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BOOK II - PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS (Arts. 414 773) Title I.- CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY (Arts. 414 426) PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS (Art. 414) See also: RA 349 as amended by RA 1056 (An Act to Legalize Permissions to Use Human Organs or Any Portion or portions of the Human Body for Medical, Surgical or Scientific Purposes under Certain Conditions); RA 7170 (An Act Authorizing The Legacy or Donation of All or Part of a Human Body After Death For Specified Purposes) as amended by RA 7875 (An Act to Advance Corneal Transplantations in the Philippines) Chapter 1. Immovable Property (Art. 415) Chapter 2. Movable Property (Arts. 416-418)

Prudential vs. Panis GR # L-50003/ Aug. 31, 1987 153 SCRA 391 Facts: On November 19, 1971, plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula Baluyut Magcale secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00 from the defendant Prudential Bank. To secure payment of this loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of defendant on the aforesaid date a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the Semi concrete 2-storey residential building with warehouse and a first class residential land evidenced only by tax declaration in the name of Fernando Magcale, situated in Olongapo City. On the Deed of Mortgage a rider typed at the bottom of the page in which case made Prudential bank become aware that the mortgagee (defendant Prudential Bank) was at the outset aware of the fact that the mortgagors (plaintiffs) have already filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot, possessory rights over which, were mortgaged to it. Plaintiffs secured an additional loan from defendant Prudential Bank in the sum of P20,000.00. To secure payment of this additional loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of the said defendant another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged. For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank after it became due, and upon

application of said defendant, the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were foreclosed. The auction sale aforesaid was held despite written request from plaintiffs through counsel for the defendant City Sheriff to desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale. In the decision of CFI, it declared that the Real Estate Mortgage is null and void. Prudential file for an MR but was also denied for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. WON the supervening issuance in favor of private respondents of miscellaneous sales patent have the effect of invalidating the deeds of real estate mortgage. Held: The answer is in the affirmative. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code, it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. In the same manner, this Court has also established that possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage. Under the foregoing considerations, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a valid mortgage. But it is a different matter, as regards the second mortgage executed over the same properties on May 2, 1973 for an additional loan of P20,000.00 which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City on the same date. Relative thereto, it is evident that such mortgage executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title, falls squarely under the prohibitions stated in Sections 121, 122 and 124 of the Public Land Act and Section 2 of Republic Act 730, and is therefore null and void. We believe that as in pari delicto may not be invoked to defeat the policy of the State neither may the doctrine of estoppel give a validating effect to a

void contract. Indeed, it is generally considered that as between parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy. Sergs. vs. PCI Leasing GR# 137705 /Aug. 22, 2000 338 SCRA 499 Facts: PCI Leasing, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for collection of sum of money with an application of a writ of replevin. Upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioners factory, seized one machinery with *the+ word that he *would+ return for the other machineries. Petitioner Sergs filed a motion for special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. The sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. The CA held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled that the words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties. Issue: Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERGS became real property by virtue of immobilization and thus should not be subjected to the writ of seizure.

Held: Under ART. 415. The following are immovable property: Xxx - (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; Xxx In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolatemaking industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.*16+ In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property. Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

Tsai vs. CA GR# 1201098 /Oct. 02, 20 366 SCRA 324 Facts: Respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where the factory stands and a list of machineries and equipment. After sometime, PBCom granted a second loan of P3,356,000.00 to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. These listed properties were similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. After the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments. Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency proceedings. All its assets were taken into the custody of the Insolvency Court, including the collateral, real and personal, securing the two mortgages as abovementioned. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On the first and second public auctions, PB Com emerged to be the highest bidder. PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. PB Com leased the property to Rubi Tsai. On 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai for P9,000,000.00, including the contested machineries. EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets. The RTC found that the lease and sale of said personal properties were irregular and illegal because they were not duly foreclosed nor sold at the December 15, 1982 auction sale since these were not included in the schedules attached to the mortgage contracts. The CA affirmed the judgment. Issue: WON the machineries listed are personal property outside the deed of real estate mortgage and that it should be excluded from the real property forclosed, despite the provision in the deed that all after-acquired properties during the lifetime of the mortgage shall form part there and despite the undisputed fact that said machineries are big and heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property.

Held: Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion, however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We have to look at the parties' intent. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. We find no reversible error in the respondent appellate court's ruling that inasmuch as the subject mortgages were intended by the parties to involve chattels, insofar as equipment and machinery were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Law applies, which provides in Section 7 thereof that: "a chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding. As the auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void, no valid title passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof to Tsai is also a nullity under the elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet, one cannot give what one does not have.

Caltex Phils. v. CBAA GR# L-50466 May 31, 1982 114 SCRA 296 Facts: Caltex installed machineries and equipment consisting of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The said machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment in good condition as when received, except ordinary wear and

tear. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty. On appeal the Central Board of Assessment Appeals held that the said machines and equipment are real property within the meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, and that the definitions of real property and personal property in articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not applicable to this case. Issue: WON the machines and equipment are subject to Real Property Tax Held: We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil 709). Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633). This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co., 119 Phil. 328, where Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered personalty because they were attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled.

Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as tools and equipment in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501). The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the city assessor's is imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas station and equipment.

MERALCO vs. CBAA GR# L-47943/ May 31, 1982 114 SCRA 273 Facts: This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants. According to Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer, a sand pad as the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous asphalt stratum as the top layer. The bottom of each tank is in contact with the asphalt layer, The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a circular wall made of concrete, eighteen inches thick, to prevent the tank from sliding. Hence, according to Meralco, the tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation. Each empty tank can be floated by flooding its dike-inclosed location with water four feet deep. Meralco filed this special civil action of certiorari to annul the Board's decision and resolution. It contends that the Board acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave error of law in holding that its storage tanks are taxable real property.

Issue: WON the said fuel tanks are subject to Realty Tax. Held: The tanks are considered real properties subject to Realty Tax. We hold that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271. For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things which should generally be regarded as personal property (84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8). It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633). The case of Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Company, 119 Phil. 328, wherein Meralco's steel towers were held not to be subject to realty tax, is not in point because in that case the steel towers were regarded as poles and under its franchise Meralco's poles are exempt from taxation. Moreover, the steel towers were not attached to any land or building. They were removable from their metal frames. Nor is there any parallelism between this case and Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501, where the tools and equipment in the repair, carpentry and blacksmith shops of a transportation company were held not subject to realty tax because they were personal property.

Laurel v. Abrogar GR# 155076/ Jan. 13, 2009 576 SCRA 41 FACTS

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PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for allegedly using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)," on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as well as petitioners subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court. In his petition for review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words "personal property" without qualification, it follows that all "personal properties" as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. In his Comment, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that "business" is not personal property. It is not the "business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a business." This right is what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be subject of theft.

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ISSUE: WON the international calls as well as the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. HELD: The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of the private offended party because the international calls, although considered as personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be liable for theft on that matter; but the business of providing telecommunication is a personal property which is capable of being appropriated hence subject tot theft. In explaining its decision, the court said: Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the definition of the term "personal property" in the penal code provision on theft had been established in Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been previously used. In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.

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The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away."7 Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away. To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.9 The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas. As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined. The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these islands.

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The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service. In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science." Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance

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calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Chapter 3. Property In Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs (Arts. 419-425) Provisions Common to the Preceding Chapters (Art. 426) Title II. Ownership (Arts. 427-483) Chapter 1. Ownership in General (Arts. 427-439)

Acap vs. CA GR# 118114 /Dec. 07, 1995 251 SCRA 30 FACTS Felixberto Vasquez inherited a parcel of land from his parents, the ownership of which he transferred in favor of Cosme Pido by executing a Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale. Pido, however, died and was survived by his wife. All of their heirs executed Declaration of Heirship with waiver of rights for the transfer of said land to private respondent De los Reyes. It appeared however, that even during the time

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that the land was allegedly transferred to respondent, petitioner Acap remained as the tenant of the land. By reason of the transfer, respondent now wanted the lease rentals to be paid to him. Initially both parties allegedly agreed but when respondent demanded for the payment, petitioner regused to recognize respondent as owner of the land. Respondent was thus prompted to file a complaint for recovery of possession of the land against petitioner. It was, however, the contention of petitioner that he had no knowledge of any sale or transfer of the land to respondent. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent and recognized the latters ownership over the land. When petitioner appealed, CA affirmed the assailed decision, ruling that respondent acquired ownership over the land through the document executed. ISSUE: WON respondent had acquired ownership of the land through the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale. HELD: No. In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. 9 Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 10 Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. 11 The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. 12 Private respondent, being then a stranger to the

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succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, 13 or a donation, 14 or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. It is even erroneous to state that a sale had transpired between the heirs of Pido and respondent by virtue of said declaration. On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights" was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990 because the document was neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no showing that private respondent had the same document attached to or made part of the record. What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse claim filed with the Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of rights and was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title to the land in question. A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent's ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court." 15 It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name.

Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. CA GR# 112519/ Nov. 14, 1996

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264 SCRA 181 FACTS A conflict arose with respect to ownership of Lot 1272 located somewhere in Balanga, Bataan. Said lot was allegedly ceded thru donation by the the then parish priest of Catholic Archbishop of Manila, prior thereto or on August 23, 1936, in favor of the predecessor of private respondent. Said predecessor, before her death, was able to give said lot to private respondent, also through a deed of donation. The deed was however, refused to be registered, for unknown reasons, by the Registered of Deeds. Despite this, however, the latter, when his predecessor died in 1945 without an issu, had allegedly been in open and continuous possession of said lot, built a house thereon and declared it for tax purposes until his ownership was disturbed on November 5, 1985 or more than 49 years after said donation, by petitioner (who obtained it from Roman Catholic Bishop of Balanga, and the latter from Roman Catholic Bishop of Manila) when petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that during the Japanese occupation, without its knowledge and prior consent, private respondent entered and occupied the subject property; that despite requests by petitioner, private respondent refused to vacate the property in question. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the action has been barred by prescription for having been filed after more than 49 years after the donation. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto alleging that the defense of prescription was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss, and as an affirmative defense in the answer. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA stated that private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through acquisitive prescription because the same having been duly registered under the Torrens system, title thereto was indefeasible. Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same due to its

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own inexcusable negligence and grave lack of vigilance in protecting its rights over a tremendously long period of time. ISSUE: WON the ownership of the said lot by private respondent which is premised on a duly accepted donation, although unregistered prevail over the titled ownership of petitioner. HELD: Yes. A just, fair and complete resolution of the present case necessitates the consideration and the application of the doctrine of laches which is not the same as but is undoubtedly closely related to, the issue of prescription which was properly raised by private respondent before the respondent Court of Appeals. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. The following are the essential elements of laches: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

19

(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case. On or some time before August 23, 1936, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, the parish priest and administrator of the church property in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, executed a deed of donation over a 265-square meter church lot in favor of Ana de los Reyes and her heirs in recognition of her long and satisfactory service to the church of Balanga, Bataan. For some reason or another, the said deed was refused registration by the Register of Deeds. However, she accepted the donation, indicated such acceptance in the said deed, occupied the donated property, and exercised acts of ownership thereupon. In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had, however, given the subject property to her nephew who is the private respondent in the instant case. Upon acceptance of the gift, private respondent immediately took possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon, and thenceforth paid land taxes therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose. The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present action is thus clearly his occupation since 1945 of the subject property in the concept of owner in continuation of the occupation of the same nature regarding the same property by the donee Ana de los Reyes starting in 1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of laches exists. The second element also exists in this case. The second element is threetiered: (a) knowledge of defendant's action; (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit. Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the trial court, alleged that without its consent, private respondent entered and occupied the subject property during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore, petitioner was clearly aware of private respondent's possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not also rebut the testimony of its own authorized representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico, that the subject property was so proximately located to the rest of

20

petitioner's church property as to foreclose assertion of ignorance of private respondent's possession of the subject property, on the part of petitioner. From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner actually commenced suit against private respondent, there was doubtlessly all the opportunity to file the appropriate action to have the donation of the subject property to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void and to demand reconveyance of said property from its present occupants. Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40) years had to first pass by for petitioner to finally institute the appropriate court proceedings. As such, the second element of knowledge, opportunity to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is undoubtedly present in the instant controversy. The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the record that impresses us as clear evidence of at least an inkling on the part of private respondent as to petitioner's serious intention to revoke the donated property. There was neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any person who actually informed private respondent of petitioner's intentions. In other words, private respondent manifestly had every reason to believe that, with the passing of almost half a century since his predecessor-ininterest accepted the donated property and without unambiguous intimation of petitioner's non-recognition of such donation, he was secure in his possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent will suffer irreparable injury under the most unfair circumstances, were we to disregard petitioner's inaction for more than forty (40) years in asserting its rights. In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49) years had lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for the long delay in the filing by petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept

21

for so long. 50 Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to spring an ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. 51 Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches from questioning private respondent's ownership of the subject property. 52 At any rate, petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property from private respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and by petitioner's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might have given rise to an action in court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file seasonably the necessary suit.

Chapter 2. Right of Accession. (Art. 440-475) Pecson vs. CA GR# 115814/ May 26, 1995 244 SCRA 407 FACTS Petitioner was the registered owner of a commercial lot with an apartment building. For failure to pay the realty taxes thereon, the lot was sold at a public auction to Nepumoceno who in turn sold it to spouses Naguid. Petitioner challenged the validity of the sale and alleged that the sale did not include the building. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondent but ruled that there is no legal basis to conclude that the sale included the building. When the case was appealed, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision and also agreed with the RTC that the sale of the lot did not include the building. In the meantime, the spouses Naguid filed a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. In their complaint, they admitted that the building was under lease by some tenants. They further agreed to comply with the rules

22

on reimbursement of the value of the building for according to them, petitioner was a builder in good faith. The trial court rendered the assailed decision ordering the spouses, among others, to reimburse the petitioner with the value of the building; to offset the rental payments previously collected by petitioner from the tenants of the lot, from the value of the building which will be reimbursed by the spouses to petitioner. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari. ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to be reimbursed for the value of the building and the improvements thereon. HELD: Yes By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco vs. Regalado: Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the part of the builder. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code

23

are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate the

24

apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom. It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to account for the rentals of the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.

Narvaez v. Alciso GR# 165907 /July 27, 2009 594 SCRA 60 FACTS Respondent owns a parcel of land situated in Benguet which she allegedly sold with right to repurchase, first, to Sansano in 1979, which he later repurchased; and second, to Baet in 1980. Baet in turn sold the land to spouses Narvaez in 1981. As per demand of respondent, however, the deed of sale between Baet and Narvaez contained a stipulation which allows respondent to repurchase said land from spouses Narvaez. The Spouses Narvaez furnished respondent with a copy of the Deed. Corollary to the said sale, spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on the said land. When respondent was about to exercise its right to repurchase, she and the spouses Narvaez did not agree with the selling price prompting respondent to file a complaint praying for the cancellation of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 sale alleging that her true intention was to mortgage the land and not to sell it and also praying that spouses Narvaez should reconvey the land to her. The court rendered a decision declaring that the repurchase in the 1979 sale becomes functus officio when she repurchased the property; the action to annul the 1980 sale had prescribed; and that she had no legal personality to annul the 1981 sale but she could repurchase the land and appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity equivalent to one-half of its market value or sell the land to spouses

25

Narvaez. The spouses appealed. The CA rendered a decision applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code to the extent of declaring that the Spouses Narvaez were builders in good faith and that respondent could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building.

ISSUE: WON Art. 448 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case such that respondent could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building. HELD: No. Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that: Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built the commercial building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy the land, which they own, would be absurd. In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles 1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Articles 1606 and 1616 state: Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence of an express agreement, shall last four years from the date of the contract.lawph!l Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years. However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.

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Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and in addition: (1) The expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made by reason of the sale; (2) The necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. Under Article 1616, Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying the Spouses Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. In the present case, the cost of the building constitutes a useful expense. Useful expenses include improvements which augment the value of the land.28 Under the first paragraph of Article 1606, Alciso had four years from 1981 to repurchase the property since there was no express agreement as to the period when the right can be exercised. Tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary in the exercise of the right of redemption. Tender of payment is the sellers manifestation of his or her desire to repurchase the property with the offer of immediate performance. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in with MODIFICATION. Respondent Rose O. Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying the petitioners Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses made on the subject property. The Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, to determine the amounts of the expenses of the contract, the legitimate expenses made by reason of the sale, and the necessary and useful expenses made on the subject property.

Cheng v. Donini GR# 167017/ June 22, 2009 590 SCRA 406

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FACTS: There was an oral lease agreement between Cheng and Sps. Donini on the formers property in Mandaluyong City. Respondents Donini, put up a restaurant in the leased property and agreed to pay a monthly rental of P17, 000 from December 1990. Later on, respondents proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises. However, before respondents business could take off and before any final lease agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding its terms and conditions. Petitioner Cheng thus wrote respondents on January 28, 1991, demanding payment of the deposit and rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to continue with the agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents, however, ignoring petitioners demand, continued to occupy the premises until April 17, 1991 when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to petitioner. Respondents then filed an action for specific performance and damages before RTC Pasig and prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorneys fees. Petitioner, in his answer, denied respondents claims and sought the award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its decision dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P964,000 representing the latters expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of the premises. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the award of reimbursement had no factual and legal bases, but this was denied by the CA in its resolution dated February 21, 2005. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: WON respondents are builders or possessors in good faith? HELD: NO. SC held that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply. Under these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful

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improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. Herein, respondents cannot be considered possessors or builders in good faith. As early as 1956, in Lopez v. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., the Court clarified that a lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in good faith x x x This principle of possessor in good faith naturally cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he knows that he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can he deny the ownership or title of his lessor. Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues only during the life of the lease contract and that he must vacate the property upon termination of the lease or upon the violation by him of any of its terms, he introduces improvements on said property at his own risk in the sense that he cannot recover their value from the lessor, much less retain the premises until such reimbursement. Being mere lessees, respondents knew that their right to occupy the premises existed only for the duration of the lease. Cortez v. Manimbo went further to state that: If the rule were otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property. These principles have been consistently adhered to and applied by the Court in many cases. It appears, however, that as soon as respondents vacated the premises, petitioner immediately reclaimed the property and barred respondents from entering it. Respondents also alleged, and petitioner did not deny, that the property subject of this case had already been leased to another entity since 1991. This is where considerations of equity should come into play. It is obviously no longer feasible for respondents to remove the improvements from the property, if they still exist. Petitioner should, therefore, indemnify respondents the amount of P171,650.95. This is in accord with the laws intent of preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who now has to pay one-half of the value of the useful improvements at the end of the lease because the lessee has already enjoyed the same, whereas the lessor can enjoy them indefinitely thereafter.

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Tuatis v. Escol GR# 175399 /Oct. 27, 2009 604 SCRA 471 FACTS: In November 1989, Visminda (seller) and Tuatis (buyer), entered into a Deed of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment (Deed of Sale by Installment) located in Poblacion, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. Tuatis claimed that she had paid by installment the agreed price of 10,000 pesos but Visminda countered that Tuatis made no other payment to her but 4,000 pesos only, despite verbal demands. In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property and constructed a residential building thereon. On 18 June 1996, Tuatis filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against Visminda before the RTC. Then, Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject property, but the latter refused, contending that the purchase price had not yet been fully paid. RTC rendered a Decision in Vismindas favor. When it was appealed to CA, it dismissed outright Tuatis Petition for failure to completely pay the required docket fees, to attach a certified true or authenticated copy of the assailed RTC Order and to indicate the place of issue of her counsels IBP and PTR Official Receipts. Hence, Tuatis filed the instant Petition, principally arguing that Article 448 of the Civil Code must be applied to the situation between her and Visminda. ISSUE: WON Article 448 of the Civil Code shall apply? HELD: YES. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

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According to the aforequoted provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity for the same, as provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis demand that, since the value of the building she constructed is considerably higher than the subject property, she may choose between buying the subject property from Visminda and selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Vismindas choice, Tuatis rights as a builder under Article 448 are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option, a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in which case, she can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same. The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

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Esmaquel vs. Coprada GR # 152423/ Dec. 15, 2010 638 SCRA 428 FACTS: In 1945, Maria Coprada (respondent) was able to persuade spouses Marcos (petitioners Esmaquel and Victoria) to allow her and her family to use and occupy a parcel of land in Laguna for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the premises should the owners/petitioners need to use the same. Respondent and her family were allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners did not oblige the respondents to pay rent and never made an attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have no other place to live in. Respondents present circumstances have completely improved, i.e., some of her children are already working; they are regularly sending her financial assistance; and she has acquired her own residential house, also in Laguna. Because of this, petitioners verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, but the latter refused. On February 24, 1997, petitioners filed an ejectment case against respondent before MCTC of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. MCTC dismissed the complaint as laches had already set in. On appeal, the RTC reversed and ruled that respondents occupation of the subject property was by virtue of petitioners tolerance and permission. Hence, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the property upon demand, thus ordered respondent and her family to vacate and surrender the possession of the subject land to the petitioners and to remove any and all improvements she introduced on the parcel of land. When brought to CA, the decision of RTC was reversed and granted respondents petition. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE: WON petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject property HELD: YES. Since respondents occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession may be

32

terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief that she is the owner thereof. On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondents unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

Benedicto vs. Villaflores GR# 185020/ Oct. 6, 2010 632 SCRA 446 FACTS: Maria Villaflores (petitioner) owned a lot in Bulacan. On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same lot to Filomena as evidenced by a Kasulatan ng

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Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan on September 6, 1994. Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land. Meanwhile, Antonio (respondent and nephew of Maria) averred that in 1980, Maria sold it to him and he eventually took possession and constructed a house thereon; that on August 15, 1992, Maria executed in favor of him a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the entire lot, though he failed to register it; and that Filomena was aware of this prior sale; hence, the subsequent sale in favor of Filomena was rescissible, fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated. On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and Attorneys Fees against Antonio. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision sustaining Filomenas ownership on the ground that it was Filomena who registered the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right than Antonio. On their separate appeals with the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC for upholding Filomenas ownership of the lot in question and for declaring Antonio a builder in good faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, and the amount due Antonio. Hence, this case. ISSUE: WON respondent Antonio is a builder in good faith? HELD: YES. Antonio is a builder in good faith. In this case, Antonio was not aware of any flaw in his title. He believed being the owner of the subject premises on account of the Deed of Sale thereof in his favor despite his inability to register the same. The improvement was, in fact, introduced by Antonio prior to Filomenas purchase of the land. Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.

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The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

Briones vs.Macabagdal GR# 150666/ Aug. 3, 2010 626 SCRA 300 FACTS: Respondent-spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter land located in Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Pias City, Metro Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R. Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of Vergon, petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergons manager, respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati City. Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which was consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergons agents

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over the seven (7)-year period they were paying for the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded Vergon as thirdparty defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is decided against them. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses, ordering petitioners to vacate. CA affirmed the RTCs findings. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON petitioners are builders in good faith? HELD: YES. CA erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith. When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said article provides that the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the

36

land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject property in accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. This case was remanded to the RTC to conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.

Limense vs. Vda de Ramos GR# 152319/ Oct. 28, 2010 604 SCRA 599 Facts: Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 12, Block No. 1074 located in Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila. He subdivided his property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1932,4 he donated the subdivided lots to his daughters, namely: Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and Felicidad, all surnamed Lozada. Lot 12-C, which was donated to Catalina, Isabel and Salud and was issued TCT No. 40043. On Lot 12-D, which was donated to Salud, the respondents predecessors -in-interest constructed their residential building in 1932, adjacent to Lot 12-C. In 1969, TCT No. 968866 was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense covering the very same area of Lot No. 12-C. And in 1981, Limense secured a building permit for the construction of a hollow block fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid property and Lot 12-D. The fence, however, could not be constructed because a substantial portion of

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respondents' residential building in Lot 12-D encroached upon portions of Limense's property in Lot 12-C. Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however, respondent ignored both oral and written demands. The parties failed to amicably settle the differences between them despite referral to the barangay. Thus, in 1983, Limense instituted a Complaint against for removal of obstruction and damages. Respondents, on the other hand, averred that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud Lozada. Lot No. 12-C was donated in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to respondents. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents ruling that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents, which was affirmed by the CA. Issue: W/N the respondents are builders in good faith and if so, what are the respective rights of the parties relative to the portions encroaching upon respondents' house. Held: (Note: the issue of W/N respondents were entitled to an easement of right of way was also discussed by the Court and held that they are. Since Lot 12-C has continuously been used as an alley since the time that Dalmacio Lozada donated the property to his daughters, the same must be respected by the petitioners and also the petitioners knew that said lot serves no other purpose than an alley since the time that the TCT was issued to them. This issue, however, is not relevant under which this case was assigned in our outline.)

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Yes, the respondents are builders in good faith. Respondents right to have access to the property of petitioners does not include the right to continually encroach upon the latters property. It is not disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-D encroach upon Lot No. 12-C. 29 In order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the encroachment, the Court deemed it proper to determine the issue above. Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12C at the time the property was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length are all within the 1/3 share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C. The Court held that when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. In this case, the co-ownership was terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of Joaquin Limense. Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners may oblige respondents to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide. The choice belongs to the owner of the land (petitioners), a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.

Mores vs. Yu-Go

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GR# 172292/ July. 23, 2010 625 SCRA 290 Facts: Yu-Go, et.al. filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against spouses Antonio and Alida Mores. Respondents alleged that they co-owned a parcel of land located in Sto. Tomas, Magarao, Camarines Sur on which a building of strong materials was built. In March 1983, petitioners pleaded to respondents that they be allowed to stay in the subject property in the meantime that they did not own a house yet. Since Antonio Mores used to be an errand boy of respondents family, they readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject only to the condition that the said stay would last until anyone of the respondents would need the subject property. Forthwith, petitioners and their children occupied the same as agreed upon. In November 1997, respondents made known to petitioners that they were already in need of the subject property. They explained that Shirley Yu-Go needed the same and, besides, petitioners already have their own house in Villa Grande Homes, Naga City. Yet, petitioners begged that they be given a 6-month extension to stay thereat or until May 1998. However, even after May 1998, petitioners failed to make good their promise and even further asked that they be allowed to stay therein until October 1998, which was again extended until the end of the same year. Thus, sometime in the first week of January 1999, respondents gave their final demand for petitioners to vacate the subject property. However, instead of heeding such demand, petitioners hired some laborers and started demolishing the improvements on the subject property on January 20, 1999 and even took away and appropriated for themselves the materials derived from such unlawful demolition.. In their Answer to the complaint, petitioners averred that they were the ones who caused the renovation to the property with the respondents consent. They also alleged that what they removed were merely the improvements made on the property by them, which removal had not caused any substantial damage thereto. Issue: W/N the spouses Mores were builders in good faith.

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Held: No. The relationship between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is one between a lessor and a lessee, making Article 1678 of the Civil Code applicable to the present case. Tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property. Article 1678 reads if the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the Yu siblings should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the improvements. Since the Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores had the right to remove the improvements.

New Regent v. Tanjuatco GR# 168800 /April 16, 2009 585 SCRA 329 Facts: New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba. NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82, 400 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 2, 1995,

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Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares of stock in the corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3694067 and T-3694078 were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco. Issue: W/N NRSI acquired the subject property by accretion and if so, W/N Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value. Held: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites. Also, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502 (1)34 of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. Clearly, the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent. The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. As regards the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of rights to the lands, suffice it to state that the assignment

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merely vested upon Tanjuatco all of Cuevass intangible claims, rights and interests over the properties and not the properties themselves. At the time of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of a pending sales application before the Bureau of Lands. For, it was not until May 24, 1996, that titles were issued in Tanjuatcos name. The assignment not being a sale of real property, it was not surprising that Cuevas demanded from Tanjuatco only P85,000 for the transfer of rights.

Meneses vs. CA GR# 83059/ July 14, 1995 246 SCRA 162 Facts: In 1977, Pablito Meneses was issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over two parcels of land located in Los Baos, Laguna. Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses. After the execution of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since 1956. On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baos, Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed

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Quisumbing. The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. The Quisumbings then filed a complaint against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Meneses, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and, confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original certificates of title to the land. Issue: W/N the lands in question are accretion lands of the Quisumbings. Held: Yes. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in controversy Since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

City Mayor of Paraaque v. Ebio GR#. 178411/June 23, 2010

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621 SCRA 555 Facts: Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez, whose daughter Zenaida married Mario Ebio. On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedros name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebios name. On March 30 1999, Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a Resolution seeking assistance from the City Government for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek, to which the respondents filed an opposition. As a result, the project was temporarily suspended. In January 2003, however, several officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted on the subject property. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, DILG and Office of the Vice Mayor. Several meeting were conducted but no definite agreement was reached. However, on March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to respondents ordering them to vacate the property within 30 days or be physically evicted. Respondents filed a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners on April 21, 2005. In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted. CA reversed. Issue: W/N the character of respondents possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

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Held: Yes. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. Under these provisions, its is clear that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. Since for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.

Almagro vs. Kwan GR# 175806/175810/ Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 250 Facts: Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181 square meter parcel of land located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 18 September 1996, they filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and damages against the occupants, on of which are the Petitioners. MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain. Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular inspections of subject lot on two separate dates: on 5 October 2001 during low tide and on 15 October 2001 when the high tide registered 1.5 meters. RTC concluded that the small portion of respondents property which

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remains as dry land is not within the scope of the well-settled definition of foreshore and foreshore land; the small dry portion is not adjacent to the sea; thus Respondent have the right to recover possession of the remaining small dry portion of the subject property in question. CA affirmed said decision. Issue: WON the disputed portion of Lot is no longer private land but has become foreshore land and is now part of the public domain? Held: The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.[The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by water during high tide. Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but remains private land owned by respondents. Chapter 3. Quieting of Title (Arts.476-481) + Other Modes of Recovery

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic GR# 179987 /April 29, 2009 587 SCRA 172 Facts: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration (land situated in Tibig, Silang Cavite). Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property. In 1966, Estebans (1 of the sons) wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator. After the death of Esteban and

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Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Velazco to Malabanan. The Republic did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, (CENRO) DENR, which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land approved as such under on March 15, 1982." RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republic interposed an appeal to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. CA reversed the RTC. It held that under Sec 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, it noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the CA was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. Malabanan died while the case was pending. Heirs appealed the decision Issues: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? Held: The Petition is denied. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of

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the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The

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earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Tan vs. Rep GR# 177797/ Dec. 04, 2008 573 SCRA 89 Facts: Spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian citizens. They seek to have the subject property registered in their names. The subject property was declared alienable and disposable in 1925, as established by a Certification issued by the DENR and Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City. Spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property. The spouses Tan took immediate possession of the subject property on which they planted rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names. However, a certain Patermateo Casio (Casio) claimed a portion of the subject property, prompting spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the RTC. RTC rendered a Decision favoring the spouses Tan and declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted." Casio appealed to the CA, which dismissed the appeal for lack of interest to prosecute. Casio elevated his case to the SC via a Petition for Review, which was for being insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final and executory in 1991.

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Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property before the Bureau of Lands. Casios application was ordered cancelled by DENR-CENRO. In 2000, Spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title to the subject property before the RTC, invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. RTC granted the application of Spouses Tan. CA reversed the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945. Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan to return the subject property to the Republic. Issue: Whether or not Spouses Tan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Ruling: The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed of, to wit: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization. (b) By administrative legalization (free patent). Since the spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the subject property. Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (b): Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or

51

earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and disposable is sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.44 Considering that no evidence was presented to disprove the contents of the aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this Court is dutybound to uphold the same. Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to sufficiently prove that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as early as 31 December 1925, they still failed to satisfactorily establish compliance with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual,

52

public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. They may be good supporting or collaborating evidence together with other acts of possession and ownership; but by themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession of the property in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to the land. For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, this Court has no other option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to the subject property. Rep vs. Tsai GR# 168184/ June. 22, 2009 590 SCRA 423 Facts: Tsai filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529. Tsai stated that on 31 May 1993, she purchased the property from Manolita Carungcong. Tsai declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Republic opposed on the following grounds: (1) that Tsai and her predecessors-in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier (2) that the tax declarations and tax receipt payments do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence and (3) that the property forms part of the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation. Trial court granted Tsai's application for registration. The Republic appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Issue: Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack of proof of Tsai's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Held: The petition has merit.

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In Tsai's original application before the trial court, she claimed that she was entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the subject property under PD 1529. However, she did not specify under what paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. It appears that she filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, which states: SEC. 14. Who may apply. - xxx (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thus, there are three requisites: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. Since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529. Tsai failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Tsai's evidence was not enough to prove that her possession of the property because the earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948.

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In view of the lack of sufficient showing that Tsai and her predecessors-ininterest possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, her application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied. Tsai also failed to prove that the subject property has been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the DENR. Applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Lim vs. Rep GR# 162047/ Sept. 4, 2009 598 SCRA 247 FACTS: Joyce Lim (petitioner) filed on September 7, 1998 before the RTC of Tagaytay City an Application for Registration of Title (LRC Case No. TG857) over Lot 13687, a 9,638-square-meter and adjacent Lot 13686 containing 18,997-square-meters located in Silang, Cavite. Petitioner, declaring that she purchased both lots on April 30, 1997 from Spouses Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan, sought the application of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree for both applications, claiming that she and her predecessors-in-interest Trinidad Mercado, Fernanda Belardo, Victoria Abueg and the Spouses Pagkalinawan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupancy of the lots under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. Petitioner alternatively invoked the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act as basis of her applications. However, per Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), the land

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was said to be within the Alienable or Disposable Land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982. The RTC granted petitioner's application. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, appealed to the CA on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the provisions of the Property Registration Decree and Article 1137 of the Civil Code both laws of which require at least 30 years of adverse possession, counted from March 15, 1982 when it became part of the alienable and disposable land. This was granted. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of PD 1529 may defeat petitioners right that has already been vested prior to promulgation thereof. HELD: As for petitioner's invocation of the provisions of the Public Land Act to have her applications considered as confirmations of imperfect titles, the same fails. When Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which made June 12, 1945 as the cut-off date, the amendment made the law concordant with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree vary, however, with respect to their operation since the latter operates when there exists a title which only needs confirmation, while the former works under the presumption that the land applied for still belongs to the State. While the subject lots were verified to be alienable or disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no sufficient proof that open, continuous and adverse possession over them by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner's applications cannot thus be granted. While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at least 30 years, public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use, public service or the development of national wealth. 42 And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

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While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15, 1982, there is no competent evidence that they are no longer intended for public use or for public service. The classification of the lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain does not change its status as properties of the public dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to them by prescription as yet. In Addition: As gathered from the CENRO Certifications, the lots were verified to be alienable or disposable lands on March 15, 1982. These Certifications enjoy the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. There is also no sufficient proof that petitioner's predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the lots since June 12, 1945 or earlier. As for petitioner's reliance on the tax declarations and receipts of realty tax payments, the documents tax declarations for Lot No. 13687 and Lot No. 13686 which were issued only in 1991 and 1994, respectively, are indicia of the possession in the concept of an owner. There is no showing of tax payments before these years. Rep vs. Ching GR# 186166/ Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 415 FACTS: On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-inFact, Antonio Ching, filed a verified Application for Registration of Title covering a parcel of land with improvements, before the RTC. The subject lot is a consolidation of three (3) contiguous lots situated in Banza, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, with an area of 58,229 square meters. Respondent alleged that on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject land from the late former governor and Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Lands. Initially, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to show cause why his application for registration of title should not be dismissed for his failure to state the current assessed value of the subject

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land and his non-compliance with the last paragraph of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.8 The OSG duly deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte filed an Opposition to the application for registration of title as well as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. On December 3, 2002, the RTC resolved to dismiss the respondents application for registration. The RTC was not convinced that respondents Deed of Sale sufficiently established that he was the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a subsequent supplemental motion for reconsideration with attached additional tax declarations. The RTC denied. Respondent appealed the RTC ruling before the CA. CA reversed the RTCs earlier resolution and granted respondents application for registration of title. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by OSG. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent application for registration of title be granted. HELD: The Court finds that the respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to show that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, therefore the application for registration should be denied. Likewise, after reviewing the documents submitted by the respondent, it is clear that there was no substantive evidence to show that he complied with the requirement of possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest tax declaration that respondent tried to incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration does not measure up to the time requirement. Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. 1073 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

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Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property in question, he must first prove that the land belongs to the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is doctrinal that, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the State and the latter is the foundation of any asserted right to ownership in land. Accordingly, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption, irrefutable evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration has been declassified and now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Rep vs. Dela Paz GR# 171631/ Nov. 15, 2010 634 SCRA 610 FACTS: On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. The respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject property and they are in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration. On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default against the

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whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their application. In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject property. Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds: ISSUE: Whether or not the application for registration of the subject property should be granted. HELD: In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides: SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the

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subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Forest Development is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. Further, the pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

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Rep vs. Vega GR# 177790/ Jan. 17, 2011 639 SCRA 541 FACTS: On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega - namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents Vegas) - filed an application for registration of title. The application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Banos, Laguna, with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land). Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother's siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without leaving any offspring. On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas' application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation. The trial court granted respondents Vegas' application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondentsintervenors Buhays' predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the subject land. CA affirmed in toto. Aggrevied by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court's conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. HELD: Under Section 14 PD 1529, Property Registration Decree, applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms

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part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14 (1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed. Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas' open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.

Rep vs. Roche GR# 175846/ July 6, 2010 624 SCRA 116 FACTS:

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On December 5, 1996 Rosila Roche applied for registration of title1 of her 15,353-square-meter land in Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,2 denominated as Lot 8698, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Roche alleged that she inherited the land in 1960 from her father, Miguel, who in turn had held the land in the concept of an owner when Roche was only about six years old. She was born on that land on January 10, 1938 and had helped her father cultivate it.3 Roche had also paid the realty taxes on the land, which had an assessed value of P490,000.00. To support her application for registration, Roche presented, among others, a certified true copy of the survey plan of the land,4 its technical description,5 a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in lieu of the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,6 tax declarations,7 and real property tax receipts.8 She also presented certifications that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the National Printing Office issued to show compliance with requirements of service of notice to adjoining owners and publication of notice of initial hearing.9 As proof of her open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land, Roche presented Manuel Adriano, a former resident of Napindan who owned an unregistered property adjoining Lot 8698. The Republic of the Philippines (the Government), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the grounds a) that neither Roche nor her predecessor-in-interest had occupied the land for the required period; and b) that the land belonged to the State and is not subject to private acquisition.13 The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) also opposed14 On September 30, 1999 the RTC rendered judgment,17 granting Roches application. On appeal by the Government,19 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.20 The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, prompting the Government to file the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the land subject of Roches application is alienable or disposable land of the public domain. HELD:

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CA decision is reversed and set aside. The Government insists that the subject land forms part of the lake bed and that it has not been released into the mass of alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As such, Roche cannot register title to it in her name. Roche points out, on the other hand, that the lot could not possibly be part of the Laguna Lakes bed since it has always been planted to crops and is not covered by water. R.A. 4850 provides that the Lake is that area covered with water when it is at the average maximum lake level of 12.50 meters. This presupposed that the lake extends only to lakeshore lands. The land in this case does not adjoin the Laguna Lake. An application for registration of title must, under Section 14(1), P.D. 1529, meet three requirements: a) that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land; and c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and the latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land. Thus, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration is alienable and disposable. Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land.25 In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)26 or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)27 of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

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Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. Since Roche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she applied for is inalienable land that belongs to the State, the Government did not have to adduce evidence to prove it.

Calara vs. Francisco GR# 156439/ Sept. 29, 2010 631 SCRA 505 Held: In the case at bench, respondents similarly claimed in their answer that they stopped payments on Lot 23 in view of petitioners' failure to develop Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision. Prior to the commencement of the case for unlawful detainer before the MTC, respondent Jesus Francisco, along with other lot buyers at said subdivision, also filed a letter-complaint for violations of P.D. 957 which was docketed before HSRC as HSRC Case No. REM-060482-1043. In her answer to the complaint, petitioner Clemencia Calara alleged that the subdivision was not covered by P.D. 957 and that she was about to file complaints for ejectment against said buyers. Unlike their contract with Gaudencio Navarro, moreover, petitioners appear to have further agreed on the terms of payment of the price for the lot purchased by respondents. Having allowed the latter to build a house on said lot after accepting their initial payments in the aggregate sum of P7,948.00,[60] petitioner Clemencia Calara significantly specified the terms of payment agreed upon by the parties in the following 20 March 1979 demand letter she sent respondent Teresita Francisco. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.[63] Given the proven justification for respondents' stoppage of further payments on Lot 23, We find that respondents' alleged refusal to

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execute said contract only gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance pursuant to Articles 1357[64] and 1357[65] of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Insofar as it concerns the sale of subdivision lots, jurisdiction over such a case is vested with the HLURB under Section 8 (11) of E.O. 648. In the second Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip[66] case which dealt with the complaint for reconveyance and damages subsequently filed by the subdivision developer, this Court ruled that "the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer." It bears emphasizing that more than 33 years have already elapsed from the time that petitioners and respondents agreed on the sale of Lot 23 of the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision sometime in 1976. In the intervening period, the parties have not only filed their respective complaints before the HLURB and the MTC but had already performed acts and acquired rights, the myriad consequences of which could not possibly be squarely addressed in the case for unlawful detainer where possession is unlawfully witliheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.

Carbonilla vs. Abiera GR# 177637/ July 26, 2010 625 SCRA 461 FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents, Marcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Maasin City. The complaint alleged that petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land, located in Barangay Canturing, Maasin City, identified as Lot No. 1781-B-P-3-B-2-B PSD-08-8452-D, Maasin Cadastre. The land is purportedly covered by a certificate of title, and declared for assessment and taxation purposes in petitioners name. Petitioner further claimed that he is also the owner of the residential building standing on the land, which building he acquired through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. He maintained that the building was being occupied by respondents by mere tolerance of the previous owners.

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In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioners allegation that they possessed the building by mere tolerance of the previous owners. Instead, they asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having inherited the same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelos parents and respondent Maricris grandparents. They maintained that they have been in possession of the building since 1960, but it has not been declared for taxation purposes. The MTCC decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined that petitioners claim of ownership over the subject parcel of land was not successfully rebutted by respondents; hence, petitioners ownership of the same was deemed established. However, with respect to the building, the court declared respondents as having the better right to its material possession in light of petitioners failure to refute respondents claim that their predecessors had been in prior possession of the building since 1960 and that they have continued such possession up to the present. The RTC reversed the MTCC decision. The RTC agreed with the MTCC that the land is owned by petitioner. The two courts differed, however, in their conclusion with respect to the building. The RTC placed the burden upon respondents to prove their claim that they built it prior to petitioners acquisition of the land, which burden, the court found, respondents failed to discharge. The RTC held that, either waywhether the building was constructed before or after petitioner acquired ownership of the land petitioner, as owner of the land, would have every right to evict respondents from the land. The CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint. Because of this, the CA, following this Courts ruling in Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, categorized the complaint as one for forcible entry. It then proceeded to declare that the action had prescribed since the one-year period for filing the forcible entry case had already lapsed. ISSUE: Who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. HELD:

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The court held that while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioners evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession

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must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. Petitioner failed to prove that respondents possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents entry to and occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessors permission to occupy the subject property. Thus, we must agree with the CA when it said: A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to prove his claim that petitioners possession of the subject building was by mere tolerance as alleged in the complaint. Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to be within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with it "permission" and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance. In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the very start of the possessionfrom entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no mention was made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such details. In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his property by filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.

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Modesto vs. Urbina GR# 189859/ Oct. 18, 2010 633 SCRA 383 FACTS: In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land situated at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272. According to Urbina, the Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to occupy a portion of this property, designated as Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of this lot. However, before the parties could finalize the sale, the Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began claiming ownership over the lot. Urbina made several demands on the Modestos to vacate the property, the last of which was through a demand letter sent on July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still refused to vacate, Urbina filed the present action against them. In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful owner of the property because it was still government property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation. The RTC of Pasig City rendered a decision in favor of Urbina on April 24, 2000, ordering the petitioners to immediately vacate and surrender the lot to Urbina and to pay him P200.00 monthly as compensation for the use of the property from July 22, 1983 until they finally vacate. The RTC noted that the petitioners recognized Urbinas possessory rights over the property when they entered into a negotiated contract of sale with him for the property. Thus, the Modestos were estopped from subsequently assailing or disclaiming Urbinas possessory rights over this lot. Urbinas claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (III-1) 460 (Miscellaneous Sales Application), which he filed on July 21, 1966. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 53483 on January 26, 2009. The CA agreed with the RTCs observation that the Modestos were estopped from challenging Urbinas right to possess the property after they acknowledged this right when they entered into the negotiated contract of sale. The CA

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also gave credence to the January 31, 2008 LMB order in LMB Conflict No. 110, ruling that this LMB order bolstered Urbinas possessory rights over the subject property. ISSUE: Whether or not the Urbinas had possessory rights over the property. HELD: An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. As the court explained in Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court: We hold that the power and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management Bureau] is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. Consequently, while we leave it to the LMB to determine the issue of who among the parties should be awarded the title to the subject

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property, there is no question that we have sufficient authority to resolve which of the parties is entitled to rightful possession. On the issue of possessory rights Prefatorily, the court observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor has it been the subject of a validly issued patent by the LMB. Therefore, the land remains part of the public domain, and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties have the right to possess the property. Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property since he has a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application, as well as tax declarations over the property. He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to possess the property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that they negotiated with him for the sale of the lot in question. On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to possess the same on their actual possession of the property. They also questioned the legality of Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application, and his tax declarations over the property, arguing that since these were obtained when the land was still not alienable and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights. After reviewing the records of this case, the court finds the reasoning of the Modestos to be more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence. The court held that Urbina utterly failed to prove that he has a better right to possess the property. Thus, the court cannot sustain his complaint for ejectment against the Modestos and, perforce, must dismiss the same for lack of merit.

Brito vs. Dianala GR# 171717/ Dec. 15, 2010 638 SCRA 529 FACTS: On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Ramon Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Fausto

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Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 12887. Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887. On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Francisca's children; that they are in open, actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs have already disposed of their shares in the said property a long time ago. Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita, Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45 rendered a decision approving the said Compromise Agreement. On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents. The case, filed with the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-C. Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs.

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ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals erred when it ruled that the lower court has the jurisdiction to hear the reconveyance case of the herein plaintiffs-appellants before the regional trial court. HELD: The court held that it is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the present case, when respondents filed their Answer-inIntervention they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Respondents, thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed without prejudice. From then on, they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that they did not have the opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less participate in the compromise agreement entered into by and between herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one hand and the defendant in Civil Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-inIntervention was dismissed, herein respondents lost their standing in court and, consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No. 12887. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are not bound by the judgment rendered therein. Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud. In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of

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which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Thus, in Caro v. Court of Appeals, this Court held as follows: x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L33261, September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a gray area on the prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and, corollarily, its point of reference: x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided: SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of action accrues: x x x xx 3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud; xxx xxx xxx In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable. Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment. x x x x x x x x x. (Italics supplied.) An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the

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fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses. An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides: In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or application. The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. x x x. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet expired. The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that respondents are guilty of laches and are already estopped from questioning the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground that they slept on their rights and allowed the said decision to become final. In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the said judgment. Secondly, respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay

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that would bar relief. Laches is recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof. Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by the one who is in possession. In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his coheirs filed a separate action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents' possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.

Tan vs. Ramirez GR# 158929/ Aug. 3, 2010 626 SCRA 327 FACTS: On August 11, 1998, the petitioner, representing her parents (spouses Crispo and Nicomedesa P. Alumbro), filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Hindang-Inopacan, Leyte a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession and/or quieting of title of a one-half portion of the subject property against the respondents. The petitioner alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona was the owner of the subject property under a 1915 Tax Declaration (TD)

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No. 2724. Catalino had four children: Gliceria, Valentina, Tomasa, and Julian; Gliceria inherited the subject property when Catalino died; Gliceria married Gavino Oyao, but their union bore no children; when Gliceria died on April 25, 1952, Gavino inherited a one-half portion of the subject property, while Nicomedesa acquired the other half through inheritance, in representation of her mother, Valentina, who had predeceased Gliceria, and through her purchase of the shares of her brothers and sisters. In 1961, Nicomedesa constituted Roberto as tenant of her half of the subject property; on June 30, 1965, Nicomedesa bought Gavinos one-half portion of the subject property from the latters heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land;[7] on August 3, 1965, Nicomedesa sold to Roberto this one-half portion in a Deed of Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land; and in 1997, Nicomedesa discovered that since 1974, Roberto had been reflecting the subject property solely in his name under TD No. 4193. The respondents, on the other hand, traced ownership of the subject property to Gavino who cultivated it since 1956; Roberto bought half of the subject property from Nicomedesa on August 3, 1965, and the remaining half from Gavinos heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, on October 16, 1972. On January 9, 1975, a certain Santa Belacho, claiming to be Gavinos natural child, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baybay, Leyte against Roberto, Nicomedesa, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, docketed as Civil Case No. B-565, for recovery of possession and ownership of two (2) parcels of land, including the subject property;[11] on September 16, 1977, Roberto bought the subject property from Belacho through a Deed of Absolute Sale of Land; and on October 5, 1977, Roberto and Nicomedesa entered into a Compromise Agreement with Belacho to settle Civil Case No. B-565. Belacho agreed in this settlement to dismiss the case and to waive her interest over the subject property in favor of Roberto, and the other parcel of land in favor of Nicomedesa in consideration of P1,800.00 The MCTC found that Catalinos 1915 TD No. 2724 was not the source of Gavinos 1945 TD No. 3257 because it involved the other parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. B-565. . It held that Roberto was entitled to only three-fourths, as this was Gavinos entire share, while the petitioner was entitled to one-fourth of the subject property, and gave the parties sixty days to effect the partition. The RTC held that the shares of the parties shall be divided and apportioned in the following manner: plaintiff shall own one-fourth (1/4) of

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Lot 3483 and defendants shall collectively own three-fourth (3/4) of Lot 3483. CA declared Roberto as the lawful owner of the entire area of the subject property. The appellate court found that the October 5, 1977 Compromise Agreement executed by Belacho gave Robertos possession of the subject property the characters of possession in good faith and with just title; the respondents twenty-one years of possession, from execution of the compromise agreement in 1977 until the filing of the case in 1998, is more than the required ten-year possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription. The CA also noted that Roberto also enjoyed just title because Belacho executed a contract of sale in his favor on September 16, 1977. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: whether the CA erred in relying upon the compromise agreement and the contract of sale to conclude that the respondents had been possessors in good faith and with just title and could acquire the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. HELD: Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. The court further held that the CA mistakenly relied upon the compromise agreement, executed by Belacho to conclude that the respondents were possessors in good faith and with just title who acquired the property

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through ordinary acquisitive prescription. In Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, we held that the main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every compromise agreement. By the nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties to agree to something that neither of them may actually want, but for the peace it will bring them without a protracted litigation. In the present case, to avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto and Nicomedesa paid P1,800.00 in consideration of Belachos desistance from further pursuing her claim over two (2) parcels of land, including the subject property. Thus, no right can arise from the compromise agreement because the parties executed the same only to buy peace and to write finis to the controversy; it did not create or transmit ownership rights over the subject property. In executing the compromise agreement, the parties, in effect, merely reverted to their situation before Civil Case No. B-565 was filed. Neither can the respondents benefit from the contract of sale of the subject property, executed by Belacho in favor of Roberto, to support their claim of possession in good faith and with just title. In the vintage case of Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson, we explained good faith in this manner: One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it, can be ascertained only from the acts of the one claiming it, as it is a condition of mind that can only be judged by actual or fancied token or signs. In the present case, no dispute exists that Roberto, without Nicomedesas knowledge or participation, bought the subject property on September 16, 1977 or during the pendency of Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore, had actual knowledge that Belachos claim to ownership of the subject property, as Gavinos purported heir, was disputed because he (Roberto) and Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto even admitted that he bought the subject property from Belacho to avoid any trouble.*35+ He, thus, cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor, Belacho.

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Not being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Robertos favor. Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has not been met because of the respondents claim to have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the subject property for only twenty-four years, from the time the subject property was tax declared in 1974 to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1998. Based on the foregoing, the CA erred in finding that the respondents acquired the petitioners one-fourth portion of the subject property through acquisitive prescription. As aptly found by the MCTC, the respondents are only entitled to three-fourths of the subject property because this was Gavinos rightful share of the conjugal estate that Roberto bought from Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao.

Lamsis vs. Dong-e GR# 173021/ Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 154 FACTS: This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1. On the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of The Heirs of Ap-ap. The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads: Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10, 1922 per true of same presented. Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families.

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They were allowed to erect their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000 square meters thereof. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of their first cousins. When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and occupied and improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot. This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose). With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin and Agustins parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents. Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-aps children, failed to include two Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito. Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from the quitclaim . In order to debunk petitioners claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying the Smiths application for recognition of the subject property as part of their ancestral land. The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because the Smiths did not possess, occupy or utilize all or a

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portion of the property x x x. The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs. To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-square meter property. The said resolution states: The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicants grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessors office of Baguio. On the matter of the applicant*s+ indiguinity *sic+ and qualifications, there is no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in 1964, by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective share of the applicants*+ co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the execution of an Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights. The trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property. The survey plan of the subject property in the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their

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predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of others. The CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witness. ISSUE: Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription. HELD: The court held that they cannot accept petitioners claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription. In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, the court can find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained. Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over the reivindicatory action The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of ones claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of officially establishing ones land as an ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the

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titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interests possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Likewise apropos is the following explanation: The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership. (Emphasis supplied) A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title transferred to his name. Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. The third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the

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ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case. Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

Ney vs. Quijano GR# 178609/ Aug. 4, 2010 626 SCRA 800 Facts: This is an appeal to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the Decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 45. Petitioners Manuel and Romulo Ney are the registered owners of a residential lot located at 1648 Main Street, Paco Manila, with an area of 120 square meters more or less, covered by TCT No. 122489. A three (3) door apartment was constructed on the subject lot 1 for Manuel, the other for Romulo; and the last one for their sister, Respondents Mina N. Quijano and her husband Celso Quijano. On October 8, 1999, respondents filed with the RTC of Manila a suit for reconveyance, partition and damages against petitioners. They averred that they are co-owners of the subject property having paid part of its purchase price; that Celsos name was inadvertently omitted as one of the buyers in the execution of the deed of sale. Consequently, TCT No. 122489 covering the subject property was issued only in the names of Manuel and Romulo. To obtain a separate certificate of title, they requested from petitioners the segregation of the portion allotted to them, but the latter refused. They later discovered that the entire property was mortgaged with

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Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, prompting them to execute and register their adverse claim with the Register of Deeds; and to file the instant complaint. Petitioners, in their answer, denied respondents allegation of coownership. They averred that Celso Quijano was not a vendee of the subject lot; thus, his name did not appear on the title. They asserted that respondents cannot validly maintain an action against them because the latter possessed the property by mere tolerance; and even assuming that respondents had a valid cause of action, the same had already been barred by prescription and/or laches. Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. It rejected respondents claim of co-ownership, and declared their documentary and testimonial evidence unreliable. The RTC sustained petitioners assertion that respondents possessed part of the property through mere tolerance; and that their cause of action, if any, already prescribed. The RTC thus ruled that respondents can no longer demand the segregation or reconveyance of the claimed portion of the property. Finally, the RTC granted petitioners counterclaim and ordered the reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in defending the case. Respondents went to the CA. They faulted the RTC for dismissing their complaint and insisted that they are co-owners of the subject lot; and that their share was erroneously included in petitioners title. Citing Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, respondents asserted that their right to institute an action for reconveyance is imprescriptible because they are in possession of the claimed portion of the property. On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision, reversing the RTC. The CA considered respondents complaint as one for quieting of title which is imprescriptible; and granted to respondents the reliefs that they prayed for. The CA declared [respondents], spouses Celso and Mina Quijano, as coowners of the subject lot to the extent of one-third (1/3) thereof which corresponds to that portion where their house stands. Accordingly, [petitioners] are hereby ordered:

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1) to partition the subject lot into three (3) equal portions of forty square meters (40 sq.m.) each, specifically allotting to [respondents] the portion where their house stands; 2) to reconvey to [respondents] the clean title to their portion of the subject lot; 3) to surrender the owners copy of TCT No. 122489 to the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of *respondents+ share thereon; and 4) to pay *respondents+ attorneys fees and the costs of suit in the reasonable amount of P50,000.00. Thus, this petition for review. They ascribe reversible error to the CA for treating respondents action as one for quieting of title. They claim that nowhere in the complaint does it state that respondents seek to quiet their title to the property. All that respondents averred and prayed for in their complaint was for petitioners to surrender their certificate of title, and for the partition of the subject property. Petitioners assert that the CA ruled on an issue not raised in the pleadings; and substituted the respondents action with an entirely new action for quieting of title. Issue/s: 1. Whether the CA erred in treating the complaint as quieting of title. 2. Whether the CA faulted in sustaining respondents claim for coownership. The argument is erroneous. 1. These allegations make out a case for reconveyance. That reconveyance was one of the reliefs sought was made abundantly clear by respondents in their prayer.

Respondents did not only seek the partition of the property and the delivery of the title, but also the reconveyance of their share which was inadvertently included in petitioners TCT. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Indeed, reconveyance is an action distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact,

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invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title for purposes of removing such cloud or to quiet title. However, we find nothing erroneous in the CAs ruling treating respondents action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title. In Mendizabel v. Apao, we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title, explaining, thus: The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.,An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. Indubitably, the characterization by the CA of respondents action as in the nature of an action for quieting of title cannot be considered a reversible error. 2. The Deed of Reconveyance executed by Manuel and Romulo explicitly states that: [W]e acknowledge and recognized the rights, interests and participation of Celso P. Quijano, Filipino, of legal age, married to Mina P. Ney and resident of 1648 Main Street, Paco, Manila, as a co-owner of the one-third

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(1/3) portion of the said lot wherein his residential house is now constructed at the above-stated address, having paid the corresponding amount over the said 1/3 portion of the property for the acquisition costs but whose name does not appear in the Deed of Sale executed in our favor, thus resulting in the non-conclusion (sic) of his name in the above-stated Transfer Certificate of Title when issued as a co-owner. NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises WE, MANUEL P. NEY and ROMULO P. NEY, do hereby transfer and convey unto said Spouses Celso P. Quijano and MINA P. NEY their onethird (1/3) portion share of the aforedescribed (sic) parcel of land where their residential house is now situated at their above-given address with an area of forty (40) square meters more or less by virtue of this Deed of Reconveyance. Petitioners never denied the due execution of the Deed of Reconveyance. In fact they admitted that the signatures appearing therein are theirs. The CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for declaring respondents as co-owners of the subject property because it merely confirmed and enforced the Deed of Reconveyance voluntarily executed by petitioners in favor of respondents. As aptly pronounced by the CA: [T]he Deed of Reconveyance, duly signed by [petitioners] themselves, put to rest the focal issue between the parties. There is no denying that it outweighs the evidence relied upon by [petitioners] despite the fact that they have the transfer certificate of title over the entire subject lot. It is settled that it is not the certificate of title that vests ownership. It merely evidences such title. In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to the true owner or to one with a better right, where the property had been erroneously or fraudulently titled in another person's name. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Thus, the CA acted correctly in rendering the challenged decision.

Toring vs. Boquilaga GR# 163610/ Sept. 27, 2010 631 SCRA 278

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Facts: For review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC except as to the land covered by reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989 (T16805) in the name of Enrique Toring On October 10, 1996, the heirs of Enrique Toring (petitioners) filed before the trial court a petition for "production, delivery, surrender of documents, annulment of document" against the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga (respondents).

On June 3, 1927, Teodosia Boquilaga sold to Enrique Toring now deceased, parcels of land for a consideration of Five Hundred and Eleven Pesos (P511.00), evidenced by a deed of absolute sale written in Spanish This deed of absolute sale was duly registered with the [Register] of Deeds, and the fees for the registration were duly paid. Thereafter, new Transfer Certificates of Title were issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds in the Province of Cebu, for all the parcels of land, in the name of Enrique Toring. From the issuance of TCT on August 20, 1927, plaintiffs have been in possession and religiously paid the real taxes due on said described lots, and collecting the proceeds of the fruits of the land. However, during World War II, the canceled Original Certificate in the name of Teodosia [Boquilaga], and the Transfer [Certificates] of [Title] in the name of Enrique Toring in the books of the Register of Deeds were destroyed; Lately, while petitioners were exercising their right over the said lots, defendants refused to share the fruits of the lot reasoning that they are the owners thereof. Petitioners learned that defendants filed petition for the reconstitution of the OCTs of said land. Petitioners thus sought the issuance of an order directing the defendants to deliver, produce and surrender the reconstituted Original Certificates of Title. Should the defendants refuse to deliver the said titles, it is prayed that the court (a) declare OCTs null and void; (b) direct the Register of Deeds to cancel said titles and in lieu thereof issue new TCTs in the name of

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Enrique Toring; and (c) declare OCT No. 13237 null and void for being cancelled by TCT No. RT-3989. As special and affirmative defenses, defendants contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction in this case since the assessed value of the properties involved does not exceed P20,000.00, and that petitioners are guilty of laches for failing to act and take corrective measures with the Register of Deeds for sixty-nine (69) years on the alleged destruction of the documents. The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position papers, memoranda/comment and other documentary evidence in support of their respective claims. On January 27, 1998, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that it cannot interfere with or render null and void the decision made by a coequal and coordinate branch of the court which ordered the reconstitution of the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga. Under the circumstances, petitioners owners duplicate certificates of title in the name of Enrique Toring are deemed "overtaken by the reconstituted title[s]." Further, the trial court found petitioners guilty of laches in not reconstituting the original TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring and in not making any opposition to the reconstitution proceedings filed by the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga. However, it was declared that the dismissal of the case will not affect the reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989 in the name of Enrique Toring. Petitioners appealed to the CA arguing that: 1. the trial court erred in concluding that the action is one for the annulment of the order of the court which granted reconstitution, when in truth the petitioners merely sought the delivery of the owners duplicate copies of the reconstituted OCTs. 2. the trial court faulted in failing to consider that the defendants predecessor-in-interest had long ago sold the lots to Enrique Toring, which document of sale defendants have not denied, and therefore defendantheirs are no longer owners. 3. the trial court erred in finding them guilty of laches despite recognizing the existence of the owners duplicate of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring; the submission by the petitioners of annexes in their Comment/Reply to defendants memorandum showing that there were previous cases wherein petitioners have asserted and defended their right

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over the subject properties and prevailed; and the fact that the OCTs were reconstituted by defendants only in 1995 and the petitioners instituted this case in 1996. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts ruling. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the CA denied the same. Petitioners submit the following arguments in this petition for review on certiorari: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS WERE ALREADY SOLD AS EARLY AS JUNE 3, 1927 BY TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA, RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR, TO ENRIQUE TORING, PETITIONERS PREDECESSOR, AS EVIDENCED BY THE ANCIENT DEED OF SALE IN SPANISH LANGUAGE DATED JUNE 3, 1927 WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERS DUPLICATE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF ENRIQUE TORING WHICH ARE GOOD PROOF OF PETITIONERS OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LANDS - WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TITLES THAT PETITIONERS HAD RECONSTITUTED WERE THE CANCELLED ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA WHICH DO NOT PROVE OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS BECAUSE THEY WERE ALREADY CANCELLED BY ENRIQUE TORINGS TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES JUST BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO RECONSTITUTE TORINGS ORIGINAL TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ON FILE IN THE RECORDS OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS, IT APPEARING THAT

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THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSOR HAVE BEEN IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LAND SINCE 1927 AND ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERS DUPLICATE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF THEIR PREDECESSOR, ENRIQUE TORING. V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ACTION TO ASSAIL THE DECISION OF A CO-EQUAL COURT, IT APPEARING THAT THE SAID COMPLAINT/PETITION WAS MERELY TO COMPEL DELIVERY OR SURRENDER BY RESPONDENTS OF THE RECONSTITUTED CERTIFICATES OF TITLE. Held: The issues raised are purely questions of fact that this Court cannot review in a petition filed under Rule 45. Ultimately, we are asked to determine the ownership of the subject lots originally registered in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, respondents predecessor-in-interest. The CA declared that petitioners failed to establish any right over the lots other than their bare assertion that their predecessor-in-interest purchased these properties from Teodosia Boquilaga and subsequently titles in his name were issued but were lost during the last world war. It agreed with the trial court in finding that whatever claim petitioners have on the subject properties was lost by their unexplained neglect for more than fifty (50) years since the destruction of the records in the registry of deeds during the last world war, under the principle of laches. As to the nature of the action filed by petitioners, the CA likewise affirmed the trial courts ruling that it is one for annulment of the reconstituted title, which essentially assails the judgment or order of a co-equal court. As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. In the case at bar, the records showed that the original petition was filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bogo-San Remigio, Cebu but was subsequently transferred to the RTC on motion of the petitioners. TCT Nos.

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16802, 16803, 16804 and RT-3989 (T-16805) were attached to the petition together with annexes "A", "C" to "G" mentioned therein. However, upon elevation to the CA, the records transmitted had missing pages, including the pages subsequent to the original petition where copies of the aforesaid TCTs should have been attached. At any rate, there appears to be no indication from the pleadings filed and orders/decision issued by the trial court throughout the proceedings that such documentary evidence was not submitted by petitioners. Hence, the CA could have been misled by the absence of these annexes from the records transmitted on appeal. Petitioners submitted to this Court the photocopies of TCT Nos. 16802, 16803 and 16804 certified as true copy from the records by the RTC of Bogo, Branch 61 Clerk of Court VI Atty. Rey Dadula Caayon. It must be noted that petitioners presented before the trial court the owners duplicate copies of the said TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Indeed, had these pieces of evidence been duly considered on appeal, the resolution of the issue of ownership would have tilted in petitioners favor. But first, we resolve the issue of the propriety of the suit filed by the petitioners. The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief. As gleaned from the averments of the petition filed before the trial court, though captioned as for delivery or production of documents and annulment of document, petitioners action was really for quieting of title and cancellation of reconstituted titles. Petitioners had prayed for the following reliefs before the trial court: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued; a. Directing defendants to deliver, produce, and surrender Original [Certificates] of Title Nos. RO- 13240, 13238, 13239, and Transfer Certificate of Title [No.] 97615 to plaintiffs, and should defendants refuse to surrender these documents, to declare Original Certificate of Titles Nos. RO- 13238, 13239, 13240, and Transfer Certificate of Title 97615 null and void, and directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, to cancel said Original Certificates of Title, and Transfer Certificate of Title and in lieu thereof issue new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Enrique Toring;

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b. Declare as null and void Original Certificate of Title 13237, being canceled by Transfer Certificate of Title RT-3989; c. Directing defendants heirs of Teodosia [Boquilaga] to pay P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. Plaintiffs, pray for other remedies just and equitable applicable to their case, pertinent with law and equity. Petitioners contend that the delivery of the reconstituted OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga was necessary to confirm and register the 1927 sale in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Enrique Toring. It appears that the remedy contemplated is a petition for surrender of withheld owners duplicate certificates provided in Section 107 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. SECTION 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. -- Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if [for] any reason the outstanding owners duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (Emphasis supplied.) However, petitioners themselves alleged that the 1927 sale had long been duly registered OCT in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, as mentioned in the Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated June 3, 1927, were cancelled and in lieu thereof TCTs have been issued in the name of Enrique Toring on August 20, 1927. Their predecessor-in-interest having already succeeded in registering the deed of sale as early as 1927, it is clear that the procedure under Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 is inapplicable.

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Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure " an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit. In alleging that petitioners were not served any notice as actual possessors or adjacent owners of the petition for reconstitution (Cad Case No. 7, Cad. Rec. No. 442, Decree Nos. 230739, 230740, 231111 and 231112) filed by the respondents for reconstitution of OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga which was granted by the court; and that the said OCTs have already been cancelled by the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring by virtue of a deed of sale executed in 1927 by Teodosia Boquilaga petitioners did not just seek to remove any doubt or uncertainty in the title of their predecessor-in-interest over the subject real properties, but also claimed irregularity and defects in the reconstitution proceedings which resulted in the issuance of reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240 in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga. If indeed, as petitioners claimed, the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga were already cancelled and new TCTs have already been issued in the name of Enrique Toring as early as 1927, then the reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240 issued in Cad Case No. 7, Cad Rec. No. 442 are null and void. It may also be noted that the petition for reconstitution filed by respondents and the Certifications issued by the LRA stated only the registration decree numbers issued in favor of Teodosia Boquilaga without mentioning the numbers of the OCTs and dates of their issuance. The reconstituted OCTs on their face contained no entry whatsoever as to the number of the OCT issued pursuant to the decrees of registration, nor the date of its issuance.

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We have held that such absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for reconstitution. Moreover, notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served on the actual possessors of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effect settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition. The decision granting the petition for reconstitution filed by the respondents was promulgated on May 9, 1996. There is no allegation or proof that petitioners availed of the remedies of appeal, petition for relief, certiorari or annulment of judgment before the CA questioning the validity of the said reconstitution order. Notwithstanding petitioners failure to avail of the afore-mentioned remedies, the decision in the reconstitution case is not a bar to the adjudication of the issue of ownership raised in the present case. The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument or the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Its purpose is to have the title reproduced after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred and not to pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. After a careful review, we hold that petitioners have satisfactorily established their claim of ownership over the subject lots by preponderance of evidence. The existence and due execution of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta was never disputed by the respondents. Petitioners documentary evidence showed that the registration fees for the transfer of the lots mentioned in the said deed of absolute sale was duly paid, resulting in the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Thereafter, petitioners took possession of the land, sharing in the fruits thereof and paying the realty taxes due on the lands. While the original owners duplicate TCTs were in the possession of petitioners, the original transfer certificates of title on file with the registry of deeds were lost or destroyed during the last world war. Petitioners were also able to judicially reconstitute TCT No. T-16805 (RT-3989) on November 11, 1994, as per the annotation thereon.

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Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches. In this case, however, laches cannot be appreciated in respondents favor. It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.37 Only the first element was present in this case, which occurred from the moment respondents refused to give petitioners share in the fruits and proceeds of the land, claiming that they are owners thereof. In the ensuing barangay proceedings, respondents presented the reconstituted OCTs prompting petitioners to verify with the office of the registry of deeds. It was only then that petitioners discovered that respondents indeed filed a petition for judicial reconstitution. There being no personal notice to them as actual possessors or adjacent lot owners, petitioners never had the opportunity to file their opposition. The order of reconstitution was issued in May 1996. Petitioners filing of the present suit for the delivery and cancellation of said reconstituted OCTs in the possession of respondents on October 20, 1996, after the lapse of only five months, cannot be considered as unreasonable delay amounting to laches.

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Additionally, petitioners showed that they were never amiss in asserting their rights over the subject lots whenever any incident threatened their peaceful possession and ownership.

Caezo vs. Bautista GR# 170189/ Sept. 1, 2010 629 SCRA 580 Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo are the registered owner[s] of a land with an area of 186 sq m. covered by TCT No. 32911. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista are the registered owners of a land with an area of 181 sq m. covered by TCT No. 31727. Both are located at Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants lot is adjacent to that of appellees. In 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by appellants without appellees knowledge and consent. However, despite oral and written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the structures encroaching appellees lot. Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but to no avail. Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of demolition. Appellants were declared in default for failure to file an Answer within the extended period granted by the court, Appellees were allowed to present their evidence ex parte before an appointed commissioner. Thereafter the RTC rendered the assailed decision in the terms earlier set forth. On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses Caezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Caezo. The spouses Bautista also refused to remove the structures and respect the boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to the

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Barangay Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in bad faith, such that the spouses Caezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. A writ of demolition be was issued directing the removal/demolition of the structures built by the defendants upon the portion of land belonging [to] the plaintiffs at the formers expense. Further, 1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as and by way of moral damages[; and] 2. the defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal On 17 October 2005, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year before the filing of the complaint, the spouses Caezo should have filed a suit for recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses Caezos complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Caezo failed to specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of their property. Because of this failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for recovery of possession and that the encroachment was built in good faith, the market value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine the appropriate indemnity. The CA granted the appeal and the case was DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum. Issues: I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the petition of the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of the Court a quo; [and]

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II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating that the petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition. Held: The petition has merit. The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a "Writ of Demolition with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the Civil Code reads: "In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim." Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same. However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiffs property. Given the efforts made by the spouses Caezo to settle the present issue prior to the filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling that the spouses Bautista were in default and in not admitting their Answer. The Complaint was not the spouses Bautistas first encounter with the present issue. Moreover, the spouses Bautista failed to file their Answer even after the expiry of the motion of extension granted to them. The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Caezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Caezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.

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A writ of demolition of the encroaching structures should be issued against and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista upon the finality of this judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista are further ordered to pay Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo P30,000 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P30,000 as attorneys fees. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall apply from the finality of judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid. Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Title III. Co-Ownership (Arts. 484-501) Republic v. Heirs of Sorono GR # 171571, Mar. 24, 2008 549 SCRA 58 This is a Petition for review on certiorari to the aardecision of the CA affirming that of the RTC Cadastral Survey of Opon, Lapu-lapu City were adjudicated on December 7, 1929 by the then CFI of Cebu in four equal shares. The two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees. It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold for P2,565.59 the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on October 11, 1957, without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots. In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence traversing Lot No. 2316 and relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security in line with the standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Federal Aviation Authority.

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MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of Tax Declaration No. 00548 covering Lot No. 2296 and Tax Declaration No. 00568 covering Lot No. 2316. Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the lots but the same was ignored. Respondents thereupon filed on January 8, 1996 a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City, alleging that the existence of the tax declarations "would cast a cloud on their valid and existing titles" to the lots. They alleged that "corresponding original certificates of title in favor of the decreed owners were . . . issued but the same could no longer be found and located, and in all probability, were lost during the Second World War." (This claim was not specifically denied by petitioner in its Answer with Counterclaim.) Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-ininterests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos. The trial court found for respondents. It held that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in peaceful and continuous possession of their shares in the lots, and were disturbed of such possession only in 1996 when petitioner put up the security fence that traversed Lot No. 2316 and relocated families that had built their houses within the airport perimeter to a portion of said lot. On petitioners claim that it had acquired ownership by extraordinary prescription, the trial court brushed it aside on the ground that registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Neither, held the trial court, had respondents action prescribed, as actions for quieting of title cannot prescribe if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property in question, as in the case of herein respondents. On petitioners defense of laches, the trial court also brushed the same aside in light of its finding that respondents, who have long been in possession of the lots, came to know of the sale only in 1996. The trial

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court added that respondents could not be charged with constructive notice of the 1957 Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the lots to CAA as it was erroneously registered under Act No. 3344, the law governing recording of instruments or deeds relating to real estate which are not registered under the Torrens system. The subject lots being registered, the trial court found, the registration of the deed should have been made under Act No. 496, the applicable law in 1957. In fine, the trial court held that the registration of the deed under Act No. 3344 did not operate as constructive notice to the whole world. Concluding, the trial court held that the questioned sale was valid only with respect to Tito Dignos share of the lots, and that the sale thereof was subject to the right of legal redemption by respondents following Article 1088 of the Civil Code, reading: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. In light of its finding that the heirs of Tito Dignos did not give notice of the sale to respondents, the trial court held that the period for legal redemption had not yet lapsed; and the redemption price should be of the purchase price paid by the CAA for the two lots. The trial court thus disposed: Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION WHEN RESPONDENTS NO LONGER HAVE ANY RIGHT TO RECOVER LOTS 2296 AND 2316 DUE TO THE PRIOR SALE THEREOF TO THE REPUBLIC AND UPON THE EQUITABLE GROUNDS OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES. Held: Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or

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mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots. Petitioners insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. The trial courts discrediting thereof is well taken. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs in 1957. The trial courts discrediting of petitioners invocation of laches and prescription of action is well-taken too. As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, "(1) they received just compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on its side. Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots. As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify

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respondents about the sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus: That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and agree to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice. Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.

Cruz v. Catapang GR # 164110, Feb. 12, 2008 544 SCRA 512 Facts: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision RTC, which had earlier affirmed the Decision of the 7th MCTC ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a portion of the lot coowned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows. Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the coowners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property. When petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property during the first week of September 1995, she was surprised to see a part of respondents house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.

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On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the coowners is not sufficient to justify defendants construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MCTCs ruling and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Catapang. Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs decision. The CA held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. The CA further held that petitioners remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with the appropriate forum. After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, she filed the instant petition and raised before us for consideration the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.] II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER. III. . . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY. Petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic

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principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition. On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property. Issue: Whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person. Held: As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the coowned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use. Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide: Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the coownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied. Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.

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Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights. Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other coowners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property. Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification "through strategy or stealth." The CA held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.

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Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.21 Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the construction.

Santos v. Heirs of Lustre GR # 151016, Aug. 06, 2008 561 SCRA 120 Facts: Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged & later on sold to Natividad Santos who subsequently sold it to her son Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name. Lustres heirs Macaspac & Maniquiz filed w/ RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Froilan Santos. Lustres other heirs filed a C omplaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia Macaspac with the same RTC. Macaspac was impleaded as defendant in the 2nd case because she refused to join the other heirs as plaintiffs. Alleging that the plaintiffs right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCT had long prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of litis pendentia. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Issue 1: Was there forum shopping?

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Decision: No Ratio: Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Its elements are identity of the subject matter, identity of the causes of action and identity of the parties in the two cases. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case. There is no forum shopping because there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in the 1st case (Macaspac) does not, in fact, share a common interest with the plaintiffs in the 2nd case. Plaintiffs in both cases are the heirs of Lustre; they are therefore co-owners of the property. However, the fact of being a co-owner does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff is acting for the benefit of the co-ownership when he files an action respecting the co-owned property. Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the property owned in common. The test is whether the additional party, the co-owner in this case, acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. [28] Macaspac filed the 1st case seeking the reconveyance of the property to her, and not to Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the co-ownership which would negate a conclusion that she acted in privity with the other heirs or that she filed the complaint in behalf of the co-ownership. In contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit of the coownership when they filed the 2nd case wherein they prayed that TCT Lustre be reinstated, or a new certificate of title be issued in her name. Issue #1: Does prescription or laches apply? Issue 2: Does prescription or laches apply? Decision: No Ratio: The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring

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property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity, which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.X

MBTC v. Pascual GR # 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246 Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,TCT No. 156283[1] of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision,[2] declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal

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partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as Waiver that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question. Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate.[3] At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was subsequently declared in default. The RTC Declared the REM Invalid Issue:

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a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Article 116 of the Family Code. b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses. c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value. Held: The Disputed Property is Conjugal It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that *a+ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife, applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Citing Manongsong v. Estimo,[8] Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not only was the property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge. To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals[9] and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,[10] among other cases, where this Court held that a property registered in the name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses marriage. On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation[11] and Wong v. IAC,[12] contends that Metrobank

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failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that Metrobanks arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to be shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are relevant only when there is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property alleged to be conjugal. As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three instances. The first was when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as spouses in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as co-mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter[13] to vacate the disputed lot, Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as spouses, albeit the finality of the decree of nullity of marriage between them had long set in. We find for Nicholson. First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobanks submission, the Court did not, in Manongsong,[14] add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in Castro v. Miat: Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of

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the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.[15] (Emphasis supplied.) Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank would thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the property in the name of Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.[16] The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding Metrobank having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in question. Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CAs holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads: Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the

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marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage. Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets. We again find for Nicholson. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns. In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.[17] In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. (Emphasis supplied.)

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In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half. The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value. Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to *the bank+ in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.*18+ This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.[19] In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable.[20] Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks

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to exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the validity of the mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable part of the banks operation.*21+ A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,[22] as here. But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is concerned. As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging to Florencia. The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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Arriola v. Arriola GR # 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666 Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. John Nabor C. Arriola filed Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any; As the parties failed to agree how to partition among them the land, John Nabor sought the sale through public auction and petitioners acceded to it. Said auction had to be reset when petitioners refused to include the house standing on the subject land.

Issue: Whether the subject house is covered in the judgment of partition of the lot and should be included in the sale through public auction. Held: The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition. First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land.

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In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto. Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the complaint for partition. That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them. Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter. Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly: Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

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Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extrajudicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged

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by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties. More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property. The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different reason. To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

Padilla vs. Magdula GR# 176858/ Sept. 15, 2010 630 SCRA 573 Facts: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Orders dated 8 September 2006[2] and 13 February 2007[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161. Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property[4] (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show that the land was registered under the Torrens system. On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of Ricardo.

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Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third parties. Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited from her parents. Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte. In an Order dated 20 February 2006,[5] the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.[6] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by

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Ricardos daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the order states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of the Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. The dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack of jurisdiction but by reason of prescription. Issue: The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription. Held: At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[8] We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a review of the case is necessary. Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states:

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Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied) The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed. After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality to sell the property: On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no moment in this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his] daughters and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or ratified the alleged deed of sale.[9] Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that Ricardos possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.[10] Dominador merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit

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submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether Ricardos family ever lived there. Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of the land. Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the coownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a coowners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other coowners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.[11] In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanitas death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera,[12] we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the

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claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run. However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardos repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This threeyear period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription. Further, Dominadors argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any other competent evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over the land. Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the land at his own risk, being aware as buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador is not afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to his claim. With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance of the case. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),[14] amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions: Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:

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Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states: Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for

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taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00 according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the value alone, being way below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.[15] Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,[16] we held that: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts). When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.[17]

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In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominadors rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the land.

Taghoy vs. Tigol, Jr GR# 159665/ Aug. 3, 2010 626 SCRA 341 Facts: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire several properties. Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago, Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the

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properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected. Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following manner: (1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias dated February 15, 1919; (2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939, for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15129 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman; (3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Inter vivos) dated April 10, 1939; (4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed by third parties. Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants father), nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the

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instant case is already barred by res judicata since there had been three previous cases involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed, the last of which was dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents covering the disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in common as agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for a title and recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in four years. After trial, the decision was rendered on April 8, 1992 which ruled as follows:8 "From the evidence, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are brothers and sisters who are the children of Estanislao Meneses and Anatalia de Guzman and the defendants are the children of plaintiffs counsin Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The defendants mother Tranquilina de Guzman and plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman and Leoncia de Guzman are full blooded sisters. The subject six (6) parcels of land were conjugal properties of Leoncia de Guzman and her husband Cornelio Aquino were in their possession until their death in 1945 and 1947, respectively. After the death of plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman on September 14, 1978, plaintiff Santiago Meneses came across an affidavit of Cesario Velasquez notarized by Atty. Elpidio Barrozo stating that he is an adopted son of said spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman (Exhibit "A") which, is however, not supported by evidence (a court order). The said affidavit mentioned, among other things, a house and a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 699 located at Guiguilonen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, (Exhibit "B"). The sugar cane and coconut land situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of 27,849 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. 978 (Exhibit "C") which was in the possession of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman until their death. Sometime in 1944 Leoncia de Guzman called a conference among the plaintiffs and spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman and told them that all their conjugal properties shall be divided equally between Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman and that she did not sign documents regarding the conveyance of their properties; and that the property (parcel B) in Malabago, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, which yielding an annual produce

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worth P15,000.00 was divided between Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman. Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman who were childless had Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman as their legal heirs. The latter succeeded the former over the subject six (6) parcels of land in equal shares - belongs to Anatalia de Guzman and the other half, to Tranquilina de Guzman." This, notwithstanding the claim of defendants that the first parcel was donated to Jose Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by way of "Donation Intervivos." The second parcel, sold to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman; The third and 6th parcels, donated to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman; and The 4th and 5th parcels, sold to third parties. The claim of Cesario Velasquez that he was adopted by the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman is not supported by evidence. The Court finds plaintiff Santiago Meneses credible; and his testimony, credible by itself. Santiago Meneses who is 80 years old testified spontaneously in a clear, straight forward and convincing manner. The version of the defendants to the effect that spouses Cornelio de Guzman and Leoncia de Guzman left no properties cannot be given serious consideration. It is incredible and unbelievable. How did the spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman support and maintain themselves if they disposed of their valuable properties, the six (6) parcels of land in question, during their lifetime? Did they really leave no properties? These questions remained unanswered. The defendants failed to prove their allegations that the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman disposed of their properties during their lifetime.

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Defendant Eliseo Velasquez is a lawyer and his co-defendant brothers are retired government officials. On the other hand, the plaintiffs are simple, innocent country folks who have not obtained substantial level of education. The Court believes and so holds that the defendants manipulated the transfer unto themselves all the properties of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman; thus, depriving the plaintiffs their shares in the inheritance, to their prejudice and damage. Insofar as the issue of whether or not partition prescribes, the court believes and so rules that it does not. "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Issue: I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the statute of limitations. II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman. III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties in question. IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal heirs of spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman. V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case. Held: Petitioners contend that public respondent erred when it held that the issue of res judicata was never raised either in the Answer or at the Pre-trial such that it was not under consideration. We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the defense of res judicata was raised in the petitioners Amended Answer filed before the trial court more particularly under paragraph 18, to wit:

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"18. b. The case at bar is already barred by RES JUDICATA, there having been three (3) previous cases involving either the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein or of the present parties themselves, the same subject matter, and the same cause of action, which were all dismissed, the last dismissal having been ordered by this very same Honorable Court in Civil Case No. D-8811 on October 21, 1988 for failure to prosecute which dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and therefore with prejudice as this Honorable Court did not provide otherwise (Sec. 3, Rule 17) and the Plaintiffs in said case, who are the same plaintiffs in the present case did not appeal from said order of dismissal." Said Amended Answer was admitted by the trial court in its Order dated March 2, 199011 and was one of the issues stipulated for resolution in its Pre-trial Order dated May 18, 1990. Thus, it was clear error for respondent court to conclude that res judicata was never raised in the lower court. The next question is whether res judicata is present in the instant case. We rule in the affirmative. Petitioners in their Memorandum established that there were three (3) earlier cases filed by private respondents against petitioners involving the same subject matter and issues as in the instant case which were all dismissed, to wit: "The first Complaint filed by Anatalia de Guzman, mother of private respondent Santiago Meneses, against Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez, docketed as Civil Case No. 11378 of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Said action was dismissed on August 18, 1950. Thirty four (34) years after, or on October 9, 1984, private respondent Santiago Meneses filed a second Complaint similar to the Complaint of his mother (Civil Case No. 11378) which was docketed as Civil Case No. D7584, entitled "Heirs of Anatalia de Guzman, represented by Santiago Meneses vs. Cesario Velasquez, defendant. In the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, dated May 28, 1986, this Complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute without prejudice (Exh. "16"). Private respondent Santiago Meneses refiled the Complaint allegedly joined this time by his siblings on October 23, 1987; which was docketed as Civil Case No. P-8811 and entitled "Heirs of Anatalia de Guzman, namely:

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Santiago Meneses, Apolonio Meneses, Andres Meneses, Luis Meneses, Felicidad Meneses, Plaintiffs, versus Heirs of Cesario Velasquez, namely: Anastacia Velasquez, Sofia Velasquez, Eliseo Velasquez, Jose Velasquez, Leonora Velasquez, Nieves Velasquez, Defendants." (Exh. "17"). On October 21, 1988, the Court a quo dismissed this Complaint as follows: "For failure to prosecute, the case is hereby dismissed without costs." (Exh. "18")." Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their Comment as the only defense raised therein was that the application of the principle of res judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purpose of justice requires it. We have examined the third complaint filed by private respondents on October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and we found that the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res judicata are present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the effect of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with prejudice.12 On this ground alone, the trial court should have already dismissed this case. However, considering that this case had already reached this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."13 Petitioners next contend that private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez and their predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity. Petitioners claim that they were able to show by

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documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of then future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the complaint; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration; (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. Petitioners claim that the record is bereft of any evidence showing the infirmities in these formidable array of documentary evidence but the courts below declared their nullity on the basis of the "telltale" story of Santiago Meneses. They contend that in giving credence to the testimony of Santiago Meneses that all the deeds of conveyances executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of the petitioners were a nullity, Santiago would want to make it appear that the spouses Aquino, in giving dowry thru escritura de donation propter nuptias and donation inter vivos, were only fooling the innocent youngsters and then future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and the innocent minors donees Jose and Anatascia Velasquez respectively. Petitioners submission is impressed with merit. After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance of evidence adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions of the courts below, which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.14 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record,15 in the instant case, we are not bound to adhere to the general rule since both courts clearly failed to consider facts and circumstances which should have drawn a different conclusion.16

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In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of coownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.17 Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.18 We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncias death; thus private respondents are still entitled to share in the subject properties. There is no preponderance of evidence to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. The trial court declared the nullity of the donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the complaint, the deed of sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the second parcel and the deed of donation propter nuptias over the third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties of fourth and fifth parcels insofar as the of these parcels of land are concerned which "legitimately belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the basis of Santiago Meneses testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia de Guzman was still alive, she called a conference among them, the plaintiffs and their mother Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother Tranquilina, telling them that all their properties which are conjugal in nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and Tranquilina and not to believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did not sign them".19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect that Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of the subject properties in favor of the petitioners. However, Santiago Meneses testimony was never corroborated by any other evidence despite his testimony that the alleged conference was also made in the presence of third parties. Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in 1944, a year before Leoncias death, Leoncia could have executed another set of documents revoking or repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier made to show her alleged intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina de Guzman but there was none. The trial court found the

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testimony of Santiago Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and this was affirmed by the respondent court which stated that the matter of ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court. However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced age makes a person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has appeared to him, and at times it weakens his resistance to outside influence.20 On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible error for the court to overlook the probative value of these notarized documents. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.27 The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the

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reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious. The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title30 and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.31 Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. It is quite surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-ownership claim over the subject property. The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of validity.32 Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards

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the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right thereto. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that this action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no coownership exists between private respondents and petitioners, we find no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are SET ASIDE. The complaint in the trial court against petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED. Monteroso v. CA GR # 105608, Apr. 30, 2008 553 SCRA 66 Facts When Don Fabian died in 1948, he left behind as part of his estate 12 parcels of land. Subject properties under dispute between Soledad Cagampang and her siblings involved 6 lots designated as F1,F2,F3,F5,F7 and F8. Soledad alleged that she owned these properties by acquisition through deeds of absolute sale excuted by her father (Don Fabian) and her on 1939. However, evidence are presented by her siblings on the invalidity of said sale such as: Don Fabian after the execution of the Deed never relinquished possession over these properties. Thereby, parties never intended to be bound. That there is no evidence to support that Don Fabian received valuable consideration in exchange of his properties. TCTs are amended judicially, that only the name of Soledad appear in the TCTs and form part of her paraphernal property. (sariling wonder lang: siguro naisip ni Don Fabian, kung nakapangalan lang sa anak nya yung property hindi yun mahahabol ng manugang) Based from the above, RTC decided for the invalidity of said sale which the CA affirmed. Hence this case. Issue:

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Provided that said sale is invalid, does this make Tirso and his sibling coowners over these properties. If yes, is it fatal to the filed case of Partition by Tirso and his siblings his omission to expressly indicate the fact that they are co-owners. Held: Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death (1948). Until then, before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabians intestate estate, a regime of coownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. And as a co-owner, his right is imprescriptible except when he expressly repudiates his share. And Soledad, by invoking as defense of prescription over Tirso and their other siblings, therefore admitted that coownership existed. Resolving the issue regarding the existence of co-ownership among the heirs, will Tirso et al can avail the remedy of Partition, when co-ownership is not properly alleged. SC held Yes. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Partition necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses and that he is a co-owner of all said properties to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.

Soriente vs. Concepcion GR# 160239/ Nov. 25, 2009 605 SCRA 315 Facts: In 1978 Arsenio Concepcion, husband of Nenita, acquired the subject lot and tolerated the occupancy of Soriente for free and on temporary basis. After Arsenio died in 1989, his family initiated to develop

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the lot but Soriente refused to vacate the property. In 2000, after Elizabeth, daughter of Nenita and Soriente failed to meet settlement, a Complaint for unlawful detainer was filed in MeTC and prayed for monthly rent and damages. After trial, said lower court decided in favor of Concepcion. Soriente appealed to RTC on the ground, among others, that Concepcion have no legal capacity to sue being not the registered owner appearing in the lots TCT. RTC upheld MeTC and so did the CA. Hence this case. Issue: Whether or not the wife of the registered owner, whose name did not appear in the subject lots TCT have the capacity to sue. Held By all means of course. Nenita as the successor-in-interest of her husband Arsenio Concepcion and co-owner of the subject property, is entitled to prosecute the ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Art 487 of CC states Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. Hulst v. PR Builders GR # 156364, Sept. 25, 2008 566 SCRA 333 Facts Hulst filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration when he was ordered to return to respondent the 2.12 M in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to him. He contends that the Contract to Sell between him and the Respondent does not involve land but merely shareholding over the Condominium Corporation that actually owned the lots. By this set up, there is no violation on Constitutional prohibition of foreigners owning land over our Country. Issue Whether or not a foreigner can acquire condominium unit, with its undivided interest over the common properties of the Condominium Corporation without violating the prohibition of Foreigners owning real properties in the Philippines. Held Yes, although it is prohibited for foreigners to own real property in the Philiipines, this is not without exception. One of which is the Condominium

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Act RA 4726 where foreigners are allowed to own a unit, and thereby having an undivided right over the common areas held by the Condominium Corporation. The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interests in the condominium corporation, and no one can buy shares in a condominium corporation without at the same time buying a condominium unit. It expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium corporation up to not more than 40% of the total outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or Controlled Corporation. Under this set up, the ownership of the land Is legally separated from the unit itself. The land is owned by a Condominium Corporation and the unit owner is simply a member in this Condominium Corporation. As long as 60% of the members of this Condo Corp are Filipino.

Title V. Possession Chapter 1.Possession and the Kinds Thereof (Arts. 523-530) Chapter.2 Acquisition of Possession (Arts. 531-538)

Bunyi v. Factor GR # 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350 Facts Constantino and Maura Factor, husband and wife, had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the subject 18 hectare of land in Las Pinas before 1906. In

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1975, upon petition, their children granted Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title thus making the 7 chilren co-owners of the subject land. Enrique as one of the 7 children, instead of taking his share over the proceeds of the land when it was sold, by agreement with his siblings, he instead take the Factor Compound as his share. He then constructed several houses over the property including the rest house under dispute. Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi, petitioners, were tenants inside the compound since 1999. When Enrique died, administration on the property was entrusted to Gloria, his eldest child. She and her family (husband and son) lived in Taguig but oversaw the property and visit it from time to time to collect rental payments. When she died, her daughter, Fe Factor took over the administration as a co-owner. She also allowed Ruben Labao married to Precy to stay for free on the property. When he died, she asserted that the property was owned by Ruben Labao and questioned Fes ownership. RTC ruled in favor of Fe Factor. CA affirmed the decision hence this case. Issue Whether or not Fe Factor have better right over the property who visits it from time time over Bunyi who actually residing in the property. Held Fe Factor have the better right. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his possession.27 For, again, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.28 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine. Respondents right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their fathers death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings. Ong v. Republic GR # 175746, Mar.12, 2008 548 SCRA 160

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Facts: Below is the history of Transfer of Ownership of the 574 sqm lot situated in Brgy Anolid Mangaldan Pangasinan: 1971- Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista owned subject land. They have duly paid Tax Declaration over the properties. 1979- Sold to Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro. 1997- Sold to Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen 1998- Sold to Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil. 1999- Sold to Ong and his brothers. As such they filed an Application for Registration of Title over subject lot. They alleged that they are the coowners of the said lot and that it is their their exclusive property. That the property is unoccupied, and that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Proved that subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain by: 1927- Bureau of Lands included said land as within alienable and disposable zone 1999- DENR and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. RTC ruled in favor of registration, which the CA reversed. Hence this case. Issue: Whether or not Ong and his co-owners can register said property under their name despite it being included in public domain. Held: No. As a general rule, properties part of public domain cannot be privately appropriated except when the applicants or their predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject log since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by PD 1073. Petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessor in interest OCCUPY sad properties. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession AND occupation. The law speaks of possession and

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occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

People v. Peaflorida GR # 175604, Apr. 10, 2008 551 SCRA 111 FACTS: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente as team leader; the team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellants possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. The trial court found appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty of transporting marijuana and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant had freely and consciously possessed the marijuana? HELD: Yes.Appelant freely and consciously possessed the marijuana. In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the

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prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case. Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the instant case. First, the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram.

Chua-Bruce v. CA GR # 109595, Apr. 27, 2000 331 SCRA 1 FACTS: On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the records and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00. The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4)

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in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager. The second was by the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then, the banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent investigation. Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the banks Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. JksmOn November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accuseds service with the bank was terminated. To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R3733 against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. Esm Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa was filed against petitioner.The trial court found the appelant guilty as charged, applelannt seasonably filed his appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the appelant was gulity or not. HELD: No. yhe appalent was not guilty. The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property. Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-

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in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees. Calrky Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code

Daclag v. Del Rosario GR # 159578, Feb 18, 2009 579 SCRA 556 FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the Decision dated July 28, 2008 where the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision dated October 17, 2001 and the Resolution dated August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48498.Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, respondents complaint for reconveyance was filed in 1991, which was within the 10-year prescriptive period. The Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners bought the property when it was still an unregistered land, the defense of having purchased the property in good faith is unavailing .It affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in finding that petitioners should pay respondents their corresponding share in the produce of the subject land from the time they were deprived thereof until the possession is restored to them. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust; that since respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are possessor in good faith. HELD: Yes the petitioners are possessor in good faith. Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character, except in a case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the

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possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. Such interruption takes place upon service of summons. Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted. Records show that petitioners received a summons together with respondents' complaint on August 5, 1991; thus, petitioners' good faith ceased on the day they received the summons. Consequently, petitioners should pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum beginning August 5, 1991 instead of 1984.

Chapter 3.Effects of Possession (Arts. 539-561) Laurora v. Sterling Techpark GR # 146815, Apr. 9, 2003 401 SCRA 181 FACTS: In a [C]omplaint for Forcible Entry with Damages filed on 27 September 1997 before the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and Gen. Mariano Alvarez, plaintiffs therein, x x x Pedro Laurora and Leonora Laurora [herein petitioners] alleged that they [were] the owners of Lot 1315-G, SWD-40763 of the Yaptinchay Estate with an area of 39,771 sq. meters and located in Carmona, Cavite. Pedro Laurora planted trees and has possessed the land up to the present. On 15 September 1997, [respondents] Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. x x x through their Engr. Bernie Gatchalian bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants, and with the use of armed men and by means of threats and intimidation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting [petitioners]. As a result of their dispossession, [petitioners] suffered actual damages in the amount of P3,000,000.00 and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. After summary proceedings in the MCTC, x x x, a judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint. The case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court. In due course, the said court rendered a decision reversing the MCTC judgment. x x x

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The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and reinstated the Order of dismissal issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). It held that there was no evidence to support the claim of petitioners to the prior physical possession of the property. The evidence allegedly showed that they had already sold the land with the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Accordingly, their subsequent entry into and possession of the land constituted plain usurpation, which could not be the source of any right to occupy it. Being planters in bad faith, they had no right to be reimbursed for improvements on the land, in accordance with Article 449 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Does the respondent have a valid and legal right to forcibly eject petitioners from the premises despite their resistance and objection, through the use of arm[ed] men and by bulldozing, cutting, and destroying trees and plants planted by petitioners, without court order, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. HELD: No. they do not. The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property -- possession de facto, not possession de jure. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. If ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such question, but only to determine the question of possession. We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue ofownership. Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom. Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by respondents, still they are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances, respondents may file,

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other than an ejectment suit, an accion publiciana -- a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria - an action to recover ownership of real property.

EDCA Publ. v. Santos GR # 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614 FACTS This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him. It turned out the Cruz was not connected with De La sale College, and the account was already closed.Police arrested Cruz and latter went to the store of Santos and seized the 120 books without a warrant . Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is unlawfully deprived of the lawfull possession of the the books HELD: Yes. Respondent is unlawfully deprived of her lawful possession of the books. Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.

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If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it. It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious in fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer. Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them. It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. We cannot

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see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz. While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Pea, who has apparently caused all this trouble. The private respondents have themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind of business. It is they and not EDCA who have a right to complain.

BPI Family v. Franco GR # 123498, Nov. 23, 2007 538 SCRA 186 Facts: This case has its genesis in an ostensible fraud perpetrated on the petitioner BPI Family Bank (BPI-FB) allegedly by respondent Amado Franco (Franco) in conspiracy with other individuals, some of whom opened and maintained separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco del Monte (SFDM) branch, in a series of transactions. On August 15, 1989, Tevesteco Arrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc. (Tevesteco) opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB. Soon thereafter, or on August 25, 1989, First Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC) also opened a time deposit account with the same branch of BPI-FB with a deposit of P100,000,000.00, to mature one year thence. Subsequently, on August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts, namely, a current, savings, and time deposit, with BPI-FB. The total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in consideration of Francos introduction of Eladio Teves, who was looking for a conduit bank to facilitate Tevestecos business transactions, to Jaime Sebastian, who was then BPI-FB SFDMs Branch Manager. In turn, the funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMICs time deposit account and credited to Tevestecos current account pursuant to an Authority to Debit purportedly signed by FMICs officers. It appears, however, that the signatures of FMICs officers on the Authority to Debit were forged. On September 4, 1989, Antonio Ong, upon being shown the Authority to Debit, personally declared his signature therein to be a forgery. Unfortunately, Tevesteco had already effected

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several withdrawals from its current account (to which had been credited the P80,000,000.00 covered by the forged Authority to Debit) amounting to P37,455,410.54, including the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco. On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its interests in light of FMICs forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its Senior Vice-President, Severino Coronacion, instructed Jesus Arangorin to debit Francos savings and current accounts for the amounts remaining therein. In the meantime, two checks drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB current account were dishonored upon presentment for payment, and stamped with a notation account under garnishment. Issue: WON Franco had a better right to the deposits in the subject accounts which are part of the proceeds of a forged Authority to Debit Held: In this case, the deposit in Francos accounts consists of money which, albeit characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible. The quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its nature or the will of the parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a distinct individuality. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPI-FB simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMICs account and credited to Tevestecos, and subsequently traced to Francos account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the Makati Case against Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which passed from one account to another, commencing with the forged Authority to Debit. It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.[35] Money, which had passed through various transactions in the general course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.

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Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate personal property, BPI-FBs illustrative example, ostensibly based on Article 559, is inapplicable to the instant case. There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts of Franco, but not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer of FMICs deposits to Tevestecos account. BPI-FB conveniently forgets that the deposit of money in banks is governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum. As there is a debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its depositor, BPI-FB ultimately acquired ownership of Francos deposits, but such ownership is coupled with a corresponding obligation to pay him an equal amount on demand.[37] Although BPI-FB owns the deposits in Francos accounts, it cannot prevent him from demanding payment of BPI-FBs obligation by drawing checks against his current account, or asking for the release of the funds in his savings account. Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against his current account, he had every right as creditor to expect that those checks would be honored by BPI-FB as debtor. More importantly, BPI-FB does not have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for that matter, the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry. Our pronouncement in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals[38] continues to resonate, thus: XXXX The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the dishonor of the check without good reason, can cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.

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The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. x x x. Ineluctably, BPI-FB, as the trustee in the fiduciary relationship, is duty bound to know the signatures of its customers. Having failed to detect the forgery in the Authority to Debit and in the process inadvertently facilitate the FMIC-Tevesteco transfer, BPI-FB cannot now shift liability thereon to Franco and the other payees of checks issued by Tevesteco, or prevent withdrawals from their respective accounts without the appropriate court writ or a favorable final judgment. Further, it boggles the mind why BPI-FB, even without delving into the authenticity of the signature in the Authority to Debit, effected the transfer of P80,000,000.00 from FMICs to Tevestecos account, when FMICs account was a time deposit and it had already paid advance interest to FMIC. Considering that there is as yet no indubitable evidence establishing Francos participation in the forgery, he remains an innocent party. As between him and BPI-FB, the latter, which made possible the present predicament, must bear the resulting loss or inconvenience.

Title VI. Usufruct Chapter 1. Usufruct in General (Arts. 562-565) Chapter 2. Rights of the Usufruct (Arts. 566-582) Chapter 3. Obligations of the Usufruct (Arts. 583-602) Chapter 4. Extinguishment of Usufruct (Arts. 603-612)

Title VII. Easements or Servitudes

Chapter 1. Easements in General (Arts. 613-633)

Fajardo v. Freedom to Build GR # 134692, Aug. 1, 2000 337 SCRA 115

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Facts: Freedom To Build, Incorporated, an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioner-spouses, a house and lot in De la Costa Homes in Barangka, Marikina. The Contract to Sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit: 1. Easements. For the homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in front. No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front easement. 2. Upward expansion. Second storey expansion must be placed above the back portion of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building. 3. Front expansion: 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units. The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioner-spouses. Despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall. Respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. The RTC directed the spouses Fajardo to immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch Sheriff of this Court shall execute this decision at the expense of the defendants. CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether or not the restrictive covenant contained in the Contract to Sell and Transfer Certificate valid. Held: Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. While it may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures

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thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements. Negative easement is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do. Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on the use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them where the covenants are reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial sanction to any other valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on constructions have been held to be valid stipulations. The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are crafted not solely for the purpose of creating easements, generally of light and view, nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be. In its Memorandum, respondent states in arguing for the validity of the restrictive covenant that the "x x x restrictions are not without specific purpose. In a low cost-socialized housing, it is of public knowledge that owners-developers are constrained to build as many number of houses on a limited land area precisely to accommodate marginalized lot buyers, providing as much as possible the safety, aesthetic and decent living condition by controlling overcrowding. Such project has been designed to accommodate at least 100 families per hectare." There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding. The statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not opposed the construction is unavailing to their cause, the subject restrictive covenant is not intended for the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe

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the uses of the building, i.e., to ensure, among other things, that the structures built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision would prevent overcrowding and promote privacy among subdivision dwellers. The argument then of petitioners that expansion is necessary in order to accommodate the individual families of their two children must fail for like reason. Nor can petitioners claim good faith; the restrictive covenants are explicitly written in the Contract To Sell and annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title. In sum, the Court holds that (1)....The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid; (2)....Petitioners must be held to be bound thereby; and (3)....Since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive Covenant, petitioner-spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits.

Goldcrest v. Cypress GR # 171072, Apr. 7, 2009 584 SCRA 435 Facts: Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the ondominium. Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof decks limited common area by

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Section 4(c)4 of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit owners. During the first inspection of the HLURB, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the common area fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof decks common area. During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an alteration approval for the said permanent structure. Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. HLURB Special Division modified the decision of Arbiter San Vicente deleting the award for damages but still directed Goldcrest to remove any or all the structures which obstruct the use of the stairway from the eighth to tenth floor, the passage and use of the lobbies at the ninth and tenth floors of the Cypress Gardens Condominium; and to remove any or all structures that impede the use of the unlimited common areas. Cypress appealed to the Office of the President for the inclusion of actual damages, OP denied. On appeal to the CA, Cypress was partially favored. Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof decks common limited area is for its exclusive use; building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do not impair the subject easement. Issue: Whether or not the contention of the third persons do not impair the subject easement. Held: Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957. The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement;

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(5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement. A careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the eas ement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.

Abellana v. CA GR # 97039, Apr. 24, 1992 208 SCRA 316 Facts: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired, through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The construction of a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be opened to them. The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place before it was developed into a subdivision. They alleged

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furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to the public highway. Issue: Whether or not easement may be acquired by prescription. Held: The appellate court did not err in holding that the road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road. Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement (discontinuous) because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land (4 Manresa 597; Haffman vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed., Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil. 781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al., 103 Phil. 84; Ayala de Roxas vs. Case, 8 Phil. 197). Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides: Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned. The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which petitioners are not) without access to a public highway.

Bicol Agro-Ind v. Obias GR # 172077, Oct. 09, 2009 603 SCRA 173 Facts: Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) constructed a road (the disputed road) measuring approximately 7 meters wide and

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2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations. On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of BISUDECO. petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents alleging that they unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioners and the other sugar planters vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECOs assets. respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a governmentowned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial Law. The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. The CA likewise affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents. Issue: Whether or not the road is a valid right of way acquired by BISUDECO vis--vis Bicol Agro-Industrial. Held:

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Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of way the privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to pass over anothers land, usually through one particular path or linen is characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title. Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz: Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. In Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Costabella) the Court held that, It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription. In Bogo-Medellin, this Court discussed the discontinuous nature of an easement of right of way and the rule that the same cannot be acquired by prescription, to wit: Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that the railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the easement of right of way over the subject land. Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.

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Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way. The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements. The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any way, convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent. Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the road in dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

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The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates against petitioners claim of laches.

Salimbangon v. Tan GR # 185240, Jan. 20, 2010 610 SCRA 426 FACTS Guillermo Ceniza died intestate . Twenty years later his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves as follows: 1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision; 2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision; 3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C; 4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and 5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs. But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.

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Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. Spouses Salimbangon instituted an action against the Tans. The trial court ruled in favor of the Salimbangons by upholding their easement of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The court pointed out that since the easement in this case was established by agreement of the parties for the benefit of Lots A, D, and E, then only by mutual agreement of the parties could such easement be extinguished. On Appeal, the CA reversed the decision, ruling that the sale had extinguished the easement of right of way by operation of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the easement which was established by the partition agreement will also be extinguished through an agreement. HELD: No. As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street.1avvphi1 Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.8 The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.

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Also, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5 meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these lots were already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B. Although the "cancellation" document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist that their right as dominant estate under the original partition agreement remains, then that would be partly on a 1.5meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B. The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to have been extinguished by operation of law.

Chapter 2. Legal Easements (Arts. 634-687) Quimen v. CA GR # 112331, May 29, 1996 257 SCRA 163 FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B-1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 14413-B-2. Adjoining Sotero's property on the right

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are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacia's Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda. In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. The latter allegedly assured her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property at a certain price. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. In the meantime, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road. For this reason, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The court dismissed her petition. On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. ISSUE: WON Yolanda may be given a right of way on the property of petitioner. HELD: YES

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We find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law. As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. 14 These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway." Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states

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that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the test. In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them.

Sta. Maria v. CA GR # 127549, Jan. 28, 1998 285 SCRA 351 FACTS: Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124. Said lot is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by

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Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest. Plaintiff spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their favor. The trial court decided in favor of respondents and found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way through which the private respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road except by traversing directly the property of the petitioners. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private respondents had sufficiently established the existence of the four requisites for compulsory easement of right of way. ISSUE: WON a compulsory right of way can be granted to private respondents who have two other existing passage ways other than that of petitioners and an alternative vacant lot fronting the provincial road also adjacent to private respondents' property, which can be used in going to and from private respondents' property.

HELD: YES. All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:

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1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); 2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); 3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and 4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). The property of the plaintiffs, spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo, is completely surrounded with adobe fence without any point of egress and ingress to the national road. It has been commented upon that where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. And if the conditions of the various tenements are the same, all the adjoining owners should be cited and experts utilized to determine where the easement shall be established. In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open to the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach the national road, to wit: (1) To traverse directly through defendants' property which is the shortest route of approximately 20 to 25 meters away from the national road; (2) To purchase a right of way from the adjoining property of Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property; and (3) To negotiate with Jacinto family on the right side of their property. In all instances, no significant structures would be adversely affected. There is sufficient vacant space between defendants' houses of approximately 11 meters. The distance of defendant Florcerfida's house with the adjoining adobe wall separating that of the property of defendants Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4 meters, while the space between the adobe wall and that of the latter's house is about 7 meters or a total of 11 meters vacant space for purposes of a right of way. On the other hand, plaintiffs may negotiate with a right of way with Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property although the same is quite circuitous. Lastly, the option through the property of the Jacinto on the right side is very circuitous and longer. The route involves a total of about 50 yards as it has to go

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straight to the right of about 35 yards and turn left of about another 15 yards before reaching the common right of way. Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that defendantsappellants' property would afford the shortest distance from plaintiffsappellees' property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "(i)t appears that there would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants' property and the rightof-way to be constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the defendants"

Quintanilla v. Abangan GR # 160613, Feb. 12, 2008 544 SCRA 494 FACTS: Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito (petitioner), her son, who is now the registered owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they filed an action asking for a right of way from respondent Pedro. However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, (the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, had earlier sold the same to DARYL'S , and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit ruling that held that petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the servient estate. On appeal, the CA affirmed the adverse decision holding that the criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest distance. ISSUE:

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WON compliance with the preconditions set forth in articles 649 and 650 of the new civil code is superior to the "mere convenience rule against the owner of the dominant estate. HELD: YES. As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way, as in the case at bar. As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right of way.

Valdez v. Tabisula GR # 175510, July 28, 2008 560 SCRA 332

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FACTS; Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from respondentspouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land, bounded on the North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot No. 223-A. In their contract of sale, they have agreed that petitioners shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters *sic+ wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot which is not included in this sale. Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondents before the RTC. Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages and attorneys fees), averred that the 2 -meter easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject property and not from theirs;6 and petitioners and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining properties have access to two public roads or highways the bigger one which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one which abuts an existing barangay road on the north. The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint and granted respondents Counterclaim. On appeal, the CA, affirmed the trial courts decision. The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way as they failed to present circumstances justifying their entitlement to it under Article 649 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: WON petitioners may demand for a right of way based on the clause in their contract of sale. HELD: NO. Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:

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Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. xxxx This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors own acts. (Underscoring supplied) Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied) Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein petitioners. As found, however, by the trial court, petitioners and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways. Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the "western side of *respondents+ lot."

Chapter 3. Voluntary Easements (Arts. 688 -693) La Vista Assoc. v. CA GR # 95252, Sept. 5, 1997 278 SCRA 498 Facts: Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one side and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road

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extends to the entrance gate of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to Ateneo. The Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into La Vista Subdivision. La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private respondents Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, the latters predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the residents of the said subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. La Vista contends that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it Issue: Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private respondents the use of the Mangyan Road Held: The rule cited by La Vista, enunciated in Ramos, Sr., v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way. A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest. A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to theVENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors;"

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(b) the Tuasons expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by Ateneo, including the obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons filed a complaint against Maryknoll and Ateneo for breach of contract and the enforcement the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that Maryknoll set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after Maryknoll constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway; (d) La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified, in a letter to Ateneo President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-ofway on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor;" (e) La Vista, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the Ateneo property, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and, (f) La Vista President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to LaVista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo inequal portions;" These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract; the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. The argument of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand Villas from Mangyan Road is meritless. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements.

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That there is no contract between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court could not have declared the existence of an easement created by the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-ininterest of both La Vista and Solid Homes,Inc.,i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.

Unisource v. Chung GR # 173252, Jul. 17, 2009 593 SCRA 230 Facts: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. As Sandicos property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandicos property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioners favor. On the other hand, Hidalgos property was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488. On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an Order dated November 24, 2000, the trial court granted the motion. In their Answer, respondents countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of great prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15 years from acquisition of the property to file the petition. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the dominant estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is

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Matienza Street. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter, however, reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way. Issue: Whether or not the easement is personal since the annotation did not prove that it is binding on the heirs or assigns of Sandico Held: The petition lacks merit. As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements. In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that *t+he easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of *the lot+ described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such court order because *the] Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties. In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that *t+he annotation found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement. Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

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It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes the easement. The mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.

Title VIII. Nuisance (Arts. 694-707) Telmo v. Bustamante GR # 182567, Jul. 13, 2009 592 SCRA 552 Facts: Respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of respondents lot. When his lot was transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the roads 10-meter easement. The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon respondents lot. Petitioner then uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building permit. On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following day, respondents relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete

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poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same, because he was present when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the incident in the barangay blotter. Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just compensation from the government when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo. Respondent charged the latter criminallyfor violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and administrativelyfor violation of Section 4 (a) (b), (c), and (e) of Republic Act No. 6713. After submitting their own counter-affidavits, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner and Danilo Consumo administratively liable, but dismissed the charge against Elizalde Telmo for lack of jurisdiction over his person, he being a private individual. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: (1) Whether or not the Honorable Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon seriously erred when he declared that there was no valid taking of respondents lot by means of expropriation (2) Whether or not respondents concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se Held: (1) NO. Sec. 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the decree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Sec. 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures. Dangerous buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally unsafe or not provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard,

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or are otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a hazard to safety or health or public welfare because of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment, or which otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the community to an intolerable degree. A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily show that they do not apply to the respondents situation. Nowhere was it shown that the concrete posts put up by respondent in what he believed was his and his coowners property were ever declared dangerous or ruinous, such that they can be summarily demolished by petitioner. What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the scope of the provisions of the National Building Code. The Code does not expressly define the word building. However, we find helpful the dictionary definition of the word building, viz: *A+ constructed edifice designed usually covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or other useful structure distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy (as fences or monuments) and from structures not intended for use in one place (as boats or trailers) even though subject to occupancy. (2) NO. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.

BOOK III - DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP PRELIMINARY PROVISION (Art. 712)

Title I. OCCUPATION (Arts. 713-720)

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Acap v. CA GR # 118114, Dec. 7, 1995 251 SCRA 30 Facts: Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights in favor of private respondent Edy delos Reyes. Respondent informed petitioner of his claim over the land, and petitioner paid the rental to him in 1982. However in subsequent years, petitioner refused to pay the rental, which prompted respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages. Petitioner averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and that he will pay the accumulated rentals to Pidos widow upon her return from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor of private respondent. Issues: (1) Whether the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent (2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of private respondent Held: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and

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intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court. It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name. Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof thereof.

Heirs of Seraspi v. CA GR # 135602, Apr. 28, 2000 331SCRA 293 Facts: Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage. In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners.

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Included in this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador. Sdaad In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property. In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos child by his third wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof. In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands. The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners action is barred by extinctive prescription; and (2) Whether or not private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in question through acquisitive prescription Held: SC ruled for petitioners. (1)Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals, it held that an action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the action for recovery of possession and ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of the possession of the property by private respondent, it was held that the action had prescribed. This case involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly, what was applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that title by prescription is acquired after ten (10) years, in

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whatever manner possession may have been commenced or continued, and regardless of good faith or with just title. On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides: Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Private respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of the questioned property by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for ten (10) years. (2) Respondent Simeon Recasa has neither just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129 provides: For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription. Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs. Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.

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Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The basis of petitioners claim of ownership is the contract of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to make them owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price, the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property. Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the ownership of things). Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata in 1983, the property was in the possession of private respondent. However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in possession of the property. Petitioners title to the property prevails over private respondents possession in fact but without basis in law. As held in Waite v. Peterson, when the property belonging to a person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action against the wrongdoer.

Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM # P-07-2399, Jun. 18, 2008 555 SCRA 28 Facts: Edna Palero-Tan a Court Stenographer charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr. a Utility Worker of the same court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for stealing her ring and bracelet. Edna claimed that it has been her practice to keep her and her sisters pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office because she fears that they might be lost at the boarding house she is renting. And that the only person who was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was respondent, whose table is adjacent to hers. On 28 July 2005, an officemate, Anecito D. Altone (Altone), confided to her that he heard from his landlady, Anastacia R. Nable (Nable), that

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respondent and his wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because the latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondents coin purse. Urdaneta denied that he stole complainants jewelry. He claimed that he found a small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet under his table, at the side nearest the adjacent table of the complainant, and thinking that the jewelry belonged to one of the litigants who approached him that morning, he took them for safekeeping with the intention of returning them to whoever was the owner. He thought that the ring and bracelet were "fancy" jewelry as they were merely placed in an ordinary plastic sachet. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them inside his coin purse and took them home. However, his wife, on 30 June 2005, found them and accused him of buying the pieces of jewelry for his mistress, and to stop his wifes nagging, he threw the pieces of jewelry at a grassy lot beside their house. Issue: W/N finding a lost property charges the finder the duty to restore the same to its owner. Held: Yes. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus: Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place. The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he deems best. If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the publication. Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The

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finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses. Contrary to respondents claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had the intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by his wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of taking something which does not belong to him.

Title III. DONATION (Arts. 725-773)

Chapter 1. Nature of Donations (Arts. 725-734) Rep vs. Guzman GR# 132964/ Feb. 18, 2000 326 SCRA 90 Facts: Simeon Guzman, a Naturalized American Citizen died intestate leaving an American Wife, Helen and an American Son, David, the herein respondent. David and Helen executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon in the Philippines. Subsequently, Helen executed a Quitclaim leaving everything to the disposal of David. David then owned everything. A concerned Lawyer wrote the Office of the Solicitor General that the ownership of David to the extent of of the estate of Simeon was defective. The reason is that, being a Citizen of America, he was prohibited to be a donee of properties in the Philippines. The deed of Quitclaim was interpreted to be that of the Donation. The government filed for Escheat Proceeding in so far as the portion was concerned. Under Article 12 of the Constitution, a foreigner is disqualified to have a property save in cases of hereditary succession. Being a donee of the , the same is void and would necessarily pertain to the republic of the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the ownership of the properties be escheated in favor of the government? Held:

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No, in order that a Donation is valid, the following requisites must concur: there must be a decrease in the property if the donor, there must be an increase in the property of the donee and there must be intent to donate. The Quitclaim made by Helen negated the intent to donate that must be satisfied. Helen meant that the quitclaim was not a donation because she was prohibited to donate under that Philippine Laws and she sad that it was absurd for he to do that. There was no donation. It was merely a waiver of right in favor of the donee, the son. Even if there has been that intent, the same should not be a valid donation since the acceptance required for in Article 748 was absent. The escheat proceeding is not proper.

RP v. Silim GR # 140487, Apr. 2, 2001 356 SCRA 1 Facts: Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation. A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact for the exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location. The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was no valid acceptance made by the donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the donation.

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Issues: 1. Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC? 2. Was the condition in the donation violated? Held: 1. Yes. There was a valid acceptance. The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor. Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void. The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendias acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states: SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not prohibited by law. 2. No. The condition was not violated. The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected when Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The

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acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

Quijada vs. CA GR# 126444/ Dec. 4, 1998 299 SCRA 6 Facts: Trinidad Quijada with her siblings inherited a 2-hectare land in Agusan Del Sur. On 1956, they executed a conditional deed of donation in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon for the subject land. The donation was subject to the condition that the donated property shall be used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed Provincial High School. If such proposal be discontinued, the property shall automatically revert to the donor. Despite this donation, Trinidad Quijada possessed the land. On 1962, she sold 1-hectare of the land to Regalado Mondejar through a deed of sale. The remaining area was sold to the same person verbally evidenced by receipts of payment. In 1987, the Provincial High School failed to materialize. The Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality enacted a resolution reverting the land back to the donors. During that time, Mondejar subsequently sold portions of the property to buyers.Upon the death of Trinidad Quijada, her heirs now seeks to recover possession and ownership of the subject land by filing a petition for quieting the title. Petitioners contend that there was no valid sale since the land was sold when ownership was already transferred to the Municipality by the deed of donation. Respondents contend otherwise. Issue: W/N there is a valid sale by the donor, Quijada to a third person, Mondejar, even if it was conditionally donated to a donee, the Municipality of Talacogan. Held: There is a valid sale by the donor. When the Municipalitys acceptance of the donation was made known to the donor, the Municipality became the new owner of the property despite

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the conditions in the deed of donation. Ownership is immediately transferred and will only revert if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled. When a person donates a land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is a resolutory one. Despite these and as provided for by the Law on Sales, ownership by the seller of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract is not necessary. Ownership is only relevant during its consummation where the thing sold will be delivered. Such delivery, in this case, happened when the donor became the owner upon the reversion of the property. Such title, in accordance to Article 1434 of the New Civil Code, passes by operation of law to the buyer. Note: Lands which were previously donated may still be sold to a third person. Such sale is still valid even if at the time the sale was perfected, the donor-seller did not own the land. It is upon the consummation of a perfected sale where the donor-seller is obliged to deliver the thing sold.

Lagazo vs. CA GR# 112796/ Mar. 5, 1998 287 SCRA 18 Facts: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of Tito Lagazo was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to become a permanent resident therein and she appointed one Eduardo Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact on October 3, 1977, to fix the requirements needed. Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as her new attorney-in-fact in April 16, 1984. The grant was subsequently given and later, the land was donated to Lagazo on January 30, 1985. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the property. The latter claims ownership over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espanol. He claimed that the house and lot in controversy were his by virtue of the following documents: 1. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina Jacob dated October 7, 1977 in favor of Eduardo B. Espaol covering the residential house located at the premises;

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2. Deed of Assignment over Lot 8W executed by Catalina Jacob in favor of Eduardo Espaol dated September 30, 1980; and 3. Deed of Assignment executed by Eduardo B. Espaol over Lot 8W and a residential house thereon in favor of defendant-appellant dated October 2, 1982. The RTC ruled in favor of Lagazo while the CA reversed stating that Lagazos failure to accept the donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void. Lagazo contends that the formalities for a donation of real property should not apply to his case since it was an onerous one because he paid for the amortizations due on the land before and after the execution of the deed of donation. Issue: W/N the donation was simple or onerous. Held: The donation was a simple, not onerous. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated: That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity and considering further that the DONEE is a grandson of the DONOR, the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives, transfer[s] and conveys, by way of donation unto said DONEE, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all the right, title and interest which the said DONOR has in the above described real property, together with all the buildings and improvements found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges whatsoever; It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure

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donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee." Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments." Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void.

Florencio v. De Leon GR# 149570/ Mar. 12, 2004 425 SCRA 447 FACTS: Petitioner Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828 square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the spouses Respondent Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein without any rentals therefore. In November 1978, Pet. De Leon, died intestate. Her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate. On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and failed to vacate the property. They filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of Florencio before the MTC. The heirs of Florencio, in their answer, alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page one of the deed. However, the original Deed cannot be produced by the latter. The lower and the appellate court ruled in favor or Respondents. ISSUE:1) WON there is donation?; 2)WON Petitioners, who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material possession of the property over the respondents who is the registered owner of the property?

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HELD: There is no donation. Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to possess the property. The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donees acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessors Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest. However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are cogent facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to whether the petitioners have a better right of possession over the property other than the respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased registered owner of the property, Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of Donation.

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First. Teresa de Leon did not turned over the owners duplicate of TCT, to Florencio, to facilitate the issuance of a new title over the property in his favor. At the very least, he should have caused the annotation of the deed immediately after the donation or shortly thereafter, at the dorsal portion of TCT. Second. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter, before her death, had executed a deed of donation on October 1, 1976 over the property in his favor. It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after the death of De Leon when the respondents sued the petitioners for ejectment Third. In the meantime, the respondents consistently paid the realty taxes for the property from 1978 up to 1996. Fourth. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owners duplicate of TCT. Fifth. The respondents adduced in evidence the affidavit-complaint of Valeriana Morente dated May 8, 1996, one of the witnesses to the deed, for falsification and perjury against Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat. Sixth. A reading of the deed will show that at the bottom of page one thereof, Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his acceptance of the donation before Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San Miguel, Bulacan. However, the mayor did not affix his signature above his typewritten name. Sevilla vs. Sevilla GR# 150179/ Apr. 30, 2003 402 SCRA 501 Facts: On December 10, 1973, Filomena Almirol de Sevilla died intestate leaving 8 children, namely: William, Peter, Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla, and Jimmy, all surnamed Sevilla. William, Jimmy and Maria are now deceased and are survived by their respective spouses and children, herein petitioners. Filomena left properties, one of which a parcel of land which she co-owned with her 2 sisters, Honorata Almirol and Felisa Almirol, who were both single and without issue. When Honorata died in 1982, her 1/3 undivided share in Lot 653, was transmitted to her heirs, Felisa Almirol and Filomena. During the lifetime of Felisa and Honorata Almirol, they lived in the house of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, together with their nephew, respondent Leopoldo Sevilla and his family. Leopoldo attended to the needs of his mother, Filomena, and his two aunts, Honorata and Felisa.

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On July 6, 1988, Felisa died. But prior thereto, on November 25, 1985, she executed a last will and testament devising her 1/2 share in Lot No. 653 to Respondent Leopoldo and his wife. On August 8, 1986, Felisa executed another document denominated as Donation Inter Vivos ceding to Leopoldo Sevilla her 1/2 undivided share in Lot No. 653, which was accepted by Leopoldo in the same document. Petitioners filed a case against respondents Leopoldo for annulment of the Deed of Donation and the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, alleging that the Deed of Donation is tainted with fraud because Felisa Almirol, who was then 81 years of age, was seriously ill and of unsound mind at the time of the execution thereof. RTC uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation and declaring the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition unenforceable. Issue: Whether the deed of donation is valid? Held: Yes. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another who accepts it. Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, the donors capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential, and the attendance of a vice of consent renders the donation voidable. In the case at bar, there is no question that at the time Felisa Almirol executed the deed of donation she was already the owner of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653. Her 1/3 undivided share therein was increased by 1/2 when she and Filomena inherited the 1/3 share of their sister Honorata after the latters death. Hence, the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot No. 653 is considered a present property which she can validly dispose of at the time of the execution of the deed of donation. The insistence that respondent Leopoldo Sevilla employed fraud and undue influence on the person of the donor is not present in the case at bar. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. Petitioners failed to show proof why Felisa should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding her share to respondent Leopoldo. As testified by the notary public who notarized the Deed of Donation, Felisa confirmed to him her intention to donate her share in Lot No. 653 to Leopoldo. He stressed that though the donor was old, she was of sound mind and could talk sensibly. Significantly, there is nothing in the record

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that discloses even an attempt by petitioners to rebut said declaration of the notary public. Catalan vs. Basa GR# 159667/ July 31, 2007 528 SCRA 645 Facts: On June 16, 1951, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN (Mercedes) one-half of the subject parcel of land. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the same property in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano's guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void, as Feliciano was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs, in lieu of BPI, as complainants. The trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation, Mercedes acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute, and the subsequent sale of the property must be upheld. Issue: Whether the trial court and the CA were correct in finding that the deed of donation executed by Feliciano in favor of Mercedes was valid.

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Held: Yes. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property rights. From the scientific studies, it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Gestopa v. Pilapil GR# 111904, Oct. 5, 2000 342 SCRA 105 Facts: Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2. The second deed pertained to parcel 3.

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The last deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels (6 parcels in all) again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions: that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them. On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Sps. Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos. On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of land. In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all. On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Gestopas and the Danlags. Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. Issue: Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa. Held: The donation was inter vivos for the following reasons: (1) The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. (2) The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties?

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(3) The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. (4) The donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution. Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa. Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. Hence the revocation made was not valid. Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.

Magat v. CA

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GR # 106755, Feb. 1, 2002 375 SCRA 556 Facts: Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of 5 children, namely, Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria, petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together with the improvement thereon covered in TCT No. RT-4036 (T-3268) and known as Lot 1, Block 1, Cavite Beach Subd., with an area of 150 sq m, located in Bagong Pook, San Antonio, Cavite City. On December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation). On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for P5,000.00. The TCT No. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat. On September 21, 1983, respondents Teodora Carampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto Apolo (representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and Florentino Lumubos filed before the RTC Cavite an action against the petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for reconveyance and damages. RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the RTC. Issue: WON THE CA GNORED THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DONATION IN QUESTION AS INTER VIVOS. Held: CA is affirmed. The provisions in the subject deed of donation that are crucial for the determination of the class to which the donation belongs are, as follows: xxx xxx xxx(I)binibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng Kabite xxx xxx

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Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na akoy pumanaw sa mundo, xxx. xxx xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder o possesion ng Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante xxx. It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, was enumerated, to wit: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. Thus, the petitioners cited provisions are only necessary assurances that during the donors lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property; but, his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon the donors death, the donees would get all the rights of ownership over the same including the right to use and possess the same. Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in general terms such that even the donor is deemed included in the said prohibition. If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said property until her death, she could have expressly stated therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees. Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.

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Maglasang v. Cabatingan GR # 131953, Jun. 5, 2002 383 SCRA 6 Held: The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20 one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.1wphi1.nt Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit: "ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express

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direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n) ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

Aluad v. Aluad GR # 176943, Oct. 17, 2008 569 SCRA 697 FACTS: Spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad were childless but during their lifetime, raised petitioners mother Maria (Aluad) and respondent Zenaido (Aluad). When Crispin died, Matilde inherited from him 6 parcels of land, all of which, she donated to Maria. The Deed provided: That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property abovedescribed, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated. Because of the agreement in the deed of donation Matilde was still able to transfer in her name the titles over 2 parcels of land (Lot 674 and Lot 676) out of the 6 donated to Maria. 1 (Lot 676) of those two was later on sold by her to respondent. A year after that, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising the remaining four parcels of land to Maria while her remaining properties, including the land the title of which was in her name (Lot 674), to respondent.

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Matilde died. Maria followed her during the same year. Marias heirs, herein petitioners, thereafter instituted a case before the RTC for the recovery of the two lots in respondents possession. For his defense, respondent alleged that the first lot was obtained by him through sale while the second lot through inheritance based on the will executed by Matilde. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners explaining that it was impossible for respondent to have a valid claim over the two lots as those were previously donated in favor of the mother of petitioners. The CA on appeal reversed the trial courts decision ruling that the donation made to the mother of petitioners was not inter vivos but a mortis causa hence invalid for failing to comply with the requisites for its validity as provided under Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Hence the present appeal. ISSUE: WON the donation made to petitioners was inter vivos. HELD: NO. As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.

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The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated" means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus: x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as 1975. The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned: x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died? The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the

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formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991. Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978. Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.

Sicad vs. CA GR# 125888/ Aug. 13, 1998 294 SCRA 183 FACTS: A document denominated as "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was executed by Montinola naming as donees her grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land located at Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. Said deed was registered. Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

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Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the case being docketed as Special Proceeding. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622. Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren (donees) alleging that it was an inter vivos donation, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code. The case was subsequently changed into an ordinary civil action. The court held that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made by herein petitionerspouses Sicad who substituted Montinola after her legal heirs had expressed their disinterest over the case. The CA however affirmed the trial courts decision hence the present petition. ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is in the character of inter vivos. HELD: NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition. The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a

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different machine, and is crammed into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise. The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property. It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection **

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is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds, Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation." Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of rights and interests". The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.

Del Rosario vs. Ferrer GR# 187056/ Sept. 20,2010 630 SCRA 683 Held: That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.10 In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

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2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied) The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.13 Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.1awphi1 Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime.15 Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

Ganuelas v. Cawed GR # 123968, Apr. 24, 2003 401 SCRA 447

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Held: Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating:24 If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.27 The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

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3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28 In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29 More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.30 More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied) To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.

Central Phil. Univ. v. CA

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GR #112127, Jul 17, 1995 246 SCRA 511 Held: Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. 5 If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished. Xxxx The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation.

This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the obligors

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cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of the compliance, there are no more obstacles for the court to decree the rescission claimed. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

Chapter 2. Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation (Arts. 735749) Chapter 3. Effect of Donations and Limitations Thereof (Arts. 750-759)

Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag GR # 181132, Jun. 5, 2009 588 SCRA 774 Issue: (A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the concubine Held: In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named

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as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer. Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

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Insular Life v. Ebrado, GR # 44059, Oct. 28, 1977 80 SCRA 181 Issue: Can a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter? Held: Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides: The following donations shall be void: 1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation; Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; 3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or ascendants by reason of his office. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. We do not think that a conviction for adultery or concubinage is exacted before the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. More specifically, with record to the disability on "persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation," Article 739 itself provides: In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

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Arangote v. Maglunob GR # 178906, Feb. 18, 2009 579 SCRA 620 Held: In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said donation, there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null and void. The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39 dated 23 September 2000, as well as the notice40 of such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner several years after the Complaint was filed in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its Decision dated 12 September 2000, although it was still during Esperanzas lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt to cure what was a defective donation. It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanzas one-third share in the subject property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.

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Quilala v. Alcantara, GR # 132681, Dec. 3, 2001 371 SCRA 311 Held: The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to be valid,7 specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.14 In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.

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Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with. In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. Arcaba v. Batocael GR # 146683, Nov. 22, 2001 370 SCRA 414 Facts: Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision of the CA, which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution denying reconsideration. Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte with a total lot area of 418 sq m. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his motherin-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of onefourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco. Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. Cirila testified that she was a

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34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time; and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden. Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets. He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he provided her family with food and lodging. A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," giving 150 sq m of his lot, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. Francisco died without any children. On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of the Family Code based on testimonies and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage. Issue:

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Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this case. Held: In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of legitimate children. Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art 87 of the Family Code.

Chapter 4. Revocation and Reduction of Donations (Arts. 760-773) Zamboanga v. Plagata

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GR # 148433, Sept. 30, 2008 567 SCRA 163 Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA and its Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It likewise asked that the second alias writ of execution issued by Hon. Julius Rhett J. Plagata, Executive Labor Arbiter of NLRC-RAB IX, be annulled and declared without any legal effect, as well as the ensuing levy, sale on execution of the subject property. On 9 January 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 93 which legalized barter trading in the Sulu Archipelago and adjacent areas, and empowered the Commander of the Southwest Command of the AFP to coordinate all activities and to undertake all measures for the implementation of said decree. On 17 June 1981, ZBTKBI, thru its President, Atty. Hassan G. Alam, donated to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Maj. Gen. Delfin C. Castro, Commander, Southern Command of the AFP, and Chairman, Executive Committee for Barter Trade, a parcel of land covered by CTC No. T-61,628 of the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga City, identified as Lot No. 6 of consolidation subdivision plan Pcs-09-000184, situated in the Barrio of Canelar, City of Zamboanga, containing an area of 13,643 sq m. The Republic accepted the donation with conditions contained in the Deed of Donation. With the acceptance of the donation, TCT No. T-61,628 in the name of ZBTKBI was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT. No. T-66,696 covering the same property was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Pursuant to condition No. 1 of the Deed of Donation, the Government and the DPWH RO IX constructed a Barter Trade Market Building worth P5,000,000.00 at the said Lot No. 6. The building was completed on 30 March 1983 and was occupied by members of ZBTKBI, as well as by other persons engaged in barter trade.

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Prior to said donation, on 16 March 1977, private respondent Teopisto Mendoza was hired by ZBTKBI as clerk. Subsequently, in a letter dated 1 April 1981, ZBTKBI, through its President, Atty. Hasan G. Alam, informed Mendoza that his services were being terminated on the ground of abandonment of work. Mendoza filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with payment of backwages and separation pay at the DOLE ROIX on July 29, 1981. The case was assigned to Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid. On 31 May, 1983, Executive Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid rendered his decision finding the dismissal of Mendoza illegal and ordered ZBTKBI to reinstate Mendoza to his former position or any equivalent position, and to pay him backwages. On 17 June 1983, ZBTKBI filed a Notice of Appeal with the NLRC. On 13 July 1983, Mendoza filed with the NLRC a Manifestation with Motion for Execution praying that petitioners appeal not be given due course, and that a writ of execution enforcing the decision of the Labor Arbiter be issued. On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President issued Memorandum Circular No. 1 which totally phased out the Zamboanga City barter trade area effective 1 October 1988. On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second) Alias Writ of Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Julius Rhett J. Plagata issued on 2 January 1990. Sheriff Anthony B. Gaviola levied whatever interest, share, right, claim and/or participation of ZBTKBI had over a parcel of land, together with all the buildings and improvements existing thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 66,696 (formerly TCT No. 61,628) in compliance of said writ. On 13 June 1990, the afore-described property was sold at public auction for P96,443.53, with Mendoza as the sole highest bidder. The property was not redeemed. As a consequence, Sheriff Gaviola issued on 25 June 1991 a Sheriffs Final Certificate of Sale in favor of Mendoza over whatever interest, share, right, claim and/or participation ZBTKBI had over the parcel of land.

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Having failed to take possession of the land in question, Mendoza filed a Petition (for Issuance of Writ of Possession) on 14 February 2000, which was granted on 5 May 2000, by Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata. The writ was issued to place the complainant in possession (of) the rights, interests, shares, claims, and participations of Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusan Bayan, Inc. in that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66,696 of the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City, which were sold on execution to the complainant on 13 June 1990, and in whose favor a final certificate of sale for such rights, interests, shares, claims, and/or participation was executed and issued on 25 June 1991. Sheriff Tejada submitted a Sheriffs Service Report dated 22 June 2000 informing Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata that the writ of possession was returned duly served and fully satisfied. On the same date, Mendoza, thru a letter, acknowledged that the writ of possession had been satisfied and implemented. A petition for review on certiorari filed on 27 June 2001 which was denied by this Court on 15 August 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 8 September 2001, which Mendoza opposed. Issue/s: Whether the CA erred that the donated property has already reverted to petitioner-donor Held: On the issue of ownership over the 13,643 square meters of land located at Barrio Canelar, City of Zamboanga. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the donated property was no longer owned by the Republic of the Philippines because ownership thereof had already reverted to it (petitioner). From the records, the subject property was donated by petitioner (donor) to the Republic (donee) with the following conditions already adverted heretofore but are being reiterated for emphasis:

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1. That upon the effectivity or acceptance hereof the DONEE shall, thru the authorized agency/ministry, construct a P5 Million Barter Trade market building at the afore-described parcel of land; 2. That the aforesaid Barter Trade Market building shall accommodate at least 1,000 stalls, the allocation of which shall be determined by the Executive Committee for Barter Trade in coordination with the Officers and Board of Directors the Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., provided, however, that each member of the DONOR shall be given priority; 3. That the said Barter Trade Market building to be constructed as abovestated, shall be to the strict exclusion of any other building for barter trading in Zamboanga City, Philippines; 4. That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the afore-described parcel of land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of any further formality or documentation, and the DONOR shall have the first option to purchase the building and improvements thereon. 5. That the DONEE hereby accepts this donation made in its favor by the DONOR, together with the conditions therein provided. (Underscoring supplied) Thus, when the property was levied and sold on 1 March 1990 and 13 June 1990, respectively, it was already petitioner that owned the same. It should be clear that reversion applied only to the land and not to the building and improvements made by the Republic on the land worth P5,000,000.00. Petitioner further claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was automatic reversion of the land, because it put the Republic in a disadvantageous situation when it had a P5 million building on a land owned by another. This claim is untenable. The Court of Appeals merely enforced or applied the conditions contained in the deed of donation. The Republic accepted the donation subject to conditions imposed by the donor. In condition number 4, the Republic is given the right to sell the building it constructed on the land and the improvements thereon. If ever such condition is disadvantageous to the Republic, there is nothing that can be done about it, since it is one of the conditions that are contained in the donation which it accepted. There being nothing ambiguous in the contents of the document, there is no room for interpretation but only simple application thereof.

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We likewise find to be without basis petitioners claim that the Republic should be reimbursed of the cost of the construction of the barter trade building pursuant to condition number 4. There is nothing there that shows that the Republic will be reimbursed. What is stated there is that petitioner has the first option to purchase the buildings and improvements thereon. In other words, the Republic can sell the buildings and improvements that it made or built. Petitioners statement that neither party to the donation has expressly rescinded the contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation contains a stipulation that allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties to the donation. As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas, citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals: The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter trading in Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said automatic reversion cannot be averted, merely because petitioner-donor has not yet exercised its option to purchase the buildings and improvements made and introduced on the land by the Republic; or because the Republic has not yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise, there would be gross violation of the clear import of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation. Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

Archbishop of Mla v. CA GR # 77425, Jun. 19, 1991 198 SCRA 300

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Facts: These two petitions for review on certiorari seek to overturn the decision of the CA which reversed and set aside the order of the RTC, as well as the order of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision. On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land located at Kawit, Cavite with an area of approx 964 sq m. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors. It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses. What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision. On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.

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On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the cause of action has prescribed. On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state a cause of action against him. After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed. Private respondents appealed to the CA raising the issues on (a) whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for reconveyance of real property. CA held that the action has not yet prescribed, reinstated and remanded the civil case to the lower court for further proceedings. CA denied the separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari. Issue: whether or not the cause of action has already prescribed Held: The Court does not agree. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:

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By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and void" would not appear in the deed of donation. In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation. It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently justified. The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon noncompliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.

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The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act. On the foregoing ratiocinations, the CA committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar. Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners. The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.

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Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time. Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20) years are void. In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail. It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation was not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving the same. It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of donation. At the same time, it was likewise

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the controverted fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case: Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case. The aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question. Case is dismissed.

De Luna v. Abrigo GR # 57455, Jan. 18, 1990 181 SCRA 150 Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order of respondent judge Sofronio F. Abrigo of the CFI of Quezon, dismissing the complaint of petitioners on the ground of prescription of action. On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square meters of Lot of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena covered by

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Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1-5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions which among others, required: xxx xxx xxx 3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a Chapel, a Nursery and Kindergarten School, to be named after St. Veronica, and other constructions and Accessories shall be constructed on the land herein being donated strictly in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by the O.R. Quinto & Associates and made part of this donation; provided that the flooring of the Altar and parts of the Chapel shall be of granoletic marble. 4. That the construction of the Chapel, Nursery and Kindergarten School shall start immediately and must be at least SEVENTY (70) PER CENTUM finished by the end of THREE (3) YEARS from the date hereof, however, the whole project as drawn in the plans and specifications made parts of this donation must be completed within FIVE (5) YEARS from the date hereon, unless extensions are granted by the DONOR in writing; As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of Donation Intervivos" also provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the conditions thereof, couched in the following terms: xxx xxx xxx. 11. That violation of any of the conditions herein provided shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns and representatives, without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without obligation whatever on the part of the DONOR. The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same document, subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation. The donation was registered and annotated on April 15, 1971 in the memorandum of encumbrances as Entry No. 17939 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5775.

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On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the foundation executed a 'Deed of Segregation" whereby the area donated which is now known as Lot No. 3707-B of Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 was adjudicated to the foundation. As a result, transfer certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued in the name of the foundation. The remaining portion known as Lot No. 3707-A was retained by the donor. On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. The assailed order of the trial court stated that revocation (of a donation) will be effective only either upon court judgment or upon consent of the donee as held in the case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, No. 24190, July 13, 1926, 49 Phil. 143. The trial court dismissed the claim of petitioners that the stipulation in the donation providing for revocation in case of noncompliance of conditions in the donation is tantamount to the consent of the donee, opining that the consent contemplated by law should be such consent given by the donee subsequent to the effectivity of the donation or violation of the conditions imposed therein. The trial court further held that, far from consenting to the revocation, the donee claimed that it had already substantially complied with the conditions of the donation by introducing improvements in the property donated valued at more than the amount of the donated land. In view thereof, a judicial decree revoking the subject donation is necessary. Accordingly, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four years counted from such non-compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on September 23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was already barred by prescription. On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code was adopted to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions when revocation of the donation has not been agreed upon by

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the parties. By way of contrast, when there is a stipulation agreed upon by the parties providing for revocation in case of non-compliance, no judicial action is necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the action filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the donation under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4) years, but one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years. Issue: Whether the action is to enforce a written contract instead of Art 764 Held: The petition is impressed with merit. From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated. It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation. Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in cases decided by the SC. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription applies. It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts.

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In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar. Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, . . ., without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto. The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of noncompliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the recession was proper. The trial court was not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations. As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, complaince with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to

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enforce a written contract (Article 1144[1], New Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976. Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint on the matter of the donee's non-compliance with the conditions of the donation have been contested by private respondents who claimed that improvements more valuable than the donated property had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Moreover, in the absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court cannot motu proprio render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading." (Emphasis supplied) Petition is GRANTED, case is hereby ordered reinstated and respondent judge is ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine the propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.

Ty v. Ty GR # 165696, Apr. 30, 2008 553 SCRA 306 Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision of the CA and the Resolution therein dated October 18, 2004. On May 19, 1988, Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro B. Ty and Bella Torres, died of cancer at the age of 34. He was survived by his wife, Sylvia Ty, and his only daughter, Krizia Katrina Ty. A few months after his death, a petition for the settlement of his intestate estate was filed by Sylvia Ty in the RTC of Quezon City. Upon petition of Sylvia Ty, as Administratrix, for settlement and distribution of the intestate estate of Alexander in the County of Los Angeles, the Superior Court of California ordered the distribution of the Hollywood condominium unit, the Montebello lot, and the 1986 Toyota pick-up truck to Sylvia Ty and Krizia Katrina Ty.

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On November 23, 1990, Sylvia Ty submitted to the intestate Court in Quezon City an inventory of the assets of Alexanders estate, consisting of shares of stocks and a schedule of real estate properties, which included the following: 1. EDSA Property a parcel of land with an area of 1,728 square meters situated in EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of Alexander Ty when he was still single, and covered by TCT No. 0006585; 2. Meridien Condominium A residential condominium with an area of 167.5 square meters situated in 29 Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of the spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3395; 3. Wack-Wack Property A residential land with an area of 1,584 square meters situated in Notre Dame, Wack-Wack, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of the spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by TCT No. 62670. On November 4, 1992, Sylvia Ty asked the intestate Court to sell or mortgage the properties of the estate in order to pay the additional estate tax of P4,714,560.02 assessed by the BIR. Apparently, this action did not sit well with her father-in-law, the plaintiffappellee, for on December 16, 1992, Alejandro Ty, father of the deceased Alexander Ty, filed a complaint for recovery of properties with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against Sylvia Ty as defendant in her capacity as [Administratrix] of the Intestate Estate of Alexander Ty. On February 26, 1993, the RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Plaintiff added that defendant acted in bad faith in including the subject properties in the inventory of Alexander Tys estate, for she was well aware that Alexander was simply holding the said properties in trust for his siblings. On January 7, 2000, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff.

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Respondent, Sylvia S. Ty, appealed from the RTC Decision to the CA. The CA tackled "the critical, crucial and pivotal issue of whether a trust, express or implied, was established by the plaintiff-appellee in favor of his late son and name-sake Alexander Ty." The CA proceeded to distinguish express from implied trust, then found that no express trust can be involved here since nothing in writing was presented to prove it and the case involves real property. It then stated that it disagrees with the court a quos application of Art. 1448 of the Civil Code on implied trust, the so-called purchase money resulting trust, stating that the very Article provides the exception that obtains when the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, in which case no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. The CA therefore reasoned that even assuming that plaintiff-appellee paid at least part of the price of the EDSA property, the law still presumes that the conveyance was a discretion (a gift of devise) in favor of Alexander. As to plaintiff-appellees argument that there was no donation as shown by his exercise of dominion over the property, the CA held that no credible evidence was presented to substantiate the claim. Regarding the residence condominium and the Wack-Wack property, the CA stated that it did not agree either with the findings of the trial court that an implied trust was created over these properties. As a final point, the Court found that the plaintiff-appellee is not entitled to moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of litigation, considering that the instant case is clearly a vexatious and unfounded suit by him filed against the estate of the late Alejandro Ty. Hence, all these awards in the judgment a quo are hereby DELETED. The CA therefore reversed and set aside the judgment appealed from and entered another one dismissing the complaint. On October 18, 2004 the CA resolved to deny therein plaintiff-appellees motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

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Issue: Whether an implied trust under Art 1448 was constituted over the subject properties. Held: The Court disposes of the petition, as follows: The EDSA Property Petitioner contends that the EDSA property, while registered in the name of his son Alexander Ty, is covered by an implied trust in his favor under Article 1448 of the Civil Code. This, petitioner argues, is because he paid the price when the property was purchased and did so for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. The CA conceded that at least part of the purchase price of the EDSA property came from petitioner. However, it ruled out the existence of an implied trust because of the last sentence of Article 1448: x x x However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. Petitioner now claims that in so ruling, the CA departed from jurisprudence in that such was not the theory of the parties. Petitioner, however, forgets that it was he who invoked Article 1448 of the Civil Code to claim the existence of an implied trust. But Article 1448 itself, in providing for the so-called purchase money resulting trust, also provides the parameters of such trust and adds, in the same breath, the proviso: "However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST IS

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IMPLIED BY LAW, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child." (Emphasis supplied.) Stated otherwise, the outcome is the necessary consequence of petitioners theory and argument and is inextricably linked to it by the law itself. The CA, therefore, did not err in simply applying the law. Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, and in this case this is undisputed, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW. The law, instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor of the child. On the question of whether or not petitioner intended a donation, the CA found that petitioner failed to prove the contrary. This is a factual finding which this Court sees no reason the record to reverse. The net effect of all the foregoing is that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an advance of Alexanders share in the estate of his father, to the extent that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price. The Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property. Petitioner would have this Court overturn the finding of the CA that as regards the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property, petitioner failed to show that the money used to purchase the same came from him. Again, this is clearly a factual finding and petitioner has advanced no convincing argument for this Court to alter the findings reached by the CA. Among the facts cited by the CA are the sources of income of Alexander Ty who had been working for nine years when he purchased these two properties, who had a car care business, and was actively engaged in the business dealings of several family corporations, from which he received emoluments and other benefits. The CA, therefore, ruled that with respect to the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property, no implied trust was created because there was no showing that part of the purchase price was paid by petitioner and,

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on the contrary, the evidence showed that Alexander Ty had the means to pay for the same. Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an advance of Alexander Tys share in the estate of his father, to the extent that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price. Eduarte vs. CA GR# 105944/ Feb. 9, 1996 253 SCRA 391 Facts: A petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.Facts: Domingo Belda and Estelita Ana were the registered owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 118 located at Sorsogon and covered by Original Certificate of TitleNo. P-4991 issued on October 5, 1962.On March 1, 1963, a letter was sent by the Land Investigator Serafin Valcarcel of theBureau of Lands to Domingo and Cipriano Bulan calling them to a conference to settle the wrongful issuance of title to the property they both occupy. At this conference, neither Domingo nor Bulan appeared but Teotimo Eduarte did. On August 9, 1963, Eduarte wrote a letter to the Director of Lands requesting him not to give due course to Domingo and Estelitas application for a free patent title over lot 118since what Domingo and Estelita are occupying is Lot 138 which was titled in the name of Bulan who refused to accept said title. After the Office of the Director of lands took note of Eduartes protest, an investigation was conducted which revealed that Eduarte is in actual possession of lot 118 while Domingo and Estelita occupy lot 138. The District Land Officer recommended that the free patent application of respondents should refer to lot 138 and the homestead application of petitioner should refer to lot 118. Eduarte remained and continuously occupied lot 118 until on December 10, 1986Domingo and Estelita filed with the RTC of Irosin, a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Eduarte, averring that sometime in August 1985, Eduarte by means of force, threats and intimidation entered the subject to lot without their consent thereby depriving them of their possession of the premises. Traversing the complaint, Eduarte asserts that he is the rightful

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owner of the property in question; that he has been in possession of the same since 1942; that the title relied upon by Domingo and Estelita was erroneously issued in their name which was acknowledged by the Bureau of Lands; that Domingo and Estelita fully know that they are not the owners of the lot in dispute.The lower court also ruled that petitioner can attack the validity of respondents' title onlythrough a direct and not by a collateral proceeding. Decision affirmed by CA, with modifications. Issue: Whether or not Eduarte can, in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by Domingo and Estelita, the registered owners, assail the validity of their title. Held: It must be stressed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it based, it becomes incontrovertible. The decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of fraud within one year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. In the case at bench, petitioner raised the following affirmative defense in his answer:3. That the defendant is the true and lawful owner and in actual possession of that certain parcel of land which is more particularly described as follows: xxx xxx xxx5. That the sole basis of the plaintiff in adversely claiming the aforesaid property is due to the erroneous issuance of OCT No. P-4991 in his name which covers said Lot No. 118 and this mistaken and erroneous issuance has been duly acknowledged and investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands;6. That plaintiff has never been in actual possession of said Lot No. 118and therefore he is not lawfully entitled to such certificate of title No. P-4991, which under the circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same to the defendant; The foregoing allegations attack the validity of the original certificate of title issued in favor of private respondents by the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. This is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The issue of the validity of title, i.e.,whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purposes. Whether or not respondents have the right to claim ownership of the subject land is beyond the province of the instant petition.

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Velasquez vs. CA GR# 126996/ Feb. 15, 2000 325 SCRA 552 Facts: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire several properties. Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago, Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce

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of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected. Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez. Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants father), nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the instant case is already barred by res judicata since there had been three previous cases involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed, the last of which was dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents covering the disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in common as agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for a title and recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in four years. Issue: I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the statute of limitations. II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman. III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties in question. IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal heirs of spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.

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V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case. Held: Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their Comment as the only defense raised therein was that the application of the principle of res judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purpose of justice requires it. We have examined the third complaint filed by private respondents on October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and we found that the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res judicata are present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the effect of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with prejudice.12 On this ground alone, the trial court should have already dismissed this case. However, considering that this case had already reached this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."13 After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance of evidence adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions of the courts below, which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.14 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to

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the evidence on record,15 in the instant case, we are not bound to adhere to the general rule since both courts clearly failed to consider facts and circumstances which should have drawn a different conclusion.16 In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of coownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.17 Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.18 We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncias death; thus private respondents are still entitled to share in the subject properties. There is no preponderance of evidence to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. The trial court declared the nullity of the donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the complaint, the deed of sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the second parcel and the deed of donation propter nuptias over the third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties of fourth and fifth parcels insofar as the of these parcels of land are concerned which "legitimately belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the basis of Santiago Meneses testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia de Guzman was still alive, she called a conference among them, the plaintiffs and their mother Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother Tranquilina, telling them that all their properties which are conjugal in nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and Tranquilina and not to believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did not sign them".19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect that Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of the subject properties in favor of the petitioners. However, Santiago Meneses testimony was never corroborated by any other evidence despite his testimony that the alleged conference was also made in the presence of third parties. Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in 1944, a year before Leoncias death, Leoncia could have executed another set of

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documents revoking or repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier made to show her alleged intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina de Guzman but there was none. The trial court found the testimony of Santiago Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and this was affirmed by the respondent court which stated that the matter of ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court. However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced age makes a person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has appeared to him, and at times it weakens his resistance to outside influence.20 On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible error for the court to overlook the probative value of these notarized documents. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.27 The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was

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incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious. The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title30 and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.31 Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. It is quite surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-ownership claim over the subject property. The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of validity.32 Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof

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must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right thereto.

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SUCCESSION

General Provisions [Arts. 774-782]

Alvarez v. IAC GR# 68053, May 7, 1990 185 SCRA 8 Facts: Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.

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Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804. The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804. On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6 After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10 Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato

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Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11 During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14 Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15 On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs. It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision. However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased

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them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17 The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823. Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be wellfounded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21 In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23 The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be

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effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25 In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27 In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. Issues: 1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court. 2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel. 3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where

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the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them. 4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33 Held: The petition is devoid of merit. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34 Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36 There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by

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the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38 As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40 The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.

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Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent. As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41 The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has

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characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42 It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

Ventura vs. Militante, GR# 63145, Oct. 5, 1999 316 SCRA 226 Facts: There is no dispute as to the following relevant facts: Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against petitioner which reads: PLAINTIFF, thru counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states that: He is of legal age, Filipino and proprietor of Cebu Textar Auto Supply whose postal address is at 177 Leon Kilat St., Cebu City, while the defendant is the estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura with residence and postal address at Back of Chong

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Hua Hospital, Cebu City where summons and other processes of the Court could be effected. During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo he was indebted with the plaintiff in the amount of P48,889.70 as evidenced by the hereto attached statement marked as Annexes A and A-1 which account was obtained by him for the benefit of his family. Said obligation is already due and demandable and the defendant thru Ms. Ventura who is ostensibly taking care of the properties/estate of deceased Carlos Ngo, refused, failed and neglected and still continues to refuse, fail and neglect to pay despite repeated demands; As a consequence of the refusal to pay the plaintiff was compelled to retain the services of counsel with whom he contracted to pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. Upon institution of this complaint, he has further incurred initial litigation expenditures in the sum of P4,000.00. Petitioner moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground that "the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality," the same being "neither a natural nor legal person in contemplation of law" 4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 of the order of public respondent permitting private respondent to amend his complaint. First, she argued that the action instituted by the private respondent to recover P48,889.70, representing the unpaid price of the automotive spare parts purchased by her deceased husband during his lifetime, is a money claim which, under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not survive, the same having been filed after Carlos Ngo had already died. Second, she claimed that the public respondent never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case which, being an action to recover a sum of money from a deceased person, may only be heard by a probate court. Private respondent opposed the foregoing motion. 9 He insisted that petitioner, being the wife of the deceased Carlos Ngo, is liable to pay the obligation which benefited their family. Public respondent issued an Order giving private respondent twenty four (24) hours to file his amended complaint "so that the Court can determine for itself whether there is really a cause of action against the defendant who

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would be substituted to the Estate of Carlos Ngo," considering that "it would seem from the arguments of counsel for plaintiff . . . that the debt incurred by the deceased Carlos [sic] Ngo was in behalf of the conjugal partnership so that the wife of Carlos Ngo might be liable to pay the obligation." 10 Private respondent then filed his Amended Complaint 11 with the new allegations. Petitioner filed a Comment to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 13 She reiterated that whether the unsecured debt was contracted by her husband alone or as a charge against the conjugal partnership of gains, it cannot be denied that her husband was now deceased, the said debt does not survive him, the conjugal partnership of gains is terminated upon the death of one of the spouses, and the debts and charges against the conjugal partnership of gains may only be paid after an inventory is made in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding. Private respondent filed a Rejoinder to Defendant's Comment. 14 He countered that the defendant in his amended complaint was now petitioner and that she was not deceased, hence the inapplicability of the legal rules on the abatement of money claims in case the defendant dies pending their prosecution. In its order of November 16, 1982, the Court in the interest of justice advised the plaintiff to make the proper amendment so that the proper party defendant may be impleaded considering that the motion to dismiss then was anchored on the ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo was not a natural nor juridical person, hence it could not be sued. On December 23, 1982, the plaintiff amended its complaint and this time the defendant is already Sulpicia Ventura. The defendant now argues that even the amended complaint would show that this is really a collection of a debt of the conjugal partnership of deceased Carlong [sic] Ngo and his wife. Perusing the amended complaint, the Court finds that in Paragraph 2 the allegation states: "During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo, he and his wife, the defendant, are indebted with the plaintiff in the amount of P48,689.70, (sic) etc.," so that the indebtedness was incurred by Carlos Ngo and defendant Sulpicia Ventura and since Carlos Ngo is now dead that will not preclude the plaintiff from filing a case against the living defendant, Sulpicia Ventura.

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Issue: Whether there is really a cause of action against the defendant who would be substituted to the Estate of Carlos Ngo," considering that " that the debt incurred by the deceased Carlos [sic] Ngo was in behalf of the conjugal partnership so that the wife of Carlos Ngo might be liable to pay the obligation. Held: First. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that "only natural or judicial persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action". This was the rule in 1982 at the time that private respondent filed his complaint against petitioner. In 1997, the rules on civil procedure were revised, but Sec. 1, Rule 3 remained largely unaltered, except for the change of the word, "judicial" to "juridical". Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party complaining, and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. 17 In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person. 18 The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. 19 In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. 20 It has even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure. 21 The original complaint of petitioner named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura" as the defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the defendant as named in the complaint had no legal personality. We agree.

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Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. 22 An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. 23 Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action. 24 Second. It is clear that the original complaint of private respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and this private respondent admitted, no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. To cure this fatal defect, private respondent amended his original complaint. In his amended complaint, private respondent deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo and named petitioner as the defendant. When petitioner, in her comment to the amended complaint, reasoned that the conjugal partnership of gains between her and Carlos Ngo was terminated upon the latter's death and that the debt which he contracted, assuming it was a charge against the conjugal property, could only be paid after an inventory is made in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding, private respondent simply reiterated his demand that petitioner pay her husband's debt which, he insisted, redounded to the benefit of everyone in her family. It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. 25 But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first place. 26 When it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action,

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then the court should refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case. 27 Moreover, as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. 28 After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal property in order to pay outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of deceased persons. 29 Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment obtained thereby is void. 30 The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. 31 In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. 32 And private respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be granted to some other person.

Sumaljag v. Literato GR# 149787, June 18, 2008 555 SCRA 53 Facts:

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On November 16, 1993, Josefa D. Maglasang ("Josefa") filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte a complaint3 (docketed as Civil Case No. B-1239) for the nullity of the deed of sale of real property purportedly executed between her as vendor and the spouses Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (the "respondent spouses") as vendees. The complaint alleged that this deed of sale dated October 15, 1971 of Lot 1220-D is spurious. Josefa was the sister of Menendez Maglasang Literato ("Menendez"). They were two (2) of the six (6) heirs who inherited equal parts of a 6.3906-hectare property (Lot 1220) passed on to them by their parents Cristito and Inecita Diano Maglasang.4 Lot 1220-D was partitioned to Josefa, while Lot 1220-E was given to Menendez. The respondent spouses' response to the complaint was an amended answer with counterclaim5 denying that the deed of sale was falsified. They impleaded the petitioner with Josefa as counterclaim defendant on the allegation that the petitioner, at the instance of Josefa, occupied Lot 1220D and Lot 1220-E without their (the respondent spouses') authority; Lot 1220-E is theirs by inheritance while 1220-D had been sold to them by Josefa. They also alleged that the petitioner acted in bad faith in acquiring the two (2) lots because he prepared and notarized on September 26, 1986 the contract of lease over the whole of Lot 1220 between all the Maglasang heirs (but excluding Josefa) and Vicente Tolo, with the lease running from 1986 to 1991; thus, the petitioner then knew that Josefa no longer owned Lot 1220-D. Civil Case No. 12816 is a complaint that Menendez filed on April 4, 1996 with the RTC for the declaration of the inexistence of lease contract, recovery of possession of land, and damages against the petitioner and Josefa after the RTC dismissed the respondent spouses' counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1239. The complaint alleged that Josefa, who had previously sold Lot 1220-D to Menendez, leased it, together with Lot 1220E, to the petitioner. Menendez further averred that the petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in entering their contract of lease as they both knew that Josefa did not own the leased lots. Menendez prayed, among others, that this lease contract between Josefa and the petitioner be declared null and void. Josefa died on May 3, 1999 during the pendency of Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281.

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On August 13, 1999, Atty. Zenen A. Puray ("Atty. Puray") - the petitioner's and Josefa's common counsel - asked the RTC in Civil Case No. 1239 that he be given an extended period or up to September 10, 1999 within which to file a formal notice of death and substitution of party. The submission alleged that prior to Josefa's death, she executed a Quitclaim Deed9 over Lot 1220-D in favor of Remismundo D. Maglasang10 who in turn sold this property to the petitioner. Menendez, through counsel, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging that Atty. Puray filed the notice of death and substitution of party beyond the thirty-day period provided under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. She recommended instead that Josefa be substituted by the latter's full-blood sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo ("Michaeles"). The RTC denied Atty. Puray's motion for substitution and instead ordered the appearance of Michaeles as representative of the deceased Josefa. Issues: Whether or not: (a) the property under litigation was no longer part of Josefa's estate since she was no longer its owner at the time of her death; (b) the petitioner had effectively been subrogated to the rights of Josefa over the property under litigation at the time she died; (c) without an estate, the heir who was appointed by the lower court no longer had any interest to represent; (d) the notice of death was seasonably submitted by the counsel of Josefa to the RTC within the extended period granted; and (e) the petitioner is a transferee pendente lite who the courts should recognize pursuant to Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Court. Held: The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. -Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such

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death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphasis ours) The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.15 Application of the Governing Rule. a. Survival of the pending action A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281 are actions that survive the death of Josefa. We said in Gonzalez v. Pagcor:16 "The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena (71 SCRA 491 (1976). as follows: . . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which

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survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. . . . Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then we are dealing with actions that survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily apply. b. Duty of Counsel under the Rule. The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after the death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the deceased's legal representative or representatives. Incidentally, this is the only representation that counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death terminated any further lawyer-client relationship.17 In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the lower court, although belatedly, of the fact of her death.18 This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of litigant Josefa Maglasang so as to free her counsel of any liability for failure to make a report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In our view, counsel satisfactorily explained to the lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the latter in fact granted counsel an extended period. The timeliness of the report is therefore a nonissue. The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel properly gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of the deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We rule that he did not. The "legal representatives" that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law - the administrator, executor or guardian19 who, under the rule on settlement of estate of deceased persons,20 is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly provides that "the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator . . .". Significantly, the person - now the present petitioner that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned under

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Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim co-defendant of the deceased whose proferred justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death. Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not giving effect to counsel's suggested substitute. First, the petitioner is not one of those allowed by the Rules to be a substitute. Section 16, Rule 3 speaks for itself in this respect. Second, as already mentioned above, the reason for the Rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and her estate. We note in this respect that the Notice that counsel filed in fact reflects a claim against the interest of the deceased through the transfer of her remaining interest in the litigation to another party. Interestingly, the transfer is in favor of the very same person who is suggested to the court as the substitute. To state the obvious, the suggested substitution effectively brings to naught the protection that the Rules intend; plain common sense tells us that the transferee who has his own interest to protect, cannot at the same time represent and fully protect the interest of the deceased transferor. Third, counsel has every authority to manifest to the court changes in interest that transpire in the course of litigation. Thus, counsel could have validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefa's interests in the subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section 19, Rule 3.21 But this can happen only while the client-transferor was alive and while the manifesting counsel was still the effective and authorized counsel for the client-transferor, not after the death of the client when the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. The fact that the alleged transfer may have actually taken place is immaterial to this conclusion, if only for the reason that it is not for counsel, after the death of his client, to make such manifestation because he then has lost the authority to speak for and bind his client. Thus, at most, the petitioner can be said to be a transferee pendente lite whose status is pending with the lower court. Lastly, a close examination of the documents attached to the records disclose that the subject matter of the Quitclaim allegedly executed by

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Josefa in favor of Remismundo is Lot 1220-E, while the subject matter of the deed of sale executed by Remismundo in the petitioner's favor is Lot 1220-D. This circumstance alone raises the possibility that there is more than meets the eye in the transactions related to this case. c. The Heirs as Legal Representatives. The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining who the appropriate legal representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or administrator. The second paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear - the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear and unequivocal. In San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, this Court held: The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals x x x that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extra-judicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.22 (Emphasis ours) We likewise said in Gochan v. Young: 23 For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Josefa's death certificate24 shows that she was single at the time of her death. The records do not show that she left a will. Therefore, as correctly held by the CA, in applying Section 16, Rule 3, her heirs are her surviving sisters (Michaelis, Maria, Zosima, and Consolacion) and the children of her deceased sister, Lourdes (Manuel, Cesar, Huros and Regulo) who should be her legal representatives. Menendez, although also a sister, should be excluded for being one of the adverse parties in the cases before the RTC.

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DBP v. Gagarani GR# 172248, Sept. 17, 2008 565 SCRA 54 Facts: Spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok are husband and wife who owned several parcels of land. Upon their death, their 11 children inherited their properties which were subsequently settled extrajudicially. Subject property acquired through free patent is a parcel of land located at Pagawan, Manticao Misamis Oriental. This was adjudicated to Denison being 1 of the 11 heirs. He was married to Ella. Thereafter, the lands OCT was cancelled and TCT in his name was issued. Denison and Ella, upon borrowing P100K from DBP subjected said land as colatteral. Upon failure if the spouses to repay the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. It was sold to DBP being the highest bidder and an eventual TCT was issued in its name. When Denison died, he was survived by Ella and their children. They filed a complaint for repurchase of the said lot in RTC invoking their right to repurchase as provided in Sec 119 of CA 141 which reads, Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper , shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of 5 years from date of the conveyance. RTC dismissed the complaint and denied the MR filed on the ground that filing of the complaint was beyond the 5 year period. (Nov 28, 1992 and May 15,1998 as the periods used). Upon appeal to CA, RTC decision was reversed on the ground that the 5 year period should be counted from the registration of the certificate of sale (Dec 24, 1992) and not from Nov 28, 1992. Filing of the complaint on May 1998 is still within the redemption period. Issue Whether or not the daughter in law and grandchildren of the patentees have the right to redeem the properties. Held Yes, The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.17 Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the

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patentees son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained inFerrer v. Mangente it was held that The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them. Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead. The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose xxxx22 Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA.23 In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail."24 Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose. Bonilla vs. Barcena, NO. L-41715, June 18, 1976 71 SCRA 491 Facts: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance , to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. However, she died during the pendency of the case and

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RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal capacity to sue. Substitution of the children as legal heirs for Fortunata was filed but denied, and so with the MRs. Hence this petition for review. Issue Whether or not the complainant, who died during the pendency of a case can be substituted by his/ her heirs. Held Yes. Before the death of the deceased, the court already acquired jurisdiction upon her person, as such, the case may proceed substituting the heirs as a real party in interest (Rules of Court prescribes such the procedure in Rule 3 Section 16). This is in compliance with Article 777 of the CC which provides that that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. The deceaseds claim, upon his/her death does not extinguished by his/her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. Cruz vs. Cruz GR# 173292/Sept. 1, 2010 629 SCRA 605 Facts During the lifetime of Memoracion Cruz, she filed with RTC a complaint against her son, Oswaldo Cruz, an Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages. She claimed that she acquired the subject land located in Tabora Tondo Mla through purchase and its TCT was duly registered under her name. However, it was transferred to her son Oswaldo and wife by virtue of a fraudulent Deed of Sale. Pending said case, Memoracion died. Oswaldo moved for a Motion to Dismiss and was granted by RTC. Another

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son-heir of Memoracion, Edgardo Cruz filed an MR representing his deceased mother but was denied. CA affirmed RTC upon appeal. Hence this case. Issue Whether or not the complaint filed can survive complainants death. If yes, whether or not an heir can substitute the deceased in pursuing the case. Held Yes to both questions. Since the complaint affects property and property rights and the injuries to a person is only incidental, the causes of action will survive death. As such, complainant can be substituted by her heirs. And although Oswaldo was an heir, he is disqualified to represent the deceased being the adverse party to the complaint. Edgardo Cruz, also a son-heir, without the disqualifications provided by law, by all means could represent Memoracion. As provided in Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff. The Motion to dismiss by RTC and as affirmed by CA was reversed by SC and the case was remanded to RTC for further proceedings.

Heirs of Sandejas vs. Lina, GR # 141634, Feb. 5, 2001 351 SCRA 183 Facts

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Eliodoro Sandejas Sr., husband of the deceased Remedios Sandejas was appointed administrator of her estate. As such, he bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety 4 parcels of land, of which half of each, as Remedios conjugal share belonged to the her estate. However, Eliodoro died before a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into by him and Lina. Lina moved that he be appointed as Eliodoros substitute to represent estate of Remedios since their children-heirs have not yet appointed one. Lower Court granted the motion. Sixto, being son-heir eventually replaced Lina upon court approval, as administrator. Lina moved that a deed of absolute sale now be executed in his favor. RTC granted the petition which the CA overturned holding that since the nature of the contract between Sandejas and Lina is not a perfected Contact of Sale. As such, said 4 lots must still form part of the deceaseds estate. Hence this case. Issue Whether or not Eliodoro Sandejas, spouse of the deceased could sell the properties of the estate still undergoing probate proceedings Held While it may not render the contract invalid, it still needed a court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership.12 In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out ofcustodia legis, but only with the court's permission.13 It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason. Balus v. Balus GR# 168970, Jan. 15, 2010 610 SCRA 178 Facts The petitioner and respondents of this case are the children of Rufo and Sebastiance, husband and wife. During the lifetime of Rufo, he mortgaged his own parcel of land, as security for a loan obtained from the Rural Bank

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of Maigo Lanao del Norte. In his failure to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and sold subsequently at public auction, where it was sold to Rural Bank as the sole bidder. Certificate of Sale was warded to the Bank and TCT was issued under its name upon failure of the heirs of Rufo to repurchase the property within the redemption period. However, in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufo, said land was adjucated to the heirs who remained in possession of the lots and refused to surrender to respondents. RTC hold that the petitioner have the right to purchase said property to respondents as provided in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. On appeal to CA, the decision was reversed and ruled that co=ownership was extinguished when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank. Hence this case. Issue Whether or not petitioners still have the right of redemption after subject property was already sold and transferred to the buyer (Bank). Held No more. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.14 In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time. Arellano vs. Pascual GR# 189776/ Dec. 15, 2010 638 SCRA 826

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FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner. Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation. Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the case was remanded to the lower court, motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the honorable Court of Appeals is Correct in declaring: THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.

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IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. HELD: Petion granted. The decision ordering the collation of property donated to Amelia Arellano is set aside. Case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblingscollateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation. The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of

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the Civil Code, viz:Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. Reyes vs. Enriquez GR# 162956/April 10, 2008 551 SCRA 86 Facts: Petitioners are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera. They executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. Subsequently, petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale over the same property. Respondents, on the other hand, allege that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land. They later filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they cannot demand the partition of the real property without first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case. Issue:

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Whether the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the aforementioned documents. Held: Yes. In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition, or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto, this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario GR# 124320/ Mar. 2, 1999 304 SCRA 18 FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.On March 17, 1994, petitioners

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executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation (Golden Bay) under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (TCT) 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. ISSUE: Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. HELD: To begin with, petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject of certiorari. Where appeal is available as a remedy, certiorari will not lie. Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:

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But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. he trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. Limos vs. Odones GR# 186979/ Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 288 FACTS: On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-33 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68. The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940square meter parcel of land located at Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale dated, January 29, 2004, executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in whom the original title to the land was registered. These heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan. It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of conveyance; and when they did, they found out that the lands Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein petitioners.Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a

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Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972. Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No. 329427 cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the names of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name of Rosa Delos Reyes.Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively. In their answer, petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real partiesin-interest to question the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable Trial court parties; and (3) respondents claim is barred by laches. In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1 to 4 in the Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners Answer, to which respondents already replied on July 17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant for respondents to make another denial. The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale appended to the complaint. On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses raised by petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown hearing.Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners are now before this Court seeking a review of the CAs pronouncements. ISSUE: Whether the affirmative defenses raised in their Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the Request for Admission. HELD: Petition denied. As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed in

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their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquir y. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy. Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale and the status of petitioners predecessors-in-interest as the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal, these issues go into the merits of the parties respective claims and defenses that can be best determined on the basis of preponderance of the evidence they will adduce in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing, the objective of which is for the court to determine whether or not the case should proceed to trial, will not sufficiently address such issues. Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court.Equally

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settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.

Alfonso vs. Andres GR# 166236/ July 29, 2010 626 SCRA 149 FACTS: The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal. Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due to their indigency and poverty. They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal specially since the PAO had just entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners as directed by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend that appeal should be allowed since the brief had anyway already been prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances so that the case may be decided on the merits and not merely on technicalities. On the other hand, respondents contend that failure to file appellants' brief on time is one instance where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners failure to file their appellants' brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45day period expired. ISSUE: Whether the appeal should be allowed beyond the period prescribed on ground of poverty. HELD: overty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due

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to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him go. They could also have requested the said lawyer to file the required appellants' brief before consenting to his withdrawal from the case. But they did neither of these. Then, not having done so, they delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty, are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements, which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration of justice, in the present case. The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not published, being deemed a partition of the inherited property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him. The records show that Jose did in fact sell to respondents the subject property. The deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of the respondents being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent evidence that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a declaration of nullity. As found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in the execution of the deed of sale. They failed to prove by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the sale of the subject real property. As found by the RTC, although Jose was suffering from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his name, there is no showing that his mental faculties were affected in such a way as to negate the existence of his valid consent to the sale, as manifested by his thumbmark on the deed of sale. The records sufficiently show that he was capable of boarding a tricycle to go on trips by himself. Sufficient testimonial evidence in fact shows that Jose asked respondents to buy the subject property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was mortgaged. This fact evinces that Joses mental faculties functioned intelligently. Acap vs. CA,

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GR# 118114, Dec. 7, 1995 251 SCRA 30

Facts: Spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma owns a lot in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido. Petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred (9,500) meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana. The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of the lot. With a provision do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and participation over the said parcel of land in favor of Edy delos Reyes not a legitimate heir. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title. Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally inform him that he (Edy) had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Private respondent further alleged that he and petitioner entered into an oral lease agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however, petitioner refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land, prompting private respondent to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. During the meeting, an officer of the Ministry informed Acap's wife about private respondent's ownership of the said land but she stated that she and her husband (Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's claim of ownership over the land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated demands.

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Issues: Whether or not the Petitioner is correct refusing to recognize Edy Reyes as the owner of the land. Held: We find the petition impressed with merit. In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question. There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. Arriola v. Arriola GR# 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666 Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. John Nabor C. Arriola filed Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.

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On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any; As the parties failed to agree how to partition among them the land, John Nabor sought the sale through public auction and petitioners acceded to it. Said auction had to be reset when petitioners refused to include the house standing on the subject land.

Issue: Whether the subject house is covered in the judgment of partition of the lot and should be included in the sale through public auction. Held: The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition. First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto. Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of

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all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the complaint for partition. That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them. Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter. Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly: Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion

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of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extrajudicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties. More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent

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Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property. The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different reason. To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code. Reyes v. RTC Makati GR# 165744, Aug. 11, 2008 561 SCRA 593

Facts: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro,

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Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro's estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia's estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith. As of June 30, 1990, Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and 4,250 shares, respectively. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with SEC, to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH and to etermine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself. Issue: Whether or not Rodrigo shall automatically become the owner of the shares in proportion to his succession share. Held: No. We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her name. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is Rodrigo's interest as an heir since the subject matter of the present controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on Rodrigo's personally-owned shares nor on his personality as shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and the parties' interest therein as her heirs. Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacia's death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate's partition, deemed co-owners thereof.[25]This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation. Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a

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settlement of the decedent's estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia's estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. Puno v. Puno Enterprises GR# 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 585 Facts: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as Joselito Musni Muno. Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that Joselito Musni Puno and Joselito Musni Muno were one and the same. Issue: WON Petitioner has the right on the stockholder of the decedent. Held: Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third

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person.[10] As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioners mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.[16] During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.[17] Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor.[18] Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

DKC Holdings Corp. vs. CA GR# 118248, April. 5, 2000 329 SCRA 666 Facts: The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome's deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse site. Petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract. In

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turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of its option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract to Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 which was raffled off to Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorney's fees. Issue: WON DKC holdings can compel Victor to accept the contract entered into between his mother and DKC Holdings. Held: The general rule, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible. The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows: Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional

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services under the contract to the probate court, substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit.9 In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death of the party who is required to render such service." 10 It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance. 11 In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor. As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his heirs." 12 In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was dutybound to reconvey land to another, and at his death the reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper deed for reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. 13 It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him. 14 This is clear from Paraaque Kings Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where this Court rejected a similar defense With respect to the contention of respondent Raymundo that he is not privy to the lease contract, not being the lessor nor the lessee referred to therein,

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he could thus not have violated its provisions, but he is nevertheless a proper party. Clearly, he stepped into the shoes of the owner-lessor of the land as, by virtue of his purchase, he assumed all the obligations of the lessor under the lease contract. Moreover, he received benefits in the form of rental payments. Furthermore, the complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for the annulment of the sale of the properties to him. Both pleadings also alleged collusion between him and respondent Santos which defeated the exercise by petitioner of its right of first refusal. In order then to accord complete relief to petitioner, respondent Raymundo was a necessary, if not indispensable, party to the case. A favorable judgment for the petitioner will necessarily affect the rights of respondent Raymundo as the buyer of the property over which petitioner would like to assert its right of first option to buy. In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which is a property right. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. 16 Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. Reyes v. Enriquez GR# 162956, April 10, 2008 551 SCRA 86 FACTS: Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes co-owned a parcel of land evidenced by (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). Anacleto was survived by his two daughters, Etta (Peter-respondents wife) and Graciana, who died single without any issue and who during her lifetime had sold her interest over the land to Etta. Dionisia Reyes on the other hand, was survived by herein petitioners. Prior to the present controversy, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. Also, together with heirs of Anacleto, petitioners executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the

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same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued in the names of Anacleto Cabrera, petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr., petitioner Faustino Reyes, petitioner Esperidion Reyes, petitioner Julieta G. Rivera, Felipe Dico, and Archimedes C. Villaluz. Meanwhile, Etta died leaving Peter and their daughter Deborah as her heirs. Peter and Deborah, believing that they own of the co-owned land of Anacleto, sold a portion of said land to Spouses Fernandez. When Spouses Fernandez was about to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint before the RTC for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property. The RTC denied dismissed their complaint alleging that since they are not the heirs of Anacleto, they cannot demand for the partition of the property without first being declared as heirs of Anacleto in a special proceedings. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents. HELD:

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YES. In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18 or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,19 this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.22 In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul. In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the

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complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Testamentary Succession [Arts. 783-959]; Wills In General;

Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, GR# 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA 755 FACTS: Dolores Luchangco Vitug, died in in New York, U. S.A., and was survived by widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug. She left a will and designated Rowena Faustino-Corona as executrix as well as Nenita Alonte as cospecial administrator. During the pendency of the probate of her two wills, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila. Rowena opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. Romarico justified his act by insisting that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides: We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the

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property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors. We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made for our abovementioned account shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. The trial court upheld the validity of the agreement but the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code, and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: WON the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which needs to comply with the formalities of a valid will. HELD: NO. Under Article 2010 of the Code: ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate time. Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other. However, as we have warned: xxx xxx xxx

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But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case. 26 xxx xxx xxx There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

Sicad vs. CA, GR# 125888, Aug. 13, 1998 294 SCRA 183 FACTS: A document denominated as "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was executed by Montinola naming as donees her grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land located at Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. Said deed was registered. Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the

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reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the case being docketed as Special Proceeding. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622. Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren (donees) alleging that it was an inter vivos donation, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code. The case was subsequently changed into an ordinary civil action. The court held that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made by herein petitionerspouses Sicad who substituted Montinola after her legal heirs had expressed their disinterest over the case. The CA however affirmed the trial courts decision hence the present petition. ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is in the character of inter vivos.

HELD: NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition. The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it.

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A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise. The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property. It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the

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services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds, Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation." Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of rights and interests". The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.

Aluad v. Aluad GR# 176943, Oct. 17, 2008 569 SCRA 697 FACTS: Spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad were childless but during their lifetime, raised petitioners mother Maria (Aluad) and respondent Zenaido (Aluad). When Crispin died, Matilde inherited from him 6 parcels of land, all of which, she donated to Maria. The Deed provided: That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property abovedescribed, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated. Because of the agreement in the deed of donation Matilde was still able to transfer in her name the titles over 2 parcels of land (Lot 674 and Lot 676) out of the 6 donated to Maria. 1 (Lot 676) of those two was later on sold by her to respondent. A year after that, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising the remaining four parcels of land to Maria while her remaining properties,

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including the land the title of which was in her name (Lot 674), to respondent. Matilde died. Maria followed her during the same year. Marias heirs, herein petitioners, thereafter instituted a case before the RTC for the recovery of the two lots in respondents possession. For his defense, respondent alleged that the first lot was obtained by him through sale while the second lot through inheritance based on the will executed by Matilde. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners explaining that it was impossible for respondent to have a valid claim over the two lots as those were previously donated in favor of the mother of petitioners. The CA on appeal reversed the trial courts decision ruling that the donation made to the mother of petitioners was not inter vivos but a mortis causa hence invalid for failing to comply with the requisites for its validity as provided under Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Hence the present appeal. ISSUE: WON the donation made to petitioners was inter vivos. HELD: NO. As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.

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The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated" means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus: x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as 1975. The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned: x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died? The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no

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right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991. Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978. Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.

Forms of Will

Suroza vs. Honrado, AM No. 2026-CFI, Dec. 19, 1981 110 SCRA 388 FACTS: Mauro Suroza was married to Marcelina Salvador. They did not have a child but they reared one, in the name of Agapito, also surnamed as Suroza. Agapito married Nenita and they had a child in the name of Lilia. Mauro Suroza died. Agapito, who was a soldier, became disabled and was declared incompetent in a special proceeding where his wife was appointed as his guardian.

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Meanwhile, Arsenia, the alleged girlfriend of Agapito had reared a child named Marilyn, who was later delivered to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. It appeared that during the lifetime of Marcelina, she allegedly executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her. In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn. Subsequently, however, Marcelina died. Thereafter, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado. As there was no opposition, and after hearing Judge Honrado issued several orders among which instructed a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof. That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She opposed said proceeding by filin in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick. Despite her opposition, respondent judge allowed the probate of the will. Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding. About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.

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ISSUE: WON the will was void for the reasons that it was written in English, a language not know to the illiterate testatrix and that the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself. HELD: YES. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660). The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix". Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

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Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.

Lee v. Tambago A.C. No. 5281, Feb. 12, 2008 544 SCRA 393

Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one

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year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary Public.

Guerrero v. Bihis GR#174144, April. 17, 2007 521 SCRA 394 The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs witnesses in QC before a notary public who was commissioned for and in Caloocan City. Held: Invalid. Notary public was acting outside the place of his commission, and this did not satisfy Art 806. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

Caneda vs. CA, GR# 103554, May. 28, 1993 222 SCRA 781 Facts: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were postponed

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for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sough his appointment as special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981. Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965R, before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition intestate proceeding consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known as Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an order for the return of the records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate proceeding for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was reraffled and eventually assigned to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained until the conclusion of the probate proceedings. In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein. On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing as the had died by then.

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On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero. Thus, petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed that of the trial courts ruling on the ground that the attestation cla use in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON the attestation clause may be considered as having substantially complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code Held: No What appears in the attestation clause which the oppositors claim to be defective is: " We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do certify that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us. SC argued that the present petition is meritorious. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

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The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses. In this case, an examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to

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the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law he cannot do directly.

Abangan vs. Abangan, Gr # 13431, Nov. 12, 1919 40 Phil 476 On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely

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purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security. In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden. What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will. Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws

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on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written. For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants.

Celada v. Abena GR# 145545, June. 30, 2008 556 SCRA 569 Facts: Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929. On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner. Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will. On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.

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On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati and the latter consequently rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. Petitioner appealed to CA but the latter only affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. Hence, the instant petition. Issues: (1) WON CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law (2) WON CA erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and pressure, and (3) WON CA erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner Held: SC ruled in favor of respondent. Since SC is not a trier of facts, they found no reason to disturb the findings of RTC, to wit: (1)With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz SamaniegoCelada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought. (2) Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a

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sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805." (3) The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The picture shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987. (4) Finally, the court finds that neither pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will. In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will. Javellana vs. Ledesma GR#. L-7179, June. 30, 1955 97 Phil 258 Facts: The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the Visayan dialect as the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Ma. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses.

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The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law. Ledesma is questioning the validity of the codicil contending that the fact that the notary did not sign the instrument in the presence of the testator and the witness made the codicil was not executed in conformity with the law ISSUE: W/N the codicil was validly executed. HELD: The instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it. Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to

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violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

Cruz vs. Villasor, GR# L-32213, Nov. 26, 1973 54 SCRA 31 Facts: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari. Issue: W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.). Held: NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a

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situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted. Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.

Azuela v. CA GR# 122880, April. 12, 2006 487 SCRA 119 Facts: Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent's signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate. According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi," comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement,

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and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule." Issue: Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence, should be admitted to probate Held: No. A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618. Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule." However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule "must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized...But the total number of

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pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings." The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781) that there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in. The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal. The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. " By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is

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fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

Garcia vs. Vasquez, GR# L-26615, April. 30, 1970 32 SCRA 489 Facts: This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (Gliceria) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( Consuelo) as special administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens. When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court approved this because Consuelo has been was already managing the properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of land for the purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in the

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probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs. At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the deceased was not of sound mind, that eventough the allegations state that the deceased prepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses prove their truthfulness. Issue: Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed? Held: NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and as well as the typographical errors contain therein which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because of cataracts. (Testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed. ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband. The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.

Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr.,

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GR # 74695, Sept. 14, 1993 226 SCRA 348 Facts: On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna. According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was executed, together with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma. Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testators eye operation. Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the previously executed will. When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. Issue: W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with. Held: YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements

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of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will. Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes. Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place. There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will. Roxas vs. De Jesus, GR #. L-38338, Jan. 28, 1985 134 SCRA 245 Facts: A specialproceeding for the settlement of the estate of Andres de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was fileds by Simon Roxas. During such proceeding he delivered to the court a notebook purporting to be the holographic will of deceased Bibiana. Said will was dated Feb. 61 to which the court admitted to probate. Luz Roxas then questioned thisa act of the

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court contending that said will should not be probated because it is not properly dated as required by law. Issue: Whether the said will indicating only the month and year (Feb. 61) is properly dated and hence must be probated. Held:Yes, the said will must be probated as there is substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established, and the only issue is the date FEB/61 appearing in the said holographic will, probate of said will should therefore be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. Labrador vs. CA, GR# 83843-44, April. 5, 1990 184 SCRA 170 FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel of land and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed a petition for the probate the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, before Melecio's death, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio the parcel of land. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. Sagrado filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise

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from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968. The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. On appeal the CAmodified said decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil Code. HELD: The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, I First Page .xxxxx II Second Page And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. ..xxxxx III THIRD PAGE .xxxx The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz: And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will

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itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death." Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.

Kalaw vs. Relova, GR #. L-40207, Sept. 28, 1984 132 SCRA 237 Facts: Natividad K. Kalaw died with a holographic Will which, as first written, named her sister Rosa K. Kalaw as her sole heir. However, there is an alteration (crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir) without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. Gregorio filed for the probate of the Will, but it was opposed by Rosa. The trial court denied the probate of the Will. Rosa, on the other hand, filed a petition for review claiming that the Will in its original form must be probated and that she be declared as the sole heir.

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Issue/s: Whether the Will be admitted to probate although the alterations and/or insertions or additions were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code; or whether the Will in its original unaltered form declaring Rosa Kalaw as sole heir be probated. Held: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: Probate of the radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as mandatory required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kin succeed to her intestate estate.

Echavez vs. Dozen cons. GR# 192916/ Oct. 11, 2010 632 SCRA 594 Facts: Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of subject lots in Cebu City. On September 7, 1985, he donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation.

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In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). A Deeds of Absolute Sale was executed over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell. On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicentes nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of Vicentes intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. The RTC dismissed Manuels petition to approve the donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale. The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void. On Appeal to SC, he argues that CA erred ignoring the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of donation, which contains the import and purpose of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills. The Acknowledgment reads: BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed. Issue: WON the Acknowledgement in the Deed of donation be considered as an Attestation clause in a will? Held: No. The purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to

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state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case. The SC ruled, that even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement. That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its execution. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Ajero vs. CA, GR# 106720, Sept. 15, 1994 236 SCRA 488 FACTS: The late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982, executed a holographic will before her death. In the will, decedent named as devisees among others, the petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero and private respondent Clemente Sand. On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171 in the QC RTC, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either

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unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. ISSUE: WON the holographic will is valid. RULING: Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit. Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads: Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6 For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.) Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement

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affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs. Codoy vs. Calugay, GR# 123486, Aug. 12, 1999 312 SCRA 333 Facts: On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily. The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.

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On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition 5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery. On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay. According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate. In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.

Issue: Whether or not the provision of Article 811 is permissive or mandatory. Held:

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We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory." Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal. So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document. From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to be probated and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory. In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will." However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is

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contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased. There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33 and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978, 35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

Rodelas vs. Aranza, No. L-58509, Dec. 7, 1982 119 SCRA 16 Will may be allowed. The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts

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may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete, GR# 76714, June. 2, 1994 232 SCRA 722 FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York

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law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills. ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed HELD: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

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The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them. On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . " WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings. SO ORDERED. Witnesses to Wills

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Codicils and Incorporation by Reference Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Disposition

Adriana Maloto vs. CA, No. L-76464, Feb. 29, 1988 158 SCRA 451 FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino) in this case who are her niece and nephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four (4) heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate which was instituted in the then CFI. However, while the case was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate which provides fo r the division of the estate into four equal parts among themselves. When presented before the court, said agreement was approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate that what they have received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Court by way or petition for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed because they were not the proper remedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will drawn up. ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.

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RULING: Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: 1. By implication of law; or 2. By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or 3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana and was not done in her presence.

Gago vs. Mamuyac, No. L-26317, Jan. 29, 1927 49 Phil. 902 Facts: On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La Union. It appears from the

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record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union). After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2d day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament, stating: "That Exhibit A is a mere carbon copy of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of witnesses Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920, the original of Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land where the house was built, he had to cancel it the will of 1919), executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased (Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same Narcisa Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when crossexamined by attorney for the opponents, testified that the original of Exhibit A could not be found. For the foregoing consideration and for the reason that the original of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of Exhibit A for the applicant." From that order the petitioner appealed. Issue: Whether or not the probate of the old will shall be allowed. Held: With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that the will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any

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evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence.

Molo vs. Molo, No. L- 2538, Sept. 21, 1951 90 Phil 37 Facts: Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without any compulsory heir in the direct line. He was survived by herein petitioner Juana Molo and by his nieces and nephew who are the oppositors. Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939. The second will contains a clause which expressly revokes the first will. Juana Molo filed for the probate of the second will which was denied by the court on the ground that it was not executed according to the requirements prescribed by law. She then also filed for the probate of the first will which was granted by the court, hence this appeal by the oppositors on the ground that the second will had expressly revoked the first will; therefore, the first will should have not been probated.

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Issue: Whether the second will containing an express revocation of the first will can be given effect Held: No, the second will cannot be given effect and the first will can be admitted to probate. A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of the law as to the making of wills , cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, in as much as the revocatory clause is void. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of dependent relative revocation, predicated on the testator' intention not to die intestate. That is why he executed two wills on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. NOTE: DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION - The doctrine that regards as mutually interrelated the acts of a testator destroying a will and executing a second will. In such cases, if the second will is either never made or improperly executed, there is a rebuttable presumption that the testator would have preferred the former will to no will at all, which allows the possibility of probate of the destroyed will. Some jurisdictions decline to apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to cases to eliminate a written revocation of a will, but apply it to declare the ineffectiveness of a physical act of revocation. The justification for the distinction is that the physical act is inherently equivocal. The court has the power to interpret the ambiguous act to ascertain what the testator did but not to disregard an express statement of the testator and substitute its own conception of what the testator should have done. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation contravenes the strict interpretation of and demand for rigid adherence to the specific language of the statutes concerning the execution and revocation of wills and the theory of the parol evidence

Diaz vs. De Leon, No. L- 17714. May. 31, 1922 43 Phil 413 FACTS: The petitioner denies there was revocation of the will, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the former.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon was revoked by him? HELD: Yes. The Court held that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not cloth with all the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation. But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)lvvph1n+ From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed. The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined. The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.

Republication and Revival of Wills Disallowance of Wills Dorotheo vs. CA, GR# 108581, Dec. 8, 1999 320 SCRA 12

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Facts: Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro Dorotheos death, petitioner, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. However, in 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors (herein private respondents) as the only heirs of the Alejandro Dorotheo . Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed. This dismissal became final and executory. A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Consequently, when petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs, (covering the properties of the late Alejandro), private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion. The lower court ruled for petitioner but the same was reversed by the CA. Hence, the present petition where petitioner assails the Order of the Court of Appeals which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate. Issue: Whether a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect. Held: A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.

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However, the intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.

Santos vs. Buenaventura GR No. L-22797, Sept. 22, 1966 18 SCRA 47 FACTS: Herein petitioner Rosalina Santos, one of the nieces of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda de Blas, filed on October 22, 1956 with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased. Among the devisees mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura, herein respondent, is not related by blood to the deceased. On November 28, 1956, Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed an opposition to the probate of said will. However, after the probate court had received the evidence for both petitioner and oppositors, but before the latter could close the evidence, Flora Blas withdrew her opposition to the probate of the will and joined the proponent of the said will for the legalization of the same. The proceedings continued however as to the opposition of Justo Garcia. On December 24, 1957, the probate of the will was allowed. Flora, thereafter filed a petition praying for the delivery to her of a fishpond as specific devise in her favor under Item No. 3, Clause No. 6, of the will. Rosalina opposed the said petition on the ground that said specific devise

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in favor of Flora was forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant to a provision of the will that should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall lose his or her right to receive any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited in favor of the other heirs, devisees and legatees. The court sustained that the no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justified under the circumstances. ISSUE: WON Floras filing of her opposition was justified which precluded violation of the no contest and forfeiture clause. HELD: The factor that preponderates in favor of Flor is that, after realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts she withdrew her opposition and joined the Santos in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected. It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its probate, but a contest or opposition to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its provisions. This is so because the questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa" instead of "pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa.This furnishes a significant index into the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which Flor brought in good faith, no prejudice has been done into the intention of the testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out. The most that can be said, if at all, is that Flora Blas' actuations were also impelled by some desire to gain. But who among the heirs can assume a posture of innocence and cast the first stone? None of them can safely claim that he is not thus similarly motivated. From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will.

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Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention. Institution of Heirs

Reyes vs. Baretto-Datu, GR # L-17818, Jan. 25, 1967 19 SCRA 85 Facts: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of Tirsos wards, and Lucia Milagros (Milagros) Barretto. The usufruct of a fishpond, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria. Maria was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition which was approved by the CFI of Manila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence, Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the OCTs and the issuance of new titles in her own name. Everything went well until Maria died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria, Tirso now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria. Hence, the action for the recovery of one-half portion thereof. This action afforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well. Milagros contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired

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the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire any valid title thereto. Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros, the lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the distributee, Salud, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void. Issue: Whether Art. 1081 of the Old Civil Code was correctly applied by the lower court. Held: Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.

Aznar vs. Duncan, GR # L- 24365, June 30, 1966 17 SCRA 590

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FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a will devising unto Maria Helen (Christensen Garcia) the amount of P3, 600.00, and leaving the rest of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy (Christensen Daney). During partition, Helen opposed, saying that she is deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child of the testator. She further argued that Section 946 of the California Civil Code provides that the laws of the domicile of the decedent should be applied. The trial court ruled that since Edward E. Christensen was a US citizen at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions of his will are to be governed by the law of California. ISSUE: Whether or not the Renvoi Doctrine should be applied HELD: There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines. Meaning of Domicile and Residence Goodrich: The terms residence and domicile might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former home, he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a

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given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. Residence, however, is a term used with shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use is the only proper one. Nationality Principle The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term national law as used therein. There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Codecannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California. The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 if the Civil Code of California: If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile. .It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines. Renvoi Doctrine

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One type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers back the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is Ruckverweisung. (Renvoyer to send back; or Weiterverweisung) Another theory, known as the doctrine of renvoi, has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. Renvoi Doctrine as Applied by the Court in this case We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In Re Kaufman, supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In Re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner. Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained, the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e.,

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apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

Acain vs. IAC GR #L- 72706, Oct. 27, 1987 155 SCRA 100 FACTS: Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters

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were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited. RULING: Article 854 of the Civil Code: The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

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The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Nuguid vs. Nuguid GR # L- 23445, June 23, 1966 17 SCRA 449 FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as follows: Nov. 17, 1951 I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one. (Sgd.) Illegible T/ ROSARIO NUGUID Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz. The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. ISSUE:

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May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the free portion of the will? RULING: No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present. Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had. Seangio v. Reyes GR # 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 172 FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most

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competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4) Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed by the private respondents because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code, of which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. Due to petitioners denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the holographic will is valid. 2. Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid. RULING: A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need to be witnessed. Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for

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the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

Substitution of Heirs

Palacios vs. Ramirez GR # L- 27952, Feb. 15, 1982 111 SCRA 704 Facts: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. Issue: WON partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski is valid. Held: 1. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.) 2. As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:

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(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." 3. The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

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This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows: One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime; One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

PCIB vs. Escolin GR# L-27860, 27896, Mar. 29, 1974 56 SCRA 265 FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should beapplied. ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. RULING: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi willhappen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law,that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisterscould be more than just stated, but this would depend

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on (1) whether upon the proper applicationof the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas,it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it canbe held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now,the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these twoissues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the firstinstance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending suchfurther proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyondcavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anywaylegally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugalpartnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estateof Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourthof the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explainedearlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons sincethen, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Codeand applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

Conditional Testamentary Disposition and Testamentary Disposition with a Term

Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals GR# 113725, June 29, 2000 334 SCRA 522 Facts:

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Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; anappendix) of Aleja Belleza, was instituted devisee of Lot No.1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with theobligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein privaterespondent every year during the latter's lifetime. The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not onlyon the instituted heir but also to his successors-in-interestand that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shallseize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants." Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children,one of whom is herein petitioner. Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to complywith their obligation, filed a complaint with the RTC prayingfor the reconveyance of the subject property to the survivingheirs of the testatrix. During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement wasconcluded between the parties wherein the lessee of theproperty assumed the delivery of 100 piculs of sugar toprivate respondent; however, only partial delivery was made. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, While there may be the non-performanceof the command as mandated, exaction from them (thepetitioners), simply because they are the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, doesnot warrant the filing of the present complaint. The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature of a modal institution and acause of action in favor of private respondent arose whenpetitioner failed to comply with their obligation under thecodicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to theestate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not private respondent has a legally demandableright against the petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Held: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession thatsuccessional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called tosucceed by operation of law. The legitimate children anddescendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and thewidow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, thepetitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of theinstituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter byoperation of law, without

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need of further proceedings, andthe successional rights were transmitted to them from themoment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritanceincludes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rightsDr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil weretransmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. Andsince obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligationsimposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon hisdeath.In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No.1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that theusufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein privaterespondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights andtitle over said property, and they also assumed his(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involvedto herein private respondent. Such obligation of the institutedheir reciprocally corresponds to the right of privaterespondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performanceof which is now being demanded by the latter through theinstitution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondenthas a cause of action against petitioner and the trial courterred in dismissing the complaint below.

Legitime Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, GR# 138774, March 8, 2001 354 SCRA 112 Facts: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided

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to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Issue: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children? Held: First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991. As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club

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as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club. Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income. We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void. Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property. According to Article 888, Civil Code: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

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The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Capitle v. Elbambuena GR# 169193, Nov. 30, 2006 509 SCRA 444 Petitioners argument that *i+t would be absurd for *Olar+ to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and *took+ good care of his needs,*15+ is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners, they having merely helped in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller. Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public officers who issued the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties, including adhering to the provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides: SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority: (a) agricultural lessees and share tenants; (b) regular farmworkers; (c) seasonal farmworkers; (d) other farmworkers; (e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

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(f) (g)

collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of their parents; And provided further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom. Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program. A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record of performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC. x x x x,

thus stands. Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded. Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.[16] Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars name.

See also Arts.103, 130,F.C./ Family Home 158,159, 26, 36, 49, 43, 44, 59 -54, SCAM. No. 91-11-19: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

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Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages; Articles 63, 65, SCA.M. No. 92-11-11: Rule on Legal Separation; Articles 192-193; 129-139; 147-148 of the Family Code

Edroso vs. Sablan GR # L-6878, Sept. 13, 1913 25 Phil. 295 FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro whoinherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance tohis mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application forregistration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan(legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either theregistration be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them berecorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration deniedthe registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature of propertyrequired by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only bepresented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, thisappeal. ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservableproperty.2.Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property tocause its registration. RULING: A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without avaluable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for whathe receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are withinthe third degree of blood relationship.

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Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from hisdescendant property which the latter acquired without avaluable consideration from another descendant, or forma brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what hehas acquired by operation of law for the relatives who arewithin the third degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded. Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcelsof land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, byinheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them byoperation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong tothe line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), wherethe lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake of the natureproperty required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law. The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the righthas, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, thelegal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he hasunder an express provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved,and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right torecover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have titleto it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right requiredby law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine ownercan do.On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the rightis reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actuallyor constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they haveno title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die beforethem will they acquire it.

Sienes vs. Esparcia GR #L-12957, March 24, 1961 1 SCRA 750 Facts: Saturnino Francisco

Father (died 1932) -

Origin Son

Propositus

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Andrea Gutan (died 1951) Mother Reservor/ Reservista Cipriana and Paulina (died 1952) Half-sisters Reservee/ Reservatarios Constancio Sienes and Genovava Silay Buyer of Andrea Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes Buyer of Cipriana and Paulina Saturnino upon his death left 1 lot to each of his children. Subject Lot 3368 was particularly bequeathed to Francisco, his only child from his 2nd marriage with Andrea. As Francisco died in 1932 with no descendant, her mother became her sole heir and inherited the land by operation of law. As such, she sold the property to Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay. However, Cipriana together with sister Paulina sold the same property in Jan 1, 1951 to Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes. They were able to transfer said lot in their name under TCT No. 2141. Paulina (sister) died first followed by Andrea in Dec 1951 leaving Cipriana as the lone reservee who died a month later. RTC and CA upheld the sale of the property to Fidel and Paulina Sienes. Constancio and Genoveva appealed. Hence this case. Issue: Whether or not the property could be adjudicated to the buyers of the reservor, Andrea. Held: No. RTC and CA are correct by deciding in favor of the buyer of the reservees. Heres how: Although the reservor has a legal title and dominion to the reservable property, it is subject to a resolutory condition as follows; 1. That he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property 2. That he may alienate the same but subject to reservation that said alienation transmits only his revocable and conditional ownership As such, the rights acquired by the transferee is revoked by the survival of reservees at the time of death of the reservor. The sale made by Andrea in favor of Constancio (appellant) was subject to the resolutory condition that they will acquire definite ownership, ONLY if she is not survived by any person entitled to the reservable

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property. Since Cipriana was still alive on her death, comes the inescapable conclusion that said sale became no legal effect for said resolutory condition did not happen. Vis--vis, the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana to Esparcia was subject to a similar condition in that, the reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservees may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee ONLY IF and when the reservees survives the reservoir. Since it was the reservee who survived the reservor, it was then the reservees buyer who would acquire absolute ownership.

Gonzales vs. CFI GR #L-34395, May 19, 1981 104 SCRA 479 Facts Benito Legarda y Tuason+ (died 1939) Origin Filomena Races+ (died 1967) Reservor Benito +, Alejandro, Jose Reservees Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Reservees Filomena+ (died 1943) Propositus

Father Mother Sons Daughters Daughters

On July 12, 1939, Benito (father) died leaving real properties to his heirs. His daughter Filomena followed on March 19, 1943 leaving Filomena (mother) as her sole heir on several properties including cash, shares of stocks and interests in lands co-owned with her siblings. On March 6, 1953 Filomena (mother) disposed these properties in favor of her 16 grandchildren. She died on September 22, 1967 and admitted to

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probate her holographic will. In the proceedings, Beatriz filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mothers estate the properties she inherited from her dead sister Filomena on the ground that these are reservable properties which should be inherited by the siblings. It was opposed by Benito (Son). On June 20, 1968, without awaiting for its resolution, she filed an ordinary civil action against her brother, nephew, nieces and Her mothers estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable which Mother Filomena could not bequeath to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her own children. Said action was dismissed by trial court. Hence this case.

Issue: WON the holographic will of Mother Filomena (reservor) bequeathing the reservable property to the 3rd degree of consanguinity (nephews and niece-reservatarios/ reservees) of the prepositus is valid at the exclusion of the 6 alive 2nd degree relatives (brothers and sistersreservatarios/reservees) Held: No. The phrase in Art 891 within the 3rd degree means the nearest relative exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the 3rd degree from the propositus. In the instant case, Mommy Filomena, being the reservor, could not convey the reservable properties at her selection. It must be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the 3rd degree of the propositus who in this case, the brothers and sister falling in the 2nd degree. She could not dispose of in her will the properties in question EVEN if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the 3rd degree from daughter (nieces and nephews). The said properties, by operation of Art 891, should go to the brothers and sisters, who are within the 3rd degree from daughter Filomena.

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Cano vs. Director GR #L-10701, Jan. 16, 1959 105 Phil. 1 Facts Evaristo Guerrero Father Origin Maria Cano+ (1955) Mother Reservor Lourdes Daughter Propositus Eustaquia Guerrero Daughter Reservee Relative from Propositus Jose and Teotimo Grandchildren Degree Relative form Propositus

2nd Degree 3rd

Evaristo Guerrero husband of Maria Cano bequeathed Lot No. 1799 to Lourdes. Thereafter, Lourdes died with no descendant hence said property was inherited by her mother Maria. Maria, 71 yrs old registered the lot with the understanding that it is subject to the right of reservation in favor or Eustaquia pursuant to Art 891 of CC. Upon the death of Cano on 1955, Lourdes filed a motion with the Cadastral Court praying that Certificate of Title in the name of Maria be cancelled and a new one issued in her favor. It was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez (grandchildren). However, the lower court decided in favor of Eustaquia and granted the issuance of a new certificate of title. Jose and Teotimo again opposed on the ground that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary to transmit ownership from Maria to Eustaquia. Issue Whether or not in reservable properties, intestacy proceedings is still necessary to revert to the reservatarios ownership of the reserved properties. Held No. The reserved property is not part of the estate of the reservor, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservees may be entered in the property records without the necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefore appear of record. Further proceedings is necessary when the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without

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determining the identity of the reservee, or where several resevees dispute the property among themselves. But in this case, the rights of Eustaquaia as reservees have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other reservees of equal or nearer degree. Vizconde vs CA Facts: Rafael (died 1992) Father Salud Mother Estrellita (died 1991) Daughter Ramon Son Lauro Son-in-Law, Husband of Estrellita Carmela and Jennifer (died 1991) Granddaughter, daughter of Estrellita Rafael and Salud Nicolas are husband and wife with 5 children as follows: Estrellita, Antonio+, Ramon, Teresita and Ricardo, an incompetent. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from her father a land from Valenzuela Bulacan with TCT 36734 for P135,000.00 as evidenced by Deed of Absolute Sale. TCT No. V-554 thereof was issued to Estrellita. On 1990, or 11 years therafter, said property was sold for P 3.4 M. Said proceeds was used in purchasing a parcel of land in BF Homes Paranaque, a car and the remaining balance was deposited in a bank. In 1991, Estrellita and her daughters were killed in what was popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. Investigation revealed that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and Lauro, succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmel and Jennifer, Lauro was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with Estrellitas parents. Said settlement divided the property of Estrellita and daughters to Lauro and Rafael and Salud. 50% of the cash deposit was given to Rafael while the remainder was to Lauro. The Paranaque Property and the car was given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs. In 1992, Rafael died with heirs, Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and Antonios+ wife and children. Sometime in 1994, RTC released an Order giving Lauro 10

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days to file a petition or motion related to the pending settlement of Rafaels estate. Lauro, in response, filed a manifestation that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael, and that he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. Despite such, Ramon moved to include petitioner and asked that the Paranaque property, the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property be collated. RTC granted the motion and likewise denying Lauros MR. Such order provided in part that: 1. Vizconde spouses are not financially capable to purchase the Valenzuela property to Rafael. 2. There is no sufficient evidence that the acquisition of the property was for valuable consideration. Accordingly, the transfer of the property in Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and that subject Paranaque property which was purchased out of the proceeds of the sale of the said property is subject to collation. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, which affirmed RTC decision upholding that the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased( Sec 1 Rule 90 of Revised Rules of Court). Hence this case. Issue: WON the subject Paranaque Property is subject to collation. Held: No on the following grounds: 1. Lauro, as the decedents son-in-law is not a compulsory heir within the ambit of Art 887 of the Civil Code. 2. Determination on the title or ownership of a property is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In this case, RTC went beyond its jurisdiction when it decided that the transfer of the Valenzuela from Rafael to Estrellita is gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed, the true intent of the parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction and must be ventilated in an appropriate action. 3. The order subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is premature since proceedings of the intestate estate is still in its initiatory stage. There is still no indication that the legitime of Rafael heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.

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4. Even assuming that collation is appropriate in this case, what should have been collated was the Valenzuela property and not the Paranaque property, and in doing so is without statutory basis. Moreover, Rafael in a public instrument, voluntarily waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation in said property. 5. Finally, Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. As such, it was actually Rafael who inherited from Estrellita. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose. Vizconde v. CA GR# 118449, Feb. 11, 1998 286 SCRA 217 FACTS: Spouses Lauro Vizconde and Estrellita Nicolas had two children namely, Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita is one of the five children of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales. The private respondent herein is a brother of Estrellita. Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land which was afterwards sold to Amelia Lim and Natividad Chiu. Estrellita purchased again from Premier Homes a parcel of land with improvements. Thereafter, an unfortunate event happened when Estrellita and her daughters were killed. Consequently, Lauro entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with his wifes parents. The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael and the other fifty percent (50%) to Lauro. The car and the property were given to Lauro and to Estrellitas parents but the latter waived all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said properties. Not long after, Rafael died and to settle his estate, Teresita (one of his children) instituted an instestate estate proceeding and prayed to be appointed Special Administratix of Rafaels estate. Further, she sought to be appointed as Salud and Ricardos guardian of which Ramon filed an opposition. Private respondent filed another opposition alleging that Estrellita was given the Valuenzela property and subsequently, he filed his own petition averring that the legitime of Salud and Ricardo should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael

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during his lifetime. Ramon stated that Lauro is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of the deceased legitimate daughter, Estrellita. In a consolidated order, RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita was appointed as the Special Administratix of Rafaels estate however, Ramon was afterwards removed as guardian for selling his wards property without the courts knowledge and permission. RTC then ordered Lauro to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by Ramon and Teresita. Lauro fied a Manifestation stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. However, despite this manifestation, Ramon moved to include Lauro in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property be collated, which the trial court granted. Lauro filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Lauro filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. Hence, this action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Paraaque property is subject to collation. RULING: Basic principles of collation: Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation: 1) The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate

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proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of the latters compulsory heirs; 2) As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction; 3) The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage; 4) Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case, the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis; and 5) it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. It should be stressed that Estrellita died ahead of Rafael.

Disinheritance Seangio v. Reyes GR# 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 177 FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and

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supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4) Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed by the private respondents because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code, of which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. Due to petitioners denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the holographic will is valid. 2. Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid. RULING: A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need to be witnessed. Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for

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the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

Legal or Intestate Succession [Arts. 960-1014] General Provision Bagunu vs. Piedad, GR# 140975, Dec. 8, 2000 347 SCRA 571 FACTS: On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the RTC of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 which was granted. Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue.

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ISSUE: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? RULING: No. Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a thirddegree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides: "ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. "ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited." "ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded." In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. "ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. "In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. "ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner that the

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representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit." "ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions." The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. "Article 966. xxx "In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth." Accordingly---Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. "Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. "The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood." "Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED.

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Right of Representation Sayson vs. CA, GR# 89224-25, Jan. 23, 1992 205 SCRA 321 Facts: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 1030) for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants. On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint (Civil Case No. 1042), this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents. In Civil Case No. 1042, the trial court found that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel. Doribel was their legitimate daughter. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In dismissing Civil Case No. 1030, the court ruled that the three children, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, the respondent court disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.

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12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects. Hence, the this petition where petitioners contend that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction." Issue: (a) Whether or not petitioners may still challenge the validity of the decree of adoption of Delia and Edmundo. (b) Whether or not the CA erred when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

Held: It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar. The birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be

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sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity." In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to Article 979 of the Civil Code. Now to the right of representation. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

See also Domestic Adoption Act

Order of Intestate Succession Descending Direct Line Sayson vs. CA, GR# 89224-25, Jan. 23, 1992 205 SCRA 321

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Facts: similar to case above. ISSUE: Who has the better right over the properties of the spouses the mother of the deceased Isabel or her children? HELD: In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code: Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Ascending Direct Line Illegitimate Children

Corpus vs. Corpus GR # L-22469, Oct. 23, 1978 85 SCRA 567 Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 29, 1939. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Osssorio, (3) Amelia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus and Ramon l. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus. The daughter of his half brother Jose Corps, Juanita died in October, 1944. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of

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whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose corpus. On October 6, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the CFI of Manila to recover bar supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangcos will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and therefore, the descendants estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. ISSUE: Whether or not Juliana Corpus the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mothers supposed intestate share in Yangcos estate? HELD: It is disputably presumed that a man and a women deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, that a child born in Lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bad and board, is legitimate, and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate.

Leonardo vs. CA GR #L-51263, Feb. 28, 1983 120 SCRA 890 Facts: On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.

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Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963. Issue: Can Cresenciano inherit from Francisca Reyes? Held: No. Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.) WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Diaz vs. IAC GR #L-66574, June 17, 1987 150 SCRA 645 Facts: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children

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to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. Held: The Supreme Court do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist. Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

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"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' "Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Diaz vs. IAC GR #L-66574, Feb. 21, 1990 182 SCRA 427 Held: We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil

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Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. To recapitulate, We quote this: The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12). Suntay v. Suntay

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GR # 183053, June 16, 2010 621 SCRA 142 Facts: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents. Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration. Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-InIntervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the

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decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the significant work experiences outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with management degree.In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died. Held: Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, *respondents immediate+ family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged.The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator. As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of the estate. The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate. From the foregoing facts, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would

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have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration. Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession: The law [of intestacy+ is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus,

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the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Surviving Spouse Verdad vs. CA GR# 109972, April. 29, 1996 256 SCRA 593 When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus: Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title. Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the

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Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners 5 required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of safe shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.

Cabales v. CA GR# 162421, Aug. 31, 2007 531 SCRA 691 Facts: Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein petitioner. Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino,

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Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the time of the sale, will be held in trust by thevendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21. In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no longer entitled to the property as his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable. Issue: Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were binding upon them Held: With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only. x xx Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable. However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said

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property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

Collateral Relatives Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA GR# 116775, Jan. 22, 1998 284 SCRA 511 Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's halfsister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. 23 That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.

Gonzales vs. CA GR# 117740, Oct. 30, 1998 298 SCRA 322 Facts: On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In their petition, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. The trial court

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appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad. Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the abovementioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola. On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twentyseven years before his death, and that during this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad. On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad. Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate. Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extrajudicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties. Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar,

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and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971. Held: With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are: Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Emphasis supplied). As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.

The State Republic vs. CA, GR# 143483, Jan. 31, 2002 375 SCRA 484 Facts: For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was

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filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question." Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. n the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision. Held: We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5 Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated

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assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession [Arts. 1015 1105] Right of Accretion

Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Rigor GR# L-22036, April 30, 1979 89 SCRA 493 Facts: A devise of ricelands was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, in favor of his nearest male relative whowould study for the priesthood.Probate court approving the project of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate theadministratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective shares.It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testateproceeding remained pending. About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator, who should deliver to thechurch as trustee the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render anaccounting of the fruits. The probate court

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granted the petition. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition praying that the bequest that they be adjudged as thepersons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relativeof" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood"RTC declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs. CA reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of theold Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code. The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the testator created apublic charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trustoperative and to prevent intestacy.The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed. In Father Rigor.s will, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest malerelative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and whowould be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and hisparents. On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated. HELD:

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What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempoque no hayalegatarioacondicionado", or how long afterthe testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. Itis that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and thetestator's legal heirs.We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be livingat the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" ( A rt. 1025, Civil Code).The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to thetestator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and createuncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticatethe exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at thetime of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (theson of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is thatthe bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parishpriest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative. The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee. That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisionsregarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained as priest and he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or

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ever became apriest.There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance

Guy v. CA GR# 163707, Sept. 15, 2006 502 SCRA 151 FACTS SIma Wei (Rifino Guy Susim) died intestate on October 29,1992 leaving an estate valued at 10M. His known heirs are his surviving spouse and their 5 children. On June 1997, minors Karen and Kamille Wei, as represented by their mother, alleging as the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of the decedent, filed a petition of administration before the RTC. ISSUE Whether or not the two alleged children of the deceased are barred by prescription from proving their filiation. HELD Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

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Citing Bernabe v Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired by the FC. Art 172 provides, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or 2. Any other means allowedby the Rules of Court and special laws. Art 172 provides, the action claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of 5 yrs within which to institute the action. Art 175 provides further that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgement, but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may retain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. In neither of these situations has

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it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason

Executors and Administrators Collation

Zaragoza vs. CA, GR# 106401, Sept. 29, 2000 341 SCRA 309 FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime. Held: It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the transfer. Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of

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sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the CA, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid. We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. Nazareno vs. CA, GR# 138842, Oct. 18, 2000 343 SCRA 637 Held: Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

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There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. on April 20, 197935 will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. The rule is settled that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Vizconde vs. CA, GR# 118449, Feb. 11, 1998 286 SCRA 217 Facts: Rafael (died 1992) Father Salud Mother Estrellita (died 1991) Daughter Ramon Son Lauro Son-in-Law, Husband of Estrellita Carmela and Jennifer (died 1991) Granddaughter, daughter of Estrellita Rafael and Salud Nicolas are husband and wife with 5 children as follows: Estrellita, Antonio+, Ramon, Teresita and Ricardo, an incompetent. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from her father a land from Valenzuela Bulacan with TCT 36734 for P135,000.00 as evidenced by Deed of Absolute Sale. TCT No. V-554 thereof was issued to Estrellita. On 1990, or 11 years therafter, said property was sold for P 3.4 M. Said proceeds was used in purchasing a parcel of land in BF Homes Paranaque, a car

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and the remaining balance was deposited in a bank. In 1991, Estrellita and her daughters were killed in what was popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. Investigation revealed that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and Lauro, succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmel and Jennifer, Lauro was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with Estrellitas parents. Said settlement divided the property of Estrellita and daughters to Lauro and Rafael and Salud. 50% of the cash deposit was given to Rafael while the remainder was to Lauro. The Paranaque Property and the car was given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs. In 1992, Rafael died with heirs, Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and Antonios+ wife and children. Sometime in 1994, RTC released an Order giving Lauro 10 days to file a petition or motion related to the pending settlement of Rafaels estate. Lauro, in response, filed a manifestation that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael, and that he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. Despite such, Ramon moved to include petitioner and asked that the Paranaque property, the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property be collated. RTC granted the motion and likewise denying Lauros MR. Such order provided in part that: 1. Vizconde spouses are not financially capable to purchase the Valenzuela property to Rafael. 2. There is no sufficient evidence that the acquisition of the property was for valuable consideration. Accordingly, the transfer of the property in Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and that subject Paranaque property which was purchased out of the proceeds of the sale of the said property is subject to collation. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, which affirmed RTC decision upholding that the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased( Sec 1 Rule 90 of Revised Rules of Court). Hence this case. Issue: WON the subject Paranaque Property is subject to collation.

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Held: No on the following grounds: 1. Lauro, as the decedents son-in-law is not a compulsory heir within the ambit of Art 887 of the Civil Code. 2. Determination on the title or ownership of a property is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In this case, RTC went beyond its jurisdiction when it decided that the transfer of the Valenzuela from Rafael to Estrellita is gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed, the true intent of the parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction and must be ventilated in an appropriate action. 3. The order subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is premature since proceedings of the intestate estate is still in its initiatory stage. There is still no indication that the legitime of Rafael heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. 4. Even assuming that collation is appropriate in this case, what should have been collated was the Valenzuela property and not the Paranaque property, and in doing so is without statutory basis. Moreover, Rafael in a public instrument, voluntarily waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation in said property. 5. Finally, Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. As such, it was actually Rafael who inherited from Estrellita. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose. Ty v. Ty GR# 165696, April. 30, 2008 553 SCRA 306 Held: To belabor a point, we are not persuaded that an implied trust was created concerning the subject properties. On the assumption, as elsewhere indicated, the plaintiff-appellee at the very least, paid for part of its purchase price, the EDSA property is presumed to be a gift, or donation, in favor of Alexander Ty, defendant-appellants late husband, following the saving clause or exception in Art. 1448 of the Civil Code. To repeat, it is the saving clause, or exception, not the general rule, that should here apply, the late Alexander Ty being the son of Plaintiff-appellee.

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Nor are we convinced, given the state of the evidence on record, that the plaintiff-appellee paid for the price of the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property. Therefore, the general rule announced in the first sentence of Art. 1448 of the Civil Code has no application in this case. Or, if the article is to be applied at all, it should be the exception, or the saving clause, that ought to apply here, the deceased Alexander Ty being the son, as stated, of plaintiff-appellee. Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, and in this case this is undisputed, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW. The law, instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor of the child. The net effect of all the foregoing is that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an advance of Alexanders share in the estate of his father,11 to the extent that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price. Petitioner would have this Court overturn the finding of the CA that as regards the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property, petitioner failed to show that the money used to purchase the same came from him. See also Art. 1448 NCC

Partition and Distribution of the Estate Effect of Partition Rescission and Nullity of Partition

Noceda vs. CA, GR# 119730, Sept. 2, 1999 313 SCRA 504 Facts: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent CA, affirming with modification the decision of the RTC in an action by private respondent

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against petitioner for recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation. Celestino Arbizo died in 1956, his daughter, grandson and widow (Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo) extrajudicially settled a parcel of land. On November 6, 1991, the RTC of Iba, Zambales decision on the case: (a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19, 1981, valid; (b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked; (c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns; (d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the donated portion at the defendants expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency; (e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00; and (f) To pay the cost. CA affirmed the trial courts judgment and ordered defendant Rodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot C of Lot 1121, which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review. . The respondent Court exceeded its judicial authority when it sustained the lower courts findings that the subject property actually contains an area of 127,289 square meters. The argument is unmeritorious. The records disclose that the trial court in an Order dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the chance to have the subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to determine the actual area of Lot 1121. The circumstances show that the lower court ordered the re-survey of the lot to determine the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was done with the conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area based on the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of both

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parties, showed a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax declaration but such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on computation. We hold that the respondent court did not err in sustaining the trial courts findings that the actual area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 square meters. . Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly encroaches on the rights and claims of third persons who were never impleaded below; that the subject lot was also declared in the name of one Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot was also issued in her name and that there are several residential houses constructed and existing on Lot 8 of lot 1121, thus these possessors/occupants of Lot 8 should be joined as defendants for their non-inclusion would be fatal to respondents cause of action. There is no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly ratiocinated on this issue as follows: The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over Lot 1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof did not make them indispensable parties in the present case. Defendant Noceda merely presented the tax declarations in the name of Cecilia Obispo without the alleged free patent in her name. Moreover, no evidence was presented showing that Cecilia Obispo possessed or claimed possession of Lot 1121. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of ownership of property. It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121, designated as Lot 8, be impleaded in the present case. The result of the present suit shall not in any way affect the occupants of Lot 8, since the issues involved in the present case are the usurpation by defendant Noceda of the land adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the propriety of the cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of defendant Noceda due to his ingratitude to plaintiff Directo. A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. Private respondent is not claiming the entire area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof which was adjudicated to her based on the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and which was

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denominated in the survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus there was no need to implead the occupants of Lot 8. . Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be partitioned based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since the distributive share of the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were different from the extrajudicial settlement executed on June 1, 1981; that the discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein indicated that they never intended that any of the deeds to be the final determination of the portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them; that the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 could not effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned only 29,845 square meters, and not its actual area of 127,298 square meters. There is no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court as follows: The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981. Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court where he stated among other things: 7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that the area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-partition in the name of Celestino

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Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots of their actual occupancy as per survey on the ground; The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement. . Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never impleaded as a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established. Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling basis to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as follows: In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half sister with a common father. On this point, the Court believes the version of the plaintiff. The Court observes that in the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition, Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-heirs of the defendant, being the widow of his grandfather, Celestino Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do not also appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition because according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo. And the defendant is one of the signatories to the said Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio Maranon. Under the circumstances, the Court is convinced that the defendant knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as well as that of Agripina. When the defendant signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was already an adult since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years old. So that in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did not know all of these, the defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and signed this document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And who could have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and Maria Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latters daughter? Besides, at the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition by the plaintiff and defendant, they were still in good terms. There was no reason for the plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over the defendant.

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Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and child. . We likewise find unmeritorious petitioners claim that there exist no factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It was established by the survey plan that based on the actual possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan was being occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area donated by private respondent Directo to petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement. . Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent Directo since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still undetermined since no final determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to the parties herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof. We do not agree. In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each coowner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. And one way of effecting a partition of the decedents estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially.

The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to

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adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-ininterest in the following manner: To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters; To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions indicated by red lines and numbered alphabetically were based on the percentage proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the actual occupancy of each heir which resulted to these divisions as follows: Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m.- goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5) Lot B; 38,872 sq.m Maria Arbizo (3/5) Lot C 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5) Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation. Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed from

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the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot 1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise: Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation. The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court; for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the

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record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. We find no such showing in this case. We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully considered the questions of fact raised below and the respondent Courts conclusions are based on the evidence on record. Petitioner failed to present any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision. Petition for review is DENIED. Silverio v. CA GR# 178933, Sept. 16, 2009 600 SCRA 1 Held: Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.22 (Emphasis supplied.)

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Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court. Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.1avvphi1 Avelino vs. CA, GR# 115181, March 31, 2000 329 SCRA 369 Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino. The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate. On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed. On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.

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Held: When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executorso named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 which provide: Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . . Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office. The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the

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Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.

Zaragoza vs. CA, GR# 106401, Sept. 29, 2000 341 SCRA 309 FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime. Held: It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the transfer. Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of

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sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the CA, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid. We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

Arrogante v. Deliarte GR# 152132, July. 24, 2007 528 SCRA 63 Facts: It appears that the lot in controversy was originally conjugal property of the spouses Bernabe Deliarte, Sr. and Gregoria Placencia who had nine children, including herein respondent Beethoven Deliarte and petitioner Fe Deliarte Arrogante. The other petitioners, Lordito, Johnston, and Arme, Jr., all surnamed Arrogante, are the children of Fe and, thus, nephews of Beethoven. Respondent Leonora Duenas is the wife of Beethoven. A series of misfortunes struck the Deliarte family. The first tragedy occurred when a brother of Beethoven and Fe was hospitalized and eventually died. Beethoven shouldered the hospitalization and other related expenses, including the transport of the body from Davao to Cebu and then to Daanbantayan. The next occurrence took place a year after, when

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Gregoria was likewise hospitalized and subsequently died. Once again, Beethoven paid for all necessary expenses. Soon thereafter, it was Bernabe, the parties ailing father, who died. Not surprisingly, it was Beethoven who spent for their fathers hospitalization and burial. In between the deaths of Gregoria and Bernabe, the Deliarte siblings agreed to waive and convey in favor of Beethoven all their rights, interests, and claims to the subject lot. At the signing of the deed of absolute sale, the siblings who failed to attend the family gathering, either because they were dead or were simply unable to, were represented by their respective spouses who signed the document on their behalf. Bernabe, who was already blind at that time, was likewise present and knew of the sale that took place among his children. Thus, from then on, Beethoven occupied and possessed the subject lot openly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner. He exercised full ownership and control over the subject lot without any objection from all his siblings, or their heirs, until 1993 when the controversy arose. In fact, on March 26, 1986, all of Beethovens siblings, except Fe, signed a deed of confirmation of sale in favor of Beethoven to ratify the 1978 private deed of sale. Sometime in August 1993, petitioner Lordito Arrogante installed placards on the fence erected by respondents, claiming that the subject lot was illegally acquired by the latter. The placards depicted Beethoven as a land grabber who had unconscionably taken the subject lot from Lordito who claimed that the lot is a devise from his grandfather. Allegedly, the bequeathal was made in Bernabes last will and testament which was, unfortunately, torn up and destroyed by Beethoven. Thus, on November 10, 1993, respondents filed an action for quieting of title and damages against the petitioners. Held: The 1978 private deed of sale, insofar as it disposed of Bernabes share in the conjugal partnership prior to his death, is void for being a conveyance of the Deliarte siblings future inheritance. Article 1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, at the time the contract was entered into, succession to Bernabes estate had yet to be opened, and the object thereof, i.e., Bernabes share in the subject lot, formed part of his childrens inheritance, and the children merely had an inchoate hereditary right thereto. True, the prohibition on contracts respecting future inheritance admits of exceptions,

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as when a person partitions his estate by an act inter vivos under Article 1080 of the Civil Code. However, the private deed of sale does not purport to be a partition of Bernabes estate as would exempt it from the application of Article 1347. Nowhere in the said document does Bernabe separate, divide, and assign to his children his share in the subject lot effective only upon his death. Indeed, the document does not even bear the signature of Bernabe. Neither did the parties demonstrate that Bernabe undertook an oral partition of his estate. Although we have held on several occasions that an oral or parole partition is valid, our holdings thereon were confined to instances wherein the partition had actually been consummated, enforced, and recognized by the parties. Absent a showing of an overt act by Bernabe indicative of an unequivocal intent to partition his estate among his children, his knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the private deed of sale does not equate to an oral partition by an act inter vivos. Besides, partition of property representing future inheritance cannot be made effective during the lifetime of its owner. Considering the foregoing, it follows that the 1986 deed of confirmation of sale which sought to ratify the 1978 sale likewise suffers from the same infirmity. In short, the 1986 deed is also void. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Bernabe treated his share in the subject lot as his childrens present inheritance, and he relinquished all his rights and claim thereon in their favor subject to Beethovens compensation for the expenses he initially shouldered for the family. The records reveal that Bernabe, prior to his hospitalization and death, wanted to ensure that his children attended to the expenditure relating thereto, and even articulated his desire that such surpass the provision for both his son and wife, Beethovens and Fes brother and mother, respectively. Their arrangement contemplated the Deliarte siblings equal responsibility for the familys incurred expenses. We take judicial notice of this collective sense of responsibility towards family. As with most nuclear Filipino families, the Deliarte siblings endeavored to provide for their parents or any member of their family in need. This was evident in Florenda Deliarte Nacuas, the youngest Deliarte siblings, remittance to her parents of her salary for two years so they could redeem the subject lot.

Orendain Jr. vs. Rodriguez GR# 168660/ June 30, 2009 591 SCRA 285

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FACTS: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. On September 23, 1960, the will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila in Special Proceeding No. 3845. On August 27, 1962, the CFI Manila approved the project of partition presented by the executor of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs will. At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes,3 as provided in her will. Some of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will. As regards Clause 10 of the will which explicitly prohibits the alienation or mortgage of the properties specified therein, we had occasion to hold, in Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,5 that the clause, insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned, does not violate Article 8706 of the Civil Code. Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence f or more than twenty years, in violation of Articles 8678 and 870 of the Civil Code, and inconsistent with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.9On April 18, 2005, the RTC issued the herein assailed Order that: (a) only the perpetual prohibition to alienate or mortgage is declared void; (b) the trust over her properties stipulated by the testatrix in Clauses 12, 13 and 24 of the will remains valid; and (c) the trustees may dispose of these properties in order to carry out the latters testamentary dis position.10 ISSUE: WON the trusteeship over the properties left by the decedent can be dissolved applying Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code. RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The decedents will did not institute any heir thereto, as clearly shown by the following: 1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;

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2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after the necessary deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund with a bank; 3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa habang panahon); 4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and 5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3. Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners motion to dissolve and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause 10 according to the testatrixs wishes. As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir therefor. Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed; We find as erroneous the RTCs holding that paragraph 4,14 Article 1013 of the same code specifically allows a perpetual trust, because this provision of law is inapplicable. Suffice it to state that the article is among the Civil Code provisions on intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting from a decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this article, the allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void testamentary provision which did not institute an heir. Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedents properties. The herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife. In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrixs properties must be dissolved and this case remanded to the lower court to determine the following: (1) The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed

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of as yet; and (2) The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties.