E.H. Carr What is History?

? Chapter 1 The Historian and His Facts In the first chapter, Carr examines whether a neutra , o!"ecti#e account of history is possi! e. He first te s us that the $uestion %what is history?& has !een answered in different ways o#er the years. In the nineteenth century, the emphasis was on collecting facts and then drawing conclusions from them. This was 'nown as the (empiricist tradition. %Facts, i'e sense)impressions, impin*e on the o!ser#er from outside and are independent of his consciousness. The process of reception is passi#e+ ha#in* recei#ed the data, he then acts on them.& Carr ar*ues that this way of oo'in* at history is fa acious. What exact y is a historica fact? ,ccordin* to the empiricist tradition, there are %certain !asic facts which are the same for a historians and form the !ac'!one of history.& However, Carr says it is that which the historian, from his point of view, considers important, and this is what separates it from ordinary facts of the past. That Caesar crossed the -u!icon is treated as a historica fact, !ut that hundreds of thousands of peop e crossed it !efore him and ha#e !een crossin* it since is not. Therefore, an element of interpretation enters into every fact of history. The historian is necessarily selective. %The !e ief in a hard core of historica facts existin* o!"ecti#e y and independent y of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fa acy, !ut one which it is #ery hard to eradicate.& What is the criterion which distin*uishes the facts if history from other facts a!out the past? .That it inf uenced the i#es of so many peop e/. 0a'er)mo! examp e. Carr then *i#es the examp e of ancient 1reece. %2ur picture of 1reece in the fifth century 0C is defecti#e not primari y !ecause so many of the !its ha#e !een accidenta y ost, !ut !ecause it is, !y and ar*e, the picture formed !y a tiny *roup of peop e in the city of ,thens. We 'now a ot a!out what fifth century 1reece oo'ed i'e to an ,thenian citi3en4 !ut hard y anythin* a!out what it oo'ed i'e to a 5partan, a Corinthian, or a The!an not to mention a 6ersian, or a s a#e, or other non)citi3en residents in ,thens. Our picture has been preselected and predetermined for us, not so much by accident as by people who were consciously or unconsciously imbued with a particular view and thought the facts which supported that view worth preserving. In the words of 6rofessor 0arrac ou*h+ The history we read, though based on facts, is strictly spea ing, not factual at all, but a series of accepted !udgments. Carr is e$ua y critica of %the fetishism of documents&, which went hand)in)hand with the %fetishism of facts.& He says+ the facts, whether found in documents or not, have still to be processed by the historian before he can ma e use of them" the use he ma es of them is, if # may put it that way, the processing process. ,nd e#en the documents, as he exp ains in a te in* examp e, re#ea on y one perspecti#e, one point of #iew. 5tresseman examp e the documents do not te us what happened !ut what the author thought had happened, or what he wanted others to thin . #t is he himself who starts the process of selection. This #iew of history can !e summed up in the words of -an'e+ %simp y to show how it rea y was.& The nineteenth century conception of history was cha en*ed !y the Ita ian historian Croce, accordin* to whom+ %, history is contemporary history&, meaning that history consists essentially in seeing the past through the eyes of the present and in the light of its problems, and that the main wor of the historian is not to record, but to evaluate$ for, if he does not evaluate, how can he now what is worth recording% In this he was supported !y Car 0ec'er, who said+ the facts of history do not e&ist for any historian until he creates them. Carr *oes on to descri!e the #iews of Co in*wood, another proponent of this schoo of thou*ht. Co in*wood ar*ues that the phi osophy of history is concerned neither with 'the past by itself, nor with the historians thought about it by itself, but with 'the two things in their mutual relations. This dictum ref ects the two current meanin*s of the word (history7 the in(uiry conducted by the historian and the series of past events into which he in(uires . The past which a historian studies is not a dead past, !ut a past which in some sense is sti i#in* in the present. 0ut a past act is dead, i.e. meanin* ess to the historian un ess he can understand the thou*ht that ay !ehind it. Hence, all history is the history of thought, and 'history is the re)enactment in the historians mind of the thought whose history he is studying. The reconstitution of the past in the historian7s mind is dependent on empirica e#idence. *ut it is not in itself an empirical process, and cannot consist in a mere recital of facts. 2n the contrary, the process of reconstitution *o#erns the se ection and interpretation of the facts+ this indeed ma'es them historica facts.& ,ccordin* to 2a'eshott+ %History is the historian7s experience. It is %made& !y no!ody sa#e the historian to write history is the on y way of ma'in* it.& 5ome important conc usions eadin* from this are+

1/ The facts of history never come to us 'pure since they do not and cannot e&ist in a pure form. They are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. The first concern therefore should not be with the facts but the historian who writes them. .Tre#e yan 8whi* history94 1i!!on/ :/ The historian needs to have an imaginative understanding for the minds of the people with whom he is dealing, for the thought behind their acts. He must achieve some ind of contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing. 8history of En* ish !y so#iets and so#iets !y En* ish disp ays a ma i*n, sense ess and hypocritica attitude since they don7t enter into minds of each other.9 +, -e can view the past and achieve our understanding of the past only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human e&istence. The very words he uses . words li e democracy, empire, war, revolution . have current connotations from which he cannot divorce them. The function of the historian is neither to love the past or to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the ey to the understanding of the present. 2n the other hand, some of the dan*ers are+ 1/ This is tota scepticism, at the other end of the spectrum from those who !e ie#e in the pure o!"ecti#e truth. #t does not follow that, because interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no e&isting interpretation is wholly ob!ective, one interpretation is as good as another, and the facts of history are in principle not amenable to ob!ective interpretation history not spun out of the human !rain. .;ery important criti$ue of <en'ins/. 8mountain from diff an* es examp e, doesn7t mean it has no shape at a or an infinity of shapes, interpretation p ays a necessary part !ut no one inter is comp ete y on"ecti#e9 :/ If the historian necessari y oo's at his period of history throu*h the eyes of his own time, and studies the pro! ems of the past as a 'ey to those of the present, will he not fall into a purely pragmatic view of the facts, and maintain that the criterion of a right interpretation is its suitability to some present purpose% The so ution Carr proposes is a midd e *round !etween facts and interpretation+ The historian must see to bring into the picture all nown or nowable facts relevant, in one sense or another, to the theme on which he is engaged and to the interpretation proposed. The historian starts with a pro#isiona se ection of facts, and a pro#isiona interpretation in the i*ht of which that se ection has !een made !y others as we as himse f. ,s he wor's, !oth the interpretation and the se ection and orderin* of facts under*o su!t e and perhaps part y unconscious chan*es throu*h the reciproca action of one or the other. ,nd this reciproca action a so in#o #es reciprocity !etween present and past, since the historian is part of the present and the facts !e on* to the past. The historian and the facts of history are necessary to one another. The historian without his facts is root ess, the facts without their historian are dead and meanin* ess. /ee page 01 Carr ends !y proposin* a new definition of history+ History is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past. -e ation !=w historian and facts is one of *i#e and ta'e.

Chapter : 5ociety and the Indi#idua Carr aims to find out how far are historians sin* e indi#idua s and how far products of their society and their period, and how fare are the facts of history facts a!out sin* e indi#idua s and how far socia facts. This is !ecause every human being at every stage of history or pre)history is born into a society and from his earliest years is moulded by that society. The an*ua*e which he spea's is not an indi#idua inheritance !ut a socia ac$uisition from the *roup in which he *rows up. 0oth an*ua*e and en#ironment he p to determine the character of his thou*ht4 his ear iest ideas come to him from others. 6rimiti#e man is ess indi#idua and more comp ete y mou ded !y his society. These societies are more uniform and pro#ide opportunities for a esser di#ersity of peop e. The historian is an individual human being. 2i e other individuals, he is also a social phenomenon, both the product and the conscious or unconscious spo esman of the society to which he belongs$ it is in this capacity that he approaches the facts of the historical past. 1reat history is written precise y when the historian7s #ision of the past is i uminated !y insi*hts into the pro! ems of the present. .6rocession/ ,ccordin* to Carr, you cannot fu y understand or appreciate the wor' of the historian un ess you have first grasped the standpoint from which he himself approached it4 that standpoint is itse f rooted in a socia and historica !ac'*round. The historian, before he begins to write history, is a product of history. 31rote7s History of 1reece, >ommsen7s History of -ome/ For examp e, in the nineteenth century, 0ritish historians with scarce y an exception regarded the course of history as a demonstration of the principle of progress+ they expressed the ideo o*y of a society in a condition of remar'a! e rapid pro*ress. History was fu of meanin* for the 0ritish historians, so on* as it seemed to !e *oin* our way4 now that it has ta'en a wron* turnin*, !e ief in the meanin* of history has !ecome a heresy. ,fter the First Wor d War, Toynbee made a desperate attempt to replace a linear view of history by a cyclical theory the characteristic ideo o*y of a society in dec ine. 5ince Toyn!ee7s fai ure, 0ritish historians ha#e for the most part !een content to throw in their hands and dec are that there is no general pattern at all. Therefore, the thou*h of historians, as of other human !ein*s, is mou ded !y the en#ironment of the time and p ace. Carr goes on to add that it is the historian who is most conscious of his own situation is also more capable of transcending it, and more capable of appreciating the essential nature of the differences between his own society and the outloo and those of other periods and other countries, than the historian who loudly protests that he is an individual and not a social phenomenon. 3;ery important method of achie#in* o!"ecti#ity/. Furthermore, re*ardin* history itse f, the facts of history are facts a!out indi#idua s, !ut not a!out actions of indi#idua s performed in iso ation, and not a!out the moti#es, rea or ima*inary, from which indi#idua s suppose themse #es to ha#e acted. They are facts about the relations of individuals to one another in society and about the social forces which produce from the actions of individuals results often at variance with, and sometimes opposite to, the results which they themselves intended. -e*ardin* the %*reat men&, or the outstandin* indi#idua s of each historica period, Carr says that they too are products of their society, and it is a mista e to see them outside history, and imposing themselves on history in virtue of their greatness. He $uotes He*e + %The *reat man of the a*e is the one who can put into words the wi of his a*e, te his a*e what its wi is, and accomp ish it. What he does is the heart and essence of his a*e. He actua ises his a*e.& Carr ends !y sayin*+ %History then, in !oth senses of the word meanin* !oth the in$uiry conducted !y the historian and the facts of the past into which he in$uires is a social process, in which individuals are engaged as social beings$ and the imaginary antithesis between society and the individual is no more than a red herring drawn across our path to confuse our thin ing. The reciprocal process of interaction between the historian and his facts, the dialogue between the present and past, is a dialogue not between abstract and isolated individuals, but between the society of today and the society of yesterday. To enable man to understand the society of the past, and to increase his mastery over the society of the present, is the dual function of history.

Carrs contribution based on empirical evidence" 1. History is a matter of num!ers. ?ame ess indi#idua s act more or ess unconscious y, to*ether and constitutin* a socia force. E*. @iscontented peasants. :. ,ctions of indi#idua s ha#e resu ts that were not intended or desired !y the actors. E*., *reat depression.

Chapter A History, 5cience and >ora ity Carr pro#ides and contends with fi#e p ausi! e reasons why History shou d not !e ca ed a science+ 1/ History deals e&clusively with the uni(ue, science with the general+ Carr disa*rees, sayin* that the historian constantly uses generalisation to test his e#idence. For examp e, the 6e oponnesian War and the 5econd Wor d War were #ery different and !oth were uni$ue, !ut the historians ca them !oth %wars.& 1i!!on ca s !oth the rise of Christianity and the rise of Is am %re#o utions.& History is concerned with the re ation !etween the uni$ue and the *enera . :/ History teaches no essons+ Carr says that the rea point a!out *enera isation is that through it we attempt to learn from history, to apply the lesson drawn from one set of events to another set of events+ when we *enera ise, we are conscious y or unconscious y tryin* to do this. He *i#es the examp es of ,ncient -ome earnin* from ,ncient 1reece, or the -ussian -e#o ution deri#in* essons from the French. He *oes on to add that earnin* from history is ne#er a one way process. To earn a!out the present in the i*ht of the past means a so to earn a!out the past in the i*ht of the present. The function of history is to promote a profounder understandin* of !oth past and present throu*h the interre ation !etween them. A/ History cannot predict+ 2nce a*ain Carr disa*rees. He says+ The historian, as we have seen, is bound to generalise$ and in so doing, he provides general guides for future action which, though not specific predictions, are both valid and useful. 0ut he cannot predict specific e#ents, !ecause the specific is uni$ue and !ecause the e ement of accident enters into it.& The Historian a so dea s in pro!a!i ities. B/ History is necessari y su!"ecti#e+ The socio o*ist, the economist, or the historian needs to penetrate into the forms of human !eha#iour in which the wi is acti#e, to ascertain why the human !ein*s who are the o!"ects of his study wi ed to act as they did. This sets up a re ation, which is pecu iar to history and the socia sciences, !etween the o!ser#er and what is o!ser#ed. The point of view of the historian enters irrevocably into every observation he ma es$ history is shot through and through with relativity. , so, the process of o!ser#ation affects and modifies what is !ein* o!ser#ed this can happen in two ways. The human beings whose behaviour is made the ob!ect of analysis and prediction may be warned in advance by the prediction of conse(uences unwelcome to them, and be induced by it to modify their actions, so the prediction, however correctly based on the analysis, proves self)frustrating. The other is that prediction may lead to actual realisation . Howe#er, Carr counters this !y sayin* that e#en modern physica scientists ha#e now ac'now ed*ed that the process of 'now ed*e, rather than separatin* su!"ect and o!"ect, in#o #es a measure of interre ation and interdependence !etween them. C/ History is in#o #ed with $uestions of re i*ion and mora ity+ Carr says that the situation of the historian is simi ar to that of the astronomer, who may !e ie#e in the existence of 1od, !ut not in that type of a 1od who can chan*e the course of p anets at wi . /imilarly, the historian may believe in a 4od who has ordained the course of history as a whole, but not in that 4od who intervenes to slaughter the 5male ites or cheats on the calendar by e&tending the hours of daylight for the benefit of 6oshuas army. 7or can he invo e 4od as an e&planation of particular historical events. ,s far as mora ity is concerned, Carr says that it is not re(uired of the historian to pass moral !udgments on the private life of the characters in his story. The standpoints of the historian and the moralist are not identical. Carr $uotes Croce+ %The accusation for*ets the *reat difference that our tri!una s, whether "uridicia or mora / are present day tri!una s desi*ned for i#in*, acti#e and dan*erous men, whi e those other men ha#e a ready appeared !efore the tri!una of their day, and cannot !e condemned or a!so #ed twice. They cannot !e he d responsi! e !efore any tri!una whatsoe#er, "ust !ecause they are men of the past who !e on* to the peace of the past and as such can on y !e su!"ects of history, and can suffer no other "ud*ment than that which penetrates and understands the spirit of their wor'D those who, on the p ea of narratin* history, !ust e a!out as "ud*es, condemnin* here and *i#in* a!so ution there, !ecause they thin' that this is the office of historyD are *enera y reco*nised as de#oid of historica sense.

There is am!i*uity, howe#er, where pu! ic institutions are concerned. The historian wi not pass "ud*ment on the indi#idua s a#e)owner, !ut this does not pre#ent him from condemnin* a s a#e)ownin* society. To this Carr says that our moral !udgments are made within a conceptual framewor which is itself the creation of history. #t is impossible to erect an abstract and super)historical standard by which historical actions can be !udged. *oth sides inevitably read into such a standard the specific content appropriate to their own historical conditions and aspirations. Historians, therefore, tend to e&press their moral !udgments in words of a comparative nature li e 'progressive and 'reactionary rather than 'good or 'bad. These are attempts to define different societies or historical phenomena not in relation to some absolute standard but in their relation to one another. >oreo#er, when we examine these supposed y a!so ute and extra)historica #a ues, we find that they too are in fact rooted to history. The emer*ence of a particu ar #a ue or idea at a *i#en time or p ace is exp ained !y the historica conditions of the p ace and time. The practica content of hypothetica a!so utes i'e e$ua ity, i!erty, "ustice, or natura aw #aries from period to period, or from continent to continent. Each *roup has its own #a ues, which are rooted in history. E#ery *roup protects itse f a*ainst the intrusion of a ien and incon#enient #a ues which it !rands !y oppro!rious epithets. The a!stract standard or #a ue, di#orced from society and di#orced from history, is as much an i usion as the a!stract indi#idua . The !e iefs that we ho d and the standards of "ud*ment that we set up are part of history, and are as much su!"ect to historica in#esti*ation as any other aspects of human !eha#iour. Few sciences today wou d ay c aim to tota independence. Chapter B Causation in History The first characteristic of the historian7s approach to the pro! em of cause is that he wi common y assi*n se#era causes to the same e#ent. The historian deals in a multiplicity of causes. The second characteristic is to reduce it to order, to establish some hierarchy of causes which wou d fix their re ation to one another, perhaps to decide which cause, or which cate*ory of causes, shou d !e re*arded in the ast resort, or in the fina ana ysis. 8very historical argument revolves around the (uestion of the priority of causes. The historian must wor' throu*h the simp ification, as we as throu*h the mu tip ication, of causes. Carr then *oes on to dea with the conf ict !etween determinism and chance in history. @eterminism is defined as the !e ief that e#erythin* that happens has a cause or causes, and cou d not ha#e happened different y un ess somethin* in the cause or causes had a so !een different. ,ccordin* to Carr, e#eryday ife wou d !e impossi! e un ess one assumed that human !eha#iour was determined !y causes which are in princip e ascertaina! e. ,r*uments that human actions shou d not !e exp ained as they are the products of human wi is fa acious. .5mith examp e, 6a*e EB/ The historian believes that human actions have causes which are in principle ascertainable. It is the specia function of the historian to in#esti*ate the causes. He does not re"ect free wi except on the untena! e hypothesis that #o untary actions ha#e no cause. 5s regards historical accident, Carr says it is not as much accident as a collision of two independent causal chains. .5ee C eopatra examp e on 6a*e EE/. This, howe#er, raises a pro! em. How can one disco#er in history a coherent se$uence of cause and effect, how can we find any meanin* in history when our se$uence is ia! e to !e !ro'en or def ected at any moment !y some other, and from our point of #iew, irre e#ant se$uence? Carr finds unsatisfactory the #iew of >arx that historica accident tends on y to retard or acce erate chan*e, not to a ter it. He a so finds unsatisfactory the #iew that accident in history is mere y the measure of our i*norance. Instead, he says that as history !e*ins with the se ection and marsha in* of facts !y the historian to !ecome historica facts, a similar process is at wor in the historians approach to causes. The causes determine his interpretation of the historica process, and his interpretation determines his se ection and marsha in* of the causes. The hierarchy of causes, the relative significance of one cause or a set of causes or another, is the essence of his interpretation . ,nd this furnishes the c ue to the accidenta in history. The shape of C eopatra7s nose, 0a"a3et7s attac' of *out, the mon'ey !ite that 'i ed Fin* , exander, the death of Genin these were accidents which modified the course of history. It is futi e to spirit them away, or to pretend that in some way they had no effect. 2n the other hand, in so far as they were accidenta , they do not enter into any rationa interpretation of history, or into the historian7s hierarchy of si*nificant causes. .-o!inson examp e, 1HC/. History therefore is a process of selection in terms of historical significance. <ust as from the infinite ocean of facts the historian se ects those which are si*nificant for his purpose, so from the multiplicity of se(uences of cause and effect he e&tracts those, and only those , which are historically significant$ and the standard of historical significance is his ability to fit them into his pattern of rational e&planation and interpretation . Other se(uences of cause and effect have to be re!ected as accidental, not because the relation between cause and effect is different, but because the se(uence itself is irrelevant. The historian can do nothing with it$ it is not amenable to rational

interpretation, and has no meaning either for the past or the present. It is true that C eopatra7s nose, or 0a"a3et7s *out, or , exander7s mon'ey)!ite, or Genin7s death, or -o!inson7s ci*arette smo'in* had resu ts. 0ut it ma'es no sense as a *enera proposition to say that *enera s ose !att es !ecause they are infatuated !y !eautifu $ueens, or that wars occur !ecause 'in*s 'eep pet mon'eys, pr that peop e *et run o#er and 'i ed on the roads !ecause they smo'e ci*arettes. Therefore, the princip e for distin*uishin* !etween rationa and accidenta causes is this+ the former, since they are potentially applicable to other countries, other periods, and other conditions, lead to fruitful generalisations, and lessons can be learned from them$ they serve the end of broadening and deepening our understanding . 5ccidental causes cannot be generalised$ and since they are in the fullest sense of the word uni(ue, they teach no lessons and lead to no conclusions. Chapter C History as 6ro*ress Carr has four thin*s to say a!out history as pro*ress+ a/ There is a sharp distinction !etween pro*ress and e#o ution, !etween !io o*ica inheritance and socia ac$uisition. E#o ution !y inheritance has to !e measured in mi ennia, or in mi ions of years, whereas pro*ress !y ac$uisition can !e measured in *enerations. History is a progress through transmission of ac(uired s ills from one generation to another. b, 9rogress does not have a finite beginning or an end. c/ 9rogress does not advance in a straight, unbro en line. There are often re*ression. Ci#i isations which contri!uted most to pro*ress in one era mi*ht not in another, ostensi! y !ecause they wi !e too deep y im!ued with the traditions, interests and ideo o*ies of the ear ier period to the demands and conditions of the next period. d/ 9rogress in history, unli e evolution, rests on the transmission of ac(uired assets. These assets inc ude !oth materia possessions and the capacity to master, transform and uti ise one7s en#ironment. Carr *oes on to ta ' a!out o!"ecti#ity in history. The su!"ect and o!"ect shou d not !e put asunder4 rather, their comp ex interre ation shou d !e rea ised. The facts of history cannot be purely ob!ective, since they become facts of history only in virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian. Ob!ectivity in history cannot be an ob!ectivity of fact, but only of relation, or the relation between fact and interpretation, between past, present and future. The a!so ute in history is not somethin* in the past from which we start4 it is not somethin* in the present, since a present thin'in* is necessarily relative. #t is something still incomplete and in the process of becoming . something in the future towards which we move, which begins to ta e shape only as we move towards it, and in the light of which, as we move forward, we gradually shape out interpretation of the past. It re"ects the re ati#ist #iew that one interpretation is as *ood as another, or that e#ery interpretation is true in its own time and p ace, and it pro#ides the touchstone !y which our interpretation of the past wi u timate y !e "ud*ed. It is this sense of direction in history which a one ena! es us to order and interpret the e#ents of the past and to i!erate and or*anise human ener*ies in the present with a #iew to the future. 0ut the process itse f remains pro*ressi#e and dynamic. Our sense of direction, and our interpretation of the past, are sub!ect to constant modification and evolution as we proceed. .>arxist methodo o*y criti$ue/. When we praise a historian for !ein* o!"ecti#e, therefore, it is not that he simp y *ets his facts ri*ht, !ut rather that he chooses the ri*ht facts, app ies the ri*ht standards of si*nificance. Ca in* a historian o!"ecti#e means two thin*s+ :irst of all, we mean that he has a capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own situation in society and in history. /econdly, he has the capacity to pro!ect his vision in to the future in such a way as to give him a more profound and more lasting insight into the past than can be attained by those historians whose outloo is entirely bounded by their own immediate situation. Therefore, more than being a dialogue between the past and the present, history is a dialogue between the past and progressively emerging future ends. History ac$uires meanin* and o!"ecti#ity on y when it esta! ishes a coherent re ation !etween past and future. .0ismarc' examp e pa*e 1AH, and the !enefit of hindsi*ht/.