Digested Cases in CRIM PRO

DIGESTED CASES ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED FACTS: Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thereafter, Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The prosecution, citing the provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code filed a manifestation and motion to remand praying that the case be returned to the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. HELD: Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that: The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense Republic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of offenses punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment under the Municipal Trial Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as there is no manifest legislative purpose to do so or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between them.
G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995 CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC. FACTS: Private respondents, FITRITE Inc. and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., are engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies bearing the trademark SUNSHINE in the Philippines. Petitioner, CONRAD AND COMPANU, Inc. is engaged in the business of importing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies in the Philippines. Private respondents were granted the trademark SUNSHINE to be used on biscuits and cookies by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). For quite some time, the trademark SUNSHINE has been used by the private respondents in the concept of an owner on its biscuits and cookies. Meanwhile, petitioner was designated as the exclusive importer and dealer of the products of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. for sale in the Philippines. Private respondents then filed a case before the Regional Trial Court, seeking for remedies against infringement under Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, as well as of the remedies against unfair competition under Sec. 29 of the same statue. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint invoking, among others, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in the case at bar. HELD: No, the doctrine finds no merit in the case at bar. While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered trademark falls under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT, an action, however, for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy for injunction and relief for damages, is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts. An application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a registered trade mark cannot per se have the effect of restraining or preventing the courts from the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary rule would unduly expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which, simply expressed, would merely behoove regular courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to defer to the findings of resolutions of administrative tribunals on certain technical matters.
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA FACTS: Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received. Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he should not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27. HELD: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of Republic Act No. 8249 shall govern. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES FACTS: A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S. Brown in sitio Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan. Said substation was composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power guns. It was alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and that defendant Joaquin R. Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court. On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint filed in court. Tebag was allegedly maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-station, said torture resulted to Tebags death. The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan. Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The prosecution is questioning said appearance due to the constitutional prohibition for senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of his office. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private respondents. HELD: Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and
that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof. It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSONDUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO FACTS: Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the Philippine National Police. The two cases was consolidated. While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a motion for the transmittal of the case to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offense charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. ISSUE: Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. HELD: No, the case is no longer cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation. In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the
jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan. It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986 ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986 ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Rolando P. Bartolome and Elino Coronel Y Santon were charged with the crime of Falsification of Official document as defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the two conspired to make it appear on the CS Personal Data Sheet that Bartolome has taken and passed the Career Service Professional Qualifying Examination with a rating of 73.35% and that he was a 4th year AB student at the Far Eastern University. The charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether or not the offense charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. HELD: No, the offense is not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crime committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied). A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379 will reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an official document mentioned, even tangentially or by implication. Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a wide range of offenses committed by public officers, from knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but falsification of an official document is not included. This is punished in Article 171 under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.
G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN," FACTS: Bienvenido Leoparte was charged and convicted with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena. It was alleged in the information that the accused, Leoparte, pulled the victim, Marinel Idea, while she was on her way home and traversing the railroad tracks. The accused then dragged her to the nearby banana plantation where the accused satisfied his carnal desires against the victims will. Thereafter, the accused brought the victim to his sisters home where he again had carnal knowledge with the victim. The following day, the accused brought the victim to his uncles home and again succeeded to have carnal knowledge with the victim against her will. After two day, the accused the brought the victim to the house of his parents where he again successfully satisfied his lascivious desires against the victim. All the incidents took place with the accused purporting that he and the victim had eloped and were planning to get married. Issues: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. Held: Yes, The Regional Trial Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the case. Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that a complaint of the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutor proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. Such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed. In the case at bar, the active cooperation of the offended party in the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates said intent.
G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012 UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. ISSUE: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar. HELD: Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar. Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
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G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006 JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO FACTS: Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. HELD: Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
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In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
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G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994 DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA vs. HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION FACTS: Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist. An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended. Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their arrests. ISSUE: Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners. HELD: No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners. For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
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G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983 EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners, Francisco and Bernardino on February 6, 1966 before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The acts constituting the complaint was allegedly perpetrated against Dr. Patrocinio Angeles on December 26, 1965. On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime of grave oral defamation was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The information was amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966 amending the offense charged to slander. The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the offense charged, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction finding the petitioners only guilty of simple slander. On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime has prescribed. HELD: No, the crime has not prescribed. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him." Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
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G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998 ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before the Fiscals office on October 20, 1987. On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not prescription has set in. HELD: We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts. It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
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G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN FACTS: Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition upon the recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998. Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. On January 5, 1999, reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on November 18, 1999. Pangilinan filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not prescription has set in. HELD: No, the action has not prescribed. Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads: SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx. SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
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The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
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G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LODRIGO BAYYA FACTS: Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 before the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela. On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the grounds that the information charging of the offense did not made any mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he was only charged using Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that which is provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As such, in convicting him under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondents right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. HELD: Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the information indicting him and nothing more. In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.
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G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008 RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Criminal and administrative charges were filed against petitioner Ramon Y. Talaga Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was alleged, that the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, has unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants. The administrative complaint was dismissed but the criminal case was retained by the Ombudsman. Three criminal information charging the petitioner of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 was recommended by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Only one information was sustained by the Sandiganbayan, the criminal information for giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting him a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city. However, said information was reverted back to the Ombudsman for the conduct of further preliminary investigation. Thereafter, an information charging the petitioner and the City Councilors for the aforementioned offense, alleging that the parties conspired to perpetrate the crime. The City Councilors moved for the motion to be quashed as the information does not constitute an offense. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist a valid information under which the petitioner stands charged. HELD: Yes, the information is valid. The test in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.
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G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR ARROJADO FACTS: The accused, Salvador Arrojado, and the victim, Mary Ann Arrojado was living in the same roof along with the victims father. The accused was helping in taking care of the victims father. One day, the accused went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim has committed suicide. Erlinda along with his husband and father went to the victims house and there they saw the already lifeless body of the victim. Upon examination, it was revealed that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds all over her body, negating the theory of suicide. On hearing, several witnesses testified on the strained relationship between the victim and the accused. The accused was found guilty of murder. ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case. HELD: No, an aggravating circumstance to be appreciated must be alleged in the information. The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellants sentence to death.
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G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA FACTS: Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape perpetrated against the 16 years old daughter of his live in partner. It was alleged that even prior to the commission of rape, the accused was already repeatedly molesting the victim by inserting his fingers in her genitalia. An information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act 7610 was then instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals only found the accused guilty of the crime of simple rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case at bar. HELD: No, the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be appreciated as it is not alleged in the information charging the accused of the crime. While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the child was a minor at the time of the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to the victims mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence, appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
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G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992 CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention. Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The amended information was filed, however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of preliminary investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted. HELD: Yes, the amendment is legal and valid. Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
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G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005 DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM vs. THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: An information charging the petitioner of violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Said violation was for his alleged refusal to pay the back wages ordered by the Civil Service Commission. After reinvestigation, an amended information was filed by the public prosecutor, Matalam, objected to the filing of the amended information and filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of action, that is, the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses. Also, the petitioner assails that admitting said information without a preliminary investigation would amount to a violation of his right to due process. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment to the information is substantial as to warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. HELD: Yes, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process. A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.
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G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS FACTS: Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of the information is substantial as to warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. HELD: Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same nature. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
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G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy FACTS: Accused, Degamo, was charged and convicted for the crime for rape before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City. The Trial Court imposed upon the accused the supreme penalty of death as the Trial Court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and night time. Also, the penalty of death was imposed due to the qualifying circumstance of that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become insane. However, said circumstance was only presented on the amended information submitted after the accused has already been arraigned. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment to include the circumstance that the victim has become insane by reason of the incident of rape is substantial. HELD: No, the amendment is not substantial. The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different from that charged in the original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment.
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G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA FACTS: Accused, Tubongbanua, was charged and convicted with the crime of murder for the death of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The conviction was based on the amended information which included the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her rank, age or sex. The Court of Appeals did not appreciate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex and age of the victim because these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment constitutes a substantial one so as to invalidate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex or age of the victim. HELD: No, the amendments are not substantial. The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived
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G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007 SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Four separate informations for illegal recruitment were filed against petitioner, Baggao, before the Regional Trial Court of Bangued. The prosecution filed a motion to amend the informations praying that the separate informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there would only be one information for illegal recruitment in large scale. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment is valid. HELD: Yes, the amendment is valid. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
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G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007 EDUARDO G. RICARZE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK) FACTS: Two informations for estafa through falsification of commercial document was filed against petitioner, Ricarze, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIBank), unknown to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, credited the amount being questioned in the criminal cases of estafa. On pre-trial, the petitioner questioned the appearance of PCIBank. The petitioner averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution of Caltex by PCIBank as private complainant is tantamount to substantial amendment. HELD: No, there is no substantial amendment. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
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G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING FACTS: Two complaints for adultery were filed against petitioner, Pilapil, before the City Fiscal of Manila, for allegedly having an affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua while her marriage with Geiling was still subsisting. Pilapil contested said charges stating that Geiling no longer qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree in Germany before filing the criminal charges for adultery. ISSUE: Whether or not Geiling is an offended spouse with capacity or legal representation to initiate an action for adultery. HELD: The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. The offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. It presupposes, therefore, that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In view of the valid divorce obtained by Geiling in his country, its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned in view of the nationality principle in civil law on the matter of status of persons. Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
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G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010 HERALD BLACK DACASIN vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN FACTS: Herald, an American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila on April of 1994. In June 1999, Sharon was able to obtain a divorce decree from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois Circuit Court also granted sole custody of their child to Sharon. In 2002, both parties instituted a contract agreeing to a joint custody over their child. In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over their child. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: Yes, the Regional Trial Court can take cognizance of the case. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
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G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984 MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO vs. HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. TEVES FACTS: Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and charged with adultery. Thecriminal action was initiated by a letter-complaint thumb marked and sworn to by complainant Julian Teves, the husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves. During the preliminary investigation, Julian Teves filed a new letter-complaint attaching his affidavit. Before the scheduled arraignment, Milagros Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the offense charged, the persons of both accused, and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of Dumaguete to file the information. The motion was denied by the CFI. During the pendency of the case, complainant Julian Teves died. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the complainant in adultery while the case is pending a ground to dismiss the case. HELD: In adultery and concubinage cases, the death of the offended party is not a ground for the extinguishment of the criminal liability, whether partial or total, of the offending spouse. The participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. The moment the offended party initiates the action, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding.
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G.R. No. 190847 April 13, 2011 BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL WHELAN, TEODOR B. LINGAN, ATTY. OFELIA B. CAJIGAL and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS FACTS: A criminal action for violation of the provisions of the Tariff and Custom Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act 7916 was filed against private respondents for alleged non-payment of duties or taxes for the shipment of bet slips and thermal papers. The State Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information against the private respondents before the Court of Tax Appeals. The Secretary of Department of Justice reversed the determination of probable cause and ordered the withdrawal of the information. Hence, the State Prosecutor withdrew the information. The Bureau of Customs then filed, in its own, a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Tax Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs can commence the action without the participation of the State Prosecutor. HELD: No, the public prosecutor has power of direction and control over prosecution of criminal cases. It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.
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G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA FACTS: The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result, Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict and Laroya filed a criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted. Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently from the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? HELD: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
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G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009 ANITA CHENG vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY FACTS: Two cases of estafa was filed by petitioner, Cheng, against the respondents, Spouses Sy, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner then filed two more criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondents based on the same facts contained in the criminal charge of estafa. The criminal charge for estafa was dismissed for failure to prove the elements thereof, however, no pronouncement as to the civil liability was made. The cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are likewise dismissed, no pronouncement as the civil liability was also made. Petitioner then filed a civil action for collection of sum of money with damages based on the same checks that are the subject of the charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 bars the institution of a civil actions arising from the criminal charges. HELD: Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
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G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011 P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO, SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ, and MARIANO CRUZ, vs. WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch III, Pasay City, ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND FERDINAND CAASI FACTS: Private respondents were charged for violating a city ordinance that prohibits the drinking of liquor in public places. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the City Prosecutor Office and the Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest and violation of Republic Act No. 7348. Both of the criminal actions against the petitioners were dismissed, however, the civil action proceeded with the trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. HELD: Yes, the civil case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. The subject civil case does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this provision contemplates only two (2) situations. First, a criminal action has been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case. No criminal action has been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by the said provision .It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case will only be considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the civil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint determination. The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless as the complainants can
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prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence. G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005 MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ vs. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GLADYS NOCOM FACTS: Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. On hearing of the criminal charge of estafa, the respondent judge allowed the appearance of a private prosecutor to try the civil aspect of the offense charged. The petitioner opposed said appearance alleging that the private prosecutors appearance is barred as the civil aspect of the case is already deemed instituted in the criminal charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is allowed to collect civil damages in both the estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 cases as to warrant the appearance of a private prosecutor in the case of estafa. HELD: No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one.
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G.R. No. 175851
July 04, 2012
EMILIA LIM vs. MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, A SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP BUSINESS OUTFIT OWNED BY EVELYN S. VALDEVIESO FACTS: Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H & E Commercial owned by Emilia Lim who issued four checks worth P25,000.00 each. Two of these checks bounced for the reasons ACCOUNT CLOSED and DRAWN AGAINSTINSUFFICIENT FUNDS. Mindanao Wines demanded from H & E Commercial the payment of their value through two separate letters but the demands went unheeded prompting Mindanao Wines to file before the MTCC for violations of BP 22. Emilia Lim was acquitted but was made to pay civil the two amounts of checks plus interest and cost of filing fees. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 case includes the dismissal of the civil aspect. HELD: No, Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability. Even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based on insufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. The MTCC dismissed the criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact of the banks dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element of the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the prosecution. This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence." Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."
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G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA FACTS: The accused, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, was charged and convicted with the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. Pending appeal, the accused suffered a cardio respiratory arrest resulting to his demise. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal and required the Solicitor General to submit his comment with regards to the civil aspect of the case. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People vs Sendaydiego, opined that the civil liability of the accused still exists despite his death, thus, the case should proceed for the determination of the civil liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of the accused arising from the offense charged is extinguished upon the death of the accused pending appeal. HELD: Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes the civil liability arising from the offense charged. In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
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G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994 EUSEBIO V. FONACIER, ROGELIO RAMOS, JOSEPH GONZALES and FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN presided by HONORABLE MANUEL PAMARAN, BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ and ROMEO ESCAREAL, and the TANODBAYAN CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR JUAN A. SISON and PROSECUTORS RODOLFO AQUINO and MANUEL HERRERA FACTS: In April 1979, Fonacier, et. al, being public officers, entered into a fixed and pre-arranged contract in the name of the Government requiring their participation and approval with Francisco T. del Moral, a private contractor, for the delivery of Five Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty (5,550) cubic meters of aggregate subbase. No delivery was ever made after payment of Ninety Six Thousand Six Hundred and Three Pesos (P96,603.00) through falsified vouchers supported by falsified, spurious, irregularly prepared and questionable documents and without the requisite delivery receipts and tally sheets approved by the accused public officers. On October 8, 1980, Del Moral died. Counsel for Del Moral filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that Del Moral died during the pendency of the case. The Solicitor General commented "petitioner's appeal should only be dismissed insofar as his criminal liability is concerned." ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal and civil liability of the accused. HELD: On 29 January 1981, the Court dismissed the petition only with regard to Del Moral's criminal liability. The death of Del Moral has extinguished the civil liability based on ex delicto. In the recent case of People vs. Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. 102007, promulgated on 02 September 1994, the Court have ruled, and might now reiterate, that 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law, b) Contracts, c) Quasi-contracts, d) .Delict, e) Quasi-delicts
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3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
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G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the action of annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case of frustrated parricide. HELD: No, there is no prejudicial question in the case at bar. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
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illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
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G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009 DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI FACTS: Petitioner, Dreamwork, instituted a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against private respondent, Janiola, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a criminal information for the said offense before the Metropolitan Trial Court on February 2, 2005. On September 20, 2006, spouses Janiola instituted a civil complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement that they entered into with the petitioner. The checks, subject of the criminal case of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement. The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend the trial in the criminal case alleging that the civil case of rescission poses a prejudicial question that needs to be resolved first before a determination on the criminal case may be had. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: No, the action for rescission does not pose a prejudicial question on the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
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January 30, 1992 JULIANA P. YAP vs. MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, FACTS: Private respondent, Paras, sold his share in the intestate estate of their parents to his sister, Juliana P. Yap. Nineteen years thereafter, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang. When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that the criminal action for estafa is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of an alleged double sale. ISSUE: Whether or not there exist a prejudicial question in the case presented. HELD: No, the criminal action for estafa is not and cannot be a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of double sale. A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
GR. No. 101236
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G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987 MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL. FACTS: An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the Criminal Circuit Court of Lucena. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the ground that there was a pending Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Said Motion was denied by Judge Mogul. Crespos Motion For Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed a TRO with the CA, which granted the same. Thereafter, the CA granted Crespos Writ of Injucntion and perpetually restrained Judge Mogul from having Crespo arrainged until the Sec. of Justice finally made his decision and ordered the Fiscal to move for dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motion attaching the Secretarys Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion and set Crespos arraignment. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice and still insist on the arraignment of the accused. HELD: Yes, it is within the power of the trial court to refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. Once an information is filed in court, the courts prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case, the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
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G.R. No. L-60962 July 11, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO MONTEVERDE y CONE alias "EDUARDO MASCARIAS FACTS: Rolando Monteverde along with his co-accused Reynaldo Codera Jr. were charged and convicted with the crime of robbery with rape and meted out the ultimate penalty of death. On appeal, Monteverde raised the following issues; 1) a) the medical certificate does not show signs of physical injuries and spermatozoa; (2) said medical certificate and even his co-accused's confession are inadmissible against him, for being hearsay; (3) recidivism cannot be considered against him because it was not alleged in the information; and (4) the lower court's proceedings are void because the amended information does not contain a certification. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can still assail the lack of preliminary investigation even after plea and conviction. HELD: No, a valid plea on arraignment is tantamount to a waiver of the right of the accused to preliminary investigation. While generally, a preliminary investigation is mandatory and a certification that such investigation was held is required, still this rule does not apply if the issue is raised only after conviction. Thus, it has been held that after a plea of not guilty to the information, an accused is deemed to have foregone the right of preliminary investigation and to have abandoned the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.
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G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEFINO G. SELFAISON, NEMESIO DALISAY, DOMINGO URETA and BERNARDO BAUTISTA FACTS: Appellants Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta and Bernardo Bautista in company with Arsenio Amacio, Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo Salde and Amrafil Dalisay who were alleged to be still at large were accused in an amended information of the crime of robbery with rape in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. After trial, Josefino G. Selfaison was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainants, Angelita Sinag and Angelina Maghibon, the amounts of P212.50 and P110, respectively, and to pay one-fourth of the cost. The other three accused namely, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta, and Bernardo Bautista, were found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, plus proportionate costs. From the judgment of conviction, the four named accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but in view of the penalty imposed, that court certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their right to preliminary investigation. HELD: No, the claim of denial of the right to preliminary investigation is not supported by any facts. Nothing appears affirmatively on the record that such preliminary investigation has not been had. On the other hand, it is presumed that the inferior court proceeded in accordance with law. (People vs. Silos and Bagano, G.R. No. L-5158, March 28, 1952.) At any rate, appellants appear to have waived such right, because immediately after their arrest, they filed bonds for their release and subsequently proceeded to trial, without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
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G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, petitioner posted bail for his conditional release. No preliminary investigation before the filing of the information charging Go for murder was conducted. The prosecutor ratiocinates that Go has already waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD: No, the petitioner did not waive his right to preliminary investigation. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioners allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.
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G.R. No. 134744 January 16, 2001 GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR vs. DINDO VIVAR y GOZON FACTS: Respondent, Vivar, was initially charged with the crime of slight physical injuries for the mauling of petitioner Villaflor. Said charge was withdrawn when it was later discovered that the injuries sustained was more serious than they had appeared at first. A case of serious physical injuries was then filed against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. A case of grave threat was also filed against the respondent. Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the information on grave threat was filed by the respondent contending that crime should be absorbed in the charge of physical injuries as such threats were made in connection with the same mauling incident. The motion was denied by the MTC. Respondent then went to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City by way of certiorari. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to quash because the cases were filed without the requisite preliminary investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to the absence of preliminary investigation. HELD: No, absence of preliminary investigation does not warrant a dismissal of a criminal action. Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process. However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
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G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998 THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented in this Suit by his mother, MARGARITA G. Present: LARRANAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES FACTS: Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, the RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation. 2) Whether or not the petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation. HELD: 1) Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andconsistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before hewas charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during thearrai gnment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding hisright to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petit ioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminaryinvestigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed. 2) No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect.The originalwarrantle ss arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of thepetiti oner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal
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G.R. Nos. 138859-60 February 22, 2001 ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) FACTS: Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The order also required respondents, within ten days from receipt thereof, to submit their counteraffidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998 recommending the prosecution of the forenamed respondents for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code andSectio n 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the originalrespon dents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. OmbudsmanAniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Accordingly, t woInformations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525(unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On thesame day, he filed a "Motion to Remand Case to the Ombudsman -Mindanao for Preliminary Investigation." In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, becausepetitione r had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned. On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may proceed with the arraignment without preliminary investigation. 2) Whether or not the filing of a bond constitute a waiver of preliminary investigation.
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HELD: 1) Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by theOmbud sman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on his behalf. 2) In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,"[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.
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G.R. No. 109036 July 5, 1995 BARTOLOME F. MERCADO vs. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION, The Honorable CESAR C. PERALEJO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City and the Honorable CITY PROSECUTOR of Quezon City FACTS: Petitioner, Mercado, was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the ground that he was not notified of the preliminary investigation. He claimed that the private complainant deliberately provided a wrong address in the issuance of the subpoena to him. He was thus prevented from submitting his counter-affidavit, which if considered, would have prevented the filing of the criminal case against him. The City Prosecutor denied the claim of petitioner, stating that the subpoena was sent to the residence of the petitioner and that the same was returned unserved. The prosecutor also avers that the presence of the accused was not a requisite to the validity of the preliminary investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is denied of his right to preliminary investigation. HELD: No, Petitioner was not denied of his right to a preliminary investigation. It is uncontroverted that a subpoena was sent to his given address but it was returned unserved. Petitioner did not dispute that the address appearing in the official receipt of his cash bond was his address. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating prosecutor to determine if a crime has been committed. A review of the evidence is thus necessary to establish probable cause and if the evidence so warrants, the investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the corresponding information (Cruz, Jr. v. People, 233 SCRA 439 [1994]). It was ruled that preliminary investigations can be conducted ex-parte if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not appear after due notice (New Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3(d); Cf. Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659 [1983]).
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January 16, 1998 RENATO CUDIA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City FACTS: Petitioner, Cudia, was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the alleged possession of unlicensed revolver. He was the brought to Angeles City where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was conducted, consequently, an information charging the petitioner of illegal possession of fire arms was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. On pre-trial, the judge called the attention of the parties to the fact that the crime was committed in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Another information charging the same offense was filed against the respondent, this time by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. Thereafter, the City Prosecutor of Angeles moved for the dismissal of the earlier case stating that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor. The petitioner the filed a motion to quash on the ground of violation to his right against double jeopardy. HELD: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is with merit. HELD: The Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside Angeles City. An information must be prepared and presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. Although failure to file a motion to quash the information is a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to pleadings are concerned, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Moreover, since the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded as prior jeopardy, and will not be a bar to a second prosecution
G.R. No. 110315
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G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH FACTS: The private respondent, Esam Gadi, was apprehended at the Manila National Airport and subsequently detained for possession of marijuana. A criminal case for violation of the provisions of Dangerous Drug Act was then filed against the private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Private respondent, though admitting that it is beyond the fide day period prescribed by law, filed a motion for reinvestigation alleging that the gravity of the offense charged against him warranted the motion and that period prescribed by law to file the motion is not mandatory. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to reinvestigation (preliminary investigation) HELD: No, the period to ask for a reinvestigation has already lapsed. The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an information has been filed against an accused who was arrested without a warrant has been characterized as mandatory by the Court. In People vs. Figueroa, the .Supreme Court applied Section 15, Rule 112 of the old Rules, which is substantially reproduced in Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court held that Section 15 of old Rule 112 granted the accused the right to ask for preliminary investigation within a period of five (5) days from the time he learned of the filing of the information. As the accused in that case did not exercise his right within the five-day period, his motion for "reinvestigation" was denied. Clearly, Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules gives the accused the right to ask for a preliminary investigation; but it does not give him the right to do so after the lapse of the five-day period. This is in accord with the intent of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to make preliminary investigation simple and speedy. The Supreme Court, elaborating on the rationale of the rules on preliminary investigation
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G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS FACTS: Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not a reinvestigation is availing in the case at bar. HELD: Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same nature. Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
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G.R. No. 132422 March 30, 2004 FILADAMS PHARMA, INC. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO FERIA FACTS: A complaint charging the private respondent, Feria, for estafa before the assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City was filed by petitioner, Filadams. Said complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed. The petitioner then appealed the same to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice arrived at the same conclusion and dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then raised the same issue to the Court of Appeals, but also to no avail. ISSUES: 1) What is the nature of the conduct of preliminary investigation of the prosecutor? 2) Are the acts (appeals) resorted to by the petitioner valid?
HELD: 1) The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rulemaking functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. 2) With our ruling in Bautista that the Office of the Prosecutor was not covered by the appellate process under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, what then was petitioner's remedy from the resolution of the Assistant Prosecutor dismissing his complaint? Based on the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations now the 2000 NPSRule on Appeals the petitioner could appeal to the Secretary of Justice. In this case, the petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but his appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since there was no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
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G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006 LAILA G. DE OCAMPO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN FACTS: Ronald Dacarra, Magdalenas nine-year-old son, complained of dizziness upon arriving home. When asked, Magdalena found out that Laila G. De Ocampo, Ronalds teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate. Due to continuous vomiting, Magdalena brought Ronald to the hospital where he underwent an x-ray. She was informed that Ronalds head had a fracture. He died after 5 days from the incident, which led Magdalena to charge De Ocampo with homicide. During the inquest proceedings, the Assistant City Prosecutor ruled that there is no concrete evidence to show proof that the banging of the heads of the two victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of Ronald, further reasoning that the vehicular accident which happened two years ago may be the cause of Ronalds head injury. Subsequently, the case was referred to another Assistant City Prosecutor for preliminary investigation. De Ocampo invoked the disposition of the inquest prosecutor which found insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. She reiterated that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of Ronalds death but the vehicular accident where he was involved. After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor found probable cause against De Ocampo for the offense charged. De Ocampo thereafter filed a petition for review with the DOJ where she contended that the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of banging Ronald and Lorendos heads was the cause of Ronalds injury. She also asserted that she was denied due process during the preliminary investigation when the prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and when said prosecutor unilaterally obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime Laboratory. The DOJ Secretary, however, denied the petition for review and held that Ronalds injury was the direct and natural result of petitioners act of banging Ronald and Lorendos heads. The Secretary also rejected De Ocampos claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest prosecutor because he inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended her release for further investigation since the case was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, De Ocampo filed this present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not De Ocampo was denied due process during the preliminary investigation.
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HELD: Petitioner was not denied due process during the preliminary investigation. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. On the issue of the prosecutors obtaining of the autopsy report, the Rules on preliminary investigation do not forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of Ronalds death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report bolstered complaina nts allegations. Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges against her. As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended it for further investigation since it was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioners active participation in the preliminary investigation without questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioners agreement with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further investigation of the case. The instant petition was denied and the Court affirms the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
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G.R. No. 119990 June 21, 2004 REMBERTO C. KARA-AN vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., HON. RAUL ARNAU FACTS: Kara-an wrote to Senator Ernesto Maceda imputing certain criminal acts to "the clique of six" in the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines. Kara-an claimed that "the clique of six" granted a loan of P250,000 to Compressed Air Machineries & Equipment Corporation (CAMEC) without a valid collateral. Kara-an also claimed that the "clique of six" approved the real estate mortgage on CAMECs loan without requiring the cancellation of a prior subsisting mortgage and without securing the written consent of the first mortgagee in violation of law. Kara-an thus asserted that the "clique of six" is liable for entering into a contract which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, which is punishable under RA 3019. Senator Maceda endorsed Kara-ans letter to Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate investigation. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Kar-an, as officer-in-charge of the Makati Branch of the Islamic Bank, was the one directly responsible in screening the qualifications of the various applicants for loan hence Kara-an filed a Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation. In said motion denied that he was the officer-in-charge of the Islamic Banks Makati Branch responsible for screening loan applications in 1986. His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, he filed this petition for review on certiorari where he contends that the Ombudsmans failure to conduct the preliminary investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and administrative mandates. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsmans failure to conduct the appropriate investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and administrative mandates. HELD: No, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal. Since the Ombudsman can dismiss a complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessarily follows that he can also dismiss the complaint for lack of merit after the respondents comment to the complaint. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive
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display of the parties evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The Resolution of the Ombudsman denying the Motion for Reconsideration is affirmed.
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G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998 TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN FACTS: Teresita G. Fabian, major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation, a company engaged in construction business, had an affair with Nestor V. Agustin, the incumbent District Engineer of Metro Manila. During their affair, Agustin gifted PROMAT with public works contracts. When their relationship soured, Fabian filed an administrative case in the Ombudsman against Agustin for violation of Section 19 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 36 of the Civil Service Decree. Consequently, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. Ombudsman Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by changing the penalty to suspension of one year without pay. Agustin moved for reconsideration but Desierto inhibited himself when he discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate." The case was transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges. ISSUE: Whether or not recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to appeal for the decision in an administrative proceeding of the Ombudsman is proper. HELD: No, under the present Rule 45 appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
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G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004 AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW GUILLERMA T. PEREZ, et al. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, et al. FACTS: Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM), instituted two complaints at the Office of the Ombudsman against several respondents, one of whom was then Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye, for violation of RA 3019 (also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Bunye and others allegedly destroyed the doors of the KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order of the KBMBPM management issued by then Agriculture Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez. In disposing of said complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution excluding respondent Bunye from the criminal indictment. The petitioners assailed the exclusion in the Court of Appeals through an original petition for certiorari and mandamus but the CA dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners now file this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, contending that the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the charges against Bunye. Respondents counter that the preliminary investigation yielded insufficient evidence to charge Bunye of the offense. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the charges against Bunye. HELD: A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
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G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA FACTS: Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land located in front of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is being subleased to several stallholders. Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of Bacoor, sent to the stallholders Notices of Violation4 of the National Building Code on the grounds that the structures they were occupying were erected without building permits and occupied by them without the necessary certificates of occupancy having been first secured. Because of stallholders repeated failure to comply, a task force from the Municipal Hall closed the stalls through the installation of galvanized iron fences. Lessees Aquino and Samoy filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Castillo and Mejia for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Office of the Ombudsman, however, dismissed the case, for lack of probable cause, ruling that the respondent local officials acted in good faith in effecting the closure of the stalls. Another complaint was filed by Sarino against Castillo and Mejia in the Office of the Ombudsman, containing the same allegations as the previous complaint filed by Aquino and Samoy. The Office of the Ombudsman now found probable cause hence the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an Information against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan which declared that probable cause exists and thus directed the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest and hold departure orders. Castillo and Mejia then filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause which was denied by the SB. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the SB reversed its ruling and dismissed the case, holding that there is no probable cause that warrants the filing of the present criminal case is a mere rehash of the previously dismissed criminal case filed by complainants lessees against respondents. The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in overturning the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause resulting in the dismissal of the case against respondents. HELD: Yes, corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutors determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that
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the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. Absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judges determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused. The SBs challenged Resolutions are reversed and the case remanded to the SB.
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G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, et al., vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense, et al. FACTS: Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry of National Defense. They filed a petition for Habeas Corpus, on the ground that the arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, contending that arrests may not be made solely on the basis of Mission Orders. On the other hand, respondents asserted that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree issued by the President, that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front and that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A. The Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of retired Chief Justice Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes as their counsel. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, further arguing that the detained attorneys "were arrested for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP." Respondents also aver that an Information for Rebellion was already filed against the attorneys in the Davao RTC, hence the petition for Habeas Corpus is already moot and academic. Petitioners countered by contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process and, consequently, the Information for Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents maintain that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation renders the Information filed in RTC Davao void. HELD: No, although the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that no Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, exceptions to this rule are provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112. Consequently, the Information filed by the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception.
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Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial Court. The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. This Court has held that the trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. The petition for Habeas Corpus is dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
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GR NOS 117952-53 FEBRUARY 14, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO DE GUZMAN FACTS: The two offenders were brought to the police station for questioning and detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest or search warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted largely during nighttime, the police officers were unable to secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. The two were charged with Unlawful Possession of Firearms and violation of Dangerous Drugs Act in the RTC. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges but the RTC convicted him on the two offenses. De Guzman appealed from said decision, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest done is valid even without conducting a preliminary investigation beforehand. HELD: A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the police officers manner of conducting the accused-appellants arrest was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In this jurisdiction, the mere possession of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a criminal offense under PD No. 1866. This is a valid warrantless arrest because despite word from their fellow officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw accused-appellant sniff shabu, they resisted the first impulse to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to seriously disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the needed opening to validly arrest the accused. To their minds, it would be the arrival of drug buyers. As the situation would have it, the arrest was necessitated by the presence of accused-appellant with a gun obviously tucked in his pants. The decision of the RTC is therefore affirmed.
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G.R. NO. 104879 MAY 6, 1994 ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, et al FACTS: Petitioners then filed a motion to quash a search warrant issued against him for alleged violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions), contending that the same was acquired from a court that does not have territorial jurisdiction over the offense. Quezon City Judge Velasco, however, upheld the validity of the warrant, opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region). The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence petitioners filed this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Fineza of Kalookan RTC is valid. HELD: Yes, the search warrant is valid. It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction. It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. The petition is denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed.
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G.R. No. 124346 June 8, 2004 YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Chief Inspector Federico Laciste ordered a team from the PNP Regional Office Intelligence Unit to conduct a buy-bust operation on Teodosio who was suspected of peddling shabu hence, the team and their informer proceeded to the Teodosios house in Pasay at about midnight. SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong and the informer entered the open gate of appellants compound and walked to his apartment while the rest of the team observed and waited outside. After the exchange of the money earlier treated with ultraviolet powder and the shabu, Inciong gave the signal to the other police officers and they arrested Teodosio. In the RTC, Teodosio insisted that the warrantless arrest was not valid because the police officers framed him up for possession of shabu after the search in his apartment produced no illegal drugs and that it should be invalidated because the police officers failed to obtain a warrant even though they had several days for such purpose. The RTC and the CA found him guilty, hence this petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted was illegal. HELD: No, the warrantless arrest was legal. Frame-up, a usual defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor since it is an allegation that can be made with ease. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the arresting policemen performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. On the argument that the officers had four days to secure a warrant but did not get one, the evidence was that the four-day period was not enough to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. All that the police authorities knew about appellant was the information gathered from the informer and their surveillance of the area. Furthermore, no warrant was needed considering that the mission was not a search but an entrapment. An arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. Any search resulting from a lawful warrantless arrest is valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person arrested (appellant in this case) committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.
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G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447 March 28, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA
FACTS: Napoleon Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda were told by Meris that she knew someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong in exchange for P15,000.00 each as their placement fee. When they went to Manila, they stayed in the house of Julie Micua who assured them of their overseas job, upon their payment of money. Two months after their downpayment, Ramos became suspicious and later realized that Meris and Micua are fake recruiters so the six of them went to Manila and filed criminal complaints for estafa and illegal recruitment against the accused, which led to her immediate arrest. Meris contended that she was also a victim of Micua and, more importantly, that the warrantless arrest conducted against her was illegal. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of petitioners, hence Meris filed this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was illegal. HELD: No, the warrantless arrest was legal. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-appellant voluntarily appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges against her, and later actively participated in the trial. Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellants arrest was defective, such is deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It should be stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused
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G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996 FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al. FACTS: A writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioners to desist and refrain from occupying their portions of the disputed lands pending litigation was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court. The Court then deputized the Philippine National Police of Lubao and Guagua, Pampanga to issue the said writ. After some time, the petitioners were able to garner a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and by virtue of such, the petitioners resumed occupation and cultivation of the disputed land. Thereafter, several policemen were dispatched in the area to enforce the earlier writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court. The policemen then arrested the petitioners for their refusal to vacate the area and subsequently charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of persons in authority. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the petitioners that was effected without a warrant was valid. HELD: Yes, the warrantless arrest was valid. At the time when the arrest was effected, the RTC has not been declared as without jurisdiction over the Agrarian case and therefore, the said writ of preliminary injunction it issued is in order. Following this, since at the time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP team was enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC and in seriously resisting the same the appellants intimidated the PNP team committing the alleged crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority, a warrant was not necessary for their arrest. Moreover, the petition for Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy. Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy then is the quashal of the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The reason for the issuance of the writ even becomes more unavailing when the person detained files a bond for his temporary release.
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G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975 LEONARDO ALMEDA vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ FACTS: Leonardo Almeda was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him but such request was denied. Because of this, Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Villaluz. Almeda contends that the judge has no authority to require that the bond be strictly in cash. ISSUE: Whether or not the judge may require that the bond to be posted entirely in cash. HELD: No, the judge does not have the authority to require such. The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. The trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond. The order of the judge denying the motion of the petitioner Almeda that he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is set aside, without prejudice to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of such conditions as the respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the attendance of the petitioner at the trial.
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A.M. No.MTJ-97-1139 October 16, 1997 ROBERTO ESPIRITU vs. JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS, respondent. FACTS: While Roberto Espiritu was with a group of people, Weny Dumlao approached him and fired at him three times, which resulted to his wounds. On the basis of this and his companions affidavits, SPO II Eduardo R. Yadao filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder in MCTC Pangasinan. After conducting a preliminary examination, Judge Jovellanos ordered the arrest of Dumlao and fixed the amount of bail for his provisional liberty at P20,000.00, which was later reduced to P10,000.00, stating that Dumlaos father had asked for the reduction. Later, the Judge ordered any peace officer under whose custody [Dumlao] may be found to release the latter in view of the fact that Dumlao had posted bail for P10,000.00. Thereafter, the Judge also ordered Dumlao to be released due to the fact that Dumlao had filed a case against Roberto Espiritu and others as a result of the same incident, charging Espiritu and his companions with a case for attempted murder and illegal possession of firearm. Espiritu sought a review in the Department of Justice, but his petition was denied for having been filed late hence he filed the complaint in this present case, alleging irregularities committed by respondent judge in the granting of bail and the conduct of the preliminary investigation of his complaint against Dumlao. ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of bail while Dumlao was not in the custody of the court and its reduction proper. HELD: Judge Jovellano correctly granted bail to Dumlao because he may be considered to be under constructive custody at the time when he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he personally asked respondent judge to admit him to bail and reduce its amount. We held that the accused was in the constructive custody of the law when he moved for admission to bail through his lawyers (1) by filing the application for bail with the trial court, (2) by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts, and (3) by unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of said court.
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G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010 JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas but was convicted by the RTC for homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals and, while the appeal was pending, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. However, the CA denied his petition for bail, ruling that Leviste failed to show that he suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger and that the court made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt. Leviste now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. His theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? HELD: No, Levistes stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules. Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
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On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. Given these, the petition is dismissed.
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G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001 FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Yap was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings but the motion was denied by the trial court. When the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. Yap however contended that the P5,500,000 proposed bail was violative of his right against excessive bail. The CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General and maintained the conditions and the P5,500,000 bail. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed this present petition. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the conditions set forth unduly restrict his constitutional liberty of abode and travel; and (2) whether or not the P5.5M bail is violative of his right against excessive bail. HELD: (1) No, the right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides exemptions to the rule, such as national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. (2) Yes the amount is too much. Section 9 of Rule 114 provides the factors to be considered when fixing the amount of bail. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
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G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000 MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16years old, had been contacted by Lavides for an assignation that night at his room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. He was charged with violation of RA 7610. Lavides filed a Motion, contending that the warrantless arrest made was illegal and that he should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right. Later, nine more Informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides. No bail was recommended but he still filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases. The trial court issued an order resolving the Motion of Lavides, ruling that he is allowed to post bail, under the conditions that: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused. He thereafter filed a motion to quash the Informations against him and to suspend his arraignment. The court however denied said motion so he was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. The court then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the Order. He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial courts denial of his motion to quash and the conditions set forth in its order. The CA declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic since Lavides has already been arraigned. He then filed this present petition in the SC, contending that the CA erred in not declaring condition (d) as a void condition and that his arraignment should be also considered void because it was held pursuant to a invalid condition. ISSUE: Whether or not the condition is void and the arraignment is invalid. HELD:
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The condition is void. Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
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A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007 Office of the Solicitor General vs. Judge Antonio de Castro FACTS: Gao Yuan, a national of the Peoples Republic of China, and her husband James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their two young children were on their way to a vacation in Canada when Philippine immigration officers arrested Gao Yuan and prevented her from boarding her flight. Her arrest was by virtue of an order issued by Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response to a letter from the Consul General of the PROC which alleged that Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and requested her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI Detention Center. Mahshi filed before the RTC the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio enjoined the Commissioner from initiating any deportation proceeding against Gao Yuan. Thereafter, Judge de Castro promulgated an Order of Release directing Commissioner Fernandez to immediately discharge the custody of Gao Yuan, she having filed her cash bond in the amount of P250,000.00. The RTC then took custody of Gao Yuan and clarified that it was only a provisional release for the duration of the TRO subject to certain conditions: the posting of an additional cash bond of P100,000.00; (2) her movements were to be monitored by the court; (3) the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her should she try to hide; and (4) the signing by Gao Yuan and her husband of an undertaking that she will come to court at any given time she is called. Respondent based the provisional release on humanitarian reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the PROC and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child. Commissioner Fernandez then was compelled to file a Notice of Appeal upon Gao Yuans release from the BIs custody. The OSG contends that Gao Yuans release on bail is illegal since such falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration and not in the regular courts pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A. No. 613. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has the authority to release an alien on bail while the case is pending. HELD: No, the RTC has no authority because the power to grant bail in deportation proceedings is vested in the BI. When an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, RTCs have no power to release said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.
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It should be noted too that Section 37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, provides that [a]ny alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration. . The exercise by the Commissioner of such power is discretionary. So too, the determination of the propriety of allowing the temporary release on bail of the alien, subject to deportation under the Immigration Act, as well as the conditions of such release falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner, not the courts of justice. The reason for this is that the courts do not administer immigration laws. The power of the Commissioner to grant bail in deportation proceedings should be exercised when the alien is still under investigation, and not after the order of deportation has been issued by the BI.
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G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ FACTS: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." Said agreement took effect on June 20, 1997. Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent so the NBI filed with the RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. In a petition for extradition filed by Hong Kong Special Administrative Region against Muoz, the latter has already filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." In a motion for reconsideration, his petition for bail was granted by respondent Judge Olalia, thus he was allowed to post a P750,000.00 bail. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the Order allowing Munoz to post bail but it was denied by Judge Olalia, hence the instant petition where the petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings .For his part, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty. ISSUE: Whether or not an extraditee is allowed to post bail. HELD: Yes. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
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extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence.
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G.R. No. 157977 February 27, 2006 EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILABRANCH 17, et al. FACTS: The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001 by the US Government through the DOJ against the petitioners. Petitioners applied for bail which the Regional Trial Court granted. The bail was set for one million pesos for each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court. Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail so in compliance with the Courts directive, the RTC, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied, hence this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not a prior notice and hearing is required before the cancellation of bail in extradition cases cancelled. HELD: Yes. However, the issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned as he is now in the USA facing the charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing. We agree that her bail should be restored. The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and is entitled to provisional release. Under these premises, and with the trial courts knowledge that in this case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing holddeparture order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.
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September 7, 2004 ANITA ESTEBAN vs. HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, and GERARDO ESTEBAN FACTS: Gerardo Esteban is the accused in four criminal cases. In each case, his sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty. However, while out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was once again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained. Fed up with Gerardos actuation, Esteban refused to post another bail and instead, she filed with the trial court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal cases and alleged that she is terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as certified to by the City Jail Warden. The Judge denied her application, as well as the motion for reconsideration, hence she filed this petition for certiorari. She contends that by surrendering the accused who is now in jail, her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114. ISSUE: Whether or not she may avail of the right to cancel bail as provided under Sec. 22 of Rule 114. HELD: No, petitioners submission is misplaced. Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the latters arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond. We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the accused who was charged in the four criminal cases to the trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case. A cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person in his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court.
G.R. No. 135012
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G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK ODIAMAR FACTS: Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he be released on bail which Buenafe opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail, stating that the evidence against Odiamar was not strong. Believing that respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed two motions to recall the bail, which was later dismissed by the court. The dismissal prompted Buenafe to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. This petition, like its predecessors, was also denied. Still convinced by the merit of its case, Buenafe filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct in allowing Odiamar to post bail even though he is charged with the crime of rape. HELD: Yes, Judge Cabral erred when he allowed respondent to post bail. In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and, as such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right. The test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. The court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above. This Court has observed that the lower courts order failed to mention and include some significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptom. The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summary that is incomplete is not a summary at all.
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G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA FACTS: An Information was filed against Defensor-Santiago with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, order of arrest was issued in said case against her by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. . On even date, Santiago filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which prays that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted and states that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,". So the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance. She then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with her cases. One year later, the Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against her by reason of her announcement, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the US to accept a fellowship offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Santiago now filed this instant petition, arguing that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over her when she posted her bail. HELD: Yes. The Court finds and so holds that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
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considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein. Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
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G.R. No. 115132 August 9, 1995 IMELDA R. MARCOS vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Imelda Marcos, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) pending before the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of these cases, petitioner was found guilty and was sentenced imprisonment. After conviction, she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. She then filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China, which was now supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Mrs. Marcos contended that she needs to travel to US and Europe for treatment of several heart diseases because the tests were not available here. Garchitorena, the presiding justice, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, to verify if the treatment for Mrs. Marcos illness was not really available here but the same was contradicted by Dr. Patacsil. The Office of the Special Prosecutor therefore opposed the motions, contending that the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated by Mrs. Marcos. On the other hand, the Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestation interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on humanitarian grounds provided that the accused comply with the terms and conditions for travel as may be imposed" by respondent court. ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the motion to travel abroad is a matter of right of the accused or a matter of discretion by the court. HELD: Yes, the granting of such motion is based on the discretion of the court. The court ruled that petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries.
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G.R. No. 138859-60 February 22, 2001 ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent. FACTS: Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order naming Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City as respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao recommended the prosecution of the aforenamed respondents for violation of Article 269 of the RPC. Significantly, the name of Alvarez A. Yusop, herein petitioner, was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of the Ombudsman. An Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan but it was learned later that he has already posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. Yusop thereafter filed a Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation but the same was denied by the SB for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court and that his filing of bail bond constitutes a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss because he was not accorded a preliminary investigation but it was still denied by the court under the same reason, hence this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a bail bond constitutes waiver of petitioners right to preliminary investigation. HELD: No, the filing of a bail bond does not constitute a waiver of petitioners right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, [a]n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x x x. We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted.
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G.R. No. 70746-47 September 1, 1992 BIENVENIDO O. MARCOS vs. HON. FERNANDO S. RUIZ, RTC JUDGE, 7TH JUDICIAL REGION, TAGBILARAN CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: After conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filedwith the Regional Trial Court of Bohol two informations against Marcos for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In the arraignment, Marcos appeared but asked for a resetting on the ground that his lawyer had just withdrawn and he had to look for another lawyer. The court granted his request and the arraignment was reset. It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his obligation with Oculam, the complainant in the criminal case, who executed a subscribed Affidavit of Desistance in favor of petitioner. When the cases were called, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared so arraignment was rescheduled. At the next arraignment, he was arraigned ex parte where he automatically entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution then presented its evidence ex-parte and rested its case. After this, the court then rendered a decision against the petitioner, asserting that his absence means that he will no longer present evidence. Thereafter, the trial court received an urgent motion for the resetting of the hearing filed by the petitioner which explained the non-appearance but the same does not contain a notice of hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal so it was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied his rights during the course of the trial. HELD: No, petitioner was not denied of his rights during the trial. Considering that he had been arraigned, petitioner was not required to appear at all the trials. Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 states that while it may be true that he has the right to be present at every stage of the proceedings, i.e. from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, he can also validly waive his presence to be present after the arraignment. On the other hand, petitioner was denied his right to be heard when the respondent Judge capriciously and arbitrarily considered that the case was already submitted for decision after the prosecution rested its case. The Judge blatantly disregarded Section 1(c) of Rule 115 when he considered the accuseds non-appearance during the first day of trial as a waiver of his right for the succeeding trial dates, when such should be construed to mean that he only waived his right to be present during that day of trial.
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G.R. No. 127772 March 22, 2001 ROBERTO P.ALMARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP.
FACTS: Petitioner is one of the accused in a case for estafa thru falsification of public document and another for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases. The When the case was already scheduled for trial, the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of RTC Makati was elevated to the Supreme Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto. The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioners counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioners three co-accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995. On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice hence, upon motion of petitioners counsel, respondent court moved that the case against Almario be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. However, upon motion of the private prosecutor the RTC set aside the previous Order that dismissed Almarios case. He filed for a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the CA, his appeal was likewise dismissed for lack of merit, hence this appeal by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners rights to speedy trial and against double jeopardy were violated. HELD: The right of the accused to speedy trial and against double jeopardy had not been violated. It has been held that the right to speedy trial may only be availed of when the trial was burdened by unreasonable delays but the fact that there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial as there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.
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G.R. NOS. 115236-37 JANUARY 16, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA FACTS: Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court which affirmed the judgement of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. In his Motion, Giovani Bernardino alleges that the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estopped, thus the lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial. He further contends that because of the absence of arraignment, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over them, hence the decision rendered against them was not valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to be arraigned may be waived or stopped. HELD: Yes. The allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading and betrays a lack of comprehension regarding the procedural requirements of arraignment in the context of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In one of the Courts decisions, it was held that the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
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G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION FACTS: The storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. The value of the missing articles was estimated at P15,298.15. The responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. At the arraignment, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well." Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop who already pleaded guilty, the RTC conducted the trial, which led the prosecution to present its witnesses and evidence. The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision. In the decision, respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the charge. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us contending that the decision denying reconsideration are "purely capricious and arbitrary, made for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals." ISSUE: Whether or not Mangalops plea of guilt immediately convicts him of the crime charged. HELD: Yes, the essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his plea. It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction
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automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
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G.R. Nos. L-30527-28 March 29, 1974 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PANFILO PADERNAL FACTS: Panfilo Padernal was charged by the Prosecutor with the crime of homicide. During the arraignment, Padernal pleaded guilty. The trial ensued for the determination of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete selfdefense but, after the testimony of Padernal, it was proved that he may invoke complete self-defense hence the trial judge ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered by the accused, even though the arraignment has long been done. The trial on the merits ensued and a decision acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal of the crime of homicide with which he was charged on the ground of reasonable doubt was reached by the court. On the other hand, Fiscal Alvero verbally moved for a reconsideration alleging that the accused has entered a plea of guilty which is sufficient to sustain conviction of the offense charged in the Information without the introduction of further evidence, the accused himself has supplied the necessary proof of his guilt and which closes the right of the accused to defend himself and leaves the Court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law. The oral motion for reconsideration was denied, as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, hence Fiscal Alvera filed this appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant may still be acquitted even though he already plead guilty during the arraignment. HELD: Yes, in People v. Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966, this Court ruled that where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete self-defense, the trial judge should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on the merits. For failure, in the Balisacan case, to follow this procedure, We ruled therein that there was deprivation of day in court against the prosecution. An acquittal on the merits thus made without the requisite trial providing sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, was held improper.
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G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008 JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Daan, together with Kuizon, were charged with three counts of malversation of public fund before the Sandiganbayan. In addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts. The prosecution found as acceptable the plea bargaining proposals of the accused. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. ISSUE: Whether or not the plea bargaining offer of the petitioner should be granted. HELD: Yes, the plea bargaining offer should be granted. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
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Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
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G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012 EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 196232 September 4, 2012 WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., FACTS: Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and others with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell BarrerasSulit and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into with the accused which was agreed upon by the SB. Outraged by this deal, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President initiated a case against Barreras-Sulit but she asserts that the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President may validly conduct the administrative disciplinary proceedings while the disposition on the PLEBARA is still pending. HELS: Yes, the Office of the President may initiate the proceedings. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner
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Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
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G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009 ARIEL M. LOS BAOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity vs. JOEL R. PEDRO FACTS: The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec. Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted but the same did not materialize because Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and attached a Comelec Certification which shows that he was exempted from the gun ban. By virtue of this, the RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos, representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated reopening which initially denied the petition but granted the same after a Motion for Reconsideration. Prosecutor Los Banos now filed this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which became permanent one year from the prosecutors receipt of the order. HELD: No, an examination of the whole Rule 117 tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
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The RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
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G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009 MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR. FACTS: Private respondents were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so because it should be the Office of the Ombudsman who filed the same. The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao, an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and prosecute the case could no longer be questioned. In a Resolution, then Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was also denied, hence this petition. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioners must be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash; and (2) Whether or not a motion to quash on the ground that it is the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: (1) No, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when
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the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. (2) No, the accuseds motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsmans power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government.
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G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006 JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioners are officers of Marcopper Mining Corp., engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. The Department of Justiced charged petitioners with violation of the Water Code of the Philippines, the National Pollution Control Decree, Philippine Mining Act and RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property by reason of the discharge millions of tons of tailings into the rivers due to their mining operation. Petitioners moved to quash the information on grounds that these were duplicitous as DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act and that the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification. The MTC ruled that as far as the 3 laws are concerned, only the Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. Thus, the Informations for violation of Anti-Pollution Law and the Water Code should be dismissed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act. The RTC reversed the said decision and ruled that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as the acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. This was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand. HELD: No, duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
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G.R. Nos. 107964-66 February 1, 1999 THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS FACTS: Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 were filed against Imelda Marcos in the RTC of Pasig. The petitioners asked for the consolidation of the three informations, hence the remaining one was re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan. Thereafter, without any action or filing any motion to quash the informations coming from Marcos, respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why the case should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondents right against ex post facto law. ISSUE: Whether or not a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latters right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy. HELD: No, it is clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one
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person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
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September 14, 2011 JOEL GALZOTE vs. JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: The prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place against Galzote before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Galzote thereafter moved to quash the said information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and in substance. He contends that the information did not allege conspiracy and questions why his alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser offense of malicious mischief in another case. The MeTC denied the petitioners motion to quash, as well as his motion for reconsideration. Galzote elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari. The petition, however, was denied by the court. Thereafter, he filed another petition for certiorari before the CA but the case was likewise dismissed. He now filed this present petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioners motion to quash the information against him was proper; and (2) Whether or not certiorari is the right mode of appeal regarding the denial of petitioners motion to quash. HELD: (1) No. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal information. A facial examination of the criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in form and substance for it states: (a) the name of the petitioner as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioners participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the information. (2) No, we find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any
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grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was consistent with the existing rules and applicable jurisprudence.
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G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE FACTS: Jason Ivler was charged with the separate offenses of (1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. During the arraignment, Ivler pleaded guilty on the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Thereafter, Ivler, invoking his right against double jeopardy, moved to quash the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property filed against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy was proper. HELD: Yes, the motion to quash is proper. The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses, hence the motion to quash is valid.
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G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010 TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., et al. vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City FACTS: The Government Prosecutor filed four informations charging Borlongan and others of four counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Petitioners then moved to quash the four (4) Informatiosn filed on the ground, among others, that "they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question." The court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC so the petitioners resorted to the filing of a special civil action for Certiorari in the CA but the same was also dismissed, hence this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to quash filed by petitioners was proper. HELD: Yes, the motion to quash should have been granted by the trial court. It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and identified the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr. However, in the accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board. The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
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G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE FACTS: Saballegue was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act, in an information. Said information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Saballegue pleaded not guilty so the case was set for pre-trial but, three days later, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The State Prosecutor thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Saballegue has waived his right to file a motion to quash when he pleaded to the information but said motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused waived his right to quash the information when he pleaded to the information. HELD: No. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for lack of authority of the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case. In the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
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G.R. No. 139615 May 28, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA FACTS: After surveillance and confirmation that drug activities were being conducted in the residence of the respondents, the police officials applied for a search warrant. Armed with the warrant, the policemen went to the residence of Tira and found drug paraphernalia. After Connies arrest, she filed a motion to quash search warrant, alleging that the police officers who applied for the said warrant did not have any personal knowledge of the reported illegal activities. The motion to quash, however, was denied by the RTC hence they were charged for violation of possession of marijuana and shabu, two offenses, in only one Information. They were both found guilty, hence this appeal. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the dismissal of the motion to quash the warrant was proper; and (2) Whether or not the information that charged them with two offenses valid. HELD: (1) Yes, the dismissal of the motion was proper. As can be gleaned from the facts, Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant after conducting searching questions, and in consideration of the affidavit of witness Enrique Milad. (2) The information is not valid because it charges two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. However, although only one Information was filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged therein and proved by the prosecution. Strictly speaking, the Information is defective because it charges two crimes and the appellants should have filed a motion to quash the Information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They failed to do so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said rule, the appellants may be convicted of the crimes charged. The said Rule provides: SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
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They are therefore found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the two offenses.
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G.R. No. 130026 May 31, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO FACTS: Two informations were filed against respondent, Magat, charging him with the crime of incestuous perpetrated against his daughter, Ann Fideli M. Magat At the arraignment, Magat pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public prosecutor agreed with the plea bargain, so he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for each case. After three months, however, the cases were revived at the instance of Magats daughter and wife on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence, Magat was rearraigned on both Informations where he entered a plea of not guilty. Three months thereafter, when the trial started, Magat entered anew a plea of guilty therefore, he was sentenced to death for each case. Because of the sentence of death, the SC had this automatic review of the case wherein Magat contends that the re-arraignment violated his right against double jeopardy because the case has already been decided and he has already been sentenced to ten years imprisonment for each case by the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the re-arraignment violates his right against double jeopardy. HELD: No. The order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that avoid judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not lie.
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G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ FACTS: Respondent, Hernandez, purporting herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, a recruitment and placement company, was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The trial court convicted respondent as charged. On appeal, respondent claimed that the prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements of the offense charged, that she is not licensed or does not have authority to engage in the business of placement and recruitment. The prosecution, however, avers that the said element was already admitted by the respondent during the pre-trial. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused -- equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial. HELD: No, said rules do not apply on stipulation of facts made during trial. A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "x x x an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit x x x has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, x x x which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive.". In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made x x x for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, x x x they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial." The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who represents him. For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity to defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire
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duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or through PhilippineThai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers. It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege which may be waived. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio, this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution. In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly. This is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that "x x x everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large." The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar. Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her defense
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G. R. No. 146854 April 28, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PASCUAL BALBARONA FACTS: Pascual Balbarona was charged of raping Odette M. Balbarona, his daughter before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 2. During arraignment, Balbarona pleaded not guilty to the accusation. The prosecution and defense subsequently entered into a stipulation of facts4 where it was admitted that the victim, Odette M. Balbarona, was appellants daughter and was fifteen at the time of the alleged rape; and that appellant was then living with the victim and his two other daughters. Balbarona was convicted by the RTC and to suffer the supreme penalty of death because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim and the offender is a parent. ISSUE: Whether or not stipulation of facts in pre-trial, which was admitted by the accused, can serve as evidence of minority of the victim. HELD: While the above-quoted information alleged the concurrence of the victims minority and her relationship to appellant as his daughter, the jurisprudentially required evidence to prove such circumstance is utterly lacking. Except for the bare testimonies of the parties, no birth certificate exists in the records to prove that the victim was fifteen (15) years old at the time she was raped by appellant. And yet there was no showing that her birth certificate was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the prosecutions fault. Thus, substitutionary evidence the victims and appellants testimonies was inadmissible. Much reliance is had on the stipulation of facts embodied in the trial courts June 22, 2000 Pre-trial Order whereby appellant admitted to the victim being his daughter and her being fifteen (15) years old at the time of the rape incident. This Court in People v. Sitao rejected stipulation of facts as a specie of evidence to prove the qualifying circumstances of rape: Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victims age be considered sufficient proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be the subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death.
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G.R. No. 148000 February 27, 2003 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas City) and MARIO N. AUSTRIA FACTS: On February 22, 2000, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Batangas City against Mario N. Austria for falsification of public official document. The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pretrial on August 1, 2000. Apparently, only three out of eleven witnesses were notified of said arraignment and pre-trial. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of said witnesses to appear before it. The public prosecutor asserted that only three were subpoenaed by the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of the case was not authorized under Republic Act No. 8493. However the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of witnesses during the pre-trial will amount to the dismissal of the case. HELD: Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor is vested with authority to consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
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G.R. No. 142848 June 30, 2006 EUGENE C. YU vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO OCHOA and REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. "Engine," FACTS: Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in Cavite where they were both shot to death. It was alleged that it was a military operation against communist rebels. An information was then filed against the said perpetrators but after investigation, the following individuals were included namely, Eugene C. Yu, and Patricia Lim-Yu as responsible for the commission of the offense. And the prosecution filed a Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos which was granted by the Court but contested by Eugene Yu for lack of evidence supporting such decision invoking Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is the one applicable despite the provision of Republic Act No. 6981 in the case at bar. HELD: The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court. On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17. An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. And the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise
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of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.
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G.R. No. 140690 June 19, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. NAZAR U. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and SPO1 Reynaldo Lim de la Victoria FACTS: An Information charging the offense of Multiple Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City. Venue of the case was moved to Cagayan de Oro City by virtue of Administrative Order No. 87-2-244. Thus, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other accused were at large. Two years later, Felizardo Roxas, was identified as another member of the group. Amended information was filed on to implead Roxas as a coaccused. He engaged the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. Roxas was given the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his defense, a preliminary investigation was conducted. In his counteraffidavit, Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the amended information was again amended to include private respondent Paderanga as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39. Trial of the case ensued. At the hearing, the prosecution called Roxas as its first witness. Paderanga objected to the presentation of Roxas testimony on the ground that the presentation of Roxas testimony will violate his right against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that before Roxas can be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state witness. Otherwise put, the prosecution cannot present Roxas as a hostile witness. On June 3, 1993 the trial court issued an order denying the prosecutions motion for reconsideration but setting the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness for hearing and granted the private respondents motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the prosecutions petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution may present the testimony of Felizardo Roxas as hostile witness. HELD: This is error. Clearly, the Order dated June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it did not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As such, the Order cannot be the proper subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in a special civil action for certiorari. Under the Rules of Court then governing, the petition for certiorari may be filed within a reasonable period.
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It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not necessary that the court discharges him first as state witness. There is nothing in the rules that says so. There is a difference between testifying as state witness and testifying as a co-accused. In the first, the proposed state witness has to qualify as a witness for the state, after which he is discharged as an accused and exempted from prosecution. In the second, the witness remains an accused and can be made liable should he be found guilty of the criminal offense. The trial court must determine with certainty, lest their right against self-incrimination be violated.
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G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007 HUN HYUNG PARK vs. EUNG WON CHOI FACTS: Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied.Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented wasinsufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurrer. HELD: Yes. In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the
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dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.- Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit
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G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002 JOEL M. SANVICENTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong. At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case together with the civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial courts resolution granting demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. HELD: Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
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G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986 SATURNINA GALMAN, et. al. vs. SANDIGAYNBAYAN, et. al. FACTS: A number of members of the Philippine Military were charged for the assassination of Former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. The fact finding committee created to determine what really occurred during that faithful day rejected the militarys version that Aquino was killed by a lone gunman, Galman. The investigation of the board revealed that only the soldiers in the staircase with Aquino could have shot him. Criminal charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, allegedy operating under the control of President Marcos acquitted all the accused of the crime charged. The private respondents is now questioning the charges against them arising from the same offense that were already decided by the Sandiganbayan alleging that the continuance of the proceedings would amount to a violation of their right against double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. HELD: None, Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
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G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN FACTS: Three separate informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban, and Illegal Possession of Firearms. During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Thereafter, joint trial of the three consolidated cases followed. On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. Then, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned, and not as regards the other two cases. Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him. Herein respondent judge granted Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not a demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits and will amount to an acquittal. HELD: An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy hence; the finality-of-acquittal rule is stressed. The exception to this rule is when the prosecution was denied due process of law. Such was not present in this case. Petitioner also used the wrong remedy before the Supreme Court; hence this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondents right against double jeopardy.
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G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICHARD O. SARCIA FACTS: Sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accusedappellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay. On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in not acquitting the accused Richard Sarcia. HELD: Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. The date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
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G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA FACTS: Mantalaba a 17-year old drug pusher was arrested after a buy-bust operation. He was found guilty of violation of RA9165. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death. It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application. The CA also did not suspend the sentence. ISSUE: Whether or not Mantalaba is entitled to suspended sentence. HELD: Mantalaba, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603
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G.R. No. 185960 January 25, 2012 MARINO B. ICDANG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Marino B. Icdang, Regional Director of the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) Region XII in Cotabato City, was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds and for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. SBs Second Division rendered its decision convicting petitioner of malversation and acquitting him from violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the accused to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. HELD: No. The right of the accused to due process was not violated. There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latters absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. -- The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
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G.R. No. L-24529 February 17, 1968 EDUARDO JIMENEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE PEDRO NAVARRO, Court of First Instance of Rizal
FACTS: Eduardo Jimenez, together with others, was charged with homicide in an information before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The case was heard and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias. The decision prepared and signed by Judge Mencias was delivered to the clerk of court on January 16, 1965. On the same date the clerk of court issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear in court on January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that January 21 was declared by the President a special holiday, the promulgation of the decision could not be carried out on that day. On January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had reached the age of 70 and was retired on that day from the bench. Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of Judge Mencias. The former judge ordered that the sentence be promulgated on January 29, 1965, but for some reason, it was postponed to March 1, 1965. Jimenez filed a motion to set aside decision and promulgation thereof, on the following grounds: (a) "That the case was heard and tried by the Hon. Eulogio Mencias and judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21, 1965, having reached the age of 70 years"; and (b) "That said judgment cannot be validly promulgated since it is no longer the official act of a judge, either de jure or de facto." ISSUE: Whether or not judgment may validly be promulgated despite the fact that the judge who rendered it is no longer the judge at the time of its promulgation. HELD: No. The decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court (Luna v. Rodriguez, 37, Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Criscini 37 Phil. 675; Barredo v. Commission on Elections, 45 O.G. 4457; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113, Aug. 28, 1956; People v. So, G.R. No. L-8732, July 30, 1957). In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation of termination of his incumbency as such judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega, (G.R. No. L-8732) this Court ruled: It is well-settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the judgment to be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the
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presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who has rendered it; and although it is true that it may be read by the clerk "when the judge is absent or outside the province," it is implied that it may be read, provided he is still the judge therein. Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal was delivered to the appellants. With more reasons, therefore, is there no judgment validly entered in this case.
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A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417 May 27, 2004 PETER BEJARASCO, JR. and ISABELITA BEJARASCO vs. JUDGE ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete, Cebu, SECUNDINO PIEDAD, Clerk of Court, and LEONISA GONZALES, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu FACTS: The complainants were charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation before the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu. According to the complainants, the respondent judge inhibited himself from the said cases on the ground of delicadeza and that Executive Judge Epifanio Llanos of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, designated Judge Palmacio Calderon of the MTC of Argao, Cebu, to hear and try the said cases. Judge Calderon conducted continuous and simultaneous trials, and the cases were submitted for decision on June 29, 1999. Unfortunately, Judge Calderon died on December 31, 1999 without having rendered judgment on the said cases. The complainants were surprise to receive a notice from the MTC of Argao Cebu, that their cases had been set for promulgation on May 15, 2000 by the respondent judge, who was then designated as presiding judge of the said court. The complainants counsel argued that the respondent judge could not promulgate the decision since he had earlier inhibited himself from trying the said cases, and that the judge who actually heard the case had already died. The respondent judge, however, ignored these arguments and proceeded with the promulgation of the Decision convicting the complainants. The complainants filed a petition for certiorari and while it was pending, investigated the signatures of the late Judge Calderon in his decisions with the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was found out that the signatures were forged. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment is valid considering the decision promulgated was penned by another judge. HELD: A judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly prepared by the judge, and duly signed by him. Corollary, a decision or resolution of the court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation. Promulgation of judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it. If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or member of a collegiate court has already vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn. In criminal cases, promulgation of judgment is made by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court only when the judge is absent or outside the province or city.
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It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who died during office cannot validly promulgate a decision penned by the latter. In fact, decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified in another office are null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his office. Granting arguendo that the decision in the criminal cases was indeed signed by the late Judge Calderon, respondent Judge Buenconsejo had no authority to promulgate the decision. Judge Calderon ceased to be the judge of that court, thus, the judgment which he signed cannot be promulgated by another judge. Any judgment or decision is valid and binding only if both [were] penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. Considering that the full records of the case were available for perusal, another judge could pen the decision even if he did not hear the case in its entirety. However, since Judge Buenconsejo previously inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases, he should have referred the matter to his Executive Judge and assigned another judge to render judgment thereon.
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G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011 ARNEL COLINARES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: RTC rendered judgment finding Arnel guilty of frustrated homicide but since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. Assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not he may still apply for probation having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. HELD: Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. Probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation. It is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
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G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976 LORENZO JOSE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Lorenzo Jose was convicted of illegal possession of explosives and seeks a new trial which was denied to him by the CFI of Pampanga and respondent CA. Petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. Trial Court denied the motion. When elevated to the CA, the Appellate Court also denied the same. Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case before the Supreme Court which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not a new trial may grant on the ground of newly discovered evidence. HELD: It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted. The Court held that the circumstances presented by petitioner justify a reopening of petitioner's case to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the documentary sought to be produced, and of cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the of the evidence during the trial.
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G.R. Nos. 96027-28 March 08, 2005 BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO HYPERLINK, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L. LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D. MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO TARAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquinos security detail upon his arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac. The Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused which includes the petitioners in its decision on December 2, 1985, however the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by the Supreme Court to be a sham trial thus nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases. A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan. In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder of Senator Aquino and Rolando Galman. The judgment became final after the Supreme Court denied petitioners petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show reversible error in the questioned decision, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman invoking the existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial which could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether or not new-trial be granted because of newly discovered evidence. HELD: Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
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even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence. The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless; it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant. In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him. Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial. The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proffered during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.
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G.R. No. 128986 June 21, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASAN MAQUILING FACTS: Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the private complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed the upgrading of the charge of homicide to murder. To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989. The trial court convicted private respondent of homicide and serious physical injuries. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals accepted the claim of self-defense. The appellate court also noted various flaws and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in effect strengthening the version set forth by the accused. It held, to the mind of the court, the discrepancies as to the manner the accused killed the deceased are material. Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution cast doubt on the guilt of the accused and such contradictory statements will not sustain a judgment of conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal made by the Solicitor General placed the accused in double jeopardy and whether or not it is valid if it does. HELD: Although the rule states that any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, the right of the people to appeal is expressly made subject to the proviso that such an appeal should not place the accused in double jeopardy. Consistently with this principle, it has been held that the constitutional mandate that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense prohibits not only a subsequent prosecution in a new and independent cause but also extends to an appeal in the same case by the prosecution after jeopardy had attached, thereby in effect viewing such appeal as presenting a new and separate jeopardy repugnant to the fundamental laws provision against double jeopardy. Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
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G.R. No. 103275 June 15, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Assisting Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, and REUBEN ALBAO FACTS: Ruben Albano was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment, private respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the parties rested their case before Judge Fortun. Judge Fortun promulgated his decision convicting Albano of the crime of arson. Albano moved for the reconsideration of the said decision and was granted and thus acquitted of the crime charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and executory and a reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal by the petitioner will place the accused in double jeopardy and thus invalidates the appeal. HELD: Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial (People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]). None exists in the case at bar. Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does not cover him. Secondly, private respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the assailed resolution of respondent judge. For one thing, it was an empty judgment of acquittal a bare adjudication that private respondent is not guilty of the offense charged anchored on the mere supposition that the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was a nullity. Indeed, respondent judge acquitted private respondent without expressing the facts and the law on which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
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G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN FACTS: The case at bar is a special civil action for Certiorari assailing the order rendered by Judge Villalon, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal. Based on the Court' s records, about the antecedent facts which resulted to the order issued by the respondent judge, complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Complainants, allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed against private respondent. A motion to dismiss was filed and later on granted by the respondent judge. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution is barred by reason of double jeopardy. HELD: The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant."
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G.R. No. 170979
February 9, 2011
JUDITH YU vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: The petitioner, Judith Yu, was charged and convicted with the crime of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Fourteen days after her conviction, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that she has discovered new and material evidence that will exculpate her from the crime of estafa. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Thereafter, using the ruling on Neypes vs Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court alleging that she had a fresh period of 15 days to perfect her appeal upon receipt of the Regional Trial Courts denial of her motion for new trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable in the case at bar. HELD: The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRSOF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro
FACTS: Neypes et. al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Oriental Mindoro, against respondents. In the course of the proceedings the parties filed various motions with the trial court. The court dismissed the petitioners complaint on February 12, 1998 and petitioners allegedly received a copy thereof on March 3, 1998 and on the 15th day thereafter, March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration and was received by the petitioners on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Petitioners argued that the 15-day period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time. HELD: The petitioners filed their notice on time. The appeal is within the 15 day period from notice of final judgment or final order appealed from within which the appeal should be filed. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day
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appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. The Court thus holds that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
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G.R. No. 141986 July 11, 2002 NEPLUM, INC. vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO FACTS: The trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting Neplum of the crime of estafa on October 29, 1999. On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment. On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed a motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment, considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999. On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal. On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It accepted respondents arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed. ISSUE: Whether or not the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended party. HELD: It is from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision. Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel. The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive or in providing for the reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
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It is petitioners assertion that the parties would always need a written reference or a copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and consider the judgment from which an appeal will be taken. Thus, it concludes that the 15-day period for filing a notice of appeal must be counted from the time the losing party actually receives a copy of the decision or order. Petitioner ratiocinates that it could not be expected to capture or memorize all the material details of the judgment during the promulgation thereof. It likewise poses the question: why require all proceedings in court to be recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit of utilizing these written [documents]? We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the judgment. In People v. Tamani, the Court was confronted with the question of when to count the period within which the accused must appeal the criminal conviction. Answered the Court: The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellants counsel by registered mail is not well-taken. The word promulgation in section 6 should be construed as referring to judgment, while the word notice should be construed as referring to order. The interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was to be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers are in agreement with this interpretation. In an earlier case, this Court explained the same interpretation in this wise: It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal case must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days from the date the decision is announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done by the court either by announcing the judgment in open court as was done in this case, or by promulgating the judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar, because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here we are confronted with the offended partys appeal of the civ il aspect only. Thus, the question arises whether the accused-appellants period for appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the same as that for the private offended party. The Court answer in the negative.
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G.R. No. 125306 December 11, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAFGU FRANCISCO BALTAR, JR., CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias ESPOK and ROLLY BALTAR, CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias ESPOK, FACTS: The trial court determined that the three accused, Baltar, Villanueva and Baltar, acted in conspiracy in the killing of Mariano Celino, Jr. From said decision, only Primo Villanueva has appealed. He prays for the reversal of said judgment, In this appeal, Primo Villanueva contends that the trial court erred in finding that he conspired with Rolly Baltar and Francisco Baltar, Jr. when the latter shot and killed Mariano Celino, Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the judgment of the appellate court. HELD: The accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the judgment of the appellate court insofar as it is favorable and applicable to him. In view of this conclusion that the crime committed and proved is homicide only and not murder, the SC discuss its consequences with respect to the criminal liability of the two other accused, namely Francisco Baltar, Jr. and Rolly Baltar, who did not interpose an appeal. Previously, the sentence imposed upon the accused who did not appeal became final, while that of his co-accused who appealed was stayed. For it had been held that decisions of the appellate court did not in any way affect the sentence imposed upon the accused who did not appeal, even if the appellants were subsequently acquitted or their sentences increased or reduced. Not having appealed, it was previously held that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over his case.
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G.R. No. 147524 June 20, 2006 SEGUNDO S. LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and CIRSE "CHOY" TORRALBA FACTS: Petitioner Lim and co-accused Boy "BG" Guingguing were convicted of libel in the RTC. A petition for review was filed by Lim but was denied. Meanwhile, Guingguing also filed a petition for review. The Court promulgated a judgment of acquittal in favor of Guingguing. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should benefit from Guingguings acquittal. HELD: Court applied to the accused, who appealed from their judgment of conviction whose conviction became final and executor, the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Courts finding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice." The nature of appeal throws open all contents of the case. Insofar as it has become favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall affect them. But if the judgment obtained in the appeal is not favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall not affect them.
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G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY FACTS: Feliciano Ulit had sexual intercourse with his 10-year old niece in numerous occasions. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty so the presentation of evidence started. After the prosecution rested its case, Ulit changed his plea of not guilty to guilty and manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death for each count of rape. Ulit did not appeal from the decision so in view of the trial courts imposition of the death penalty, the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal. Ulits sole contention is that the trial court erred in sentencing him with a death penalty despite his admission of guilt. ISSUE: Whether or not an automatic appeal to the SC is limited to the assigned errors that the accused presented. HELD: No. The appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors. An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. Given this, even if Ulit only assigned one error, the Court ruled on other issues regarding the case, such as: the validity of the change of his plea from not guilty to guilty; the strength of the evidence of the prosecution regarding the alleged rapes; the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the prosecution; and the guilt of Ulit in the two crimes of rape.
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G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. Accused has jumped bail and remained at large. It is worth to mention that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. HELD: When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them. As to when a judgment of
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conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote: "A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation." In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.
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G.R. No. 159116 September 30, 2009 SPS. NESTOR and FELICIDAD DADIZON vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. DOMINADOR and ELSA MOCORRO FACTS: The Mocorros spouses filed a case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naval, Biliran against the Dadizons to recover a parcel of land with an area of 78 square meters and to cancel the latter's tax declaration. Because of a judgment unfavorable to them, the Dadizons filed a notice of appeal. The Mocorros moved to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal on the ground that the mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA dismissed the Dadizons' appeal through its resolution dated February 26, 2003.11 The CA denied the Dadizons' motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2003. Hence, the Dadizons have come to the Supreme Court to assail the dismissal of their appeal and the denial of their motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the mode appeal of the Dadizons was erroneous. HELD: The mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC via a notice of appeal adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They should have filed a Petition for Review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
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G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009 IRENORIO B. BALABA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Irenorio Balaba was the assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guidulman, Bohol. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with Malversation of Funds. On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty. On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Balabas appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the Sandiganbayan. Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that the notice of appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal was dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits. The Court of Appeals denied Balabas motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court. HELD: Upon Balabas conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. RA 8249 states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
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G.R. No. 173990 October 27, 2009 EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, and EDWARD RANADA FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija, then Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority, for violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019 and the RTC rendered a decision convicting Estarija of the crime charged and imposing upon him a straight penalty of seven years. Estarija filed his notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of appeal is correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals. HELD: Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 reads: In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. It is manifest from the above provision that the decisions of the Regional Trial Court -- convicting an accused who occupies a position lower than that with salary grade 27 or those not otherwise covered by the enumeration of certain public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 are to be appealed exclusively to the Sandiganbayan. Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. In the instant case, instead of appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan, Estarija erroneously filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. This fatal flaw committed by Estarija did not toll the running of the period for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because of Estarijas failure to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor, the Decision of the RTC convicting him of violating Section
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3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 has thus become final and executory. G.R. No. 188630 February 23, 2011 FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES FACTS: Petra Martinez filed a civil action for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court against Armando Villanueva, the husband of the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) Filomena Villanueva. The trial court declared Armnado in default and ordered him to pay the amount of P 1, 107, 210.90 plus fine and interest. Armando filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals alleging that he should not be made to pay said loan as the same had long been fully paid as shown by an official receipt evidencing his payment. The CA nullified the RTC decision on the ground that the obligation has been settled. Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner Filomena Villanueva with violation of Sec. 7 (d) in relation to Sec. 11 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A No. 6713). The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The Ombudsman also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court found merits in the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration to which the Court of appeals denied both motions. Aside from those cases, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner for violation of Sec. 2 (d) of R.A No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Claveria Cagayan (MCTC). MCTC promulgated its decision convicting petitioner and imposing penalty of 5 years imprisonment and disqualification to hold office. Petitioner appealed the MCTC decision to the RTC of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan but the RTC affirmed the MCTC decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the petition. The petitioner argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for the first time before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to bring out the same when she appealed the MCTC Decision to the RTC. She claimed to have availed of the remedy provided under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court in good faith. The CA agreed with the OSG and the CA dismissed the petition. ISSUE:
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Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the petition. HELD: In this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides, among others, that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. This has been the consistent holding of the Court. Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the petitioners husband, was also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation had already been settled. This civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases filed against petitioner. Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an afterthought considering that the civil case against her husband and the administrative case against her were resolved in the couples favor. Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the interest of substantial justice that the criminal case against her should be reviewed on the merits by the proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under the rules. Our legal culture requires the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. The primary consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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G.R. No. 144590 February 7, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO F. PARADEZA
FACTS: On June 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, was found the appellant, Romeo F. Paradeza guilty of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant then filed his notice of appeal anchored on the sole assignment of error that the Court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused- appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Public Attorneys Office, as counsel for appellant, filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. The Brief for the appellant was filed on June 1, 2001, and the Brief for the appellee was filed on November 20, 2001. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment seeking stiffer penalties, pointed out that since the appellee as well as the appellant already filed briefs, under the Rules of Court, the approval of appellants motion to withdraw his appeal is now a matter of discretion on the part of the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court could grant the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by accused-appellant. HELD: An appeal is a "resort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court or administrative agency." As a statutory remedy to correct errors which might have been committed by the lower court, the object of an appeal is simply and solely the protection of the accused. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of the due process. Like any other right or privilege, it may be waived. A person accused and convicted of an offense may withdraw his appeal not only because he is guilty as charged. It could be due to his prior erroneous perception of the applicable provision of law, or of the decision itself. He may feel that to seek a pardon might be the better and faster remedy. Regardless of his reasons, in our view, he is within his rights to seek the withdrawal of his appeal. This option should not be closed to herein accusedappellant except for clearly important substantial reasons of law and policy. Appellant in withdrawing his appeal has accepted and recognized that the trial courts judgment of conviction and his sentence thereunder is conclusive upon him. His exercise of the option to withdraw appeal before the case is submitted for this Courts decision, but fully cognizant of its legal consequences at this stage of the case, not only saves the Court precious time and resources. It also opens soonest the path for the reformation of the contrite offender, pursuant to the ideal of a just and compassionate society envisioned
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in our fundamental law. Considering the particular circumstances of this case, this Court is not without justifiable reasons to act favorably on his motion. G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004 IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) JUNE DE VILLA vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS FACTS: Reynaldo De Villa was charged with the crime of rape by his niece Aileen Mendoza. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. An automatic review was made, the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua. Reynaldo is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Three years after the promulgation of judgment, June De Villa, the son of Reynaldo was informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case, of which he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine paternity and that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. Hence he sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test but it was denied. Convict filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration for the test but was again denied. June DE villa, was undaunted by these challenges. He then gathered thru some help, samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa and transported them to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory. After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's ISSUE: Whether or not the presentation of newly-discovered evidence be allowed through a petition to grant new trial. HELD: A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
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that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, the court nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newlydiscovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, the court is not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
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G.R. No. 126170 August 27, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMMA MAQUILAN FACTS: Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing in violation of R.A. No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal as a result of which the records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However, before the Court could act on the appeal, accused-appellant moved to withdraw her appeal, as she was going to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to seek her release from confinement. The Solicitor General was ordered by the Supreme Court to comment on said withdrawal and required accused-appellants counsel, Atty. de Guzman to confer with her and to determine whether in filing the motion was done voluntarily. The Solicitor General stated he had no objection to the motion. Atty. de Guzman informed the Court that accused-appellant had been released from prison by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court issued in a habeas corpus case. Subsequently, the Court required Judge Lavia of the Regional Trial Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus , considering that the appeal in this case was still pending. ISSUE: May an accused-appellant file for habeas corpus after withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion? HELD: The release of accused-appellant constitutes unlawful interference with the proceedings of this Court and is only somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City appears to have been misled by accused-appellant as to the status of the decision in Criminal Case No. S2191. The trial courts order granting release on habeas corpus, based as it is on the erroneous assumption that the decision in the criminal case had become final, is void. The trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the order in question. This case is analogous to People v. Bacang. There accused-appellants moved for the withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion, they applied for and were granted pardon by the President and released from confinement. Quoting People v. Salle,Jr., this Court ruled: We now declare that the conviction by final judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
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pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement. Accordingly, the Court in that case denied the accused-appellants motion to withdraw their appeal and ordered their rearrest. Those responsible for their release were cited for contempt. What was said in Bacang applies mutatis mutandis to this case. The use of the high prerogative writ as a post-conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment by virue of which accused is detained for the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, however, that is not the case here as accusedappellants appeal is still pending.
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G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005 SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA FACTS: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed. Subqequently, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said court after hearing the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy. HELD: No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum shopping.
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G.R 80812
September 2, 1992 LUZ TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: A criminal charge for illegal recruitment was filed against petitioner, Tan. She pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The prosecution then presented all its witnesses. The defense wasnt able to present its witness despite several schedules of hearing. Consequently, the trial court declared petitioner to have lost her right to present evidence and the case was deemed submitted for decision. On May 28, 1986, the trial court found the petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner then filed for a Notice of Appeal with the CA and when she could not file her brief within the 30-day reglamentary period, she moved and was granted a 90-day extension until August 12, 1987. On August 4, 1987, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and motion praying that the period for the filing of Appellants Brief be suspended, and that she be given five days (until August 9, 1987) to file a Motion for New Trial. The CA, on August 18, 1987, denied aforesaid Manifestation but granted the filing of a Motion for New Trial provided that the decision of the trial court had not yet become final on account of petitioners failure to file her brief. Luz Tan filed a Motion for New Trial on August 24, 1987 which motion was denied by the court. Then, petitioner filed a motion for leave to admit Appellants Brief. This was denied on October 7, 1987. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case for an error in the procedure in the Court of Appeals. HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioners filing of the Motion for New Trial did not suspend the period for filing appellants brief which was due to expire on August 12, 1987. Such assumption is not supported by the Rules of Court or any other authority. When Tan filed her Motion for New Trial, she did not take any step to file her brief, but simply waited for the resolution of said motion, such being subsequently denied. Petitioner was grossly negligent and had no one to blame but herself in losing her right to appeal since the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost, as in the case at bar.
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PERTINENT LAWS ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Sec. 32, BP 129, as amended by RA 7691 SC Adm. Circular No. 09-94 Adm. Circular No. 104 96 Jurisdiction of Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts in Cities 1. All civil cases, the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, and all probate proceedings, where the value of personal property, estate or amount of demand does not exceed Php 200,000. exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses (in Metro Manila, the amount should be Php 400,000.) 2. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (ejectment) 3. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property or any interest therein where the assessed value does not exceed Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila Php 50,000.) exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses 4. Civil cases under the rules on summary procedure 5. All offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years, regardless of the fine or other imposable accessory or other penalties including the civil liability (in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction) 6. Petitions for issuances of original certificates of titles Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts A. Exclusive original jurisdiction 1. All civil cases in which the subject of litigation cannot be estimated in monetary terms 2. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, where the assessed value of the property exceeds Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila exceeding Php 50,000.) Exceptions: forcible entry and unlawful detainer of lands and buildings 3. All actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, over Php 200,000) 4. All probate matters, both testate and intestate where the gross value of the estate exceeds Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, the value must exceed Php 200,000.) 5. All actions involving the marriage contract and marital relations (annulment, legal separation, support, etc)
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6. All cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or quasi-judicial body 7. All civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) and the Court of Agrarian Relations 8. All other cases in which the demand or the value of personal property, exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other costs, exceeds Php 200,000. (in Metro Manila, the value must exceed Php 400,000.) 9. Intra-corporate disputes (formerly under the SEC); intellectual property cases B. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the lower courts (MTCs) in their respective territorial jurisdictions C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against all lower courts; habeas corpus and quo warranto Note: Republic Act 8369, approved on October 28, 1997, established the Family Court, with jurisdiction over adoption, guardianship, custody of children, support, acknowledgment, complaints for annulment or nullity of marriage, criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below 18 years of age, domestic violence against women and children, etc. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals A. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs and processes B. Exclusive jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Courts C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against the RTCs, the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, commissions and other quasi-judicial bodies or agencies. D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and RTCsover petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against lower courts and quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. E. Appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals from RTCs, except in cases exclusively appealable to the Supreme Court; petitions for review from the RTCs in all cases appealed to it from the lower courts; petitions for review from the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Tax Appeals and the other quasi-judicial bodies or agencies (e.g. National Labor Relations Commission)
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Note: The Sandiganbayan handles cases of government officials and employees with salary grades 27 and above. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court A. Original exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed against the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, and the Department of Labor and Employment B. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed against the Regional Trial Courts, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, other quasi-judicial bodies C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed against the lower courts and certain quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs over actions against ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls E. Appellate jurisdiction over petitions for review on certiorari from the CA, Sandiganbayan and RTCs on questions of law only; criminal cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is either death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) on questions of fact and law. ACT NO. 3326 AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
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the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code. Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval. SEC 6.; SEC 10. A.M No. 06-11-5-SC RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction. Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause. A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.
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