attempt to combine all elements, and while
it is a most useful instrument, perfection in the combination is still
far away.
The term mobility has no special meaning here. A mobile weapon's
function is to enable the fighting man to get to the enemy, get
around him, or get away from him faster than he could accomplish
these ends with his own legs. From the Metal Ages onward the
horse has been the most notable weapon of mobility in land fighting,
combining as he does shock power with mobility. There might be
some objection to calling domestic animals weapons, inasmuch as
the warrior does not change their morphology. It was said that the
element of artificiality must be added to some natural object to make
it either a tool or a weapon. While one could hardly call a war horse
an artifact, yet an artificiality is involved, albeit a psychological one.
A simple horse is not a war horse. Cavalry horses must be meticu-
lously trained in order to make them chargers, beasts that will have
sufficient confidence in their riders to plunge into fire, into a hail of
projectiles, strike their riders' foes with their forefeet and stamp them,
bite the right party with their vicious teeth, and otherwise coop-
erate intelligently with the cavalier in striking down opposition. When
one has learned that the fundamental factor in equine psychology is .
self-preservation, as it is with all grazing, fleet, gregarious animals,
he has gone far in his lessons in equitation, civil or military. When
one appreciates that it takes much skill and patience to overcome
this equine fear and to instill in the troop mounts a desire to combat
the enemy, he will never say that the element of artificiality is absent
and that the horse is not a weapon.
The element of protection hardly seems consistent with valor, but
valor requiring useless self-sacrifice is hardly military. To be sure,
the best protection is to stay away from the enemy and do all of one's
military exercise on the parade ground. "He who fights and runs
away will live to fight another day," is not entirely stupid, and is also
frequently necessary. "Discretion is ever the better part of valor,"
_ .
D 9 iz e b
16
16 Primitive War said one of the world's greatest captains, but discretion is a tactical
Primitive War
device, not an armorial one.
Armor is the best known category of defensive weapons. The cor-
rect term, however, is defensive armor, for all weapons are armor.
The defensive armory has always been a response to improvements in
(I,' (
'
the enemy's fire and shock weapons, and when used moderately, has
great value. The Iroquois and the tribes of the American Northwest
Coast and Plateau knew the use of wooden or reed armor. Many
others understood the value of suits of quilting, linked mail, etc., in
eliminating or minimizing the bite of arrow, pike, and sword. Many
nonliterates in Middle America, Polynesia, and Africa knew that
armor would enable them to keep in the field longer than if dressed
simply in their skins. The use of the shield is known to every conti-
nent save Australia, where the twirling stick takes its place.
Aside from such disciplined troops as can form a testudo with their
shields, this instrument's value has been a delusion. Any armor de-
creases the mobility of the fighting line, makes the warrior particu-
larly visible, and draws fire from bow or cannon. The greatest
modern problem of tank warfare is the weight of the armor. Shall
the storm-wagon rely on its speed to avoid fire, thus arming itself
lightly, or shall it rely on the thickness of its steel plates and thus be-
come slow? We have no perfect solution yet, and nonliterate man
never solved the problem. True, the weight of metal is the great
immobilizer, and most nonliterate tribes were also non-metallurgical.
Some of the European Bronze and Iron Age peoples did manage to
weight themselves down to no good end before the dawn of history,
and some pre-metallurgical folk managed to encumber themselves
with too much wood. Wherever too much armor is observed, one
,. will find that the enemy fights with very effective war clubs, or the
war club's derivatives. Among these would be the tribes of the
North Pacific Coast who found armor weight of minor disadvantage
since they were seafighters and used the canoe instead of legs to carry
them to the scene of action.
Like the dinosaurs of old, when man once achieves some success in
a protective device, he is apt to carry it beyond the demands of neces-
sity. He is likely to forget the old cavalry maxim, "The best defense
is a vigorous offense." Thus it is easy to violate the "Principle of the
Offensive," to be discussed later.
One of the surest ways to do this is to rely too much on fortifica-
t-/uon. This type of protection is known to all continents. Perhaps
Aside from such disciplined troops as can form a testudo with their shields, this instrument's value has been a delusion. Any armor de creases the mobility of the fighting line, makes the warrior particu larly visible, and draws fire from bow or cannon .' The greatest modem problem of tank warfare is the weight of"the armor. Shall the storm-wagon rely on its speed to avoid fire, thus arming itself lightly, or shall it rely on the thickness of its steel plates and thus be come slow? We have no perfect solution yet, and nonliterate man never solved the problem. True, the weight of metal is the great immobilizer, and most nonliterate tribes were also non-metallurgical. Some of the European Bronze and Iron Age peoples did manage to weight themselves down to no good end before the dawn of history, and some pre-metallurgical folk managed to encumber themselves with too much wood. Wherever too much armor is observed, one ,. will find that the enemy fights with very effective war clubs, or the war club's derivatives. Among these would be the tribes of the North Pacific Coast who found armor weight of minor disadvantage since they were seafighters and used the canoe instead of legs to carry them to the scene of action.
The defensive armory has always been a response to improvements in .' the enemy's fire and shock weapons, and when used moderately, has great value. The Iroquois and the tribes of the American Northwest Coast and Plateau knew the use of wooden or reed armor. Many others understood the value of suits of quilting, linked mail, etc., in eliminating or minimizing the bite of arrow, pike, and sword. Many nonliterates in Middle America, Polynesia, and Africa knew that armor would enable them to keep in the field longer than if dressed simply in their skins. The use of the shield is known to every conti nent save Australia, where the twirling stick takes its place.
Armor is the best known category ofd&eniWe weapons. The cor rect term, however, is defensive armor, for all weapons are armor.
said one of the world's greatest captains, but discretion is a tactical device, not an armorial one.
Like the dinosaurs of old, when man once achieves some success in protective device, he is apt to carry it beyond the demands of neces sity. He is likely to forget the old cavalry maxim, "The best defense is a vigorous offense." Thus it is easy to violate the "Principle of the Offensive," to be discussed later.
a
'-
tiOR.
One of the surest ways to do this is to rely too much on fortifica This type of protection is known to all continents. Perhaps
D 9 iz e b

The Form and Function of Weapons 17 the natives in question merely choose their defensive sites with care,
17
the natives in question merely choose their defensive sites with care, fighting behind natural protection of trees, boulders, and streams. Some nonliterate people even choose their defensive sites along the true military crest, sites which will make the enemy climb an emi nence against withering arrow fire, arranging their line so that there is no dead space uncovered by fire. Such people are very few. Many others improve such sites by engineering. The archeologists par ticularly have done some remarkably fine work in exploring and de scribing the fortresses of nonliterate men. Many ethnographers have also made excellent descriptions of defensive works. Perhaps the cleverest, quite aside from the bulk of earth, stone, and adobe in volved, are the palisades of the Iroquois and the pai of the New Zeland !vlaori. Both of these people were aggressive fighters and used fortification in the correct manner : the prevention of surprise, the protection of noncombatants, a place of retirement for the de feated, and a source of sortie and pivot of maneuver for troops primarily fighting in the open. Some Polynesians and American Indians understood the art of trench fortification. The Iroquois knew the value of the curtain, the light wall out in front of the princi ple defensive palisade. The mediaeval castle at its best also had a curtain, the light wall which kept the enemy's siege engines out of effective range of the chief wall. \Vhether the curtain is of stone, scantling or, as today, of barbed wire, its primary use is to break the enemy rush so that his full shock power will be frittered away under fire before he can extricate himself and bring himself in force against the main works.
I know of no use of a water curtain, that is, a moat, among any nonliterate peoples. I have seen something with the same function
fighting behind natural protection of trees, boulders, and streams.
Some nonliterate people even choose their defensive sites along the
true military crest, sites which will make the enemy climb an emi-
nence against withering arrow fire, arranging their line so that there
is no dead space uncovered by fire. Such people are very few. Many
others improve such sites by engineering. The archeologists par-
ticularly have done some remarkably fine work in exploring and de-
scribing the fortresses of nonliterate men. Many ethnographers have
also made excellent descriptions of defensive works. Perhaps the
cleverest, quite aside from the bulk of earth, stone, and adobe in-
volved, are the palisades of the Iroquois and the pai of the New
Zeland Maori. Both of these people were aggressive fighters and
used fortification in the correct manner: the prevention of surprise,
the protection of noncombatants, a place of retirement for the de-
feated, and a source of sortie and pivot of maneuver for troops
primarily fighting in the open. Some Polynesians and American
Indians understood the art of trench fortification. The Iroquois
knew the value of the curtain, the light wall out in front of the princi-
ple defensive palisade. The mediaeval castle at its best also had a
curtain, the light wall which kept the enemy's siege engines out of
effective range of the chief wall. Whether the curtain is of stone,
scantling or, as today, of barbed wire, its primary use is to break the
enemy rush so that his full shock power will be frittered away under
fire before he can extricate himself and bring himself in force against
the main works.
I know of no use of a water curtain, that is, a moat, among any
nonliterate peoples. I have seen something with the same function
in the waterless country of southern Morocco where a belt of terrible
cactus is grown around the chief defensive wall. Many people in
Malaysia construct very clever pits in front of their rudimentary fort-
resses, however. These are filled with sharp stakes, often poisoned,
and the whole pit cleverly hidden by vegetation. These are sometimes
staggered like modern tank traps, so that no enemy could know of
their exact location nor pass through the whole line without luck.
During the Philippine Insurrection, United States troops learned to
approach these native forts with great caution.
Some particularly clever people construct spring traps along the
line of approach to their villages. Some of these nonliterate booby-
traps, when sprung, will drive a spear through an enemy. One
in the waterless country of southern Morocco where a belt of terrible cactus is grown around the chief defensive wall. Many people in Malaysia construct very clever pi ts in front of their rudimentary fort resses, however. These are filled with sharp stakes, often pOisoned, and the whole pit cleverly hidden by vegetation. These are sometimes staggered like modern tank traps, so that no enemy could know of their exact location nor pass through the whole line without luck. During the Philippine Insurrection, United States troops learned to approach these native forts with great caution.
Some particularly clever people construct spring traps along the line of approach to their villages. Some of these nonliterate booby traps, when sprung, will drive a spear through an enemy. One
D 9 iz e b
18
18 Primitive War
Primitive War
African tribe, described later, protected the approaches to their strong-
holds by planting an extremely poisonous plant there, one whose
chemical action causes much greater and much quicker pain than
poison ivy.
Protective devices are of value when properly used. They can be
improperly used, as some peoples forget that the defensive can only
win negative victories. The defense merely staves off defeat. Only
the offensive can win.
The anthropologists have been given due credit for the scrupulous
way in which they have described the weapons of nonliterate peoples.
One flaw in the literature, however, cries for correction. With the
exception of numerous and fine articles on the use of projectile wea-
pons, there are practically no descriptions of the uses of the arms.
Practically no one thinks it necessary to tell of the manual of arms,
of the method of fencing and fighting with the weapons. Ordinarily
it has been considered quite adequate to report the presence of such
and such a weapon and the materials and methods of its manufacture.
This is particularly a civilian failing. The important part of a weapon
or tool is its method of use. As has been repeatedly said, a clever
man with a club can kill an ignorant man armed with a rifle. This
actually has been done, so it is not a matter of conjecture. One very
fine description of the use of weapons is written by the artist Frances
Del Mar.2 It would be well for the ethnographers to copy this care-
fulness.
This chapter will not comment on the origin and development of
weapons. It will suffice to say that developmental or typological
series can and have been made. Many monographs and books of Old
World archeologists have much to say about the time of origin of
fighting implements, much of which is extremely civilian. It is not
difficult to find remarks positively attributing weapons to Neander-
thaloid men deep in the Mid- or sometimes in the Early Paleolithic.
Reasoning from form to function, there is not one scrap of evidence
of the existence of a weapon, a specific man-killer, until the end of
the Old Stone Age, and even then such interpretation is extremely
dubious. Indeed, even Neolithic weapons are not as clearly dis-
tinguishable from hunting tools as one would like.
This does not mean that mankind had to own specific weapons in
order to inflict harm on his fellows. An eye can be gouged with a
2 Frances Del Mar, A Year Among the Maoris (London: E. Benn, 1924),
passim.
Mrican tribe, described later, protected the approaches to their strong holds by planting an extremely poisonous plant there, one whose chemical action causes much greater and much quicker pain than poison ivy. Protective devices are of value when properly used. They can be improperly used, as some peoples forget that the defensive can only win negative victories. The defense merely staves off defeat. Only the offensive can win. The anthropologists have been given due credit for the scrupulous way in which they have described the weapons of nonliterate peoples. One flaw in the literature, however, cries for correction. With the exception of numerous and fine articles on the use of projectile wea pons, there are practically no descriptions of the uses of the ann s . Practically no one thinks it necessary to tell of the manual of arms, of the method of fencing and fighting with the weapons. Ordinarily it has been considered quite adequate to report the presence of such and such a weapon and the materials and methods of its manufacture. This is particularly a civilian failing. The important part of a weapon or tool is its method of use. As has been repeatedly said, a clever man with a club can kill an ignorant man armed with a rifle. This actually has been done, so it is not a matter of conjecture. One very fine description of the use of weapons is written by the artist Frances Del Mar.2 It would be well for the ethnographers to copy this care fulness. This chapter will not comment on the origin and development of weapons. It will suffice to say that developmental or typological series can and have been made. Many monographs and books of Old World archeologists have much to say about the time of origin of fighting implements, much of which is extremely civilian. It is not difficult to find remarks pOSitively attributing weapons to Neander thaloid men deep in the Mid- or sometimes in the Early Paleolithic. Reasoning from form to function, there is not one scrap of evidence of the existence of a weapon, a specific man-killer, until the end of the Old Stone Age, and even then such interpretation is extremely dubious. Indeed, even Neolithic weapons are not as clearly dis tinguishable from hunting tools as one would like. This does not mean that mankind had to own specifiC weapons in order to inflict harm on his fellows. An eye can be gouged with a
pa8$1m.
2 Frances Del Mar, A Year Among the Maoris ( London: E. BeDD, 1924 ) .
D 9 iz e b

The Form and Function of Weapons 19 well-directed thumb, so no weapon at all is needed with which to
19
well-directed thumb, so no weapon at all is needed with which to hurt people. But inflicting pain and doing it in the most effective A pacific tool can kill , a woodman's So is a shotgun. So can a shotgun. But a lumberman's axe was de A One can take manner are two different things. axe for instance.
hurt people. But inflicting pain and doing it in the most effective
manner are two different things. A pacific tool can kill, a woodman's
axe for instance. So can a shotgun. But a lumberman's axe was de-
signed to cut down trees and is a poor weapon. So is a shotgun. A
war arrow differs from a hunting arrow, or should. One can take
signed to cut down trees and is a poor weapon.

a
a scythe to war, as peasants have been known to do, though it is a
war arrow differs from a hunting arrow, or should. grass-cutter and a poor man-killer.
grass-cutter and a poor man-killer. So, too, one could take a great
piece of artillery duck hunting, but what a poor job it would dol A
scythe to war, as peasants have been known to do, though it is a So, too, one could take a great A
shotgun does well against geese; a machine gun does well against men,
and no sensible person would confuse the form or function of the two
firearms. So there are weapons, man-killers, quite distinct from peace-
piece of artillery duck hunting, but what a poor job it would do l
ful tools of somewhat similar shape. Specialized man-killers did not
shotgun does well against geese; a machine gun does well against men, and no sensible person would confuse the form or function of the two firearms. So there are weapons, man-killers, quite distinct from peaceSpecialized man-killers did not ful tools of somewhat similar shape. think.
appear so early in Old World archeology as some people seem to
think. There are even tribes, such as the Eskimo, who have never
made a distinctive weapon.
Much could be written regarding the interdependence of weapons
and tactics, how changes in the tactical method have necessitated
changes in the armory, and how changes in the armory have compelled
appear so early in Old \Vorld archeology as some people seem to There are even tribes, such as the Eskimo, who have never made a distinctive weapon. Much could be \\Titten regarding the interdependence of weapons and tactics, how changes in the tactical method have necessitated changes in the armory, and how changes in the armory have compelled changes in tactics. ample of this. The discussion of African war relates a clear ex The introduction of the white man's musket and rifle
changes in tactics. The discussion of African war relates a clear ex-
ample of this. The introduction of the white man's musket and rifle
in some areas almost always forced a change of tactics on the natives.
This change in tactics sometimes followed the white man's methods,
but it did not always do so.
[The final statement of the theory of armory is that the weapons of *
a people tend to conform to those of the traditional enemy, to the ;
terrain, and to the mission. In the first place, weapons must be able
to excel or at least to meet those of the traditional enemy fighting
under his own terms. If the foe relies on shock and fire, the shock
must be met with adequate shock weapons, with defensive armor,
in some areas almost always forced a change of tactics on the natives.

This change in tactics sometimes followed the white man's methods, but it did not always do so.
a
and with fire weapons as good as or better than his. Anything else
spells expulsion or extinction^ This is no more than a re-statement of
the offense-defense cycle noted before. For example, one finds re-
liance on the spear and shield in long grass areas of east Africa. The
bow has little value there and is not used. Such shock weapons
would not be very useful in the heavily forested region of tropical
west Africa, however, and there the bow is much commoner than
/the spear and shield.
This statement by no means indicates that such an adjustment to
people tend to conform to those of the traditional enemy, to the ) terrain, and to the mission. In the first place, weapons must be able to excel or at least to meet those of the traditional enemy fighting If the foe relies on shock and fire, the shock must be met with adequate shock weapons, with defensive armor, and with fire weapons as good as or better than his. Anything else under his own terms. spells expulsion or extinction This is no more than a re-statement of the offense-defense cycle noted before. For example, one finds re liance on the spear and shield in long grass areas of east Africa. The
( The final statement of the theory of armory is that the weapons of .
enemy, terrain, and mission will be automatic. Conservatism and cul-
bow has little value there and is not used. Such shock weapons would not be very useful in the heavily forested region of tropical west Africa, however, and there the bow is much commoner than This statement by no means indicates that such an adjustment to enemy, terrain, and mission will be automatic. Conservatism and cul-
lthe spear and shield.
D 9 iz e b
20
20 Primitive War
Primitive War
tural inertia have been well discussed in both ethnology and sociology,
and there is no need to summarize such theory here. Conservatism
is always *ha "ll" "f primitute "'ir- nm"*yr, and a people can
tural inertia have been well discussed in both ethnology and sOciology, , ," . and there is no need to summarize such theory here. Conservtig:o . "'" is always the I:Uler of-primitive war, however, and a people can change its weapons. All Europeans, white Americans, Polynesians,
.
change its weapons. All Europeans, white Americans, Polynesians,
and some Melanesians once knew the military use of the bow. Since
and some Melanesians once knew the military use of the bow. they have relegated it to the function of a toy.
Since
cultural change necessitated the abandonment of this ancient weapon,
cultural change necessitated the abandonment of this ancient weapon, cultural inertia create many problems in peaceful life, but in war Conservatism and
they have relegated it to the function of a toy. Conservatism and
cultural inertia create many problems in peaceful life, but in war
they spell but defeat and destruction.
they spell but defeat and destruction.
DI
Iz.e b
CHAPTER 2
The Theory War and the Military Hrizn
IT WOULD BE SIMPLE BUT DEFINITELY MISLEADING TO ENTITLE THIS
discussion "Primitive Tactics." As the problem unfolds it will be
increasingly apparent that tactical operations are not primitive. The
bulk of nonliterate mankind failed to establish certain simple rules.
This is what kept nonliterate man a warrior instead of a soldier, de-
spite the fact that he ordinarily valued "war" and the warrior far more
than does civilized man.
This work would fail signally in its duty if it did not reveal the
CHAPTER 2
neglect of anthropologists in describing the military methods of their
informants. Nowhere is this fault more pronounced than for North
America, the best reported continent, and nowhere was the oppor-
The Theery ef War and the Military Herizen

discussion "Primitive Tactics." As the problem unfolds it will be increasingly apparent that tactical operations are not primitive. The bulk of nonliterate mankind failed to establish certain simple rules. This is what kept nonliterate man a warrior instead of a soldier, de spite the fact that he ordinarily valued "war" and the warrior far more than does civilized man. This work would fail signally in its duty if it did not reveal the neglect of anthropologists in describing the military methods of their informants. Nowhere is this fault more pronounced than for North America, the best reported continent, and nowhere was the oppor tunity for acceptable work more possible. The typical field report makes a fine description of attitudes, values, ceremonials, ersonnel, and motives for war. Indeed, the avoirdupois weight of ecellent material about all behavior leading up to an engagement and that immediately following a fight would make an impressive recording. Only the actual conduct of the fight is missing. There can be only one explanation of this vast lacuna : The anthropologists failed to inquire or were not alert when the informants were discussing their exploits.
tunity for acceptable work more possible. The typical field report
makes a fine description of attitudes, values, ceremonials, personnel,
and motives for war. Indeed, the avoirdupois weight of excellent
T WOULD BE SIMPLE BUT DEFINITELY
MISLEADING
TO ENTITLE
TInS
material about all behavior leading up to an engagement and that
immediately following a fight would make an impressive recording.
Only the actual conduct of the fight is missing. There can be only
one explanation of this vast lacuna: The anthropologists failed to
inquire or were not alert when the informants were discussing their
exploits.
The ethnographer has not hesitated to describe, classify, and co-
ordinate all culture, material and non-material, to the best of his
ability. Neither has he hesitated to discuss war at length, for it is
one of man's most important non-material complexes. The core
alone, "How does this group fight," is excluded. The field researcher
has been meticulous regarding the icing and has overlooked the cake,
which is not ordinarily the way the typical field ethnographer works.
In justice it should be stated that these remarks are more applicable
to the American anthropologists than to those of Europe. Often
British anthropologists, for example, include an intelligent comment
21
The ethnographer has not hesitated to describe, cl as s ify, and co

ordinate all culture, material and non-material, to the best of his ability. Neither has he hesitated to discuss war at length, for it is one of man's most important non-material complexes. The core alone, "How does this group fight," is excluded. The field researcher has been meticulous regarding the icing and has overlooked the cake, which is not ordinarily the way the typical field ethnographer works. In justice it should be stated that these remarks are more applicable to the American anthropologists than to those of Europe. Often British anthropologists, for example, include an intelligent comment
21
D 9 iz e b
22
22 Primitive War or two on their informants' military methods, and far, far oftener than
Primitive War
ever seen in this country, British colonial soldiers have some knowl-
edge of and interest in the simpler people under them. It would be
hard to find a more worthless literature than that produced by Ameri-
can army officers writing on the Indians or the Filipinos.
Since soldiering is ordinarily accounted a profession, it might be
or two on their informants' military methods, and far, far oftener than ever seen in this country, British colonial soldiers have some knowl edge of and interest in the simpler people under them. It would be hard to find a more worthless literature than that produced by Ameri can army officers writing on the Indians or the Filipinos. Since soldiering is ordinarily accounted a profession, it might be that there is some profundity in the simpler doctrines of war which the anthropologist could not be expected to master. This is not the case, and any professional soldier will admit it in his franker moments. In an article in the Militar Wochenblatt, a German professional jour nal, a distinguished general admitted in 1935 that war as an art can not be rated above the minor arts. Some might agree with General Bliss that warfare is even a science. 1 Bliss maintained that a branch of knowledge which is based on inductive investigation, and which has so systematized and correlated its accumulated knowledge into generalizations or "laws" demonstrable as true is a science. Warfare has long done this, more or less. There is no intention of allowing a general to define science for a scientific audience. The present purpose is to show that professional generals believe that the prosecution of warfare follows such suffi ciently well-known rules that they may be transmitted by instruction, as is true of any science. If these rules exist, they could be learned by the anthropologist and sociologist. As for the scientific nature of war, the unpredictable human and terrain elements enter too much into the subject; the unknown factors called "the fog of war" lay the term open to challenge. A man might be defeated though following the principles scrupulously due to the inability of the human mind to grasp all the factors in the engagement.2 l!.l:_rules do exist, and have existed without Thus it appears that .certa ificant chap.ge _ !n..__the- n egr D-nm g -oL ral -military _o perations. They were practiced by the first civilizations of the eastern :Medi terranean and, at least in a rudimentary fashion, by all nonliterate social groups of any military ability. They are simple, easily mastered, readily available, and usually ignored by anthropologists writing on the nonmaterial culture of peoples, particularly in America.
1 Tasker H. Bliss, in Oliver L. Spaulding, Hoffman Nickerson, and John W. Wright, Warfare, A Study of Military Methods from the Earliest Times ( New York: Harcourt Brace, 1925 ) , p. iii. 2 Tactics and Techmque of Cavalry ( 6th ed.; Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1 935 ) , p. 4.
that there is some profundity in the simpler doctrines of war which
the anthropologist could not be expected to master. This is not the
case, and any professional soldier will admit it in his franker moments.
In an article in the Militar Wochenblatt, a German professional jour-
nal, a distinguished general admitted in 1935 that war as an art can-
not be rated above the minor arts. Some might agree with General
Bliss that warfare is even a science.1 Bliss maintained that a branch
of knowledge which is based on inductive investigation, and which
has so systematized and correlated its accumulated knowledge into
generalizations or "laws" demonstrable as true is a science. Warfare
has long done this, more or less.
There is no intention of allowing a general to define science for a
scientific audience. The present purpose is to show that professional
generals believe that the prosecution of warfare follows such suffi-
ciently well-known rules that they may be transmitted by instruction,
as is true of any science. If these rules exist, they could be learned
by the anthropologist and sociologist. As for the scientific nature
of war, the unpredictable human and terrain elements enter too much
into the subject; the unknown factors called "the fog of war" lay the
term open to challenge. A man might be defeated though following
the principles scrupulously due to the inability of the human mind to
grasp all the factors in the engagement.2
Thus it appears that-certain rules do exist, and have existed without
Significant rhangp sjncs rriB bpginning nf rpal military operations.
They were practiced by the first civilizations of the eastern Medi-
terranean and, at least in a rudimentary fashion, by all nonliterate
social groups of any military ability. They are simple, easily mastered,
readily available, and usually ignored by anthropologists writing on
the nonmaterial culture of peoples, particularly in America.
1 Tasker H. Bliss, in Oliver L. Spaulding, Hoffman Nickerson, and John W.
Wright, Warfare, A Study of Military Methods from the Earliest Titties (New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1925), p. iii.
2 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry (6th ed.; Harrisburg: The Military
Service Publishing Company, 1935), p. 4.
D 9 iz e b
The Theory of War and the M ilitary Horizon

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 23 It is now necessary to discuss the concept of the "Military Horizon."
23
It is now necessary to discuss the concept of the " Military Horizon. " This means that there are tribes with social control adequate enough for all other purposes, and certainly making such tribes happy enough
This means that there are tribes with social control adequate enough
for all other purposes, and certainly making such tribes happy enough
in their daily relations with their fellows, but which is so ineffective,
so lacking in authority, team work, cohesion, and cooperation that
they could not indulge in a fight which could be called a battle. It
is also stated herewith that there are tribes which have such capacity
for military organization. It is furthermore alleged that the tribes
lacking in such organization would have been or have been defeated
by those who had it. The generalization is also offered that the mili-
tary horizon is one of social organization and has next to nothing to
do with the state of weapons^ While this might be shocking both to
the professional soldier and the social scientist, let us venture to say
that the art, or the art and science of war, if you will, is a social
science. It is also the oldest social science, having arrived at its
basic principles centuries before any of the other social sciences were
conceived. Engineering and material invention are the handmaidens
of war and are not war per se, except in the minds of those who must
win quickly. Organization and tactics are the major foci of a dis-
cussion of war.
The military horizon depends, then, not upon the adequacy of'
weapons but the adequacy of team work, organization, and command^
working along certain simple principles. Some groups failed to<
achieve this and, despite their face-painting and sporadic butchery,
were not soldiers. Some cultures do contain the rudiments of the art
of war. It is also seen that this achievement correlates with success]
along other lines. The war complex fits with the rest of the patternl
of social organization, which in turn seems to have a close correlation ?
with victory in the technological and economic configurations. This \
may, indeed, seem "evolutionary," but since it is indicated by the~^
published field data, it is going to be the lot of the critic to comb
the monographic data in his own turn and make what refutation he
can.
The position that a group with the sociologic trait of tactics, though
armed with only Neolithic materials, could defeat a non-tactical body
equipped with the latest weapons may seem extreme. But the elements
of the art of war change slowly if at all, while weapons are constantly
trying to correct their own defects according to the offense-defense
cycle, attempting to solve special problems of terrain, raw materials,
and changes in enemy equipment, thus making the material side of
can .
in their daily relations with their fellows, but which is so ineffective, so lacking in authority, team work, cohesion, and cooperation that they could not indulge in a fight which could be called a battle. It is also stated herewith that there are tribes which have such capacity for military organization. It is furthermore alleged that the tribes lacking in such organization would have been or have been defeated by those who had it. The generalization is also offered that the mili tary horizon is one of social organization and has next to nothing to do with the state of weapons ", '"'bile this might be shocking both to the professional soldier and the social scientist, let us venture to say that the art, or the art and science of war, if you will, is a social science. It is also the oldest social science, having arrived at its basic principles centuries before any of the other social sciences were conceived. Engineering and material invention are the handmaidens of war and are not war per se, except in the minds of those who must win quickly. Organization and tactics are the major foci of a dis cussion of war. The military horizon depends, then, not upon the adequacy of ) weapons but the adequacy of team work, organization, and command working along certain simple principles. Some groups failed to achieve this and, despite their face-painting and sporadic butchery, . were not soldiers. Some cultures do contain the rudiments of the art of war. It is also seen that this achievement correlates with succesl along other lines. The war complex fits with the rest of the pattern! of social organization, which in tum seems to have a close correlation ': with victory in the technological and economic configurations. This \ may, indeed, seem "evolutionary, " but since it is indicated by the-J be the lot of the critic to comb published field data, it is going the monographic data in his own tum and make what refutation he
to
The position that a group with the sociologic trait of tactics, though armed with only Neolithic materials, could defeat a non-tactical body equipped with the latest weapons may seem extreme. But the elements of the art of war change slowly if at all, while weapons are constantly trying to correct their own defects according to the offense-defense cycle, attempting to solve special problems of terrain, raw materials, and changes in enemy equipment, thus making the material side of
D 9 iz e b
24
24 Primitive War
Primitive War
No better example
war too unstable for a generalized discussion.
,-
war too unstable for a generalized discussion. No better example
of the paramount SOciological nature of the war complex can be found than in a comparison of Battles of Mickmash described in First Samuel and later fought by the British against the Turks in almost the same place and under almost identical conditions during the war of
of the paramount sociological nature of the war complex can be
found than in a comparison of Battles of Mickmash described in
First Samuel and later fought by the British against the Turks in
almost the same place and under almost identical conditions during
the war of 1914-1918. Despite the vast amount of improvement and
1914-1918.
Despite the vast amount of improvement and
change in material equipment between King Saul and King George
V, each battle was won and lost by application of the same tactical
change in material equipment between King Saul and King George
principles.8
V, each battle was won and lost by application of the same tactical
principles.3 The present position, made in the face of a possible charge of over simplification, is that the principles of the art of war are so simple and so rigidly exacting that there should be no surprise that peoples widely separated in space and time should have discovered some or
an
The present position, made in the face of a possible charge of over-
simplification, is that the principles of the art of war are so simple
and so rigidly exacting that there should be no surprise that peoples
widely separated in space and time should have discovered some or
all of them. We are not here speaking of anything so complicated as
an explanation of polyandry among separated peoples, nor the similari-
ties or dissimilarities in the ceramic complex of the Americas and New
Stone Age Europe. The art of war or the artlessness of fighting are
so simple throughout time and over the face of the world that the
all of them.
We are not here speaking of anything so complicated as
discussion could be made very monotonous. Since this statement is
explanation of polyandry among separated peoples, nor the similari The art of war or the artlessness of fighting are Since this statement is
extreme, the writer is not content to assert it on his own recognizance.
ties or dissimilarities in the ceramic complex of the Americas and New Stone Age Europe. so simple throughout time and over the face of the world that the discussion could be made very monotonous. extreme, the writer is not content to assert it on his own recognizance. The reader is urged to consult the best military authorities on this score. It is predicted t1lat he will find agreement with Spaulding's statement :
\Var is war. Its outward fonns change, just as the outward fonns of peace change. But from the stylus to the typewriter is just as far as fro m the club to the machinegun-a weapon also known affection ately or otherwise as a "typewriter. " And the development of tactics is neither more nor less remarkable than the development of office methods. Strip any military operation of external, identifying details, and one will find it hard to put a place and date to the story
.
The reader is urged to consult the best military authorities on this
score. It is predicted that he will find agreement with Spaulding's
statement:
War is war. Its outward forms change, just as the outward forms
of peace change. But from the stylus to the typewriter is just as far
as from the club to the machineguna weapon also known affection-
ately or otherwise as a "typewriter." And the development of tactics
is neither more nor less remarkable than the development of office
methods.
Strip any military operation of external, identifying details, and one
will find it hard to put a place and date to the story.4
Several professional officers with whom I have discussed the project
have stood for the non-existence of the military art among nonliterate
folk. It was occasionally held that the American Indian, at least,
simply had no tactics, no art of war, no system of combat. This is
tantamount to saying that he had no cutting instruments because he
lacked steel knives. It is suspected that some tribes lacked utterly
any system of fighting. Among the majority it is obvious that some
8 Vivian Gilbert, The Romance of the Last Crusade (New York: D. Appleton,
1923), p. 183.
* Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright, op. cit., p. 3.
Several professional officers with whom I have discussed the project have stood for the non-existence of the military art among nonliterate folk. It was occasionally held that the American Indian, at least, simply had no tactics, no art of war, no system of combat. This is tantamount to saying that he had no cutting instruments because he lacked steel knives. It is suspected that some tribes lacked utterly any system of fightin g.
1923 ) ,
Vivi ;n p.
- il bert, The
Among the majority it
is
obvious that some
Romance of the Last Crusade ( New York: D. Appleton, cit., p. 3.
Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright, op.
1 83 .
D 9 iz e b
The Theory of War and the Military Horizon

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 25 pattern was followed, although it was often below the military hori-
25
pattern was followed, although it was often below the military hori Inadequacy is not proof of non-existence.
zon and inadequate from the standpoint of the. officers.-just quoted...
Inadequacy is not proof of non-existence. For example, the Menomini
had a very poor method of fighting which could succeed only against
similarly incompetent warriors, or against the unorganized whites
had a very poor method of fighting which could succeed only against' similarly incompetent warriors, or against the unorganized whites who had been pushed out onto the midwest frontier, but they had a system which had an advantage which ours did not : I t was divine. I)
zon and inadequate from the standpoint of the officers just quoted. For example, the Menomini
,/
who had been pushed out onto the midwest frontier, but they had a
system which had an advantage which ours did not: It was divine.5
The Thunderers gave the Menomini leaders very explicit directions,
as good tactical advice as Jehovah gave the Jews at Jericho, and almost
of the same type.6 It might have been an incomplete system, but it
involved the tactical principles of envelopment, surprise, movement, *
The Thunderers gave the Menomini leaders very explicit directions, of the same type.6
and shock, all that was needed for the kind of action involved.
as good tactical advice as Jehovah gave the Jews at Jericho, and almost
Furthermore, one cannot avoid the suspicion that primitive societies
had more system to their fighting than they are given credit for in
field reports. They made some very creditable stands against the
involved the tactical principles of envelopment, surprise, movement, . ' and shock, all that was n eeded for the kind of action involved. Furthermore, one cannot avoid the suspicion that primitive societies
It might have been an incomplete system, but it
white man, in spite of their small populations and simple weapons.
Let us now summarize the principles of tactics so that we may com-
pare the behavior of nonliterate societies with them. The principles
are given such descriptive titles that they will only be quoted, post-
poning explanation and exposition to the descriptive chapters.
had more system to their fighting than they are given credit for in white man, in spite of their small populations and simple weapons. field reports .
There are a few fundamental truths which have been applicable in
They made some very creditable stands against the
war from time immemorial and which will continue to be so in future
wars. These truths are known as tactical principles, or principles of war.
Though these principles themselves do not change, their application
is different for units of different sizes and varies from time to time for
Let us now summarize the principles of tactics so that we may com pare the behavior of nonliterate societies with them. The principles poning explanation and exposition to the descriptive chapters.
units of the same size.7
The principles referred to are entitled:
are given such descriptive titles that they will only be quoted, post
There are a few fundamental truths which have been applicable in
war from time immemorial and which will continue to be so in future wars.
1. The Principle of the Offensive.
2. The Principle of Combined Employment of All Forces.
3. The Principle of Concerted Effort.
4. The Principle of Concentration of Force at the Critical Point.
5. The Principle of Integrity of Tactical Units.
These truths are known as tactical principles, or principles of war.
6. The Principle of Fire and Movement.
7. The Principle of Simplicity of Plan.
Though these principles themselves do not change, their application
8. The Principle of Surprise.
5 Alanson B. Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini
is different for units of different sizes and varies from time to time for units of the same size.7
Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History (New
York: 1913), XIII, Part 1, p. 97.
The 'principles referred to are entitled : 2. The Principle of Combined Employment of All Forces. 3. The Principle of Concerted Effort.
8 Ibid., p. 100.
i Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, pp. 3ff.
1. The Principle of the Offensive.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
The Principle of Concentration of Force at the Critical Point. The Principle of Integrity of Tactical Units. The Principle of Fire and Movement. The Principle of Surprise.
The Principle of Simplicity of Plan .
Indians,

Anthropological Papers, American Museum
York : 1913 ) , XIII, Part 1 , p. 97. 6 Ibid., p. 100. 7 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry,
of Natural History ( New
pp.
3ff.
D 9 iz e b
26
26 Primitive War 9. The Principle of Security.
Primitive War
The The The The The Principle Principle Principle Principle Principle of of of of of Security. Utilization of the Terrain. Correct Formations. Intelligence. Mobility.
10. The Principle of Utilization of the Terrain.
11. The Principle of Correct Formations.
12. The Principle of Intelligence.
13. The Principle of Mobility.
14. The Principle of Exploitation of Victory.
One cannot say which of these principles is the most important
in civilized war. They are all important, and important with respect
9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
The Principle of Exploitation of Victory.
to each other. They must function in a composite pattern. At times
it may be necessary to emphasize one at the apparent relegation of
another to a subordinate role, but they must all be observed in every
action. When one is speaking of the simpler mlhirps, thp. arid text
of achievement of the military horizon is the observance of the elev-
enth, the prinpiplg_Qf corrpf* y"""''8
The use of the proper formations before, during, and after an en-
gagement is hardly the point in primitive warfare. It is difficult
enough to find nonliterate warriors using any. There can be no doubt
but that the regularization of the participants in a war party into
some kind of a team distributed over the scene of action is one of the
sine qua non elements of tactics. It is true that even today certain
They are all important, and important with respect to each other. They must function in a composite pattern. At times it may be necessary to emphasize one at the apparent relegation of another to a subordinate role, but they must all be observed in every action. When one is speaki.pg of the simpler cultures, the acid test .,,9f achievement of the mili . tary . is the observance of the elev enth, the principle of correct . JPrmations.
_
in civilized war.
One cannot say which of these principles is the most important
types of action may degenerate into unorganized melees as the re-
sult of shock action. This is particularly true of cavalry and the de-
scendants of cavalry, armored and air forces. Nevertheless, the en-
gagement is always entered in formation and, whether in defeat or
victory, both sides must withdraw from the fight in some semblance
of order if the first is to escape slaughter and the second to exploit
victory.
In the first place this is essential for command. The leader must
have some idea of where his men are in order to exercise any control
over their movements. It will soon be seen that the simpler non-
literate societies were defective in command functions. If for no other
reason, it would therefore seem that such societies, so lacking in
social organization and compulsive institutions in peace, except in
certain clearly defined areas, would also be lacking in military or-
ganization and command and, therefore, in effective fighting forma-
tion. For the most part this is true, although not as much so as
might appear on the surface of the discussion.
Reduced to the essence of simplicity, military organization consists
of the column and the line. Those people who do not avail them-
The use of the proper formations before, during, and after an en gagement is hardly the point in primitive warfare. It is difficult enough to find nonliterate warriors using any. There can be no doubt but that the regularization of the participants in a war party into some kind of a team distributed over the scene of action is one of the sine qua non elements of tactics. It is true that even today certain types of action may degenerate into unorganized melees as the re sult of shock action. This is particularly true of cavalry and the de scendants of cavalry, armored and air forces. Nevertheless, the en gagement is always entered in formation and, whether in defeat or victory, both sides must withdraw from the fight in some semblance of order if the first is to escape slaughter and the second to exploit victory. In the first place this is essential for command. The leader must have some idea of where his men are in order to exercise any control over their movements. It will soon be seen that the Simpler non literate societies were defective in command functions. If for no other reason, it would therefore seem that such societies, so lacking in social organization and compulsive institutions in peace, except in certain clearly defined areas, would also be lacking in military or ganization and command and, therefore, in effective fighting forma tion. For the most part this is true, although not as much so as might appear on the surface of the discussion. Reduced to the essence of simplicity, military organization consists of the column and the line. Those people who do not avail them-
D 9 iz e b

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 27 selves of these two simple sociologic devices are below the military
27
horizon without argument. Their fighting can be nothing but a
selves of these two simple sociologic devices are below the military horizon without argument. Their fighting can be nothing but a scuffle, regardless of the amount of bloodshed, and cannot be called a war. The column is not a fighting device. of getting men to the scene of
a
scuffle, regardless of the amount of bloodshed, and cannot be called
a war.
The polumn is not a fighting device. It is an organizational method
of getting men to the scene of a fight in the best condition, close
enough to be controlled by a chief, or to render each other some
support and mutual protection. Fifty men close enough together to
act as a unit can defeat a thousand spread over the terrain, each doing
It is an organizational method fight in tlie- best con dition, close
what seems good in his own eyes until he must flee for his life or
enough to be controlled by a chief, or to render each other some support and mutual protection. Fifty men close enough together to act as a unit can defeat a thousand spread over the terrain, each doing what seems good in his own eyes until he must flee for his life or be cut down by cooperators of bloody intent. after the other like the old convict lock-step. It is not implied that Should the enemy be In our day the such columns must be shoulder to shoulder in proximity, nor one well-equipped with weapons of fire, or with horses to make a shock attack on the flanks, such formations would be fatal. column, threatened by aerial attack from above and by weapons of great mobility, fire, and shock power on the flanks, tends to be more dispersed than it was fifty years ago. required of it. One form of column is familiar to everybody; the so-called Indian file, the placing of men in one file one after the other. this is practical only for arms of great mobility. twos. In large units Cavalry, horsed or
be cut down by cooperators of bloody intent. It is not implied that
such columns must be shoulder to shoulder in proximity, nor one
after the other like the old convict lock-step. Should the enemy be
well-equipped with weapons of fire, or with horses to make a shock
attack on the flanks, such formations would be fatal. In our day the
column, threatened by aerial attack from above and by weapons
of great mobility, fire, and shock power on the flanks, tends to be
more dispersed than it was fifty years ago. All that is meant is that
the column should be sufficiently compact to perform the functions
required of it.
One form of column is familiar to everybody; the so-called Indian
file, the placing of men in one file one after the other. In large units
this is practical only for arms of great mobility. Cavalry, horsed or
mechanized, often rides Indian file, or more frequently by column of
twos. Due to the speed with which such troops can maneuver into
a fighting line, this is often desirable. It is particularly ineffective for
All that is meant is that
foot commands of any size. It makes for a spread-outthat terror of
all professional soldiers, "column attenuation." It covers such space
the column should be sufficiently compact to perform the functions
in depth that a determined enemy can defeat the foremost elements
before the rear can be brought up. Its maneuverability is practically
nil. The classical Greeks marched in this manner, and were often
defeated for their clumsiness.
There may be civilians who will object to the simplicity of
this generalization concerning basic formations, although it is the
opinion of competent military scholars. Lest it be thought that these
mechanized, often rides Indian file, or more frequently by column of Due to the speed with which such troops can maneuver into It is particularly ineffective for It covers such space It makes for a spread-out-that terror of a fighting line, this is often desirable. foot commands of any size.
principles are the author's, please read the article on tactics in the
Encyclopedia Britannica. The writer of the article is eminent enough.
This extremely common source was deliberately chosen to show that
all professional soldiers, "column attenuation." before the rear can be brought up. nil. defeated for their clumsiness.
in depth that a determined enemy can defeat the foremost elements The classical Greeks marched in this manner, and were often Its maneuverability is practically
There may be civilians who will object to the simplicity of
this generalization concerning basic formations, although it is the

opinion of competent military scholars. Lest it be thought that these principles are the author's, please read the article on tactics in the The writer of the article is eminent enough. This extremely common source was deliberately chosen to show that
Encyclopedia Britannica.
D 9 iz e b
28
28 Primitive War basic military doctrine has long been available to anyone who wished
Primitive War
to consider it.3
basic military doctrine has long been available to anyone who wished to consider it. 8
A good approach or withdrawal order based on the column may be
considered vital, but its importance wanes before a good battle for-
mation. Whether speaking of the simplest warriors or of the modern,
this order must be based on some form of a line or echelon of lines.
The line is the simplest tactical formation, and a sociologic trait with-
out which there can be no true war. No one need object to this
statement as an attempt to judge all people by our standards. The
line is dictated by nature. Whether one is speaking of fighting men
or animals, whether of one individual or a group of armies, the vul-
nerable places are the sides and the back. It takes neither logical
profundity nor vast experience to appreciate this. A mammal's fight-
ing equipment is to the fore, in the direction of the enemy. Not be-
ing equipped with armor or stinging tails, the forward section con-
tains the only means of offense or defense. The predatory animals
who hunt in packs appreciate this and have a battle formation of
sorts, relying largely on the technique of the envelopment. Physical
anthropology and zoology have yet to give us a description of the
psychology of our most immediate primate ancestors. Judged by
their behavior, it seems that men were a rather solitary though fierce
Mspecies of carnivorous primates; but it would also seem that the
ability to correct this defect in primate anatomy is purely cultural
and without instinctive basis among the decendants of those dour
Simiidae. Many peoples have never made this very simple adjust-
ment.
This adjustment may be found in a line, and there is no other.
Even the most advanced military nations have only improved on the
basic concept. The adjustment and formation are very simple, re-
quiring no great reasoning, and all successful tribes use it. The
scrupulous ethnologist need not be worried on that score. The tac-
tical line provides a means by which each man, save those on the ex-
treme flanks, may protect the sides of his neighbor and be protected
by the enlightened self-interest of that neighbor. Once the line is
severed, broken into, or smashed, safety is gone.
Given warriors of equal equipment and will to victory, the de-
A good approach or withdrawal order based on the column may be considered vital, but its importance wanes before a good battle for mation. Whether speaking of the simplest warriors or of the modern, this order must be based on some form of a line or echelon of lines. The line is the simplest tactical formation, andaS ociologic trait with 'out which there can be no true war. No one need object to this statement as an attempt to judge all people by our standards. The line is dictated by nature. Whether one is speaking of fighting men or animals, whether of one individual or a group of armies, the vul nerable places are the sides and the back. It takes neither logical profundity nor vast experience to appreciate this. A mammal 's fight ing equipment is to the fore, in the direction of the enemy. Not be ing equipped with armor or stinging tails, the forward section con tains the only means of offense or defense. The predatory animals who hunt in packs appreciate this and have a battle formation of sorts, relying largely on the technique of the envelopment. Physical .anthropology and zoology have yet to give us a description of the psychology of our most immediate primate ancestors . Judged by their behavior, it seems that men were a rather solitary though fierce IISpecies of carnivorous primates; but it would also seem that the ability to correct this defect in primate anatomy is purely cultural and without instinctive basis amon g the decendants of those dour Simiidae. M any peoples have never made this very simple adjust ment.
This adjustment may be found in a line, and there is no other. Even the most advanced military nations have only improved on the basic concept. The adjustment and formation are very simple, re quiring no great reasoning, and all successful tribes use it. scrupulous ethnologist need not be worried on that score. The
cision will rarely be made in the front. If the lines are of equal
length, victory will go to that which can maneuver enough to deliver
8 Thomas R. Phillips, Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed.; Chicago 1946), XXI,
p. 739ff.
The tac
tical line provides a means by which each man, save those on the ex treme flanks, may protect the sides of his neighbor and be protected by the enlightened self-interest of that neighbor. severed, broken into, or smashed, safety is gone. Given warriors of equal equipment and will to victory, the de cision will rarely be made in the front. If the lines are of equal length, victory will go to that which can maneuver enough to deliver Once the line is
p. 73OO.
8 Thomas R. Phillips, Encyclop edia Britannica ( l4th ed. ; Chicago 1946 ) , XXI,
D 9 iz e b

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 29 a crumbling, rolling up movement on the flank. Other things being
29
equal, the longer line will surely win by enveloping the weak flanks
of the other. To be sure, there are devices whereby a clever com-
equal, the longer line will s urely win by enveloping the weak flanks mander of a short line may envelop the long on of an unwary leader. of the other.
a crumbling, rolling up movement on the flank.
Other things being
mander of a short line may envelop the long on of an unwary leader.
To be sure, there are devices whereby a clever com
One is the "weak center" formation, whereby it is prearranged that
the center of the short line will pretend to be weaker than it is and
withdraw enough so that the eager but stupid enemy will surge into
One is the "weak center" formation, whereby it is prearranged that withdraw enough so that the eager but stupid enemy will surge into flanks of the less numerous and clever equal to or even longer than the numerous but too-anxious foe. Large numbers of his fighting spearmen in the front rank. men are rendered ineffectual in the center and cannot aid their fellow The outcome of the Punic war depended the gap. Pressure on the ends at the right moment will make the the center of the short line will pretend to be weaker than it is and
the gap. Pressure on the ends at the right moment will make the
flanks of the less numerous and clever equal to or even longer than
the numerous but too-anxious foe. Large numbers of his fighting
men are rendered ineffectual in the center and cannot aid their fellow
spearmen in the front rank. The outcome of the Punic war depended
upon this maneuver. Indeed, it has been successfully used from the
wars recorded in the Book of Kings, through the Zulu King Chaka,
to Hindenburg's defeat of the Russians at Tannenberg.
It is not geometrical perfection of the line that counts. Often it
is irregular or, as in the Zulu wars, bent into a crescent. It is cohesion
that makes an armed body strong, as Hilaire Belloc said:
upon this maneuver.
Every member wishes to separate himself from the band when it is
Indeed, it has been successfully used from the wars recorded in the Book of Kings, through the Zulu King Chaka, to Hindenburg's defeat of the Russians at Tannenberg. It is not geometrical perfection of the line that counts.
in danger. Indeed, the wish to decamp is always strongest at just that
point, the tactically critical point, where the group is in the greatest
danger. The prime object of discipline and training is to prevent this.9
This primer of tactics has been sketchy, admittedly at the risk of
the reader falling into misconception for lack of exposition. Yet
is irregular or, as in the Zulu wars, bent into a crescent.
this work does not pretend to be a general exposition of the art of
that makes an arllle d body strong, as Hilaire Belloc said :
It is cohesion
.
Often it
war, and must hold to its own course. Elaboration and exposition in
part may be found in the descriptive material to follow. Should the
Every member wishes to separate himself from the band when it is
reader find that he needs to read further on the subject, he is assured
in
that the art of war has been well and interestingly discussed through-
point, the tactically critical point, where the group is in the greatest The prime object of discipline and training is to prevent this .9
danger.
Indeed, the wish to decamp is always strongest at just that
out the ages, while tactical history has engaged some of the greatest
danger.
captains of all times, many of whom possess literary skill.
Ethnologists frequently report that certain tribes gathered berries
and nuts and, like those of California, may have depended upon wild
vegetable foods for their principal sustenance. Such a condition did
the reader falling into misconception for lack of exposition. war, and must hold to its own course.
This primer of tactics has been sketchy, admittedly at the risk of Yet
not make them agriculturalists, although they may have eaten no more
this work does not pretend to be a general exposition of the art of
meat than a farming tribe. There is something more to the agri-
cultural complex than mere diet, as there is more to war than mere
killing. To proceed one step further, tribes like the Ojibway of Min-
part may be found in the descriptive material to follow.
Elaboration and exposition in Should the
nesota even encouraged the wild rice to grow, planted it in swamps
9 Hilaire Belloc, Poitiers (London: 1913), pp. 112.
that the art of war has been well and interestingly discussed through out the ages, while tactical history has engaged some of the greatest captains of all times, many of whom possess literary skill.
reader find that he needs to read further on the subject, he is assured
cultural complex than mere diet, as there is more to war than mere killing. To proceed one step further, tribes like the Ojibway of Min nesota even encouraged the wild rice to grow, planted it in swamps
Ethnologists frequently report that certain tribes gathered berries and nuts and, like those of California, may have depended upon wild vegetable foods for their principal sustenance. Such a condition did not make them agriculturalists, although they may have eaten no more meat than a farming tribe. There is something more to the a gri
9 Hilaire Belloc, Poitiers ( London : 1913 ) ,
pp.
1 12.
D 9 iz e b
30
30 Primitive War which had not hitherto borne it, and carefully protected the swamps
Primitive
\Var
which had not hitherto borne it, and carefully protected the swamps from birds . To be considered a farming people, however, they would have actually have had to domesticate the food plant, bring its growth under their control, and systematically plant, harvest, and save cer tain seed for future planting. Wilhelm Schmidt maintains that the Unless the soil is worked, therefore, horizon of true agriculture consists in altering the life conditions of
from birds. To be considered a farming people, however, they would
have actually have had to domesticate the food plant, bring its growth
under their control, and systematically plant, harvest, and save cer-
tain seed for future planting. Wilhelm Schmidt maintains that the
horizon of true agriculture consists in altering the life conditions of
the plants by disturbing the soil. Unless the soil is worked, therefore,
plant-food production cannot be considered true tillage.
(The threshold, then, that divides true war from submilitary combat
must be taken as the invention of tactics.
It might be stated with somewhat less clarity, that not only must
there be tactical movement of combatants but also the ability to con-
duct a somewhat protracted campaign. A raid is hardly more of a
war than is a modern burglary. It might be said, then, that the follow-
{
, ,
the plants by disturbing the soil.
plant-food production cannot be considered true tillage. The threshold, then, that divides true war from submilitary combat must be taken as the invention of tactics. It might be stated with somewhat less clarity, that n ot only must there be tactical movement of combatants but also the ability to con duct a somewhat protracted campaign . war than is a modern burglary. A raid is hardly more of a It might be said, then, that the follow-
ing conditions are necessary for true war:_
" - ""**"
1. Tactical operations.
2. Definite command and control. Without definite military au-
thority in control throughout the action, there exists only a bloody
brawl.
3. Ability to conduct a campaign for the reduction of enemy re-
ing conditions are necessary for true war :
sistance if the first battle fails. This is a much higher condition than
that of the mere raid, and implies more self-discipline and social or-
1. Tactical operations.
2. Definite command and control.
brawl. Without definite military au thority in control throughout the action, there exists only a bloody
ganization.
4. The motive must have some clarity. The war must have a group
motive rather than an individual one, or even one based on kinship.
True war is above the plane of feuds; it is a political device, properly
so-called.
5. An adequate supply.
3. Ability to conduct a campaign for the reduction of enemy re

sistance if the firs t battle fails. ganization. This is a much higher condition than that of the mere raid, and implies more self-discipline and social or
Very few nonliterate tribes have been able to meet these conditions.
A most interesting and vital part of the war pattern, however, is to be
seen in the fifth point. This linkage with economic success, this
ability to provide surplus food for armies in the field, is so important
that there is temptation to place it in the center of the whole mili-
tary complex. Most peoples either could not produce enough food
4. The motive must have some clarity. The war must have a group
motive rather than an individual one, or even one based on kinship. True war is above the plane of feuds ; it is a political device, properly so-called.
to prosecute a war or did not perceive the importance of this staff
function. The supply function will be obvious in following chapters,
but it will be seen to be truly primitive or rudimentary in most in-
stances. Consequently the military operations described are also
primitive and rudimentary.
5.
An adequate supply.
V ry few nonliterate tribes have been able to meet these conditions. A most interesting and vital part of the war pattern, however, is to be ability to provide surplus food for armies in the field, is so important that there is temptation to place it in the center of the whole mili tary complex. function. stances. Most peoples either could not produce enough food to prosecute a war or did not perceive the importance of this staff The supply function will be obvious in following chapters, Consequently the military operations described are also but it will be seen to be truly primitive or rudimentary in most in primitive and rudimentary. seen in the fifth point. This linkage with economic success, this
D 9 iz e b

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 31 An army fights not only on courage but on food. Any discussion
31
An army fights not only on courage but on food. Any discussion

of war, then, is extremely artificial unless it describes the social and economic organization of the tribal or national culture. A social or ganization capable of producing an economic surplus by a high agri culture.. and a means of transporting such food, is as necessary for war as the jnyti_<?!1 of tactics. 'Without it, war is confined to raids or to single battles. Campaigns are impossible, and therefore the most civilized motive for war is impossible : the subjugation of enemy peoples and the expansion of the group's territory at their expense. A small party may live off the country, but this is not possible for an army, especially one pursuing a fleeing enemy who may be spoil ing the available food along their line of retreat. An invasion in former times was slow unless the mission could be accomplished by a raid. ( Some Asiatic exceptions to this will be mentioned later. ) Witness the poor conduct of the Trojan war as an example of the folly of inadequate supply. The attack was made by a descent from the sea, which meant that a foreign base had to be established in order that fields to feed the troops might be available. The Greek troops were thus tied to their com fields and could not move far inland. One might suspect that adequate military supply had a slow development, and hence true war was tardy in appearing in the world. Lest the civilian reader be confused by this discussion of what is and what is not war, it is desirable that a truly military campaign be described. An example will be chosen of a people who had only recently emerged from primitivity, the Hebrews as revealed in the earlier books of the Old Testament. They had achieved the military horizon, to be sure, but retained several sub military practices, and were far behind their more powerful neighbors both in weapons and in the art of war. They occupied what is now known as a buffer state. To the north were the military empires of Mesopotamia, and to the south was Egypt. Both sides were very anxious to hold Judaea, or at least keep it in harmless native hands. It served as too valuable a base of attack for either of the great powers to be content if the other held it. Its foreign relations were, therefore, almost always hostile. The religious attitudes and values of the Hebrews included hatred and fighting of the outgroup as a sacred duty. Their strategy was ex tremely simple, as it was with other peoples at the dawn of history. Before the kings arose, the two armies set out to find each other,
of war, then, is extremely artificial unless it describes the social and
economic organization of the tribal or national culture. A social or-
ganization capable of producing an economic surplus by a high agri-
culture, and a means nf transporting snrn food, is as necessary for
war as the invention of tactics. Without it, war is confined to raids
or to single battles. Campaigns are impossible, and therefore the most
civilized motive for war is impossible: the subjugation of enemy
peoples and the expansion of the group's territory at their expense.
A small party may live off the country, but this is not possible for
an army, especially one pursuing a fleeing enemy who may be spoil-
ing the available food along their line of retreat.
An invasion in former times was slow unless the mission could be
accomplished by a raid. (Some Asiatic exceptions to this will be
mentioned later.) Witness the poor conduct of the Trojan war as an
example of the folly of inadequate supply. The attack was made by
a descent from the sea, which meant that a foreign base had to be
established in order that fields to feed the troops might be available.
The Greek troops were thus tied to their corn fields and could not
move far inland. One might suspect that adequate military supply
had a slow development, and hence true war was tardy in appearing
in the world.
Lest the civilian reader be confused by this discussion of what is
and what is not war, it is desirable that a truly military campaign be
described. An example will be chosen of a people who had only
recently emerged from primitivity, the Hebrews as revealed in the
earlier books of the Old Testament. They had achieved the military
horizon, to be sure, but retained several submilitary practices, and
were far behind their more powerful neighbors both in weapons and
in the art of war.
They occupied what is now known as a buffer state. To the north
were the military empires of Mesopotamia, and to the south was
Egypt. Both sides were very anxious to hold Judaea, or at least
keep it in harmless native hands. It served as too valuable a base
of attack for either of the great powers to be content if the other held
it. Its foreign relations were, therefore, almost always hostile. The
religious attitudes and values of the Hebrews included hatred and
fighting of the outgroup as a sacred duty. Their strategy was ex-
tremely simple, as it was with other peoples at the dawn of history.
Before the kings arose, the two armies set out to find each other,
D 9 iz e b
32
32 Primitive War
Primitive War
Seldom were campaigns found before the
fought, and went home.
fought, and went home. Seldom were campaigns found before the
social organization was strong enough to support the monarchy, and
social organization was strong enough to support the monarchy, and that against Sisera is an exception . l O militia service. out to battle. " had to be in . Organization was simple, being merely a levy o f tribal manhood The hom was sounded from village to village, in
that against Sisera is an exception.10
Organization was simple, being merely a levy of tribal manhood
militia service. The horn was sounded from village to village, in-
forming the eligible that it was spring, and "the time when kings go
out to battle." This time was set for purposes of supply, as a crop
had to be in. Furthermore, if the invasion were planned before the
forming the eligible that it was spring, and "the time when kings go This time was set for purposes of supply, as a crop Furthermore, if the invasion were planned before the
enemy had grown his crop, the invader would have nothing to live
on while in hostile territory. Ordinarily each man carried "iron
rations" on his person sufficient for about three days. When this
was eaten it was necessary to live off the country of friend or foe.
Organized supply such as in Judges 20 was rare until later.
enemy had grown his crop, the invader would have nothing to live Ordinarily each man carried " iron on while in hostile territory. rations" on his person sufficient for about three days. Organized supply such as in Judges When this was eaten it was necessary to live off the country of friend or foe.
In contrast with the poor staff work in supply, military intelligence
was fairly well organized, which is typical of folk far less civilized
than the early Hebrews. A spy system was maintained in hostile ter-
ritory, and when the armies drew together, scouts were sent out to
20 was rare until later.
prevent surprise and to reconnoiter the enemy's strength.11 Tactics
existed but were simple, usually consisting of conflicts between two
In contrast with the poor staff work in supply, military intelligence was fairly well organized, which is typical of folk far less civilized than the early Hebrews .
parallel lines with simple enveloping movements. The forces were
frequently divided into three echelons.12 The tactical retreat was
known and employed. More elaborate tactics are to be found in the
A spy system was maintained in hostile ter

Tactics
command of Joab before Rabbathammon.18
ritory, and when the armies drew together, scouts were sent out to prevent surprise and to reconnoiter the enemy's strength , u parallel lines with simple enveloping movements. frequently divided into three echelons. 1 2 known and employed. command of Joab before Rabbathammon . l 3 Keeping this summary i n mind, the following description of the short campaign against Gibeah will illustrate every element of true war, even existed but were simple, usually consisting of conflicts between two The forces were The tactical retreat was
Keeping this summary in mind, the following description of the
short campaign against Gibeah will illustrate every element of true
war, even if practiced in a rudimentary way.
Whether there was an economic casus belli in this intratribal war
is not known. The motive was the ancient one of the purity of woman-
hood, even though a concubine was concerned.
A certain priest was on a peaceful mission to Bethlehem-Judah to
More elaborate tactics are to be found in the
bring back his concubine who had deserted. Passing with her through
the friendly allied country of Benjamin, the priest spent the night
in the city of Gibeah with an elderly stranger. During the night,
however, certain persons, nationals of the place, broke the law of
hospitality and killed the young woman by sexual abuse, a grievance
hardly to be borne.
if practiced in a rudimentary way.
10 Judges 4.
11 Judges 2; I Samuel 26; Maccabees 5; Judges 1; II Samuel 15; Judges 7.
Whether there was an economic is not known.
casus belli
in this intra tribal war
12 Judges 7; I Samuel 11; II Samuel 18.
The motive was the ancient one of the purity of woman
II Samuel 10.
hood, even though a concubine was concerned.
A certain priest was on a peaceful mission to Bethlehem-Judah to

bring back his concubine who had deserted. Passing with her through the friendly allied country of Benjamin, the priest spent the night
in the city of Gibeah with an elderly stranger. During the night, however, certain persons, nationals of the place, broke the law of hospitality and killed the young woman by sexual abuse, a grievance hardly to be borne. 10 11 12 18
Judges 4. Judges 2; I Samuel 26; Maccabees 5; Judges 1; Judges 7; I Samuel 1 1 ; II Samuel 18. II Samuel 10.
II
Samuel 15; Judges 7.
D 9 iz e b

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 33 Arriving in his own country, the priest complained to the civil authority of his treatment in Gibeah. This was before the rise of kings,
33
Arriving in his own country, the priest complained to the civil au thority of his treatment in Gibeah. assembled. This was before the rise of kings, and government was vested in a tribal council which was immediately The priest's complaint was deemed grievous enough for In the intersib action, and an embassy was sent to the tribe of Benjamin to meantime diplomacy was backed by preparedness, and the mobili zation order for the militia went out to the other tribes of Israel. A demand the summary execution of their offending kinsmen .
and government was vested in a tribal council which was immediately
assembled. The priest's complaint was deemed grievous enough for
intersib action, and an embassy was sent to the tribe of Benjamin to
demand the summary execution of their offending kinsmen. In the
meantime diplomacy was backed by preparedness, and the mobili-
zation order for the militia went out to the other tribes of Israel. A
force of four hundred thousand swordsmen was nationalized and put
on war footing. An adequate supply was organized, for the record
states, "We will take ten men of an hundred, throughout the tribes of
Israel, and an hundred of a thousand, and a thousand out of ten
thousand, to fetch victual for the people . . ." Observe the tribal au-
thoritarianism in this enlistment and staff work in contrast with the
submilitary behavior soon to be described.
Diplomatic relations were soon severed. The embassy had gone
to offending Benjamin, stated the case of the offended tribes of the
states, " \Ve will take ten men of an hundred, throughout the tribes of Israel, and an hundred of a thousand, and a thousand out of ten thousand, to fetch victual for the people . . . " Observe the tribal au thoritarianism in this enlistment and staff work in contrast with the submilitary behavior soon to be described. Diplomatic relations were soon severed. to offending The embassy had gone Benjamin, stated the case of the offended tribes of the
force of four hundred thousand swordsmen was nationalized and put on war footing. An adequate supply was organized, for the record
rest of Israel, and was allowed to go among the Benjamite villages
to conduct its own propaganda campaign. All this came to naught,
for Benjamin haughtily refused to surrender the guilty parties. Dip-
lomatic relations therefore failed, and war was declared on both sides.
The mobilization order then went forth in Benjamin and every
available man was authoritatively ordered to the standard. Remem-
ber this when reading the invitation to war of the Plains chiefs in
America. Benjamin's fields and villages were depopulated; everyone
concentrated within the fenced city of Gibeah as the mobilization
point. All noncombatants were ordered within the circumvallation and
rest of Israel, and was allowed to go among the Benjamite villages to conduct its own propaganda campai gn . All this came to naught, for Benjamin haughtily refused to surrender the guilty parties. Dip lomatic relations therefore failed, and war was declared on both sides. available man was authoritatively ordered to the standard. America. The mobilization order then went forth in Benjamin and every Remem
the defenses were strengthened. The offending city of Gibeah con-
tributed seven hundred picked men, and the other Benjamite ele-
ments raised twenty-six thousand good swordsmen of the line. Be-
sides the swordsmen, Benjamin was able to muster an effective fire
element. "Among all these people there were seven hundred chosen
men, left handed; every one could sling stones at an hair and not
miss."
ber this when reading the invitation to war of the Plains chiefs in
The situation at the opening of hostilities was as follows: Benjamin
lay behind its fortifications anticipating a war of position because of
Benjamin's fields and villages were depopulated; everyone
its numerical inferiority. It had twenty-six thousand infantry swords-
concentrated within the fenced city of Gibeah as the mobilization point. All noncombatants were ordered within the circumvallation and the defenses were strengthened. The offending city of Gibeah con Be tributed seven hundred picked men, and the other Benjamite ele sides the swordsmen , Benjamin was able to muster an effective fire element. "Among all these people there were seven hundred chosen men, left handed; every one could sling stones at an hair and not miss." The situation at the opening of hostilities was as follows : Benjamin lay behind its fortifications anticipating a war of position because of ments raised twenty-six thousand good swordsmen of the line.
men, seven hundred able slingers, and strong walls. Having ade-
quate notice, Benjamin could fight from a prepared position.
its
numerical inferiority.
It had twenty-six thousand infantry swords Having ade
men, seven hundred able slingers, and strong walls.
quate notice, Benjamin could fight from a prepared position.
D 9 iz e b
34
34 Primitive War
Primitive War
The confederated sibs of Israel had a superiority of three hundred
seventy-four thousand swordsmen, such an overwhelming shock power
that the Benjamite line could not hope to meet it in the open. Such
a number could easily surround and invest the fortified city of Gibeah
and, while lacking engines capable of reducing the works, would
have to rely on a war of position and attrition. In such a case, their
numerical superiority and the excellence of their service of supply
could easily reduce the garrison by starvation. Israel, however, was
deficient in fire power, a fact which was to cost them dearly.
Passing to the opening of hostilities and the first engagement, one
reads how Israel invaded Benjamin territory. Arriving at the theater
The confederated sibs of Israel had a superiority of three hundred seventy-four thousand swordsmen, such an overwhelming shock power that the Benjamite line could not hope to meet it in the open . Such a number could easily surround and invest the fortified city of Gibeah and, while lacking engines capable of reducing the works, would have to rely on a war of position and attrition. In such a case, their numerical superiority and the excellence of their service of supply could easily reduce the garrison by starvation. Israel, however, was deficient in fire power, a fact which was to cost them dearly. Passing to the opening of hostilities and the first engagement, one reads how Israel invaded Benjamin territory. Arriving at the theater of war, the council in which the supreme command was vested con vened. It hardly thought the full force of Israel was necessary to de feat Benjamin and, with contempt for the principle of mass, ordered the one division of Judah to assail Gibeah while the remainder rested in reserve. The division Judah moved against Gibeah at dawn but was dila tory in its attack, taking leisure to pitch its camp under full observa tion of the enemy. Since even this one division outnumbered the city's total garrison, it was tempted to rely too much on its shock power. The mass of shock was a principle of tactics which had been borrowed from the great neighbors with which Israel was surrounded, and almost never proved as successful as the light mobile methods of the nation's earlier Bedouin history. Thus, instead of making a vigorous attack on the fortifications, or investing the place by siege, it proceeded to tempt the Benjamites outside their own walls in order to crush them. This, of course, would have saved Israel the expense and strain of a long siege. Gibeah was in a sad plight and was forced to take desperate chances. If the city had been surrounded and the arteries of its food supply from friendly territory cut off, the eventual capitulation of the gar rison would have been inevitable. But Israel signified its dislike of a siege as well, and had formed in a heavy line straddling the two im portant highways, and was slowly moving towards the wall. Gibeah decided on daring, seeing that their numbers were comparable to that of the one division of Judah, and moved out for a sortie. The Judah division had thus lost the initiative by its clumsy moving forward like a steam roller. Benjamin, on the other hand, had high morale, an almost equal number of swordsmen, and an effective fire power of seven hundred slingers. The fire superiority was apparently
of war, the council in which the supreme command was vested con-
vened. It hardly thought the full force of Israel was necessary to de-
feat Benjamin and, with contempt for the principle of mass, ordered
the one division of Judah to assail Gibeah while the remainder rested
in reserve.
The division Judah moved against Gibeah at dawn but was dila-
tory in its attack, taking leisure to pitch its camp under full observa-
tion of the enemy. Since even this one division outnumbered the
city's total garrison, it was tempted to rely too much on its shock
power. The mass of shock was a principle of tactics which had been
borrowed from the great neighbors with which Israel was surrounded,
and almost never proved as successful as the light mobile methods
of the nation's earlier Bedouin history. Thus, instead of making a
vigorous attack on the fortifications, or investing the place by siege,
it proceeded to tempt the Benjamites outside their own walls in order
to crush them. This, of course, would have saved Israel the expense
and strain of a long siege.
Gibeah was in a sad plight and was forced to take desperate chances.
If the city had been surrounded and the arteries of its food supply
from friendly territory cut off, the eventual capitulation of the gar-
rison would have been inevitable. But Israel signified its dislike of
a siege as well, and had formed in a heavy line straddling the two im-
portant highways, and was slowly moving towards the wall. Gibeah
decided on daring, seeing that their numbers were comparable to that
of the one division of Judah, and moved out for a sortie.
The Judah division had thus lost the initiative by its clumsy moving
forward like a steam roller. Benjamin, on the other hand, had high
morale, an almost equal number of swordsmen, and an effective fire-
power of seven hundred slingers. The fire superiority was apparently
The Theory of War and the 1ilitary Horizon

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 35 aided by a superior mobility. Benjamin then threw forward a line of
35
aided by a superior mobility.
Benjamin then threw forward a line of
light-armed slingers, covering by fire a line of swordsmen behind
light-anned slingers, covering by fire a line of swordsmen behind them, a fine combination of fire and movement. slingers began to inHict heavy casualties upon the solidly packed Judah for which the latter were unable to retaliate. Soon Judah was immobilized by the hostile fire and was greatly discomfited. At the proper time, before Judah could recover from this embar rassment, the mobile swordsmen of Benjamin fell ferociously upon the weak spots and flanks of the Judah line and destroyed it then and there. sand. The Israelite casualties were numbered at twenty-two thou The main body was so far in the rear that it could not send sup The Benjamin fire superiority soon began to tell. The excellent
them, a fine combination of fire and movement.
The Benjamin fire superiority soon began to tell. The excellent
slingers began to inflict heavy casualties upon the solidly packed
Judah for which the latter were unable to retaliate. Soon Judah was
immobilized by the hostile fire and was greatly discomfited.
At the proper time, before Judah could recover from this embar-
rassment, the mobile swordsmen of Benjamin fell ferociously upon
the weak spots and flanks of the Judah line and destroyed it then and
there. The Israelite casualties were numbered at twenty-two thou-
sand. The main body was so far in the rear that it could not send sup-
port forward.
Benjamin, on the other hand, though elated with its victory, did
not have the numerical strength to exploit its success by a blow against
the main body, and was forced to retire behind its fortifications.
Israel was made to suffer for a tactical error which many have made
since. She divided her forces in the face of an able and aggressive
port forward.
enemy. Every good commander proceeds on the modest assump-
tion that the enemy troops are the equals of his in equipment, train-
ing and esprit. Contempt is a fatal luxury. Furthermore, Israel al-
Benjamin, on the other hand, though elated with its victory, did not have the numerical strength to exploit its success by a blow against the main body, and was forced to retire behind its fortifications . since. enemy. ing and Israel was made t o suffer for a tactical error which many have made She divided her forces in the face of an able and aggressive Every good commander proceeds on the modest assump
lowed the initiative to pass to the capable Benjamin, and therefore
fought on Benjamin's termsa bit of folly, considering her large man-
power. Seemingly Israel's overconfidence allowed them to choose
an unfavorable terrain upon which to receive the Benjamite shock.
The second engagement proved no better. Israel's first defeat was
a terrific surprise, but despite loud wailing, her morale was still high,
as it should have been. Apparently, however, she had learned no
tion that the enemy troops are the equals of his in equipment, train lowed the initiative to pass to the capable Benjamin, and therefore fought on Benjamin's terms-a bit of folly, considering her large man power. Seemingly Israel's overconfidence allowed them to choose Israel's first defeat was an unfavorable terrain upon which to receive the Benjamite shock. The second engagement proved no better. a terrific surprise, but despite loud wailing, her morale was still high, as it should have been . Apparently, however, she had learned no lesson, ascribing the defeat to lack of valor on the part of the division of Judah rather than on her own tactical errors. Consequently, on the second day a similarly numerous body was drawn up before Gibeah in the same formation. act counterpart of the first day's movement. When it arrived at the same unfavorable ground, Benjamin delivered an attack, the ex Benjamin had seen from its towers that the main body was again too far in the rear to be of any assistance to the task force, and that Israel had not learned in the dear school of fools. They decided, therefore, to duplicate the same The confederated tribes left eighteen fire-and-movement infantry maneuver, the results of which were again disastrous to Israel.
lesson, ascribing the defeat to lack of valor on the part of the division
of Judah rather than on her own tactical errors.
esprit.
Contempt is a fatal luxury.
Furthermore, Israel al
Consequently, on the second day a similarly numerous body was
drawn up before Gibeah in the same formation. When it arrived at
the same unfavorable ground, Benjamin delivered an attack, the ex-
act counterpart of the first day's movement. Benjamin had seen from
its towers that the main body was again too far in the rear to be of
any assistance to the task force, and that Israel had not learned in the
dear school of fools. They decided, therefore, to duplicate the same
fire-and-movement infantry maneuver, the results of which were
again disastrous to Israel. The confederated tribes left eighteen
D 9 iz e b
36
mained unharmed.
Primitive War
thousand casualties on the field the second day, and Benjamin re

36 Primitive War thousand casualties on the field the second day, and Benjamin remained unharmed.
The third engagement showed a change of heart on Israel's part. The confederated sibs had now lost forty thousand of their best men, ten percent of the total effective strength, had suffered two crushing defeats, and had inflicted n o appreciable damage on Gibeah. By now they had decided that they had walked into a war instead of engag ing in spring maneuvers, and that something had to be done about it. council constituted too loose a command center. fect found in allied troops . In the first place, they were wise enough to perceive that the tribal This is often a de The war chiefs They now thought it wise to centralize
The third engagement showed a change of heart on Israel's part.
The confederated sibs had now lost forty thousand of their best men,
ten percent of the total effective strength, had suffered two crushing
defeats, and had inflicted no appreciable damage on Gibeah. By now
they had decided that they had walked into a war instead of engag-
ing in spring maneuvers, and that something had to be done about it.
In the first place, they were wise enough to perceive that the tribal
council constituted too loose a command center. This is often a de-
fect found in allied troops. They now thought it wise to centralize
the command in one person whom all would obey. The war chiefs
had lost confidence in each other, so they elected to high command
one Phinehas ben Eleazar ben Aaron, who was not a military man at
all. Phinehas was the High Priest of the Lord who had accompanied
the command in one person whom all would obey.
the command for magico-religious purposes. While he was not a
had lost confidence in each other, so they elected to high command one Phinehas ben Eleazar ben Aaron, who was not a military man at all. Phinehas was the High Priest of the Lord who had accompanied While he was not the command for magico-religious purposes.
a
fighting man, he was a scholar and was thoroughly familiar with the
successes and reversals in the nation's martial past, and he could ap-
preciate the reasons for both. At first the priest had scruples re-
garding a man of the ephod actually taking up arms. Furthermore,
the rebellious Benjamin was still an integral part of the House of
Israel, and he found it distastful to shed the blood of his kin. Never-
fighting man, he was a scholar and was thoroughly familiar with the successes and reversals in the nation 's martial past, and he could ap preciate the reasons for both. At first the priest had scruples re Furthermore, Never garding a man of the ephod actually taking up arms.
theless, the war had been undertaken to avenge one of his minor
clergy and, overcoming his scruples in prayer, he took the field.
The literate Phinehas recalled a method of assailing a walled city
without recourse to siege which had been successfully used by Joshua
in the campaign for the subjugation of Canaan, and decided to employ
it. Again, he reasoned that the garrison of Gibeah had been made
the rebellious Benjamin was still an integral part of the House of Israel, and he found it distastful to shed the blood of his kin. theless, the war had been undertaken to avenge one of his minor clergy and, overcoming his scruples in prayer, he took the field. The literate Phinehas recalled a method of assailing a walled city without recourse to siege which had been successfully used by Joshua
overconfident by its two easy victories, so he decided to dangle be-
fore them a pin-hook baited with the appearance of Israel's persistent
stupidity. Even as a priest he saw the folly of dividing the forces in
face of an aggressive foe, only to be defeated in detail, therefore he
decided to attack in strength.
Under the cover of darkness a sizable force was moved up to occupy
the meadows near the two gates of Gibeah. The garrison, gloating
behind its strong wall, had neglected its service of security and did
not discover the stratagem. By dawn this detail had taken cover in
the wheat fields.
The main force was then divided into three bodies, but this time
in easy communication with each other. Too much had already been
in the campaign for the subjugation of Canaan, and decided to employ Again, he reasoned that the garrison of Gibeah had been made overconfident by its two easy victories, so he decided to dangle be fore them a pin-hook baited with the appearance of Israel's persistent stupidity. Even as a priest he saw the folly of dividing the forces in face of an aggressive foe, only to be defeated in detail, therefore he decided to attack in strength.
it. Under the cover of darkness a sizable force was moved up to occupy The garrison, gloating
the meadows near the two gates of Gibeah. not discover the stratagem. the wheat fields.
behind its stron g wall, had neglected its service of security and did By dawn this detail had taken cover in
The main force was then divided into three bodies, but this time Too much had already been
in easy communication with each other.
D 9 iz e b

The Theory of War and the Military Horizon 37 lost by violating the principle of cooperation. The two flank parties
37
were to contain the main strength; the center, which was of no great
power, was to be the bait. Those familiar with tactical history will
The two flank parties were to contain the main strength ; the center, which was of no great power, was to be the bait. Those familiar with tactical history will at once recognize this as the "weak center" formation successfully used by Hannibal's inferior force against the Romans at Cannae, by Hindenburg against the Russians at Tannenberg, and by many others The plan was as follows : The two strong flanks were to be con The central force was to ad
lost by violating the principle of cooperation .
at once recognize this as the "weak center" formation successfully
used by Hannibal's inferior force against the Romans at Cannae, by
Hindenburg against the Russians at Tannenberg, and by many others
in between.
The plan was as follows: The two strong flanks were to be con-
cealed under the cover of the low hills. The central force was to ad-
vance slowly down the road as before, leading Gibeah to think that
in between.
Israel could not learn. But as soon as the Benjamites had attacked
the weak center, this center was to become not the main effort but
merely a pivot of maneuver and to effect a tactical withdrawal with
cealed under the cover of the low hills. Israel could not learn .
the appearance of defeat. Benjamin would likely pursue this ob-
vance slowly down the road as before, leading Gibeah to think that But as soon as the Benjamites had attacked the weak center, this center was to become not the main effort but merely a pivot of maneuver and to effect a tactical withdrawal with the appearance of defeat. jaws . Benjamin would likely pursue this ob viously craven force until it should be drawn within the two strong The strong flanks would then catch them in a set of pincers Once the attack was well under way, and the gar and crush them.
viously craven force until it should be drawn within the two strong
jaws. The strong flanks would then catch them in a set of pincers
and crush them. Once the attack was well under way, and the gar-
rison of Gibeah drawn into the field, the party near the gates would
rush into the poorly defended fortifications and set fire to the town,
destroying any possible place of refuge for the remnant of which might
escape.
Phinehas's estimate of the situation proved correct. The battle
proceeded as he had planned it in every detail. Yet when the Benja-
mites perceived the nature of the stratagem they launched a desperate
attack on the weak center, hoping to effect a break-through by which
rison of Gibeah drawn into the field, the party near the gates would rush into the poorly defended fortifications and set fire to the town, destroying any possible place of refuge for the remnant of which might escape. Phinehas's estimate of the situation proved correct. proceeded as he had planned it in every detail. The battle Yet when the Benja
to escape. The center of Israel hardly expected this wild attack and
began to give way. Their morale was already sorely tried and they
looked towards Gibeah to see it in flames, but the liers-in-wait also
encountered a hitch in their plans and Gibeah remained intact. The
day was almost lost in spite of Israel's great strength. The field troops
looked towards Gibeah and finally it burst into flames as the shrieks
of women and children suffering the sword came to encourage the
ears of Israel. Heartened thus, Israel set about the job of slaughter
with good courage and will, while Benjamin, beholding its citadel of
mites perceived the nature of the stratagem they launched a desperate attack on the weak center, hoping to effect a break-through by which to escape. The center of Israel hardly expected this wild attack and Their morale was already sorely tried and they The began to give way.
retreat being demolished, lost all hope.
A small portion of the Benjamites managed to break through the
Israel line and escape. Israel was exultant over its crushing victory
and ably exploited its success. The confederated tribes had no cavalry
and the mopping up, while partly successful, did not prevent the Ben-
looked towards Gibeah to see it in flames, but the liers-in-wait also encountered a hitch in their plans and Gibeah remained intact. day was almost lost in spite of IsraePs great strength. The field troops
jamite remnant from fighting a rear guard action. Benjamin had lost
looked towards Gibeah and finally it burst into flames as the shrieks ears of Israel.
of women and children suffering the sword came to encourage the Heartened thus, Israel set about the job of slaughter
with good courage and will , while Benjamin, beholding its citadel of
retreat bein g demolished, lost all hope.
A small portion of the Benjamites managed to break through the Israel was exultant over its crushing victory and ably exploited its success. The confederated tribes had no cavalry and the mopping up, while partly successful, did not prevent the Ben jamite remnant from fighting a rear guard action. Benjamin had lost
Israel line and escape.
D 9 iz e b
38
38 Primitive War twenty-five thousand casualties, but some six hundred men escaped
Primitive War
to the rocky passes of Mount Rimon which they could hold Ther-
mopylae-fashion against all comers.
The war was thus terminated by the complete defeat of guilty
twenty-five thousand casualties, but some six hundred men escaped to the rocky passes of Mount Rimon which they could hold Ther mopylae-fashion against all comers. The war was thus terminated by the complete defeat of guilty Benjamin. It was an internecine war, however, and the victors felt It seemed un a fraternal interest in the Mount Rimon remnant. fortunate that the tribal integrity of Israel should be disrupted by the total destruction of one of the sacred sibs. Benjamin was humbled and repentant, but wary enough not to come down from Mount rumon. Now the victors wished to rebuild "little Benjamin," their sister, but at the sack of Gibeah all the women and children of the latter had been slain. Unfortunately in the confederacy's first rage all had sworn a mighty oath never to give a daughter in mar riage to the Benjamites who had such a poor regard for womankind. In their mercy they recalled that the town of Jabesh-Gilead had been dilatory in the campaign and had not taken the oath. There fore the victors sent a party of twelve thousand picked men to assail Jabesh-Gilead. They slew every male, and every matron, carrying away four hundred virgins as wives for the ex-enemy, and as a peace offering. Yet this left two hundred men of Benjamin without wives. The victors again recalled that they had no love for the people of Shiloh, whereat the young girls would come into the vineyards to dance. The victorious confederacy then gave the two hundred Ben jamite bachelors and widowers permission to hide and, at the right moment, each to seize himself a wife. This being done, the Benjamite remnant departed to repair its farms, villages, and its strong city of Gibeah, and also its population. The confederated militia was then demobilized, and peace again reigned in Israel. This chapter has intimated that some kinds of combat are not war. The foregoing analysis of the Gibeah campaign was made to show what true war is, although practiced quite early in mankind's written history. If the Gibeah campaign is kept somewhat in mind while reading the following description of truly primitive war, it will be of some help, for no other descriptions of true war will follow.
Benjamin. It was an internecine war, however, and the victors felt
a fraternal interest in the Mount Rimon remnant. It seemed un-
fortunate that the tribal integrity of Israel should be disrupted by
the total destruction of one of the sacred sibs. Benjamin was
humbled and repentant, but wary enough not to come down from
Mount Rimon. Now the victors wished to rebuild "little Benjamin,"
their sister, but at the sack of Gibeah all the women and children of
the latter had been slain. Unfortunately in the confederacy's first
rage all had sworn a mighty oath never to give a daughter in mar-
riage to the Benjamites who had such a poor regard for womankind.
In their mercy they recalled that the town of Jabesh-Gilead had
been dilatory in the campaign and had not taken the oath. There-
fore the victors sent a party of twelve thousand picked men to assail
Jabesh-Gilead. They slew every male, and every matron, carrying
away four hundred virgins as wives for the ex-enemy, and as a peace-
offering. Yet this left two hundred men of Benjamin without wives.
The victors again recalled that they had no love for the people of
Shiloh, whereat the young girls would come into the vineyards to
dance. The victorious confederacy then gave the two hundred Ben-
jamite bachelors and widowers permission to hide and, at the right
moment, each to seize himself a wife. This being done, the Benjamite
remnant departed to repair its farms, villages, and its strong city of
Gibeah, and also its population. The confederated militia was then
demobilized, and peace again reigned in Israel.
This chapter has intimated that some kinds of combat are not war.
The foregoing analysis of the Gibeah campaign was made to show
what true war is, although practiced quite early in mankind's written
history. If the Gibeah campaign is kept somewhat in mind while
reading the following description of truly primitive war, it will be of
some help, for no other descriptions of true war will follow.
CHAPTER 3
Formations
OvER THE HILL AND ACROSS THE RIVER LIVES AN ENEMY, A FOE BECAUSE
he has something we want: farm lands, heads, and other things which
stir our envy. Perhaps we own horses, pretty women, storage bins,
and other things worth defending. We know he can harm us whether
we be on the offensive or defensive. To that foe the world's most
beautiful color is the crimson of our blood. We have many things with
which to work our will on him or to prevent his prevailing against us.
We have all the panoply of war, munitions and supplies. Our chiefs
are wise, experienced, and in possession of real authority. Men in
CHAPTER 3
plenty we have, and all imbued with a will to win.
^ Impressive as these things are, they are not enough. Men eager,
Formations
courageous, and equipped must be shaped, molded into those correct
formations which a previous chapter made an indispensable element
of true war. The principle of correct formations is a vital constituent
of the military horizon. Few professional soldiers would argue with
this statement. Formations are the sociologic core of war, and with
he has something we want : farm lands, heads, and other things which stir our envy. Perhaps we own horses, pretty women, storage bins, We know he can harm us whether To that foe the world's most We have many things with
Our chiefs
OVER
THE Hn.L AND ACROSS THE RIVER LIVES AN ENEMY, A FOE BECAUSE
that core we shall now deal. Intimately surrounding this core, how-
ever, are the principles of cooperation, the integrity of tactical units,
-!) the combined employment of all forces, and cooperation which con-
and other things worth defending.
, i sequently must also be treated in this section. By these, men are
:. t shaped, and men must be shaped if they are to work as a team in
we be on the offensive or defensive.
either war or peace.
beautiful color is the crimson of our blood.
.*) .. Thus the horn, conch or bronze, has been sounded and men set
which to work our will on him or to prevent his prevailing against us. We have all the panoply of war, munitions and supplies. plenty we have, and all imbued with a will to win . are wise, experienced, and in possession of real authority. Impressive as these things are, they are not enough. Men in
r f f forth to war and he who first sets forth already has an advantage.
The player who takes the bid tells how the card game is to be played.
; * He who waits also serves, but he usually serves his enemy who has
'' r-, ~ not waited. Even primitive fighters know this, and with the best
of reasons. And so the side which hopes to win sets forth to war,
or at least to a pleasant exercise in murder.
Men eager,
courageous, and equipped must be shaped, molded into those correct formations which a previous chapter made an indispensable element of true war. The principle of correct formations is a vital constituent Few professional soldiers would argue with Intimately surrounding this core, how Formations are the sociologic core of war, and with of the military horizon. this statement.
that core we shall now deal.
ever, are the principles of cooperation, the integrity of tactical units, the combined employment of all forces, and cooperation which con sequently must also be either war or peace. Thus the horn, conch or bronze, has been sounded and men set forth to war and he who first sets forth already has an advantage. The player who takes the bid tells how the card game is to be played.
<.
treated
in this section.
By these, men are
shaped, and men must be shaped if they are to work as a team in
He who waits also serves, but he usually serves his enemy who has not waited. Even primitive fighters know this, and with the best of reasons. And so the side which hopes to win sets forth to war, or at least to a pleasant exercise in murder.
39
D 9 iz e b
40
40 Primitive War The approach order is of great importance but, apparently, it is too difficult for the bulk of primitive tribes to appreciate. It requires
Primitive War
discipline, planning, and other military elements discussed in this
book, hence disorder is the rule of most of the nonliterate world.
The approach order is of great importance but, apparently, it i s too difficult for the bulk of primitive tribes to appreciate. It requires discipline, planning, and other military elements discussed in this book, hence disorder is the rule of most of the non literate world. Many tribes with a high enough social organization to know better have no more approach order than does a lynching mob. Much of the approach to battle will be discussed under the con cepts of intelligence, security, and battle plans. Only a few examples
Many tribes with a high enough social organization to know better
have no more approach order than does a lynching mob.
Much of the approach to battle will be discussed under the con-
cepts of intelligence, security, and battle plans. Only a few examples
will therefore be given here.
Typical of far too many tribes were those of the Canadian tundra.
These simple sub-Arctic hunters practiced warfare only in its rudi-
ments. Each man went forth with two hundred arrows. The warriors
got within range of their enemy as best they individually could. They
will therefore be given here.
discharged their arrows "like snow'' when something like range had
been attained. During the approach and the engagement every op-
portunity was taken to utilize the cover of trees. They were reported
as being expert dodgers in this type of warfare, children being taught
Typical of far too many tribes were those of the Canadian tundra. These simple sub-Arctic hunters practiced warfare only in its rudi ments. Each man went forth with two hundred arrows. The warriors got within range of their enemy been attained.
as as
arrow-dodging from early age.
The approach order of the American Great Plains bison hunters
best they individually could.
They
relied too much on scouting, so is discussed under intelligence. The
discharged their arrows "like snow" when something like range had During the approach and the engagement every op portunity was taken to utilize the cover of trees. They were reported being expert dodgers in this type of warfare, children being taught arrow-dodging from early age. The approach order of the American Great Plains bison hunters relied too much on scouting, so is discussed under intelligence. The most settled semi-agricultural people used something more, however, although not much. Typical of such groups were the Omaha. 1 They secured intelligence by a line of scouts preceding the war party. Upon reconnoitering the enemy camp, they halted until one of their chief's lieutenants could come up and check their survey. If all seemed well, the Omaha advanced in companies of twenty each, each man holding the hand of his neighbor to prevent dispersion. Just before the at tack the chief indulged in tactical magiC with his war bundle and exhorted his band in whispers. Each warrior found cover and, at the whistled si gnal, opened a fire-fight on the enemy's lodges. Unfor
most settled semi-agricultural people used something more, however,
although not much. Typical of such groups were the Omaha.1 They
secured intelligence by a line of scouts preceding the war party. Upon
reconnoitering the enemy camp, they halted until one of their chief's
lieutenants could come up and check their survey. If all seemed well,
the Omaha advanced in companies of twenty each, each man holding
the hand of his neighbor to prevent dispersion. Just before the at-
tack the chief indulged in tactical magic with his war bundle and
exhorted his band in whispers. Each warrior found cover and, at the
whistled signal, opened a fire-fight on the enemy's lodges. Unfor-
tunately the Omaha usually bungled a battle well begun. On the
march, however, their work was definitely good. There was a hier-
archy of command not unlike that used in the advance of a modern
small force. The line of scouts marched from two to four miles ahead,
providing the service of security. Next came the "captains" and their
servants or orderlies, the former carrying the war bundles, since their
function was more magical than tactical. The chiefs were careful
to rest when they saw their troops were fatigued.
1 James O. Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," Annual Report 3, Bureau of Amer-
ican Ethnology (Washington: 1881-1882), pp. 321ff.
tunately the Omaha usually bungled a battle well begun. On the march, however, their work was definitely good. There was a hier archy of command not unlike that used in the advance of a modem small force. The line of scouts marched from two to four miles ahead, providing the service of security. Next came the "captains' and their
servants or orderlies, the former carryin g the war bundles, s ince their function was more magical than tactical. The chiefs were careful to rest when they saw their troops were fatigued.
1 James O. Dorsey, "Omaha SOCiology," Annual Report 3, Bureau of Amer ican Ethnology ( Washington: 1881-1882 ) , pp. 32 1ff.
Ori g i n a l from U N I VE R S ITV 0 F CAU FORN IA
Fonnations
Formations 41
41
From th e Southeast comes
an
account by General Millord of an It must be taken with some This doubt
From the Southeast comes an account by General Milford of an
almost perfect approach organization. It must be taken with some
almost perfect approach organization .
caution since it was written by a soldier who may be reading his own
caution since it was written by a soldier who may be reading his own training and experience into his account of the Indians. eracy were not generally obeyed.
training and experience into his account of the Indians. This doubt
is bolstered by Swanton's remark that the chiefs of the Creek Confed-
eracy were not generally obeyed. A march order of this kind would
is bolstered by Swanton's remark that the chiefs of the Creek Confed

have been impossible without authority. The general says that the The band ad
have been impossible without authority. The general says that the
A march order of this kind would
Muskogee march order was arranged by the chief. The band ad-
vanced in column, each family (sic) having its specific position. To
prevent surprise, the youths and their chiefs formed the van while
Muskogee march order was arranged by the chief.
the old men acted as rear guards. Men in middle Me were the
flank guards. The women and children marched in the safe center.
vanced in column, each family ( sic ) having its specific position. the old men acted as rear guards. Bank guards.
To
This order was maintained until contact with the enemy, when the
prevent surprise, the youths and their chiefs formed the van while Men in middle life were the The women and children marched in the safe center.
youths advanced to form a line of scouts to cover the approach of
the men of middle life. The helpless dropped to the rear to be
guarded by the old men.2
The doubt cast upon the excellence of this social organization in
This order was maintained until contact with the enemy, when the youths advanced to form a line of scouts to cover the approach of the men of middle life. guarded by the old men.2 The doubt cast upon the excellence of this social organization in the approach to battle may be mitigated by recalling that the Creek and their neighbors were socially capable of making widespread con federacies, if not particularly strong ones. The motives for such con federation was to keep the peace among the relatively strong groups and to exploit the less organized neighbors. Unless a mounted action was sought, the approach to actual battle was often best made afoot, even though the tribe own ed horses. This is typical of a modem cavalry fire fight, and it has been observed that even some horsed Plainsmen approached on foot, including the Omaha just mentioned . In South America the Jibaro entered hostile territory with great caution . Being a riparian people, they made approaches by rafts If they came up to an enemy village Like most primitive warriors, camouflaged with leaves and branches. they liked to approach at night. and waited for nightfall. fierce killers . The helpless dropped to the rear to be
the approach to battle may be mitigated by recalling that the Creek
and their neighbors were socially capable of making widespread con-
federacies, if not particularly strong ones. The motives for such con-
federation was to keep the peace among the relatively strong groups
and to exploit the less organized neighbors.
Unless a mounted action was sought, the approach to actual battle
was often best made afoot, even though the tribe owned horses.
This is typical of a moder n cavalry fire fight, and it has been observed
that even some horsed Plainsmen approached on foot, including the
Omaha just mentioned.
In South America the Jibaro entered hostile territory with great
caution. Being a riparian people, they made approaches by rafts
camouflaged with leaves and branches. Like most primitive warriors,
they liked to approach at night. If they came up to an enemy village
by day, they surprised and killed anyone found outside the precincts
and waited for nightfall. The fire-ring and fire-arrow were used to
set the village aflame, and no one could expect mercy from these
fierce killers. They did not like open warfare, but if two hostile
parties unexpectedly came upon each other in the approach, they
would not refuse it. Each side war-danced in full view of the foe,
hurling the customary insults and boasts. Whether or not it was con-
2 Milford, in John R. Swanton, Creek Social Organization and Uses, Annual
Report 42, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1924-1925), p. 43.
by day, they surprised and killed anyone found outside the precincts The fire-ring and fire -arrow were used to set the village aflame, and no one could expect mercy from these They did not like open warfare, but
if two hostile
parties unexpectedly came upon each other in the approach, they would not refuse it. E ach side war-danced in full view of the foe, Whether or not it was conhurling the customary insults and boasts.
2 Milford, in John R. Swanton, Creek Social Organization and Uses, Annual Report 42, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1924- 1925 ) , p. 43.
D 9 iz e b
42
42 Primitive War ('
Primitive War
sidered good form to attack the enemy in the midst of his dancing
sidered good form to attack the enemy in the midst of his dancing is not reported. Negro Africa reveals approach orders varying from the best to the worst. The armies of the kingdoms ordinarily marched in good order.
is not reported.
Negro Africa reveals approach orders varying from the best to the
worst. The armies of the kingdoms ordinarily marched in good order.
Iris said that aZuhi impi (regiment) marched yery_rapidly, soon out-
It is said that aZulu impi ( regiment ) marched yery.!.apidly, soon out

Miss Krige repo rts that it could This record
stripping the supply train and herds. Miss Krige reports that it could
march forty miles by night and forthwith give battle.3 This record
stripping the supply train and herds.
is a bit too remarkable even for the admittedly remarkable Zulu. For
march forty miles by night and forthwith give battle.s
the finest modern infantry to be able to march that far in column
at night, or even by day, and be able to give vigorous battle would
be an excellent achievement.
is a bit too remarkable even for the admittedly remarkable Zulu. For the finest modern infantry to be able to march that far in column
TheÂshanti had a well worked out approach order. Some kind
at night,
or even by day, and be able to give vigorous battle would
is reported~fbr~the not distant Ibibio. At the conclusion of the pre-
paratory magic, the men set out in silence in a straight line for the
be an excellent achievement.
is reported for the not distant Ibibio.
enemy town, and they might not look backward or even take a few
steps to the rear on any pretext whatever. They might address no
woman on the way.4
The _Ash anti _had a well worked out approach order. Some kind At the conclusion of the pre
As the jDahomeans approached a town marked for destruction, the
paratory magic, the men set out in silence in a straight line for the enemy town, and they might not look backward or even take a few steps to the rear on any pretext whatever. woman on the way. "
As the Dahomeans approached a town marked for destruction, the
commanders imposed the most stringent march discipline in order
to prevent the enemy from being informed of his fate. The Daho-
means relied almost entirely on surprise in battle, and great care had
They might address no
to be exercised to prevent failure of the surprise. Captives from the
towns marked for attack had been taken beforehand, and were com-
pelled to accompany the army to show the way. Naturally, these men
deserted when possible to give their friends the alarm.5 Just before
the contact the Dahomeans might have surpassed the Zulu. Their
commanders imposed the most stringent march discipline in order to prevent the enemy from being informed of his fate. The Daho means relied almost entirely on surprise in battle, and great care had to be exercised to prevent failure of the surprise. pelled to accompany the army to show the way. Captives from the towns marked for attack had been taken beforehand, and were com Naturally, these men deserted when possible to give their friends the alarm. 5 Just before Their
preparatory intelligence, immediate approach, and careful reconnoiter
were magnificent, but then they relied on the surprise surround while
the Zulu liked a stand-up spear action.6
Good approach order is not infrequently found in Polynesia, in spite
of a statement by Brown that the Samoans observed no formation in
camp or on the march. Each man did as he saw fit, save that shelter
8 Eileen J. Krige, The Social System of the Zulus (London: Longmans Green,
1936), pp. 273f.
4 Percy A. Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush (London: Macmillan, 1912),
the contact the Dahomeans might have surpassed the Zulu.
p. 233.
6 Sir Richard F. Burton, A Mission to Gelele, King of Dahomey (New York:
preparatory intelligence, immediate approach, and careful reconnoiter were magnificent, but then they relied on the surprise surround while the Zulu liked a stand-up spear action.6 Good approach order is not infrequently found in Polynesia, in spite
Scribners 1893), pp. 15ff.
8 Sir Richard F. Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa (New York:
Harpers, 1864), pp. 85f.
of a statement by Brown that the Samoans observed no formation in

camp or on the march. E ach man did as he saw fit, save that shelter
8 Eileen J. Krige, The Social System at the Zulus ( London : Longmans Green, 1936 ) , pp. 273f. " Percy A. Talbot, In the Shadow at the Bush ( London : Macmillan, 1912 ) , p. 233. II Sir Richard F. Burton, A Mission to Gelele, King of Dahomey ( New York: Scribners 1893 ) , pp . 15f. 6 Sir Richard F. Burton, The Lake Regions at Central Africa ( New York: Harpers, 1864 ) , pp. 85.
D 9 iz e b
Formations
Formations 43
43
was consistently used.7
This seems contradictory to other reports and It
was consistently used.7 This seems contradictory to other reports and
even to Brown himself in other passages.
even to Brown himself in other passages. The approach of the Kiwai of New Guinea is very fine indeed. scouting service. is made on dark nights only, and with the aid of the most excellent Should the Kiwai themselves lack scouts with local It knowledge, they hire the services of men from neutral towns. able while the men, led by the scouts, accomplish the surround. The preceding chapter described the line and the column as the chief military formations, all others being derived from them. tle. The column is, of course, the approach formation while the line is for bat The column in approach is more often lacking than in use, and implied rather than described. The civil states of the American areas of intense cultivation are indicated as marching their troops in columns of several men abreast. Indian file was adequate for the uncivilized tribes of both the northern and southern continents because of the small size of the parties in the field. It was not adequate where many Men were taken on the expedition, and was successful largely because it was the logistical pattern of both sides . had nothing better. them vulnerable. Remember that the Greeks Column attenuation was the thing most to be
The approach of the Kiwai of New Guinea is very fine indeed. It
is made on dark nights only, and with the aid of the most excellent
scouting service. Should the Kiwai themselves lack scouts with local
knowledge, they hire the services of men from neutral towns. It
must be said that the control of the chief is surprisingly real and valu-
able while the men, led by the scouts, accomplish the surround.
The preceding chapter described the line and the column as the
must be said that the control of the chief is surprisingly real and valu
chief military formations, all others being derived from them. The
column is, of course, the approach formation while the line is for bat-
tle. The column in approach is more often lacking than in use, and
implied rather than described. The civil states of the American areas
of intense cultivation are indicated as marching their troops in columns
of several men abreast. Indian file was adequate for the uncivilized
tribes of both the northern and southern continents because of the
small size of the parties in the field. It was not adequate where many
Men were taken on the expedition, and was successful largely because
it was the logistical pattern of both sides. Remember that the Greeks
had nothing better. Column attenuation was the thing most to be
feared both because it exhausted the warriors and because it made
them vulnerable. The foremost elements could be defeated before
aid could arrive from the rear.
The field evidence regarding logistic formation in America is most
scanty, and there is some reason to think that the Indians were wiser
than the ethnographers have reported. For example, Denig says that
the members of the Soldier Societies of the Assiniboin were detailed
to ride the length of the body to prevent straggling, useless noise, and
disorderly travel, keeping whatever column there was policed into
feared both because it exhausted the warriors and because it made The foremost elements could be defeated before aid could arrive from the rear. The field evidence regarding logistic formation in America is most scanty, and there is some reason to think that the Indians were wiser than the ethnographers have reported. For example, Denig says that the members of the Soldier Societies of the Assiniboin were detailed to ride the length of the body to prevent straggling, useless noise, and disorderly travel, keeping whatever column there was policed into efficient order. 8 This is just one hint among many of the same kind. The Many people, with the Plains horse-raid in mind, consider that the Indian observed no approach order and did not use the column. horse-capture was, of course, a theft and
as
efficient order.3 This is just one hint among many of the same kind.
Many people, with the Plains horse-raid in mind, consider that the
Indian observed no approach order and did not use the column. The
horse-capture was, of course, a theft and as such had no more use for
the column than had any other form of robbery. Yet it is rather clear
that the device was used in such planned actions as were fought. The
7 George Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians (London: Macmilkn, 1910),
pp. 167f.
s E. T. Denig, "Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri", ed. J. N. B. Hewitt,
Annual Report 46, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1928-1929),
p. 549.
such had no more use for Yet it is rather clear The
the column than had any other form of robbery.
that the device was used in such planned actions as were fought.
'1 George Brown, Melanesia1l8 and Polynesia1l8 ( London : Macmillan, 1910 ) , pp. 167f. 8 E. T. Denig, "Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri", ed. J. N. B. Hewitt, Annual Report 46, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1928- 1929 ) ,
p. 549.
D 9 iz e b
44
44 Primitive War common use of the Indian file has been mentioned. This refers to
Primitive War
This refers to
common use of the Indian file has been mentioned. front of only one human being.
marching in single file, one man after the other, a column with the
marching in single file, one man after the other, a column with the
front of only one human being. There is nothing primitive or stupid
in this. It is the way small units often advance to the combat today.
A sergeant usually so forms his squad if advancing over dangerous
ground. It is most efficient, and was the only practical column in the
heavily forested regions in which many Indians fought.
It was definitely attributed to the Omaha a few paragraphs back.
It is said that they attempted to prevent column attenuation as a pre-
in this. It is the way small units often advance to the combat today. A sergeant usually so forms his squad if advancing over dangerous ground. It is most efficient, and was the only practical column in the heavily forested regions in which many Indians fought.
It is said that they attempted to prevent column attenuation as a pre lude to defeat. One of Wissler's Blackfoot informants gave him
an
There is nothing primitive or stupid
lude to defeat. One of Wissler's Blackfoot informants gave him an
It was definitely attributed to the Omaha a few paragraphs back.
account of training along such lines among those socially simple people.
Boys on their first war party were warned by their leader to avoid
column attenuation in order to prevent fatigue. Once individuals fell
behind the others they were forced continually to maintain a trot to
keep up.9 Karsten implies the single file on land to the Jibaro, which
account of training along such lines among those socially simple people. Boys on their first war party were warned by their leader to avoid column attenuation in order to prevent fatigue. keep Up .9 behind the others they were forced continually to maintain a trot to
as
is as good an approach order as the tropical forest would need or
permit.10
Once individuals fell
The best use of columns of approach comes from Africa, and the
best use of the device in Africa was among the Zulu. The Zulufied
Thonga acted in the same manner, as all tribes influenced by Zulu
Karsten implies the single file on land to the Jibaro, which the tropical forest would need or
methods largely followed the same march order.11 Small parties of
Zulu marched in single file columns, but larger bodies marched in
columns of several men wide. The eyewitnesses are rather vague on
is as good an approach order permit. 1 0
the exact front of the column. In Africa, where large infantry hordes
were taken into the field, the single or Indian file would have been
unforgivable, but the Negroes had learned of the close column.
best use of the device in Mrica was among the Zulu.
The best use of columns of approach comes from Africa, and the The Zulufied
Useful as the column is, the line of battle is the eventual test of war.
Nonliterate men occasionally invented or accepted the device, but not
often enough to preserve their liberty.
Thonga acted in the same manner, as all tribes influenced by Zulu methods largely followed the same march order. 1 1 Small parties of Zulu marched in single file columns, but larger bodies marched in columns of several men wide . the exact front of the column. The eyewitnesses are rather vague on In Mrica, where large infantry hordes
The statement is often encountered that the American Indian used
no tactics and hence no line. This probably means that the writers
have fallen into the error of the older explorers who expected the
9 Clark Wissler, The Social Life of the Blackfoot Indians, Anthropological
Papers, American Museum of Natural History (New York: 1911), VII, Part 1,
pp. 32f.
were taken into the field, the single or Indian file would have been unforgivable, but the Negroes had learned of the close column . Useful as the column is, the line of battle is the eventual test of war. Nonliterate men occasionally invented or accepted the device, but not often enough to preserve their liberty. The statement
10 Rafael Karsten, Blood Revenge, War, and Victory Feasts Among the Jibaro
Indians of Eastern Ecuador, Bulletin 79, Bureau of American Ethnology (Wash-
ington: 1923), p. 24.
11 Henri A. Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe (2nd ed.; Neuchatel,
1927), p. 470.
is
often encountered that the American Indian used This probably means that the writers
no tactics and hence no line.
have fallen into the error of the older explorers who expected the
9 Clark Wissler, The Social Life of the Blackfoot Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History ( New York : 191 1 ) , VII, Part 1, pp. 32f. 10 Rafael Karsten, Blood Revenge, War, and Victory Feasu Among the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador, Bulletin 79, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Wash lington : 1923 ) . p. 24. 1 1 Henri A. Junod. The Life of a South African Tribe ( 2nd ed. ; Neuchatel. 1927 ) . p. 470.
DI
Iz.e b
Ori g i n a l fro m U N I VE R S ITY O F CAL I FORN IA
Formations
Formations 45 close-order line of the drill field. Because the Indian fought with
45
close-order line of the drill field.
Because the Indian fought with
great interval and distance, taking every opportunity for cover be-
great interval and distance, taking every opportunity for cover be hind boulder and tree, it was assumed that he exercised no battle order at all. Undoubtedly this was true for many groups, but it certainly was not true for all. Due to the efficacy of modern weapons, our own line soldiers take interval, distance, and use cover, but the line is there even though it be wavy and hard for the enemy machine gun ners to estimate. Irregularity is not the significant point, and it never Organization, mutual They has been since the perfection of fire weapons .
hind boulder and tree, it was assumed that he exercised no battle order
at all.
Undoubtedly this was true for many groups, but it certainly was
not true for all. Due to the efficacy of modern weapons, our own
line soldiers take interval, distance, and use cover, but the line is
there even though it be wavy and hard for the enemy machine gun-
ners to estimate. Irregularity is not the significant point, and it never
has been since the perfection of fire weapons. Organization, mutual
protection, and cohesion are, were, and shall be vital issues. They
are the cause and effect of discipline; they are the fighting man's
greatest source of safety. The reasons for this were given in Chap-
ter 2.
Actual references to lines of battle are rare. They are less rarely
protection, and cohesion are, were, and shall be vital issues . greatest source of safety. ter
hinted at. Often engagements are described that could be fought in
are the cause and effect of diScipline; they are the fighting man's The reasons for this were given in Chap
no other way. Just as often, to be sure, it is obvious that the action
was a pell-mell of disorder with no one knowing where he belonged
or what his function was. On the whole, there is reason to think that
2.
this was not universal in America. Witness the fact that Skinner
Actual references to lines of battle are rare. They are less rarely hinted at. Often engagements are described that could be fought in no other way. Just as often, to be sure, it is obvious that the action was a pell-mell of disorder with no one knowing where he belonged or what his function was. On the whole, there is reason to think that Witness the fact that Skinner clearly states that the Kansa and Iowa charged in a line, and that one To be
clearly states that the Kansa and Iowa charged in a line, and that one
of the functions of the police societies was to keep that line in order.12
This latter function of battle police is certainly used today. To be
sure the Kansa were a small Dhegiha Siouan group closely kin to the
Osage and Quapaw. Perhaps as such they had led a better Me in
the past and this preservation of battle order might be a survival of
more integrated society on the Plains which knew so little fighting
this was not universal in America.
order. Yet this is a dubious reservation. Eagle Shield, one of Miss
Densmore's Teton informants, spoke to her very distinctly of the bat-
tle line. Certainly the Teton Sioux must be considered Plains people
of the functions of the police societies was to keep that line in order.1 2 This latter function of battle police is certainly used today. Osage and Quapaw.
par excellence.
.... The second night a man who had been on the lookout said,
"The Crows are after us; they are on our trail."
sure the Kansa were a small Dhegiha Siouan group closely kin to the Perhaps as such they had led a better life in the past and this preservation of battle order might be a survival of more integrated society on the Plains which knew so little fighting order. tle line. Yet this is a dubious reservation. Eagle Shield, one of Miss Densmore's Teton informants, spoke to her very distinctly of the bat
I said: "We are not cowards. We must stand our ground and not
run away." My companions cried, "What shall we do?" I said, "We
will go to that little rough ravine and take the horses there." It was a
'draw' in the prairie, and at the end of it were some great rocks. It was
a moonlight night, and bright as day. We got the horses into a ravine
12 Alanson B. Skinner, Societies of the Iowa, Kansa, and Ponca Indians, An-
thropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History, (New York: 1915),
XI, Part 9, p. 690.
par excellence.
Certainly the Teton Sioux must be considered Plains people
. . . . The second night a man who had been on the lookout said, "The Crows are after us; they are on our trail." I said : "We are not cowards. We must stand our ground and not run away . " My companions cried, "What shall we do?" I said, "We
will go to that little rough ravine and take the horses there." It was a 'draw' in the prairie, and at the end of it were some great rocks. It was We got the horses into a ravine a moonlight night, and bright as day.
thropological
12 Alanson B. Skinner, Societies of the Iowa, Kansa, and Ponca Indians, An

XI, Part 9, p . 690.
Papers,
American Museum of Natural History, ( New
York : 1915 ) ,
D 9 iz e b
46
46 Primitive War and could hear the voices of the Crows. Evidently there were many of
Primitive War
them. and could hear the voices of the Crows.
I made up my mind that we had a hard time before us, but we
Evidently there were many of
them. I made up my mind that we had a hard time before us, but we
had good guns and plenty of bullets. I said: "We will crawl up on top
of the ridge land and lie flat in a line far apart. We can see them on the
prairie and as soon as they are in range, we will fire."13
prairie and as soon as they are in range, we will fire . " 1 3
had good guns and plenty of bullets . I said : "We will crawl up on top of the ridge land and lie flat in a line far apart. We can see them on the
No small cavalry detachment, finding itself in a position where
it had to fight for its life against a large force, could have been better
N o small cavalry detachment, finding itself i n a position where it had to fight for its life against a large force, could have been better led than this one. Cover was sought for man and beast on the best The force de possible position, apparently at the military crest. have been impossible to dislodge. to tell the tale ! It is impossible to describe the Plains method of war preceding the introduction of the horse, although the above might contain some hint. Wissler found it impossible to acquire any knowledge on this He assumed that the horse point when working with the Blackfoot.
led than this one. Cover was sought for man and beast on the best
possible position, apparently at the military crest. The force de-
ployed into a line of battle that, knowing the Crow as one does, must
have been impossible to dislodge. Witness the informant's survival
to tell the tale!
ployed into a line of battle that, knOWing the Crow as one does, must Witness the informant's survival
It is impossible to describe the Plains method of war preceding the
introduction of the horse, although the above might contain some
hint. Wissler found it Impossible to acquire any knowledge on this
point when working with the Blackfoot. He assumed that the horse
greatly changed such methods, but that is only the usual civilian as-
sumption that foot and horsed tactics differ more radically than they
ever have. He made an even more important statement that the
Blackfoot charged knee to knee in a line when delivering a mounted
shock attack, but deployed over the length of the enemy front to de-
liver fire. When firing from the ground the Blackfoot used their re-
greatly changed such methods, but that is only the usual civilian as sumption that foot and horsed tactics differ more radically than they ever have. He made an even more important statement that the Blackfoot charged knee to knee in a line when delivering a mounted shock attack, but deployed over the length of the enemy front to de liver fire. When firing from the ground the Blackfoot used their re The modernity of such practices suggest cumbent mounts for cover.
cumbent mounts for cover. The modernity of such practices suggest
the suspicion that the Plains warriors may have been better cavalry-
men than they seemed.14
As for the Plateau, my own Kutenai and Flathead informants have
very specifically stated that they deployed into lines during a fire-
fight which, though outnumbered, would cover the entire enemy line
in order to prevent envelopment.
Densmore describes the works of a small Ojibway party organized
to harrass the Sioux near St. Paul. The leader deployed warriors in
a line behind adequate cover near a road the Sioux must travel. He
ordered them to hold their fire until the proper moment. But he al-
lowed the main body of the entrapped Sioux merrily to pass by so that
the suspicion that the Plains warriors may have been better cavalry men than they seemed. 1 4 As for the Plateau, my own Kutenai and Flathead informants have very specifically stated that they deployed into lines during a fire fight which, though outnumbered, would cover the entire enemy line in order to prevent envelopment. Densmore describes the works of a small Ojibway party organized to harrass the Sioux near St. Paul.
a
they could murder one man who had straggled behind. This feat
enabled one Ojibway to wear fancy clothes. As the commander said
13 Frances Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, Bulletin 61, Bureau of American
Ethnology (Washington: 1918), p. 380.
14 Clark Wissler, Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians, Anthropological
Papers, American \iuseum of Natural History (New York: 1910), V. Part 1,
passim.
The leader deployed warriors in He But he al
line behind adequate cover near a road the Sioux must travel.
ordered them to hold their fire until the proper moment.
lowed the main body of the entrapped Sioux merrily to pass by so that they could murder one man who had straggled behind. This feat enabled one Ojibway to wear fancy clothes. As the commander said
Ethnology ( Washington : 1918 ) , p. 380. 14 Clark Wissler, Material Culture of the
13 Frances Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, Bulletin 61, Bureau of American
Papers, American
ruseum
of Natural History
Blnckfoot Indial1$, Anthropological ( New York : 1910 ) , V. Part 1 ,
passim.
DIg iz e b
Ori g i n a l fro m U N I VE R S ITY 0 F CAL I FORN lilt
Fonnations
Formations 47 they "just killed that man to let the Sioux know that they had been
47
they "just killed that man to let the Sioux know that they had been
aroun d . " 1 5
around."15
Very little praise can be given the Ojibway commander for such an
action. He actually commanded his troops, which few Indian chiefs
Very little praise can be given the Ojibway commander for such an action . He actually commanded his troops, which few Indian chiefs He exercised all necessary knowledge of surprise, use of He had every op He re fu sed t o fi ght The could say.
could say. He exercised all necessary knowledge of surprise, use of
terrain, and commanded his fire fighters to form the all important line.
Adequate cover was taken and a beautiful trap laid. He had every op-
portunity of dealing his enemy an effective blow, but he abandoned
terrain, and commanded his fire fighters to form the all important line. Adequate cover was taken and a beautiful trap laid. the use of war to indulge in a ceremonial murder. portunity of dealing his enemy an effective blow, but he abandoned
a
the use of war to indulge in a ceremonial murder. He refused to fight
a battle, so could not exploit the victory which was in his hands. The
principle of concerted effort was easy for him, but he threw it away.
Since one marauder could have committed this homicide, he violated
the principle of economy of force by bringing a whole party afield
to indulge in a little exhibitionism for the benefit of one of his coup-
battle, so could not exploit the victory which was in his hands .
counters.
If the central Algonkian Ojibway had their troubles, how sad was
the fate of their eastern cousins who had the indomitable Iroquois for
p rin ciple of concerted effort was easy for him, but he threw it away. Since one marauder could have committed this homicide, he violated the principle of economy of force by bringing a whole party afield to i ndul ge in a little exhib iti oni sm for the benefit of one of his counters. If the central Algonkian Ojibway had their troubles, how sad was the fate of their eastern cousins who had the indomitable Iroquois for hereditary foes. These people had at one time been the serfs of th e Algonkians and represent the classical example of the worm which turned. Only the white man's interference and their basically small population, constantly reduced by war, prevented the Great League from becoming the masters of northeastern United States. The League was abolished before the rise of American eth nology. Our chief sources, tales of travellers and the reports of the to be. Our knowledge of Iroquois tactics is not what we would like it
hereditary foes. These people had at one time been the serfs of the
Algonkians and represent the classical example of the worm which
turned. Only the white man's interference and their basically small
coup
population, constantly reduced by war, prevented the Great League
from becoming the masters of northeastern United States.
Our knowledge of Iroquois tactics is not what we would like it
to be. The League was abolished before the rise of American eth-
nology. Our chief sources, tales of travellers and the reports of the
Jesuit missionaries, are all of a non-technical nature, and hence are
no more than suggestive.
It is reported that the Iroquois fought in a line, or rather two lines
in echelon whenever open country presented itself. This follows
the principle of correct formations. Indeed, they are the only people
north of the Rio Grande who consistently practiced every principle
of the art of war at all times, emphasizing those which the mission de-
manded, as a good general should.
The California area was marked by peoples of simple cultures,
small social groups, and great social isolation. Only one California
group, the Modoc, had any success against the white man. Most of
them were peaceful and were ruthlessly enserfed and slaughtered,
Jesuit
missionaries, are all of
non-technical nature, and hence are

a
15 Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs, Bulletin 86, Bureau of American
Ethnology (Washington: 1929), 71.
no m ore than suggestive.
in echelon whenever open country presented itself. This follows the prin cip l e of correct formations. Indeed, they are the on ly people north of the Rio Grande who c onS is tently practiced every principle of the art of war at all times, empha sizing those which the miss ion de m an ded , as a good general should.
The California area was marked by pe oples of simple c u l tures , group, the Modoc, had any success a gains t the white man. small social groups, and great social isolation . Only one California Most of
It is reported that the IroqUOis fou ght in
line, or rather two lin es
them were peaceful and were ruthlessly enserfed an d slau ghtered , 1 5 Frances Densmore, Chippewa Cu.noms, Bulletin 86, Bureau of American 'Ethnology ( Washington: 1929 ) , 71.
D 9 iz e b
48
48 Primitive War the first by the Spanish, the second by the Americans. Tactically
Primitive War
Tactically Indeed,
the first by the Spanish, the second by the Americans . Kroeber hints that the Maidu formed a line for fighting. I 6 Dr. Kroeber implies the line for several California people.
they were as incompetent as anything America could show, although
they were as incompetent as anything America could show, although
Kroeber hints that the Maidu formed a line for fighting.16 Indeed,
Dr. Kroeber implies the line for several California people.
The Indians of South America seem to have used the line, certainly
the surround, which is a line of a land, but the evidence is very dubious.
The Indians of South America seem to have used the line, certainly the surround, which is a line of a kind, but the evidence is very dubious. The early missionaries, reporting the tribes of Amazon ia, say that "Those of the forest fought dispersed, but in squadrons when in open ground," whatever that means , l 1 The finest use of battle order in Africa was made b y the Zulu. Their famous crescent and its operation is discussed in the chapter on battle plans, since its functioning entailed so much thought and team work. Yet even before Kings Dingiswayo and Chaka, who founded Zulu preeminence, the southeast Bantu had some idea of battle formation. people is a very fine achievement.
a a
The early missionaries, reporting the tribes of Amazonia, say that
"Those of the forest fought dispersed, but in squadrons when in open
ground," whatever that means.17
The finest use of battle order in Africa was made by the Zulu.
Their famous crescent and its operation is discussed in the chapter
on battle plans, since its functioning entailed so much thought and
team work.
Yet even before Kings Dingiswayo and Chaka, who founded Zulu
preeminence, the southeast Bantu had some idea of battle formation.
They formerly fought in a straight line, which among nonliterate
people is a very fine achievement. The Zulu modified the line into
a crescent which proved its superiority by rolling up the enemy into
a ball and vitiating all his effectives save those on the margins.
Others adopted Zulu tactics. The BaThonga had clear ideas of the
attack, forming in an echelon of lines, and of the proper use of re-
versed and refused lines. Later they adopted the Zulu crescent.
They formerly fought in a straight line, which among nonliterate The Zulu modified the line into crescent which proved its superiority by rolling up the enemy int o ball and vitiating all his effectives save those on the margins. The BaThonga had clear ideas of the
re
These features as well as the principles of combined employment of
all forces, concentration of force at the critical point, integrity of
tactical units, and economy of force are implied in the crescent line,
even for the Thonga. The battalions were ordered to attack by
echelons. If the commander observed his men giving way, he fol-
lowed the principles of economy of force and mass by sending in
Others adopted Zulu tactics . versed and refused lines.
companies to the critical point until the assault was successful and the
attack, forming in an echelon of lines, and of the proper use of
pursuit begun.1s No such leadership and organization will be found
Later they adopted the Zulu crescent.
in native America save in the central areas, and it is not very clear
there.
These features as well as the principles of combined employment of all forces, concentration of force at the critical point, integrity of tactical units, and economy of force are implied in the crescent line, even for the Thonga. echelons. The battalions were ordered to attack by If the commander observed his men giving way, he fol
The principle of correct formations, or of formations at all, is only
rudimentarily observed in most of Melanesia. An old missionary
source says that Papuans never willingly range a force in front of an
16 Alfred L. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California, Bulletin 78,
(Washington: 1923), p. 400.
17 George E. Church, The Aborigines of South America, ed. Clement R. Mark-
Iham (London: Chapman & Hall, 1912), p. 93.
lowed the principles of economy of force and mass by sending pursuit begun. I S
in
Junod, op. cit., p. 467
companies to the critical point until the assault was successful and the
in
native America save in th e central areas, and it is not very clear
No such leadership and organization will be found
there. The principle of correct formations, or of formations at all, is only rudimentarily observed in most of Melanesia. An old missionary source says that Papuans never willingly range a force in front of an
1 6 Alfred L. Kroeber, ( Washington : 1923 ) , p.
I ham 18
17
Handbook of the Indians of California, Bul letin 78. 400. George E. Church, The Aborigines of S outh America, ed. Clement R. Mark ( London : Chapman & Hall , 1912 ) , p. 93. Junod, op . cit., p. 467
D 9 iz e b
Fonnations
Formations 49 enemy line. When circumstances make this absolutely necessary, neither side suffers much in the engagement.19
49
Humphreys describes only primitive mass actions for the New
neither side suffers much in the engagement. 1 9 Humphreys describes only primitive
mass
enemy line.
When circumstances make this absolutely necessary,
Hebridean Melanesians, and their use of the line is not clear. The
two masses met and indulged in a series of individual combats, so
apparently the line was not common. When one man was killed the
actionjtoppfid-saJhat aH_might feast and praise the successful war-
rior, his tribe, and their allies. The next day the enemy sought to get
apparently the line was not common. rior, his tribe, and their allies . action st()p-ped
so
two masses met and indulged in a series of individual combats, so When one
man was
Hebridean Melanesians, and their use of the line is not clear.
actions for the New
The
a score in the same way. Casualties were rare in such general skir-
mishes.20 Of course such mass duelling, or individual combat of cham-
that all might feast and praise the successful war
killed the
pions is not war at all, any more than duelling is war. It is merely an
The next day the enemy sought to get
athletic event, hardly more effective or lethal than football as played
a few decades ago.
Melanesians have often been capable of open combat as well as
a score in the same way. Casualties were rare in such general skir mishes . 2 0 Of course such mass duelling, or individual combat of cham It is merely an
the savagery just "mentionedâs Bishop Codrington witnessed. He tells
ôfthe individual or mass ambush, the dawn attack, and the athletic
events just described for the western Pacific, but he also says that the
Floridians can at times do better. He mentions the clash of lines of
a few decades ago.
athletic event, hardly more effective or lethal than football as played Melanesians have often been capable of open combat as well as
pions is not war at all, any more than duelling is war.
spearmen as a rarity but also as a possibility. He says that occasionally
real masses are used by persuading or buying allies. If the surprise
attack fails, the allies may settle down to "something like a siege."21
the savagery just mentioned, as Bishop Codrington witnessed.
He tells
The chapter on battle plans quotes Riley as saying the Kiwai Papuans
- of the individual or mass ambush, the dawn attack, and the athletic Floridians can at times do better. events just described for the western Pacific, but he also says that the He mentions the clash of lines of
relied entirely on the dawn attack. Landtman gives a somewhat dif-
ferent version of Kiwai fighting. He says that these Papuans sometimes
deliberately threw away their tribal preference for surprise by having
scouts shoot a few arrows at individuals and then fly away with their
whole war party, which is certainly subtactical. All this accomplished
was to make the enemy angry and leave his camp in an uproar. He
admits that the night surround and stealthy attack were common and
spearmen as a rarity but also as a possibility. He says that occasionally real masses are used by persuading or buying allies. If the surprise attack fails, the allies may settle down to "something like a siege. ' 2 1 relied entirely on the dawn attack. The chapter on battle plans quotes Riley as saying the Kiwai Papuans Landtman gives a somewhat dif He says that these Papuans sometimes
that a general stand-up fight was rare, but some of his description can
bear no other interpretation than that the Kiwai could fight like
modern infantry. On such occasions a large party advanced in three
lines in echelon, first, the old experienced men, next the "strong
fighting men" in the prime of life, followed by the young men. The
ferent version of Kiwai fighting.
party advanced cautiously to the right and left of the scouts who had
deliberately threw away their tribal preference for surprise by having scouts shoot a few arrows at individuals and then fly away with their was to make the enemy angry and leave his camp in an uproar. whole war party, which is certainly sub tactical. All this accomplished He
19 Charles W. Abel, Savage Life in New Guinea (London: London Missionary
'Society 1902), p. 131.
20 Clarence B. Humphreys, The Southern New Hebrides (Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 1926), p. 58.
21 Robert H. Codrington, The Melanesians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891),
p. 305.
admits that the night surround and stealthy attack were common and that a general stand-up fight was rare, but some of his description can bear no other interpretation than that the Kiwai could fight like lines in echelon, first, the old experienced men, next the "strong The
modern infantry.
On such occasions a large party advanced in three
party advanced cautiously to the right and left of the scouts who had
fighting men" in the prime of life, followed by the young men.
1 9 Charles W. Abel, Savage Life in New Guinea ( London : London Missionary " Society 1902 ) , p. 131. 2 0 Clarence B . Humphreys, The Southem New Hebrides ( Cambridge : Uni verSity Press. 1 926 ) . p. 58. 2 1 Robert H. Codrington, The M eumesians ( Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1891 ) , p. 305.
D 9 iz e b
50
50 Primitive War signalled contact. Zulu-like wings were formed by the "strong men"
Primitive War
to contain the flanks and assail the enemy's rear. If the enemy be-
signalled contact. Zulu-like wings were formed by the "strong men" to contain the flanks and assail the enemy's rear. If the enemy be came alarmed before the fighting line was formed, the old men engaged them in a fire fight to keep them hotly occupied until the envelopment was completed. Arrows were directed at the enemy's shoulders if at too long a range to kill. This disabled him as an archer, so that he could no longer fire even if but slightly wounded. were sought. 2 2 If the range was short the fatal areas of the armpits or center of the chest
came alarmed before the fighting line was formed, the old men
engaged them in a fire fight to keep them hotly occupied until the
envelopment was completed. Arrows were directed at the enemy's
shoulders if at too long a range to kill. This disabled him as an archer,
so that he could no longer fire even if but slightly wounded. If the
range was short the fatal areas of the armpits or center of the chest
were sought.22
The missionary Brown takes pains to say that the Samoans ob-
served no battle order, that each man fought as he pleased.23 Ac-
tually, the Samoans, being Polynesians of high grade, exemplified
the principle of formations in both the line and the column, as re-
lated by many writers, including Brown himself in other passages.
The principles of utilization of the terrain, planning, and the in-
The missionary Brown takes pains to say that the Samoans ob served no battle order, that each man fought as he pleased. 2 3 Ac tually, the Samoans, being Polynesians of high grade, exemplified the principle of formations in both the line and the column, as re lated by many writers, including Brown himself in other passages .
tegrity of units are clearly implied in their battles as well. The Sa-
moans were really on the military threshold, as the descriptions of
their mass duels show. Very probably they would have crossed
that threshold had they not forced their battles to conform to cere-
monial attitudes and values. The importance of head-taking set up a
standard of individuation which prevented the necessary socialization
The principles of utilization of the terrain, planning, and the in tegrity of units are clearly implied in their battles as well. The Sa moans were really on the military threshold, as the descriptions of their mass duels show. Very probably they would have crossed The importance of head-taking set up a that threshold had they not forced their battles to conform to cere monial attitudes and values. required for true war. Dr. Buck described a battle between a small party led by Mautara on Mangaia against a large one of N gariki which was the identical penetrative movement used by Napoleon at Austerlitz and the Ger mans in the who believe standard of individuation which prevented the necessary socialization
required for true war.
Dr. Buck described a battle between a small party led by Mautara
on Mangaia against a large one of Ngariki which was the identical
penetrative movement used by Napoleon at Austerlitz and the Ger-
mans in the 1940 campaign for France, and by many commanders
who believe in mobile war. It shows how civilized the Polynesians
could be on occasion.
The common Polynesian formation was the clash of two battle
lines in the Homeric fashion, but Mautara knew he had too small
a force for this. He therefore told his men that it was victory or
the cannibal ovens for them and organized them in a column with
depth, not a line, on top of a slope. He then ordered them to charge
downhill against the large Ngariki force like a hurled spear. Concen-
trating at the critical point, this spear split the long enemy line in the
center, enabling Mautara's party to defeat their numerous foe in de-
22 Gunner Landtman, The Kiwai Papuans of British New Guinea (London:
Macmillan, 1927), pp. 157-159.
1940 campaign in mobile war.
for France, and by many commanders It shows how civilized the Polynesians
23 Brown, op. cit., p. 167.
could be on occasion. The common Polynesian formation was the clash of two battle lines in the Homeric fashion, but Mautara knew he had too small
a
force for this.
He therefore told his men that it was victory or He then ordered them to charge
the cannibal ovens for them and organized them in a column with depth, not a line, on top of a slope. downhill against the large Ngariki force like a hurled spear. Concen
trating at the critical point, this spear split the long enemy line in the
center, enabling Mautara's party to defeat their numerous foe in de2 2 Gunner Landtman, The Kiwai Papuans of British New Guinea ( London : Macmillan, 1927 ) , pp. 157-159. 2 3 Brown, op. cit., p. 167.
D 9 iz e b
Fonnations
Formations 51 tail after a fierce battle.21 Buck's description shows an aggressive,
51
Many
tail after a fierce battle. 24
Buck's description shows a n aggressive,
modern, and sagacious commander with real troops at his back. Many
commanders would have stood and been chopped to pieces by the
modern, and sagacious commander with real troops at his back. longer line, or would have fled without disgrace. shorter line seeks to envelop the longer.
longer line, or would have fled without disgrace. The more civilized
commanders would have stood and been chopped to pieces by the The more civilized might have tried the weak center movement, a device whereby the This Mangaian commander Surely adopted the maxim that the best defense is a vigorous offense.
might have tried the weak center movement, a device whereby the
shorter line seeks to envelop the longer. This Mangaian commander
adopted the maxim that the best defense is a vigorous offense. Surely
his observation of the principles of the offensive, of simplicity of plan,
and of correct formations was good because it was successful against
an able, aggressive, and numerous foe.
So far as Eurasia is concerned, there was an appreciation of the
value of the line of battle which dictated fair formations from Ireland
to India among all Metal Age peoples. The line crops up repeatedly
his observation of the principles of the offensive, of simplicity of plan, and of correct formations was good because it was successful against an able, aggressive. and numerous foe. So far as Eurasia is concerned, there was an appreciation of the value of the line of battle which dictated fair formations from Ireland to India among all Metal Age peoples. The line crops up repeatedly For example, there are in the songs of the Aryan invasion of India. which clearly indicate the battle line.
in the songs of the Aryan invasion of India. For example, there are
many passages in the Ramayana describing the invasion of Ceylon
which clearly indicate the battle line. Yet in the last analysis, both
sides seemed to put their faith in champions. The ties between Early
Hindu and Early Greek cultures are more than linguistic. The cul-
ture of the Indie Aryans was in transition at that time, so that the
transitional character of their tactics, from championship duel to true
war is not surprising. In contrast, it must be admitted that our knowl-
edge of them rests almost entirely on their poetry, the epic nature of
many passages in the Ramayana describing the invasion of Ceylon Yet in the last analysis, both The ties between Early The cul sides seemed to put their faith in champions.
which might easily accentuate the value of the hero champions be-
yond the actual practice of the times.
But what of formations after the battle is over? The victor's wor-
ries are moderate, of course. He need not form to escape destruction,
Hindu and Early Greek cultures are more than linguistic.
although another chapter will show that he had best be systematic if
ture of the Indic Aryans was in transition at that time, so that the transitional character of their tactics, from championship duel to true war is not surprising. In contrast, it must be admitted that our knowl edge of them rests almost entirely on their poetry, the epic n ature of which might easily accentuate the value of the hero champions be yond the actual practice of the times. ries are moderate, of course. But what of formations after the battle is over? The victor's wor He need not form to escape destruction,
he expects to make the most of his victory. Proper formations are
of paramount importance to the defeated, since an aggressive, in-
telligent foe will surely destroy him if he withdraws from defeat in
a disorderly rout. After all, proper formations are organized mutual
aid, and a people or nation needs its friends more in defeat than in
victory; and who has not suffered defeat at times? _-. _
I have been able to find but one hint of a ^pgd_orderbf withdrawal
among the American field reports. Early explorers
Ankara returned by tactical units called "platoons." Each platoon
kept perfect step to its field music and held to its own standards or
24 Peter H. Buck, Mangaian Society, Bulletin 75, Bernice P. Bishop Museum
(Honolulu: 1930), p. 56.
although another chapter will show that he had best be systematic if he expects to make the most of his victory. Proper formations are of paramount importance to the defeated, since an aggressive, in telligent foe will surely destroy him if he withdraws from defeat in a disorderly rout. After all, proper formations are organized mutual aid, and a people or nation needs its friends more in defeat than in victory; and who has n ot suffered defeat at times? I have been able to find but one hint of a good order .of withdrawa . Early explorers" y -tnar-t11e among the American field reports. Arikara returned by tactical units called platoons." Each platoon kept perfect step to its field music and held to its own standards or 24 Peter H. Buck, Mangaian Society. ,Bulletin 75, Bernice P. Bishop Museum ( Honolulu : 1930 ) , p. 56.
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52
52 Primitive War guidons.25 By implication they must also have approached in the same
Primitive War
guidons. 25 By implication they must also have approached in the same way, and perhaps fought in organization, thereby obeying the combat principles of integrity of tactical units. This seems to have been so rare that it might be that the early observers cited by Lowie read civil ized warfare into the account. This suspicion is bolstered by the beha vior of the culturally similar Omaha. When the Omaha in attack had massacred enough strays and had enjoyed a fine holiday, when indi vidual warriors exhibited their valor by slapping the face of some un wary foe, honor had been satisfied on both sides and the attack with When the defenders saw that they were no longer smitten, attack then they promptly pursued. The withdrawal on the drew.
way, and perhaps fought in organization, thereby obeying the combat
principles of integrity of tactical units. This seems to have been so
rare that it might be that the early observers cited by Lowie read civil-
ized warfare into the account. This suspicion is bolstered by the beha-
vior of the culturally similar Omaha. When the Omaha in attack had
massacred enough strays and had enjoyed a fine holiday, when indi-
vidual warriors exhibited their valor by slapping the face of some un-
wary foe, honor had been satisfied on both sides and the attack with-
drew. When the defenders saw that they were no longer smitten,
they promptly pursued. The withdrawal on the^Jhiaha attack then
invariably became a rout-flight, regardless of whethernjey won or
loSt. Ny
"Of other continents one can say little. Eye witnesses have told us
that the Zolu withdraw from an action as well as the best guard
troops, but one has learned to expect that. To the northwest of
invariably became a rout-Hight, regardless of
Africa the Dahomeans organized and planned a war with the finesse
of the general staff of a totalitarian state (which they were), ad-
fu
wh e th er
., won or
.
vanced in fair order, fought by encirclement, and withdrew as a rab-
ble with the needless loss of hundreds of their troops.
) Self-reliance has its part in war, but the keynote of good fighting is
that the Zulu withdraw from an action as well as the best guard troops, but one has learned to expect that. Africa the Dahomeans organized and planned a war with the finesse
Of other continents one can say little.
Eye witnesses have told us To the nor thw es t of
cooperation, and the more rugged the Tjetter. In order to affect dis-
"/ unity in the enemy ranks there must be unity within one's own. Or- \
ganized and directed friendship, if you will, is needed to discomfit
those to whom we are not friendly. Individual heroes belong to
poetry. The battle is a symphony wherein the soloist is seldom sig-
vanced in fair order, fought by encirclement, and withdrew as a rab ble with the needless loss of hundreds of their troops. Self-reliance has its part in war, but the keynote of good fighting is In order to affect dis Or
of the general staff of a totalitarian state ( which they were ) , ad
nificant.
It is necessary, after the battle organizations just described are
formed, that they act in unity to accomplish the common end, the
destruction of the enemy's will to resist and the imposition of our will
upon him. It is therefore part of the shaping of men into workable
cooperation, and the more rugged the better.

ganized and directed friendship, poetry. nificant.
structures that the mutual aid principles of the combined employ-
unity in the enemy ranks there must be unity within one's own. those to whom we are not friendly.
ment of all forces, of concerted effort, of integrity of tactical units,
and concentration at the critical point be employed as intelligently
if you will, is needed to discomfit

Individual heroes belong to
as possible.
There is nothing profound in these principles. Combined em-
ployment of all forces means that every man, every unit should have
25 Robert H. Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshone, Anthropologi-
The battle is a symphony wherein the soloist is seldom sig
cal Papers, American Museum of Natural History (New York: 1915), XI, Part
It is necessary, after the battle organizations just described are formed, that they act in unity to accomplish the common end, the destruction of the enemy's will to resist and the imposition of our will upon him. It is therefore part of the shaping of men into workable structures that the mutual aid principles of the combined employ ment of all forces, of concerted effort, of integrity of tactical units, and concentration at the critical point be employed as intelligently as possible. There is nothing profound in these principles. Combined em ployment of all forces means that every man, every unit should have
10, pp. 649ff.
2 5 Robert H. Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshone, Anthropologi cal Papers, American Museum of Natural History ( New York : 1915 ) , XI, Part 10, pp. 649ff.
DI
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Fonnations
Formations 53
53
a specific job to do. The whole war party should be used sooner or
later in the action.
a specific job to do.
The whole war party should be used sooner or
later in the action.
The integrity of tactical units is seldom a part of primitive war-
fare, although some parties are large enough, specialized enough, and
The integrity of tactical units is seldom a part of primitive war fare, although some parties are large enough, specialized enough, and well enough led to employ it. It means simply that
well enough led to employ it. It means simply that if the party is
if the party is
divided into cooperating units, the commander should take care not
to split up these units during the action. Each should have its own
divided into cooperating units, the commander should take care not to split up these units during the action. job. never violated it. The above principle is really a function of the greater one, that of concerted effort. War more than any other human occupation re A successful war party ought quires team work by numerous men. Each should have its own The Zulu are one people who saw this clearly and apparently
job. The Zulu are one people who saw this clearly and apparently
never violated it.
The above principle is really a function of the greater one, that of
concerted effort. War more than any other human occupation re-
quires team work by numerous men. A successful war party ought
to respond to the commander's will as the orchestra responds to that
of the conductor. All units of the war party should direct their efforts
to the common end.
Violation of concentration at the critical point is so prevalent in
primitive war as to be one of its features. The warrior, in contrast
to respond to the commander's will as the orchestra responds to that of the conductor. All units of the war party should direct their efforts to the common end. Violation of concentration at the critical point is so prevalent in primitive war as to be one of its features. The warrior, in contrast with the soldier, almost always yields to the temptation to accomplish useless little victories, the slaughter of one man or the crushing of one small party. This fritters away the force's strength so that more often than not no real advantage is acquired by the victor nor permanent injury done to the defeated. Force which is not brought to bear at the right point and the right time is wasted. The enemy's weak point or points should be ascertained and struck with sufficient force to make him regret having entered the contest. obvious principle violated more often than in North America. Nowhere was this rather
with the soldier, almost always yields to the temptation to accomplish
useless little victories, the slaughter of one man or the crushing of one
small party. This fritters away the force's strength so that more often
than not no real advantage is acquired by the victor nor permanent
injury done to the defeated. Force which is not brought to bear at
the right point and the right tune is wasted. The enemy's weak point
or points should be ascertained and struck with sufficient force to
make him regret having entered the contest. Nowhere was this rather
obvious principle violated more often than in North America.
The effective use of proper formations is intimately bound up with
troop specialization, a fact not often found among primitive warriors.
Lack of specialization is just as much a mark of primitivity as is lack
of specialized tools in the material culture of peace, or lack of division
of labor in social and economic life. Even in small modern units like
the squad, so many are riflemen, some are automatic riflemen, another
is a grenadier, another is guide, and so on, most men performing
specialized functions while working as a team. This coordination in
small units is anything but savage. It implies the organization of
men and materials into one beautifully coordinated whole, working
for the common mission according to a well-understood tactical pat-
The effective use of proper formations is intimately bound up with " Lack of specialization is just as much a mark of primitivity as is lack of specialized tools in the material culture of peace, or lack of division troop specialization, a fact not often found among primitive warriors.
tern.
It would seem that such elaboration would be beyond simple non-
literates. Scraps from field reports lead one to think, however, that
of labor in social and economic life. Even in small modem units like , the squad, so many are riflemen, some are automatic riflemen, another , is a grenadier, another is guide, and so on, most men performing l specialized functions while working as a team. This coordination in : small units is anything but savage. It implies the organization of : men and materials into one beautifully coordinated whole, working ': for the common mission according to a well-understood tactical pat
tern. It would seem that such elaboration would be beyond simple non literates. Scraps from field reports lead one to think, however, that
54
54 Primitive War at times the reporters have not written what they may have seen. Ac-
Primitive War
Ac
at times the reporters have not written what they may have seen.
tually, pre-firearm warriors needed such specialization more than
modern soldiers, due to the lack of versatility of their weapons. A
rifle with a bayonet is both a weapon of fire and shock, but a bow
tually, pre-fire ann warriors needed such specialization more than modem soldiers, due to the lack o f versatility of their weapons. A rifle with a bayonet is both a weapon of fire and shock, but a bow is only a weapon of fire and a spear is ordin arily one of shock. There fore, the need exists if the culture can rise to the occasion. In answer
is only a weapon of fire and a spear is ordinarily one of shock. There-
fore, the need exists if the culture can rise to the occasion. In answer
to the question one finds typically such reports as the following by
Gifford regarding the Kamia of the Imperial Valley of California:
There were three kinds of warriors: (1) armed with bows and arrows,
to the question one finds typically such reports as the following by Gifford regarding the Kamia of the Imperial Valley of California : There were three kinds of warriors :
(2) armed with clubs and shields, (3) armed with stabbing pikes.26
Gifford does not affirm or deny the use of these troops as a team.
Here was every opportunity, according to the printed page, of having
the same tactical organization the Romans used. The archers could
( 2 ) anned with clubs and shields, ( 3 ) anned with stabbing pikes. 2 6 Gifford does not affirm or deny the use of these troops as a team.
( 1 ) anned with bows and arrows,
have disconcerted the enemy by fire. The heavy clubmen should have
led the assault, while the light pikemen could have maneuvered where
they pleased to finish off the immobilized enemy. Perhaps that is
what the Kamia did. Reasoning from form to function, that is what
Here was every opportunity, according to the printed page, of having the same tactical organization the Romans used. The archers could have disconcerted the enemy by fire. The heavy clubmen should have led the assault, while the light pikemen could have maneuvere d where they pleased to finish off the immob ilized enemy. what the Kamia did. Perhaps that is Reasoning from fonn to function, that is what Instead
they should have done with their specialized fighters.
Densmore speaks with more clarity regarding the Papago. Instead
of allowing everyone to shoot in a haphazard fire-fight, their chiefs
designated certain men to be "killers" beforehand, while others were
appointed to protect them.27
This work frequently suggests that the warrior and police societies
on the Great Plains of America were better organized tacticians than
were the rest of the fighting males. Their horse and foot elements
they should have done with their specialized fighters. Densmore speaks with more clarity regarding the Papa go. of allowing everyone to shoot in a haphazard fire-fight, their chiefs designated certain men to be "killers" beforehand, while others were appointed to protect them. 2 1 This work frequently suggests that the warrior and police societies on the Great Plains of America were better or ganized tacticians than Their horse and foot e le ments were obviously used in combination by the Assiniboin. 2 8 were the rest of the fighting males. Similarly, James Mooney refers to the Ghost Dance association of the Arapaho as consisting of eight degrees. Nearly all men over seven teen belonged, and no one outside it could partici pate in a public ceremony or join a war-party. Men, those in the prime of life. insignia of the ir degree. The third degree consisted of the Club In attack their special duty was to
were obviously used in combination by the Assiniboin.2s
Similarly, James Mooney refers to the Ghost Dance association of
the Arapaho as consisting of eight degrees. Nearly all men over seven-
teen belonged, and no one outside it could participate in a public
ceremony or join a war-party. The third degree consisted of the Club
Men, those in the prime of life. In attack their special duty was to
dash ahead and strike the enemy with their clubs which were also the
insignia of their degree. After delivering this blow they would ride
back and take their places in the line for the regular mounted attack.
This was dangerous work, but the Club Men were given proportionate
honor.
26 Edward W. Gifford, The Kamia of Imperial Valley, Bulletin 97, Bureau of
American Ethnology (Washington: 1931), p. 31.
27 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, p. 180.
2s Denig, op. ctt., pp. 548f.
dash ahead and strike the enemy with their clubs which were also the Mter deli vering this blow they would ride back and take their places in the honor. 2 6 Edward W. Gifford, The Kamia at Imperial Valley, Bulletin 97, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1931 ) , p. 31. 21 Densmore, Chippewa Customs, p. 180. 2 8 Denig, op. cit., pp. 548f.
line for the regular mounted
attack.
This was dangerous work, but the Club Men were given proportionate
DI
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Ori g i n a l from U N I VE R S ITY O F CAL I FORN IA
Formations
Formations 55 Two types of cultures characterize Southwest United States. First
55
First
Two types of cultures characterize Southwest United States. non-aggressive, merely wishing to be left alone.
were the town-building or pueblo tribes, peaceful, successful farmers,
were the town-building or pueblo tribes, peaceful, successful fanners, Constantly pressing upon them through the centuries were hordes of wild hunters, at tempting to loot the corn which in their savagery they could not grow. The pueblo-building peoples were brave enough, but their chief mili
non-aggressive, merely wishing to be left alone. Constantly pressing
upon them tiirough the centuries were hordes of wild hunters, at-
tempting to loot the corn which in their savagery they could not grow.
The pueblo-building peoples were brave enough, but their chief mili-
tary efforts were defensive, and hence could not be victorious in the
end. Between these two extremes were groups such as the Pima, not
advanced enough to erect impressive pueblos but corn-growing and
tary efforts were defensive, and hence could not be victorious in the
end. Between these two extremes were groups such as the Pima, not advanced enough to erect impressive pueblos but corn-growing and peace-loving, and also beset by such pests as the Apache. The Pima were pacific enough, but till like the pueblo peoples, they did not ob ject to using the principle of the offensive to carry the war into Apache territory. They had specialized troops for fire and shock designed to advance by fire and movement, according to correct formations, and maintained the integrity of tactical units, a rare observance in Ameri ca. They were well aware of their true mission, ridding the good earth of their foes. The Iroquois were described a few pages back as capable of using the tactical line. These lines advanced according to the precept of In the front the archers marched in good order, fire and movement.
peace-loving, and also beset by such pests as the Apache. The Pima
were pacific enough, but unlike the pueblo peoples, they did not ob-
ject to using the principle of the offensive to carry the war into Apache
territory. They had specialized troops for fire and shock designed to
advance by fire and movement, according to correct formations, and
maintained the integrity of tactical units, a rare observance in Ameri-
ca. They were well aware of their true mission, ridding the good
earth of their foes.
The Iroquois were described a few pages back as capable of using
the tactical line. These lines advanced according to the precept of
fire and movement. In the front the archers marched in good order,
delivering arrow fire to immobilize and disconcert the enemy. If
trees prevented closer action, this fire won the battle. If open country
permitted a shock assault, at the proper moment a line of heavily
armed shock troops, protected by wooden armor, would rush in front
of the archers and assail the discomfited foemen most ferociously with
clubs. The archers then became light-armed tomahawk auxiliaries of
great mobility, hacking off anyone who got beyond the line of club-
men. Given anything like even numbers, such tactics were bound to
win the day against the enemy at hand.
The typical American Indian war party, however, was a force too
small and the use of troop specialization was too undeveloped to
make the principle of cooperation of much significance. The use of
delivering arrow fire to immobilize and disconcert the enemy. If trees prevented closer action, this fire won the battle. If open country permitted a shock assault, at the proper moment a line of heavily anned shock troops, protected by wooden annor, would rush in front of the archers and assail the discomfited foemen most ferociously with clubs. men . The archers then became l i ght-anned tomahawk auxiliaries of great mobility, hacking off anyone who got beyond the line of club Given anything like even numbers, such tactics were bound to
support and reserve was known to some, but to so few that the princi-
ple may be passed without discussion. Specialized troops were seen
in some of the better Plains tribes, the Iroquois League, on the North
Pacific Coast, and possibly among some Californians. Those people
who succeeded in achieving the military horizon, Iroquois, North
Pacific Coast, and probably some of the Southeast Woodland mon-
archies, apparently made good use of the principle.
win the day against the enemy at hand. The typical American Indian war party, however, was a force too small and the use of troop specialization was too undeveloped to make the principle of cooperation of much significance. The use of support and reserve was known to some, but to so few that the princi ple may be passed without discussion. Specialized troops were seen in some of the better Plains tribes, the Iroquois League, on the North Pacific Coast, and possibly among some Californians. Those people who succeeded in achieving the military horizon, Iroquois, North Pacific Coast, and probably some of the Southeast Woodland mon archies, apparently made good use of the principle.
DI
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56
56 Primitive War An element of the warfare of barbarian Europe which pointed away
Primitive War
An element of the warfare of barbarian Europe which pointed away
from primitivity was the use of specialized troops and the observa-
from primitivity was the use of specialized troops and the observa tion of the principles of concerted effort and combined employment of all forces. Julius Caesar said of the Germans under Ariovistus that each horseman went to battle with a foot soldier companion, very brave, highly trained, and very fleet. If the cavalry found it neces sary to withdraw, they fell back upon this elite infantry for protection. The infantry could concentrate very speedily upon observing any mis chance in the mounted fight an d rush to the rescue. vance and retreat.29 Caesar's trained eye saw in this a remarkable combination and co operation of trained and disciplined fighting men. Here, too, was the forerunner of the knight-and-squire relationship which the Ger manic tribes were to continue through the Middle Age. The com bination of infantry fighting in a cavalry line was used by the British
in the Napoleonic wars.
tion of the principles of concerted effort and combined employment
of all forces. Julius Caesar said of the Germans under Ariovistus that
each horseman went to battle with a foot soldier companion, very
brave, highly trained, and very fleet. If the cavalry found it neces-
sary to withdraw, they fell back upon this elite infantry for protection.
The infantry could concentrate very speedily upon observing any mis-
chance in the mounted fight and rush to the rescue. These expert
runners would cling to the cavalry's manes and aid both in the ad-
vance and retreat.29
Caesar's trained eye saw in this a remarkable combination and co-
These expert
operation of trained and disciplined fighting men. Here, too, was
runners would cling to the cavalry's manes and aid both in the ad
the forerunner of the knight-and-squire relationship which the Ger-
manic tribes were to continue through the Middle Age. The com-
bination of infantry fighting in a cavalry line was used by the British
in the Napoleonic wars. Such work required training and great cour-
age, whether executed by Germans or Wellington's Highlanders.
Caesar had the highest praise for British chariot troops. They
would drive in all directions to confuse the enemy line by the noise
of the wheels and showers of arrows. When they had worked them-
selves into the enemy cavalry's resultant interstices, the fighting men
would jump out and fight afoot while the drivers would gradually re-
Such work required training and great cour They
tire to a distance and dispose the chariots in such a way as to form
age, whether executed by Germans or Wellington's Highlanders. Caesar had the highest praise for British chariot troops. of the wheels and showers of arrows . would drive in all directions to confuse the enemy line by the noise When they had worked them selves into the enemy cavalry's resultant interstices, the fightin g men would jump out and fight afoot while the drivers would gradually re tire to a distance and dispose the chariots in such a way
as
a quick get-away device for their own troops if needed. "Thus they
show in action the mobility of cavalry and the stability of infantry."80
Such fine cooperation between the shock and protective elements
and the infantry is still a goal to be attained by the combined use of
modern infantry and tanks. Caesar admitted that the British cavalry-
men were successful against his own legionaries in pursuit and re-
tirement. They never fought in close enough order to please Caesar.
Their detachments were posted at wide intervals but in foreordained
order. Each party covered the other, and fresh warriors could take
to form
the place of tired ones.31 They should have been defeated in detail
for being so bold, but their mobility and cooperation prevented this.
Some experts might consider this British use of mounted infantry
a quick get-away device for their own troops if needed. "Thus they show in action the mobility of cavalry and the stability of infantry ."8 0 Such fine cooperation between the shock and protective elements and the infantry is still a goal to be attained by the combined use of modem infantry and tanks. Caesar admitted that the British cavalry men were successful against his own legionaries in pursuit and re tirement. order. They never fought in close enough order to please Caesar. Their detachments were posted at wide intervals but in foreordained Each party covered the other, and fresh warriors could take the place of tired ones.8 1 They should have been defeated in detail for being so bold, but their mobility and cooperation prevented this. Some experts might consider this British use of mounted infantry bad, but the proof of its excellence lies in its victory over Roman 2 9 Caius Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, Ibid., iv. 3. 8 1 Ibid., v. 16.
80 i.
bad, but the proof of its excellence lies in its victory over Roman
29 Caius Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, L 48.
8 Ibid., iv. 3.
31 Ibid., v. 16.
48.
Di
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Ori g i n a l fro m U N IV ERSI TY O F I C H IGA N
Formations
Formations 57 cavalry. Its sound combination of mobility, cooperation, use of re-
57
serves, and concentration at the critical point gave the great dictator
cause for worry.
Tacitus reported a similar condition of disciplined cooperation
among the Germans. He commented on the inferiority of the mounts,
giving most of the credit for cavalry success to the elite corps of in-
fantry which fought with and among the horsemen. These were men
apart from the regular line infantry.32 But if he deprecated the
quality of German horses, the discipline and precision of their cavalry
maneuver were rare on the modern drill fields, to say nothing of on
the battle field. Tacitus might be suspected of puffing up his Ger-
mans, as he did more than once.
The Celts in no wise fell below the German standards. They ad-
vanced in a close order line of swordsmen whose attack had been pre-
pared by a flight of javelins, adequately observing the principles of
fire and movement. The cavalry was subordinated to the infantry
attack. They had charioteers before they dared have mounted cavalry,
cavalry. Its sound combination of mobility, cooperation, use of re serves, and concentration at the critical point gave the great dictator cause for worry. Tacitus reported a similar condition of disciplined cooperation among the Germans . He commented on the inferiority of the mounts, giving most of the credit for cavalry success to the elite corps of in fantry which fought with and among the horsemen. These were men apart from the regular line infantry.32 But if he deprecated the quality of German horses, the discipline and precision of their cavalry maneuver were rare on the modem drill fields, to say nothing of on the battle field. Tacitus might be suspected of puffing up his Ger mans, as he did more than once. The Celts in no wise fell below the German standards. They ad vanced in a close order line of swordsmen whose attack had been pre pared by a flight of javelinS, adequately observing the principles of fire and movement. The cavalry was subordinated to the infantry attack. They had charioteers before they dared have mounted cavalry, ' which is probably true of all Aryans. Livy, in reporting the Battle of Cannae, observed that the Celtic people differed in the use of the sword. The Gauls cut and the Iberians thrust. 3 3 The Romans re learned the value of the short thrusting sword from the Iberians, which is the chief reason why most of the civilized world is governed by the Roman Law. Infantry attacks by swordsmen apparently were typical of all the Celts, for Irish poems describe the same thing. It was not true of the historic Greeks who considered the push of pikes with the long spear the primary infantry effort. They used the sword only as an auxiliary weapon, therefore Roman courage in closing with the enemy resulted in the Romans selling the Greeks as merchandise. spite of the subservience of ethnographical and tactical report ing to the demands of poetry, it seems that the early Vedic army utilized similar cooperation between specialized cavalry and infantry troops. The poems mention groups called sardhocs, the cavalry of heroes and charioteers supported by the unarmored common people acting as infantry.34
In
which is probably true of all Aryans. Livy, in reporting the Battle
of Cannae, observed that the Celtic people differed in the use of the
sword. The Gauls cut and the Iberians thrust.33 The Romans re-
learned the value of the short thrusting sword from the Iberians,
which is the chief reason why most of the civilized world is governed
by the Roman Law. Infantry attacks by swordsmen apparently were
typical of all the Celts, for Irish poems describe the same thing. It
was not true of the historic Greeks who considered the push of pikes
with the long spear the primary infantry effort. They used the sword
only as an auxiliary weapon, therefore Roman courage in closing with
the enemy resulted in the Romans selling the Greeks as merchandise.
In spite of the subservience of ethnographical and tactical report-
ing to the demands of poetry, it seems that the early Vedic army
utilized similar cooperation between specialized cavalry and infantry
troops. The poems mention groups called sardhocs, the cavalry of
heroes and charioteers supported by the unarmored common people
acting as infantry.34
The principle of war here under discussion could upon occasion be
well observed in America, especially among the Plains warrior as-
sociations. There is no doubt but that this particular trait contained
82 Cornelius Tacitus, Germania, 6.
33 Titus Livy, The History of Rome xii, 46.
34 The Rig Veda, i, 8, 11, 53, 71.
The principle of war here under discussion could upon occasion be well observed in America, especially among the, Plains warrior as sociations. There is no doubt but that this particular trait contained 8 2 Cornelius Tacitus, Germania, 6. 8 3 Titus Livy, The History of Rome xii, 46. 8 4 The Rig Veda, i, 8, 1 1 , 53, 7 1 .
Di
iz e
58
58 Primitive War the germ of military professionalization which might have blossomed
Primitive War
Wissler
the germ of military professionalization which might have blossomed reports into something effective if given the proper nourishment.
an
into something effective if given the proper nourishment. Wissler
reports an action of the Oglala Teton Blotaunka Society which indi-
cates this. The leader took the party within about three miles of a
large enemy camp. A detail of from six to ten men was then sent
cates this.
action of the Oglala Teton Blotaunka Society which indi
forward to rush, kill or otherwise excite the enemy into following the
advanced party. This type of raiding would content most Indians.
In this case the mission was not so trivial. The gadfly element merely
stung the foe into accepting an ambush. When they got close enough
the Blotaunka lodge launched a vigorous counter-attack which was
advanced party.
A detail of from six to ten men was then sent forward to rush, kill or otherwise excite the enemy into following the
In this case the mission was not so trivial. This type of raiding would content most Indians. The gadfly element merely
large enemy camp.
The leader took the party within about three miles of a
intended to kill all the effectives participating. This done, they
rushed the weakened main camp and wiped it out, returning home in
time for the appropriate ceremonies.35
In Oceania the superior social organization of Polynesia would lead
the Blotaunka lodge launched a vigorous counter-attack which was rushed the weakened main camp and wiped it out, returning home in time for the appropriate ceremonies .3 ll In Oceania the superior social organization o f Polynesia would lead Some of the better intended to kill all the effectives participating. This done, they
stung the foe into accepting an ambush.
\Vhen they got close enough
us to suspect that this area would excel Melanesia in the observance
of these principles, and the facts bear this out. Some of the better
Melanesians could and did use it in their village raiding, as will be
seen.
Buck describes an action between the aggressive Polynesian Tongaiti
and the Te-kama on Mangaia which should be read, since it followed
the old maxim of aggressive soldiers, "Grab them by the nose and kick
them in the pants."36 The party was divided into two units. One unit
of these principles, and the facts bear this out. seen.
us to suspect that this area would excel Melanesia in the observance
formed a pivot of maneuver to immobilize the defensive Te-kama,
while the other executed a movement around the Te-kama rear while
Melanesians could and did use it in their village raiding, as will be
they were hotly engaged in front. Cavalry and other mobile soldiers
prefer to fight this way. It is always a good fools-mate to try on a foe
in love with the defensive. The description of this action makes it
plain that the Mangaian Polynesians appreciated the value of con-
and the Te-kama on Mangaia which should be read, since it followed them in the pants."36 the old maxim of aggressive soldiers, "Grab them by the nose and kick The party was divided into two units. One unit
Buck describes an action between the aggressive Polynesian Tongaiti
certed effort, concentration at the critical point, the integrity of units,
and the economy of force.
The same author describes a more typical Polynesian action in an-
other section. It by no means utilized the cooperative principles of
formed a pivot of maneuver to immobilize the defensive Te-kama, they were hotly engaged in front. in love with the defensive.
mobile troops as did the foregoing, but it did contain the use of cooper-
ation of another type.
while the other executed a movement around the Te-kama rear while It is always a good fools-mate to try on a foe
The first party to arrive at the designated battle site arranged itself
in a line about five files deep. The front line was composed of the
35 Clark Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division
prefer to fight this way.
Cavalry and other mobile soldiers
of the Teton-Dakota, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural
History, (New York: 1912), XI, Part 1, passim.
plain that the Mangaian Polynesians appreciated the value of con certed effort, concentration at the critical point, the integrity of units, and the economy of force. other section. The same author describes a more typical Polynesian action in an
The description of this action makes it
36 Buck, op. cft., p. 44.
It by no means utilized the cooperative principles of
mobile troops as did the foregoing, but it did contain the use of cooper ation of another type. The first party to arrive at the deSignated battle site arranged itself The front line was composed of the
in a line about five files deep.
35 Clark Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division of the Teton-Dakota, Anthropological Papers, American M useum of Natural History, ( New York : 1912 ) , XI, Part 1, passim. 36 Buck, op. cit., p. 44.
D 9 iz e b
Fonnations
Formations 59
59
heads of families armed with the longest weapons. their sons in file according to seniority.
heads of families armed with the longest weapons. Behind them were
their sons in file according to seniority. The other party came up and
was allowed to make a similar disposition with no attempt to break up
was allowed to make a similar disposition with no attempt to break up
Behind them were The other party came up and
the maneuver by shock. Time was allowed for the various families
to be sure that they were ranged opposite ones with whom they had a
the maneuver by shock.

grudge.
grudge. The two battle lines then came slowly together and the fight
Time was allowed for the various families to be sure that they were ranged opposite ones with whom they had a
The two battle lines then came slowly together and the fight consisted of duels between members of the front ranks, those to the re ar cooperating by protecting the heads of families, passing up muni tions, dragging the dead and wounded away from the grasp of the can nibalistic foe, and taking the place of those disabled.
consisted of duels between members of the front ranks, those to the
rear cooperating by protecting the heads of families, passing up muni-
tions, dragging the dead and wounded away from the grasp of the can-
nibalistic foe, and taking the place of those disabled. Even the wives
who formed the final rank played an heroic part in the service of
supply, even offering their own bodies to protect those of their mates
and sons. Naturally such a battle lost its rigid order fairly soon, but
Even the wives
so do many modern ones.37
who formed the final rank played an heroic part in the service of supply, even offering their own bodies to protect those of their mates and sons. so do many modem ones. 3 7 While the foregoing action does not exhibit the cleverness of some Polynesian battles, and certainly required but little manipulation on the part of the commander, it is not exactly primiti ve unless one chooses to call most pre-Roman tactics primitive. element of surprise was thrown away. action. It is true that th e It is also hue that the wonder Naturally such a battle lost its rigid order fairly soon, but
While the foregoing action does not exhibit the cleverness of some
Polynesian battles, and certainly required but little manipulation on
the part of the commander, it is not exactly primitive unless one
chooses to call most pre-Roman tactics primitive. It is true that the
element of surprise was thrown away. It is also true that the wonder-
ful opportunity for shock action was discarded for a Frederician line
action. But in all, this battle sounds very much like Greeks fighting
after the invention of the phalanx, only better. And possibly its re-
semblance to Greek or Aryan line actions might be more than ac-
cidental parallelism. There was cooperation between the files organ-
ized on a kinship basis. There were echelons of support and reserve,
as well as some thought for security and sufficient numbers. It is true
that next to no attempt at mobility was made. This was static battle
ful opportunity for shock action was discarded for a Frederician line But in all, this battle sounds very much like Greeks fighting And possibly its re after the invention of the phalanx, only better.
in which the longest line was almost certain to win, given troops of
equal hardihood.
Melanesia and Papua were for the most part quite incompetent in
the use of these principles. Landtman, however, describes a Kiwai
action which clearly used a pivot backed by a mobile unit, exempli-
semblance to Greek or Aryan line actions might be more than ac
fying the principles of cooperation, movement, and the combined em-
cidental parallelism.
There was cooperation between the files organ
ployment of all forces. According to Landtman the Kiwai had real
battle ability beyond the savage dawn attack which seems to be as
much as Riley can credit them with. Riley thought them tacticians of
no mean order, however, and with this we may agree within the limits
of the type of action they were called upon to fight.3s
s7 Buck, op. cit., pp. 159f.
There were echelons of support and reserve, as well as some thought for security and sufficient numbers. It is hue that next to no attempt at mobility was made. This was static battle in which the longest line was almost certain to win , given troops of
ized on a kinship basis.
3s Landtman, op. cit., pp. 157ff.
equal hardihood .
Melanesia and Papua were for the most part quite incompetent in the use of these principles . Landtman, however, describes a Kiwai action which clearly used a pivot backed by a mobile unit, exempli fying the principles of cooperation, movement, and the combined em
ployment of all forces . According to Landhnan the Kiwai had real battle ability beyond the savage dawn attack which seems to be as much as Riley can credit them with. Riley thought them tacticians of no mean order, however, and with this we may agree within the limits of the type of action they were called upon to fight. 3 8
37 Buck, op. cit., pp. 159f. 38 Landtman, op. cit., pp. 157ff.
D 9 iz e b
60
60 Primitive War This discussion has, I hope, shown that along such lines, and
Primitive War
This discussion has, I hope, shown that along such lines, and
columns, the men of the tribe must be shaped if they are to prevail in the approaching combat. Yet mere formation is not enough. The shaping of men will be no more effective than the pretty figures of
a
columns, the men of the tribe must be shaped if they are to prevail in
the approaching combat. Yet mere formation is not enough. The
shaping of men will be no more effective than the pretty figures of
a full dress parade of cadets on a grassy drill field unless the forma-
tions are handled according to the simple principles herein outlined.
Formations are only instruments. They do not work themselves any
full dress parade of cadets on
grassy drill field unless the forma
more than a violin of the finest workmanship can play itself. They
tions are handled according to the simple principles herein outlined. Formations are only instruments . They do not work themselves any more than a violin of the finest workmanship can play itself. They require skillful handling, which is the commanders role, and adequate foresight, which will be discussed in the principle of plans.
require skillful handling, which is the commander's role, and adequate
foresight, which will be discussed in the principle of plans.
D 9 iz e b
CHAPTER 4
Discipline and Command
.LEADERSHIP AND OBEDIENCE, SUPERORDINATION AND SUBORDINATION,
are essential to any task requiring team work. This may be said
categorically. The more important the task, the greater its magnitude
and complexity, and the greater the danger involved to the cooper-
ators, the greater must be the element of discipline, administration,
and command. Discipline and command are two faces of the same
coin, and if this coin be military, are strong forces which make for
victory. War is not child's play, even if it be primitive war, and the
loss of a worker, protector, or kinsman through military death is
CHAPTER 4
serious in all societies.
The reason for this discussion of the command function might be
clarified by three citations. Romans said that a Choctaw chief could
not pretend to command but could only persuade. Any attempt to
command on his part would have brought desertion or even his as-
sassination.1
Against this situation let us pose the opinion of a modern profes-
are essential to any task requiring team work. categorically.
LEADERSHIP
AND
OBEDIENCE,
SUPERORDINATION
AND
SUBORDINATION,
This may be said
sional soldier:
The question is frequently asked, why do we need discipline in the
The more important the task, the greater its magnitude
army? The answer is that there can be no orderly effort of any kind,
and complexity, and the greater the danger involved to the cooper ators, the greater must be the element of discipline, administration, and command. coin, and Discipline and command are two faces of the same
in the army or out of it, without teamwork, which is merely the ulti-
mate expression of organized discipline.2
The fruits of organized, commanded, disciplined group effort is
success in achieving the group goal. The reward of such behavior
as described by Romans is strikingly enunciated by Denig for the
Assiniboin. Their war parties never fully accomplished their missions,
if this coin be military, are strong forces which make for victory. War is not child's play, even if it be primitive war, and the
loss of a worker, protector, or kinsman through military death is serious in all societies. The reason for this discussion of the command function might be clarified by three citations. Romans said that a Choctaw chief could Any attempt to not pretend to command but could only persuade.
and the chief cause of failure was insubordination. No man could
1 Romans, The Natural History of East and West Florida (New York: 1775),
p. 25.
2 Address by General M. B. Stewart.
61
command on his part would have brought desertion or even his as sassination . 1
Against this situation let us pose the opinion of a modem profes sional soldier :
Th e q ues ti on is frequ entl y asked, why do we need dis cipline in the army? The answer is that there can be no orderly effort of any kind, in the army or out of it, without teamwork, which is merely the ulti mate expression of organized discipline 2
.
The fruits of organized, commanded, disciplined group effort is success in achieving the group goal. The reward of such behavior as described by Romans is strikingly enunciated by Denig for the Assiniboin. Their war parties never fully accomplished their missions, and the chief cause of failure was insubordination. No man could
p. 25.
Romans, The Natural History of East and West Florida ( New York : 1775 ) ,
2 Address by General M. B. Stewart.
61
D 9 iz e b
62
62 Primitive War
Primitive War
make plans, carry them out, or actually lead. The nominal Assiniboin
head chief was only leader of his own band, which contained many
men who considered themselves his equals. Everyone's advice was
asked and nobody's taken. A party might look fair on setting forth,
but soon old personal grudges cropped up and the party was dis-
rupted by disputes. In the end, a large percentage of the army drifted
home in detached parties.3
make plans, carry them out, or actually lead. The nominal Assiniboin head chief was only leader of his own band, which contained many men who considered themselves his equals. Everyone's advice was asked and nobody's taken. A party might look fair on setting forth, but soon old personal grudges cropped up and the party was dis rupted by disputes. In the end, a large percentage of the army drifted home in detached parties.8 But who is the primitive commander? The choice of a commander for magico-religious reasons could be called primitive when con trasted with the civilized methods of choice on the basis of training, experience, and the qualities of leadership. A dream may have tacti cal value if one is fighting other dreamers. If not, its value is prob ably negative, although one must not discount the value of a dream as a creator of morale. The Assiniboin just mentioned had no permanent war leaders. An individual had a dream, whereupon he went to the young men and tried to recruit them for a party under his leadership. They might, of course, enlist or not according to their own wishes. Mter the party had departed, they took care to stop four times on the way to the point where the dream had predicted victorious contact with the enemy. At the last spot the leader had to have a dream which would confirm the original one. It is said that such a party was usually successful, which is, of course, the final test of efficacy. 4 This might be taken as the general pattern of the Great Plains command. Among the Winnebago the sacerdotal element was injected by the inclusion of the war-bundle idea. They thought that no one should lead a large party unless he could prove his possession of some special blessing from the supernaturals guaranteeing every detail of the expe dition.1i i\-, This bundle trait must not be underestimated. The fetish id whether one is speaking of sub-Saharan Mricans, or the Indians of north central United States, or the palladia of the eastern Mediter , ranean, has some importance regarding the command function. When the Iowa launched an attack, their commander had strictly ceremonial duties. The sacerdotal idea was introduced when instead of com4 Robert H. Lowie, The Assiniboine, Anthropological Papers, American Mu seum of Natural History ( New York : 1 909 ) , p. 28. Ii Paul Radin, The Winnebago Tribe, Annual Report 37, Bureau of American Ethnology, ( Washington: 1915-1916 ) , p. 156.
3 Denig, op. cit., p. 548.
But who is the primitive commander? The choice of a commander
for magico-religious reasons could be called primitive when con-
trasted with the civilized methods of choice on the basis of training,
experience, and the qualities of leadership. A dream may have tacti-
cal value if one is fighting other dreamers. If not, its value is prob-
ably negative, although one must not discount the value of a dream
as a creator of morale.
The Assiniboin just mentioned had no permanent war leaders. An
individual had a dream, whereupon he went to the young men and
tried to recruit them for a party under his leadership. They might,
of course, enlist or not according to their own wishes. After the party
had departed, they took care to stop four times on the way to the point
where the dream had predicted victorious contact with the enemy.
At the last spot the leader had to have a dream which would confirm
the original one. It is said that such a party was usually successful,
which is, of course, the final test of efficacy.4 This might be taken
as the general pattern of the Great Plains command.
Among the Winnebago the sacerdotal element was injected by the
inclusion of the war-bundle idea. They thought that no one should
lead a large party unless he could prove his possession of some special
blessing from the supernaturals guaranteeing every detail of the expe-
dition.5
This bundle trait must not be underestimated. The fetish_idea,
whether one is speaking of sub-Saharan Africans, or the Indians of
north central United States, or the palladia of the eastern Mediter-
ranean, has some importance regarding the command function. When
the Iowa launched an attack, their commander had strictly ceremonial
duties. The sacerdotal idea was introduced when instead of com-
4 Robert H. Lowie, The Assiniboine, Anthropological Papers, American Mu-
seum of Natural History (New York: 1909), p. 28.
5 Paul Radin, The Winnebago Tribe, Annual Report 37, Bureau of American
Ethnology, (Washington: 1915-1916), p. 156.
D 9 iz e b

Discipline and Command 63 manding the action he had to stay behind, pray to the bundle, sing,
63
and rattle for success. If the party was successful, the glory went
to him and his rattling, not to the fighting men.6 When the war'
leader is considered a priest to a fetish or god, the idea is introduced
which may, under proper circumstances, lead to the concept ofjjriest-
kingship, a concept which has done so much for certain African king-
doms, the civilizations of the American area of intense cultivation of
maize, and for the eastern Mediterranean.
LaFlesche, speaking of the reasonably well-organized Osage, plainly
indicated that their war leader was considered more the high priest of
the expedition than its commander. He was the intermediary be-
tween the people and the supernatural wakanda. He was too laden
with tabus, vigils, and continual supplication to lead the fight. It
was just as well to keep him occupied this way, for the warriors would
not have obeyed him even had he given any tactical instructions.7
This might have been very good tactical and organizational procedure
if the Osage had not encountered the United States Cavalry, whose
tables of organization, command, tactics, and theology were notably
different. LaFlesche reported that the songs and ceremonials to be
rendered before an Osage attack took more time than the battle it-
self. To the misfortune of moder n armies, there are no more such
singing soldiers to vanquish. Cromwell's psalm-singing infantry did
not wait until they got to the doxology before they struck. The priest-
king idea is most beneficial provided that it does not interfere with
tactics, or that the praying be done the night before as Stonewall
Jackson did, or that some less holy man should actually command.
The commonest form of acquiring command in America was to
elect one's self to the post. Typically, the Assiniboin allowed any
chief or brave warrior to raise and lead a war party. He had only
to persuade men to follow him.3 This method was admirably suited
to a people who had enlistment by individual preference rather than
tribal levy. It is without doubt primitive in nature and is very wide-
spread. It has an unapproved or illegal survival among living his-
toric people in the nature of partisan or guerrilla troops. Despite the
6 Skinner, op. cit., p. 686.
7 Francis La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of the Chiefs: Sayings of Ancient
Men, Annual Report 36, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1914-
1915), p. 107.
s James O. Dorsey, "Siouan Sociology," Annual Report 15, Bureau of American
Ethnology (Washington: 1893-1894), p. 224.
manding the action he had to stay behind, pray to the bundle, sing, and rattle for success. If the party was successful, the glory went to him and his rattling, not to the fighting men.6 When the war leader is considered a priest to a fetish or god, the idea is introduced which may, under proper circumstances, lead to the concept of priest kingsh'p'. a concept which has done so much for ertain African king doms, the civilizations of the American area of intense cultivation of maize, and for the eastern Mediterranean. LaFlesche, speaking of the reasonably well-organized Osage, plainly indicated that their war leader was considered more the high priest of the expedition than its commander. He was the intermediary be tween the people and the supernatural wakanda. He was too laden with tabus, vigils, and continual supplication to lead the fight. It was just as well to keep him occupied this way, for the warriors would not have obeyed him even had he given any tactical instructions.7 This might have been very good tactical and organizational procedure if the Osage had not encountered the United States Cavalry, whose tables of organization, command, tactics, and theology were notably different. LaFlesche reported that the songs and ceremonials to be rendered before an Osage attack took more time than the battle it self. To the misfortune of modem armies, there are no more such singing soldiers to vanquish. Cromwell's psalm-singing infantry did not wait until they got to the doxology before they struck. The priest king idea is most beneficial provided that it does not interfere with tactics, or that the praying be done the night before as Stonewall Jackson did, or that some less holy man should actually command. The commonest form of acquiring command in America was to elect one's self to the post. Typically, the Assiniboin allowed any chief or brave warrior to raise and lead a war party. He had only to persuade men to follow him.8 This method was admirably suited to a people who had enlistment by individual preference rather than tribal levy. It is without doubt primitive in nature and is very wide spread. It has an unapproved or illegal survival among living his toric people in the nature of partisan or guerrilla troops. Despite the
6 Skinner, op. cit., p. 686. 7 Francis La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of the Chiefs: Sayings of Ancient Men, Annual Report 36, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 19141915 ) , p. 107. 8 James O. Dorsey, "Siouan SOCiology," Annual Report 1 5, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1893-1894 ) , p. 224.
D 9 iz e b
64
64 Primitive War limitation that the warlike operations of such personal troops shall be
Primitive War
limitation that the warlike operations of such personal troops shall be
confined to the public enemy, this type of leadership and recruiting
confined to the public enemy, this type of leadership and recruiting
is primitive because it is essentially private and personal in nature
and non-public. Limiting the effort to a tribal enemy is the only
modern note. Otherwise it falls into the recruiting and leadership
is primitive because it is essentially private and personal in nature and non-public . Limiting the effort to a tribal enemy is the only
pattern of the Italian renaissance mercenary troops against whom Machiavelli railed. This type of leadership was really a matter of organization rather modern note. Otherwise it falls into the recruiting and leadership
pattern of the Italian renaissance mercenary troops against whom
Machiavelli railed.
This type of leadership was really a matter of organization rather
than command. Such a person had to have a favorable name for
success against the enemy, or no one would volunteer to go with him.
Yet he could not attempt to command any of his followers with any
ring of authority. A Chickasaw leader was a man famous for having
harmed the enemy, but he could do no more than propose or per-
than command.
suade. His party would have deserted in a body had he attempted
more.9
Yet he could not attempt to command any of his followers with any harmed the enemy, but he could do n o more than propose or per suade. more. 9
a
success against the enemy, or no one would volunteer to go with him.
Such a person had to have a favorable name for
Often, by contrast, some distinguished man might be asked to lead
a war party. This does not mean that he had any official permanent
ring of authority.
A Chickasaw leader was a man famous for having
title, rank, or authority. After the expedition he would lapse back
into the ranks of distinguished private persons. The Plains-Ojibway
and Plains-Cree parties were usually of this semi-private type. If,
His party would have deserted in a body had he attempted
among the latter, no one was inspired to lead a party, the warriors
might organize one themselves and not only request some distin-
guished warrior to lead it but actually make him substantial gifts
to do so.10
A more effective method was for the group to decide to go to war,
define its objective, make up its party, and then elect a proper chief to
head it. This was the method of the Jibaro, a loosely-knit people
into the ranks of distinguished private persons.
title, rank, or authority.
war party.
Often, by contrast, some distinguished man might be asked to lead
This does not mean that he had any official permanent After the expedition he would lapse back The Plains-Ojibway If,
with no concept of tribal authority. Yet their perception of the
utility of choosing a real chief impelled them to do so. On those rare
instances when a whole Jibaro tribe, or even a temporary federation
among the latter, no one was inspired to lead a party, the warriors might organize one themselves and not only request some distin to do SO. 1 0 guished warrior to lead it but actually make him substantial gifts A more effective method was for the group to decide to go to war,
and Plains-Cree parties were usually of this semi-private type.
of tribes went to war as a unit, a chief over the whole was elected.11
The civil chief in America was not necessarily the war chief. More
often the reverse was true. Indeed, the term chief itself is more
often meaningless than otherwise. Most American societies had not
developed authoritative rulers, and the civil state, where it existed,
9 Romans, op. cit., p. 70.
10 Alanson B. Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the
Plains-Ojibway and Plains-Cree Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Mu-
seum of Natural History (New York: 1914), XI, Part 6, p. 490.
11 Karsten, op. cit., p. 18.
with no concept of tribal authority.
define its objective, make up its party, and then elect a proper chief to head it. This was the method of the Jibaro, a loosely-knit people utility of choosing a real chief impelled them to do so.
Yet their perception of the
instances when a whole Jibaro tribe, or even a temporary federation of tribes went to war as a unit, a chief over the whole was elected . 1 ! often the reverse was true. The civil chief in America was not necessarily the war chief.
On those rare
often meaningless than otherwise.
In deed, the term chief itself is more
More
developed authoritative rulers, and the civil state, where it existed,
Most American societies had not
seum
9 Romans , op. cit., p. 70. 10 Alanson B. Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains-O;ibtca y and Plains-Cree Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Mu
1 1 Karsten, op. cit., p . 18.
of
Natural History ( New York :
1914 ) , XI,
Part
6,
p.
490.
D 9 iz e b

Discipline and Command 65 is out of the scope of this volume. But even when a civil chief of
65
is out of the scope of this volume. commander.
But even when a civil chief of First, he may not have
some rank and authority had arisen, he was not necessarily the war
some rank and authority had arisen, he was not necessarily the war acquired sufficient military prestige for him to have the de to lead his people in battle. tainship for reasons other than military. This may be for two reasons.
commander. This may be for two reasons. First, he may not have
acquired sufficient military prestige for him to have the de jure right
to lead his people in battle. Furthermore, he might hold his chief-
lure
right
tainship for reasons other than military. Some of the older writers
Furthermore, he might hold his chief Some of the older writers
postulated that all chieftainship and kingship came from the power
of some distinguished warrior to persuade or overawe the common-
alty into making him governor in all things. This happened time and
postulated that all chieftainship and kingship came from the power of some distinguished warrior to persuade or overawe the common alty into making him governor in all things. This happened time and Among
a
again, but to trace the civil state to war alone is an oversimplification.
It discounts, for instance, the power of the spiritual leader. Among
the Southeast United States tribes the most influential chief, often a
rudimentary king, was a peace chief and forbidden to shed blood.
again, but to trace the civil state to war alone is an oversimplification. It discounts, for instance, the power of the spiritual leader. the Southeast United States tribes the most influential chief, often
Even some of the Northeast Woodland peoples had similar ideas.
In the second place, the civil chief might not be a war chief because
the culture had developed beyond this, as has our own.
Inspection of the literature shows that the American Indians used
rudimentary king, was a peace chief and forbidden to shed blood. Even some of the Northeast Woodland peoples had similar ideas . In the second place, the civil chief might not be a war chief because the culture had developed beyond this, as has our own.
both methodsthe war chief being the general chief, as well as the sep-
aration of the peace and war powers. An Assiniboin head chief was
leader in all things, including war, thus differing from the neighboring
Omaha and Ponca who used the dual civil and war chieftainships.12
The Yuki, though simple and isolated Californians, had a specialized
war chief aside from the civil power. He was a notably brave man,
Inspection of the literature shows that the American Indians used

_
ruling by influence rather than direct command. In a battle he stood
in the rear or on one side where he advised and encouraged the
both methods-the war chief bein g the general chief, as well as the sep aration of the peace and war powers. An Assiniboin head chief was leader in all things, including war, thus differing from the neighboring Omaha and Ponca who used the dual civil and war chieftainships. l :l The Yuki, though simple and isolated Californians, had a specialized war chief aside from the civil power. He was a notably brave man, In a battle he stood ruling by influence rather than direct command. fighting men . 1 3 the second type, these Plateau people used the Plains method of in dividual organization and command. In the tribal wars, however, the head ( civil ) chief assembled a council of chiefs, that is, band chiefs and distinguished warriors, wherein the matter was discussed. If the council decided on war, they hoisted a robe on the council All who wished to join likewise hoisted a robe or blanket on their own tents. The chief or chiefs decided upon going to war but they did not necessarily lead the expedition. They themselves elected the war leader, although they went one step towards the civil state by lodge. keeping this suffrage to themselves and not sharing it with the war riors who would make up the bulk of the command. 1 2 Dorsey, op. cit., p. 224. 1 3 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 177.
fighting men.18
The Coeur d'Alene had two kinds of war, public and private. In
the second type, these Plateau people used the Plains method of in-
dividual organization and command. In the tribal wars, however,
the head (civil) chief assembled a council of chiefs, that is, band
chiefs and distinguished warriors, wherein the matter was discussed.
If the council decided on war, they hoisted a robe on the council
lodge. All who wished to join likewise hoisted a robe or blanket on
their own tents. The chief or chiefs decided upon going to war but
they did not necessarily lead the expedition. They themselves elected
in the rear or on one side where he advised and encouraged the
the war leader, although they went one step towards the civil state by
keeping this suffrage to themselves and not sharing it with the war-
riors who would make up the bulk of the command.
Th e Coeur d'Alene had two kinds o f war, public and private.
In
12 Dorsey, op. cit., p. 224.
18 Kroeber, op. ctt., p. 177.
D 9 iz e b
66
66 Primitive War '/
Primitive War
The nearbyOkanagan had two types of chieftainships, that con-
ferred by heredity and that acquired through prestige.. The large
bands had permanent war chiefs aside from the civil leaders, while
such command among small bands was temporary.
such command among small bands was temporary. The rise of an
bands had permanent
The nearby. Okanagan had two types of chieftainships, that con ferred by heredity and that acquired through. prestige. . The large
war
chiefs aside from the civil leaders, while chieftainship not vested with war com
The rise of an hereditary chieftainship not vested with war com-
mand was not unusual] Miss Densmore reported that any Ojibway
warrior might organize a private war party by sending a messenger
mand was not unusuar.- Miss Densmore reported that any Ojibway warrior might organize a private war party by sending a messenger with tobacco to the men he wished to recruit. and encouraged the warriors to enlist. These men assembled, the prospective leader gave a speech concerning the objective sought He gave a banquet to those Now the Ojibway did who pledged to go and all smoked the pipe. abilities.
reditMY
with tobacco to the men he wished to recruit. These men assembled,
the prospective leader gave a speech concerning the objective sought
and encouraged the warriors to enlist. He gave a banquet to those
who pledged to go and all smoked the pipe. Now the Ojibway did
have hereditary war chiefs, so prestige depended upon one's own
abilities. Persons of various sibs would leave their own unsuccessful
chiefs to enlist under a good one. The hereditary chief was the presi-
dent of the council, made decisions regarding the general welfare,
have hereditary war chiefs, so prestige depended upon one's own Persons of various sibs would leave their own unsuccessful The hereditary chief was the presi chiefs to enlist under a good one.
settled small disputes, and represented his band in tribal councils
and in international affairs, but he was by no means an authoritative
war chief de jure.1* The man who actually led was accorded con-
siderable obedience and received all the credit if the expedition was
successful.
It might be well to summarize this subject First, the leader might
have no authority at all, as in Guiana, hence there could be no disci-
pline. War could be no more than "a disorderly route," and since
everyone was his own judge as to when to retire, could be only of
war chief de jure. 1 4 The man who actually led was accorded con siderable obedience and received all the credit if the expedition was successful. It might be well to summarize this subject. pline.
dent of the council, made decisions regarding the general welfare, settled small disputes, and represented his band in tribal councils and in international affairs, but he was by no means an authoritative
brief duration.15
Second, several instances have been cited of the titular commander
having only sacerdotal functions, so there is no need of multiplying
First, the leader might
examples. Where his duties consisted of remaining behind the main
action to pray to some wakanda or bundle it is doubtful if he should
be called a commander.
have no authority at all, as in Guiana, hence there could be no disci War could be no more than "a disorderly route , and since
Third, the commonest degree of authority in the Americas was
adequate for the type of action fought, and as much as could be im-
brief duration. I II
everyone was his own judge as to when to retire, could be only of
posed upon companions as disorderly and anarchic as most Indian
fighters were. The authority of such command was generally advisory
only, no matter what title the leader might hold. Therefore, Fletcher
and LaFlesche complained that Omaha war parties were not organ-
Second, several instances have been cited of the titular commander having only sacerdotal functions, so there is no need of multiplying Where his duties consisted of remaining behind the main action to pray to some wakanda or bundle it is doubtful if he should be called a conimander. Third, the commonest degree of authority in the Americas was adequate for the type of action fought, and as much as could be im posed upon companions as disorderly and anarchic as most Indian fighters were. The authority of such command was generally advisory only, no matter what title the leader might hold. Therefore, Fletcher and LaFlesche complained that Omaha war parties were not organ1 4 Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs, p. 135 . Gumilla, in Walter E. Roth, An Introductory Study of the Arts, Crafts, and Customs of the Guiana Indians, Annual Report 38, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1916-1911 ) , p. 582.
11\
14 Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs, p. 135.
examples.
15 Gumilla, in Walter E. Roth, An Introductory Study of the Arts, Crafts, and
Customs of the Guiana Indians, Annual Report 38, Bureau of American Ethnology
(Washington: 1916-1917), p. 582.
D 9 iz e b

Discipline and Command 67 ized "into lines, companies, or battalions," each warrior marched and
67
fought independently, and no one awaited anyone else's order to
attack (or withdraw).16
One should not discount the American Indian's ability to confer
ized "into lines, companies, or battalions," each warrior marched and fought independently, and no one awaited anyone else's order to attack ( or withdraw ) . 1 8 One should not discount the American Indian's ability to confer real authority on a war chief in certain areas. It has been pointed out that the term " chief" had little or no authoritative meaning among the Plains bison hunters who did not grow corn. On the other hand, these people generally had societies and lodges, most of them in volved in problems of war and social control. As a fourth type the councils and heads of these soldier societies were often real com manders vested with real power. Analogous to this was the rever sion to primitive war during our own crusading period. Many of the primitive features of command and enlistment observed in this dis cussion will be recalled for these historic wars. On the other hand there were orders of military monks, the Hospitallers and Templars, who had iron discipline, real tactical training, and true command functions. These voluntary societies constituted the real fighting backbone of the crusading armies. As a fifth type, the otherwise unorganized Jibaro could confer real power on a chief, called "the old one, " during a war of extermination. He alone made plans and dispositions, and the young warriors obliged themselves to obey him implicitly. This absolute authority ceased with peace, and even a successful war chief lapsed to the level of all other Jibaro. 1 7 One would expect the socially and economically well-organized tribes of the North Pacific Coast, with their clear-cut caste ideas, to have authoritative commanders. According to Tsimshian mythology, They followed the their chiefs had the right of absolute command.
real authority on a war chief in certain areas. It has been pointed
out that the term " chief" had little or no authoritative meaning among
the Plains bison hunters who did not grow corn. On the other hand,
these people generally had societies and lodges, most of them in-
volved in problems of war and social control. As a fourth type the
councils and heads of these soldier societies were often real com-
manders vested with real power. Analogous to this was the rever-
sion to primitive war during our own crusading period. Many of the
primitive features of command and enlistment observed in this dis-
cussion will be recalled for these historic wars. On the other hand
there were orders of military monks, the Hospitallers and Templars,
who had iron discipline, real tactical training, and true command
functions. These voluntary societies constituted the real fighting
backbone of the crusading armies.
As a fifth type, the otherwise unorganized Jibaro could confer real
power on a chief, called "the old one," during a war of extermination.
He alone made plans and dispositions, and the young warriors obliged
themselves to obey him implicitly. This absolute authority ceased
with peace, and even a successful war chief lapsed to the level of all
other Jibaro.17
One would expect the socially and economically well-organized
tribes of the North Pacific Coast, with their clear-cut caste ideas, to
have authoritative commanders. According to Tsimshian mythology,
their chiefs had the right of absolute command. They followed the
American pattern of having to request recruits, but once anyone had
joined up, he was under the very real and great command of his chief.
These chiefs apparently could declare a state of war on their own
recognizance which bound their people, because they were great
chiefs and princes.1s
War chiefs sometimes became so authoritative that their power in-
creased beyond the functions of war. They were men of such suc-
16 Alice C. Fletcher and Francis La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe, Annual Report
27, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1905-1906), p. 427.
1s Franz Boas, "Tsimshian Mythology," Annual Report 31, Bureau of American
Ethnology (Washington: 1909-1910), pp. 381f.
American pattern of having to request recruits, but once anyone had joined up, he was under the very real and great command of his chief. These chiefs apparently could declare a state of war on their own recognizance which bound their people, because they were great chiefs and princes. 1 S War chiefs sometimes became so authoritative that their power in creased beyond the functions of war. They were men of such suc27,
Ethnology ( Washington : 1909-1910 ) , pp. 381.
1 8 Alice C. Fletcher and Francis La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe, Annual Report Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1905-1906 ) , p. 427. 1 7 Karsten, cp. cit., p. 7. 1 S Franz Boas, "Tsimshian Mythology," Annual Report 31 , Bureau of American
D 9 iz e b
68
68 Primitive War cess that they might encroach on the civil chief. This was true in
Primitive War
on
cess that they might encroach more than tactical importance.
the
civil
chief.
This was true in
some of the pueblos of the Southwest. The Acoma war chiefs had
some of the pueblos of the Southwest.
The Acoma war chiefs had Since rain is the
more than tactical importance. They were "virtually the backbone
They were "virtually the backbone
of the spiritual and institutional life of the pueblo." Since rain is the
most important event in pueblo life, the war chiefs had the duty of
of the spiritual and institutional life of the pueblo." making it rain.
making it rain. They protected the magico-religious associations and
most important event in pueblo life, the war chiefs had the duty of They protected the magico-religious associations and Today they are general overseers of daily life, combatted witchcraft. can ways.
combatted witchcraft. Today they are general overseers of daily life,
doing their best to prevent acculturation towards American and Mexi-
can ways. The task is arduous, entailing onerous ritual and routine
behavior, demanding sexual continence, and is not rewarded with
pay. Acoma has three such war chiefs elected annually without re-
doing their best to prevent acculturation towards American and Mexi The task is arduous, entailing onerous ritual and routine behavior, demanding sexual continence, and is not rewarded with pay. Acoma has three such war chiefs elected annually without re gard to clan affiliation. They are considered the chief heralds of the civil cacique. Indeed, a war chief is analogous to the executive of ficer of a modern man-of-war. The cacique rules, but through his war chiefs who are obviously the real authority. 1 9 , The responsibility o f the authoritative war chiefs t o their civil sbperiors, or to the society in general, varied in degree as much as ' did their power. The supreme authority of the group was exerted among the Acoma by giving the war chiefs a thorough if ceremonial whipping upon their assumption and resignation of office. Plains-Ojibway chief had to depose them.20 As for successful chiefs, their rewards were likewise manifold. expedition went well. It will be remembered that the Ojibway chiefs got all the glory if the The Iowa chief, as priest to the war-bundle, He could not was so engaged in prayer that he could not command.
run
gard to clan affiliation. They are considered the chief heralds of the
civil cacique. Indeed, a war chief is analogous to the executive of-
ficer of a modern man-of-war. The cacique rules, but through his
war chiefs who are obviously the real authority.19
/The responsibility of the authoritative war chiefs to their civil
superiors, or to the society in general, varied in degree as much as
did their power.' The supreme authority of the group was exerted
among the Acoma by giving the war chiefs a thorough if ceremonial
whipping upon their assumption and resignation of office. The
Plains-Ojibway chief had to run the gauntlet. Weak or incapable
Assiniboin chiefs were supposed to resign. Indeed, the council could
depose them.20
As for successful chiefs, their rewards were likewise manifold. It
will be remembered that the Ojibway chiefs got all the glory if the
expedition went well. The Iowa chief, as priest to the war-bundle,
was so engaged in prayer that he could not command. He could not
turn aside nor turn back while marching. He was so tabu that some-
one had to turn him from straight ahead when this was necessary.
The
He slept alone and had someone feed him. But to this sacred person-
the gauntlet.
Weak or incapable
age went all the credit and loot from a successful party. The property
he distributed to the community. Such loot distribution comprises one
Assiniboin chiefs were supposed to resign.
Indeed, the council could
of the economic roots of kingship. Such advantages given to a com-
mander who could not command reminds one of the South American
Mojo. Their caciques could not command, and their greater pres-
19 Leslie A. White, "The Acoma Indians," Annual Report 47, Bureau of Ameri-
can Ethnology (Washington: 1929-1930), pp. 45-50.
20 Dorsey, op. cit., p. 224.
turn aside nor turn back while marching. He was so tabu that some
one had to turn him from straight ahead when this was necessary. He slept alone and had someone feed him. he distributed to the community. of the economic roots of kingship. Mojo. But to this sacred person age went all the credit and loot from a successful party. The property Such loot distribution comprises one Such advantages given to a com
mander who could not command reminds one of the South American Their caciques could not command, and their greater pres19 Leslie A. White, "The Acoma Indians," Annual Report 47, Bureau of Ameri can Ethnology { Washington : 1929-1 930 } , pp. 45-50. 2 0 Dorsey, ap. cit., p. 224.
Di
iz e

Discipline and Command 69 tige rested only on their individual valor. But they could use other
69
tige rested only on their individual valor.
men's women "without repugnance or resistance."21
But they could use other men's women "without repugnance or resistance."2 1
An unsuccessful chief might suffer in many ways.
An unsuccessful chief might suffer in many ways. Among those
tribes wherein the would-be leader decided himself to go on a party
Among those
and recruited his own followers, he might lose his own prestige, a
tribes wherein the would-be leader decided himself to go on a party very terrible thing. If the society had an aristocratic basis, he might be degraded to the rank of a common person, as among the Choctaw.22 go hard with an unsuccessful commander. Among people with a separate and authoritative civil chief it might The head chiefs of the and recruited his own followers, he might lose his own prestige, a
very terrible thing. If the society had an aristocratic basis, he might
be degraded to the rank of a common person, as among the Choctaw.22
Among people with a separate and authoritative civil chief it might
go hard with an unsuccessful commander. The head chiefs of the
Winnebago were interested in conserving human life and were peace
chiefs. Should anyone feel sufficient spiritual vitality for getting up
a war party, he was permitted to do so, but he was decidedly re-
sponsible to the civil chief for failure.23
r '-
American war outside the areas of intense cultivation of maize,
Winnebago were interested in conserving human life and were peace chiefs. Should anyone feel sufficient spiritual vitality for getting up
then, was primitive war because the choice of the commander rested
upon reasons which seem whimsical and impermanent when tested
by the effectiveness of compelling the other-group to submit to the we-
group's will. Because a man has an idea of going to war and being
a captain is no sign that he is an able commander. We have people
like that today, and if they attempt to put their ideas into practice,
we lock them up in prisons or mental hospitals. A dream, too, may
be very pleasant if confined to bed, but not as a substitute for tactical
planning or a method of military promotion. To go to war under
a dreamer against an enemy who plans battles and chooses com-
manders by utilitarian means is suicidal.
The large forces of Africa were not only well organized but well
led. The weak leadership of the American Indian gave his land to
the white man without adequate struggle. In Africa this struggle
was often very real. Effective command backed by iron discipline
existed wherever the kingship or even a good strong chieftainship
arose, and this condition was typical of the continent.
The African kings rarely were field commanders themselves. Pro-
fessional generals often commanded as a matter of course, frequently
being responsible to the king for success even with their own lives, as
gouP's will. Because a man has an idea of going to war and being a captain is no sign that he is 'an able commander. We have people like that today, and if they attempt to put their ideas into practice, we lock them up in prisons or mental hospitals. A dream, too, may be very pleasant if confined to bed, but not as a substitute for tactical planning or a method of military promotion. To go to war under a dreamer against an enemy who plans battles and chooses commanders by utilitarian means is suicidal.
J / a war party, he was permitted to do so, but he was deCidedly re ..JJ . sponsible to the civil chief for failure. 23 I/, " . _AmeJ"can u ' e areas C?f inens culti a " aizjl, v e was .p.r.!.tiv war because the choice of th .c<?mandr rs i'" , . upon reasons_ hich seem whimsical and impJ!rmanen when tele.d . l>y tIie effectiveness of compelling the o\:4er-group io submil to ...the.. we-
.,- r
.-
."
21 Church, op. cit., p. 104.
22 Jean B. Bossu, Nouveaux Voyage mix Indes Occidentales (Paris: Lejay,
1768), I, pp. 89-94.
28 Radin, op. cit., p. 156.
r were not only well organized but well : The large forces of : led. ' The weak leadership f 'Uie AiiienCan "Iii dian gave- IllS' l'and to ... the white man without adequate. truggle. In Mrica this struggle was often very real. Eff(;)G e oommand backed by jron diSCipline fsted wherever the kingship or even a good strong chieftainship ,. arose, and this condition was typical of the continent.
'
,1he African kings rarely were field commanders> themselves. fessional generals often commanded ,as, a matte}: .0 course, frequently being responsible to the king for success even with their own lives, as 2 1 Church, CYp. cU" p. 104. 22 Jean B. Bossu, Nouveaux Voyage 28 Radin, CYp. cit., p. 156.
Indes Occldentalea
1768 ), I, pp. 89-94.
DUX
(Paris: LeJaYt
D ig llzed by
Ori g i n a l from U N IV ERSI TY O F MI C H IGA N
70
70 Primitive War in the lake region.24 In Dahomey the king went to war himself, but
Primitive War
In Dahomey . the
in the lake region. U
king went to war himseH, but

He sat on a low stool while The commander-in-chief This was to deceive
was ceremonially degraded at the outset of the campaign and theo-
was ceremonially degraded at the outset of the campaign and theo retically did none of the tactical direction. the field officers sat on the exalted seats.
retically did none of the tactical direction. He sat on a low stool while
the field officers sat on the exalted seats. The commander-in-chief
smoked in his presence and ordered him about. This was to deceive
the enemy gods as to the reality of the true head and divert their
anger from the king.
smoked in his presence and ordered him about. anger from the king.
The emergence of the command function is obscure for<
the enemy gods as to the reality of the true head and divert their _ o rnrn4 1l!.Dction is QQscWe for The emergence of the c Aside from the negnti ctrIDes -:-wno- were orare too sim ---.E!Y-Q!"nized _ lor any command at all. there seems to be w.i!k. Yariation.!, In the Jomons the character of the chief appears to have resembled the , with the strengthening of some coup-counting Great Plains di h element. If a man killed a large number of enemies, the eXisting chiefs decided to make him a chief ( tsunaum ) . A raid was made on an enemy village to bring back a live captive. The chiefs then cut the wretch and annointed the candidate for chieftainship with the blood. The prisoner then became food for a feast in front of the village's principle house. The child of the sister of such a coup chief was a chief from birth, so the rank was perpetuated in the family.25 .... Other Mela.s iIl "peQples-ha.d-1lhsolute chiefs, an d there could be no war unless the chiefs of the constituent villages agreed. This was also true of the Southern New Hebrides.26
Aside from the negritic triBes7who~were or are too simply organized.
Tor any command at all, there sflpms tr> h* wirto variation^ In the
Solomons the character of the chief appears to have resembled the
coup-counting Great Plains dignitary, with the strengthening of some
hereditary element. If a man lolled a large number of enemies, the
existing chiefs decided to make him a chief (tsunawn). A raid was
made on an enemy village to bring back a live captive. The chiefs
then cut the wretch and annointed the candidate for chieftainship
with the blood. The prisoner then became food for a feast in front
giiitafy
of the village's principle house. The child of the sister of such a coup-
chief was a chief from birth, so the rank was perpetuated in the
family.25 Other Melanesian peoples had absolute chiefs, and there
could be no war unless the chiefs of the constituent villages agreed.
This was also true of the Southern New Hebrides.26
Miss Powdermaker says that Lesu on New Ireland had two chiefs,
a clan head and a war chief. This latter was a rich man with strong
war magic. His position was inherited, but only weakly, as his own
preference for a successor or some applicant's personal ability were
taken into serious consideration.27 This marks the beginning of the
temporal lordship, but what an ineffective one! The pleonarchist
and hereditary elements would have cost them their lives if matched
against a military people. Melanesian paladins did hold war councils,
but one wonders what truly military matters were discussed? In the
Solomons they were held in the canoe house or club house, and one
suspects that their functions were magical and recreational as well
24 Sir Harry H. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate (London: Hutchinson,
1902) passim.
26 Beatrice Blackwood, Both Sides of Buka Passage (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), p. 47.
26 Humphreys, op. cit., p. 35.
27 Hortense Powdermaker, Life on Lesu (New York: W. W. Norton, 1933),
p. 41.
Miss Powdennaker says that Lesu on New Ireland had two chiefs, TitiSiatter was a rich man withstrong war magic. His position was inherited, but only weakly, as his own preference for a successor or some applicant's personal ability were taken into serious consideration.27 This marks the beginning of the temporal lordship, but what an ineffective one I The pleonarchist and hereditary elements would have cost them their lives if matched again st a military people. Melanesian paladins did hold war councils, but one wonders what truly military matters were discussed? In the Solomons they were held in the canoe house or club house, and one suspects that their functions were magical and recreational as well
a clan head and a war chief.
19(2 ) pasalm.
25
2 f Sir Harry H. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate ( London : Hutchinson, Beatrice Blackwood, Both Sides
cit.,
Press ) , p. 47.
of BUM Passage ( Oxford: Oxford University

LeIU ( New York : W. W. Norton,
26 Humphreys, op.
p. 35.
on
p. 41.
27 Hortense Powdennaker, Life
1933 ).
Di
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Discipline and Command 71 as of staff nature.2s Apparently little could be expected from such
71
a s of staff nature. 2 8 much in evidence.
war commands as in the Loyalties where emotional instability is so
war commands as in the Loyalties where emotional instability is so
Apparently little could b e expected from such
much in evidence. Shouting, frightful gestures, and screaming were
more important than discipline, order, and the subordination of the
individual.29
The speech-loving Polynesians had war councils and authoritative
chiefs, but in many cases these commanders could not overcome their
more important than discipline, order, and the subordination of the individual. 2 9 chiefs, but in many cases these commanders could not overcome their jealousy enough to have
a
Shouting, frightful gestures, and screaming were
jealousy enough to have a chief of party. War councils were com-
The speech.loving Polynesians had war councils and authoritative chief of party. War councils were com
posed of the heads of all families, each sitting in his appointed place.
When the proper time came each village was heard from through
one speaker only, chosen in order of precedence. Yet there was
often no central commander. Each head commanded his own kin
posed of the heads of all families, each sitting in his appointed place. one speaker only, chosen in order of precedence. only.
only. The older chiefs sat in council and determined the policy.30
The principle of plan seems to have been observed thereby, but the
When the proper time came each village was heard from through often no central commander. E ach head commanded his own kin Yet there was
weakness of not having a definite executive for the plan must have
caused much trouble.
We are well informed of the close-knit character of many Polynesian
societies. The war function improved tremendously among those
peoples who frankly admitted that their chief noble was too tabu to
The principle of plan seems to have been observed thereby, but the caused much trouble. societies . be
an
The older chiefs sat in council and determined the policy.3 0
be an effective commander and shifted the martial command to a war
lord, or had it shifted for them.
weakness of not having a definite executive for the plan must have We are well informed of the close-knit character of many Polynesian
Something like real leadership obtruded among the martial Man-
gaians. Buck cites more than one instance of true commanders exhib-
iting a very enviable military skill.31 One must remind himself that
the recent tendency is to think that the earlier reporters may have
overemphasized the chiefly character of Polynesian society in contrast
with that of Melanesia. It is certain that all Polynesians did not have
peoples who frankly admitted that their chief noble was too tabu to effective commander and shifted the martial command to a war lord, or had it shifted for them. gaians. Something like real leadership obtruded among the martial Man Buck cites more than one instance of true commanders exhib One must remind himself that
The war function improved tremendously among those
the tactical and command ability of the Mangaians, or of Kamaham-
eha I. It may have been that this truly military method diffused to
just a few island from some unknown place outside Polynesia.
Miss Meade tends to play down the importance of war for Samoan
Manua. She implies that the war myths were inspired by but few
and insignificant squabbles, that they had no real war gods, war
priests, or great respect for the warrior. They had professional spies
iting a very enviable military skill. 3 1
2s Florence Coombe, Islands of Enchantment (London: Macmillan, 1911),
the recent tendency is to think that the earlier reporters may have with that of Melanesia. eha I.
pp. 57f.
29 Emma Hadfield, Among Natives of the Loyalty Group (London: Mamillan,
overemphasized the chiefly character of Polynesian society in contrast the tactical and command ability of the Mangaians, or of Kamaham just a few island from some unknown place outside Polynesia. Manua. It is certain that all Polynesians did not have
1920), p. 169.
80 Brown, op. tit., p. 165.
31 Buck, op. tit., p. 161.
It may have been that this truly military method diffused to
Miss Meade tends to play down the importance of war for Samoan
priests, or great respect for the warrior.
and insignificant squabbles, that they had no real war gods, war They had professional spies
She implies that the war myths were inspired by but few
2 8 Florence Coombe, Islands of Enchantment ( London : Macmillan , 191 1 ) , pp. 57. 2 9 Emma Hadfield, Among Natives of the Loyalty Group ( London : Mamillan, 1920 ) , p. 169. 8 0 Brown, op. cit., p. 165 . 8 1 Buck, op. cit., p. 161.
D 9 ize b
72
72 Primitive War and scouts who sat in the town assembly, and they held war councils,
Primitive War
This would indicate that they were
and scouts who sat in the town assembly, and they held war councils, but there were no commanders.32 outside the stream of Polynesian military diffusion, for they would have lived but a short while if confronted by Polynesians inspired by the god Rongo or led by the Mangaian war-lord.
in battle.
but there were no commanders.32 This would indicate that they were
outside the stream of Polynesian military diffusion, for they would
have lived but a short while if confronted by Polynesians inspired by
the god Rongo or led by the Mangaian war-lord. No one has ever
been able to point to a success of a debating society over a commander
in battle. Remember the campaign against Gibeah.
No one has ever
A few theorists have tried to derive the field commander from the
been able to point to a success of a debating society over a commander Remember the campaign against Gibeah. A few theorists have tried to derive the field commander from the champion, the individual warrior of note who met his foe in Sohrab Rustum, David-Goliath fashion and compelled his followers to come to the field mainly to furnish a cheering section. This does seem to have some validity for Eurasia, but it breaks down so completely for the rest of the world that it may be dismissed as phantasy. ' The hangover from primitivity of many Eurasiatics is seen in the True, such stupidity is not persistence of the championship duel.
champion, the individual warrior of note who met his foe in Sohrab-
Rustum, David-Goliath fashion and compelled his followers to come
to the field mainly to furnish a cheering section. This does seem to
have some validity for Eurasia, but it breaks down so completely for
the rest of the world that it may be dismissed as phantasy.
The hangover from primitivity of many Eurasiarics is seen in the
persistence of the championship duel. True, such stupidity is not
reported in any amount for the warlike Germans and most Celts, but
the Aryans of India, the early Persians, and the Teutonic Viking cer-
tainly enjoyed it. Instead of this being a common practice of all
tribes all over the world, it is probably an integral part of the war
pattern of all the Aryans, and since so much of our tradition is de-
rived from these peoples, this led at least one writer to consider such
conduct a universal stage.
The duel of champions seems too idealized in Book I of the Hindu
epic of the Maha-Bharata, although it is obvious that the incident de-
reported in any amount for the warlike Germans and most Celts, but the Aryans of India, the early Persians, and the Teutonic Viking cer tainly enjoyed it. Instead of this being a common practice of all tribes all over the world, it is probably an integral part of the war pattern of all the Aryans, and since so much of our tradition is de rived from these peoples, this led at least one writer to consider such conduct a universal stage. The duel of champions seems too idealized in Book I of the Hindu epic of the
scribed was more of a tournament than a battle. On the other hand,
Books VIII, IX, and X were written to glorify individual combat be-
tween the two principals Indeed, the high light of the Maha-Bharata is
a duel with the retainers used only as spectators, as the chief incident
of the Iliad is the combat between Hector and Achilles. Book VII,
Drona-Badha (the Fall of Drona) tells of some good tactical war,
although its chief incident is the championship duel between the rebel
Brahman Drona and Salya, the Panchala king allied to the hero of the
book. In startling contrast is Book VI, Bhishma-Badha (the Fall of
Bhishma) which shows that during the time of the composition of
the Maha-Bharata (the Twelfth to Tenth Centuries, B. C), the Aryans
could abandon this childish exhibitionism and indulge in war with
Maha-Bharata, although it is obvious that the incident de

On the other hand,
8a Margaret Mead, Social Organization of Manila (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop
scribed was more of a tournament than a battle.
Museum, 1930), p. 168.
Books VIII, IX, and X were written to glorify individual combat be tween the two principals Indeed, the high light of the
Maha-Bharata is
Book VII,
a duel with the retainers used only as spectators, as the chief incident of the Iliad is the combat between Hector and Achilles.
Drona-Badha ( the Fall of Drona ) tells of some good tactical war,

although its chief incident is the championship duel between the rebel Brahman Drona and Salya, the Panchala king allied to the hero of the book. In startling contrast is Book VI,
Bhishma-Badha ( the Fall of
Bhishma ) which shows that during the time of the composition of the Maha-Bharata ( the Twelfth to Tenth Centuries, B. C. ) , the Aryans could abandon this childish exhibitionism and indulge in war with
8 2 Margaret Mead, Social Museum, 1 930 ) , p. 168.
Organization of Manua ( Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop
Di
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Discipline and Command 73 few if any primitive elements. This date antedates any such excel-
73
lence in Europe.88
few if any primitive elements. lence in Europe. 33
This date antedates any such excel One of
The championship duel is quite common in the Norse lays. One of
them relates how King Agantyr of the Goths offered to fight King
The
championship duel is quite common in the Norse lays .
Humli of the Huns who was overrunning the land.84 Humli could
them relates how King Agantyr of the Goths offered to fight King Humli of the Huns who was overrunning the land .34 not be bothered. Humli could
not be bothered.
The method certainly survived in Roman tradition long enough to
be written down. Dion Cassius describes such a duel in the struggle
for supreme power between the Albans and the early Romans. The
Albans and Romans fell into a wrangle about the sovereignty upon
the death of King Numa. They did not wish to slaughter each other
by a clash of armies, nor did they want the outcome of a single com-
bat to decide the issue. It happened that each side had a group of
triplet brothersmighty men at armsso a contest was arranged be-
tween them. The three Alban brothers very quickly killed two of the
Roman triplets, but the third was not content to stand and be valiantly
chopped down. He started running around for all he was worth,
making the Alban brothers pursue him, and thus separated them.
This enabled him to slay each one as he came up.85
Eurasia varied as much as America in the more practical part of
the command function. The authority varied directly with the rest
of social organization and cohesion, from the rudimentary kingships
of the Metal Age folk, through the fairly well-organized cattle and
horse nomads of Central Asia, to the simple democratic societies of
The method certainly survived in Roman tradition long enough to be written down. Dion Cassius describes such a duel in the struggle for supreme power between the Albans and the early Romans. The Albans and Romans fell into a wrangle about the sovereignty upon the death of King Numa. They did not wish to slaughter each other by a clash of armies, nor did they want the outcome of a single com bat to decide the issue. It happened that each side had a group of triplet brothers-mighty men at arms-so a contest was arranged be tween them. The three Alban brothers very quickly killed two of the Roman triplets, but the third was not content to stand and be valiantly chopped down . He started running around for all he was worth,
making the Alban brothers pursue him, and thus separated them. This enabled him to slay each one as he came U p. S 6 Eurasia varied as much as America in the more practical part of the command function. The authority varied directly with the rest of social organization and cohesion, from the rudimentary kingships of the M etal Age folk, through the fairly well-organized cattle and horse nomads of Central Asia, to the simple democratic societies of the reindeer Arctic. The response of the social pattern to war neces The Chuckchee wars with the Tannit sity is remarked by Bogoraz.
the reindeer Arctic. The response of the social pattern to war neces-
sity is remarked by Bogoraz. The Chuckchee wars with the Tannit
tended to develop the war chieftainship, but it did not go far and
ceased with the wars. The "conditions of Chuckchee life are too
simple for such an institution," but had the wars continued a strong
civil chieftainship might have prevailed.88
Miss Czaplicka reported a situation among the Chuckchee which
is from reminiscent to almost identical with that of the American Es-
88 Romesh C. Dutt, trans., The Mahabharata (London: Macmillan, 1899), i,
vi, vii, viii, ix, x.
84 Lee M. Hollander, ed. and trans., Old Norse Poems: The Most Important
Non-Skaldic Verse Not Included in the Poetic Edda (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1936), p. 44.
85 Cassius Dio, "Fragment of Zonoras," Roman History, iii. 6, 7.
tended to develop the war chieftainship, but it did not go far and ceased with the wars. The "conditions of Chuckchee life are too Simple for such an institution," but had the wars continued a strong civil chieftainship might have prevailed.s6 Miss Czaplicka reported a situation among the Chuckchee which is from reminiscent to almost identical with that of the American Es8 3 Romesh C. Dutt, trans., The Mahabharata ( London : Macmillan, 1899 ) , i,
vi, vii, viii, ix,
x.
89 Waldemar Bogoraz, "The ChuckcheeSocial Organization," American Mu-
seum of Natural History Memoirs (New York: 1904-1909), XI, Part 3, p. 647.
84 Lee M. Hollander, ed. and trans., Old Norse Poems: The Most Important Non-Skaldic Verse Not Included in the Poetic Edda ( New York : Columbia Uni versity Press, 1936 ) , p. 44. 86 Cassius Dio, "Fragment of Zonoras," Roman History, iii . 6, 7. 88 Waldemar Bogoraz, "The Chuckchee-Social Organization," American Mu ,eum of Natural History Memoirs ( New York : 1904-1909 ) , XI, Part 3, p. 647.
D 9 iz e b
74
74 Primitive War kimo town bully, who may or may not constitute a rudimentary war
Primitive War
leader. He was the war hero during the struggles with the Koryak,
Eskimo, and Cossacks but he did not develop much beyond the Es-
kimo level.37 Among the Siberian Yukaghir the strongmanship's mili-
tary importance was more clearly defined as real leadership. It was
the strong man's duty to lead his warriors in defense of the clan,
although he might not be a member of the consanguineous group
himself.3B
The Ainu culture of Northeast Asia and adjacent islands is very
poorly documented. From the available sources it seems that their
chiefs had some war authority but were held in check by a council
of elders. In strong contrast with other Siberian peoples, the Ostyak
chiefs and their families formed an aristocratic military caste whose
duty was to defend the tribe against foreign aggression. Like the
mediaeval knightly class they occupied themselves in peace times
with tournaments and hunting.39
The Siberian peoples illustrate the danger of too close a generaliza-
tion about culture areas. Undoubtedly every one of these tribes should
be heaped into one great Arctic culture area, but they seem to exhibit
almost every possible degree of war-chieftainship.
Tacitus points out the emergence of the commander from the cham-
pion among the Germans. German kings were chosen on the grounds
of birth, but generals were appointed for their courage and conspic-
uous behavior in the front line. Yet these generals could not com-
mand, but led by example and through the admiration of their follow-
ers.40 For the retainers to surpass the chief was his disgrace; to be
surpassed by him was theirs. To have survived one's chief in battle
brought infamy and shame. To defend him with one's own Me was
glory, the essence of allegiance. The chief fought to win the battle,
"but the retainers fought for the chief."41
To go a step higher in the authority of command, perhaps as high
as one can go, Caesar says that the common people of some tribes
were almost enslaved by the knightly aristocracy. These chiefs kept
the barbarians in perpetual uproar, and were ranked according to
37 Marie A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914),
pp. 25f.
ss Ibid., p. 38.
s9 Ibid., p. 69.
*0 Cornelius Tacitus, Germania, 7.
Ibid., 14.
kimo town bully, who may or may not constitute a rudimentary war leader. He was the war hero during the struggles with the Koryak, Eskimo, and Cossacks but he did not develop much beyond the Es kimo leveJ.37 Among the Siberian Yukaghir the strongmanship's mili tary importance was more clearly defined as real leadership. It was the strong man's duty to lead his warriors in defense of the clan, although he might not be a member of the consanguineous group himself.3s The Ainu culture of Northeast Asia and adjacent islands is very poorly documented. From the available sources it seems that their chiefs had some war authority but were held in check by a council of elders. In strong contrast with other Siberian peoples, the Ostyak chiefs and their families fonned an aristocratic military caste whose duty was to defend the tribe against foreign aggression. Like the mediaeval knightly class they occupied themselves in peace times with tournaments and hunting.39 The Siberian peoples illustrate the danger of too close a generaliza tion about culture areas. Undoubtedly every one of these tribes should be heaped into one great Arctic culture area, but they seem to exhibit almost every possible degree of war-chieftainship. Tacitus points out the emergence of the commander from the cham pion among the Gennans. German kings were chosen on the grounds of birth, but generals were appOinted for their courage and conspic uous behavior in the front line. Yet these generals could not com mand, but led by example and through the admiration of their follow ers.4 0 For the retainers to surpass the chief was his disgrace; to be surpassed by him was theirs. To have survived one's chief in battle brought infamy and shame. To defend him with one's own life was glory, the essence of allegiance. The chief fought to win the battle, "but the retainers fought for the chief."41 To go a step higher in the authority of command, perhaps as high as one can go, Caesar says that the common people of some tribes were almost enslaved by the knightly aristocracy. These chiefs kept the barbarians in perpetual uproar, and were ranked according to
8 7 Marie A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia ( Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1914 ) .
pp. 25f. 8 8 Ibid., p. 38. 8 9 Ibid., p. 69. 4 0 Cornelius Tacitus, Germania, 7. 41 Ibid., 14.

Discipline and Command 75 birth, wealth, and number of retainers. "This is the one form of in-
75
birth, wealth, and number of retainers. fluence and power known to them. "42
"This is the one form of in
fluence and power known to them."42
The command problem is by no means solved with the appointment
of one commander. In modern war even the smallest unit needs more
The command problem is by no means solved with the appointment of one commander. than one chief. In modem war even the smallest unit needs more
as
than one chief. Even in a squad, the smallest modern tactical unit
with its own permanent integrity, some man must be designated as
leader in event the sergeant becomes a casualty. Furthermore, in
Even in a squad, the smallest modem tactical unit Furthermore, in
working out the combat functions of even so small a unit, good team
with its own permanent integrity, some man must be designated leader in event the sergeant becomes a casualty.
work often requires that the men working at some distance from the
squad leader shall be supervised by someone. In large commands
the subordinate commander is even more indispensable. No human
can direct more than just so many other men; no master mind can
care for all details of supervision. A hierarchy of junior commanders
is essential. So likewise is some type of staff to care for details. It is
working out the combat functions of even so small a unit, good team work often requires that the men working at some distance from the squad leader shall be supervised by someone. In large commands the subordinate commander is even more indispensable. No human can direct more than just so many other men ; no master mind can care for all details of supervision. A hierarchy of junior commanders is essential. So likewise is some type of staff to care for details. It is necessary that there be another officer or officers to take the organiza tional details from the shoulders of the tactical or strategic commander and to act in his name. A mark of primitivity in war, as has been noted, is a weak command function . This being so, any elaboration of command into a hierarchy, or chain, or channel of command is hardly expectable, and the field literature shows that this is very poorly developed. tively un led America. The organization of command in an Omaha war party was thus : A young man seeking to organize an expedition with himself as com mander discussed the matter with a good friend. If this one approved, he became junior commander and the two set about enlisting others This does not mean that the hierarchy of command is entirely absent, even in rela
necessary that there be another officer or officers to take the organiza-
tional details from the shoulders of the tactical or strategic commander
and to act in his name.
A mark of primitivity in war, as has been noted, is a weak command
function. This being so, any elaboration of command into a hierarchy,
or chain, or channel of command is hardly expectable, and the field
Literature shows that this is very poorly developed. This does not
mean that the hierarchy of command is entirely absent, even in rela-
tively unled America.
The organization of command in an Omaha war party was thus:
A young man seeking to organize an expedition with himself as com-
mander discussed the matter with a good friend. If this one approved,
he became junior commander and the two set about enlisting others
in the banqueting fashion which will be discussed presently. The
proper fasting and feasting done, they slipped away in the night and
went against the enemy. The hierarchy of command was observed
by the two leaders insofar as they chose a lieutenant apiece. The
only staff functions were exercised by the commander's messengers,
who wore plumes and women's pack straps as insignia.43 This sort
of organization was common to the entire Plains and Plateau.
Some acumen was occasionally introduced into the bundle priest-
commander combination. The Osage, while considering the head
chief too sacred and too prayerful to direct operations, gave him eight
42 Caesar, op. cit., vi. 15.
43 James O. Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," Annual Report 15, Bureau of Amer-
ican Ethnology (Washington: 1881-1882), p. 318.
in the banqueting fashion which will be discussed presently. The proper fasting and feasting done, they slipped away in the night and went against the enemy. The hierarchy of command was observed by the two leaders insofar as they chose a lieutenant apiece. The only staff functions were exercised by the commander's messengers, who wore plumes and women's pack straps as insignia. 4 a This sort of organization was common to the entire Plains and Plateau.
Some acumen was occasionally introduced into the bundle priest commander combination . The Osage, while considering the head chief too sacred and too prayerful to direct operations, gave him eight
ican Ethnology ( Washington : 1881-1882 ) , p. 318.
4 2 Caesar, op. cit., vi. 15. 4 a James O. Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," Annual Report 1 5, Bureau of Amer
,
D 9 iz e b
76
76 Primitive War subordinates to take over the bother of directing a large party. Four
Primitive War
Four
of these were chosen from each moiety.44
of these were chosen from each moiety. U
subordinates to take over the bother of directing a large party.
The management of Wyandot military affairs resided in a military
council which consisted of a chief and all able-bodied men. The
The management of Wyandot military affairs resided in a military council which consisted of a chief and all able-bodied men . The war chief was chosen by the council from the Porcupine gens. There were usually several potential military chiefs in the gens who acted as companions and assistants to the war chief, and in case of his death, took over command in order of seniority. 5 Although the Choctaw were not a particularly well-disciplined group of warriors, their ideas of the hierarchy of command were strangely well developed. Each village had a civil chief and a war chief, the latter having two lieutenants and a staff functionary who attended to all military ceremonials. Below them all fighting men were formally ranked according to achievement.6 In the United States Army units large enough to have staffs divide the work into the following departments : the Executive and second in command, Chief of Staff, Administration, the Intelligence Section, the Operations and Training Section, and the Supply Section. The intelligence function will be discussed later, so will not be dealt with here.
war chief was chosen by the council from the Porcupine gens. There
were usually several potential military chiefs in the gens who acted as
companions and assistants to the war chief, and in case of his death,
took over command in order of seniority.45
Although the Choctaw were not a particularly well-disciplined
group of warriors, their ideas of the hierarchy of command were
strangely well developed. Each village had a civil chief and a war
chief, the latter having two lieutenants and a staff functionary who
attended to all military ceremonials. Below them all fighting men
were formally ranked according to achievement.46
In the United States Army units large enough to have staffs divide
the work into the following departments: the Executive and second
in command, Chief of Staff, Administration, the Intelligence Section,
the Operations and Training Section, and the Supply Section.
The intelligence function will be discussed later, so will not be dealt
with here.
An Ojihaay-leader, appointed four aides before setting out. Theirs
were what we call staff functions, since they superintended all prepa-
rations, including the requisite ceremonial. They arranged for camps
on the march. One carried the leader's pipe and another the
drum. Every party carried a supply of magical objects and ma-
terials for making moccasins. The leader himself furnished part
of the supplies. This is an important point which will be dis-
cussed separately in a few paragraphs. If a fight was expected,
the Ojibway prepared for the care of the wounded ahead of time.
Litters of poles were made for their transportation, as the hereditary
Siouan enemy always pursued, hoping to destroy some of the
wounded. An old man was appointed to carry extra medical supplies
and water. He took no part in the fight but ran to the aid of those
** Francis La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of Wa-xo-be, Annual Report 45,
were what we call staff functions, since they superintended all prepa rations, including the requisite ceremonial. They arranged for camps One carried the leader's pipe and another the on the march. drum. Every party carried a supply of magical objects and ma This is an important point which will be dis The leader himself furnished part If a fight was expected, terials for making moccasins. of the supplies.
An...Qjjbwp- leade ap-P0!nt_ fuULqe
before setting out. Theirs
Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1927-1928), p. 593.
48 J. W. Powell, "Wyandot Government," Annual Report 1, Bureau of American
Ethnology (Washington: 1879-1886), pp. 59ff.
48 Anonymous French Memoir, in John R. Swanton, Source Material for the
Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, Bulletin 103, Bureau of
cussed separately in a few paragraphs.
the Ojibway prepared for the care of the wounded ahead of time. Litters of poles were made for their transportation, as the hereditary Siouan enemy wounded. and water. always pursued, hoping to destroy some of the An old man was appointed to carry extra medical supplies He took no part in the fight but ran to the aid of those
U Francis La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of Wa-xo-be, Annual Report 45, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1927-1928 ) , p. 593 . 5 J. W. Powell, "Wyandot Government," Annual Report 1 , Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1879-1 886 ) , pp. 59f. U Anonymous French Memoir, in John R. Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, Bulletin 103, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1931 ) , p. 90.
D 9 iz e b

Discipline and Command 77 who needed him.47 This carefulness is consistent with the ability of
77
who needed him.4 7
This carefulness is consistent with the ability of It had
the Ojibway shown in later tactical discussion.
the Ojibway shown in later tactical discussion. Even a small Omaha party observed certain staff functions. whom he issued his orders. two war chiefs, each of whom had a lieutenant-adjutant through The chain of command was clear in a Obedience was obtained among These men kept order and Each warrior carried about
a
Even a small Omaha party observed certain staff functions. It had
two war chiefs, each of whom had a lieutenant-adjutant through
whom he issued his orders. The chain of command was clear in a
large party wherein the men were divided into units of twenties, each
with its subordinate commander. Obedience was obtained among
the Omaha by means of battle police. These men kept order and
large party wherein the men were divided into units of twenties, each with its subordinate commander. the Omaha by means of battle police. Hogged the laggard or disobedient.
flogged the laggard or disobedient. Each warrior carried about
fifteen pairs of moccasins, some sewing sinew, and a supply of parched
corn provided by the women.4s Note, again, this supply function.
The supply function, the moving of men and materials to the places
needed is so important that it is considered a separate branch of the
art of war. Logistics is considered almost as important today as are
fifteen pairs of moccasins, some sewing sinew, and
supply of parched
the other branches, Tactics and Strategy. There is no need to empha-
size the Napoleonic truism about fighting on one's stomach.
corn provided by the women.48 Note, again, this supply function.

The supply function, the movin g of men and materials to the places needed is so important that it is considered a separate branch of the art of war. Logistics is considered almost as important today as are the other branches, Tactics and Strategy. There is no need to empha size the Napoleonic truism about fighting on one's stomach. Lack of adequate supply is one sure mark of primitive war. Without food "wars" had to be short. Ordinarily they were confined to one battle. Consequently, campaigns were out of the question. Hence primitive man-killing ordinarily came to no real end, aside from the joy of slaughter. Because of lack of food as much as anything else, Nowhere was this inadequacy Neither was this It was simply a lack the status quo was rarely changed.
Lack of adequate supply is one sure mark of primitive war. Without
food "wars" had to be short. Ordinarily they were confined to one
battle. Consequently, campaigns were out of the question. Hence
primitive man-killing ordinarily came to no real end, aside from the
joy of slaughter. Because of lack of food as much as anything else,
the status quo was rarely changed. Nowhere was this inadequacy
more apparent than among the American Indians. Neither was this
lacuna necessary, except for the poorest people. It was simply a lack
of foresight, lack of planning and care, truly a mirror of real primitivity
in social practice.
Anthropology has commented on the American Indian's lack of
siege methods and wondered why this should be, since several tribes
erected fortifications. Some students cannot understand why such
works were not invested and reduced by siege, assault, or starvation.
The reader must see the reason immediately. It is true that the siege
was not part of Indian war. The assault was starved out before the
defense, which was living at home within its pallisaded village. This
more apparent than among the American Indians. lacuna necessary, except for the poorest people. in social practice.
genuine mark of primitivity in war ought to mystify no one.
The people who built forts generally supplied them with rations,
but was this in anticipation of siege or just for general food purposes?
of foresight, lack of planning and care, truly a mirror of real primitivity Anthropology has commented on the American Indian's lack of siege methods and wondered why this should be, since several tribes erected fortifications. Some students cannot understand why such It is true that the siege works were not invested and reduced by sie ge, assault, or starvation. The reader must see the reason immediately. was not part of Indian war. The assault was starved out before the defense, which was living at home within its pallisaded village . This genuine mark of primitivity in war ought to mystify no one. The people who built forts generally supplied them with rations, but was this in anticipation of Siege or just for general food purposes?
47 Frances Densmore, Chippewa Music, Bulletin 53, Bureau of American Eth-
nology (Washington: 1913), pp. 841.
*s Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," pp. 318-326.
47 Frances Densmore, Chippewa Music, Bulletin 53, Bureau of American Eth nology ( Washington : 1913 ) , pp. 84f. 48 Dorsey, "Omaha SOciology," pp. 318-326.
D 9 iz e b
78
78 Primitive War
Primitive War
Were they ever invested, or
Verendrye remarked that the Mandan fortified villages were very well supplied to endure investiture.4 9 was the food supply mentioned for this purpose? There is no reason to think that any enemy ever encompassed an Indian work with the intention of waging
a
1-- \ -.
Verendrye remarked that the Mandan fortified villages were very
well supplied to endure investiture.49 Were they ever invested, or
was the food supply mentioned for this purpose? There is no reason
to think that any enemy ever encompassed an Indian work with the
war of attrition. They reduced the supply function
intention of waging a war of attrition.
The gentle Papago of Arizona and Sonora were typical of the In-
The gentle Papago of Arizona and Sonora were typical of the In dian's treatment of field supplies. fo
a minimum, which is surprising among an agricultural people. They wished to travel light and literally lived off the country, carryin g only a little pinole individually. In the late afternoon the warriors
dian's treatment of field supplies. They reduced the supply function
to a minimum, which is surprising among an agricultural people.
They wished to travel light and literally lived off the country, carrying
only a little pinole individually. In the late afternoon the warriors
divided into groups and hunted for the evening meal. They had to
catch game with their bare hands, as the use of weapons on the war-
path for hunting was forbidden. They ate very poorly because they
divided into groups and hunted for the evening meal.
They had to
had to, but they uselessly decreased their fighting efficiency by eating
only raw meat "to make men fierce."60
The procurement of food and clothing in America was usually per-
catch game with their bare hands, as the use of weapons on the war path for hunting was forbidden. They ate very poorly because they had to, but they uselessly decreased their fighting efficiency by eating only raw meat "to make men fierce."IIO The procurement of food and clothing in America was usually per formed by women, and it was done poorly enough. The South American Indians of Bahia Blanca were even more Spar tan than the Papago. Each warrior hung a horse or cow lung full of This mess was to satisfy salt on his mount's mane before setting out.
formed by women, and it was done poorly enough.
The South American Indians of Bahia Blanca were even more Spar-
tan than the Papago. Each warrior hung a horse or cow lung full of
salt on his mount's mane before setting out. This mess was to satisfy
hunger on the long march.51
V^frjca^has a different story to tell. Sudanese men, for example, had
to work for grain, but work they did and grain they had. Econom-
ically successful Sudan chiefs could put really effective forces in the
field on the surplus, and soldiers always live on someone's surplus.
The presence of beasts of burden not only made food production
easier but simplified the supply functic^Lflfljbjearmies. Furthermore,
the long march.lI l Sudanese men, for example, had
the Sudan wars sometimes included Campaigning] and they sometimes
altered the status xpo.
r'
has a different story to tell.
Snelgrave said that he saw a Dahomean army of about three thou-
sand regulars accompanied by about ten thousand "rabble" to porter
the baggage, supplies, and captive heads. All this sounds very well
to work for , but work they did and grain they had. Econom ically successful Sudan chiefs could put really effective forces in the field on the surplus, and soldiers always live on someone's surplus. The presence of beasts of burden not only made food production easier but simplified the supply functioxul.l!h ..!l !mies . Furthermore, c Jhe Sun wars sometimes included ampaignin g : and th ey sometimeS' altered the status quo.
on the surface, but Burton reported that Dahomean supplies were
most inadequate and that even a victorious army returned home under
conditions of great privation. They even lacked adequate drinking
49 Chevalier de la Verendiye, Journal, Report on Canadian Archives 1889 (Ot-
tawa: 1890), p. 21.
50 Frances Densmore, Papago Music, Bulletin 90, Bureau of American Eth-
_ .
nology (Washington: 1929), p. 180.
Snelgrave said that he saw a Dahomean army of about three thou sand regulars accompanied by about ten thousand "rabble" to porter the baggage, supplies, and captive heads . All this sounds very well on the surface, but Burton reported that Dahomean supplies were most inadequate and that even a victorious army returned home under conditions of great privation. They even lacked adequate drinking 4 9 Chevalier de la Verendrye, Journal, Report on Canadian Archives 1889 ( Ot tawa : 1 890 ) , p. 2 1 . 11 0 Frances Densmore, Papago Music, Bulletin 90, Bureau of American Eth nology ( Washington : 1 929 ) , p. 180. II I Church, op. cit., p. 284.
Oi
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Discipline and Command 79 water. He estimated that they lost two hundred men for every hun-
79
dred slaves captured due to privation, starvation, and the filth occa-
water. He estimated that they lost hvo hundred men for every hun dred slaves captured due to privation, starvation, and the filth occa sioned by their military c:: e remonial uncleanliness. 52 could be forgiven the culturally retarded and socially simple Papago, but hardly the great totalitarian state of Dahomey. Zulu supply was somewhat better organized.
sioned by their military ceremonial uncleanliness.^2 Such ineptitude
Such ineptitude
could be forgiven the culturally retarded and socially simple Papago,
but hardly the great totalitarian state of Dahomey.
Zulu supply was somewhat better organized. A troop of girls car-
ried food and beer for the expedition until their burdens were ex-
hausted, whereupon they returned home. Male porters were provided
for the principal men, otherwise the troops carried their own supplies.
They were allowed to help themselves to food found in friendly vil-
lages en route providing they broke the cooking vessels they had used.
A herd of cattle was marched two miles on the flank both for food and
in hope that they would assist in finding the enemy cattle.53
for the principal men, otherwise the troops carried their own supplies. They were allowed to help themselves to food found in friendly vil
ried food and beer for the expedition until their burdens were ex hausted, whereupon they returned home. :Male porters were provided
A troop of girls car
The staff planning section was poorly developed. Lack of plan-
ning will be seen later as one of the things which kept primitive war
primitive. Several heads are better than one in making plans. In
lages en route providing they broke the cooking vessels they had used. A herd of cattle was marched two miles on the flank both for food and in hope that they would assist in finding the enemy cattle. 5 3 The staff planning section was poorly developed. Lack of plan ning will be seen later as one of the things which kept primitive war
the most primitive war no head at all was preferred. Not every tribe
was completely incompetent on this point, however. The Teton Da-
kota made plans in council, working out the problem on a skin map
or one drawn on the earth like a modern sand table problem. One
such map was left behind so that other parties could find the main
body when necessary.
pve.
The corollary of the plans section, the training section, rarely ex-
isted. Teaching youths and children to handle weapons was consid-
ered enough. Mature warriors were not trained, nor would they have I
Several heads are better than one in making plans. In the most primitive war no head at all was preferred. Not every tribe was completely incompetent on this point, however. The Teton Da
submitted to such instruction with its implication of their ignorance.
Those groups who did train their recruits were successful against
those who did not, as one would expect. The South African tribes,
for example, did not leave training to chance but started conditioning
kota made plans in council, working out the problem on a skin map or one drawn on the earth like a modern sand table problem . One such map was left behind so that other parties could find the main body when necessary. The corollary of the plans section, the training section, rarely ex-
the boys as soon as they had been enrolled into a regiment. They
had to live in temporary huts used normally only on a campaign,
which they had to build themselves under an induna's (regimental-
commander's) direction. They were sent on difficult missions to
gather kraal-building material. They took no food, having to live on
the country. They were drilled and daily taught how to run. They
isted. Teaching youths and children to handle weapons was consid ered enough. Mature warriors were not trained, nor would they have submitted to such instruction with its implication of their ignorance. those who did not, as one would expect. Those groups who did train their recruits were successful against The South Mrican tribes,
were taught arduous singing and dancing exercises which were
thought of as military drill. Rigid obedience was exacted.54
52 Burton, op. ctt., II, pp. 85f.
"3 Krige, op. cft., pp. 273f.
* Ibid., pp. 109f.
for example, did not leave training to chance but started conditioning the boys as soon as they had been enrolled into a regiment. had to live in temporary huts used normally only on a campai gn They
which they had to build themselves under an induna8 ( regimental commander's ) direction. They were sent on difficult missions to the country. gather kraal-building material. They were drilled and daily taught how to run. Rigid obedience was exacted. 5 4
They took no food, having to live on
were taught arduous singing and dancing exercises which were thought of as military drill.
52 Burton, op. cit., II, pp. 85. 53 Krige, op. cit., pp. 273f. 54
They
Ibid., pp. 109.
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80
80 Primitive War The classical writers are rather silent about troop training in old
Primitive War
Bogoraz says of the Chuckchee, however, that they and the
The classical writers are rather silent about troop training in old Eurasia. Yukaghir warriors voluntarily went through hard individual training : running with heavy weights, jumping, fencing with the spear, archery, dodging, and general nimbleness. tire spare time.1S 1S Such exercise occupied their en The ideal Chuckchee training fitted the warrior Observations of a similar kind
Eurasia. Bogoraz says of the Chuckchee, however, that they and the
Yukaghir warriors voluntarily went through hard individual training:
running with heavy weights, jumping, fencing with the spear, archery,
dodging, and general nimbleness. Such exercise occupied their en-
tire spare time.55 The ideal Chuckchee training fitted the warrior
adequately for the type of combat he was called upon to fight, the
mass duel and the duel of champions. Observations of a similar kind
could be made of the large amount of time devoted to sports among
adequately for the type of combat he was called upon to fight, the mass duel and the duel of champions . the American Indians. ing. Caesar says that the Suebi had a method of training not unlike the individualistic Chuckchee. They would tolerate no battle discipline or direction, but strove by exercise, proper feeding and fasting, going naked in winter, and bathing in streams to make each individual a physical giant.1S 6 But let us return to a more general discussion of the command organization. A rudimentary state such as Zululand could be expected The to organize its command hierarchy as well as its tactical units . could be made of the large amount of time devoted to sports among Informants maintain that athletics were prac ticed only secondarily for recreation and primarily for military train
the American Indians. Informants maintain that athletics were prac-
ticed only secondarily for recreation and primarily for military train-
ing.
Caesar says that the Suebi had a method of training not unlike the
individualistic Chuckchee. They would tolerate no battle discipline
or direction, but strove by exercise, proper feeding and fasting, going
naked in winter, and bathing in streams to make each individual a
physical giant.56
But let us return to a more general discussion of the command
organization. A rudimentary state such as Zululand could be expected
to organize its command hierarchy as well as its tactical units. The
Zulu, like the Israelites, waited until the harvest for kings to go forth
to war. The king summoned his councillors, usually the regimental
commanders, to advise him in deciding for war at the Feast of First-
Fruits, the opening of winter. Even the despotic Zulu king could not
act without his councillors' concurrence, but he could summon a new
and more pliable council if need be. The general council was a very
common phenomenon, and should have been the seed of a general
staff and a council of state. Apparently the Zulu were able to go
some little distance down that path.57
The actual .emergence of staff functions was backward in Africa,
but it is amazing that they are at all apparent. It is best observed
Zulu, like the Israelites, waited until the harvest for kings to go forth to war. The king summoned his councillors, usually the regimental commanders, to advise him ill deciding for war at the Feast of First Fruits, the opening of winter. Even the despotic Zulu king could not act without his councillors' concurrence, bu t he could summon a new
in the kingdom of Uganda.5s The neighboring Banyoro and Banyan-
kole developed it almost as well.59 In this the Zulu were not partic-
ularly efficient. Their supply functions were fair. They no doubt
85 Bogoraz, op. cit., p. 646.
56 Caesar, op. cit., iv. 1.
" Krige, op. cit., p. 267.
Rs Johnston, op. cit., passim.
and more pliable council if need be. The general council was a very common phenomenon, and should have been the seed of a general staff and a council of state. Apparently the Zulu were able to go some little distance down that path.1S7 The actual _emergence of staff functions was backward in Africa, but it is amazing that they are at all apparent. It is best observed in the kingdom of Uganda. 1S 8 The neighboring Banyoro and Banyan kole developed it almost as well. 59 In this the Zulu were not particularly efficient.
ISIS
59 John Roscoe, The Banyankole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1924), passim.
Their supply functions were fair.
They no doubt
1924 ) ,
Bogoraz, op . cit., p. 646. 1S 6 Caesar, op. cit., iv. 1 . 11 7 Krige, op. cit., p . 267. 11 8 Johnston, op. cit., passim. 119 John Roscoe, The Banyankole ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
passim.
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Discipline and Command 81 excelled in peace-time intelligence, and on this much of their success
81
hinged. Chaka maintained spies all over the region. He left nothing
to chance. The intelligence was reported to the whole aforemen-
tioned war council, but Chaka made and kept his own plans to him-
self, describing the mission to the commanding general only at the
moment of departure.60 Fnrmulating Wa,r plan<; in peace is a good
staff principle, but Chaka's distrust of his council and the general
officer commanding mirrors his own egoism and was, of course,
essentially stupid.
We have observed that no one man can command every element
of a large unit. The hierarchy of command is essential. Now in
Ashanti each local chief had a force of brave men. He took these into
excelled i n peace-time intelligence, and o n this much o f their success hinged. Chaka maintained spies all over the region. He left nothing to chance. The intelligence was reported to the whole aforemen tioned war council, but Chaka made and kept his own plans to him self, describing the mission to the commanding general only at the moment of departure.6o Formulating waL in peace is a good staff principle, but Chaka's distrust of his council and the general officer commanding mirrors his own egoism and was, of course, essentially stupid.
the field in the king's service when called upon, he himself falling
into the capacity of a subordinate leader. The commander-in-chief
marched in the rear of the host surrounded by his guard. This guard
also acted as military police, chopping down anyone who broke the
march order.61 Observe that the Dahomean and Ashanti commanders
were not the kings but were royal appointees. This was also true
of the kingdoms of the Kitwara Empire of the Great Lakes region.
The king of Uganda expected his general to win. If he lost a cam-
paign, he was liable to the king for his life.62
The Zulu Dingiswayo shaped his regiments according to recogniz-
able tables of organization with a real chain of command. At the
head of each regiment he placed a colonel, or induna. Though only
the king could send a regiment into national war, the induna could
put down local disturbances on his own recognizance, could see that
every fit male in his district rendered adequate annual service, from
two to three months, and had the power of life and death over his sol-
diers. Chaka's successor, Dingane, limited the power of death to
three chief indunas. Only the indurta could keep his wives with him.
Ranking below him was a second in command. Below him were the
commanders of the two wings, or battalions. Below him were com-
pany (amaviyo) commanders, assisted by from one to three junior
officers.68
The hierarchy of command was seerningly-unknown to-the btdk of
Eufastattc warriors. This was not because the better tribes could not
o Dudley Kidd, The Essential Kaffir (London: Macmillan, 1904), pp. 302f.
81 Robert S. Rattray, Ashanti (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), passim.
82 Johnston, op. cit., passim.
88 Krige, op. cit., p. 265.
We have observed that no one man can command every element of a large unit. The hierarchy of command is ess ential . Now in Ashanti each local chief had a force of brave men. He took these into the field in the king's service when called upon, he himself falling into the capacity of a subordinate leader. The commander-ill -chief marched in the re ar of the host surrounded by his guard. This guard also acted as military police, chopping down anyone who broke the march order.61 Observe that the Dahomean and Ashanti commanders were not the kings but were royal appointees. This was also true o f the kingdoms of the Kitwara Empire o f the Great Lakes region. The king of Uganda expected his general to win . If he lost a cam paign, he was liable to the king for his life.82 The Zulu Dingiswayo shaped his regiments according to recogniz able tables of organization with a real chain of command. At the head of each regiment he placed a colonel, or induna. Though only the king could send a regiment into national war, the induna could put down local disturbances on h i s own recognizance, could see that every fit- male in his district rendered adequate annual service, from two to three months, and had the power of life and death over his sol diers. Chaka's successor, Dingane, limited the power of death to three chief indunas. Only the induna could keep his wives with him. Ranking below him was a second in command. Below him were the commanders of the two wings, or battalions. Below him were com pany ( amaviyo ) commanders, assisted by from one to three junior officers. 6 3 The hierarchy of command was seemingly--unJmown- -to- the btrlk of -Wamois. This was not because th e better tribes could not
-- - ...
80 Dudley Kidd, The Essential KnUir ( London: Macmillan, 1904 ) , pp. 302f. 8 1 Robert S. Rattray, Ashanti ( Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1923 ) , passi m. 82 Johnston, op. dt., passim.
83
Krige, op. de., p. 265.
D 9 iz e b
82
82 Primitive War bring enough men to the field to make the subdivision of command
Primitive War
The apparent reason was that they could not develop or bor It ran cross-grain to their pattern. Remember that The
bring enough men to the field to make the subd ivision of command useful. row the idea.
useful. The apparent reason was that they could not develop or bor-
row the idea. It ran cross-grain to their pattern. Remember that
this was the great defect in the so-called Age of Chivalry, practiced
by these Teutonic barbarians with a gilding of civilization. The
this was the great defect in the so-called Age of Chivalry, practiced by these Teutonic barbarians with a gilding of civilization. Byzantine Emperor Leo the 'Vise showed that the Teutons were in capable of really superior warfare despite their several centuries of historic contact with the best of the Greeks and the Romans. Years after the fall of the Western Empire and after the barbarians had been blessed with centuries of his toric existence, the great Byzantine general and one of the last Roman emperors, spoke worse of them than did Caesar, the first of the imperial list. 64 M arco Polo is often suspected of being a monstrous liar, yet the tradition of the conquest of Russia by the Tartars he described sub stantiates him; the fact of that conquest is real enough. Polo con ceived a Tartar army to be one hundred thousand horse. There was an officer over every ten men, another over every hundred, another over every thousand, and one over every ten thousand. The prince, therefore, gave his orders to ten men only, and expected them to How down to each human by a clear-cut channel of command and responsi bility.6 5 This decimal channel of command might be s imple but it is not primitive. From this fact alone, if fact it be, one can see why nothing or no one could stand in face of the Tartar horde. The concept of superordination and command contains that of sub ordination and discipline. A social group endeavoring to accomplish Some must be mus some purpose must work like the body of a man. and command.
Byzantine Emperor Leo the Wise showed that the Teutons were in-
capable of really superior warfare despite their several centuries of
historic contact with the best of the Greeks and the Romans. Years
after the fall of the Western Empire and after the barbarians had
been blessed with centuries of historic existence, the great Byzantine
general and one of the last Roman emperors, spoke worse of them
than did Caesar, the first of the imperial list.64
Marco Polo is often suspected of being a monstrous liar, yet the
tradition of the conquest of Russia by the Tartars he described sub-
stantiates him; the fact of that conquest is real enough. Polo con-
ceived a Tartar army to be one hundred thousand horse. There was
an officer over every ten men, another over every hundred, another
over every thousand, and one over every ten thousand. The prince,
therefore, gave his orders to ten men only, and expected them to flow
down to each human by a clear-cut channel of command and responsi-
bility.65 This decimal channel of command might be simple but it is
not primitive. From this fact alone, if fact it be, one can see why
nothing or no one could stand in face of the Tartar horde.
The concept of superordination and command contains that of sub-
ordination and discipline. A social group endeavoring to accomplish
some purpose must work like the body of a man. Some must be mus-
cles and nerves; others must, like the higher nerve centers, coordinate
and command. No one with a social-science attitude will need to
have this viewpoint expanded for him. I have spoken to many old
Indian warriors who would admit that their reason for defeat at the
hands of white troops was their lack of discipline. And all effective
discipline is self-discipline.
Civilized behavior, pacific or martial, requires this virtue. The prim-
itive warrior remained primitive largely because he refused to submit
to discipline. The Eighteenth Century doctrine that discipline is "the
art of making soldiers fear their officers more than the enemy" is non-
sense. Good civilized troops, whether Sumerian or Saracen, Chaldean
or Canadian, will carry on the battle even after their officers and non-
cles and nerves; others must, like the higher nerve centers, coordinate No one with a social-science attitude will need to have this viewpoint expanded for him. I have spoken to many old And all effective
64 Leo the Wise, in Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright, op. cit., p. 291.
65 Marco Polo, The Book, H. Yules, trans. (London: 1903), p. 261.
Indian warriors who would admit that their reason for defeat at the hands of white troops was their lack of discipline. discipline is self-discipline. Civilized behavior, pacific or martial, requires this virtue. The prim itive warrior remained primitive largely because he refused to submit to discipline. sense.
or
art of making soldiers fear their officers more than the enemy" is non
Canadian, will carry on the battIe even after their officers and nonGood civilized troops, whether Sumerian or Saracen, Chaldean
The Eighteenth Century doctrine that discipline is "the
6 . Leo the Wise, in S p aulding, Nickerson, and Wright, op. cit., p . 291 . 6 5 Marco Polo, The Book, H. Yules, trans. ( London : 1903 ) , p . 261.
D ig ize
Ori g i n a l fro m
U N I VE R S ITV O F CAL I FORN IA

Discipline and Command 83 commissioned officers are killed. This does not affirm that punishment
83
But
commissioned officers are killed .
This does not affirm that punishment
is always unnecessary, for in what walk of life is it not found? But
is always unnecessary, for in what walk of life is it not found? officer, not the lash.
good discipline means the willing cooperation of the soldier with the
officer, not the lash.
good discipline means the willing cooperation of the soldier with the Nonliterate Africa was not primitive in this feature. It maintained \ a troop discipline which not even the best organized American groups could have understood. The responsibility of the Baganda general . to his king even to the point of execution is a case in point. To be : sure, the harshest discipline known on that continent was that of the later Zulu and their pupils, so needlessly harsh that one suspects delib- . erate cruelty if not sadism. The Zulu kings had no use for the humanitarian United States Ann y doctrine that good discipline comes from within the soldier. preferred the old Prussian doctrine. Zulu They Even so, the high esp rit of the
Nonliterate Africa was not primitive in this feature. It maintained
a troop discipline which not even the best organized American groups
could have understood. The responsibility of the Baganda general
to his king even to the point of execution is a case in point. To be
sure, the harshest discipline known on that continent was that of the
later Zulu and their pupils, so needlessly harsh that one suspects delib-
erate cruelty if not sadism.
The Zulu kings had no use for the humanitarian United States Army
doctrine that good discipline comes from within the soldier. They
preferred the old Prussian doctrine. Even so, the high esprit of the
Zulu impis showed that even this unquestioned obedience did come
from within; they suffered Chaka's tyrannies gladly. Chaka said that
all cowards must die, and the officers designated some persons as
cowards after each battle whether there had been any or not. King
Chaka understood the system of rewards and punishments. While his
punishments were stern, his rewards for the valiant were lavish.
As Ferguson has pointed out, the Zulu paralleled the Spartans re-
markably.66 The Spartan soldier dared not return without his shield;
impis
showed that even this unquestioned obedience did come Chaka said that King
the Zulu soldier who returned without his assegai was killed. The
from within ; they suffered Chaka's tyrannies gladly.
king hardened his men by making no provision for the return march.
Troops who retreated or who were defeated were killed en masse by
all cowards must die, and the officers designated some persons as cowards after each battle whether there had been any or not. Chaka understood the system of rewards and punishments. punishments were stern, his rewards for the valiant were lavish.
As Ferguson has pointed out, the Zulu paralleled the Spartans re
some veteran regiment. Old men were put out of the way. Soldiers
were taught from youth to bear pain without flinching. Units or indi-
While his
viduals were taught to obey unthinkingly and without delay, even
to tackling a lion unarmed and alone. To test loyalty the soldier was',
sometimes ordered to kill his son or brother. \
Would it be unkindness to ask what would have happened to any
American Indian group four thousand strong confronted by a Zulu
markably. 66
impi of a thousand strength? Had one been at the Little Big Horn,
The Spartan soldier dared not return without his shield ; the Zulu soldier who returned without his assegai was killed. The
commanded by a veteran induna, armed as well as Ouster's men,
would it have lost its standards and collective life? What would an
American group, red or white, have thought of a commander who
king hardened his men by making no provision for the return march . Troops who retreated or who were defeated were killed en masse by some veteran regiment. Old men were put out of the way. Soldiers were taught from youth to bear pain without flinching. to tackling a lion unarmed and alone. Units or indi
66 W. S. Ferguson, "The Zulus and the Spartans: A Comparison of their Mili-
tary Systems," Harvard African Studies, Varia Africana II (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1918), II, passim.
viduals were taught to obey unthinkingly and without delay, even To test loyalty the soldier was sometimes ordered to kill his son or brother. Would it be unkindness to ask what would have happened to any American Indian group four thousand strong confronted by a Zulu impi of a thousand strength? Had one been at the Little Big Horn, commanded by a veteran What would an American group, red or white, have thought of a commander who
tary Systems,"
S. Ferguson, "The Zulus and the Sp artans : A Comp arison of their Mili Haroard African Studies, Varia Africana II ( Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1918 ) , II, passim.
would it have lost its standards and collective life?
induna,
armed as well as Custer's men,
66 W.
D ig ize
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84
84 Primitive War
Primitive War
wished to test the merits of two rival weapons by ordering a fight
wished to test the merits of two rival weapons by ordering a fight wherein lives were lost? 67 The neighboring south Bantu tribes might not have been as severe as the Zulu in the punishment of unsuccessful regiments but they were as harsh as need be. the Nondwane in \Vhen the Maputju
wherein lives were lost?67
The neighboring south Bantu tribes might not have been as severe
as the Zulu in the punishment of unsuccessful regiments but they were
as harsh as need be. When the Maputju yimpis were decimated by
the Nondwane in 1876, their chief ordered the survivors back to battle.
When they refused, he ordered them to fetch water like women, only
on their knees, crying, "It is the result of our cowardice." Afterward
he ordered them to put out a brush fire with their bare hands.6s
\Vhen they refused, he ordered them to fetch water like women, only Mterward ,he ordered them to put out a brush fire with their bare hands . 68 In west Africa, all the authorities on Dahomey emphasize the sever . common for minor military offenses. GO ity of the discipline. Burton says that almost fatal floggings were Skertchly said that each sol on their knees, crying, " It is the result of our cowardice."
1876, their chief ordered the
yimpis
were decimated by
survivors back to battle.
In west Africa, all the authorities on Dahomey emphasize the sever-
ity of the discipline. Burton says that almost fatal floggings were
common for minor military offenses.69 Skertchly said that each sol-
dier could expect the utmost in punishment if he did not bring back
,an enemy head to the king.70
Much more wholesome was the condition of the Germanic Chatti.
German discipline on the whole was not too well praised by its Roman
foes. While one telling test must be cited against the Romans for
being unable to penetrate the Rhine frontier, yet it must be said that
the Germans generally wore the Romans down far from their bases
dier could expect the utmost in punishment if he did not bring back , an enemy head to the king.7 0 Much more wholesome was the condition of the Germanic Chatti. German discipline on the whole was not too well praised by its Roman foes. \Vhile one telling test must be cited against the Romans for being unable to penetrate the Rhine frontier, yet it must be said that the Germans generally wore the Romans down far from their bases by a nuisance technique rather than defeat in the field. ancestors of the modern Hessians :
They elect magistrates and listen to the man elected ; know their place in the ranks and recognize opportunities ; reserve their attack ; have time for everything; entrench at night; distrust luck, but rely on courage ; and-rarest thing of all, which only Roman discipline has been permitted to attain-depend on the initiative of the general rather than on that of the soldier. Their whole strength lies in the infantry, whom they load with iron tools and baggage, in addition to their anns : other Germans may be seen going to battle, but the Chatti go to war. Forays and casual fighting are rare with them ; the latter no doubt is part of the strength of cavalry-to win suddenly, that is, and as suddenly to retire ; for the speed of cavalry is near allied to panic, but the deliberate of infantry is more likely to be resolute . 7 1
by a nuisance technique rather than defeat in the field. In contrast,
Tacitus loudly praises the Chatti, who may or may not have been the
ancestors of the modern Hessians:
They elect magistrates and listen to the man elected; know their
place in the ranks and recognize opportunities; reserve their attack; have
time for everything; entrench at night; distrust luck, but rely on courage;
andrarest thing of all, which only Roman discipline has been permitted
to attaindepend on the initiative of the general rather than on that of
In contrast,
the soldier. Their whole strength lies in the infantry, whom they load
with iron tools and baggage, in addition to their arms: other Germans
Tacitus loudly praises the Chatti, who may or may not have been the
may be seen going to battle, but the Chatti go to war. Forays and
casual fighting are rare with them; the latter no doubt is part of the
strength of cavalryto win suddenly, that is, and as suddenly to retire;
for the speed of cavalry is near allied to panic, but the deliberate action
of infantry is more likely to be resolute.71
It makes no difference whether or not the Chatti tattooed them-
selves or indulged in any other primitive trait. If Tacitus is not
Kidd, op. cit., p. 290.
6s Junod, op. cit., p. 475.
69 Burton, op. cit., p. 42.
7O Melville J. Herskovits, Dahomey (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1938), II,
Tacitus, op. cit., 30.
p. 84.
action
I t makes n o difference whether or not the Chatti tattooed themselves or indulged in any other primitive trait. If Tacitus is not
6 7 Kidd, op . cit., p. 290. 68 Junod, op. cit., p. 475. 6 9 Burton, op. cit., p. 42. 70 Melville J. Herskovits, Dahomey ( New York : J.
p. 84. 7 1 Tacitus, op. cit., 30.
J. Augustin, 1938 ) , II,
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U N I VE R S ITY O F C L l FORN IA

Discipline and Command 85 stretching the truth, they had achieved the military horizon. This
85
passage is perhaps the most ringing praise ever written by a civilized
man about nonliterate warriors. Had the Britons or the American
Indians "gone to war" rather than to battle, how different history
might have beenl
Nothing could be more important to a fighting group than "how
Grant got his army." Who shall be the fighters, who shall stay at
home, how shall the fighting men be enlisted, are the paramount
questions of socio-military organization. It is in the militia character
of the fighters among most tribes that we see another characteristic
of primitive war. The following statement might be taken as a type
example for all nonliterate folk until, under some inspiration, they
achieve civilized war practices.
Like most Indian tribes of North America, the Menomini did not carry
on their campaigns after the manner of nations of the Old World. A
standing army was unknown, but a sort of militia existed, for every man
above the age of puberty was a potential warrior. In his earliest youth
every male looked forward to the day when he could take his place
stretching the truth, they had achieved the military horizon. This passage is perhaps the most ringing praise ever written by a civilized man about nonliterate warriors. Had the Britons or the American Indians "gone to war" rather than to battle, how different history might have been ! Nothing could be more important to a fighting group than "how Grant got his anny. " Who shall be the fighters, who shall stay at home, how shall the fighting men be nlisted, are the paramount questions of socio-military organization . It is in the militia character of the fighters among most tribes that we see another characteristic of primitive war. The following statement might be taken as a type example for all nonliterate folk until, under some inspiration, they achieve civilized war practices.
on their campaigns after the manner of nations of the Old \Vorld. Like most Indian tribes of North America, the Menomini did not carry
among the fighting men, and devoted much of his spare time to acquir-
ing dexterity in the use of weapons, and endurance on the warpath.72
But let no one think that this primitive militia constituted an obliga-
tory levee en masse. It was characteristic of primitive fighters that if
standing army was unknown, but a sort of militia existed, for every man every m ale looked forward to lhe day when he could take his pl ace ing dexterity in the use of weapons, and endurance on the warpath. 7 2 above the age of puberty was a potential warrior.
a warrior did not choose to go to war, at least offensively, he did not
In h is earliest youth
have to. Like Achilles of old, he could sulk in his tent and no one
had the authority to compel him to enter the campaign. Some kind
of a party, banquet, or dance was common in America, whereat either
among the fighting men, and devoted much of his spare time to acquir
the chief or some private party requested recruits. Recall the common
American practice of permitting any private individual to organize a
party against the traditional foe without waiting for public action.
This is not denying the existence of publicly levied parties, for they
did exist among the better organized groups. For example, the Teton
tolerated private parties enlisted by self-appointed chiefs who re-
cruited by sending gifts of tobacco to able warriors, but they also
could make war as a tribe.78
Even the fairly well-organized Omaha society tolerated these pri-
vately organized aggressive parties, permitting an individual to invite
the owner of a war bundle to a feast whereat volunteers were re-
Indians, p. 97.
73 Frances Densmore, Yuman and Yaqui Music, Bulletin 110, Bureau of
But let no one think that this primitive militia constituted an obliga tory levee en masse. It was characteristic of primitive fighters that if a warrior did not choose to go to war, at least offensively, he did not have to. Like Achilles of old, he could sulk in his tent and no one had the authority to compel him to enter the campaign. Some kind of a party, banquet, or dance was common in America, whereat either the chief or some private party requested recruits. Recall the common American practice of permitting any private individual to organize a party against the traditional foe without waiting for public action. This is not denying the existence of publicly levied parties, for they did exist among the better organized groups . For example, the Teton tolerated private parties enlisted by self-appointed chiefs who re cruited by sending gifts of tobacco to able warriors, but they also could make war as a tribe. 7 3 Even the fairly well-organized Omaha society tolerated these pri vately organized aggressive parties, pennitting an individual to invite the owner of a war bundle to a feast whereat volunteers were re72 Alanson B. Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini p. 97. 7 3 Frances Densmore, Yuman and Yaqui Music, Bulletin l lO, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1 923 ) , p. 144.
Indians,
Di
iz e
86
86 Primitive War quested. When a Pima chief thought there was a chance to wreak
Primitive War
When a Pima chief thought there was a chance to wreak
an
quested.
revenge on the Apache, he issued an invitation to a meal, during
which he besought the guests to enlist. He could exert no authority
revenge on the Apache, he issued
invitation to a meal, during He could exert no authority
to compel them to do so.74 When the warriors of one west Eskimo
which he besought the guests to enlist.
village wished to go to war, they sent a singer to the friendly villages
to compel them to do SO. 7 4
When the warriors of one west Eskimo One would expect better things
to sing a song about their wrongs.75 One would expect better things
of the Southeast United States tribes, but Hewat says that a Creek
village wished to go to war, they sent a singer to the friendly villages to sing a song about their wrongsYi of the Southeast United States tribes, but Hewat says that a Creek
if the campaign had been ordered by the chief and council.
warrior might refuse to join a war party or might desert at will, even
if the campaign had been ordered by the chief and council. Only his
own desire for prestige and fear of public censure kept him in line,
but these were very strong.76
warrior might refuse to join a war party or might desert at will, even Only his
A new note is hereby introduced. Desire for prestige and social
pressure may serve almost as effectively as positive punishment for
failure to enlist for chief and country. This will be discussed at length
later. But for the time being, let us observe the enlistment practices
of the Indians of Surinam. Whenever the head of the community
..., own desire for prestige and fear of public censure kept him in line, but these were very strong. 76
A new note is hereby introduced.
wished to go to war, he saw that the guests were in a favorable state
Desire for prestige and social
and all somewhat intoxicated with "Dutch courage"; he had an old
woman come into the circle and expound the tribe's wrongs at the
hands of the Arawak. People felt ashamed not to volunteer in such
pressure may serve almost as effectively as positive punishment for failure to enlist for chief and country. This will be discussed at length later. But for the time being, let us observe the enlistment practices of the Indians of Surinam. Whenever the head of the community wished to go to war, he saw that the guests were in a favorable state and all somewhat intoxicated with "Dutch courage"; he had an old woman come into the circle and expound the tribe's wrongs at the hands of the Arawak. People felt ashamed not to volunteer in such Everyone
a situation. The tribe was then put on a war footing. Everyone
responded to the drums and to signals left on the principal paths. An
emisary was sent to all friendly villages without saying a word but
indicating by a sign that the "nation" was at war.77
The young Plains recruit had to be hard driven by his desire for
prestige to enlist, for all sorts of hazing awaited him on the warpath.
The older Crow warriors considered him fit for any type of humil-
iating practical joke. Further east his lot was hardly better. The
Ojibway treated beginners as animals. They had to camp apart,
sleeping in the rudest of shelters, and eating hardly enough to keep
a situation.
The tribe was then put on a war footing.
them alive. A series of irritating tabus was likewise laid upon them.7s
7* Frank Russell, "The Pima Indians," Annual Report 26, Bureau of American
Nelson, Edward W., "The Eskimo About Bering Strait," Annual Report 18,
responded to the drums and to signals left on the principal paths. An emisary was sent to all friendly villages without saying a word but indicating by a sign that the "nation" was at war.7 7 The young Plains recruit had to be hard driven by his desire for prestige to enlist, for all sorts of hazing awaited him on the warpath. The older Crow warriors considered him fit for any type of humil iating practical joke. Further east his lot was hardly better. The Ojibway treated beginners as animals. them alive. They had to camp apart,
Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1896-1897), Part I, p. 327.
76 Hewat, in John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their
Neighbors, Bulletin 73, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1922),
p. 77.
Roth, op. cit., p. 579.
7s Densmore, Chippewa Music, p. 144.
sleeping in the rudest of shelters, and eating hardly enough to keep A series of irritating tabus was likewise laid upon them.78
74 Frank Russell, "The Pima Indians," Annual Report 26, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1904- 1905 ) , p. 202. 711 Nelson, Edward W., "The Eskimo About Bering Strait," Annual Report 1 8, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1 896-1897 ) , Part I, p. 327. 76 Hewat, in John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians a nd Their Neighbors, Bulletin 73, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1922 ) , p. 77. 77 Roth, op. cit., p. 579. 78 Densmore, Chippewa Music, p. 144.
D ig ize
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Discipline and Command 87 Primitive war properly designated, then, was fought by a militia
87
Primitive war properly designated, then, was fought by a militia of manpower of the group. Perhaps the term militia should not be used, because the problem as to whether or not to join a war party was so often left to the individual himself. He would not be forced. The existence of some military caste or class which is permanently on a war footing was one of the avenues out of primitivity. The Plains soldier societies constituted one of the methods by which mod ernity might have been reached through professionalism. A similar rudimentary military establishment or standing army existed in those secret societies of Melanesia and sub-Saharan Mrica which had a military bias . The employment of some age class, such as the Lion Soldiers of the Masai, is a step beyond this. The ability to choose to go into the field or not is certainly a mark of primitive war. More primitive still, and probably more disastrous, was the fact that in truly primitive war the soldier could leave the campaign whenever he saw fit. in he was in for duration. Among many of the people cited, a man was permitted to join the party on his own free will, but once Nevertheless, the greater majority of them Even a chief could were like the Choctaw among whom it was no disgrace to desert providing one could cite an unfavorable dream. return a whole party to his village on the basis of a bad dream.79 With all due regard for the value of the magico-religious in primitive " or civilized societies, behavior of this type could lead to nothing but defeat for a tribe unless it was fighting against people with similar attitudes. A good stiff jolt of punishment should have directed dream ing into disciplined channels. The fighting of nonliterate societies. then, can often be calle d primi tive because of its ineffective or defective recruiting technique. This There are indeed few links which run through the whole of American Indian societies, but one of them is certainly compounded of the vol unteer militia, the constant banqueting and feasting, the reliance on ceremonial, the power of those too proud to fight to stay away, or those too scared to fight to run away without penalty. The private organization of a dinner party with RSVPs regarding attendance does not fit into an adequate war pattern. Many Mrican chieftains already had the basis for their troop organi zation and mobilization in the formalized age-groups. Thus, when 7 9 Bossu, in Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, p. 163. '
of manpower of the group. Perhaps the term militia should not be
used, because the problem as to whether or not to join a war party
was so often left to the individual himself. He would not be forced.
The existence of some military caste or class which is permanently
on a war footing was one of the avenues out of primitivity. The
Plains soldier societies constituted one of the methods by which mod-
ernity might have been reached through professionalism. A similar
rudimentary military establishment or standing army existed in those
secret societies of Melanesia and sub-Saharan Africa which had a
military bias. The employment of some age class, such as the Lion
Soldiers of the Masai, is a step beyond this.
The ability to choose to go into the field or not is certainly a mark
of primitive war. More primitive still, and probably more disastrous,
was the fact that in truly primitive war the soldier could leave the
campaign whenever he saw fit. Among many of the people cited, a
man was permitted to join the party on his own free will, but once
in he was in for duration. Nevertheless, the greater majority of them
were like the Choctaw among whom it was no disgrace to desert
providing one could cite an unfavorable dream. Even a chief could
return a whole party to his village on the basis of a bad dream.79
With all due regard for the value of the magico-religious in primitive
or civilized societies, behavior of this type could lead to nothing but
defeat for a tribe unless it was fighting against people with similar
attitudes. A good stiff jolt of punishment should have directed dream-
ing into disciplined channels.
The fighting of nonliterate societies, then, can often be called primi-
tive because 6T its ineffective or defective recruiting technique. This
is inherent in the lack of authority to compel men to take the field.
There are indeed few links which run through the whole of American
Indian societies, but one of them is certainly compounded of the vol-
unteer militia, the constant banqueting and feasting, the reliance on
ceremonial, the power of those too proud to fight to stay away, or
those too scared to fight to run away without penalty. The private
organization of a dinner party with RSVPs regarding attendance does
not fit into an adequate war pattern. i
Many African chieftains already had the basis for their troop organi-
zation and mobilization in the formalized age-groups. Thus, when
79 Bossu, in Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of
the Choctaw Indians, p. 163.
Is inherent in the lack of authority to compel men to take the field.
D ig ize
Ori g i n a l fro m
88
88 Primitive War an age-group attained maturity among the Ibo of Nigeria, between
Primitive War
an age-group attained maturity among the Ibo of Nigeria, between fifteen and eighteen, it took some elder as its captain and, after it had performed some fine deed, was allowed to take a name. formed a coherent unit and could take the field as such. 8 0 It
fifteen and eighteen, it took some elder as its captain and, after it
had performed some fine deed, was allowed to take a name. It
formed a coherent unit and could take the field as such.30
Kings Dingiswayo and Chaka observed the fine organizational
framework of these old African age societies and bathed them in the
cauldron of real war. They were regimented (ukubuthwa) and were
Kings Dingiswayo and Chaka observed the fine organizationa1 framework of these old African age societies and bathed them in the cauldron of real war. glad to be. They were regimented
glad to be. The kings gave them real meaning.
Soon after a boy had passed through his puberty ceremonial he ran
off to the military kraal having jurisdiction over his father's district.
( ukubuthwa ) and were
There he ostentatiously drank milk direct from the udder as a sign
The kings gave them real meaning.
of his desire to enlist. For a time he cared for the royal cattle and
learned the use of the spear. When the induna observed that a suf-
Soon after a boy had passed through his puberty ceremonial he ran off to the military kraal having jurisdiction over his father's district. There he ostentatiously drank milk direct from the udder as a sign of his desire to enlist. For a time he cared for the royal cattle and When the learned the use of the spear.
ficiently large number of these boys was hanging about, he informed
the king, who summoned them to the royal kraal to be "grouped up"
into a regiment. Only the king had the power to form new regi-
ments. This he would do as soon as the weather was dry and cool
and the harvests were in. Sometimes to prevent the name of some
famous old regiment from disappearing, he would send the boys to
induna observed that a suf
it as replacements for the casualties or dotards. In any event, a youth
ficiently large number of these boys was hanging about, he informed the king, who summoned them to the royal kraal to be " grouped up" into a regiment. ments. Only the king had the power to form new regi Sometimes to prevent the name of some In any event, a youth This he would do as soon as the weather was dry and cool
had to be a member of a regiment to attain full manhood status and
to know his place in the age hierarchy, which was the core of Zulu
social life. Furthermore, the king would summon at will the reserve
as well as active regiments to the royal kraal for training, ceremonial,
or war. The summons he sent through the indunas was binding.31
This Zulu mobilization method was borrowed by other South
and the harvests were in.
Africans. It seems a long way from the American dream-hunting and
party-giving system. The soldier could not pick up and go home
famous old regiment from disappearing, he would send the boys to it as replacements for the casualties or dotards. had to be a member of a regiment to attain full manhood status and to know his place in the age hierarchy, which was the core of Zulu social life. Furthermore, the king would summon at will the reserve as well as active regiments to the royal kraal for training, ceremonial, or war. The summons he sent through the indunas was binding. 8 1 This Zulu mobilization method was borrowed by other South Africans. It seems a long way from the American dream-hunting and The soldier could not pick up and go home The warrior was not only in for duration, he After that he Should he party-giving system. whenever he saw fit.
whenever he saw fit. The warrior was not only in for duration, he
was in the regulars until he was too old to be of use. After that he
had to serve in the reserve, subject to the king's call. Should he
desert, the king did not kill him. His own regiment took care of that.
The Dahomean king was not one whit behind Zululand, and was
even more systematic about his conscription. He had a very exacting
and efficient form of census-taking. This managed to conscript every
useful human for the king's wars. The census was but little behind
80 Charles K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, A Study in In-
direct Rule (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 113.
81 Krige, op. cit., pp. 106ff.
was in the regulars until he was too old to be of use. desert, the king did not kill him.
had to serve in the reserve, subject to the king's call.
His own regiment took care of that.
The Dahomean king was not one whit behind Zululand, and was even more systematic about his conscription. He had a very exacting and efficient form of census-taking. This managed to conscript every useful human for the king's wars. The census was but little behind Charles K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, A Study in In direct Rule ( London : Oxford University Press, 1 937 ) , p. 1 13. 8 1 Krige, op. cit., pp. 106f.
80
Di
iz e

Discipline and Command 89 our own in complexity, so cannot be discussed.82 The king always
89
knew his M-Day strength, and always understood just what munitions
of war he could expect. Every Dahomean was a soldier and was
subject to the king's call at any time.88
Meek reports a system of enlistment at the behest of wealthy men
our own in complexity, so cannot be discussed. 8 2 The king always knew his M-Day strength, and always understood just what munitions of war he could expect. Every Dahomean was a soldier and was subject to the king's call at any time.8 3 Meek reports a system of enlistment at the behest of wealthy men among the Ibo which surpasses the power of the rich on the North Pacific Coast of North America. These Ibo magnificos could exert such influence by gifts and protection that they actually became the political heads of the villages. If they were rich enough, they could extend their sway over several otherwise autonomous towns by put ting them under financial obligation. They could purchase the sinews of war whereby they could protect themselves and their kin, and offer protection to other kindreds, thus redUCing the latter to dependency. The decisions of war and peace rested with them, for only they could purchase the munitions needed for successful war. The conditions of enlistment were also in their hands.84 They could then become richer by demanding shares of the resultant slaves and loot as interest on capital expended in the munitions business. No doubt this method of building a chieftainship or kingship by purchase and thus organ izing society on a basis other than by blood kin has been used in other areas. Once in the saddle, the mate:qlOwer WftS bound togrow if his iI'ii1ifary exploits were successful. He was in a position to solidify his afus oy economic means, always a strong and useful method of gaining control. The heads of slain enemies were hung on a tree outside his house to increase his prestige. If one of his clients was slain, he would order an age-grade out against the murderer's town and, if the slayers were brought back, the age-grade received a bounty in money or goats. Should one of his own people die in the action, he would compensate his kin out of the sale of the slaves taken.85 The technique of muster in Oceania was the levee en 11UlSse. If a social unit when to war, its members were supposed to go, even in on them to do so was considerable. Melanesia, and the016;91 N Brown says that in ew ntain every male was supposed to take up
among the Ibo which surpasses the power of the rich on the North
Pacific Coast of North America. These Ibo magnificos could exert
such influence by gifts and protection that they actually became the
political heads of the villages. If they were rich enough, they could
extend their sway over several otherwise autonomous towns by put-
ting them under financial obligation. They could purchase the sinews
of war whereby they could protect themselves and their kin, and offer
protection to other kindreds, thus reducing the latter to dependency.
The decisions of war and peace rested with them, for only they could
purchase the munitions needed for successful war. The conditions of
enlistment were also in their hands.84 They could then become richer
by demanding shares of the resultant slaves and loot as interest on
capital expended in the munitions business. No doubt this method
of building a chieftainship or kingship by purchase and thus organ-
izing society on a basis other than by blood kin has been used in
other areas.
Once in the saddle, the magnateis, rjqwer was buuild ICTgiow if his
mmtary exploits were successful. He was in a position to solidify his
status by economic means, always a strong and useful method of
gaining control. The heads of slain enemies were hung on a tree
outside his house to increase his prestige. If one of his clients was
slain, he would order an age-grade out against the murderer's town
and, if the slayers were brought back, the age-grade received a bounty
in money or goats. Should one of his own people die in the action,
he would compensate his kin out of the sale of the slaves taken.85
The technique of muster in Oceania was the levee en masse. If a \/
social unit when to war, its members were supposed to go, even in
Melanesia, and fV> mowJ prcfflre on them to do so was considerable^
brown says that in New britain every male was supposed to take up
8a Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 72ff. , i J. v , ,(/a
88 Burton, op. cit, p. 444. | { ". ^'. / . I'
8* Meek, op. cit, p. 111. ^"
85 im- *113- ^mJL* i *
l'9..re
82 Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 72ff. 83 Burton, op. cit., p. 444. 8. Meek, op. cit., p. I l l . 8 5 Ibid., p . 1 13.
'"
D 9 iz e b
90
90 Primitive War his position at the boundary as soon as war was determined. "If he
Primitive War
I'll he
That
failed to do so, the people would be very angry with him."s6
failed to do so, the people would be very angry with him. " 8 6
his position at the boundary as soon as war was detennined.

The levee en masse was even more compulsive in Polynesia.
The levee en masse was even more compulsive in Polynesia. That
region had no regularly enlisted warriors, for every male adult who
had been through the puberty ceremonial was expected to participate
region had no regularly enlisted warriors, for every male adult who had been through the puberty ceremonial was expected to participate without reserve. Each village kept watch for slackers, but this was They had no per manent war establishment in peace times, for its foundation would in itself have been considered a declaration of war by potential ene mies. 8 7 The subsidiary or allied social units, on the other hand, were allowed much discretion as to whether or not they would take the field. In the Northwest Solomons a messenger was sent around to the villages with a branch of areca nuts as a request for them to join a fight.88 This was likewise common to the New Hebrides. Caesar records the method of the Suabians. Messengers were sent to all quarters, but not to hold a banquet, or to beat a blanket, but authoritatively to assemble all military eHectives.89 The great general records a similar practice among the Gauls. Teeth were put in the invitation to war which would have astounded the heroes of the Plains. The Gallic chief or king Indutiomarus threatened the Romans with a largely uncalled for as every man wished to fight.
without reserve. Each village kept watch for slackers, but this was
largely uncalled for as every man wished to fight. They had no per-
manent war establishment in peace times, for its foundation would
in itself have been considered a declaration of war by potential ene-
mies.37 The subsidiary or allied social units, on the other hand, were
allowed much discretion as to whether or not they would take the
field. In the Northwest Solomons a messenger was sent around to
the villages with a branch of areca nuts as a request for them to join
a fight.3s This was likewise common to the New Hebrides.
Caesar records the method of the Suabians. Messengers were sent
to all quarters, but not to hold a banquet, or to beat a blanket, but
authoritatively to assemble all military effectives.39 The great general
records a similar practice among the Gauls. Teeth were put in the
invitation to war which would have astounded the heroes of the Plains.
The Gallic chief or king Indutiomarus threatened the Romans with a
general uprising which by law all grown men had to attend. The
last man to arrive was elaborately tortured to death before the entire
host as a matter of routine.90 This was recruiting with a vengeance!
s6 Brown, op. cit., p. 152.
s7 Ibid., p. 164.
s8 Blackwood, op. cit., p. 33.
o Ibid, v. 56.
general uprising which by law all grown men had to attend. The last man to arrive was elaborately tortured to death before the entire host as a matter of routine.90 This was recruiting with a vengeance! 86 87 88 89 90
Blackwood, op . cit., p. 33. Caesar, op. cit., iv. 9.

Ibid,
v.
Ibid., p. 164.
Brown, op. cit., p. 152.
56.
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CHAPTER 5
The Functional Desiderata
OTUDENTS OF TACTICS OFTEN INTRODUCE THEIR TEXTS BY DEFINITIONS
of the functions of the particular arm under discussion. One reads
in an infantry work that the arms function is fire, mobility, and shock.
These three are repeated in the cavalry texts with greater emphasis
on mobility and shock. Again, the tank experts say that the func-
tions of the armored force are fire, mobility, shock, and protection.
The job of the combat elements of the air force is obviously mobility
and fire, while the artillery is reduced to fire, with some mobility.
CHAPTER 5
These, then, seem to be the functions of battle units. These functions
are accomplished through use of the principles of war and combat. No
real difference can be discerned between successful civilized soldiers
and successful nonliterate warriors in this regard.
Let us first regard the Eskimo tactically. For the most part they
were too pacific to have any battle practices worthy of the name.
TUDENTS OF TACTICS OFTEN INTRODUCE THEm TEXTS
BY DEFINITIONS
Their groups were too small for combat effectiveness. Their social
of the functions of the particular arm under discussion.
One reads
organization made no provision for real chieftainships with authority
in the other walks of life, and they were practically without motives
in an infantry work that the arms function is fire, mobility, and shock. These three are repeated in the cavalry texts with greater emphasis on mobility and shock. Again, the tank experts say that the func tions of the armored force are fire, mobility, shock, and protection. The job of the combat elements of the air force is obviously mobility and fire, while the artillery is reduced to fire, with some mobility. These, then, seem to be the functions of battle units. These functions are accomplished through use of the principles of war and combat. No real difference can be discerned between successful civilized soldiers and successful nonliterate warriors in this regard. Let us first regard the Eskimo tactically. For the most part they Their social were too pacific to have any battle practices worthy of the name. Their groups were too small for combat effectiveness . organization made no provision for real chieftainships with authority in the other walks of life, and they were practically without motives for making war on anyone. generally found out. necessary. They were capable of effective and fierce
for making war on anyone. They were capable of effective and fierce
resistance when attacked, as the Indians who tried to persecute them
generally found out. The Eskimo were, therefore, practical pacifists.
They did not relish an open fight, but would stand up to one if
necessary. In such cases they relied on fire without movement. They
could deliver arrow fire in great volume and, a phenomenon far from
common in America, by volleys. Anyone venturing within range of
this mass of fire would almost certainly be hit. It is reported that
often a man resembled a pin cushion when he finally fell. Since they
did not rush an enemy discomfited by fire, the winning side would be
that which delivered the best fire and the most of it, had the largest
number of archers and stores of ammunition. If one side became
weary or wished to eat, it would hoist a fur coat on a stick as a signal
91
resistance when attacked, as the Indians who tried to persecute them The Eskimo were, therefore, practical pacifists . They They did not relish an open fight, but would stand up to one if In such cases they relied on fire without movement. could deliver arrow fire in great volume and, a phenomenon far from common in America, by volleys.
this mass of fire would almost certainly be hit.
Anyone venturing within range of It is reported that Since they
often a man resembled a pin cushion when he finally fell.
did not rush an enemy discomfited by fire, the winning side would be that which delivered the best fire and the most of it, had the largest number of archers and stores of ammunition. If one side became weary or wished to eat, it would hoist a fur coat on a stick as a signal
91
D ig ize
Ori g i n a l fro m
92
92 Primitive War
Primitive War
an
for
armistice.
If agreeable, both sides . would then rest, posting After all had en joyed their Such behavior was ob
for an armistice. If agreeable, both sides would then rest, posting
guards to see that the truce was kept. After all had enjoyed their
guards to see that the truce was kept.
leisure, they went at the fire-fight again.1 Such behavior was ob-
leisure, they went at the fire-fight again. l
viously unmilitary and was more of an athletic event.
The pure fire-fight, or archery contest, seems to be typical of the
viously unmilitary and was more of an athletic event. The pure fire-fight, or archery contest, seems to be typical of the socially simplest people. To call the Eskimo socially simple is no reflection on their material culture, which was rich, nor on their clever ness, but simply says that their social organization was well nigh anarchical. A people almost as simple in organization and much less People like the Maidu expert in manufacture were the Californians. as will be seen .
socially simplest people. To call the Eskimo socially simple is no
reflection on their material culture, which was rich, nor on their clever-
ness, but simply says that their social organization was well nigh
anarchical. A people almost as simple in organization and much less
expert in manufacture were the Californians. People like the Maidu
liked to attack at dawn, a fact common among nonliterate tacticians,
as will be seen. They relied exclusively on the fire-fight, taking care
not to get too close. Most Californians likewise delivered mass fire,
but the extreme range made it notably bloodless. They even went
so far as to take poorer arrows to war than they used in economic
liked to attack at dawn, a fact common among nonliterate tacticians, They relied exclusively on the fire-fight, taking care Most Californians likewise delivered mass fire, They even went not to get too close.
hunting.2
Most Californians were too cowardly to make fighting men. They
really loved a fire-fight on the athletic level, practiced while well
encased in armor. This is well enough as far as it goes, but they
needed to advance by movement to dislodge or destroy an enemy by
but the extreme range made it notably bloodless. hunting.2
shock to alter the status quo. Kroeber says that the bow was then-
so far as to take poorer arrows to war than they used in economic Most Californians were too cowardly to make fighting men. encased in armor. They
chief weapon. Spears were "employed only sporadically in hand-to-
hand fighting and not for hurling from the ranks." The probable use
of the spears was to impale unsuspecting sleepers, for "In a set fight
the spear could not be used against a row of bowmen by unarmored
really loved a fire-fight on the athletic level, practiced while well This is well enough as far as it goes, but they needed to advance by movement to dislodge or destroy an enemy by shock to alter the status quo. Kroeber says that the bow was their chief weapon . Spears were "employed only sporadically in hand-to hand fighting and not for hurling from the ranks . " The probable use of the spears was to impale unsuspecting sleepers, for "In a set fight the spear could not be used against a row of bowmen by unarmored and unorganized warriors. "3 Kroeber should have stressed the term "unorganized," for otherwise his assumptions are unwarranted. He assumes that unarmored spear men could not attack a line of bowmen . They could and should. Modern bayonet-men consistently attack lines of men firing with rifles and machine guns, weapons far more lethal than the bow. He seems to assume that the proper use of a spear was as a weapon of fire to
and unorganized warriors."3
Kroeber should have stressed the term "unorganized," for otherwise
his assumptions are unwarranted. He assumes that unarmored spear-
men could not attack a line of bowmen. They could and should.
Modern bayonet-men consistently attack lines of men firing with rifles
and machine guns, weapons far more lethal than the bow. He seems
to assume that the proper use of a spear was as a weapon of fire to
be hurled from the ranks. Nothing could be farther from the truth,
especially since the warriors owned a much better fire weapon in the
arrow. The Californians, too, failed to appreciate the function of fire,
which was explained in the chapter on weapons. Occasionally one
1 Nelson, op. ctt., p. 329.
2 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 152.
3 Ibid., p. 844.
be hurled from the ranks.

arrow.
Nothing could be farther from the truth, especially since the warriors owned a much better fire weapon in the The Californians, too, failed to appreciate the function of fire, Occasionally one
which was explained in the chapter on weapons.
1 Nelson, op. cit., p. 329. 2 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 152. 8 Ibid., p. 844.
Ori g i n a l fro m
U N I VE R S ITY 0 F CAL I FORN III.
92
92 Primitive War
Primitive War
an
for
armistice.
If agreeable, both sides . would then rest, posting After all had en joyed their Such behavior was ob
for an armistice. If agreeable, both sides would then rest, posting
guards to see that the truce was kept. After all had enjoyed their
guards to see that the truce was kept.
leisure, they went at the fire-fight again.1 Such behavior was ob-
leisure, they went at the fire-fight again. l
viously unmilitary and was more of an athletic event.
The pure fire-fight, or archery contest, seems to be typical of the
viously unmilitary and was more of an athletic event. The pure fire-fight, or archery contest, seems to be typical of the socially simplest people. To call the Eskimo socially simple is no reflection on their material culture, which was rich, nor on their clever ness, but simply says that their social organization was well nigh anarchical. A people almost as simple in organization and much less People like the Maidu expert in manufacture were the Californians. as will be seen .
socially simplest people. To call the Eskimo socially simple is no
reflection on their material culture, which was rich, nor on their clever-
ness, but simply says that their social organization was well nigh
anarchical. A people almost as simple in organization and much less
expert in manufacture were the Californians. People like the Maidu
liked to attack at dawn, a fact common among nonliterate tacticians,
as will be seen. They relied exclusively on the fire-fight, taking care
not to get too close. Most Californians likewise delivered mass fire,
but the extreme range made it notably bloodless. They even went
so far as to take poorer arrows to war than they used in economic
liked to attack at dawn, a fact common among nonliterate tacticians, They relied exclusively on the fire-fight, taking care Most Californians likewise delivered mass fire, They even went not to get too close.
hunting.2
Most Californians were too cowardly to make fighting men. They
really loved a fire-fight on the athletic level, practiced while well
encased in armor. This is well enough as far as it goes, but they
needed to advance by movement to dislodge or destroy an enemy by
but the extreme range made it notably bloodless. hunting.2
shock to alter the status quo. Kroeber says that the bow was then-
so far as to take poorer arrows to war than they used in economic Most Californians were too cowardly to make fighting men. encased in armor. They
chief weapon. Spears were "employed only sporadically in hand-to-
hand fighting and not for hurling from the ranks." The probable use
of the spears was to impale unsuspecting sleepers, for "In a set fight
the spear could not be used against a row of bowmen by unarmored
really loved a fire-fight on the athletic level, practiced while well This is well enough as far as it goes, but they needed to advance by movement to dislodge or destroy an enemy by shock to alter the status quo. Kroeber says that the bow was their chief weapon . Spears were "employed only sporadically in hand-to hand fighting and not for hurling from the ranks . " The probable use of the spears was to impale unsuspecting sleepers, for "In a set fight the spear could not be used against a row of bowmen by unarmored and unorganized warriors. "3 Kroeber should have stressed the term "unorganized," for otherwise his assumptions are unwarranted. He assumes that unarmored spear men could not attack a line of bowmen . They could and should. Modern bayonet-men consistently attack lines of men firing with rifles and machine guns, weapons far more lethal than the bow. He seems to assume that the proper use of a spear was as a weapon of fire to
and unorganized warriors."3
Kroeber should have stressed the term "unorganized," for otherwise
his assumptions are unwarranted. He assumes that unarmored spear-
men could not attack a line of bowmen. They could and should.
Modern bayonet-men consistently attack lines of men firing with rifles
and machine guns, weapons far more lethal than the bow. He seems
to assume that the proper use of a spear was as a weapon of fire to
be hurled from the ranks. Nothing could be farther from the truth,
especially since the warriors owned a much better fire weapon in the
arrow. The Californians, too, failed to appreciate the function of fire,
which was explained in the chapter on weapons. Occasionally one
1 Nelson, op. ctt., p. 329.
3 Ibid., p. 844.
be hurled from the ranks.

arrow.
Nothing could be farther from the truth, especially since the warriors owned a much better fire weapon in the The Californians, too, failed to appreciate the function of fire, Occasionally one
which was explained in the chapter on weapons.
1 Nelson, op. cit., p. 329. 2 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 152. 8 Ibid., p. 844.
Ori g i n a l fro m

The Functional Desiderata 93
93
of their brave men would run up and slay an enemy to get his head,
but this was considered quite a deed.
of their brave men would run up and slay an enemy to get his head, but this was considered quite a deed. One now turns to Oceania to examine the use of fire in the South Seas. Melanesia used fire better than Polynesia, and for reasons easy The Melanesians, being good archers, surpassed the There is evidence that the Polynesians, Its chief use has The chief Polynesian fire This to appreciate.
One now turns to Oceania to examine the use of fire in the South
Seas. Melanesia used fire better than Polynesia, and for reasons easy
to appreciate. The Melanesians, being good archers, surpassed the
Polynesians in fire weapons. There is evidence that the Polynesians,
like ourselves, formerly handled the bow quite well. Its chief use has
Polynesians in fire weapons.
been as a child's toy in more recent times. The chief Polynesian fire
weapons were expertly made and handled throwing-clubs, but no
like ourselves, formerly handled the bow quite well. been as a child's toy in more recent times.
club can have the range, accuracy, and selectivity of the arrow. This
does not mean that the Melanesians relied entirely on the arrow for
fire, for many of them trusted its less competent prototype, the thrown
weapons were expertly made and handled throwing-clubs, but no club can have the range, accuracy, and selectivity of the arrow. does not mean that the Melanesians relied entirely on the arrow for fire, for many of them trusted its less competent prototype, the thrown spear. Brown said that the men of New Britain rarely came to grips but generally fought by hurling spears at a distance, the method of all military cowards, the harmless tossing of weapons at an enemy trained in dodging.4 This is reminiscent of the tactically incompetent Some Africans were no better. Eskimo and Californians.
spear. Brown said that the men of New Britain rarely came to grips
but generally fought by hurling spears at a distance, the method of
all military cowards, the harmless tossing of weapons at an enemy
trained in dodging.4 This is reminiscent of the tactically incompetent
Eskimo and Californians. Some Africans were no better.
Bishop Codrington likewise comments on this over-reliance on fire
tactics in the Banks Islands. These people had bows, but the real
fight was "shouting of defiance, cursing, abuse and boasting," and
stamping the ground with little bloodshed. He makes the interesting
comment that the Banks men protected themselves from surprise at
night by casting stones with slings from time to time down paths a
marauding enemy might use.5 This is one of the few quotable ex-
Bishop Codrington likewise comments on this over-reliance on fire tactics in the Banks Islands . These people had bows, but the real fight was "shouting of defiance, cursing, abuse and boasting," and stamping the ground with little bloodshed. He makes the interesting comment that the Banks men protected themselves from surprise at night by casting stones with slings from time to time down paths a marauding enemy might use. II This is one of the few quotable ex amples of the use of prohibitive fire by a nonliterate folk, albeit an in effective and wasteful one. The use of prohibitive fire is very common in modem war, especially at night, as in this case. The Banks men would have done much better, however, if they had exercised the principle of security a little more instead of slinging random stones down suspect paths. them much better. The counterpart of fire is mobility, the power to move effectively towards an enemy in the attack, or to get away from him if things should not be as favorable as one had hoped. Simple mobility alone is of little more tactical value than simple fire, unless one is defeated. King Richard the Third's prayer for a horse at Bosworth was anything but foolish.
ei Robert H. Codrington, The Melanesians ( Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1891 ) , p. 305.
amples of the use of prohibitive fire by a nonliterate folk, albeit an in-
effective and wasteful one. The use of prohibitive fire is very common
in modern war, especially at night, as in this case. The Banks men
would have done much better, however, if they had exercised the
principle of security a little more instead of slinging random stones
down suspect paths. A few scouts and sentries would have protected
them much better.
The counterpart of fire is mobility, the power to move effectively
towards an enemy in the attack, or to get away from him if things
should not be as favorable as one had hoped. Simple mobility alone
is of little more tactical value than simple fire, unless one is defeated.
King Richard the Third's prayer for a horse at Bosworth was anything
but foolish.
4 Brown, op. (At., p. 153.
5 Robert H. Codrington, The Melanesians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891),
.. 305.
A few scouts and sentries would have protected
D ig iz e
Ori g i n a l fro m
94
94 Primitive War
Primitive War
The mention of mobile fighters immediately calls to mind the
American Plains Indians. Mobility they had, although as fighters they
might be subject to a very conservative estimate. It takes more than
a bow and a spear to make a savage an infantryman, and a dolt on
horseback is no cavalryman. It is true that the Plains Indians learned
to be horsemen of no mean ability. Indeed, one frequently encounters
statements that at the end of their culture as a going concern, they
constituted the finest light cavalry ever known. Such a statement is
pure romance. It is true that they were known to defeat the regular
United States Cavalry; witness the Battle of the Big Horn. The
reasons for such a rare success is to be found in the large numbers of
Indians involved, in the wretched leadership of the post-Civil War
Federal Cavalry under men like Custer, and the superior armaments
put into the Indians' hands by politics. Remember that the Con-
federates whipped Custer almost at will, and he never joined Lincoln's
victory parade down Pennsylvania Avenue because his horse ran away
in the wrong direction. So much for the Seventh Cavalry's leadership!
It will be sufficient to observe that the Plains Indians did not prevent
their country from becoming the property of the white man. This the
Indians strove to prevent, and they had the numbers and equipment
to do so. The test of military excellence is the accomplishment of the
mission.
With the introduction of the horse (circa 1750) they became cava-
liers, and if they used any tactics successfully against the whites, it is
because they adopted those of their opponents. This is the simple
process of ethnological diffusion. As cavalry they inherited all the
weaknesses of that arm. They did not have to learn the civilized
cavalryman's inherent psychological defect, the galloping away on
spectacular, flashy military rides to the abandonment of the principle
of objective. Regardless of the preference of flash for discipline still
The mention of mobile fighters immediately calls to mind the American Plains Indians. Mobility they had, although as fighters they might be subject to a very conservative estimate. It takes more than a bow and a spear to make a savage an infantryman, and a dolt on horseback is no cavalryman. It is true that the Plains Indians learned to be horsemen of no mean ability. Indeed, one frequently encounters statements that at the end of their culture as a going concern, they constituted the finest light cavalry ever known. Such a statement is pure romance. It is true that they were known to defeat the regular United States Cavalry; witness the Battle of the Big Hom. The reasons for such a rare success is to be found in the large numbers of Indians involved, in the wretched leadership of the post-Civil War Federal Cavalry under men like Custer, and the superior armaments put into the Indians' hands by politics. Remember that the Con federates whipped Custer almost at will, and he never joined Lincoln's victory parade down Pennsylvania Avenue because his horse ran away in the wrong direction . So much for the Seventh Cavalry's leadership I It will be sufficient to observe that the Plains Indians did not prevent their country from becoming the property of the white man. This the Indians strove to prevent, and they had the numbers and equipment to do so. The test of military excellence is the accomplishment of the mission. With the introduction of the horse ( circa 1750 ) they became cava liers, and if they used any tactics successfully against the whites, it is because they adopted those of their opponents. This is the simple process of ethnological diffusion. As cavalry they inherited all the weaknesses of that arm. They did not have to learn the civilized cavalryman's inherent psychological defect, the galloping away on spectacular, flashy military rides to the abandonment of the principle of objective. Regardless of the preference of flash for discipline still observed in horse cavalry or its more modem derivatives, tank and air fighters, they had the unavoidable weakness of all cavalry, horsed, mechanized, or winged. There is an old maxim that cavalry can take but cannot hold. Even the mediaeval knights knew that. The Plains Indians did not effechIally want to hold, even their own land, their own bison herds, their own lives, and their own self-respect. They merely resented the white man. They could not or would not submit to enough diSCipline to keep the cowboy and the farmer off the short grass lands. They preferred actions which would not interfere with the child's play of coup-counting. Hence, they lost all.
observed in horse cavalry or its more modern derivatives, tank and
air fighters, they had the unavoidable weakness of all cavalry, horsed,
mechanized, or winged. There is an old maxim that cavalry can take
but cannot hold. Even the mediaeval knights knew that. The Plains
Indians did not effectually want to hold, even their own land, their
own bison herds, their own lives, and their own self-respect. They
merely resented the white man. They could not or would not submit
to enough discipline to keep the cowboy and the farmer off the short-
grass lands. They preferred actions which would not interfere with
fiie child's play of coup-counting. Hence, they lost all.
D ig ize
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The Functional Desiderata 95 Despite all that was at stake, they were not only less capable of
95
Despite all that was at stake, they were not only less capable of aggressive cohesion and team fighting than a successful gang of un derprivileged slum children, but even comprehended that their mounted action was futile. All the old Plainsmen I have ever talked Infantry
aggressive cohesion and team fighting than a successful gang of un-
derprivileged slum children, but even comprehended that their
mounted action was futile. All the old Plainsmen I have ever talked
with realized that Indians could not fight "walking-soldiers." Infantry
can both take and hold, yet the Indians rarely dismounted to fight
with realized that Indians could not fight "walking-soldiers. "
the white man, although they frequently did in their internecine wars.
Who with any historic feeling or ethnological information would dare
can both take and hold, yet the Indians rarely dismounted to fight the white man, although they frequently did in their internecine wars. Who with any historic feeling or ethnological information would dare say that, as cavalry, they could have made any respectable showing against the horsed nomads who poured out of Asia - Magyars, Kazak, Seljuk, Tartars? The great khans would have destroyed them sooner, for they had no reason to quibble with a puritan conscience.
say that, as cavalry, they could have made any respectable showing
against the horsed nomads who poured out of Asia Magyars, Kazak,
Seljuk, Tartars? The great khans would have destroyed them sooner,
for they had no reason to quibble with a puritan conscience.
As for Africa, very few people on that continent could be accused
of static warfare. The mobility element was enormously increased
among some Sudanic peoples when the desert men introduced the
horse to them. Much of the Sudan resembles the American Great
Plains geographically, and the results of the introduction of the horse
should be comparable. Comparable they were, but the Sudanese
were culturally in advance of the Plains hunters, so the results were
of static warfare.
As for Mrica, very few people on that continent could be accused The mobility element was enormously increase d
superior. The Mandingo, among others, had to develop their empire
among some Sudanic peoples when the desert men introduced the horse to them. Much of the Sudan resembles the American Great Plains geographically, and the results of the introduction of the horse should be comparable. Comparable they were, but the Sudanese were culturally in advance of the Plains hunters, so the results were superior. The Mandingo, among others, had to develop their empire without the aid of the horse, for the animal did not flourish every where. Our Eurasiatic ancestors retained a praiseworthy respect for mobil ity from their manhunting days. It took civilization to bog them down into immobile masses, especially civilization as known to Greece, Egypt, and pre-Persian Mesopotamia. It is true that the civilized sol dier most often defeated the mobile barbarian, but this was through better observance of a combination of the principles of combat, and even more often through superiority of organization and command. But civilization was all but overwhelmed by the mobile Magyars and Seljuks when its organized effectiveness declined. No one used mobility better than the pastoral nomads. Herodotus speaks respectfully of the terrible and able Scyths, praising not only their superiority in tactical mobility bu also their appreciation of the cavalry maxim that mobile troops must live off the country. No en emy invading their lands punitively could ever reach them. Their tactics were Fabian, while the nature of their country and its inter secting rivers favored their type of warfare. They had neither cities They scorned agrinor forts; their only dwellings were their wagons.
without the aid of the horse, for the animal did not flourish every-
where.
Our Eurasiatic ancestors retained a praiseworthy respect for mobil-
ity from their manhunting days. It took civilization to bog them down
into immobile masses, especially civilization as known to Greece,
Egypt, and pre-Persian Mesopotamia. It is true that the civilized sol-
dier most often defeated the mobile barbarian, but this was through
better observance of a combination of the principles of combat, and
even more often through superiority of organization and command.
But civilization was all but overwhelmed by the mobile Magyars and
Seljuks when its organized effectiveness declined.
No one used mobility better than the pastoral nomads. Herodotus
speaks respectfully of the terrible and able Scyths, praising not only
their superiority in tactical mobility but also their appreciation of the
cavalry maxim that mobile troops must live off the country. No en-
emy invading their lands punitively could ever reach them. Their
tactics were Fabian, while the nature of their country and its inter-
secting rivers favored their type of warfare. They had neither cities
nor forts; their only dwellings were their wagons. They scorned agri-
D ig ize
Ori g i n a l fro m
96
96 Primitive War culture and lived on their flocks. As horsed nomads, they were expert
Primitive War
As horsed nomads, they were expert
culture and lived on their Hocks. mounted archers.6
mounted archers.6
The excellent mobility of the cavalry and mounted infantry of the
west of Europe is praised elsewhere in this work. If more be needed,
The excellent mobility of the cavalry and mounted infantry of the west of Europe is praised elsewhere in this work. observe Caesar's praise of the Suebi. dismounted to fight afoot. mount and Hy. lence. 7 If more be needed, In cavalry combats they often
observe Caesar's praise of the Suebi. In cavalry combats they often
dismounted to fight afoot. Their horses were trained to stand in the
same spot so that their riders could retire quickly if they needed to
mount and fly. They considered the use of a saddle a mark of indo-
Their horses were trained to stand in the
lence.7 The repetition of the American Plains Indian's attitude re-
garding the saddle is interesting. Speaking of the Gaulish cavalry,
same spot so that their riders could retire quickly if they needed to They considered the use of a saddle a mark of indo Speaking of the Gaulish cavalry, Having The repetition of the American Plains Indian's attitude re
Caesar said that they charged the Roman cavalry on sight. Having
thrown them off balance by shock, they dismounted and fought afoot,
stabbing the horses and bringing down the riders.3 Dismounting in a
cavalry melee requires the highest kind of courage. It would be folly
garding the saddle is interesting.
today, of course, or at any time since the invention of the stirrup, but
Caesar said that they charged the Roman cavalry on sight.
it will be remembered that the Welsh kept their freedom in face of
the English knighthood for a long time by the same old Celtic method.
thrown them off balance by shock, they dismounted and fought afoot, stabbing the horses and bringing down the riders.s Dismounting in a cavalry melee requires the highest kind of courage. It would be folly today, of course, or at any time since the invention of the stirrup, but it will be remembered that the Welsh kept their freedom in face of the English knighthood for a long time by the same old Celtic method. Fire is all very well, and so is mobility but, like many things in cookery and chemistry, they are better, or even something entirely else when used in combination. The effective use of fire alone is in the defensive. Used by itself on the offensive it constitutes a marks manship contest which can effect little. ice to them as well as failure. Some tribes just mentioned tried it, however, and we are not far from wrong in ascribing coward U sed offensively, it immobilizes the enemy, disconcerts him, and overcomes his ground advantage if he uses the terrain or fortification skilfully. Mobility alone will produce only a shock action. Shock actions are often praiseworthy; indeed, they indicate able and brave troops. Good troops always want to close with the enemy. But to attempt shock alone on a brave and healthy foe, anxious to see you coming in order to make a blow at you while you are off balance through mobility, is to lead with the chin. The enemy ought to be "softened" by fire before the shock action begins. Fire and movement ought to be used in combination, then, when ever the situation permits. This is so important that it is considered a tactical principle.
Fire is all very well, and so is mobility but, like many things in
cookery and chemistry, they are better, or even something entirely
else when used in combination. The effective use of fire alone is in
the defensive. Used by itself on the offensive it constitutes a marks-
manship contest which can effect little. Some tribes just mentioned
tried it, however, and we are not far from wrong in ascribing coward-
ice to them as well as failure. Used offensively, it immobilizes the
enemy, disconcerts him, and overcomes his ground advantage if he
uses the terrain or fortification skilfully. Mobility alone will produce
only a shock action. Shock actions are often praiseworthy; indeed,
they indicate able and brave troops. Good troops always want to
close with the enemy. But to attempt shock alone on a brave and
healthy foe, anxious to see you coming in order to make a blow at you
while you are off balance through mobility, is to lead with the chin.
The enemy ought to be "softened" by fire before the shock action
begins.
Fire and movement ought to be used in combination, then, when-
ever the situation permits. This is so important that it is considered a
tactical principle.
6 Herodotus, History iv. 46-47.
t Caesar, op. cft., iv. 2.
s Ibid., iv. 11.
6 Herodotus, History iv. 46-47. 7 Caesar, op. cit., iv. 2. S Ibid., iv. 1 1 .
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The Functional Desiderata 97 It is said that more battles have been won by strength of leg than
97
force of arms. We have seen that a rapid concentration of superior force
at the critical point is the secret of victory. To effect such concentra-
tions, troops must be mobile, that is they must have the power of
prompt, rapid and sustained movement. Mobility, so far as the troops
themselves are concerned, is chiefly a matter of training, and it is the
characteristic which especially distinguishes well-trained troops. It is
the outstanding characteristic of cavalry.9
Good infantry, too, must be mobile. It was not flippancy that
It is said that more battles have been won by strength of leg than force of arms. We have seen that a rapid concentration of superior force at the critical pOint is the secret of victory. To eHect such concentra tions, troops must be mobile, that is they must have the power of prompt, rapid and sustained movement. Mobility, so far as the troops themselves are concerned, is chiefly a matter of training, and it is the characteristic which especially distinguishes well-trained troops . It is the outstanding characteristic of cavalry . 9
dubbed Stonewall Jackson's infantry "foot cavalry." The type of mo-
Good infantry, too, must be mobile.
It was not flippancy that
bility described in the foregoing quotation is not only important tac-
tically but strategically and logistically as well. But with all of mobil-
dubbed Stonewall Jackson s infantry "foot cavalry. " The type of mo bility described in the foregoing quotation is not only important tac tically but strategically and logistically as well.
As the United States Cavalry says :
ity's virtues, it must be employed in combat in conjunction with fire.
As the United States Cavalry says:
Combat consists essentially in the advance of the attacker against the
But with all of mobil
defender. The defender will oppose this movement by fire. Accord-
ity's virtues, it must be employed in combat in conjunction with fire.

Combat consists essentially in the advance of the attacker against the defender. The defender will oppose this movement by fire. Accord
ingly, in order to advance, the attacker must beat down the fire of the
defense by a superior fire in which all available fire weapons will take
part. The attack, then, has two elements, fire and movement. The
intelligent combination of these two elements of battle is the aim of all
training. 1o
The value of fire and movement in cavalry attacks could be grasped
by some nonliterate warriors. The Patagonian tribes normally flung
bolas expertly before themselves in mounted attacks, which was most
ingly, in order to advance, the attacker must beat down the fire of the defense by a superior fire in which all available fire weapons will take part. The attack, then, has two elements, fire and movement. The intelligent combination of these two elements of battle is the aim of all training . l O
disconcerting, even to the Spanish regulars.
Later pages will describe the Indians of Southeast United States as
relying largely on the dawn attack. In addition, they could use fire
and movement. Swanton quotes an early report on the Choctaw
which describes their clubmen as rushing in to finish an enemy which
The value of fire and movement in cavalry attacks could be grasped by some nonliterate warriors. The Patagonian tribes normally Hung bolas expertly before themselves in mounted attacks, which was most disconcerting, even to the Spanish regulars . Later pages will describe the Indians of Southeast United States relying largely on the dawn attack. and movement.
as
had been immobilized by the first flight of arrows.11
The fire and movement principle seems to have been observed in
Surinam. Each warrior carried seven poisoned arrows. A cloud was
discharged by each side in the opening of the engagement. The
ammunition expended, each side fell upon the other with war clubs,
and from then on it was man for man. If one side was forced to retire,
In addition, they could use fire
it attempted to gather up its dead, knowing the cannibalistic end of
the slain and wounded. This function was the chief job of the women.
Swanton quotes an early report on the Choctaw
These people are now known to have spread their population and
which describes their clubmen as rushing in to finish an enemy which had been immobilized by the first flight of arrows . ! t Surinam. The fire and movement principle seems t o have been observed in Each warrior carried seven poisoned arrows. A cloud was
* Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, p. 6.
10 Ibid., p. 5.
discharged by each side in the opening of the engagement. The ammunition expended, each side fell upon the other with war clubs, and from then on it was man for man. If one side was forced to retire, it attempted to gather up its dead, knowing the cannibalistic end of the slain and wounded. This function was the chief job of the women. These people are now known to have spread their population and
Tactics and Technique ot Cavalry, p. 6. 10 Ibid., p. 5. 1 1 Bossu, in Swanton, Source Material tor the Social and Ceremonial Lite of the Choctaw Indians, p. 162.
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98
98 Primitive War culture into North America as far as southern Florida, using island-
Primitive War
hopping seamanship thither from South America.12
culture into North America as far as southern Florida, using island hopping seamanship thither from South America . 1 2 It seems that even some of the simplest African tribes appreciated the principle of combined fire and movement, as witness the behavior of the Nigerian Ibibio. As soon as the action began they chewed magical herbs for invulnerability and began their fire fight. 'When the smoke from their antiquated muskets got too dense for good vision, they dropped their fire arms and rushed the foe with machete and sword, sincere in the belief that the gods would make them bullet proof. ls Later pages will describe the Melanesians as preferring a relatively immobile dawn attack in the American manner. Yet fire with move ment was far from unknown to them. The courageous men of Alu When the critical first attacked their enemy with a shower of arrows .
It seems that even some of the simplest African tribes appreciated
the principle of combined fire and movement, as witness the behavior
of the Nigerian Ibibio. As soon as the action began they chewed
magical herbs for invulnerability and began their fire fight. When
the smoke from their antiquated muskets got too dense for good
vision, they dropped their fire arms and rushed the foe with machete
and sword, sincere in the belief that the gods would make them bullet-
proof.13
Later pages will describe the Melanesians as preferring a relatively
immobile dawn attack in the American manner. Yet fire with move-
ment was far from unknown to them. The courageous men of Alu
first attacked their enemy with a shower of arrows. When the critical
moment came they dropped the bow and, grasping the spear and axe,
assailed the enemy with such vigor that their shields were of slight
value.14
A naval battle offers the supreme opportunity for the use of fire and
movement. Indeed, it is hard to see how a marine action can be fought
otherwise. With the exception of the Indians of the North Pacific
Coast, the Americans lacked naval war. The African negroid is a poor
canoe builder, so one finds no African marine war, even on the rivers.
Water-borne African war is no more than a descent upon the shore.
Both Melanesians and Polynesians were and are great seafarers. It
moment came they dropped the bow and, grasping the spear and axe, assailed the enemy with such vigor that their shields were of slight value. 1 4
A naval battle offers the supreme opportunity for the use of fire and
is unfortunate that we have so few descriptions of their sea fights from
competent sources.
One might consider Riley's description of the Fly River natives of
New Guinea. Like all island negroids they preferred descents upon
movement. Indeed, it is hard to see how a marine action can be fought otherwise. With the exception of the Indians of the North Pacific Coast, the Americans lacked naval war. The African negroid is a poor canoe builder, so one finds no African marine war, even on the rivers. Water-borne African war
the shore, but they could use their fine canoes for actual marine en-
gagements as well as for purely logistical purposes. When, for ex-
ample, the men of Waduba saw canoes from Kiwai passing over to the
mainland, they put forth to capture both the canoes and the occu-
is
no more than a descent upon the shore. It
pants. They attemped to maneuver into a position commanding the
enemy's escape. A shower of arrows was then directed at the enemy
Both Melanesians and Polynesians were and are great seafarers.
helmsman. The maneuverability of an enemy canoe thus being de-
stroyed, they promptly attacked it at close range with a greater force,
is unfortunate that we have so few descriptions of their sea fights from competent sources. One might consider Riley's description of the Fly River natives of New Guinea. Like all island negroids they preferred descents upon
as
12 Roth, op. cit., pp. 582f.
Percy A. Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria (London: Macmillan, 1923),
p. 234.
the shore, but they could use their fine canoes for actual marine en gagements as well for purely logistical purposes . When, for ex ample, the men of Waduba saw canoes from Kiwai passing over to the mainland, they put forth to capture both the canoes and the occu pants. They attemped to maneuver into a position commanding the enemy's escape. A shower of arrows was then directed at the enemy helmsman. The maneuverability of an enemy canoe thus being de stroyed, they promptly attacked it at close range with a greater force,
12 Roth, op. cit., pp. 582f. 1 8 Percy A. Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria ( London : Macmill a n, 1923 ) ,
p. 234.
1 4 Brown, op. cit., p. 161.
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The Functional Desiderata 99 and generally succeeded in destroying the Kiwai.15 Fire and move-
99
Fire and move
and generally succeeded in destroyin g the Kiwai. Hi ment were apparently well observed.
ment were apparently well observed. The use of maneuver and fire
to impede the enemy's steering and mobility was used in our own
The use of maneuver and fire
naval engagements right up to the present; now sea fights are normally
at such ranges that it is useless to aim for the enemy's rudder. The
use of specialists, cooperation, the combined use of forces, and co-
naval enga gemen ts right up to the present; now sea fights are normally
to impede the enemy's steerin g and m obility was used in our own at such ranges that it is useless to aim for the enemy's rudder.
ordination were also well portrayed in the Waduba actions. Riley's
Th e
chapter on battle plans also illustrates the ability of the Papuan to
use of specialists, cooperation, the combined use of forces, and co
fight on land according to fire and movement when called upon to
do so.
The principal of fire and movement seems to have been known to
ordin ation were also well portrayed in the Waduba actions. Riley's chapter on battle plan s also illustrates the ability of the Papuan to
fight on land acc ording to fire and movement when called upon t o
all the Metal Age Eurasiatic peoples. Such reports as we have, assum-
ing for the moment that they are trustworthy, are somewhat disap-
pointing in their descriptions of the principle. The fire element seemed
do so .
The principal of fire and movement seems to have b een known to all the Metal Age Eurasiatic peoples. Such reports as we have, assum ing for th e moment that they are trustworthy, are somewhat disap
to rely more on such inefficient weapons as sling shots and hurled jave-
lines rather than on the arrow, which archeology shows to have been
developed to a high degree of perfection. The combination of fire
and movement, though, was well understood. Caesar recounts in-
stances of the able use of the combination against prepared positions.
The Gauls and the Belgae assailed a fortified place by raining stones
pointin g in their des cription s of the principle. The fire element seemed
to rely more on such inefficient weapons as sling shots and hurled jave lines rather than on the arrow, which archeology shows to have been developed to a high degree of perfection. The combination of fire Caesar recounts in
on the ramparts. When the defenders did not show themselves, the
attack assailed the place with an infantry "tortoise," firing the gates
and under-cutting the wall. The slingers and archers kept the wall
stripped at the point the assault was made.16 Workmanship of this
kind also illustrates a knowledge of the use of mass and concentration
of force at the critical point.
and movement, though, was well understood.
The object of fire and movement is, of course, shock. At least one
can say that shock is one of the goals of mobility. Mobility also has
stances of the able use of the combination against prepared p osition s . The Gauls and the Belgae assailed a fortified place by raining stones on the ramparts. When the defenders did not show themselves, the The slingers and archers kept the wall Workmanship o f this attack assailed the place with an infantry "tortoise," firing the gates and under-cutting the wall. stripped at the point the assault was made. 1 6 of force at the critical point. The object of fire and movement is, of course, shock. can say that shock is one of the goals of m ob ili ty . At least one Mobility also has
uses in the retreat after defeat, but since few informants will ever
admit that their people were defeated, we have little knowledge of
that most useful device, the tactical withdrawal. Fire, mobility, and
shock imply aggression, the great principle of the offensive.
Decisive results cannot be achieved by passive measures: The de-
fensive may evade defeat, for a time, but it can never gain victory. In
war it is best to retain the initiative and to force the enemy to adapt his
plan to ours. This means that we should prefer the offensive to the
kind also illustrates a knowledge of the use of mass and concentration
15 E. Baxter Riley, Among Papuan Headhunted (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
1925), p. 273.
16 Caesar, op. cit., ii. 6.
uses in the retreat after defeat, but since few informants will ever admit that their people were defeated, we have little knowledge of that most useful device, the tactical withdrawal. Fire, mobility, and shock imply aggression, the great principle of the offensive.
Decisive results cannot be achieved by passive measures : The de fensive may evade defeat, for a time, but it can never gain victory. In war it is best to retain the initiative and to force the enemy to adapt his plan to ours. This means that we should prefer the offensive to the
1925 ) , p. 273.
1 11 E . Baxter Riley, Among Papuan Headhunters ( Philadelphia: Lippincott, 16 Caesar, op. cit., ii. 6.
D ig iz e
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100
100 Primitive War defensive. "If in doubt, attack," is a good rule, especially applicable to
Primitive War
cavalry.17
defensive. "If in doubt, attack," is a good rule, especially applicable to cavalry. I 7
Although there were exceptions, such as the Eskimo and Califor-
nians, the principle of the offensive was generally well observed in
America. The Indian was generally aggressive and good in the at-
tack. The Yuma, to choose an extreme example, scorned a fire-fight.
Like all aggressive and successful fighters, they liked close-up shock
work, delivering crushing blows against the foeman's chin with clubs
shaped like potato mashers.1s They alone in their general area seem
to have had any method of defense against a shock attack delivered
against themselves. They would bunch up, apparently like a ring of
mediaeval infantry attacked by horsemen, and die there to a man if
necessary. The enemy charging against such a ring would do well
to be cautious, since they strove to grab individuals from the attack,
drag them into the ring, and chop them to pieces with long knives.19
The principle of the offensive was well observed all over Africa,
only the little people of the forest, the Kalahari desert, and a few
Negroes being shy. The greatest masterpiece in the utilization of the
principle was, of course, instituted by the Zulu king Chaka when he
saw the futility of a fire fight with spears. (The east Bantu were not
archers.) He is reported to have made his troops destroy their
Although there were exceptions, such as the Eskimo and Califor nians, the principle of the offensive was generally well observed in America. The Indian was generally aggressive and good in the at tack. The Yuma, to choose an extreme example, scorned a fire-fight. Like all aggressive and successful fighters, they liked close-up shock work, delivering crushing blows against the foeman's chin with clubs shaped like potato mashers. I s They alone in their general area seem to have had any method of defense against a shock attack delivered against themselves. They would bunch up, apparently like a ring of mediaeval infantry attacked by horsemen, and die there to a man if necessary. The enemy charging against such a ring would do well to be cautious, since they strove to grab individuals from the attack, drag them into the ring, and chop them to pieces with long knives. I 9 The principle of the offensive was well observed all over Africa, only the little people of the forest, the Kalahari desert, and a few Negroes being shy. The greatest masterpiece in the utilization of the principle was, of course, instituted by the Zulu king Chaka when he saw the futility of a fire fight with spears. ( The east Bantu were not archers. ) He is reported to have made his troops destroy their throwing spears, which forced them to come to grips with short thrusting ones.20 This is reminiscent of the doctrine of another great warrior-king. One day Frederick the Great's cavalry commander complained to him that the enemy had sabers six inches longer than those of the Prussians. The king replied, "Ach, let our cavalry get six inches closer to the enemy cavalry." Chaka was too intelligent en tirely to forego the advantage of combined fire and movement. Ac tually, "Every Zulu warrior was armed with a shield, one or more throwing assegais, and one stabbing one . . "2 1
.
throwing spears, which forced them to come to grips with short
thrusting ones.20 This is reminiscent of the doctrine of another great
warrior-king. One day Frederick the Great's cavalry commander
complained to him that the enemy had sabers six inches longer than
those of the Prussians. The king replied, "Ach, let our cavalry get six
inches closer to the enemy cavalry." Chaka was too intelligent en-
tirely to forego the advantage of combined fire and movement. Ac-
tually, "Every Zulu warrior was armed with a shield, one or more
throwing assegais, and one stabbing one.. ,"21
The shock line action was the Polynesian ideal, but it was used with
too little fire preparation to be entirely effective. They did know the
charge, however, as will be shown later.
Protection, the last of the great desiderata, will not be discussed,
because it is hard enough to keep the civilian reader from thinking
17 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, p. 4.
1s Densmore, Yurruzn and Yaqui Music, p. 10.
i9 Ibid., pp. l0ff.
20 Kidd, op. cit., p. 302.
The shock line action was the Polynesian ideal, but it was used with too little fire preparation to be entirely effective. They did know the charge, however, as will be shown later. Protection, the last of the great desiderata, will not be discussed, because it is hard enough to keep the civilian reader from thinking
1 7 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, p. 4. I S D ensmore, Yuman and Yaqui Music, p. 10.
2 0 Kidd, op. cit., p. 302. 2 1 Kri ge, op . cit., p. 262.
19
Ibid., pp.
100.
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The Functional Desiderata 101 too highly of it even without emphasizing it. It is also too grave a
101
temptation for the nonliterate and civilized soldiers who have grasped
too highly of it even without emphasizing it. It is also too grave a temptation for the nonliterate and civilized soldiers who have grasped
it to overuse it. Protection by materials, which is the commonest, also lies entirely within the realm of material culture, which this book has so largely foresworn for reasons which seem good. A certain amount of armor, a device well-known to some nonliterate tribes, is all very well, but there is such a strong tendency springing from the cowardly nature of mankind to destroy any offensive ability with weight, to slow down mobility, and to make the soldier think too much of his own hide's value that it would have been well if it had never been discovered. This might also be said of fortification. True, the typical American Indian used it far too little, considering that his foe dealt in surprise.
it to overuse it. Protection by materials, which is the commonest,
also lies entirely within the realm of material culture, which this book
has so largely foresworn for reasons which seem good. A certain
amount of armor, a device well-known to some nonliterate tribes, is
all very well, but there is such a strong tendency springing from the
cowardly nature of mankind to destroy any offensive ability with
weight, to slow down mobility, and to make the soldier think too much
of his own hide's value that it would have been well if it had never
been discovered.
This might also be said of fortification. True, the typical American
Indian used it far too little, considering that his foe dealt in surprise.
But we will let the archeologist discant upon primitive fortresses. War
is_ an_extroy_ert activity, and too much effort expended on fortification
is a sign of military infrpversion. This is not said flippantly.
It should not^ however, be inferred that all use of protection is bad.
Just because the mediaeval knight used too much armor towards the
end does not mean that a certain amount is not good, even on modern
tanks. Just because the pueblo-building tribes of Southwest United
States tended to wall themselves up from the facts of life, certain
i_ extro\e}:t acqvity) . and too much effort expended on fortification

is a sign of military introversiof.l. This is not said flippantly.
But we will let the archeologist discant upon primitive fortresses.
Americanists to the contrary, is no sign that a reasonable amount of
fortification is not useful. The Iroquois and the Maori were certainly
aggressive fighters, but they made adequate use both of fortification
and of armor. But the temptation to consider protection too important
'nsIi oulcI not, however, be inferred that all use of protection is bad. Just because the mediaeval knight used too much armor towards the
end does not mean that a certain amount is not good, even on modem tanks. Just because the pueblo-building tribes of Southwest United States tended to wall themselves up from the facts of life, certain Americanists to the contrary, is no sign that a reasonable amount of fortification is not useful. The Iroquois and the Maori were certainly aggressi ve fighters, but they made adequate use both of fortification and of armor. But the temptation to consider protection too important leads us to avoid discussing it here. The best protection is tactical and lies in the intelligence of the warrior, not in materials. The principle of mass ( or of sufficient numbers ) , a combat prin- I. ciple, is a device by which the tactical desiderata are brought about. work.
leads us to avoid discussing it here. The best protection is tactical
and lies in the intelligence of the warrior, not in materials.
The principle of mass (or of sufficient numbers), a combat prin-
ciple, is a device by which the tactical desiderata are brought about.
This means, in brief, that one should not send a boy out to do a man's :
work. Quality must be sought, certainly, but quantity has meaning,
too. The commander ought always to dispatch enough men to accom-
plish the mission. Otherwise they might not only be defeated but
exterminated as well. The final situation would then be worse than if
no effort at all had been made. This by no means indicates that
enormous bodies must be sent forth, as the principle of economy of
force will show. These principles are functions of social organization.
The principle of mass was not well developed in Indian America.
First, the population was too small outside the civilized culture areas
to take large forces afield. Yet the principle does not depend on mere
This means, in brief, that one should not send a boy out to do a man's
Quality must be sought, certainly, but quantity has meaning, too. The commander ought always to dispatch enough men to accom plish tIie mission. Otherwise they might not only be defeated but extermin ated as well. The final situation would then be worse than if no effort at all h ad been made. This by no means indicates that enormous bodies must be sent forth, as the principle of economy of force will show. These principles are functions of social organization.
to take large forces afield.
First, the population was too small outside the civilized culture areas Yet the principle does not depend on mere
The principle of mass was not well developed in Indian America.
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102
102 Primitive War size, but varies with the mission and the condition of the enemy. If
Primitive War
the foe has two squads in the field and the commander sends three
squads against them, the principle of mass has been observed, even
though the chief has thousands at his disposal.
Sufficient numbers were always available to Indian chiefs for the
size, but varies with the mission and the condition of the enemy. If the foe has two squads in the field and the commander sends three squads against them, the principle of mass has been observed, even though the chief has thousands at his disposal. Sufficient numbers were always available to Indian chiefs for the accomplishment of sensible missions. Rather than suffering from paucity of man power, the Indians were defective in the social cohe sion which would demand that one band inevitably come to the aid of their kin, or that tribes should confederate to repel or attack dif ferent types of peoples. The concept of social and therefore military leadership was too vague for the principle to operate in all its possi bilities. Consequently, the sociological patterns demanded that the raid and the ambuscade remain the chief types of operations. Africa had a denser population. The kings had people wherewith to make war. Sub-Saharan Africa is a land blessed with good geo graphical features. This, coupled with farming and herding cultures, produced a surplus of food on which masses of soldiers could be sup ported and a population from which they could be recruited. The King of Dahomey, for example, could take enough troops afield to accomplish almost any imaginable mission, although he handled them only fairly well when he got there. The large number of troops the Iron and Bronze Age peoples of Eurasia could bring into the field is surprising. There can be no doubt that they could muster sufficient masses to accomplish any mission they had in mind. This is a tribute to their economics. The principle of economy of force, which says that it is likewise reprehensible to send a man to do a boy's work, was necessarily used by some fighting groups. Few men were taken to the field because more were not available. A Great Plains horse-stealing party observed it, if it can be called military. When the gathering of a coup or a few horses constituted the mission, just the right number of men was sent. Large numbers were avoided because they would have been in the way and their approach would have been detected. In spite of all this , the impression remains that the principle was generally honored in the breach by most primitive warriors. The very common practice was to bring along all the manpower willing to enlist, even if the killin g of one person, the acquisition of one scalp or head would fulfill the mission. The question may now be asked, why should all this military activ ity be exercised at all? The answer lies in the principles of objective
accomplishment of sensible missions. Rather than suffering from
paucity of man power, the Indians were defective in the social cohe-
sion which would demand that one band inevitably come to the aid
of their kin, or that tribes should confederate to repel or attack dif-
ferent types of peoples. The concept of social and therefore military
leadership was too vague for the principle to operate in all its possi-
bilities. Consequently, the sociological patterns demanded that the
raid and the ambuscade remain the chief types of operations.
, Africa had a denser population. The kings had people wherewith
to make war. Sub-Saharan Africa is a land blessed with good geo-
graphical features. This, coupled with farming and herding cultures,
produced a surplus of food on which masses of soldiers could be sup-
ported and a population from which they could be recruited. The
King of Dahomey, for example, could take enough troops afield to
accomplish almost any imaginable mission, although he handled them
only fairly well when he got there.
The large number of troops the Iron and Bronze Age peoples of
Eurasia could bring into the field is surprising. There can be no doubt
that they could muster sufficient masses to accomplish any mission
they had in mind. This is a tribute to their economics.
The principle of economy of force, which says that it is likewise
reprehensible to send a man to do a boy's work, was necessarily used
by some fighting groups. Few men were taken to the field because
more were not available. A Great Plains horse-stealing party observed
it, if it can be called military. When the gathering of a coup or a few
horses constituted the mission, just the right number of men was sent.
Large numbers were avoided because they would have been in the
way and their approach would have been detected. In spite of all this,
the impression remains that the principle was generally honored in
the breach by most primitive warriors. The very common practice
was to bring along all the manpower willing to enlist, even if the
killing of one person, the acquisition of one scalp or head would fulfill
the mission.
The question may now be asked, why should all this military activ-
ity be exercised at all? The answer lies in the principles of objective
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The Functional Desiderata 103 and exploitation. These might almost be called the first principles of
103
war and combat. Objective means that one must consider why the
battle is fought at all. This in part lies in the motive for the war, but
the modern tactical reason is the defeat of the enemy and victory for
ourselves. This is done only by the destruction of the enemy army,
although few nonliterate warriors grasp the point. Some civilized
chieftains also grasp it poorly. The objective of the Union Army in
the War Between the States was the destruction of the Confederate
Army. McClellan never grasped this. He thought the objective was
the capture of Richmond, and had a walk around Virginia for his
pains. Neither did the German General Staff grasp the point suffi-
ciently in 1914, or a second world war would have been unnecessary.
They thought the proper objective was the capture of Paris, not the
destruction of allied resistance. The objective of the battle may be a
place, but the objective of the war must be the defeat of a people.
Victory alone is of slight value, except to a militarist properly so-
called. A victory must be exploited, if it is not a Pyrrhic one.
The mere defeat of the opposing force is not the sole aim of the
attacker. He is not like the boxer who is content to win a technical de-
cision "on points," but seeks to administer a knockout. The purpose
of war is to impose our will upon the enemy, and this must be accom-
and exploitation. These might almost be called the first principles of war and combat. Objective means that one must consider why the battle is fought at all. This in part lies in the motive for the war, but the modern tactical reason is the defeat of the enemy and victory for ourselves. This is done only by the destruction of the enemy army, although few nonliterate warriors grasp the point. Some civilized chieftains also grasp it poorly. The objective of the Union Anny in the War Between the States was the destruction of the Confederate Ann y . McClellan never grasped this. He thought the objective was the capture of Richmond, and had a walk around Virginia for his pains. Neither did the German General Staff grasp the point suffi ciently in 1914, or a second world war would have been unnecessary. They thought the proper objective was the capture of Paris, not the destruction of allied resistance. The objective of the battle may be a place, but the objective of the war must be the defeat of a people. Victory alone is of slight value, except to a militarist properly so called. A victory must be exploited, if it is not a Pyrrhic one.
The mere defeat of the opposing force is not the sole aim of the attacker. He is not like the boxer who is content to win a technical de cision "on points," but seeks to administer a knockout. The purpose of war is to impose our will upon the enemy, and this must be accom plished by completely breaking down his resistance by capturing or de stroying his armed forces. Accordingly, the attacker, having driven the enemy from his position, must exploit his success by inflicting all pos sible damage upon his defeated opponent. Local successes are promptly followed by utilizing the supports and reserves to press the defeated enemy. 2 2
plished by completely breaking down his resistance by capturing or de-
stroying his armed forces. Accordingly, the attacker, having driven the
enemy from his position, must exploit his success by inflicting all pos-
sible damage upon his defeated opponent. Local successes are promptly
followed by utilizing the supports and reserves to press the defeated
enemy.22
The principle of objective, then, represents the art of war reduced
to its essence. Without its proper exercise, fighting must be called
something else besides war. The civilian is often confused about this
in reading accounts of wars. It is difficult for him to comprehend
that a defeat along one line means nothing if the enemy's resistance
is destroyed at the main point. He finds it hard to understand how an
army may win all the battles and lose the war.
It is in the disregard for this first principle that the American Indian
showed his major defect as a soldier. People like the Iroquois under-
stood it and were successful, yet the great majority of American tribes
behaved towards their enemies like modern game laws regard deer:
If you kill them all now, what fun will there be in the future? They
The principle of objective, then, represents the art of war reduced to its essence. Without its proper exercise, fighting must be called something else besides war. The civilian is often confused about this in reading accounts of wars. It is difficult for him to comprehend that a defeat along one line means nothing if the enemy's resistance is destroyed at the main point. He finds it hard to understand how an army may win all the battles and lose the war. It is in the disregard for this first principle that the American Indian showed his major defect as a soldier. People like the Iroquois under stood it and were successful, yet the great majority of American tribes behaved towards their enemies like modern game laws regard deer : If you kill them all now, what fun will there be in the future? They
2 2 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, p. 6.
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104
104 Primitive War consistently failed to pursue and exploit a victory, removing forever
Primitive War
an hereditary enemy.
Since they apparently needed the presence of an enemy to fulfill
their social pattern, they saw the principle with different eyes. The
end of the enemy would have meant the end of manhood society, the
raison d'etre for the male population. The pattern overdeveloped the
war honor concept almost everywhere. It is valuable always, but the
practice of war for its own sake rather than the achievement of some
socio-economic end is militarism. The Americas were, paradoxically,
continents rife with militarism but with little war.
Perhaps we might say that with few exceptions the American Indians
had motives different from those of a truly military people rather
than having none. The objective was often gained by vindicating
consistently failed to pursue and exploit a victory, removing forever an hereditary enemy. Since they apparently needed the presence of an enemy to fulfill their social pattern, they saw the principle with different eyes. The end of the enemy would have meant the end of manhood society, the raison d'etre for the male population. The pattern overdeveloped the war honor concept almost everywhere. It is valuable always, but the practice of war for its own sake rather than the achievement of some socio-economic end is militarism. The Americas were, paradoxically, continents rife with militarism but with little war. Perhaps we might say that with few exceptions the American Indians had motives different from those of a truly military people rather than having none. The objective was often gained by vindicating honor, or slapping someone in the face with a quirt rather than killing him. The Omaha, for example, were superior fighters as Plains Indians went. They made fairly intelligent preparations and began their fights with some system. But when the fight opened and the enemy was thoroughly discomfited by fire, they should have rushed in to finish him off by the use of fire and movement. Yet only the very bravest warriors rushed into the beleaguered camp, far too few to accomplish any good. Again, they retreated when one of the leaders had been kill e d or wounded, even though they were victorious.23 Thus they utterly ignored the principle of exploitation. From the standpoint of any truly military people they failed in the objective and mission. If this was true of the better Plains tribes, it was much more so of the Simpler. If but one enemy was killed, the party often returned home. This was the mission . Coup had been counted, which was eminently more honorable ( and safer ) than a pitched battle of great success wherein several of the attacking side would be killed.24 The Ecuadorian Jibaro, in contrast, observed the principle of objec tive scrupulously. They had strong honor and trophy ideas, as found in North America, but the real mission of an engagement was the ex termination of the enemy. Their foes disregarded the principle of security and paid dearly for it. Reliance was put on the strength of fortified houses and the sentry duty of chickens. The refusal of the inhabitants of one house to come to the aid of those of the besieged
2 3 Dorsey, Omaha SOciology, p. 237. 2 4 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremon ies of the Plains-Ojibway and Plains-Cree Indians, p. 492.
honor, or slapping someone in the face with a quirt rather than killing
him.
The Omaha, for example, were superior fighters as Plains Indians
went. They made fairly intelligent preparations and began their fights
with some system. But when the fight opened and the enemy was
thoroughly discomfited by fire, they should have rushed in to finish
him off by the use of fire and movement. Yet only the very bravest
warriors rushed into the beleaguered camp, far too few to accomplish
any good. Again, they retreated when one of the leaders had been
killed or wounded, even though they were victorious.23 Thus they
utterly ignored the principle of exploitation. From the standpoint of
any truly military people they failed in the objective and mission.
If this was true of the better Plains tribes, it was much more so
of the simpler. If but one enemy was killed, the party often returned
home. This was the mission. Coup had been counted, which was
eminently more honorable (and safer) than a pitched battle of great
success wherein several of the attacking side would be killed.24
The Ecuadorian Jibaro, in contrast, observed the principle of objec-
tive scrupulously. They had strong honor and trophy ideas, as found
in North America, but the real mission of an engagement was the ex-
termination of the enemy. Their foes disregarded the principle of
security and paid dearly for it. Reliance was put on the strength of
fortified houses and the sentry duty of chickens. The refusal of the
inhabitants of one house to come to the aid of those of the besieged
23 Dorsey, Omaha Sociology, p. 237.
24 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains-Ojibway
and Plains-Cree Indians, p. 492.
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o The Functional Desiderata 105
105
(, X
dwelling was cowardly and unintelligent. A telling counter-attack by
the dwellers of the other houses would spoil the Jibaro's game, but
such poltroons preferred to lock themselves up and await death, which
was sure to follow, for after the victory the Jibaro destroyed every life,
human and animal, in the enemy village.
dwelling was cowardly and unintelligent. A telling counter-attack by the dwellers of the other houses would spoil the Jibaro's game, but such poltroons preferred to lock themselves up and await death, which was sure to follow, for after the victory the Jibaro destroyed every life, human and animal, in the enemy village. Africa contained both competent and inefficient observance of the principle. The mighty kingdom of Dahomey observed it poorly, though they took huge masses into the field. The Dahomean objective was slave raiding, however, and not the destruction of the enemy. So, like the Plains horse thieves, they should not be blamed too heartily. The fact that the principle of objective changes warriors into sol diers was well illustrated in South Africa. Observe the before-and after-taking Zulufication situation in southeast Africa. Formerly inva sions into the land of the Thonga were relatively peaceful. Conquer ors and conquered intermingled, and there was no memory of real bloodiness. They thought they had performed feats of great valor if they killed two or three of the enemy. The arrival of the Zulu in 1820 changed all that. The Zulu or the Ngoni taught the tribes of the plains to spare no one except, perhaps, female prisoners .23 The Zulu spared no eHectives and no cattle. They terrorized the region in con sequence, and were thus safe from attack themselves. They knew, as every general staH knows in spite of the doctrine of some statesmen, that the objective must not only be the extinction of an enemy army but his materials and morale and those of the civilian population as well.
Africa contained both competent and inefficient observance of the
principle. The mighty kingdom of Dahomey observed it poorly,
though they took huge masses into the field. The Dahomean objective
was slave raiding, however, and not the destruction of the enemy. So,
like the Plains horse thieves, they should not be blamed too heartily.
The fact that the principle of objective changes warriors into sol-
diers was well illustrated in South Africa. Observe the before-and-
after-taking Zulufication situation in southeast Africa. Formerly inva-
sions into the land of the Thonga were relatively peaceful. Conquer-
ors and conquered intermingled, and there was no memory of real
bloodiness. They thought they had performed feats of great valor if
they killed two or three of the enemy. The arrival of the Zulu in 1820
changed all that. The Zulu or the Ngoni taught the tribes of the
plains to spare no one except, perhaps, female prisoners.25 The Zulu
spared no effectives and no cattle. They terrorized the region in con-
sequence, and were thus safe from attack themselves. They knew, as
every general staff knows in spite of the doctrine of some statesmen,
that the objective must not only be the extinction of an enemy army but
his materials and morale and those of the civilian population as well.
The African states, whether old ones like those of the Baganda,'
Banyankole, Banyoro, Bushongo, or later ones such as the Zulu, Zande,
and Masai, were very apt at exploiting a victory. Perhaps no one did
it with more thoroughness than the Zulu. They were formerly a chiv-
alrous group, fighting for the pure love of athletics. They waited
for the other army to get ready, considering it below themselves to
take any advantage. They thought it rather mean to take all the
enemy's cattle, and they never harmed women and children. Chaka,
however, modernized them. Generosity never occurred to him, for he
preferred to take his foe at a disadvantage and slaughter every man,
woman, and child if he so chose. Civilized deceit was his delight.
Kidd reports that if he could save work for his own troops by prom-
ising quarter which he never intended to grant, he did so, only to
slaughter the beleaguered afterwards.26 This sounds like the cynical
25 Junod, op. cit., p. 449.
The African states, whether old ones like those of the Baganda, Banyankole, Banyoro, Bushongo, or later ones such as the Zulu, Zande, , and Masai, were very apt at exploiting a victory. Perhaps no one did it with more thoroughness than the Zulu. They were formerly a chiv alrous group, fighting for the pure love of athletics. They waited for the other army to get ready, considering it below themselves to take any advantage. They thought it rather mean to take all the enemy's cattle, and they never harmed women and children. Chaka, however, modernized them. Generosity never occurred to him, for he preferred to take his foe at a disadvantage and slaughter every man, woman, and child if he so chose. Civilized deceit was his delight. Kidd reports that if he could save work for his own troops by prom ising quarter which he never intended to grant, he did so, only to slaughter the beleaguered afterwards. 26 This sounds like the cynical 2 11 Junod, op. cit., p. 449.
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106
106 Primitive War claim made by our fellow citizens at the outbreak of every modern
Primitive War
war, "Our veneer of civilization is really very thin."
claim made by our fellow citizens at the outbreak of every modem war, "Our veneer of civilization is really very thin. " Kidd's horror need not impress us. Chaka made a real transition from the primitive to the civilized. His work sounds much like mod em power politics which prefers to gain military ends by political techniques when it can. He ceased considering battle an athletic event and abolished the game laws protecting the fallen foe. In sport hunting these rules are all very well, but in food hunting or war, the quarry is just as dead if shot sitting as on the wing. Chaka pursued the defeated instead of holding a dance, and he did away with poten tial enemies when he caught them. Hence, in the end, such a reign , of peace surrounded Zululand that he had to go far afield to find any one to fight. Although the surrounding tribes often borrowed Zulu ideas, many of them could not emerge from the primitive enough to exploit a victory because of the lack of discipline, or timidity, and the mutual distrust which Junod claims was the result of their frequent earlier defeats and the cause of their recent ones. The Maputju, he says, considered themselves the Zulu's equals, but were courageous only when out of danger. 2 1 Both Polynesians and Melanesians generally but not always ex ploited a victory. It must be admitted that the best Melanesian fighters went about this in a thoroughgoing manner, which the Polynesians did not. The great value of heads to the Melanesians dictated the complete annihilation of the defeated without pity or hesitation. No one states this with more vigor than Mrs. Coombe, who in other places says that her informants knew not war. 2 B The Iron Age Celts were as thorough in their exploitation as Chaka's Zulu. Apparently they left nothing standing when they conquered a country. Avienus, speaking from tradition, says that the ravaging Gael always left desolation where prosperity once dwelt. 2 9 Here, then, are some of the ways the sinews and muscles are flexed. But the brawn of war is futilely exercised unless it is di rected by the eye and brain of Mars, which is the subject of the next two chapters. 26 Kidd, op. cit., p. 304. 2 1 Junod, op. cit., p. 450. 28 Coombe, op. cit., p. 220.
Kidd's horror need not impress us. Chaka made a real transition
from the primitive to the civilized. His work sounds much like mod-
ern power politics which prefers to gain military ends by political
techniques when it can. He ceased considering battle an athletic
event and abolished the game laws protecting the fallen foe. In sport
hunting these rules are all very well, but in food hunting or war, the
quarry is just as dead if shot sitting as on the wing. Chaka pursued
the defeated instead of holding a dance, and he did away with poten-
tial enemies when he caught them. Hence, in the end, such a reign
of peace surrounded Zululand that he had to go far afield to find any-
one to fight.
Although the surrounding tribes often borrowed Zulu ideas, many
of them could not emerge from the primitive enough to exploit a
victory because of the lack of discipline, or timidity, and the mutual
distrust which Junod claims was the result of their frequent earlier
defeats and the cause of their recent ones. The Maputju, he says,
considered themselves the Zulu's equals, but were courageous only
when out of danger.27
Both Polynesians and Melanesians generally but not always ex-
ploited a victory. It must be admitted that the best Melanesian fighters
went about this in a thoroughgoing manner, which the Polynesians
did not. The great value of heads to the Melanesians dictated the
complete annihilation of the defeated without pity or hesitation. No
one states this with more vigor than Mrs. Coombe, who in other
places says that her informants knew not war.2s
The Iron Age Celts were as thorough in their exploitation as Chaka's
Zulu. Apparently they left nothing standing when they conquered
a country. Avienus, speaking from tradition, says that the ravaging
Gael always left desolation where prosperity once dwelt.29
Here, then, are some of the ways the sinews and muscles are
flexed. But the brawn of war is futilely exercised unless it is di-
rected by the eye and brain of Mars, which is the subject of the next
two chapters.
26 Kidd, op. cit., p. 304.
2s Coombe, op. cit, p. 220.
29 Rufus Festus Avienus, Ora Maritime, p. 586.
211 Rufus Festus Avienus, Ora Maritima, p. 586.
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CHAPTER 6
Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise
Ali EYES AND EARS IS THE SECOND OFFICE OF A GENERAL STAFF; IT
inspires the foe with terror and its friends with confidence. The gen-
eral relies upon it to know what the enemy is about to do, and even
to estimate what he is thinking. It is the intelligence function; its
news is secret news. It is espionage and, just as important, it is
counter-espionage. It seeks to enable its commander to surprise the
foe, and by its assiduity to throw an aura of mystery around his plans.
Regardless of the unwarranted romance with which the civilian
CHAPTER 6
invests it, it is most important, and no military body, group of armies
or squad, can afford to do without its functions of intelligence, sur-
prise, and security for one moment, and no victorious one ever has.
The fog of war is never perfectly pierced, but the effort must be
made.
That this includes primitive warriors is no accident. The primitive
ALL
EYES AND EARS
IS THE SECOND OFFICE OF
GENERAL STAFF;
IT
fighter does not fall behind the modern in this feature, and for rea-
sons which it is hoped will be apparent. Indeed, its very alertness
is primitive. Only its techniques have developed with need.
The chief-of-party must utilize every possible source of informa-
tion regarding the enemy in order successfully to wage war. Military
intelligence in the ordinary reconnaissance forms known as "scouting
and patrolling" was so highly developed among the American Indians,
for example, that it has not been surpassed if even equalled by the
ground troops of any military power. Nonliterate man was not
primitive in a derogatory sense, that is, undeveloped in the use of
military intelligence. This point has theoretical significance; there-
fore, attention is called to it with considerable strength.
Certainly some of the books written by white travellers have grossly
exaggerated the Indian's scouting powers. Many of them have as-
cribed some organic superiority to him, some mysterious hyperacute
sensory system innately beyond the capacity of civilized man. Such
107
inspires the foe with terror and its friends with confidence. The gen eral relies upon it to know what the enemy is about to do, and even to estimate what he is thinking. It is the intelligence function; its news is secret news. It is espionage and, just as important, it is counter-espionage. It seeks to enable its commander to surprise the foe, and by its assiduity to throw an aura of mystery around his plans. Regardless of the unwarranted romance with which the civilian invests it, it is most important, and no military body, group of armies or squad, can aHord to do without its functions of intelligence, sur prise, and security for one moment, and no victorious one ever has. The fog of war is never perfectly pierced, but the eHort must be made. That this includes primitive warriors is no accident. The primitive fighter does not fall behind the modem in this feature, and for rea sons which it is hoped will be apparent. Indeed, its very alertness is primitive. Only its techniques have developed with need. The chief-of-party must utilize every possible source of informa tion regarding the enemy in order successfully to wage war. Military intelligence in the ordinary reconnaissance forms known as "scouting and patrolling" was so highly developed among the American Indians, for example, that it has not been surpassed if even equalled by the ! ground troops of any military power. Nonliterate man was not primitive in a derogatory sense, that is, undeveloped in the use of military intelligence. This point has theoretical significance; therefore, attention is called to it with considerable strength. Certainly some of the books written by white travellers have grossly exaggerated the Indian's scouting powers. Many of them have as cribed some organic superiority to him, some mysterious hyperacute sensory system inn ately beyond the capacity of civilized man. Such
107
D ig ize
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108
108 Primitive War theories are, of course, basically unsound. No man can develop his
Primitive War
sensory acuteness in all ways. He will develop his perception along
the lines of his occupation and interest. The American Indian was
a marvellous scout because his life depended on it, both as a hunter
and a warrior. Craft acuteness of this order is common enough in
civilized life.
Most American groups departed for war with from adequate to
more than adequate reconnaissance patrols to gather information and
theories are, of course, basically unsound. No man can develop his sensory acuteness in all ways. He will develop his perception along the lines of his occupation and interest. The American Indian was a marvellous scout because his life depended on it, both as a hunter and a warrior. Craft acuteness of this order is common enough in civilized life. Most American groups departed for war with from adequate to more than adequate reconnaissance patrols to gather infonnation and to offer the service of security. Often the scouts would locate the village of the enemy and spy it out for several days before telling the main body to come up to attack. The Teton scouts prepared s tone shelters on high ground which would screen them from the f 'l1emy villagers. l The Comanche appointed the scouts for each I !xpedition. After having discovered the enemy position, they re turned and set up a pile of bison chips near their own main body. The scout leader went in front of the pile of chips and sang a war song. This pile constituted a rallying point during the engagement, while the song was an attestation that the intelligence offered was true. 2 Reconnaissance was provided for the Iowa by some three to four scouts who left the camp secretly in advance of the rest of the war party. When they were ready to inform the main party of what they saw, they sang their war bundle songs in such a way as to con vey the correct information.3 The Menomini and many others sent their scouts right up to the edge of the enemy village. Often the scouts were disguised for purposes of concealment. Many Plains scouts daubed themselves with mud, often fashioning wolf ears of the same material on their heads both for disguise and for magical purposes. Leaves and branches were utilized for camou flage when available. Various ways of conveying intelligence to the rear were used, some of which have been mentioned. Sometimes the scouts, often called "wolves," made specific wolf howls ; or would run in zig-zag lines back to camp; or would run in the four directions to infonn the main body that the enemy was in sight. In the South American jungle, as in Africa, the ceremonial drum was used to convey military in telligence over considerable distances, although the system was by
2 Lowie, op
to offer the service of security. Often the scouts would locate the
village of the enemy and spy it out for several days before telling
the main body to come up to attack. The Teton scouts prepared
stone shelters on high ground which would screen them from the
fnemy villagers.1 The Comanche appointed the scouts for each
expedition. After having discovered the enemy position, they re-
turned and set up a pile of bison chips near their own main body.
The scout leader went in front of the pile of chips and sang a war
song. This pile constituted a rallying point during the engagement,
while the song was an attestation that the intelligence offered was
true.2 Reconnaissance was provided for the Iowa by some three to
four scouts who left the camp secretly in advance of the rest of the
war party. When they were ready to inform the main party of what
they saw, they sang their war bundle songs in such a way as to con-
vey the correct information.3 The Menoinini and many others sent
their scouts right up to the edge of the enemy village.
Often the scouts were disguised for purposes of concealment. Many
Plains scouts daubed themselves with mud, often fashioning wolf
ears of the same material on their heads both for disguise and for
magical purposes. Leaves and branches were utilized for camou-
flage when available.
Various ways of conveying intelligence to the rear were used, some
of which have been mentioned. Sometimes the scouts, often called
"wolves," made specific wolf howls; or would run in zig-zag lines
back to camp; or would run in the four directions to inform the main
body that the enemy was in sight. In the South American jungle,
as in Africa, the ceremonial drum was used to convey military in-
telligence over considerable distances, although the system was by
1 Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, passim,
2 Lowie, op. cit., p. 811.
3 Skinner, Societies of the Iowa, Kansa, and Ponca Indians, p. 687.
1 Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, cit., p. 8l l .

.
passim.
Skinner, Societies of the Iowa, Kama, and Ponca Indians, p. 687.
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 109 no means as well developed in South America as in Africa.4 The well-
109
known smoke signal technique and the famous Plains sign language
also served the reconnaissance patrols well.
Some tribes merely chose their scouts from among the clever
men, often changing them daily to prevent fatigue. There were a
few, though not many, who had permanent professional scouts. The
men were generally those who had Wolf or Coyote for their super-
natural guardian. This was true, for example, of the Kutenai. Those
who had Wolfe societies, or lodges in which certain members were
Wolves, generally utilized them as scouts. For example, the of-
ficials known as Wolf Hide Bearers in the Oglala Wolf Cult per-
formed this duty.5
It is interesting to note that Wolf in one form or another was the
patron spirit of war all over the Plains.6 He was primarily the genius
of the intelligence service, the ruthless, crafty, cautious hunter. This
may well be taken as symbolic of all Plains, or of all American Indian
warfare. Its prototype was the shrewd stalker and, as Wolfs depre-
dations depended upon intelligence, the Indians hunted men in the
same manner. The service of intelligence was the one branch of their
art of war which was perfectly developed.
One method of gathering military intelligence or effecting counter-
reconnaissance practiced by many Indians was the use of magic.
Among the Flathead there was an especial class of shamans who
were believed to be able to project their vision wherever they wished.7
When a Northern Saulteaux chief had chosen his war party, a shaman
would smoke and send his pipe into the air in the direction of the
enemy. The enemy shaman did the same thing, apparently in the
spirit of sportsmanship. When the enemy pipe arrived, the chief
of the party smoked it almost to the finish. The shaman then made
a speech. After this a great noise was heard first in the east, then
in file north, then in the south, and at last in the west. At this a bat
appeared and told the council the position and strength of the enemy.
These people also had shamans who could gaze into a smoked glass
4 Karsten op. cit., p. 5.
5 Wissler, op. cit., p. 91.
6 Robert H. Lowie, Plains Age-Societies: Historical and Comparative Summary,
Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History (New York:
1916), XI, Part 8, passim.
7 Harry H. Turney-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, Memoir 48,
American Anthropological Association (Menasha: 1937), p. 29.
no means as well developed in South America as in Mrica. 4 The well known smoke signal technique and the famous Plains sign language also served the reconnaissance patrols well. Some tribes merely chose their scouts from among the clever men, often changing them daily to prevent fatigue. There were a few, though not many, who had permanent professional scouts. The men were generally those who had Wolf or Coyote for their super natural guardian. This was true, for example, of the Kutenai. Those who had Wolfe societies, or lodges in which certain members were Wolves, generally utilized them as scouts. For example, the of ficials known as 'Volf Hide Bearers in the Oglala Wolf Cult per fonned this duty. II It is interesting to note that Wolf in one form or another was the patron spirit of war all over the Plains. 6 He was primarily the genius of the intelligence service, the ruthless, crafty, cautious hunter. This may well be taken as symbolic of all Plains, or of all American Indian warfare. Its prototype was the shrewd stalker and, as Wolf's depre dations depended upon intelligence, the Indians hunted men in the same manner. The service of intelligence was the one branch of th e ir art of war which was perfectly developed. One method of gathering military intelligence or effecting counter reconnaissance practiced by many Indians was the use of magic. Among the Flathead there was an especial class of shamans who were believed to be able to project their vision wherever they wished. 7 When a Northern Saulteaux chief had chosen his war party, a shaman would smoke and send his pipe into the air in the direction of the enemy. The enemy shaman did the same thing, apparently in the spirit of sportsmanship. When the enemy pipe arrived, the chief of the party smoked it almost to the finish. The shaman then made a speech. Mter this a great noise was heard first in the east, then in the north, then in the south, and at last in the west. At this a bat appeared and told the council the position and strength of the enemy. These people also had shamans who could gaze into a smoked glass
op. cit., p. 5. 5 Wissler, op. cit., p. 9 1 . 6 Robert H. Lowie, Plains Age-Societies: Historical a nd Comparative Summary, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History ( New York : 1916 ) , XI, Part 8, passim. 7 Harry H. Turney-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, Memoir 48, American Anthropological Association ( Menasha : 1937 ) , p. 29.
4 Karsten
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1 10
110 Primitive War and describe the enemy strength and position.3 Perhaps shamanistic
Primitive War
military leadership was most highly developed on the North Pacific
Coast.
Counter-reconnaissance was secured in the Southwest by shamans
causing dust storms to blow. The Teton liked to attack under the cover
of rain, so the shamans sprinkled a wolf hide to make the rain come.
Wissler relates that the Oglala Hide Bearers of the Wolf cult could
make the weather cloudy to screen a raid. Those woodland people
who had war bundles often sought military information from them
by elaborate ceremonials.9
The gathering of information by actual spies or intelligence op-
eratives within the enemy lines or villages was quite rare in America.
It was common in Africa, as will be seen. This may or may not have
been the result of the great linguistic variation of America. There
is some reason to think that the Iroquois Confederacy used this de-
vice, and Flathead informants insist that they did. Their language
contains words meaning to dress as a Crow or a Blackfoot with the
intent of visiting the enemy camp for purposes of espionage. Ac-
cording to Karsten, espionage among the Jibaro covered every de-
tail as well as any moder n Deuxieme Bureau could desire.10
The African Kingdom of Dahomey maintained a well organized
spy service in the villages its king intended to assail. No moder
power could excel Dahomey in this. Their king went to war on a
sure thing, thanks to his G2. A shrewd bit of intelligence work, not
unknown to modern powers, was performed in Nigeria. Neutral
towns were bribed to bring news of any movement on the part of a
suspected enemy. Ambushes were prepared upon receipt of such
intelligence with expectable results.11 Neutrals have never been pop-
ular with belligerents, nor has harboring hostile spies increased good
feeling towards them.
The Zulu were most adept at gathering military information, as the
next chapter shows. But able as these warriors were, they were not
above using shamanistic rites for intelligence purposes any more than
s Alanson B. Skinner, Notes on the Eastern Cree and the Northern Saulteaux,
Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History (New York: 1911),
IX, pp. 165f.
9 Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menamini Indians, pp.
l00ff.
10 Karsten, op. ctt., p. 20.
" Talbot, op. at., p. 237.
and describe the enemy strength and position. 8 Perhaps shamanistic military leadership was most highly developed on the North Pacific Coast. Counter-reconnaissance was secured in the Southwest by shamans causing dust storms to blow. The Teton liked to attack under the cover of rain, so the shamans sprinkled a wolf hide to make the rain come. Wissler relates that the Oglala Hide Bearers of the Wolf cult could make the weather cloudy to screen a raid. Those woodland people who had war bundles often sought military information from them by elaborate ceremonials.9 The gathering of information by actual spies or intelligence op eratives within the enemy lines or villages was quite rare in America. It was common in Mrica, as will be seen. This may or may not have been the result of the great linguistic variation of America. There is some reason to think that the Iroquois Confederacy used this de vice, and Flathead informants insist that they did. Their language contains words meaning to dress as a Crow or a Blackfoot with the intent of visiting the enemy camp for purposes of espionage. Ac cording to Karsten, espionage among the Jibaro covered every de tail as well as any modem Deuxieme Bureau could desire.1o The Mrican Kingdom of Dahomey maintained a well organized spy service in the villages its king intended to assail. No modem power could excel Dahomey in this. Their king went to war on a I sure thing, thanks to his C2. A shrewd bit of intelligence work, not unknown to modem powers, was performed in Nigeria. Neutral towns were bribed to bring news of any movement on the part of a suspected enemy. Ambushes were prepared upon receipt of such intelligence with expectable results. l l Neutrals have never been pop ular with belligerents, nor has harboring hostile spies increased good feeling towards them. The Zulu were most adept at gathering military information, as the next chapter shows. But able as these warriors were, they were not above using shamanistic rites for intelligence purposes any more than
8 Alanson B. Skinner, Notes on the Eastern Cree and the Northern Saulteaux, Anthropological Papers, American Musewn of Natural History ( New York : 191 1 ) , IX, pp. 165f. 9 Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini Indians, pp. 1000. 1 0 Karsten, op. cit., p. 20. 1 1 Talbot, op. cit., p. 237.
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 111 were the Saulteaux. Their functionaries would observe two vessels
111
were th e Saulteaux.
Their functionaries would observe two vessels ' The behavior of the froth in the ves Perhaps the shaman set two
in which magical mixtures had been brewed, one representing the
in which magical mixtures had been brewed, one representing the Zulu and the other the enemy. sels was thought to foretell victory.
Zulu and the other the enemy. The behavior of the froth in the ves-
sels was thought to foretell victory. Perhaps the shaman set two
sticks in the ground likewise representing each side. The side would
lose whose stick would first be blown over by the wind.12 The king
would also send spies to acquire some property of the enemy chief
sticks in the ground likewise representing each side.
over which he and his shamans could perform magic.13 Such state-
The side would lose whose stick would first be blown over by the wind. 1 2 The king Such state- ,
ments seem necessary to remind us that in spite of their fine war sys-
tem, the Zulu were a nonliterate people. Yet while the army was on
would also send spies to acquire some property of the enemy chief over which he and his shamans could perform magic.1S tern, the Zulu were a nonliterate people. ments seem necessary to remind us that in spite of their fine war sys- , Yet while the army was on ' Reliance was really the march, magic was not of paramount importance, though there were "doctors" aplenty along in a staff capacity. put on scouts sent by twos and threes ahead of the advanced guard. When the enemy was located the main body was informed by run ners . 1 4 Military intelligence was highly developed in Oceania. American Indian was . Th e Mel anesians were most expert in this work, for the same reason that the The Kiwai Papuans normally sent out scouts called "ghost people" to estimate resistance and to spy out the land. Their chief function was to aid in accomplishing the surround of the hostile village. 1 :! In addition, both Melanesians and Polynesians tried to obtain in telligence from the behavior of animals and other magical means. Birds were thought to give notice of the enemy in New Britain. Omens were observed and their appearance would alter a war party's behavior.
the march, magic was not of paramount importance, though there
were "doctors'' aplenty along in a staff capacity. Reliance was really
put on scouts sent by twos and threes ahead of the advanced guard.
When the enemy was located the main body was informed by run-
ners."
Military intelligence was highly developed in Oceania. The Mel-
anesians were most expert in this work, for the same reason that the
American Indian was. The Kiwai Papuans normally sent out scouts
called "ghost people" to estimate resistance and to spy out the land.
Their chief function was to aid in accomplishing the surround of the
hostile village.15
In addition, both Melanesians and Polynesians tried to obtain in-
telligence from the behavior of animals and other magical means.
Birds were thought to give notice of the enemy in New Britain.
Omens were observed and their appearance would alter a war party's
behavior. A snake on the road, for example, indicated that the enemy
was in position on the boundary, and the war party disposed itself
accordingly.16 A bird flying across the path of a Samoan party was
a bad omen, and if they saw a rainbow behind them instead of in
front, they postponed the attack.17
Practically every type of military intelligence method was utilized
by the Eurasiatic barbarians. The arctic tribes relied heavily on mag-
ical and ornithological methods. Bogoraz says the Chuckchee relied
12 Kidd, op. cit., pp. 308f.
Krige, op. cit., p. 268.
i* Ibid., p. 274.
15 Landtman, op. cit., p. 159.
A snake on the road, for example, indicated that the enemy
Ibid., p. 169.
was in position on the boundary, and the war party disposed itself accordingly. 1 6 A bird flying across the path of a Samoan party was
a bad omen, and if they saw a rainbow behind them instead of in

front, they postponed the attack. 1 7 Practically every type o f military intelligence method was utilized by the Eurasiatic barbarians. The arctic tribes relied heavily on mag ical and ornithological methods. 1 2 Kidd, op. cit., pp. 308. 18 Krige, op. cit., p. 268.
If
Bogoraz says the Chuckchee relied
Ibid., p . 274. 111 Landbnan, op. cit., p. 159. 1 6 B rown, op. cit., p. 154.
1 7 Ibid., p. 169.
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112
112 Primitive War heavily on incantation. The arctic tern was considered both their
Primitive War
The arctic tern was considered both their against sudden attack. 1 8 Julius
heavily on incantation . chief sentinel and
chief sentinel and Deuxieme Bureau against sudden attack.1s
Deuxieme Bureau
The Iron Age Europeans were somewhat more realistic. Julius
Caesar said that it was the regular habit of the Gauls to compel travel-
The Iron Age Europeans were somewhat more realistic.
lers and merchants to halt and to tell all they knew of other peoples,
Caesar said that it was the regular habit of the Gauls to compel travel even against their wilJ. 1 9 lers and merchants to halt and to tell all they knew of other peoples, He thought the motive in gathering such tactical and strategic information was creditable, but said the Gauls' lack of analysis and intelligence critique led them into fatal gullibility. Their visitors often told them some very tall tales . One of the chief functions of military intelligence is to effect sur prise on the enemy. the art of war. victory. The American Indian, as well as most other nonliterates, was adept in the use of surprise. type. Especially is this true of the hunters. Such expertness has given rise to a plethora of remarks of the following This one is by DeVries on the Leni Lenape of Delaware :
As soldiers they are far from be i n g honorable, but perfidious, and ac complish all their deSigns by treachery; they also use many stratagems to deceive their enemies and execute by night al most all their plans that are in any way hazardous . 2 0
even against their will.19 He thought the motive in gathering such
tactical and strategic information was creditable, but said the Gauls'
lack of analysis and intelligence critique led them into fatal gullibility.
Their visitors often told them some very tall tales.
One of the chief functions of military intelligence is to effect sur-
prise on the enemy. The principle of surprise is one of the greatest in
the art of war. He who has effected a surprise has gone far towards
victory.
The American Indian, as well as most other nonliterates, was adept
in the use of surprise. Especially is this true of the hunters. Such
The principle of surprise is one of the greatest in
expertness has given rise to a plethora of remarks of the following
type. This one is by DeVries on the Leni Lenape of Delaware:
He who has effected a surprise has gone far towards
As soldiers they are far from being honorable, but perfidious, and ac-
complish all their designs by treachery; they also use many stratagems to
deceive their enemies and execute by night almost all their plans that
are in any way hazardous.20
This Dutch remark regarding the uses of the principle of surprise
is pure nonsense. The principle always has been and always will be
important. The only critical remark to be made on this score applies
to almost all Indians, which is to call attention to their almost com-
plete reliance on this principle to the exclusion of most of the others.
As for the comment on the treacherous character of the Leni Lenape,
DeVries would have done well to have omitted it. There is no more
damning chronicle of white treachery than that contained in his
Journal. Most of the Dutch victories over the Indians were accom-
plished through broken promises and the mass murder of undefended
This Dutch remark regarding the uses of the principle of surprise is pure nonsense. important. The principle always has been and always will be The only critical remark to be made on this score applies
villagers.
The French explorer Romans made a similarly condescending re-
mark regarding the Chickasaw to the southeast, but most of his sneers
are applicable to almost any modern commander.
to almost all Indians, which is to call attention to their almost com plete reliance on this principle to the exclusion of most of the others. As for the comment on the treacherous character of the Leni Lenape, DeVries would have done well to have omitted it. There is no more damning chronicle of white treachery than that contained in his
Js Bogoraz, op. tit., p. 646.
20 DeVries, in Clark Wissler, The Indians of Greater New fork and the Lower
Hudson, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History (New
York: 1909), III, pp. 281f.
Joumal.
villagers.
Most of the Dutch victories over the Indians were accom
plished through broken promises and the mass murder of undefended The French explorer Romans made a similarly condescending re mark regarding the Chickasaw to the southeast, but most of his sneers are applicable to almost any modem commander.
1 8 Bogoraz, op. cit., p. 646. 1 9 Caesar, op. cit., iv. 5. 2 0 DeVries, in Cl ark Wissler, The Indians of Greater New York and tile Lower Hudson, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History ( New York : 1 909 ) , III, pp. 281.
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 113 They make war by stratagem, surprise, or ambush, despising us as
1 13
fools for exposing ourselves to be shot at like marks. A man's valour
with them consists in their cunning, and as he is deemed the greatest
hero who employs most art in surprising his enemy; they never strike
a blow unless they think themselves sure of a retreat, and the loss of
many men is an infamous crime laid to the charge of the party.21
They make war by stratagem, surprise, or ambush, despising us as fools for exposing ourselves to be shot at like marks. A man's valour with them consists in their cunning, and as he is deemed the greatest hero who employs most art in surprising his enemy; they never strike a blow unless they think themselves sure of a retreat, and the loss of many men is an infamous crime laid to the charge of the party .2 1
Apparently intelligence was condemned in the soldiers of Romans'
day. Cannon-fodder attitudes are not well-considered today, how-
ever, and apparently the Chickasaw had truly modern views.
One would expect the simple hunters of Africa to be expert at '
surprise and to rely almost entirely upon it, but it is surprising to
Apparently intelligence was condemned in the soldiers of Romans' day. Cannon-fodder attitudes are not well-considered today, how ever, and apparently the Chickasaw had truly modern views. One would expect the simple hunters of Africa to be expert at surprise and to rely almost entirely upon it, but it is surprising to iscover that such a well-organized, efficient kingdom as Dahomey d did the same thing. In spite of the most civilized preparations made for war, the Dahomeans were really tactically simple. Reliance on surprise as " the essential tactic of Dahomean warfare" marked them as primitive warriors after all. In commendable contrast, however, they themselves were very hard to surprise. Their vast network of spies in enemy territories prevented this. They knew the enemis situation even better than did the Zulu. They knew his terrain, his population, his resources, and generally his intentions.22 The Nigerian Oronn relied on surprise very much as did the Ojibway killing a hut-full of Sioux. This would be expected of hunters. The Oronn chose some compound apart from the others and took great pains to hew a secret path through the dense brush almost up to the house. There they lay in ambush until some inhabi tant left his house to pedorm a chore. They would shoot him in cold blood and flee down their secret path. Often the dead man's kin, gathering in sorrow around his corpse, would senselessly provide another target.23 Nigerians so valued the principle of surprise that no one of a war party was allowed to scratch the terrible insect bites of the region for fear the slight noise might alarm the enemy.2-i Note again another Ojibway-Jibaro surprise murder method from Nigeria. A s m all band would creep up to an enemy house at night. They would silently pour water on the mud wall so that they could cauti ously dig away a hole with their fingers. They would peer through this to find the sleeping head of the house and shoot him with a
2 1 Romans, Natural History of East and West Florida ( New York : 1775 ) ,
discover that such a well-organized, efficient kingdom as Dahomey'
did the same thing. In spite of the most civilized preparations made
for war, the Dahomeans were really tactically simple. Reliance on
surprise as "the essential tactic of Dahomean warfare" marked them
as primitive warriors after all. In commendable contrast, however,
they themselves were very hard to surprise. Their vast network of
spies in enemy territories prevented this. They knew the enemy's
situation even better than did the Zulu. They knew his terrain, his
population, his resources, and generally his intentions.22
The Nigerian Oronn relied on surprise very much as did the
Ojibway killing a hut-full of Sioux. This would be expected of
hunters. The Oronn chose some compound apart from the others
and took great pains to hew a secret path through the dense brush
almost up to the house. There they lay in ambush until some inhabi-
tant left his house to perform a chore. They would shoot him in
cold blood and flee down their secret path. Often the dead man's
kin, gathering in sorrow around his corpse, would senselessly provide
another target.23 Nigerians so valued the principle of surprise that
no one of a war party was allowed to scratch the terrible insect bites
of the region for fear the slight noise might alarm the enemy.24 Note
again another Ojibway-Jibaro surprise murder method from Nigeria.
A small band would creep up to an enemy house at night. They
would silently pour water on the mud wall so that they could cauti-
ously dig away a hole with their fingers. They would peer through
this to find the sleeping head of the house and shoot him with a
21 Romans, Natural History of East and West Florida (New York: 1775),
p. 70.
22 Herskovits, op. ctt., I, pp. 15-17.
2 Talbot, op. cft., p. 236.
2* Ibid., p. 233.
p . 70. 22 Herskovits, op. cit., I, pp. 15-17. 23 Talbot, op. cit., p. 236. 2-i Ibid., p. 233.
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1 14
114 Primitive War musket. Talbot says that to this day fear of this fate impels the
Primitive War
Ofonn chiefs to build their sleeping rooms in the center of the com-
pound and to erect thick, low mud walls around their couches.2"
musket. Talbot says that to this day fear of this fate impels the Oro-nn chiefs to build their sleeping rooms in the center of the com pound and to erect thick, low mud walls around their couches. 2 11 Even the southeast Bantu did not hesitate to use such primitive methods before Dingiswayo and Chaka civilized them. Kidd says that some tribes accustomed themselves to raw meat so that they could subsist in ambush for days without betraying their presence by fire. They would sneak up to a kraal at night and station killers at the door of each hut. Others would go to the rear and fire the houses in the Jibaro fashion. The witless inhabitants were killed as they crawled through the low doors on their hands and knees.2 6 The principle of surprise was highly developed in Melanesia, as with all simple folk. Polynesians used it less, in fact often threw away any advantage it might have given them in order to conform to their ceremonial pattern. The blacker people, though, relied on it almost entirely. Brown says that the men of New Britain "did not consider it to be any disgrace to use treachery, concealment, or am bush in war; in fact, these were to them the proper way of carrying on war. "27 Neither do civilized soldiers consider any of these things disgraceful, but we need not dwell on that. Mter commenting on their dislike for close fighting and love of boasting, a missionary says of the Gaua warriors on Santa Maria, Banks Islands, that six men like to lie in wait for one victim. If the first shot fails, they take to their heels and wait for better luck next time. If they succeed, they may expect the dead man's kin to try the same thing on them. 2 8 The same author describes a descent from the sea in San Cristoval, Solomon Islands, Northern Melanesia. The landing was not made until darkness. Then the enemy was surrounded. Dawn was awaited so that no victim could escape in the dark. The war cry was given in the first light and the butchery began. 2 9 It is useless to repeat that in an over-reliance on surprise the Euro pean barbarians revealed their savagery. The use of "treachery," which the moralistic writers are so fond of attributing to men with out writing, is and must be essential to warfare, including anything
Ibid., p. 237. IGdd, op. cit., p. 304. Brown, op. cit. , p. 154. Coombe, op. cit., pp. 57. 2 9 Ibid., pp. 219f.
Even the southeast Bantu did not hesitate to use such primitive
methods before Dingiswayo and Chaka civilized them. Kidd says
that some tribes accustomed themselves to raw meat so that they
could subsist in ambush for days without betraying their presence by
fire. They would sneak up to a kraal at night and station killers at
the door of each hut. Others would go to the rear and fire the
houses in the Jibaro fashion. The witless inhabitants were killed as
they crawled through the low doors on their hands and knees.26
The principle of surprise was highly developed in Melanesia, as
with all simple folk. Polynesians used it less, in fact often threw
away any advantage it might have given them in order to conform
to their ceremonial pattern. The blacker people, though, relied on
it almost entirely. Brown says that the men of New Britain "did not
consider it to be any disgrace to use treachery, concealment, or am-
bush in war; in fact, these were to them the proper way of carrying
on war."27 Neither do civilized soldiers consider any of these things
disgraceful, but we need not dwell on that.
After commenting on their dislike for close fighting and love of
boasting, a missionary says of the Gaua warriors on Santa Maria,
Banks Islands, that six men like to lie in wait for one victim. If the
first shot fails, they take to their heels and wait for better luck next
time. If they succeed, they may expect the dead man's kin to try
the same thing on them.2s The same author describes a descent
from the sea in San Cristoval, Solomon Islands, Northern Melanesia.
The landing was not made until darkness. Then the enemy was
surrounded. Dawn was awaited so that no victim could escape in
the dark. The war cry was given in the first light and the butchery
began.29
It is useless to repeat that in an over-reliance on surprise the Euro-
pean barbarians revealed their savagery. The use of "treachery,"
which the moralistic writers are so fond of attributing to men with-
out writing, is and must be essential to warfare, including anything
zs Ibid., p. 237.
26 Kidd, op. tit., p. 304.
" Brown, op. tit., p. 154.
2s Coombe, op. tit., pp. 57f.
29 Ibid. . 219f.
,.
Ibid., pp. 219f.
2 11 21 27 28
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 115 we can foresee in the future. Indeed, the recent war indicated a
1 15
marked return to the savage reliance on the principle since without
surprise the attack airplane has little value against military person-
nel.
The surprise element was well undertaken by certain ancient Ger-
we can foresee in the future. Indeed, the recent war indicated a marked return to the savage reliance on the principle since without surprise the attack airplane has little value against military person nel. The surprise element was well undertaken by certain ancient Ger mans who were trying to cross the Rhine against the Celtic Menapii who were trying to prevent their passage. There was a good plan in this action as well. The Menapian service of security had been too good for the Germans to rely on brute surprise, so they had to think up a ruse. The Germans then pretended to retire to their own land and the Menapian scouts reported all clear. They went three days away to effect this stratagem, but in a single night the fine German cavalry wheeled and attacked, catching the Menapii complacent and unprepared. The Menapii could only die. 8 o Nonliterate tribes have not been described as submilitary because they used surprise but because they relied almost exclusively upon it. The ancient Germans used it as just described, but did not give up because their original surprise attack failed. Nevertheless, they were not above the common American or r>.lelanesian night surprise and surround. The Roman Tacitus said that the Harii, a tribe of Lugii, were a strong, fierce, artful people. They liked to paint themselves and equipment black and attack on the darkest nights, striking "like an army of ghosts." They were universally successful, partly because of their phantasmal appearance, for "in every battle after all the eye is conquered first. "8 1 The same author shows that the Scots could also make able use of this principle. His father-in-law Agricola once divided his forces in the face of the enemy, which should have brought him to Custer's fate. As it was, the Scots apparently were shrewd enough to appreci ate the blunder and tried to take advantage of it. They attempted a night attack by combined forces on the weakest legion, chopping through the pickets and charging the sleepy Romans.32 Tacitus made a poor amanuensis here for his parent-in-law. In this passage, how ever, it is implied that the Scots made an able combination of the prin ciples of intelligence, surprise, cooperation, mass, and concerted effort. The battle finally went to the Romans due to their superior handling of the last three of these principles. Even then the defeated Scots
8 0 Caesar, op. cit., iv. 4. 8 1 Tacitus, ap. cit., 43. 8 2 Cornelius Tacitus, Agricola, 25-26.
mans who were trying to cross the Rhine against the Celtic Menapii
who were trying to prevent their passage. There was a good plan
in this action as well. The Menapian service of security had been too
good for the Germans to rely on brute surprise, so they had to think
up a ruse. The Germans then pretended to retire to their own land
and the Menapian scouts reported all clear. They went three days
away to effect this stratagem, but in a single night the fine German
cavalry wheeled and attacked, catching the Menapii complacent and
unprepared. The Menapii could only die.30
Nonliterate tribes have not been described as submilitary because
they used surprise but because they relied almost exclusively upon it.
The ancient Germans used it as just described, but did not give up
because their original surprise attack failed. Nevertheless, they were
not above the common American or Melanesian night surprise and
surround. The Roman Tacitus said that the Harii, a tribe of Lugii,
were a strong, fierce, artful people. They liked to paint themselves
and equipment black and attack on the darkest nights, striking "like
an army of ghosts." They were universally successful, partly because
of their phantasmal appearance, for "in every battle after all the eye
is conquered first."31
The same author shows that the Scots could also make able use of
this principle. His father-in-law Agricola once divided his forces in
the face of the enemy, which should have brought him to Custer's
fate. As it was, the Scots apparently were shrewd enough to appreci-
ate the blunder and tried to take advantage of it. They attempted
a night attack by combined forces on the weakest legion, chopping
through the pickets and charging the sleepy Romans.32 Tacitus made
a poor amanuensis here for his parent-in-law. In this passage, how-
ever, it is implied that the Scots made an able combination of the prin-
ciples of intelligence, surprise, cooperation, mass, and concerted effort.
The battle finally went to the Romans due to their superior handling
of the last three of these principles. Even then the defeated Scots
Tacitus, op. cit., 43.
*2 Cornelius Tacitus, Agricola, 25-26.
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1 16
116 Primitive War saved themselves from extinction at the hands of a determined and
Primitive War
saved themselves from extinction at the hands of a determined and vengeful foe by proper use of the terrain. The Viking raids were famous for the use of surprise. The Norse were quite capable of fighting pitched battles, but they were not above the use of the night surprise, stealthy house-burning, and murder which would do credit to Ecuador, Papua, Minnesota, or the Congo. It is said that this practice was not well thought-of, but it The Icelandic sagas speak of one Earl Rogn This they surrounded and fired by was used nevertheless.
vengeful foe by proper use of the terrain.
The Viking raids were famous for the use of surprise. The Norse
were quite capable of fighting pitched battles, but they were not
above the use of the night surprise, stealthy house-burning, and
murder which would do credit to Ecuador, Papua, Minnesota, or the
Congo. It is said that this practice was not well thought-of, but it
was used nevertheless. The Icelandic sagas speak of one Earl Rogn-
vald who came with his men by stealth to the house of King Vemund
while the latter was feasting. This they surrounded and fired by
night, burning the king and his men, and appropriating their ships
and property.33
vald who came with his men by stealth to the house of King Vemund while the latter was feasting. night, burning the king and his men, and appropriating their ships and property. 33 The use of the principle of surprise among the Paleo-Siberian rein deer nomads is reminiscent of the folk east of Bering Strait. often fought, even crossing Bering Strait to do so. stand-up battles of sorts . Chuck chee warfare was remarkably like that of the E skimo, with whom they The Chuckchee are described as being frank with their enemies and often fighting Most of their stories of past wars, however, are tales of "surprise, nightly attacks, and murder of the sleeping."34 Confronted with an aggressive enemy relying on the principle of surprise, any group which wishes to survive has but one answer, eternal vigilance. security. This means able observation of the principle of
The use of the principle of surprise among the Paleo-Siberian rein-
deer nomads is reminiscent of the folk east of Bering Strait. Chuck-
chee warfare was remarkably like that of the Eskimo, with whom they
often fought, even crossing Bering Strait to do so. The Chuckchee
are described as being frank with their enemies and often fighting
stand-up battles of sorts. Most of their stories of past wars, however,
are tales of "surprise, nightly attacks, and murder of the sleeping."34
Confronted with an aggressive enemy relying on the principle of
surprise, any group which wishes to survive has but one answer,
eternal vigilance. This means able observation of the principle of
security. A United States Army publication says, "Security in a mili-
tary sense means measures to prevent surprise. A commander may
be excused for being defeated, but never for being surprised."35
Such security may be obtained by information regarding the enemy,
which means continuous reconnaissance. In the field, there must be
covering detachments flung to the fore, rear, and the flanks. Military
intelligence work must be constant. Correct formations must be ob-
served on the march, in camp, and in battle to prevent any initial sur-
prise from being successful. Concealment and cover must be used
intelligently. Fortifications must be built within reason, but not
A United States Army publication says, "Security in a mili

A commander may
enough to permit defensive Maginot complacency. After all, ag-
tary sense means measures to prevent surprise.
gression and initiative are the best protection against surprise. An
enemy will hardly ever surprise you if you have him on the defensive
be excused for being defeated, but never for being surprised. "3 5 Such security may be obtained by infonnation regarding the enemy, which means continuous reconnaissance. intelligence work must be constant. prise from being successful. intelligently. In the field, there must be Military covering detachments flung to the fore, rear, and the flanks.
or on the run.
33 Snorri Sturluson, The Heimskringla, W. Morris and E. Magnusson, trans.,
4 vols. (London: 1893), I, pp. 93f.
34 Bogoraz, op. cit., pp. 6451.
Correct formations must be ob
served on the march, in camp, and in battle to prevent any initial sur Concealment and cover must be used Mter all, ag Fortifications must be built within reason, but not
An
enough to pennit defensive Maginot complacency.
enemy will hardly ever surprise you if you have him on the defensive or on the run. 3 3 Snorri Sturluson, The Heimskringla, W. Morris and E. Magnusson. 4 vols. ( London: 1893 ) , I. pp. 93. 3 4 Bogoraz. op. cit., pp. 645. 3 5 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry. p. 5.
trans .
gression and initiative are the best protection against surprise.
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 117
1 17
The miserable observation of the principle of security by most American Indians is frankly incomprehensible. It would seem that the aggressor who so completely relied on surprise would take pains to see that he himself was not surprised, but this seldom occurred and the clever scouts of the Great Plains were the worst. While living They in th e M iddle West the Sioux had no concept of the principle. non -agricultural Plainsmen. detachment of white troops. were unwilling to learn . bison hunters normally were.
The miserable observation of the principle of security by most
American Indians is frankly incomprehensible. It would seem that
the aggressor who so completely relied on surprise would take pains
to see that he himself was not surprised, but this seldom occurred and
the clever scouts of the Great Plains were the worst. While living
in the Middle West the Sioux had no concept of the principle. They
did not learn it when they moved onto the Plains, nor did any of the
non-agricultural Plainsmen. The semi-agricultural people developed
their system of sentinels and Cossack posts as well as did any small
did not learn it when they moved onto the Plains, nor did any of the The semi-agricultural people developed The bison hunters had their teachers but The The core pattern of Plains war was to their system of sentinels and Cossack posts as well as did any small The farmers were seldom surprised.
detachment of white troops. The bison hunters had their teachers but
were unwilling to learn. The farmers were seldom surprised. The
bison hunters normally were. The core pattern of Plains war was to
sneak into a village, steal a few good horses and women, and to
slaughter some of the sleepers before the hostile party was discovered.
The hunting tribes rarely erected effective works or even fences
around their villages, though they had the raw materials at hand.
They never learned the value of posting sentinels, although both the
sneak into a village, steal a few good horses and women , and to slaughter some of the sleepers before the hostile party was discovered. The hunting tribes rarely erected effective works or even fences around their villages, though they had the raw materials at hand. They never learned the value of posting sentinels, although both the defenders and attackers relied entirely upon surprise and shock. In light of the perfect state to which they developed intelligence, it is incomprehensible why they neglected the other side of the picture, the reply to enemy scouting and surprise, the service of security. Certainly one thing is clear : Contiguity and need are no assurances of diffusion . For example, the Plateau Kutenai considered that every healthy young man's nightly job was to patrol the camp and its en virons as mounted vedettes. Kutenai. The nearby Flathead, whom they often fought, never did so and were almost always soundly beaten by the The Kutenai chose their camp sites for defensive positions. Yet the The Flathead preferred to camp in hollows on open ground sur rounded by trees, the most vulnerable positions possible. hung rattles to give the alarm. such a thing . s 6 Flathead did fence their camps with stakes and ropes on which were The Kutenai never thought of doing
defenders and attackers relied entirely upon surprise and shock. In
light of the perfect state to which they developed intelligence, it is
incomprehensible why they neglected the other side of the picture,
the reply to enemy scouting and surprise, the service of security.
Certainly one thing is clear: Contiguity and need are no assurances
of diffusion. For example, the Plateau Kutenai considered that every
healthy young man's nightly job was to patrol the camp and its en-
virons as mounted vedettes. The nearby Flathead, whom they often
fought, never did so and were almost always soundly beaten by the
Kutenai. The Kutenai chose their camp sites for defensive positions.
The Flathead preferred to camp in hollows on open ground sur-
rounded by trees, the most vulnerable positions possible. Yet the
Flathead did fence their camps with stakes and ropes on which were
hung rattles to give the alarm. The Kutenai never thought of doing
such a thing.36
The Siouan neglect of security stood them in bad stead in their
Minnesota war with the Ojibway. The latter were clever at surprise.
They also obtained gunpowder sooner than the Sioux, which they
used to good advantage. In those days the Sioux lived in permanent
mud huts when they were not on the march. It was no trick for the
Ojibway to make grenades, sneak up on the undefended villages,
36 Harry H. Turney-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, Memoir 56, American
Anthropological Association (Menasha: 1941), pp. 162f.
The Siouan neglect of security stood them in bad stead in their M innesota war with the Ojibway. The latter were clever at surprise. They also obtained gunpowder sooner than the Sioux, which they used to good advantage . In those days the Siou x lived in permanent mud huts when they were not on the march. It was no trick for the Ojibway to make grenades, sneak up on the undefended villages,
36 Harry H. Turney-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, Memoir 56, Ame rican Anthropological Association ( Menasha : 1 94 1 ) , pp. 162f.
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1 18
118 Primitive War toss a bomb into the smoke hole of each hut, and accomplish a tell-
Primitive War
toss a bomb into the smoke hole of each hut, and accomplish a tell ing victory in a few minutes. It is easy to overestimate Ojibway superiority. changed the story. Had the Sioux formed the Confederacy of Five Fires soon enough, they might have In effect, the Ojibway planned to rout the Sioux from Minnesota because they themselves were being pressed by other Indians, who in turn were being squeezed westward by the white settlers. The Plainsmen and Plateau people as a whole showed that they had some lmowledge of the principle, for their march security was ex cellent, as shown by several passages of this work. selves. But when camp was made, only the maize-growers of the Plains could guard them Could it be that men with only their lives to save are unwary while those with full bins are cautious? The expectable response to an enemy who deals in stealth is stealth. That the Plains villages normally went to sleep at night with neither sentinel nor fortification is a fact. This did happen, but rarely. Sentry-go would have been a normal function of their military lodges had they but seen it that way. This duty was often the work of a whole sib in the Northeast Woodland. Le M oyne wrote that the Creeks of Florida protected their villages from an enemy notorious for clever stealth by moat and palisade. Sentinels were posted whose scent was so keen that they could smell a foe from afar. Should a village be surprised through the neglect of the sentinels, the culprits were given a ceremonious execution in the chief's presence. 3 7 Le Moyne claimed to have been an eye-witness of such punishment; if so, he witnessed rare in nonliterate America. Observe, too, the disciplined state of march security observed by the neighboring Timucua. Le M oyne says :
a
ing victory in a few minutes.
It is easy to overestimate Ojibway superiority. Had the Sioux
formed the Confederacy of Five Fires soon enough, they might have
changed the story. In effect, the Ojibway planned to rout the Sioux
from Minnesota because they themselves were being pressed by other
Indians, who in turn were being squeezed westward by the white
settlers.
The Plainsmen and Plateau people as a whole showed that they had
some knowledge of the principle, for their march security was ex-
cellent, as shown by several passages of this work. But when camp
was made, only the maize-growers of the Plains could guard them-
selves. Could it be that men with only their lives to save are unwary
while those with full bins are cautious?
The expectable response to an enemy who deals in stealth is stealth.
That the Plains villages normally went to sleep at night with neither
sentinel nor fortification is a fact. Sentry-go would have been a
normal function of their military lodges had they but seen it that way.
This did happen, but rarely. This duty was often the work of a whole
sib in the Northeast Woodland.
Le Moyne wrote that the Creeks of Florida protected their villages
from an enemy notorious for clever stealth by moat and palisade.
Sentinels were posted whose scent was so keen that they could smell
a foe from afar. Should a village be surprised through the neglect of
the sentinels, the culprits were given a ceremonious execution in the
chief's presence.37 Le Moyne claimed to have been an eye-witness
of such punishment; if so, he witnessed a degree of discipline very
rare in nonliterate America.
Observe, too, the disciplined state of march security observed by
the neighboring Timucua. Le Moyne says:
When Saturiwa went to war his men preserved no order, but went
along one after another, just as it happened. On the contrary, his
enemy, Holata Outina, whose name, as now I remember, means "king
of many kings,' and who was much more powerful than he as regards
both wealth and the number of subjects, used to march with regular
ranks, like an organized army; himself marching along in the middle of
the whole force, painted red. On the wings, or horns, of his order of
degree of diSCipline very
march were his young men, the swiftest of whom, also painted red,
37 Le Moyne, in John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and
Their Neighbors, Bulletin 73, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington:
1922), pp. 379f.
When Saturiwa went to war his men preserved no order, but went along one after another, just as it happened. On the contrary, his enemy, Holata Outina, whose name, as now I remember, means 'king of many kings,' and who was much more powerful than he as regards both wealth and the number of subjects, used to march with regular ranks, like an organized army; himself marching along in the middle of the whole force, painted red. On the wings, or horns, of his order of march were his young men, the swiftest of whom, also painted red,
3 7 Le Moyne, in John R. Swanton, Early Hmory of the Creek Indial13 and Their Neighbors, B ulletin 73, B ureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1922 ) , pp. 379f.
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 119 acted as advanced guards and scouts for reconnoitering the enemy.
1 19
These are able to follow up the traces of the enemy by scent as dogs
do wild beasts; and when they come upon such traces they immediately
return to the army to report. And, as we make use of trumpets and
drums to promulgate orders, so they have heralds, who by cries of cer-
tain sorts direct them to halt, or to advance, or to attack, or to per-
form any other military duty. After sunset they halt, and are never
wont to give battle. For encamping they are arranged in squads of ten
each, the bravest being put in squads by themselves. When the chief
has chosen the place of encampment for the night, in open fields or
woods, and after he has eaten, and is established by himself, the quarter-
master places ten of these squads of the bravest in a circle around him.
About ten paces outside of this circle is placed another line of twenty
squads; at twenty yards farther, another of forty squads; and so on,
increasing the number and distance of these lines, according to the
size of the army.3s
This statement is valuable not only for its description of march
order, scouting, and patrolling but particularly for its revelation of
acted as advanced guards and scouts for reconnoitering the enemy. These are able to follow up the traces of the enemy by scent as dogs do wild beasts; and when they come upon such traces they immediately return to the army to report. And, as we make use of trumpets and drums to promulgate orders, so they have heralds, who by cries of cer tain sorts direct them to halt, or to advance, or to attack, or to per form any other military duty. After sunset they halt, and are never wont to give battle. For encamping they are arranged in squads of ten each, the bravest being put in squads by themselves. When the chief has chosen the place of encampment for the night, in open fields or woods, and after he has eaten, and is established by himself, the quarter master places ten of these squads of the bravest in a circle around him . About ten paces outside of this circle is placed another line of twenty squads; at twenty yards farther, another of forty squads ; and so on, increasing the number and distance of these lines, according to the size of the army.3S
the unusually effective service of security for the camp at night. This
is remarkably modern, except that the camp was not ringed by out-
This statement is valuable not only for its description of march

the unusually effective service of security for the camp at night. This order, scouting, and patrolling but particularly for its revelation of
posts according to the principle of increasing resistance in numbers
but by increasing resistance in the valor and efficiency of the posts.
The ferocity of the Apache corn-thieves forced a division of labor
on the Pima which withdrew their male strength from productive
work in the fields. Enemy parties were expected at from weekly to
is remarkably modem, except that the camp was not ringed by out posts according to the principle of increasing resistance in numbers but by increasing resistance in the valor and efficiency of the posts. The ferocity of the Apache com-thieves forced a division of labor on the Pima which withdrew their male strength from productive work in the fields. Enemy parties were expected at from weekly to The women were perforce the tillers. monthly intervals, so sentry-go around the camp by day and night was the chief duty of the men. The Apache liked to attack under the cover of a storm, so stormy Dogs were trained to warn the village of the approach of strangers, and all the trails were guarded. The Pima liked to build little fires around the camp at night, hoping that the foe would come near them and thus reveal themselves.3 9
An exception to the poorly guarded Plains hunting villages is found among the Assiniboin. These people posted sentinels in a ring some
monthly intervals, so sentry-go around the camp by day and night
was the chief duty of the men. The women were perforce the tillers.
The Apache liked to attack under the cover of a storm, so stormy
nights brought on particular vigilance. Dogs were trained to warn
the village of the approach of strangers, and all the trails were
guarded. The Pima liked to build little fires around the camp at
night, hoping that the foe would come near them and thus reveal
themselves.39
An exception to the poorly guarded Plains hunting villages is found
among the Assiniboin. These people posted sentinels in a ring some
two to three hundred yards away from the camp circle and at inter-
vals of from fifty to sixty steps. It no doubt paid them.40
nights brought on particular vigilance.
The people of the forested portions of South America tended to
rely on the village chickens and dogs to give warning of an approach-
ss Ibid., pp. 6f.
39 Frank Russell, "The Pima Indians," Annual Report 26, Bureau of American
Ethnology (Washington: 1904-1905), pp. 200-205.
*0 Denig, op. cit., pp. 548f.
two to three hundred yards away from the camp circle and at inter vals of from fifty to sixty steps. It no doubt paid them.4 0 The people of the forested portions of South America tended to rely on the village chickens and dogs to give warning of an approach8 9 Frank Russell, "The Pima Indians," Annual Report 26, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1904-1905 ) , pp. 200-205. 40 Oenig, op. cit., pp . 548f.
3S
Ibid., pp. 6f.
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120
120 Primitive War
Primitive War
The war drums were then sounded and friends gathered The assailants abandoned the attack in such an instance,
ing enemy. from afar.
ing enemy. The war drums were then sounded and friends gathered
from afar. The assailants abandoned the attack in such an instance,
having no stomach for an effort against an organized position.
having no stomach for an effort against an organized position . This area was notable for the rudimentary use of chemical warfare in security, the closing of areas hard to defend by noxious gases . Chemical warfare based on capsicum was well known among the Arawak and Carib. Fires were lit and laden with capsicum so that The attack the fumes would blow over ground which they wished to interdict to the enemy, thereby releasing fighters for other spaces. windward. gas areas. also built rings of fire around the village and threw in capsicum to This is nothing more nor less than the use of prohibitive The advanced party of the attack consistently introduced The defense likewise threw capsicum grenades to
This area was notable for the rudimentary use of chemical warfare
in security, the closing of areas hard to defend by noxious gases.
Chemical warfare based on capsicum was well known among the
Arawak and Carib. Fires were lit and laden with capsicum so that
the fumes would blow over ground which they wished to interdict to
the enemy, thereby releasing fighters for other spaces. The attack
also built rings of fire around the village and threw in capsicum to
windward. This is nothing more nor less than the use of prohibitive
gas areas. The advanced party of the attack consistently introduced
peppers on coals into the cracks of unwatched houses to force out
the inhabitants. The defense likewise threw capsicum grenades to
irritate the attack.
A similar prohibitive use of noxious materials is reported for Ni-
geria. Before an engagement scouts were sent ahead secretly to lay
magic leaves along the route the enemy must take. Talbot says that
peppers on coals into the cracks of unwatched houses to force out the inhabitants. irritate the attack.
this was not superstition but a clever use of juices from virulent fruits
which would make the hardiest warrior howl with pain if he should
step on them. Men are said to have gone mad from such agony.41
The Nigerians did not hesitate to use -guremagip, however, as they
decked the thoroughfares with the limbs of dead enemies to guard
A similar prohibitive use of noxious materials is reported for Ni

geria. Before an engagement scouts were sent ahead secretly to lay Talbot says that magic leaves along the route the enemy must take.
against surprise. Sometimes roads were interdicted to the foe by
bringing thither magic stones taken from the temples. Goats were
then sacrificed and, as their blood was spilled over the stones, the
names of the deceased members of the chief secret societies were
this was not superstition but a clever use of juices from virulent fruits which would make the hardiest warrior howl with pain if he should The Nigerians did not hesitate to use re magic, however, as they decked the thoroughfares with the limbs of dead enemies to guard against surprise. Sometimes roads were interdicted to the foe by bringin g thither magic stones taken from the temples . Goats were step on them. :r-.fen are said to have gone mad from such agony. 4 1
recited so that they would act as sentries. Farther south the Bechuana
likewise relied on the sentry value of tortured and sacrificed beef
blood rather than on their own eyes, ears, and wakefulness.42
In contrast with this savagery, the post-Dingiswayo Zulu used the
principle of security much as a modern army would. In safe country
the regiment marched in extended regimental formation, with scouts
to the flanks and rear. Close order was maintained on entering the
theater of operations to prevent stragglers from being sniped. About
ten companies preceded the main body in the service of security, with
the additional intent of persuading the enemy that they were the
Talbot, op. cit., p. 235.
names of the deceased members of the chief secret societies were recited so that they would act as sentries. Farther south the Bechuana likewise relied on the sentry value of tortured and sacrificed beef blood rather than on their own eyes, ears, and wakefulness.4 2 In contrast with this savagery, the post-Dingiswayo Zulu used the principle of security much as a modem army would. to the flanks and rear. the regiment marched in extended regimental formation, with scouts theater of operations to prevent stragglers from being sniped. In safe country
then sacrificed and, as their blood was spilled over the stones, the
Kidd, op. cit., pp. 310f.
Close order was maintained on entering the About
the additional intent of persuading the enemy that they were the
ten companies preceded the main body in the service of security, with
4 1 Talbot, op. cit., p . 235. 4 2 Kidd, op. cit., pp. 3 1 0.
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Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise 121 main body. Passwords and countersigns were used to prevent sur-
121
prise on the march and in camp.43
prise on the march and in camp. 43
main body.
Passwords and countersigns were used to prevent sur
The principle of security was observed by a few Melanesians, but
with reference to protecting themselves while on the march rather
The principle of security was observed by a few Melanesians, but with reference to protecting themselves while on the march rather than by guarding or fortifying their villages. The practice of fortify ing the villages was well developed in Polynesia. Polynesians on the march or about to engage in an action took great pains for their security. One missionary says that in Samoa a war party moved in a body with advance and rear guards, while two or three scouts were sen t to locate the enemy.H It was said at the outset of this work that the material culture of For the same reasons but little Certainly the
than by guarding or fortifying their villages. The practice of fortify-
ing the villages was well developed in Polynesia. Polynesians on the
march or about to engage in an action took great pains for their
security. One missionary says that in Samoa a war party moved in
a body with advance and rear guards, while two or three scouts were
sent to locate the enemy.44
It was said at the outset of this work that the material culture of
war would be dealt with very little. For the same reasons but little
will be said regarding primitive military engineering. Certainly the
archeologists have written enough on this subject to satisfy anyone.
There are, however, a few remarks which could be made regarding
the lack of understanding of the principle of security by that branch
of anthropology. There is no doubt that the earlier investigators of
war would be dealt with very little.
the pueblos of Southwest United States erred in attributing too much
\vill be said regarding primitive military engineering.
military significance to the pueblo structures. A healthy reaction set
in, but when an archeologist says that the pueblos were not fortresses
archeologists have written enough on this subject to satisfy anyone. the lack of understanding of the principle of security by that branch of anthropology. There are, however, a few remarks which could be made regarding There is no doubt that the earlier investigators of A healthy reaction set
at all, he has erred. The enemies of these people dealt in surprise.
Furthermore, many of the pueblo structures were admirably adapted
to defense. If they were not so used we can dismiss much of the
sympathy most people have had for their builders. True, not all the
buildings were adaptable for defense, but it is difficult for a trained
the pueblos of Southwest United States erred in attributing too much military significance to the pueblo structures.
soldier to believe that some of them were not. It would be extremely
hard, for example, for the trained eye to view the casa grande as any-
thing other than a fort, even if poorly sited with reference to the de-
in,
but when an archeologist says that the pueblos were not fortresses The enemies of these people dealt in surprise.
fensive terrain.
at all, he has erred. to defense.
So let it be. Fortification of the camp according to the principle
seems to have been best done by the best farmers. Is this not ex-
Furthermore, many of the pueblo structures were admirably adapted If they were not so used we can dismiss much of the True, not all the
pectable? They had something to lose. Furthermore, their socio-
economic systems provided food and training in ways whereby enough
group labor could be summoned to erect the primordial forts. There
sympathy most people have had for their builders.
is no use to go to Peru to see Ollantay Tambo. That work could not
be taken today except with good artillery and air support. The
buildings were adaptable for defense, but it is difficult for a trained soldier to believe that some of them were not. It would be extremely hard, for example, for the trained eye to view the fensive terrain. So let it be. pectable? thing other than a fort, even if poorly sited with reference to the de Fortification of the camp according to the principle Furthermore, their socio Is this not ex
Mandan-Arikara-Hidatsa group had quite enough. So did many oth-
ers. The Canichanas of Southwest Amazonia entrenched their vil-
casa grande
as any
; Krige, op. at., pp. 273f.
seems to have been best done by the best farmers. They had something to lose.
economic systems provided food and training in ways whereby enough group labor could be summoned to erect the primordial forts. be taken today except with good artillery and air support. M andan-Arikara-Hidatsa group had quite enough. ers . is no use to go to Peru to see Ollantay Tambo.
There The
That work could not So did many oth
The Canichanas of Southwest Amazonia entrenched their vil-
43 Krige, op. cit., pp. 273f. 44 Brown, op. cit., p. 166.
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122
122 Primitive War lages against surprise. They used these little citadels as points from
Primitive War
which they could raid their enemies.45 Most of the villages in Ecuador
were protected by approaches full of traps and pitfalls meant to kill
were protected by approaches full of traps and pitfalls meant to kill or maim. They had to be approached with great care. The walls of the houses were strongly built and loopholed for arrows. Similar deadly pits are common in Malaysia, as anyone who has served in the Philippine Scouts or the U. S. regulars can relate. only sensible.
4 Church, op.
They used these little citadels as points from which they could raid their enemies. 4 Most of the villages in Ecuador
lages against surprise.
or maim. They had to be approached with great care. The walls
of the houses were strongly built and loopholed for arrows. Similar
deadly pits are common in Malaysia, as anyone who has served in the
Philippine Scouts or the U. S. regulars can relate. Such things are
only sensible. They do not lead to the introversion, in a particularly
extrovert activity, that can only mean defeat in the long run.
Such things are

run .
They do not lead to the introversion, in a particularly

cU.,
extrovert activity, that can only mean defeat in the long

p . 104.
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CHAPTER 7
Battle Plans
IS IT NOT A TRUISM THAT EVERY HUMAN ACTIVITY OF ANY COMPLEXITY
must be planned? Any business venture, scientific experiment, or
athletic contest succeeds largely because it was soundly planned. Now
war is an extremely complicated activity, requiring close teamwork
according to the principle of cooperation. That such work requires
planning seems too obvious to mention, despite the fact that many
primitive actions are practically planless. One might say with some
justification that it is planning which in part takes war out of the
CHAPTER 7
classification of murder.
The necessity for planning is too patent to be elevated into a mili-
Battle Plans
tary principle. The pertinent generalization is called the principle
of simplicity of plans. Regardless of careful attempts to prevent sur-
prise, to gather intelligence and to make meticulous plans, war con-
tains too many unpredictable eventualities to permit any complexity of
Is
IT I\'OT A TRUISM THAT EVERY HUMAN ACTIVITY OF ANY COMPLEXITY
planning. The "fog of war" is dense at best without the commander
must be planned ?
Any business venture, scientific experiment, or
needlessly increasing it. "Simplicity should be the keynote of tactical
procedure in plans, orders and execution. Only the simplest plan j
athletic contest succeeds largely because it was soundly planned. Now war is an extremely complicated activity, requiring close teamwork according to the principle of cooperation . primitive actions are practically planless. classification of murder. The necessity for planning is too patent to be elevated into a mili tary principle. The pertinent generalization is called the principle Regardless of careful attempts to prevent sur of simplicity of plans. That such work requires One might say with some planning seems too obvious to mention, despite the fact that many justification that it is planning which in part takes war out of the
has any success in war. Never attempt anything complicated. A|
simple plan, whose success does not hinge upon a number of con-
tingencies, is always possible."1 It is not planning which is military
and non-civilian. Any man or woman in active life knows that. The
essential non-civilian element is simplicity. Study the work of the
world's great captains and be convinced. Anthropologists of recent
years have commented on the tendency of human culture to expand
and grow complicated beyond any requirements of practical utility,
apparently just for expansion's own sake. Is this not also true of
planning? Every sociologist knows that unnecessary complexity, com-
plexity beyond the requirements of the situation, is one great cause
of social problems. Most of us in our really honest moments will
123
prise, to gather intelligence and to make meticulous plans, war con tains too many unpredictable eventualities to permit any complexity of plannin g . The "fog of war" is dense at best without the commander needlessly increasing it. has any success in war. " Simplicity should be the keynote of tactical . Only the Simplest plan ; Never attempt anything complicated. procedure in plans, orders and execution.
AI simple plan, whose success does not hinge upon a number of con
It is not planning which is military Any man or woman in active life knows that.
tingencies, is always possible."1 and non-civilian.
The
essential non-civilian element is simplicity. world's great captains and be convinced.
Study the work of the Anthropologists of recent
years have commented on the tendency of human culture to expand and grow complicated beyond any requirements of practical utility, apparently just for expansion's own sake. planning? Is this not also true of Every sociologist knows that unnecessary complexity, com Most of us in our really honest moments will
plexity beyond the requirements of the situation, is one great cause of social problems.

123
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124 Primitive War admit that our lives, our work, recreation, and certainly college courses
Primitive War
It is careful planning that the
admit that our lives, our work, recreation, and certainly college courses of instruction are planned to death. work of the world demands, not that complex planning which is the
of instruction are planned to death. It is careful planning that the
work of the world demands, not that complex planning which is the
refuge of the unimaginative and fearful mind. This sort of thing
may be tolerated in civilian life, but it will not do in war.
There is no need so to sermonize the modern soldier, for he appre-
ciates the principle of simplicity of plans. There is no need so to
refuge of the unimaginative and f arful mind. This SOli of thing may be tolerated in civilian life, but it will not do in war. There is no need so to sermonize the modern soldier, for he appre preach to the sub-civilized warrior, either, for it is difficult to get him to follow any plan at all. . pIe. would guarantee that. \Vhere plans are used they are always simThe small forces involved and lack of troop specialization alone ciates the principle of simplicity of plans. There is no need so to
preach to the sub-civilized warrior, either, for it is difficult to get him
to follow any plan at all. Where plans are used they are always sim-
ple. The small forces involved and lack of troop specialization alone
would guarantee that.
Let us first consider the Eskimo, for he was so pacific that elaborate
battle practice was too much for him. However, contacts with un-
Eskimo ideas did contaminate the west Eskimo to the extent of having
some kind of method. Nelson says that the old way of making war
among the Bering Eskimo was to lie in wait around a village until
night, then to steal to every house and barricade the doors from the
Let us first consider the Eskimo, for he was so pacific that elaborate battle practice was too much for him. some kind of method. H owever, contacts with Ull Eskimo ideas did contaminate the west Eskimo to the extent of having among the Bering Eskimo was to lie in wait around a village until The men of the village being thus confined, the attackers The principle of offensive was Nelson says that the old way of making war
outside. The men of the village being thus confined, the attackers
could leisurely shoot them with arrows through the smoke holes.2
This reveals a rather simple method. The principle of offensive was
observed, as throughout America. The chief element, however, was
the reliance on surprise. This was not as easy to accomplish as it
might seem, since the Bering Eskimo made a half-hearted effort to
guard their villages.
night, then to steal to every house and barricade the doors from the outside. could leisurely shoot them with arrows through the smoke holes.2 This reveals a rather simple method. observed, as throughout America. the reliance on surprise. guard their villages . A complete lack of planning is exhibited in Apache tales. The Apache under Geronimo were the last Indians to give the United aboriginal wars with the Pima, they must have relied on ferocity alone. States Army any field work, but when they were fightin g the old The chief element, however, was
A complete lack of planning is exhibited in Apache tales. The
Apache under Geronimo were the last Indians to give the United
States Army any field work, but when they were fighting the old
aboriginal wars with the Pima, they must have relied on ferocity alone.
Jicarilla war folklore shows complete lack of methodical planning.3
It relates that very soon after men came upon earth from the under-
world, a chief led a war party against some other men. The com-
This was not as easy to accomplish as it
mander allowed the enemy completely to surround his force of five
might seem, since the Bering Eskimo made a half-hearted effort to
hundred during a parley. When the parley failed, it was no trick for
the foe to kill every one of the five hundred.
So it was, too, in California, where simple murder and feud were
more popular than war. The Kato hardly tried more than to lure
some witless individual into close quarters in order to destroy him.
2 Nelson, op. cit., p. 327.
3 Pliny E. Goddard, Jicarilla Apache Texts, Anthropological Papers, American
Museum of Natural History (New York: 1911), VIII, p. 196.
Jicarilla war folklore shows complete lack of methodical planning.s It relates that very soon after men came upon earth from the under world, a chief led a war party against some other men . hundred during a parley. The com mander allowed the enemy completely to surround his force of five the foe to kill every one of the five hundred. \Vhen the parley failed, it was no trick for
So it was, too, in California, where simple murder and feud were more popular than war. The Kato hardly tried more than to lure some witless individual into close quarters in order to destroy him. 2 Nelson, op. cit., p. 327. 3 Pliny E. Goddard, Jicarilla Apache Texts, Anthropological Papers, American M useum of Natural History ( New York : 191 1 ) , VI II , p. 1 96.
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Battle Plans 125 Stand-up fighting was not in favor except in pitched battles, and these
125
Stand-up fighting was not in favor except in pitched battles, and these were long-range affairs with arrows and infinite dodging.4 Skinner lamented that the Menomini of Green Bay, \Visconsin, never fought in the open with large bodies of boops, and lacked method in warfare. Their faith was pinned on ambuscade and raids
were long-range affairs with arrows and infinite dodging.4
Skinner lamented that the Menomini of Green Bay, Wisconsin,
never fought in the open with large bodies of troops, and lacked
method in warfare. Their faith was pinned on ambuscade and raids
by small parties.5 Quite aside from the competence of the Menomini,
such criticism has little meaning. Skinner had the grand strategy of
the War between the States as an ideal, which would have been fatal
in the woods of northern Wisconsin. It is true, though, that most of
the Algonkian peoples, particularly those of the east, never rose above
by small parties. II Quite aside from the competence of the tenomini, such criticism has little meaning. Skinner had the grand strategy of the War between the States as an ideal, which would have been fatal in the woods of northern Wisconsin . It is true, though, that most of
the technique of the raid, which made them easy prey for white men
and Iroquois alike. Some of them could plan a surround, as soon
will be shown, but many of them could plan no more than a bloody
game of tag.
Strangely enough, it was not in the east of the Algonkian range that
the technique of the raid, which made them easy prey for white men and Iroquois alike.
the Algonkian peoples, particularly those of the east, never rose above
one found the best fighting men. The good warriors were not near
the Iroquois and other astute tribes, but in the west, confronted by
Some of them could plan a surround, as soon
the incompetents of the Great Plain. For information on the Central
will be shown, but many of them could plan no more than a bloody
game of tag. Strangely enough, it was not in the east of the Algonkian range that the Iroquois and other astute tribes, but in the west, confronted by the incompetents of the Great Plain . Algonkians, reliance is put on the works of Frances Densmore. One one found the best fighting men. The good warriors were not near
Algonkians, reliance is put on the works of Frances Densmore. One
cannot forbear to remark that there is more insight into military eth-
nology in this musicologist's reports than in the combined works of
many other experts.
The Ojibway were good examples of Central Algonkian superiority.
It is apparent that their greater success in part relied on a social or-
ganization which could bring large numbers into the field. Though
For information on the Central
this book has shown them capable of fatal and primitive incompe-
tence, yet they were one of the few American tribes outside the cen-
tral civilizations who had any strategic sense. Miss Densmore
cannot forbear to remark that there is more insight into military eth nology in this mUSicologist's reports than in the combined works of many other experts. The Ojibway were good examples of Central Algonkian superiority. It is apparent that their greater success in part relied on a social or ganization which could brin g large numbers into the field. Though this book has shown them capable of fatal and primitive incompe tence, yet they were one of the few American tribes outside the cen clearly indicates that the Ojibway were capable of planning to occupy an entire region, and of accomplishing that objecti ve by war.6 tral civilizations who had any
clearly indicates that the Ojibway were capable of planning to occupy
an entire region, and of accomplishing that objective by war.6 I say
by war, for it will be recalled that the wilder tribes of the Southwest
United States were partly responsible for shrinking the pueblo area
not by war but by a simple nuisance technique, making it unprofitable
for the peaceful corn-growers to hold on. But it is an historically
authenticated fact that the Ojibway did plan to drive the Sioux out
of Minnesota onto the Plain, and that they accomplished that mission,
despite the fact that their material equipment was very little better
5 Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini Indians, p. 97.
6 Densmore, Papago Music, passim.
strategic
sense.
Miss
Densmore I say
by war, for it will be recalled that the wilder tribes of the Southwest United States were partly responsible for shrinking the pueblo area not by war but by a simple nuisance technique, makin g it unprofitable for the peaceful com-growers to hold on. But it is an historically authenticated fact that the Ojibway did plan to drive the Sioux out
of Minnesota onto the Plain, and that they accomplished that mission,
despite the fact that their material equipment was very little better
4 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 152. 1\ Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini lndiaru, p. 97. 6 Densmore, Papago Music, passim .
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126 Primitive War than that of the Sioux. The Siouan tribes could not comprehend strat-
Primitive War
The Siouan tribes could not comprehend strat None of their leaders or councils had the ability This one fact
than that of the Sioux. egy or campaigning.
egy or campaigning. None of their leaders or councils had the ability
or authority to plan and carry out such an objective. This one fact
or authority to plan and carry out such an objective.
was enough to throw the balance on the side of the Ojibway. Like
the Iroquois and the Germanic Chatti, they could go to war as well
as to battle.
was enough to throw the balance on the side of the Ojibway. Like the Iroquois and the Gennanic Chatti, they could go to war as well as to battle. Le Moyne wrote of the simple southeastern Timuca, saying that they and their chief Holata Outina never indulged in anything recog nizable to his Seventeenth Century training as a battle. significant, was killed. He said that they were content to call it a day if any one man, no matter how in This gave adequate excuse for a rather elab orate style of head-hunting. Yet one cannot be so sure that Le Moyne gave a good analysis. He was an artist accompanying the military expedition of Laudonniere, and his accuracy of reporting is questionable. He describes as a typical Indian skirmish one which used support and reserves, a rarity in the field reports. The Timuca seem to have scouted the principle of objective and mission, or rather their missions were different from ours. In another section of this book commander Holata Outina is said to have been able to organize his people into admirable forma tions, which is not consistent with planless savagery. It might be that Le Moyne, Romans, and many other early observ ers could not recognize a battle when they saw one, hence they re ported that the tribes had no battle method. This has become almost an idee fixe in the civilian anthropologist and civilized military mind, and one might ask why. of the early reporters. The reason is not hard to find. From the centuries following Gustavus Adol This Skirmishing as light troops was not the European style at the time phus and culminating in Frederick the Great, the musket had de veloped enough efficiency to make it the chief weapon of war. reinstituted the infantry
as
Le Moyne wrote of the simple southeastern Timuca, saying that
they and their chief Holata Outina never indulged in anything recog-
nizable to his Seventeenth Century training as a battle. He said that
they were content to call it a day if any one man, no matter how in-
significant, was killed. This gave adequate excuse for a rather elab-
orate style of head-hunting.
Yet one cannot be so sure that Le Moyne gave a good analysis. He
was an artist accompanying the military expedition of Laudonniere,
and his accuracy of reporting is questionable. He describes as a
typical Indian skirmish one which used support and reserves, a rarity
in the field reports. The Timuca seem to have scouted the principle
of objective and mission, or rather their missions were different from
ours. In another section of this book commander Holata Outina is
said to have been able to organize his people into admirable forma-
tions, which is not consistent with planless savagery.
It might be that Le Moyne, Romans, and many other early observ-
ers could not recognize a battle when they saw one, hence they re-
ported that the tribes had no battle method. This has become almost
an idee fixe in the civilian anthropologist and civilized military mind,
and one might ask why. The reason is not hard to find.
Skirmishing as light troops was not the European style at the time
of the early reporters. From the centuries following Gustavus Adol-
phus and culminating in Frederick the Great, the musket had de-
veloped enough efficiency to make it the chief weapon of war. This
reinstituted the infantry as the Queen of Battles, leading to its pres-
ent, or at least recent status as the chief arm of any battle. It might
be that since the Battle for France and the Ardennes counteroffensive
the textbook tenet, "The infantry mission is the mission," has suddenly
become obsolete, but it worked for over three centuries. The pri-
mary infantry weapon, the musket, was still an inefficient fire device.
It was slow to load and of short effective range. This, at least so it
was thought, necessitated the musketeers firing shoulder to shoulder
in serried ranks by platoons in order to get any effective mass fire. The
movement part of the action had to be supplied by pikemen. This
the Queen of Battles, leading to its pres

arm
ent, or at least recent status as the chief
of any battle.
It might
be that since the Battle for France and the Ardennes counteroffensive the textbook tenet, "The infantry mission is the mission," has suddenly become obsolete, but it worked for over three centuries. The pri mary infantry weapon, the musket, was still an inefficient fire device. It was slow to load and of short effective range. This, at least so it was thought, necessitated the musketeers firing shoulder to shoulder in serried ranks by platoons in order to get any effective mass fire. The movement part of the action had to be supplied by pikemen. This
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Battle Plans 127 massing of infantry destroyed its maneuverability and made the mo-
127
massin g of infantry destroyed its maneuverability and made the mo bility of its heavy lines as nothing. This was a transitional period of This can be said defi infantry tactics and was evidently a mistake. pretty Frederician tactics in America.
bility of its heavy lines as nothing. This was a transitional period of
infantry tactics and was evidently a mistake. This can be said defi-
nitely since two British generals could not rid themselves of the
pretty Frederician tactics in America. Braddock was defeated by the
nitely since two British generals could not rid themselves of the Braddock was defeated by the His General Paken There sound tactics of fire, movement, and utilization of the terrain . failure necessitated another campaign for the west.
sound tactics of fire, movement, and utilization of the terrain. His
failure necessitated another campaign for the west. General Paken-
ham conducted a Frederician parade before New Orleans and suffered
complete defeat at the hands of Jackson's Indian fighters. There-
fore, because the American Indian failed to array a dress parade, he is
accused of having no battle method.
ham conducted a Frederician parade before New Orleans and suffered complete defeat at the hands of Jackson's Indian fighters. accused of having no battle method. Africa was capable of many carefully planned actions, but all the Negroes were not so competent. The Ibo and several other Simpler "Warfare among the Ibo was Sudanese never rose to such levels. fore, because the American Indian failed to array a dress parade, he is l
Africa was capable of many carefully planned actions, but all the
Negroes were not so competent. The Ibo and several other simpler
Sudanese never rose to such levels. "Warfare among the Ibo was
more a matter of affrays and raids than of organized campaigns."7
/The Ibibio had adequate man power and a good command principle,
' but they made no formal arrangements. They set out at dawn in an
unorganized mass, murdering such enemies as they found on the way.
They could conduct an engagement of several days' duration, were
organized and commanded as age-groups, but the fighting took place
\ apparently without plan as the occasion seemed to demand. The
planning principle could be expected only among the better organized
African states. Yet this certainly did not take place automatically.
more a matter of affrays and raids than of organized campaigns. "1 /frhe Ibibio had adequate man power and a good command principle, but they made no formal arrangements. They set out at dawn in an unorganized mass, murdering such enemies as they found on the way. They could conduct an engagement of several days ' duration, were organized and commanded as age-groups, but the fighting took place apparently without plan as the occasion seemed to demand. African states. The planning principle could be expected only among the better organized Yet this certainly did not take place automatically. The efficiently organized kingdom of Dahomey, with all its force and authority, could think of nothing but the grossest animal surround, which was indeed a plan, but a simple and inflexible one. One remark frequently made about Melanesian war is that it lacked method, while another, constantly repeated, is that the Melanesians did not know war in any recognizable sense. Such statements are hardly borne out by the facts. For example, Armstrong says that there was "no real war on Rossel" because the islanders do not fight in the open but "murder secretly in safety." He laments the lack of a
The efficiently organized kingdom of Dahomey, with ah1 its force and
authority, could think of nothing but the grossest animal surround,
which was indeed a plan, but a simple and inflexible one.
One remark frequently made about Melanesian war is that it lacked
method, while another, constantly repeated, is that the Melanesians
did not know war in any recognizable sense. Such statements are
hardly borne out by the facts. For example, Armstrong says that
there was "no real war on Rossel" because the islanders do not fight
in the open but "murder secretly in safety." He laments the lack of a
stand-up fight between ranks or spearmen.s This is just a repetition
of the desire on the part of some reporters for the natives to fight in
close order in the old Frederician manner. Why, indeed, in a forested
country should they abandon the use of cover and "fight in the open"?
i Meek, op. cit., p. 242.
s Wallace E. Armstrong, Rossel Island (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1928), p. 106.
stand-up fight between ranks or spearmen. 8 This is just a repetition of the desire on the part of some reporters for the natives to fight in close order in the old Frederician manner. Why, indeed, in a forested country should they abandon the use of cover and "fight in the open"? 7 Meek, op. cit., p. 242. 8 Wallace E. Annstrong, Rossel Island ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1928 ) , p. 106.
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128 Primitive War Perhaps the typical Melanesian killing was the man-hunt, which
Primitive War
Perhaps the typical Melanesian killing was the man-hunt, which requu'ed little plan or method, but Melanesians did know something else. to earn blood money, but the islanders also made planned punitive actions. surround and dawn attack. The consistent battle plan of primitive war was overwhelmingly the The surround itself \vas an old The time chosen was when the enemy In the Solomons, for example, individual man-stalking was done
required little plan or method, but Melanesians did know something
else. In the Solomons, for example, individual man-stalking was done
to earn blood money, but the islanders also made planned punitive
raids on whole villages and apparently had plenty of inter-group
actions.
raids on whole villages and apparently had plenty of inter-group
The consistent battle plan of primitive war was overwhelmingly the
surround and dawn attack. The time chosen was when the enemy
would be sleepiest and most unwary. The surround itself was an old
method carried over from the surrounding of herd animals in hunting.
It relies almost entirely on surprise. It has something of a formation,
insofar as the surround is really a line bent into a circle. Recall that
the principle of correct formation does not demand that the battle
method carried over from the surrounding of herd animals in hunting. insofar as the surround is really a line bent into a circle. line be straight. the chief ordered his men forward cautiou sly. \Vhen the Kutenai scouts reported contact with an enemy camp, As the simple approach It relies almost entirely on surprise. It has something of a formation, Recall that
would be sleepiest and most unwary.
line be straight.
When the Kutenai scouts reported contact with an enemy camp,
the chief ordered his men forward cautiously. As the simple approach
column arrived at the proper spot, one man turned to the right, the
the principle of correct formation does not demand that the battle
next to the left, the next to the right, and so on until the sleeping camp
was surrounded. When the first two men met they knew the circle
had been formed. These two men then touched the men next to them
in the direction from which they had come. When this touch signal
reached the chief, he blew on his whistle and the Kutenai fell on the
hapless sleepers.9 This was almost the identical battle plan used by
column arrived at the proper spot, one man turned to the right, the was surrounded. next to the left, the next to the right, and so on until the sleeping camp '\Vhen the first two men met they knew the circle These two men then touched the men next to them When this touch Signal
such Central Algonkians as could make any.
The Ecuadorian Jibaro likewise made the attack by night or just
before dawn. A house was cautiously surrounded. When a person
opened the door to come out he was shot and the attackers rushed in
had been formed.
to massacre the inhabitants. If they were not able to penetrate the
house by violence or chicanery they set fire to the thatch, forcing the
in the direction from which they had come. hapless sleepers .9
inhabitants to come out and be killed or remain within and be smoth-
reached the chief, he blew on his whistle and the Kutenai fell on the such Central Algonkians as could make any.
ered. The attack intended to slaughter every defender, an observance
of objective unlike the common North American practice. The inhabi-
This was almost the identical battle plan used by
tants could expect no help from the other villagers for they, at the
first sound of tumult, bolted their own doors and waited for the enemy
to set fire to their own houses in turn. The only hope of escape was
to break through the besieging ring as individuals, and that was a
The Ecuadorian Jibaro likewise made the attack by night or just before dawn. A house was cautiously surrounded. \Vhen a person opened the door to come out he was shot and the attackers rushed in to massacre the inhabitants . If they were not able to penetrate the
slight one.10 The dawn attack, then, was typical of South America
outside Peru or Colombia. The Chiriguano of the Gran Chaco, for
9 Tumey-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, pp. 167f.
house by violence or chicanery they set fire to the thatch, forcing the The attack intended to slaughter every defender, an observance of objective unlike the common North American practice. The inhabi tants could expect no help from the other villagers for they, at the ered. first sound of tumult, bolted their own doors and waited for the enemy to set fire to their own houses in tum. The only hope of escape was slight one. 1 0 inhabitants to come out and be killed or remain within and be smoth
to break through the besieging ring as individuals, and that was a The dawn attack, then, was typical of South America The Chiriguano of the Gran Chaco, for outside Peru or Colombia.
9 Tumey-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, pp. 167f. 1 0 Karsten, op. cit., p. 26.
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Battle Plans 129 example, assailed an enemy town at dawn with much noise. The
129
The
example, assailed an enemy town at dawn with much noise. had to win at once or lose. I I
first attack was so furious that it could not be sustained for long. It
had to win at once or lose.11 This remark is applicable to most users
first attack was so furious that i t could not be sustained for long. It This remark is applicable to most users The bulk of Melanesian war had only the same story to teU : the
of the dawn attack and surround.
The bulk of Melanesian war had only the same story to tell: the
of the dawn attack and surround. preference for the dawn attack, an exaggeration of the old animal hunting surround, linked with an over-reliance on the principle of surprise noted so often among the simpler subjects of this study. A counter use of the service of security, the postin g of sentinels and watch, seemed no more to have occurred to most Melanesians than it did to the Plains Indians. This carelessness is very difficult to un derstand, since the enemy habitually relied on such surprise methods. That a culture will produce a response to human needs, material or nonmaterial, is not automatically certain . 1 2 in I elanesia. The dawn attack pre ceded by sea voyages and a descent upon the coast are also common
Guinea. 13
preference for the dawn attack, an exaggeration of the old animal
hunting surround, linked with an over-reliance on the principle of
surprise noted so often among the simpler subjects of this study. A
counter use of the service of security, the posting of sentinels and
watch, seemed no more to have occurred to most Melanesians than
it did to the Plains Indians. This carelessness is very difficult to un-
derstand, since the enemy habitually relied on such surprise methods.
That a culture will produce a response to human needs, material or
nonmaterial, is not automatically certain.12 The dawn attack pre-
ceded by sea voyages and a descent upon the coast are also common
in Melanesia. A good example is given in Abel, Savage Life in New
Guinea.13
The dawn attack using infiltration as well as the surround was pop-
ular in New Guinea. Just before sunrise the Kiwai attempted to enter
each bushman's house quietly and tapped the individual inhabitant
silently but adequately on the head, which was removed on the spot.
Since this was done with the greatest caution and organization, and
A good example is given in Abel,
Savage Life
in New
since the enemy posted no sentinels, no villager was left alive. Should
some wretch awake and give cry, he would benefit himself and his
fellows but little. The Kiwai were awake, organized, and in command
The dawn attack using infiltration as well as the surround was pop ular in New Guinea. Just before sunrise the Kiwai attempted to enter each bushman's house quietly and tapped the individual inhabitant silently but adequately on the head, which was removed on the spot. Since this was done with the greatest caution and organization, and since the enemy posted no sentinels, no villager was left alive. fellows but little. Should some wretch awake and give cry, he would benefit himself and his The Kiwai were awake, organized, and in command The Kiwai of all principal positions, which the villagers were not.
of all principal positions, which the villagers were not. The Kiwai
found it paid to be able to distinguish friend and foe by painting
themselves with white pipe clay, even though some enemy might use
the white stripes as an arrow target.14
The Kiwai plan was, in other words, reliance on the dawn attack,
surprise, and exploitation by wiping out every enemy life. A rudi-
mentary command function shows through and the element of sim-
plicity in the plan is apparent. A single file approach order was
maintained, preceded by able scouts observing the principles of in-
telligence and security. The principle of objective is very plain. The
12 Coombe, op. cit., pp. 219f.
found it paid to be able to distinguish friend and foe by painting the white stripes as an arrow target. 1 4 themselves with white pipe clay, even though some enemy might use
The Kiwai plan was, in other words, reliance on the dawn attack, surprise, and exploitation by wiping out every enemy life. A rudi mentary command function shows through and the element of sim
13 Charles W. Abel, Savage Life in New Guinea (London: London Missionary
Society, 1902), pp. 138f.
14 Riley, op. cit., pp. 263f.
plicity in the plan is apparent. A single file approach order was maintained, preceded by able scouts observing the principles of in telligence and security. The principle of objective is very plain. The 1 1 C hurch, op. cit., p. 234. 1 2 Coombe, op. cit., pp. 219f. 1 3 Charles W. Abel, Savage Life in New Guinea ( London : London MissiOnary Society, 1 902 ) , pp. 138f. 1 4 Riley, op . cit., pp. 263f.
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130 Primitive War stupidity of the bushman enemy and his unwillingness to learn from
Primitive War
stupidity of the bushman enemy and his unwillingness to learn from experience is also apparent.
experience is also apparent.
The principle of utilization of the terrain is most important in battle
practice anywhere.
Terrain exercises a controlling influence on all military operations.
Properly utilized it is frequently the decisive factor. The elements of the
terrain are the concealment, cover, facilities for movement and opportu-
nities for observation and fire which it affords, and the obstacles it inter-
poses to fire and movement. Every individual and every unit in every
situation, whether moving or stationary, should seek the natural advan-
tages of the terrain, and avoid its disadvantages.15
Terrain often defeats civilized troops, too, when confronted by sav-
ages who know how to use it. Braddock found this out. The Inca
likewise made little or no progress in subduing the eastern face of the
The principle of utilization of the terrain is most important in battle practice anywhere. Terrain exercises a controlling influence on all military operations. Properly utilized it is frequently the decisive factor. The elements of the terrain are the concealment, cover, facilities for movement and opportu nities for observation and fire which it affords, and the obstacles it inter poses to fire and movement. Every individual and every unit in every situation, whether moving or stationary, should seek the natural advan tages of the terrain, and avoid its disadvantages. H I
Terrain often defeats civilized troops, too, when confronted by sav ages who know how to use it. Braddock found this out. The Inca likewise made little or no progress in subduing the eastern face of the Andes though, according to Garcilasso de la Vega, the Inca Rocca sent his own able son Yahuar-Huaccac against the tribes with as many as fifteen thousand men. 1 6 Some American Indian tribes disregarded every other principle of war but this one. interior. Typical of such actions were those of the Canadian Their actions were completely These people could only effect adequate fire, without move
Andes though, according to Garcilasso de la Vega, the Inca Rocca
sent his own able son Yahuar-Huaccac against the tribes with as many
as fifteen thousand men.16
Some American Indian tribes disregarded every other principle of
war but this one. Typical of such actions were those of the Canadian
interior. These people could only effect adequate fire, without move-
ment, and use the terrain skilfully. Their actions were completely
ineffectual, since their overreliance on terrain was an indication of
their cowardice rather than an opportunity to launch a telling offen-
sive.17
Proper use of terrain was almost always observed in Africa. Even
the simple Kerri-Kerri of the Sudan used natural hill tops for village
sites. The bases of their precipitous cliffs were artificially fortified by
ditches hidden by verdure.1s The Americans and Africans as a whole
ment, and use the terrain skilfully. their cowardice rather than sive. 1 7
an
used the terrain skilfully in the offensive, but the latter surpassed the
Indians in a defensive use of nature.
ineffectual, since their overreliance on terrain was an indication of opportunity to launch a telling offen
The principle of utilization of the terrain was well observed in both
Melanesia and Polynesia. Brown says the Samoans "took every ad-
vantage of ground or position which would afford shelter," which they
would not forsake until the enemy was in retreat. In typical fashion
Proper use of terrain was almost always observed in Mrica. Even the simple Kerri-Kerri of the Sudan used natural hill tops for village ditches hidden by verdure. IS The Americans and Mricans as a whole used the terrain skilfully in the offensive, but the latter surpassed the Indians in a defensive use of nature. The principle of utilization of the terrain was well observed Melanesia and Polynesia. sites. The bases of their precipitous cliffs were artificially fortified by
he scorns their use of shelter as "treachery and ambush."19
17 Skinner, Notes on the Eastern Cree and the Northern Saulteaux, p. 165.
1s Olive Macleod, Chiefs and Cities of Central Africa (Edinburgh and London:
W. Blackwood, 1912), p. 287.
i9 Brown, op. cit., p. 169.
in
both
Brown says the Samoans " took every ad vantage of ground or position which would afford shelter, " which they would not forsake until the enemy was in retreat. In typical fashion he scorns their use of shelter as "treachery and ambush . 1 9 1 5 Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, p. 6. 1 6 Church, op. cit., p. 195. 1 7 S kinner, Notes on the Eastern Cree and the Northern Saulteaux, p. 165. 1 8 Olive Macleod, Chiefs and Cities of Central Africa ( Edinburgh and London : W. Blackwood, 1912 ) , p. 287. 1 9 Brown, op. cit., p. 169.
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Battle Plans 131 Approaching the military threshold, the Polynesians could be ex-
lSI
Buck cites
Approaching the military threshold, the Polynesians could b e ex pected to utilize the terrain in both defense and offense. an example showing fine tactical sense in fonning the battle line. The attacking side used two taro swamps to protect the Hanks, and chose a site for a prepared position which would afford good retreat They then offered battle, but in spite of their pains, were defeated.2 0 Some Melanesians prepared a position in the old days . By this one means that they accentuated the natural advantages of the position in event of defeat.
pected to utilize the terrain in both defense and offense. Buck cites
an example showing fine tactical sense in forming the battle line.
The attacking side used two taro swamps to protect the flanks, and
chose a site for a prepared position which would afford good retreat
in event of defeat. They then offered battle, but in spite of their
pains, were defeated.20
Some Melanesians prepared a position in the old days. By this one
means that they accentuated the natural advantages of the position
by art. If time permitted they often cleared away the bush in order
to have a clear field of fire. This fell into disfavor in the New He-
brides when fire arms brought about a preference for sniping instead
of mass fighting and mass arrow fire.21 This is an interesting example
of a quick response of tactics, a part of the nonmaterial culture, to a
change in material culture.
There was a fair indication that the principle was well observed
in Eurasia. When the Chinese first descended from the plateau and
started forming their nation, they were opposed by certain Turkic
by art. If time permitted they often cleared away the bush in order to have a clear field of fire. This fell into disfavor in the New He brides when fire arms brought about a preference for sniping instead of mass fighting and mass arrow fire.2 1 This is an interesting example of a quick response of tactics, a part of the nonmaterial culture, to a change in material culture. There was a fair indication that the principle was well observed in Eurasia. When the Chinese first descended from the plateau and started forming their nation, they were opposed by certain Turkic tribes who resented the intrusion into their land. Chinese tradition says that the Turki often fought them and, if possible, attacked with
a
tribes who resented the intrusion into their land. Chinese tradition
says that the Turki often fought them and, if possible, attacked with
a swamp at their back. If the Turki were successful the swamp was
not needed, but if they failed they retreated through the swamp
where the Chinese could not follow. This was possible because the
Turkic tribes were horsemen and negotiated the swamp which was
impassable to the Chinese infantry.
Caesar relates a clever and painstaking method of the Gaulish Bel-
lovaci which is reminiscent of die Manuan Polynesians just mentioned.
This enemy had prepared for him a set of ambushes surrounding an
open plain of about one square mile. They tried to make Caesar
give battle on this field. The open country itself was "fenced every
way by woods or by a troublesome river."22
swamp at their back. If the Turki were successful the swamp was not needed, but if they failed they retreated through the swamp
Appian tells of an instance wherein a group of savages mistook
Augustus for a general with Braddock's intelligence. They used much
where the Chinese could not follow. This was possible because the Turkic tribes were horsemen and negotiated the swamp which was impassable to the Chinese infantry. Caesar relates a clever and painstaking method of the Gaulish Bel lovaci which is reminiscent of the M anuan Polynesians just mentioned. This enemy had prepared for him a set of ambushes surrounding an open plain of about one square mile. give battle on this field. They tried to make Caesar The open country itself was "fenced every way by woods or by a troublesome river. " 22 Appian tells of an instance wherein a group of savages mistook Augustus for a general with Braddock's intelligence. They used much more energy than the Indians in preparing the terrain, but this time without success. The transalpine Iapydes, "a strong and savage tribe, " had trounced the Romans twice in twenty years, had raided both Italy and the Roman colonies, so Augustus set out to make them 2 0 Buck, op. cit., p . 43. 2 1 Hump hreys, op. cit., p . 57. 22 Caesar, op. cit., v. 56.
more energy than the Indians in preparing the terrain, but this time
without success. The transalpine lapydes, "a strong and savage
tribe," had trounced the Romans twice in twenty years, had raided
both Italy and the Roman colonies, so Augustus set out to make them
20 Buck, op. cit., p. 43.
22 Caesar, op. cit., \. 56.
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132
132 Primitive War
Primitive War
He had to traverse a steep, rugged road to get into their They made constant assaults on his Hanks, but Augustus He had Hank guards marching on the ridges The Iapydes
cooperate. across it.
cooperate. He had to traverse a steep, rugged road to get into their
territory which they had made more unpleasant by felling large trees was not Braddock.
territory which they had made more unpleasant by felling large trees
across it. They made constant assaults on his flanks, but Augustus
was not Braddock. He had Hank guards marching on the ridges
paralleling the main advance, and so avoided disaster. The lapydes
paralleling the main advance, and so avoided disaster.
fled to defensible thickets when finally defeated, but eventually came
out on the promise of amnesty.23
In the far east the Aryans found a rather able tribe of Dravidians
Hed to defensible thickets when finally defeated, but eventually came out on the promise of amnesty. 23 In the far east the Aryans found a rather able tribe of Dravidians called Puri blockin g their passage through the Himalayas by erecting blockhouses at strategic points. The Vedas tell how the Aryans of The incident is Tritsu overcame them, however, but only by the intervention of their god who destroyed the Puri forts for his devotees . 2 4 Latin counterpart Ignis, the fire. quoted from a Vedic hymn to Agni, the fire god, in whom we see the The clear implication is that the Aryans managed to make a Jibaro-Kiwai sneak-up on the wooden Puri forts and drove the inhabitants out by putting fire to them . \Vhile the Puri did take advantage of the Himalayan terrain, even accentuat ing it with blockhouses, they seemed to neglect the service of security. The prime function of fortification is, of course, the accentuation of terrain difficulties for the enemy. It was mentioned elsewhere that Like most fortification was an outgrowth of the principle of the defensive, but proper utilization of the terrain is also offensive as well. features of simple and civilized material culture, field and permanent fortification begins with natural advantages and improves on them. The only modem elements in actions described so far are s implicity
called Puri blocking their passage through the Himalayas by erecting
blockhouses at strategic points. The Vedas tell how the Aryans of
Tritsu overcame them, however, but only by the intervention of their
god who destroyed the Puri forts for his devotees.24 The incident is
quoted from a Vedic hymn to Agni, the fire god, in whom we see the
Latin counterpart Ignis, the fire. The clear implication is that the
Aryans managed to make a Jibaro-Kiwai sneak-up on the wooden
Puri forts and drove the inhabitants out by putting fire to them. While
the Puri did take advantage of the Himalayan terrain, even accentuat-
ing it with blockhouses, they seemed to neglect the service of security.
The prime function of fortification is, of course, the accentuation of
terrain difficulties for the enemy. It was mentioned elsewhere that
fortification was an outgrowth of the principle of the defensive, but
proper utilization of the terrain is also offensive as well. Like most
features of simple and civilized material culture, field and permanent
fortification begins with natural advantages and improves on them.
The only modern elements in actions described so far are simplicity
in plans, the dawn attacks and surround, and a rather good utilization
of terrain. Yet there were nonliterate peoples who approached efficient
battle planning. The tribes of the American North Pacific Coast were
reportedly among these.
Almost all of their travels, including military approaches, were by
sea. Thus, a war canoe or group of them would attempt to round
the point of a bay without being discovered. The attackers would
paddle as close to the shore line as they could, taking every opportu-
nity for concealment offered by rocks and trees. Upon being ob-
served, or upon approaching the shore line of the village, those de-
in plans, the dawn attacks and surround, and a rather good utilization
of terrain. Yet there were nonliterate peoples who approached efficient battle planning. The tribes of the American North Pacific Coast were reportedly among these. Almost all of their travels, including military approaches, were by sea. Thus, a war canoe or group of them would attempt to round The attackers would Upon being ob the point of a bay without being discovered.
tailed to paddle would exert every possible force while the bowmen
would deliver as much fire as possible. When the shallow water was
reached the archers would jump from the canoes, rush to the shore
23 Appianus of Alexandria, Roman History, x. 18.
24 Rig Veda, vii. 3, 6.
paddle as close to the shore line as they could, taking every opportu nity for concealment offered by rocks and trees. served, or upon approaching the shore line of the village, those de tailed to paddle would exert every possible force while the bowmen would deliver as much fire as possible. 23 Appianus of Alexandria, Roman History, 2 4 Rig Veda, vii. 3, 6. \Vhen the shallow water was
x.
reached the archers would jump from the canoes, rush to the shore
18.
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Battle Plans 133 line, and continue to deliver such withering fire that the enemy could
133
line, and continue to deliver such withering fire that the enemy could not effectively organize. The other half of the party would beach the canoes, then form a line of shock troops for the assault. Since they were armed with particularly terrible clubs and encased in slat armor, this assault was very effective, and if the enemy's service of security had in any way been lax, it was almost certain to succeed. This was almost as effective and tactically sound as the procedure of a landing party of modern marines. It was aggressive, so obeyed the principle of the offensive. of concerted effort. Unusual among Indian fighters, these tribes had specialized troops and used them according to the principle They followed the principle of concentration of They obeyed
a
not effectively organize. The other half of the party would beach
the canoes, then form a line of shock troops for the assault. Since
they were armed with particularly terrible clubs and encased in slat
armor, this assault was very effective, and if the enemy's service of
security had in any way been lax, it was almost certain to succeed.
This was almost as effective and tactically sound as the procedure
of a landing party of modern marines. It was aggressive, so obeyed
the principle of the offensive. Unusual among Indian fighters, these
tribes had specialized troops and used them according to the principle
of concerted effort. They followed the principle of concentration of
effort, but that was almost inevitable in Indian warfare. They obeyed
the principle of economy of force, and afforded a perfect example of
the use of combined fire and movement. The plan was simple and
practical, and the surprise element was used to the fullest degree.
The Northcoast people utilized the terrain as much as possible, and no
modern officer could deny that they used the correct formation to
effort, but that was almost inevitable in Indian warfare. the principle of economy of force, and afforded the use of combined fire and movement.
accomplish the objective. They, like other Indians, were not lax in
perfect example of
gathering intelligence and, as with others, their mobility was almost
The plan was simple and
perfect. They could also exploit a victory inasmuch as they got what
they wanted in the way of goods and slaves, destruction of property,
practical, and the surprise element was used to the fullest degree. The Northcoast people utilized the terrain as much as possible, and no modem officer could deny that they used the correct formation to accomplish the objective. perfect. They, like other Indians, were not lax in gathering intelligence and, as with others, their mobility was almost They could also exploit a victory inasmuch as they got what they wanted in the way of goods and slaves, destruction of property, and so on , although from our standpoint they might have done this more efficiently. However, if all the American Indians had been as
a
and so on, although from our standpoint they might have done this
more efficiently. However, if all the American Indians had been as
able tacticians as they, this might have remained a red man's conti-
nent much longer than it did.
If Adair was an accurate reporter, the southeastern Indians were
fairly successful battle planners. He said that the typical war party
contained from twenty to forty men if a long distance was to be cov-
ered in order to avoid providing information to the enemy by numer-
ous tracks. Invasion of contiguous territory where this secrecy was
not needed frankly employed the principle of mass to overwhelm the
foe by numbers. Surprise, again, was the chief element, and the
loss of many men even in victory was not highly considered. The
able tacticians as they, this might have remained nent much longer than it did.
red man's conti
extremes to which they went to guarantee surprise were astounding.
Very clever approach formations were used, and the command ele-
ment was strictly in control. They liked to be pursued by the enemy
If Adair was an accurate reporter, the southeastern Indians were fairly successful battle planners . He said that the typical war party contained from twenty to forty men if a long distance was to be cov ered in order to avoid providing information to the enemy by numer ous tracks. Invasion of contiguous territory where this secrecy was not needed frankly employed the principle of mass to overwhelm the foe by numbers . Surprise, again, was the chief element, and the loss of many men even in victory was not highly considered. The extremes to which they went to guarantee surprise were astounding. Very clever approach formations were used, and the command ele ment was strictly in control. so that they could lure him into the hollow of a crescent formation in South African fashion. The surround in any form was their chief motive for movement, in contrast with the more static operations ob served elsewhere in America. Tactical employment was well obThey liked to be pursued by the enemy
so that they could lure him into the hollow of a crescent formation
in South African fashion. The surround in any form was their chief
motive for movement, in contrast with the more static operations ob-
served elsewhere in America. Tactical employment was well ob-
D ig ize
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134
134 Primitive War served on both sides. Intelligence work was really intelligent, bol-
Primitive War
stered by clever signal communications. The fire-fight from cover
served on both sides. Intelligence work was really intelligent, bol stered by clever signal communications. The fire-fight from cover was begun on signal and not before, and was usually adequate. the action was long enough and the occasion demanded it, the for mation was changed according to an altered situation. 2 11 The mock retreat with intent to lure the enemy into a trap was also known to the ordinarily inept Plains fighters. The Assiniboin were probably the most methodical fighters on the Plains when they
was begun on signal and not before, and was usually adequate. If
the action was long enough and the occasion demanded it, the for-
If
mation was changed according to an altered situation.25
The mock retreat with intent to lure the enemy into a trap was
also known to the ordinarily inept Plains fighters. The Assiniboin
were probably the most methodical fighters on the Plains when they
set their minds to it, which they often failed to do. They obtained
intelligence and security by clever scouting, of course, and the ap-
proach was made by night. All the advantageous ground was occu-
pied before dawn. Surprise was often accomplished by the use of
decoys, just a few men who were sent to make a feint at the enemy
camp. Upon apparent defeat, these men fled, drawing the unwary
enemy into an ambush. The Assiniboin also liked to make the foe
leave his camp in disorder by firing the prairie grass to windward of
the camp.
set their minds to it, which they often failed to do. They obtained intelligence and security by clever scouting, of course, and the ap proach was made by night. All the advantageous ground was occu pied before dawn. Surprise was often accomplished by the use of decoys, just a few men who were sent to make a feint at the enemy camp. Upon apparent defeat, these men fled, drawing the unwary enemy into an ambush. The Assiniboin also liked to make the foe leave his camp in disorder by firing the prairie grass to windward of the camp. However, such astute though Simple plans were the exception rather than the rule with the Assiniboin, who usually proceeded as follows. After dawn had broken, a group of horsemen chosen out of the distinguished warrior class would charge the enemy camp, firing and howling as they went. These people did as much damage as possible, but were ordinarily content to pass on through, driving as many horses before them as they could. They were followed by an echelon of footmen who advanced without order, file, or line. This group, acting on the good principle of fire and movement, would have destroyed the enemy if it had observed any cohesion at all. But each man fought individually and accomplished individual and poor results. The actual battle was no more than a mildly dangerous game. The shrieks were horrible, especially if a warrior fell. His friends howled and tried to get his body, while the foe screamed in exultation. Ac tually very little damage was done if the parties were about equal. If the warriors remained bunched, the technique was to snipe the strays. Neither side wished to attack unless there were plain chances of an overwhelming smother. Otherwise the action degenerated into boasting and feather-waving parade punctuated with mutual in sult, no doubt a very fine thing to witness. The chiefs made some ef2 11 James Adair. The History of the American Indians ( London: E. and C. Dilly. 1775 ) , pp. 382-388.
a
However, such astute though simple plans were the exception
rather than the rule with the Assiniboin, who usually proceeded as
follows. After dawn had broken, a group of horsemen chosen out
of the distinguished warrior class would charge the enemy camp,
firing and howling as they went. These people did as much damage
as possible, but were ordinarily content to pass on through, driving
as many horses before them as they could. They were followed by an
echelon of footmen who advanced without order, file, or line. This
group, acting on the good principle of fire and movement, would have
destroyed the enemy if it had observed any cohesion at all. But
each man fought individually and accomplished individual and poor
results.
The actual battle was no more than a mildly dangerous game. The
shrieks were horrible, especially if a warrior fell. His friends howled
and tried to get his body, while the foe screamed in exultation. Ac-
tually very little damage was done if the parties were about equal.
If the warriors remained bunched, the technique was to snipe the
strays. Neither side wished to attack unless there were plain chances
of an overwhelming smother. Otherwise the action degenerated into
a boasting and feather-waving parade punctuated with mutual in-
sult, no doubt a very fine thing to witness. The chiefs made some ef-
25 James Adair, The History of the American Indians (London: E. and C.
Dilly, 1775), pp. 382-388.
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Battle Plans 135 fort to plan battles according to the situation, and during the action
135
fort to plan battles according to the situation, and during the action shouted advice which everyone entirely disregarded. The Seri of Sonora and the islands of the Gulf of Lower California were remarkably modem in their use of planned actions, although McGee, on whose reports we here rely, describes them as being "de void of military tactics."
shouted advice which everyone entirely disregarded.
The Seri of Sonora and the islands of the Gulf of Lower California
were remarkably moder n in their use of planned actions, although
McGee, on whose reports we here rely, describes them as being "de-
void of military tactics." This is the standard remark. The Seri were
not only capable in comparison with their neighbors, but in compari-
son with the American Indian as a whole and with nonliterate war-
This is the standard remark. The Seri were

as
riors anywhere. McGee says that they acted on a preconceived plan,
generally using a small group as a pivot of maneuver while the main
not only capable in comparison with their neighbors, but in compari son with the American Indian riors anywhere. generally using a small group a whole and with nonliterate war McGee says that they acted on a preconceived plan,
as
body attempted ambush or a surround. A use of reserves, extreme-
ly rare in America, is mentioned. They sought every advantage of
position and number, used cover intelligently, and planned their
avenues of retreat in case of defeat. McGee scorns them for their
a pivot of maneuver while the main

A use of reserves, extreme
lack of "open face-to-face fighting," and "that sense of fairness
which finds expression in the duel." He might rather praise them
body attempted ambush or a surround. ly rare in America, is mentioned.
for sensible use of preparatory fire followed by a shock attack which
They sought every advantage of McGee scorns them for their He might rather praise them
sought to brain the harrassed enemy.26
The Seri were characterized by an implacable animosity for other
pOSition and number, used cover intelligently, and planned their avenues of retreat in case of defeat. which finds expression in the duel. " lack of "open face-to-face fighting," and "that sense of fairness for sensible use of preparatory fire followed by a shock attack which sought to brain the harrassed enemy. 2 6 The Seri were characterized by an implacable animosity for other Indians and for the whites. Their highest virtue was to kill a for eigner and their greatest crime was to marry one. Their life was communal, self-centered, and ethnocentric. Despite the ethnolo gisfs reiteration that the Seri were not tacticians, they managed to keep their own land against all comers - white, red, and mixed very recent times. ones for all occ asions, as most of the foregoing were, but individual ones for specific situations. some induna appointed by him on the eve of dep arture, gave much He left as little to chance as possible. Later Zulu methods left little to be desired. It has often been al leged that the great militarizing kings borrowed their basic ideas from white sources. Competent Africanists, however, see in this an un True, he lived at He had heard of Na warranted effort to discredit Chaka's originality. the time Napoleon was conquering Europe. Their supreme commander, the king or The later
-
Indians and for the whites. Their highest virtue was to kill a for-
eigner and their greatest crime was to marry one. Their life was
communal, self-centered, and ethnocentric. Despite the ethnolo-
gist's reiteration that the Seri were not tacticians, they managed to
keep their own land against all comers white, red, and mixed until
very recent times.
The later/ûhj/'were quite capable of making plans, not only set
ones for all occasions, as most of the foregoing were, but individual
ones for specific situations. Their supreme commander, the king or
some induna appointed by him on the eve of departure, gave much
thought to planning the entire campaign. He left as little to chance
as possible.
Later Zulu methods left little to be desired. It has often been al-
leged that the great militarizing kings borrowed their basic ideas from
white sources. Competent Africanists, however, see in this an un-
until
warranted effort to discredit Chaka's originality. True, he lived at
the time Napoleon was conquering Europe. He had heard of Na-
poleon and tried to emulate him, but in all fairness his battle order
26 W. J. McGee, The Seri Indians, Annual Report 17, Bureau of American
ulu
were quite capable of making plans, not only set
Ethnology, (Washington: 1895-1896), pp. 254ff.
thought to planning the entire campaign.
poleon and tried to emulate him, but in all fairness his battle order
2 6 W. J. McGee, The Sen Indians, Annu al Report 17, Bureau of American Ethnology, ( Washington : 1895-1896 ) , pp. 254ff.
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136 Primitive War was not Napoleonic, nor European at all except in its success. It
Primitive War
It
was not Napoleonic, nor European at all except in its success.
possessed all the characteristics of good tactics, and it had originality.
possessed all the characteristics of good tactics, and it had originality. Its fluid, mobile flanks were not only his own idea but are worthy of imitation. In all, it was a parallel invention of the great fools mate which has been successful against incompetent commanders from the Bronze Age to the Battle of Tannenberg.
Its fluid, mobile flanks were not only his own idea but are worthy
of imitation. In all, it was a parallel invention of the great fools-
mate which has been successful against incompetent commanders from
the Bronze Age to the Battle of Tannenberg.
Either before or just after this sprinkling, the men were drawn up in
a semicircle and instructed by the officer in supreme command as to
the routes to be taken, what regiments were to form the right horn, and
what the left (of the crescent). Then the warriors, once more reminded
of their challenge and exhorted through praise of departed kings, dashed
forward to the attack. The Zulus attacked in the form of an umkhumbi,
or semicircle, usually making a feint with one horn, while the other, con-
cealed in the bush and grass, swept around to surround the enemy.
The 'chest,' consisting of the greatest number of men, and also the most
experienced [for the 'black' (young)] regiments always form the horns,
now advance and tried to crush the enemy. Behind them was a large
force which came to their aid when the army was in difficulty, or joined
in the pursuit of the enemy, while the commanding officer and staff took
up their positions on high ground to watch and issue directions, which
were delivered by runners.27
This description of a Zulu action leaves one amazed at its modern-
ity. It was realized that the main effort would be to the fore, and
the strongest and oldest regiments were entrusted with the job of
being "chest," or the widest and central part of the crescent's belly.
The enveloping movement was extremely clever and very mobile. The
Either before or just after this sprinkling, the men were drawn up in semicircle and instructed by the -officer in supreme command as to the routes to be taken, what regiments were to form the right horn, and what the left ( of the crescent ) . Then the warriors, once more reminded of their challenge and exhorted through praise of departed kings, dashed forward to the attack. The Zulus attacked in the form of an umkhumbi, or semicircle, usually making a feint with one horn, while the other, con cealed in the bush and grass, swept around to surround the enemy. The 'chest,' consisting of the greatest number of men, and also the most experienced [for the 'black' ( young ) ] regiments always form the horns, now advance and tried to crush the enemy. Behind them was a large force which came to their aid when the army was in difficulty, or joined in the pursuit of the enemy, while the commanding officer and staff took up their positions on high ground to watch and issue directions, which were del ivered by runners. 2 7
a
young men were assigned to that job.
The Zulu formation was primarily an offensive device. The prin-
This description of a Zulu action leaves one amazed at its modern ity. It was realized that the main effort would be to the fore, and the strongest and oldest regiments were entrusted with the job of being "chest," or the widest and central part of the crescent's belly. The enveloping movement was extremely clever and very mobile. The young men were assigned to that job. The Zulu formation was primarily an offensive device. The prin ciples of cooperation, of the combined, planned employment of all forces obviously working in concerted effort were carefully observed. The commander was able to concentrate his forces at the critical point because he had planned this beforehand. units was well observed. The integrity of tactical The withholding of the reserve is an ex
ciples of cooperation, of the combined, planned employment of all
forces obviously working in concerted effort were carefully observed.
The commander was able to concentrate his forces at the critical point
because he had planned this beforehand. The integrity of tactical
units was well observed. The withholding of the reserve is an ex-
ample of the economy of force. Fire and movement were used, but
the aggressive movement was stressed and fire was only incidental.
The plan, of course, had to be altered for every engagement, but it
so followed a customary pattern that an able enemy commander could
predict it. But how much more so is this true of all other nonliterate
plans! They were so stereotyped that they should have deceived no
one.
27 Krige, op. tit., p. 275.
ample of the economy of force. Fire and movement were used, but the aggressive movement was stressed and fire was only incidental. The plan, of course, had to be altered for every engagement, but it so followed a customary pattern that an able enemy commander could predict it. plans I one. 2 7 Krige, ap. cit., p. 275. But how much more so is this true of all other nonliterate They were so stereotyped that they should have deceived
no
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Battle Plans
Battle Plans 137 The principle of surprise was observed by masking part of the en-
137
veloping force by utilization of the terrain. That the Zulu used cor-
The principle of surprise was observed by masking part of the en veloping force by utilization of the terrain. That the Zulu used cor rect formations for the job at hand is proven by their mastery of the region. It was a mobile formation, acting forcibly and with dispatch. As for exploitation, the Zulu did that in
a
rect formations for the job at hand is proven by their mastery of the
region. It was a mobile formation, acting forcibly and with dispatch.
Intelligence had been gathered ahead of time so that the commander
knew what he was doing. As for exploitation, the Zulu did that in a
most thoroughgoing manner, as noted elsewhere. Other African king-
Intelligence had been gathered ahead of time so that the commander knew what he was dOing. most thoroughgoing manner, as noted elsewhere. as non literate man could. Other African king
doms achieved considerable tactical success, but the Zulu went as far
as nonliterate man could. \
Almost all Eurasiatic peoples used some kind of plans which could
be recommended today. Even some of the simplest Siberian tribes
doms achieved considerable tactical success, but the Zulu went as far Almost all E urasiatic peoples used some kind of plans which could be recommended today. Even some of th e simplest Siberian tribes could make rudimentary ones and carry them out. Bogaraz, for ex ample, records an action between the Siberian Chuckchee and the Eskimo on the American side of the Bering Strait. A large party from Asia landed on St. Lawrence Island under the cover of fog. The largest portion moved around the Eskimo rear. A small pivot of maneuver moved cautiously forward to engage and immobilize the was a telling one and the islanders lost their lives and women .2 8 enemy. Fog lent almost complete surprise. The blow from the rear
could make rudimentary ones and carry them out. Bogaraz, for ex-
ample, records an action between the Siberian Chuckchee and the
Eskimo on the American side of the Bering Strait. A large party from
Asia landed on St. Lawrence Island under the cover of fog. The
largest portion moved around the Eskimo rear. A small pivot of
maneuver moved cautiously forward to engage and immobilize the
enemy. Fog lent almost complete surprise. The blow from the rear
was a telling one and the islanders lost their lives and women.2s
In general one might say that the plans of primitive war had to be
simple since they had to be standardized. This standardization was
too weak to tolerate any real thought. Each man was too much his
own general, certainly in America. Any violation of the simple pat-
terns of battle would have been resented as much by friend as by foe.
2s Bogoraz, op. cit., pp. 656f.
In general one might say that the plans of primitive war had to be simple since they had to be standardized. This standardization was too weak to tolerate any real thought. Each man was too much his own general, certainly in America. Any violation of the simple pat terns of battle would have been resented as much by friend as by foe. 2 8 Bogoraz, op. cit., pp. 656f.
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PART II
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PART II
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CHAPTER 8
The Socio-Psychological Motives
W HY DO MEN GO TO WAB? THIS PLAIN QUESTION HAS NO PLAIN ANSWER,
for no single thread runs through all wars. Man's motivation for
every simple act is complex, so how shall it be outlined for war, which
is not a simple activity? Every war is fought for more than one mo-
tive, spurious or real, appreciated or unrealized. Every individual
warrior joins the colors for more than one reason. It is characteristic
of successful social institutions to have a bundle of functions, as every
human activity has a bundle of utilities. War is an institutionalized
CHAPTER 8
behavior pattern even among nonliterate men, and the basic function
of every social institution is the maintenance of the psycho-physical
equilibrium of its clientele considered as individual persons, and the
The SOcio-Psychological Motives
balance of those persons within the social system. In brief, the pri-
mary function of a social institution is the maintenance or restoration
of a feeling of well-being in persons and their groups.
W HY DO MEN GO TO WAR? TIDS
PLAIN
QUESTION HAS NO
PLAIN
ANSWER,
A very profound motive for going to war is to resolve life's tensions,
to escape from unhappiness caused by frustration in other realms of
existence. War is one of the most ejFective devices ever invented for
every simple act is complex, so how shall it be outlined for war, which tive, spurious or real, appreciated or unrealized.
for no sin gle thread runs through all wars.
Man's motivation for
this cathartic purpose. Life at best is full of frustration, thwarteJ am-
is not a simple activity? Every war is fought for more than one mo
bitions, unfulfilled wishesall of the sorrows and-disappointments with
which humanity is only too familiar, xêople become involved in per-
sonal dislikes which develop into hatreds, often irrational ones. Now
in civilized groups, and even more so in nonliterate ones above the
simplest individual food-gathering horizons, the release of these hat-
warrior joins the colors for more than one reason. It is characteristic of successful social institutions to have a bundle of functions, as every human activity has a bundle of utilities. War is an institutionalized behavior pattern even among nonliterate men, and the basic function equilibrium of its clientele considered as individual persons, and the balance of those persons within the social system. In brief, the pri
Every individual
reds toward members of die we-group is intolerable. To be sure, per-
sonal feud has been very common among loosely knit nonliterate
groups and, until recently, in isolated areas of civilization. Neverthe-
less, the maiming and destruction of personal foes within the group
of every social institution is the maintenance of the psycho-physical
interferes with the efficient functioning of the group, weakens the
front against the common enemy, and reduces the economic produc-
tiveness of the workers in a society perhaps already underpopulated.
141
mary function of a social institution is the maintenance or restoration

of a feeling of well-being in persons and their groups. A very profound motive for going to war is to resolve life 's tensions,
tJIis catharti;pUrPse. Life at best is full of frustration, thwarted am
existence.
to escape from unhappiness caused by frustration in other realms of
War is one of the most effective devices ever invented for
bitions, unfulfilled wishes-all of the sorrows ruuidisappoinbnents with sonal dislikes which develop into hah-eds, often irrational ones. Now
which humanity is only too familiar . ., People become involved in per
Simplest individual food-gathering horizons, the release of these hat
in civilized groups, and even more so in nonliterate ones above the
groups and, until recently, in isolated areas of civilization. Neverthe less, the maiming and destruction of personal foes within the group front against the common enemy, and reduces the economic produc
141
reds toward members of the we-group is intolerable. To be sure, per sonal feud has been very common among loosely knit nonliterate
interferes with the efficient functioning of the group, weakens the
tiveness of the workers in a society perhaps already underpopulated.
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142
142 Primitive War The poor hygiene and obstetrics of nonliterate groups make the ex-
Primitive War
cess of male births over deaths too small to waste effective population
by feud, even in those areas where the vendetta is tolerated. Thus,
if this amassed hate can be transferred or sublimated from socially
undesirable expenditure on the we-group and wreaked with little or no
control upon the out-group enemy, then war, bloody or otherwise, has
The poor hygiene and obstebics of non literate groups make the ex cess of male births over deaths too small to waste effective population by feud, even in those areas where the vendetta is tolerated. Thus, if this amassed hate can be transferred or sublimated from socially undesirable expenditure on the we-group and wreaked with little or no control upon the out-group enemy, then war, bloody or otherwise, has served a great sOcio-psychological utility, whether perceived or not. Man's balked wishes and denied ambitions in time tie him into tight knots of frustration, crying for release. War is one such release. It allows desires disapproved within the group to find an approved out let. The piping times of peace are often bores orne except for the very fortunate. Ennui seems to be a price of domestication, and man, the sell-domesticated primate, suffers from it more severely than any other creature. The orderly processes of group living, with their constant repetition of all-too-familiar activities, frustrate the universal wish for release from boredom in new experiences. By contrast, war is the most exciting exercise in the world. The real struggle of fighting is more thrilli ng than the mock opposition of games; the real man-hunt is incomparably more stimulating than the slaughter of animals. War is the great bigger-release of pent-up emotions, and it is apparent that more than one tribe has realized this. The Winnebago, for ex ample, recognized that war affords an excellent release when the load of sorrow becomes too great to be borne. I Many tribes, indeed, were more realistic in conceiving of war as Hight-from-grief device than we are.
a
served a great socio-psychological utility, whether perceived or not.
Man's balked wishes and denied ambitions in time tie him into tight
knots of frustration, crying for release. War is one such release. It
allows desires disapproved within the group to find an approved out-
let. The piping times of peace are often boresome except for the very
fortunate. Ennui seems to be a price of domestication, and man, the
self-domesticated primate, suffers from it more severely than any other
creature. The orderly processes of group living, with their constant
repetition of all-too-familiar activities, frustrate the universal wish for
release from boredom in new experiences. By contrast, war is the
most exciting exercise in the world. The real struggle of fighting is
more thrilling than the mock opposition of games; the real man-hunt
is incomparably more stimulating than the slaughter of animals. War
is the great trigger-release of pent-up emotions, and it is apparent
that more than one tribe has realized this. The Winnebago, for ex-
ample, recognized that war affords an excellent release when the load
of sorrow becomes too great to be borne.1
Many tribes, indeed, were more realistic in conceiving of war as a
flight-from-grief device than we are. Fletcher and La Flesche men-
tion the Omaha as having recognized it in general, and particularly
for a father grief-stricken at the death of a child. In addition, the
spirit of the man slain by the Omaha father would act as a guide for
the child in the next world.2 It is a well-recorded fact that in some
Plains tribes a man through grief or disappointment would delib-
erately seek military death, would "give his body to the enemy." One
could join the Crazy Dog Society, the members of which association
often considered their bodies ceremonially votive to enemy weapons.
The forms which sexual jealousy and disappointment take vary tre-
Fletcher and La Flesche men
mendously in the cultures of the world; only their universality seems
to be constant. War throughout the ages has been a method whereby
the jilted, the snubbed, and the cuckolded could obtain release and
tion the Omaha as having recognized it in general, and particularly for a father grief-sbicken at the death of a child. In addition, the spirit of the man slain by the Omaha father would act as a guide for the child in the next world. 2 It is a well-recorded fact that in some Plains bibes a man through grief or disappointment would delib erately seek military death, would "give his body to the enemy." One could join the Crazy Dog Society, the members of which association often considered their bodies ceremonially votive to enemy weapons. The forms which sexual jealousy and disappointment take vary tre mendously in the cultures of the world; only their universality seems to be constant. War throughout the ages has been a method whereby the jilted, the snubbed, and the cuckolded could obtain release and restoration of sell-respect. Miss Densmore says that a Teton Sioux,
I Fletcher and La Flesche, op. cit., p. 594. 2 Ibid.
restoration of self-respect . Miss Densmore says that a Teton Sioux,
1 Fletcher and La Flesche, op. cit., p. 594.
2 Ibid.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 143 upon being teased about his girl's infidelity, would go to war even
143
though he knew the report to be false, and even though he was in no
mood to fight. Before the fight he asked his comrades to tell the girl
that he hoped he would be killed.3
A Flathead husband had definite rights to wound or kill both his
adulterous wife and her lover if he caught them in flagrante. If he
could not do this, but still had reasonably certain knowledge of his
betrayal, he could go against the enemy and strive to count coup.
Should he be successful, he would ride into camp singing his war
song. He would shoot an arrow into the tipi of his persecutor, prefer-
ably at the place where the cord bound the poles together, thus mak-
ing it fall down. He could shoot one of his rival's finest horses, and
the seducer could do nothing about it. To be sure, the husband had to
have grounds for his suspicion. If the suspected man were innocent,
he would resent these acts as unwarranted aggression and take steps
to obtain revenge. But if in the right, the husband could thus de-
stroy property belonging to his wife's lover just as often as he could
manage to count coup.*
Having conquered an enemy, there are no reasons why nonliterate
tribes should have then indulged in gloating, orgiastic victory dances,
except that tensions were thereby released. Such victory, scalp, and
other dances afforded opportunity to tribes righteously to vent all pos-
sible spleen against a defeated foe, his scalp, one of his captive mem-
bers, and his very name, regardless of the source of the ill-humor.
Victory has ever been strong medicine. The victory dance restored
the equilibrium of the ante-bellum frustrations and those caused by
the war as well. They were also a necessary rite of passage indicating
the return to normality of statuses which had been seriously dis-
turbed by the war.
Perhaps the weakest expression of victory gloating was to be found
among the simpler California tribes. For instance, the Yurok were
absolutely subtactical and to ah" intents a warless people. Their scuf-
fling amounted to no more than feuds wherein little blood was shed.
They had practically no sense of victory. When a feud was closed,
the warriors of each side danced in opposing lines, fully armed, while
the compensation money was magically being purified of the ill-will
between the rows. There was no true victory dance, for the dance
3 Densmore, felon Sioux Music, p. 357.
* Turney-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, pp. 95f.
upon being teased about his girl's infidelity, would go to war even though he knew the report to be false, and even though he was in no mood to fight. Before the fight he asked his comrades to tell the girl that he hoped he would be killed. S A Flathead husband had definite rights to wOlmd or kill both his adulterous wife and her lover if he caught them in flagrante. If he could not do this, but still had reasonably certain knowledge of his betrayal, he could go against the enemy and strive to count coup. Should he be successful, he would ride into camp singing his war song. He would shoot an arrow into the tipi of his persecutor, prefer ably at the place where the cord bound the poles together, thus mak ing it fall down. He could shoot one of his rival's finest horses, and the seducer could do nothing about it. To be sure, the husband had to have grounds for his suspicion. If the suspected man were innocent, he would resent these acts as unwarranted aggression and take steps to obtain revenge. But if in the right, the husband could thus de stroy property belonging to his wife's lover just as often as he could manage to count coup :' Having conquered an enemy, there are no reasons why nonliterate tribes should have then indulged in gloating, orgiastic victory dances, except that tensions were thereby released. Such victory, scalp, and other dances afforded opportunity to tribes righteously to vent all pos sible spleen against a defeated foe, his scalp, one of his captive mem bers, and his very name, regardless of the source of the ill-humor. Victory has ever been strong medicine. The victory dance restored the equilibrium of the ante-bellum frustrations and those caused by the war as well. They were also a necessary rite of passage indicating the return to normality of statuses which had been seriously dis turbed by the war. Perhaps the weakest expression of victory gloating was to be found among the simpler California tribes. For instance, the Yurok were absolutely subtactical and to all intents a warless people. Their scuf fling amounted to no more than feuds wherein little blood was shed. They had practically no sense of victory. When a feud was closed, the warriors of each side danced in opposing lines, fully armed, while the compensation money was magically being purified of the ill-will between the rows. There was no true victory dance, for the dance
a
Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, p. 357. , Tumey-High, The Flathead IncUan.f of Montana, pp. 95f.
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.-
144
144 Primitive War after victory was participated in by both combatant parties. Such
Primitive War
The more mili in Such
after victory was participated in by both combatant parties. tary practices were common to several California tribes. Ii Maidu frankly tortured prisoners after victory
practices were common to several California tribes.5 The more mili-
tary Maidu frankly tortured prisoners after victory in gloating
vengeance, but lacked the refinement of the Northeast Woodland
in such matters. The simple Pima farmers of the Southwest were
vengeance, but lacked the refinement of the Northeast Woodland in such matters. openly orgiastic The simple Pima farmers of the Southwest were
gloating
openly orgiastic in their victory celebrations, reportedly much to the
disgust of their chiefs. The leaders thought the death of an enemy a
sufficient crime against humanity without the riotousness of a dis-
orderly dance which was wasteful of goods and food. Their disap-
proval was contrary to accepted behavior patterns, however, and they
could only express their opposition verbally.6
Such gloat-dances were not absent from the more advanced Ameri-
can Indians. An anonymous relation quoted by Swanton says that the
orderly dance which was wasteful of goods and food. Their disap proval was contrary to accepted behavior patterns, however, and they could only express their opposition verbally.6 Such gloat-dances were not absent from the more advanced Ameri
disgust of their chiefs. The leaders thought the death of an enemy a sufficient crime against humanity without the riotousness of a dis
in
their victory celebrations, reportedly much to the
Choctaw had orgiastic dances after victory wherein little sons and
nephews were given portions of fresh scalps so that they, too, might
gloat.7 Such a practice must have been effective in conditioning the
children to the war pattern. The neighboring Creek set legs, arms,
and scalps taken from the enemy on poles with great ceremony, after
which the shamans cursed the foe with a "thousand imprecations."s
Such tension-release dances have not been confined to native Amer-
ica. They have been a complicated and important feature in the life
of almost every African tribe, and have actually formed one of the
high arts of Polynesia.
nephews were given portions of fresh scalps so that they, too, might gloat. 7 Such a practice must have been effective in conditioning the children to the war pattern. The neighboring Creek set legs, arms,
Choctaw had orgiastic dances after victory wherein little sons and
can Indians.
An anonymous relation quoted by Swanton says that the
The use of fighting and its accompaniments for tension-release has
been barely mentioned by reporters on Greco-Roman civilization, but
it took place nevertheless. Our barbarian ancestors, however, knew
and scalps taken from the enemy on poles with great ceremony, after which the shamans cursed the foe with a "thousand imprecations. "8 Such tension-release dances have not been confined to native Amer They have been a complicated and important feature in the life
it well. They did not possess the artistic and recreational outlets that
we have. Their lot was hard, and their material culture was inade-
quate for the fulfillment of man's basic needs. War offered them a
ica.
means of sublimating their blocked wishes. They must have been
bored much of the time when at peace.
Some of the passages in Caesar might be interpreted as illustrating
high arts of Polynesia.
of almost every Mrican tribe, and have actually formed one of the The use of fighting and its accompaniments for tension-release has
the tension-release motivation in barbarian fighting. Certainly the
Norse poems given the berserker a very prominent place. This man,
as heedless of danger as a member of a Plains military no-retreat so-
been barely mentioned by reporters on Greco-Roman civilization, but it took place nevertheless. it well. They did not possess the artistic and recreational outlets that we have. Their lot was hard, and their material culture was inade Our barbarian ancestors, however, knew
6 Russell, op. cit., p. 205.
7 Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw
Indians, p. 169.
s Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors, p. 378.
bored much of the time when at peace.
quate for the fulfillment of man's basic needs. 'Var offered them a means of sublimating their blocked wishes. They must have been
Some of the passages in Caesar might be interpreted as illustrating the tension-release motivation in barbarian fighting. Certainly the Norse poems given the berserker a very prominent place. This man, as heedless of danger as a member of a Plains military no-retreat so-
Kroeber, op. cit., p. 50. 6 Russell, op. cit., p. 205. 7 Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, p. 169. 8 Swanton, Early Hist011j of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors. p. 378.
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The SOcio-PsychologicaI 1otives

The Socio-Psychological Motives 145 ciety, or as a Malay who has run amok, had all but vowed his body to
145
ciety, or as a Malay who has
run
amok, had all but vowed his body to Psychologists and
the enemy, for he sought danger at every turn.
the enemy, for he sought danger at every turn. Civilized warriors have also fought for glory. for prestige and ego-expansion. deavor society permits. psychiatrists have no more than scratched the surface of man's search \Ve know the wish for recognition is strong, and that its fulfillment will be sought in whatever field of en Certainly war has been a convenient device for this type of wish fulfillment. Denig reported that he was "acquainted with no ( Assiniboin ) In dian who has risen to distinction without success in war being the principal cause of his advancement."9 to the fount of honor. easterners.
a
Civilized warriors have also fought for glory. Psychologists and
psychiatrists have no more than scratched the surface of man's search
for prestige and ego-expansion. We know the wish for recognition is
strong, and that its fulfillment will be sought in whatever field of en-
deavor society permits. Certainly war has been a convenient device
for this type of wish fulfillment.
Denig reported that he was "acquainted with no (Assiniboin) In-
dian who has risen to distinction without success in war being the
principal cause of his advancement."9 Success in hunting, religion,
generosity, and all else were honorable, but they were only garnishes
to the fount of honor. The Assiniboin were simple Plains hunters, but
such attitudes were just as common among the more cultivated south-
easterners. Swanton says that a Creek might be famous for oratory,
stoicism under trial, or wisdom in council, but if he had not been on
Success in hunting, religion.
a war party he bore no title and was classified as a boy.10 Young men
generosity. and all else were honorable, but they were only garnishes The Assiniboin were simple Plains hunters, but such attitudes were just as common among the more cultivated south Swanton says that a Creek might be famous for oratory, stoicism under trial, or wisdom in council, but if he had not been on war party he bore no title and was classified as a boy. lO Young men performed the menial labor, were submitted to many indignities, and were excluded from the councils of manhood until they had per formed a warlike exploit. Man's desire for emulation and invidious comparison has been noted by many writers . Most Indian cultures north of the Rio Grande con tained economic and social organizations so weak that war was the chief means whereby an ambitious man could obtain the privilege of looking with contempt upon some and being looked up to by others. The chief type of social stratification in America, then, was a military aristocracy into which anyone could be inducted upon performing cer tain specific deeds. It could hardly have been otherwise. glory were motives for living greater than life itself.
An Iowa father
performed the menial labor, were submitted to many indignities, and
were excluded from the councils of manhood until they had per-
formed a warlike exploit.
Man's desire for emulation and invidious comparison has been noted
by many writers. Most Indian cultures north of the Rio Grande con-
tained economic and social organizations so weak that war was the
chief means whereby an ambitious man could obtain the privilege of
looking with contempt upon some and being looked up to by others.
The chief type of social stratification in America, then, was a military
aristocracy into which anyone could be inducted upon performing cer-
tain specific deeds. It could hardly have been otherwise. Fame and
glory were motives for living greater than life itself. An Iowa father
might say to a son, "Go out and die so that I may hear of you to the
end of my days. Increase your name. If you are shot in the back and
fall on your face I'll be ashamed, but if you are wounded in the front
and fall on your back I'll be proud."11
Such honors were not all empty ones. A man on the Plains could
not be deemed a chief until he had acquired a certain number of
standardized war-honors. The term "chief" among the Plainsmen and
10 Swanton, "Creek Social Organization and Uses," p. 366.
Fame and
might say to a son, "Go out and die so that I may hear of you to the end of my days. Increase your name. If you are shot in the back and and fall on your back I 'll be proud. "1 1 fall on your face I'll be ashamed, but if you are wounded in the front Such honors were not all empty ones . standardized war-honors.
A man on the Plains could
not be deemed a chief until he had acquired a certain number of The term "chief" among the Plainsmen and 9 Denig. op. cit., p. 525. 10 Swanton, "Creek Social Organization and Uses," p. 366. 1 1 Skinner, Societies of the Iowa, Kansa, and Ponca Indians, p. 686.
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U N I VE R S ITY O F C L 1 FORN IA
146
146 Primitive War many tribes of the Plateau simply indicated such war-honors, for their
Primitive War
many tribes of the Plateau simply indicated such war-honors, for their chieftains were ordinarily without authority. Just after he had created the Legion of Honor, Napoleon was chided by one of his generals with the words, "How could you be interested
in such a toy l "
chieftains were ordinarily without authority.
Just after he had created the Legion of Honor, Napoleon was chided
by one of his generals with the words, "How could you be interested
in such a toy!" The rising dictator replied, "Men can be controlled
with toys." The appeal of an especial honorific military costume
is very strong. The privileges of costume and face painting have been
The rising dictator replied, " Men can be controlled The privileges of costume and face painting have been
so extensively dealt with in the literature that they will only be men-
with toys." is very strong. tioned here.
The appeal of an especial honorific military costume
tioned here. The Sank and Fox allowed even the grave of the valiant
dead to be decorated with poles signifying the number of the enemy
he had killed and scalped.12 The very brave Kansa, Osage, and neigh-
so extensively dealt with in the literature that they will only be men The Sauk and Fox allowed even the grave of the valiant The very brave Kansa, Osage, and neigh dead to be decorated with poles signifying the number of the enemy he had kille d and scalped. 1 2 bors were allowed to tattoo their breasts and be one of the two splen did bodyguards of the chief. Even the less brave but fairly successful warriors among them were exempt from all kinds of vengeance, could be present at all parties the chief gave, could whip ungrateful guests, and were the camp, hunting, and ceremonial police. Coup-counters among the Crow and neighbors could paint their tents with repre sentations of their valor, could use an especial interior drape within, and wore distinguishing costumes, such as ermine tails on their shirts . While the love of personal display on the Plains could be satisfied only through war, military honors were sometimes more solid. Members of the war societies and those entitled to wear the war-bonnet among the Oglala Sioux could walk into any tent where food was being cooked, blow the whistle of the war society, and appropriate any or all of the meat. 1 3 There were many public offices to which a man could not aspire until he had counted one or more coups. Notable among such political honors was membership in the Plains war fraternities. In the west, where the chieftainship was particularly weak, these associations were the only political devices other than the pressure of custom and the joking-relationship which kept the camp in order. They were the police, and their power over offenders was al most unlimited. On the eastern Plains the war societies were the administrators of posed of men of others they were blood vengeance the chiefly and tribal decisions, and were com great valor and honor. Among the Ojibway and exempt from all labor. They were exempt from and could marry immediately after any successful
bors were allowed to tattoo their breasts and be one of the two splen-
did bodyguards of the chief. Even the less brave but fairly successful
warriors among them were exempt from all kinds of vengeance, could
be present at all parties the chief gave, could whip ungrateful guests,
and were the camp, hunting, and ceremonial police. Cowp-counters
among the Crow and neighbors could paint their tents with repre-
sentations of their valor, could use an especial interior drape within,
and wore distinguishing costumes, such as ermine tails on their shirts.
While the love of personal display on the Plains could be satisfied only
through war, military honors were sometimes more solid. Members of
the war societies and those entitled to wear the war-bonnet among
the Oglala Sioux could walk into any tent where food was being
cooked, blow the whistle of the war society, and appropriate any or
all of the meat.13 There were many public offices to which a man
could not aspire until he had counted one or more coups.
Notable among such political honors was membership in the Plains
war fraternities. In the west, where the chieftainship was particularly
weak, these associations were the only political devices other than the
pressure of custom and the joking-relationship which kept the camp in
order. They were the police, and their power over offenders was al-
most unlimited. On the eastern Plains the war societies were the
administrators of the chiefly and tribal decisions, and were com-
posed of men of great valor and honor. Among the Ojibway and
others they were exempt from all labor. They were exempt from
blood vengeance and could marry immediately after any successful
" Bushnell, op. cit., pp. 13ff.
is Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division of the
Teton-Dakota, pp. 15f.
1 2 B ushnell, op. cit., pp. lSf. 1 3 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division of the Teton-Dakota, pp. l5f.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 147 war party regardless of the number of wives already espoused.14 To
147
To
war party regardless of the number of wives already espoused. 1 4
be sure, they had many dangerous duties. The akicita societies often
could not retreat before an enemy, and it was not always safe to serve
be sure, they had many dangerous duties .

as tribal executioner.
The akicita societies often
as tribal executioner.
could not retreat before an enemy, and it was not always safe to serve The whole complex of Plains war honors, or coup, formed one of the most interesting social traits in all nonliterate life. have been excellently reported elsewhere. Their com plexity would make their discussion too lengthy for this work, and they The point to be empha sized here is that these honors were for the most part individual, de pending upon personal valor and accomplishment rather than on group military success. civilized states. Certainly the brave individual is honored in modem armies, but the winning of the war is the primary object of Among almost all American Indians, by contrast, war existed to bring glory to the individual, and since war was relatively safe, everyone was happy even though few tactical, strategic, and eco nomic advantages for a whole people were obtained. One might ob serve that almost the same remarks could be made of the knightly coup-counters of our mediaeval period, and with the same imperma nent results. The modem attitude of the Ojibway wherein "the lead er of a war party gets all the credit if it is successful," was extremely
The whole complex of Plains war honors, or coup, formed one of
the most interesting social traits in all nonliterate life. Their com-
plexity would make their discussion too lengthy for this work, and they
have been excellently reported elsewhere. The point to be empha-
sized here is that these honors were for the most part individual, de-
pending upon personal valor and accomplishment rather than on
group military success. Certainly the brave individual is honored in
moder n armies, but the winning of the war is the primary object of
civilized states. Among almost all American Indians, by contrast, war
existed to bring glory to the individual, and since war was relatively
safe, everyone was happy even though few tactical, strategic, and eco-
nomic advantages for a whole people were obtained. One might ob-
serve that almost the same remarks could be made of the knightly
coup-counters of our mediaeval period, and with the same imperma-
nent results. The modern attitude of the Ojibway wherein "the lead-
er of a war party gets all the credit if it is successful," was extremely
rare in primitive war.15
The result of such a war motive, the preening of the adult male,
was disastrous for the military efficiency of the American Indian, and
caused a state of tactical confusion and military incompetence com-
parable to that of the European early mediaeval period. Aside from
a few negritic tribes in Africa, the individualistic head-hunters of In-
donesia, and the lowest of the Melanesian societies, the American In-
dian outside the areas of intense cultivation and state-building stood
at the bottom. He would have been no match for most African tribes,
while the Polynesians would have slaughtered him with as much ef-
rare in primitive war. l ll
ficiency and probably more dispatch than the whites did. His prime
motive was individual glory, which made disciplined, planned team-
work impossible. It obviated protracted campaigning. The honor
The result of such a war motive, the preening of the adult male, was disastrous for the military efficiency of the American Indian, and state of tactical confusion and military incompetence com parable to that of the European early mediaeval period. Aside from a few negritic tribes in Africa, the individualistic head-hunters of In caused donesia, and the lowest of the Melanesian societies, the American In dian outside the areas of intense cultivation and state-building stood at the bottom. He would have been no match for most African tribes,
a
went to the individual, not the village, band, or nation. It tended to
make fighting the work of assembled individual champions. While
it is too much to say that war based on individual bids for role, status,
and recognition was the only thing which prevented most American
14 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains-Oftbuiay
and Plains-Cree Indians, pp. 490ff.
" Ibid., p. 491.
while the Polynesians would have slaughtered him with as much ef ficiency and probably more dispatch than the whites did. His prime motive was individual glory, which made disciplined, planned team work impossible. It obviated protracted campaigning. The honor went to the individual, not the village, band, or nation. It tended to make fighting the work of assembled individual champions. While it is too much to say that war based on individual bids for role, status, and recognition was the only thing which prevented most American
14 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains..oiibway and Plains-Cree Indians, pp. 490ff. 1 5 Ibid., p. 49l.
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--
148
148 Primitive War Indians from becoming soldiers, certainly no truly military people
Primitive War
Indians from becoming soldiers, certainly no truly military people ever rose who were burdened with such tactical and organizational ineptitude. It is not implied that Africa was free from such practices. through military media in Africa and America. war. It is granted that all men enjoy renown . There was no real difference between the satisfaction of the basic wishes The human ego needs The Indian was only It would take Most Power puffing up, and there is always enough atmosphere of this kind in more childish than most in his admission of that fact.
ever rose who were burdened with such tactical and organizational
ineptitude.
It is not implied that Africa was free from such practices. There
was no real difference between the satisfaction of the basic wishes
through military media in Africa and America. The human ego needs
puffing up, and there is always enough atmosphere of this kind in
war. It is granted that all men enjoy renown. The Indian was only
more childish than most in his admission of that fact. It would take
a large volume, however, to describe in detail the victory dancing,
group and individual gloating of the militarily efficient Zulu.16 Most
of it was no more than the familiar coup-counting in Bantu. Power
and wealth can always belong to those who can capitalize on human
vanity, a fact which the Zulu princes understood well. The real dif-
a large volume, however, to describe in detail the victory dancing, group and individual gloating of the militarily efficient Zulu. 1 6 of it was no more than the familiar coup-counting in Bantu. vanity, a fact which the Zulu princes understood well. emphasis on the individual. War contributed to the determination of role and status also in Oceania. The method of becoming a tsunaum ( chief ) in the Solo mons by raiding for war-honors was reminiscent of the coup-counting of the American Great Plains. Since the Polynesian social system had developed a nobility based on divine descent, individual war-boasting could not take paramount place, although it was very important. In dividual honor was the basis of Polynesian beheading. Brown said that he had seen successful warriors dance in the public square before the chief, each bringing his captive head to throw before the prince with appropriate remarks of self-praise. The warrior would juggle his war-club ceremoniously and receive the chief's thanks and the crowd 's acclamation. Heads were not ordinarily kept as permanent trophies, as in Melanesia. Sometimes the relatives of the slain were allowed to take them away after they had served as coup-counters. The chief cause of war in Samoa lay in some disparaging language or behavior towards a chief, or some rival claim to his honor, so it be hooved him to praise his protectors. The African king of Dahomey held a similar levee wherein he publicly praised and rewarded vic torious officers . T7 So did the kings of mediaeval France. The honor motive and ideal in Samoa was strikingly similar to that of the mediaeval military gentleman. Buck reports that jealousy for 1 6 Krige, op . cit., pp. 275ff. 1 7 Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 89ff.
ference between the American and the African was the former's fatal
emphasis on the individual.
War contributed to the determination of role and status also in
Oceania. The method of becoming a tsunaum (chief) in the Solo-
and wealth can always belong to those who can capitalize on human The real dif ference between the American and the African was the former's fatal
mons by raiding for war-honors was reminiscent of the coup-counting
of the American Great Plains. Since the Polynesian social system had
developed a nobility based on divine descent, individual war-boasting
could not take paramount place, although it was very important. In-
dividual honor was the basis of Polynesian beheading. Brown said
that he had seen successful warriors dance in the public square before
the chief, each bringing his captive head to throw before the prince
with appropriate remarks of self-praise. The warrior would juggle
his war-club ceremoniously and receive the chief's thanks and the
crowd's acclamation. Heads were not ordinarily kept as permanent
trophies, as in Melanesia. Sometimes the relatives of the slain were
allowed to take them away after they had served as coup-counters.
The chief cause of war in Samoa lay in some disparaging language or
behavior towards a chief, or some rival claim to his honor, so it be-
hooved him to praise his protectors. The African king of Dahomey
held a similar levee wherein he publicly praised and rewarded vic-
torious officers.17 So did the kings of mediaeval France.
The honor motive and ideal in Samoa was strikingly similar to that
of the mediaeval military gentleman. Buck reports that jealousy for
16 Krige, op. cit., pp. 275ff.
17 Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 89ff.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 149 honor also was a powerful cause of war among the Mangaian Poly-
149
honor also was a powerful cause of war among the Mangaian Poly nesians. This personal bumptiousness characterized many of our barbarian ancestors-the same prestige-seeking through war so often observed elsewhere. The satisfaction of wishes for prestige, the road to glory lay in war, but there was also the desire for gain which impelled Germanic youth to enroll in someone else's war as proto-mercenaries. Caesar's Gallic war is, for the first part at least, all but monopolized with a discussion of economic war waged by land-hungry tribes rath er than a search for prestige. next chapter. The honor motive is not as apparent in the literature on Eurasia as it is elsewhere, but it does appear. Scythian behavior, for example, The governor of each dis Those who Those resembled a Crow coup-counting council. This contrast will be discussed in the
nesians.
This personal bumptiousness characterized many of our barbarian
ancestorsthe same prestige-seeking through war so often observed
elsewhere. The satisfaction of wishes for prestige, the road to glory
lay in war, but there was also the desire for gain which impelled
Germanic youth to enroll in someone else's war as proto-mercenaries.
Caesar's Gallic war is, for the first part at least, all but monopolized
with a discussion of economic war waged by land-hungry tribes rath-
er than a search for prestige. This contrast will be discussed in the
next chapter.
The honor motive is not as apparent in the literature on Eurasia as
it is elsewhere, but it does appear. Scythian behavior, for example,
resembled a Crow coup-counting council. The governor of each dis-
trict held an annual wine feast at which all Scythian men who had
slain a foe during the year dipped into the chief's bowl. Those who
had killed several could bring two cups and drink from both. Those
who had killed no one had to sit aloof in disgrace.1s
Tacitus reported coup-counting among the able Chatti, who were
so military that they went forth to war and not to battle. Their youths
did not shave or cut their hair until they had killed an enemy, so
trict held an annual wine feast at which all Scythian men who had slain a foe during the year dipped into the chiefs bowl. who had killed no one had to sit aloof in disgrace. I s Tacitus reported coup-counting among the able Chatti, who were so military that they went forth to war and not to battle. cowards and weaklings remained unkempt always. Their youths did not shave or cut their hair until they had killed an enemy, so At a Chattian's first killing he stood above his spoil and shaved, advertising that he was now worthy of his kin and country and had paid for his birth pan gs. The elite warriors wore iron rings on their fingers, which were otherwise badges of shame, symbolizing slavery's chains. This was, of course, a boast of pride that they could afford to wear a ser vile badge without disgrace. This elite band owned no property had killed several could bring two cups and drink from both.
cowards and weaklings remained unkempt always. At a Chattian's
first killing he stood above his spoil and shaved, advertising that he
was now worthy of his kin and country and had paid for his birth-
pangs. The elite warriors wore iron rings on their fingers, which
were otherwise badges of shame, symbolizing slavery's chains. This
was, of course, a boast of pride that they could afford to wear a ser-
vile badge without disgrace. This elite band owned no property and
did no work, always knowing that they would be welcome to any-
body's food, which they wasted without regard for their host's wel-
fare.19 Such behavior was a clear parallel to that of a Plains military
association.
Revenge is so consistently reported as one of the principal causes of
war that it requires detailed analysis. Why should the human per-
sonality yearn to compensate for its humiliation in the blood of ene-
mies? The tension-release motive plays a part here: Revenge loosens
the taut feeling caused by the slaying or despoiling of one's self, clan,
tribe, nation. Even the hope for revenge helps the humiliated human
1s Herodotus, op. cit., iv.
and
19 Tacitus, Germanic, 30.
did no work, always knowing that they would be welcome to any bodis food, which they wasted without regard for their host's wel fare. 19 Such behavior was a clear parallel to that of a Plains military association. Revenge is so consistently reported as one of the principal causes of war that it requires detailed analysis. mies ? Why should the human per sonality yearn to compensate for its humiliation in the blood of ene The tension-release motive plays a part here : Revenge loosens Even the hope for revenge helps the humiliated human the taut feeling caused by the slaying or despoiling of one's self, clan, tribe, nation.
IS
Herodotus, op. cit., iv. 1 9 Tacitus, Germania, 30.
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150
150 Primitive War to bear up, enables him to continue to function in a socially unfavora-
Primitive War
to bear up, enables him to continue to function in a socially unfavora ble environment. Fray Camposano wrote of the Mojos of southwestern Amazonia to Philip II of Spain that, "The most valiant were the most respected and their patience under injuries was only dissimulation for subsequent vengeance. " 2 0 Revenge, or the hope of revenge, restores the deflated. ego, and is a conHict motive with which mankind must reckon with universally. The revenge motive has been strong in African war, and has always been more marked among the Simpler people socially organized on a sib basis than in areas with strong over-all tribes. The chief among such folk has never been able to assert the national or political in terest over that of the clan, hence the vendetta has been the cause of much bloodshed in such simple societies. 2 1 The loose organization of the Nigerian tribes, for example, probably made revenge their para mount military motive, although they recognized. enough social au thority to put this on a somewhat broader tribal basis than would the Bushman or Hottentot. Yet the Ibo did not fight for economic reasons In the absence of strong central authority, but for noneconomic reprisal, so r. with them was more a penal
ble environment. Fray Camposano wrote of the Mojos of southwestern
Amazonia to Philip II of Spain that, "The most valiant were the most
respected and their patience under injuries was only dissimulation for
subsequent vengeance."20 Revenge, or the hope of revenge, restores
the deflated ego, and is a conflict motive with which mankind must
reckon with universally.
The revenge motive has been strong in African war, and has always
been more marked among the simpler people socially organized on a
sib basis than in areas with strong over-all tribes. The chief among
such folk has never been able to assert the national or political in-
terest over that of the clan, hence the vendetta has been the cause of
much bloodshed in such simple societies.21 The loose organization of
the Nigerian tribes, for example, probably made revenge their para-
mount military motive, although they recognized enough social au-
thority to put this on a somewhat broader tribal basis than would the
Bushman or Hottentot. Yet the Ibo did not fight for economic reasons
but for noneconomic reprisal, so war with them was more a penal
than a military measure. In the absence of strong central authority,
every individual and kin group had to be its own court and executioner
in order to survive.22
This universal method of wiping stains from the individual or col-
lective mirrored self has been apparent in both Melanesia and Poly-
nesia. It was not as strong in the well-knit Polynesian societies as
elsewhere, for vengefulness has always been more productive of feud
and vendetta among peoples with strong sibs and loose over-all socie-
a mQitary
mease.
ties. But nations can suffer mass humiliation and have sensitive honors
as well as families. The primacy of the revenge motive, however, seems
to retard the development of real war and eventually becomes a
every individual and kin group had to be its own court and executioner in order to survive. 22 This universal method of wiping stains from the individual or col lective mirrored self has been apparent in both Melanesia and Poly nesia. It was not as strong in the well-knit Polynesian societies as elsewhere, for vengefulness has always been more productive of feud and vendetta among peoples with strong sibs and loose over-all socie ties . But nations can suffer mass humiliation and have sensitive honors as well as families. The primacy of the revenge motive, however, seems to retard the development of real war and eventually becomes
a
nuisance to its practitioners. It is reported that the Maori welcomed
the white prohibition of revenge warfare.
The vengeance motive appears to have been more often mixed
with others in Melanesia than in Africa and America. The Kiwai of
Papua fought to take heads in vengeance for enemy depredation, to
deter him from further hostility, and to acquire skulls to enhance the
prestige of individuals.23 The Solomon Islanders made war because
20 Church, op. ctt., p. 104.
21 Meek, op. cit., pp. 240ff.
22 Ibid., p. 7.
23 Landtman, pp. 240ff.
the white prohibition of revenge warfare.
nuisance to its practitioners.
It is reported that the Maori welcomed
The vengeance motive appears to have been more often mixed with others in Melanesia than in Africa and America. The Kiwai of Papua fought to take heads in vengeance for enemy depredation, to deter him from further hostility, and to acquire skulls to enhance the prestige of individuals. 2 3 The Solomon Islanders made war because 20 21 22 28
Church, cp. cit., p. 104. Meek, cp. cit., pp. 2400.
Ibid., p. 7. Landtman, pp. 2400.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives

The Socio-Psychological Motives 151
151
an
an outsider spoke disparagingly of, or cursed, their chief or his chiefly
outsider spoke disparagingly of, or cursed, their chief or his chiefly
symbols; because a foreign chief injured them; because of theft of
symbols ; because a foreign chief injured them; because of theft of pigs, canoes, or women ; because someone had illicit intercourse with
a
pigs, canoes, or women; because someone had illicit intercourse with
a chief's wife or daughter, or rejoiced in an unseemly manner over
their misfortunes.24 But battle has also been sought in honor of a new
chiefs wife or daughter, or rejoiced in an unseemly manner over But battle has also been sought in honor of a new
house for the chief or the assembly, the launching of a large canoe, the
death of a chiefly personage, or the birth of a son.25
their misfortunes.2" death of

a
The vengeance motive was important in Eurasia, but it does not
house for the chief or the assembly, the launching of a large canoe, the chiefly personage, or the birth of a son.211 The vengeance motive was important in Eurasia, but it does not seem to have as much relation to the rest of the culture as noticed in the Americas, Mrlca, and Oceania. Mter having observed the pattern elsewhere, one would expect the revenge motive to be strong in Siberia where the social system did not develop strong groups beyond clans. The lack of vital tribal spirit made interclan fights for revenge more penal in quality than military. compensation. The Chuckchee held the whole clan of a murderer responsible for the blood of a fellow, and demanded If this was refused, a hereditary blood feud might The Gilyak, too, held an offender's clan spring up between clans.26
seem to have as much relation to the rest of the culture as noticed in
the Americas, Africa, and Oceania. After having observed the pattern
elsewhere, one would expect the revenge motive to be strong in Siberia
where the social system did not develop strong groups beyond clans.
The lack of vital tribal spirit made interclan fights for revenge more
penal in quality than military. The Chuckchee held the whole clan
of a murderer responsible for the blood of a fellow, and demanded
compensation. If this was refused, a hereditary blood feud might
spring up between clans.26 The Gilyak, too, held an offender's clan
responsible. This was very serious, since an unavenged soul could not
enter a desirable afterlife. For similar reasons, the clan's vengeance
was visited upon animals. The life of a clansman at the claws of a
bear had to be expiated with the death of a bear, any bear. The obli-
gation of vendetta existed for three generations, during which time
each clan submitted to a type of martial law until the affair was set-
tled. This might be quickly done if the clans were neighbors. If
they lived at a distance "a military expedition on a small scale is ar-
ranged."27
In Britain vengeance was even more keen if on a more tribal scale.
Widsith often sang of the gold-adorned chiefs seeking "vengeance for
responsible. This was very serious, since an unavenged soul could not enter a desirable afterlife. For similar reasons, the clan's vengeance was visited upon animals . The life of a clansman at the claws of a bear had to be expiated with the death of a bear, any bear. The obli gation of vendetta existed for three generations, during which time each clan submitted to a type of martial law until the affair was set tled. This might be qUickly done if the clans were neighbors. If they lived at a distance "a military expedition on a small scale is ar ranged."27 In Britain vengeance was even more keen
their warriors and their wives."2s In old Ireland the king of Ulster
fought to punish the Connaught clansmen "who dared to take spoil
from the north."
It has often been said that men fight for booty and beauty. The
economic motive will be analyzed in the next chapter, while the net
which has long enmeshed Mars and Venus will be discussed at this
point.
2* Brown, op. ctt., pp. 150f.
25 Ibid., p. 156.
26 Bogoraz, op. ctt., pp. 659-661.
if
on a more tribal scale.
" Czaplicka, op. ctt., pp. iBi-TO. 4k-40
2s Widsith, in Cook and Tinker, op. cft., lines 35-45.
Widsith often sang of the gold-adorned chiefs seeking "vengeance for their warriors and their wives. "2 8 In old Ireland the king of Ulster fought to punish the Connaught clansmen "who dared to take spoil from the north . " I t has often been said that men fight for booty and beauty. The economic motive will be analyzed in the next chapter, while the net which has long enmeshed Mars and Venus will be discussed at this point. 24 2 11 26 27 28
Brown, op. cit., pp. 150. Ibid., p. 156 . B ogoraz, op. cit., pp. 659-661. Czaplicka, op. cit., pp. 'M.;Q. 4 (. . . Widsith, in Cook and Tinker, op. cit., lines 35-45.
'
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152
152 Primitive War If it is conceded that the reflection of the self in the mirror of the
Primitive War
If it is conceded that the reflection of the self in the mirror of the general community is important enough to impel a man to risk his life, the prestige mirror of Aphrodite has even more emotional import. Sex is an important consideration in work, play, eloquence, or war. \Vhatever the ethos of the group, prestige-conferring activity is sought avidly by the male that his glory may shine in the eyes of his own and other men's women . Much has been written about the role of But war women in war, and most of it is too fantastic for review.
general community is important enough to impel a man to risk his
life, the prestige mirror of Aphrodite has even more emotional import.
Sex is an important consideration in work, play, eloquence, or war.
Whatever the ethos of the group, prestige-conferring activity is sought
avidly by the male that his glory may shine in the eyes of his own
and other men's women. Much has been written about the role of
women in war, and most of it is too fantastic for review. But war
is an important complex in the cultures of most societies, and women
form too large a proportion of any populations to be left out of the
discussion.
Without commenting upon the importance of women in the war
is an important complex in the cultures of most societies, and women form too large a proportion of any populations to be left out of the discussion . Without commenting upon the importance of women in the war complexes of civilized societies , it is most obvious that they have al ways had a role, although a subordinate one, in the fighting of non literate groups . They were conditioned to their roles in the tribal war just as they were conditioned to the rest of the culture. Feminine social pressure often influenced the nonliterate warrior to take up arms in a quarrel which might or might not be his own. not borne out by the facts. Why should they? In the light of such facts, the opinion that women inherently h ate war is In an unsuccessful war of defense women may suffer as much as combatants, but women have been, are, and so far as anyone can see,
complexes of civilized societies, it is most obvious that they have al-
ways had a role, although a subordinate one, in the fighting of non-
literate groups. They were conditioned to their roles in the tribal
war just as they were conditioned to the rest of the culture.
Feminine social pressure often influenced the nonliterate warrior to
take up arms in a quarrel which might or might not be his own. In
the light of such facts, the opinion that women inherently hate war is
not borne out by the facts. Why should they?
In an unsuccessful war of defense women may suffer as much as
combatants, but women have been, are, and so far as anyone can see,
will be essentially civilians. But women are just as enthusiastic for
aggressive war as their men, leaving civilized people out of the dis-
cussion; this is testified in hundreds of pages of field reports. If riches
infallibly get social adulation, men try for that with the urging of
their women. So with piety, and all the other socially desirable traits.
If the patterns of culture emphasize military preeminence, the women
are not far behind urging the male to fight.
Let us view the opening of hostilities in America. When the re-
cruiting season opened, women who had lost sons, husbands, or other
relatives were very apt to visit the lodge of any distinguished warrior
and urge him to wipe away their tears with enemy blood. Teit re-
will be essentially civilians.
marked that when a Flathead war party was announced by proper
authority, the band sang and beat on buffalo hides before the lodges
aggressive war as their men, leaving civilized people out of the dis If riches
But women are just as enthusiastic for
of warriors, urging them to enlist after the common western method.
cussion ; this is testified in hundreds of pages of field reports .
Those who joined up rode around the camp circle all night singing,
infallibly get social adulation, men try for that with the urging of their women . So with piety, and all the other socially desirable traits. are not far behind urging the male to fight. If the patterns of culture emphasize military preeminence, the women Let us view the opening of hostilities in America. \Vhen the re
as more and more recruits joined the procession from time to time.
The women followed the horsed procession, singing and urging the
relatives were very apt to visit the lodge of any distinguished warrior marked that when a Flathead war party was announced by proper of warriors, urging them to enlist after the common western method.
as
cruiting season opened, women who had lost sons, husbands, or other and urge him to wipe away their tears with enemy blood. Teit re
authority, the band sang and beat on buffalo hides before the lodges
Those who joined up rode around the camp circle all night singing,
The women followed the horsed procession, singing and urging the
more and more recruits joined the procession from time to time.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 153 men to volunteer.29 It has been observed elsewhere that membership
153
men to volunteer. 2 9
It has been observed elsewhere that membership To hold the office of Lance Bearer in the
in the Plains military societies carried with it many dangerous obli-
in the Plains military societies carried with it many dangerous obli gations as well as privileges . Kit-Fox Society of the Oglala Sioux meant almost certain death . When a candidate for this office had been chosen the women stood outside the lodge and cheered while the members sang the ritual within.3 0 The Arikara were a rather peaceful group of farmers on the margins of the Plains whose women, could be expected to love peace, if any could. Instead, they played an important part during the two-day The musicians in this hate-raising dance war preparatory ceremonial.
gations as well as privileges. To hold the office of Lance Bearer in the
Kit-Fox Society of the Oglala Sioux meant almost certain death.
When a candidate for this office had been chosen the women stood
outside the lodge and cheered while the members sang the ritual
within.30
The Ankara were a rather peaceful group of farmers on the margins
of the Plains whose women, could be expected to love peace, if any
could. Instead, they played an important part during the two-day
war preparatory ceremonial. The musicians in this hate-raising dance
for recruits were men, but the dancers were appropriately feminine.31
They dressed in their husbands' clothes and danced round and round
in a circle. From time to time an Ankara woman would step into the
circle and harangue the five to six hundred persons in the great lodge
about her husband's valor in order to increase that of the recruits.
During the preparatory dance of the simpler Comanche, the instru-
for recruits were men, but the dancers were appropriately feminine. 3 1 They dressed in their husbands clothes and danced round and round in a circle. From time to time an Arikara woman would step into the circle and harangue the five to six hundred persons in the great lodge about her husband's valor in order to increase that of the recruits. During the preparatory dance of the Simpler Comanche, the instru mental music was supplied by beating a bison hide. its one side while women held up the other.32 Men held up Women have usually
mental music was supplied by beating a bison hide. Men held up
its one side while women held up the other.32 Women have usually
played a part in the recruiting and preparational activities of non-
literate societies, and their influence upon the prospective combatants
has undoubtedly been great. Women shone in the reflected glory of
their men, often being allowed, as among the Teton, to wear or carry
distinguishing ornaments indicative of their husband's success.33
It was very common in America for women to accompany a depart-
ing war party for some distance to encourage the men. The wives and
mothers of Ojibway men slain by the Sioux got the captured scalps,
and the party of departing warriors was led from the camp by women
either afoot or in canoes.34
played a part in the recruiting and preparational activities of non literate societies, and their influence upon the prospective combatants has undoubtedly been great. Women shone in the reflected glory of their men, often being allowed, as amon g the Teton, to wear or carry distinguishing ornaments indicative of their husband's success.33 It was very common in America for women to accompany a depart ing war party for some distance to encourage the men. The wives and mothers of Ojibway men slain by the Sioux got the captured scalps, and the party of departing warriors was led from the camp by women either afoot or in canoes.34 29 Teit, James A., "Salishan Tribes of the Western Plateau," edited by Franz Boas, Annual Report 45, Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington : 1 927- 1 928,
29 Teit, James A., "Salishan Tribes of the Western Plateau," edited by Franz
Boas, Annual Report 45, Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington: 1927-1928,
passim.
30 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division of the
Teton-Dakota, pp. 15f.
31 Lowie, Societies of the Arikara Indians, passim.
82 Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshone, passim.
S3 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division of the
Teton-Dakota, p. 17.
and Plains-Cree Indians, pp. 490f.
passim. 3 0 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Teton-Dakota, pp. 15f. 8 1 Lowie, Societies of the Arikara Indians, passim. 3 2 Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshone, passim. 3 3 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Teton-Dakota, p. 17. 8 4 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the and Plains-Cree Indians, pp. 490f.
Division of the
Division of the Plains-Oiibway
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154
154 Primitive War Although not typical of America, among some tribes a number of
Primitive War
Although not typical of America, among some tribes a number of women actually accompanied a war party, usually performing some supply function. plies.all The Shasta women, who also danced on the Hanks during the war dance, went with the warriors to cook and carry sup A woman who had lost a relative to the enemy went with an She Hidatsa party to provide cooking, mending, and encouragement. victory dance.a6
women actually accompanied a war party, usually performing some
supply function. The Shasta women, who also danced on the flanks
during the war dance, went with the warriors to cook and carry sup-
plies.35 A woman who had lost a relative to the enemy went with an
Hidatsa party to provide cooking, mending, and encouragement. She
received a scalp if they took one, which she carried in the subsequent
victory dance.36 The peaceful Pima always took one or two women
along in their revenge expeditions against the predatory Apache, al-
ways females who had lost relatives to the ferocious foe.37 Bossu
received a scalp if they took one, which she carried in the subsequent The peaceful Pima always took one or two women along in their revenge expeditions against the predatory Apache, al ways females who had lost relatives to the ferocious foe.a7 Bossu said that Choctaw women might venture to help their husbands even
said that Choctaw women might venture to help their husbands even
in the field if they were fond of them. So, too, in Guiana the women
kept by their husbands' sides and collected the spent arrows for them,
although taking no part in the actual fighting.3s
Women who actually fought have been authentically reported, but
they were as rare in fact as the legend of them is extensive. Female
marching clubs with war insignia were well-known, but such bat-
talions were not tactically operational. The Great Plains had many
harmless women's associations patterned after the male war frater-
in the field if they were fond of them. So, too, in Guiana the women kept by their husbands ' sides and collected the spent arrows for them, although taking no part in the actual fighting. 8 8 Women who actually fought have been authentically reported, but Female
nities. To be sure, in times of grave danger and defeat, women in all
places have been known to defend themselves and their own as best
they could, but every warrior, primitive or civilized, has known that
women are essentially unfitted for the hardships of service. The
they were as rare in fact as the legend of them is extensive. talions were not tactically operational. nities.
Britons under Boadicea were conquered, and that may be accepted
marching clubs with war insignia were well-known, but such bat The Great Plains had many harmless women's associations patterned after the male war frater To be sure, in times of grave danger and defeat, women in all places have been known to defend themselves and their own as best they could, but every warrior, primitive or civilized, has known that women are essentially unfitted for the hardships of service. The Britons under Boadicea were conquered, and that may be accepted
as
as the symbol for the whole idea.
On the other hand, it should be noted that a woman could take the
field, count the same standardized coups, and thereby be admitted
into the police-soldier okitcita lodge of the Plains Ojibway.39 Even
then she did not wear the okitcita feather, which a relative wore for
her, although she had all the other privileges. And it should be re-
called that the Amazon river was named for the fierce South Ameri-
can women. The Carib considered fighting the characteristic of man-
hood, but their enemies and victims, the Tapuya, allowed women to
fight alongside their men. One supposes that the observation that the
the symbol for the whole idea.
36 Densmore, Mandan and Hidatsa Music, p. 145.
" Russell, op. ctt., p. 201.
3s Roth, op. cit., ch. 28, passim, especially p. 764.
On the other hand, it should be noted that a woman could take the field, count the same standardized coups, and thereby be admitted into the police-soldier okitcita lodge of the Plains Ojibway.a 9 Even then she did not wear the okitcita feather, which a relative wore for her, although she had all the other privileges. And it should be re called that the Amazon river was named for the fierce South Ameri can women. The Carib considered fighting the characteristic of man hood, but their enemies and victims, the Tapuya, allowed women to fight alongside their men. One supposes that the observation that the
and Plains-Cree Indians, pp. 490.
Kroeber, <>p. cit., p. 298. 8 8 Densmore, Mandan and Hidatsa Music, p. 145. 8 7 Russell, <>p. cit., p. 201 . 8 8 Roth, <>p. cit., ch. 28, passim, especially p. 764. 8 9 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plalns-Ofibway
811
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 155 Carib normally defeated the Tapyua has no bearing on the discus-
155
sion.40 Abbe Durand says the women of the South American "Ju-
Carib normally defeated the Tapyua has no bearing on the discus sion. 4 0 Abbe Durand says the women of the South American "Ju Nevertheless, only iD Africa were there real female fightrs in the male sense.4 1 The Kiowa regarded their women highly, and a warrior sought praise and honor from the females. middle-aged women. One of the two important wom en's associations was the Old Woman Society, composed of old ruas" fought savagely side by side with their men.
ruas" fought savagely side by side with their men. Nevertheless,
only in Africa were there real female fighters in the male sense.41
The Kiowa regarded their women highly, and a warrior sought
praise and honor from the females. One of the two important wom-
en's associations was the Old Woman Society, composed of old or
middle-aged women. A man starting forth to war would always pray
to the Old Women, promising them a feast upon his victorious return.
If success followed him, he would accost them in session upon his
or
return, light a pipe, and present it to each member in turn that she
A man starting forth to war would always pray
might smoke it. The warriors then brought water for the sisterhood
who drank and prayed again for their welfare. At length the leader
to the Old Women, promising them a feast upon his victorious return. If success followed him, he would accost them in session upon his
of the war party arose and told of his deeds. Then one of the society's
officers cut a piece of meat and buried it while praying. And so she
did with a morsel of each type of food served.42.
return,
light a pipe, and present it to each member in tum that she The warriors then brought water for the sisterhood
When the Tlingit warriors of the North Pacific Coast departed for
might smoke it.
battle in their canoes, their wives gave them little wooden images.
Once in their canoes, the men threw these back to their wives. If a
who drank and prayed again for their welfare. of the war party arose and told of his deeds.
At
length
the
leader
wife failed to catch the image, her husband would presumably die in
battle. The wife of the leader had to have stones tied about her
blanket, just like her husband had while on the expedition. She
dressed her wooden image like her spouse. She also provided her-
Then one of the society's officers cut a piece of meat and buried it while praying. And so she did with a morsel of each type of food served. 4 2 .
self with a long board which she called her "canoe," causing the wives
of the other warriors to sit with her thereon from time to time and
pretend they were on the expedition. They took great care that the
board did not tip over lest the real war canoe meet the same disaster.
They ate from the same dishes which were customarily used by the
warriors.43 Jibaro women met every night during the absence of a
'When the Tlingit warriors of the North Pacific Coast departed for b attle in their canoes, their wives gave them little wooden images. Once in their canoes, the men threw these back to their wives. If a wife failed to catch the image, her husband would presumably die in battle. The wife of the leader had to have stones tied about her
party to dance and chant incantations to the time of rattles and snail
shells. Thus their men were enabled to shed the enemy's weapons, to
prevent surprise by him, and to avoid his vengeance for the defeat
inflicted upon him.44 Likewise the Chirguano women of the Grand
* Church, op. ctt., pp. 102f.
*i Smith, Edwin, W., The Golden Stool (London: Holbom House, 1926),
passim.
42 Lowie, Societies of the Kiowa, passim.
43 Swanton, "Social Conditions, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationships of the
Tlingit Indians," pp. 407f.
on the expedition. She dressed her wooden image like her spouse. She also provided her self with a long board which she called her "canoe," causing the wives of the other warriors to sit with her thereon from time to time and pretend they were on the expedition. They took great care that the board did not tip over lest the real war canoe meet the same disaster. They ate from the same dishes which were customarily used by the warriors,4 8 Jibaro women met every night during the absence of a party to dance and chant incantations to the time of rattles and snail shells. Thus their men were enabled to shed the enemy's weapons, to prevent surprise by him, and to avoid his ven geance for the defeat inflicted upon him.44 Likewise the Chirguano women of the Grand
husband had while
blanket, just like
her
40 Church, op. cit., pp. 102f. 4 1 Smith, Edwin, W., The Golden S tool ( London: Holborn House, 1926 ) , passim. 42 Lowie, Societies of the Kiowa, passim. 4 8 Swanton, "Social Conditions , Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationships of the Tlingit Indians," pp . 407. H Karsten, op. cit., p. 24 .
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156 Primitive War Chaco often marched in procession with bodies bent and singing
Primitive War
Chaco often marched in procession with bodies bent and singing mournful songs during the absence of the war party.4 5 It will be seen later that the wives and daughters of the Jibaro, hav ing ceremonially participated in the war, fell under the same blood uncleanness as their victorious men, and had to undergo the same tabus and lustration. Therefore it is not surprising in the light of this fem inine magical power that tribes whose patterns were sufficiently com plex to contain true divinities often had female war goddesses and valkyrs. When the Hopi of Powamu worshiped the war gods, a appeared in the guise of a warrior maid.4 6 If this sort of morale-stimu women often did perform
a
mournful songs during the absence of the war party.45
It will be seen later that the wives and daughters of the Jibaro, hav-
ing ceremonially participated in the war, fell under the same blood
uncleanness as their victorious men, and had to undergo the same tabus
and lustration. Therefore it is not surprising in the light of this fem-
inine magical power that tribes whose patterns were sufficiently com-
plex to contain true divinities often had female war goddesses and
valkyrs. When the Hopi of Powamu worshiped the war gods, a katcina
appeared in the guise of a warrior maid.46 If this sort of morale-stimu-
lating behavior had military value, and it has, it might be said that
women often did perform a tactical function.
katcina
Women were the leaders at the victory rituals. If they went forth
ahead of the departing warriors for a space, they also went forth to
meet them when they returned victorious, for their real job began then.
lating behavior had military value, and it has, it might be said that tactical function. If they went forth Women were the leaders at the victory rituals.
When the Plains-Ojibway warriors returned with honor, they blacken-
ed their faces and made signals. Women came out to meet them, gave
them presents, and in return got the precious scalps with which they
would soon dance.47 Almost the same trait has been observed among
the distant Papago of the Southwest.4s
ahead of the departing warriors for a space, they also went forth to meet them when they returned victorious, for their real job began then. When the Plains-Ojibway warriors returned with honor, they blacken
The victory dance, called by many names in various tribes and con-
taining many and diverse features and complexities, always contained
this one feature throughout America wherever it was held. Women
took at least equal part with the men, and generally they were the
ed their faces and made signals .
Women came out to meet them, gave
primary actresses within it. Examples could be cited at great length,
but the following will suffice.
The ritual among the Assiniboin was characterized by a chorus of
them presents, and in return got the precious scalps with which they would soon dance. 4 7 Almost the same trait has been observed among the distant Papago of the Southwest.48 The victory dance, called by many names in various tribes and con taining many and diverse features and complexities, always contained this one feature throughout America wherever it was held. primary actresses within it. "Vomen took at least equal part with the men, and generally they were the Examples could be cited at great length, but the following will suffice. The ritual among the Assiniboin was characterized by a chorus of women who sang in praise of war and warriors, although they did not especially eulOgize the present victors .4 9 The first ceremony of the Omaha was principally a scalp dance by the women . They did all the dancing, the men merely providing the music. The men had their The role of American women in victory was ex own dance later. 5 0 emplified by the simple Wind River Shoshone . Three dances were 4 5 Church, op. cit., pp. 1 10f. 46 Fewkes, op. cit., p. 74. 4 7 Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the PWins-Oiibway and Plains-Cree Indians, pp. 490f. 4 8 Densmore, Papago Music, p. 1 87. 4 9 Lowie, The Assiniboine, pp. 90f. 50 Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," p. 330.
women who sang in praise of war and warriors, although they did not
especially eulogize the present victors.49 The first ceremony of the
Omaha was principally a scalp dance by the women. They did all
the dancing, the men merely providing the music. The men had their
own dance later.50 The role of American women in victory was ex-
emplified by the simple Wind River Shoshone. Three dances were
45 Church, op. cft., pp. 110f.
46 Fewkes, op. tit., p. 74.
*s Densmore, Papago Music, p. 187.
49 Lowie, The Assiniboine, pp. 90f.
50 Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," p. 330.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 157 held when one of the enemy had been killed. The first was one in which
157
held when one of the enemy had been killed. The first was one in which the women danced with the scalps on poles. In the second dance the men took their best horses, tied up their tails and, taking the wom en on behind them, rode about the camp singing war songs, this time the men holding the scalp poles . dance on foot. This ceremony was succeeded by a The dance was clockwise to The men stood in a row, each Each man stood between two women whom he em This was followed by another dance in The women now walked back
the women danced with the scalps on poles. In the second dance
the men took their best horses, tied up their tails and, taking the wom-
en on behind them, rode about the camp singing war songs, this time
the men holding the scalp poles. This ceremony was succeeded by a
dance on foot. Each man stood between two women whom he em-
braced in the circle which was formed. The dance was clockwise to
slow drumming and song. This was followed by another dance in
which young people alone participated. The men stood in a row, each
braced in the circle which was formed. slow drumming and song. which young people alone participated. facing a woman in an opposing line. ward, followed by the men. them to their row.
facing a woman in an opposing line. The women now walked back-
ward, followed by the men. A man would then choose a woman and
bring her over to his side, as also women would choose men and bring
them to their row. The women would then walk backward pursued
by the men, and so on until the figure was stopped by the chief.51
The early settlers were often impressed with the ferocity of Indian
A man would then choose a woman and
women, as European colonials have been both in Africa and Asia.
bring her over to his side, as also women would choose men and bring The women would then walk backward pursued by the men, and so on until the figure was stopped by the chief.!> 1 The early settlers were often impressed with the ferocity of Indian women, as European colonials have been both in Africa and Asia. Women had an important emotional role to play in war. Because of the very high place of women in the social organizations of many American peoples, this ferocity, while not universal by any means, is not surprising. quite marked. Among the well-organized peoples of the North and Mooney says that by tradition the Cherokee had a Southeast Woodlands the power of the women over captives was body of female dignitaries called the War Women or Pretty \Vomen who had the power to decide the fate of captives, and who might have had the power of declaring war and peace, as among the Iro quois. This power of the Iroquois matrons is well attested. A cap Since tive under this system was an enemy until he had been adopted, which meant that some clan or family was willing to receive him. kinship among these people was counted on the female side, such questions of mercy and adoption naturally fell to the women. 52 Mooney surmised that such customs would mitigate the severity of war, but this should mislead no one. The institution he describes re sembled little the evils of war softened by the feminine touch. This touch was too often applied with a hot coal. Our forefathers on the continent were not all liars, granted a certain amount of exaggeration and romance. It is admitted such women had the power to spare or condemn the captive, and condemned they often were, for there is no evidence of an innate desire of American Indian women to dull the
Women had an important emotional role to play in war. Because of
the very high place of women in the social organizations of many
American peoples, this ferocity, while not universal by any means, is
not surprising. Among the well-organized peoples of the North and
Southeast Woodlands the power of the women over captives was
quite marked. Mooney says that by tradition the Cherokee had a
body of female dignitaries called the War Women or Pretty Women
who had the power to decide the fate of captives, and who might
have had the power of declaring war and peace, as among the Iro-
quois. This power of the Iroquois matrons is well attested. A cap-
tive under this system was an enemy until he had been adopted, which
meant that some clan or family was willing to receive him. Since
kinship among these people was counted on the female side, such
questions of mercy and adoption naturally fell to the women.52
Mooney surmised that such customs would mitigate the severity of
war, but this should mislead no one. The institution he describes re-
sembled little the evils of war softened by the feminine touch. This
touch was too often applied with a hot coal. Our forefathers on the
continent were not all liars, granted a certain amount of exaggeration
and romance. It is admitted such women had the power to spare or
condemn the captive, and condemned they often were, for there is no
evidence of an innate desire of American Indian women to dull the
51 Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshone, pp. 650f.
52 Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee, p. 489.
5 1 Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshooe, pp. 650. 11 2 Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee, p. 489.
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158
158 Primitive War bite of war. The Omaha women mutilated the bodies of the fallen,53
Primitive War
The Omaha women mutilated the bodies of the fallen, II 3 Such examples could be cited at length. Women They had They were
bite of war.
while some of the Upper Dakota allowed their women to torture
while some of the Upper Dakota allowed their women to torture prisoners to death. reserved their role as the conservers of life to the we-group. They were also denied the excitement of actual fighting.
prisoners to death. Such examples could be cited at length. Women
reserved their role as the conservers of Me to the we-group. They had
been conditioned as children to war psychology just as had the men.
They were also denied the excitement of actual fighting. They were
been conditioned as children to war psychology just as had the men. the ones who lost their inestimable economic male providers to the enemy; it was they who had been deprived of their affectional part ners through his deeds. need not be surprised. co mmon in America as in Africa. An example of the essential fear of sex - at such a crisis is found among the Iowa. In contrast with the preparation ceremonies of some tribes, an Iowa woman was not al lowed to attend the sacred ceremonies to the war bundles before the Neither could a warrior have intercourse during the four days needed to purify himself in the preparatory sweat bath . 1I 4 The Kutenai also had this fear of sex during w ar . II II Like the Kutenai, the Mojos of southwest Amazonia fasted and were sexually temperate for a long time before war in order to attain invincibility. Compare this with the Hindu attitude which will be described later.1I 6 stention. Yet war was oftener a Signal in America for more license than ab The girls of an Assiniboin camp fell easy prey to the seduc It was very easy for a young Crow who departure. Sexual intercourse in connection with war was apparently not as If they were thoroughly angry about it, one
the ones who lost their inestimable economic male providers to the
enemy; it was they who had been deprived of their affectional part-
ners through his deeds. If they were thoroughly angry about it, one
need not be surprised.
Sexual intercourse in connection with war was apparently not as
common in America as in Africa. An example of the essential fear of
sex at such a crisis is found among the Iowa. In contrast with the
preparation ceremonies of some tribes, an Iowa woman was not al-
lowed to attend the sacred ceremonies to the war bundles before the
departure. Neither could a warrior have intercourse during the four
days needed to purify himself in the preparatory sweat bath.54 The
Kutenai also had this fear of sex during war.56 Like the Kutenai, the
Mojos of southwest Amazonia fasted and were sexually temperate for
a long time before war in order to attain invincibility. Compare this
with the Hindu attitude which will be described later.56
Yet war was oftener a signal in America for more License than ab-
stention. The girls of an Assiniboin camp fell easy prey to the seduc-
tions of the young victors.57 It was very easy for a young Crow who
had just counted coup not only to have an affair with one of the young
girls but with almost any married woman. It was rather expected that
under certain conditions a successful warrior could do so even with
the husband's disgruntled knowledge. It was the common Crow
custom for warriors gathered around the campfire of a war party to
boast of their adulteries. Should the cuckolded husband later hear of
the boast, or even be present to hear it first hand, there was nothing
he could do but divorce his wife, which was allowed him even though
she had been faithful. It is well reported that a young man could of-
ten dispense with any go-between, his or the girl's parents' objection,
and marry at once after counting coup. Among the Flathead it was
53 Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," pp. 312f.
had just counted cou p not only to have an affair with one of the young girls but ,vith almost any married woman. It was rather expected that under certain conditions a successful warrior could do so even with the husband's disgruntled knowledge. boast of their adulteries.
tions of the young victors.67
55 Turney-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, p. 127.
It was the common Crow
67 Denig, op. cit., p. 558 and passim.
custom for warriors gathered around the campfire of a war party to Should the cuckolded husband later hear of the boast, or even be present to hear it first hand, there was nothing she had been faithful. It is well reported that a young man could of Among the Flathead it was
he could do but divorce his wife, which was allowed him even though ten dispense with any go-between, his or the girl's parents ' objection, and marry at once after counting coup . 11 3 Dorsey, "Omaha SOciology," pp. 3 12. 1!4 Skinner, Societies of the Iowa, Kansa, and Ponca Indians, p. 686. 11 11 Turney-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, p. 127. 11 6 Church, op. cit., p. 103. 11 7 Denig. op. cit., p. 558 and passim.
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159
Their
seldom that a youth who had counted coup would be refused by any girl's parents, even though they might have objected before. reasoning in this matter was sound. and therefore a good provider.
A man who had counted
seldom that a youth who had counted coup would be refused by any
girl's parents, even though they might have objected before. Their
reasoning in this matter was sound. A man who had counted coup
coup
used the same skill, daring, and vigor needed to be a great hunter
used the same skill, daring, and vigor needed to be a great hunter According to their thinking, a man who was intelligent, brave, and skilful, was a good warrior; he was therefore a good hunter and provider, and was a desirable son-in-law
and therefore a good provider. According to their thinking, a man
who was intelligent, brave, and skilful, was a good warrior; he was
therefore a good hunter and provider, and was a desirable son-in-law
in a perfectly logical sequence.5s
America and Africa observed the sex motive quite differently. Afri-
can men did not enlist because the women performed some dance or
in a perfectly logical sequence. li S
other, or expected them to go out and get killed. The expectation was
America and Mrica observed the sex motive quite differently. other, or expected them to go out and get killed. the chiefs . simply because their husbands were man-killers. the ordinary prerequisite to marriage.
Afri
the chief's. Women did not commonly wear some special costume
simply because their husbands were man-killers. War success was not
can men did not enlist because the women performed some dance or The expectation was War success was not Women did not commonly wear some special costume True, Chaka always promised
the ordinary prerequisite to marriage. True, Chaka always promised
his soldiers vast sexual joys as soon as they should conquer the whole
world, but he was loath to release an able warrior from his celibate
garrisons. The fact is that women in Africa generally occupied an
humbler social position than they did in America as a whole. Instead
of finding themselves important in the military complex, they were
his soldiers vast sexual joys as soon as they should conquer the whole world, but he was loath to release an able warrior from his celibate garrisons. The fact is that en in Africa generally occupied an Instead umbler social position than they did in America as a whole. something in the way and to be feared.
something in the way and to be feared. This is not saying, however,
that women had no part in the causation of African war.
Women were not needed to bolster up Zulu courage, but they took
their toll of cowards. Girls sometimes disrobed in the presence of a
cowardly fiance to shame him, afterwards breaking the engagement.5*
The female war dance before the dispatch of the war party was rare
of finding themselves important in the military complex, they were This is not saying, however, that women had no part in the causation of African war. Women were not needed to bolster up Zulu courage, but they took their toll of cowards. Girls sometimes disrobed in the presence of a cowardly fiance to shame him, afterwards breaking the engagement. lie The female war dance before the dispatch of the war party was rare
in Africa. However, one has been reported in Ashanti where only
women with participating husbands danced.
One rare female element existed in Africathe real Amazon soldier.
It is reported that the female guard of the King of Dahomey consti-
tuted a genuine group of fighters, not a parade organization. It is
said that they made stronger soldiers than the men because of their
hard lives. If this is true, it is at variance with the generally recog-
nized female inferiority of physique. This, too, might be the result
of cultural rather than genetic influences. These female fighters had
changed their sex in their own estimation. They had their own units,
in b-frica.
_ _
However, one has been reported in Ashanti where only
specialized tactically and in armament.60 They endured hard disci-
women with participating husbands danced. It is reported that the female guard of the King of Dahomey consti tuted a genuine group of fighters, not a parade organization . hard lives. One rare female element existed in Africa-the real Amazon soldier.
pline, and were actual shock troops in the attack. They were sup-
5s Tumey-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, pp. 88,133.
6o Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 89f.
said that they made stronger soldiers than the men because of their :1 If this is true, it is at variance with the generally recog- ' This, too, might be the result These female fighters had They endured hard disci They were sup- " nized female inferiority of physique.
It is "
of cultural rather than genetic influences. changed their sex in their own estimation. specialized tactically and in armament.6 0
They had their own units, ,
pline, and were actual shock troops in the attack.
Cl 8 Turney-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, pp. 86, 133. &III Krige, op. cit., p. 279. eo Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 89f.
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160
160 Primitive War posedly all virgins and were theoretically "the king's wives."61 With-
Primitive War
\Vith
posedly all virgins and were theoretically "the king1s wives. " 6 1
out casting any doubt on the competence or ferocity of these women,
out casting any doubt on the competence or ferocity of these women let the reader recall the type of action fought by the Dahomeans and he will suspect that women could do as well in them as men. Privileges of sexual license to successful warriors were rare in Africa, but they were granted. pressed continent. Apparently Africa was not a sup The soldiers of the M asai garrison-kraals were
let the reader recall the type of action fought by the Dahomeans and
he will suspect that women could do as well in them as men.
Privileges of sexual license to successful warriors were rare in
Africa, but they were granted. Apparently Africa was not a sup-
pressed continent. The soldiers of the Masai garrison-kraals were
bachelors, yet the prepubertal girls lived in the kraals with them as
servants and concubines. These girls married retired soldiers upon
arriving at puberty.62 Even Chaka had to make some concession to
humanity, so permitted his celibate soldiers to philander with unmar-
bachelors, yet the prepubertal girls lived in the kraals with them as servants and concubines. These girls married retired soldiers upon arriving at puberty.6 2 Even Chaka had to make some concession to humanity, so permitted his celibate soldiers to philander with unmar ried girls providing they were not his personal feminine reserve in the
ried girls providing they were not his personal feminine reserve in the
military kraal's isogodlo. The king handled the sex affairs of his sol-
diers with the same authoritativeness he used in their tactical disci-
pline. He forbade their marrying until they were mature men.
Sometimes in his gentler moments he might command all the girls
of a group to marry a whole regiment without asking the consent of
either.63
military kraal's isogodlo.
/ The magical influence of the stay-at-home women on the men in
;the field was a factor in Africa as elsewhere, being especially marked
in the kingdoms of the Kitwara Empire. A wife's observance of tabu
in her husband's behalf was both exacting and onerous. The absent
warrior husband's behavior could in turn harm his family at home.64
The tabus laid on the Zulu home people were quite thoroughgoing,
and they applied to the whole clan. For example, the village had to
diers with the same authoritativeness he used in their tactical disci pline. He forbade their marrying until they were mature men. Sometimes in his gentler moments he might command all the girls of a group to marry a whole regiment without 'asking the consent of either.63
The king handled the sex affairs of his sol
keep strict silence during the absence of a war party. Great "bitter-
ness" would overtake an absent warrior husband should his wife close
her door. The family fire had to be lit every night so that the ab-
! The magical influence of the stay-at-home women on the men in the field was a factor in Africa as elsewhere, being especially marked
sentee would have light. Very little farm work was done, and then
only in the cool of the morning. If work were done in the heat of the
day, any thorn in the absent soldier's foot would burn, any stump he
might knock against would hurt him. It was tabu to mourn the dead
until the army's return, even if a messenger should bring bad news,
and illicit mourners were fined. Any sex activity would hurt the
warriors and cause their defeat. The Zulu women could not quarrel
while the army was away. They might wear no ornaments and
61 Forbes, I, p. 23f, in Herskovits, op. cit., II, p. 85.
62 Hollis, op. cit., passim.
6* Junod, op. cit., p. 470.
64 Johnston, op. cit., passim.
her door. The family fire had to be lit every night so that the ab sentee would have light. Very little farm work was done, and then day, any thorn in the absent soldier's foot would bum, any stump he might knock against would hurt him. It was tabu to mourn the dead until the army's return, even if a messenger should bring bad news, only in the cool of the morning.
keep strict silence during the absence of a war party. Great " bitter ness" would overtake an absent warrior husband should his wife close
in the kingdoms of the Kitwara Empire. A wife's observance of tabu in her husband's behalf was both exacting and onerous. The absent warrior husband's behavior could in tum harm his family at home.64 The tabus laid on the Zulu home people were quite thoroughgoing, and they applied to the whole clan. For example, the village had to
If work were done in the heat of the
and illicit mourners were fined. Any sex activity would hurt the warriors and cause their defeat. The Zulu women could not quarrel while the army was away. They might wear no ornaments and
62 63
6 1 Forbes, I, p. 23f, in Herskovits, op. cit., II, p. 85. Hollis, op. cit., passim. Junod, op. cit., p. 470. 64 Johnston, op. cit., passim.
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161
their skirts were worn inside out. ashes, earth, and other dirt.
They painted their faces with The mens
their skirts were worn inside out. They painted their faces with
They beat large stones together and
ashes, earth, and other dirt. They beat large stones together and
rattled small ones to keep death from their husbands. The men's
rattled small ones to keep death from their husbands.
huts had to be swept and fire made in them to encourage their return.
These are but examples from a lengthy list of observances.65
On the other hand, femininity constituted a greater threat than a \
huts had to be swept and fire made in them to encourage their return . These are but examples from a l ngthy list of observances. 65
help to the African warrior, not even excluding the civilized Mediter-
On the other hand, femininity constituted a greater threat than a \
ranean literal. Elements of this were noticed in America,, but -the
fear of women in the western world did not compare with the dread
they inspired in Africa. In America the warriors were like strutting
help to the African warrior, not even excluding the civilized :Mediter r anean litoral. Elements of this were noticed in America, but -the
.
cockerels before the women. African warriors had to avoid the soft-
fear of women in the western world did not compare with the dread they inspired in Africa. In America the warriors were like strutting African warriors had to avoid the soft cockerels before the women. rades ' sakes .
ening effects of femininity during war for their own and their com-
rades' sakes. A wounded Ibibio could not let a woman see his blood
flow, for it was his masculine strength. It was nothing if a man saw a
woman's blood flow, for she was inferior anyhow and any feebleness
which might come to Her was of no account.66 Neither would these
ening effects of femininity during war for their own and their com A wounded Ibibio could not let a woman see his blood It was nothing if a man saw a flow, for it was his masculine strength .
people permit the dangerous female to witness the peace-making
rites. Zulu women directed their unfavorable magic against the en-
emy by running naked before their own troops before they set forth.67
Zulu warriors might not cohabit with their wives after the shamans
had "doctored" the army lest they lose their keen vision and hence
woman's blood How, for she was inferior anyhow and any feebleness er was of no account. 66 Neither would these which might come to h people permit the dan gerous female to witness the peace-making rites. Zulu women directed their unfavorable magic against the enemy by running naked before their own troops before they set forth. 67
their lives. Women might not see the ox-throwing rites of mobiliza-
tion, nor might they eat any of the meat of this ceremonial slaughter.
They had to keep afar off unless they had passed the child-bearing
age. Zulu commanders distrusted recently married men and sent
them home until their first child had been born. Junod reports that
after the Mooudi battle a certain Zulu slayer took grave offense at a
Zulu warriors might not cohabit with their wives after the shamans had ; 'doctored' the army lest they lose their keen vision and hence their lives . Women might not see the ox-throwing rites of mobiliza tion, nor might they eat any of the meat of this ceremonial slaughter. They had to keep afar off unless they had passed the child-bearing age. Zulu commanders distrusted recently married men and sent Junod reports that them home until their first child had been born. stay-at-home man who touched his food. his death or that of one of his kin. 6 8 The sex motive was present and strong in Oceania. apparent among the Fly River Kiwai. It was very However, some observers may
stay-at-home man who touched his food. This man had cohabited
with his own wife, and the slayer thought his carelessness might cause
his death or that of one of his kin.6s
The sex motive was present and strong in Oceania. It was very
apparent among the Fly River Kiwai. However, some observers may
have exaggerated the importance the women themselves put on an en-
emy head. Yet an enemy head was a necessary requirement for marri-
age, for the males who had the women in gift placed high value upon
this trophy. In any event, the man had to have a head in order to
65 Krige, op. ctt., pp. 277f.
after the Jvf ooudi battle a certain Zulu slayer took grave offense at a This man had cohabited with his own wife, and the slayer thought his carelessness might cause
66 Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. 223, 243.
6s Junod, op. cit., p. 483, footnote.
have exaggerated the importance the women themselves put on an en emy head . Yet an enemy head was a necessary requirement for marri age, for the males who had the women in gift placed high value upon
this trophy.
In any event, the man had to have a head in order to
65 Krige, op. cit., pp. 277f. 66 Talbot. Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. 223, 243. 6 7 Krige, 0]1. cit., p. 275. 68 Junod, op. cit. , p. 483, footnote.
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162 Primitive War
Primitive War
If a non-killer married, he lived in the men's club house and
marry.69 If a non-killer married, he lived in the men's club house and
refrained from regular, child-begetting intercourse with his wife.
refrained from regular, child-begetting intercourse with his wife.
marry. 6 9
When he fulfilled his murderous obligation he and his relatives wore
When he fulfilled his murderous obligation he and his relatives wore red paint instead of the usual ceremonial black, and a son begotten at this time was supposed to become a great fighter.
red paint instead of the usual ceremonial black, and a son begotten at
this time was supposed to become a great fighter. A first son who was
not a "blood-son" was humiliated when he grew up.70
A first son who was
Nowhere did people more frankly connect sex and war than did
these Kiwai. Like many people, they had a complicated war magic,
not a "blood-son " was humiliated when he grew Up.7 0 Nowhere did people more frankly connect sex and war than did these Kiwai. Like many people, they had a complicated war magic, War magic and fear-suppressing rites among the In contrast, the sex relation was fraught with much of which was connected with their own genitalia and that of the slain enemy. mothers' genitals. many tribes. The husband of a pregnant woman endangered himself and his comrade, so he stayed at home. or otherwise. Men contemplating an expedition had to live in the men's house to avoid any intercourse, matrimonial tomed to intercourse.7 1 New Britain fighter.7 2 Neither could their food be cooked by women accus War chastity was likewise demanded of the Kiwai were also related to the secretions of their wives' and even danger to the male, particularly the fighter, as was the case with many,
much of which was connected with their own genitalia and that of
the slain enemy. War magic and fear-suppressing rites among the
Kiwai were also related to the secretions of their wives' and even
mothers' genitals. In contrast, the sex relation was fraught with
danger to the male, particularly the fighter, as was the case with many,
many tribes.
The husband of a pregnant woman endangered himself and his
comrade, so he stayed at home. Men contemplating an expedition
had to live in the men's house to avoid any intercourse, matrimonial
or otherwise. Neither could their food be cooked by women accus-
tomed to intercourse.71 War chastity was likewise demanded of the
New Britain fighter.72
Kiwai matrons sometimes accompanied their husbands, who oblig-
ingly failed to kill an occasional enemy so that the women might dis-
patch him with digging-sticks or daggers. The Kiwai considered man-
gling the wounded particularly woman's work. Codrington reports
Melanesian women cheering an attacking party with cries and beat-
ing upon trees.73 They only acted as cooks in New Britain, but were
stimuli to cruelty toward prisoners and the abuse of the dead.7*
The Polynesians did not develop the military chastity required
among many peoples in America, Melanesia, and Africa. The Poly-
Kiwai matrons sometimes accompanied their husbands, who oblig ingly failed to kill an occasional enemy so that the women might dis patch him with digging-sticks or daggers . The Kiwai considered man Codrington reports gling the wounded particularly woman's work. ing upon trees .7S
nesian men demanded chastity of their wives while they were at
war but they did not impose it on themselves. Beauty and booty were
joint motives with the men, and while war was a woman-gathering
job in part, captive women were chivalrously treated, in contrast with
their slaughter and cannibalization in Melanesia. They were consid-
69 Riley, op. cit., p. 271.
Melanesian women cheering an attacking party with cries and beat They only acted as cooks in New Britain, but were stimuli to cruelty toward prisoners and the abuse of the dead .74 among many peoples in America, Melanesia, and Mrica. war but they did not impose it on themselves. The Polynesians did not develop the military chastity required The Poly
70 Landtman, op. cit., pp. 24f.
Ibid., p. 149.
Codrington, op. cit., pp. 306f.
nesian men demanded chastity of their wives while they were at joint motives with the men, and while war was a woman-gathering job in part, captive women were chivalrously treated, in contrast with They were considBeauty and booty were
their slaughter and cannibalization in Melanesia.
6 9 Riley, op. cit., p. 271. 7 0 Landtman, op. cit., pp. 24. 'l'1 Ibid., p. 149. 72 Brown, op. cit., p. 154. 7 8 Codrington, op. cit., pp. 306f. 74 Brown, op. cit., p. 153.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 163 ered the spoil of their Polynesian conquerors, but their status was that
163
ered the spoil of their Polynesian conquerors, but their status was that of wives, not concubine slaves. They were offered no degradation and their children succeeded to their fathers' names and property.7 5 War in Polynesia was primarily men's business. Women were al lowed freely to pass through enemy lines without hurt or insult even
of wives, not concubine slaves. They were offered no degradation and
their children succeeded to their fathers' names and property.75
War in Polynesia was primarily men's business. Women were al-
lowed freely to pass through enemy lines without hurt or insult even
if it were known that they were carrying food to their warrior hus-
bands. This is in marked contrast with Melanesia, where such women
would have been slaughtered as gleefully as if they had been men.
if
it were known that they were carryin g food to their warrior hus
In further contrast, note the paradox that, while Polynesian women
were most considerately treated by the enemy, they often formed a
bands. This is in marked contrast with Melanesia, where such women would have been slaughtered as gleefully as if they had been men. In further contrast, note the paradox that, while Polynesian women were most considerately treated by the enemy, they often formed a fair fighting auxiliary, which they did not in Melanesia. They often assisted their husbands in the battle line by parrying spear thrusts with short clubs, or catching the enemy points with thicknesses of cloth. 76 According to sources available, Eurasian women played a very the German women in the band of Ariovistus. great part in war. Caesar certainly reported no lack of spirit among The Germans arr anged
fair fighting auxiliary, which they did not in Melanesia. They often
assisted their husbands in the battle line by parrying spear thrusts
with short clubs, or catching the enemy points with thicknesses of
cloth.76
According to sources available, Eurasian women played a very
great part in war. Caesar certainly reported no lack of spirit among
the German women in the band of Ariovistus. The Germans arranged
their wagons so as to make retreat impossible, setting their women
on them so that they would beseech the advancing men with tears not
to deliver them to Roman slavery.77 Tacitus likewise said that the
Germans placed their women and children where they could behold
their valor. Wives and mothers supplied the men with food and ex-
hortation, and delighted to view their wounds. He said the Germans
wrested many a victory from apparent defeat because the women
bared their breasts with pleas that they fall not into enemy thrall-
dom.7s
their wagons so as to make retreat impossible, setting their women on them so that they would beseech the advancing men with tears not to deliver them to Roman slavery.7 7 their valor. Tacitus likewise said that the Germans placed their women and children where they could behold Wives and mothers supplied the men with food and ex He said the Germans hortation, and delighted to view their wounds.
Women egging men on to war, sometimes to an unjust war, is a
common situation in the Norse legends. In the Lay of Biarki (Biark-
mol Him Foinu), Skuld, the wife of King Hiovarth of the Gauts
(Goths), persuaded her husband to revolt against his hero-overlord
Hrolf Kraki, which he successfully did. The poem brings out the
sex motive on Hiovarth's part, and the economic one for his carls,
who would receive the booty, as well as the political ambition of
Skuld.79
Ibid., p. 172.
wrested many a victory from apparent defeat because the women bared their breasts with pleas that they fall not into enemy thrall dom.7s Women egging men on to war, sometimes to an unjust war, is a
mol Him
Buck, op. cit., p. 160.
Caesar, i, 51.
Tacitus, Germania, 7, 8.
Hollander, op. cit., pp. 6f.
common situation in the Norse legends. In the Lay of Biarki ( Biark
Foinu ) ,
Skuld, the wife of King Hiovarth of the Gauts
Hrolf Kraki, which he successfully did. The poem brings out the sex motive on Hiovarth's part, and the economic one for his carls,
( Goths ) , persuaded her husband to revolt against his hero-overlord
who would receive the booty, as well as the political ambition of Skuld. 7 9 7 5 Ibid., p. 172. 1 t! Buck, op. cit., p. 160. 1 7 Caesar, i, 51. 18 Tacitus, Germania, 7, 8. 19 Hollander, op. cit., pp. 6f.
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164
164 Primitive War Women have always had political ambitions as well as men, and
Primitive War
who would not prefer to be a first-rate queen instead of the wife of a
princeling? Gyda, the daughter of King Erid of Hordaland, spurned
even the hand of the great Harald Fairhair until he made himself
master of all Norway. Said she, "I will not waste my maidenhood
for the taking to husband of a king who has no more than a few
folk."s0
If one sees the valkyr strain in the Nordic women, so likewise he
observes that the men were not above woman-raiding. King Helgi
even the hand of the great Harald Fairhair until he made himself master of all Norway. Said she, "I will not waste my maidenhood for the taking to husband of a king who has no more than a few folk. "80 If one sees the valkyr strain in the Nordic women, so likewise he observes that the men were not above woman-raiding. King Helgi
Women have always had political ambitions as well as men, and who would not prefer to be a first-rate queen instead of the wife of a princeling? Gyda, the daughter of King Erid of Hordaland, spurned
harried Sweden in those days, "and got plenteous plunder, and laid
hands on Yrsa the queen, and had her away with him."s1
The Aryan of India was egged on to war by women as vigorously
as in Germany. The Ramayana has several passages in which wives
and mothers behaved very much like those reported by Caesar and
Tacitus. But in contrast with many another tribe, the Aryas had
harried Sweden in those days, " and got plenteous plunder, and laid hands on Yrsa the queen, and had her away with him. 8 1 The Aryan of India was egged on to war by women as vigorously as in Germany. The Ramayana has several passages in which wives and mothers behaved very much like those reported by Caesar and Tacitus. But in contrast with many another tribe, the Aryas had achieved a great respect for sexual restraint by the date of the Vedic hymns. vVhile they hymned the virtues of heavy drinking, they con sidered that their victories over the licentious Dasyus were due in part to their own continence. Specifically, the hymns ascribed the victory of the Aryas over the Asuras entirely to the fonner's Brahmach arya tapas, their semi-mystical stability of character which resulted from their sexual control. This is very reminiscent of Kutenai thinking.
achieved a great respect for sexual restraint by the date of the Vedic
hymns. While they hymned the virtues of heavy drinking, they con-
sidered that their victories over the licentious Dasyus were due in
part to their own continence. Specifically, the hymns ascribed the
victory of the Aryas over the Asuras entirely to the former's Brahmach-
arya tapas, their semi-mystical stability of character which resulted
from their sexual control. This is very reminiscent of Kutenai thinking.
The Aryan women, if we are to believe the hymns, were likewise
valkyr fighters. How much of this is just another Amazon myth is
hard to say, but the Taittiriya Samhita praises the women who were
organized into troops for both offensive and defensive warfare. The
Rig Veda definitely states that the weapons of the non-Aryan enemy
were made by their women.s2 The hymns also relate that the non-
Aryan girls formed troops against the invaders which were in no wise
inferior to the male battalions.33
The political ambitions of the Nordic princesses call to mind the
fact that the political motive for waging war is not a primitive one,
nor has it often been found among primitive warriors. This trait has
belonged principally to areas with fully developed or rudimentary
states such as Middle America, the Iroquois League, Peru, and the
best of Negro Africa.
s0 The Heimskringla, I, ch. 3, p. 93.
s1 Ibid., ch. 33, pp. 49f.
s2 Rig Veda, v. 9, 30.
organized into troops for both offensive and defensive warfare. The Rig Veda definitely states that the weapons of the non-Aryan enemy were made by their women.8 2 The hymns also relate that the non Aryan girls formed troops against the invaders which were in no wise inferior to the male battalions. 8 3 The political ambitions of the Nordic princesses call to mind the fact that the political motive for waging war is not a primitive one,
The Aryan women, if we are to believe the hymns, were likewise valkyr fighters . How much of this is just another Amazon myth is hard to say, but the Taittiriya Samhita praises the women who were
s3 Ibid., v. 51, 80; vii. 78; viii. 19, 33, 91.
nor has it often been found among primitive warriors . This trait has belonged principally to areas with fully developed or rudimentary
best of Negro Africa. 80 81 82 83
states such as Middle America, the Iroquois League, Peru, and the
The Heimskringla, I, ch. 3, p. 93. Ibid., ch. 33, pp. 49f. Rig Veda, v. 9, 30. Ibid., v. 51, 80; vii. 78; viii. 19, 33, 9 1 .
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 165 The better-organized Polynesians, though, were a political people
Socio-Psychological Motives
165
This is not Earlier
The better-organized Polynesians, though, were a political people and were capable of waging war for political supremacy. found anywhere in Melanesia, nor among all Polynesians.
and were capable of waging war for political supremacy. This is not
found anywhere in Melanesia, nor among all Polynesians. Earlier
writers not only erred in thinking the gap between Melanesian cul-
ture and that of Polynesia was greater than subsequent research has
writers not only erred in thinking the gap between Melanesian cul ture and that of Polynesia was greater than subsequent research has shown, but they also considered Polynesian culture much more of an unity than it ever was. In Mangaia, Hawaii, and elsewhere, the power motive was a strong one. praised. The great courtesy of the Polynesians has often been Yet when motivated by real military ambitions, they were
shown, but they also considered Polynesian culture much more of
an unity than it ever was.
In Mangaia, Hawaii, and elsewhere, the power motive was a
strong one. The great courtesy of the Polynesians has often been
praised. Yet when motivated by real military ambitions, they were
capable of casting aside their ceremonialism and seeking power, and
were not above the basest treachery and breaches of hospitality in
attaining it. The political rewards of victory were high in Mangaia.
A successful leader could become lord of the whole island, so pow-
erful that he could depose the otherwise omnipotent hereditary high
capable of casting aside their ceremonialism and seeking power, and were not above the basest treachery and breaches of hospitality in attaining it. The political rewards of victory were high in Mangaia. A successful leader could become lord of the whole island, so pow erful that he could depose the otherwise omnipotent hereditary high priests and pay his leading warriors with liberal grants of land. 8 4 Likewise it was to be expected that the political motive, the desire to spread the power of one kinship group over another, to increase dominion of princes and chiefs, should have bulked large in parts of Eurasia. The Metal Age folk who practiced the institution of the Widsith sang of the northern kings who "won state knew it well.
priests and pay his leading warriors with liberal grants of land.34
Likewise it was to be expected that the political motive, the desire
to spread the power of one kinship group over another, to increase
dominion of princes and chiefs, should have bulked large in parts of
Eurasia. The Metal Age folk who practiced the institution of the
state knew it well. Widsith sang of the northern kings who "won
more lordship with the sword, of King Offa who forced the Angles
and the Swaefs to be one."s5
The connection between military enterprise and religious cult is
not new, nor is its history completed. Among the Teton-Dakota, the
Omaha, and similar folk, those at home continually sang ritual songs
for the absent war party.36 The young Siouan warriors were conse-
crated to the divinities with abuse, fasting, and sweat-bathing.37 It
has not been long since we have had such orders of fighting monks
as the Templars, Knights of Malta, and Teutonic Knights. The better-
organized Siouan warriors had to fast four days before a war party,
and their leader abstained from food and women even more com-
more lordship with the sword, of King Offa who forced the Angles and the Swaefs to be one. "8 11 The connection between military enterprise and religious cult is not new, nor is its history completed. Among the Teton-Dakota, the Omaha, and similar folk, those at home continually sang ritual songs for the absent war party. 8 6 The young Siouan warriors were conse crated to the divinities with abuse, fasting, and sweat-bathing. 8 1 It has not been long since we have had such orders of fighting monks The better organized Siouan warriors had to fast four days before a war party, and their leader abstained from food and women even more com pletely than did his warriors. 8 8 The religiOUS motive generally has pointed away from primitivity when conflict has been undertaken in 8 4 Buck, ap. cit., p. 161. 8 5 Widsith, in Cook and Tinker, ap. cit., lines 39-48. 8 6 Dorsey, "A Study of Siouan Cults," p. 492. 8 7 Ibid., p. 444 . 88 Ibid., p. 390. as the Templars, Knights of Malta, and Teutonic Knights.
pletely than did his warriors.3s The religious motive generally has
pointed away from primitivity when conflict has been undertaken in
* Buck, op. eft., p. 161.
s5 Widsith, in Cook and Tinker, op. ctt., lines 39-48.
86 Dorsey, "A Study of Siouan Cults," p. 492.
s7 Ibid., p. 444.
ss Ibid., p. 390.
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166
166 Primitive War the service of the gods. This is because the simpler societies have had
Primitive War
This is because the simpler societies have had
the service of the gods. no definite gods.
no definite gods.
For example, the religious motive in the pure has not stood out
very clearly in Melanesia and tropical South America, except with
For example, the religious motive in the pure has not stood out very clearly in Melanesia and tropical South America, except with reference to the mana-acquiring element in head hunting. Polynesia, however, was an area of true gods, some of whom were definitely war gods. The religious motive was, in consequence, very powerful. The lords of Mangaia, for example, were fortunate in having a Val halla motive to spur on their warriors. Men killed in battle went to a special warrior's paradise where they danced with their old friends and fonner enemies. All others had to face the "ovens of Miru in the lower Avaiki. " 89 The presence of war gods was attested among those Eurasiatics who had any gods at all. Some of them apparently went to war in honor of their gods, but this is by no means clear. In such excerpts as we have, most of the war-god idea seemed to be a wish-fulfillment cult directed toward inevitable victory . This apparently was true of India, at least. The Aryas had an unconquerable war god in Indra, who led them in their conquests like Yahveh led the Israelites as a pillar of fire, or as Huitzilopochli conducted the Nahua into the Vale
reference to the mona-acquiring element in head hunting. Polynesia,
however, was an area of true gods, some of whom were definitely
war gods. The religious motive was, in consequence, very powerful.
The lords of Mangaia, for example, were fortunate in having a Val-
halla motive to spur on their warriors. Men killed in battle went to a
special warrior's paradise where they danced with their old friends
and former enemies. All others had to face the "ovens of Miru in
the lower Avaiki."s9
The presence of war gods was attested among those Eurasiatics
who had any gods at all. Some of them apparently went to war in
honor of their gods, but this is by no means clear. In such excerpts
as we have, most of the war-god idea seemed to be a wish-fulfillment
cult directed toward inevitable victory. This apparently was true of
India, at least. The Aryas had an unconquerable war god in Indra,
who led them in their conquests like Yahveh led the Israelites as a
pillar of fire, or as Huitzilopochli conducted the Nahua into the Vale
of Mexico. Like many other war gods, he fought the other divinities
in the pantheon, and when he won, so did his devotees. The early
concept of Indra was not pacific, as it became later, for it was he
whom "steed-possessing men," pressed into battle, invoked.90 Many
Africans likewise have thought that the real battle is that between
the heavenly hosts, of which the one on earth is only a mirror.
Before taking up the great civilized motive, let us turn again for a
moment to a type of tension-release warfare, the recreational. A fact
. which some people have failed to realize is that war is often fun.
Frankly, men enjoy soldiering, the dangers of which have been exag-
of Mexico. Like many other war gods, he fought the other divinities in the pantheon, and when he won, so did his devotees. The early
concept of lndra was not pacific, as it became later, for it was he whom "steed-possessing men," pressed into battle, invoked.90 Many Africans likewise have thought that the real battle is that between the heavenly hosts, of which the one on earth is only a mirror. Before taking up the great civilized motive, let us turn again for a
gerated. Proportionately few people are injured or killed in war.
No one has explained why this is so, why marksmanship is so fatal
against animals while it is almost impossible to shoot a man. Let one
contemplate the millions of dollars spent on equipment and organiza-
tional devices located far behind the lines in the theater of operations
or the theater of war, the thousands of dollars worth of ammunition,
the vast amount of energy expenditure needed in our day of mechan-
ical efficiency to do what? Kill one man! Governments have com-
s9 Buck, op. ctt., p. 181.
o Rig Veda, iv. 42.
: which some people have failed to realize is that war is often fun. Frankly, men enjoy soldierin g, the dangers of which have been exag gerated. Proportionately few people are injured or killed in war. No one has explained why this is so, why marksmanship is s o fatal again st animals while it is almost impossible to shoot a man. Let one contemplate the millions of dollars spent on equipment and organiza tional devices located far behind the lines in the theater of operations or the theater of war, the thousands of dollars worth of ammunition, the vast amount of energy expenditure needed in our day of mechan ical efficiency to do what?
moment to a type of tension-release warfare, the recreational.
A fact
Kill one manl
Governments have com-
90 rug Veda, iv. 42.
8 9 Buck, op. cU., p. 161.
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The Socio-Psychological Motives 167 piled statistics on that. Now if we have so much trouble killing
167
people with all of our devices for doing so, what about the nonliterate
piled statistics on that. Now if we have so much trouble killing people with all of our devices for doing so, what about the non literate folk? War stories are still the most entertaining stories, and in order to spin yarns there must be wars. Wissler's discussion of the Blackfoot makes this clear. With them the military yarn was the most impor tant form of entertainment, and the Blackfoot insisted that it be a true one. Plains life was probably very monotonous, and therefore the successful warrior had not only provided pleasure for himseH in manhunting but was a public benefactor in relieving the ennu.i of his fellow-tribesmen.9 1 Much primitive war was more of an athletic than a military exer cise. Of course, one sought to kill a human and risked being killed himseH, but dangerous games have always been the most fun, espe cially those which look more dangerous than they are. When a in the face, for being first to whip a corpse, for taking a bow or blan ket from a living man than for slaughtering a hundred troublesome war. California informants admitted as much to Kroeber. They knew that war looked more dangerous than it was. They remarked that an fly right by a man ; modem musketry and marksmanship experts can testify to the same phenomenon. They also knew that they were athletic humbugs rather than killers, although they would not have said so in so many words. These tribes knew how to make stone arrow points, for they used them in hunting. Yet with the full knowl edge that stone-tipped arrows were the more dangerous, that they produced more nervous shock and bleeding than blunt shafts, they carried headless arrows to war. Warriors would return from an en gagement bristling like pin-cushions. Their wives would pull out the simple wood arrows, and they would live to "fight" another day. Kroeber also found the Mohave willin g to admit that the wish for new experience was their primary cause for going to war. to see new lands and peoples.92
in Papua were exercised with much seH-restraint.
folk?
War stories are still the most entertaining stories, and in order to
spin yarns there must be wars. Wissler's discussion of the Blackfoot
makes this clear. With them the military yarn was the most impor-
tant form of entertainment, and the Blackfoot insisted that it be a
true one. Plains life was probably very monotonous, and therefore
the successful warrior had not only provided pleasure for himself in
manhunting but was a public benefactor in relieving the ennui of his
fellow-tribesmen.91
Much primitive war was more of an athletic than a military exer-
cise. Of course, one sought to kill a human and risked being killed
himself, but dangerous games have always been the most fun, espe-
cially those which look more dangerous than they are. When a
Plains warrior got more honorable coups for slapping a living enemy
in the face, for being first to whip a corpse, for taking a bow or blan-
ket from a living man than for slaughtering a hundred troublesome
enemies in ordinary battle, he was indulging in an athletic event, not
war.
California informants admitted as much to Kroeber. They knew
that war looked more dangerous than it was. They remarked that an
Plains warrior got more honorable cou.ps for slapping a living enemy
arrow flew straight to the mark in animal hunting while it seemed to
Sy right by a man; modern musketry and marksmanship experts can
testify to the same phenomenon. They also knew that they were
athletic humbugs rather than killers, although they would not have
enemies in ordinary battle, he was indulging in an athletic event, not
said so in so many words. These tribes knew how to make stone
arrow points, for they used them in hunting. Yet with the full knowl-
edge that stone-tipped arrows were the more dangerous, that they
produced more nervous shock and bleeding than blunt shafts, they
carried headless arrows to war. Warriors would return from an en-
gagement bristling like pin-cushions. Their wives would pull out
arrow flew straight to the mark in animal hunting while it seemed to
die simple wood arrows, and they would live to "fight" another day.
Kroeber also found the Mohave willing to admit that the wish for
new experience was their primary cause for going to war. They liked
to see new lands and peoples.92
Landtman points out that the inter-clan and* infra-village hostilities
in Papua were exercised with much self-restraint. They were gen-
9i Wissler, Social Life of the Blackfoot Indians, pp. 32-36.
They liked
Landtman points out that the inter-clan am! intra-village hostilities They were gen-
91 Wissler, Social Life of the Blackfoot Indiana, pp. 32-36. 92 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 727.
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168
168 Primitive War erally held at night by the light of torches held by women. The
Primitive War
observer might think that the battle was frightful from the noise and
expenditure of rage. The opposing sides went at each other with
whatever was at hand, but deadly missiles were aimed at the legs,
not chests, and deaths were rare.93
Here was a social pattern which tolerated internecine fighting, but
one wherein the tribal concept had become important despite the
emotional significance of the sib in everyday We. Unless viewed from
the standpoint of a game, the whole thing seemed impossibly futile.
How far this motive has figured in the patterns of culture of the
whole world is very difficult to understand from the field material.
It may often be inferred, and the inference is strong, Since ordinary
nonliterate life has never been very exciting save 'in its hunting and
military aspects, these two were probably developed far beyond the
rationale of economics and security.
erally held at night by the light of torches held by women. The observer might think that the battle was frightful from the noise and expenditure of rage. The opposing sides went at each other with whatever was at hand, but deadly missiles were aimed at the legs, not chests, and deaths were rare. 93 Here was a social pattern which tolerated internecine fighting, but one wherein the tribal concept had become important despite the emotional significance of the sib in everyday life. Unless viewed from the standpoint of a game, the whole thing seemed impossibly futile. How far this motive has figured in the patterns of culture of the whole world is very difficult to understand from the field material. It may often be inferred, and the inference is strong. Since ordinary nonliterate life has never been very exciting save ' in its hunting and military aspects, these two were probably developed far beyond the rationale of economics and security.
9 3 Landtman, op. cit., p. 148.
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CHAPTER 9
The Economic Motive
ONL1TERATE MAN'S MOTIVATION FOR WAB CONTRASTS MARKEDLY WITH
that of civilized man. One generalization seems valid regardless of
the identity or efficiency of the culture under consideration: Civiliza-
tion wages war for more coldly calculated motives than does non-
literate society. Civilized war need not be primarily derived from
hate. Merely want is required, and out of the frustration of a wish
hate can be built up. In essence, the paramount motive in civilized
war is overtly economic or covertly economic through politics. The
economic motive was rarely strong in pre-metallurgical war, and was
CHAPTER 9
sometimes entirely absent.
Examine any war waged by city-building peoples and the economic
The Economic Motive

that of civilized man. One generalization seems valid regardless of the identity or efficiency of the culture under consideration : Civiliza tion wages war for more coldly calculated motives than does non literate society. Civilized war need not be primarily derived from ' hate. Merely want is required, and out of the frustration of a wish hate can be built up. In essence, the paramount motive in civilized war is overtly economic or covertly economic through politics. The economic motive was rarely strong in pre-metallurgical war, and was sometimes entirely absent. Examine any war waged by city-building peoples and the economic motive is either openly supreme or so important beneath the surface that it ranks with the admitted motive. To be sure, the simpler so cieties have not been entirely unappreciative of the economics of war, nor have all tribes and cultures been equally blind to this civil ized motive. Furthermore, the contact with civilization during the im perialist epoch led to a more economic approach to war than non literate conditions had previously appreciated. This has been histor ically recorded for North America. The westward pressure of white settlement, the appearance of the horse, and the introduction of the fur trade are cases in point. N either was the economic motive com pletely absent from pre-Columbian America. It was merely undevel
motive is either openly supreme or so important beneath the surface
that it ranks with the admitted motive. To be sure, the simpler so-
cieties have not been entirely unappreciative of the economics of
NONUTERATE MAN 'S MOTIVATION FOR WAR CONTRASTS MARKEDLY WITII
war, nor have all tribes and cultures been equally blind to this civil-
ized motive. Furthermore, the contact with civilization during the im-
perialist epoch led to a more economic approach to war than non-
literate conditions had previously appreciated. This has been histor-
ically recorded for North America. The westward pressure of white
settlement, the appearance of the horse, and the introduction of the
fur trade are cases in point. Neither was the economic motive com-
pletely absent from pre-Columbian America. It was merely undevel-
oped in the noncivilized areas, while such people as the Toltec knew
it well. Itsj>oqr expression fitted the pattern of meager development
in all economic techniques among most Indians. Starvation was never
far distant on a continent which proved to be a land of plenty. The
production of consumption goods and the storing of food never devel-
oped sufficiently to allow any large part of the male population to
withdraw from work for long periods. Such conditions of culture
could not and did not produce many or good soldiers, or states bent
169
oped in the noncivilized areas, while such people as the Toltec knew it well. r expression fitted the pattern of meager development in all econmic techniques among most Indians. Starvation was never far dIstant on a continent which proved to be a land of plenty. The production of consumption goods and the storing of food never devel oped sufficiently to allow any large part of the male population to withdraw from work for long periods. Such conditions of culture could not and did not produce many or good soldiers, or states bent
169
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170
170 Primitive War on improving the national wealth. The Indian was more concerned
Primitive War
The Indian was more concerned
on improving the national weal.
with keeping what he had than in improving his economic lot. Thus
with keeping what he had than in improving his economic lot. !hllS
the motives, economic or otherwise, tended to fit into the patterns of
the particular culturesT
Outsicle tneTiigh American civilizations the Indian's appreciation
the motives, economic or otherwise, tended to fit into the patterns of particular cultures. Outside the high American civilizations the Indian 's appreciation of the economic benefits of war tended to be individual rather than
of the economic benefits of war tended to be individual rather than
tribal. Such exploits, then, were thefts tolerated against unfriendly
groups rather than war. There were some exceptions, to be sure.
The Iroquois League recognized the importance of economic war
tribal.
Such exploits, then, were thefts tolerated against unfriendly There were some exceptions, to be sure.
from a tribal aspect. Furthermore, as stated, the recognition of the
groups rather than war. from a tribal aspect. toward the end.
tribal importance of economic war seemed to have been growing
The Iroquois League recognized the importance of economic war Furthermore, as stated, the recognition of the tribal importance of economic war seemed to have been growing Typically, the Teton Dakota practiced two forms of When the tribe as a whole needed horses, war, tribal and individual.
toward the end. Typically, the Teton Dakota practiced two forms of
war, tribal and individual. When the tribe as a whole needed horses,
it was put on a war footing by tribal authority, and it fought for
horses as a unit, as it did on the bison hunt. Individual "war" was
indeed plain theft.1
Africa contrasts strikingly with America, for the economic element
has been more important there, and nonliterate folk of that continent
have possessed more effective economic techniques than those of non-
literate America, taken as a whole. Either the Negro developed an
it was put on a war footing by tribal authority, and it fought for horses as a unit, as it did on the bison hunt. Individual "war" was
indeed plain theft. 1 Mrica contrasts strikingly with America, for the economic element
advanced technology for himself or he was not so cut off from the
civilized world. After all, the Sahara, forbidding as it was, was not
so great a barrier as the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For example,
cattle-herding was diffused through the desert along the valleys of
has been more important there, and nonliterate folk of that continent have possessed more effective economic techniques than those of non literate America, taken as a whole. civilized world. Either the Negro developed an advanced technology for himself or he was not so cut off from the Mter all, the Sahara, forbidding as it was, was not so great a barrier as the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For example, cattle-herding was diffused through the desert along the valleys of the Nile's headwaters. Peru, was no more than rudimentary. The Negro also became a good metallurgist, in some regions surpassing in technique the best Peruvian work. It is not surprising that the peoples of Eurasia should have attached . more importance to the economic motive than anyone else. This is explainable by their greater economic success in non-military fields, being within the zone of diffusion from the Old World focal area. These remarks apply to the Metal Age peoples, however, for the old noneconomic motives were paramount among the others. One marginal economic motive is seen in cpmpensation for America's domestication of animals, except in
the Nile's headwaters. America's domestication of animals, except in
Peru, was no more than rudimentary. The Negro also became a
good metallurgist, in some regions surpassing in technique the best
Peruvian work.
It is not surprising that the peoples of Eurasia should have attached
more importance to the economic motive than anyone else. This is
explainable by their greater economic success in non-military fields,
being within the zone of diffusion from the Old World focal area.
These remarks apply to the Metal Age peoples, however, for the old
noneconomic motives were paramount among the others.
One marginal economic motive is seen in compensation for injury.
No people seems to have been free from it, and it is for some reason
frequently pled by civilized states to elevate their war to a higher
moral level. Actually, it belongs as much to the realm of primitive
penology as to primitive war and economics.
1 Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, pp. 332f.
No people seems to have been free from it, and it is for some reason frequently pled by civilized states to elevate their war to a higher moral level. Actually, it belongs as much to the realm of primitive penology as to primitive war and economics.
injury.
1 Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, pp. 332.
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The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 171 This concept, present in the internal penology of many American
171
peoples, was often carried to considerable lengths in relations with
outsiders, notably on the North Pacific Coast, in Southeast United
States, and in California. In such instances the injured tribe would
consent to remain on a peace footing if it or its members should be
paid compensation in traditional amounts for the casualties claimed.
Even the simple Yuki considered peace without payment impossible.2
In such cases the economic ideas of the tribe had developed beyond
the simplest primitivity. Usually such ideas have implied the concept
of media of exchange. The tribes of the North Pacific Coast, for
example, have rarely been surpassed in their reverence for wealth and
the symbols of wealth.
Compensation for the death of a tribesman was not as important in
Africa as in the American areas just mentioned. The custom did exist,
however, for when a Nigerian war became tiresome, the elders of both
sides and of some neutral town took a tally of the slain and audited
This concept, present in the internal penology of many American peoples, was often carried to considerable lengths in relations with outsiders, notably on the North Pacific Coast, in Southeast United States, and in California. In such instances the injured tribe would consent to remain on a peace footing if it or its members should be paid compensation in traditional amounts for the casualties claimed. Even the simple Yuki considered peace without payment impossible. 2 In such cases the economic ideas of the tribe had developed beyond the simplest primitivity. Usually such ideas have implied the concept of media of exchange. The tribes of the North Pacific Coast, for example, have rarely been surpassed in their reverence for wealth and the symbols of wealth.
Compensation for the death of a tribesman was not as important in \, Mrica as in the American areas just mentioned. The custom did exist, : however, for when a Nigerian war became tiresome, the elders of both : sides and of some neutral town took a tally of the slain and audited the compensation. The victors, of all people, had to pay the most, since I they had slain the most. Neither was the gross score all that counted. The social merit of the slain also required reckoning in the price-fix- \ ing, as in the Codes of Hammurabi and the Salic Franks. Thus a dead man with three wives cost more than a casualty with one; a rich, important man was worth more than a nobody. The balance had to be made up in cash and slaves.8
the compensation. The victors, of all people, had to pay the most, since
they had slain the most. Neither was the gross score all that counted.
The social merit of the slain also required reckoning in the price-fix-
ing, as in the Codes of Hammurabi and the Salic Franks. Thus a
dead man with three wives cost more than a casualty with one; a rich,
important man was worth more than a nobody. The balance had to be
made up in cash and slaves.3
Another element lying on the margins of primitive military eco-
nomics might be mentioned, although it will be given a more inten-
sive discussion in the chapter on military values. This is the value of
the magico-economic, of economic fetishes acquired by military
means. There are several which, though differing from the capitalis-
tic economy of modern civilization, were of economic-military signifi-
cance to the practitioners. Head-hunting is in such a category. For
example, the Jibaro warrior of Ecuador not only sought honor and
fame when he took an enemy head but positive economic advantage.
The captured head became an object of magico-economic advantage.4
His behavior towards the wakani, the enslaved spirit of the man whose
head he had taken, was definitely practical, for the slayer became in-
vested with great insight into domestic affairs through its ownership.
The women were the gardeners, but the owners of heads were their
3 Meek, op. cit., p. 246.
Another element lying on the margins of primitive military eco- ' nomics might be mentioned, although it will be given a more inten sive discussion in the chapter on military values. This is the value of the magico-economic, of economic fetishes acquired by military means. There are several which, though differing from the capitalis tic economy of modem civilization, were of economic-military signifi cance to the practitioners. Head-hunting is in such a category. For . example, the Jibaro warrior of Ecuador not only sought honor and fame when he took an enemy head but positive economic advantage. The captured head became an object of magico-economic advantage.4 His behavior towards the wakani, the enslaved spirit of the man whose head he had taken, was definitely practical, for the slayer became in vested with great insight into domestic affairs through its ownership. The women were the gardeners, but the owners of heads were their
B
* Karsten, op. cft., p. 2.
2 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 178. Meek, op. cit., p. 246. 4 Karsten, op. cit., p. 2.
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172
172 Primitive War advisers on all fanning and herding affairs.8 Such practices might
Primitive War
advisers on all farming and herding affairs . Ii not be deemed economic in a "principles"
not be deemed economic in a "principles" book, but Jibaro head-
book,
Such practices might but Jibaro head Nor were they
hunting obviously had a strong economic motivation. Nor were they
the only people in the world who attached similar importance to head-
hunting obviously had a strong economic motivation.
hunting. The Dayak of Borneo put them far in the shade in this point.
the only people in the world who attached similar importance to head hunting. The Dayak of Borneo put them far in the shade in this point. The simplest economic military motive is thievery against the out group.
The simplest economic military motive is thievery against the out-
group. This is obviously so simple, or simply so obvious, that one is
surprised to find that there were areas which had but slight concept
of its value.
The technique of raiding the enemy to secure food and other goods
This is obviously so simple, or simply so obvious, that one is
was, for example, poorly developed in Indian America. True, the typ-
surprised to find that there were areas which had but slight concept of its value. The technique of raiding the enemy to secure food and other goods was, for example, poorly developed in Indian America. appropriating it was not intelligently developed. True, the typ ical raid destroyed the enemy's property, but the idea of systematically The realistic Es kimo, of course, could be expected to conform to their intensely utili tarian pattern, and they frankly looted the villages and corpses of the defeated.1I But let us consider the Great Plains. It would have been distinctly to the advantage of the hunters consistently to have raided the farmers for their superior food, but they normally burned the crops of the conquered tillers rather than appropriating them. One would expect the farmers and animal husbandmen of tropical South America to take the goods of the conquered, but several tribes did not. In their attempt to make a conquered village look as bloody as possible, they slaughtered all the domestic animals on the spot and left them.T The exception to this situation north of the Rio Grande is found in Southwest United States culture. Both archeological evidence and ethnological tradition make the raids of the wild hunters upon the peaceful com-growing pueblo-builders an outstanding fact in the area's prehistory. With the improvement of the material and non
ical raid destroyed the enemy's property, but the idea of systematically
appropriating it was not intelligently developed. The realistic Es-
kimo, of course, could be expected to conform to their intensely utili-
tarian pattern, and they frankly looted the villages and corpses of the
defeated.6 But let us consider the Great Plains. It would have been
distinctly to the advantage of the hunters consistently to have raided
the farmers for their superior food, but they normally burned the
crops of the conquered tillers rather than appropriating them. One
would expect the farmers and animal husbandmen of tropical South
America to take the goods of the conquered, but several tribes did
not. In their attempt to make a conquered village look as bloody as
possible, they slaughtered all the domestic animals on the spot and
left them.7
The exception to this situation north of the Rio Grande is found in
Southwest United States culture. Both archeological evidence and
ethnological tradition make the raids of the wild hunters upon the
peaceful corn-growing pueblo-builders an outstanding fact in the
area's prehistory. With the improvement of the material and non-
material cultures of the settled peoples, it became more and more to
the advantage of the wild men to scout the bordering hills, wait for
the crop to ripen, choose a time when the villages or fields contained
but few men, and to swarm like fury from the hills to capture the val-
uable maize. The pueblo area always centered on the San Juan Val-
ley, and finally shrank to just about that region. The nuisance tech-
nique of the savages was an important cause of this restriction, along
e Ibid., p. 47.
6 Nelson, op. cit., pp. 327-330.
* Karsten, op. ctt,, p. 23.
material cultures of the settled peoples, it became more and more to the advantage of the wild men to scout the bordering hills, wait for the crop to ripen, choose a time when the villages or fields contained but few men, and to swarm like fury from the hills to capture the val uable maize. The pueblo area always centered on the San Juan Val ley, and finally shrank to just about that region. The nuisance tech
II II T
nique of the savages was an important cause of this restriction, along
Ibid., p. 47. Nelson, op. clt., pp. 327-330. Karsten, op. cit., p. 23.
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The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 173 with soil depletion and increasing aridity.s In the same area it was
173
area
with soil depletion and increasing aridity.8

agricultural Pima.
In the same
it was
always profitable for the savage Apache to raid the sedentary and
always profitable for the savage Apache to raid the sedentary and The Pima resented the Apache but could only The Apache got the maize and exact profitless revenge from them.
agricultural Pima. The Pima resented the Apache but could only
exact profitless revenge from them. The Apache got the maize and
live stock from the Pima, although at a price in their own blood prob-
ably exceeding the disutility of going to work.*
Yet on the whole, economic raiding was poorly developed in Amer-
live stock from the Pima, although at a price in their own blood prob ably exceeding the disutility of going to work. e Yet on the whole, economic raiding was poorly developed in Amer ica and some other regions for reasons not too hard to find. There was too little technological or economic contrast between contiguous peoples. This is not saying that all Americans were on the same or similar technological and economic levels, but that the relatively poor and simple tribes were ordinarily close against other poor populations with simple technologies. Tribes which were savage, numerous, brave, and poor, were seldom contiguous to those which were rich, flabby, and easy prey to raiders. The rich were too apt to be the strong, while the poor had slight reason to raid their fellow poor. In addition to this it is by no means clear how much the fear of inimical magic attached to enemy property might have acted as a brake to military acquisition of goods. The Plains tribes found a true economic raison d'etre for war after the Introduction of the horse. The animal became the symbol of everything good and manly-valor, religious power, honor-but basic ally it was economic. A man rich in horses was rich in everything else, including wives. A horseless man was reduced to dependence on oth ers, or to the standard of living of pre-horse days, which was cer tainly at the subsistence level for people not occupying good farm land. The horse became the chief Plains production capital in a very modem sense. As he was the end of war, he was also the means of waging it, playing a very important role in such military operations as the Plainsmen practiced. It might well have been that Plains war was kept typically to the level of raiding by small parties-hardly bet ter than organized robbery - because the captured horse was ordi narily the property of the captor, not of the group. The economic im portance of the animal made horse-stealing the Plains synonym for war.
ica and some other regions for reasons not too hard to find. There
was too little technological or economic contrast between contiguous
peoples. This is not saying that all Americans were on the same or
similar technological and economic levels, but that the relatively poor
and simple tribes were ordinarily close against other poor populations
with simple technologies. Tribes which were savage, numerous,
brave, and poor, were seldom contiguous to those which were rich,
flabby, and easy prey to raiders. The rich were too apt to be the
strong, while the poor had slight reason to raid their fellow poor. In
addition to this it is by no means clear how much the fear of inimical
magic attached to enemy property might have acted as a brake to
military acquisition of goods.
The Plains tribes found a true economic raison d'etre for war after
the Introduction of the horse. The animal became the symbol of
everything good and manlyvalor, religious power, honorbut basic-
ally it was economic. A man rich in horses was rich in everything else,
including wives. A horseless man was reduced to dependence on oth-
ers, or to the standard of living of pre-horse days, which was cer-
tainly at the subsistence level for people not occupying good farm
land. The horse became the chief Plains production capital in a very
modern sense. As he was the end of war, he was also the means of
waging it, playing a very important role in such military operations as
the Plainsmen practiced. It might well have been that Plains war
was kept typically to the level of raiding by small partieshardly bet-
ter than organized robbery because the captured horse was ordi-
narily the property of the captor, not of the group. The economic im-
portance of die animal made horse-stealing the Plains synonym for
war.
s Alfred V. Kidder, An Introduction to the Study of Southwestern Archaeology
with a Preliminary Account of the Excavations at Pecos, Papers of the South-
western Expedition, Number 1, Department of Archaeology, Phillips Academy,
Andover, Massachusetts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), passim.
9 Russell, op. cit., p. 203.
An Introduction to the Study of Southwestern Archaeology Preliminary Accou nt of the Ercaootion.t at Pecos, Papers of the South western Expedition, Number 1, Department of Archaeology, Phillips Academy,
with
a
8 Alfred V. Kidder,
Andover,
e Russell,
Massachusetts ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1924 ) , passim. op. cit., p. 203.
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174
174 Primitive War Horse-stealing did not seek to inflict casualties on the persons of the
:primitive War
Indeed, it was hardly considered within the rules to kill or maim
Horse-stealing did not seek to inHict casualties on the persons of the foe. an enemy while sneaking his horses unless self-defense so demanded. The athletic war game idea, discussed elsewhere, was such that it was
foe. Indeed, it was hardly considered within the rules to kill or maim
an enemy while sneaking his horses unless self-defense so demanded.
The athletic war game idea, discussed elsewhere, was such that it was
more honorable stealthily to cut the prized charger from the tether
bound to the sleeping owner inside his tipi than to capture a hundred
horses on the open plains. Among such people as the Blackfoot and
Crow, horse-raiding was, indeed, more of a game than an economic
enterprise. One Blackfoot hereditary foe, the Plateau Flathead, had
a more realistic economic motive for horse-raiding, but the imprint
of horse culture was strong enough to change the military terminology
even with them. The term "horse-thief" became the honorific syno-
horses on the open plains. Among such people as the Blackfoot and Crow, horse-raiding was, indeed, more of a game than an economic enterprise. One Blackfoot hereditary foe, the Plateau Flathead, had
a
more honorable stealthily to cut the prized charger from the tether bound to the sleeping owner inside his tipi than to capture a hundred
nym for warrior, while the word in their Salishan dialect, "I went to
steal horses from the Blackfoot," means "I went to war against the
of horse culture was strong enough to change the military terminology

even with them. The term "horse-thief" became the honoriBc syno nym for warrior, while the word in their Salishan dialect, "I went to steal horses from the Blackfoot," means "I went to war against the Blackfoot," whether horses were involved in the expedition or not. I O Piracy is a form of economic military endeavor with
an
more realistic economic motive for horse-raiding, but the imprint
Blackfoot," whether horses were involved in the expedition or not.10
Piracy is a form of economic military endeavor with an ancient and
somewhat honorable tradition. It is recorded that the Payaguas pira-
tized on the Paraguay and Parana rivers for three hundred years.
'This form of military theft has but recently been put down among
our Eurasiatic selves. The Teutonic Vikings considered the economic
motive almost the paramount reason for waging war, and piracy was
their favorite technique. The resources of Scandinavia were too poor
ancient and
to maintain the somewhat brilliant Bronze and Iron Ages known to
that area. Therefore the sea-kings clave the swanpath with their long
ships for business reasons, linked with dominion. Military looting was
an organized trade with them. More than once some chief possessing
somewhat honorable tradition. It is recorded that the Payaguas pira tized on the Paraguay and Parana rivers for three hundred years . . ,This form of military theft has but recently been put down among our Eurasiatic selves. The Teutonic Vikings considered the economic . motive almost the paramount reason for waging war, and piracy was their favorite technique. The resources of Scandinavia were too poor to maintain the somewhat brillian t Bronze and Iron Ages known to that area. Therefore the sea-kings clave the swanpath with their long ships for business reasons, linked with dominion. Military lootin g was an organized trade with them. More than once some chief possessing nothing but long ships gathered about him a mighty host of bare sark men and proclaimed himself a king. King of what? Nothing but the wastes of the sea. There was naught to do but look about for some defenseless monarch, set upon him without the slightest provo cation, kill him, his heirs and his men, and steal his land and throne.
nothing but long ships gathered about him a mighty host of bare-
sark men and proclaimed himself a king. King of what? Nothing
but the wastes of the sea. There was naught to do but look about for
some defenseless monarch, set upon him without the slightest provo-
cation, kill him, his heirs and his men, and steal his land and throne.
The Swedes had learned something the Jibaro and Kiwai had not dis-
covered, but arable land was scarcer in Scandinavia.11
Organized war looting was not confined to the west of Eurasia.
The Go-Harna episode of the Hindu Muha-Bharata epic poem shows
that cattle rustling was a practice which the Arya king did not despise.
Victory looting is reported for all New Guinea and Melanesia in
the monographs available to the writer. The theft of a New Hebri-
10 Turney-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, p. 62.
11 Sturluson, op. ctt., ch. XXV, pp. 37f.
The Swedes had learned something the Jibaro and Kiwai had not dis covered, but arable land was scarcer in Scandinavia. I I
The Go-Harna episode of the Hindu Maha-Bharata epic poem shows that cattle rustling was a practice which the Arya king did not despise. Victory looting is reported for all New Guinea and Melanesia in the monographs available to the writer. The theft of a New Hebri1 0 Turney-High, The Flathead IndiaM of 1 1 Sturluson, op. cU., ch. XXV, pp. 37.
Organized war looting was not confined to the west of Eurasia.
Montana, p. 62.
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"The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 175 dean woman infuriated her group, not because of her sexual value but because of her economic worth as a gardener. Marital and extra-
175
Marital and extra
dean woman infuriated her group, not because of her sexual value but because of her economic worth as
a
gardener.
marital sex partners were too easily obtained to have value in the New
Hebrides, but the abduction of a producer was a blow to the village's
marital sex partners were too easily obtained to have value in the New Hebrides, but the abduction of a producer was a blow to the village's seH-sufficiency. 1 2 Malinowski and Herskovits have shown us how diHerent was the economic motivation of primitive societies from our own. This is also This apparent in the prestige value inherent in war-loot among them.
self-sufficiency.12
Malinowski and Herskovits have shown us how different was the
economic motivation of primitive societies from our own. This is also
apparent in the prestige value inherent in war-loot among them. This
factor might be considered chiefly in connection with the prestige
motive, but since honors in this case were obtained through economic
means, we will mention it here. Some students have been confused
on this point, have been unaware that people might live in an economy
other than an acquisitive one. The motive for wealth-getting, aside
factor might be considered chieHy in connection with the prestige motive, but since honors in this case were obtained through economic means, we will mention it here. Some students have been confused on this point, have been unaware that people might live in an economy other than an acquisitive one. The motive for wealth-getting, aside from immediate consumption, may be prestige as well as profit. To be sure, hoarded wealth confers prestige in civilization, as Veblen has pointed out, but among many nonliterates the prestige has lain not in hoarding but giving away. No one could think more of prop erty than did the North Pacific Coast peoples, for example, although acquisition was more for prestige than consumption. No one could have been more assiduous than a Kwakiutl chief in the shrewd and ruthless acquisition of food, canoes, slaves, Chilkat blankets, and copper pieces, and one of the best ways of acquiring surpluses in these was by war. But prestige did not follow mere ac quisition, use, or hoarding. It consisted in the lavish way in which wealth was displayed, given away, or even publicly destroyed at fes tivals. Great men even fought by destroying property to see who was the richer and therefore more honorable. So, too, the marginal tribes still have gifting dances wherein the one who out-gives his rival, or her husband, is the man of the hour. To give away all the deceased's wealth at the Death Feast is honorable; for his kin to make contri butions is magnificent. Now a successful warrior has a hard time to keep from acquiring wealth. Napoleon was no "Silverspoon" Butler, but he amassed a grand fortune. And it would be difficult for some nonliterate peoples to consider our leaders lords and chiefs if they knew that they behave in an unlordly and unchieHy manner by keep ing the loot instead of giving it away. Such motives underlay many of the horse-stealing wars of the Plains and Plateau. All but the finest captive horses were given away after
1 2 Humphreys, op. cit., p. 45.
from immediate consumption, may be prestige as well as profit. To
be sure, hoarded wealth confers prestige in civilization, as Veblen
has pointed out, but among many nonliterates the prestige has lain
not in hoarding but giving away. No one could think more of prop-
erty than did the North Pacific Coast peoples, for example, although
acquisition was more for prestige than consumption.
No one could have been more assiduous than a Kwakiutl chief in
the shrewd and ruthless acquisition of food, canoes, slaves, Chilkat
blankets, and copper pieces, and one of the best ways of acquiring
surpluses in these was by war. But prestige did not follow mere ac-
quisition, use, or hoarding. It consisted in the lavish way in which
wealth was displayed, given away, or even publicly destroyed at fes-
tivals. Great men even fought by destroying property to see who was
the richer and therefore more honorable. So, too, the marginal tribes
still have gifting dances wherein the one who out-gives his rival, or
her husband, is the man of the hour. To give away all the deceased's
wealth at the Death Feast is honorable; for his kin to make contri-
butions is magnificent. Now a successful warrior has a hard time to
keep from acquiring wealth. Napoleon was no "Silverspoon" Butler,
but he amassed a grand fortune. And it would be difficult for some
nonliterate peoples to consider our leaders lords and chiefs if they
knew that they behave in an unlordly and unchiefly manner by keep-
ing the loot instead of giving it away.
Such motives underlay many of the horse-stealing wars of the Plains
and Plateau. All but the finest captive horses were given away after
D ig ize
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176
176 Primitive War a Kutenai raid, and if the circumstances were favorable, even the most
Primitive War
Assiniboin horse-steal
prized were distributed to the unfortunate.13 Assiniboin horse-steal-
prized were distributed to the unfortunate.1 8
a Kutenai raid, and if the circumstances were favorable, even the most
ing was frankly economic, but, as with other Plainsmen, honor went to
him who captured horses only to give them away.14 The victorious
ing was frankly economic, but, as with other Plainsmen, honor went to
Choctaw chief in the south received honor not for his victory but for
his generosity in distributing the booty. The beneficiaries were his
warriors and the kin of those who had died in previous battles. Their
grief was thus assuaged. The chief retained nothing but the "honor
him who captured horses only to give them away. 1 4 The victorious Choctaw chief in the south received honor not for his victory but for his generosity in distributing the booty. The beneficiaries were his
warriors and the kin of those who had died in previous battles. grief was thus assuaged. of being the restorer of the nation."u Flathead women gave the victorious counter of coup a regular Their The chief retained nothing but the "honor
of being the restorer of the nation."18
Flathead women gave the victorious counter of coup a regular
charivari until he made expensive gifts to all.16 Assiniboin warriors
went to a victorious chief's lodge after the victory dance and sere-
naded him with songs regarding his own valor. The chief was then
supposed to come forth and make them a present of one of his horses.
The serenaders then went to the lodge of each prominent man in
turn where they expected similar treatment.17 A young Teton, like-
charivari until he made expensive gifts to all. 1 8

naded him with songs regarding his own valor.
Assiniboin warri ors The chief was then
wise, was very anxious to capture many horses. After a successful
went to a victorious chief's lodge after the victory dance and sere supposed to come forth and make them a present of one of his horses.
turn where they expected similar treatment. 1 7
war-party, he would give away many animals at the next gathering, at
which he discarded his childhood name for one of manhood suggest-
ing his deeds of valor.1s The giving of lavish feasts by a victor was
common even if no loot had been taken. A victorious Jibaro slayer
The serenaders then went to the lodge of each prominent man in
gave banquets to the community, although he and his wife and daugh-
ter could not eat any but the commonest foods since they were under
A young Teton, like

After a successful
blood tabus until purged.19
wise, was very anxious to capture many horses.
This gift-bestowal was not confined to successful, rich tribes. When
a man of the Wind River Shoshone had slain an enemy he could ex-
war-party, he would give away many animals at the next gathering, at which he discarded his childhood name for one of manhood suggest ing his deeds of valor. l s Th e giving o f lavish feasts by a victor was common even if no loot had been taken. A victorious Jibaro slayer
pect the old men and women of the village to visit him during the
night, singing and beating on sticks until he came out and gave fine
robes to the men and meat to the women. The elders then went to
the lodge of the other members of the party until they had collected
from each.20 Such pressure on victorious warriors was very common
gave banquets to the community, although he and his wife and daugh
in America.
" Tumey-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, p. 165.
14 Lowie, The Assiniboine, jxissim.
ter could not eat any but the commonest foods since they were under blood tabus until purged. 1 9 This gift-bestowal was not confined to successful, rich tribes. When a man of the Wind River Shoshone had slain an enemy he could ex pect the old men and women of the village to visit him during the night, singing and beating on sticks until he came out and gave fine robes to the men and meat to the women. The elders then went to the lodge of the other members of the party until they had collected from each.20 in America. Such pressure on victorious warriors was very common
Bossu, op. cit., p. 103.
J6 Turney-High, The Flathead Indians of Montana, p. 63.
" Lowie, The Assiniboine, p. 30.
18 Densmore, Teton Sioux Music, p. 357.
20 Lowie, Dances and Societies of the Plains Shoshone, p. 821.
13 Turney-High, Ethnography of the Kutenai, p. 165. 1 4 Lowie, The Assiniboine, pas.rim. 111 Bossu, op. cit., p. 103. 1 6 Turney-High, The Flathead Indiam of Montana, p. 63. 1 7 Lowie, The As.riniboine, p. 30. 1 8 Densmore, Teton Siotn: Mu.ric. p. 357. 1 9 Karsten, op. cit., p. 38. 2 0 Lowie, Dancu and Socletia of the Pialm ShMhone, p. 821.
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The Economic Motive 177 Charivari parties to victorious chiefs were lacking in Africa. True,
177
Charivari parties to victorious chiefs were lacking in Mrica. True,

the African kings and chiefs did make presents of loot, very lavish I ones indeed, but no one dared exert cat-calling pressure to increase their generosity. Gift-giving by victorious chiefs was also common in Europe, although likewise without the element of ridicule. Tacitus commented on the Gennanic youths' dislike of peace, how they would seek service under foreign chiefs if their own tribe were cursed by long years of quiet. The chiefs likewise preferred war, for from war came loot, and by loot one could maintain a large retinue, could make gifts of fine horses and weapons, could give banquets, and earn a name for generosity. 2 1 War for the purpose of laying other peoples under tribute is hardly primitive. It belongs to such tribute empires as those of Rome, Peru, It is the mark of civilized military robbery, too and Mesopotamia.
the African kings and chiefs did make presents of loot, very lavish
ones indeed, but no one dared exert cat-calling pressure to increase!
their generosity. Gift-giving by victorious chiefs was also common in \
Europe, although likewise without the element of ridicule. Tacitus
commented on the Germanic youths' dislike of peace, how they would
seek service under foreign chiefs if their own tribe were cursed by long
years of quiet. The chiefs likewise preferred war, for from war came
loot, and by loot one could maintain a large retinue, could make gifts
of fine horses and weapons, could give banquets, and earn a name for
generosity.21
War for the purpose of laying other peoples under tribute is hardly
primitive. It belongs to such tribute empires as those of Rome, Peru,
and Mesopotamia. It is the mark of civilized military robbery, too
gradual and drawn out, too refined, and too productive for primitive
society to appreciate.
Failure to collect tribute in goods was a defect in the economic-mili-
tary patterns of American peoples outside the areas of intensive agri-
culture, where it was practiced with great efficiency, as attested by
the thorough-going Aztec tribute rolls. A savage exception existed
among the Sumu, a simple tribe of farmers in Central America. They,
gradual and drawn out, too refined, and too productive for primitive society to appreciate. Failure to collect tribute in goods was a defect in the economic-mili tary patterns of American peoples outside the areas of intensive agri culture, where it was practiced with great efficiency, as attested by the thorough-going Aztec tribute rolls. A savage exception existed They, among the Sumu, a simple tribe of fanners in Central America.
indeed, laid others under tribute of commodities and found it a mar-
velous substitute for work. Under their "kings" they began a rudi-
mentary conquest empire in the Seventeenth Century, but it is not
clear where they got such ideas. They lay too near the great Middle
American civilizations to have been culturally independent of them,
and they may have acquired such modern military and economic no-
tions from the buccaneers who used them as mercenary sodiers.22
Tribute collecting, then, has been characteristic of rudimentary
states. The getting of scat is one of the favorite themes of the Norse
Edda. The Irish Leabhar Gubhala, The Book of Invasions, relates
that the second invasion of the island by the Celts from Spain failed
indeed, laid others under tribute of commodities and found it a mar velous substitute for work. Under their " kings" they began a rudi mentary conquest empire in the Seventeenth Century, but it is not clear where they got such ideas. They lay too near the great Middle American civilizations to have been culturally independent of them, and they may have acquired such modern military and economic no tions from the buccaneers who used them as mercenary sodiers. 22 Tribute collecting, then, has been characteristic of rudimentary The getting of scat is one of the favorite themes of the Norse Edda. The Irish Leabhar Gabhala, The Book of Invasions, relates that the second invasion of the island by the Celts from Spain failed states.
because of a pestilence. This gave the indigenous Formorians, who
have come down in legend as sea-demons, a fine opportunity for set-
ting upon the survivors. This they did, and they levied tribute upon
Tacitus, Germania, 14.
22 Eduard Conzernius, Ethnographical Survey of the Miskito and Sumu In-
dians of Honduras and Nicaragua, Bulletin 106, Bureau of American Ethnology
(Washington: 1932), p. 82.
because of a pestilence. This gave the indigenous Fonnorians, who have come down in legend as sea-demons, a fine opportunity for set ting upon the survivors. This they did, and they levied tribute upon 2 1 Tacitus, Germania, 14. 22 Eduard Conzemius, Ethnographical Survey of the Miskito and Sumu I dlaru of Honduraa and Nicaragua, Bulletin 106, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1932 ) , p. 82.
D ig iz e
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178
178 Primitive War them of two thirds of the children, grain, and milk.23 Herodotus said
Primitive War
that the nomadic Scyths invaded and successfully held Asia Minor
under tribute for long periods.24
Herodotus said that the nomadic Scyths invaded and successfully held Asia Minor under tribute for long periods. 2 4 Military slaving as an economic enterprise also belongs on levels above the lowest primitivity. It is certainly more productive to en slave a war captive than to kill him or to eat him. The brilliant rudi mentary civilizations of Mexico and the Mediterranean basin might not have been built without the institution, so the world may have stands that the Inca built his Peruvian greatness without it, but the Peruvians were able and willin g to effect an efficient social organiza tion. Slaving was an economic military motive of only moderate impor tance in native America, for certain economic thresholds must be at tained before the slave becomes valuable. the male captive a burden. The Plains hunters found He could not be sent for horses ; he could profited thereby. Such an opinion receives a blow when one under
them of two thirds of the children, grain, and milk. 28
Military slaving as an economic enterprise also belongs on levels
above the lowest primitivity. It is certainly more productive to en-
slave a war captive than to kill him or to eat him. The brilliant rudi-
mentary civilizations of Mexico and the Mediterranean basin might
not have been built without the institution, so the world may have
profited thereby. Such an opinion receives a blow when one under-
stands that the Inca built his Peruvian greatness without it, but the
Peruvians were able and willing to effect an efficient social organiza-
tion.
Slaving was an economic military motive of only moderate impor-
tance in native America, for certain economic thresholds must be at-
tained before the slave becomes valuable. The Plains hunters found
the male captive a burden. He could not be sent for horses; he could
not be trusted with weapons with which to hunt for his master; he was
more of a nuisance than an economic asset, so was promptly killed,
adopted, or sent home. The female slave, quite aside from her value
as a concubine, was economically useful to the man and his wife. More
than one woman was required to process the bison one man could
kill. A woman's duties could be performed at or near home where
she could be kept under surveillance.
not be trusted with weapons with which to hunt for his master; he was more of a nuisance than an economic asset, so was promptly killed, adopted, or sent home. The female slave, quite aside from her value as a concubine. was economically useful to the man and his wife. More than one woman was required to process the bison one man could kill . A woman's duties could be performed at or near home where she could be kept under surveillance. The slave has therefore been valuable where the economic level, either through technological superiority or the presence of an easily exploitable natural resource, permitted work near home. An example is found in the legendary enslavement of the early Iroquois by the Al gonkin. The latter soon appreciated the utility of agriculture and the disutility of the labor involved. So when the early Iroquois came north, the Algonkin enslaved these expert tillers, put the men in women's clothes, and set them to farming. As time rolled by, the Iro quois perfected their social and military organization to such an ex tent that only white intervention prevented the probable extermination of the eastern Algonkin by their erstwhile servants. The Oregon Klamath and Modoc, each culturally simple people, went one step farther. While their economy had slight need for slaves, they went into the business commercially, venturing into Calitrans. ,
The slave has therefore been valuable where the economic level,
either through technological superiority or the presence of an easily
exploitable natural resource, permitted work near home. An example
is found in the legendary enslavement of the early Iroquois by the Al-
gonkin. The latter soon appreciated the utility of agriculture and the
disutility of the labor involved. So when the early Iroquois came
north, the Algonkin enslaved these expert tillers, put the men in
women's clothes, and set them to fanning. As time rolled by, the Iro-
quois perfected their social and military organization to such an ex-
tent that only white intervention prevented the probable extermination
of the eastern Algonkin by their erstwhile servants.
The Oregon Klamath and Modoc, each culturally simple people,
went one step farther. While their economy had slight need for
slaves, they went into the business commercially, venturing into Cali-
23 TheLeabhar Gabhala, in Henri Hubert, The Rise of the Celts, M. W. Dobie,
trans., (New York: A. Knopf, 1934), p. 192.
" Herodotus, i. 106.
28 The Leabha, Gabhala, in Henri Hubert. The Rise qf the Celts, M. W. Dobie, ( New York : A. Knopf, 1934 ) , p. 192. 24 Herodotus, i. 106.
D ig ize
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The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 179 fornia in their razzias to enslave the Achomavi whom they carried to
179
fornia in their razzias to enslave the Achomavi whom they carried to the international slave market at The Dalles , Oregon. Skinner reports that the Menomini were consistent slavers . They
the international slave market at The Dalles, Oregon.
Skinner reports that the Menomini were consistent slavers. They
took captives of both sexes and were none too kind to them. The
Menomini did not try to capture or purchase many slaves, as they
were never large-scale farmers, but slaves had some value to them.
One Augustin Grignon said that he knew of two female slaves which
sold among the Menomini for as high as two hundred dollars. These
people preferred to raid as far as the distant Pawnee who, being taken
so far from home, would have slight motive or opportunity to escape.
The tribes of the North Pacific Coast made slavery almost as much a
center of their economy as it was with the Arabs. Consequently, they
were as fierce and as able warriors as this continent knew. In con-
trast, the Flathead frequently took male slaves in order to enhance
the prestige of the captor, but finding them a burden, killed them off.25
A median attitude existed among the Plains Ojibway. These people,
probably retaining a memory of past corn-growing practices, took cap-
tives of both sexes whom they did not torture but kept subjugated by
fear of death. The women were taken as wives while the men were
forced into a mild type of semi-slavery.
An extreme slaving attitude was found among the Sauk and Fox.
took captives of both sexes and were none too kind to them. The Menomini did not try to capture or purchase many slaves, as they were never large-scale farmers, but slaves had some value to them. One Augustin Grignon said that he knew of two female slaves which sold among the Menomini for as high as two hundred dollars. These people preferred to raid as far as the distant Pawnee who, being taken so far from home, would have slight motive or opportunity to escape. The tribes of the North Pacific Coast made slavery almost as much a center of their economy as it was with the Arabs. Consequently, they were as fierce and as able warriors as this continent knew. In con trast, the Flathead frequently took male slaves in order to enhance the prestige of the captor, but finding them a burden, killed them off.25
A median attitude existed among the Plains Ojibway. These people, probably retaining a memory of past com-growing practices, took cap tives of both sexes whom they did not torture but kept subjugated by fear of death. forced into
a
The spirits of the foes a man had slain in his lifetime were perpetual-
ly enslaved to his service in the afterlife. Indeed, upon a warrior's
death some dear friend would go to the edge of the grave during the
funerary ceremonial and, by waving his war club toward the corpse
of his comrade, bequeath to his spirit the ghostly servitors whom the
donor's war exploits had amassed.26
The women were taken as wives while the men were mild type of semi-slavery.
No generalization can be made concerning slaving in South Ameri-
ca. Some very ferocious people who also had lands to till never prac-
ticed it, while such gentle people as the Chiquitos of southwest Ama-
zonia consistently enslaved their neighbors.
It has been noted that Africans as a whole fought better than Ameri-'
ly enslaved to his service in the afterlife.
The spirits of the foes a man had slain in his lifetime were perpetual Indeed, upon a warrior's
An extreme slaving attitude was found among the Sauk and Fox.
cans as a whole. They likewise had stronger economic motivation.
Farming was most important in at least two great African areas, and
was known to all save one. Serious farming, a fortunate geography,
death some dear friend would go to the edge of the grave during the funerary ceremonial and, by waving his war club toward the corpse of his comrade, bequeath to his spirit the ghostly servitors whom the donor's war exploits had amassed. 26 No generalization can be made concerning slaving in South Ameri ca. Some very ferocious people who also had lands to till never prac ticed it, while such gentle people as the Chiquitos of southwest Ama It has been noted that Africans as a whole fought better than Ameri- \ cans as a whole. They likewise had stronger economic motivation. Farming was most important in at least two great African areas, and was known to all save one. Serious farming, a fortunate geography, and a teeming population produced slavery, and slavery meant war. 211 Tumey-High, The Flathead Indiaru of Montana, p. 130. 26 David I. Bushnell, BuriaU of the Algonquin, Siouan, and Caddoan TriM West of the Misrisrip,n, Bulletin 83, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washing ton: 1927 ) , p. 14. zonia consistently enslaved their neighbors.
and a teeming population produced slavery, and slavery meant war.
25 Turney-High, The Flathead Indiana of Montana, p. 130.
28 David I. Bushnell, Burials of the Algonquin, Siouan, and Caddoan Tribes
West of the Mississippi, Bulletin 83, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washing-
ton: 1927), p. 14.
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180
180 Primitive War Many kingdoms of West Africa were founded for defense. Once
Primitive War
they were established, the temptation to loot the scattered and less
organized towns of their ivory, gold, and slaves became too strong.
These kingdoms already possessed organized slave markets when the
whites discovered them. They eventually became enormous slave fac-
tories. Actually what the Dahomeans called wars were no more than
large scale slaving enterprises.27 They were means of affording the
king magnificent revenues, for he bought slaves at about five francs
per head from his soldiers and sold them at much higher rates.2s
Slaving, however, was not universally valued in Africa. The humb-
ler tribes had no more use for the institution than did the bulk of the
Americans. Even the great Zulu kingdom valued it no more than did
Many kingdoms of West Africa were founded for defense. Once they were established, the temptation to loot the scattered and less organized towns of their ivory, gold, and slaves became too strong. These kingdoms already possessed organized slave markets when the whites discovered them. They eventually became enormous slave fac tories. Actually what the Dahomeans called wars were no more than large scale slaving enterprises. 2 7 They were means of affording the king magnificent revenues, for he bought slaves at about Dve francs per head from his soldiers and sold them at much higher rates.2 8 Slaving, however, was not universally valued in Africa. The humb ler tribes had no more use for the institution than did the bulk of the Americans. Even the great Zulu kingdom valued it no more than did the Sioux. Slaves were of no great value to herdsmen such as they, although at one time they were more concerned with slaves than in the great period. In the latter and magnificent day their slaving be came most primitive, and they reverted to a preoccupation with the slaughter of survivors. Only attractive young women in later times were spared for sale into matrimony, and since this was true matri mony instead of sexual bondage, they were so well treated that they could hardly be called slaves. 2 9 Slavery among the cruder south Sudan people could not have been of much importance, judged by the slight social distinction between master and slave. War captives could become their masters' heirs among the Makaraka, and could even marry free women. Lugbari slave women could marry free-born Kakwa, 80 all of which is in great contrast with Dahomean practice. African slavery never reached the personal harshness recorded in the history of our civilization. Even in the well-organized and suc cessful Congo Kingdoms slaves were given almost every right of freemen. If he could hoard enough, the slave could buy a slave to do his work. The interference of the white man changed this halcyon condition in many areas. It is strange that the SOCially, agriculturally, and martially able Polynesians did not grasp the point of converting conquered folk into economically valuable objects more than they did. The Samoans, for 2 7 Herskovits, op. cit., II, pp. 70. 28 Ibid., pp. 95. 2 9 Junod, op. cU., p. 471. 80 Leonard F . Nalder, ed., A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province ( London : Oxford University Press, 1937 ) , p. 27.
the Sioux. Slaves were of no great value to herdsmen such as they,
although at one time they were more concerned with slaves than in
the great period. In the latter and magnificent day their slaving be-
came most primitive, and they reverted to a preoccupation with the
slaughter of survivors. Only attractive young women in later times
were spared for sale into matrimony, and since this was true matri-
mony instead of sexual bondage, they were so well treated that they
could hardly be called slaves.29
Slavery among the cruder south Sudan people could not have been
of much importance, judged by the slight social distinction between
master and slave. War captives could become their masters' heirs
among the Makaraka, and could even marry free women. Lugbari
slave women could marry free-born Kakwa,30 all of which is in great
contrast with Dahomean practice.
African slavery never jeached the personal harshness recorded in
the history of our civilization. Even in the well-organized and suc-
cessful Congo Kingdoms slaves were given almost every right of
freemen. If he could hoard enough, the slave could buy a slave to
do his work. The interference of the white man changed this halcyon
condition in many areas.
It is strange that the socially, agriculturally, and martially able
Polynesians did not grasp the point of converting conquered folk into
economically valuable objects more than they did. The Samoans, for
27 Herskovits, op. cit., 11, pp. 70f.
" Ibid., pp. 95f.
30 Leonard F. Nalder, ed., A Tribal Survey of Mongolia Province (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 27.
D ig ize
Ori g i n a l fro m
The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 181 example, made no attempt to enslave the conquered or to convert them
181
If
example, made no attempt to enslave the conquered or to convert them into servile castes.
All prisoners and wounded men were killed.
into servile castes. All prisoners and wounded men were killed. If
their territory was occupied, the surviving vanquished would seek
their territory was occupied, the surviving vanquished would seek refuge in a neutral town and eventually ask their hosts to intercede for them or help them expel their foe by force.3 1 The conquerors were content with destroying the gardens and houses and with temporarily always got their homes back for the original owners.3 2 driving off their victims. The intercession of neutral hosts almost
refuge in a neutral town and eventually ask their hosts to intercede
for them or help them expel their foe by force.31 The conquerors were
content with destroying the gardens and houses and with temporarily
driving off their victims. The intercession of neutral hosts almost
always got their homes back for the original owners.32
One cannot say that war-slavery was a particularly important trait
among the agricultural peoples of barbarian Europe. Viewing the
parallel development of the institution with the rise of civilization
and the civilizing traits elsewhere, a somewhat greater development
One cannot say that war-slavery was a particularly important trait among the agricultural peoples of barbarian Europe. Viewing the parallel development of the institution with the rise of civilization and the civilizing traits elsewhere, a somewhat greater development might have been expected. The pastoral nomads perhaps practiced slavery most consistently. It would appear that the slave would have been more in the way among such wanderers than his slight economic worth would counter balance. The captive's opportunities to run away must have been They used cap great, but the Scyths, for one, solved that problem. them to make them docile and immobile.
might have been expected.
The pastoral nomads perhaps practiced slavery most consistently.
It would appear that the slave would have been more in the way
among such wanderers than his slight economic worth would counter-
balance. The captive's opportunities to run away must have been
great, but the Scyths, for one, solved that problem. They used cap-
tives to milk their mares for them, and finding them valuable, blinded
them to make them docile and immobile. The chronicler ascribes
such blinding to "their not being tillers of the ground but a pastoral
race."33 The Scyths were able, shrewd, and hard enough to make
slavery conform to the rest of their culture.
More surprising than the Scythian practice was the presence of
slaves among the Siberian reindeer nomads and their neighbors, fre-
quently mentioned in the works of Jochelson, Bogoraz, and Czaplicka.
tives to milk their mares for them, and finding them valuable, blinded The chronicler ascribes such blinding to "their not being tillers of the ground but a pastoral race. "33 The Scyths were able, shrewd, and hard enough to make slavery conform to the rest of their culture. More surprising than the Scythian practice was the presence of slaves among the Siberian reindeer nomads and their neighbors, fre quently mentioned in the works of Jochelson, Bogoraz, and Czaplicka. An adult captive was beaten to soften his spirit, which in the end only made him so treacherous that his master had to kill him. Actual ly, the Siberians preferred to kill all the vanquished adults and to take the more tractable youths and children. Siberian slavery was part of the reindeer complex. The victors therefore preferred to take a number of the enemy with the herds, for they were acquainted with the animals. The slave might earn virtual emancipation and a portion of his master's herd if he behaved. Women were sold as chat tels, were worked hard, and were their masters' sexual subordinates, but in these things their lot was but slightly different from that of free women. Adult female captives were until recently priced at a
An adult captive was beaten to soften his spirit, which in the end
only made him so treacherous that his master had to kill him. Actual-
ly, the Siberians preferred to kill all the vanquished adults and to
take the more tractable youths and children. Siberian slavery was
part of the reindeer complex. The victors therefore preferred to
take a number of the enemy with the herds, for they were acquainted
with the animals. The slave might earn virtual emancipation and a
portion of his master's herd if he behaved. Women were sold as chat-
tels, were worked hard, and were their masters' sexual subordinates,
but in these things their lot was but slightly different from that of
free women. Adult female captives were until recently priced at a
31 Brown, op. ctt., p. 172.
32 Ibid., pp. 175f.
33 Herodotus, iv. 2.
3 1 Brown, op. cit., p. 172. 32 Ibid., pp. 175f. 33 Herodotus, iv. 2.
D ig iz e
Ori g i n a l fro m
182
182 Primitive War large bag of tobacco, from seventy-two to one hundred eighty pounds.
Primitive
War
large bag of tobacco, from seventy-two to one hundred eighty pounds. Young girls were less dear.84 Bogaraz and the other Siberianists state that in addition to this beating to tame the spirit, the arctic mbes tried to make their captives something less than fighting men by dressing them in female costume and making them otherwise behave as women, like the alleged Algonkin practice. But it is the land which civilizes humanity in war as in all things. Economic land, the resources of nature in the service of humanity, is what makes man a food producer instead of a food gatherer, some thing new and uncommon in the world, instead of a parasite, which is something older and commoner than mankind. Archeology, history, and ethnology all speak of the mad scramble for arable land, and much fann land has been fertilized with human blood . . Despite the fact that many American Indian tribes were agricul turalists, the economic motive of acquiring more or better farm lands by force was poorly developed, save in the areas of intensive cultiva tion. The concept was well developed in such regions even if the technique lagged behind the conquest empires of the Old World. The patterns of culture for these people contained such ideas as a highly training cadre for conscript troops in time of emergency ( Maya ) , and a highly trained, profeSSionalized, disCiplined standing army of regu lars ( Peru ) . Farm lands and other natural resources were systemati cally conquered, or brought under mbute control. Such features, to gether with a degree of urbanism, take the area of intense cultivation outside the discussion of "primitive" warfare and hence outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, such societies strengthen the theory For this reason it is well to mention that cultural traits, including military ones, function as wholes within patterns and configurations. Peru, which from an economic-sociologic-military viewpoint was as modem in its pattern as the external British conquest empire or the internal one of the United States. In brief, the Peruvian monarchy systematically acquired territory by conquest with a trained regular army. Where such land in the hands of primitive fanners was unpro ductive, the empire brought the force of its civil service personnel and public works program-perhaps the most effective ever designed by any state in history or prehistory-to bear upon such land and its in habitants. That such conquest was essentially benevolent though despotic is demonstrated by the consensus that such conquered tribes 84 Bogoraz, op. cU., pp. 659-66 l . trained militia levy ( Aztec ) , a well organized reserve corps and
Young girls were less dear.34 Bogaraz and the other Siberianists state
that in addition to this beating to tame the spirit, the arctic tribes tried
to make their captives something less than fighting men by dressing
them in female costume and making them otherwise behave as
women, like the alleged Algonkin practice.
But it is the land which civilizes humanity in war as in all things.
Economic land, the resources of nature in the service of humanity, is
what makes man a food producer instead of a food gatherer, some-
thing new and uncommon in the world, instead of a parasite, which is
something older and commoner than mankind. Archeology, history,
and ethnology all speak of the mad scramble for arable land, and
much farm land has been fertilized with human blood.
Despite the fact that many American Indian tribes were agricul-
turalists, the economic motive of acquiring more or better farm lands
by force was poorly developed, save in the areas of intensive cultiva-
tion. The concept was well developed in such regions even if the
technique lagged behind the conquest empires of the Old World. The
patterns of culture for these people contained such ideas as a highly
trained militia levy (Aztec), a well organized reserve corps and
training cadre for conscript troops in time of emergency (Maya), and
a highly trained, professionalized, disciplined standing army of regu-
lars (Peru). Farm lands and other natural resources were systemati-
cally conquered, or brought under tribute control. Such features, to-
gether with a degree of urbanism, take the area of intense cultivation
outside the discussion of "primitive" warfare and hence outside the
scope of this study. Nevertheless, such societies strengthen the theory
that cultural traits, including military ones, function as wholes within
patterns and configurations. For this reason it is well to mention
Peru, which from an economic-sociologic-military viewpoint was as
moder n in its pattern as the external British conquest empire or the
internal one of the United States. In brief, the Peruvian monarchy
systematically acquired territory by conquest with a trained regular
army. Where such land in the hands of primitive fanners was unpro-
ductive, the empire brought the force of its civil service personnel and
public works programperhaps the most effective ever designed by
any state in history or prehistoryto bear upon such land and its in-
habitants. That such conquest was essentially benevolent though
despotic is demonstrated by the consensus that such conquered tribes
4 Bogoraz, op. cU., pp. 659-661.
Ori g i n a l fro m
The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 183 were thereby raised from a marginal economy to one of surplus. Peru-
183
vian conquest meant not only a regular tribute payment to go to the
government and religion at Cuzco but a real rise in the standard of
living of the defeated.35
The concept of territorial and political society, in contrast with Ion-
were thereby raised from a marginal economy to one of surplus. Peru vian conquest meant not only a regular tribute payment to go to the government and religion at Cuzco but a real rise in the standard of living of the defeated.811 The concept of territorial and political society, in contrast with kin based society, was highly developed only in those portions of the Americas mentioned above. It was as much their failure to appreciate a land-space society as any other which made the American Indians the brave but wretchedly ineffective soldiers they were. It was tri balism which defeated them and made this a white man's continent far more than fire arms, a fact which those who overemphasize materials have not been able to comprehend. It can hardly be said that the agricultural Indians succeeded much better than the hunters and food gatherers in their territorial mili tary ideas. This has been stated before in the tactical discussion. The Plains hunters did protect their bison range, tended to think of certain hunting ranges and herds as theirs, and strove to drive off intruders. Their agricultural neighbors on the margins of the Plains erected rudi mentary fortifications to protect the com fields. Verendrye said the Mandan built minor strong points apart from the fortified villages to protect the fields and kept them well stocked with food even when not garrisoned. 8 6 This was unusual. Of all the American tribes encountered in this study, only the Mo have looked clearly upon land as economic property and something to fight for as such. Kroeber reports that they could own, buy, and sell tracts as individuals. Indeed, one of the reasons for going to war was to acquire booty and slaves herewith to purchase tracts of land.n It is hard to understand how this simple California group acquired such a civilized concept on a continent where hunting or farming land was thought of in terms of kin ownership. This is especially mystify ing since agriculture prOvided them with no more than half their subsistence. s 8 For most Indians land was too involved with kin own ership or was not sufficiently scarce to matter economically or mar tially. The Jibaro might be taken as an extreme example. Their wars were spite wars which never aimed at conquest. They really feared
8 5 George P. Murdock, "The Organization of Inca SOciety," Scientific Monthly, March, 1934, passim. 8 8 Verendrye, op . cit., p . 23. 8 7 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 744. 8 8 Ibid., p. 735.
based society, was highly developed only in those portions of the
Americas mentioned above. It was as much their failure to appreciate
a land-space society as any other which made the American Indians
the brave but wretchedly ineffective soldiers they were. It was tri-
balism which defeated them and made this a white man's continent far
more than fire arms, a fact which those who overemphasize materials
have not been able to comprehend.
It can hardly be said that the agricultural Indians succeeded much
better than the hunters and food gatherers in their territorial mili-
tary ideas. This has been stated before in the tactical discussion. The
Plains hunters did protect their bison range, tended to think of certain
hunting ranges and herds as theirs, and strove to drive off intruders.
Their agricultural neighbors on the margins of the Plains erected rudi-
mentary fortifications to protect the corn fields. Verendrye said the
Mandan built minor strong points apart from the fortified villages to
protect the fields and kept them well stocked with food even when
not garrisoned.36 This was unusual.
Of all the American tribes encountered in this study, only the Mo-
have looked clearly upon land as economic property and something to
fight for as such. Kroeber reports that they could own, buy, and sell
tracts as individuals. Indeed, one of the reasons for going to war was
to acquire booty and slaves herewith to purchase tracts of land.37
It is hard to understand how this simple California group acquired
such a civilized concept on a continent where hunting or farming land
was thought of in terms of kin ownership. This is especially mystify-
ing since agriculture provided them with no more than half then-
subsistence.3s For most Indians land was too involved with kin own-
ership or was not sufficiently scarce to matter economically or mar-
tially. The Jibaro might be taken as an extreme example. Their wars
were spite wars which never aimed at conquest. They really feared
35 George P. Murdock, "The Organization of Inca Society," Scientific Monthly,
March, 1934, passim.
36 Verendrye, op. cit., p. 23.
37 Kioeber, op. cit., p. 744.
ss Ibid., p. 735.
Ori g i n a l fro m
184
184 Primitive War and detested the farms and country of their foes, and vacated the
Primitive War
and detested the farms and country of their foes, and vacated the same promptly as soon as victory was complete, for they considered the danger of occupying enemy land too great. Furthermore, there was an inexhaustible supply of free land available by simply clearing the jungle, so there was no need to conquer any.89
An exception to
same promptly as soon as victory was complete, for they considered
the danger "of occupying enemy land too great. Furthermore, there
was an inexhaustible supply of free land available by simply clearing
the jungle, so there was no need to conquer any.39
An exception to this disregard for natural resources from a tribal and
military viewpoint is again cited by Kroeber. The Porno, says he,
were about the most peaceful of the California tribes. An extensive
this disregard for natural resources from a tribal and
salt field lay within their range, and while they made no effort to pre-
vent others from coming and gathering this most valuable commodity,
they expected them to pay a royalty or tribute in the form of presents.
military viewpoint is again cited by Kroeber. The Porno, says he, were about the most peaceful of the California tribes. An extensive salt field lay within their range, and while they made no effort to pre vent others from coming and gathering this most valuable commodity, they expected them to pay a royalty or tribute in the form of presents. Those who failed to pay were considered enemies. 40 The failure to conceptualize economic land as nature functioning in the service of man generally held back the military development of nonliterate peoples unless their patterns included the intensive culti vation of some crop. Some Indians were effective farmers, of course, and yet did not become good soldiers, as the pueblo-builders attest. One might say, though, that a truly military people would attempt to capture the natural resources of an enemy, and we have observed that that American Indian seldom did this. Neither did they lay them under tribute, except in Middle America, Colombia, and Peru, or destroy them. Some effort was made against natural resources as The Plains people consistently attempted to drive such, to be sure.
Those who failed to pay were considered enemies.40
The failure to conceptualize economic land as nature functioning in
the service of man generally held back the military development of
nonliterate peoples unless their patterns included the intensive culti-
vation of some crop. Some Indians were effective farmers, of course,
and yet did not become good soldiers, as the pueblo-builders attest.
One might say, though, that a truly military people would attempt to
capture the natural resources of an enemy, and we have observed that
that American Indian seldom did this. Neither did they lay them
under tribute, except in Middle America, Colombia, and Peru, or
destroy them. Some effort was made against natural resources as
such, to be sure. The Plains people consistently attempted to drive
the bison off their foe's range and even fired the grass. Swanton quotes
Simpson Tubby as saying that the Choctaw and their neighbors used
to poison springs in enemy territory so consistently that the Indians
preferred to drink from running water.41
The Jibaro example should not be taken as typical of disregard for
territory in South America. It has been mentioned that the Caraio
(Carib) and Tapuya fought for possession of the Brazilian littoral.42
The Caraio ultimately spread over two thirds of South America, a very
important fact of South American ethnology.43
Enough has already been said to show that war for new land was
the bison off their foe's range and even fired the grass. Swanton quotes Simpson Tubby as saying that the Choctaw and their neighbors used preferred to drink from running water.4 1 territory in South America. to poison springs in enemy territory so consistently that the Indians The Jibaro example should not be taken as typical of disregard for It has been mentioned that the Caraio ( Carib ) and Tapuya fought for possession of the Brazilian littoral. 42
very important in much of Africa. Likewise, we have already seen
39 Karsten, op. ctt., p. 16.
40 Kroeber, op. cft., p. 236.
41 Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw
Indians, p. 169.
Church, op. dt., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 28.
The Caraio ultimately spread over two thirds of South America, a very important fact of South American ethnology. 4 8 Enough has already been said t o show that war for new land was very important in much of Africa. Likewise, we have already seen 3 9 Karsten, op. cit., p. 16. 40 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 236. 4 1 Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, p. 169. 4 2 Church, op. cit., p. 27. 43 Ibid., p. 28.
D 9 iz e b
The Economic Motive

The Economic Motive 185 that it was not as important in Polynesia as one would expect. But the acquisition of new land was almost the paramount motive for ma-
185
jor war in barbarian Europe.
War against the enemy's resources is an effective procedure, and is
thought to be recent enough for modern moralists to inveigh against
as something new. There are several passages in Caesar which show
that both the Cauls and Germans realized that their forces and those
of their foes were too large to live off the country, so they consistent-
ly attacked their enemy's grain fields as well as the supply elements in
his army with the design of hamstringing his operations through
hunger.
Several American tribes could be cited to show the slight concept of
defensive war to protect their own land and wealth. This would have
been surprising except for the lack of economic motivation, a condi-
tion brought about by defective agriculture and poverty of material
culture. That such quiescence was lacking in Europe is clearly indi-
cated by authorities which have come down to us. The Chauci, for
example, were a superior and numerous people occupying a vast tract
in west Germany. They made war on no one, undertook no raids, and
depended on social justice instead of force to maintain internal
peace. Yet any raider or land-hungry foreign chief would find them
"with armies, horses, and men in abundance," and with plenty of in-
telligent ferocity should an attempt be made on their land and prop-
erty.44 To the east along the Vistula, likewise, the Hraeds resisted
the Huns, fighting unceasing war "for home against the folk of At-
tila."45 It is probable that our noncivilized ancestors fought better
than many other peoples not only because they had learned better
principles of war from the more civilized east but also because they
had more to fight for, their fields.
The Samoans were good fanners and fair fighters, but they failed
to hold the land captured. The fury with which the Jibaro destroyed
all the food and food potentialities of their conquered foe is in point.
Similar garden and animal destruction took place in both Melanesia
and Polynesia, which also failed either to appropriate the soil or to
make the conquered till their own gardens for the benefit of the
conquerors. It no more occurred to the New Hebrideans to hold
** Tacitus, Germania, 35.
Widsith, in Albert S. Cook and Chauncey B. Tinker, Selected Transla-
tions from Old English Poetry (Boston: Ginn, 1902), lines 119-122.
that it was not as important in Polynesia as one would expect. But the acquisition of new land was almost the paramount motive for ma jor war in barbarian Europe. War against the enemy's resources is an effective procedure, and is thought to be recent enough for modem moralists to inveigh against as something new. There are several passages in Caesar which show that both the Gauls and Germans realized that their forces and those of their foes were too large to live off the country, so they consistent ly attacked their enemy's grain fields as well as the supply elements in his army with the design of hamstringing his operations through hunger. Several American tribes could be cited to show the slight concept of defensive war to protect their own land and wealth. This would have been surprising except for the lack of economic motivation, a condi tion brought about by defective agriculture and poverty of material culture. That such quiescence was lacking in Europe is clearly indi cated by authorities which have come down to us. The Chauci, for example, were a superior and numerous people occupying a vast tract in west Germany. They made war on no one, undertook no raids, and depended on social justice instead of force to maintain internal peace. Yet any raider or land-hungry foreign chief would find them "with armies, horses, and men in abundance," and with plenty of in telligent ferocity should an attempt be made on their land and prop erty."" To the east along the Vistula, likewise, the Hraeds resisted the Huns, fighting unceasing war "for home against the folk of At tila. "4 5 It is probable that our noncivilized ancestors fought better than many other peoples not only because they had learned better principles of war from the more civilized east but also because they had more to fight for, their fields. The Samoans were good farmers and fair fighters, but they failed to hold the land captured. The fury with which the Jibaro destroyed all the food and food potentialities of their conquered foe is in point. Similar garden and animal destruction took place in both Melanesia and Polynesia, which also failed either to appropriate the soil or to make the conquered till their own gardens for the benefit of the conquerors. It no more occurred to the New Hebrideans to hold
Tacitus, Germania, 35. 45 Widsith, in Albert S. Cook and Chauncey B. Tinker, Selected Transkr tion.f from Old English Poetry ( Boston : Ginn, 1902 ) , lines 1 1 9-122.
H
D 9 iz e b
186
186 Primitive War
Primitive War
enemy land for more than a few days than it did to sell any of the
tribal land. Actually, the victors were far more interested in the
great victory feast they were to hold than in the economic advantages
tribal land. Actually, the victors were far more interested in the great victory feast they were to hold than in the economic advantages granted by victory.
enemy land for more than a few days than it did to sell any of the
granted by victory.
Not all Polynesia was so stupid about economic expansion and the
creation of rudimentary conquest empires. Buck shows that in Man-
Not all Polynesia was so stupid about economic expansion and the creation of rudimentary conquest empires. Buck shows that in Man Sometimes the first failure to occupy, gaia and elsewhere the Polynesians were capable of armed invasion by many canoes seeking homes and new farms. pressed castes . The raiding of garden lands comers were conquered and absorbed; sometimes they formed de
gaia and elsewhere the Polynesians were capable of armed invasion by
many canoes seeking homes and new farms. Sometimes the first
comers were conquered and absorbed; sometimes they formed de-
pressed castes. The raiding of garden lands with failure to occupy,
as noted in Oceania and America, may be inherent in gardening, which
is intensive agriculture, in contrast with true farming for grain, which
is extensive. This is far from apparent.
with
As has been observed before, primitive war, in spite of the dancing
as noted in Oceania and America, may be inherent in gardening, which is intensive agriculture, in contrast is extensive. .
I,
about, honors-counting, scalping, and head-hunting, was remarkably
tame. Perhaps this is because it so rarely was thoroughly economic.
with
true farming for grain, which
One might even be justified in observing that feelings were more often
This is far from apparent.
hurt than bodies, that primitive war was more psychological than le-
thal. In all but a few areas the bloodiness of primitive war has been
As has been observed before, primitive war, in spite of the dancing about, honors-counting, scalping, and head-hunting, s remark .2!?ly Perhaps this is because it so rarely was thoroughly economic. One might even be justified in observing that feelings were more often hurt than bodies, that primitive war was more psychological than le thal. In all but a few areas the bloodiness of primitive war has been greatly exaggerated. But one must recall that just a few casualties in a primitive economy at or n ot far above subsistence levels may be very important. The loss of the life of one producer in an Indian village might be economically more disastrous than the loss of a hun dred in a community of comparatively similar importance among our selves. Recall that in primitive economics the concepts of Land and Capital were slight; that of Labor was everything. So it was with our ancestors until the Renaissance. Therefore the loss of a small number of lives should not be dismissed as of no ecomonic importance. A people whose keen economic sense stood in their way, a folk who overdid a good thing, were the Hausa in the African Sudan. The Hausa nations should have become great through their devotion to economic motives, but they overplayed the role. Even under their Islamic emirs they could effect no more than weak confederations with all but complete village and town autonomy. It is alleged that they failed politically because they counted wealth a greater prestige bearer than valor or gentle birth. them together in the early Nineteenth Century. It took a religious zealot to bring ' tame.
greatly exaggerated. But one must recall that just a few casualties
in a primitive economy at or not far above subsistence levels may be
Very important. The loss of the life of one producer in an Indian
village might be economically more disastrous than the loss of a hun-
dred in a community of comparatively similar importance among our-
selves. Recall that in primitive economics the concepts of Land and
Capital were slight; that of Labor was everything. So it was with
our ancestors until the Renaissance. Therefore the loss of a small
number of lives should not be dismissed as of no ecomonic importance.
A people whose keen economic sense stood in their way, a folk who
overdid a good thing, were the Hausa in the African Sudan. The
Hausa nations should have become great through their devotion to
economic motives, but they overplayed the role. Even under their
Islamic emirs they could effect no more than weak confederations
with all but complete village and town autonomy. It is alleged that
they failed politically because they counted wealth a greater prestige
bearer than valor or gentle birth. It took a religious zealot to bring
them together in the early Nineteenth Century.
D 9 iz e b
X , .'...'
e'
-">
V.v l'
V>N X CHAPTER 10
r* ^ * * *
Military Values
JL/EFINrnON OF THE CONCEPTS "VALUE" AND
CHAPTER 10
so difficult that there is a considerable variation in the use of the
terms. It is, therefore, necessary for a work not technically in the field
of social psychology to use the simplest definitions possible. A value,
Military Values
AND "A1TITUDE" HAS so difficult that there is a considerable variation in the use of the terms. It is, therefore, necessary for a work not technically in the field of social psychology to use the simplest definitions possible. A value, therefore, is defined as an object with meaning. But what, then, is the meaning of "meaning?" The word in this sense indicates that a trait, material or otherwise, possesses utility, while utility is the power of any object or trait to satisfy a human want. This leads directly to the anatomy and physiology of the human organism. The organism, being as it is, has certain needs, basic or acquired. The objects which satisfy these needs are useful and, being useful, are valuable. They have meaning. cultural value, then, is an object or practice with e<lning.
therefore, is defined as an object with meaning. But what, then, is
the meaning of "meaning?" The word in this sense indicates that a
trait, material or otherwise, possesses utility, while utility is the power
D EFINITION OF
THE
CONCEPTS
"V ALUE"
BEEN
of any object or trait to satisfy a human want. This leads directly to
the anatomy and physiology of the human organism. The organism,
being as it is, has certain needs, basic or acquired. The objects which
satisfy these needs are useful and, being useful, are valuable. They
have meaning. A cultural value, then, is an object or practice with
meaning.
An attitude is the way people tend to behave toward a value. In
the simplest words, an attitude is, a_ tendency ia acL_ Such an attitude
need not call forth continuous action. An attitude is merely a habit,
a learned response in the acquired nervous organization of the person,
a tendency to respond in certain ways in the presence of specific
stimuli. Such concepts are introduced into an ethnological discussion
because the inspection of the attitudes and values of a people is only
another way of studying its culture. Indeed, it might be the ulti-
mately valid way. The former preoccupation of ethnologists with the
overt was a matter of necessity, but it has become more and more ap-
parent that the true nature of culture is covert. Overt behavior, all the
tools and artifactual materials, are symbolic of the covert conditioned
'response. They are, perhaps, the values which satisfy the needs of
man, but those needs are in the man. Tendencies to act toward such
materials are also in the man whether he is in the presence of the
tools or not. A man carries the skills needed to use his tools wherever
he goes, whether or not he carries his tool kit with him.
187
An attitude is the way people tend to behave toward a value. In the simplest words, an attitude is. a.Jendency_ta acL...- Such an attitude need not call forth continuous action. An attitude is merely a habit, a learned response in the acquired nervous organization of the person, a tendency to respond in certain ways in the presence of specific stimuli. Such concepts are introduced into an ethnological discussion because the inspection of the attitudes and values of a people is only another way of studying its culture. Indeed, it might be the ulti mately valid way. The former preoccupation of ethnologists with the overt was a matter of necessity, but it has become more and more ap parent that the true nature of culture is covert. Overt behavior, ll the tools and artifactual materials, are symbolic of the covert conditioned -response. They are, perhaps, the values which satisfy the needs of man, but those needs are in the man. Tendencies to act toward such materials are also in the man whether he is in the presence of the
tools or not. A man carries the skills needed to use his tools wherever he goes, whether or not he carries his tool kit with him.
187
D 9 iz e
188
188 Primitive War Attitude and valueconditioned response and the symbol which evokes itare opposite sides of the same coin. The functioning whole
Primitive War
of an individual's habits or life pattern, together with his potential be-
havior, is that person's culture, for the carrier and transmitter of cul-
ture is the specific person. Persons do not have identical tendencies
to act towards any particular value. Differences in heredity, anatomy,
physiology, and experience will care for that. But the culture into
which one is born finds him plastic material, so while the person is the
transmitter and carrier of culture, cultural data are mass phenomena.
Our habits are formed in sufficiently similar ways so that any culture
as a going concern can function. Any society, as Malinowski has shown
us, tolerates a certain divergence in individual attitudes and values.
It is untrue that "savage" man demands absolute uniformity in obe-
dience to custom, while the mark of civilization is "individualism."
The tolerated divergences vary from culture to culture, to be sure, but
if the individual is sufficiently indoctrinated and conditioned to the
accepted mores to get along and keep out of his neighbors' way, noth-
ing serious happens to him. If his attitudes and values are too much
out of line with those accepted in his time and locale, he is mal-
adjusted or disorganized. A culture which tolerates so much diverg-
ence in attitude and value that it cannot function as a working whole
is~in a state of rapid change or redefinition of values, or is in a state of
disintegration, acculturation, and perhaps on the way out.
Military attitudes and values of nonliterate societies have always
been extremely diverse. They have not had in common an instinct
of war or pugnacity as has been supposed. There has been no uni-
formity, for instance, regarding hatred of the enemy, or a tendency
to act in a uniform way toward some part of his body. In some places
a scalp has been honored, in others heaped with abuse. The atti-
tudes and values regarding military phenomena have varied Accord-
ing to flie_pattern ofjHie entire culture, and this variation seems to
have had all but infinite possibilties.
Attitude and value-conditioned response and the symbol which evokes it-are opposite sides of the same coin. The functioning whole of an individual's habits or life pattern, together with his potential be havior, is that person's culture, for the carrier and transmitter of cul ture is the specific person. Persons do not have identical tendencies to act towards any particular value. Differences in heredity, anatomy, physiology, and experience will care for that. But the culture into which one is born finds him plastic material, so while the person is the transmitter and carrier of culture, cultural data are mass phenomena. Our habits are formed in sufficiently similar ways so that any culture as a going concern can function. Any society, as Malinowski has shown us, tolerates a certain divergence in individual attitudes and values. It is untrue that "savage" man demands absolute uniformity in obe dience to custom, while the mark of civilization is "individualism. " The tolerated divergences vary from culture to culture, to be sure, but if the individual is sufficiently indoctrinated and conditioned to the accepted mores to get along and keep out of his neighbors' way, noth ing serious happens to him. If his attitudes and values are too much out of line with those accepted in his time and locale, he is mal adjusted or disorganized. A_.culture which tolerates so much diverg ence in attitude and value that it cannot function as a working whole Jsin a state of rapid change or redefinition of values, or is in a state of disintegration, acculturation, and perhaps on the way out. Military attitudes and values of nonliterate societies have always been extremely diverse. They have not had in common an instinct of war or pugnacity as has been supposed. There has been no uni formity, for instance, regarding hatred of the enemy, or a tendency to act in a uniform way toward some part of his body. In some places a scalp has been honored, in others heaped with abuse. The ,atti tudes and values regarding military phenomena have varied accord ing to the pattern of the entire culture, and this variation seems to Ilavehild all but infinite possibilties. Since civilized, modem man has so sharpened his acquisitive tend encies, the problem of the loot and spoils might be the most obvious and therefore the easiest way in which to introduce this subject. This is, of course, part of the wider discussion of "things acquired from the enemy." The question of loot has been discussed under the eco nomics of war, so we will turn immediately to the enemy himself con sidered as a value, either as a captive whole or in piece-meal. The liv ing captive as a slave has had economic value, as noted in Chapter 9.
Since civilized, modern man has so sharpened his acquisitive tend-
encies, the problem of the loot and spoils might be the most obvious
and therefore the easiest way in which to introduce this subject. This
is, of course, part of the wider discussion of "things acquired from
the enemy." The question of loot has been discussed under the eco-
nomics of war, so we will turn immediately to the enemy himself con-
sidered as a value, either as a captive whole or in piece-meal. The liv-
ing captive as a slave has had economic value, as noted in Chapter 9.
D 9 iz e
Military Values
Military Values 189 We are here discussing him as a prisoner rather than as a work animal
189
or economic capital.
We are here discussing him as a prisoner rather than as a work animal or economic capital. One of the greatest values the captive could serve has been as hu man sacrifiCe to a god who demanded such immolation. This per mitted the substitution of a member of the out-group for the more valuable member of the in-group. Enough has been written on the
us
One of the greatest values the captive could serve has been as hu-
man sacrifice to a god who demanded such immolation. This per-
mitted the substitution of a member of the out-group for the more
valuable member of the in-group. Enough has been written on the
gorier aspects of the religions of Mexico and Middle America for us
to pass them by here. Suffice it to say that the pyramids of Mexico
ran with the blood of thousands of victims annually. The sacrifice
gorier aspects of the religions of Mexico and Middle America for
of a captive was often necessary for the appeasement of many Poly-
nesian gods. Some Africans regarded prisoner immolation highly7\
nowhere more than in the west where thousands of victims were an-
to pass them by here. Suffice it to say that the pyramids of Mexico ran with the blood of thousands of victims annually. The sacrifice of a captive was often necessary for the appeasement of many Poly nesian gods. nowhere more than in the west where thousands of victims were an-
nually immolated in the Yam Festival. Indeed, it is to be suspected
that human sacrifice has played a part in the religious history of every
single group which has achieved civilization. Certainly not all of the
:'\ Some Africans regarded . prisoner immolation highly
victims have been war captives, but the bulk of them have been.
The significant point in the sacrifice of captives is that a rather high
culture, indeed a civilization of sorts, has usually been attained be-
fore such practice has had any place in the complex. There had to
nually immolated in the Yam Festival. Indeed, it is to be suspected that human sacrifice has played a part in the religiOUS history of every Certainly not all of the victims have been war captives, but the bulk of them have been . The significant point in the sacrifice of captives is that a rather high culture, indeed a civilization of sorts, has usually been attained be fore such practice has had any place in the complex. There had to be definite deities to whom sacrifice was directed, and specific, per sonalized gods were not characteristic of the simpler cultures. Such gods demanded organized, trained priesthoods with complicated rit single group which has achieved civilization.
be definite deities to whom sacrifice was directed, and specific, per-
sonalized gods were not characteristic of the simpler cultures. Such
gods demanded organized, trained priesthoods with complicated rit-
uals. In contrast with this, sacrifice of war captives has been a great
rarity when the highest religious ministrant has been a shaman or
"medicine man" seized with vague spirits, not gods. They possessed
no rituals elaborate enough to demand such service. Human sacrifice
to definite gods also has accompanied rather authoritative social or-
ganization with developed economic techniques.
Let us consider the marginal Plains Skidi Pawnee with their culture,
authoritative social organization, and priesthood. Beyond them lay the
socially anarchical Plains, without agriculture and without priests.
The Skidi Pawnee strove to capture a beautiful enemy maiden on
each of their raids. This girl was then adopted into some very honorable
uals. In cQntrast with this, sacrifice of war captives has been a great rarity when the highest religiOUS ministrant has been a shaman or "medicine man I I seized with vague spirits, not gods. They possessed no rituals elaborate enough to demand such service. Human sacrifice to definite gods also has accompanied rather authoritative social or ganization with developed economic techniques. Let us consider the marginal Plains Skidi Pawnee with their culture, authoritative social organization, and priesthood. Beyond them lay the socially anarchical Plains, without agriculture and without priests. The Skidi Pawnee strove to capture a beautiful enemy maiden on each of their raids. This girl was then adopted into some very honorable Pawnee family where, to her surprise, she was treated with more con sideration than the real daughters of the lodge. She became the pampered darling. Yet late one night she was rudely seized, stripped of her clothing, and her body half painted down its length from head, through groin, to foot with charcoal. of night and day. with cross pieces. She thus symbolized the junction She was then strung up between two upright poles Her adopted father was compelled to shoot an ar-
Pawnee family where, to her surprise, she was treated with more con-
sideration than the real daughters of the lodge. She became the
pampered darling. Yet late one night she was rudely seized, stripped
of her clothing, and her body half painted down its length from head,
through groin, to foot with charcoal. She thus symbolized the junction
of night and day. She was then strung up between two upright poles
with cross pieces. Her adopted father was compelled to shoot an ar-
D 9 iz e
190
190 Primitive Waf row through her heart just as the sacred Morning Star was rising. The
Primitive Wat
arrows of the priests soon followed, and her body was horribly
mangled before it had served its purpose. This rite of appeasement
to the Morning Star was considered essential to Pawnee welfare, to
success in all things and agriculture in particular.
The economic chapter described the Dahomeans as seeking prison-
ers assiduously. Suitable physical specimens were kept as slaves while
the old and decrepit were decapitated at once for their heads. The
enemy chiefs, however, were reserved for human sacrifice to the
Dahomean pantheon.
Prisoners were sacrificed in Eurasia wherever the culture had de-
veloped gods demanding it. The Celtic devotion to the rite is well-
attested. It existed in India, too, even before the Aryan invasion. The
more primitive Tamil, for example, considered sacrifice-getting, some-
times no more than plain kidnapping, one of their prime motives for
war. These people had a female fertility deity who had to be pro-
pitiated to fructify the fields, and captive boys and girls were often
forced to breed victims for the sacrifice. The victim himself, aside
from the cruel manner in which he was put to death, was not badly
treated. A Tamil woman considered it an honor to have a child by
a prospective victim. If we are to believe Herodotus, the Scyths sacri-
ficed a vast number of prisoners to their war god.1
It appears, then, that captive sacrifice was not characteristic of the
simpler cultures. The reverse is correct.
This does not mean that captives were not tortured or slain by sim-
pler peoples. Kroeber reports torture by several simple Californian
tribes, such as the Maidu and Gabrieleno, as a preliminary to execu-
tion. This was only spleen-venting, the release of tensions and emo-
tions caused by the death of relatives and the other nuisance activi-
ties of the enemy. It had no theological value. Teit reported that the
Coeur d'Alene of the northern Plateau mildly abused prisoners at
the scalp dance.2 This was the neighboring Flathead's only real rea-
son for taking male prisoners. There is an old tradition on the North-
ern Plateau of tree crucifixion of war prisoners to some divinity, but
this is highly doubtful. Spleen-venting seems to have been satisfac-
1 Herodotus, iv. 62.
2 James A. Teit, 'The Salishan Tribes of the Western Plateau," Franz Boas, ed.,
Annual Report 45, Bureau of American Ethonology (Washington: 1927-1928),
p. 190.
row through her heart just as the sacred Morning Star was rising. The arrows of the priests soon followed, and her body was hOrribly mangled before it had served its purpose. This rite of appeasement to the Morning Star was considered essential to Pawnee weHare, to success in all things and agriculture in particular. The economic chapter described the Dahomeans as seeking prison ers assiduously. Suitable physical specimens were kept as slaves while the old and decrepit were decapitated at once for their heads. The enemy chiefs, however, were reserved for human sacrifice to the Dahomean pantheon. Prisoners were sacrificed in Eurasia wherever the culture had de veloped gods demanding it. The Celtic devotion to the rite is well attested. It existed in India, too, even before the Aryan invasion. The ' more primitive Tamil, for example, considered sacrifice-getting, some times no more than plain kidnapping, one of their prime motives for war. These people had a female fertility deity who had to be pro pitiated to fructify the fields, and captive boys and girls were often forced to breed victims for the sacrifice. The victim himseH, aside from the cruel manner in which he was put to death, was not badly treated. A Tamil woman considered it an honor to have a child by a prospective victim. If we are to believe Herodotus, the Scyths sacri ficed a vast number of prisoners to their war god.l It appears, then, that captive sacrifice was not characteristic of the simpler cultures. The reverse is correct. This does not mean that captives were not tortured or slain by sim pler peoples. Kroeber reports torture by several simple Californian tribes, such as the Maidu and Gabrieleno, as a preliminary to execu tion. This was only spleen-venting, the release of tensions and emo tions caused by the death of relatives and the other nuisance activi ties of the enemy. It had no theological value. Teit reported that the Coeur d'Alene of the northern Plateau mildly abused prisoners at the scalp dance. 2 This was the neighboring Flathead's only real rea son for taking male prisoners. There is an old tradition on the North ern Plateau of tree crucifixion of war prisoners to some divinity, but this is highly doubtful. Spleen-venting seems to have been satisfac1 Herodotus, iv. 62.
2 James A. Teit, "The Salishan Tribes of the Western Plateau," Franz Boas, ed., Annual Report 45, Bureau of American Ethonology ( Washington: 1927-1928 ) , p. 190.
D 9 iz e
Military Values
Military Values 191 tory to such cultures. American field reports are filled with this ten-
191
sion release value of prisoner torture.
The Iroquois, as a sociological refinement, tied prisoners to stakes
and wreaked almost unbelievable tortures upon them before they died.
But if the man bore his torment with fortitude or even contempt, he
was honored though not necessarily released. The children were
brought to witness his brave death and taught to emulate his courage.
In this way the dying captive served the purpose of indoctrinating
youth to the war pattern. The Iroquois were a state-building people,
and certainly not among the simplest people.
The royal Zulu by no means maintained Iroquois dignity in prison-
er-abuse. If a defeated chief were brought home bound, he was re-
served for the king's wrath. But the Zulu king required much sham-
anizing to enable him to meet the victim face to face, for the captive
was magically potent even though bound. When the defeated chief
came within striking distance, the Zulu monarch lept into the air and
stabbed him repeatedly to demonstrate his own bravery. If the man
had been brave, portions of his body were cut out for medicine to
give the Zulu lord kingly qualities. The chief then chewed certain
parts of the body and ate them, stopping now and then to spit out por-
tions in the direction of the enemy. The slain chief's head was then
made into a vessel to hold medicines, for they increased in virtue when
stored in this manner.3 This spitting portions of masticated enemy in
the direction of the enemy had parallels in other parts of the world.
The greatest of all values to be obtained from the enemy in Mela-
nesia was one of the enemy himself. This was not for human sacri-
fice, as among the refined, godly, and priestly Polynesians. The Mela-
nesians did not understand slavery, neither did they need prisoners for
refined ceremonial torture; but they could not be surpassed in childish
cruelty. The spleen-venting catharsis of the Melanesian victory cele-
bration has already been mentioned, but it was not considered com-
plete unless witnessed by a slowly dying enemy. Abel quotes the
following account of one of his informants which should be read in
full.
tory to such cultures. American field reports are filled with this ten sion release value of prisoner torture. The Iroquois, as a sociological refinement, tied prisoners to stakes and wreaked almost unbelievable tortures upon them before they died. But if the man bore his torment with fortitude or even contempt, he was honored though not necessarily released. The children were brought to witness his brave death and taught to emulate his courage. In this way the dying captive served the purpose of indoctrinating youth to the war pattern. The Iroquois were a state-building people, and certainly not among the Simplest people. The royal Zulu by no means maintained Iroquois dignity in prison er-abuse. If a defeated chief were brought home bound, he was reserved for the king's wrath. But the Zulu king required much sham anizing to enable him to meet the victim face to face, for the captive was magically potent even though bound. When the defeated chief came within striking distance, the Zulu monarch lept into the air and stabbed him repeatedly to demonstrate his own bravery. If the man had been brave, portions of his body were cut out for medicine to give the Zulu lord kingly qualities. The chief then chewed certain parts of the body and ate them, stopping now and then to spit out por tions in the direction of the enemy. The slain chief's head was then made into a vessel to hold medicines, for they increased in virtue when stored in this manner.8 This spitting portions of masticated enemy in the direction of the enemy had parallels in other parts of the world. The greatest of all values to be obtained from the enemy in Mela nesia was one of the enemy himself. This was not for human sacri fice, as among the refined, godly, and priestly Polynesians. The Mela nesians did not understand slavery, neither did they need prisoners for refined ceremonial torture; but they could not be surpassed in childish cruelty. The spleen-venting catharsis of the Melanesian victory cele bration has already been mentioned, but it was not considered com plete unless witnessed by a slowly dying enemy. Abel quotes the following account of one of his informants which should be read in full.
The war party had captured a man and a woman alive. As the canoes neared their home bay the warriors paused to put on their finery. The village was informed of the victory and the presence of spoils by conch shell signals. Joyful pandemonium set in ashore, and the homeguard began preparing for the feast. Their frenzied joy knew no bounds when
3 Kidd, op. cit., p. 309.
The war party had captured a man and a woman alive. As the canoes
neared their home bay the warriors paused to put on their finery. The
village was informed of the victory and the presence of spoils by conch
shell signals. Joyful pandemonium set in ashore, and the homeguard
began preparing for the feast . Their frenzied joy knew no bounds when
3 Kidd, op. cit., p. 309.
D 9 iz e
192
192 Primitive War they learned that the human spoil was alive. As the canoes neared the
Primitive War
beach, twenty or thirty men came dashing into the shallow waters to lift
the bound captives ashore on their spear points, taking care not to touch
them with their hands, as this privilege belonged to the relatives of
recent battle casualties. The captives were flung ashore and dragged to
the center of the village where they were tied to two trees. The inhabi-
tants and visitors from friendly villages were by then enjoying the most
abandoned dance, which the captives were forced to watch. Women
who had lost husbands to the enemy in former battles vied in cursing
and torturing them. Tiring of this, the victims were trussed over a fire
of coconut leaves and roasted alive. The drumming and dancing went
on for days after the victims had been eaten.4
The person of an enemy was not always in danger in primitive so-
they learned that the human spoil was alive. As the canoes neared the beach, twenty or thirty men came dashing into the shallow waters to lift the bound captives ashore on their spear points, taking care not to touch them with their hands, as this privilege belonged to the relatives of recent battle casualties. The captives were flung ashore and dragged to the center of the village where they were tied to two trees. The inhabi tants and visitors from friendly villages were by then enjoying the most abandoned dance, which the captives were forced to watch. Women who had lost husbands to the enemy in former battles vied in cursing and torturing them. Tiring of this, the victims were trussed over a fire of coconut leaves and roasted alive. The drummin g and dancing went on for days after the victims had been eaten. t
The person of an enemy was not always in danger in primitive so .cieties. This was especially true of those who had strong ideas of hospitality. Persons coming to enemy villages voluntarily on the North American Plateau were almost invariably well treated. Among
.cieties. This was especially true of those who had strong ideas of
hospitality. Persons coming to enemy villages voluntarily on the
North American Plateau were almost invariably well treated. Among
the Osage an enemy could run into camp where a certain official was
bound to protect him, feed him, and care for his wants. The man was
immune as long as he remained with the Osage, but his immunity
came to an end if he returned to his own people.5
The attitude even toward prisoners was by no means universally
hostile. Indeed, their presence might be desired for roles other than
the Osage an enemy could run into camp where a certain official was bound to protect him, feed him, and care for his wants. The man was came to an end
those of slaves. The Iroquois Confederacy suffered terrific casualties
immune as long as he remained with the Osage, but his immunity
in its efforts to conquer a continent. A valiant young man was a
most welcome captive if he would consent to drop his own tribal
if he returned to his own people. II
and Ion affiliations, becoming an Iroquois and ceremonially taking the
place of some Iroquois fallen in battle. This included taking over the
dead man's name, property, and even his wife and children. Yet the
The attitude even toward prisoners was by no means universally hostile. Indeed, their presence might be desired for roles other than those of slaves. The Iroquois Confederacy suffered terrific casualties in its eHorts to conquer a continent. A valiant young man was a most welcome captive if he would consent to drop his own tribal and kin affiliations, becoming an Iroquois and ceremonially taking the place of some Iroquois fallen in battle. This included taking over the dead man 's name, property, and even his wife and children. Yet the captive sometimes was feared because of evil magic, the hostile gods, and other inimical influences which might have adhered to his person. He therefore had to be purged of being an enemy. Kroeber reports that the Mohave, after several days of song and dance, took new cap tives to the river and plunged in with them. The captives emerged as Mohave, and thus the tribe was magically innoculated against any sickness inherent in their enmity. 6 Melanesia has just been mentioned as a torture area without peer, but this applied on some islands only to adult prisoners. The Solomon Islanders also recruited their depleted ranks from enemy children. The adults were cruelly slain and eaten, but enemy children were
captive sometimes was feared because of evil magic, the hostile gods,
and other inimical influences which might have adhered to his person.
He therefore had to be purged of being an enemy. Kroeber reports
that the Mohave, after several days of song and dance, took new cap-
tives to the river and plunged in with them. The captives emerged
as Mohave, and thus the tribe was magically innoculated against any
sickness inherent in their enmity.6
Melanesia has just been mentioned as a torture area without peer,
but this applied on some islands only to adult prisoners. The Solomon
Islanders also recruited their depleted ranks from enemy children.
The adults were cruelly slain and eaten, but enemy children were
* Abel, op. cit., pp. 143f.
5 Dorsey, Siouan Sociology, p. 237.
6 Kroeber, op. dt., p. 746.
Abel, op. cit., pp. 143f. Dorsey, Siouan Sociology, p. 237. 6 Kroeber, op. cU., p. 746.
II
D 9 iz e
Military Values
Military Values 193 taken into the clans of the wives of their captors. Upon adulthood
193
they could not speak their native language and would not hesitate to
fight their real kin.7
The body of an enemy, though dead, has often had value. The first
taken into the clans of the wives of their captors. Upon adulthood they could not speak their native language and would not hesitate to Bght their real kin. T few Plains warriors to strike the dead body of an enemy were given The body of an enemy, though dead, has often had value. The first
few Plains warriors to strike the dead body of an enemy were given
war honors. This often misled the pioneering whites into thinking
that all Plainsmen mutilated the bodies of the slain, although mutila-
tion of the dead was common enough in primitive war. Such mutila-
tion in itself had social value. If the tensions and petty hates which
everyone felt in connection with members of his own group could be
transferred to tEeTeelingless body of a dead enemy, the tahgroup was
strengtfieogdTKefeby. The Coeur d'Alene liked to bring home the
body uf a famous enemy warrior, if he were killed close to camp, so
that it might be dressed up and set on a pole for exhibition.3 The dead
body of an enemy had coup-counting value to the Zulu, too, but not as
much as on the American Plains.
The value of an enemy body for cannibalism has been a most im-
portant phenomenon. Many peoples ate the bodies of slain enemies
for a great variety of reasons, ranging from attitudes of religion to just
plain commestible ones. No generalization may be made regarding
the state of culture of habitual cannibals for the world as a whole, for
war honors. This often misled the pioneering whites into thinking that all Plainsmen mutilated the bodies of the slain, although mutila tion of the dead was common enough in primitive war. Such mutila_ tion in tself hl social yalue. If the tensions and petty hates which everyone felt in connection with members of his own group couI_ be tra nsferred to the feelingless body of a dead enemy, the in-group was strengthened thereby. The Coeur d'Alene liked to bring home the body of a famous enemy warrior, if he were killed close to camp, so that it might be dressed up and set on a pole for exhibition. 8 The dead body of an enemy had coup-counting value to the Zulu, too, but not as much as on the American Plains. The value of an enemy body for cannibalism has been a most im portant phenomenon. Many peoples ate the bodies of slain enemies for a great variety of reasons, ranging from attitudes of religion to just plain commestible ones. No generalization may be made regarding the state of culture of habitual cannibals for the world as a whole, for they have varied from the simplest to the most complex. It is not surprising that the savage men of South America were can nibals. The Caytes of the Brazilian coast ate every wrecked vessel's crew. At one meal they ate the first Bishop of Bahia, two canons, the Procurator of the Royal Portuguese Treasury, two pregnant white women, and several children, shipwrecked in a French brig on the reefs of the Rio Sao Francisco in 1556. The particular Tapuya whom the Portuguese called Botocudo were as merciless and persistent can
they have varied from the simplest to the most complex.
It is not surprising that the savage men of South America were can-
nibals. The Caytes of the Brazilian coast ate every wrecked vessel's
crew. At one meal they ate the first Bishop of Bahia, two canons, the
Procurator of the Royal Portuguese Treasury, two pregnant white
women, and several children, shipwrecked in a French brig on the
reefs of the Rio Sao Francisco in 1556. The particular Tapuya whom
the Portuguese called Botocudo were as merciless and persistent can-
nibals as have ever been known.9 According to one Gandavo, they
were "so prompt and expeditious in their vengeance" that they often
cut a piece from a man while he still lived, and cooked and ate it be-
fore his eyes.10 The constant wars of the Cashibos of Amazonia were
for the purpose of obtaining human flesh.11 (One must recall that
tropical jungles are ordinarily poor in meat game.) The Chiriguanos
7 Blackwood, op. cit., p. 43.
8 Teit, op. cit., p. 190.
10 Ibid., p. 71.
11 Ibid., p. 183, footnote.
nibals as have ever been known.9 According to one Gandavo, they were "so prompt and expeditious in their vengeance" that they often cut a piece from a man while he still lived, and cooked and ate it be fore his eyes . t O The constant wars of the Cashibos of Amazonia were for the purpose of obtaining human flesh. 1 1 ( One must recall that tropical jungles are ordinarily poor in meat game. )
7
The Chiriguanos
Blackwood, op. cit., p. 43. 8 Teit, op. cit., p. 190. 9 Church, op. cit., p. 69. )0 Ibid., p. 71. 1 1 Ibid., p. 183, footnote.
D 9 iz e
194
194 Primitive War of the Gran Chaco enslaved prisoners whom they kept at domestic
Primitive War
of the Gran Chaco enslaved prisoners whom they kept at domestic service until delectably fat. They would then be killed without warn ing, and any man who refused to eat a piece of heart was called a woman, a terrible word in a warrior's mouth. 1 2
service until delectably fat. They would then be killed without warn-
ing, and any man who refused to eat a piece of heart was called a
woman, a terrible word in a warrior's mouth.12
Such practices were not surprising among South American savages,
but what of the civilized Aztec? It is merely euphemistic to point out
that the cultivated Nahua restrained themselves to religious cannibali-
zation of human sacrifices, and that they did not eat much human
flesh. This was a difference in degree, not of kind, and the religious
rationalization amounted to little. It is doubtful if any cannibal could
be forced to eat human food for whatever reason if he did not have
but what of the civilized Aztec? It is merely euphemistic to point out that the cultivated Nahua restrained themselves to religious cannibali zation of human sacrifices. and that they did not eat much human flesh. This was a diHerence in degree. not of kind. and the religious rationalization amounted to little. It is doubtful if any cannibal could be forced to eat human food for whatever reason if he did not have a liking for it.
Such practices were not surprising among South American savages,
a liking for it.
As Africa considered the person of an enemy of great value for hu-
man sacrifice, so did it think well of him as a food. African slavery
was indeed mild, as noticed, but the captive could never tell when he
and a number of his friends would be victims at some magnificent
festival. West Africa surpassed America in sheer slaughter, fell be-
hind it in refined torture, and far surpassed it in cannibalism. Cere-
monial or hate-venting cannibalism has been reported for Africa, and
a Plains or Winnebago note was struck by Meek when he observed an
Ibo chief eating the raw heart of the King of Calabar with the boast,
"This is the way I serve my enemies."13
Oceania was the cannibal area par excellence. The most valuable
outgroup value in Melanesia was undoubtedly an edible enemy. The
desire to obtain a cannibal meal ranked with vengeance as the pri-
mary incentive to war in Papua. Dead or alive, a slain or captive
As ca considered the person of an enemy of great value for hu man sacrifice. so did it think well of him as a food. African slavery was indeed mild. as noticed, but the captive could never tell when he and a number of his friends would be victims at some magnificent festival. West Africa surpassed America in sheer sr, fell be hind it in refined torture, and far surpassed it in cannibalisih . Cere monial or hate-venting cannibalism has been reported for Africa, and
a Plains or Winnebago note was struck by Meek when he observed an Ibo chief eating the raw heart of the King of Calabar with the boast, "This is the way I serve my enemies."I8
foe was taken home, although pains needed to do this were consider-
able. Most Melanesians claimed that their real motive was to insult
their foes in this way and that they did not cannibalize for food
per se. Almost all admitted, though, that roast enemy was savory and
that they enjoyed it. Miss Powdermaker's Lesu people said that war
captives were just another meat dish, wrapped in leaves and baked in
the ovens, and savored as food without any idea of acquiring spiritual
Oceania was the cannibal area par exceUence. The most valuable outgroup value in Melanesia was undoubtedly an edible enemy. The desire to obtain a cannibal meal ranked with vengeance as the pri mary incentive to war in Papua. Dead or alive, a slain or captive foe was taken home, although pains needed to do this were consider able. Most Melanesians claimed that their real motive was to insult their foes in this way and that they did not cannibalize for food
power.14
Cannibalism was practiced intensively on some Polynesian islands,
while other groups had strong negative attitudes regarding it. Miss
Mead says that cannibalism was never strong in Manua and probably
Ibid., p. 235.
* Meek, op. cit., p. 71.
14 Powdermaker, op. cit., pp. 185f.
per se. Almost all admitted, though, that roast enemy was savory and
that they enjoyed it. Miss Powdennaker's Lesu people said that war captives were just another meat dish, wrapped in leaves and baked in the ovens, and savored as food without any idea of acquiring spiritual power. a Cannibalism was practiced intensively on some Polynesian islands, while other groups had strong negative attitudes regarding it. Miss Mead says that cannibalism was never strong in Manua and probably 1 2 Ibid., p.
1 1 Meek,
U
op. cit., p. 71. Powdermaker, op. cit., pp. 185E.
235.
D 9 iz e
Military Values
Military Values 195 was never institutionalized. On the other hand, the whole war pat-
195
was never institutionalized. tern was weak in Manua.
On the other hand, the whole war pat For Polynesia, at least, one -may say that
tern was weak in Manua. For Polynesia, at least, one -may say that
cannibalism was apparently correlated with weak social organization.
According to Professor Linton, regions of weak social control cherished
cannibalism was apparently correlated with weak social organization . According to Professor Linton, regions of weak social control cherished the trait enthusiastically, while in those with strong central govern ments it was from weak to absent and was usually considered abomi nable. For theoretical purposes it would be gratifying to conclude that such a correlation has been universal. But recall that in America it was the civilized
the trait enthusiastically, while in those with strong central govern-
ments it was from weak to absent and was usually considered abomi-
nable.
For theoretical purposes it would be gratifying to conclude that
such a correlation has been universal. But recall that in America it
was the civilized Aztec who practiced cannibalism in contrast with
the lowly tribes to the north who detested it. The advanced societies
of the North Pacific Coast indulged in ceremonial prisoner cannibal-
ism while the simpler tribes of the interior looked upon the habit with
Aztec who practiced cannibalism in contrast with
European horror. Actually, we know too little about the phenomenon
to theorize about it.
the lowly tribes to the north who detested it.
The cannibalization of prisoners had dropped out of importance in
of the North Pacific Coast indulged in ceremonial prisoner cannibal European horror.
The advanced societies
Eurasia by the time any record became available to us, but this had
not always been so. The builders of the pile villages of the Swiss
ism while the simpler tribes of the interior looked upon the habit with
Neolithic and inhabitants of certain areas in the Balkans and the Dan-
Actually, we know too little about the phenomenon
ube valley split human bones for the marrow, a rather certain sign
to theorize about it. The cannibalization of prisoners had dropped out of importance in Eurasia by the time any record became available to us, but this had not always been so. The builders of the pile villages of the Swiss Neolithic and inhabitants of certain areas in the Balkans and the Dan of cannibalism. But quite aside from their food value, scraps of the enemy body have been held in high esteem as trophies in many places. savage" cultures. as bracelets. u .Again, suCli mutilation was not always indicative of the "lowest" or "most There is no reason to look down upon the Maya But certainly the trait is not In contrast with the Maya, the The highly civilized Maya wore enemy jaw-bones
of cannibalism.
But quite aside from their food value, scraps of the enemy body
have been held in high esteem as trophies in many places. Again,
such mutilation was not always indicative of the "lowest" or "most
savage" cultures. The highly civilized Maya wore enemy jaw-bones
as bracelets.15 There is no reason to look down upon the Maya
for such practices, as it is doubtful if any civilized people has been
free from them throughout its history. But certainly the trait is not
ube valley split human bones for the marrow, a rather certain sign
confined to rudimentary civilizations. In contrast with the Maya, the
Gran Chaco Chiriguano brought home all kinds of scraps to expose
to the mockery of the women and children.
Tpkensjjf. enemy bodies were insignia of military honor in South
Africa. The simple Bechuana took off the navel and some of the sur-
rounding skin as a passport into the cattle kraal of the victorious vil-
lage where honors were to be bestowed. Here the shaman gashed
each slayer on the thigh, a gash for each victim, as a sort of coup-
count. The slayers then ate their scraps of skin.16 The economic note
15 Sylvanus G. Morley, An Introduction to the Study of Maya Hieroglyphs,
for such practices, as it is doubtful confined to rudimentary civilizations.
if any civilized people has been
Bulletin 57, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1915), p. 11.
6 Kidd, op. ctt., p. 310.
free from them throughout its history.
Gran Chaco Chiriguano brought home all kinds of scraps to expose to the mockery of the women and children.
Tokens
of enemy bodies were insignia of military honor in South
Africa. The Simple Bechuana took off the navel and some of the sur
rounding skin as a passport into the cattle kraal of the victorious vil lage where honors were to be bestowed. count. each slayer on the thigh, a gash for each victim, as a sort of coup The slayers then ate their scraps of skin.16 The economic note Here the shaman gashed
1 5 Sylvanus G. Morley, An Introduction to the Study of Maya Hieroglyph., Bulletin 57, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1915 ) , p. 1 1 . 1 6 Kidd, op. cit., p. 310.
D 9 iz e
196
196 Primitive War was introduced by the BaThonga, who thought that a powerful oint-
Primitive War
was introduced by the BaThonga, who thought that a powerful oint ment could be made of enemy flesh and blood which, smeared on the seed, would produce a good harvest. The mealies were again treated The blacksmiths bought with the drug when they were two feet high.
ment could be made of enemy flesh and blood which, smeared on the
seed, would produce a good harvest. The mealies were again treated
with the drug when they were two feet high. The blacksmiths bought
it to mix with their ore, for otherwise they would get nothing but slag.
Hunters treated themselves and their weapons with a similar oint-
it to mix with their ore, for otherwise they would get nothing but slag. Hunters treated themselves and their weapons with a similar oint ment to improve their aim. Powder made from enemy tendons was spread along the paths so that foes stepping on it unwittingly would become unable to walk, and hence easy to kill. I 7
ment to improve their aim. Powder made from enemy tendons was
spread along the paths so that foes stepping on it unwittingly would
become unable to walk, and hence easy to kill.17
jits of .enemy flesh êrejijsed magically in Melanesia as in South
Africa. For example, Miss Blackwood reported that in the Solomons
a warrior would take a bit of the ear of any enemy chief he had killed,
mix this with lime, bits of his eye-lash and pubic hair, and roll the
whole into a bundle with a leaf. Before setting out on a party a qual-
.!3 ts
Mrica.
of enemy flesh were used magically in Melanesia as in South For example, Miss Blackwood reported that in the Solomons
ified man would untie this bundle and blow a pinch of the mixture in
the direction of the enemy, uttering the proper formula, which was
supposed to make the enemy so blind and ill that he would become
a warrior would take a bit of the ear of any enemy chief he had kill ed, mix this with lime, bits of his eye-lash and pubic hair, and roll the whole into a bundle with a leaf. Before setting out on a party a qual ified man would untie this bundle and blow a pinch of the mixture in the direction of the enemy, uttering the proper formula, which was supposed to make the enemy so blind and ill that he would become an easy prey. I 8 While the most prized values obtained from the out group in Oceania were enemy scraps, nonhuman values were also sought. In addition to corpses, the Loyalty Islanders sought and prized the conquered chief's banner or mace of rare jade stone mount ed on a handle and ornamented with Loyalty Island valuables. These royal standards were symbols of great honor. I t Simple scraps of enemy bodies apparently played a minor role in Eurasia, although archeology shows occasional bits of bone, mandi bles, and cranial amulets prepared ceremonially. The importance of non-capital scraps pales before the value of a whole head. The attitude that something of power is inherent in the human head seems persistent. Perhaps the greatest expression of head-taking has existed in the islands of the Pacific. The taking of enemy heads was not only the chief but only Indonesian athletic event. Stress was laid on the fact that among such people the head had to be an enemy head, not simply that of some disliked fellow-tribesman. The J ibaro of Ecuador had several attitudes in common with the dis tant Indonesian Dayak. The intra-tribal feud was popular with the
an easy prey.1s While the most prized values obtained from the out-
group in Oceania were enemy scraps, nonhuman values were also
sought. In addition to corpses, the Loyalty Islanders sought and
prized the conquered chief's banner or mace of rare jade stone mount-
ed on a handle and ornamented with Loyalty Island valuables. These
royal standards were symbols of great honor.19
Simple scraps of enemy bodies apparently played a minor role in
Eurasia, although archeology shows occasional bits of bone, mandi-
bles, and cranial amulets prepared ceremonially.
The importance of non-capital scraps pales before the value of
a whole head. The attitude that something of power is inherent in
the human head seems persistent. Perhaps the greatest expression of
head-taking has existed in the islands of the Pacific. The taking of
enemy heads was not only the chief but only Indonesian athletic event.
Stress was laid on the fact that among such people the head had to
be an enemy head, not simply that of some disliked fellow-tribesman.
The Jibaro of Ecuador had several attitudes in common with the dis-
tant Indonesian Dayak. The intra-tribal feud was popular with the
17 Junod, op. ctt., p. 476.
Blackwood, op. cft., pp. 469f.
19 Emma Hadfield, Among Natives of the Loyalty Group (London: Mac-
millan, 1920), pp. 117f.
1 7 Junod, up. cit. , p. 476. 1 8 Blackwood, up. cit., pp. 469f. 1 9 Emma Hadfield, Among NaUvu of the Loyalty Croup ( London : Mac millan, 1 920 ) , pp. 117f.
D 9 iz e
Military Values
Military Values 197 Jibaro, but the heads so taken did not count. Only foreign heads had
197
Only foreign heads had
Jibaro, but the heads so taken did not count. value.20
value.20
The Jibaro and Indians of similar culture, such as the Munducurus,
were extremely clever in removing the bones from a head and drying
The Jibaro and Indians of similar culture, such as the Munducurus, were extremely clever in removing the bones from a head and drying it slowly so that it shrank to about the size of a human fist. 2 1 tures it bore in life. This work was done so well that the resultant miniature retained the fea Even female heads were sometimes taken, but it was the stronger and more valiant male who provided honor for the slayer. But the Jibaro shrunken heads, or tsantas, were more than trophies . Their value was practical, not merely honorific. The Ji baros believed that the enemy's spirit was located in the head and that, though this spirit was thirsting for revenge, its malevolence could be turned into practical benevolence through the elaborite rites of the victory feast. The feast was not, therefore, merely the common gloat-celebration but a rite of deep spiritual import. 2 2 The well-considered attitudes of the Jibaro regarding these heads as values has by no means been universal. It is doubtful
it slowly so that it shrank to about the size of a human fist.21 This
work was done so well that the resultant miniature retained the fea-
tures it bore in life. Even female heads were sometimes taken, but
it was the stronger and more valiant male who provided honor for
the slayer. But the Jibaro shrunken heads, or tsantas, were more than
trophies. Their value was practical, not merely honorific. The Ji-
baros believed that the enemy's spirit was located in the head and
that, though this spirit was thirsting for revenge, its malevolence
could be turned into practical benevolence through the elaborite
rites of the victory feast. The feast was not, therefore, merely the
common gloat-celebration but a rite of deep spiritual import.22
The well-considered attitudes of the Jibaro regarding these heads
as values has by no means been universal. It is doubtful if the Co-
camas of the Upper Amazon could have attached such spiritual value
to them because they took them in such enormous quantities.23 The
Jibaro, Dayak, Philippine hill tribes, and certain African people defi-
nitely sought to acquire the magical power residing in the enemy
head in order to put it to work. Often, however, it seems as if head-
hunting were mere trophy gathering. There was nothing in Eskimo
religion which could possibly utilize an enemy head as a working
if the Co
fetish, but some Eskimo have been reported as head-takers. Nelson
camas of the Upper Amazon could have attached such spiritual value to them because they took them in such enormous quantities .23 The Jibaro, Dayak, Philippine hill tribes, and certain African people defi nitely sought to acquire the magical power residing in the enemy head in order to put it to work. Often, however, it seems as if head There was nothing in Eskimo Nelson hunting were mere trophy gathering.
reports that the Bristol Bay Eskimo were content merely to set up
enemy heads on stakes with arrows thrust cross-wise through the
noses.24 This sort of thing probably represented a simple gloat, and
was very common.
So strong was the head-value idea in Oceania that on many islands
head-taking was the primary motive for war, and anthropophagy was
merely incidental. This strong attitude probably represented a dif-
fusion from somewhere in the west, perhaps Indonesia. One tends
to suspect a central focus of diffusion for all the head-taking complex
religion which could possibly utilize an enemy head as a working fetish, but some Eskimo have been reported as head-takers . reports that the Bristol Bay Eskimo were content merely to set up enemy heads on stakes with arrows thrust cross-wise through the noses . 2 4 This sort of thing probably represented a simple gloat, and was very common. So strong was the head-value idea in Oceania that on many islands head-taking was the primary motive for war, and anthropophagy was merely incidental. This strong attitude probably represented a dif fusion from somewhere in the west, perhaps Indonesia. One tends
outside America and Africa, or can we except these continents?
91 îl t. ..... - _ fO
AV41 I JlV.il j l'l> . I.H. , p. AWt
22 Karsten, op. cit., pp. 87ff.
2* Nelson, op. cit., p. 329.
to suspect a central focus of diffusion for all the head-taking complex outside America and Africa, or can we except these continents? 2 0 Karsten, op. cit., p. 13. 2 1 Church, op. cit., p. 78. 22 Karsten, op. cit., pp. 87ff. 2 8 Church, op. cit., p. 176. 2 4 Nelson, op. cit., p. 329.
D 9 iz e
198
198 Primitive War Many Melanesians were zealous head-takers and skillful taxiderm-
Primitive War
Recalling the theory of Polynesian origins, one would hardly Indeed, Polynesian religion com
Many Melanesians were zealous head-takers and skillful taxiderm ists. expect them to fall behind the Melanesians in head-taking, for all their superiority in other realms. ture. pelled some of them to take vast quantities of heads for temple furni They equaled some of the West African temple builders in this. Buck relates that one great lord of Mangaia took so many heads so that he could make an entire Hooring for a new temple out of them. Raiding parties were sent out to attack isolated families, without declaration or intent of tribal war, simply to get foundation material for a new temple Hoor. 2 5 Since no first-rank warrior or member of his family was killed in the raids, the enemy tribes made very little of such occasions. The Maori of New Zealand took enemy heads in order to pour insult on the foe, which was their prime defense of cannibalism. Skulls were placed on the comer pallisades of the stockaded villages, facing their erstwhile friends, in order to make the insult biting. An elab orate ceremony of "causing-to-Iook-backward" was held in which the heads were repeatedly pointed toward their former homes and urged in song and dance to bid farewell. 2 6 Enemy fragments were also made into jewelry and even fish hooks .
This represented no attempt to get the man's spirit to work for one but was rather an expression
ists. Recalling the theory of Polynesian origins, one would hardly
expect them to fall behind the Melanesians in head-taking, for all
their superiority in other realms. Indeed, Polynesian religion com-
pelled some of them to take vast quantities of heads for temple furni-
ture. They equaled some of the West African temple builders in this.
Buck relates that one great lord of Mangaia took so many heads so
that he could make an entire flooring for a new temple out of them.
Raiding parties were sent out to attack isolated families, without
declaration or intent of tribal war, simply to get foundation material
for a new temple floor.25 Since no first-rank warrior or member of
his family was killed in the raids, the enemy tribes made very little
of such occasions.
The Maori of New Zealand took enemy heads in order to pour insult
on the foe, which was their prime defense of cannibalism. Skulls
were placed on the corner pallisades of the stockaded villages, facing
their erstwhile friends, in order to make the insult biting. An elab-
orate ceremony of "causirig-to-look-backward" was held in which the
heads were repeatedly pointed toward their former homes and urged
in song and dance to bid farewell.26 Enemy fragments were also
made into jewelry and even fish hooks. This represented no attempt
to get the man's spirit to work for one but was rather an expression
of a first-rate hate. Captured heads were valuable in Maori diplom-
acy. The tattooed heads of chiefs and nobles were affixed to poles
and spears and turned so that their friends could see them enduring
insult and jest, but at the end of the war they were exchanged as part
of the peace ceremonial. For a group to refuse to accept its own
heads was to refuse peace.
While perhaps not exercising the skill and patience noticed in Ama-
zonia or Malaysia, the Maori took some pains to cure heads. The
commonest practice was to remove the brains and suspend the head
over a pile of heated stones. A mat funnel was arranged to concen-
trate the heat on the suspended head. The trophy was occasionally
of a first-rate hate. Captured heads were valuable in M aori diplom acy. The tattooed heads of chiefs and nobles were affixed to poles and spears and turned so that their friends could see them enduring insult and jest, but at the end of the war they were exchanged as part of the peace ceremonial. For a group to refuse to accept its own heads was to refuse peace. While perhaps not exercising the skill and patience noticed in Ama zonia or Malaysia, the Maori took some pains to cure heads. The commonest practice was to remove the brains and suspend the head over a pile of heated stones. A mat funnel was arranged to concen trate the heat on the suspended head. The trophy was occasionally removed from the funnel to allow the humidity to dry off, basted with fat, and put back in the funnel. smoked. The attitudes directed towards heads, the motivation behind such decollation, and the esteem in which they were held varied in Oceania The head was thus slowly dried and
removed from the funnel to allow the humidity to dry off, basted with
fat, and put back in the funnel. The head was thus slowly dried and
smoked.
The attitudes directed towards heads, the motivation behind such
decollation, and the esteem in which they were held varied in Oceania
26 Frances Del Mar, op. cit., pp. 57ff.
2 5 Buck, op. cit., p. 45. 2 ft Frances Del Mar, op.
cit.,
pp. 57ff.
D 9 iz e
Military Values
Military Values 199 from trivial to the important political concept noticed in San Cristoval,
199
Solomon Islands. There the chiefs mana, and therefore his importance,
was estimated by the number of skulls decorating his door. A petty
leader might have as many as thirty, while a really important per-
sonage would have around a thousand. This was an attempt to an-
swer objectively the question which all societies would like to know:
Is the chief chiefly, the king really royal? An enemy skull was an
objective test which even the great emperors of Mesopotamia did not
despise.
Nowhere in Eurasia did head-hunting play the part it did in
Oceania, Amazonia, and Africa, although the practice was by no means
unknown. The use of amulets carved from human skulls in the Euro-
from trivial to the important political concept noticed in San Cristoval, Solomon Islands. There the chiefs mana, and therefore his importance, was estimated by the number of skulls decorating his door. A petty leader might have as many as thirty, while a really important per sonage would have around a thousand. This was an attempt to an swer objectively the question which all societies would like to know: Is the chief chiefly, the king really royal? An enemy skull was an objective test which even the great emperors of Mesopotamia did not despise. Nowhere in Eurasia did head-hunting play the part it did in Oceania, Amazonia, and Africa, although the practice was by no means unknown. The use of amulets carved from human skulls in the Euro pean Neolithic sites hints of its very early importance on that conti nent. So likewise might the decorated and elaborately buried skulls characteristic of the Mesolithic of Offnet. European archeologists deduce that the care in burial and expensive decoration of such Meso lithic skulls indicate that they were honorific burials of prestigefuI members of the we-group, and not enemies. From the many instances of honorable or even worshipful treatment of skulls taken from the enemy among living peoples, it is seen that such an interpretation is by no means forced on the student. In fact, quite the reverse is robable. Asia knew a high head-taking complex even among civilized peo ples. The Mon and Khmer, for example, although nominal Buddhists, have a survival of ceremonial head-taking wherein the spirit of the victim becomes a protective genius. These mainland people of South east Asia, however, are included in the vast head-taking area which covers Malaysia and spreads to Melanesia and beyond. For nearer Asia, Herodotus reported the practice among the Scyths, whom he admired and therefore was not slandering. The prestige and recognition elements stood out in his report. The Scythian war rior not only drank the blood of the first man he slew in battle but decapitated every one he could. These heads were tokens of his right to share in the booty when the king distributed it. The Scyth then removed the scalps and prepared them carefully. The crania of enemies particularly detested were made into drinking cups. The poor man covered his captured skulls with leather, the rich man with gold. They did this with the crania of kinsmen if they slew them in
pean Neolithic sites hints of its very early importance on that conti-
nent. So likewise might the decorated and elaborately buried skulls
characteristic of the Mesolithic of Offnet. European archeologists
deduce that the care in burial and expensive decoration of such Meso-
lithic skulls indicate that they were honorific burials of prestigeful
members of the we-group, and not enemies. From the many instances
of honorable or even worshipful treatment of skulls taken from the
enemy among living peoples, it is seen that such an interpretation is
by no means forced on the student. In fact, quite the reverse is
'probable.
Asia knew a high head-taking complex even among civilized peo-
ples. The Mon and Khmer, for example, although nominal Buddhists,
have a survival of ceremonial head-taking wherein the spirit of the
victim becomes a protective genius. These mainland people of South-
east Asia, however, are included in the vast head-taking area which
covers Malaysia and spreads to Melanesia and beyond.
For nearer Asia, Herodotus reported the practice among the Scyths,
whom he admired and therefore was not slandering. The prestige
and recognition elements stood out in his report. The Scythian war-
rior not only drank the blood of the first man he slew in battle but
decapitated every one he could. These heads were tokens of his
right to share in the booty when the king distributed it. The Scyth
then removed the scalps and prepared them carefully. The crania
of enemies particularly detested were made into drinking cups. The
poor man covered his captured skulls with leather, the rich man with
gold. They did this with the crania of kinsmen if they slew them in
D 9 iz e b
200
200 Primitive War
Primitive War
judicial duels before the king. Such cups were the cause of much
boasting.27
Legend has preserved the tradition of such behavior among our
immediate ancestors in Northwest Europe, both Celtic and Teutonic.
Furthermore, Poseidonius of Apamea and Strabo both distinctly said
that mutilation of the dead was general in that area. Diodorus Siculus
claimed that the Gauls were head-takers. The Assyrians, of course,
carried this primitivity into civilization, and few if any peoples ever
surpassed them in head-taking. And, speaking of the Semites, one
might observe that David's decollation of Goliath did not shock the
Jews. Herodotus furthermore says the plundering inhabitants of
of Taurus beheaded war prisoners and set their heads as high as pos-
sible over the decapitator's house in order to bring its inhabitants
under the heads' protection.2s One cannot find a clearer statement
of magical head-taking in the literature for Amazonia or Melanesia.
The Nordic Eddas rarely speak of head-taking, but they do mention
the trait. The Heimskringla tells how the viking Earl Sigurd harried
the Scots in company with other Norse rovers. He slew the Scots
Earl Tusk-Melbridga and took his head, but as Sigurd rode along
with the head bound to his crupper, he struck himself with one of
the Scot's prominent teeth which infected his leg, causing his own
death.29
The head is cumbersome to carry about, so it was to be expected
that some tribes would be content with only the scalp. It is thought
by some students that scalping was often a substitution, that some
people who became expert scalpers were formerly head-hunters. It
is believed by some, for example, that the Indians of Southeast United
States were generally decapitators, often with a human sacrifice mo-
tive connected with a solar cult. It is contended that the Iroquois,
having come from this area, turned into scalpers in their new north-
eastern home. It is also thought that the practice in America was
formerly not as widespread as when the white man noted it in early
historic times. It seems to have been rapidly diffusing from the
south and east of the United States just at the close of Pre-Columbian
times. Indeed, there are Indians who blame the white man for much
of the speed of the diffusion, and we know that many of the pioneer
governments were hair buyers.
Herodotus, iv. 64-66.
ibid., iv., 104.
29 Sturluson, op. ctt., I, ch. Ill, pp. 93ff.
judicial duels before the king. Such cups were the cause of much boasting.27 Legend has preserved the tradition of such behavior among our immediate ancestors in Northwest Europe, both Celtic and Teutonic. Furthermore, Poseidonius of Apamea and Strabo both distinctly said that mutilation of the dead was general in that area. Diodorus Siculus claimed that the Gauls were head-takers. The Assyrians, of course, carried this primitivity into civilization, and few if any peoples ever surpassed them in head-taking. And, speaking of the Semites, one might observe that David's decollation of Goliath did not shock the Jews. Herodotus furthermore says the plundering inhabitants of of Taurus beheaded war prisoners and set their heads as high as pos sible over the decapitator's house in order to bring its inhabitants under the heads' protection.28 One cannot find a clearer statement of magical head-taking in the literature for Amazonia or Melanesia. The Nordic Eddas rarely speak of head-taking, but they do mention the trait. The Heimskringla tells how the viking Earl Sigurd harried the Scots in company with other Norse rovers. He slew the Scots Earl Tusk-Melbridga and took his head, but as Sigurd rode along with the head bound to his crupper, he struck himself with one of the Scot's prominent teeth which infected his leg, causing his own death.29 The head is cumbersome to carry about, so it was to be expected that some tribes would be content with only the scalp. It is thought by some students that scalping was often a substitution, that some people who became expert scalpers were formerly head-hunters. It is believed by some, for example, that the Indians of Southeast United States were generally decapitators, often with a human sacrifice mo tive connected with a solar cult. It is contended that the Iroquois, having come from this area, turned into scalpers in their new north eastern home. It is also thought that the practice in America was formerly not as widespread as when the white man noted it in early historic times. It seems to have been rapidly diHusing from the south and east of the United States just at the close of Pre-Columbian times. Indeed, there are Indians who blame the white man for much of the speed of the diffusion, and we know that many of the pioneer governments were hair buyers.
28 2t
2 7 Herodotus, iv. 64-66.
Ibid., iv., 104. Sturluson, op. cit., I, ch. III, pp. 93ff.
D 9 iz e b
Military Values
Military Values 201 Scalping was particularly common in America and rare elsewhere,
201
although there was no unanimity in the method of taking or pre-
paring scalps in the New World. For example, the California Kato
went so far as to take whole heads to dance over while many other
California tribes, such as the Yurok, did not even take scalps.30 The
southern tribes, such as the Creek, were zealous prisoner-torturers
and trophy-gatherers. Le Moyne said that special warriors were
detailed to seize and drag away every slain or wounded enemy to a
safe place and literally to skin the head, taking much more than the
scalp, with reed slips "sharper than any steel blade." Enemy scraps,
legs, arms, head skins were brought home and affixed on a circle of
tall poles with great solemnity. The "sorcerer" then cursed the
enemy with "a thousand imprecations."31
Here again was something more than simple victory gloating. The
Creek, having acquired scraps of the enemy, could work evil against
the surviving members of the tribe, a rather common attitude. On
the other hand, some tribes had simpler ideas. The Flathead held
no victory dance unless the war party had brought home something
to dance over, to be thankful about, but their dances were mere hate-
expenditure and tension release devices. The nearby Kutenai did not
hold a dance if their side had suffered a fatal casualty.
The scalps might in some instances be relics of cannibalistic rites.
Among the Menomini the scalps were the property of the women,
but while they were still fresh the warriors licked the blood from
them to symbolize the devouring by the sun of men slain in battle,
that is, decomposition. Indeed, the Menomini warriors actually ate
strips of roast enemy out of bravado and jeered at those who would
not.32
The revenge gloat seems to have been the attitude impelling the
Northcoast people to take scalps. The Tlingit took whole heads and,
when leisure and safety permitted, scalped them so as to take the
Scalping was particularly common in America and rare elsewhere. although there was no unanimity in the method of taking or pre paring scalps in the New World. For example, the California Kato went so far as to take whole heads to dance over while many other California tribes, such as the Yurok, did not even take scalps.3 0 The southern tribes, such as the Creek, were zealous prisoner-torturers and trophy-gatherers. Le Moyne said that special warriors were detailed to seize and drag away every slain or wounded enemy to a safe place and literally to skin the head, taking much more than the scalp, with reed slips "sharper than any steel blade." Enemy scraps, legs, arms, head skins were brought home and affixed on a circle of tall poles with great solemnity. The "sorcerer" then cursed the enemy with "a thousand imprecations. "S I Here again was something more than simple victory gloating. The Creek, having acquired scraps of the enemy. could work evil against the surviving members of the tribe, a rather common attitude. On the other hand, some tribes had simpler ideas. The Flathead held no victory dance unless the war party had brought home something to dance over, to be thankful about, but their dances were mere hate expenditure and tension release devices. The nearby Kutenai did not hold a dance if their side had suffered a fatal casualty. The scalps might in some instances be relics of cannibalistic rites. Among the Menomini the scalps were the property of the women, but while they were still fresh the warriors licked the blood from them to symbolize the devouring by the sun of men slain in battle, that is, decomposition. Indeed, the Menomini warriors actually ate strips of roast enemy out of bravado and jeered at those who would not. 82 The revenge gloat seems to have been the attitude impelling the Northcoast people to take scalps. The Tlingit took whole heads and, when leisure and safety permitted, scalped them so as to take the ears. These trophies were dried to permanence by the fire. 33 80 Kroeber, cp. cit., p. 157. 3 1 Le Moyne, in Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their
ears. These trophies were dried to permanence by the fire.33
31 Le Moyne, in Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their
Neighbors, p. 7.
32 Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini Indians,
pp. 116-123.
Tlingit Indians," p. 449.
Neighbors, p. 7. 8 2 Skinner, Social Life and Ceremonial Bundles of the Menomini Indians, pp. 1 16-123. 38 Swanton, "Social Conditions, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationships of the Tlingit Indians," p. 449.
D 9 iz e b
202
202 Primitive War The religious motive was revealed in North America most strongly
Primitive War
The religious motive was revealed in North America most strongly in the Southwest, and among the simpler societies more pertinently than among the more cultivated pueblo-building peoples. portance of the scalp was considerable. Neverthe less, even among such peoples as the Zuni the religio-economic im The Zuni felt that they had to Such men became
a
in the Southwest, and among the simpler societies more pertinently
than among the more cultivated pueblo-building peoples. Neverthe-
less, even among such peoples as the Zuni the religio-economic im-
portance of the scalp was considerable. The Zuni felt that they had to
induct each scalp-taker into the Bow priesthood for his own protec-
tion against the malevolent powers of the scalp. Such men became
rainmakers for the benefit of the tribe and commanders in war. Nev-
induct each scalp-taker into the Bow priesthood for his own protec tion against the malevolent powers of the scalp. rainmakers for the benefit of the tribe and commanders in war. ertheless, they suffered a tabu against sexual intercourse for forming to the exacting ritual pattern of the pueblos .34 The fear of the scalp, the penalties a scalper must undergo, and the potential good a scalp might be made to serve have been clearly ported this well for the Papago.3 11 assistants. its shape. seen among the simpler Southwest pe6ple. Miss Underhill has re Similarly, the Yuma had the entire Nev year
ertheless, they suffered a tabu against sexual intercourse for a year
and had to be purified by very elaborate ceremonies, thereby con-
forming to the exacting ritual pattern of the pueblos.34
The fear of the scalp, the penalties a scalper must undergo, and
the potential good a scalp might be made to serve have been clearly
seen among the simpler Southwest pec-pie. Miss Underhill has re-
and had to be purified by very elaborate ceremonies, thereby con
ported this well for the Papago.35. Similarly, the Yuma had the entire
skin of the head removed with great formality by a shaman and four
assistants. Not everyone could do this or the skin would not keep
its shape. At that, no small amount of skill and experience in dis-
section was required. This was a matter requiring several days. At
home, the warrior who had slain the enemy lived with the skin for
several days, affectionately talking to it to calm its spirit. As soon
as the spirit was convinced of the love with which it was now sur-
rounded, an elaborate victory feast was held. No one but the scalp's
skin of the head removed with great formality by a shaman and four Not everyone could do this or the skin would not keep At that, no small amount of skill and experience in dis This was a matter requiring several days . At
owner dared carry it to the feast. Indeed, it is alleged that it was
physically impossible for anyone else to do so. At this time the Yuma
and some of their neighbors kept the slayers under a number of tabus
because of their blood-guilt. The owner held subsequent feasts in
section was required.
honor of the skin, and at his death it was thrown into the river and
home, the warrior who had slain the enemy lived with the skin for several days, affectionately talking to it to calm its spirit. As soon as the spirit was convinced of the love with which it was now sur rounded, an elaborate victory feast was held. No one but the scalp's owner dared carry it to the feast. Indeed, it is alleged that it was At this time the Yuma physically impossible for anyone else to do so. because of their blood guilt. "drowned. " 3 6 Popular opinion which holds that scalping found its highest and most important expression on the Great Plains is at variance with The typical Plains tribe by no means conceived the scalp to have the social, religious, and economic value assigned to scraps of enemy bodies by many peoples. It is true that scalps were uni versally taken in the area, that they were valued, and usually danced the facts .
"drowned."36
Popular opinion which holds that scalping found its highest and
most important expression on the Great Plains is at variance with
the facts. The typical Plains tribe by no means conceived the scalp
to have the social, religious, and economic value assigned to scraps
of enemy bodies by many peoples. It is true that scalps were uni-
versally taken in the area, that they were valued, and usually danced
34 Ruth L. Bun/cl, "Introduction to Zuni Ceremonialism," Annual Report 47,
Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1929-1930), p. 527.
and some of their neighbors kept the slayers under a number of tabus
35 Ruth Underbill, The Autobiography of a Papago Woman, Memoir 46,
The owner held subsequent feasts in
American Anthropological Association (Menasha: 1936), passim.
36 Densmore, Mandan and Hidatsa Music, pp. 10-13.
honor of the skin, and at his death it was thrown into the river and
Annual Report 47, 1929- 1930 ) , p. 527. 8 11 Ruth Underhill, The Autobiography of a Papago Wonuzn, Memoir 46, American AnthropolOgical Association ( Menasha: 1936 ) , passim. 86 Densmore, Mandan and Hidatsa Music, pp. 10-13.
Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington :
34
Ruth L. Bunzel, "Introduction to Zuni Ceremonialism,"
DI
Iz.e b
1ilitary Values
Military Values 203 over, shrieked at, and given some emotional importance. Yet the
203
Yet the
as
over, shrieked at, and given some emotional importance. graded system of war honors, or
graded system of war honors, or coup, pressed the scalp far into the
background of emotional importance.37 A scalp was not regarded as
coup,
pressed the scalp far into the A scalp was not regarded It
a fetish fraught with benefit and potential danger on the Plains. It
background of emotional importance.3T
could grow no crops; it could win no subsequent battles; and a scalp
as such had little value. It could even be divided and subdivided
a fetish fraught with benefit and potential danger on the Plains. as such had little value. at fraud.38
and put on poles to make it look like several with no apparent intent
could grow no crops ; it could win no subsequent battles; and a scalp It could even be divided and subdivided and put on poles to make it look like several with no apparent intent Any bit of human hair was primarily a trophy, a tangible Often war shirts and horse The popular bit of evidence of victory and valor.
at fraud.3s Any bit of human hair was primarily a trophy, a tangible
bit of evidence of victory and valor. Often war shirts and horse
ornaments were decorated with strands of enemy hair. The popular
importance ascribed to Plains scalping is probably due to the fact
that these people were the last fierce warriors encountered by the
white man in the westward expansion.
While North America was the chief scalping continent, the practice
ornaments were decorated with strands of enemy hair.
was known in artic Asia, which, because of its proximity to North
America, is an item of considerable interest. Miss Czaplicka says
importance ascribed to Plains scalping is probably due to the fact that these people were the last fierce warriors encountered by the white man in the westward expansion. While North America was the chief scalping continent, the practice was known in artie Asia, which, because of its proximity to North America, is an item of considerable interest. Miss Czaplicka says that the Ostyak, Vogul, and Samoyed were acquainted with scalping. Some Ostyak songs tell of eating enemy hearts, another trait observ able on North America's Great Plains.39 Herodotus reported scalping among the more distant Scyths. and carefully prepared it. After the victorious warrior had taken an enemy head he removed the scalp He proudly used the scalp as a napkin, Sometimes a often sewing many of them together to form a cloak. made of Bayed enemy arms were highly esteemed. 4 0 One must also consider the important category of military values acquired, in contrast, from within the friendly group, such as the vast host of amulets, charms, or fetishes which made "our" side victorious. The Ark of the Covenant fought for David, spreading emerods among the uncircumcized Philistines, and the Palladium fought for Troy. The legionary Eagles had military might in themselves which en abled Roman law to spread. Winnebago had
war
that the Ostyak, Vogul, and Samoyed were acquainted with scalping.
Some Ostyak songs tell of eating enemy hearts, another trait observ-
able on North America's Great Plains.39
Herodotus reported scalping among the more distant Scyths. After
the victorious warrior had taken an enemy head he removed the scalp
and carefully prepared it. He proudly used the scalp as a napkin,
often sewing many of them together to form a cloak. Sometimes a
Scyth would completely flay an enemy for the purpose, and quivers
made of flayed enemy arms were highly esteemed.40
One must also consider the important category of military values
acquired, in contrast, from within the friendly group, such as the vast
host of amulets, charms, or fetishes which made "our" side victorious.
The Ark of the Covenant fought for David, spreading emerods among
the uncircumcized Philistines, and the Palladium fought for Troy.
The legionary Eagles had military might in themselves which en-
abled Roman law to spread. Christians in the past have been known
to parade the bones of the saints before the seried host, and the
Winnebago had war bundles.
Wissler, Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians, p. 154.
3s Lowie, Societies of the Ankara Indians, passim.
Scyth would completely Bay an enemy for the purpose, and quivers
39 Marie A. Czaplicka, op. cit., 69.
40 Herodotus, iv. 64-66.
Christians in the past have been known
to parade the bones of the saints before the seried host, and the bundles.
p. 154.
8 9 Marie A. Czaplicka, op. cit., 69.
8T Wissler, Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians, 8 8 Lowie, Societies of the Ankara Indians, passim.
Herodotus,
40
iv. 64-66.
DI
Iz.e b
204
204 Primitive War The writings of Radin and Skinner on Winnebago and Menomini
Primitive War
war bundles have been mentioned with regard to tactical magic.
The Northeast Woodland of America had developed the war fetish
about as highly as any area, although the Plateau Kutenai and Salish
understood their fabrication. The Southeast Woodland was hardly
less adept. Bossu said that the Choctaw always consulted their
"Manitou" before going to war. The chief carried it, guarded by
the warriors. On the march it was exhibited in the direction of the
enemy, apparently to their discomfiture.41
Many such fetishes were personal rather than tribal. The Plains
warriors acquired theirs through individual dreams and visions. War-
riors would consult their "medicine" before going into battle and
would often wear such animal scraps into the fray. Some people,
such as the Assiniboin, acquired their war charms through the dreams
of professional shamans who would collect handsome fees.42
The we-group granted many objects of military value to the African
warrior, such as special decorations for killers and valiant men. Of-
ficers' insignia were highly prized in the eastern and southern Afri-
can kingdoms.
European literature is likewise full of references to charms, amulets,
palladia, and insignia. Weapons themselves were honor-fetishes as
well as instruments of death. Everyone is familiar with that attitude
in the Old World. "To have abandoned one's shield is the height of
disgrace," says Tacitus of the Germans; "the man so disgraced cannot
be present at religious rites, nor attend a council: many survivors of
war have ended their infamy with a noose."43
One's name was often a military object of great value. Omaha
warriors took entirely new names after they had been on a war party
four days44, while a Kwakiutl brave could assume a new name if he
was able to eat a whole captive. The granting of permission to
acquire a new and more honorable name upon the completion of
some valiant exploit has been very common in the world.
41 Bossu, op. cit<, II, pp. 89-94.
42 Lowie, The Asstniboine, p. 33.
44 Dorsey, "Omaha Sociology," p. 324.
The writings of Radin and Skinner on Winnebago and Menomini war bundles have been mentioned with regard to tactical magic. The Northeast Woodland of America had developed the war fetish about as highly as any area, although the Plateau Kutenai and Salish understood their fabrication. The Southeast Woodland was hardly less adept. Bossu said that the Choctaw always consulted their "Manitou" before going to war. The chief carried it, guarded by the warriors. On the march it was exhibited in the direction of the enemy, apparently to their discomfiture. 4 1 Many such fetishes were personal rather than tribal. The Plains warriors acquired theirs through individual dreams and visions. War riors would consult their "medicine" before going into battle and would often wear such animal scraps into the fray. Some people, such as the Assiniboin, acquired their war charms through the dreams of professional shamans who would collect handsome fees.42 The we-group granted many objects of military value to the African warrior, such as special decorations for killers and valiant men. Of ficers' insignia were highly prized in the eastern and southern Afri can kingdoms. European literature is likewise full of references to charms, amulets, palladia, and insignia. Weapons themselves were honor-fetishes as well as instruments of death. Everyone is familiar with that attitude i; th e Old ''''orId. "To have abandoned one's shield is the height of disgrace," says Tacitus of the Germans ; "the man so disgraced cannot be present at religious rites, nor attend a council : many survivors of war have ended their infamy with a noose." 4 8
,
One's name was often a military object of great value. Omaha warriors took entirely new names after they had been on a war party four daysH, while a Kwakiutl brave could assume a new name if he was able to eat a whole captive. The granting of permission to acquire a new and more honorable name upon the completion of some valiant exploit has been very common in the world. 41
42
Bossu . op. cit II. pp. 89-94. Lowie. The Assiniboine, p. 33.
...
4 3 Tacitus, Germanill ,
H
6.
Dorsey, "Omaha SOCiology," p. 324.
D 9 iz e b
CHAPTER 11
Certain Military Attitudes
A SUMMARY OF THE ATTITUDE PATTERN OF ANY POPULATION WOULD
describe the symbolic fabric of its culture as a whole, but the very
complexity of such a work prevents its being undertaken for the
world. The subject has been successfully studied for individual
persons in case histories, and perhaps for very small, homogeneous
groups. Such work has been intensive, and one cannot as yet work
intensively with the world. Ethnographers have not employed such
methods until very recently, and few subjective considerations are
CHAPTER 1 1
apparent in existing field literature.
For these reasons we are confined even in military affairs to atti-
tudes towards war itself, towards the enemy, towards one's own life

describe the symbolic fabric of its culture as a whole, but the very complexity of such a work prevents its being undertaken for the world. The subject has been successfully studied for individual persons in case histories, and perhaps for very small, homogeneous groups. Such work has been intensive, and one cannot as yet work intensively with the world. Ethnographers have not employed such methods until very recently, and few subjective considerations are apparent in existing field literature. For these reasons we are confined even in military affairs to atti tudes towards war itself, towards the enemy, towards one's own life considered as a value, and closely allied considerations. That these attitudes are apparent despite the objectivity of field reports indicates that they must be endowed with great emotional importance. They are therefore discussed here as the greatest of military attitudes. No generalization on basic attitudes towards even war and peace is possible for nonliterate peoples as a whole. There have been those whose attitudes were almost completely pacific while peoples like the Blackfoot considered fighting their chief delight. By contrast, war has sometimes been conceived of as a sorrow inherent in the universe which must be accepted. The semi-agricultural Omaha, through Plainsmen, had essentially pacific attitudes. They considered aggressive war a disintegrating force. The mysterious wakanda, the great cosmic force, had decreed the existence of war, hate, and vengeance, and man must submit. Rites were said to control war and the turbulent, ambitious men who liked it, but the control was feeble. 1 War to such people was a neces sary evil which they practiced efficiently, but the Omaha did not
considered as a value, and closely allied considerations. That these
attitudes are apparent despite the objectivity of field reports indicates
that they must be endowed with great emotional importance. They
SUMMARY OF THE A'ITITUDE PATfERN OF ANY POPULAnON WOULD
are therefore discussed here as the greatest of military attitudes.
No generalization on basic attitudes towards even war and peace
is possible for nonliterate peoples as a whole. There have been those
whose attitudes were almost completely pacific while peoples like the
Blackfoot considered fighting their chief delight. By contrast, war
has sometimes been conceived of as a sorrow inherent in the universe
which must be accepted.
The semi-agricultural Omaha, through Plainsmen, had essentially
pacific attitudes. They considered aggressive war a disintegrating
force. The mysterious wakanda, the great cosmic force, had decreed
the existence of war, hate, and vengeance, and man must submit.
Rites were said to control war and the turbulent, ambitious men who
liked it, but the control was feeble.1 War to such people was a neces-
sary evil which they practiced efficiently, but the Omaha did not
1 Fletcher and La Flesche, op. cit., p. 402.
205
1 Fletcher and La Flesche,
op. cit., p. 402.
205
D 9 iz e b
rr
206
206 Primitive War revere it as an end in itself, as their purely bison-hunting neighbors
Primitive War
The old men strove to spread the paramount doctrine War was secondary, and its real Aggression was considered more trouble Since war is life-wasting and marriage life
revere it as an end in itseU, as their purely bison-hunting neighbors tended to do. of peace and order within the tribe. function was protective. some than beneficial. 2
tended to do. The old men strove to spread the paramount doctrine
of peace and order within the tribe. War was secondary, and its real
function was protective. Aggression was considered more trouble-
some than beneficial.2 Since war is life-wasting and marriage life-
creating, it was inconsistent with "natural law" for a man on or about
to go on the warpath to marry.3
The great variance in attitudes between such American Plains peo-
creating, it was inconsistent with "natural law" for a man on or about to go on the warpath to marry.3 The great variance in attitudes between such American Plains peo ples as the Blackfoot and the Omaha is striking, making any genetic "human nature" theory for or against war seem naive. The only pos sible conclusion is that human nature, if such a thing exists, is any thing but set and unchangeable but something modelled by the pat terns of culture into which the particular human is born. While among the Blackfoot, horse thievery and coup-counting were the only real means of advancement, the Omaha had other means of acquiring prestige. The latter were a peaceful agricultural people surrounded They found that communal They were by predatory and and parasitic hunters .
ples as the Blackfoot and the Omaha is striking, making any genetic
"human nature" theory for or against war seem naive. The only pos-
sible conclusion is that human nature, if such a thing exists, is any-
thing but set and unchangeable but something modelled by the pat-
terns of culture into which the particular human is born. While
among the Blackfoot, horse thievery and coup-counting were the only
real means of advancement, the Omaha had other means of acquiring
prestige. The latter were a peaceful agricultural people surrounded
by predatory and and parasitic hunters. They found that communal
war distinctly interfered with more important activities. They were
pacific by preference, but realistically conceived of war as something
placed in this world by Thunder, which therefore had to be suffered.
Other American Indians found intense war a nuisance. The Iro-
quois League was founded as an experiment in practical pacifism,
an institution to put down war. The Iroquois horror of needless
bloodshed was probably real, for they believed in the brotherhood
of man and the fatherhood of the Manitou, which they sought to im-
war distinctly interfered with more important activities.
press on all peoples. Those who rejected this noble principle were
thought unworthy of life, and fit only for extermination. There were
pacific by preference, but realistically conceived of war as something placed in this world by Thunder, which therefore had to be suffered. Other American Indians found intense war a nuisance. an institution to put down war. The Iro quois League was founded as an experiment in practical pacifism, The Iroquois horror of needless bloodshed was probably real, for they believed in the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of the Manitou, which they sought to im press on all peoples. Those who rejected this noble principle were There were thought unworthy of life, and fit only for extermination.
peaceful people in ordinarily warlike South America. The Goaynazes
of Brazil, nonagricultural hunters and gatherers, fought ably to pro-
tect their own persons and territory. Wanting peace bad enough to
fight for it is not as paradoxical as it sounds.
Africa had some simpler cultures, even perhaps basically humbler
people, than were found in the Americas. To the simplest, such
as the pygmies and Bushmen, out-group killing was not a matter of
glory but a matter of self-protection against stronger men. The
Bushman killed Hottentots to get Hottentot cattle, since this was the
easiest way to get the best food. Some pygmies and Negroes lived
2 Ibid., p. 211.
3 Ibid., p. 325.
peaceful people in ordinarily warlike South America. The Goaynazes of Brazil, nonagricultural hunters and gatherers, fought ably to pro tect their own persons and territory. Wanting peace bad enough to fight for it is not as paradoxical as it sounds. Mrica had some Simpler cultures, even perhaps basically humbler people, than were found
in
the Americas.
To the simplest, such The
as the pygmies and Bushmen, out-group killing was not a matter of glory but a matter of seU-protection against stronger men. easiest way to get the best food. 2 Ibid., p. 2 1 1 . 3 Ibid., p. 325. Bushman killed Hottentots to get Hottentot cattle, since this was the Some pygmies and Negroes lived
D 9 iz e b
Certain M ilitary Attitudes

Certain Military Attitudes 207 in a state of economic symbiosis. The Negroes gave the Pygmies
207
If
a
in a state of economic symbiosis.
The Negroes gave the Pygmies
garden bananas and the pygmies hunted for the Negroes. If a
garden bananas and the pygmies hunted for the Negroes .
Pygmy shot a Negro with a poisoned arrow for breach of contract it
was because there were no courts to which the Pygmy could take
Pygmy shot a Negro with a poisoned arrow for breach of contract it was because there were no courts to which the Pygmy could take his case, nor would he have understood them if they existed. his. The glorification ofman-killin.g has ahyys equired Lhighe I ulture than Only among the high cultures, such as the Dahomean, has the army been the symbol of the national vitality. Cold-blooded slaughter has really never been approved by the bulk of mankind. All have understood the amenities of peace to a greater Civilized and savage men understand that war re
mana,
his case, nor would he have understood them if they existed.4 The
glorification of jnan-killing has always required a higheiLculture than
his. Only among the high cultures, such as the Dahomean, has the
army been the symbol of the national vitality.
Cold-blooded slaughter has really never been approved by the bulk
of mankind. All have understood the amenities of peace to a greater
or less degree. Civilized and savage men understand that war re-
quires regulation and that human death is full of mana, which is a
fearsome thing.
Some African tribes had oracles who tried to settle disputes be-
tween villages in preference to fighting it out. There was killing
enough, but peace was valued for its own sake. Indians of Southeast
or less degree. fearsome thing.
United States likewise had peace towns wherein no human life could
quires regulation and that human death is full of
which is
be taken, not even an enemy's. The Nigerians had super-naturals who
were the personification of pity and peace, and Ihi the peace spirit
would take vengeance on anyone violating a formally proclaimed
Some African tribes had oracles who tried to settle disputes between villages in preference to fighting it out. enough, but peace was valued for its own sake. There was killing Indians of Southeast
peace between two towns. Furthermore, they had rules_ limiting
cruelty in warfare which had thejforce of international law.5
The BaThonga were not particularly warlike until the Zulu diffused
their bellicose attitudes to them. The regimental organization of
United States likewise had peace towns wherein no human life could be taken, not even an enemy's. The Nigerians had supernaturals who were the personification of pity and peace, and Ihi the peace spirit would take vengeance on anyone violating a formally proclaimed peace between two towns. Furthermore, they had r}_es _ limip'g !:ll elty in warfare which had the force of internati ?a law. II
the later Thonga looks like a new addition to an old device, the add-
ing of a new function to the old puberty rite. Junod thinks that the
Thonga considered peace the normal situation. The adoption of
war a dangerous and abnormal status was considered a rite de
passage. This was especially true for the warriors, but the status of
war placed the whole clan also into a condition of marginality. For
example, the queen would enter the regimental circle quite naked
during the rites, an otherwise unthinkable act. Other sexual tabus
were relaxed, while ordinary sexual behavior came under stricture.
The BaThonga were not particularly warlike until the Zulu diffused their bellicose attitudes to them. The regimental organization of Junod thinks that the The adoption of the later Thonga looks like a new addition to an old device, the add
The wild shouts at leave-taking, the swallowing of meat without
touching it, the taking of emetics, the jumping over ntjhopfa branches,
the medicine of oblivion, the triumphant return, the eating of cap-
tured oxen, were rites of separation from normal peace and re-entry
* Paul Schebesta, Among Congo Pygmies (London: Hutchinson, 1933), passim.
ing of a new function to the old puberty rite.
6 Meek, op. cit., p. 481.
Thonga considered peace the normal situation.
war - a dangerous and abnormal status - was considered a
rite de
For
passage.
This was especially true for the warriors, but the status of
a
war placed the whole clan also into
condition of marginality.
example, the queen would enter the regimental circle quite naked during the rites, an otherwise unthinkable act. Other sexual tabus were relaxed, while ordinary sexual behavior came under stricture. The wild shouts at leave-taking, the swallowing of meat without touching it, the taking of emetics, the jumping over ntfhopfa branches, the medicine of oblivion, the triumphant return, the eating of cap tured oxen, were rites of separation from normal peace and re-entry
II
4 Paul Schebesta, Among Congo Pygmies ( London : Hutchinson, 1933 ) , passim. Meek, op. cit., p. 481.
D 9 iz e b
208
208 Primitive War into it, true rites of passage from the usual to the dangerously re-
Primitive War
markable and back.6
Turning to Oceania, Miss Blackwood says that war so preoccupied
the lives of the people on Bougainville that it monopolized their
dreams. It is interesting to note that the colonial pacification of the
coast has altered the dream content of the population, while the na-
tives of the unpacified interior retain their dreams of killing.7 Dreams
are always a mirror of culture, so that if the native culture has been
so altered by white administration that the dream content has
changed, then acculturation has gone far. Aside from the advisability
of stopping the interminable native wars, the white man has some-
times been unjust in accusing the male native everywhere of useless-
ness, laziness, and decadence. The men often considered war their
raison <fetre, and when this was abruptly terminated, no adequate
reason for existence was substituted.
No brief for the old wars need be entertained. One simply ob-
serves that profound acculturation was to be expected by their pro-
hibition. Neither do all natives feel that the old killing days should
be brought back. There are many old Indians who appreciate the
piping days of peace under the Washington-Ottawa administration.
Miss Powdermaker says that some Melanesians think they have bene-
fited, too, appreciating their present ability to move about among
other people in safety.3 Such appreciative natives do realize, how-
ever, that they have lost something by the disruption of the old mili-
tary attitudes.
A prime consideration of the natives' attitude toward war is re-
flected in the constant repetition of observers that war as such did
not exist in Melanesia. Attention has been called to this before.
Almost every competent book states that battles were few, casualties
negligible, but boastings many. From the standpoint of a truly com-
petent and tactical tribe, the Melanesians were indeed military hum-
bugs. The psychologist and sociologist see the importance of the
war gloat, however, which the statisticians might miss.
The truth of this hinges on what one calls war. Such warless
people have by no means been friendly and pacific. They have not
been ignorant of how to shed human blood, nor have they abhorred
7 Il1..,,T-,..,,,,,l ,-. ,..'* M
uno, op. n., p. .
7 Blackwood, op. cit., p. 566.
8 Powdermaker, op. cit., p. 215, footnote.
into it, hue rites of passage from the usual to the dangerously re markable and back. 6 Turning to Oceania, Miss Blackwood says that war so preoccupied the lives of the people on Bougainville that it monopolized their dreams. It is interesting to note that the colonial pacification of the coast has altered the dream content of the population, while the na tives of the unpacified interior retain their dreams of killin g. 7 Dreams are always a mirror of culture, so that if the native culture has been so altered by white administration that the dream content has changed, then acculturation has gone far. Aside from the advisability of stopping the interminable native wars, the white man has some times been unjust in accusing the male native everywhere of useless ness, laziness, and decadence. The men often considered war their raison aetre, and when this was abruptly terminated, no adequate reason for existence was substituted. No brief for the old wars need be entertained. One simply ob serves that profound acculturation was to be expected by their pro hibition. Neither do all natives feel that the old killing days should be brought back. There are many old Indians who appreciate the piping days of peace under the Washington-Ottawa administration. Miss Powdermaker says that some Melanesians think they have bene fited, too, appreciating their present ability to move about among other people in safety. 8 Such appreciative natives do realize, how ever, that they have lost something by the disruption of the old mili tary attitudes. A prime consideration of the natives' attitude toward war is re flected in the constant repetition of observers that war as such did not exist in Melanesia. Attention has been called to this before. Almost every competent book states that battles were few, casualties negligible, but boastings many. From the standpoint of a truly com petent and tactical tribe, the Melanesians were indeed military hum bugs. The psychologist and sociologist see the importance of the war gloat, however, which the statisticians might miss. The huth of this hinges on what one calls war. Such warless people have by no means been friendly and pacific. They have not been ignorant of how to shed human blood, nor have they abhorred
6 Junod, op. cit., p. 481. 7 Blackwood, op . cit., p. 566. 8 Powdermaker, op. cit., p. 215, footnote.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 209 it. Neither have they been without social institutions which formal-
209
it.
Neither have they been without social institutions which formal The lack of organized war may demonstrate cer
ized man-killing. The lack of organized war may demonstrate cer-
ized man-killing.
tain points, but it should not be overstressed, as it sometimes is.
Field ethnology no more demonstrates that a warless people are
tain points, but it should not be overstressed, as it sometimes is. Field ethnology no more demonstrates that a warless people are
per se a kindly one than it shows that a monogamous tribe is sexually
chaste. Armstrong, for example, relates that war was very unusual
on Rossel Island, but that the natives were murderously inhospitable
p er se a kindly one than it shows that a monogamous tribe is sexually

chaste. Armstrong, for example, relates that war was very unusual on Rossel Island, but that the natives were murderously inhospitable to visitors and strangers who chanced upon their coast.9 It is impossible to speak of Polynesia as one culture province re garding the importance of war attitudes. most important part of their being. We know that the men of New Zealand, Hawaii, Managaia, and elsewhere considered war the In contrast, Miss Mead says One can judge from that it was of slight importance on M anua. very important
to visitors and strangers who chanced upon their coast.9
It is impossible to speak of Polynesia as one culture province re-
garding the importance of war attitudes. We know that the men of
New Zealand, Hawaii, Managaia, and elsewhere considered war the
most important part of their being. In contrast, Miss Mead says
that it was of slight importance on Manua. One can judge from
both ethnological and missionary sources that it was not considered
very important in other parts of Samoa. Mead believes that the
relative unimportance of war and war gods in Manua was due to
"local differentiation upon a common base under conditions of iso-
lation and differentiation in the size of the population."10 Manua,
then, never felt the influences which made war so important in
Western Samoa.
both ethnological and missionary sources that it was not considered
In Mangaia of the Cook Group there existed the same pragmatic
test of political superiority through war that has been cited for San
in
other parts of Samoa.
M ead believes that the
Cristoval in the Solomons. The Mangaians glorified war, therefore
relative unimportance of war and war gods lation and differentiation Western Samoa .
in
Manua was due to Manua,
the lordship went to the strong. Could it be that because the lord-
ship was wrested by the strong the Mangaians glorified that which
"local differentiation upon a common base under conditions of iso
their masters cherished? Formerly in fact and today by tradition,
in
the size of the population. "1 0
he who is strong enough to take and hold the important English
castle of Arundel is by that fact Earl of Arundel; this is a clear par-
then, never felt the influences which made war so important in In Mangaia of the Cook Croup there existed the same Cristoval in the Solomons.
allel to Mangaian line of thought.
Eurasian attitudes were almost universally bellicose and peace was
esteemed only by a few. In very old times, according to the arche-
pragmatic
ologist Childe, some folk were indicated as peaceful by the lack of
test of political superiority through war that has been cited for San The Mangaians glorified war, therefore Could it be that because the lord the lordship went to the strong.
weapons in their sites. Childe also says in many places that it is
obvious that the pacific went down before the warlike, were extermi-
nated, or became socially and economically subordinated to the war
9 Wallace Armstrong, Rossel Island (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1928), p. 108.
ship
was wrested by the strong the Mangaians glorified that which Formerly is strong enough to take
10 Mead, op. cU., p. 9.
their masters cherished?
he who
castle of Arundel is by that fact
in fact and today by tradition, and hold the important English Earl of Arundel ; this is a clear par
allel to Mangaian line of thought. Eurasian attitudes were almost universally bellicose and peace was esteemed only by a few. In very old times, according to the arche ologist Childe, some folk were indicated as peaceful by the lack of
weapons in their sites. Childe also says in many places that it is obvious that the pacific went down before the warlike, were extermi nated, or became socially and economically subordinated to the war 1928 ) , p. 108.
9 Wallace Annstrong. Rossel Island ( Cambridge : Cambridge University

10 Mead,
op. cit., p. 9.
Press,
D 9 iz e b
210
210 Primitive War
Primitive War
chiefs.11 While they were considered barbarians, the Celts were
thought the most superior of that category by the Greek and Roman
writers because of their warlike spirit.
x Life is the dearest of all treasures in our civilization. It is the
supreme value, as witness the horror with which western civilization
regards suicide. The attitude that life as life holds the highest pos-
sible evaluation has great local variation, however.
Perhaps the greatest proof that civilized cultures are "better" than
primitive ones is seen in this fact: Civilized man, no matter how
chiefs. I I While they were considered barbarians, the Celts were thought the most superior of that category by the Greek and Roman writers because of their warlike spirit. ,/ Life is the dearest of all treasures in our civilization. It is the I. supreme value, as witness the horror with which western civilization regards suicide. The attitude that life as life holds the highest possible evaluation has great local variation, however. Perhaps the greatest proof that civilized cultures are "better" than ..1Yo matter h.<> primitive ones is seen in this fact: JyJIed I!! -ly placedl_poba has more to live for than savage man : Life rewards civilized man more richly. If this is true, the rise of western civilization has been in part the rise in the valuation of the individual , life. Yet we know that the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean basin valued life rather cheaply, providing the life was not that of the individual concerned. One valued his own life and that of his imme diate associates, but was rather extravagant in the expenditure of the lives of others. Even civilization has not always produced elsewhere in the world the high regard for one's own life that is found in the occident. Field reports show us that under strong religious motiva tion it has not been as difficult to persuade victims to undergo human sacrifice as one might think. This is the very point. There can be little doubt but that there is some instinctive basis to the will to live, yet whatever this may be, it is capable of great modification by the conditioning culture. While there may be an instinctive basis to living, love of life scarcely seems to be as high among people who have not felt the civilization-plus Christianity glorification. Nor is this entirely a matter of military bravery. It is impossible to generalize on the proposition that the non literate man is or is not braver than the civilized man. Too many exceptions can be found on both sides. The conclusion is simply that ".aJta?()n o human life, including )ll e s own. cau _ be powerfully . affected by culhrre - that cultural valuation is of tremendously greater hiipoitcUice than instinctive foundation. The Jicarilla Apache of southwestern United States were a fierce, untamed people with a very humble culture. The myth of their first war tells how a chief led the party of five hundred men against the enemy. These men were surrounded, even deliberately allowed
__ _ _
humbly placed, probably has more to liye fprjthan savage man. Life
rewards civilized man more richly. If this is true, the rise of western
civilization has been in part the rise in the valuation of the individual
life. Yet we know that the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean
basin valued life rather cheaply, providing the Me was not that of the
individual concerned. One valued his own life and that of his imme-
diate associates, but was rather extravagant in the expenditure of the
lives of others. Even civilization has not always produced elsewhere
in the world the high regard for one's own life that is found in the
Occident. Field reports show us that under strong religious motiva-
tion it has not been as difficult to persuade victims to undergo human
sacrifice as one might think.
This is the very point. There can be little doubt but that there is
some instinctive basis to the will to live, yet whatever this may be,
it is capable of great modification by the conditioning culture. While
there may be an instinctive basis to living, love of life scarcely seems
to be as high among people who have not felt the civilization-plus-
Christianity glorification. Nor is this entirely a matter of military
bravery. It is impossible to generalize on the proposition that the non-
literate man is or is not braver than the civilized man. Too many
exceptions can be found on both sides. The conclusion is simply that
the valuation of human Me, including one's own, can..be powerfully
affected twculture that cultural valuation is of tremendously greater
importance than instinctive foundation.
The Jicarilla Apache of southwestern United States were a fierce,
untamed people with a very humble culture. The myth of their
first war tells how a chief led the party of five hundred men against
the enemy. These men were surrounded, even deliberately allowed
" Vere Gordon Childe, The Dawn of European Civilization, 2nd ed., (Lon-
don: Kegan Paul, 1939), passim.
1 1 Vere Gordon Childe, The Dawn of European Cit-'ilizatton, 2nd ed, ( Lon don: Kegan Paul, 1939 ) , passim.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 211 themselves to be, and stood there to be chopped to pieces to the last
21 1
themselves to be, and stood there to be chopped to pieces to the last man. There is no hint in the text that these were unusually brave men, that they were particularly meritorious, or, on the other hand, particu larly blame-worthy. The myth simply reHects the fact that the Jica rilla, like many other people, had not been conditioned to look on life as we do. 1 2 Perhaps escape was out of the question for these Apache. Man, like any other respectable animal, is capable of great feats of valor when trapped beyond hope. DeVries, an eye witness of the Indian wars on Staten Island, spoke very disparagingly of Leni Lenape bravery, but ascribed great feats of heroism to them when death was inevitable, including magnificent fortitude under torture . 1 8 But this valiant acceptance of the inevi table is not the point in question.
a
man. There is no hint in the text that these were unusually brave men,
that they were particularly meritorious, or, on the other hand, particu-
larly blame-worthy. The myth simply reflects the fact that the Jica-
rilla, like many other people, had not been conditioned to look on
life as we do.12 Perhaps escape was out of the question for these
Apache. Man, like any other respectable animal, is capable of great
feats of valor when trapped beyond hope.
DeVries, an eye witness of the Indian wars on Staten Island, spoke
very disparagingly of Leni Lenape bravery, but ascribed great feats
of heroism to them when death was inevitable, including magnificent
fortitude under torture.13 But this valiant acceptance of the inevi-
table is not the point in question. We mean that under the drive of
a culturally conditioned spirit of self-sacrifice or patriotism, religious
expectation of reward in an afterlife and other such attitudes, men
can be made to be contemptuous of death. Even among people with
hazy ideas of life after death and with no concept of patriotism as
we know it, warriors have been led to take an oath of no-retreat, tanta-
mount to a suicide vow, merely for the honor involved.
We mean that under the drive of
Nowhere in the world has this been more apparent than on the
culturally conditioned spirit of self-sacrifice or patriotism, religious Even among people with
American Great Plains. The Plainsman was undoubtedly a very poor
expectation of reward in an afterlife and other such attitudes, men can be made to be contemptuous of death. hazy ideas of life after death and with no concept of patriotism as we know it, warriors have been led to take an oath of no-retreat, tanta mount to a suicide vow, merely for the honor involved. Nowhere in the world has this been more apparent than on the American Great Plains. The Plainsman was undoubtedly a very poor soldier. He loved a sure thing and often ran from a real battle. He was often a poltroon, a man whose valor could only be trusted when put against inevitable death. But an outstanding characteristic of Plains sociology was the prevalence of military lodges whose member ship as a whole, or certain officers thereof, could be induced to take a vow to retreat under no circumstances. Among the Arapaho the leader and his four associates in the Dog Dance made such a pledge. They went into battle with scarfs trail ing on the ground which at the beginning of the action they staked
soldier. He loved a sure thing and often ran from a real battle. He
was often a poltroon, a man whose valor could only be trusted when
put against inevitable death. But an outstanding characteristic of
Plains sociology was the prevalence of military lodges whose member-
ship as a whole, or certain officers thereof, could be induced to take
a vow to retreat under no circumstances.
Among the Arapaho the leader and his four associates in the Dog
Dance made such a pledge. They went into battle with scarfs trail-
ing on the ground which at the beginning of the action they staked
to the ground so that they could not flee.14 The Arapaho Warrior
Society had eight degrees. The third degree consisted of the Club
Men, individuals in the prime of life, who in a bad fight planted sticks
in the ground which they would not desert unless the head chief
gave the signal for a general retreat. Some of the higher orders had
12 Goddard, op. cit., p. 196.
is DeVries, in Wissler, The Indians of Greater New fork and the Lower
Hudson, pp. 281f.
1* Lowie, The Assiniboine, p. 91.
to the ground so that they could not Hee.u The Arapaho Warrior Society had eight degrees. The third degree consisted of the Club Men, individuals in the prime of life, who in a bad fight planted sticks in the ground which they would not desert unless the head chief gave the signal for a general retreat. Some of the higher orders had 1 2 Goddard, op. cit., p. 196. 1 8 DeVries, in Wissler, The Indians of Greater New York and the Lower Hudson, pp. 281. 1 4 Lowie, The Assinibotne, p. 91.
D 9 iz e b
212
212 Primitive War even more stringent no-retreat obligations.15 Such a vow was taken
Primitive War
Such a vow was taken
even more stringent no-retreat obligations.1 5
by the Dog Society among the Gros Ventres, by the Mandan old men
by the Dog Society among the Gros Ventres, by the Mandan old men who had been admitted into the lowest ( Foolish Dog ) society, by the two leaders in the Mandan Buffalo Society, and others. The Blackfoot Brave Dogs could retreat from no danger. 1 6 The ten Kiowa Dog Warriors could not Hee, and their leader staked himself repel every hostile charge or die on the SpOt. 1 8 guished themselves in war. to the ground. l 1 The Inverted Warriors of the Cheyenne had to Some Dakota tribes
who had been admitted into the lowest (Foolish Dog) society, by
the two leaders in the Mandan Buffalo Society, and others. The
Blackfoot Brave Dogs could retreat from no danger.16 The ten
Kiowa Dog Warriors could not flee, and their leader staked himself
to the ground.17 The Inverted Warriors of the Cheyenne had to
repel every hostile charge or die on the spot.1s Some Dakota tribes
had no-flight societies consisting of young men who had not yet distin-
guished themselves in war. The Oglala Dakota Brave Hearts had
lance-bearers who could not flee. Even worse was the plight of their
no-flight men who went into battle with such a vow but armed
had no-Hight societies consisting of young men who had not yet distin The Oglala Dakota Brave Hearts had Even worse was the plight of their With these lance-bearers who could not Hee.
only with rattles or deer dew-claws tipped with iron. With these
inadequate weapons they rushed the enemy and tried to stab them
before they could draw the bow.
The Oglala had a society called the Kit-Fox. This was reorganized
no-Hight men who went into battle with such a vow but armed only with rattles or deer dew-claws tipped with iron. before they could draw the bow. The Oglala had a society called the Kit-Fox. every spring and new officers elected. and the two pipe-bearers. This was reorganized Among the important posts inadequate weapons they rushed the enemy and tried to stab them
every spring and new officers elected. Among the important posts
were the four lance-bearers who ranked just after the two leaders
and the two pipe-bearers. To be elected a lance-bearer was tanta-
mount to being elected to die, as these officials had to undergo every
danger and be in the worst of the fight. Such men were elected to
the society without their knowledge, and might even be chosen from
outside the association's membership. The individual learned of his
election from the society's Whip-Bearers who brought him to the
society's lodge. Usually the man hesitated, although sometimes he
were the four lance-bearers who ranked just after the two leaders To be elected a lance-bearer was tanta Such men were elected to mount to being elected to die, as these officials had to undergo every danger and be in the worst of the fight. outside the association's membership. the society without their knowledge, and might even be chosen from The individual learned of his election from the society's Whip-Bearers who brought him to the society's lodge. Usually the man hesitated, although sometimes he was glad. Acceptance was almost certain, for no Plains Indian could hesitate for long while surrounded by the valiant circle of the asso ciation members with the herald of the society shouting his praises . 1 9 The works of Lowie and Linderman on the Crow show that such no-Hight men did not have to be organized into mutually stimulating 15 James Mooney, "The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890," Annual Rep ort 1 4, Bureau of American Ethnology, Part 2, ( Washington: 1892- 1893 ) , pp. 987. 1 6 Clark Wissler, "The Blackfoot," Annual Archaeological Report far 1 905 ( Toronto : 1906 ) , p. 174. 1 7 Mooney, op. cit., p. 284 . 1 8 James O. Dorsey, "A Study of Siouan Cults," Annual Report 1 1 , Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1889-1890 ) , pp. 21, 25. 1 9 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Divirion of the Teton-Dakota, p. 15.
was glad. Acceptance was almost certain, for no Plains Indian could
hesitate for long while surrounded by the valiant circle of the asso-
ciation members with the herald of the society shouting his praises.19
The works of Lowie and Linderman on the Crow show that such
no-flight men did not have to be organized into mutually stimulating
15 James Mooney, "The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of
1890," Annual Report 14, Bureau of American Ethnology, Part 2, (Washington:
1892-1893), pp. 987f.
16 Clark Wissler, "The Blackfoot," Annual Archaeological Report for 1905
(Toronto: 1906), p. 174.
17 Mooney, op. cit., p. 284.
Js James O. Dorsey, "A Study of Siouan Cults," Annual Report 11, Bureau of
American Ethnology (Washington: 1889-1890), pp. 21, 25.
19 Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Associations of the Oglala Division of the
Teton-Dakota, p. 15.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 213 associations. For any number of reasons, or for just plain welt-
213
schmerz, a young Crow might "vow his body to the enemy." His
parents might grieve for him as one dead, but nothing would deflect
him from his purpose of dying in an attack against hopeless odds at
the first opportunity. One could not honorably and therefore toler-
ably escape the obligations once assumed. Neither could one there-
after flee from the enemy if the Crow dance-police should sit him
on the lodgepoles during the Sun Dance ritual.
Some South Americans, like the Guarayos of the Southwest Ama-
zonia, likewise have preferred death to surrender.20 It is said that
the Abiponian Mocobi-Toba of Patagonia have never been known
associations. For any number of reasons, or for just plain welt schmerz, a young Crow might "vow his body to the enemy." His parents might grieve for him as one dead, but nothing would deflect him from his purpose of dying in an attack against hopeless odds at the first opportunity. One could not honorably and therefore toler ably escape the obligations once assumed. Neither could one there after flee from the enemy if the Crow dance-police should sit him on the lodgepoles during the Sun Dance ritual. Some South Americans, like the Guarayos of the Southwest Ama zonia, likewise have preferred death to surrender. 20 It is said that the Abiponian Mocobi-Toba of Patagonia have never been known to beg for life or mercy under torture.2 1 The \Vinnebago attitude toward the life of a member of the we group had a strong economic tinge which is far from uncommon. The whole revenge complex which so saturates the field literature is an aggregate of attitudes toward the lives of fellow tribesmen as values. Often the valuation was bluntly economic, as among the acquisitive North Pacific Coast peoples. Revenge for a death which had not been paid for was a principal Tlingit reason for fightin g. 22 This economic aspect of revenge often had magical connotations. The Jibaro boy was harangued by his father every morning that his gar dens would be fruitful, his animals and fowls would prosper, and plenty of food would be his if he strove to avenge every wrong done by the enemy, even those committed long before. 28 Almost every tribe has evaluated the lives of the members of the we-group so highly that effort has been made to keep peace within. The Jibaro, just mentioned, made very little attempt to keep peace within their own tribe because to them the effective we-group was the family, not the political tribe. Most people have gone far beyond that. Certainly the lives of fellow-tribesmen have been values of such importance that an unavenged death among the simpler peoples has always been a fact of overwhelming gravity. This has been true regardless of the variance in the idealization of revenge. 20 Church, op. cit. , p. 1 1 3. 2 1 Ibid., p . 246. 22 Swanton, "Social Conditions, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationships of the
to beg for life or mercy under torture.21
The Winnebago attitude toward the life of a member of the we-
group had a strong economic tinge which is far from uncommon.
The whole revenge complex which so saturates the field literature
is an aggregate of attitudes toward the lives of fellow tribesmen as
values. Often the valuation was bluntly economic, as among the
acquisitive North Pacific Coast peoples. Revenge for a death which
had not been paid for was a principal Tlingit reason for fighting.22
This economic aspect of revenge often had magical connotations. The
Jibaro boy was harangued by his father every morning that his gar-
dens would be fruitful, his animals and fowls would prosper, and
plenty of food would be his if he strove to avenge every wrong done
by the enemy, even those committed long before.23
Almost every tribe has evaluated the lives of the members of the
we-group so highly that effort has been made to keep peace within.
The Jibaro, just mentioned, made very little attempt to keep peace
within their own tribe because to them the effective we-group was the
family, not the political tribe. Most people have gone far beyond
that. Certainly the lives of fellow-tribesmen have been values of
such importance that an unavenged death among the simpler peoples
has always been a fact of overwhelming gravity. This has been true
regardless of the variance in the idealization of revenge.
20 Church, op. tit., p. 113.
" Ibid., p. 246.
Tlingit Indians," p. 449.
23 Karsten, op. tit., p. 2.
Tlingit Indians," p. 449. 28 Karsten, op. cit., p. 2.
DI
Iz.e b
214
214 Primitive War No-retreat societies would have been incomprehensible to the Mela-
Primitive War
They valued their lives highly and lost them as seldom as This fact alone would have made them poor soldiers.
A
No-retreat societies would have been incomprehensible to the Mela nesians. possible.
nesians. They valued their lives highly and lost them as seldom as
possible. This fact alone would have made them poor soldiers. A
few Polynesians felt the same way, although the presence of war
gods, of special paradises for slain warriors, suppressed this feeling.
few Polynesians felt the same way, although the presence of war gods, of special paradises for slain warriors, suppressed this feeling. Death-contempt in Polynesia has been linked with strong feelings of tribalism or nationality. It was not so linked on the American Great Plains, where tribalism was weak or absent, but it was also common
Death-contempt in Polynesia has been linked with strong feelings of
tribalism or nationality. It was not so linked on the American Great
Plains, where tribalism was weak or absent, but it was also common
in the African kingdoms where strong tribalism existed. Therefore no
generalization can be made from death contempt alone.
Buck reports that warriors were capable of vowing their deaths on
Mangaia. Here such attitudes were linked with a well-developed war
god theology. The high-born noble Tiora did not shrink when in-
in the Mrican kingdoms where strong tribalism existed.
Therefore no
formed by the war priests that their god demanded his sacrificial
generalization can be made from death contempt alone. Buck reports that warriors were capable of vowing their deaths on Mangaia. Here such attitudes were linked with a well-developed war The high-born noble Tiora did not shrink when in He went against the foe alone and Melanesia could produce no god theology.
death at the enemy's hands. He went against the foe alone and
they obligingly killed him, unaware that his immolation was intended
to accomplish their own defeat.24 Melanesia could produce no
Tiroa, Horatius at the Bridge, or Arnold von Winkelried.
The fact that formalized death-contempt existed in several areas
of Eurasia is not surprising. The recklessness of the northern berserk
formed by the war priests that their god demanded his sacrificial death at the enemy's hands. they obligingly killed him, unaware that his immolation was intended to accomplish their own defeat. 24 Tiroa, Horatius at the Bridge, or Arnold von Winkelried. The fact that formalized death-contempt existed in several areas of Eurasia is not surprising. The recklessness of the northern berserk
a
man has already been noted, while there is at least a legend that
among the early Slavs a deadly game was sometimes played merely
to while away the long nights. Among a group of warriors sitting
around the drinking table, one would make a bet that he could cut
himself free from the hangman's noose with his saber. His com-
panions would cover the bet, tie a rope to a beam, and noose it to
the man's neck while he stood on the table. His bare saber was
then given to him and the table removed. He was then suspended
to all intents as if he were being executed, save that his hands were
not tied. He would then try to hack himself free from the strangling
cord. If he succeeded, he won the wager. If he did not, he lost
man has already been noted, while there is at least to while away the long nights. Among
a
legend that
his propertyand his life.
among the early Slavs a deadly game was sometimes played merely group of warriors sitting His com around the drinking table, one would make a bet that he could cut himself free from the hangman's noose with his saber. the man's neck while he stood on the table. then given to him and the table removed. panions would cover the bet, tie a rope to a beam, and noose it to His bare saber was He was then suspended
Caesar reported a condition among the Aquitanians which resem-
bled the no-retreat idea and institution of war-friendship noticed
elsewhere. They had a society of elite fighters sailed solidurii, or
"bound-by-duty." These men were war-friends, enjoying all benefits
with their comrades but sharing their misfortunes, even to death. If
to all intents as if he were being executed, save that his hands were not tied. He would then try to hack himself free from the strangling cord. If he succeeded, he won the wager. If he did not, he lost his property-and his life. Caesar reported a condition among the Aquitanians which resem bled the no-retreat idea and institution of war-friendship noticed elsewhere. They had a society of elite fighters saIled
solidurii,
or
"bound-by-duty."
These men were war-friends, enjoying all benefits
with their comrades but sharing their misfortunes, even to death.
If
2 4 Buck, op. cit., p. 49.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 215 one of their fellows met calamity, they all shared it on the spot. If
2 15
If
one of their fellows met calamity, they all shared it on the spot. they could not do this, they committed suicide25
they could not do this, they committed suicide25
None of the foregoing statements must be interpreted as pretend-
ing that certain areas were above fear. But fear can be inhibited,
None of the foregoing statements must be interpreted as pretend ing that certain areas were above fear. But fear can be inhibited, Other values
1 Ill !
and no military society has lacked devices for doing so. Other values
have been set higher than that of Me, or the life value itself may
not have reached a development as strong as our own.
and no military society has lacked devices for doing so. not have reached
a
Nowhere has the element of fear become more apparent than in
have been set higher than that of life, or the life value itself may development as strong as our own. Nowhere has the element of fear become more apparent than
nonliterate man's military preparational ceremonies. The multitude of
dances and other pre-combat rites were devices to insure the proper
glandular activity enabling warriors to walk into probable death.
Of such value were the multitude of charms, amulets, war bundles,
and so forth, which supposedly guaranteed victory for "our" side,
nonliterate man's military preparational ceremonies. The multitude of . dances and other pre-combat rites were devices to insure the proper ,' glandular activity enabling warriors to walk into probable death . , O f such value were the multitude of charms, amulets, war bundles, and so forth, which supposedly guaranteed victory for "our" side, took a supernatural advantage of the enemy, and influenced the out t. come of the fight by means other thn skil!,. pr9wess, equipment, _ or, 'aay been- po lli ted out, Il}agi _b_. !actisal. ' As has alre
__
took a supernatural advantage of the enemy, and influenced the out-
come of the fight by means other than skill, prowess, ejguirjment, or
merit. As has already been pointed out, magic may be tactical.
Even such well-organized societies as the Cherokee sought invuF""
nerability by elaborate formulae before setting out on an expedition.26
A man, feeling himself invulnerable and sure of success, could afford
to be brave, daring, and valiant, so such mass mutual incitement
might actually have had value in the field.27 The Osage, for example,
were a peaceful people but, like others, were forced by circumstances
to fight both offensively and defensively. At such times the warriors
did not pretend to rely solely on their own strength, but "cried with-
. Even such well-organized societies as the Cherokee sought invur
out ceasing for divine aid" against the foe.2s It was the first duty of
a war party to select a man to call upon wakando. It was he who
nerability by elaborate formulae before setting out on an expedition .ol6 A man, feeling himself invulnerable and sure of success, could afford to be brave, daring, and valiant, so such mass mutual incitement were might actually have had value in the field .21 The Osage, for example, a peaceful people but, like others, were forced by circumstances At such times the warriors did not pretend to rely solely on their own strength, but "cried with out ceasing for divine aid" against the foe . 2 8 It was the first duty of war party to select a man to call upon won,
won, if victory was achieved, and all honors went to him.
The Winnebago, too, like the peaceful Osage and the ancient
Israelites, sought to inhibit fear by reliance on the supernatural. War
was their honor-path, the avenue to social prestige, and the means
of satisfying strong emotional needs. Given this great importance,
prayers for success in war were the most important ones. Indeed,
war prayers were also included in most of the ceremonies of peace.-9
to fight both offensively and defensively.
25 Caesar, op. cit., iii. 22.
26 James Mooney, "The Sacred Formulae of the Cherokees," Annual Report 7,
Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1885-1886), pp. 388f.
2 La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of the Chiefs, p. 49.
29 Paul Radin, The Winnebago Tribe, Annual Report 37, Bureau of American
if victory was achieved, and all honors went to him.
wakanda.
It was he who
The Winnebago, too, like the peaceful Osage and the ancient Israelites, sought to inhibit fear by reliance on the supernatural. War was their honor-path, the avenue to social prestige, and the means of satisfying strong emotional needs. Given this great importance, Indeed, prayers for success in war were the most important ones .
war prayers were also included in most of the ceremonies of peace.:l9 25 Caesar, up. cit., iii. 22. 28 James Mooney, "The Sacred Formulae of the Cherokees," AnnfUll Report 7, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1885- 1886 ) , pp. 388f. 2 7 Kroeber, op. cit., p. 844. 28 La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of the Chiefs, p. 49. 29 Paul Radin, The Winnebago Tribe, Annual Report 37, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington : 1915-1916 ) , p. 156.
D 9 iz e b
216
216 Primitive War Radin points out the valuation of human Me to the Winnebago in a
Primitive War
Radin points out the valuation of human life to the Winnebago very realistic manner.
in
very realistic manner. It is not surprising that war should have been
It is not surprising that war should have been
surrounded by ceremonial and tabu, for life was at stake, and to an
economically precarious community, the life of every laborer was
surrounded by ceremonial and tabu, for life was at stake, and to an economically precarious community, the life of every laborer was precious. The chief of the Thunderbirds, therefore, exercised a re He sought to prevent anyone If the foolhardy endan straining inHuence in the public interest, demanding an accounting from everyone who left on a war party. gered others, they had to face the other wrongdoers. from endan gering himself unnecessarily.
precious. The chief of the Thunderbirds, therefore, exercised a re-
straining influence in the public interest, demanding an accounting
from everyone who left on a war party. He sought to prevent anyone
from endangering himself unnecessarily. If the foolhardy endan-
gered others, they had to face the kin of their comrades like any
other wrongdoers. Neither was anyone permitted to head a large
party unless he could acquire a special blessing from the supernatu-
rals regarding every detail of the campaign.
Men may vary from place to place in their estimation of their own
kin of their comrades like any
lives, but life is about all that the individual knows he owns. Hence,
Neither was anyone permitted to head a large
many fear-inhibiting ceremonies "> have been observed even in fierce
Africa. The primitive warrior's wish for a sure thing was apparent
party unless he could acquire a special blessing from the supematu rals regarding every detail of the campaign. Men may vary from place to place in their estimation of their own
in the sacrifices offered in Nigeria before the warrior's departure.
The priest rubbed each man with magic leaves to render him in-
visible. Then an animal was slain, and as it died, the priest called
the roll of the famous enemy warriors, hoping thereby to call their
souls to him, leaving their owners spiritless and hence helpless in the
coming battle.30 The Nigerian warriors then drank fresh goat's
blood to gain new vigor and valor. To guard against his own friends,
i many
lives, but life is about all that the individual knows he owns.
Hence,
fear-inhibiting ceremonies have been observed even in fierce The primitive warriors wish for a sure thing was apparent
each recruit put a few drops of his blood into a bowl of palm wine
Mrica.
in the sacrifices offered in Nigeria before the warrior's departure. The priest rubbed each man with magic leaves to render him in visible. Then an animal was slain, and as it died, the priest called the roll of the famous enemy warriors, hoping thereby to call their souls to him, leaving their owners spiritless and hence helpless in the coming battle.s o The Nigerian warriors then drank fresh goat's blood to gain new vigor and valor. To guard against his own friends, each recruit put a few drops of his blood into a bowl of palm wine from which all drank with mighty oaths to the god to abstain from treachery. 3 1 Such works have not been confined to simple Nigeria. When the Zulu king proclaimed a war, the first thing the soldier did was to go to his own cattle kraal where his ancestral spirits dwelled to fortify himself with magic. anything like order." Kidd reports that " S o many are the various The warriors drank emetics and purgatives. They per modes of doctoring the army that one despairs of reducing them to The shamans worked magic over bits of enemy property. and their weapons unseen. tues.
from which all drank with mighty oaths to the god to abstain from
treachery.31
Such works have not been confined to simple Nigeria. When the
Zulu king proclaimed a war, the first thing the soldier did was to go
to his own cattle kraal where his ancestral spirits dwelled to fortify
himself with magic. Kidd reports that "So many are the various
modes of doctoring the army that one despairs of reducing them to
anything like order." The warriors drank emetics and purgatives.
The shamans worked magic over bits of enemy property. They per-
formed rites whereby the warriors become invisible and invulnerable
and their weapons unseen. Warriors ate lion heart, tiger blood, and
such things to gain sagacity, ferocity, agility, and other military vir-
tues. An ox was then thrown with bare hands and its shoulder cut
30 Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, p. 233.
31 Ibid., p. 244.
formed rites whereby the warriors become invisible and invulnerable Warriors ate lion heart, tiger blood, and such things to gain sagacity, ferocity, agility, and other military vir An ox was then thrown with bare hands and its shoulder cut s o Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, p. 233. 3 1 Ibid., p. 244.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 217 out alive, which the shaman cooked with a "sickening mess" which
217
out alive, which the shaman cooked with a "sickening mess" which the soldiers had to eat. A man was killed if he had to spit out this foul morsel, for he had thus given strength to the enemy. The shaman then made incisions in the men's flesh and rubbed the medi cated beef into the wounds. the enemy. The tortured ox was chased about until dead, and the longer his agony endured, the more unfortunate The ox was then roasted and the ancestral spirits were Indeed, many natives thought that the real invoked for war-aid.
the soldiers had to eat. A man was killed if he had to spit out this
foul morsel, for he had thus given strength to the enemy. The
shaman then made incisions in die men's flesh and rubbed the medi-
cated beef into the wounds. The tortured ox was chased about
until dead, and the longer his agony endured, the more unfortunate
the enemy. The ox was then roasted and the ancestral spirits were
invoked for war-aid. Indeed, many natives thought that the real
battle was between the spirit ranks in the air above the earthly fight.
While the chief himself had to be doctored, he really stayed at home
to manipulate the spirits in the manner of a priest-king.
Omens were inspected, and if favorable, the warriors were painted
battle was between the spirit ranks in the air above the earthly fight. While the chief himseH had to be doctored, he really stayed at home to manipulate the spirits in the manner of and sent forth, but unfaYQl"able
omens a
and sent forth, but unfavorable omens would cause the priests and
shamans to postpone the expedition. The warriors "fight with the
most marvelous bravery when they are assured by their doctors that
priest-king.
cause
success is certain," but they "lose heart quickly in a forlorn hope.
They are either stupidly and magnificently brave or ridiculously timid
Omens were inspected, and if favorable, the warriors were painted '
and fearful."32
would
the priests and
Kidd's comment is obviously unsympathetic, but the modicum of
, shamans to postpone the expedition. success
The warriors "fight with the

a
truth therein has more than once given the white man the victory
over the nonliterate warrior when the estimate of the tactical situation
most marvelous bravery when they are assured by their doctors that They are either stupidly and magnificently brave or ridiculously timid \ and fearful. "82 Kidd's comment is obviously unsympathetic, but the modicum of truth therein has more than once given the white man the victory over the non literate warrior when the estimate of the tactical situation indicated otherwise. Despite fetish and shaman, defeat sometimes comes to every army. What, then, of the faith in the magic? The same excuse is given It is easy, which all of us have heard in freshman physics when the laboratory
as
I
indicated otherwise.
is certain," but they "lose heart quickly in
forlorn hope. '.
Despite fetish and shaman, defeat sometimes comes to every army.
What, then, of the faith in the magic? The same excuse is given
which all of us have heard in freshman physics when the laboratory
demonstrator has failed to produce the textbook result. It is easy,
as in Nigeria, to claim some inadvertent breach in the law, or the
intervention of superior enemy magic.33
We have observed that courage has been a rare quality in the
western Pacific. Only rarely did a warrior stand out as personally
brave. The Papuan was an assassin, not a soldier.34 Seeing that the
attitudes of bravery in New Guinea and Melanesia have not been
particularly strong, much attention has been paid to such things as
war dances, or rather to fear-inhibiting ceremonies. Such squabblers
would not enter a fight if the chances were not entirely in their favor.
Fear replaced fury in an even fight, and they were at their best with
S2 Kidd, op. ctt., p. 309.
demonstrator has failed to produce the textbook result.
3* Abel, op. cft., p. 130.
intervention of superior enemy magic. 88 western Pacific.
in Nigeria, to claim some inadvertent breach in the law, or the
We have observed that courage has been a rare quality in the Only rarely did a warrior stand out as personally brave. The Papuan was an assassin, not a soldier. 8 4 Seeing that the attitudes of bravery in New Guinea and Melanesia have not been particularly strong, much attention has been paid to such things as
war dances, or rather to fear-inhibiting ceremonies. Such squabblers would not enter a fight if the chances were not entirely in their favor. Fear replaced fury in an even fight, and they were at their best with 82 Kidd, op. cit., p. 309. 8 3 Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, p. 234. 34 Abel, op. cit., p. 130.
D 9 iz e b
218
218 Primitive War their foe a captive tied to a tree.35 The Kiwai practiced many rites
Primitive War
to affect the enemy adversely from a distance, especially to make
him so preoccupied with women that he would fall easy prey, making
extensive use of the genitalia of their own women to secure this. They
had a long list of omens to be read before starting, a common enough
practice. Many tabus fell on the stay-at-homes as well: the old
women had to keep good fires burning in the men's house; the whole
village had to keep quiet lest the enemy hear a noise from afar and
be warned. The women could do only necessary work, therefore, and
had to abstain from eating the flesh of any shy animal. The wife
could not mourn her absent husband, and had to refrain from adultery
lest he die in battle.
Another Zulu-like element was observable in the Loyalty Group
where the'shamans likewise attempted to insure victory by preparing
a magic broth by a secret formula. They poured some of the mixture
in a hole and retired to see if a lizard Would come and taste it, though
they abhorred lizards under other circumstances. They were de-
lighted if a reptile obliged. Being thus reassured of the magical
efficacy of the brew, the warriors gulped it down, thinking that they
had their enemies where they wanted them.36
The characteristic men's lodge of Melanesia was important in such
fear-inhibiting work. Brown says of New Britain that all the victory-
insurance rites were held in the club houses. He says parenthetically
that he never met a brave man in New Britain.37
The men of New Britain had a war god who insured victory if un-
injured cuscus, harmless local marsupials, were roasted alive and
eaten. One of the party would be killed if any of the little animals
were dead or injured before being put on the fire. And so the feast
their foe a captive tied to a tree.85 The Kiwai practiced many rites to affect the enemy adversely from a distance, especially to make him so preoccupied with women that he would fall easy prey, making extensive use of the genitalia of their own women to secure this. They had a long list of omens to be read before starting, a common enough practice. Many tabus fell on the stay-at-homes as well : the old women had to keep good fires burning in the men's house; the whole village had to keep quiet lest the enemy hear a noise from afar and be warned. The women could do only necessary work, therefore, and had to abstain from eating the Hesh of any shy animal. The wife could not mourn her absent husband, and had to refrain from adultery lest he die in battle . Another Zulu-lik element was observable in the Loyalty Group where the-shamans likewise attempted to insure victory by preparing a magic broth by a secret formula. They poured some of the mixture in a hole and retired to see if a lizard would come and taste it, though they abhorred lizards under other circumstances. They were de lighted if a reptile obliged. Being thus reassured of the magical efficacy of the brew, the warriors gulped it down, thinking that they had their enemies where they wanted them.8 6 The characteristic men's lodge of Melanesia was important in such fear-inhibiting work. Brown says of New Britain that all the victory insurance rites were held in the club houses. He says parenthetically that he never met a brave man in New Britain.8 7 The men of New Britain had a war god who insured victory if un injured cuscus, harmless local marsupials, were roasted alive and eaten. One of the party would be killed if any of the little animals were dead or injured before being put on the fire. And so the feast continued, invoking the aid of the god, blaming him for their warlike idea, and putting it up to him to make them successful. The weapons were then blessed at his shrine. Perhaps the more courageous Polynesians did not make so much of fear-inhibiting devices, but they did use them. The dances held in Samoa before battles were just the ordinary ones, but each village had a characteristic war song. The priests invoked the war gods of the various villages for success, protection, and courage for the war8 5 Landtman, op. cit., pp. 149, 153, 155. 86 Hadfield, op . cit., p. 174. 8 7 Brown, op. cit., p. 153.
continued, invoking the aid of the god, blaming him for their warlike
idea, and putting it up to him to make them successful. The weapons
were then blessed at his shrine.
Perhaps the more courageous Polynesians did not make so much
of fear-inhibiting devices, but they did use them. The dances held in
Samoa before battles were just the ordinary ones, but each village
had a characteristic war song. The priests invoked the war gods of
the various villages for success, protection, and courage for the war-
35 Landtman, op. cit., pp. 149, 153, 155.
6 Hadfield, op. cit., p. 174.
*7 Brown, op. cit., p. 153.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 219 riors, especially addressing themselves to the war-powerful Cuttle
219
riors, especially addressing themselves to the war-powerful Cuttle Fish. Each warrior then confessed his transgressions, made what resti tution he could, and was shriven by the priests with coconut milk lus tration . death. valor. The warrior who did not confess would be killed. A similar indoctrination also led the Celts to do deeds of Caesar, speaking of the Gallic Druids, said that they taught Firm belief in a hereafter made the Germans contemptuous of
Fish. Each warrior then confessed his transgressions, made what resti-
tution he could, and was shriven by the priests with coconut milk lus-
tration. The warrior who did not confess would be killed.
Firm belief in a hereafter made the Germans contemptuous of
death. A similar indoctrination also led the Celts to do deeds of
valor. Caesar, speaking of the Gallic Druids, said that they taught
the metempsychosis of souls as their cardinal doctrine, so that, fear
of death being removed, the warriors could be incited to great
valor.3s The Valhalla myth of the old Teutons was a fear-inhibiting
idea too well known to need recounting here. Many things were
worse than death in their minds, such as failing to protect one's
the metempsychosis of souls as their cardinal doctrine, so that, fear of death being removed, the warriors could be incited to great valor.3 s The Valhalla myth of the old Teutons was a fear-inhibiting M any things were idea too well known to need recounting here. chief or king.
chief or king. For a liegeman to lay down his life in defense of his
leader was a boon surpassing all others.
Courage was not lacking in barbarian north Europe, but it was
sometimes intermixed with cowardice in the same manner that later
was to mystify the European in viewing the conduct of the American
Indian and Zulu. Agricola's remarks about the Britons being super-
worse than death in their minds, such as failing to protect one's For a liege man to lay down his life in defense of his leader was a boon surpassing all others. Courage was not lacking in barbarian north Europe, but it was sometimes intermixed with cowardice in the same manner that later was to mystify the European in viewing the conduct of the American Indian and Zulu. Agricola's remarks about the Britons being super
a
stitiously reckless at times and cowardly at others has a familiar
ring.39
Parenthetically, almost all the Roman writers remarked on the
evils of acculturation in destroying the courage of the barbarians.
Caesar says that the Nervii were aware of this and strove, like some
other nonliterate tribes, to maintain themselves free from enfeebling
and corrupting Roman vices.40
While the men of Northern Europe were brave, they had the same
need of fear-inhibiting ceremonies as any other warrior. After all,
death is both so painful and so very final that even brave men must
be soothed into accepting it, or made to feel that they are invincible.
Caesar was once surprised that Ariovistus did not strike hard at him
stitiously reckless at times and cowardly at others has ring. 8 9
familiar
to win a decisive victory, but upon questioning the prisoners, he
discovered that the German matrons, whose duty it was to foretell
Parenthetically, almost all the Roman writers remarked on the evils of acculturation in destroying the courage of the barbarians. Caesar says that the Nervii were aware of this and strove, like some other nonliterate tribes, to maintain themselves free from enfeebling and corrupting Roman vices.4o While the men of Northern Europe were brave, they had the same need of fear-inhibiting ceremonies as any other warrior. After all, death is both so painful and so very final that even brave men must be soothed into accepting it, or made to feel that they are invincible.
victory by lot and divination, had declared the heavens unpropitious
and warned the king not to fight before the new moon.41
*s Caesar, op. ctt., vi. 14.
39 Tacitus, Agricola, 11.
*0 Caesar, op. cit., ii. 15.
*i Ibid., i. 50.
Caesar was once surprised that Ariovistus did not strike hard at him to win a decisive victory, but upon questioning the prisoners, he discovered that the German matrons, whose duty it was to foretell victory by lot and divination, had declared the heavens unpropitious and warned the king not to fight before the new moon. 4 1
40 Caesar, op . cit., 41 Ibid., i. 50.
8 8 Caesar, op . cit., vi . 14. 8 9 Tacitus, Agricola, 11.

ii .
15.
DI
Iz.e b
220
220 Primitive War Tacitus described the fear-inhibiting ceremonial of the Germans.
Primitive War
Archeology shows that the Hercules epos had diffused to the north-
west before the Romans arrived. The Germans said that the demi-
god had appeared to them and taught them to sing hymns to him
on the eve of battle. They likewise had a peculiar war-cry, and the
leading men could predict the outcome of the approaching battle by
the way the warriors performed this shouting rite.42 Tacitus like-
wise said that Germans divine the outcome of battle by ordeal. One
favorite method was to capture somehow a member of the prospective
enemy group and pit him against one of their own champions, refrain-
ing from battle if the stranger won.43 Fear could be repressed by en-
tering only those battles the favorable outcome of which was assured.
Tacitus recorded the fear-inhibiting nature of the human sacrifice
of a member of the we-group, as well as the presence of certain
victory-insuring palladia. The Germans would not tolerate so much
as a disciplinary blow from their commanders but submitted to death
if the war divinity demanded it. The priests also carried "certain
fetishes ... and emblems into battle to insure success."44
More than one battle between two nonliterate groups, or between
a nonliterate group and civilized men has come to an abrupt end
because the shamans or someone else suspected unfavorable magic.
Justin characteristically relates that a coalition of Celts under a petty
chief named Catumandus attacked the Greek colony of Marseilles in
about 400 B. C., but were frightened away by some magico-religious
omen.48
Attitudes toward the enemy and his life have been as variable as
those toward the lives of members of the we-group, ranging from
sympathy for captives to torture. Prisoner torture has been common
enough. The eastern portion of the United States was noted for it.
Simple abuse during the victory dance was common throughout the
west. Some western Indians, such as the Wyandot, would adopt
prisoners at times and kill them ruthlessly at others.46
It is hard to generalize about the Plains and other western tribes.
The Plains-Cree subjected prisoners to a sort of semi-slavery in which
Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 1.
*5 Justin, in Hubert, Of. cit., p. 301.
46 J. W. Powell, "Wyandot Government," Annual Report 1, Bureau of Amer-
ican Ethnology (Washington: 1879-1886), pp. 59-69.
Tacitus described the fear-inhibiting ceremonial of the Germans. Archeology shows that the Hercules epos had diffused to the north west before the Romans arrived. The Germans said that the demi god had appeared to them and taught them to sing hymns to him on the eve of battle. They likewise had a peculiar war-cry, and the leading men could predict the outcome of the approaching battle by the way the warriors performed this shouting rite. 4 2 Tacitus like wise said that Germans divine the outcome of battle by ordeal. One favorite method was to capture somehow a member of the prospective enemy group and pit him against one of their own champions, refrain ing from battle if the stranger won} 3 Fear could be repressed by en tering only those battles the favorable outcome of which was assured. Tacitus recorded the fear-inhibiting nature of the human sacrifice of a member of the we-group, as well as the presence of certain victory-insuring palladia. The Germans would not tolerate so much as a disciplinary blow from their commanders but submitted to death if the war divinity demanded it. The priests also carried '"certain fetishes . . . and emblems into battle to insure success."44 More than one battle between two nonliterate groups, or between a non literate group and civilized men has come to an abrupt end because the shamans or someone else suspected unfavorable magic. Justin characteristically relates that a coalition of Celts under a petty chief named Catumandus attacked the Greek colony of Marseilles in about 400 B. C., but were frightened away by some magico-religious omen.411 Attitudes toward the enemy and his life have been as variable as those toward the lives of members of the we-group, ranging from sympathy for captives to torture. Prisoner torture has been common enough. The eastern portion of the United States was noted for it. Simple abuse during the victory dance was common throughout the west. Some western Indians, such as the Wyandot, would adopt prisoners at times and kill them ruthlessly at others.4 6 It is hard to generalize about the Plains and other western tribes. The Plains-Cree subjected prisoners to a sort of semi-slavery in which 42 Tacitus, Germania, 3. 4 3 Ibid., 10. 4 11 Justin, in Hubert,
Ibid., 7.
op. cit., p. 301 . 4 6 J . W. Powell, "Wyandot Government," Annual Report I , Bureau of Amer ican Ethnology ( Washington : 1879-1 886 ) , pp. 59-69.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 221 the lives of the men were in constant danger, while the persons of
22 1
the lives of the men were in constant danger, while the persons of the women were at the disposal of their captors. a horror of captive torture.47 They had, however, The life of an enemy refugee was
the women were at the disposal of their captors. They had, however,
a horror of captive torture.47 The Me of an enemy refugee was
perfectly safe in an Osage village provided he had eaten Osage food.
The Omaha did not kill captives but kept them until the end of the
perfectly safe in an Osage village provided he had eaten Osage food. The Omaha did not kill captives but kept them until the end of the war. At the conclusion of hostilities they could remain with the Omaha permanently
war. At the conclusion of hostilities they could remain with the
Omaha permanently if they chose, and could have the same role
and status as a born Omaha, although they were not formally adopted.
The Omaha were notoriously cruel to the wounded enemy, though,
and enjoyed chopping them to pieces in sight of their friends, throw-
if they chose, and could have the same role
ing bits after the retreating foe, who raged appropriately.4s
and status as a born Omaha, although they were not formally adopted. The Omaha were notoriously cruel to the wounded enemy, though, and enjoyed chopping them to pieces in sight of their friends, throw ing bits after the retreating foe, who raged appropriately.t8 The enemy in South America could only be an enemy. marked for slaughter. Both chivalrous and hateful attitudes toward the enemy existed in Eurasia. Granted that all conflict follows certain rules, extreme con But they discov sideration toward an enemy either because of chivalry or international law seemed most marked among the early Hindus. ered the disutility of this attitude against unchivalrous enemies, such as the Nagas who relied on tactical magic, or the Rakshashas who relied on ambush and the principle of surprise. The unchivalrous Pisachas also made the terrain more difficult by scattering thorns and dotting it with underground obstacles like modern tank traps. The Dasya chief Namuchi loosed hordes of lovely women on the Arya troops with orders to seduce them. In the end the Arya reverted to pre-chivalric methods of warfare, including pOisoned arrows .49 The Carib considered every human who could not speak their dialect a person
The enemy in South America could only be an enemy. The Carib
considered every human who could not speak their dialect a person
marked for slaughter.
Both chivalrous and hateful attitudes toward the enemy existed in
Eurasia. Granted that all conflict follows certain rules, extreme con-
sideration toward an enemy either because of chivalry or international
law seemed most marked among the early Hindus. But they discov-
ered the disutility of this attitude against unchivalrous enemies, such
as the Nagas who relied on tactical magic, or the Rakshashas who
relied on ambush and the principle of surprise. The unchivalrous
Pisachas also made the terrain more difficult by scattering thorns
and dotting it with underground obstacles like modern tank traps.
The Dasya chief Namuchi loosed hordes of lovely women on the
Arya troops with orders to seduce them. In the end the Arya reverted
to pre-chivalric methods of warfare, including poisoned arrows.49
All this aside, the Vedas did show over the long period during
which they were written a slow development of chivalry and attitudes
of fair play in warfare. With the development and elaboration of
tactical principles, they relied more and more on truly military meth-
ods, abandoning the stupid slaughter of savages, and passed out of
the realm of this study and into civilization. Indeed, as early as the
Battle of the Ten Kings, Aryan tactics and strategy were well-devel-
oped and one Eurasiatic people, perhaps the first in the world, ceased
to be primitive warriors. True, it is hard to exaggerate the loathing
and Plains-Cree, passim.
*s Dorsey, "Siouan Sociology," p. 332.
49 Rig Veda, vi. 15, 75.
All this aside, the Vedas did show over the long period during
which they were written a slow development of chivalry and attitudes of fair play in warfare. With the development and elaboration of tactical principles, they relied more and more on truly military meth ods, abandoning the stupid slaughter of savages, and passed out of the realm of this study and into civilization. Indeed, as early as the Battle of the Ten Kings, Aryan tactics and strategy were welldevel oped and one Eurasiatic people, perhaps the first in the world, ceased
to be primitive warriors.
True, it
is hard to exaggerate the loathing
H Skinner, Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains-Ojibway and Plains-Cree, passim. t S Dorsey, "Siouan SOCiology," p. 332. t o Rig Veda, vi. 15, 75.
D 9 iz e b
222
222 Primitive War with which they viewed the Dasya enemy whom they robbed. The
Primitive War
The
with which they viewed the Dasya enemy whom they robbed. motive for hate. ion .
race difference provided adequate symbolization, social distance, and
race difference provided adequate symbolization, social distance, and They ascribed all sorts of low practices to them and called them many vile names in the Sodom and Gomorrah fash \Vhile such attitudes may not be admirable, they have not been the monopoly of savage warriors. We have been led to think that disregard for enemy life and his feelings are characteristic of warfare, but this is not nesessarily so. The gentle Papago considered an enemy life precious and its de struction a murder, even though committed by a Papago warrior in legitimate war. A Papago man who had killed an enemy was un clean and dangerous, and the ordeal of purification necessary to re admit him to society was even more severe than the hardships of the warpath. He had to expiate for the murder of the hated Apache He had no comforts. for sixteen days, four periods of four days each. warpath. He was isolated from his fellows .
motive for hate. They ascribed all sorts of low practices to them
and called them many vile names in the Sodom and Gomorrah fash-
ion. While such attitudes may not be admirable, they have not been
the monopoly of savage warriors.
We have been led to think that disregard for enemy life and his
feelings are characteristic of warfare, but this is not nesessarily so.
The gentle Papago considered an enemy life precious and its de-
struction a murder, even though committed by a Papago warrior in
legitimate war. A Papago man who had killed an enemy was un-
clean and dangerous, and the ordeal of purification necessary to re-
admit him to society was even more severe than the hardships of
the warpath. He had to expiate for the murder of the hated Apache
for sixteen days, four periods of four days each. He had no comforts.
He was allowed no more bedding and warmth than he had on the
warpath. He was isolated from his fellows. It was tabu for him to
see fire, to scratch himself, and so on. He was attended by a man
who brought him a little food each day and supervised his exercise.
His hair had to be worn long as if he were in mourning. Finally,
he was allowed to clean up and join a dance, which was very rigor-
ous. The Papago wounded were also thought to have received
He was allowed no more bedding and warmth than he had on the It was tabu for him to see fire, to scratch himself, and so on. He was attended by a man
Apache contamination and were forced to purify themselves for four
days.50
Sympathy for the enemy was not universal in America. The Jibaro
intertribal wars had no idea of expiation or balancing a life for a life,
who brought him a little food each day and supervised his exercise. His hair had to be worn long as if he were ous.
for these people fought only for extermination. The hated tribe had
to be annihilated without regard for sex or age, along with its live-
in
mourning.
Finally,
stock, so that no potential avenger should survive.51 Yet the Jibaro
he was allowed to clean up and join a dance, which was very rigor The Papago wounded were also thought to have received Apache contamination and were forced to purify themselves for four days . 5 0 Sympathy for the enemy was not universal in America. for these people fought only for extermination. The Jibaro intertribal wars had no idea of expiation or balancing a life for a life, The hated tribe had to be annihilated without regard for sex or age, along with its live stock, so that no potential avenger should survive.5 1 Yet the Jibaro killer also had to go through a lengthy and troublesome purification rite, but presumably from different motives than those of the Papa go. This is not clear, however. A killer could not enter his own house He wore
no
killer also had to go through a lengthy and troublesome purification
rite, but presumably from different motives than those of the Papago.
This is not clear, however. A killer could not enter his own house
until his captured head was prepared. He wore no paint or adorn-
ment and had to dress as a penitent.52 Even his wife and daughter
had to be purified partly because of their close relationship and partly
because they had touched his blood-polluted clothes and person.53
50 Densmore, Papago Music, pp. 187f.
62 Ibid., p. 35.
53 Ibid., p. 37.
until his captured head was prepared. ment and had to dress as a penitent. 52
paint or adorn
Even his wife and daughter
had to be purified partly because of their close relationship and partly because they had touched his blood-polluted clothes and person.58 11 0 Densmore, Papago Music, pp. 187. 5 1 Karsten, op. cit., p. 16. 52 Ibid., p. 35. 5 8 Ibid., p. 37.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 223 These purification rites were not admittedly conscience-cleansers, how-
223
These purification rites were not admittedly conscience-cleansers, how ever, but they were motivated by fear of the enemy spirit thirsting for revenge, which might be the same thing.4 The bloodY ' kulu are estimated to have killed easily a million men
ever, but they were motivated by fear of the enemy spirit thirsting
for revenge, which might be the same thing.54
The bloody GJuluâre estimated to have killed easily a million men
in the wars of Chaka. They militarized the BaThonga and persuaded <
them to accompany their career of slaughter. But note that while
in
the wars of Chaka.
They militarized the BaThonga and persuaded ( But note that while
. \
( ( .
the killer of enemies attained great glory, he also acquired great dan- x
ger. The killer was subject to the persecution of the nuru of his
them to accompany their career of slaughter. ger.
victim's vengeful spirit. Nuru might haunt him into insanity, might
the killer of enemies attained great glory, he also acquired great dan The killer was subject to the persecution of the
make his eyes swell, might instill such blood-lust into him that he
nuru
would fall upon his own family with. l>is assegai. The victorious
of his
slayer therefore had to receive itaagical_medication to purge him of
victim's vengeful spirit.
Nuru
might haunt him into insanity, might
An Ibd warrior, after decapitating an enemy, licked some of the
blood from the knife in order to become identified with the slain,
thereby becoming immune from attack by the ghost. After the peace
he therefore could feast in the enemy's village, and even drink wine
make his eyes swell, might instill such blood-lust into him that he would fall upon his own family with his assegai. The victorious slayer therefore had to receive magical medication to purge him of
from the victim's palms without spiritual danger. Indeed, after the
blood-licking the spirit of the slain might become reincarnated as
nuru ..:l
the slayer's son, and hence become an ally.56
Scraps of an enemy were no more an unmixed blessing among some
Africans than they were among the Papago. Neither, as has been
An)b warrior, after decapitating an enemy, licked some of the blood fro m the knife in order to become identified with the slain, thereby becoming immune from attack by the ghost. After the peace he therefore could feast in the enemy's village, and even drink wine from the victim's palms without spiritual danger. Indeed, after the
as
observed, was his death. His magic was still potent, his revenge
something to fear. The Nigerian warrior was glad to return home
after the peace ceremony carrying many heads, but he had to bathe
in every stream he came to en route and anoint himself with medicine
"to stay the avenging power of the blood which was shed." Other-
wise the man might not enter his house or approach any of his wives.57
The brave Zulu freed themselves with even greater difficulty from
blood-licking the spirit of the slain might become reincarnated the slayer's son, and hence become an ally. 6 Africans than they were among the Papago. observed, was his death. something to fear.
death-contamination. The slayer first had to stab the fallen enemy
through the bowels lest the unreleased spirit drive him insane. He then
Scraps of an enemy were no more an unmixed blessing among some Neither, as has been His magic was still potent, his revenge
removed his victim's loin cloth and substituted it for his own until
his purification. He carried the death-dealing assegai point down-
ward instead of in the usual horizontal position. He could not mingle
in normal society nor partake of amasi. He had potentially con-
The Nigerian warrior was glad to return home
5* Ibid., p. 39.
after the peace ceremony carrying many heads, but he had to bathe
55 Junod, op. cit., pp. 477ff.
56 Meek, op. cit., p. 242.
in every stream he came to
en route
and anoint himself with medicine Other
"to stay the avenging power of the blood which was shed."
vf
wise the man might not enter his house or approach any of his wives. 7
\f-
The brave Zulu freed themselves with even greater difficulty from death-contamination. The slayer first had to stab the fallen enemy , through the bowels lest the unreleased spirit drive him insane. He then removed his victim's loin cloth and substituted it for his own until I his purification. He carried the death-dealing assegai point down- ; ward instead of in the usual horizontal position. He could not mingle \ in normal society nor partake of amasi. He had potentially con-
Ibid., p. 39. Junod, Gp. cit., pp. 477ff. G 6 Meek, Gp. cit., p. 242. G 7 Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, p. 242.
U
D 9 iz e b
224
224 Primitive War
Primitive War
tracted a disease called ism. .
iZembe
which would cause dysentery, kidney
traded a disease called iZembe which would cause dysentery, kidney
disorders, and finally insanity unless purified with herbs and shaman-
disorders, and finally insanity unless purified with herbs and shaman He had to live on the veld with those of his kind, wearing a There he was respectfully This residence
a
ism. He had to live on the veld with those of his kind, wearing a
sprig of wild asparagus in his hair. There he was respectfully
treated and well fed by the rest of the community. This residence
sprig of wild asparagus in his hair. on the veld might be for quite
a
on the veld might be for quite a while, for the slayer had to find a
treated and well fed by the rest of the community. female of a tribe other than his own or, have intercourse with her, or him.
female of a tribe other than his own or, faute de mieux, a boy, and
have intercourse with her, or him. This woman did not contract
while, for the slayer had to find
iZembe herself but passed it on to the next man with whom she co-
faute de mieux,
a boy, and
habited. The killer had to submit to many charms before entering
This woman did not contract
his own kraal and taking up normal life. Even so, all his subsequent
life he was forced to abstain from the milk of any cow whose calf
iZembe
habited.
herself but passed it on to the next man with whom she co The killer had to submit to many charms before entering Even so, all his subsequent
has not yet sprouted horns, from the annual first-fruits of the season,
or beer made from new grain, unless he had fortified himself with
charms each time.5s
his own kraal and taking up normal life.
Why this revulsion against man-killing? Why such rites even
life he was forced to abstain from the milk of any cow whose calf
among fierce people? Why also the retreat from blood-revulsion to
such beautiful and esoteric religious ceremonialism as the Pawnee
has not yet sprouted horns, from the annual first-fruits of the season, or beer made from new grain, unless he had fortified himself with charms each time. 6 S Why this revulsion against man-killing? among fierce people? Hako? Not all Mricans had such obvious blood-guilt as the murderous Zulu although among other peoples it often only had less patent ex pression. The Dahomeans, for example, had no apparent fear of kill
,
Hako?
Not all Africans had such obvious blood-guilt as the murderous
Zulu although among other peoples it often only had less patent ex-
pression. The Dahomeans, for example, had no apparent fear of kill-
Why such rites even
ing an ordinary enemy, for they were mass-destructive people, but
Why also the retreat from blood-revulsion to
they feared to kill the king of a conquered people lest his magic
and his gods work against them. He was kept in splendid captivity
such beautiful and esoteric religious ceremonialism as the Pawnee
surrounded by plenty of choice women until he died naturally.
The Papuans looked upon their enemies as a type of game. But
since this was so for the enemy as a whole, the hatred toward a
particular individual could be greatly mollified in spite of all their
spleen-venting attitudes. If a warrior observed a friend on the other
side whom he wished spared, he would hold his bow in front of the
man or mark him with betel spittle, and be sure these signs would
ing an ordinary enemy, for they were mass-destructive people, but they feared to kill the king of a conquered people lest his magic and his gods work against them. He was kept in splendid captivity But surrounded by plenty of choice women until he died naturally. The Papuans looked upon their enemies as a type of game. since this was so for the enemy as spleen-venting attitudes.
a
be respected.59
The attitude toward the feminine element in the enemy population
was universally mild in Polynesia. In Melanesia an enemy was an
enemy regardless of sex, and was therefore marked for slaughter.
Ivens reports an exception to this in the Southeast Solomons where
5s Krige, op. cit., p. 276.
whole, the hatred toward a
particular individual could be greatly mollified in spite of all their If a warrior observed a friend on the other side whom he wished spared, he would hold his bow in front of the man or mark him with betel spittle, and be sure these signs would be respected. 6 s The attitude toward the feminine element in the enemy population was universally mild in Polynesia. In Melanesia an enemy was
an
enemy regardless of sex, and was therefore marked for slaughter. Ivens reports an exception to this in the Southeast Solomons where
6S
6 S Krige, op. cit., p. 276. Landtman, op. cit., p. 159.
D 9 iz e b

Certain Military Attitudes 225 war was considered man's business and women were allowed to visit
225
to and fro in Polynesian fashion.60
The Polynesians were capable of the most intense hatred toward
the enemy's male fighting effectives. Yet they often showed them the
most intense ceremonial courtesy before the action began. Brown
gives an interesting description of the Samoans he knew. The combat
lines would meet and address each other with formality as great chiefs
and warriors, and present each other with food in an excess of cour-
tesy. One side would ask the other if it wished to fight that day
or postpone the action. The other would reply that "It is not for us
to speak of such things in the presence of chiefs and warriors such
as you." The most polite words in the language were used, and the
most gentlemanly caution was exercised by each side to keep from
seeming to dictate to the other. Once the fight was joined, however,
the Samoans meant to kill and all chivalry was dropped, the language
bandied between the lines becoming very scurrilous.61
Gallantry paid the Maori poorly when they tried it with modern
British troops. They played the game more fairly than fair in the
European concept. They were amazed when the British shot the
people whom they sent from the palisades for water, for was not
water necessary? When British ammunition ran low they waited
for them to bring up supplies, for why fight a man on uneven terms?'52
Let us repeat. There has existed a dread of taking enemy life, a
feeling that if the life of a member of the we-group was precious,
so was that of a member of the other-group. Fear of death-contami-
nation has demanded expiation or purification among many folk. The
blood-dread or fear of the vengeful spirit of the slain enemy and
they probably are the same has been apparent in black Oceania.
In Papua, according to Riley, captured skulls themselves first had to
be washed. Then the head preparateur had to purify himself by
bathing in salt water, taking great care to cleanse his teeth, nostrils,
and mouth. When washed the men were supplied with a quantity
of perfumed leaves.63
Landtman describes the following Papuan method of freeing the
warrior from blood stain. The slayer took a long stem of a certain
60 Walter G. Ivens, Melanesians of the Southeast Solomon Islands (London:
K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1927), p. 300.
61 Brown, op. cit., pp. 166f.
62 Del Mar, op. cit., p. 153.
63 Riley, op. cit., p. 270.
war was considered man's business and women were allowed to visit to and fro in Polynesian fashion.6 0 The Polynesians were capable of the most intense hatred toward the enemis male fighting effectives. Yet they often showed them the most intense ceremonial courtesy before the action began. Brown gives an interesting description of the Samoans he knew. The combat lines would meet and address each other with formality as great chiefs and warriors, and present each other with food in an excess of cour tesy. One side would ask the other if it wished to fight that day or postpone the action. The other would reply that "It is not for us to speak of such things in the presence of chiefs and warriors such as you." The most polite words in the language were used, and the most gentlemanly caution was exercised by each side to keep from seeming to dictate to the other. Once the fight was joined, however, the Samoans meant to kill and all chivalry was dropped, the language bandied between the lines becoming very scurrilous.6 1 Gallantry paid the Maori poorly when they tried it with modern British troops. They played the game more fairly than fair in the European concept. They were amazed when the British shot the people whom they sent from the palisades for water, for was not water necessary? When British ammunition ran low they waited for them to bring up supplies, for why fight a man on uneven terms?') 2 Let us repeat. There has existed a dread of taking enemy life, a feeling that if the life of a member of the we-group was precious, so was that of a member of the other-group. Fear of death-contami nation has demanded expiation or purification among many folk. The blood-dread or fear of the vengeful spirit of the slain enemy - and they probably are the same - has been apparent in black Oceania. In Papua, according to Riley, captured skulls themselves first had to be washed. Then the head preparateur had to purify himself by bathing in salt water, taking great care to cleanse his teeth, nostrils, and mouth. \Vhen washed the men were supplied with a quantity of perfumed leaves.6 3 Landtman describes the following Papuan method of freeing the warrior from blood stain. The slayer took a long stem of a certain
K.
Ivens, Melanesians of the Southeast Solomon Islanch ( London: 1927 ) , p. 300. 6 1 Brown, op. cit., pp. 166f. 6 2 Del Mar, op. cit., p. 153. 6 3 Riley, op. cit., p. 270.
60
Walter G.
Paul, Trench, Trubner,
D 9 iz e b
226
226 Primitive War creeping plant and slit it at both ends. Stepping into the sea or
Primitive War
swamp, he passed the slit creeper over his head and body to the
waist. Turning toward the shore, he completed the slit in the vine,
threw both parts behind him, and kicked some water, and apparently
the evil, backward with his foot.64
Even in Polynesia, where hate was a thoroughgoing affair and
where the art of war had a considerable development, a killer had
to be purified by a priest after battle and to wash himself thoroughly.
In New Zealand he was not permitted to enter his own enclosure
until his was done, after the South African way of thought.
Peace, then, seems to be the normal situation in the minds of even
warlike peoples. War and killing push men into some kind of mar-
ginality which is at least uncomfortable, for there seems to be a basic
fear of blood contamination, an essential dread of human murder.
If man did not consider human killing something out of the ordinary,
why has there been such common fear of the enemy dead, the idea
of contamination of even a prestigeful warrior of the we-group? Does
the blood of even righteously punished Cain cry up from the ground
as well as that of virtuous Abel? In spite of ethnocentrism, of hatred
for foreign ways, of a justifiable desire for the property of the other-
group, of the implication of simian ancestry to other tribes, yet the
cry of Shylock, that the other-group members have the same anatomy,
the same emotions as we, cannot be downed except by the conscience-
cleansing ceremonies which civilization has denied us. Nonliterate
man has relied on ancient an3 powerfurcereniohTaT sanctions, while
civilization prefers mental hospitals. We have seen that the channel-
ling of frustration into hatred toward the enemy is good for the in-
ternal harmony of the we-group, but the enemy is human, too. Hu-
manity is capable of ambivalent attitudes toward its enemies.
creeping plant and slit it at both ends. Stepping into the sea or swamp, he passed the slit creeper over his head and body to the waist. Turning toward the shore, he completed the slit in the vine, threw both parts behind him, and kicked some water, and apparently the evil, backward with his foot. 6 4 Even in Polynesia, where hate was a thoroughgoing affair and where the art of war had a considerable development, a killer had to be purified by a priest after battle and to wash himself thoroughly. In New Zealand he was not permitted to enter his own enclosure until his was done, after the South African way of thought. Peace, then, seems to be the normal situation in the minds of even warlike peoples. War and killing push men into some kind of mar ginality which is at least uncomfortable, for there seems to be a basic fear of blood contamination, an essential dread of human murder. If man did not consider human killin g something out of the ordinary, why has there been such common fear of the enemy dead, the idea of contamination of even a prestigeful warrior of the we-group? Does the blood of even righteously punished Cain cry up from the ground as well as that of virtuous Abel? In spite of ethnocentrism, of hatred for foreign ways, of a justifiable desire for the property of the other group, of the implication of simian ancestry to other tribes, yet the cry of Shylock, that the other-group members have the same anatomy, the same emotions as we, cannot be downed except by the conscience clansing ceremonies which civilization has denied us. N onliterate n h as relied on ancient and powerful ceremoniar sanctions, while ma civilization prefers mental hospitals. We have seen that the channel ling of frustration into hatred toward the enemy is good for the in ternal harmony of the we-group, but the enemy is human, too. Hu manity is capable of ambivalent attitudes toward its enemies. 6 4 Landtman,
op. cit., p. 160.
DI
Iz.e b
CHAPTER 12
WHILE CIVILIZATION HAS USED MATERIAL TOOLS TO MASTER THE PHYS-
ical environment, few will deny that organization, leadership, and
administration in group endeavor are necessary for success. Disor-
ganization and unorganization limit success. Psychologists and social
scientists know that because men differ in capacities and interests,
they also differ in the roles they must play in society's organized
division of labor and in the statuses which accompany these roles.
All societies are formally or informally characterized by stratification
CHAPTER 12
in role and status. There is no need to discuss this fact in detail, for
it is the theme of many elementary treatises.
An inspection of primitive military behavior reveals little to contro-
vert this general theory. Organization with clear-cut command func-
tions brings success in war just as it does in economics, politics, or
any other field of social endeavor. Because warfare is a life and death
matter this organization must become so definite and exacting that
WHILE
CIVILIZATION HAS USED M A TERIAL TOOLS TO MASTER THE
PHYS
it is called discipline. Foregoing chapters have said that the lack of( r.
ical environment, few will deny that organization, leadership, and Disor Psychologists and social
tactical operations made primitiy^îp:_"jgrimitive." In the end, this
administration in group endeavor are necessary for success. ganization and unorganization limit success.
means nothing more or less than saying that the non-civilized fighter
is no soldier, his warfare is not war, and his butchering is futile and
primitive because his operations lack organization and because he has
scientists know that because men differ in capacities and interests, they also differ in the roles they must play in society's organized division of labor and in the statuses which accompany these roles. All societies are formally or informally characterized by stratification in role and status. There is no need to discuss this fact in detail, for it is the theme of many elementary treatises.
developed the functons of leadership and command so poorly.
Successful organization and management in the peaceful walks of
life and in martial affairs have a rough parallel development. Co-
operative hunting and fishing will require organization and direction
and are ordinarily good training schools for organized warfare with
a developed command element. Men have more to eat when they
cooperate under direction in extracting nature's gifts from her, and
they likewise are more successful against their human enemies. Yet
the parallel is only a rough one. Cultural lags play a large part in
An
inspection of primitive military behavior reveals little to contro Organization with clear-cut command func Because warfare is a life and death
227
vert this general theory.
tions brings success in war just as it does in economics, politics, or any other field of social endeavor. it is called discipline.
matter this organization must become so definite and exacting that taccal operations made primitive war "primitive. " In the end, this
Foregoing chapters have said that !he lack of ( \
means nothing more or less than saying that the non-civilized fighter is no soldier, his warfare is not war, and his butchering is futile and primitive because his operations lack organization and because he ha:i developed the functons of leadership and command so poorly. Successful organization and management in the peaceful walks of Co operative hunting and fishing will require organization and direction and are ordinarily good training schools for organized warfare with
a
life and in martial affairs have a rough parallel development.
developed command element.
Men have more to eat when they Yet
cooperate under direction in extracting nature's gifts from her, and they likewise are more successful against their human enemies. the parallel is only a rough one. Cultural lags play a large part in
227
D 9 iz e b
228
228 Primitive War military history and prehistory. Martial activity is fraught with
Primitive War
emotion, and social behavior on the emotional plane relies heavily
on tradition. Men in danger look to the old men for advice, and old
warriors and generals tend to fight the battles of the past.
When civilized man first began visiting the "savages" he almost
invariably wrote of their social systems in terms of the one from
which he had come. Most social aggregates were called kingdoms
and their head men denominated kings. Later explorers called almost
every social group a "tribe," whether they might have been viewing
kinship organizations, associations, local bands, groups of friends,
hunting parties, religious bodies, or monarchical states as formalized
as that of Bourbon France. Hence the term "tribe" has practically
no meaning, for the socio-political organizations of nonliterate men
are too complex and varied to come under any such simple term. The
term here means nothing more nor less than a group of persons who
collectively permit some sort of social relation and authority, weak or
strong, among each other and collectively deny any authority on the
part of an outside person or group of persons. This definition is of
necessity weak and inclusive, embracing the constitutional govern-
ment of the United States as well as a small band of hunting Bush-
men in the Kalahari desert of South Africa.
Tribal Cohesion and political authority are most important in any
discussion of war. Without both of them, but few men could be put
and maintained in the field, but slight control exercised over them
when there, and but meager results expected from their activity.
Some societies such as the Jibaro, have completely lacked tribal
organization and common political authority.1 Each Jibaro family
father was and is by theory master of the house, its only master, and
there is no chief in peace times. The Jibaro do not even have a spe-
cific term for a chief.2 The forests and river courses of tropical South
America where they live are inhabited by similar men of implacable
ferocity which, combined with the inhospitable climate and unpro-
ductive character of the land, make this the only region of the New
World still inhabited by real Indians. The typical fight in this area is
really the feud, which being a family matter, is a category of its own
outside a military discussion. Nevertheless, the families of one com-
munity are upon occasion capable of gathering together and making
2 Ibid., p. 7.
military history and prehistory. Martial activity is fraught with emotion, and social behavior on the emotional plane relies heavily on tradition. Men in danger look to the old men for advice, and old warriors and generals tend to fight the battles of the past. When civilized man first began visiting the "savages" he almost invariably wrote of their social systems in terms of the one from which he had come. Most social aggregates were called kingdoms and their head men denominated kings. Later explorers called almost every social group a "tribe," whether they might have been viewing kinship organizations, associations, local bands, groups of friends, hunting parties, religious bodies, or monarchical states as formalized as that of Bourbon France. Hence the term "tribe" has practically no meaning, for the socio-political organizations of non literate men are too complex and varied to come under any such simple term. The term here means nothing more nor less than a group of persons who collectively permit some sort of social relation and authority, weak or strong, among each other and collectively deny any authority on thc part of an outside person or group of persons. This definition is of necessity weak and inclusive, embracing the constitutional govern ment of the United States as well as a small band of hunting Bush men in the Kalahari desert of South Africa. '[ribal cohesion and p olitical authority are most important in any discussion of war. Without both of them, but few men could be put and maintained in the field, but slight control exercised over them when there, and but meager results expected from their activity. Some societies such as the Jibaro, have completely lacked tribal Each Jibaro family organization and common political authority. l father was and is by theory master of the house, its only master, and there is no chief in peace times. The Jibaro do not even have a spe cific term for a chief.2 The forests and river courses of tropical South America where they live are inhabited by similar men of implacable ferocity which, combined with the inhospitable climate and unpro ductive character of the land, make this the only region of the New World still inhabited by real Indians. The typical fight in this area is really the feud, which being a family matter, is a category of its own outside a military discussion. Nevertheless, the families of one com munity are upon occasion capable of gathering together and making 1 Karsten, op. cit., 2 Ibid., p . 7.
p.
1.
D 9 iz e b

War and the Organization of Society 229 war upon another community. The tactical chapters showed that,
229
and surely the great Carib invasion must have been accompanied by
something resembling true war. People such as these could hardly
be expected to go to war under a commander and to obey his orders.
and surely the great Carib invasion must have been accompanied by something resembling true war. People such as these could hardly
war upon another community.
The tactical chapters showed that,
But what is expectable does not invariably occur, and these tribes
perceived the utility of the command institution better than some
others, the Eskimo, for example.
be expected to go to war under a commander and to obey his orders. But what is expectable does not invariably occur, and these tribes
The California Indians had a somewhat more closely knit political
perceived the utility of the command institution better than some others, the Eskimo, for example. The California Indians had a somewhat more closely knit political
society than the familial Jibaro. Most Californians were at least or-
ganized into bands, local groups, or villages which cut across kinship
lines. The village was generally the basic socio-political unit, and
the tribe as a larger unit typically did not exist. The Mohave, how-
ever, constituted a sharp contrast to the typical people, for with them
the tribe was all and the local settlement unimportant. They thought
society than the familial Jibaro. M ost Californians were at least or ganized into bands, local groups, or villages which cut across kinship lines. the tribe as a larger unit typically did not exist. The Mohave, how ever, constituted a sharp contrast to the typical people, for with them The village was generally the basic sOcio-political unit, and
of themselves as a national entity living in a specific territory which
was regarded as an emotional value.3 Consequently they were led
by chiefs: a head chief of hereditary of vague authority, a war chief
in whom most of the emotional attitudes were centered, a chief of en-
tertainments, and a shaman. The last three acquired office through
supernatural experiences.4 The Mohave are mentioned with the
typical Californians to provide contrast. Of the more typical people
the tribe was all and the local settlement unimportant. They thought of themselves as a national entity living in a specific territory which by chiefs : a head chief of hereditary of vague authority, a war chief in whom most of the emotional attitudes were centered, a chief of en tertainments, and a shaman. The last three acquired office through typical Californians to provide contrast. it has been said that : supernatural experiences. Of the more typical people was regarded as an emotional value.8 Consequently they were led
it has been said that:
No distinction or principle exists in the native mind between murder
and war. It is rather clear that all so-called wars were only feuds that
happened to involve large groups of kinsmen, several such groups or
unrelated fellow townsmen of the original participants. Whoever was
not drawn into a war was careful to remain neutral as in a private
quarrel5
The Mohave are mentioned with the
The foregoing remarks describe the Yurok. Most Californians
were absolutely nonmilitary; they possessed next to none of the traits
requisite for the military horizon, a condition which would have taxed
their all but nonexistent social organization too much. Their socie-
ties made no provision for collective political action. When a terrier
bites a spaniel, the other spaniels, as spaniels, do not enter the fight,
and the Californians felt the same way.
Both the South American Forest and general California patterns
were really nontribal, simple, and primitive, and neither area con-
3 Kroeber, op. ctt., p. 727.
* Ibid., p. 745.
No distinction or principle exists in the native mind between murder and war. It is rather clear that all so-called wars were only feuds that happened to involve large groups of kinsmen, several such groups or unrelated fellow townsmen of the original participants. Whoever was not drawn into a war was careful to remain neutral as in a private quarre l.
were absolutely nonmilitary; they possessed next to none of the traits requisite for the military horizon, a condition which would have taxed ties made no provision for collective political action. bites a spaniel, the other spaniels,
as
5 Ibid., p. 49.
The foregoing remarks describe the Yurok.
Most Californians
their all but nonexistent social organization too much.
When a terrier spaniels, do not enter the fight, and the Californians felt the same way.
Their socie
Both the South American Forest and general California patterns were really nontribal, simple, and primitive, and neither area cona
II
Kroeber, op. cit., p. Ibid., p. 745. Ibid., p. 49.
727.
D 9 iz e b
--
230
230 Primitive War tained many good warriors. The preceding chapter discussed the
Primitive War
Jibaro feeling toward their enemies, which exterminative attitude
alone made them into something resembling soldiers. It was not
merely coincidental, by contrast, that the Mohave had ideas of terri-
toriality and also achieved more military success than did the typical
California groups.
Africa is a continent which has generally been characterized by
, strong social organization, although this has not been true for the
whole continent. Some people had a poor political or extra-kinship
concept of the tribe as a whole, the Pygmies being a case in point.
The Bushman of the Kalahari desert did indeed get together once a
year to talk things over, but the clan was far more important with
them than was the tribe, which was most shadowy. There have been
people even in the royalist Sudan with practically no tribal concept.
The natives of Mongalla, the southern-most province of the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan, for example, had no word for "tribe," and apparently
possessed only a vague concept of the "tribe-as-a-whole."6
One certain test of lack of adequate military organization that is,
adequate from modern standards is a sense of tribalism which will
prevent fighting inside the we-group. We have just discussed people
with little of this sense. The we-group to such people was some kin
organization. Such extended families have had little or no hesitancy
in attacking other sibs which were of the same cultural, linguistic, or
even social group, large if weak in structure.
The Eurasiatic Chuckchee illustrate a transitional condition. The
old Siberian tribes generally fought with other tribes but were not
above a little intra-tribal scuffling. The various branches of the
Chuckchee still distrust each other and have occasional fights.7 This
is reminiscent of the Crow of Montana, who generally fought an
outside group as a whole but could have reasonably lethal struggles
between the constituent clans. The distrust of the River Crow for
the Mountain Crow is still noticeable.
Most Melanesians were to all intents a tribeless and a warless peo-
ple. The kin group with them was the important social unit, and
war does not flourish where the sib is too strong. Such strong kin
feeling and military efficiency are almost antonyms. Where kinship
6 Leonard F. Nalder, ed., A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 18.
tained many good warriors. The preceding chapter discussed the Jibaro feeling toward their enemies, which exterminative attitude alone made them into something resembling soldiers. It was not merely coincidental, by contrast, that the Mohave had ideas of terri toriality and also achieved more military success than did the typical California groups. Mrica is a continent which has generally been characterized by strong social organization, although this has not been true for the whole continent. Some people had a poor political or extra-kinship concept of the tribe as a whole, the Pygmies being a case in point. The Bushman of the Kalahari desert did indeed get together once a year to talk things over, but the clan was far more important with them than was the tribe, which was most shadowy. There have been people even in the royalist Sudan with practically no tribal concept. The natives of Mongalla, the southern-most province of the Anglo Egyptian Sudan, for example, had no word for "tribe," and apparently possessed only a vague concept of the "tribe-as-a-whole." 6 One certain test of lack of adequate military organization - that is, adequate from modem standards - is a sense of tribalism which will prevent fighting inside the we-group. We have just discussed people with little of this sense. The we-group to such people was some kin organization. Such extended families have had little or no hesitancy in attacking other sibs which were of the same cultural, linguistic, or even social group, large if weak in structure. The Eurasiatic Chuckchee illustrate a transitional condition. The old Siberian tribes generally fought with other tribes but were not above a little intra-tribal scuffiin g . The various branches of the Chuckchee still distrust each other and have occasional fights.7 This is reminiscent of the Crow of Montana, who generally fought an outside group as a whole but could have reasonably lethal struggles between the constituent clans. The distrust of the River Crow for the Mountain Crow is still noticeable. Most Melanesians were to all intents a tribeless and a warless peo ple. The kin group with them was the important social unit, and war does not flourish where the sib is too strong. Such strong kin feeling and military efficiency are almost antonyms. Where kinship
Oxford University Press, 1937 ) , p. 18.
T Bogoraz,
Leonard
F.
Nalder, ed. ,
A Tribal Survey of Monga11a Province ( London :
op. cit., p. 657.
D 9 iz e b

War and the Organization of Society 231 lines cut across those of village, tribe, or other group, and kinship takes precedence, there is little place for real war. The tradition
231
lines cut across those of village, tribe, o r other group, and kinship takes precedence, there is little place for real war. exists in Melanesian Lenarkel that a man would not shoot at his sister's The tradition
exists in Melanesian Lenarkel that a man would not shoot at his sister's
husband if he were a member of the other side in battle.3 Much of
Melanesia had so little concept of the political tribe, of social grouping
husband
beyond the immediate kin, that intra-village fighting was very un-
common. Some groups acknowledged a shadowy central authority,
but a chief who had so little sense of tribal cohesion that he would
buy off raiders by giving them heads from his own people, as in the
common.
beyond the immediate kin, that intra-village fighting was very un Some groups acknowledged a shadowy central authority,
Melanesia had so little concept of the political tribe, of social grouping
if he were a member of the other side in battle. 8 Much of
Banks Islands, could hardly be expected to be an efficient commander.
The Melanesian tribelessness was sometimes reduced by one great
social control institution, the secret association. Thus, if a chief had
but a chief who had so little sense of tribal cohesion that he would buy off raiders by giving them heads from his own people, as in the Banks Islands, could hardly be expected to be an efficient commander. Thus, The Melanesian tribelessness was sometimes reduced by one great
much power on islands where the secret lodge was dominant, he
might speak with authority in his capacity as head of the lodge, not
as chief per se. In tropical West Africa the secret society seemed to
bolster up the rising central authority, but this was hardly true in
Melanesia. It did not act as a king-maker and was a drag on the
social control institution, the secret association.
development of adequate patterns of command, not the reverse.
The linkage between war and the rest of the social pattern is always
interesting, although there are few general statements to be made
for mankind as a whole. Perhaps the most important of these made
possible by this study is that while intense in-group feeling or na-
might speak with authority in his capacity as head of the lodge, not as chief per se. In tropical West Mrica the secret society seemed to bolster up the rising central authority, but this was hardly true in Melanesia. It did not act as a king-maker and was a drag on the development of adequate patterns of command, not the reverse.
much power on islands where the secret lodge was dominant, he
if a chief had
tionalism has made better and tactically more efficient wars, tribe-
lessness has not meant lack of bloodshed. Perhaps the concept of the
state^ such as west and northeast Africa has known, is necessary for
true war properly so-called. The corollary is not true, however, that
the rise of the state brought more wars into the world, nor is there
reason to think that the abolition of the national state would mean
the abolition of institutionalized slaughter. This study has shown
interesting, although there are few general statements to be made possible by this study is that while intense in-group feeling or na tionalism has made better and tactically more efficient wars, tribe for mankind as a whole. Perhaps the most important of these made
The linkage between war and the rest of the social pattern is always
that people with but little social cohesion, little concept of those
political attitudes which produce and maintain the state, have killed
off just as large a percentage of their populations as have the war-
like, well-knit groups.
If the behavior of subpolitical people is any criterion, abolition of
the strong tribe or state might indeed mean the abolition of effective
war on a grand scale, but it would also mean abolition of the longer
lessness has not meant lack of bloodshed. Perhaps the concept of the s such as west and northeast Mrica has known, . is necessary for true w_.EroP_r1y so-called . The corollary is not true, however, that
periods of peace and larger areas of peace which the strong state
affords. Where there is no war- or peace-declaring authority, there
s Humphreys, op, cit., p. 49.
the rise of the state brought more wars into the world, nor is there reason to think that the abolition of the national state would mean \ the abolition of institutionalized slaughter. that people with but little social cohesion, little concept of those political attitudes which produce and maintain the state, have killed like, well-knit groups.
This study has shown \,

I
off just as large a percentage of their populations as have the war
the strong tribe or state might indeed mean the abolition of effective war on a grand scale, but it would also mean abolition of the longer periods of peace and larger areas of peace which the strong state affords.
H the beqavior of subpolitical people is any criterion, abolition of
Where there is no war- or peace-declaring authority, there
Humphreys, op. cit., p. 49.
D 9 iz e b
"
232
232 Primitive War as no peace at all. Brown reports, for example, that there were no
Primitive War
Brown reports, for example, that there were no
regularly organized wars in New Britain but that each independent
r no peace at all.
pendent village.
regularly organized wars in New Britain but that each independent Indeed, continual killing inside the village between
village was in constant and perpetual fear of the next similarly inde-
pendent village. Indeed, continual killing inside the village between
village was in constant and perpetual fear of the next similarly inde hostile families and their allies was socially acceptable. 9 The existence of the strong. far-Hung tribe or state provides peace over wider territories, then, even though the fewer wars fought by them are more intense. Family quarrels which go as far
as
hostile families and their allies was socially acceptable.9
The existence of the strong, far-flung tribe or state provides peace
over wider territories, then, even though the fewer wars fought by
them are more intense. Family quarrels which go as far as man-
killing call into action the police power of the central authority in
large, closely organized societies.
The spread of central authority over territory and population has
man
not always been accomplished by force and coercion. The alliance
killing call into action the police power of the central authority in large, closely organized societies. The spread of central authority over territory and population has not always been accomplished by force and coercion. been purely voluntary. The alliance for war, or confederations such as that of the Iroquois, sometimes has The military alliance was an important trait
for war, or confederations such as that of the Iroquois, sometimes has
been purely voluntary. The military alliance was an important trait
in Samoan sociology. A district would often wait for months until it
could align its allies before embarking on war. The Samoan council
of allies determined affairs of policy, which was strength, but each
group fought under its own leaders, which was weakness.10 Nothing
Drought Greece so much together as the military alliance against the
Persians. External war as well as conquest, then, can knit tribes to-
gether and thus increase the area of peace.
in Samoan sociology.
district would often wait for months until it The Samoan council
A condition intermediate between tribeless localism and adequate
central authority in America existed among such peoples as the Teton-
could align its allies before embarking on war.
Dakota on the Plains and the Plateau Flathead. Such tribes admitted
tribal authority for some affairs of life, and likewise submitted to
tribal war controls of certain kinds. In addition to these, many social
group fought under its own leaders, which was weakness. 1 0 Persians.
of allies determined affairs of policy, which was strength. but each Nothing External war as well as conquest, then, can knit tribes to
affairs were dominated by the family, band, or voluntary group.
brought Greece so much together as the military alliance against the gether and thus increase the area of peace.
They likewise had tribal war parties instead of those organized around
the extended family. The Teton planned a tribal war party in a
council of chiefs, and these plans apparently were well conceived and
executed. Yet it must be admitted that among such people the anarch-
ical uncontrolled, individually organized war party was typical. Their
condition intermediate between tribeless localism and adequate Such tribes admitted
not-too-distant neighbors, the Omaha, likewise had a sense of national-
central authority in America existed among such peoples as the Teton Dakota on the Plains and the Plateau Flathead. tribal war controls of certain kinds. tribal authority for some affairs of life, and likewise submitted to In addition to these, many social affairs were dominated by the family. band, or voluntary group. They likewise had tribal war parties instead of those organized around the extended family. The Teton planned a tribal war party in a council of chiefs. and these plans apparently were well conceived and executed. Yet it must be admitted that among such people the anarch ical uncontrolled, individually organized war party was typical. Their not-too-distant neighbors, the Omaha, likewise had a sense of national ism. For this reason, they thought that defensive war was more honor able than offensive, and a man who acquired war honors in defending women and property was ranked higher than he who achieved his honors
ism. For this reason, they thought that defensive war was more honor-
able than offensive, and a man who acquired war honors in defending
women and property was ranked higher than he who achieved his
honors in offense. These attitudes are understandable among people
* Brown, op. ctt., pp. 1521.
o Ibid., p. 169.
in
offense.
These attitudes
are
understandable among people
9 Brown, op. cU., pp. 152f.
1 0 Ibid., p. 169.
D 9 iz e b

War and the Organization of Society 233 who had mastered agriculture and had, in comparison with most Plains hunters, a sense of a well-knit social order.11
233
There was considerable variation in tribal sentiment and effective
institutions in the Southeast Woodland area. There were monarchical
civil states which succeeded in war, such as the Natchez, and those
whose military success was as limited as the authority of their social
control devices, such as the Choctaw. One eye witness said of the
latter,
This nation is governed by a head chief whose power is absolute only
so far as he knows how to make use of his authority, but as disobedience
is not punished among them, and they do not usually do what is re-
who had mastered agriculture and had, in comparison with most Plains hunters, a sense of a well-knit social order. l 1 There was considerable variation in tribal sentiment and effective institutions in the Southeast Woodland area. There were monarchical civil states which succeeded in war, such as the Natchez, and those whose military success was as limited as the authority of their social control devices, such as the Choctaw. One eye witness said of the latter,
This nation is governed by a head chief whose power is absolute only so far as he knows how to make use of his authority, but as disobedience is not punished among them, and they do not usu a lly do what is re quested of them, except when they want to, it may be said that it is an ill-disciplined govemment. 12
quested of them, except when they want to, it may be said that it is an
ill-disciplined government.12
While most southerners failed to achieve monarchical organization,
yet the idea of tribal solidarity was far from absent. When a for-
eigner killed a Georgia Cusabo, for example, a tribal council was
called. If no one appeared to defend the aggressor, an embassy was
sent to the foreign group to demand satisfaction in the name of all
the Cusabo. Should such people be disposed to peace, their council
weighed the merits of the case and, if finding their tribesman guilty,
had him executed without warning him. Otherwise the Cusabo or-
ganized a war party of the slain man's kin which kept the field until
it had killed the exact number of men they had lost. They then sent
the enemy a token of their satisfaction.13 Bossu said that the Choctaw
thought poorly of a leader who lost any men even though victorious.
This made the chiefs too tender regarding losses and forced them to
take minimum risks through the use of ambuscades, topography, skill
in scouting, care in avoiding ambush, and the dawn attack.14 The
Choctaw may have disappointed Bossu, but the tactical chapters
showed that they could make war of a sort.
The most important point of contrast between America and Africa
was the greater power and authority of the group on the latter conti-
nent. When African kings went forth to war, their subjects went
11 Fletcher and La Flesche, op. ctt., p. 431.
12 Anonymous French Memoir, in Swanton, Source Material for the Social and
Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, p. 90.
n Alexander Hewat, Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colo-
nies of South Carolina and Georgia (London: A. Donaldson, 1790), cited in
Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors, p. 77.
While most southerners failed to achieve monarchical organization, yet the idea of tribal solidarity was far from absent. When a for eigner killed a Georgia Cusabo, for example, a tribal council was called. If no one appeared to defend the aggressor, an embassy was sent to the foreign group to demand satisfaction in the name of all the Cusabo. Should such people be disposed to peace, their council weighed the merits of the case and, if finding their tribesman guilty, had him executed without warning him. Otherwise the Cusabo or ganized a war party of the slain man's kin which kept the field until it had killed the exact number of men they had lost. They then sent the enemy a token of their satisfaction. 18 Bossu said that the Choctaw thought poorly of a leader who lost any men even though victorious. This made the chiefs too tender regarding losses and forced them to take minimum risks through the use of ambuscades, topography, skill in scouting, care in avoiding ambush, and the dawn attack. H The Choctaw may have disappointed Bossu, but the tactical chapters showed that they could make war of a sort. The most important point of contrast between America and Africa was the greater power and authority of the group on the latter conti nent :- When African kings went forth to war, their subjects went
Fletcher and La Flesche, op. cit., p. 431. 12 Anonymous French Memoir, in Swanton, Source Material for the Social and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, p. 90. 1 3 Alexander Hewat, Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colo nies of South Carolina and Georgia ( London : A. Donaldson, 1790 ) , cited in Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors, p. 77. H Bossu, in Swanton, Source Material for the S ocial and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, p. 163.
11
D 9 iz e b
234
234 Primitive War along. No one could pick and choose the campaign he liked, stay
Primitive War
No one could pick and choose the campaign he liked, stay Such a man would have been cut to ribbons in most
along.
at home when he would, plead a bad dream, or some other anarchical
foolishness. Such a man would have been cut to ribbons in most
at home when he would, plead a bad dream, or some other anarchical foolishness.
African societies. Of course this strong social control machinery has
not been observable all over the continent, as noted in the opening of
this chapter; but tribal weakness, the situation of the marginal Afri-
African societies. Of course this strong social control machinery has

not been observable all over the continent, as noted in the opening of this chapter; but tribal weakness, the situation of the marginal Mri cans, has not been typical of the continent. The kingdoms of the Admitted Sudan, the Congo drainage and, far more, the harsh and authoritative kingdoms of East and South Africa are the most typical. that the Zulu kingdom was of late origin, at least in its final extreme form, yet the seed must have fallen on fertile soil, for the Ama-Zulu embraced gladly an authoritative, totalitarian military state. At the end of the typical preparatory shamanizing, the warriors danced, brandished their weapons, and screamed at the chief their intentions of victory. They shouted their pledges that he might do as he pleased with their lives, possessions, and kraals
cans, has not been typical of the continent. The kingdoms of the
Sudan, the Congo drainage and, far more, the harsh and authoritative
kingdoms of East and South Africa are the most typical. Admitted
that the Zulu kingdom was of late origin, at least in its final extreme
form, yet the seed must have fallen on fertile soil, for the Ama-Zulu
embraced gladly an authoritative, totalitarian military state. At the
end of the typical preparatory shamanizing, the warriors danced,
brandished their weapons, and screamed at the chief their intentions
of victory. They shouted their pledges that he might do as he pleased
with their lives, possessions, and kraals if they failed. They were
serious in pledging whole villages to the chief that they would win,
and their chief was serious in accepting this oath.15
This devotion to the nation and its head was spread by the Zulu to
other folk, such as the nearby Thonga, who readily accepted the idea
of national authority. Their preparatory rites were national, not per-
sona] as in America. The chief, the central cell of their social organ-
ism, was threatened, hence all warriors responded to the call to sur-
if they failed.
They were
round and protect him. Individual courage was whipped up in their
un-American war dance, but the rites were for th^ preservation_of
serious in pledging whole villages to the chief that they would win, and their chief was serious in accepting this oath. 11' This devotion to the nation and its head was spread by the Zulu to other folk, such as the nearby Thonga, who readily accepted the idea of national authority. Their preparatory rites were national, not per soal as in America. The chief, the central cell of their social organ is m, was threatened, hence all warriors responded to the call to sur round and protect him. Individual courage was whipped up in their un-American war dance, but the rites were for the group and in honor of its chief. 1 6
the group and in honor of. its chief.16
According to legend, nationalistic ideas were implanted in the lake
region of Africa by white men from the north typified by the culture-
hero Kintu, who probably was a symbol of the Hamite invasion. The
Sahara was a barrier to the diffusion of materials, but it served as a
channel for ideas. It is a point of no importance that the Negro per-
haps obtained some ideas of organization by diffusion, but it is im-
portant that he received them. The American Indians outside the
great focal areas had no barriers like the Sahara between them and
civilization, yet they were in the majority incapable of absorbing
ideas of authoritative social control.
Kidd, op. cit., p. 307.
. preservation
of
i6 Junod, op., cit., p. 76.
According to legend, nationalistic ideas were implanted in the lake region of Mrica by white men from the north typified by the culture hero Kintu, who probably was a symbol of the Hamite invasion. The Sahara was a barrier to the diffusion of materials, but it served as a channel for ideas. It is a point of no importance that the Negro per haps obtained some ideas of organization by diffusion, but it is im The American Indians outside the civilization, yet they were in the majority incapable of absorbing ideas of authoritative social control. 1 11 Kidd, op. cit., p. 307. 1 6 Junod. op., cit., p. 76.
portant that he received them.
great focal areas had no barriers like the Sahara between them and
D 9 iz e b

War and the Organization of Society 235 fi
235
A."
To be sure, the African Negro did not allow himself to be regi- ,<*"
mented in all places without protest, but who would? it was the occasion of civil wars.n
mented in all places without protest, but who would? The western!
The western Ibo did not evolve the kingship and when it was imported to them By contrast, the Dahomeans had Consequently their ene '
To be sure, the African Negro did not allow himself to be regi
Ibo did not evolve the kingship and when it was imported to them' \.,
it was the occasion of civil wars.17 By contrast, the Dahomeans had
a real royal bureaucracy in peace and war. Consequently their en- ;' \
a real royal bureaucracy in peace and war. primitive. I 8
listment, supply, command, etc., were formal, efficient, and non-1 N , >c '
listment, supply, command, etc., were fonnal, efficient, and non
primitive.1s
Study shows that one cannot speak in general regarding the social
organization and military practices of all the South Pacific areas:
Polynesia, Melanesia, Micronesia, and Indonesia. Indonesia, of
course, lies so close to the mainland of Asia that the dominant cultures
are marginal Asiatic and not insular, so will not be discussed at all.
The real point lies in the fact that one must not overstress the concept
of isolation. Many if not most of the coastal peoples of Oceania
course, lies so close to the mainland of Asia that the dominant cultures are marginal Asiatic and not insular, so will not be discussed at all.
Polynesia,
Study shows that one cannot speak in general regarding the social organization and military practices of all the South Pacific areas : Melanesia, Micronesia, and Indonesia. Indonesia,
of
accepted the sea as a challenge, not a barrier. They were the most
successful blue water voyagers of all nonliterate men, surpassing,
The real point lies in the fact that one must not overstress the concept of isolation. Many if not most of the coastal peoples of Oceania accepted the sea as a challenge, not a barrier. They were the most
indeed, civilized Europe, Asia, and Africa until the Renaissance voy-
ages of discovery began.
The opinion among competent ethnologists is that the Polynesians,
at least, came from some place in the Orient at a date of no great
antiquity and that somewhere, somehow, sometimes, they may well
have been in contact with peoples near the centers of ancient civiliza-
tion, which might explain their superior social and military organiza-
tion.
indeed, civilized Europe, Asia, and Africa until the Renaissance voy ages of discovery began. at least, came from some place in the Orient at a date of no great
successful blue water voyagers of all nonliterate men, surpassing,
All Melanesian war, in contrast, has been primitive, but this primi-
The
opinion among competent ethnologists is that the Polynesians,
tivity must be explained sociologically, not geographically. Betel
chewing diffused into hither Melanesia from the west but civilized
tactics did not. Some Polynesian war was hardly primitive. Most,
antiquity and that somewhere, somehow, sometimes, they may well have been in contact with peoples near the centers of ancient civiliza tion. tion, which might explain their superior social and military organiza
though not all, Polynesians were as successful as the Achaean Greeks
as portrayed by Homer, while some of the better organized tribes
could have crushed the well-greaved heroes.
It must be kept in mind that warjs, in Oceania as elsewhere, an
essential part of the societal complex, perhaps of one its strongest
links, and certainly one of its clearest reflectors. The relationship of
efficient social organization in the arts of peace and in the arts of
tivity must be explained sociologically, not geographically.
All Melanesian war, in contrast, has been primitive, but this primi
Betel
group conflict is almost absolute, whether one is speaking of civiliza-
tion or subcivilization. Successful war depends upon team work and
" Meek, op. cit., p. 113.
Herskovits, op. cit., II, p. 70.
tactics did not. Some Polynesian war was hardly primitive. Most, though not all, Polynesians were as successful as the Achaean Greeks as portrayed by Homer, while some of the better organized tribes could have crushed the well-greaved heroes. It must be kept in mind that Js, in Oceania as elsewhere, an esential part of the societal complex, perhaps of one its strongest links, and certainly one of its clearest reHectors . The relationship of efficient social organization in the arts of peace and in the arts of group conflict is almost absolute, whether one is speaking of civiliza Successful war depends upon team work and
IT
chewing diffused into hither Melanesia from the west but civilized
tion or subcivilization.
18
Meek, 01" cU., p . 1 13. Herslcovits, 01" cU., II, p. 70.
D 9 iz e b
236
236 Primitive War /consensus, both of which requke.comnja.nd and discipline. Com[mand and discipline, furthermore, can eventually be no more than
Primitive War
_ _
symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves.
Which was the cart and which the horse is not a question easily an-
'
consensus, both of which require ucomnulnd d discipline . Com mand and discipline, furthermore, can eventually be no more than symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves. swered for all peoples.
task.
swered for all peoples. But Polynesia had great nobles and effective,
Which was the cart and which the horse is not a question easily an But PolyneSia had great nobles and effective,
workable social stratification based upon sensible division of the social
task. Melanesia had none of these things beyond the most rudi-
mentary need. In Polynesia there were tabued kings and war lords
workable social stratification based upon sensible division of the social Melanesia had none of these things beyond the most rudi mentary need. In Polynesia there were tabued kings and war lords descended from the gods. In Melanesia custom was king. Poly nesia had commanders and apprached the military threshold. Mela nesia contained such childish warriors that one would have to come to the simplest parts of Pre-Columbian America or the very darkest Mrica to find their equal in folly. This does not mean that Mela nesians were not as happy as Polynesians, but it does mean that Poly nesian teamwork could have and did defeat Melanesian tribelessness whenever the two came in contact.
descended from the gods. In Melanesia custom was king. Poly-
nesia had commanders and approached the military threshold. Mela-
nesia contained such childish warriors that one would have to come
to the simplest parts of Pre-Columbian America or the very darkest
Africa to find their equal in folly. This does not mean that Mela-
nesians were not as happy as Polynesians, but it does mean that Poly-
nesian teamwork could have and did defeat Melanesian tribelessness
whenever the two came in contact.
One fact which marked the tribes of barbarian Europe as approach-
ing civilized standards was their social organization which could eas-
ily be put to military purposes. Almost all of them had rudimentary
states wherein a type of king ruled, sometimes hedged about by a
council of nobles or elders, sometimes not. In this they differed but
little from those rudimentary kingdoms of Africa. Others had such
strong chieftainships that they could put up effective resistance against
the early imperialists of the classical empires. After all, archeology
shows that these tribes had been receiving waves of cultural in-
fluence from the civilized eastern Mediterranean for a very long pe-
riod before they entered the historical arena. One must go to Cen-
tral Asia, or even to the north of that in search of the truly primitive.
The kinship groups did not have to be destroyed if they were used
wisely. Tacitus revealed that the traditional sib organization of the
Germans, disciplined, subordinated, and welded into working order
by the higher political authority, was one of the sources of Teutonic
strength. Tactical units were bound together by the emotional value
set on blood ties. This gave them strong incentive to courageous
action.19 There is no doubt but that the abolition of sibs can go too
far. The British still enroll their territorial regiments from the same
areas and give them local names. Men of old friendship and kin
One fact which marked the tribes of barbarian Europe as approach ing civilized standards was their social organization which could eas ily be put to military purposes. Almost all of them had rudimentary states wherein a type of king ruled, sometimes hedged about by a council of nobles or elders, sometimes not. In this they differed but little from those rudimentary kingdoms of Mrica. Others had such strong chieftainships that they could put up effective resistance against the early imperialists of the classical empires. Mter all, archeology shows that these tribes had been receiving waves of cultural in fluence from the civilized eastern Mediterranean for a very long pe riod before they entered the historical arena. One must go to Cen tral Asia, or even to the north of that in search of the truly primitive.
ties, led by their ordinary social leaders, make a formidable team.
19 Tacitus, Germania, vii. passim.
The kinship groups did not have to be destroyed if they were used wisely. Tacitus revealed that the traditional sib organization of the Germans, disciplined, subordinated, and welded into working order by the higher political authority, was one of the sources of Teutonic
far. The British still enroll their territorial regiments from the same areas and give them local names. Men of old friendship and kin ties, led by theii- ordinary social leaders, make a formidable team.
strength. Tactical units were bound together by the emotional value set on blood ties. This gave them strong incentive to courageous action. 1 9 There is no doubt but that the abolition of sibs can go too
19 Tacitus, Germania,
vii .
pas.rim.
D 9 iz e b

War and the Organization of Society 237 The United States practice of forming regiments without regard for
2:37
local feeling, the National Guard excepted, overlooks a source of mili-
tary esprit.
The interaction of social organization and war need not be one-
sided. War may affect the social organization as well as the reverse.
The presence of an able and warlike enemy may have an effect upon
the nonmilitary, economic, and social institutions which might never
have taken place in a regime of peace. In another place the Pima
opinion has been cited that the presence of the warlike Apache, raid-
ing as they did from weekly to monthly, forced upon them their sex-
ual division of labor. The presence of an aggresive enemy necessi-
tated the service of the men on permanent war footing so that the
fields had to be tilled by women. The effect of war on the Pima
was most striking. Neither the Spaniard nor the Mexican could cope
with the Apache, so the Pima were left to their own devices. They
therefore concentrated their tilled fields instead of leaving them wide-
spread. They perfected a system of defense and engaged in sham
battles to test and perfect it. A system of runners was instituted to
bring assistance. Physical training was incumbent on all males. In-
deed, all their social life became regulated with reference to possible
Apache attacks, and eventually all their arts, myths, and religion be-
came tinged with the war tension. Russell makes the interesting
comment that, "the Pimas were building up a war cult that in time
might have led them from the lethargic state in which the natural en-
vironment tended to fit them."20 Such* instances clearly show that geo-
graphic determinism cannot tell the whole story of warfare or social
practice.
A similar tradition exists among the Osage. According to their
legends, the military branch of the government passed through two
stages. They claim that originally their social organization was very
chaotic, but under the impact of war they perceived the utility of set-
ting up orderly social controls. The first stage was marked by giv-
ing the control of war to one sib, which carried with it internal au-
thority to suppress disorder. This sib had the sole right to initiate
military action, therefore, and to punish internal strife. Unfortunate-
ly, it became so overburdened with war ceremonial that prompt ac-
tion was out of the question, which led to the second step. The war
ceremonial was stringently reorganized so that the war sib could act
20 Russell, op. at., p. 204.
The United States practice of forming regiments without regard for local feeling, the National Guard excepted, overlooks a source of mili tary esprit. The interaction of social organization and war need not be one sided. War may aHect the social organization as well as the reverse. The presence of an able and warlike enemy may have an eHect upon the nonmilitary, economic, and social institutions which might never have taken place in a regime of peace. In another place the Pima opinion has been cited that the presence of the warlike Apache, raid ing as they did from weekly to monthly, forced upon them their sex ual division of labor. The presence of an aggresive enemy necessi tated the service of the men on permanent war footing so that the fields had to be tilled by women. The eHect of war on the Pima was most striking. Neither the Spaniard nor the Mexican could cope with the Apache, so the Pima were left to their own devices. They therefore concentrated their tilled fields instead of leaving them wide spread. They perfected a system of defense and engaged in sham battles to test and perfect it. A system of runners was instituted to bring assistance. Physical training was incumbent on all males. In deed, all their social life became regulated with reference to possible Apache attacks, and eventually all their arts, myths, and religion be came tinged with the war tension. Russell makes the interesting comment that, "the Pimas were building up a war cult that in time might have led them from the lethargic state in which the natural en vironment tended to fit them. "2 0 Sucn instances clearly show that geo graphic determinism cannot tell the whole story of warfare or social practice. A similar tradition exists among the Osage. According to their legends, the military branch of the government passed through two stages. They claim that originally their social organization was very chaotic, but under the impact of war they perceived the utility of set ting up orderly social controls. The first stage was marked by giv ing the control of war to one sib, which carried with it internal au thority to suppress disorder. This sib had the sole right to initiate military action, therefore, and to punish internal strife. Unfortunate ly, it became so overburdened with war ceremonial that prompt ac tion was out of the question, which led to the second step. The war ceremonial was stringently reorganized so that the war sib could act
20
Russell, 01" cU., p.
204.
238
238 Primitive War with speed in an emergency. It was furthermore seen wise to per-
Primitive War
It was furthermore seen wise to per
with speed in an emergency.
mit the other groups to organize war parties under certain circum-
stances.21
The transition of a democratic people to a monarchical one has
mit the other groups to organize war parties under certain circum stances. 2 1 The transition of a democratic people to a monarchical one has taken place under historically observable conditions. It is reported that the Miskito of Central America were at one time quite demo cratic except during war, when the council of elders appointed a war chief from among the distinguished men. Later under the pressure He began holding Did warfare become With of continued war, and with British inspiration and protection, the Miskito war chief rose to the position of a king. large areas which he governed by village chiefs. more efficient under the new arrangement? Attention is merely called to this parallel.
taken place under historically observable conditions. It is reported
that the Miskito of Central America were at one time quite demo-
cratic except during war, when the council of elders appointed a war
chief from among the distinguished men. Later under the pressure
of continued war, and with British inspiration and protection, the
Miskito war chief rose to the position of a king. He began holding
large areas which he governed by village chiefs. Did warfare become
more efficient under the new arrangement? Apparently it did. With
the kingship, Miskito rule spread over the Sumu, Paya, and Rama.22
Attention is merely called to this parallel. There is no need to do
more with readers historically trained to appreciate the rise of Euro-
pean kingdoms, civil states, feudal institutions, and dictatorships.
Theorists in the past have often ascribed to war and conquest the
Apparently it did.
chief role in the formation of the state and civil society. Later writ-
ers have been doubtful of such simple explanations and have consid-
the kingship, Miskito rule spread over the Sumu, Paya, and Rama. 22 There is no need to do more with readers historically trained to appreciate the rise of Euro pean kingdoms, civil states, feudal institutions, and dictatorships. Theorists in the past have often ascribed to war and conquest the chief role in the formation of the state and civil society. ered other methods of attaining civilized conditions. such works as Moret's Later writ Since there ers have been doubtful of such simple explanations and have consid have been but few regions with the long record of Egypt, as related in
ered other methods of attaining civilized conditions. Since there
have been but few regions with the long record of Egypt, as related in
such works as Moret's From Tribe to Empire, it must be admitted that
that rise from a kin society to the civil state cannot be described for
the world as a whole.
The comparative ethnography and tradition of Indian America tend
to show that strong military patterns followed the strengthening of
the social controls into rudimentary political bodies or states. The
American evidence, cloudy as it is, does not bear out the military de-
"~ terminists without important exceptions. In Africa one finds a dif-
ferent situation. The military determinists could find one convincing
text book situation after another. On that continent war produced
many though not all of the states. That this situation was caused by
the greater and more complicated mass migrations and invasions of
From Tribe to Empire, it must be admitted that
that continent is most possible. But why should this happen in Africa
that rise from a kin society to the civil state cannot be described for the world as a whole. The comparative ethnography and tradition of Indian America tend to show that strong military patterns
more than it did in America? Or is it that we do not have adequate
knowledge of what happened in America?
21 La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of the Chiefs, pp. 65f.
22 Conzemius, op. cit., pp. 82ff.
followed the strengthening of

The
the social controls into rudimentary political bodies or states. -- terminists without important exceptions. ferent situation. text book situation after another. many though not all of the states. that continent is most possible. more than it did
American evidence, cloudy as it is, does not bear out the military de In Africa one finds a dif The military determinists could find one convincing
On
that continent war produced
That this situation was caused by
the greater and more complicated mass migrations and invasions of But why should this happen in Africa Or is it that we do not have adequate
in
America?
knowledge of what happened in America? 2 1 La Flesche, The Osage Tribe: Rite of the Chie/8, pp. 65. 2 2 Conzemius, op. cit., pp. 82ff.
D 9 iz e b
War
o^^V1* War and the Organization of Society 239 The situation is rather clear in the southwestern Sudan. A nu-
and
the
Organizaon of
Society
A
239
nu
The situation is rather clear in the southwestern dan. in that area.
merous, hardworking population with a relatively high culture lived
merous, hardworking population with a relatively high culture lived sults in stored-up food which is a temptation to hungry people from less favored regions. When the starved barb arian s assailed the southwestern United States com-growers, those people simply quit, which is one of the important reasons why the pueblo area shrank and shrank. Not so in fighting Africa I The threat of defeat united Wide many communities in defense of their lives and property. into peace times.
As noted, work in favorable environments produces re
in that area. As noted, work in favorable environments produces re-
sults in stored-up food which is a temptation to hungry people from
less favored regions. When the starved barbarians assailed the
southwestern United States corn-growers, those people simply quit,
which is one of the important reasons why the pueblo area shrank
and shrank. Not so in fighting Africa! The threat of defeat united
many communities in defense of their lives and property. Wide-
spread war-chieftainships and confederacies arose which survived
into peace times. When outside aggressions welded wide territories
into defensive organizations, this added strength was used to the det-
riment of some still independent peoples.
Further south, where the forests were too dense for large scale op-
spread war-chieftainships and confederacies arose which survived into defensive organizations, this added strength was used to the det riment of some still independent peoples. Further south, where the forests were too dense for large scale op erations, the people remained separate and martially incompetent ex cept in the west Bantu kingdoms, such as those of Congo, Bushongo, . and others. Constant contact with enemy peoples in an open country did not produce civil governments on the American Great Plains. made an effort or remembered how to grow com. to defend. veloped among them. In that region agriculture was too poorly developed, and only a few tribes There was little The concept of territoriality was therefore too weakly de By contrast, the opcm country of the grain It is a fertile region When outside aggressions welded wide territories
erations, the people remained separate and martially incompetent ex-
cept in the west Bantu kingdoms, such as those of Congo, Bushongo.
and others.
Constant contact with enemy peoples in an open country did not
produce civil governments on the American Great Plains. In that
region agriculture was too poorly developed, and only a few tribes
made an effort or remembered how to grow corn. There was little
to defend. The concept of territoriality was therefore too weakly de-
veloped among them. By contrast, the open country of the grain-
growing Sudan permitted the formation of the civil state after the
people had been hammered and welded by war. It is a fertile region
without forests, marshes, or rivers terrible enough to interfere with
military communications. In such areas as Ibo, and others to the
south, the lines of communication were too cut up for the formation
of such strong states as the Sudanic empire of Bornu.
Parenthetically, the influence of Islam in the formation of kingdoms
and empires on the Gold, Ivory, and Slave Coasts must not be over-
estimated. The Arab and Mohammedan invasions and missionary wars
had strong influence, but the rise of some strong states, Bornu and the
Fulani for example, antedated either the birth of the Prophet or the
growing Sudan permitted the formation of the civil state after the people had been hammered and welded by war. military communications. without forests, marshes, or rivers terrible enough to interfere with In such areas as lbo, and others to the south, the lines of communication were too cut up for the formation of such strong states as the Sudanic empire of Bornu. Parenthetically, the influence of Islam in the formation of kingdoms and empires on the Gold, Ivory, and Slave Coasts must not be over estimated. The Arab and Mohammedan invasions and missionary wars had strong influence, but the rise of some strong states, Bornu and the Fulani for example, antedated either the birth of the Prophet or the importance of his faith. The west African kingdoms before Islam's rise to power were ex amples of the turned worm, as in the case of the Iroquois in America. Founded for defense, they almost always became aggressive. Defense taught them the elements of true war, which elements could in tum
importance of his faith.
The west African kingdoms before Islam's rise to power were ex-
amples of the turned worm, as in the case of the Iroquois in America.
Founded for defense, they almost always became aggressive. Defense
taught them the elements of true war, which elements could in turn
D 9 iz e b
240
240 Primitive War be used to take other people's property by capture or tribute. Binger
Primitive War
said that as soon as any Negro chief could command twenty thousand
soldiers he dreamed of empire. His standard of living rose and, as he
had no budget, he had to hunt slaves to make up his deficit.23
America might have had another story to tell if the southwestern
said that as soon as any Negro chief could command twenty thousand soldiers he dreamed of empire. His standard of living rose and, as he had no budget, he had to hunt slaves to make up his deficit . 28
be used to take other people's property by capture or tribute. Bin ger
pueblo-building tribes had possessed the politico-military acumen of
the Fulani. Both were beset by hungry men, but war, government,
and confederation fitted the cultural pattern of the one and not the
other. Felt need is not always sufficient to call forth invention, or
even the acceptance of devices which other people have invented.
Culture and social life do not work that automatically. One need
not turn to such humble peoples as Bushmen, Pygmies, and Hotten-
tots. All Negroes did not have or use the capacity to form military
states for their own survival. There were many folks among them
whose patterns permitted an undisciplined, untrained, worthless war-
rior class who loved war well enough but could no more develop or
accept real war or war-chieftainship than could the Plains coup-
counters. But as evidence of the untrustworthiness of unilateral theo-
ries of social development, witness the intersectional fights in Mon-
galla. External threats in this region had no unifying effect. The
Moru did not unite to repel the Zande menace, and the Lugbari
failed to unite against the Kawa incursions. The expectable process
did not take place.24
Lack of diffusional opportunities does not account for such failure,
for the Moru were instructed by Zande efficiency. Just what part in-
dividual and tribal attitudes play in military development is no better
understood than in other phases of social history. No doubt the Zulu
had some effective organization before the rise of the military geniuses
Dingiswayo and Chaka, but under them they achieved a social ef-
fectiveness in all realms and a proficiency in military techniques and
organization, in particular, which left little to be desired. Their history
and character in the Nineteenth Century were admittedly molded by
their military system, before which all other walks of life had to yield
America might have had another story to tell if the southwestern pueblo-building tribes had possessed the politico-military acumen of the Fulani. Both were beset by hungry men, but war, government, and confederation fitted the cultural pattern of the one an d not the other. Felt need is not always sufficient to call forth invention, or even the acceptance of devices which other people have invented. Culture and social life do not work that automatically. On e need not turn to such humble peoples as Bushmen, Pygmies, and Hotten tots. All Negroes did not have or use the capacity to form military states for their own survival. There were many folks among them whose patterns permitted an undisciplined, untrained, worthless war rior class who loved war well enough but could no more develop or accept real war or war-chieftainship than could the Plains coup counters. But as evidence of the untrustworthiness of unilateral theo ries of social development, witness the intersectional fights in Mon galla. External threats in this region had no unifying effect. The Morn did not unite to repel the Zande menace, and the Lugbari failed to unite against the Kawa incursions. The expectable process did not take place . 2 Lack of diffusional opportunities does not account for such failure, for the Morn were instructed by Zande efficiency. Just what part in dividual and tribal attitudes play in military development is no better understood than in other phases of social history. No doubt the Zulu had some effective organization before the rise of the military geniuses Dingiswayo and Chaka, but under them they achieved a social ef fectiveness in all realms and a proficiency in military techniques an d organization, in particular, which left little to be desired. Their history and character in the Nineteenth Century were admittedly molded by their military system, before which all other walks of life had to yield precedence, but to what extent was their adaptation of adequ ate war patterns governed by their character ? 2 11
I, p .
precedence, but to what extent was their adaptation of adequate war
patterns governed by their character?25
23 Louis G. Binger, Du Niger au Golfe de Guinee (Paris: Hatchette, 1892),
I, p. 502.
** Nalder, op. cit., p. 18.
Krige, op. cft., p. 261.
28 Louis G. Binger, Du Niger 502. 2 . Nalder, op. cit., p. 1 8. U Krige, op. cit., p. 261 .
au
Golfe de Guinee ( Paris : Hatchette, 1892 ) ,
D 9 iz e b

War and the Organization of Society 241 Zulu government and Zulu war were indeed adequate. The Zulu
241
The Zulu
rise to power was not caused by new weapons but an improved meth-
rise to power was not caused by new weapons but an improved meth
Zulu government and Zulu war were indeed adequate. in part, of handling one considered obsolete.
od, in part, of handling one considered obsolete. Let us pause once
more to stress die principle that war, true war, is a matter of_ social ~
od,
organization, notj)f material jgujture_gjr_weapons. Zulu war represents V"\*
acultural thrust by a non-material culture, and not the more common ]' \< ^
cultural lag so often observed. / "
The Zulu spread their ideas of royal and military power to many
anization, not o IJlaterial culture or weapons. Zulu war represents a cultural thrUst by a non-material culture, and not the more common cultural lag so often observed. peoples in South Mrica. The Zulu spread their ideas of royal and military power to many Not
more to stress the
pnciple.
at ar, true war, is a matter of social
Let us pause once
peoples in South Africa. Not all of them, however, abandoned the
clan for the royal principle quite as wholeheartedly as the Zulu.
The Thonga, for example, retained many features of the old kinship
society. Indeed, that which had gone before formed a good founda-
tion for the later condition. The old clan chief traditionally acquired
his position because of a magical and spiritual character derived from
his sacred ancestor. While this laid upon him a vast tabu system, it
was not enough to emasculate his power of administration, so that
The Thonga, for example, retained many features of the old kinship tion for the later condition. his sacred ancestor. society.
clan for the royal principle quite as wholeheartedly as the Zulu.
all of them, however, abandoned the
the new Zulu idea could constitute an effective overlay. The fusion of
Indeed, that which had gone before formed a good founda
the two, the old and the new, formed an absolutist state, a well-or-
ganized government with good laws and courts and a keen sense of
justice. The last of these South African military empires was de-
his position because of a magical and spiritual character derived from was not enough to emasculate his power of administration, so that the two, the old and the new, formed an absolutist state, a well-or justice. The last of these South Mrican military empires was de While this laid upon him a vast tabu system, it
The old clan chief traditionally acquired
stroyed in 1895-1896 by the Portuguese victory over Gungunyana at
Mandlakazi.
The story of the state supported by arms can also be told for
Dahomey. "Of the forces which contributed to the stability of the
monarchy, the army was of first importance."2* The Dahomeans evi-
the new Zulu idea could constitute an effective overlay.
The fusion of
dently overdid the thing, for Burton says that the population of the
kingdom was not one third what the natural resources should have
supported. The annual withdrawal of both sexes from industry to
ganized government with good laws and courts and a keen sense of stroyed in
indulge in the slaving wars, the horrible sacrifices of the "Customs"
at the capital, the conscription of so many women into the king's
army of virgin Amazons, and the not infrequent disastrous defeats
held the population in check.27
Mandlakazi.
1895-1896 by the Portuguese victory over Gungunyana at
Sociology was made to conform to the war patterns in several places
in Melanesia. In the Northwest Solomons, for example, a man had to
support his fellow clansmen in war. One of the chief causes for accul-
turation and the breakup of the clan spirit in this area has been the
26 Herskovits, op. ctt., I, p. 70.
Dahomey. "Of the forces which contributed to the stability of the monarchy, the army was of first importance ." 2 8 The Dahomeans evi
The story of the state supported by arms can also be told for
27 Burton, op. ctt., II, pp. 155f.
dently overdid the thing, for Burton says that the population of the supported.
kingdom was not one third what the natural resources should have
indulge in the slaving wars, the horrible sacrifices of the "Customs" at the capital, the conscription of so many women into the Icing's army of virgin Amazons, and the not infrequent disastrous defeats held the population in check. 2 7
The annual withdrawal of both sexes from industry to
Sociology was made to conform to the war patterns in several places in Melanesia. In the Northwest Solomons, for example, a man had to support his fellow clansmen in war. One of the chief causes for accul turation and the breakup of the clan spirit in this area has been the 2 8 Herskovits. op. cit., I. p. 70. 2 7 Burton, op. cit., II, pp. 155f.
DI
Iz.e b
242
242 Primitive War peace which the white man has enforced. The clan no longer has a
Primitive War
real job.2s
A conformation of the social pattern to war needs, reminiscent of
our own history, has been clearly apparent in Polynesia. Mangaian
sociology shows traces of two opposing forces, an older group of
settlers who wished the society to be characterized by rank and title
in hereditary succession, and a newer group who wished it to be based
on physical force and war. Buck says that succession to title and
property was strongly influenced by this conflict, and that success
in war was the concept which was increasing in importance.29
Such people, organized into a caste society with divine chiefs, were
capable of invading, occupying, and subjecting no mean areas of ter-
ritory. The leader of a successful war party could gain the temporal
lordship over all Mangaia, setting up the power of a military dictator
which overshadowed that of any tabued hereditary lord. The latter
could only become a rot faineant, occupied with sacred things. The
real or military chieftainship was confirmed or changed with each
battle. If the dictator chose to abdicate in favor of another, he be-
came the military right hand of the new temporal lord.30
Another sociological effect of abruptly altering the war pattern can
be seen in Samoa. Brown thinks the long and continual wars kept
the population down. Exposure in trench or fort, battle casualties,
food scarcity during war, the separation of sexes for the duration, to-
gether with the very few marriages which could be consummated while
the men were in the field checked any real increase in numbers.31
Brown might also have mentioned that abortion and infanticide pre-
vailed in Samoa. Thus war kept population down, and peace should
have increased it. However, the peace-making European did not
bring an increase in Polynesian population, strangely enough, but de-
population. It cannot be positively stated that this situation was
caused by the introduction of a new culture which upset the old
ways and caused men to cease to be proud and life-loving, as Pitt-
Rivers thinks. Yet there is an element of truth in what Brown says,
and we have seen that social organization of any kind is based on the
underlying population.
2s Blackwood, op. cit., p. 33.
" Ibid., p. 35.
peace which the white man has enforced. The clan no longer has a real job. 2 8 A conformation of the social pattern to war needs, reminiscent of our own history, has been clearly apparent in Polynesia. Mangaian sociology shows traces of two opposing forces, an older group of settlers who wished the society to be characterized by rank and title in hereditary succession, and a newer group who wished it to be based on physical force and war. Buck says that succession to title and property was strongly influenced by this conflict, and that success in war was the concept which was increasing in importance. 29 Such people, organized into a caste society with divine chiefs, were capable of invading, occupying, and subjecting no mean areas of ter ritory. The leader of a successful war party could gain the temporal lordship over all Mangaia, setting up the power of a military dictator which overshadowed that of any tabued hereditary lord. The latter could only become a roi faineant, occupied with sacred things. The real or military chieftainship was confirmed or changed with each battle. If the dictator chose to abdicate in favor of another, he be came the military right hand of the new temporal lord. 3 0 Another sociological effect of abruptly altering the war pattern can be seen in Samoa. Brown thinks the long and continual wars kept the population down. Exposure in trench or fort, battle casualties, food scarcity during war, the separation of sexes for the duration, to gether with the very few marriages which could be consummated while the men were in the field checked any real increase in numbers:H Brown might also have mentioned that abortion and infanticide pre vailed in Samoa. Thus war kept population down, and peace should have increased it. However, the peace-making European did not bring an increase in Polynesian population, strangely enough, but de population. It cannot be positively stated that this situation was caused by the introduction of a new culture which upset the old ways and caused men to cease to be proud and life-loving, as Pitt Rivers thinks. Yet there is an element of truth in what Brown says, and we have seen that social organization of any kind is based on the underlying population.
28
80
2 9 Buck,
81
Blackwood, op. cit., p. 33. op. cit., p. 84. Ibid., p. 35. Brown, op . cit., p . 173.
D 9 iz e

War and the Organization of Society 243 The concept of society organized on a territorial basis has been
243
The concept of society organized on sanguineous society.
territorial basis has been

a
mentioned as one of the marks of civil society in contrast with con-
mentioned as one of the marks of civil society in contrast with con
sanguineous society. This has always had a marked effect on a
tribe's military patterns. There is a rough correlation between
This has always had a marked effect on

There is
a
this trait and true war which, however, has been far from automatic.
tribe's military patterns.
rough correlation between
The South American Indians as a whole, for example, had a keener
sense of territoriality than did tribes of no more cultural complexity
this trait and true war which, however, has been far from automatic. The South American Indians as a whole, for example, had a keener sense of territoriality than did tribes of no more cultural complexity on the northern continent. The Brazilian littoral was so valuable be But, for the most cause of the good things the sea yielded that there was incessant part, the primitive warrior has been more concerned with his kin than his land. The appreciation of this concept in, Mrica was remarkably stronger than Indian war for it during the Sixteenth Century.
on the northern continent. The Brazilian littoral was so valuable be-
cause of the good things the sea yielded that there was incessant
Indian war for it during the Sixteenth Century. But, for the most
part, the primitive warrior has been more concerned with his kin than
his land.
The appreciation of this concept in Africa was remarkably stronger
than in America. Whether as herders of domestic animals, or as
farmers, or both, the Negroes had a higher valuation of economic
land as a supporting agency than simple hunters and gatherers ever
could have had. The Indian apparently devolved his agriculture in
America, and an effective domesticator of animals he never became,
save in the alpaca area. The reverence which the Negro has for the
soil, the deification of the mythical lords of the soil, is most impres-
in
America.
Whether as herders of domestic animals, or as
sive. There have been no Negro groups of any importance without
appreciation of gardening, farming, and herding. This, unfortunate-
farmers, or both, the Negroes had a higher valuation of economic land as a supporting agency than simple hunters and gatherers ever could have had. The Indian apparently devolved his agriculture in The reverence which the Negro has for the America, and an effective domesticator of animals he never became, save in the alpaca area. sive. soil, the deification of the mythical lords of the soil, is most impres There have been no Negro groups of any importance without This, unfortunate He worked under a cultural handi appreciation of gardening, farming, and herding. ly, cannot be said of the Indian. cap and,
ly, cannot be said of the Indian. He worked under a cultural handi-
cap and, if these pages compare him unfavorably with the African
as a warrior, one must keep this extenuating circumstance in mind.
Furthermore, African Negroes, almost as a whole, came into knowl-
edge of the metallurgical arts very early in their cultural history.
Since in the history of our own people iron came later than copper-
bronze metallurgy, it is a fair premise that copper-bronze smithing has
been more obvious than iron metallurgy. It is then possible to make
a really unfavorable comparison of the Indian with the Negro. The
latter early appreciated and utilized the less obvious metal, while the
former, excepting the Peruvians, could not grasp the virtues of copper
except in the most rudimentary fashion.
The point to be noticed is that active agriculture and herding not
only have provided the economic basis (and cause) of effective war-
fare but, linked with metals, have been the great builders of the state.
if these pages compare him unfavorably with the Mrican as a warrior, one must keep this extenuating circumstance in mind.
Furthermore, Mrican Negroes, ahnost as a whole, came into knowl edge of the metallurgical arts very early in their cultural history. Since in the history of our own people iron came later than copper
They have contained the seeds of the destruction of kin societies and
bronze metallurgy, it is a fair premise that copper-bronze smithing has been more obvious than iron metallurgy. It is then possible to make The a really unfavorable comparison of the Indian with the Negro.
latter early appreciated and utilized the less obvious metal, while the former, excepting the Peruvians, could not grasp the virtues of copper except in the most rudimentary fashign. The point to be noticed is that active agriculture and herding not only have provided the economic basis ( and cause ) of effective war fare but, linked with metals, have been the great builders of the state. They have contained the seeds of the destruction of kin societies and
D 9 iz e
244 Primitive War
-- v
244
Primitive War
That
the building of civil governments.
i1
society has always made
the building of civil governments. That <%yjl society has always made
more effective war than could a sib or
kin
society should be obvious. There is some
imore effective war than could a sib or kin society should be obvious.
It has been said, perhaps too loosely, that America was a democratic
It has been said, perhaps too loosely, that America was a democratic continent while Mrica was the continent of the kings. validity in this, for north of Mexico and in most of South America, Indian social groups considered themselves peoples rather than coun tries. It was quite different in Mrica. There were kingdoms which considered the tribal area of greater importance than the blood tie. Few American Indians would have had the emotional reaction of the Bantu BaThonga when it became known that their territory was . foot touched the land. The women fled and the men hastened to j the capital. 8 2 It is not meant that the Indian had no nept o territoriality. The concept, however, was pale in comparison to the Mrican one, and this must be taken as one explanation for the In dian's inferiority as a soldier. The importance of closely integrated and efficiently functioning socio-political institutions has been strikingly demonstrated in the power or lack of power to declare states of war or peace. To be sure, many people think that the universal state of all persons below literate levels has been one of war. This hardly squares with the facts. Many tribes in varying states of culture considered war the unusual, so un usual that it required some formal act of declaration. It is impos sible to say that this idea correlates with either the very simple or the complicated cultures. It has been evident in all degrees of cul tural development. Perhaps no simpler or more wretched people existed in either of the Americas than the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego. They were also accustomed to bitter and long standing feuds. Nevertheless, one Captain Low, quoted by Cooper, says that the and with a neck halter of hide. Around this they stuck spears, ar rows and clubs. This they set up as a declaration of war. A similar method was used by the Auracanians. 8 8 Among the somewhat more developed Plains-Ojibway, war was declared by the soldier society, the okUcita, who, upon sufficient
82 Junod, op. cU., p. 455 .
continent while Africa was the continent of the kings. There is some
validity in this, for north of Mexico and in most of South America,
Indian social groups considered themselves peoples rather than coun-
tries. It was quite different in Africa. There were kingdoms which
considered the tribal area of greater importance than the blood tie.
Few American Indians would have had the emotional reaction of
the Bantu BaThonga when it became known that their territory was
invaded. Anyone could and did give the hue and cry once a hostile
foot touched the land. The women fled and the men hastened to
the capital.32 It is not meant that the Indian had no concept of
territoriality. The concept, however, was pale in comparison to the
African one, and this must be taken as one explanation for the In-
invaded.
Anyone could and did give the hue and cry once a hostile
dian's inferiority as a soldier.
The importance of closely integrated and efficiently functioning
socio-political institutions has been strikingly demonstrated in the
power or lack of power to declare states of war or peace. To be sure,
many people think that the universal state of all persons below literate
levels has been one of war. This hardly squares with the facts. Many
tribes in varying states of culture considered war the unusual, so un-
usual that it required some formal act of declaration. It is impos-
sible to say that this idea correlates with either the very simple 01
the complicated cultures. It has been evident in all degrees of cul-
tural development. Perhaps no simpler or more wretched people
existed in either of the Americas than the inhabitants of Tierra del
Fuego. They were also accustomed to bitter and long standing feuds.
Nevertheless, one Captain Low, quoted by Cooper, says that the
West Patagonians made a rude image of a man with long red teeth
and with a neck halter of hide. Around this they stuck spears, ar-
rows and clubs. This they set up as a declaration of war. A similar
method was used by the Auracanians.33
Among the somewhat more developed Plains-Ojibway, war was
declared by the soldier society, the okitcita, who, upon sufficient
33 John M. Cooper, Analytical and Critical Bibliography of the Tribes of
Tierra del Fugo and Adjacent Territory, Bulletin 63, Bureau of American Ethnol-
ogy (Washington: 1917), p. 154.
West Patagonians made a rude image of a man with long
red
teeth
ogy
88,. John M. Cooper, Analytical and Critical Blloaphy of the Tribe. of Tierra del Fugo and Adfacent Territory, Bulletin 63, Bureau of American Ethnol
( Washington: 1917 ), p. 154.
D 9 iz e

War and the Organization of Society 245 injury, sent tobacco by a runner to each band or camp. The enemy was not informed. The ceremonial included only friendly bands,
245
and was never more than semi-public, or semi-private, for their war-
fare never got beyond such a condition.34
When the somewhat better organized but yet simple Canadian
Algonkians went to war, they sent as a messenger to the people they
intended to attack a slave formerly captured from that people, bear-
ing an axe with a handle painted red and black.35 The Huron sent a
black wampum belt to the enemy-to-be.
The royal Natchez lagged little behind the level which civil and
civilized states had achieved a few years ago. They declared war by
leaving a "hieroglyph" picture in enemy territory to announce their
intention of attacking at a certain phase of the moon.31 The any thing-
but-royal Pomo behaved similarly. This, to be sure, destroyed the
surprise element, which may be why moder n nations have lost their
manners.
If a tribe with a concept of nationalism lived in contiguity with
one which had little or none, the primitivity of the latter was imme-
diately apparent. An instance of this was seen in the continual wars
between the Plateau Salishan Flathead and the Plains Blackfoot. The
former had a fair concept of nationality. The hereditary high chief
alone had the power of declaring war and peace, aided by his council.
The Blackfoot idea was not so strong. No man or body of men could
bind the tribe, or for that matter, authoritatively commit one band.
The Flathead wished the right to pass east of the Rockies to hunt
bison on the Great Plain, while the Blackfoot, lacking adequate vege-
table food, wished to wander into the Flathead valleys in the spring
to gather bitter root and camas. Upon many occasions the Flathead
thought they had concluded a valid treaty with all the Blackfoot to
wander onto the Plains, only to find themselves assailed by Piegan
bands whom they considered friendly. Very naturally they would
then attack the first Blackfoot band which came onto their bitter root
flats as treaty breakers, although it might be the same band with which
they originally had negotiated. The fact that the Flathead had an
** Skinner, Political Organisation, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains-Ojibway
and Plains-Cree, pp. 490f.
35 Lahontan, in Canick Mallery, Picture-Writing of the American Indians,
Annual Report 10, Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington: 1880-1889),
p. 358.
36 ibid., pp. 358, sea
injury, sent tobacco by a runner to each band or camp. The enemy was not infonned. The ceremonial included only friendly bands, and was never more than semi-public, or semi-private, for their war fare never got beyond such a condition.a When the somewhat better organized but yet simple Canadian Algonkians went to war, they sent as a messenger to the people they intended to attack a slave fonnerly captured from that people, bear ing an axe with a handle painted red and black.1Ii The Huron sent a black wampum belt to the enemy-to-be. The royal Natchez lagged little behind the level which civil and civilized states had achieved a few years ago. They declared war by leaving a "hieroglyph" picture in enemy territory to announce their intention of attacking at a certain phase of the moon. 8 8 The anything but-royal Pomo behaved similarly. This, to be sure, destroyed the surprise element, which may be why modem nations have lost their manners. If a tribe with a concept of nationalism lived in contiguity with one which had little or none, the primitivity of the latter was imme diately apparent. An instance of this was seen in the continual wars between the Plateau Salishan Flathead and the Plains Blackfoot. The fonner had a fair concept of nationality. The hereditary high chief alone had the power of declaring war and peace, aided by his council. The Blackfoot idea was not so strong. No man or body of men could bind the tribe, or for that matter, authoritatively commit one band. The Flathead wished the right to pass east of the Rockies to hunt bison on the Great Plain, while the Blackfoot, lacking adequate vege table food, wished to wander into the Flathead valleys in the spring to gather bitter root and camas. Upon many occasions the Flathead thought they had concluded a valid treaty with all the Blackfoot to wander onto the Plains, only to find themselves assailed by Piegan bands whom they considered friendly. Very naturally they would then attack the first Blackfoot band which came onto their bitter root Hats as treaty breakers, although it might be the same band with which they originally had negotiated. The fact that the Flathead had an 84 Skinner, PoUtical OrganlzatWn, Cult8, and Ceremonle.r of the PlaiM-Ojibway and Plains-Cree, pp. 490. 8Ii Lahontan, in Garrick Mallery, Picture-Writing of the American Indiana, Annual Report 10, Bureau of American Ethnology ( Washington: 1880-1889 ) , p. 358.
a6
Ibid., pp. 358, 362.
D 9 iz e
246
246 Primitive War authority which could commit the nation and the Blackfoot did not
Primitive War
was the source of bitter warfare over several centuries.37
In Africa this power has varied with the other powers of the king-
ship. Many kingdoms have expected the king to take counsel with
his local chiefs. Just who these chiefs were and just what was their
source of authority has an important bearing. If they were survivors
of a formerly important sib system, that was one thing. If they
were the appointees and therefore creatures of the king, that was
another. This latter was the most common situation among the
strong South African monarchies. Such principalities never were
feudal in the European sense, so there never was some Duke of
Burgundy or Earl of Warwick to set his will against that of the king.
This is not saying that the king was in all cases absolute, for some
tribes not only had officials who were king-appointers but also who
were king-deposers. Foreign relations were, however, always the
royal prerogative wherever monarchy existed. The African kings
were seldom field commanders themselves, so the right to declare
war and peace was an important part of the war complex in their
estimation.
The methods, or lack of method, and forms of declaring war and
peace have been more manifold in Africa than those found in America.
Strangely enough, there has been some tendency for the formalities
to decline as the power of a central government has risen. The kings
have been the realists, not the democrats.
The politically retarded Nigerians, for example, threw away the
principle of surprise for reasons of state. When one town wished to
fight another, it informed the enemy by two messengers who laid
some powder, shot, and caps on a plantain leaf upon the road near
the enemy town. Except among the northeastern Ibibio, who gave
no warning, the fighting started at the boundary on a day agreed
upon by both sides. The peace declaration was almost Californian
in its formality. When one side wearied, it sent to the enemy one of
its own men or a neutral friend dressed in palm leaves and white
bast, carrying peppers in his hand. If the proposal was accepted,
both sides met at the boundary and sacrificed a goat, a dog, and
sometimes a cow. A neutral chief sometimes divided a palm leaf
among the parties. Talbot says the neighboring Oronn celebrated
37 Harry H. Turney-High, "Cooking Camas and Bitter Root," American An-
thropologist, XXXVI, n.. 1933, p. 283.
authority which could commit the nation and the Blackfoot did not was the source of bitter warfare over several centuries. 8 7 In Africa this power has varied with the other powers of the king ship. Many kingdoms have expected the king to take counsel with his local chiefs. Just who these chiefs were and just what was their source of authority has an important bearing. If they were survivors of a formerly important sib system, that was one thing. If they were the appointees and therefore creatures of the king, that was another. This latter was the most common situation among the strong South African monarchies. Such principalities never were feudal in the European sense, so there never was some Duke of Burgundy or Earl of Warwick to set his will against that of the king. This is not saying that the king was in all cases absolute, for some tribes not only had officials who were king-appointers but also who were king-deposers. Foreign relations were, however, always the royal prerogative wherever monarchy existed. The African kings were seldom field commanders themselves, so the right to declare war and peace was an important part of the war complex in their estimation. The methods, or lack of method, and forms of declaring war and peace have been more manifold in Africa than those found in America. Strangely enough, there has been some tendency for the formalities o decline as the power of a central govern ment has .risen. The kiii gs have been the realists, not the democrats. The politically retarded igerian$, for example, threw away the principle of surprise for reasons of state. When one town wished to fight another, it informed the enemy by two messengers who laid some powder, shot, and caps on a plantain leaf upon the road near the enemy town. Except among the northeastern Ibibio, who gave no warning, the fighting started at the boundary on a day agreed upon by both sides. The peace declaration was almost Californian in its formality. When one side wearied, it sent to the enemy one of its own men or a neutral friend dressed in palm leaves and white bast, carryin g peppers in his hand. If the proposal was accepted, both sides met at the boundary and sacrificed a goat, a dog, and sometimes a cow. A neutral chief sometimes divided a palm leaf among the parties. Talbot says the neighboring Oronn celebrated
thropologm, XXXVI ,
87
Harry H. Turney-High, "Cooking Camas and Bitter Root," American

D.S.
1933, p. 263.
D 9 iz e

War and the Organization of Society 247 peace by implanting a sacrificial goat's head on a stake upon which a
247
dog had been impaled through the jaws to die slowly. Eggs were then
placed on "medicine" leaves and sprinkled with goat's blood. The
chief men then crushed all this together with their hands and smeared
their erstwhile foes' faces with the mixture, expressing the wish that
they will see each other's blood no more. They then divided the
goat's cooked flesh and other food, and sang, danced, ate and drank
in joy at the peace.3s
In contrast, the highly organized kingdom of Dahomey did not take
the enemy into its confidence. The king formally declared war, at
which ceremonial he and his functionaries performed elaborate
dances, but the enemy was not informed since the Dahomean army
relied on surprise.
The Papuans in Oceania considered peace declaration women's
work. If peace was desired, a couple of men went with their wives
to the hostile village. The presence of the women indicated the end
sought, so the rights of embassy were respected. The suit for peace
was almost always accepted, and the men thereupon broke each
other's beheading knives and exchanged arm guards. At night the
hosts had relations with their guests' women, "and that is the real
object of the visit." In a few days the erstwhile hosts returned the
visit and brought some of their wives for their former foes to enjoy.S9
The more chiefly Solomon Islanders were not quite so informal
about peace-making as the Papuans, but the end and the means were
largely the same. When one side had enough war they would inform
the enemy of the fact and ask for one of their chiefly daughters as a
bride for one of their own chiefs. If all went well the fighting ceased
and the side which sued for peace brought a large bride price for the
young woman.40 These people, like many others, had an economic
attitude toward peace declaration as well as a sexual one. The war
ceased when one side had enough. Valuable presents were ex-
changed to make matters right, sometimes without regard for the
peace by implanting a sacrificial goat's head on a stake upon which a dog had been impaled through the jaws to die slowly. Eggs were then placed on "medicine" leaves and sprinkled with goat's blood. The chief men then crushed all this together with their hands and smeared their erstwhile foes' faces with the mixture, expressing the wish that they will see each other's blood no more. They then divided the goat's cooked flesh and other food, and sang, danced, ate and drank in joy at the peace. S 8 In contrast, the highly organized kingdom of Dahomey did not take the enemy into its confidence. The king formally declared war, at which ceremonial he and his functionaries performed elaborate dances, but the enemy was not informed since the Dahomean army relied on surprise. The Papuans in Oceania considered peace declaration women's work. If peace was desired, a couple of men went with their wives to the hostile village. The presence of the women indicated the end sought, so the rights of embassy were respected. The suit for peace was almost always accepted, and the men thereupon broke each other's beheading knives and exchanged arm guards. At night the hosts had relations with their guests' women, "and that is the real object of the visit." In a few days the erstwhile hosts returned the visit and brought some of their wives for their former foes to enjoy.:l 9 The more chiefly Solomon Islanders were not quite so informal about peace-making as the Papuans, but the end and the means were largely the same. When one side had enough war they would infoml the enemy of the fact and ask for one of their chiefly daughters as a bride for one of their own chiefs. If all went well the fighting ceased and the side which sued for peace brought a large bride price for the young woman.40 These people, like many others, had an economic attitude toward peace declaration as well as a sexual one. The war ceased when one side had enough. Valuable presents were ex changed to make matters right, sometimes without regard for the rights of the quarrel or the number of the slain on either side, which latter element was both un-American and un-Mrican,4 1 19
H
rights of the quarrel or the number of the slain on either side, which
latter element was both un-American and un-African.41
3s Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. 241f.
4o Ivens, op. cit., p. 310.
Ibid., p. 304.
Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. Landman. op. cU., p. 165. 40 Ivens. op. cit., p. 810.
88
24 l f.
Ibid., p. 304.
D 9 iz e
248
248 Primitive War Melanesian peace declarations had little idea of honor. Miss Pow-
Primitive War
Miss Pow
Melanesian peace declarations had little idea of honor. afraid of those of Lesu.
dermaker records an instance when the people of Tagam village were
dermaker records an instance when the people of Tagam village were The Tagam people fled to a neighboring Tiring of this, community and the Lesu folk plundered their fields. suaded the Tagam folk to return.
afraid of those of Lesu. The Tagam people fled to a neighboring
community and the Lesu folk plundered their fields. Tiring of this,
they sent a message saying that they wanted no more war and per-
suaded the Tagam folk to return. This they did, and the first cere-
they sent a message saying that they wanted no more war and per
monials of peace were held, but Lesu had no intention of honoring
its word and murdered the chief of Tagam as soon as possible. When
This they did, and the first cere
the Tagam people were about to run away again the men of Lesu
monials of peace were held, but Lesu had no intention of honoring its word and murdered the chief of Tagam as soon as possible. When the Tagam people were about to
run
protested that they really meant it this time, that the real object of
the war had been the chief's life, and the peace ceremonies were re-
peated and respected.*2
away again the men of Lesu
The signal for peace in the New Hebrides seems to have been
fronds of palm carried between the combatants.43 The Loyalty
protested that they really meant it this time, that the real object of the war had been the chief's life, and the peace ceremonies were re peated and respected. f2 The signal for peace in the New Hebrides seems to have been The Loyalty
Islanders were so formal in their declarations that one suspects Poly-
nesian influence, for they never undertook war without observing a
strict diplomatic etiquette, no matter how serious the quarrel. The
two chiefs negotiated for possible peace by three messengers whose
persons were as sacred as Creek or mediaeval heralds. Diplomatic
representations were not broken off and war begun until peace efforts
fronds of palm carried between the combatants. 4 8
were made and each chief duly notified. After peace had been declared
Islanders were so formal in their declarations that one suspects Poly nesian influence, for they never undertook war without observing a strict diplomatic etiquette, no matter how serious the quarrel. persons were
as
the victorious chief sent his adversary a present to show that all ill
feeling was over, which the defeated chief received with all protesta-
tions of good will. Enmity smouldered, however, and the defeated
The
chief could be expected to reinstitute the war as soon as he felt
himself strong enough.**
two chiefs negotiated for possible peace by three messengers whose sacred as Greek or mediaeval heralds. Diplomatic representations were not broken off and war begun until peace efforts were made and each chief duly notified. Mter peace had been declared the victorious chief sent his adversary a present to show that all ill feeling was over, which the defeated chief received with all protesta tions of good will . Enmity smouldered, however, and the defeated chief could be expected to reinstitute the war as soon as he felt himself strong enough. 44 The Polynesian Mangaian were a thoroughly political people. While they occaSionally indulged in a surprise attack, for the most part the great formality of their social pattern demanded that an aggrieved chief formally challenge another to war. and a human sacrifice to the war god. recognized war and peace
as
The Polynesian Mangaian were a thoroughly political people.
While they occasionally indulged in a surprise attack, for the most
part the great formality of their social pattern demanded that an
aggrieved chief formally challenge another to war. Peace likewise
had to be formally declared by announcement on the peace drums
and a human sacrifice to the war god. In other words, these people
recognized war and peace as definite social statuses and observed
the shift from one to the other by specific rites of passage. Such
civilized attitudes developed in conjunction with the rest of the social
pattern. Surprise attack and "treachery" had been common there
42 Powdermaker, op. cit., pp. 42f.
44 Hadfield, op. cit., pp. 169f.
had to be formally declared by announcement on the peace drums In other words, these people definite social statuses and observed
Peace likewise
the shift from one to the other by specific rites of passage. pattern.
Such civilized attitudes developed in conjunction with the rest of the social Surprise attack and "treachery" had been common there
42 Powdennaker, op. cit., pp. 42. 4 8 Humphreys, op. cit., p. 59. U HadDeld, op. cit., pp. 169f.
D 9 iz e

War and the Organization of Society 249 before the rise of the temporal lordship mentioned before. After
249
Mter
before the rise of the temporal lordship mentioned before. render fonnal declaration of allies.
a
that event it became customary for a group aspiring to power to
render formal declaration of a state of war to its opponent and his
that event it became customary for a group aspiring to power to The neutral social groups had the role of furnishing the human
allies. The neutral social groups had the role of furnishing the human
state of war to its opponent and his
sacrifices needed for declaring peace.45
War in Samoa was proclaimed formally only to members of the we-
group. Heralds were sent from the capital town to subordinate ones
sacrifices needed for declaring peace. ' 5 group.
and allied capitals, whereupon warriors and councillors converged
on the capital. The prospective enemy found out about it as best he
War in Samoa was proclaimed fonnally only to members of the we Heralds were sent from the capital town to subordinate ones and allied capitals, whereupon warriors and councillors converged on the capital. The prospective enemy found out about it as best he could, usually through observation of warlike preparations or the murder of some member of his group. ' 6 The Metal Age E urasiatics likewise exhibited an efficient social authority to declare peace and war. The rudimentary states which came into being with the Metal Ages could behave effectively in this regard. Primitivity such as observed elsewhere, with the usual exchange of gifts and ceremonial meals, existed among the Siberians. The following refers to the war-weariness of the Siberian Chuckchee and the Eskimo-Aleut peoples of St. Lawrence Island. The islanders, whose " massacre was mentioned in the tactical discussion, eventually sought revenge with considerable success, but the next summer they sought peace, their honor having been vindicated. This was accept able to the Chuckchee, and an exchange of fine presents took place. The transferral of a shaman hostage exactly evened the score and removed the
casus
could, usually through observation of warlike preparations or the
murder of some member of his group.46
The Metal Age Eurasiatics likewise exhibited an efficient social
authority to declare peace and war. The rudimentary states which
came into being with the Metal Ages could behave effectively in
this regard. Primitivity such as observed elsewhere, with the usual
exchange of gifts and ceremonial meals, existed among the Siberians.
The following refers to the war-weariness of the Siberian Chuckchee
and the Eskimo-Aleut peoples of St. Lawrence Island. The islanders,
whose massacre was mentioned in the tactical discussion, eventually
sought revenge with considerable success, but the next summer they
sought peace, their honor having been vindicated. This was accept-
able to the Chuckchee, and an exchange of fine presents took place.
The transferral of a shaman hostage exactly evened the score and
removed the casus belli, the gifts clinched the matter, and the geron-
tarchs were satisfied. One more war was concluded.47
Europe and Asia contribute little that was novel regarding the inter-
relationship of the social pattern and that for war. These patterns
operated in functional dependence, and changes in the one were apt
to produce changes in the other. Defects in sociological coherence
likewise produced military incapacity. The Thracians, say the old
writers, could easily have threatened Greece, but their intense local-
istic attitudes prevented them. This relatively small category is
thought once to have had as many as fifty "tribes," and Strabo knew
of as many as twenty-two in his time. Herodotus called them the
most powerful people in the world, barring the Hindus, and repeated
belli, the gifts clinched the matter, and the geron

One more war was concluded.H
the opinion that they would have been invincible if they had been
tarchs were satisfied.
Europe and Asia contribute little that was novel regarding the inter relationship of the social pattern and that for war. These patterns operated in functional dependence, and changes in the one were apt to produce changes in the other. Defects in sociological coherence The Thracians, say the old likewise produced military incapacity.
writers, could easily have threatened Greece, but their intense local istic attitUdes prevented them. This relatively small category is thought once to have had as many
as
fifty
"tribes," and Strabo knew
of as many as twenty-two in his time. Herodotus called them the most powerful people in the world, barrin g the Hindus, and repeated the opinion that they would have been invincible
if they had been
Buck. op. cit., p. 158. Brown. op. cit., p. 164. H Bogoraz. op. cit., p. 657.
'8 ..s
D 9 iz e
250
250 Primitive War able to effect internal unity. They could never accomplish this, and
Primitive War
They could never accomplish this, and
"herein therefore consists their weakness."4s
"herein therefore consists their weakness. "f 8 indifferently by the field reports. is a function of size.
able to effect internal unity.
The allied field of tactical organization has been revealed very
indifferently by the field reports. Perhaps this is due to the small
The allied field of tactical organization has been revealed very Perhaps this is due to the small size of most nonliterate war parties, for in many ways organization This is not entirely true, for two men going about any job efficiently should have their work organized. The size of the better rican military groups alone required organ ization, which was forthcoming. It is said that the Dahomey state could muster fifty thousand men without difficulty during the height of its power, so its army was therefore divided into three echelons.fa The first division consisted of three thousand fierce females; the sec ond consisted of residents of the capital including the palace guard; the third was a levy of the male population of the nation. the outbreak of hostilities. and standards .lIo Each local chief had his own force which was mustered into national service at The older eyewitnesses were astounded at the regularity of the Dahomean formations with their units, officers, Forbes said the regular army amounted to twelve In any thousand fighters, of whom five thousand were Amazons.
size of most nonliterate war parties, for in many ways organization
is a function of size. This is not entirely true, for two men going
about any job efficiently should have their work organized.
The size of the better African military groups alone required organ-
ization, which was forthcoming. It is said that the Dahomey state
could muster fifty thousand men without difficulty during the height
of its power, so its army was therefore divided into three echelons.4'
The first division consisted of three thousand fierce females; the sec-
ond consisted of residents of the capital including the palace guard;
the third was a levy of the male population of the nation. Each local
chief had his own force which was mustered into national service at
the outbreak of hostilities. The older eyewitnesses were astounded
at the regularity of the Dahomean formations with their units, officers,
and standards.50 Forbes said the regular army amounted to twelve
thousand fighters, of whom five thousand were Amazons. In any
event, Dahomey could muster a fair-sized army even by European
standards.51 These troops are said to have been uniformed after a
fashion.52
The Dahomean army was primarily organized into left and right
wings, each with its own commander, the right wing being the larger.
These appear to have resembled brigades or divisions. Under the
two commanders were officials whose functions were like those of
moder n field officers, while beneath them were units and commanders
resembling modern companies and their commanders. These com-
panies, according to Herskovits, had their own uniforms and names,
and apparently had different weapons of specialized function.53
When King Chaka came to power in Zululand he immediately set
event, Dahomey could muster a fair-sized army even by European standards. 111 These troops are said to have been uniformed after a fashion.1I 2 The Dahomean army was primarily organized into left and right wings, each with its own commander, the right wing being the larger. These appear to have resembled brigades or divisions. Under the two commanders were officials whose functions were like those of modem field officers, while beneath them were units and commanders resembling modem companies and their commanders. These com panies, according to Herskovits, had their own uniforms and names, When King Chaka came to power
f 8 Herodotus, f9 Frederick
v.
about organizing the Zulu mass, using the traditional age-sets or
4s Herodotus, v. 3.
*9 Frederick E. Forbes, Dahomey and Dahomeans (London: Longmans, Brown,
Green, Longmans, 1851), I, p. 14.
50 William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave
Trade (London: J. J. and P. Knapton, 1734), in Herskovits, op. cft., II, p. 80.
Forbes, I, pp. 14f, in Herskovits, op. cft., II, p. 81.
52 Ibid., II, p. 58.
" Herskovits, op. cft., II, p. 82.
and apparently had different weapons of specialized function. lIB
in
Zululand he immediately set
about organizing the Zulu mass, using the traditional age-sets or 3.
E. Forbes, Dahomey and Dahomeana ( London: Longmans. Brown, Green, Longmans, 1851 ) , I, p. 14. 110 William SneIgr ave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave Trade ( London : J. J. and P. Knapton, 1734 ) , in Herskovits . op. cit., II, p. SO. 111 Forbes , I, pp. 14, in Herskovits, op. cit., II, p. 81. 11 2 Ibid., II, p. 56. 113 Herskovits, op. cit., II, p. 82.
D 9 iz e
------
- ---

War and the Organization of Society 251 "circumcision guilds" as a base. These were seldom large enough
251
to serve his military purposes, so he altered them into regiments.64
The need of organization is apparent when one considers that Chaka
kept a force of one hundred thousand men under arms, one half of
which was on constant call.55 The South African regiment was about
the size of a modern infantry battalion. The essential tables of or-
ganization were worked out by Dingiswayo, Chaka's royal mentor in
Mthethwaland.
A tool is a good tool only if the skill exists for its use. Similarly,
all the good tactical principles imaginable are vitiated if the command
and administrative functions necessary for their employment are lack-
ing. The importance of organization in Eurasiatic war was particu-
larly well illustrated by the rise of Genghis Khan and his Mongols.
These people were once no more than ordinary Turko-Tartar pastoral
nomads, indulging in the pettiest tactical operations or subtactical
raiding. Genghis rose to power by two means: luck and organization.
Actually, luck rarely favors a man for long. Often what the van-
quished think is the victor's luck is his power of organization, his
ability to be prepared for any emergency. Genghis really owed his
success to the second factor, his enormous capacity for organization
and his tireless vitality in seeing that his wishes were carried out.
He rose from a petty chief to a world power, and he did it by ab-
sorbing other petty chiefs and putting his fighting force under simple
though effective tables of organization.
It was also to adequate military organization that the invading
Aryas could attribute their conquest of India. These people were
governed by a military aristocracy, under whom they defeated the
Dravidians and others who lacked it. The Brahmans unfortunately
showed a gradual shift in attitude from a strong military spirit to an
otherworldliness, from commander to priest, so that when the Euro-
pean powers decided to take over India there was no really effective
resistance. The Brahmans could not pray the French and British
rulers out of India, and the spirit of the Kshatriya caste of warriors
and rulers was broken.
War, therefore, is not unique among the various social activities.
Success in that type of group behavior requires organization and co-
operation, as it does in all else. Economics has long taught that lack
" Krige, op. cit, p. 261.
55 Kidd, op. cft., p. 290.
"circumcision guilds" as a base. These were seldom large enough to serve his military purposes, so he altered them into regiments. G 4 The need of organization is apparent when one considers that Chaka kept a force of one hundred thousand men under arms, one haH of which was on constant call. 5 The South African regiment was about the size of a modern infantry battalion. The essential tables of or ganization were worked out by Dingiswayo, Chaka's royal mentor in Mthethwaland. A tool is a good tool only if the skill exists for its use. Similarly, all the good tactical principles imaginable are vitiated if the command and administrative functions necessary for their employment are lack ing. The importance of organization in Eurasiatic war was particu larly well illustrated by the rise of Genghis Khan and his Mongols. These people were once no more than ordinary Turko-Tartar pastoral nomads, indulging in the pettiest tactical operations or subtactical raiding. Genghis rose to power by two means : luck and organization. Actually, luck rarely favors a man for long. Often what the van quished think is the victor's luck is his power of organization, his ability to be prepared for any emergency. Genghis really owed his success to the second factor, his enormous capacity for organization and his tireless vitality in seeing that his wishes were carried out. He rose from a petty chief to a world power, and he did it by ab sorbing other petty chiefs and putting his fighting force under Simple though effective tables of organization. It was also to adequate military organization that the invading Aryas could attribute their conquest of India. These people were governed by a military aristocracy, under whom they defeated the Dravidians and others who lacked it. The Brahmans unfortunately showed a gradual shift in attitude from a strong military spirit to an otherworldliness, from commander to priest, so that when the Euro pean powers decided to take over India there was no really effective resistance. The Brahmans could not pray the French and British rulers out of India, and the spirit of the Kshatriya caste of warriors and rulers was broken. War, therefore, is not unique among the various social activities. ' Success in that type of group behavior requires organization and co operation, as it does in all else. Economics has long taught that lack
G5
4 Krige, op. cit., p. 261 . Kidd, op . cU., p. 290.
D 9 iz e
252
Primitive War of division of labor, or poor specialization of function and coordination of effort, characterize backward economic systems which result
Primitive War
in a small production for consumption. An economy so based is
obviously primitive. This is no less true in warfare. One may legit-
imately speak of certain peoples as practicing primitive war, because
they had too little specialization of troops, division of labor and func-
tion, too little coordination and command to fight more effectively.
The tactical discussion showed that specialized troops have been
most rare among nonliterate societies. This fact alone would keep
the bulk of nonliterate fighters in the category of the primitive. Such
Jacks-of-all-arms and masters-of-none have offered too small a range
of opportunity. They have not offered enough spread for men of
different capacities and temperaments to perform functions for which
they were best fitted. This type of fighting did not permit the com-
mander to emerge, nor did it need him. It prevented the stratification
through differentiation of function and ability wherein a coordinator,
director, commander might be superordinated. The tactical discus-
sion said that nonliterate forces taken afield were ordinarily small, the
time consumed by their campaigns minute^Jtheir type of war in turn
requiring little specialization and, therefore, little team work. Since
team work is the essence of effective tactics, most nonliterate fighters
were poor tacticiansând hence poor soldiers.
It has been stated by some theorists that the civil state, royal or
democratic, invariably evolved from the power of some military com-
mander to overawe the commonalty. That this has happened often
enough is well known, but there is more to the story. Civil society
and orderly government require discipline, and this discipline has
sometimes come from nonmilitary sources. It may have sprung from
disciplined economic cooperation or it might have had religious inspi-
ration. In America the rudimentary civil chief was often a peace chief,
just as forbidden to shed blood as the pope was forbidden to com-
mand the troops of the papal states in the field. In this division of
labor between a war chief and a peace chief there existed possibilities
of progress through specialization and professionalization. It is folly,
however, to expect that the two powers would develop efficiency at
the same rate of speed. The field literature is full of instances of
the peace chieftainship having acquired effectiveness while the war
chieftainship remained in the hands of some counter of coup, some
merely brave and distinguished individual fighter; for a personally
of division of labor, or poor specialization of function and coordina tion of effort, characterize backward economic systems which result in a small production for consumption. An economy so based is obviously primitive. This is no less true in warfare. One may legit imately speak of certain peoples as practicing primitive war, because they had too little specialization of troops, division of labor and func tion, too little coordination and command to fight more effectively. The tactical discussion showed that specialized troops have been most rare among nonliterate societies. This fact alone would keep the bulk of nonliterate fighters in the category of the primitive. Such Jacks-of-all-arms and masters-of-none have offered too small a range of opportunity. They have not offered enough spread for men of different capacities and temperaments to perform functions for which they were best fitted. This type of fighting did not permit the com mander to emerge, nor did it need him. It prevented the stratification through differentiation of function and aoility wherein a coordinator, director, commander might be superordinated. The tactical discus SiOn said that non literate forces taken afield were ordinarily sm!lll, the time consumed by their campaigns minute, their type of war in turn requiring- little specialization and, therefore, little team work. Since team work is the essence of effective tactics, most nonliterate fighters w r_e poor tacticians, and hence poor soldiers. It has been stated by some theorists that the civil state, royal or democratic, invariably evolved from the power of some military com mander to overawe the commonalty. That this has happened often enough is well known, but there is more to the story. Civil society and orderly government require discipline, and this diScipline has sometimes come from nonmilitary sources. It may have sprung from disciplined economic cooperation or it might have had religious inspi ration. In America the rudimentary civil chief was often a peace chief, just as forbidden to shed blood as the pope was forbidden to com mand the troops of the papal states in the field. In this division of labor between a war chief and a peace chief there existed possibilities of progress through specialization and professionalization. It is folly, however, to expect that the two powers would develop efficiency at the same rate of speed. The field literature is full of instances of the peace chieftainship having acquired effectiveness while the war chieftainship remained in the hands of some counter of coup, some merely brave and distinguished individual fighter; for a personally
D 9 iz e

War and the Organization of Society 253 brave and able man is not necessarily a good commander for that
253
reason alone. In Napoleon and Lord Nelson there was too much
of the physical and perhaps the temperamental weakling for either
to have been a good Plains coup counter, who had to be an extremely
brave and able fighter in personal combat. They were good enough
to be great captains among the highly civilized French and British,
but the Creek or Coeur d'Alene would have never made them war
chiefs. Indeed, the fact that a man is a good and brave individual
fighter may temperamentally unfit him for command. He may be
too much of an individual to have a group concept strong enough to
coordinate and lead a mass.
The discussion of the relation of civil society to effective war may
be dropped with this statement. Many of the slayers of consanguine
society have been identified: the Nile flood, economic food production,
commerce, secret societies, the division of labor and specialization
inherent in Bronze Age metallurgy, new gods, and many others. But
there is certainly one which has been consistently neglected. This
is the rise of the army with officers. The sib society and the Tables
of Organization are almost antithetical.
brave and able man is not necessarily a good commander for that reason alone. In Napoleon and Lord Nelson there was too much of the physical and perhaps the temperamental weakling for either to have been a good Plains coup counter, who had to be an extremely brave and able fighter in personal combat. They were good enough to be great captains among the highly civilized French and British, but the Creek or Coeur d'Alene would have never made them war chiefs. Indeed, the fact that a man is a good and brave individual fighter may temperamentally unfit him for command. He may be too much of an individual to have a group concept strong enough to coordinate and lead a mass. The discussion of the relation of civil society to effective war may be dropped with this statement. Many of the slayers of consanguine society have been identified : the Nile Hood, economic food production, commerce, secret societies, the division of labor and specialization inherent in Bronze Age metallurgy, new gods, and many others. But there is certainly one which has been consistently neglected. This is the rise of the army with officers. The sib society and the Tables of Organization are ahnost antithetical.
D 9 iz e
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---'"
Thomson, Sir Basil H., The Fijians: A Study of the Decay of Custom,
London: W. Heineman, 1908.
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1925.
Tumey-High, Harry H., "Cooking Camas and Bitter Root," American
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., Ethnography of the Kutenai, Memoir 56, American Anthrop-
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, The Flathead Indians of Montana, Memoir 48, American
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Underhill, Ruth, The Autobiography of a Papago Woman, Memoir 46, '
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Weeks, John H., Among Congo Cannibals, Philadelphia: Lippincott,
Ethnography of the Kutenai, Memoir 56, American Anthrop ological Association, Menasha : 1941. , The Flathead Indians of Montana, Memoir 48, American Anthropological Association : Menasha : 1937.
'
1913.
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1914.
White, Leslie A., "The Acoma Indians," Annual Report 47, Bureau of
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Underhill, Ruth, The Autobiography of a Papago Woman, Memoir 46, American Anthropological Association, Menasha : . 1936. Verendrye, Le Chevalier de la, Journal, Report on Canadian Archives 1889, Ottawa : 1890. Weeks, John H., Among Congo Cannibals, Philadelphia : Lippincott, 1913.
_ _
Wissler, Clark, The American Indian, 3rd edition, New York: Oxford
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, The Indians of Greater New fork and the Lower Hudson,
Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History,
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-"
Among the Primitive BaKongo, Philadelphia : Lippincott,

47,
1914.
White, Leslie A., "The Acoma Indians," Annual Report American Ethnology, Washington : 1929-1930.
Bureau of
Williamson, Robert W., The Ways of the South Sea Savage, Philadel phia : Lippincott, 1914. Wissler, Clark, The American Indian, 3rd edition, New York : Oxford University Press, 1938.
_ _
The Blackfoot, Annual Archaeological Report for 1905, To ronto : 1906. The Indians of Greater New York and the Lower Hudson, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History, vol. 3, New York: 1909.
-"
-. ,
_ _
D 9 iz e
266
266 Primitive War
Primitive War
Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History, vol. 5, part 1, New York: 1910.
---"
, Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians, Anthropological
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---" Social Life of the Blackfoot Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History, vol. 7, part 1, New York : 1911.
---
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INDEX
Abel, C. W., 49, 129, 191, 217
Acoma, civil and war chiefs, 68
Adair, J., 134
Adoption, prisoner, 192f
INDEX
Abel,
Africa (see particular tribes), ap-
proach order, 42, 44; attitudes, 206;
C.
W., 49, 129, 191, 217
cannibalism, 194; captive sacrifice,
Acoma, civil and war chiefs, 68 Adair, J., 134 Adoption, prisoner, 1 92f Africa ( see particular
of champions, 72; fonnations, 5 1 ; organization, 251 Ashanti, approach battle order, police, mand hierarchy, 8 1
189; command and discipline, 69,
42; com
43; com
83; compensation, 171; economics,
170; fear inhibiting, 216; female
warriors, 155, 159f; foreign rela-
proach order, 42, 44; attitudes, 206;
tribes ) , ap
Assiniboin,
mand, 63, 65, 68; combined em ployment of forces, 54 ; discipline, 61; gifting, 176; security, 1 1 9; sex license, 158; social climbing, 145; victory gloat, 156 Associations, 87; fear inhibiting, 2 1 8 ; Great Plains women's, 154 ; Ojib way and declaration of war, 244; M elanesian tribelessness and, 231 ; scouts, 109; valuation of life, 2 1 1 Athletics
tions, 246; land concepts, 184; loot
gifting, 177; mobility, 95; naval
cannibalism, 194; captive sacrifice, 189; command and discipline, 69, 83; compensation, 1 7 1 ; economics, 170; fear inhibiting, 2 1 6 ; female warriors, 155, 159f; foreign rela tions, 246; land concepts, 1 84; loot gifting, 177 ; mobility, 95 ; naval actions, 98; objective, 1 04 ; plans, 127f; population and tactical mass, 1 02, 250; revenge, 230; 150; sex li cense, 1 59; slaves, 179f; social or ganization, spies, 1 1 0; staff functions, 80; supply, 78; surprise, 1 13 ; terrain use, 130; wish fulfill ment, 148 Age-classes, as recruits, 87 ; Zulu, 250 Agriculture
actions, 98; objective, 104; plans,
127f; population and tactical mass,
102, 250; revenge, 150; sex li-
cense, 159; slaves, 179f; social or-
ganization, 230; spies, 110; staff
functions, 80; supply, 78; surprise,
113; terrain use, 130; wish fulfill-
ment, 148
Age-classes, as recruits, 87; Zulu, 250f
Agriculture (see also Supply), so-
ciology and, 243f
( see also Recreation ) , 167; Californian war as, 9 1 , 167; New
Ainu, chiefs, 74
Alliances, peace and, 232
Ambition, satisfaction of, 142ff
Hebridean war as, 49; training in America, 80 Attitudes, 205-226; defined, 1 87 ; Samoan, 50 Attrition, war of, 78 Augustus, 1 3 1 Australian aborigine, 1 1 Avienus, Rufus Festus, 106 Baganda
Apache (see also Pima), plans, 124;
valuation of life, 210
Approach order, 40ff
Aquitanian, no-retreat, 214
( see also Supply ) , so-
Arapaho, troop specialization, 54; val-
ciology and, 243f Ainu, chiefs, 74 Alliances, peace and, 232 Ambition, satisfaction of, 142 Apache
uation of life, 211
Arawak, chemical warfare, 120
Arikara, formations, 51; women, 153
Ariovistus, 56
( see also Uganda ) , disci
Armaments, see Weapons
( see also Pima ) , plans, 124;
pline, 83 Banks Islands, fire function, 93; surprise, 1 14 Banyankole, staff, 80 Banyoro, staff, 80 BaThonga, Thonga, approach order, 44; attitudes, 207 ; battle lines, 48; bodily scraps, 1 96; social control, 234 ; territoriality, 244 Bayonet ( see also Spear ) , 9, 1 1 Bechuana, bodily scraps, 195; security, 1 20 Belgae, fire, 99 BeIloc, H . , 29 Bellovaci, terrain use, 1 3 1 Berserker, 144, 2 1 4 Binger,
Armor, defensive, 16, 101; Iroquois,
valuation of life, 2 1 0 Approach order, 40ff Aquitanian, no-retreat, 2 1 4 Arapaho, troop specialization, 54 ; valuation of life, 2 1 1 Arawak, chemical warfare, 120 Ankara, fonnations, 51 ; women, 153 Ariovistus, 56 Annaments, see Weapons Annor, defensive, 16, 1 0 1 ; Iroquois, 55 Annstrong, W. E . , 127, 209 Arrow, 1 0 ; Jibaro fire, 4 1 Artifact, 8f Aryan ( see
55
Armstrong, W. E., 127, 209
Arrow, 10; Jibaro fire, 41
Artifact, 8f
Aryan (see also Hindu, India, Vedic),
attitude regarding enemy, 221; duel
of champions, 72; formations, 51;
organization, 251
Ashanti, approach order, 42; com-
mand hierarchy, 81
Assiniboin, battle police, 43; com-
mand, 63, 65, 68; combined em-
ployment of forces, 54; discipline,
61f; gifting, 176; security, 119; sex
license, 158; social climbing, 145;
victory gloat, 156
Associations, 87; fear inhibiting, 218;
also Hindu, India, Vedic ) ,
Great Plains women's, 154; Ojib-
attitude regarding enemy, 22 1 ; duel
L. G.,
240
way and declaration of war, 244;
Melanesian tribelessness and, 231;
267
scouts, 109; valuation of life, 211
Athletics (see also Recreation), 167;
Californian war as, 91, 167; New
Hebridean war as, 49; training in
America, 80
Attitudes, 205-226; defined, 187; Sa-
moan, 50
DI
Iz.e b
Attrition, war of, 78
Augustus, 131
Australian aborigine, 11
Avienus, Rufus Festus, 106
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) Blackfoot, attitudes, 205; battle lines,
46; horse theft, 174; no-retreat
vow, 212; training, 44; treaties,
245; war tales, 167
Blackwood, B., 70, 90, 193, 208, 242
Bliss, T. H., 22
Blowgun, 10
Boas, F., 67
Bogoraz, W., 73, 80, 111, 116, 137,
151, 182, 230, 249
Blackfoot, a ttitudes , 205; battIe lines, 46; horse the ft, 174; no-retreat vow , 212; training, 44; treaties, 245; war tales, 167 Blackwood, B . , 70, 90, 1 93, 208, 242 Bliss, T. H., 22 Blowgun, 10 Boas, F., 67 Bogoraz, W., 73, 80, l l l , l l 6, 137,
Carib, land concept,
184 ;
women,
154
Cashibo, cannibalism, 1 9S Cavalry , l l , 15, 26; Germ anic, 57 ; Great Plains, 94 Caytes, cannibalism, 193 Celts ( see also Gauls ) , 14; attitudes, 210; captive sacrifice, 190; death contempt, 219; exploitation of vic tory, 106; head taking, 200; mo bility and s hock , 96; troop coopera
Bodily scraps, enemy (see also
1 5 1 , 182, 230, 249

Bodily scraps, enemy ( see also Corpse ) , 195ff Booby traps, 17 Boredom, release from, 142ff; Plains life and, 167 Bossu, J. B . , 69, 87, 97, 176, 204, 233 Bow ( see also Arrow ) , 1 9f British, early, revenge, IS; troop specialization, 56 Bronze Age, IS, 16 Brown, G., 43f, 50, 71, 89, 90, 9S,
Corpse), 195ff
Booby traps, 17
Boredom, release from, 142ff; Plains
tion, 57
Chaka, King, 14, 29, 83, 88, 100,
life and, 167
Bossu, J. B., 69, 87, 97, 176, 204, 233
105, 1 14, 135, 159, 250

ChampiOns, duel of, 72ff; Aryan, 51; New Hebridean, 49 Change, tactical, 2Sf Channel of command ( see also Hier archy of command ) , 7 Chatti, diScipline, 84; honors ques t ,
Bow (see also Arrow), 19f
British, early, revenge, 15; troop
specialization, 56
Bronze Age, 13, 16
Brown, G., 43f, 50, 71, 89, 90, 93,
98, 111, 114, 121, 130, 148, 151,
162, 181, 218, 225, 232, 242, 249
Buck, P. H., 50, 51, 58f, 71, 131, 163,
198, 214, 242, 249
Bundle, war (see also Fetish), Iowa,
68; Omaha, 85; Osage, 75; Winne-
bago, 62
Bunzell, R. L., 202
98, l l l, 1 14, 1 2 1 , ISO, 148, 151, 162, 181, 218, 225, 2S2, 242, 249 Buck, P. H., 50, 51, 58f, 7 1 , lSI, 1 63, 198, 214, 242, 249
BundIe, war ( see also Fetish ) , Iowa, 68; Omaha, 85 ; Osage, 75; Winne bago, 62 Bunzell, R. L . , 202 Burton, Sir R. F., 42, 78, 79, 84, 89,
149
Chauci, economic land, 185 Chemical warfare, 18, 120 Cherokee, fear inhibiting, 215; women and captives, 157 Cheyenne, no-retreat vow, 212 Chickasaw, leadership, 64; surprise,
Burton, Sir R. F., 42, 78, 79, 84, 89,
214
Bushmen, Kalahari, attitudes, 206
1 12
Chief ( see also Command, Disci pline ) , Assiniboin, 62 ; Californian, 229; civil and war, 64; Great Plains social climbers, 145f; Jibaro, 229; Ojibway, 66, Tsimshian, 67 Childe, V. G., 209 Chirguano, bodily scraps, 195; can nibalism, 193f; women, 155 Choctaw, channel of command, 76; command, 61, 69; fire and move ment, 97; loot gifting, 176; social control, 233; victory orgy, 144 ; women, 154 Chuckchee, compensation and re venge, 151 ; intelligence l 1 lf; lead ership, 73; peace declaration, 249; plans, 137; training, 80; tribal cohesion, 230 Church, G. E., 48, 69, 78, 122, 129,
Bushnell, D. I., 179
Caesar, Caius Julius, 10, 56, 74, 80,
90, 96, 99, 112, 115, 131, 163,
214f, 219
214
Bushmen, Kalahari, attitudes, 206 Bushnell, D. I., 179 Caesar, Caius Julius, 10, 56, 74, 80,
C.);i I if or nil ins (see particular tribes),
compensation, 171; fire actions, 92;
military athletics, 167; plans, 124;
political organization, 229; scalps,
201; victory gloat, 143
Campaigns, 30; supply and, 77
Canadians (see particular tribes), 40;
terrain use, 130
Cannae, Battle of, 57
Cannibalism, 193ff; Melanesian, 191f
Captives (see oho Torture), 188ff
Carib, land concept, 184; women,
154
Cashibo, cannibalism, 193
Cavalry, 11, 15, 26; Germanic, 57;
Great Plains, 94
Caytes, cannibalism, 193
Celts (see also Gauls), 14; attitudes,
210; captive sacrifice, 190; death
contempt, 219; exploitation of vic-
90, 96, 99, 1 12, l IS, lSI, 1 63, 214f, 219 Californians ( see particular tribes ) , compensation, 171 ; fire actions, 92; military athletics, 167; plans, 124; political organization, 229; scalps, 201 ; victory gloat, 143 Campaigns, 30; supply and, 77 Canadians ( see particular tribes ) , 40; terrain use, 130 Cannae, Battle of, 57 Cannibalism, 193ff; Melanesian, 19lf Captives ( see also Torture ) , 188ff
130, 150, 1 84, 193, 197, 213
tory, 106; head taking, 200; mo-
bility and shock, 96; troop coopera-
268
tion, 57
Chaka, King, 14, 29, 83, 88, 100,
105, 114, 135, 159, 250
Champions, duel of, 72ff; Aryan, 51;
New Hebridean, 49
Change, tactical, 23f
Channel of command (see also Hier-
D 9 iz e
archy of command), 7
Chatti, discipline, 84; honors quest,
149
Chauci, economic land, 185
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) Civilization, early Mediterranean, 22;
economic motives and, 169ff; hu-
man sacrifice and, 189; loss of mo-
bility and, 95
Classification of weapons, 9f
Club, war, 13
Codrington, R. H., 49, 93, 162
Coeur d'Alene, chiefs, 65; enemy
corpses, 193; torture, 190
Column, 26ff; approach, 43ff; Mus-
kogee, 41
Comanche, scouting, 108
Combined Employment of All Forces,
25, 39, 52ff
Command, 26, 30, 61, 90; social or-
ganization and, 235 ff
Compensation, 170f; Yurok, 143f
Concentration of Force, principle, 25,
53
Concerted Effort, principle, 25
Congo, slaving, 180
Control (see also Command), Kiwai,
43
Conzemius, E., 177, 238
Coombe, F., 71, 106, 114, 129
Cooper, J. M., 244
Cooperation, principle, 39, 52
Corpses, enemy, 193ff
Counter attack, Teton, 58
Countersurprise, 107-122
Coup (see also Honors), 146ff
Cree, attitudes regarding enemy,
220f; leadership, 64
Creek, bodily scraps, 201; march
order, 41; recruiting, 86; security,
118; social climbing, 145; victory
orgy, 144
Crest, military, Crow use of, 46
Crow, battle pattern, 45f; horse theft,
174; no-retreat vow, 212 f; sex li-
cense, 158; social climbing, 146,
tribal cohesion, 230
Culture, material, of war, 8f
Custer, General G., 94
Cycle, offense-defense, 7f, 23
Czaplicka, M. A., 73, 151, 203
Dahomean, approach order, 42;
blood guilt, 224; captive sacrifice,
190; civil state, 241; command, 70,
81; conscription, 88; declaration of
war, 247; discipline, 84; exploita-
tion of victory, 105; female sol-
diers, 159; plan, 127; regard for
army, 207; slaving, 180; spies, 110;
supply, 78; surprise, 113; tactical
mass, 102, 205; withdrawal order,
Civilization, early Mediterranean, 22; economic motives and, 1 69ff; hu man sacrifice and, 189; loss of mo bility and, 95 Classification of weapons, 9f Club, war, 13 Codrington, R. H., 49, 93, 162 Coeur d' Alene, chiefs, 65; enemy corpses, 1 93 ; torture, 190 Column, 26ff; approach, 43ff; Mus kogee, 4 1 Comanche, scouting, 108 Combined Employment of All Forces, 25, 39, 52ff Command, 26 30, 61, 90; social or ganization and, 235 ff Compensation, 1 70; Yurok, 143f Concentration of Force, prinCiple, 25, 53 Concerted Effort, principle, 25 Congo, slaving, 180 Control ( see also Command ) , Kiwai, 43 Conzemius, E., 177, 238 Coombe, F., 7 1 , 1 06, 1 14, 129 Cooper, J . M., 244 Cooperation, principle, 39, 52 Corpses, enemy, 193ff Counter attack, Teton, 58 Countersurprise, 1 07-122 Coup ( see also Honors ) , 146ff Cree, attitudes regarding enemy, 220; leadership, 64 Creek, bodily scraps, 201 ; march order, 4 1 ; recruiting, 86; security, 1 1 8; social climbing, 145; victory orgy, 1 44 Crest, military, Crow use of, 46 Crow, battle pattern, 45f; horse theft, 174; no-retreat vow, 212 f; sex li cense, 158; social climbing, 146, tribal cohesion, 230 Culture, material, of war, 8f Custer, General G., 94 Cycle, offense-defense, 7f, 23 Czaplicka, M. A., 73, 151, 203
,
Dahomean, approach order, 42; blood guilt, 224; captive sacrifice, 190; civil state, 241 ; command, 70, 8 1 ; conscription, 88; declaration of war, 247 ; discipline, 84; exploita tion of victory, 105; female sol diers, 1 59; plan, 127; regard for ann y , 207 ; slaving, 180; spies, 1 10; supply, 78; surprise, 1 13; tactical mass, 1 02, 205 ; withdrawal order, 52 Dances ( see also Rites ) , 156ff; Jib aro, 4 1 ; victory, 143f Dawn attack, Kiwai, 49; simple plans and, 128 Dayak, head taking, 172, 1 96 Death contempt, see Life Valuation, No-retreat Declaration of war and peace, 244ff; Iroquois women and, 157; Tsim shian, 67 Defensive, shift of African attitudes towards aggressiveness, 239 Del Mar, F., 18, 1 98, 225 Denig, E. T., 43, 54, 6lf, 1 1 9, 145 Densmore, E . , 45, 46f, 54, 77, 78, 85, 86, 100, 108, 125, 1 43, 154, 170, 1 76, 222 Descent on the shore, African, 98 DeVries, 1 12, 2 1 1 Diffusion, attitudes of aggressive states, 238ff Dio, Cassius, 73 Diodorus Siculus, 200 Discipline, 29, 45, 61-90; social or ganization and, 227, 236 Division of labor, 53 ; Pima and war, 119 Dorsey, J . 0 . , 40, 63, 65, 68, 75, 77, 104, 156, 158, 192, 204, 212, 22 1 Dreams, Bougainville, 208 Echelons, 28; BaThonga, 48; Da home an, 250; Iroquois, 47; Kiwai, 49 Economics, 7f, 251 ; fortification and, 1 2 1 ; motives, 169- 186
52
Dances (see also Rites), 156ff; Jib-
269
aro, 41; victory, 143f
Dawn attack, Kiwai, 49; simple plans
and, 128ff
Dayak, head taking, 172, 196
Death contempt, see Life Valuation,
No-retreat
Declaration of war and peace, 244ff;
D 9 iz e
Iroquois women and, 157; Tsim-
shian, 67
Defensive, shift of African attitudes
towards aggressiveness, 239
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) Economy of Force, principle, 102f
Enemy life, valuation of, 220-226
Engineering (see also Fortification),
121
Economy of Force, principle, 1 02f Enemy life, valuation of, 220-226 E ngineerin g ( see also Fortification ) , 121 Enlistment ( see also Recruiting ) , 85ff E nvelopment, 25, 28f Equilibrium, restoration of, 143f Eskimo, I I , 1 9 ; economic raids , 172; head taking, 197; plans, 124; re cruiting, 86; tactics, 9 1 Eurasia ( see particular tribes ) , atti tudes regarding enemy, 22 1 ; bodily scraps, 1 96; cannibalism, 195 ; cap tive sacrifice, 1 90 ; command, 73f, channels, 8 1 ; death contempt, 2 1 4 ; declaration o f peace a n d war, 249; economics, 170; fire and move ment, 99; fonnations, 5 1 ; honors quest, 149; head taking, 199; intel ligence, I l l ; loot, 174; mobility, 95; plans, 137; political motive, 165; revenge, 1 5 1 ; sex, 163; s laving, 1 8 1 ; social organization, 236; sur prise, 1 I 4 ; tactical mass, 102; ter rain use, 1 3 1 ; training, 80; tribal cohesion, 230; war attitudes, 209; war gods, 166 Fear, 6; inhibiting rites, 2 1 5-220 Ferguson, W. S . , 83 Fetish, war, 62 ; 203f File, "Indian," 27, 43 Fire, weapons, 7, 9ff; functions of, 92f Fire action, California, 92 ; defensive nature of, 96; Eskimo, 9 1 Fire and Movement, principle, 12, 96-99; as, 98 Eskimo, 91; naval actions
Fletcher, A. C., 67, 205, 233 Fly River, New Guinea, tribes, actions, 98 Fog of war, 22, 107 Forbes, F. E., 250 Fonnations
naval
Enlistment (see also Recruiting), 85ff
Envelopment, 25, 28f
( see also Column, Line ) ,

121; Kerri-Kerri,
Equilibrium, restoration of, 143f
principle of correct, 26, 39-60 Fortification, 16f, 130; Purl, 132
Eskimo, 11, 19; economic raids, 172;
head taking, 197; plans, 124; re-
cruiting, 86; tactics, 91
Eurasia (see particular tribes), atti-
tudes regarding enemy, 221; bodily
scraps, 196; cannibalism, 195; cap-
Fraternities ( see also Associations ) , social climbing and Great Plains, 146f Frederician tactics, 126 Frustration, war 145
as
tive sacrifice, 190; command, 73f,
channels, 81; death contempt, 214;
declaration of peace and war, 249;
release from, 1 4 1 -
economics, 170; fire and move-
ment, 99; formations, 51; honors
quest, 149; head taking, 199; intel-
ligence, 111; loot, 174; mobility, 95;
Gardening agriculture, 186 Gauls ( see also Celts ) , head taking, 200; intelligence, 1 I2 ; mobilization, 90; siege methods, 99; supply de struction, 1 85 Gennans, early, champions, 74; death contempt, 2 1 9 ; honors quest, 1 4 9 ; logistical war, 185 ; loot, 1 7 7 ; socia l organization, 236; surprise, 1 1 5; troop specialization, 56 Gibeah, campaign against, 32-.'38 Gifford, E. W., 54 Gifting, 175ff Gilbert, V., 24 Gilyak, revenge, 1 5 1 Goaynazes, war attitudes, 206 Goddard, P. E., 124, 2 1 I Gods, war ( see also Sacrifice ) , CIV1lization and, 1 65f; Hopi feminine katchina, 156; M angaian, 2 1 4 ; Great Plains, American ( see particu Manuan, 209; Polynesian,
plans, 137; political motive, 165;
revenge, 151; sex, 163; slaving,
181; social organization, 236; sur-
prise, 114; tactical mass, 102; ter-
rain use, 131; training, 80; tribal
cohesion, 230; war attitudes, 209;
war gods, 166
Fear, 6; inhibiting rites, 215-220
Ferguson, W. S., 83
Fetish, war, 62; 203f
File, "Indian," 27, 43
Fire, weapons, 7, 9ff; functions of,
92f
Fire action, California, 92; defensive
nature of, 96; Eskimo, 91
Fire and Movement, principle, 12,
96-99; Eskimo, 91; naval actions
as, 98
Fire arrow, Jibaro, 41
Flathead, battle lines, 46; horse theft,
174; loot gifting, 176; intelligence
magic, 109; security, 117; sex jeal-
ousy, 143; slaves, 179; spies, 110;
torture, 190; treaties, 245; tribal
71
authority, 232; victory gloat and
enemy scraps, 201; women in re-
cruiting, 152f
Fletcher, A. C., 67, 205, 233
Fly River, New Guinea, tribes, naval
actions, 98
Fog of war, 22, 107
Forbes, F. E., 250
Formations (see also Column, Line),
principle of correct, 26, 39-60
Fortification, 16f, 121f; Kerri-Kerri,
130; Puri, 132
Fire arrow, Jibaro, 4 1 Flathead, battle lines, 4 6 ; horse theft, 174; loot gifting, 176; intelligence magic, 109; security, 1 I 7; sex jeal ousy, 1 43; slaves, 179; spies, 1 I0 ; torture, 1 90; treaties , 245; tribal authOrity, 232 ; victory gloat and enemy scraps, 20 1 ; women in re cruiting, 1 52f
lar tribes ) , 40; approach order, 4 1 ; attitudes regarding enemy life, 220f; civil state, 239; command organization, 75; enlistment, 86f; evaluation of life, 2 1 I ; land con cept, 183; loot, 172; military mis
sion, 1 04 ; mobility, 94f; pre-horse actions, 46; release from grief, 142 ; scalps, 202f; scouts, 108; security,
Fraternities (see also Associations),
270
social climbing and Great Plains,
146f
Frederician tactics, 126
Frustration, war as release from, 141-
145
Gardening agriculture, 186
Gauls (see also Celts), head taking,
200; intelligence, 112; mobilization,
D 9 iz e
90; siege methods, 99; supply de-
struction, 185
Germans, early, champions, 74; death
contempt, 219; honors quest, 149;
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) 117ff; slavery, 178; women's as-
sociations, 154
Greeks, 14, 27
1 1 7; slavery, sociations, 1 54 Greeks, 14, 27
178;
women's
as
Increasing Resistance, Creek, 1 1 9 ics and, 170; honors
principle,
Individualism, military, 52 ; econom
Guiana, discipline and leadership, 66;
women, 154
Guiana, discipline and leadership, women, 154 Guilt, BaThonga marginality, Papa go, 202 Gumilla, 66 Hadfield, E . , 7 1 , 196, 2 1 8, 248 Harli, surprise, 1 1 5 Hatred, 188, 1 92 Hausa, economic motives, 1 86
66;
quest
and,
Guilt, BaThonga marginality, 207;
207 ;
147 Indonesia, head taking, 1 96 Infantry, 1 0f, 95, 126f Insignia of rank, Omaha, 75 Institutions, social, 5 Integrity of Tactical Units, principle, 25, 39, 53 Intelligence
Papago, 202
Gumilla, 66
Hadfield, E., 71, 196, 218, 248
Harii, surprise, 115
Hatred, 188, 192
Hausa, economic motives, 186
Head taking, 196-200; economics and,
( see also Spies ) , 26, 40,
171; Kiwai, 150; Samoan, 50; so-
107- 122; Zulu, 8 1 Invention, 7f Iowa, battle lines, 45; command, 62, 68; reconnaissance, 108; social climbing, Irish, 177 Iroquois, 16f; formations, pacific 47; ma trons, 157; military economics, 170; objective, 103; attitudes, 206; prisoner adoption, 192; scalps, 200 ; slaves, 178; spies, 1 1 0 ; troop specialization, 55 Ivens, W. G., 225, 247 Jibaro, approach order, 4 1 , 44 ; blood guilt, 222 ; head taking, 1 7 1 , 196f; land concept, 1 83, 1 85; leadership, early, 145; women 151; and war bundles, 158 revenge, tribute,
cial climbing and, 148f
Hebrews, early military operations,
Head taking, 196-200; economics and, 1 7 1 ; Kiwai, 1 50 ; Samoan, 50; so cial climbing and, 148f Hebrews, early military operations, 31-38; head taking, 200 Helmet, 1 3 Herodotus, 95, 149, 1 7 8 , 1 8 1 , 190, 1 99f, 203, 249f
31-38; head taking, 200
Helmet, 13
Herodotus, 95, 149, 178, 181, 190,
199f, 203, 249f
Herskovits, M. J., 84, 89, 113, 159f,
175, 180, 235, 241, 250
Hewat, A., 233
Hierarchy of command, 75ff
Hollander, L. M., 73, 163
Honors quest, Bechuana, 195; jeal-
ousy and, 143; social climbing and,
145ff
Hopi, feminine war katchina, 156
Horizon, military, 21-38, Chattian, 85
Horse (see also Cavalry), 15, Plains
wealth and, 173
Hospitality, 192
Hubert, H., 178
Human nature, 206
Humphreys, C. B., 49, 70, 131, 175,
231, 248
Hunting, simple plans and, 128
Huron, declaration of war, 245
lapydes, terrain use, 131
Ibibio, approach order, 42; fire fight,
98; foreign relations, 246; plans,
84, 89, 1 1 3, 159f, 175, 1 80, 235, 24 1 , 250 Hewat, A., 233 Hierarchy of command, 75 Hollander, L. M . , 73, 1 63 Honors quest, Bechuana, 195; jeal ousy and, 143; social climbing and, 145f Hopi, feminine war katchina, 156 Horizon, military, 2 1 -38, Chattian, 85 Horse ( see also Cavalry ) , 15, Plains wealth and, 173 Hospitality, 1 92 Hubert, H., 178 Human nature, 206 Humphreys, C. B . , 49, 70, 1 3 1 , 175,
23 1 , 248 Hunting, simple plans and, 128 Huron, declaration of war, 245
Herskovits,
M . J.,
64;
loot gifting, 176; objective, 1 04f; plans, 128; political authority,
228; spies, 1 1 0 ; valuation of life, 2 1 3 ; women, 1 55 Johnston, Sir H. H . , 70, 80, 8 1 Junod, H., 44, 4 8 , 84, 1 05f, 161, 1 80, 1 96, 207f, 223, 234, 244 Justin, 220 Kamia, troop specialization, 54
127; sex tabu, 161
Ibo, blood guilt, 223; cannibalism,
194; plans, 127; recruiting, 88f;
social organization, 235
Increasing Resistance, principle,
Creek, 119
Individualism, military, 52; econom-
lapydes, terrain use, 1 3 1
ics and, 170; honors quest and,
Ibibio, approach order, 42; fire fight, 98; foreign relations, 246; 127; sex tabu, 161 plans,
Kansa, 146 Karsten,
police,
45;
social
climbing, 1 1 0,
147ff
R., 44, 64, 67, 109,
Indonesia, head taking, 196
128, 1 7 1 , 172, 176, 184, 197, 213, 222, 228 Kato, plans, 124 Kerri-Kerri, terrain use, 130 88f;
Infantry, l0f, 95, 126f
lbo,
blood
guilt,
223 ;
cannibalism,
Insignia of rank, Omaha, 75
Institutions, social, 5
Integrity of Tactical Units, principle,
194; plans, 127; recruiting, social organization, 235
25, 39, 53
Intelligence (see also Spies), 26, 40,
271
107-122; Zulu, 81
Invention, 7f
Iowa, battle lines, 45; command, 62,
68; reconnaissance, 108; social
climbing, 145; women and war
bundles, 158
Irish, early, revenge, 151; tribute,
D 9 iz e
177
Iroquois, 16f; formations, 47; ma-
trons, 157; military economics, 170;
objective, 103; pacific attitudes,
INDEX
INDEX (Continued)
( Continued )
Loyalty Islands, ration, 248 MacLeod, 0., 130 Magico-religious command 7 1 ; fear inhibiting rites, 2 1 8 ; peace decla
Kidd, D., 81, 84, 100, 106, 111, 114,
120, 191, 195, 216f, 234, 251
Kidder, A. V., 173
Kiowa no-retreat vow, 212; women,
155
Kiwai, approach order, 43; combat
106, 1 1 1 , 1 14, 120, 1 9 1 , 195, 2 1 6f, 234, 251 Kidder, A. V., 173 . Kiowa no-retreat vow, 212; women, 1 55 Kiwai, approach order, 43; combat
principles, 59; fear inhibiting rites,
Kidd, D., 8 1 , 84, 1 00,
principles, 59; fear inhibiting rites,
( see also Rites ) , 40;
218; plans, 129; revenge, 150; sex,
161; scouts, 111
Klamath, commercial slavers, 178
Krause, F., 11
Krige, E. J., 42, 79, 80, 81, 88, 100,
111, 121, 136, 159, 161, 224, 240,
251
Kroeber, A. L., 48, 65, 91, 125, 144,
154, 167, 171, 183f, 190, 192, 201,
215, 229
2 1 8 ; plans, 129; revenge, 150; sex, 1 6 1 ; scouts, 1 1 1 Klamath, commercial slavers, 178 Krause, F., 1 1 Krige, E . J. , 42, 79. 80, 8 1 , 88, 100, 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 . 136, 1 59, 1 6 1 . 224, 240, 251 Kroeber, A. L., 48, 65, 9 1 , 125, 144, 1 54, 167, 1 7 1 , 1 83f, 1 90, 192, 201, 2 1 5, 229
Kutenai,
commanders, 62 ; feminine magic,
1 60f; motive, 1 65ff; Winnebago, 62 Maha-Bharata, championship duel, 72 Maidu, lines, 48; victory orgies, 144 Malaysia ( see particular tribes, also
Indonesia ) , 17 Malinowski, B . , 175, 188 Mallery, C., 245
Kutenai, battle lines, 46; envelop-
M amm a lian, fighting anatomy, 28 Mandan, fortified villages, 78; land and, 183; no-retreat vow, 212 Mandingo, conquest empire, 95 Maneuver, Mangaian, 58; pivot of, Mangaians, battle operations,
ments, 128; loot gifting, 176; scout
associations, 109; security, 117; sex
fear, 158
Kwakiutl, cannibalism, 204; econom-
ics, 175
Labor, economic, contrasted with
Land and Capital, 186
La Flesche, F., 63, 66, 67, 76, 205,
46; envelop ments, 128; loot gifting, 176; scout associations, 1 09; security, 1 1 7 ; sex fear, 158 Kwakiutl, cannibalism, 204 ; econom ics, 175
battle lines, Labor, economic, contrasted
17
215, 238
Land, economic, 182-186
Landtman, G., 50, 59, 111, 150, 162,
with
168, 218, 224, 226, 247
Le Moyne, 118, 126, 201
La Flesche, F . , 63, 66, 67, 76, 205,
Land and Capital, 1 86
Leni Lenape, surprise, 112
Leo the Wise, Emperor, 82
Lesu, cannibalism, 194; chieftainship,
70; peace declaration, 248
2 1 5, 238 Land, economic, 182-186 Landtman, G., 50, 59, 1 1 1 . 1 50, 162, 168, 2 1 8, 224, 226, 247 Le Mayne, 1 1 8, 126, 201
Leni Lenape, surprise, 1 1 2 Leo the Wise, Emperor, 82 Lesu, cannibalism, 1 94 ; chieftainship, 70; peace declaration, 248 Life, attitudes regarding, 210-2 15
Life, attitudes regarding, 210-215
Line, tactical, 26ff, 44ff
Linderman, F., 212
Linkage, war and social patterns,
231ff
Linton, R., 195
Livy, Titus, 57
Localism, peace and, 232f
Logistics, see Supply
Line, tactical, 26ff, 44ff

Linkage, 231H war and
58; death contempt, 2 1 4 ; declaration of war and peace, 248; head taking, 1 98; honors quest, 149; land, 186; political motive, 165; religiOUS mo tive, 1 66; sociology, 242 ; tactical formations, 50 M anua, attitudes, 209; cannibalism, 194f; command, 7 1 Maori, 1 7 ; bodily scraps and enemy heads, 1 98; revenge, 150 Maputju, discipline, 84 Marginality of personality ( see Cuilt ), Thonga, 207 Masai, sex license, 160 Mass, or Sufficient Numbers. princi ple, 1 0 1
Mass duel, New Hebridean, 49 ; Mangaian, 59 McGee, W. J., 1 35 Mead, M . , 7 1 . 194f, 209 Mediaeval, 17 Meek, C. K., 88 f, 127, 207, 223, 235 Melanesia
Loot, 172ff, 188; Iowa, 68
Linderman, F. , 2 1 2 social patterns,
Lowie, R. H., 52, 62, 108, 109, 155,
157, 176, 203f, 21 If
Loyalty Islands, command 71; fear
inhibiting rites, 218; peace decla-
Linton, R . , 195 Livy, Titus, 57 Localism, peace and, 232f Logistics,
ration, 248
1 50 , 171, 194,
MacLeod, O., 130
Magico-religious (see also Rites), 40;
see Supply
commanders, 62; feminine magic,
160f; motive, 165ff; Winnebago,
Loot, 172ff. 188; Iowa, 68 Lowie, R. H . , 52, 62, 108, 109, 155,
( see particular tribes and islands ) , bodily scraps, 196; can
62
Maha-Bharata, championship duel, 72
157, 1 76, 203f, 2 1 1f
nibalism, 194; combat prinCiples, 59, 70; exploitation of victory, 106;
Maidu, lines, 48; victory orgies, 144
Malaysia (see particular tribes, also
272
Indonesia), 17
Malinowski, B., 175, 188
Mallery, G., 245
Mammalian, fighting anatomy, 28
Mandan, fortified villages, 78; land
and, 183; no-retreat vow, 212
Mandingo, conquest empire, 95
D 9 iz e
Maneuver, Mangaian, 58; pivot of, 17
Mangaians, battle operations, 58;
death contempt, 214; declaration of
war and peace, 248; head taking,
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) fire function, 93; formations, 48;
head taking, 198; land, 185; loot,
174; peace declaration, 248; plans,
127ff; recruiting, 89; religious mo-
tive, 166; revenge, 150; security,
121; sociology, 241f; surprise, 114;
fire function, 93; fonnations, 4 8 ; head taking, 1 9 8 ; land, 1 85 ; loot, 174; peace declaration, 248; plans, 127ff; recruiting, 89; religious mo tive, 1 66; revenge, 150; security, 1 2 1 ; sociology, 24 1 ; surprise, 1 14 ; terrain use, 1 3 0 ; tribal cohesion, 230; valuation of life, 2 1 4 ; war honors, 148 Menomini , 25; plans, 125; scalps, 201 ; scouts, 108; slaves, 179 Mesolithic, head taking, 199 Methods, tactical, 2 1 -38 Mickmash, Battle of, 24 Middle Age ( see also Mediaeval ) , 1 4 Middle America, 1 1 , 13, 1 6 ; human sacrifice, 1 89 M ilitarism, defined, 104 M iskito, social organization, 238 Mobility, principle, 26; function, 93ff; weapons of, 9, 1 4ff Modoc, commercial slavers, 178f; formations, 4if Mohave, land concept, 183 ; new ex perience, 1 67 ; political organiza tion, 229; prisoners, 192 Mojo, command, 68; revenge, 150; sex fear, 1 58 Mongol, organization, 251 Mon-Khmer, head taking, 199 Mooney, J., 54, 1. 57, 212, 215 Morley, S. G., 1 95 Motive, 30, 103f; Creek, 4 1 Murdock, G . P., 1 83 Music, Arikara field, 5 1 Muskogee, m arch order, 4 1 Nalder, L . F., 180, 230, 240 Napoleon, war wealth of, 175 Natchez, declaration of war, 245 ; tribal authority, 233 Nationalism ( see also Politics, Social Organization ) , 232 Natural Resources, 182-186 Naval actions, fire and movement in, 98, 132 Needs, basic human, 8f Nelson, E . W . , 86, 9 1 , 124, 172, 197
Neolithic Age, 6, 1 8 ; cannibalism, 195; head taking, 199 Neutrals, spies and, 1 1 0 New Britain, chastity, 162; fear in hibiting, 2 1 8 ; fire action, 93 ; in telligence, 1 1 1 ; recruiting, 89; sur prise, 1 1 4 New Hebrides, fonnations, 49; land, 1 85f; peace declaration, 248; re cruiting, 90; woman theft, 174 Nigerian, attitudes, 207 ; compensa tion, 1 7 1 ; foreign relations, 246; re venge, 150; security, 120; spies, 1 1 0; surprise, 1 13 No-retreat vows, ( see also Associa tions, Fraternities ) , 2 1 1 f; Great Plains, 144f Norse ( see also Teutonic, Viking ) , head taking, 200; tension release and berserkers, 144; tribute, 177; women, 1 63 Northeast Woodland, American ( see particular tribes ) , chiefs, 65 North Pacific Coast, American ( see particular tribes ) , 13, 1 6 ; com mand, 67; compensation, 1 7 1 ; na val actions, 98; 132 Objective, principle of, 1 02f Oceania ( see particular tribes and is lands ) , intelligence, I l l ; mobiliza tion, 89; sex m otive, 161; social climbing, 148; social organization, 235 ; tactical principles, 58 Offensive, principle of, 25, 100; of fense-defense cycle, 7f, 23 Oglala, no-retreat vow, 2 1 2 ; war so cieties, 58 Ojibway, 29; battle lines, 46; declara tion of war, 244f; fraternities, 146; leadership, 64, 68; plans, 125; re cruits, 66, 86; slaves, 179; social climbing, 146; staff, 76; women, 153f, 156 Okanagan, leadership, 66 Omaha, 40; attitudes, 205 ; battle or der, 52 ; chiefs, 65f; columns, 43 ; command channels, 7 5 ; enemy
terrain use, 130; tribal cohesion,
230; valuation of life, 214; war
honors, 148
Menomini, 25; plans, 125; scalps, 201;
scouts, 108; slaves, 179
Mesolithic, head taking, 199
Methods, tactical, 21-38
Mickmash, Battle of, 24
Middle Age (see also Mediaeval), 14
Middle America, 11, 13, 16; human
sacrifice, 189
Militarism, defined, 104
Miskito, social organization, 238
Mobility, principle, 26; function, 93ff;
weapons of, 9, 14ff
Modoc, commercial slavers, 178f;
formations, 47f
Mohave, land concept, 183; new ex-
perience, 167; political organiza-
tion, 229; prisoners, 192
Mojo, command, 68; revenge, 150;
sex fear, 158
Mongol, organization, 251
Mon-Khmer, head taking, 199
Mooney, J., 54, 157, 212, 215
Morley, S. G., 195
Motive, 30, 103f; Creek, 41
Murdock, G. P., 183
Music, Arikara field, 51
Muskogee, march order, 41
Nalder, L. F., 180, 230, 240
Napoleon, war wealth of, 175
Natchez, declaration of war, 245;
tribal authority, 233
Nationalism (see also Politics, Social
Organization), 232ff
Natural Resources, 182-186
Naval actions, fire and movement in,
98, 132
Needs, basic human, 8f
Nelson, E. W., 86, 91, 124, 172, 197
Neolithic Age, 6, 18; cannibalism,
195; head taking, 199
Neutrals, spies and, 110
New Britain, chastity, 162; fear in-
hibiting, 218; fire action, 93; in-
telligence, 111; recruiting, 89; sur-
prise, 114
New Hebrides, formations, 49; land,
185f; peace declaration, 248; re-
cruiting, 90; woman theft, 174f
Nigerian, attitudes, 207; compensa-
273
tion, 171; foreign relations, 246; re-
venge, 150; security, 120; spies,
110; surprise, 113
No-retreat vows, (see also Associa-
tions, Fraternities), 211ff; Great
Plains, 144f
Norse (see also Teutonic, Viking),
D 9 iz e
head taking, 200; tension release
Ori g i n a l from U N I VE R S ITY O F C L l FORN IA
and berserkers, 144; tribute, 177;
women, 163
Northeast Woodland, American (see
INDEX
INDEX (Continued)
( Continued )
1 89; command, 71; death
con
lives, 22 1 ; nationalism, 232; objec tive, 104; recruiting, 85; release from sorrow, 142; staff, 77; women, 1 53, 1 56, 1 58 Omens
lives, 221; nationalism, 232; objec-
tive, 104; recruiting, 85; release
tempt, 2 1 4 ; exploitation of victory, 106; fear inhibiting, 2 1 8 ; fire func tion, 93; head taking, 198; land,
from sorrow, 142; staff, 77; women,
153, 156, 158
Omens (see also Rites), intelligence
( see also Rites ) , intelligence
and, 111
and, 1 1 1 Oracles, Mrican mediators, 207 Organization, military, 251 Oronn, peace declaration, 246f Osage, command, 23, 26f, 45,
1 85 ; political motive, 1 65; recruit ing, 90 ; religious motive, 1 66 ; re venge, 150; security, 1 2 1 ; sex, 162; shock action, 100; slaVing, 180f; SOciology, 242; social climbing,
Oracles, African mediators, 207
Organization, military, 23, 26f, 45,
251f
Oronn, peace declaration, 246f
Osage, command, 63, channels, 75;
enemy lives, 221; fear inhibiting,
63, channels, 75;
1 48f; surprise, 1 1 4 ; terrain use, 130 Porno, declaration of war, 245; land concept, 1 84 Ponca, chiefs, 65 Population, Mangaian conservation war pattern of and, 141; 242 ;
215; social organization, 237f
enemy lives, 22 1 ; fear inhibiting, 2 1 5 ; social organization, 237f Ostyak, military aristocracy, 74 Paleolithic Age, lOf, 1 8 Papago, blood guilt, 222 ; scalps, 202 ; supply, Papuans 78; troop specialization, Melanesians ) , 54; women, 1 56
Ostyak, military aristocracy, 74
Paleolithic Age, l0f, 18
Papago, blood guilt, 222; scalps, 202;
supply, 78; troop specialization,
54; women, 156
principle of mass and, 1 0 1 Poseidonius o f Apamea, 2 00 Powell, J. W . , 76, 220 Prestige motive Powdermaker, H . , 70, 1 94, 208, 248
Papuans (see also Melanesians),
blood guilt, 225; formations, 48f;
military attitudes, 167f; peace de-
claration, 247
Patagonian, fire and movement, 97
( see
also
( see also Gifting,
Pawnee, Skidi captive sacrifice, 189f
blood guilt, 225; formations, 48f; military attitudes, 1 67f; peace de claration, 247 Patagonian, fire and movement, Payaguas, piracy, 174 Peace, attitudes, 226; declaration au thority, 2.'3 1 ff; Maori, 1 98; strong social authority and, 232 Persians, championship duel, 72 Pima, recruiting, 86; security, 1 1 9; social change, 237; troop specializa tion, 55; victory orgy, 144; women, 154 Piracy, 1 74 Plans, principle of Simplicity of, 79, 123- 137 Plateau, North American ( see partic 97 Pawnee, Skidi captive sacrifice, 1 89f
Honors, Loot ) , 145ff Principles, combat, 8; explained, 2530; war, 24 Prisoners, 189ff Professionalization, Plains war asso ciations and, 57f, 87 Projectiles ( see also Fire ) , 6f, 9ff Protection, principle, functions of 1 00f; weapons of, 9, 1 5f Punic War, 29 Puri ( Dravidians ) , terrain use, 1 32 Pygmies, African, attitudes, 206 Radin, P . , 62, 69, 2 1 5 Raid
Payaguas, piracy, 174
Peace, attitudes, 226; declaration au-
thority, 231ff; Maori, 198; strong
social authority and, 232
Persians, championship duel, 72
Pima, recruiting, 86; security, 119;
social change, 237; troop specializa-
tion, 55; victory orgy, 144; women,
154
Piracy, 174
Plans, principle of Simplicity of, 79,
123-137
Plateau, North American (see partic-
ular tribes), battle lines, 46; organ-
ization of command, 75; security,
117f
( see also Loot, Tactics ) ,
eco-
Politics, political, authority, 228ff;
motive, 164ff
nomic, 172 Ramayana, The, 51 Rattray, R. S., 81 Reconnaissance, see Scouting and Pa trolling Recreation ( see al.so Athletics ) , 166 f Recruiting ( see also Enlistment ) , siniboin, Omaha, 7 5 , 85; Teton, 85 62, 63; Ojibway,
Polo, Marco, 82
Polynesians (see particular tribes and
islands), 13; approach order, 42;
ular tribes ) , battle lines, 46; organ

ization of command, 75; security, 1 1 7f Politics , political, authority, 228ff; motive, 1 64ff Polo, Marco, 82 Polynesians ( see particular tribes attitudes, 209; blood guilt,
attitudes, 209; blood guilt, 226;
189; command, 71f; death con-
tempt, 214; exploitation of victory,
As
106; fear inhibiting, 218; fire func-
66 ;
tion, 93; head taking, 198; land,
185; political motive, 165; recruit-
and
226 ;
Religion, see Magico-religious Revenge ( see also Tension Release ) , 149ff
ing, 90; religious motive, 166; re-
islands ) , 1 3 ; approach order, 42 ;

venge, 150; security, 121; sex, 162;
shock action, 100; slaving, 180f;
sociology, 242; social climbing,
Rig Veda, The,
132, 1 64, 22 1
148f; surprise, 114; terrain use, 130
274
Pomo, declaration of war, 245; land
concept, 184
Ponca, chiefs, 65
Population, conservation of 141f;
Mangaian war pattern and, 242;
principle of mass and, l0lf
Poseidonius of Apamea, 200
Powdermaker, H., 70, 194, 208, 248
Powell, J. W., 76, 220
D 9 iz e
Prestige motive (see also Gifting,
Honors, Loot), 145ff
Principles, combat, 8; explained, 25-
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) Riley, E. B., 99, 129, 162, 225
Rites (see also Dances, Declaration of
War and Peace), fear inhibiting,
215-220; Morning Star, 189f;
peace, 248; Thonga war as, 207;
victory, 143, 156ff
Role (see also Honors, Prestige, So-
cial Climbing, Wish), assignment
of, 148ff
Romans (early explorer in America),
61, 64, 112
Romans (people), 14, 54; champion-
ship duel, 73
Roscoe, ].} 80
Rossel Island, battle plans, 127; mur-
derous attitudes, 209
Roth, W. E., 66, 86, 98, 154
Russell, F., 86, 119, 144, 154, 173,
237
Sacrifice, human, 189ff
Riley, E . B . , 99, 129, 1 62, 225 Rites ( see also Dances, Declaration of War and Peace ) , fear inhibiting, 215-220; Morning Star, 1 89f; peace, 248; Thonga war as, 207; victory, 1 43, 156ff Role ( see also Honors, Prestige, So cial Climbing, Wish ) , assignment of, 148ff Romans ( early explorer in America ) , 6 1 , 64, 1 1 2 Romans ( people ) , 14, 54 ; champion ship duel, 73 Roscoe, h 80 Rossel Island, battle plans, 121; mur derous attitudes, 209 Roth, W. E . , 66, 86, 98, 1 54 Russell, F., 86, 1 19, 144, 1 54, 173,
237
Shasta, women, 154 Shield, 13, 16 Shock, principle, actions of, 96; Gaul ish use of, 96; weapons, 9, 12ff Shoshone, Wind River, loot gifting, 176; women, 1 56f Siberian ( see particular tribes ) , leadership, 74; scalps, 203 ; slaving, 181 Siege, Belgae, 99; supply and, 77 Signals, intelligence, 1 08f, 120 Simplicity of Plans, principle, 123ff; primitive war and, 137 Sioux ( see particular tribes ) , security,
1 17
Skinner,
A. B., 25, 45, 64, 85, 104, 108, 1 1 0, 125, 130, 154, 158, 179, 201, 22 1 , 245
Samoan, approach order, 42; battle
formations, 50; battle order, 50;
fear inhibiting rites, 218; honors
quest, 148f; land, 185; Manuan
command, 71f; peace declaration,
249; slaves, 180; sociology, 242;
terrain use, 130; war attitudes, 209
Sauk and Fox, social climbing, 146;
spiritual slavery, 179
Saulteaux, intelligence magic, 109
Scalps, 200-203
Schebesta, P., 207
Schmidt, W., 30
Scots, surprise, 115
Scouting and patrolling (see also In-
telligence), 40, 107-109; Muskogee,
41; Kiwai, 43, 49
Scyths, captive sacrifice, 190; head
taking, 199; honors quest, 149; mo-
bility, 95; scalps, 203; slaving, 181;
tribute, 178
Security, 26, 41, 116ff; Muskogee, 41
Sentinels (see Security, above), 117f
Seri, battle plans, 135
Sex, fear of, 68, 158; jealousy, 142f;
license, Mojo, 68f; motive, 151-164
Shamans, counter-intelligence and,
109f
Shasta, women, 154
Shield, 13, 16
Shock, principle, actions of, 96; Gaul-
ish use of, 96; weapons, 9, 12ff
Shoshone, Wind River, loot gifting,
176; women, 156f
Siberian (see particular tribes), lead-
Sacrifice, human, 189f Samoan, approach order, 42; battle formations, 50; battle order, 50; fear inhibiting rites, 2 1 8 ; honors quest, 1 48f; land, 1 85 ; Manuan command, 71; peace declaration, 249; slaves, 180; sociology, 242 ; terrain use, 130; war attitudes, 209 Sauk and Fox, social climbing, 146; spiritual slavery, 179 Saulteaux, intelligence magic, 109 Scalps, 200-203 Schebesta, P., 207 Schmidt, W. , 30 Scots, surprise, 1 1 5 Scouting and patrolling ( see also In telligence ) , 40, 107- 109; Muskogee, 4 1 ; Kiwai, 43, 49 Scyths, captive sacrifice, 190; head taking, 1 99; honors quest, 149; mo bility, 95; scalps, 203 ; slaving, 1 8 1 ; tribute, 178 Security, 26, 41, 1 1 6ff; Muskogee, 4 1 Sentinels ( see Security, above ) , 1 1 7f Seri, battle plans, 135 Sex, fear of, 68, 158; jealousy, 142f; license, Mojo, 68f; motive, 151-164 Shamans, counter-intelligence and,
1 09
Slaving, 178-182 Slaughter, attitudes towards, 207 Snelgrave, 78, 250 Social climbing, 1 45ff Social control ( see also Politics ) , 233ff; military associations and, 67 Social organization, 10, 23, 227-253 ; cannibalism and, 1 95 ; Creek, 4 1 ; Polynesian, 71; Ojibway, 125 Social psychology, war motives and,
1 4 1 - 1 68
Social science, tactics as, 23 SOCiology, 227-253 ; tactics as,

39
23, 28,
ership, 74; scalps, 203; slaving, 181
Solomon Islands, bodily scraps, 196; councils, 70; descent from the sea, 1 14 ; head taking, 199; prisoner adoption, 1 92 ; recruiting, 90; re venge, 150 South America ( see particular tribes ) , 10; battle lines, 48; dawn attack, 128; economic motive, 172; enemy lives, 22 1 ; religiOUS motive, 1 66; security, 1 19; terrain use, 130; ter ritoriality, 243 Southeast United States ( see particu lar tribes ) , 10; chiefs, 65 ; compen sation, 171 ; fire and movement, 97 ; march order, 4 1 ; plans, 133; re cruiting, 86
Siege, Belgae, 99; supply and, 77
Signals, intelligence, 108f, 120
275
Simplicity of Plans, principle, 123ff;
primitive war and, 137
Sioux (see particular tribes), security,
117
Skinner, A. B., 25, 45, 64, 85, 104,
108, 110, 125, 130, 154, 158, 179,
201, 221, 245
Slaving, 178-182
Slaughter, attitudes towards, 207
Snelgrave, 78, 250
Social climbing, 145ff
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) Southwest United States (see particu-
lar tribes), counter-intelligence,
110; defensive war, 55; economic
raids, 172; outside aggression, 239;
scalps, 202
Spartan, discipline, 83
Spaulding, O. L., Nickerson, H., and
Wright, J. W., 22, 24
Spear (see also Bayonet), 9, 11, 13,
fire weapon, 92; Zulu, 100
Specialist, specialization, 11; troop,
53, 124, 252
Spies (see also Intelligence), ll0ff
Staff, 75, 76ff; African, 80
Stewart, M. B., 61
Strabo, 200, 249
Strategy, 31; Ojibway, 125
Sturluson, S., 116, 174, 200
Suabians (see also Suebi), recruiting,
90
Sublimation, in-group hatred, 14 If
Sudanese, civil state, 239; logistics,
78; mobility, 95
Suebi (see also Suabians), mobility,
96; training, 80
Sufficient Numbers, principle (see
also Mass), American Indian, 101
Sumu, tribute, 177
Supply, 30ff, 77, 169f
Surinam, fire and movement, 97; re-
cruiting, 86
Surplus, economic, 169ff; Dahomey
and tactical mass, 102; Sudanese
war and, 78
Surprise, principle, 25, 107-122
Surround (see also Envelopment),
Dahomean, 42, 127; Kiwai, 111;
Melanesian, 128ff
Swanton, J. R., 41, 76, 86, 97, 118,
184, 201, 213, 233
Sword, 13f; use of, 57
Symbol, 188
Tabu, Jibaro, 156, 160; Polynesian
chiefs, 71
Tacitus, Cornelius, 57, 74, 84, 115,
163, 177, 185, 204, 219f, 236
Tactics and Technique of Cavalry,
22, 100, 103, 116, 123, 130, 149
Tactical functions, 91-106
Talbot, P. A., 42, 98, 110, 113, 120,
161, 216f, 223, 246f
Southwest United States ( see particu lar tribes ) , counter-intelligence, 1 1 0; defensive war, 55; economic raids, 172; outside aggression, 239; scalps, 202 Spartan, discipline, 83 Spaulding, O. L., Nickerson, H., and Wright, J. W., 22, 24 Spear ( see also Bayonet ) , 9, 1 1 , 13, fire weapon, 92; Zulu, 100 Specialist, specialization, 1 1 ; troop, 53, 124, 252 Spies ( see also Intelligence ) , l 1 0ff Staff, 75, 76; African, 80 Stewart, M. B., 6 1 Strabo, 200, 249 Strategy, 3 1 ; Ojibway, 125 Sturluson, S., 1 16, 174, 200 Suabians ( see also Suebi ) , recruiting, 90 Sublimation, in-group hatred, 141 Sudanese, civil state, 239; logistics, 78; mobility, 95 Suebi ( see also Suabians ) , mobility, 96; training, 80 Sufficient N umbers, principle ( see also Mass ) , American Indian, 101 Sumu, tribute, 177 Supply, 30ff, 77, 169 Surinam, fire and movement, 97; re cruiting, 86 Surplus, economic, 169ff; Dahomey and tactical mass, 102; Sudanese war and, 78 Surprise, principle, 25, 107- 122 Surround ( see also Envelopment ) , Dahomean, 42, 127; Kiwai, I l l ; Melanesian, 128ff Swanton, J. R., 4 1 , 76, 86, 97, 1 1 8, 1 84, 201, 213, 233 Sword, 13f; use of, 57 Symbol, 188 Tabu, Jibaro, 1 56, 160; Polynesian chiefs, 71 Tacitus, Cornelius, 57, 74, 84 , 1 15, 1 63, 177, 185, 204, 219, 236
Tamil, captive sacrifice, 190
Tactics and Technique of Cavalry, 22, 100, 103, 1 16, 123, 130, 149 Tactical functions, 91-106 Talbot, P. A., 42, 98, 1 10, 1 13, 120, 161, 216f, 223, 246f Tamil, captive sacrifice, 190 Tannenberg, Battle of, 29, 136 Tapuya, cannibalism, 193; land concept, 1 84 ; women, 154 Tartar, command channel, 82 Teit, J. A., 153, 190, 193 Tension release, 141- 145; enemy corpses and, 193; prisoner torture and, 1 9Of; revenge, 1400 Terrain, Utilization of, principle, 26, 130f Territoriality ( see also Land ) , 243ff; Mohave, 230 Teton, battle lines, 45; counter-intel ligence, 1 10; economics, 170; loot gifting, 176; plans, 79; recruiting, 85; scouting, 108; tactical coopera tion, 58; tribal authority, 232 Teutonic tribes ( see also Nordic, Vik ing ) , command, 82; head taking, 200 Theory, of war, 21-38; of weapons, 6ff Thonga, see BaThonga Thracians, sociological defects, 249 Threshold ( see also Horizon ) , of slavery, 178 Timuca, plans, 126 Tlingit, scalps, 201 ; valuation of life, 213; women, 155 Torture, 1900; Dakota women and, 158; Maidu, 1 44, 1 90 Training, 29, 79f; Blackfoot, 44 Tribal cohesion, 228ff; peace and, 232f Tribute, 177 Tsimshian, command, 67 Turki, terrain use, 131 Turney-High, H. H., 109, 1 17, 128, 143, 158f, 174, 176, 179, 246
Tannenberg, Battle of, 29, 136
Tapuya, cannibalism, 193; land con-
cept, 184; women, 154
Uganda ( see Baganda ) , generals, 8 1 ; staff, 80
Tartar, command channel, 82
Teit, J. A., 153, 190, 193
276
Tension release, 141-145; enemy
corpses and, 193; prisoner torture
and, 190f; revenge, 149ff
Terrain, Utilization of, principle, 26,
130f
Territoriality (see also Land), 243ff;
Mohave, 230
Teton, battle lines, 45; counter-intel-
D 9 iz e
ligence, 110; economics, 170; loot-
gifting, 176; plans, 79; recruiting,
85; scouting, 108; tactical coopera-
tion, 58; tribal authority, 232
INDEX ( Continued )
INDEX (Continued) Underbill, R., 202
Underhill, R., 202 Values, military, 187-204 Veblen, To, 175 Vedic ( see also Aryan, Hindu ) , troop cooperation, 57 Vega, Garcilasso de la, 130 Verendrye, Chevalier de la, 78, 1 83 Victory, exploitation of, 26, l03f; gloat dance and women, 1 56f1; orgies, 143f Viking ( see also Nordic, Teutonic ) , championship duel, 72; piracy, 174; surprise, 1 1 6 Weak center formation, 29 Weapons, form and function of, 520; versatility of, 54 White, Lo A o , 68 Widsith, 151, 165, 185 Winnebago, fear-inhibiting, 215; re lease from sorrow, 142; valuation of life, 213 Wish, war as fulfillment of, 141f1 Wissler, Co, 44, 45, 58, 109, 1 12, 146, 1 53, 167, 203, 212
Values, military, 187-204
Veblen, T., 175
Vedic (see also Aryan, Hindu), troop
cooperation, 57
Withdrawal ( see also Retreat ) , As siniboin, 134 ; mobility in, 99 Women ( see also Sex ) , 151-164 Wyandot, attitude regarding enemy, 220; command, 76 Yukaghir, champiOns, 74; training, 80 Yuki, chiefs, 65 ; compensation, 171 Yuma, scalps, 202; offensive and shock, 100 Yurok, political organization, 229; victory, 143 Zulu, 14, 29; approach march, 42f1; battle lines, 48; blood guilt, 223f; command channels, 8 1 ; discipline, 83; exploitation of victory, 104; fear inhibiting, 216; intelligence, 1 10; offensive, 100; plans, 135; re cruiting, 88; security, 120f; slav ing, 1 80; social control, 234, 240; staff, 80; supply, 79; tactical organ ization, 25 1 ; torture, 1 9 1 ; training, 79f; unit integrity, 53; withdrawal order, 52; women, 159f Zuni, scalps, 202
Vega, Garcilasso de la, 130
Verendrye, Chevalier de la, 78, 183
Victory, exploitation of, 26, 103f;
gloat dance and women, 156ff;
orgies, 143f
Viking (see also Nordic, Teutonic),
championship duel, 72; piracy, 174;
surprise, 116
Weak center formation, 29
Weapons, form and function of, 5-
20; versatility of, 54
White, L. A., 68
Widsith, 151, 165, 185
Winnebago, fear-inhibiting, 215; re-
lease from sorrow, 142; valuation
of life, 213
Wish, war as fulfillment of, 14 Iff
Wissler, C., 44, 45, 58, 109, 112, 146,
153, 167, 203, 212
Withdrawal (see also Retreat), As-
siniboin, 134; mobility in, 99
Women (see also Sex), 151-164
Wyandot, attitude regarding enemy,
220; command, 76
Yukaghir, champions, 74; training, 80
Yuki, chiefs, 65; compensation, 171
Yuma, scalps, 202; offensive and
shock, 100
Yurok, political organization, 229;
victory, 143
Zulu, 14, 29; approach march, 42ff;
battle lines, 48; blood guilt, 223f;
command channels, 81; discipline,
83; exploitation of victory, 104;
fear inhibiting, 216; intelligence,
110; offensive, 100; plans, 135; re-
cruiting, 88; security, 120f; slav-
ing, 180; social control, 234, 240f;
staff, 80; supply, 79; tactical organ-
ization, 251; torture, 191; training,
79f; unit integrity, 53; withdrawal
order, 52; women, 159f
Zuni, scalps, 202
277
277
D ig Ize
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PRIMITIVE

Its Practice and Concepts

HARRY HOLBERT TURNEY-HIGH

Professor of Anthropology and Sociology,

University of South Carolina

University of South Carolina Press , Columhia

Generated on 2013-08-12 07:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015031976767 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA PRESS ' COLUMBIA 1949

Original from UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Copyright 1949 by the University of

South Carolina Press, Columbia. Printed

by the State Commercial Printing Com-

G'N :'\1' i . T"i'

Generated on 2013-08-12 07:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015031976767 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Ori g i n a l from UNIVERSITY O F ICHIG N

Major General Ewart G. Plank

Brigadier General Gordon C. Hollar

To MAJOR GENERAL EWART G. PLANK

Generated on 2013-08-12 07:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015031976767 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Ori g i n a l from U N IV ERSI TY O F I C H IG N

J WO CONSIDERATIONS ORIGINALLY LED TO THE STUDY OF WHICH THIS

volume is the product. First, considering the importance of war to

analyze the complex among nonliterate folk. Anthropologists, sociolo-

deprecating war rather than attempting to understand this behavior

pattern which has played such a tremendous role in human affairs.

Second, considering the qualitative and quantitative excellence of the

field literature of anthropology, several authors consider that it is time

to enter the generalizing phase of the science.

This work represents an effort to help correct the first defect. It

will at least raise questions which other students are encouraged to

CONSIDERATIONS ORIGINALLY LED

solve, and it is hoped that the field ethnographers will be encouraged

volume is the product.

First, considering the importance of to Anthropologists, sociolo

to be more explicit in their treatment of their informants' military

Civilized war will be discussed only briefly in Chapter I. The term

"civilization" refers to cultures with writing, metal-smelting, organized

commerce, civil government, city-building, tactical warfare, and such

complexes. The military practices of such peoples as the Pre-Colum-

This study, therefore, treats of nonurban societies without stone archi-

tecture and literate members. The term used here is nonliterate,

which actually approaches the popular meaning of "primitive" and

"uncivilized" in most instances.

to forget opinions based on secondary, tertiary, and often quatenary

materials. Only descriptive field literature has been used. Every

Civilized war will be discussed only briefly in Chapter 1.

"civilization" refers to cultures with writing, metal-smelting, organized

Ori g i n a l from U N IV ERSI TY O F I C H IG N

recorded facts scream, whisper, or be silent. The condition of the

field literature made the latter necessary in many important phases.

have to enter active military service. In order to obtain criticism of a

requested the Montana State University to mimeograph and dis-

ter of the resultant criticism suggested publication of this, the com-

plete study. Again, publication was delayed in light of the possibili-

ties of the theoretical position being weakened by field experience.

Study of the manuscript after separation, however, showed that the

recent European war only confirmed the original conclusions.

fall, largely because of its limited Twentieth Century tradition. (First,)

it might be said that it tends to ignore the other patterns of culture

with which warfare must certainly be linked. This work is meant to

be a study of warfare only, and does not pretend to be a general social

anthropology. It is hoped that other students will describe these

linkages. (Second,;one might suspect that the materials have been

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