The Executive Committee of the National Security Council

ADVANCED: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CABINET PROFILE

LSEMUN 2014 | 14-16 FEBRUARY 2014

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Synopsis: The two superpowers plunged into one of their biggest Cold War confrontations after the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane making a high-altitude pass over Cuba on October 14, 1962, photographed a Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile being assembled for installation. U2 spyplane spotted 16-32 potential missile sites For the American officials, the urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that the nuclear-armed Cuban missiles were being installed so close to the U.S. mainland--just 90 miles south of Florida. From that launch point, they were capable of quickly reaching targets in the eastern U.S. If allowed to become operational, the missiles would fundamentally alter the complexion of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which up to that point had been dominated by the Americans. Military Overview US Missiles: Specific types of SLBMs (current, past and under development) include: United States of America (also known as Fleet Ballistic Missiles)

UGM-27 Polaris Decommissioned (4,600km, 2500 nautical miles, 8000mph 13000km/h) UGM-73 Poseidon Decommissioned UGM-96 Trident I (C4) Decommissioned / Soviet Union / Russian Federation

R-13 NATO name SS-N-4 Decommissioned R-21 NATO name SS-N-5 Decommissioned RSM-25[5] R-27 NATO name SS-N-6 Decommissioned RSM-40[5] R-29 "Vysota", NATO name SS-N-8 "Sawfly" Decommissioned R-27K, NATO name SS-NX-13 designed for anti-ship use, never operational[6] RSM-45 R-31 NATO name SS-N-17 "Snipe"[5] Decommissioned RSM-50[5] R-29R "Vysota", NATO name SS-N-18 "Stingray" Operational

RSM-52[5] R-39 "Rif", NATO name SS-N-20 "Sturgeon" Decommissioned RSM-54 R-29RM "Shtil", NATO name SS-N-23 "Skiff" Decommissioned (last ship is now under rebuild to R29RMU "Sineva")[7] RSM-54 R-29RMU "Sineva", NATO name SS-N-23 "Skiff" Operational RSM-54 R-29RMU2 "Layner" Operational RSM-56 R-30 "Bulava", SS-NX-32[8] Operational

Table of US Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces SSBN Forces SSBNs Polaris [1] Total SSBNs SLBM Launchers Polaris A1 [4] Polaris A2 [5] Polaris A3 [6] Total Launchers SLBM Warheads W47Y1 (A1) [11] W47Y1 (A2) [11] W47Y2 (A2) [11] W58 (A-3) [12] Total Warheads (MRV=1) Year 1960 1965 Army 873,078 969,066 32 80 144 160 32 80 80 64 80 64 16 80 64 144 32 320 0 64 144 176 384 32 176 352 560 0 208 448 656 208 448 656 208 448 656 32 80 144 160 32 80 80 64 80 80 80 208 32 320 0 208 176 384 208 352 560 208 448 656 208 448 656 208 448 656 2 2 5 5 9 9 10 10 20 20 24 24 35 35 41 41 41 41 41 41 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

Air Force 814,752 824,662

Navy 616,987 669,985

Marine 170,621 190,213

Total 2,475,438 2,653,926

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles After World War II, the U.S. defensive policy of strategic deterrence depended on a large fleet of longrange bombers that could deliver accurate nuclear strategic attacks. This method of defence was too slow to deploy in case of extreme emergency, a better, faster, and less costly solution was needed. Three developments in the mid-1950s, however, led to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): (1) development of the thermonuclear bomb with a much greater destructive power than the original atomic bomb; (2) the rapid refinement of inertial guidance systems for ballistic missiles; and (3) the development of powerful booster engines for multistage rockets, greatly increasing their size and range. As a result, ballistic missiles became sufficiently accurate and powerful to destroy targets 8000 km (5000 mi) away. For more than thirty years, the ICBM has been the symbol of the United States' strategic nuclear arsenal.

US / USSR Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Atlas D Missile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile stands 75ft high and 10 ft in diameter. Atlas, the U.S.'s first successful ICBM, was tested in 1959 and was followed one year later by theTitan. Both were multistage liquid-fueled rockets using extremely low temperature propellants that had to be added just before launching.

Year 1964

Launchers US USSR 2416 375

Warheads US USSR 6800 500

Megatonnage US USSR 7500 1000

Global Nuclear Weapon Stockpile

Year 1960 US 18638 USSR 1605 UK 42

US Navy - Facts and Figures Active Ships of the US Navy 1960-2000 (MSC and NRF not included): 1960 1964 1968 1969 1972 1976 1978 1980 1987 2000 812 917 975 926 654 476 453 462 495 315

Comparison of the Ship Force Level of US Navy and Soviet Navy in 1969 and 1979: Soviet Navy 1969 0 220 354 0 148 103 165 680 1670 US Navy 1969 22 279 156 2 9 153 74 231 926 Soviet Navy 1979 2 264 355 0 129 100 176 743 1769 US Navy 1979 13 165 123 2 3 65 3 83 457

Type Aircraft Carriers Surface Combatants Submarines Command Ships Small Fighting Vessels Amphibious Ships Mine Vessels Auxiliary Vessels Total

Operational 1976-1987: Type of Aircraft Strike Fighter Fighter Attack Planes ASW Planes Reconnaissance Planes AWACS Planes Cargo Planes Tankers Helicopters other Total 1976 0 623 1135 112 369 106 213 35 1087 1251 4931

Aircraft

of

the

US

Navy

1980 0 602 984 136 352 90 165 45 1046 1016 4436

1984 93 515 940 109 377 104 115 44 1127 1013 4437

1986 256 496 813 118 333 96 90 47 1217 1008 4474

1987 311 441 787 124 331 99 86 45 1210 987 4421

500+ B52 available for nuclear deployment. At any one point of time, 66 will be on air.

Economic overview (GDP graph, agriculture, industry, trade) President: John F. Kennedy Vice President: Lyndon B. Johnson Population: Life expectancy: Dow-Jones High: Low: Federal spending: Federal debt: Inflation: Consumer Price Index: Unemployment: US Real GDP Dec 31, 1963 186,537,737 70.1 years

767 723 $106.82 billion $302.9 billion 0.4% 30.2 6.7%

3.59 trillion

Dec 31, 1962

3.41 trillion

Dec 31, 1961 Dec 31, 1960

3.27 trillion 3.08 trillion

US GDP per capita 1960 $2,881 1961 $2,935 1962 $3,108

Employment by industry sector (millions) Jobs Percentage Total 65.6 100.0 Services 31.3 47.7 Manufacturing 16.4 25.0 All other 17.9 27.3

During the 1950s, the number of workers providing services grew until it equaled and then surpassed the number who produced goods. And by 1956, a majority of U.S. workers held white-collar rather than blue-collar jobs. At the same time, labor unions won long-term employment contracts and other benefits for their members. Farmers, on the other hand, faced tough times. Gains in productivity led to agricultural overproduction, as farming became a big business. Small family farms found it increasingly difficult to compete, and more and more farmers left the land. As a result, the number of people employed in the farm sector, which in 1947 stood at 7.9 million, began a continuing decline; by 1998, U.S. farms employed only 3.4 million people.

Political Overview
Background The breakdown in US-UUSSR relations was inevitable because there was a power struggle to become a stronger superpower through geopolitical manoeuvring and economic friction in Europe since the end of the Second World War. In the Kennan telegram, Kennan wrote that the Russians believed that conflicts between capitalist states... held out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause and although there was no desire for aggressive war; loss of territory or influence for one side was seen as a gain for the other. The administration and future of occupied Germany provided a source of contention between the US and USSR and economic problems multiplied in 1946 and 1947. The most fundamental reason for the inevitability of the breakdown in East-West relations was ideological antagonism. Both powers believed their own ideologies should prevail in the world. Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a collapse of World War Two political stances and both the USSR and the US felt their economic and political models of the world were universally applicable. The US was in favour of liberal free market capitalism and the USSR advocated revolutionary Marxism. Although neither Truman nor Stalin were looking for conflict, it was inevitable as these ideologies were polar opposites. In Ambassador Kennans telegram to the US Secretary of State he wrote that USSR lives in antagonistic capitalist encirclement with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.

Furthermore, the prestige of communism was at a global all time high and this worried US policy-makers who feared communist uprisings on home soil. International Alliances: NATO, see political map. Political Map

Blocs within Cabinet

HAWKS
In favour of a surprise air strike McGeorge Bundy Robert Kennedy General Taylor Chiefs Dean Acheson Treasury Secretary Dillon Director McCone

DOVES
In favour of blockade option Robert McNamara Secretary Rusk Llewellyn Thompson Edward McDermott George Ball Adm. George Anderson Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup Deputy Secretary Gilpatric Theodore Sorensen

Definition of DEFCON

Readiness condition DEFCON 1

Description

Readiness

Nuclear war is imminent

Maximum readiness Armed Forces ready to deploy

DEFCON 2

Next step to nuclear war

and engage in less than 6 hours

Increase in force DEFCON 3 readiness above that required for normal readiness Increased intelligence watch and strengthened Air Force ready to mobilize in 15 minutes

DEFCON 4

Above normal readiness

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security measures DEFCON 5 Lowest state of readiness Normal readiness

MISSILE MAPS

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References: http://www.history.com/topics/cuban-missile-crisis http://hnn.us/article/43977 http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatispersonae/the-leaders/

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