Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
DOClD: 3803783
Declassified and approved for release by NSA. CIA &. State Dept on
b'I-'1 ~-~O'I 'I I)ursuant to E.O. '135~6 MDR 58453
DOClD: 3803783
lOP SECREI/7COIVlINIJlREL 10 USA, A:US, CK!{, GlUt, N2':L
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(U) Table ofContents "
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Page ..
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(U) Introduction. .. .... . ... .. . . .1 ~
,
"'
(U) GUNMAN Impact. ...... .. ...... . ... .. .... .. ..... . ...... . .17
, ;
(U) Conclusions . ..
. .. 19
t
(U) Acknowledgements. .20
(U)Notes. . . . .. ...
. .20 ,
(U)Index. ........ . .
. . . . .23
~~
.,., .
'FOt' SECRE'Ft/COMHff//REL 'FO USA, IMS, GYt, CBR, P>t~L Page iii
DOClD: 3803783
TOP S:ECltM11COMtN'f'f/KEL 'FO US:z't, I.tUS, G\fl GHR, N~L
CU) Dan Rather: "In another U.S.-Soviet CUI/r'OUO) How accurate was the CBS report?
development, Pentagon correspondent The following paper will examine the nature of
David Martin has been told how Soviet the Soviet electronic penetration and the damage
secret police in Moscow have been getting assessment of Soviet access to typewriters at the
the latest word on sensitive U.S. embassy U.S. embassy in Moscow. This history of Project
documents even before U.S. offici~s read GUNMAN will also answer such questions as how
them." were the typewriter bugs discovered and how did
they work.
CU) David Martin: "Informed sources tell
CBS News that for at least one year, and CU) Countries have spied on each other by gath-
probably longer, the American embassy in ering information from embassies for centuries.
Moscow was the victim of a sophisticated The United States and the Soviet Union were of
electronic spy operation which gave Soviet course archenemies during the Cold War C1945 to
leaders an inside look at what U.S. dip- the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991), and there is
lomats were doing and planning. Soviet a long history of attempts by the Soviets to gain
agents secretly installed tiny sensing devic- access to information from the U.S. embassy and
es in about a dozen embassy typewriters. its diplomatic apparatus. Perhaps the most famous
The devices picked up the contents of docu- incident of Soviet espionage was the Great Seal
ments typed by embassy secretaries and implant.
transmitted them by antennas hidden in
the embassy walls. The antennas, in turn, CU) On 4 August 1945, Soviet school children
relayed the signals to a listening post out- presented a carving of the Great Seal of the U.S.
side the embassy.... to Averell Harriman, the U.S. ambassador to the
Soviet Union. The carving hung in Spaso house,
CU) "Depending on the location of the the ambassador's residential office' in Moscow,
bugged typewriters, the Soviets were able until 1952, when the U.S. State Department dis-
to receive copies of everything from routine covered that there was a microphone hidden inside
administrative memos to highly classified the carving that the Soviets turned on at will. This
documents. bug was not a standard microphone and could not
be detected unless it was in use. For six years the
CU) "One intelligence officer said the poten- Soviets were able to eavesdrop on the conversations
tial compromise of sensitive information of the U.S. ambassador. 2 The Soviet threat to U.S.
should be viewed with 'considerable seri- embassy security was both well-documented and
ousness'. real.
Page 1
DOClD: 3803783
I UP SEeM I j j COWIIt<llj jtmL TO tJSA, ADS, CMt4' 6Blt, N2":L
tion, when conducted by any but the best trained I briefed Ken DeGrqffenreid [the
technicians, would normally be unproductive. All senior director of intelligence pro-
concluded that if the Soviet KGB would go to these grams on the National Security
lengths against a Western ally, then certainly the Council]. Next we briefed Admiral
John Poindexter [the deputy nation- (U) The Race to Remove and Replace
al security adviser, who became the Embassy Equipment
national security adviser in 1985J.
Admiral Poindexter wrote the neces- ~ The first goal of the GUNMAN Project, to
sary memorandum and within afew replace all of the electronic equipment in the U.S.
days we had a signed document of embassy in Moscow with signaturized equipment,
authorization from the president. was a daunting challenge. Electronic equipment
included teletype machines, printers, computers,
CU) President Reagan approved the GUNMAN cryptographic devices, and copiers - in short,
project in February 1984. almost anything that plugged into a wall socket.
NSA staff had to move quickly to replace equipment
CU) Even after presidential approval, knowl- to.... avoid tiPPin}ts hand to the Soviets. According
edge of GUNMAN was still tightly held within the t~ ho was involved with the procure-
government. I IfuIther explained: ment and shipment of the upgraded equipment to
Moscow, Walter Deeley gave the staff one hundred
Admiral Poindexter toldine to days to complete this phase ()fth.eproject.1 I
brief the secretary of state [George stated,
SchultzJ and the director of Central P.L. 86-36
Intelligence [William CaseyJ, and no The first problem that we faced was
one else. I pleaded to briefLawrence the lack of a centralized inventory at
Eagleburger [deputy undersecretary the embassy. The problem was fur-
for political affairsJ, because Ifeared ther complicated because individual
that I could not reach the secretary of departments had software tailored
state if we needed help in gaining the to their specific needs. For instance,
cooperation of the State Department. we could not simply replace all ofthe
After much begging, Poindexter Wang computers.] I
relented. This incident is an indica- ________---ll Keeping track of OGA
tion ofthe concernfor security within all of the various software was hard
the u.S. government. 9 enough, but keeping track ofall ofthe
variations was a nightmare. With the
~ Developing and gaining approval of a plan assistance of a few trusted commu-
to respond to a possible security threat in approxi- nication center embassy employees,
mately six months were significant accomplish- we were able to obtain diagrams and
ments for a large bureaucracy such as NSA. They blueprints of equipment. However,
were a testament to the leadership ofWalter Deeley, wefound thatfrequently the original
a manager who took risks and made decisions. diagram did not always match with
Right from the start of GUNMAN, the research and the equipment that had been actually
COMSEC directorates worked together. This type of delivered.
collaboration was very effective but a very unusual
phenomenon in the 1980s. Overcoming bureau- iS1 Security concerns were another challenge
cratic hurdles was also possible because during the identified by I Ip . L. 86- 3 6
1980s the Reagan administration had an overarch-
ing concern with the Soviet threat to the U.S. We could not simply show up to take
an inventory because we could not
risk alerting the Soviets. Instead, tele-
communication personnel from NSA
~The
equipment was stored
and guarded by U.S. personnel at
a warehouse in Germany until it
could be flown into Moscow. This
/ ~ Fig. 3. CONEX boxes used to ship equipment to andfrom was necessary because there was
/ the u.s. embassy. The boxes were over 30feet long, 8feet no place at the embassy to store
/ tall, and 8feet wide. Boxes in theforeground were wrapped
ten tons of equipment. The embas-
/ in burla.]Ja.~cl.Hsecuredwith steel strips.1
EOi~H4H~m(~)HHHHHHH .. I I
(back to cam~e~ra-::-)T".------- sy attic had been damaged in a fire
P.L~8Ei-36
in 1978 and was not stable enough
to hold such heavy equipment.
~ehtto the embassy. In preparation for shipment,
boxes ~feqllipment were placed in crates which ~ The equipment was flown into Moscow in
were wrapped.ihbllrlap. Burlap signified that these stages on a Lufthansa aircraft, a common State
items were to be treated, as U.S. diplomatic cargo Department procedure. The Soviets were not sur-
and would not be subjecttojnspection by Soviet prised by an influx of equipment entering the
customs officials. As a furthe~secllrity measure, embassy because such activity was typical in the
the burlap was stapled onto each cr~te~1 spring. I
The only way to get equipment into the
the embassy as very intense. Nobody trusted the up and down the stairs. The teletype
Soviets. machines were really, really heavy.
They were also very wide and could
Workers took theirjobs seriously. We barelyfit through the stairways.
were always under the watcliful eye of
the Soviets, even in our personal life. I We started changing equipment in
lived in an apartment outside the the State Department communication
u.S. compound. I would come home centerr
to find my freezer unplugged, shirts
missing from my closet, or a dirty
glass in the sink that had contained
liquor. I am sure that the apartment
was bugged. Americans had no priva-
cy.17
P.L. 86-36
(U//OUO) I 1/
a physicist who
worked in S6S, described the atmosphere as the
search for bugs proceeded at NSA
worked at night and on the weekends ect. I could hardly wait for morning
by myself in the trailer examining when my colleagues would return. 26
equipment. After we had looked at
all of the crypto gear, we eventually ~L...- lcontinued the story.
.....
the diffieult task ofreverse engineer- handpicked the people to brief President Reagan at
ing the bug to see how it worked. I the White House. R9 grabbed publicity, too."3 0 As
had been discouraging the wide use Count Galeazzo Ciano summed up human nature
of x-rays because we had diffieul- in his diary in World War II, "As always, victory
ty obtaining Polaroid film. Polaroid finds a hundred fathers but defeat is an orphan."
P.L. 86-36
only made about 3,000 sheets offilm
a year. We had used 10,000 sheets -t&) The discovery that the Soviets had bugged
and were having trouble obtaining a typewriter in the U.S. embassy in Moscow did
film. Thank goodness Mike ignored not diminish the level of secrecy surrbunding the
my advice and x-rayed the entire GUNMAN projecd la tech-
machine. There was no way to see nical writer in S64, the Tempest.office, which
that bug without x-rays. 27 was located next to S65, saw large amounts of
equipment going up and down the halL She even
CU//FOU011 lclaimed to have no special helped with the procurement of film and packag-
talent. . ing materials. She learned about the true nature of
the GUNMAN project only after the implant was
I found that bug by luck. After look- , discovered. Even then her sup~fvisor swore her to
..i ng at so many x-rays day after day keep the information secret.
for so many hours, I could easily
have missed it. I'm glad that I saw CU//vOllO) One morniIjg, with no time for
it. I certainly was delighted with the preparation, I r
was told to brief the
$5,000 cash award. 28 deputy director, Robert Rich, on the GUNMAN
l?;L. 86-36
implant. She did the best she could with the brief-
................~ Ibelieved that the GUNMAN expe-
ing, but determined that she would learn as much
rience had an important positive effect on the as possible about the subject. Since the engineers
COMSEC organization. were ve bus with their investi ations
"---_----'soon became the NSA GUNMAN briefer.
Another lesson that GUNMAN taught
us was to expand our thinking. Many ~ While the search for additional bugs con-
ofus in the COMSEC area expected the tinued, the secrecy of GUNMAN remained par-
\\ bug to be in crypto or other COMSEC amount.1 l1?riefed Agency seniors
\~quipment. It ended up being in a about GUNMAN. People wetepriefed one at a time
~pewriter that produced plain text. in an anechoic chamber, which was a soundproof
W~ had to pay more attention to anti-echo room used to conduct techhkal tests. She
plmn text communication devices if reported that the reaction to the news ra:nged from
we were to keep u.s. communica- astonishment to anger. ... ~. L. 86- 3 6
tionsseeure. 29
CUI/Poua) Over time, the need to warn o~ers
(U) ReacticillS to the GUNMAN Find of the Soviet threat grew,and NSA began to brief
other members of the intelligence communIty.
CU/lFaUO)1 I
characterized the Balancing the need for secrecy versus the need to
reaction to the GUNMAN find within the organi- warn a ainst a threat was a difficult task.
zations that had worked on the project as chaotic. ' - - - _....
briefed the GUNMAN project for seven
"Everyone jumped on the bandwagon and wanted years. One of the highlights for her was briefing the
to take credit for the find. Everyone wanted to be on President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
stage. S65 was pushed into the background. Deeley Normally this task would fall to Agency seniors,
but none were available so she was able to go to neering was very successful. Analysts uncovered
the White House to make the resentation.3 1 numerous characteristics of the implant.
w 0 so wor ed in S64, reported that
he an took a GUNMAN briefing (D) A brief explanation of the general charac-
'. on the road to warn our allies of the Soviet threat. teristics of IBM Selectric typewriters will aid in the
I ~ole was to answer technical questions understanding of how the implant worked. Most
from the audience.3 2 typewriters had metal arms that swung up against
a ribbon to type a letter. IBM Selectrics, however,
(U//POUO) In 1985, when the story of the were unique because they used a round ball with
Soviet bug of U.S. typewriters in the Moscow numbers and letters around the outside surface.
embassy broke on the CBS nightly news, William When a typist struck a key, the ball moved into
Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence position over an inked plastic ribbon and descend-
Agency, was furious. He demanded a list of every- ed to imprint the character onto the paper.
one that NSA had briefed on the GUNMAN project.
I Iwas glad that she was able to supply ~ The lot of equipment from the U.S. embassy
that list. Casey eventually dropped the investigation in Moscow that was shipped back to NSA contained
of the leak because the task of discovery w~s impos- forty-four typewriters, six of which were bugged.
sible. Too many people knew about GUNMAN.33 The first step in evaluating the implant was to com-
I .//
I / pare a bugged with a nonbugged typewriter. As S65
r ,/
(U) Implant Characteristics and R9 personnel disassembled the typewriters
I'P.L.
, '--,
86-36
side by side, they took video and still photography
\':' ..... ~ A discussion arose within the COMSEC of each part to ensure a thorough evaluation. Some
\ ' " organization about whether the GUNMAN bug of the unique characteristics of bugged typewrit-
\" "should be reverse engineered by a contractor or ers were that these typewriters had an additional
\\ bythe organization itself. Engineers such as spring lug and screw; had a modified switch; and
. .mslste t at t ey had the capability to do had modified bails (the official term for bail is
this workl Igained reverse engineering expe- interpose latch) or arms that controlled the pitch
rience at a previous job with Naval Intelligence. 34 and rotation of the ball.
Management sided with the engineers, and reverse
engineering of the GUNMAN bug became an in- ~ Reverse engineering was another example
house project. This was an important decision of how entities within NSA worked in collaboration
because it e:p.abled NSA to learn a great deal about even though they were in different organizations.
the ingenuity of the Soviets and to gain a better Personnel from S65 and R9 divided the reverse
understanding of the threat. This decision also engineering tasks. R9 personnel focused on the
showed that management and subordinates had a operational aspects of the bug. S65 personnel
good working relationship and that subordinates removed the printed wire assemblies and deter-
had initiative. It was an atmosphere that furthered mined the emanation capabilities. Together, S65
the Agency's ability to fully carry out its mission. and R9 personnel drew logic diagrams describing
the circuits. S65 persoimel also trained people from
-t81 NSA analysts left no stone unturned in other agencies to perform visual and x-ray inspec-
reverse engineering the implant. The COMSEC and tions of equipment in the field so that they could
Research organizations 'devoted considerable time look for bugs. This training paid off because seven
and effort into studying all aspects of the bug. NSA additional typewriters in the Moscow embassy and
was determined' to learn from the enemy. As the three typewriters in the Leningrad consulate con-
following discussion demonstrates, reverse engi- tained implants. A total of sixteen bugs were found
in twelve IBM Selectric II typewriters and four IBM
~Fig7
Exploded views
ofbugged power
switch
Selectric III typewriters. Common features were informatiQn as it was being typed. 35 Later battery-
found in all sixteen typewriters: six ferromagnetic powered implants had a test point underneath an
magnetizable bails were replaced with six nonfer- end screw. By removing the screw and inserting a
romagnetic nonmagnetizable bails with a very probe, an individual could easily read battery volt-
strong magnet in the tip; all the typewriters con- age to see if the batteries were still active.
tained a modified comb support bar which housed
the bug; all used burst transmissions at the 30, 60, ~The ingenuity of the Soviets was remarkable
or 90 MHZ range via radio frequency. because they did not merely move from batteries
as a source of power to alternating current. There
-f81 The Soviets continually upgraded and were early versions and later versions of bugs that
improved their implants. There were five varieties used both sources of power. NSA found that the
or generations of bugs. Three types of units oper- first three implants were battery powered. The
ated using DC power and contained either eight, first of these was shipped to Moscow in October
nine, or ten batteries. The other two types oper- 1976, and the other two were shipped in April of
ated from AC power and had beacons to indicate 1977. The first bug that used alternating current
whether the typewriter was turned on or off. Some as its source of power was shipped to Moscow in
of the units also had a modified on and off switch November 1977.The remaining nine machines that
with a transformer, while others had a special were found in Moscow used alternating current
coaxial screw with a spring and lug. The modified as their source of power and were more advanced
switch sent power to the implant. Since the battery- than the first AC-powered bug. Five of the advanced
powered machines had their own internal source of model AC bugged typewriters were delivered to
power, the modified switch was not necessary. The Moscow in February 1982. The remainder were
special coaxial screw with a spring and lug con- delivered in January of 1984.36 The later battery-
nected the implant to the typewriter linkage, and powered bugged typewriters found in the consulate
this linkage was used as an antenna to transmit the
in Leningrad were shipped in April of 1977 and the paper, and thus determine which
March of 1982. 37 character had been tappedAt./ P . L. 86- 3 6
the Soviets could turn them off when inspection fied information. Manual typewriters that were to
teams were in the area. Newer spectrum analyzers be used for the processing of classified information
had memory and could integrate energy detected were to be shipped from Moscow to other Soviet
over a period of time. Newer analyzers may have embassies only in diplomatic pouches. When these
detected the GUNMAN device, but there would typewriters were not in use at the various embas-
OGA
have to be an element of luck. When using the sies, they were to be stored in sealed containers. 49
spectrum analyzer, the typewriter would have to
be turned on, the bug would have to be on, and
the analyzer would have to be tuned to the right
frequency range.
Only
"-----.....,,""':"'l"'"-----'l"""":'.,.....---.,.....""""l"'----' -"i.
II embassy,] I
1
L...- ----J----------.... NSA had its own program to protect keying mate-
rial and equipment, but it was small in comparison
P.L. 86-36
f8t Plans that had been stalled were imple- to t h e CIA program. OCiA
mented because of GUNMAN. For instance, the
National Security Council promulgated National E&) Because of the GUNMAN revelations
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 145. This direc- and other compromises, such as the Walker spy
tive, signed on 17 September 1984, made DIRNSA ring, NSA expanded its anti-tamper program.
the national manager for telecommunications and Customers were more receptive to using these
automation information systemss~curity.61 solutions because they recognized the security
P. L,S6-36
threat. Technicians at NSA, such as
(~) After the GUNMAN revelations, sever"il invented new
"-----:----~-.;----.:---:------.;-~
changes came about within the COMSEC orga- anti-tamper technologies such as holograph and
nization at NSA. While the GUNMAN discov- prism labels that could not be easily duplicated
ery was not the only cause for these changes, by an adversary who tried to remove them from a
it certainly influenced their implementation. In package. 64 On 1 May 1989, in recognition of both
1985 the name of the COMSEC organization was the growth and importance of these technologies,
changed to the Information Security (INFOSEC) the INFOSEC organization consolidated all of its
organization. 62 Information security denoted an anti-tamper programs into a new separate division,
expansion of responsibilities for the organization. Y26, the Protective Technologies Implementation
The organization had more to protect than just the Division. 65 In recognition of the need to train cus-
transmission of information. This name change tomers in the proper use of tamper technologies,
also reflected the greater awareness of the need to a separate awareness and education branch was
protect plain text information and the intention of established within the division. Prior to the forma-
the DDI to place greater emphasis on the protec- tion of this branch, technologies were provided to
tion of plain text. NSA management reorganized the customer without any emphasis on their proper
the INFOSEC organization to better handle its use~ Iwho worked as a chemist
information security responsibilities. For instance, in vanous technology tamper programs, reported
the organization became more involved in tech- on a visit that she made to seea.customer on the
nical security countermeasures. The Technical USS Witman in the spring of 1984:
P.L. 86-36
Security Engineering Center, X3, created on 14
May 1986, became responsible for advanced tech- I asked the COMSEC custodian where
nology development, fabrication security - the he stored the keying material. He
security of equipment as it is being built - techni- showed me the plastic bags that had
cal security, and facility evaluation. Plans called for contained a tamper-proof canister.
X3 and R9, which was responsible for the exploita- He praised the use ofthe plastic bags
tion of the adversary's communications, to jointly and said they were great for storing
conduct facility evaluations. NSA hoped to improve fish bait. To my horror, the fellow
technical security through this more coordinated was removing all of the key from
approach. 63 the canister which was intended for
key storage. Instead of removing
00 In the late
197()S,1 I only the key neededfor that day, he
came to NSA fromClA to start an anti-tamper was taking it out all at once, which
technology program. In the spring of 1984, when totally eliminated the tamper protec-
NSAseI1f replacement equipment to the Moscow
P.L. 86-36
OGA
OGA
TOP SECR:ETjfCOl\'IIm//R:EL TO Ut~M:, hUS, CAN GBR, N2JL Page 19
EC[):O[:.]f): 3803783
f.L. 86-36
OGA '1'01' SEetffi't'l/eO~IIN't'//tffiL'1'0 USA, AUS, CAN 8BR, N~L
!.f.L. 86-36
P.L. 86-36
25. (U//fOUO) Oral Histo 2006-1 42. (UI/FODO) Oral History 2006-47,
Interviewers: Linda Murdock and Interviewers: Linda Murdock and Sharon
a.,.~..,......~ '------'
'. '. (Center for Cryptologic History) Maneki. (Center for Cryptologic History)
26.. . (Ui/FOUO) Oral Histo 200-0 43. (Ul/FOVO) Oral History 2008-79,
Interviewers: Linda Murdock 00 ey an S aron Mane
. ~:-----.,---=~
Sharon Mapeki. (Center for Cryptologic History) en er for Cryptologic History)
,..-----,
27. ( J Oral Histo 2006-1 44. (U) Time, 8 April 1985, "A Deadly Serious
""'--_ _....... Interviewers: Linda Murdock and Sharon Game."
Maneki. (CenterJor Cryptologic History) 45. (U//FOUO~ "GUNMAN Text Recovery from
28. (Ur:/FOO:(7) Oral Histo 200-0 IBM Selectric III Typewriters." C Expository Report
interviewers: Linda Murdock and NO.18-91, 19 July 1991. (NSA Archives, accession num-
... '":::":""""--:-:~-;-:--}
Sharon Maneki. (Center for Cryptologic History) ber 49509)
~----.
29. ( Oral Histo 2006-1 46. (U) "Parting Shot: Espionage Russia." (Federal
Interviewers:\Linda Murdock and Sharon Bureau of Investigation) March 15, 1985, 2. (NSA
L......,-~~~
Maneki. (Center for Cryptol()gic History) Archives, accession number 49509)
30. (U//FOUOj Oral Histo 200 -06 47. (U) Report on the GUNMAN Project by a
.1.---- Interviewers: Linda Murdock and Sharon
Maneki. (Center for Cryptologic History)
Damage Assessment Team of the Department of State.
July 11, 1985.
31. (U Oral Histo\ 2006- 48. ~Jr-----------
....... ...J Interviewers: Lin~a Murdock and
Sharon Maneki. (Center for Cryptologlc History)
32. (UjfFOUOj Oral History 1998-15~ I 49 (U//FOU01 rProject GUNMAN ~
Interviewer: Dr. Thomas R. Johnson. (Center for After the Smoke Cleared." November 1986, 19-21. (NSA
Cryptologic History) Archives, accession number 46286)\.
33. (Uf/FOUO) Oral Histo 2006-0, 50. (UI/FOUO)I ~~:T4e Legacy of
nterviewers: Linda Murdock GUNMAN." (briefing to the NSA workforce},fNovember
L..",.....---:-::---;-:....
S aron Maneki. (Center for Cryptologic History) 2000. (NSA archives, accession number 49509)
. U Oral Histo 2006- r - - - - - . , 51. (U) "Parting Shot: Espionage Russia." "(F~eral
Interviewers: Linda Murdock and Sharon Bureau of Investigation) March 15, 1985, 10. (N,SA
'-M:-:-a-n-eki;-:"'".'~(C":!!:'enter for Cryptologic History) Archives, accession number 4 9 5 0 9 ) / .... iP L . 86-36
35. (U) S65 COMSEC Standards and Advanced 52. (U//FOUO~ 1"Pf6Je~tGUNMAN:
Technology Division, Evaluation of Project GUNMAN. After the Smoke Cleared." Novem~er 1986, 40. (NSA
28 January 1985. (NSA Archives, accession number Archives, accession number 46286)
49509) 53 (U) Ronald Kessler, Moscow Station: How the
36. (U) ''Twelfth Interim Analysis Report on the KGB Penetrated the American Embassy. (New York,
GUNMAN Find." 18 October 1984. NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1989), 97.
37. (U) "Thirteenth Interim Analysis Report on the 54. (Ui/FOUO) Oral History 1998-~5~r---------'1
GUNMAN Find." 25 October 1984. Interviewer: Dr. Thomas R. J()hrison. (Center for
38. (U) "Sixth Interim Analysis Report on the Cryptologic History) ,
GUNMAN Find." 6 September 1984. 5 . ( OralHi~to 20
39. (U) "First Interim Analysis Report on the Interviewers; Linda Murdock and Sharon
GUNMAN Find," no date. M-an
L.- - eki
--.-(Cented6;'Cryptologic History)
40. (U//FOUO) Oral Histo 200 -0 r-----, 56. (U)J:{~raig Barker, The Protection ofDiplomatic
L..- ..."Interviewers: David Cooley and Sharon Pers?T.tnel, Chapter 1. (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate
Maneki. (Center for Cryptologic History) Publishing Co., 2006) EO 1.4. (c)
41. (U) Discover, June 1985. "Tapping the Keys." !// P. L. 86- 3 6
P.L. 86-36 OGA
Afte~3~~/~:~:O~leared.9S NovemJ;ro;:;~~~~~
Archives, accession number 46286)
64. (U//FOUO) Oral History 2006-17,
(e-mail attachment to transcript.) Interviewers:
L..,,-~--'
Linda Murdock and Sharon Maneki. (Center for
Cryptologic History)
65. (U//FOUO) Organization Audit Trail Database
(OATS)
66. (U//FOUO) Oral Histo 200-2
Interviewers: Linda Murdock and Sharon
ane . Center for Cryptologic History)
(U) Index
r.L. 86-36
\A delivering to embassy 6
inspection process 8-9
\. acquiring replacement equipment 5 preparing for shipment 5-6
\I 18 replacement process 7-8
f. anti-tamper technology program 18
F
~.. ..
I approval of prolect GUNMAN plan 4
~~ \10_~~ Faurer, General Lincoln 2-3, 16
Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) IS, 17
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board IIEO 1. 4. (c)
B
17
I tEO 1.4. (d)
P.L. 86-36
G P.L. 86-36 OGA
CJwens. i 1 P,1O
0 Great Seallmplant example
12, 14, 18
, u. nt H
Bureau of Diplomatic Security 17
Harriman, Averell 1
r
Hartman, Ambassador Arthur 7
~4,7 I
Casey, William 4,12 <OGA IBM Selectric typewriters
cash bonus, offered for bug discovery 9, II .. acquiring replacements 5
CBS news report 1-2,12 ../ characteristics of 12, 14
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)I / / / r implant discovery 10
Cold War 1 / 1 , . 0 ~--- implant operation 14
COMSEC organization 1 8 / impact of GUNMAN 17-19
COMSEC Standards angAdvanced Technology Division 8 implant
I IS characteristics 12, 14
con ressional investigations 17 EO 1. 4. (c) discovery of 8-11
15 P. L. 86- 3 6 reasons undetected 15-16
Information Security (INFOSEC) 18
D inspecting equipment 9
5 inventory of embassy equipment, laci<,oL'Eo 1. 4. (c)
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P.L. 86-36
[ ~-;~, 17
S
S64 11-12
S65 5,8-9,11-12
S651 5
S building 9
Schultz, Georg~ 4
security during equipment shipment 6
Senior Intera ency Group for Intelligence 17
16
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T
T2 5
TlOOZ teleprinters, implants placed in 2-3
tamper detection devices 5
Technical Security Engineering Center 18
T Motor Pool 5
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Page 24 ~OF' SE~~//OMIN"f'i/ltl:L~O USA, AUS, CAr, 6ftlt, NEt