Rule 3, Sec.

1. Alberto v. CA G.R No. 119088 Jun 30, 2000 Facts: This case involves the Complaint for collection of money filed by petitioner Atty. Alberto against Sps. Alano when the latter refused to pay her fees stipulated in their retainer agreement. Petitioner Atty. Alberto represented the spouses before the SEC case to recover real properties, money and other assets that may pertain to them by virtue of their stockholdings in the Natalia Realty, Inc. However, the SEC Case was later dismissed as the opposing parties reached a settlement without consulting petitioner. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared that the Attorneys fees shall constitute a lien on the property subject of the case. Atty. Alberto later found out that a portion of the subject property was sold to Sps. Alanos daughter, Yolanda as settlement before the parties moved to dismiss the case. Because of this, Atty. Alberto filed second Amended Complaint to declare the deed of sale void. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and cancelled the attorneys lien on the TCT. WON Atty. Alberto has cause of action to assail the deed of sale between Natalia Realty and Yolanda. Ruling: YES. By virtue of the retainer agreement, a right was created in her favor. This right was confirmed by the RTC in first case that petitioner filed against the spouses. Correspondingly, the spouses had the obligation to honor and not to violate the retainer agreement. However, the Sps. breached their obligation and worse, Alberto found that the Sps had no more leviable property as such was sold to Yolanda. Thus, Atty. Alberto not only have a cause of action against the Sps. Alano but also against Yolanda. The rule that in order to determine the cause of action the court must examine only the averments in the complaint has exceptions: 1st, All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon. 2nd, Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the complaint, may be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. All the pleadings attached should be considered in determining whether there was a sufficient cause of action as the order of dismissal is summary in nature. So long as they are procedurally responsive to the complaint, then they may be used to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action in the complaint. Strictly limiting the evaluation of the merits of the complaint to its averments or allegations would limit the interpretation of the rule. 2. Jimenez v. Jordana G.R No. 152526 Nov 25, 2004 Facts: Jordana filed an action for specific performance and damages against Bunye. She alleged that despite his demand, Bunye refused to execute a deed of absolute sale after they entered into a perfected sale. Then, Jimenez moved to intervene. Subsequently, Bunye executed a deed of sale in favor of the Jimenez. Because of this, Jordana filed an amended complaint impleading Jimenez as parties-defendants. Jimenez moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. Issue: WON Jordana has a cause of action against Sps. Jimenez. YES. Ruling: As a rule, the court takes into account only the material allegations in the complaint. However, in some cases, the court may also consider the annexes or documents attached, other pleadings of the plaintiff or admissions in the record. By looking into the allegations in the Complaint, the pleadings of the Jordana and the records of the case sufficiently support a cause of action for recovery of property against Jimenez. It is generally accepted that when property belonging to a person is unlawfully or fraudulently taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of the property. The cause of action Jordana was based in the averments in the complaint.

3. Zepeda v. China Bank G.R. No. 172175 Oct 9, 2006 Facts: Sps. Zepeda filed a Complaint for the nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents and damages against China Bank. They alleged that they obtained a loan secured by a parcel of land. The RTCs favored the Sps. Zepeda. China Bank filed a petition before the CA. Among its allegations is that the complaint states no cause of action. WON the complaint states a cause of action. YES. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Sps. Zepeda specifically alleged that China bank acted in bad faith when it extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property despite the restructuring of their loan obligation, thus, making them believe that the foreclosure would be postponed. Assuming these allegations to be true, petitioners can validly seek the nullification of the foreclosure since the alleged restructuring of their debt would effectively modify the terms of the original loan obligations thus, making the subsequent foreclosure void. 4. Fluor Daniel v. EB Villarosa G.R. No. 159648 Jul 27, 2007 Facts: E.B Villarosa filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against Fluor Daniel for its failure to pay the payment for suspension cost and for work so far performed by E.B Villarosa. Fluor Daniel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motion of petitioner and favored the respondents. So, petitioner assailed RTCs ruling before the CA. WON the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action. NO. In this case, the 3 contracts that were attached with the subject complaint governed the rights and obligations between petitioner and respondent. Records show that in each of the said contracts a provision that payment by petitioner shall be subject to its timely receipt of similar payments from Fil-Estate was stipulated. The attached annexes defined and delimit the obligations of the parties, that a specific condition must be met before petitioner is held liable for payment. Therefore, considering the contracts annexed to it, the complaint for collection of sum of money and damages failed to sufficiently state a cause of action. The complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 5. Perkins v. Dakila G.R. No. 172242 Aug 14, 2007 Facts: Respondent filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against petitioner PEIA and PEIP after petitioner unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement entered by them. RTC denied the prayer of respondent and its motion to reconsider which was filed thereafter. Later, an Alien Summons was issued to petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states to cause of action. CA denied the motion. Hence, this case. WON the complaint states a cause of action. YES. SC upholds the RTCs ruling all of the essential elements of action are present in the Complaint and that in a Motion to Dismiss, the petitioner hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in a complaint. When a Motion to Dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must rule on the issue based only on the allegations in the complaint, although this rule admits exceptions, none of the exceptions are present in this case. Thus, the general

rule must apply. 6. Pioneer v. Guadiz G.R. No. 156848 Oct 11, 2007 Facts: Private respondent Todaro filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner for failure of the petitioners to comply with its obligation to grant Todaro a permanent employment status after rendering 3 mos. of service as a consultant of petitioners in its Phil. office. This obligation was pursuant to an agreement by Todaro and petitioners before Todaro filed the complaint. PIL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over PIL because it is a foreign not doing business in the Philippines.PIL also questioned the service of summons on it. That it was not the PILs agent in the Philippines who received services of summons on it. Lastly, PIL maintained that the complaint does not state a cause of action as there was no perfected contract, and no personal judgment could be rendered by the trial court against PIL because PIL is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and there was improper service of summons on PIL. WON the complaint filed by Guadiz has no cause of action. As a rule, a complaint is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if by admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein and that its essential elements of a cause of action exist in the complaint. In this case, the allegations of Todaro stated that the Petitioners failed to fulfill their contractual obligation to employ Todaro on a permanent basis in PILs Phil. office. The presence of a cause of action rests on the sufficiency, and not on the veracity, of the allegations in the complaint. The veracity of the allegations will have to be examined during the trial on the merits. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the trial court is limited to the four corners of the complaint and its annexes. It is not yet necessary for the trial court to examine the truthfulness of the allegations in the complaint. Such examination is proper during the trial on the merits. 7. Dolleton v. Fil-Estate G.R. No. 170750 Apr 7, 2009 Facts: Petitioners Dolleton, et al. filed separate Complaints for quieting of title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents Fil-Estate Management Inc. They alleged that they are in OCEN possession of the subject parcels of land. The respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging, among others, that said complaint lacked a cause of action. Respondents alleged that the subject parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens system in their names. RTC dismissed the complaint as the court found that the subject properties were already registered in the names of respondents and petitioner failed to prove their title to the said properties. CA affirmed RTCs ruling. Hence, this case. WON the Complaints filed by petitioners stated a cause of action. YES. The test in determining whether there existed a cause of action in a complaint whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Thus, if the complaint contains a sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. 8. Heirs of Santiago v. Ong G.R. No.161238 Jul 13, 2009 Facts: This case involves the action filed by the heirs of Santiago for annulment of titles against respondent Ong. The

complaint alleged that the subject parcel of land was co-owned under the name of petitioners deceased father and brother. That while his brother was confined in the hospital, he sold the land to a 2-year old child. Thus, they were alleging that the subject property was acquired through fraud. RTC partly denied the Heirs claims. CA declared that the Heirs are not the real parties in interest possessing the character of a contracting party, or of heirs or assigns of the vendor. WON the Heirs are the real parties in interest to bring the instant suit and that they have a cause of action against the respondents. NO. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In this case, the Heirs questioned the transaction entered into by their deceased brother even though they are not parties to the contract nor heirs or assigns of the deceased brother. Juan Santiago left a probated will leaving all his properties to his wife Aurea, to the exclusion of petitioners. As heirs of Jose Santiago, co-owner of the subject property, petitioners may only question the sale if their right of preemption under the Civil Code of the Philippines was disregarded, and they wish to exercise such right. However, petitioners do not seek to exercise the right of preemption. Thus, they are not real parties in interest in the present case and it follows that they do not have a cause of action against the respondents.

Sec. 3

9. Lapanday v. Espita G.R. No. 162109 Jan 21, 2005 Facts: Espita, et al. filed the following cases: forcible entry, reinstatement, nullification of affidavits of quitclaims, relinquishment, waiver and any other documents on disposition of lands before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) against Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., et. al. Espita, et al. alleged that they had been the shared tenant-tillers, openly and continuously, of the late Orval Hughes and his heirs and they remained as such on the subject land. Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation, on the other hand, opposed said actions on the ground that there exists no entity named Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc. which has agricultural operation in Davao del Sur. The fact is that said company had already merged with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation. Thus, it is not a real-party in interest. WON Lapanday was correct in alleging that it was not a real-party in interest. NO. As a rule, misjoinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as are just. Moreover, if there is defect in parties, objections should be made at the earliest opportunity. This is when the defect becomes apparent, through filing a motion to strike the names of the parties wrongly impleaded because objections to misjoinder cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In this case, Lapanday did not file a motion to strike its name in all proceedings below. As we have said time and again, "the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction." Even assuming, that "Lapanday" does not have a juridical personality, it may still be sued under such a name considering that respondents commonly know petitioner by the name "Lapanday Group of Companies", as shown in their alleged letter of intent to relinquish their rights over the subject land. Thus, under Sec. 15, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, which reads: "SEC. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or

commonly known" Rule 4, Sec. 1-3 Nocum v. Tan G.R no.145022 Sep 23, 2005 Facts: Respondent Tan filed a complaint against reporter Nocum Capt. Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article before the RTC of Makati. Inquirer and Nocum filed their joint answer alleging, among others, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. ALPAP and Umali, likewise, filed their joint answer, alleging that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. At first, the complaint was dismissed for improper venue. But upon a Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of an amended complaint filed by Tan, the dismissal was set aside by the RTC and admitted the amended complaint. Aggrieved, Nocum, et al appealed to the CA. CA dismissed their action. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint of damages despite Tans failure to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published. YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here, after examining the original complaint, SC found that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of RPC, provides that it is RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Further, the dismissal of the complaint for improper venue was proper as on its face because there was failure to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. This is in connection with Sec. 2, Rule 4 on the rule on venue of personal actions which basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff. However, SC ruled that the complaint may still be amended before the finality of the dismissal, as in fact what happened in this case with regard the amended complaint which was admitted. The failure of the original complaint to contain to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published is not fatal because the case at bar is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional, unlike in criminal cases. Saludo, Jr.v. American Express G.R. No. 159507 Apr 19, 2006 Facts: Saludo filed a complaint for damages against American Express (AMEX) and its officers before the court a quo of Maasin City. Saludos cause of action stemmed from the wrongful dishonor his AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. AMEX denied the allegations of the complaint and raised the defense of lack of cause of action and improper venue. The court a quo favored Saludo and denied AMEX defense that venue was improperly laid. AMEX appealed to the CA. CA ruled that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo because none of the parties were residents of Southern Leyte. WON venue was improperly laid in the court a quo because none of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, who, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint. The complaint of Saludo against AMEX before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants

resides, at the election of plaintiff. The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. Thus, as the plaintiff, Saludo chose to file his complaint with the court a quo of Maasin City. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule. CA was wrong when it ruled that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." In civil law, residence is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Therefore, Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte likewise is properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.