ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS.

COMELEC

FACTS: In the run up to the 1995 Elections, former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (IMR)
filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Congressperson of the 1st District of Leyte, which
encompasses the city of Tacloban and the towns of the northeastern Leyte, including Tolosa, versus
the incumbent Cirilo Roy Montejo In her COC, IMR stated that she had been a resident of Tolosa for
several years prior to the election. CMR moved for her disqualification, arguing that IMR’s residency fell
short of the 1-year residency requirement. IMR sought to amend her COC entry to “since birth” (which is
actually futile since she was born in San Miguel, Manila). The COMELEC refused the amendment, correctly
holding that it was filed out of time, and disqualified IMR. IMR trounced CRM and appealed to the Supreme
Court, on the contention that she did not lose her residency even when she went to Manila, married then
Congressman Marcos, lived in Malacanang and fled to Hawaii, since she was only following the residence of
her husband, who under the Civil Code then in force, had sole authority to determine the family residence.

ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner has lost her domicile based on the foregoing facts to be a ground for
disqualifying her for the congressional election.

The Court ruled that:

For purposes of election, residency and domicile are synonymous to each other. It is only
in Civil Law that we keep the distinction between the two, which is:
● Residence – where one stays at the moment
● Domicile – where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence at one point,
with animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus revertendi (intent to retun if
absent). In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity (domicilium
necessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose her domicile, and her father chose
Tolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to Ferdie did not necessarily result in the loss of that domicile
in favor of a new one since (1) a woman follows only the actual residence of her husband and not
his domicile and (2) as a rule, change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of three
elements, (1) actual removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts
effecting that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained as
evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban and Tolosa,
and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district, thereby negating the last two
requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when, by her acts she proved
her intent to follow her husband’s domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for the recovery of her
“ancestral” house in Tolosa, and public announcement to represent the 1st District in Congress after
she returned from US exile and almost three years before the 1995 elections, showed her decision
to re-establish her domicile there (domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying the
minimum residency requirement.

Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying her.

Maceda vs. Vasquez

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman before
Hon. Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision
had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. Petitioner contends
that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charge arose from the judge’s
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. And that
the investigation of the Ombudsman is an enroachmen in the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all
lower court. Hence, the petitioner filed this petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and restraining order against the Ombudsman in entertaining the criinal complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct
and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal
Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue
of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties,
the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination
whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

United States of America vs. Ruiz

136 SCRA 487

Facts: This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil
Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal where HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. the United States invited the submission
of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to
the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received fro the US.
Eventually, letter was received by the private-respondent indicating that he company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance from several repair
works. the company sued the United States of America and the Heads and all members of the Engineering
Command of the U.S. Navy to order to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects ot to pay
damages if the awarding of project will no longer be possible. It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction,which was granted, to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third
parties for work on the projects. The petitioner moved to submit instant petition which seeks to restrain
perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court being
the subject matter of the complaint as agents United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not
given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint

Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions
to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of states.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of
its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order;
they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is
dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Mun of Makati vs CA
FACTS: The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner
Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium involving a parcel of
land and improvements located at San Antonio Village, Makati. The action for eminent domain was filed
where respondent RTC judge rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay the corresponding amount as
fixed in the decision. Respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of
petitioner. Private respondent filed a motion praying that an order be issued directing the bank to deliver to
respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the RTC decision. Petitioner filed
a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount
should be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision which the
private respondent opposed. On the other hand, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) and private respondent
entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between themselves the
compensation due from the expropriation proceedings.

Respondent trial judge ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum which
corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the RTC decision. The
general manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still
waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling him to make a disbursement for the
amount so ordered. Petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without
the proper appropriation required under the law.

Respondent trial judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine did not
apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account was specifically opened for the expropriation
proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise
declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order.
Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate petitions for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which were eventually consolidated. The Court of Appeals dismissed both petitions for
lack of merit and sustained the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's
PNB Account and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds. Hence, this petition for review with prayer for
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: whether public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.

HELD: The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the
municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute More particularly, the properties of a municipality,
whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale
to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and
the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose for three (3) years, the
Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately pay
Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the corresponding compensation.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA

FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of
Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to
deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and
despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was
referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.

The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth
the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of
the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in
India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the
foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent
refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed
to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute
between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari,

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
"memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that
the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that
an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before
Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED,

VITAL GOZON VS. CA

FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization of the various
offices of the Ministry of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was demoted to Medical Specialist II
from being the Chief of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital. De la Fuente filed a protest with the
DOH Reorganization Board but was ignored and she brought this to Civil Service Commission. While the
case was pending, the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by
Dr. Jose D. Merencilla.

Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared that the demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr.
from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void, the resolution became final. De la Fuente
thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, 4
demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision but she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's
letters or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of
the Civil Service Commission.
She instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of "mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to
compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with
the final and executory resolution but Vital-Gozon did not respond to the order of the court. Thus CA
declared, that the said resolution declared dela Fuente as the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents,
particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be
complied with. A writ of execution was issued thereafter. On his motion for reconsideration, Vital-Gozon
argued that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action and
referred this to the Office of Solicitor General. Court of Appeals denied the motion and ruled that the Sol.
Gen has no authority to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a
public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant
officer,

HELD: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and specific statement
regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding none, concluded that the Court of
Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The
conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in
civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does
not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims
for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling
within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural
one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a
claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be
litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action
for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.

It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages
arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

The petition was DENIED and the resolution was affimed.

CORPUS VS. CUADERNO

FACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively
charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office.
He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the recommendation of the investigating committee that he
be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of
the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of
Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awarded
P5,000 as attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealing
the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for attorney’s fees. While
the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack
of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.

ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a public
officer?

HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and to
the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law.

Pertaining to the petitioner’s claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to
attorney’s fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code
allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the
discretion of the trial court.

Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.