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CRIMINAL LAW CASES

G.R. No. 193003 July 13, 2011


FRANCISCO IMSON y ADRIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition
1
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition challenges the 11 March 2010 Decision
2
and 21 July 2010 Resolution
3
of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30364. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 2 August
2005 Decision
4
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon City, Branch 72, in Criminal Case Nos. 28218-MN and 28219-MN, finding
petitioner Francisco A. Imson (Imson) and Rolando S. Dayao (Dayao) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Facts
On 24 January 2003, at around 9:30 p.m., a confidential informant arrived at the
District Drug Enforcement Unit office in Langaray, Caloocan City. The confidential
informant advised PO1 Gerry Pajares (Pajares), PO1 Noli Pineda (Pineda) and other
policemen that Imson was selling shabu at Raja Matanda Street, San Roque, Navotas.
District Drug Enforcement Unit Chief P/Supt. Reynaldo Orante formed a team to
conduct a buy bust operation, with Pajares acting as poseur buyer.
Pajares, Pineda, the confidential informant, and other policemen arrived at Raja
Matanda Street at around 10:30 p.m. There, they saw Imson talking with Dayao.
Thereafter, they saw Imson giving Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. Pajares approached the two men and introduced himself. He
immediately apprehended Imson while Pineda ran after Dayao who tried to escape.
The policemen confiscated two plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu.
The policemen brought Imson and Dayao to the Langaray Police Station where Imson
and Dayao executed their joint sworn statements and where PO1 Ariosto B. Rana
marked the two plastic sachets with "RDS" and "FIA." The two plastic sachets were
sent to the Philippine National Police - Northern Police Crime Laboratory Office for
examination. Both tested positive for shabu.
Third Assistant State Prosecutor Marcos filed two informations dated 27 January 2003
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs against Imson and Dayao.
The RTCs Ruling
In its 2 August 2005 Decision, the RTC found Imson and Dayao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC held:
The denial, sort of alibi and insinuated claim of evidence planting put up by the two
accused in these cases as their defense cannot be sustained by the Court.
Dayao would want the Court to believe that at past 10:30 in the evening, he would be
playing "kara y krus" along a street. This is hard to believe. The playing of "kara y
krus" would require that it be done in a well lighted place, preferably during day
time. While the possibility that it can be played during the night cannot be ruled out,
it is not the normal time of the day to play "kara y krus". And "kara y krus" is a form of
illegal gambling. You do not openly play it along a street/near a street corner.
Imson, on the other hand, maintained that he was preparing food for dinner. While
dinner may be taken even late in the evening, it is not usual for a man to do so. There
must be an explanation for having a late dinner. In these cases, Imson did not offer
any explanation for preparing to have dinner at past 10:30 in the evening.
Additionally, the two accused did not claim that there was any ill motive that made
the policemen concoct a tale that resulted in the filing of these cases against them.
The denial made by the two accused cannot prevail. Denial, like alibi is a weak
defense in criminal prosecution. It cannot prevail over positive, clear and convincing
testimony to the effect that a crime was committed and the accused committed the
same (P. vs. Belibet, 197 SCRA 587).
The insinuated claim of the accused to the effect that the shabu must have been
planted by the police deserves little or scant consideration. It is the usual defense of
those accused of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and, before that, of then
existing laws on illegal drugs (refer to P. vs. Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 114116,
February 1, 1995).
On the other hand, the evidence of the prosecution tend to show that a buy bust
operation was about to be conducted by reason of a report that accused Imson was
selling shabu. It was no longer undertaken because Imson was immediately seen
handing shabu to Dayao. This resulted in the arrest of the two accused who were both
found in possession of shabu. This version of the police is a reasonable one.
5

Imson and Dayao appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its 11 March 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs 2 August 2005
Decision. The Court of Appeals held:
We x x x find no merit in Appellants contention that they should be acquitted
because of the allegedly procedural lapses committed by the police operatives who
failed to conduct a physical inventory of the subject specimen and to photograph the
same resulting in the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt of the crime
charged.
On this regard, the required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs as
provided under Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 pertinently
provides:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The aforecited section is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
x x x
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items:
x x x
To the mind of this Court, granting arguendo that the police operatives team failed to
faithfully implement the post-operational requirement on the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs as required by Section 21 of RA 9165, nevertheless,
jurisprudence has it that non-compliance with the procedure shall not invalidate the
legitimate drug operation conducted by the police operatives. On this point, the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in People v. Bralaan is highly relevant, thus:
x x x
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as
long as there is justifiable ground therefore, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
x x x
Notably, the aforecited ruling was echoed by the Supreme Court in People v. Pringas,
viz:
x x x
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as
long as there is justifiable ground therefore, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
x x x
At this juncture, We rule that the apprehending team was able to preserve the
integrity of the subject drugs and that the prosecution was able to present the
required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug, viz: a.) starting from the
apprehension of the Appellants by the police operatives and the recovery of the
subject illegal drugs by virtue of the formers valid warrantless arrest; b.) upon
seizure of subject drugs by PO1 PAJARES and PO1 PINEDA, the same remained in their
possession until the same were turned over to PO1 ARIOSTO B. RANA (PO1 RANA), the
police investigator stationed in their headquarters, with the markings "RDS" and "FIA",
initials of Appellants DAYAO and IMSON, respectively; c.) upon receipt of the subject
drugs, a Laboratory Examination Request was then prepared [sic] P/Supt. ORANTE
addressed to the Chief of the NPDO Crime Laboratory Office of Caloocan City
requesting the Forensic Chemist on duty to examine the illegal drugs confiscated from
Appellants; d.) the subject specimens were received by PO1 SAMONTE of the PNP-NPD
Crime Laboratory Office from PO2 RANA; e.) the said specimens were examined by
P/Insp. CALOBOCAL who found the same to be positive for shabu; f.) thereafter,
P/Supt. ORANTE prepared a referral slip dated 26 January 2003, addressed to the
inquest prosecutor presenting as evidence, inter alia, the two (2) plastic sachets
confiscated from the Appellants and the Laboratory Examination Report with PSR# D-
097-03; g.) the two (2) plastic sachets recovered from Appellants IMSON and DAYAO
were turned over to the custody of the trial prosecutor Fiscal RHODA MAGDALENE
OSINAGA (Fiscal OSINAGA), who presented the same as prosecution evidence during
the direct examination of PO2 PAJARES on 22 April 2005 marking them as Exhibits "C-
1" and "C-2", respectively. To stress, the unbroken chain of custody of the subject
specimen was established by the prosecution and supported by the evidence on hand.
6

Imson and Dayao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 21 July 2010 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Imson raises as issue that the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible
in evidence because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired. He states:
The failure to: (a) conduct a physical inventory; (b) photograph the plastic sachet in
the presence of the accused or his representative, counsel, representative from the
media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official; and (c)
immediately mark the plastic sachet on site, all cast doubt as to whether the chain of
custody remains intact.
7

The Courts Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the two
plastic sachets containing shabu do not render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. In People v. Campos,
8
the Court held that the failure of the policemen to
make a physical inventory and to photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to
the prosecutions cause. The Court held that:
The alleged procedural lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
namely the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA and the failure to inventory and
photograph the confiscated items immediately after the operation, are not fatal to
the prosecutions cause.
x x x x
The absence of an inventory of personal effects seized from appellant becomes
immaterial to the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation for it is enough that it is
established that the operation was indeed conducted and that the identity of the
seller and the drugs subject of the sale are proven. People v. Concepcion so
instructs:
"After going over the evidence on record, we find that there, indeed, was a buy-bust
operation involving appellants. The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the
required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photography pursuant to
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not exonerate appellants. Non-
compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.[]
9
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the failure of the policemen to mark the two plastic sachets containing
shabu at the place of arrest does not render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. In People v. Resurreccion,
10
the Court held that the failure of the
policemen to immediately mark the confiscated items does not automatically impair
the integrity of chain of custody. The Court held:
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody.
The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
x x x x
Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidros failure to mark the
confiscated shabu immediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the
drugs identity. People v. Sanchez, however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify a
time frame for "immediate marking," or where said marking should be done:
"What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that
the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory
and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that
the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1)
in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation."
To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that
the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate
confiscation. "Immediate Confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v.
Gum-Oyen, testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police
station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance
with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.
11
(Emphasis supplied)
The presumption is that the policemen performed their official duties regularly.
12
In
order to overcome this presumption, Imson must show that there was bad faith or
improper motive on the part of the policemen, or that the confiscated items were
tampered. Imson failed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the 11 March 2010 Decision and 21 July 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30364.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188897 June 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) seeks the reversal of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133 convicting him with three (3) counts of Statutory Rape
under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610) and Acts of Lasciviousness under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue
and his finger into the genital of his minor daughter, AAA.
2

The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0254 against Ireno
reads:
That on or about the month of December 1998 in the City of Las Pias and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of
influence and moral ascendancy, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his tongue and finger into the
genital of his daughter, [AAA], a minor then eight (8) years of age, against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special aggravating/qualifying circumstance of
minority of the private offended party, [AAA], being then only eight (8) years of age
and relationship of the said private offended party with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua
y Berce, the latter being the biological father of the former.
3

The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0255
4
has the same accusatory allegations
while the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0256
5
and Criminal Case Nos. 03-
0257
6
are similarly worded, except for the date of the commission of the crime and
the age of AAA, which are December 2000 and ten (10) years old, respectively.
The cases were later consolidated
7
and upon his arraignment, Ireno pleaded not guilty
to the four (4) counts of rape with which he was charged. Consequently, trial on the
merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, AAA; the
victims mother; and Dr. Melissa De Leon. The defense, on the other hand, presented
the lone testimony of the accused as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution established that in 1998, AAA and her mother left their house in
Candelaria, Quezon to spend the Christmas with accused-appellant in Las Pias City.
They stayed in the house of a certain Lola Jean, the godmother in the wedding of her
parents, at Sta. Cecilia Subdivision, Las Pias City.
AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while her younger brothers were
playing outside the house and her mother was not home. Accused-appellant entered
the room. He approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and removed her shorts and
panty. She tried to resist by putting her clothes back on, but her fathers strength
prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant touched and caressed her breasts. He licked
her vagina then inserted his finger into it.
In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant raped AAA again in the same
manner and under the same circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that she was
raped because accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother by placing the latters
body in a drum and have it cemented if she would report the incidents. She returned
to Quezon with her mother before the end of the Christmas season.
In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-appellant for the third time when he
went to Candelaria, Quezon. In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent the
Yuletide season with accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las Pias City. In a single day,
AAA was raped for the fourth and fifth time. While spending the afternoon inside her
fathers room at the car-wash station, he removed her shorts and panty then
proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina. Accused-appellant repeated
the same sexual assault shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report these incidents
for fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside a drum.
On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain which prompted her
mother to take her to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was transferred to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on her
a physical examination. The results revealed that there was a healed superficial
laceration at the 9 oclock position on the hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced
AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of rape committed by accused-
appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAAs mother took her to the Police
Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for rape against accused-
appellant. AAAs mother also took her to the office of the National Bureau of
Investigation in Legaspi City where she executed a sworn statement against accused-
appellant.
8

Evidence for the Defense
Accused-appellant denied committing the charges of rape hurled against him. He
claimed to be working in Las Pias City while AAA, her mother and siblings where (sic)
in Sariaya, Quezon at the time the alleged rapes occurred. While he admitted that
there were times when AAA and her mother would visit him in Las Pias City, he
nonetheless averred that they would leave on the same day they arrived after he
gives them money.
Accused-appellant asserted further that the charges of rape against him were
fabricated by AAAs mother, who suspected him of having an affair with another
woman in Las Pias City.
9

On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after finding the evidence for the
prosecution overwhelming against the accuseds defense of denial and alibi, rendered
a Decision
10
convicting Ireno with four (4) counts of Rape, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that
accused IRENO BONAAGUA, has committed four (4) counts of RAPE under par. 2 of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to R.A. 7610, as
charged, the Court hereby pronounced him GUILTY and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case and to pay private complainant [AAA],
the amount of Php50,000 for each case, or a total of Php200,000, by way of civil
indemnity plus Php50,000 for each case or a total of Php200,000 as moral damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
11

Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA, which appeal was later
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133.
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision
12
affirming the decision of the RTC
with modifications on the imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256,
and 03-0257, and finding Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610, instead of Rape, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0255, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254,
finding Ireno Bonaagua y Berce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for each rape in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256
and 03-0257 and is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in each case, apart from the civil indemnity and moral damages that
have already been awarded by the trial court;
2. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, with relationship
as an aggravating circumstance. He is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods and ordered to pay AAA
the amount of PhP15,000 as moral damages and a fine of PhP15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
13

In fine, the CA found Irenos defense of denial and alibi inherently weak against the
positive identification of AAA that he was the culprit of the horrid deed. Thus, aside
from modifying the imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-
0257, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC finding Ireno guilty of the crime of
Rape Through Sexual Assault.
In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, however, after a diligent review of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, the CA only found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The CA opined that since the
prosecution failed to establish the act of insertion by Ireno of his finger into the
vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, a crime
which is necessarily included in the Information filed against him in Criminal Case No.
03-0255.
Ireno now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution
14
dated December 16, 2009, the Court informed the parties that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. In their respective
Manifestations,
15
the parties waived the filing of their supplemental briefs and,
instead, adopted their respective briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Ireno raises the lone error:
I
The COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
16

Simply put, Ireno maintains that the testimony of AAA was replete with
inconsistencies and was extremely unbelievable. Ireno insists that the allegation that
he inserted his tongue and finger into the genital of AAA was manifestly incredible as
the deed is physiologically impossible. Moreover, the medical findings are grossly
inconclusive to prove that AAA was raped, since it only established that there was
only one healed superficial laceration.
This Court, however, finds the arguments raised by Ireno untenable. To determine the
innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-
entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while
the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons
are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.
17

After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the prosecution has indubitably
established that Ireno was the one who sexually assaulted her. AAA categorically
narrated that Ireno sexually abused her on several occasions and even threatened AAA
that he would kill her mother if she would report the incidents.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape cases, the evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge
whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had
the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling
the truth or not. Generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts
assessment in this regard, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has
overlooked some material facts of substance or value, or gravely abused its
discretion.
18

It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended parties are young and
immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame
and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they
testified were not true.
19
A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration;
publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of
her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly
moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain
justice for the wicked acts committed against her.
20
Moreover, the Court has
repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is
enough to sustain a conviction.
21

Moreover, contrary to Irenos contention, the medical findings of Dr. Melissa De Leon
did not refute AAAs testimony of defilement, but instead bolstered her claim. The
RTC correctly concluded:
It is true that Dr. Melissa De Leon, when called to the witness stand to substantiate
the same medical certification, did not rule out the possibility that the laceration
might have been inflicted through some other causes and that there could have been
only one instance of finger insertion into the vagina of private complainant. However,
it is equally true that Dr. De Leon also did not rule out the possibility that finger
insertion might have been the cause of the laceration (pp. 7-12, TSN, January 31,
2006). Dr. De Leon also clarified that only one laceration may be inflicted although a
finger is inserted into the vagina on separate instances (pp. 19-26, supra). According
to Dr. De Leon, this instance depends on the force exerted into the vagina and on
whether or not the hymen is membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen is
easily lacerated and so when a force is exerted into it on several occasions, several
lacerations may occur. A thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated and so a force
exerted into it on several occasions may cause only one laceration. Private
complainant has thick and firm hymen and this may explain why there is only (sic)
laceration on her hymen although she claimed her father inserted into her vagina his
finger several times (pp. 19-29, supra).
This non-categorical stance of Dr. De Leon is nonetheless understandable because Dr.
De Leon has no personal knowledge of what actually happened to private complainant
that she (complainant) suffered hymenal laceration. However, there is one thing very
certain though in the testimony of Dr. De Leon that she medically examined [AAA],
herein private complainant, because of the information that [AAA] was sexually
abused by her [AAAs] own father (pp. 5-6, supra). And indeed, as already discussed
lengthily above, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of AAAs allegation.
22

The same conclusion was also arrived at by the CA, to wit:
While the medico-legal findings showed a single healed superficial laceration on the
hymen of AAA, Dr. De Leon clarified that it is not impossible for a hymen to sustain
only one laceration despite the fact that a finger had been inserted into the vagina on
several accounts. This situation may arise depending on the force extended into the
vagina and on whether or not the hymen of the victim is membranous or firm and
thick. A membranous hymen is easily lacerated; thus, when a force is exerted into it
on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. On the other hand, a thick and
firm hymen is not easily lacerated; a force exerted into it on several occasions may
cause only one laceration. According to Dr. De Leon, AAA has thick and firm hymen
and this may explain why it has only one laceration despite her claim that accused-
appellant inserted his finger inside her vagina several times.
23

Even Irenos contention that the charges against him were merely fabricated by his
wife because she suspects that he is having an affair with another woman deserves
scant consideration. Aside from the fact that the said allegation was not proved, it
must be emphasized that no member of a rape victims family would dare encourage
the victim to publicly expose the dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact
committed, especially in this case where the victim and the offender are
relatives.
24
It is unnatural for a mother to use her daughter as an engine of malice,
especially if it will subject her child to embarrassment and lifelong stigma.
25

Also, Ireno cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance stating that AAA and her
mother are no longer interested in pursuing the case filed against him.
Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against
persons.
26
Consequently, rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which
cannot be prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence,
pardon by the offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish
the offenders criminal liability. Moreover, an Affidavit
dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already been instituted. To
justify the dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have been made prior to
the institution of the criminal actions.
27
As correctly concluded by the CA, the said
affidavit was executed in connection with another accusation of rape which Ireno
committed against AAA in Candelaria, Quezon and not the four cases of rape subject
of this appeal. In addition, AAAs mother testified that she executed the said affidavit
to regain custody of her children who were brought to Bicol by Irenos siblings.
28

It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with disfavor on affidavits of
desistance. As cited in People v. Alcazar,
29
the rationale for this was extensively
discussed in People v. Junio:
30

x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are
looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the
process of having the [appellant] arrested by the police, positively identifying him as
the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a
careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or
warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should
not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule [would] make a solemn trial a
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses,
usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits
as exceedingly unreliable.
31

Amidst the overwhelming evidence against him, Ireno offered nothing but his bare
denial of the accusations against him and that he was someplace else when the
dastardly acts were committed. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected.
32
It has been consistently held
that denial and alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not
prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a
positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a
bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
33
All said, as found
by the CA, the prosecution has convincingly proved and more than sufficiently
established that: (1) Ireno committed the accusations of Rape Through Sexual Assault
against AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257; (2) that AAA was a
minor when Ireno committed the sexual assault against her;
34
and (3) that Ireno was
the biological father of AAA.
35

Verily, in criminal cases, an examination of the entire records of a case may be
explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal
cases throws the whole case open for review, it being the duty of the court to correct
such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from.
36
Since the CA found Ireno
guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case
No. 03-0255 instead of rape, the Court should thus determine whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish that the intentional touching
of the victim by Ireno constitutes lascivious conduct and whether the CA imposed the
appropriate penalties.
As aptly found by the CA:
A diligent review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, however, shows that
accused-appellant cannot be held guilty as charged for the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 03-0255. The prosecution failed to establish insertion by accused-appellant
of his finger into the vagina of AAA, who testified on direct examination that accused-
appellant "touched my private part and licked it but he did not insert his finger inside
my vagina." In fact, even the trial court asked AAA if accused-appellant inserted his
finger inside her vagina. She answered in the negative and averred that he licked her
vagina and touched her breasts. In reply to the prosecutions query if accused-
appellant did anything else aside from licking her organ, she said he also touched it.
During cross-examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant "merely touched her
vagina but did not insert his finger."
37

Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
38

Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It
t
lascivious conduct with a child.
39

However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of
child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of
age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met
in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
40

Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following
elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
41

In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 must be established:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
42

Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations
43
of R.A. No. 7610 defines
"Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.
44

Undeniably, all the afore-stated elements are present in Criminal Case No. 03-0255.
Ireno committed lascivious acts against AAA by touching her breasts and licking her
vagina and the lascivious or lewd acts were committed against AAA, who was 8 years
old at the time as established by her birth certificate.
45
Thus, the CA correctly found
Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610.1avvphi1
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or
the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the
tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should
also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault,
not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such
logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim
testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his
finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various
interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was
defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for
convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.
Penalties and Award of Damages
Having found Ireno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape Through Sexual Assault in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257 and Acts of Lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 03-0255, We shall proceed to determine the appropriate penalties
imposable for each offense.
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual assault is reclusion
temporal "if the rape is committed by any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article."
46
In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256,
and 03-0257, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship are
present, considering that the rape was committed by a parent against his minor child.
Reclusion temporal ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC. Other than the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship which have been
taken into account to raise the penalty to reclusion temporal,
47
no other aggravating
circumstance was alleged and proven. Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period,
48
or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code which
is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
49
Thus, Ireno
should be meted the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
It must be clarified, however, that the reasoning expounded by the Court in the
recent case of People v. Armando Chingh y Parcia,
50
for imposing upon the accused
the higher penalty provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, has no
application in the case at bar. In the said case, the Court, acknowledging the fact
that to impose the lesser penalty would be unfair to the child victim, meted upon the
accused the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period as provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, instead of the lesser penalty of prision
mayor prescribed by Article 266-B for rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC. The Court elucidated:
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of
the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly
prosecuted under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years
of age, and considering further that Armandos act of inserting his finger in VVVs
private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 366 in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the
one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision
mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the
intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A.
No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of RA No. 8353,
R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children
or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
In the present case, the factual milieu was different since the offender, Ireno, is the
father of the minor victim. Hence, the offenses were committed with the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, attendant
circumstances which were not present in the Chingh case, which in turn, warrants the
imposition of the higher penalty of reclusion temporal prescribed by Article 266-B of
the RPC. Considering that the RPC already prescribes such penalty, the rationale of
unfairness to the child victim that Chingh wanted to correct is absent. Hence, there is
no more need to apply the penalty prescribed by R.A. No. 7610.
As to civil liabilities, the damages awarded in the form of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages, also in the amount of P50,000.00, for each
count of Rape must be both reduced to P30,000.00, respectively, in line with current
jurisprudence.
51
Also, the amount of exemplary damages awarded in the amount
of P25,000.00 must be increased to P30,000.00 for each count of Rape.
52

Criminal Case No. 03-0255
It is beyond cavil that when the sexual abuse was committed by Ireno, AAA was only
eight (8) years old. Hence, the provisions of R.A. No. 7610, or The Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, should be
applied.
Thus, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period which is
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months. As the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the
alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated. In crimes against
chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, relationship is always
aggravating.
53
Therefore, Ireno should be meted the indeterminate penalty of
thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Moreover, the award in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and a fine in the
amount of P15,000.00, is proper in line with current jurisprudence.
54
However, civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 should also be awarded.
55
In view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount
of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages should likewise be awarded.
56

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for each count. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA the
amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Qualified Rape Through
Sexual Assault or a total of P90,000.00 for each count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is meted to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to moral damages and fine, he is
likewise ordered to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161651 June 8, 2011
ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, and BARTOLOME BALDEMOR
y MADRIGAL,Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the August 7, 2003 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23240, which affirmed with modification the March 17, 1998 decision
2
of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, convicting Elvira Lateo (Lateo),
Francisco Elca (Elca), and Bartolome Baldemor (Baldemor) of attempted estafa.
On April 28, 1995, Lateo, Elca, and Baldemor (petitioners), along with Orlando Lalota
(Lalota) and Nolasco de Guzman (De Guzman), were charged with estafa in an
information, which reads:
That on or about April 27, 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, conspiring and
confederating with FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL,
ORLANDO LALOTA and NOLASCO DE GUZMAN, and mutually helping one another,
acting in common accord, by means of deceit, that is, by falsely representing
themselves to be the true and [lawful] owner of a piece of land located in the
province of Cavite, and possessing power, influence, qualification, property, credit,
agency, business, or imaginary transactions and by means of other similar deceits, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce ELEONOR LUCERO to part
with her money in the amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, as indeed she parted only with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, which said accused actually received in
marked Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said ELEONOR LUCERO in
the aforestated amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) PESOS
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

When arraigned on May 31, 1995, petitioners, with the assistance of their counsel,
entered their respective pleas of not guilty. Accused Lalota and De Guzman remained
at large.
Trial on the merits then ensued. The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized
by the CA in this wise:
Sometime in 1994, [petitioners] Lateo and Elca proposed that [Lucero] finance the
titling of the 122 hectares of land located in Muntinlupa allegedly owned by
[petitioner] Elca as the sole heir of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been
transferred to [petitioner] Elcas name because of a certain discrepancy between the
Deed of Sale and TCT No. 77730. [Petitioner] Elca offered to assign to [Lucero] 70
hectares of said land. She was then introduced to [petitioner] Baldemor, Orlando
Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
[Lucero] released to [petitioners] about P4.7 million in staggered amounts.
[Petitioner] Elca told [Lucero] that certain portions of the property will first be put in
the name of [petitioner] Lateo and would later be assigned to her. [Lucero] was given
a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987. [Petitioner] Elca likewise executed an
irrevocable Special Power of Attorney in favor of [Lucero]. Later, she was presented
certified true copies of three (3) titles, TCT Nos. 195550, 195551 and 195552 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the name of [petitioner] Lateo covering
approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan A-7 of the Mutinlupa Estate,
situated in Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion, Muntinlupa. However, [in] December 1994,
when [Lucero] verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered that the
aforesaid titles of the property were actually registered in the names of Marc Oliver
R. Singson, Mary Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza.
[Lucero] confronted [petitioners] and demanded from them [the] return of the
money. She was told that they did not have any money to return. They instead
offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441
located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by [petitioner] Elca. [Petitioner] Elca,
however, demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer of title.
When [Lucero] verified with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that
[petitioner] Elca only had a pending application for the sales patent over a four (4)[-
hectare] area of the subject land. These misrepresentations prompted her to file a
complaint with the Task Force Kamagong, PACC, Manila.
On April 26, 1995, the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato Restaurant.
[Petitioners] were apprehended in possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting
to P100,000.00, supposedly in exchange for the Deed of Assignment prepared by
[Lucero] for their transaction.
4

Petitioners version, on the other hand, is summed up as follows:
Sometime in 1994, [Lucero], [petitioner] Lateo, Oscar Lalota met with [petitioner]
Elca in Muntinlupa to discuss the proposal of [Lucero] to finance the titling of
[petitioner] Elcas land.
On June 28, 1994, in a meeting called by [Lucero], she laid down the terms and
conditions regarding her plans to finance the titling of [petitioner] Elcas land. She
proposed that 22 out of the 122 hectares of the land would be given to the old
tenants of the property, the 30 hectares would be titled in the name of [petitioner]
Elca as his retained share and the other 70 hectares would be her profit as financier
of the transaction. [Lucero] would also pay P10.00 for every square meter of the 70
hectares or a total amount of P7 million. All the expenses for the titling and
management of the land would be deducted from P7 million. The remaining balance
would then be given to [petitioners].
[Lucero] assigned Oscar Lalota to work for the titling of the land and to prepare all
documents necessary thereto. [Petitioner] Baldemor would act as overseer of the
transaction as [Luceros] attorney-in-fact. [Petitioner] Lateo would serve as secretary
and assistant of [Lucero]. [Petitioner] Elca would guard the property to keep off
squatters. He and his wife were instructed to sign all documents prepared by Oscar
Lalota.
In December 1994, [Lucero] told [petitioner] Elca that upon verification from the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City, she found out that all the documents submitted by
Oscar Lalota pertaining to their transaction were falsified. Oscar Lalota disappeared
after getting the money.
In order to recover her losses from the anomalous transaction, [Lucero] offered to
purchase [petitioner] Elcas property in Cavite. [Petitioner] Elca agreed to sell 2
hectares of his property at a price of P100.00 per square meter. [Petitioner] Elca
informed [Lucero] that the land was not yet titled although the documents had
already been completed. [Lucero] agreed to pay in advance the amount
of P200,000.00 for the immediate titling of the land.
On December 21, 1994, however, [Lucero] gave no advance payment. [Petitioner]
Elca was made to return [in] January 1995. On that date still [Lucero] made no
payment.
On [April] 25, 1995, [Lucero] promised to give the P200,000.00 advance payment at
Furosato Restaurant [on] Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Having failed to contact his
lawyer, on [April] 26, 1995, [petitioner] Elca went alone to Furosato Restaurant.
Because of the absence of [petitioner] Lateo, [Lucero] postponed their meeting to
[April] 27, 1995.
When [petitioner] Elca arrived at Furosato Restaurant on [April] 27, 1995, [Lucero]
and her lawyer Atty. Velasquez, [petitioners] Lateo and Baldemor and Atty. Ambrosio
were already there. Atty. Velasquez, upon the order of [Lucero], produced a
document entitled "Contract to Sell" outlining their agreement over the 2 hectares of
land in Bacoor, Cavite. Atty. Ambrosio examined the contract to find out if it contains
the terms and conditions agreed upon. Attys. Velasquez and Ambrosio made their own
handwritten corrections in the contract including the change of the title from
"Contract to Sell" to "Deed of Assignment," after which, both of them signed the
document. [Petitioner] Elca and [Lucero] signed the document as parties while
[petitioners] Lateo and Baldemor signed as witnesses.
After the signing of the Deed of Assignment, [Lucero] brought out the P200,000.00 as
the promised payment for the land. While [petitioner] Baldemor was counting the
money, Atty. Velasquez and [Lucero] went to the comfort room. Thereafter, several
agents of the PACC approached them. They were arrested and brought to the NBI
Headquarters.
5

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision
6
dated March 17, 1998, viz.:
It should be noted that the transaction over the Cavite property was a continuation of
and is somehow related to their first transaction. The same was offered to [Lucero] in
lieu of the Muntinlupa property with Francisco Elca telling [Lucero] just to add
another two million (P2,000,000.00) pesos plus expenses for titling and the property
can be transferred to her.
The second transaction which covers the Bacoor property was again an attempt to
defraud [Lucero] when Francisco Elca again represented himself as the owner of the
said property when in truth and in fact his right was merely derived from his
application to purchase Friar Lands dated June 25, 1992 which at the time of the
transaction was still being protested as shown by the Investigation Report of Rogelio
N. Bruno, Special Investigator II, DENR, Land Management Bureau (Exhibit "LLLL")
hence accused has no right and/or authority to deliver or transfer the ownership over
said parcel of land to [Lucero].
In the case of Celino vs. CA 163 SCRA 97, it was held that "Estafa under Art. 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by means of using fictitious name or
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transaction or by means of other similar deceits.
Further, in the case of Villaflor vs. CA 192 SCRA 680, the Supreme Court held: what is
material is the fact that appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when
knowing that the car was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc., still he told the
private complainant that the car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at
the time he obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the accused was in bad
faith in obtaining the loan under such circumstance.
The attempt to defraud the complainant did not materialize due to the timely
intervention of the Task Force Kamagong operatives.
Art. 6, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "there is an attempt when the
offender convinces (sic) the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." The entrapment
thus prevented the consummation of the transaction over the Cavite property.
x x x [I]n the case of Koh Tieck Heng vs. People 192 SCRA 533, the Court held [that]
"although one of the essential elements of Estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party, in the absence of proof thereof, the offender would x x x be guilty of
attempted estafa." Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but
he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime not by
reason of [their] spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension of the
authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause
damage and not the damage itself has been shown respondent court correctly
convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
The culpability of x x x the accused is strengthened by the transfer of his rights over
the same subject land in Cavite in favor of Leticia Ramirez (Exhibit "NNNN") thus
clearly influencing his intention to defraud herein complainant as the same shows his
lack of intent to transfer his rights and/or ownership to complainant.
The representations made by Francisco Elca that he owns the property in Bacoor,
Cavite, his having offered the same again to the complainant in lieu of the aborted
deal in the Muntinlupa property their constant follow-up of complainants decision
over the matter convincing the complainant to accept the offer and their persona[l]
presence at the place of entrapment and their receipt of the P100,000.00 marked
money which they even counted one after the other, thus making all of them positive
of the presence of fluorescent powder. Those among others indicate strongly that all
three accused Francisco Elca, Elvira Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor attempted to
deceive and defraud complainant Eleanor Lucero.
7

The RTC decreed that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds all accused Francisco Elca, Elvira
Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted Estafa
and is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Ten (10) years and One (1) Day to Twelve
(12) Years.
SO ORDERED.
8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
9
but the RTC denied it on December 28,
1998.
10

Petitioners appealed to the CA, assigning in their brief the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I. That with due respect to the Honorable Court, it is respectfully submitted
that it erred in finding that THEY ARE GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED
ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 PAR. 2(a) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. That the basis of the findings of the Honorable Court that they (three
accused) are guilty of attempted estafa is not in accordance with the evidence
on record.
III. That the Honorable Court erred in the imposition of the appropriate penalty
based on its findings assuming without admitting that they (three accused) are
guilty of attempted estafa.
11

The CA was not at all persuaded by petitioners arguments and sustained petitioners
conviction, although with modification as to the penalty imposed. The decretal
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. [Petitioners] Elvira E. Lateo, Francisco A.
Elca and Bartolome M. Baldemor are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Cost against [petitioners].
SO ORDERED.
12

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
13
but their motion also suffered the
same fate, as the CA denied it on January 12, 2004.
14

Before us, petitioners insist that their conviction lacked factual and legal basis. They
assail the RTC finding, which was sustained by the CA, that the transaction involving
the Bacoor property was again an attempt to defraud Eleonor Lucero (Lucero).
Petitioners deny that they deceived Lucero. They claim that Lucero was aware that
the Bacoor property is not yet titled in the name of Elca; and that they went to
Furosato restaurant upon Luceros invitation and on Luceros representation that she
would hand to them the P200,000.00 needed to facilitate the issuance of title in
Elcas name. Petitioners, therefore, plead for an acquittal. Finally, petitioners assail
the penalty imposed by the CA for being erroneous.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, asserts that the CA
correctly sustained petitioners conviction for attempted estafa. However, it
recommends for further modification of the penalty to six (6) months of arresto
mayor.
Inarguably, the resolution of the issues raised by petitioners requires us to inquire
into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, including the credibility of the
witnesses, a course of action which this Court will not do, consistent with our
repeated holding that this Court is not a trier of facts. Basic is the rule that factual
findings of trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are
entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms
the findings.
15

It is true that the rule admits of several exceptions,
16
but none of the recognized
exceptions is present in the case at bar.
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code lists the ways by which estafa may be
committed, which includes:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). x x x.
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the felony are as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
17

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the transaction involving the Bacoor
property was a continuation of the transaction involving parcels of land in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elcas certificates of title over the
Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare portion of
his purported 14-hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an
additional P2,000,000.00, in this wise:
Dear Ms. Lucero:
This is with reference to the advances we had obtained from you in the total amount
of P4.7 million, more or less. It was agreed that the said advances shall be due and
demandable upon the release of titles over my parcels of land situated in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila of which we are presently working out with appropriate government
agencies. Your current demand fro[m] us to pay the aforesaid amount plus your
unilaterally imposed interests is therefore premature and baseless.
However, with regards to your alternative demand that you be given a total of 5
hectares (2 has. upon signing of an agreement assigning my rights and additional 3
has. upon complete release of the remaining 14 hectares) please be informed that I
am now amenable, provided that an additionalP2.0 million will be paid to me to take
care of my other personal commitments. These 5 hectares are situated in Malipay,
Bacoor, Cavite with a portion of Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs-04213-000441-D. I am expecting
the title of said property early next year. The current market [valuation] of real
estate properties in that area is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the property
will be more [than] sufficient to cover our obligates (sic).
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
Francisco N. Elca
Bo. Katihan, Poblacion
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
18

As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an
inchoate right over the Bacoor property, derived from his Application to Purchase
Friar Lands, which covered only 7 hectares.
19
Elcas application was later amended to
cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo Salenga (Salenga).
20
Clearly,
Elca was in no position to transfer ownership of the 5-hectare Bacoor property at the
time petitioners offered it to Lucero.
In Alcantara v. Court of Appeals,
21
this Court, citing People v. Balasa,
22
explained the
meaning of fraud and deceit, viz.:
[F]raud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which
an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are
resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and
any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of
a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or
by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Indubitably, petitioners parody that Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and
was offering a 5-hectare portion of it, in substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and
demanding an additional P2,000,000.00 from Lucero, constituted fraud and deceit.
To reiterate, it is an oft-repeated principle that the factual findings of the trial
courts, including their assessment of the witness credibility, are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the
findings.
23
Considering that there is nothing in the records that shows that the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court were erroneous, we affirm their
conclusion that petitioners attempted to defraud Lucero again.
Undoubtedly, petitioners commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but they
failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by
reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension by the
authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause
damage and not the damage itself had been shown,
24
the RTC and the CA correctly
convicted petitioners of attempted estafa.
On the penalty. The RTC sentenced petitioners to an imprisonment term of ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve years.1awphi1 The CA modified it to six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners and the OSG both argue that the penalty imposed by the CA was wrong,
and plead for its modification.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Thus, if the crime of estafa
had been consummated, Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount
of P100,000.00.
25
Hence, the applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for
every P10,000.00 in excess of the firstP22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty
should not exceed twenty years.
Since what was established was only attempted estafa, then the applicable penalty
would be that which is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony pursuant to Article 51,
26
in relation to Article 61(5),
27
of the
RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period
to arresto mayor in its maximum period,
28
or an imprisonment term ranging from two
(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved
exceeded P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for everyP10,000.00 should be
added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the
additional incremental penalty of 7 years to the maximum period of penalty,
considering that petitioners were charged and convicted merely of attempted and not
consummated estafa. We, therefore, modify the penalty and sentence petitioners to
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23240 are AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo, Francisco
Elca, and Bartolome Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
estafa, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173198 June 1, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOLORES OCDEN, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision
1
dated April 21, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00044, which affirmed with modification the
Decision
2
dated July 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch 60,
in Criminal Case No. 16315-R. The RTC found accused-appellant Dolores Ocden
(Ocden) guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under
Article 13(b), in relation to Articles 38(b), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442,
otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, in Criminal
Case No. 16315-R; and of the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R.
3
The Court
of Appeals affirmed Ocdens conviction in all four cases, but modified the penalties
imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R,
The Amended Information
4
for illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No.
16315-R reads:
That during the period from May to December, 1998, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and
promise employment as factory workers in Italy to more than three (3) persons
including, but not limited to the following: JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, HOWARD C.
GOLIDAN, KAREN M. SIMEON, JEAN S. MAXIMO, NORMA PEDRO, MARYLYN MANA-A,
RIZALINA FERRER, and MILAN DARING without said accused having first secured the
necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
Ocden was originally charged with six counts of estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R,
16318-R, 16350-R, 16369-R, 16964-R, and 16966-R.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 16316-R states:
That sometime during the period from October to December, 1998 in the City of
Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to
or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused
knowing fully well that she is not (sic) authorized job recruiter for persons intending
to secure work abroad convinced said Jeffries C. Golidan and pretended that she
could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum
of P70,000.00when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Jeffries C.
Golidan deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused
parted away the total sum of P70,000.00, in favor of the accused, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Jeffries C. Golidan in the aforementioned amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000,00), Philippine Currency.
5

The Informations in the five other cases for estafa contain substantially the same
allegations as the one above-quoted, except for the private complainants names, the
date of commission of the offense, and the amounts defrauded, to wit:
Case No. Name of the
Private
Complainant
Date of Commission of the
Offense
Amount
Defrauded
16318-R Howard C. Golidan Sometime during the period
from October to December
1998
P70,000.00
16350-R Norma Pedro Sometime in May, 1998 P65,000.00
16369-R Milan O. Daring Sometime during the period
from November 13, 1998 to
December 10, 1998
P70.000.00
16964-R Rizalina Ferrer Sometime in September P70,000.00
16966-R Marilyn Mana-a Sometime in September 1998 P70,000.00
6

All seven cases against Ocden were consolidated on July 31, 2000 and were tried
jointly after Ocden pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented three witnesses namely: Marilyn Mana-a (Mana-a) and
Rizalina Ferrer (Ferrer), complainants; and Julia Golidan (Golidan), mother of
complainants Jeffries and Howard Golidan.
Mana-a testified that sometime in the second week of August 1998, she and Isabel
Dao-as (Dao-as) went to Ocdens house in Baguio City to apply for work as factory
workers in Italy with monthly salaries of US$1,200.00. They were required by Ocden
to submit their bio-data and passports, pay the placement fee of P70,000.00, and to
undergo medical examination.
Upon submitting her bio-data and passport, Mana-a paid Ocden P500.00 for her
certificate of employment andP20,000.00 as down payment for her placement fee. On
September 8, 1998, Ocden accompanied Mana-a and 20 other applicants to Zamora
Medical Clinic in Manila for their medical examinations, for which each of the
applicants paid P3,000.00. Mana-a also paid to Ocden P22,000.00 as the second
installment on her placement fee. When Josephine Lawanag (Lawanag), Mana-as
sister, withdrew her application, Lawanags P15,000.00 placement fee, already paid
to Ocden, was credited to Mana-a.
7

Mana-a failed to complete her testimony, but the RTC considered the same as no
motion to strike the said testimony was filed.
Ferrer narrated that she and her daughter Jennilyn were interested to work overseas.
About the second week of September 1998, they approached Ocden through Fely
Alipio (Alipio). Ocden showed Ferrer and Jennilyn a copy of a job order from Italy for
factory workers who could earn as much as $90,000.00 to $100,000.00.
8
In the first
week of October 1998, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to apply for work, so they
submitted their passports and pictures to Ocden. Ferrer also went to Manila for
medical examination, for which she spent P3,500.00. Ferrer paid to Ocden on
November 20, 1998 the initial amount of P20,000.00, and on December 8, 1998 the
balance of her and Jennilyns placement fees. All in all, Ferrer paid
Ocden P140,000.00, as evidenced by the receipts issued by Ocden.
9

Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers
to be sent to Italy. Their flight was scheduled on December 10, 1998. In preparation
for their flight to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they were
introduced by Ocden to Erlinda Ramos (Ramos). Ocden and Ramos then accompanied
Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio to the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga.
Ocden explained to Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio that they would be transported to
Malaysia where their visa application for Italy would be processed.
Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of
their money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the
Baguio office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that
Ocden was not a licensed recruiter.
Expecting a job overseas, Ferrer took a leave of absence from her work. Thus, she
lost income amounting toP17,700.00, equivalent to her salary for one and a half
months. She also spent P30,000.00 for transportation and food expenses.
10

According to Golidan, the prosecutions third witness, sometime in October 1998, she
inquired from Ocden about the latters overseas recruitment. Ocden informed Golidan
that the placement fee was P70,000.00 for each applicant, that the accepted
applicants would be sent by batches overseas, and that priority would be given to
those who paid their placement fees early. On October 30, 1998, Golidan brought her
sons, Jeffries and Howard, to Ocden. On the same date, Jeffries and Howard handed
over to Ocden their passports andP40,000.00 as down payment on their placement
fees. On December 10, 1998, Jeffries and Howard paid the balance of their placement
fees amounting to P100,000.00. Ocden issued receipts for these two
payments.
11
Ocden then informed Golidan that the first batch of accepted applicants
had already left, and that Jeffries would be included in the second batch for
deployment, while Howard in the third batch.
In anticipation of their deployment to Italy, Jeffries and Howard left for Manila on
December 12, 1998 and December 18, 1998, respectively. Through a telephone call,
Jeffries informed Golidan that his flight to Italy was scheduled on December 16, 1998.
However, Golidan was surprised to again receive a telephone call from Jeffries saying
that his flight to Italy was delayed due to insufficiency of funds, and that Ocden went
back to Baguio City to look for additional funds. When Golidan went to see Ocden,
Ocden was about to leave for Manila so she could be there in time for the scheduled
flights of Jeffries and Howard.
On December 19, 1998, Golidan received another telephone call from Jeffries who
was in Zamboanga with the other applicants. Jeffries informed Golidan that he was
stranded in Zamboanga because Ramos did not give him his passport. Ramos was the
one who briefed the overseas job applicants in Baguio City sometime in November
1998. Jeffries instructed Golidan to ask Ocdens help in looking for Ramos. Golidan,
however, could not find Ocden in Baguio City.
On December 21, 1998, Golidan, with the other applicants, Mana-a and Dao-as, went
to Manila to meet Ocden. When Golidan asked why Jeffries was in Zamboanga, Ocden
replied that it would be easier for Jeffries and the other applicants to acquire their
visas to Italy in Zamboanga. Ocden was also able to contact Ramos, who assured
Golidan that Jeffries would be able to get his passport. When Golidan went back
home to Baguio City, she learned through a telephone call from Jeffries that Howard
was now likewise stranded in Zamboanga.
By January 1999, Jeffries and Howard were still in Zamboanga. Jeffries refused to
accede to Golidans prodding for him and Howard to go home, saying that the
recruiters were already working out the release of the funds for the applicants to get
to Italy. Golidan went to Ocden, and the latter told her not to worry as her sons
would already be flying to Italy because the same factory owner in Italy, looking for
workers, undertook to shoulder the applicants travel expenses. Yet, Jeffries called
Golidan once more telling her that he and the other applicants were still in
Zamboanga.
Golidan went to Ocdens residence. This time, Ocdens husband gave
Golidan P23,000.00 which the latter could use to fetch the applicants, including
Jeffries and Howard, who were stranded in Zamboanga. Golidan traveled again to
Manila with Mana-a and Dao-as. When they saw each other, Golidan informed Ocden
regarding theP23,000.00 which the latters husband gave to her. Ocden begged
Golidan to give her the money because she needed it badly. Of the P23,000.00,
Golidan retained P10,000.00, Dao-as received P3,000.00, and Ocden got the rest.
Jeffries was able to return to Manila on January 16, 1999. Howard and five other
applicants, accompanied by Ocden, also arrived in Manila five days later.
Thereafter, Golidan and her sons went to Ocdens residence to ask for a refund of the
money they had paid to Ocden. Ocden was able to return only P50,000.00. Thus, out
of the total amount of P140,000.00 Golidan and her sons paid to Ocden, they were
only able to get back the sum of P60,000.00. After all that had happened, Golidan and
her sons went to the Baguio office of the POEA, where they discovered that Ocden
was not a licensed recruiter.
12

The defense presented the testimony of Ocden herself.
Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an
applicant for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the
recruiter.
Ocden recounted that she met Ramos at a seminar held in St. Theresas Compound,
Navy Base, Baguio City, sometime in June 1998. The seminar was arranged by Aida
Comila (Comila), Ramoss sub-agent. The seminar was attended by about 60
applicants, including Golidan. Ramos explained how one could apply as worker in a
stuff toys factory in Italy. After the seminar, Comila introduced Ocden to Ramos.
Ocden decided to apply for the overseas job, so she gave her passport and pictures to
Ramos. Ocden also underwent medical examination at Zamora Medical Clinic in
Manila, and completely submitted the required documents to Ramos in September
1998.
After the seminar, many people went to Ocdens house to inquire about the jobs
available in Italy. Since most of these people did not attend the seminar, Ocden asked
Ramos to conduct a seminar at Ocdens house. Two seminars were held at Ocdens
house, one in September and another in December 1998. After said seminars, Ramos
designated Ocden as leader of the applicants. As such, Ocden received her co-
applicants applications and documents; accompanied her co-applicants to Manila for
medical examination because she knew the location of Zamora Medical Clinic; and
accepted placement fees in the amount of P70,000.00 each from Mana-a and Ferrer
and from Golidan, the amount of P140,000.00 (for Jeffries and Howard).
Ramos instructed Ocden that the applicants should each pay P250,000.00 and if the
applicants could not pay the full amount, they would have to pay the balance through
salary deductions once they start working in Italy. Ocden herself paid
Ramos P50,000.00 as placement fee and executed a promissory note in Ramoss favor
for the balance, just like any other applicant who failed to pay the full amount.
Ocden went to Malaysia with Ramoss male friend but she failed to get her visa for
Italy.
Ocden denied deceiving Mana-a and Ferrer. Ocden alleged that she turned over to
Ramos the money Mana-a and Ferrer gave her, although she did not indicate in the
receipts she issued that she received the money for and on behalf of Ramos.
Ocden pointed out that she and some of her co-applicants already filed a complaint
against Ramos before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) offices in Zamboanga
City and Manila.
13

On July 2, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 16315-R)
and three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R). The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16315-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed
in large scale as defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article
38(b), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code as amended by P.D. Nos. 1693, 1920, 2018
and R.A. 8042. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to nine (9) years and
nine (9) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to nine (9) years and
nine (9) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Howard
Golidan the amount ofP40,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 16350-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa for lack of evidence and a verdict of
acquittal is entered in her favor;
5. In Criminal Case No. 16369-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa for lack of evidence and a verdict of
acquittal is hereby entered in her favor;
6. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, up to Twelve (12) years and Nine (9) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount
of P70,000.00; and
7. In Criminal Case No. 16966-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN,
NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa for insufficiency of evidence and a verdict
of acquittal is hereby entered in her favor.
In the service of her sentence, the provisions of Article 70 of the Penal Code shall be
observed.
14

Aggrieved by the above decision, Ocden filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal on
August 15, 2001.
15
The RTC erroneously sent the records of the cases to the Court of
Appeals, which, in turn, correctly forwarded the said records to us.
In our Resolution
16
dated May 6, 2002, we accepted the appeal and required the
parties to file their respective briefs. In the same resolution, we directed the
Superintendent of the Correctional Institute for Women to confirm Ocdens detention
thereat.
Ocden filed her Appellant's Brief on August 15, 2003,
17
while the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief on January 5, 2004.
18

Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,
19
we transferred Ocdens appeal to the
Court of Appeals. On April 21, 2006, the appellate court promulgated its Decision,
affirming Ocdens conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the
three counts of estafa, viz:
[T]he trial court erred in the imposition of accused-appellants penalty.
Pursuant to Article 315 of the RPC, the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. If the amount of the fraud
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period (6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years), adding 1 year for each additionalP10,000.00;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years.
Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R involve the amount of P40,000.00 each.
Considering that P18,000.00 is the excess amount, only 1 year should be added to the
penalty in its maximum period or 9 years. Also, in Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the
amount involved is P70,000.00. Thus, the excess amount is P48,000.00 and only 4
years should be added to the penalty in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated 02 July
2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 2 years, 11
months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum to 9 years of prision
mayor, as maximum and to indemnify Jeffries Golidan the amount
of P40,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 2 years, 11
months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum to 9 years of prision
mayor, as maximum and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount
of P40,000.00; and
3. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 4 years and
2 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 12 years of prision mayor, as
maximum and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00.
20

Hence, this appeal, in which Ocden raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE ALTHOUGH THE CRIME WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ESTAFA IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16316-R, 16318-R AND 16[9]64-R.
21

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find nothing on record that
would justify a reversal of Ocdens conviction.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
she is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare
allegations of the prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she
was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers. No certification attesting to this fact was formally offered
in evidence by the prosecution.
Ocdens aforementioned contentions are without merit.
Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code defines and enumerates the acts which
constitute recruitment and placement:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising for advertising for employment locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, broadened the
concept of illegal recruitment and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that
constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042
are reproduced below:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any
such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.It shall
likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a
non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that
actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation
to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any
act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority
under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his
employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to
liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any
worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to
public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement
vacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs,
departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an
officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or
to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before
departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized
under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with
his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where
the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually
or as a group.
x x x x
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than
twelve (12) years and a fine of Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally
recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority. (Emphasis ours.)
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant
gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send
complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their
money in order to be employed.
22
As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan,
Ocden gave such an impression through the following acts: (1) Ocden informed Mana-
a, Ferrer, and Golidan about the job opportunity in Italy and the list of necessary
requirements for application; (2) Ocden required Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons,
Jeffries and Howard, to attend the seminar conducted by Ramos at Ocdens house in
Baguio City; (3) Ocden received the job applications, pictures, bio-data, passports,
and the certificates of previous employment (which was also issued by Ocden upon
payment of P500.00), of Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard; (4)
Ocden personally accompanied Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and
Howard, for their medical examinations in Manila; (5) Ocden received money paid as
placement fees by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, and even
issued receipts for the same; and (6) Ocden assured Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans
sons, Jeffries and Howard, that they would be deployed to Italy.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts
which would constitute illegal recruitment "whether committed by any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority." Among such
acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse
expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing
for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the workers fault."
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even
by a licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or
not, is inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said
provision by receiving placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons,
Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to
reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons the amounts they had
paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own.
Ocden questions why it was Golidan who testified for private complainants Jeffries
and Howard. Golidan had no personal knowledge of the circumstances proving illegal
recruitment and could not have testified on the same. Also, Jeffries and Howard
already executed an affidavit of desistance. All Golidan wants was a reimbursement
of the placement fees paid.
Contrary to Ocdens claims, Golidan had personal knowledge of Ocdens illegal
recruitment activities, which she could competently testify to. Golidan herself had
personal dealings with Ocden as Golidan assisted her sons, Jeffries and Howard, in
completing the requirements for their overseas job applications, and later on, in
getting back home from Zamboanga where Jeffries and Howard were stranded, and in
demanding a refund from Ocden of the placement fees paid. That Golidan is seeking a
reimbursement of the placement fees paid for the failed deployment of her sons
Jeffries and Howard strengthens, rather than weakens, the prosecutions case. Going
back to illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, failure to
reimburse the expenses incurred by the worker when deployment does not actually
take place, without the workers fault, is illegal recruitment.
The affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by Jeffries and Howard does not
exonerate Ocden from criminal liability when the prosecution had successfully proved
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Romero,
23
we held that:
The fact that complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance does not serve to exculpate accused-appellant from criminal
liability insofar as the case for illegal recruitment is concerned since the Court looks
with disfavor the dropping of criminal complaints upon mere affidavit of desistance of
the complainant, particularly where the commission of the offense, as is in this case,
is duly supported by documentary evidence.
Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance,
especially when it is executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule for
courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply
because the witnesses who had given them, later on, changed their mind for one
reason or another, for such rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness.
Complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope may have a change of heart
insofar as the offense wrought on their person is concerned when they executed their
joint affidavit of desistance but this will not affect the public prosecution of the
offense itself. It is relevant to note that "the right of prosecution and punishment for
a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctly charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard
and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the
liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights." This cardinal
principle which states that to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish
crimes should not be overlooked since a criminal offense is an outrage to the
sovereign State.
24

In her bid to exculpate herself, Ocden asserts that she was also just an applicant for
overseas employment; and that she was receiving her co-applicants job applications
and other requirements, and accepting her co-applicants payments of placement
fees, because she was designated as the applicants leader by Ramos, the real
recruiter.
Ocdens testimony is self-serving and uncorroborated. Ocdens denial of any illegal
recruitment activity cannot stand against the prosecution witnesses positive
identification of her in court as the person who induced them to part with their
money upon the misrepresentation and false promise of deployment to Italy as factory
workers. Besides, despite several opportunities given to Ocden by the RTC, she failed
to present Ramos, who Ocden alleged to be the real recruiter and to whom she turned
over the placement fees paid by her co-applicants.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand,
and the bare denial of Ocden, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the
former comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and always received with
caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is
easily fabricated and concocted.
25

Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.
26
It is a settled rule that factual
findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility,
are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the
Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the best
position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The
absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that
its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts
determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.
27

Ocden further argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently establish that she
illegally recruited at least three persons, to constitute illegal recruitment on a large
scale. Out of the victims named in the Information, only Mana-a and Ferrer testified
in court. Mana-a did not complete her testimony, depriving Ocden of the opportunity
to cross-examine her; and even if Mana-as testimony was not expunged from the
record, it was insufficient to prove illegal recruitment by Ocden. Although Ferrer
testified that she and Mana-a filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against Ocden,
Ferrers testimony is competent only as to the illegal recruitment activities
committed by Ocden against her, and not against Mana-a. Ocden again objects to
Golidans testimony as hearsay, not being based on Golidans personal knowledge.
Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale,
that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
In People v. Hu,
28
we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be
based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons,
whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that
at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is
sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more
persons. In this case, there is conclusive evidence that Ocden recruited Mana-a,
Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as factory
workers in Italy. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
Mana-as testimony, although not completed, sufficiently established that accused-
appellant promised Mana-a a job placement in a factory in Italy for a fee with
accused-appellant even accompanying her for the required medical examination.
Likewise, Julia Golidans testimony adequately proves that accused-appellant
recruited Jeffries and Howard Golidan for a job in Italy, also for a fee. Contrary to the
accused-appellants contention, Julia had personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the charges for illegal recruitment and estafa filed by her
sons. Julia was not only privy to her sons recruitment but also directly transacted
with accused-appellant, submitting her sons requirements and paying the placement
fees as evidenced by a receipt issued in her name. Even after the placement did not
materialize, Julia acted with her sons to secure the partial reimbursement of the
placement fees.
29

And even though only Ferrer and Golidan testified as to Ocdens failure to reimburse
the placements fees paid when the deployment did not take place, their testimonies
already established the fact of non-reimbursement as to three persons, namely,
Ferrer and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard.
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 if the illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, imposed upon Ocden the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
onlyP100,000.00. Since the fine of P100,000 is below the minimum set by law, we are
increasing the same toP500,000.00.
Estafa
We are likewise affirming the conviction of Ocden for the crime of estafa. The very
same evidence proving Ocdens liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People
v. Yabut
30
that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does
not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for
estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction
for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
31

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or
by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
32

Both these elements are present in the instant case. Ocden represented to Ferrer,
Golidan, and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard, that she could provide them
with overseas jobs. Convinced by Ocden, Ferrer, Golidan, and Golidans sons paid
substantial amounts as placement fees to her. Ferrer and Golidans sons were never
able to leave for Italy, instead, they ended up in Zamboanga, where, Ocden claimed,
it would be easier to have their visas to Italy processed. Despite the fact that
Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, were stranded in Zamboanga for almost a month,
Ocden still assured them and their mother that they would be able to leave for Italy.
There is definitely deceit on the part of Ocden and damage on the part of Ferrer and
Golidans sons, thus, justifying Ocdens conviction for estafa in Criminal Case Nos.
16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when
the amount of fraud is overP22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, adding one year to the maximum period for each
additional P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we take the minimum term from the
penalty next lower than the minimum prescribed by law, or anywhere within prision
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
33
Consequently, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly fixed the
minimum term in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R at 2 years, 11 months, and
10 days of prision correccional; and in Criminal Case No. 16964-R at 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, since these are within the range of prision
correccional minimum and medium.1avvphi1
As for the maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we take the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, adding 1 year of imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, the
time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be
divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this
computation, the maximum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty,
when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to
8 years, at the discretion of the court.
34

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be substracted
by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a
year shall be discarded as was done starting with People v. Pabalan.
35

In Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R, brothers Jeffries and Howard Golidan
were each defrauded of the amount of P40,000.00, for which the Court of Appeals
sentenced Ocden to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of
prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor as maximum. Upon
review, however, we modify the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
imposed on Ocden in said criminal cases. Since the amount defrauded
exceeds P22,000.00 by P18,000.00, 1 year shall be added to the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty (anywhere between 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years).
There being no aggravating circumstance, we apply the lowest of the maximum
period, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days. Adding the one year incremental
penalty, the maximum term of Ocdens indeterminate sentence in these two cases is
only 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor.
In Criminal Cases No. 19694-R, Ferrer was defrauded of the amount of P70,000.00, for
which the Court of Appeals sentenced Ocden to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor, as
maximum. Upon recomputation, we also have to modify the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence imposed upon Ocden in Criminal Case No. 19694-R. Given
that the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P48,000.00, 4 years shall be added
to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (anywhere between 6 years, 8
months, and 21 days to 8 years). There likewise being no aggravating circumstance in
this case, we add the 4 years of incremental penalty to the lowest of the maximum
period, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days. The maximum term, therefor, of
Ocdens indeterminate sentence in Criminal Case No. 19694-R is only 10 years, 8
months, and 21 days of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Dolores Ocden is DENIED. The
Decision dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00044 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16315-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed
in large scale as defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to
Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to
an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to
an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; and
4. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to
an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182918 June 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EFREN PATELAN LAMBERTE @ "KALBO" and MARCELINO RUIZ NIMUAN @
"CELINE," Accused,
MARCELINO RUIZ NIMUAN, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by accused Marcelino Ruiz Nimuan (appellant)
1
from the
November 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02352.
2

The Factual Antecedents
On November 25, 2004, the appellant, together with Efren Patelan Lamberte,
3
was
charged with murder
4
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La
Union.
5
A year and a half later, on April 7, 2006, the appellant was arrested.
6
On April
12, 2006, the prosecution filed an amended information charging the appellant and
Lamberte with the same crime of murder.
7
The appellant pleaded not guilty when
arraigned.
8
His co-accused, Lamberte, remained at large. At the trial that followed,
the prosecution established the facts outlined below.
At about 6:00 p.m. of September 22, 2004, Eulalia Garcia was tending her sari-sari
store along the National Highway in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union when the
appellant and Lamberte came to borrow her gas lamp. She noticed that both were
drunk and armed. They said they were looking for a bullet that fell on the ground.
After finding the bullet, she asked them where they were going and they answered,
"We are going to kill the doctor." The two then waited under a mango tree. Shortly
thereafter, the victim (Dr. Jose Villanueva), on board a truck, passed by Garcias
store on the way to his poultry farm. The appellant and Lamberte followed on foot.
Ten (10) minutes later, Garcia heard two (2) gunshots coming from the direction of
the poultry farm.
9

It appears that the victim arrived at his poultry farm at around 7:00 p.m. to deliver
medicines and bread to his workers, Alvin Manolong, Crispino Yaranon and Ferrer
Anasario. After the delivery, the victim instructed the workers to resume their work.
The workers then proceeded to Building 1 and left the victim standing beside his truck
near Building 5.
10

Subsequently, the workers heard gunfire coming from the victims direction.
Manolong went down to investigate. On hearing a second shot, Manolong ran towards
the parked truck and saw the victim lying on the ground with a gunshot wound in his
stomach. Manolong called his companions, yelling that the victim had been shot.
11

On hearing Manolongs cries for help, Yaranon and Anasario ran toward Building 5. On
the way, they met the appellant and Lamberte. The appellant kicked Yaranon three
times and hit him on the stomach with the butt of the carbine he was holding, while
Lamberte poked a shotgun at Anasario. The appellant and Lamberte threatened
Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (the appellant and
Lamberte) were responsible for the killing of the victim. The appellant and Lamberte
then left, going northward in the direction of the mango plantation, owned by Atty.
Paulino Cases, where both worked as security guards.
12

A postmortem examination confirmed that the victim died from shotgun wounds in
the back.
13
The victims widow, Dr. Eufemia Villanueva, presented in court the
official receipts, amounting to P56,500.00, for the victims funeral and burial,
14
and
the victims 2003 and 2004 income tax returns to establish loss of earning capacity.
15

The appellant denied any participation in the killing of the victim, and pointed to
Lamberte as the person solely responsible. He claimed that he merely accompanied
Lamberte to the victims farm when the latter suddenly shot the victim; Lamberte
threatened him with death if he (appellant) did not escape with him.
16

The RTC Ruling
In its May 31, 2006 Decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder. It gave
credence to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses who saw the accused
before and after the shooting incident, thus pointing to a conspiracy in the killing of
the victim. It rejected the appellants denial of criminal liability. In imposing the
death penalty, the RTC appreciated the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime, without, however, explaining its
reasons. The RTC ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of the victim P3 million in
lost income, P8 million as moral damages, P2 million as exemplary
damages, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P60,000.00 as actual damages.
17

The CA Ruling
On intermediate appellate review, the CA fully agreed with the RTCs appreciation of
the adduced evidence. While the appellate court appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of treachery because the appellant was shot at the back, it disregarded
nighttime as an aggravating circumstance because it is absorbed by treachery. The CA
appreciated evident premeditation because the accused had sufficient time to reflect
on the consequences of their acts from the time they told Garcia that they would kill
the victim to the time of killing. It likewise appreciated in the appellants favor the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication because Garcia testified that the accused
were drunk. Since the mitigating circumstance of intoxication offsets the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, the CA sentenced the appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On civil indemnity, the appellate court modified the amounts awarded by the RTC.
Civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P50,000.00 each, while the
amount of exemplary damages was reduced toP25,000.00, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence. The amount of actual damages was reduced toP56,150.00, based on
actual receipted expenses.
18
The amount for loss of earning capacity was reduced
toP622,453.95,
19
based on the victims income tax returns
20
from 2002 to 2004.
21

From the CA, the case is now with us for final review.
Our Ruling
We affirm the appellants conviction for murder.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly prove that a conspiracy existed
in the commission of the crime. Garcia testified that the appellant and Lamberte had
the common design of killing the victim. The fact that each one was armed with a
firearm shows that they acted with the singular purpose of killing the victim. Both
accused threatened workers Manolong, Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they
tell anyone that they (accused) killed the victim. Under these facts, it does not
matter who actually shot the victim because of the conspiracy that existed. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all; each of the accused is equally guilty of the
crime committed.
22

The CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery as the victim
was shot at the back.
23
The attack was deliberate, sudden and unexpected; it
afforded the unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself.
24

Nonetheless, we find that the CA misappreciated the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be
proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination
and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
25

In this case, there is dearth of evidence on when the accused first conceived of killing
the victim and that they were afforded sufficient time to reflect on the consequences
of their contemplated crime before its final execution. Moreover, the span of time
(less than thirty minutes), from the time the accused showed their determination to
kill the victim (when they told Garcia that they were "going to kill the doctor") up to
the time they shot the victim, could not have afforded them full opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed.
26
Thus,
the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.
We also find that the CA erred in crediting the appellant with the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication simply because Garcia testified that "the accused were
both drunk."
27
For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must
be shown that the intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused that he did not
know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.
28

In this case, there is no convincing proof of the nature and effect of the appellants
intoxication.1avvph!1 The mitigating circumstance of intoxication cannot be
appreciated in the appellants favor merely on the testimony of a prosecution witness
that he was drunk during the incident.
29
Such testimony does not warrant a conclusion
that the degree of the accuseds intoxication had affected his faculties.
30

The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attended the commission of the felony, the proper imposable penalty
on the appellant is reclusion perpetua.
Lastly, we find it necessary to increase to P30,000.00 the amount of exemplary
damages, to conform with recent jurisprudence.
31

WHEREFORE, the November 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 02352 is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marcelino Ruiz
Nimuan is found guilty of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to
pay the heirs of Dr. Jose Villanueva P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P56,150.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P622,453.95 as indemnification for loss of earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191065 June 13, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JONIE DOMINGUEZ, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
The appeal before us assails the 20 August 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03130
1
affirming the conviction of Appellant Jonie
Dominguez
2
for eight counts of the crime of rape.
The present appeal stems from nine (9) criminal Informations filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65, Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-582 to 02-
590. In the Informations, Jonie Dominguez was accused of committing multiple counts
of the crime of rape -- under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 in relation to R.A. No. 7610
-- against two minor female relatives, hereinafter called AAA and BBB.
The aggravating circumstance of relationship was also alleged in the Informations --
the accused was allegedly the victims "grandfather."
3
In Criminal Case No. 02-583,
the Information alleged that in committing the crime, the accused was armed with a
knife -- an aggravating circumstance.
AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001 when she was only nine years old, and
second on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly done by the accuseds
insertion of his two fingers into AAA's sex organ under the circumstance of
intimidation with a knife,
4
described in the Information
5
docketed as Criminal Case
No. 02-583, as follows:
That sometimes (sic) in the year 2001, at Barangay XXX, municipality of YYY, province
of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, while armed
with a knife, taking advantage of the youthfulness of the victim and his moral
ascendancy over her, with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously inserted his two (2) fingers to the sex organ of AAA, a minor, 9 years of
age, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present considering that the
accused is the grandfather of the victim being the brother of the mother of the
victims father.
The second instance of rape was allegedly committed by the accused by inserting his
fingers into AAAs vagina and having carnal knowledge of her afterwards. The accused
did not use a deadly weapon, but was able to perpetrate the crime through threats
and the use of moral ascendancy over AAA.
6
The Information, docketed as 02-582,
reads:
That on or about July 12, 2002, in the afternoon, at Barangay XXX, municipality of
YYY, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
taking advantage of the youthfulness of the victim and his moral ascendancy over her,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his fingers to the sex
organ of victim and then have carnal knowledge of the victim, AAA, a minor, 10 years
of age, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present considering that the
accused is the grandfather of the victim being the brother of the mother of the
victims father.
BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped seven times: first on 15 June 2000 when
she was 12 years old; and again on 20 April 2001, 1 June 2001, 13 April 2001; and
finally on 2, 8, and 12 June 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly by carnal
knowledge through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy.
7
The
subsequent instances of rape were allegedly committed by the insertion of a finger
into BBB's sex organ, also through force, violence and intimidation, and moral
ascendancy.
8

These accusations are contained in the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. 02-584
9

That on or about June 15, 2000, at more or less 10:00 oclock (sic) in the morning at
barangay XXX, municipality of YYY, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation and taking advantage of the youthfulness of the victim and
also his moral ascendancy over the latter, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of BBB, a minor, 12 years of age, against her
will and without her consent, which acts likewise constitute child abuse and
exploitation, as it demeans, debases and degrades the integrity of the child as a
person, to her damage and prejudice.
The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present, the accused being
the brother of the other of the victims father.
Criminal Case No. 02-585
10

That on or about midnight of April 20, 2001, at barangay XXX, municipality of YYY,
province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking
advantage of the youthfulness and his moral ascendancy over the victim did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd designs inserted his fingers to
the sex organ of the victim BBB, a minor, 13 years of age, against her will and without
her consent, which acts likewise constitute child abuse and exploitation as it debases,
demeans and degrades the integrity of the victim as a person, to her damage and
prejudice.
The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present, the accused is the
grandfather of the victim being the brother of the mother of the victims father.
Criminal Case Nos. 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590, were also couched in the same
language as Criminal Case No. 02-585, except for the dates of commission and the age
of BBB.
AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother
accidentally discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself.
Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the children's
vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the
remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. As a result, the
girls were brought to a doctor for examination.
11
The examining physician, Dr. Estrella
Payoyo, found AAAs hymen intact, but did not discount the fact that the child could
have been molested.
12
In contrast, BBB was found to have old hymenal lacerations.
13

The Informations, filed on 21 October 2001, were subsequently amended to state that
the aggravating circumstance of relationship was a special qualifying circumstance.
The accused, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.
Thereafter trial ensued.
During the trial, AAA and BBB testified against Dominguez by narrating the lascivious
acts he had done to them. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed
trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped,
with threats of harm to her person or her family.
14
It should be noted that as to the
second rape, AAA was silent on the alleged sexual intercourse. She in fact did not
mention it, but merely testified that the accused inserted his fingers into her vagina
on two occasions.
15

The main theory of the defense was one of denial and alibi. The accused insisted that
he was in the mountains on the dates that he was alleged to have committed the
crimes.
16

The trial court, after receiving the evidence, convicted the accused. It gave credence
to the testimonies of the two child-victims, who had positively identified him and
candidly narrated the sexual acts he had perpetrated against them. The court
observed that he had failed to rebut the said allegations. The fallo of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ having been found
GUILTY of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape under par. (2) of Article 266-A in relation
to Article III, Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 and six (6) other counts of Simple Rape under pars.
(1) and (2) pf Article 266-A in relation to Article III, Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, is hereby
sentenced as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-582 (Statutory Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional
Maximum, as minimum, to 10 years of Prision Mayor medium, as maximum; to
indemnify the offended party AAA in the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
2) In Criminal Case No. 02-583 (Statutory Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional
Maximum, as minimum, to 12 years of Prision Mayor maximum as maximum,
present the generic aggravating circumstance of USE OF DEADLY WEAPON
(Article 266-B in relation to par. (2) of Article 266-A); to indemnify AAA the
amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another Php50,000.00 as moral
damages and Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) In Criminal Case No. 02-584 (Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the indivisible
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA (Article 266-B in relation to par. (1) of Article
266-A, RPC as amended); to indemnify BBB the amounts of Php50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) In Criminal Cases Nos. 02-585; 586; 587; 588 and 590 (Rape), he is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of Prision
Correccional maximum, as minimum, to 10 years or Prision Mayor medium, as
maximum, for EACH COUNT of RAPE; to indemnify BBB the amounts of
Php50,000.00 civil indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and
to pay the costs;
5) In Criminal Case No. 02-589 (Rape), accused is ACQUITTED for insufficiency
of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to establish his GUILT beyond
reasonable doubt.
The period of preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be
credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended.
In the service of the sentences above-mentioned, the order of their respective
severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as
may be possible pursuant to the provision of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended.
SO ORDERED.
17

The accused thereafter resorted to the CA for a review of the court a quos Decision.
The assailed Decision was affirmed by the appellate court, which disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal interposed by Jonie Dominguez is
DENIED, and accordingly his convictions as pronounced under the herein assailed
November 5, 2007 Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED together with the
appropriate prison penalty, but with modification only as to the awards for civil
indemnity and moral damages, for which appellant is hereby ordered to pay:
1) Php75,000.00 for civil indemnity, and Php75,000.00 by way of moral
damages in Crim. Case No. 02-584.
2) Php30,000.00 for civil indemnity and Php30,000.00 by way of moral damages
for each of appellants convictions in Crim. Case Nos. 02-582, 02-583, 02-585,
02-586, 02-587, 02-588, and 02-590.
3) Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages in Crim. Case No. 02-583.
SO ORDERED.
18

The accused timely filed a notice of appeal to elevate the case to this Court. He did
not submit a Supplemental Brief, and instead filed a Manifestation that the case be
deemed submitted for decision.
19
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
People, had earlier filed a similar Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief.
20
We
thus refer to the Appellants Brief filed with the CA, wherein the accused-appellant
advanced this lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
21

We sustain the conviction.
Accused-appellant argues that the prosecutors evidence was doubtful.
The charges against him, he says, were just fabricated, since the parents of the
victims had an axe to grind against him. He claims that he had loaned an amount to
the victims aunt, who is the sister of the victims father. When he demanded the
return of the money, the victims parents got mad at him. He insinuates that these ill
feelings were the reason why he was falsely charged by AAA and BBB.
22
We disregard
this allegation for being irrelevant to the question of whether the crime as charged
did take place.
To introduce reasonable doubt on his criminal culpability, the accused highlights the
testimony of Dr. Payoyo that BBBs old lacerations could also have been caused by
infection from scratching her vagina or by injury from accidents. He also emphasizes
Dr. Payoyos finding that BBBs vagina could admit only one finger with resistance. As
to Dr. Payoyos report that AAAs hymen was intact, the accused-appellant relies on it
to bolster his defense that there was no sexual intercourse or sexual abuse.
Jurisprudence is clear on this matter. The absence of a laceration in BBBs hymen
does not overturn the testimonies of the child-victims. As the Court held in People v.
Gabayron:
23

Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that based on the medico-legal
findings, there is no showing that his daughters hymen was penetrated, nor there
was any evidence of injuries inflicted. However, jurisprudence is well-settled to
the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of the hymen is not
necessary, nor it is necessary that the vagina sustained a laceration especially if
the complainant is a young girl. ... The fact that there was no deep penetration of
the victims vagina and that her hymen was intact does not negate rape, since this
crime is committed even with the slightest penetration of a womans sex organ.
Presence of a laceration in the vagina is not (sic) essential prerequisite to prove
that a victim has been raped. Research in medicine even points out that negative
findings are of no significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated
coitus. In fact, many cases of pregnancy have been reported in women with
unruptured hymen.(emphasis supplied)
24

Another point being raised by the accused-appellant concerns the consistency of AAA's
testimony. He argues that the inconsistencies in her testimony taint her credibility. In
effect, he claims that since rape is a traumatic event for the victim, there was no way
AAA could have forgotten or been mistaken about it, including its place of
occurrence, had rape really happened. Specifically, the accused is arguing that since
AAA mentioned two places -- their house and the back of the school her testimony
was not credible. In rebuttal, the Office of the Solicitor General states that AAA
indeed testified that she was violated in their house and that, immediately prior to
that incident, she was playing at the back of the school when the accused-appellant
called her to come inside the house. AAA's house, where the second rape was
committed, was at the back of the school.
25
She herself clarified this detail during the
redirect examination. The relevant portion of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes is
reproduced below:
26

Q: AAA, during the last time that you were here in court, you declared that you
were sexually molested by Jonie Dominguez at the house of your uncle Rogelio,
is that correct?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: And the other sexual molestation happened at the back of your school in
Butag Elementary School, is that also correct?
A: No, Maam.
Q: What do you mean no, Maam?
A: At the house of Uncle Rogelio and at our house.
Q: But during the last time when you were asked by Atty. Gojar, you said that
you were also molested at the back of the elementary school, Barangay XXX, so
which is correct now?
A: The truth is that I was sexually molested at the house of my Uncle Rogelio
and at our house.
Q: And why did you say that you were molested at the back of the elementary
school in Barangay XXX, if not true?
A: I was confused thinking that the question of Atty. Gojar is the location of
our house and our house is situated at the back of the elementary school."
There was therefore no inconsistency to speak of. We find AAA's testimony credible on
this point and disregard the accused's attack on the same.
The accused also cites AAAs testimony that after each incident of molestation, she
told her parents about it. According to him, her testimony was discrepant with that of
her mother. Recall that the mother had alleged that the discovery of the crime was
due to his utterance regarding the state of her daughters vaginas.
27
We reject the
claim of the accused. It can clearly be deduced from AAAs answer during the cross-
examination that when she told her parents about the molestations, she was referring
to the time immediately before the filing of the Complaint and not immediately after
the rape.
28
It should be pointed out that she was consistent and unwavering in her
claim that the accused inserted his two fingers into her organ on two occasions. The
trial court observed AAAs consistency in her testimony and ruled that she was a
credible witness.
29
We respect the trial courts ruling on this matter. This Court
recognizes that:
Ample margin of error and understanding is accorded to young witnesses who, much
more than adults, would naturally be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the
experience of testifying before a court.
30

We have reviewed the records and find no cogent reason to disturb the conviction. A
reading of the TSN of the hearing of the case convinces us that the CA did not commit
any reversible error. The victims were still minors at the time they testified.
Nevertheless, they were able to narrate the incidents, albeit not exactly with the
same coherence as a fully capacitated adult witness would. Leeway should be given to
witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.
Relevant to this, we quote the following discussion by retired Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.:
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of
relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision
in United States vs. Buncad, this Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point,
says: "But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular
age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular
child is to be investigated." (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)
While on the same subject, Underhill declares:
257. Children on the witness stand. - Under the common law, competency of a child
under the age of fourteen years to testify must be shown to the satisfaction of the
court. He is presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown to be competent it is
immaterial how young he may be when he testifies. He is competent if he
possesses mental capacity and memory sufficient to enable him to give a
reasonable and intelligible account of the transaction he has seen, if he
understands and has a just appreciation of the difference between right and
wrong, and comprehends the character, meaning and obligation of an oath. If the
witness fulfills these requirements, it is immaterial as bearing upon his
competency that he is unable to define the oath or to define testimony. In the
wise discretion of the court, a child four, five, six and for such ages as seven,
eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen or fifteen years of age may be shown
competent to testify. It may not be said that there is any particular age at which
as a matter of law all children are competent or incompetent. x x x
The requirements then of a childs competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity
of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication.
And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the
foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make
such determination. As held in United States vs. Buncad, quoting from Wheeler vs.
United States, and reiterated in People vs. Raptus and People vs. Libungan:
The decision of (sic) this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees
the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of
intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his
capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath.
As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of
the trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved
it is clear that it was erroneous. (citations omitted).
31

We find that AAA and BBB were able to candidly answer the questions propounded to
them during the examination in court and to communicate the ordeal they suffered in
the hands of the accused. They were credible witnesses.
The legal doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left to the
judgment of the trial court is well-established.
32
Its findings of facts, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are deemed conclusive on this Court.
33
In this case, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found the prosecution witnesses credible.
The narrated facts disprove the alibi of the accused-appellant that he was up in the
mountains on the dates that he allegedly molested the victims. BBB testified that the
accused was staying with another relative, their TiaCita, whose husband is his
brother. He invited BBB and her two siblings to go to the house of their Tia Cita. He
then ordered the two siblings of BBB to go to the seashore and pull the crab catcher.
BBB was left alone with appellant, who then perpetrated his lewd acts on her. BBB
likewise testified that appellant lived with them, thus making it possible for him to be
near her and to molest her even at night while she was sleeping. She also testified
that she was threatened by the accused who warned her not to tell anyone, or else
her family would be killed.
34

Both the trial court and the CA found these defenses of denial and alibi incredible.
The testimony of the accused was riddled with obvious inconsistencies. He denied
knowing the victims, but eventually identified AAA as his grandniece. His own
testimony contradicted his alibi, since he testified that from 2000 to 2002, he was
residing in his brothers house. This was where one of the rape incidents happened,
and was even near the house of the victims. On this point, we have stated previously:
To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime.Physical impossibility "refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places."
35

On its part, the prosecution was able to show the existence of the elements of rape
under the amended Revised Penal Code, effectuated by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, which states:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and how committed
Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.
Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of threats that the
victims family would be killed by the accused. The accused also employed trickery
and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these circumstances,
the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and commit a series of sexual
assaults against both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened
before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and 10 then. For those incidents,
proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary.
As to damages, there is a need to modify the award of civil indemnity in Criminal Case
No. 02-584.
Contrary to the claim of the prosecution, the accuseds relationship to the victims
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. For relationship to aggravate or
qualify the crime of rape committed against a minor, the accused must be a relative
of the victim within the third civil degree.
36
As a brother of the victim's paternal
grandmother, he is but a relative within the fourth civil degree. This relationship
cannot qualify the crime as to merit the punishment of reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Thus, the rape of BBB by
means of carnal knowledge was simple rape, and the amount of civil indemnity should
be decreased from P75,000 to P50,000.
With respect to the manner of rape committed against AAA twice and against BBB six
times, which was rape by digital insertion, jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present
yields the information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to
victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion
isP30,000.
37
We adhere to these precedents.
We note that prior to the amendment of the law on rape, the act of inserting the
finger, with lewd designs, into the genital orifice of a girl or a non-consenting woman
falls under acts of lasciviousness.1avvphi1 The victim was awarded civil indemnity
likewise in the amount of P30,000.
38
In amending the law and renaming the act as
rape, there is a recognition that the same evil, as that of conventional rape, is sought
to be prevented. This was recognized in People v. Jalosjos
39
when the Court awarded
civil indemnity, for each digital insertion committed by the accused against the
victim, in the amount of P50,000 similar to conventional rape. Subsequent decisions,
however, reverted to P30,000 the civil indemnity for the commission of rape under
Art. 266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
40
We follow the latter in the present case.
An award of exemplary damages to AAA and BBB for all the instances of rape
committed by the accused against them is also warranted. In People v. Alfredo
41
, the
Court reiterated an earlier decision held "that exemplary damages may be awarded
not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show a highly reprehensible conduct."
42
In the present case,
the circumstances show the higher degree of perversity of the accused. Instead of
showing any remorse in abusing children of tender age, he repeatedly committed the
crime against the victims. Worse, he even degraded them before other people by
making fun of the fact that their private parts were already non-virginal, something
that society sees as outrageous and uncommon for their age. Surely, only a person
who is outrageously perverse can brag about his vulgarities to others with seeming
impunity. These are conducts and dispositions that are abhorrent to the norms of a
civilized society and should be curtailed and discouraged. We apply the Courts
rationale in People v. Rayos
43
, wherein we held that "Article 2229 of the Civil Code
sanctions the grant of exemplary or correction damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts in the future and to allow the courts to mould behaviour
that can have grave and deleterious consequences to society."
In People v. Alfredo
44
, the Court clarified that the basis of awarding exemplary
damages on account of a crime is not exclusively Article 2230 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of civil liability may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances." The Court held as that:
In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis
of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages
to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of
the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of
the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The
People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary
damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather
than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow
Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v.
Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi
juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind
the award of exemplary damages to set a public example or correction for the
public good."
45

The records reveal the accuseds perversity and moral corruption, which should not
be replicated in our society. To deter such behavior, exemplary damages must be
imposed on the accused as a warning to those persons who are similarly disposed.
Regarding the penalty of imprisonment, we find that a modification thereof is in
order. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads:
Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
. . . . . . . . .
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision
mayor.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
The trial court failed to apply the proper penalty in Criminal Case No. 02-583, for
rape by sexual assault aggravated by the use of a knife, in imposing a maximum of
only 12 years of prision mayor instead of prision mayor to reclusion temporal with a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. We impose fifteen (15)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.
As to the minimum penalty required by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTCs
Decision was appropriate. Article 61 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code states
that the penalty next lower in degree to a prescribed penalty of one or more divisible
penalties imposed to their full extent is that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties. The minimum of the penalty to be imposed is to be taken from within the
entire period of prision correccional, or six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Considering the abhorrent character of the crime committed and the innocence
of the victim in Criminal Case No. 02-583, we peg the minimum penalty at six (6)
years of prision correccional.
The sentence of imprisonment imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 02-582, 02-584 to 02-588
and 02-590 will remain undisturbed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ is sentenced to suffer
the following:
a) In Criminal Case No. 02-583, the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum, to fifteen (15) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
b) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-582, 02-585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590,
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum for each count of
rape; and
c) In Criminal Case No. 02-584, the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
a) To AAA:
1) P30,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-
582 and 02-583;
2) P30,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-
582 and 02-583; and
3) P30,000.00 exemplary damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos.
02-582 and 02-583.
b) To BBB:
1) P50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-584;
2) P50,000 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 02-584;
3) P30,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-
585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590;
4) P30,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-
585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590;
5) P30,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos.
02-584, 02-585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194379 June 1, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO "SAYSOT" CIAS, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the April 30, 2010 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00075, which affirmed the January 31, 2003 Decision in Criminal
Case No. 14791
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37 in Dumaguete City. The
RTC convicted accused Feliciano "Saysot" Cias (Cias) of rape.
The Facts
The charge against the accused stemmed from the following Information:
That at about nine oclock in the evening of April 1, 2000 at [PPP],
3
Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, the accused holding a scythe and
forcibly removed the panty of [AAA] who was then resting inside the house with her
child and while her husband was away and did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have succeeded a sexual intercourse with said [AAA] against her will
and consent.
Contrary to Articles 266-A and 266-B, Section 2 of RA 8353, otherwise known as the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, amending the Revised Penal Code.
4

On January 29, 2001, Cias, with the assistance of his counsel, was arraigned, and he
pleaded "not guilty" to the charge against him. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits
ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of the private complainant;
Dr. Stephen S. Estacion (Dr. Estacion), who conducted the medico-legal examination
on AAA; and Senior Police Officer 3 Georgen Barot Sefe (SPO3 Sefe). On the other
hand, the defense presented as witnesses accused Cias and his wife, Felina Cias.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
AAA and her common-law husband lived together with her two children in PPP, Negros
Oriental. For two years, they had been neighbors with Cias. Their houses were just 30
meters apart.
5

In the evening of April 1, 2000, AAA and her children were already sleeping in their
house.
6
Her husband was not there that night as he had gone to the poblacion
7
to look
for work, while her father-in-law, who used to sleep in their house, was not around.
8

At around 9:00 p.m., AAA was awakened from sleep by the feeling of hands covering
her mouth. Upon waking up, she saw the accused kneeling on her legs. She was able
to identify Cias clearly because the kerosene lamp in the bedroom shed light on his
face.
9

Cias then told her to be quiet or he would kill her and her children. All the while, Cias
was holding a scythe in his right hand which he positioned close to her neck.
10

With his right hand still holding the scythe to AAAs neck, Cias removed her panty
with his left hand, tearing it and wounding her in the process. AAA tried her best to
struggle and managed to kick Cias in the legs, but her efforts proved futile. Cias then
had carnal knowledge with AAA, which AAA estimated to have lasted for an
hour.
11
Cias only stopped when he heard his wife, Felina Cias, shouting, "You are all
pigs! You are a bitch!" Cias then stood up and left the house to confront his wife.
After Cias had left, AAA hugged her children while they could hear Cias and his wife
arguing. AAA then ran to the living room to shout for help but changed her mind,
afraid that Cias and his wife might harm her and her children. Once the argument
stopped, AAA noticed that it was already 10:00 p.m. as reflected in the wall clock
hanging in the living room.
12
She also noticed that the living room window had been
forced open, thereby concluding that Cias must have entered through the said
window.
The following day, AAA kept her silence. But on the second day, April 3, 2000, she
decided to tell her common-law husband what had happened so she went to the
poblacion to look for him. Upon finding him, AAA narrated the incident to him, after
which, they proceeded to the police station to report it. Likewise, they informed
policeman Alex Tizon (Tizon), who hired Cias to tend to his livestock, of the said
incident. Tizon then advised AAA to see a physician and submit herself to a physical
examination.
13

AAA went to Dr. Estacion, the Municipal Health Officer of PPP, who conducted the
medico-legal examination on her. His examination revealed the presence of white
mucoid discharges in her vaginal opening which are normally produced when there is
sexual contact or when a woman is nearing the ovulation phase of her menstrual
cycle.
14
Further, the laboratory microscopic examination also revealed the absence of
spermatozoa in AAAs cervical os.
15
However, Dr. Estacion clarified in his testimony
that even if there had been actual sexual contact during which sperm was deposited
in the vagina, it would have degenerated already on the second day making it harder
to find.
16
Similarly, he noted a linear abrasion at the left side of AAAs abdomen,
which was probably caused by a blunt object or a fingernail, and not a scythe.
17
No
other injury was noted on the body of AAA.
The final witness, SPO3 Sefe, corroborated AAAs testimony that on April 3, 2000, the
couple arrived at the police station and reported an alleged rape. She also advised
AAA to have herself examined by a doctor. SPO3 Sefe recorded the reported incident
in the stations police blotter.
18

Version of the Defense
Cias, on the other hand, denied the allegations and said that the sexual intercourse
was consensual, to wit:
Cias testified that he and AAA had been carrying an illicit affair for about six months.
He alleged that in all their previous assignations, she submitted herself to him
voluntarily and willingly on each occasion that they had sexual intercourse.
In the evening of April 1, 2000, Cias and AAA had agreed to meet at AAAs house at
9:00 p.m. When he arrived, they talked for a while then engaged in sexual
intercourse. They did the "69" position on the living room floor so as not to awaken
the children sleeping in the bedroom.
19

Their lovemaking was, however, interrupted by a voice coming from outside the
house, screaming, "You have no pity, you are animals! You are pigs!" Cias then patted
AAAs buttocks and told her that it was his wife shouting.
20
They hurriedly put their
clothes on and Cias left to confront his wife. Cias and his wife argued for a while
before proceeding to their own house.
21

Cias testimony was corroborated by his wife, Felina Cias. In her testimony, she stated
that on April 1, 2000, Cias left their house at around 9:00 p.m. supposedly to get the
carabao he was tending in a nearby pasture. When he did not return after an hour,
she decided to look for him. On the way, she passed by the house of AAA and heard
familiar voices emanating from it. As she drew closer, she recognized AAAs voice
saying, "Lets go away," but she did not hear any reply.
22

Curious, she peeped through a hole in the wall below the windows of the living room.
To her great dismay, she saw Cias and AAA doing the "69" position. She screamed
epithets at them and left. Cias followed her and, subsequently, asked for her
forgiveness.
23

Enraged by the events, Felina Cias went to the poblacion the next day to narrate the
incident to AAAs common-law husband. When she told him what happened, he
showed no visible reaction to her story. Instead, he requested her to bring food
supplies to AAA and her children.
24
She later learned that the couple had filed the
instant case against her husband.
Although she had suspected that her husband and AAA were having an affair, Felina
was not really sure about it until she saw them that night. She further testified that
Cias never went to AAAs house alone. This was the very first time. In the past, both
she and Cias went over to AAAs house to listen to daytime drama programs on the
radio. During these times, she would notice AAA give her husband penetrating looks
but the two never spoke to each other in her presence.
25
Her suspicions were
sufficiently aroused but she did not confide them to anyone.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of its January 31,
2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, accused FELICIANO "Saysot" CIAS is hereby declared GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH; and he is directed to indemnify [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand (-P-
50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, Seventy-Five Thousand (-P- 75,000.00) Pesos as
civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
26

On appeal to the CA, the accused disputed the trial courts finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He argued that the allegations of the private
complainant are improbable and contrary to human experience, resulting in the
failure of her case to meet the test of moral certainty required in order to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On April 30, 2010, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It found that the RTCs
assessment of the credibility of the private complainant deserved respect. It also
found AAAs testimony to be consistent and straightforward. Hence, it did not see any
reason to deviate from the ruling of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 37,
dated January 31, 2003, in Criminal Case No. 14791, finding appellant Feliciano Cias
@ "Saysot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to
the effect that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay private offended party [AAA] the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages in addition to the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
27

The Issue
Cias now comes before this Court with the lone assignment of error, contending that
"[t]he court a quo erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the
crime [charged] has been proven beyond reasonable doubt."
28

The Courts Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
In his Brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court should not have received
the lone testimony of the private complainant with precipitate credulity because it
does not bear the stamp of truth and candor of a narration of actual events.
He points out three (3) alleged flaws in her testimony. First, private complainants
testimony stated that he used a scythe around her neck. In fact, she said that the
scythe was already touching her neck. Accused-appellant argues that if such
allegation were true, the private complainant would have sustained an injury in the
neck area but none was found. Second, in her testimony, private complainant avers
that she was not able to free herself from accused-appellant because, according to
her, he was kneeling on her two legs. Again, accused-appellant points out that if this
were true, private complainant would have sustained hematomas on her legs due to
the pressure applied on them. However, the physical examination conducted on her
did not show any. And third, accused-appellant cites numerous circumstances in
private complainants testimony, which would reveal several telltale signs that the
sexual intercourse that transpired between them was consensual and pre-arranged.
One such circumstance is the absence of both the common-law husband and the
father-in-law.
The arguments are bereft of merit.
In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided
by the following principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent,
to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons
are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.
29

Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even
secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the
forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the
victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the
victims testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be
convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted
of the crime.
30

More importantly, appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with
regard to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
31
The reason for this is that
trial courts have the "unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination."
32

The exceptions to this rule are when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions
are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and
value, likely to change the outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trial
court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
33
However, this Court finds none of these exceptions present in the instant case.
The private complainant testified in a steadfast and straightforward manner, to wit:
FISCAL JUDITHO AGAN:
Q And can you tell us if there was any unusual incident on April 1, 2000 at about 9:00
oclock in the evening while you were in your house?
A It was Saysot whom I saw went up.
Q In what particular place of your house did Saysot Cias go?
A He went up thru the window.
Q And how did you know that Saysot went up thru the window?
A Because our door was closed.
Q And was Saysot Cias able to enter your house?
A Yes, he was able to get inside.
Q After Saysot Cias was inside your house, what happened, if any?
A He kneeled down on my two (2) legs and he covered my mouth.
Q How were you able to recognize Saysot Cias at that time?
A Because when he covered my mouth I was able to wake up.
Q And how were you able to see his face clearly after you woke up?
A Because there was a kerosene lamp.
Q And how far was the kerosene lamp to the place where you were lying down?
A Above our head.
Q When Saysot kneeled on your two (2) legs and covered your [mouth], did he say
anything?
A He told me that "Just be silent ha" but there was a scythe around my neck.
Q How did Saysot Cias place the scythe?
A He placed it here. (The witness is indicating where the scythe was placed at the
right neck.)
Q Was the scythe touching your neck already at that time?
A Yes, it was touching.
Q What did you do if any after Saysot Cias told you not to say anything while placing a
scythe at your neck?
A He told me to be silent because if I am going to make a noise he will kill us.
x x x x
Q And what were your children doing at that time when Saysot Cias was kneeling on
your legs holding a scythe at your neck?
A The children were sleeping.
Q After that, what if any did Saysot Cias do?
A He raped me.
Q Were you not wearing a panty at that time?
A Yes.
Q How was he able to rape you when you were wearing a panty?
A He removed my panty.
Q How did Saysot Cias remove your panty?
A While he was holding the scythe around my neck the other hand removed my panty.
Q And what happened to your panty?
A It was torn.
x x x x
Q After Saysot Cias was able to remove your panty, what happened next?
A He raped me.
Q Did you not shout or scream at that time?
A Because if I am going to shout he is going to kill me.
Q Did you not try to wake up your children?
A No, I did not because they were lying on one side.
Q How long was that when Saysot Cias was having sexual intercourse with you?
A [Maybe] about one (1) hour.
Q And during this one (1) hour, did you not struggle?
A I struggled.
Q And were you not able to release yourself?
A I cannot because he was kneeling on my two (2) legs.
Q After that, what happened next?
A After that he went down.
Q And what did you do if any after he went down?
A After he went down, his wife kept on shouting outside while I was crying.
Q Why were you crying?
A Because if I am going to tell anyone, he is going to kill me.
34

Evidently, the above transcript shows that AAAs testimony was very coherent and
candid.
The trial court likewise reached a similar conclusion after hearing the testimony of
AAA, viz:
After a careful and thorough review of the evidence and a conscientious disquisition
of the disputed issue in this case, this Court finds that the lone testimony of the
private complainant passes the test of credibility and is, by itself, sufficient to sustain
a conviction. x x x
x x x x
On cross-examination, her narration of the events was unshaken. The defense
attempted, but failed, to point out any contradictions or flaws in her recollection of
the events. She remained consistent and spontaneously answered on even the minute
details. Even her testimony on recall bore the badge of sincerity and truthfulness. Her
forthright replies to rigorous questioning dispelled the initial doubts on matters which
initially seemed, to the mind of the Court, as slight inconsistencies in her testimony.
She successfully parried all questions in a frank and spontaneous manner that
convinced this Court that she did not fabricate this accusation against Saysot Cias.
Consequently, her testimony must be given full faith and credit.
35

Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the time-honored doctrine that the
trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies deserves
great respect.
Further, the theory that Cias and AAA were having an illicit affair is unsupported by
evidence. As held in People v. Cabanilla,
36
the sweetheart defense is an affirmative
defense that must be supported by convincing proof. In the case at bar, accused-
appellant relied solely on his testimony and that of his wife. He did not offer any
other evidencesuch as a love letter, a memento, or even a single photographto
substantiate his claim that they had a romantic relationship.
Besides, granting they had an illicit affair, this fact alone does not rule out rape as it
does not necessarily mean that consent was present. As We held, "A love affair does
not justify rape for a man does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to
his carnal desires against her will."
37

Lastly, the contention of accused-appellant that the absence of any form of injury to
AAAs neck or legs contradicts the charge of rape, is untenable. In People v. Hacbang,
We ruled that absence of injury does not negate the charge of rape and destroy the
credibility of the victims testimony. What is important is the fact that the victim was
made to submit to the will of the accused through force and intimidation.
38

The elements needed to prove the crime of rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the act is accomplished by using force or
intimidation. All these elements were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. The
testimony of AAA overwhelmingly proves that accused-appellant raped her with the
use of force and intimidation.
Accordingly, We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.1awphi1
As to the penalty, Art. 266-B of the RPC provides that "[w]henever the rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death (emphasis supplied)." Accordingly, in determining the proper
imposable penalty, the Court is guided by the provisions of Art. 63 of the RPC, which
reads:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
x x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. x x x
In this case, the trial court appreciated not just one, but three (3) aggravating
circumstances, namely: (a) the use of a deadly weapon; (b) the act was committed in
the dwelling of the private complainant;
39
and (c) entrance to the private
complainants dwelling was obtained by unlawful entry.
40
The first two aggravating
circumstances were sufficiently alleged in the criminal information and were also
adequately proved by the prosecution during trial. The third aggravating
circumstance, although not alleged in the criminal information, was amply proved
during trial. In People v. Mitra, We ruled that "aggravating circumstance not alleged
in the information may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the
sentence. Evidence in support thereof merely forms part of the actual commission of
the crime and its appreciation by the courts does not constitute a violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him."
41

Thus, considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable
penalty is death. However, due to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the CA correctly modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua.
Finally, although the CA was correct in awarding PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages,
the award of moral damages should be increased to PhP 75,000. There should also be
an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the finality of
judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
42

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00075
finding accused-appellant Feliciano "Saysot" Cias guilty of the crime charged is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the CA should read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 37,
dated January 31, 2003, in Criminal Case No. 14791, finding appellant Feliciano Cias
@ "Saysot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to
the effect that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay private offended party [AAA] the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages in addition to the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00
as moral damages, with 6% interest per annum on all damages from finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186395 June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ITO PINIC, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for final review is the conviction
1
of appellant Ito Pinic for the rape
of AAA,
2
a seven (7) year old lass.
The Facts
In three (3) separate Informations
3
all dated 12 December 2001 filed with the Regional
Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 730-T to 732-T, appellant was accused
of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April[,] 2001, in the municipality of xxx, province of
xxx, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Ito Pinic], did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [had] carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a
seven (7) year old girl, by means of force and against the latters will and consent.
4

It was only on 27 January 2003 that appellant was apprehended and committed
5
to
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology by virtue of an Alias Warrant of
Arrest
6
issued by the trial court.
On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
7
During pre-trial,
8
the parties
stipulated, among others, that AAA was only seven (7) years old during the incident of
April 2001; and that Ito Pinic and Lito Pinic are one and the same person.
On trial, AAA testified that sometime in April 2001, she, together with playmates JJJ
and a certain MJR, played bahay-bahayan outside the house of Victorio Pinic a.k.a.
Balulang.
9
On that same day, her neighbor appellant, who was armed with a
bolo/knife,
10
summoned her to the house of Balulang.
11
Inside the house, he
threatened to cut her ears with his bolo.
12
He undressed her and removed her
panty.
13
Thereafter, he took off his own pants
14
and inserted his penis into her
vagina.
15
She felt pain.
16
He withdrew his penis after about ten (10) seconds but
inserted it again after ten (10) seconds. After five (5) seconds, he withdrew it again
but inserted it once more after five (5) seconds. He also inserted his finger and licked
her vagina.
17
After consummating the act, appellant sent her home and warned her
not to tell anyone of the incident.
18

Sometime in the same month of April 2001, AAA complained to her father FFF that her
anus was painful.
19
When her mother MMM examined her, she confided that she was
raped by appellant.
20
It was then that MMM recalled of one morning when she could
not find her daughter. She and her relatives looked for her from 9:00 oclock in the
morning until she arrived home at 12:00 oclock noon. AAA refused to have her lunch
and was "quiet and fearful" for a long time. She would not say why.
21

AAA submitted herself to a physical examination and was issued a Medico-Legal
Certificate
22
showing that she has old hymenal lacerations at 10:00 oclock and 2:00
oclock positions. Dr. Jomelyn Bolompo, her attending physician, later testified in
court that the lacerations could have been caused by "any object bigger than the
hymenal opening" like a penis or a finger.
23

On the other hand, appellant denied the accusations against him. He claimed that
nobody could enter the house of Balulang where the alleged rape was committed. His
brother Luis, the caretaker of the house, padlocks the windows and the doors
whenever he leaves.
24
Luis gave the same version on the witness stand and added that
he is the only one who has the keys to the house.
25

JJJ, one of the playmates of AAA who stayed at the house of the Pinics on a one-
month vacation, testified that her mother and the appellant are siblings;
26
that while
playing with AAA and MJR on the date of the alleged commission of the crime, she did
not see the appellant nor AAA enter the house of Balulang;
27
that she did not notice
AAA cry or shout;
28
and that during her whole stay at the Pinics where the appellant
supposedly stayed, she never saw him in the house.
29

On 22 December 2006, the regional trial court convicted the appellant of the crime of
rape in Criminal Case No. 730-T but acquitted him in Criminal Case Nos. 731-T and
732-T.
30
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, this Court finds the
accused ITO PINIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 730-T defined and penalized under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and hereby further
ordered to pay the victim [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) Pesos as
civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages.
xxx. [A]side from the moral damages and civil indemnity the latter which is
automatically granted in rape cases, the accused should likewise be made to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Five (Php25,000.00) Pesos.
The accused is hereby acquitted in [Criminal Case Nos.] 731-T and 732-T, his guilt not
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
31

Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on 31 January 2007.
32
On 6 May
2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
33
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02673
dismissing the appeal. Thus:
In fine, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court which took
extreme caution to scrutinize [AAAs] testimony.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
34

Appealed to this Court, we required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.
35
Both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental
pleadings.
36

Our Ruling
We uphold the conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. 730-T.
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of
age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force,
threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.
37

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused, we are guided by the
following principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
38

Owing to the manner of the commission of rape, the sole testimony of the victim may
be sufficient to convict the accused so long as the court finds the testimony "credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things."
39
More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of
the examining physician.
40

I
Invoking the three (3) well-entrenched principles that guide the court in the
determination of the guilt of an accused, appellant maintains that the sole testimony
of AAA should not be made the basis for his conviction.
We are not convinced.
The points raised by appellant had been squarely addressed by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.
The trial court explained:
xxx In her testimony, the inconsistency whether the rape happened in the morning or
afternoon becomes clear, when she averred that she entered the house of Balulang
when she was playing alone and after she went home she again returned to the house
of Balulang and played with [MJR] and [JJJ] outside. This [c]ourt entertains the
conclusion that the sexual assault happened in the morning before she returned to the
house of Balulang and played with her playmates. Besides, the time of the alleged
rape is not an element of the crime of rape.
41

In his brief, counsel for the accused, attempts to discredit [AAA] by pointing out
alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. These so called inconsistencies e.g., the
time of day when the alleged rape happened, whether morning or afternoon, whether
the rape [was] on a bed and that these inconsistencies belie the accusation of
rape.
42

A careful review of the transcript of the testimony of the private complainant shows
that these supposed inconsistencies bear [on] relatively minor points, and even taken
as a whole, fail to debunk the gravamen of the accusation; that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the complainant against the latters will.
43

An impeccable recollection cannot reasonably be expected from the victim of a
horrendous crime, such that minor contradiction in a witness testimony [is] perceived
to enhance, rather than detract from the credibility of said witness.
44

The Court of Appeals added that the Office of the Solicitor General
45
correctly argued
that the young age of AAA at the time she was defiled did not lessen her credibility
inasmuch as she was able to relate her ordeal clearly and consistently.
46

On cross examination, AAA vividly testified:
47

Q You testified [AAA] that Ito Pinic inserted his penis into your vagina, do you
still remember that?
A I can remember, maam.
Q How many times did Ito Pinic insert his penis?
A Three (3) times, maam.
x x x x
ATTY. FORTUNA:
Q How long did Ito Pinic insert his penis?
A Short, maam.
Q How short it was?
ATTY. DAVIS:
Your Honor, the witness cannot understand the word short.
WITNESS:
A For a bit longer time, maam.
Q [AAA], do you know how to count?
A I know, maam.
Q Do you know how to count up to ten?
A I know, maam.
Q How about up to twenty?
A I know, maam.
Q Will you count one to five? Was it also the time Ito Pinic inserted his penis or
up to ten?
COURT:
The complainant is allowed to count on her fingers.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is counting her fingers.
ATTY. DAVIS:
May we stipulate for 5 seconds, Your Honor, based on her count from 1 to 5.
WITNESS:
It is even longer, maam. (Emphasis supplied.)
ATTY. FORTUNA:
Q Was it up to 10?
A Yes, maam..
Q [AAA] when you count 1 to 10 that is also the time that Ito Pinic inserted his
penis for the first time, am I correct?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about the second time that Ito Pinic inserted his panis, can you count
again how long it was?
A For a short period, maam.
Q [AAA], can you count again to tell us how short it was?
COURT:
After the complainant counted her fingers from 1 to 5.
ATTY. FORTUNA:
Q How about the third time?
INTERPRETER:
The witness counted 1,2,3,4,5.
Q How about the first insertion to the second insertion, can you tell us how
long?
ATTY. DAVIS:
That is leading, Your Honor. May we know what is the point of counsel, Your
Honor.
COURT:
You are asking the duration between the first and the second insertion?
ATTY. FORTUNA:
Yes, the time in between, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
INTERPRETER:
The witness counte[d] her fingers from 1 to 10 as the duration or representing
10 seconds for the duration between the first and second insertion.
Q How about the duration between the second and third insertion?
INTERPRETER:
Witness is counting her fingers from 1 to 5 as the duration between the second
and the third insertion.
Q Aside from inserting his penis, did Ito Pinic do something else to you?
A Ito Pinic inserted his finger and licked my vagina, maam.
Q When Ito Pinic raped you, what were you wearing at that time?
ATTY. DAVIS:
It is misleading because the question calls at that time that she was raped, may
we know if was it before the rape or during the rape?
ATTY. FORTUNA:
At the time that she was raped, Your Honor.
A A dress, maam.
Q Were you wearing panty at that time?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about Ito Pinic what was he wearing at that time?
A Pants, maam.
Q Pants only?
A Pants only, maam.
Q Did he remove your dress when you were raped?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about your panty, did he remove it?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about Ito Pinic, did he remove his pants?
A Yes, maam.
Q When you were raped, what did you feel?
A Painful, maam.
Q Did you laugh after you were raped?
A No, maam.
Q Did you shout?
A Yes, maam.
Q After Ito Pinic raped you, did you find any blood on your panty?
A Yes, maam.
Q After you were raped did you go home after?
A Yes, maam.
Q You said that it was painful, which part of your body was painful?
A My vagina, maam.
Agreeably, there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA with respect to
matters other than the aforequoted testimony. However, the appellate court
correctly applied Boromeo,
48
where this Court declared:
Inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if
the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape. x x x
49

In Rellota,
50
this Court reiterated:
It is established jurisprudence that testimony must be considered and calibrated in its
entirety inclusive and not by truncated or isolated passages thereof. Due
consideration must be accorded to all the questions propounded to the witness and
her answers thereto. The whole impression or effect of what had been said or done
must be considered and not individual words or phrases alone. Moreover, rape xxx
causes deep psychological wounds, often forcing the victims conscience or
subconscious to forget the traumatic experience xxx. A rape victim cannot thus be
expected to keep an accurate account and remember every ugly detail of the
appalling and horrifying outrage perpetrated on her especially since she might in fact
have been trying not to remember them. xxx Error-free testimony cannot be expected
most especially when a young victim of rape is recounting details of a harrowing
experience, one which even an adult would like to bury in oblivion deep in the
recesses of her mind xxx. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of
strangers, face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile
and intimidating lawyer would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this
can affect the accuracy of her testimony. xxx [A]mple margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.
51

We defer to the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of the testimony of AAA,
to wit:
The testimonies of the private complainant [are] scrutinized by this [c]ourt with
extreme caution. These testimonies from direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examination were given on different dates. They were given after the lapse of days or
months in intervals. But it can be clearly seen that they are consistent save for the
minor inconsistencies xxx.
52

This should not be unnecessarily disturbed absent a showing that material facts,
which might affect the results of the case, had been overlooked.
53
We found none in
the instant case.
Appellant likewise argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt inasmuch as the attending physician testified that the hymenal
lacerations found in the vagina of AAA could have also been caused by strenuous
activities.
54
He added that the medico-legal findings did not show that he was the one
who perpetrated the crime.
55

Settled is the rule, however, that when the testimony of the victim is supported by
the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude that
the requisites of carnal knowledge existed.
56
Moreover, AAA positively identified
appellant as her assailant.
57

The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the positive identification and
credible testimony of AAA as we have consistently ruled that a categorical testimony
generally prevails over a bare denial.
58

Alibi and denial must be strongly supported by corroborative evidence in order to
merit credibility.
59
But the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of the
defenses corroborating witnesses. JJJ allegedly did not hear AAA shout because,
apparently, the rape was committed when she and MJR were not
around.
60
Appellants brother Luis later admitted that he could not say whether or not
a person had entered or could enter the house.
61
Further, Luis testimony is tainted
with bias because he is the older brother of the appellant. He is necessarily interested
in the latters acquittal.
62
1avvphil
All considered, we are convinced that the guilt of appellant has been sufficiently
established with moral certainty with respect to Criminal Case No. 730-T. On the
other hand, the acquittal of the appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 731-T and 732-T was
also in order. The aforequoted testimony of AAA
63
shows that although the penis was
thrice inserted in her private organ, the same constituted one (1) count of rape.
II
In the determination of the imposable penalty, we note that the appellant used a
deadly weapon to threaten AAA.
64
This would have the effect of increasing the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that reclusion perpetua to death
should be the penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon.
65
While
Republic Act 9346
66
prohibits the imposition of death penalty, such qualifying
circumstance would still produce two (2) effects: (1) the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed;
67
and (2) the
award of moral damages and civil indemnity should be increased each from Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under
prevailing jurisprudence.
68

It is a requisite, however, that the use of a deadly weapon be alleged in the
information because such circumstance is also in the nature of a qualifying
circumstance that increases the range of the penalty to include death.
69
Otherwise, it
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance even if the prosecution proves the
same.
70

Unfortunately, the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the
Information. Appellant cannot, therefore, be convicted of the crime of qualified rape
and meted the penalty of death.
71
Consequently, appellant shall be eligible for parole
and the damages to which the victim is entitled to shall correspond to that for simple
rape.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
award of damages to the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
each as civil indemnity and moral damages is likewise in order. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, however, the amount of exemplary damages has already been
increased from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
72

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 6 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 02673 DISMISSING the appeal of appellant Lito Pinic a.k.a. Ito Pinic is hereby
AFFIRMED.
The Decision dated 22 December 2006 of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 730-T to
732-T is hereby MODIFIED in the following manner:
1. Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against AAA in Criminal Case No. 730-T. He is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages; and
2. With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 731-T and 732-T, the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193105 May 30, 2011
CLAY & FEATHER INTERNATIONAL, INC., RAUL O. ARAMBULO, and ADAM E.
JIMENEZ III (for themselves and for Clay and Feather Intl., Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
ALEXANDER T. LICHAYTOO and CLIFFORD T. LICHAYTOO, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision
1
dated February 26, 2010 and the Resolution
2
dated July
21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111007.
The facts of the case are, as follows:
Petitioners Raul Arambulo (Arambulo) and Adam E. Jimenez III (Jimenez) and
respondents Alexander T. Lichaytoo (Alexander) and Clifford Lichaytoo (Clifford) are
stockholders and incorporators of Clay & Feather International, Inc. (CFII), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of marketing guns and ammunitions. Petitioner
Arambulo is the President of CFII, while petitioner Jimenez is a member of the Board
of Directors. On the other hand, respondent Alexander is the Corporate Secretary of
CFII, while respondent Clifford is its Chief Finance Officer/Treasurer. Petitioners own
fifty percent (50%) of the shares of stock of CFII, and respondents own the remaining
50%.
3

In a complaint-affidavit dated April 4, 2008, petitioners charged respondents before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati with the crime of five (5) counts of
Qualified Theft, defined and penalized under Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of
the Revised Penal Code.
4

Petitioners alleged that sometime in February 2006 to November 2007, respondents,
by virtue of their positions in CFII and with grave abuse of confidence, intentionally,
maliciously, and feloniously, with intent to gain and to profit thereby, took several
firearms owned by CFII without the knowledge and consent of the corporation and its
stockholders. The firearms taken are, as follows:
Source of
Firearms
Kind Make Caliber Serial
No.
Date Taken Amount
1. C & F Shotgun Beretta
DT10 Skeet
12ga AG0222B February
2006
Euro
3,577.00
2. C & F Shotgun Beretta
DT10 LTD
Trap
12ga AF9670B February
2006
Euro
3,894.00
3. C & F Shotgun Beretta
DT10L
Trap
12ga AF6715B November
2007
Euro
5,091.00
4. C & F Shotgun Beretta 20ga AA311917
AB315666
June 2007 Euro 590
5. C & F Shotgun Beretta 12ga C15987B November
2006
Euro
12,066.00
TOTAL
AMOUNT
Euro
25,218.00*
*Philippine Currency equivalent is One Million Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand One
Hundred Seventy Pesos (P1,639,170.00) at the rate of Sixty-Five Pesos per Euro
(P65/Euro).
5

In their counter-affidavit dated May 5, 2008, respondents sought the dismissal of the
criminal complaint, and stressed that petitioners filed the same as a form of
harassment intended to divest respondents of their interests in CFII, as well as in
retaliation of the criminal complaint for Qualified Theft that they previously filed
against petitioner Arambulo. They argued that there was no basis for petitioners to
charge them with Qualified Theft, as the subject firearms were purchased by them,
and were, in fact, already paid in full. They averred that since CFII does not maintain
a Euro bank account, all foreign exchange payments for the companys purchases of
guns and ammunitions were deposited in respondents Euro bank accounts with
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. Like all corporate financial transactions of CFII, the
payments for the subject firearms described in items 1, 2, and 5 were deposited in
the Euro accounts of respondents. As payments for the firearms described in items 1
and 2, which cost Euro 3,577.00 and Euro 3,894.00, respectively, respondents
deposited the total amount of Euro 7,471.00 in the Euro bank account under the name
"Clifford/Alexander Lichaytoo." As to the firearm described in item 5, the amount of
Euro 12,066.00 was debited from the Euro account under the name "Clifford/Melissa
Lichaytoo." Respondents claimed that even petitioner Arambulo did this practice
when he himself purchased guns from CFII.
6

Respondents further claimed that the firearms described in items 3 and 4 were paid
by way of offsetting against advances made by respondent Alexander for CFIIs
importation of 2,000 Beretta 92s pistols. They alleged that these transactions were
fully accounted for and disclosed to the auditor, who was chosen by petitioners
themselves, and that petitioner Arambulo was aware of the offsetting for the firearms
described in items 3 and 4, since he was closely monitoring the payments made by
CFII to respondent Alexander.
7

On May 9, 2008, petitioners filed a reply-affidavit, refuting the arguments of
respondents. They admitted that CFII does not have a Euro bank account in its name,
and that the corporation uses the Euro bank accounts of respondents to send
payments in Euros to their suppliers. However, petitioners stressed that respondents
cannot claim ownership of the funds, which were sent to the suppliers of the
firearms, since the foreign currency (Euro) was purchased from currency dealers using
CFII funds generated from its corporate funds and orders paid in advance by its
customers. Thus, petitioners argued that this fact does not indicate that the funds
used and deposited by respondents in paying for the firearms under items 1,2, and 5
were respondent Alexanders personal funds. In the same manner, the remittances to
CFII suppliers withdrawn from the Euro bank accounts of petitioners do not show to
which supplier and to what particular firearms the deposits and payments pertain. No
concrete proof was shown that the firearms under items 3 and 4 were indeed the
subject of offsetting from the advances made by respondent Alexander to CFIIs
purchase of the 2,000 Beretta 92s pistols. The petty cash vouchers attached to the
counter-affidavit of respondents were too general, there being no particular
breakdown and official receipts presented to correlate the same to the alleged
offsetting.
8

After the submission of the rejoinder-affidavit of respondents and of the sur-rejoinder
affidavit of petitioners, and after the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution
9
on July 7, 2008, the fallo of
which reads:
Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
respondents Clifford T. Lichaytoo and Alexander T. Lichaytoo for the crime of
Qualified Theft be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
10

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of
the Department of Justice. On June 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued a
resolution,
11
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati dated July 7, 2008 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati is hereby
ordered to file the necessary information/s against [respondents] Alexander and
Clifford Lichaytoo and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from the receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
12

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a
resolution
13
dated August 20, 2009. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. On February
26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision,
14
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby
GRANTED.1avvphi1 The assailed Resolutions dated June 2, 2009 and August 20, 2009
of public respondent Secretary of Justice are ANNULLED. Accordingly, the Resolution
dated July 7, 2008 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City dismissing the
complaint for Qualified Theft is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 150,
Makati City is ORDERED to DISMISS and QUASH the Informations for Qualified Theft
against [respondents].
SO ORDERED.
15

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 21, 2010, the CA issued a
Resolution
16
denying the said motion. Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the CA committed reversible error in ordering
the dismissal of the information for 5 counts of Qualified Theft against respondents.
The resolution of the issue requires a determination of the existence of probable
cause, in order to indict respondents for Qualified Theft.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances, which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average person weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence
of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion, but it requires less than evidence that would
justify a conviction.
17

A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
18
The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. A trial is intended precisely for the reception of prosecution
evidence in support of the charge. The court is tasked to determine guilt beyond
reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by the parties at a trial on the
merits.
19

To constitute the crime of Theft, defined and penalized under Article 308
20
of the
Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be established that: (1) there be
taking of personal property; (2) said property belongs to another; (3) the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) the taking be accomplished without use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.
21

Theft is qualified under Article 310
22
of the Revised Penal Code under the following
circumstances: (1) if the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) if the theft is
committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) if the property stolen is a (a) motor
vehicle, (b) mail matter, or (c) large cattle; (4) if the property stolen consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) if the property is fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery; or (6) if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident, or
civil disturbance.1awphi1
In the instant case, the affidavit-complaint and the pleadings petitioners filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor sufficiently show all the elements of theft. The
evidence on hand sufficiently shows that, more likely than not, the crime of Qualified
Theft has been committed and the same was committed by respondents. There was
unlawful taking by respondents of the subject firearms that incontestably belonged to
CFII. The taking was without the consent of the owner CFII and was accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Furthermore, the subject firearms were taken with grave abuse of confidence in as
much as respondents could not have taken the subject firearms if not for the positions
that they held in the company. This last circumstance qualifies the offense charged.
However, our pronouncement as to the existence of probable cause does not delve
into the merits of the case; neither do we pronounce that the evidence is sufficient to
secure a conviction.
The counter-allegations of respondents essentially delve on evidentiary matters that
are best passed upon in a full-blown trial. The issues upon which the charges are built
pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the
preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of
prosecution's evidence in support of the charge.
23
The presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. The validity and merits of a partys
defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
24

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated February 26, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice dated June 2, 2009 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189847 May 30, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO MERCADO, Appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution the appeal from the July 14, 2009 decision
1
of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03120. The CA affirmed with modification the
decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, finding Ernesto
Mercado (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
AAA
3
is the fifth child of the appellant and BBB. Sometime in 2000, BBB (AAAs
mother) and CCC (AAAs sister), went to Ambalite, Pugo, La Union. AAA, her two
other siblings, and the appellant, were left in their house at Rosario, La Union. At
around 8:00 a.m., and while AAA was doing her school assignment, the appellant
entered her room and sat in a corner. Afterwards, the appellant sat beside AAA,
kissed her on the right cheek, and removed her shorts and panty. The appellant
threatened to kill AAA if she shouted. The appellant then removed his shorts and
briefs, went on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
4

AAA also recalled that at around 2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000, while BBB was at the
market and AAAs siblings were at their aunts house, the appellant again sexually
abused her.
5

Sometime in 2003, AAA and the appellant were cleaning a banana grove when the
latter told her to take a rest. AAA did as instructed, and while she was resting, the
appellant embraced her and kissed her on the cheek and lips. The appellant removed
AAAs clothes and panty, and laid her on the grass. The appellant took off his own
shorts and briefs, went on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
6

According to AAA, the appellant sexually abused her five (5) times from 2000 to
2003.
7

Dr. Sheila Fe (Dr. Fe), a physician at the Rosario District Hospital, conducted a
medical examination of AAA on August 3, 2003, and found healed lacerations at 3 and
9 oclock positions in her private part.
8

The prosecution charged the appellant with three (3) counts of rape before the
RTC.
9
The appellant denied the charges against him, and claimed that his brother was
the one who raped AAA.
10

The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. It
also ordered him to pay AAA P75,000.00 andP50,000.00 as moral damages and civil
indemnity, respectively, for each count.
11

The CA, in its decision of July 14, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision with the following
modifications: (1) the civil indemnity was increased to P75,000.00; and (2) the
appellant was further ordered to pay the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
12

The CA held that AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had
sexually abused her on different occasions. AAA was firm in her narration, and did not
waver despite the rigid cross examination by the defense. In addition, the defense
failed to impute any ill motive on her part to falsely testify against her father.
The CA also held that AAAs failure to specify the exact dates of the rapes do not
detract from her credibility. The CA explained that it is too much to require from a
young girl, who had been raped several times, to mechanically recall the exact dates
of each rape.
13

The CA further added that AAAs delay in reporting the rape was due to the
appellants threats on her life.
We resolve to deny the appeal for lack of merit, but we modify the amount of the
awarded indemnities.
AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on two
occasions in 2000 and 2003, respectively. Her testimonies were clear and
straightforward; she was consistent in her recollection of the details of her
defloration. If the sexual abuses did not happen, we see no plausible reason showing
why AAA should testify against her own father, imputing on him the grave crime of
rape.
AAAs testimony was also corroborated by Dr. Fe, who found hymenal lacerations on
AAAs private part. We have held that when the testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there
has been carnal knowledge.
14

We find AAAs testimony regarding the rape that happened on July 26, 2000, to be
deficient; it lacked specific details on how the rape was committed. AAAs statement
that she had been "fucked" [sic] for the second time by the appellant "in the same
house," without nothing more, is insufficient to establish carnal knowledge with moral
certainty. Every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and each must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
15
The lower courts were thus correct in convicting
the appellant of only two (2) counts of rape.
We find unmeritorious the appellants argument that AAAs testimony is unreliable
due to the inconsistencies in the dates when the rapes were committed.
It is settled that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters best left to the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and was in the best position to discern whether they were
telling the truth. At any rate, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. The discrepancies in the actual dates the rapes took place are
not serious errors warranting a reversal of the appellants conviction.
16
What is
decisive in a rape charge is the victims positive identification of the accused as the
malefactor.
17

The appellants denial must also crumble in light of AAAs positive testimony. We
have consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive of the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the mere denial of the appellant whose testimony is
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
18

We also do not find merit in the appellants contention that his brother (now
deceased) was the one who had raped AAA. The appellant did not present any
evidence to substantiate this claim.
The Proper Indemnities
The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon a finding that rape
took place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without
need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
19

Considering that the death penalty was not imposed due to the prosecutions failure
to prove the minority of the victim, we reduce the amounts of civil indemnity and
moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively, for each count.
20

We also increase the amount of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in
accordance with current jurisprudence.
21
1awphil
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the July 14, 2009 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03120 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages is REDUCED
from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively, for each count; and
(b) exemplary damages is INCREASED from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each
count.
Costs against appellant Ernesto Mercado.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 189981 March 9, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLAN GABRINO, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the August 28, 2008 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00731, which affirmed the April 3, 2007 Decision
2
in Criminal
Case No. 1347 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10 in Abuyog, Leyte. The RTC
convicted accused Allan Gabrino of murder.
The Facts
The charge against the accused stemmed from the following Information:
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1993 in the Municipality of La Paz,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound
one JOSEPH BALANO with the use of bladed weapon locally known as pisaw which said
accused had purposely provided himself, thereby causing and inflicting upon the said
JOSEPH BALANO wounds on his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.
Contrary to law.
3

On July 7, 2003, the arraignment was conducted. The accused, who was assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charge. A mandatory pre-trial conference
was done on October 1, 2003. Thereafter, trial ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Bartolome Custodio
(Bartolome), laborer and a resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte; and Ismael
Moreto (Ismael), farmer and a resident of Barangay Mohon, Tanauan, Leyte. On the
other hand, the defense presented Nestor Sarile (Nestor), Municipal Planner of La
Paz, Leyte and a resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte; and the accused as
witnesses.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
The first witness, Bartolome, testified that he is a resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La
Paz, Leyte for more than 30 years and he knows the accused as they were classmate
from Grade 1 to Grade 5. He also testified that on certain occasions, the accused
would spend the night at their house. He stated that he likewise knows Joseph Balano
(Balano), the deceased, as he was a former resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz
Leyte, but had to transfer to Barangay Cogon, Tanauan, Leyte because of an
insurgency.
4

He narrated that on December 30, 1993, he visited his uncle, Gorgonio Berones
(Gorgonio) in Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte with Balano. Upon arrival at the house
of his uncle, he noticed that a certain Jom-jom and his friends, including the accused,
were having a drinking session. Thirty minutes later, Jom-jom and his group left the
vicinity. Bartolome and Balano stayed for less than an hour at the house of
Bartolomes uncle, and left thereafter. On their way home, however, somebody
suddenly sprang out from behind the coconut tree and stabbed Balano. As there was a
bright moonlight at the time, and because of the two-arms-length distance between
them, Bartolome easily recognized the assailant to be the accused. He even testified
that he tried to calm the accused down. Bartolome further stated that he saw the
accused stab Balano once, after which Balano ran away while being pursued by the
accused. He stated that he asked the people for help in transporting Balano to the
hospital but the latter died on the way there.
5

The second witness, Ismael, testified that on December 30, 1993, he was in Barangay
Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte, working with Balano for the processing of copra of Guadalupe
Balano. That night, he stayed at the house of Bartolome in the same barangay. He
stated that while he was already at Bartolomes house at about 10:30 in the evening,
he could not sleep yet as Bartolome and Balano were still out of the house looking for
a helper. He, therefore, decided to go out of the house and upon going outside, he
saw the accused suddenly stab Balano once with a pisao (small bolo or knife).
6
Fearing
for his life, Ismael instantly went back to Bartolomes house.
7

The Defenses Version of Facts
Nestor, the first witness for the defense, stated that on December 30, 1993 at about 5
oclock in the afternoon, he was in Sitio Siwala, Barangay Rizal, La Paz, Leyte, picking
up passengers as a motorcycle driver for hire. Gorgonio was one of the passengers at
that time who he brought to Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte. When they arrived at
the house of Gorgonio, the latter went inside to get money to pay for his fare.
Consequently, Nestor waited in his tricycle outside of Gorgonios house. During such
time, Nestor saw four people going down the house: the accused, Jeffrey Erro
(Jeffrey), Tap-ing Fernandez (Tap-ing), and Balano. According to Nestors testimony,
the accused went to the side of the house to urinate and while so doing, he saw Tap-
ing throw something at the accused, which caused him to bleed, and then they ran
away. Thereafter, Balano attacked the accused, and as they grappled, the former was
stabbed by the latter on the chest. The accused ran away after the incident
happened.
8

Quite differently, the accused narrated that on December 30, 1993 at 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at the house of Gorgonio having a conversation with Leny Berones
and Luna Berones. After an hour had passed, Gorgonio arrived with Nestor, Tap-ing,
Balano and a certain Eddie who all came from the fiesta in Barangay Siwala. The
accused stated that he went outside of the house to urinate when Tap-ing threw a
stone at him, which hit him on the forehead and caused him to fall down. And when
he saw Balano rushing towards him with an ice pick, he immediately stabbed him and
then ran away.
9

The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of its April 3, 2007
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused [Allan] Gabrino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime as [charged], this Court hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, ordering the accused to indemnify the offended party the
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
10

In finding for the prosecution and convicting the accused of murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution. The RTC found that treachery was employed by the
accused in killing Balano. The RTC further held that the justifying circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under Art. 11(1) of the RPC could not be applied in the
present case as the element of unlawful aggression is absent.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On August 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC in toto. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellant Allan Gabrino of the
crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
payment to the victims heirs of civil indemnity in the amount of P65,000.00 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
11

The Issues
Hence, this appeal is before Us, with accused-appellant maintaining that the trial
court erred in convicting him of the crime of murder, despite the fact that his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant also alleges that
assuming that he could be made liable for Balanos death, the CA and the RTC erred
in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Another issue that he raises
is the alleged existence of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant.
Factual findings of the RTC should be given credence and should therefore be
respected
In the instant case, while both the prosecution and the defense agree on the date
when the incident occurred and the fact that accused-appellant stabbed Balano, they
conflict with the rest of the facts. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the RTC to
appreciate the facts during trial and determine which information carries weight. And
in doing so, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses,
with which the CA thereafter concurred. Accordingly, the RTC adopted the version of
the prosecution as the correct factual finding.
We agree with the RTCs factual determination as affirmed by the CA.
We have held time and again that "the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality."
12
As We have
reiterated in the recent People v. Combate, where there is no showing that the trial
court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of the facts and
the credibility of the witnesses.
13
This is clearly because the judge in the trial court
was the one who personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and observed their
demeanor as well as the manner in which they testified during trial.
14
Accordingly, the
trial court, or more particularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to assess
and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
In the present case, in giving weight to the prosecutions testimonies, there is not a
slight indication that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, or that it
overlooked any material fact. In fact, no allegation to that effect ever came from the
defense. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb the findings of fact made by the
RTC and its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. To reiterate this time-
honored doctrine and well-entrenched principle, We quote from People v. Robert
Dinglasan, thus:
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-
entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The
judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses,
having personally heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of
the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect,
because it had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and
detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate
court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial
court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered
might affect the result of the case.
15
(Emphasis Ours.)
Treachery was committed by accused-appellant
Art. 248 of the RPC defines murder as follows:
ART. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin;
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of
an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any
other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (Emphasis Ours.)
For a person to be convicted of the offense of murder, the prosecution must prove
that: (1) the offender killed the victim; and (2) that the killing was committed with
any of the attendant circumstances under Art. 248 of the RPC, such as treachery.
Particularly, People v. Leozar Dela Cruz enumerates the elements of murder, thus:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
16

In this case, it is undoubted that accused-appellant was the person who stabbed
Balano and caused his death.
17
And this killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. The
question, therefore, to be resolved in this case is whether the killing was attended by
treachery that would justify accused-appellants conviction of murder.
Treachery exists when "the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make."
18
What is important in ascertaining the
existence of treachery is the fact that the attack was made swiftly, deliberately,
unexpectedly, and without a warning, thus affording the unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape the attack.
19
In People v. Lobino, We held that a sudden
attack against an unarmed victim constitutes treachery.
20

In this case, it is clear accused-appellant employed treachery in stabbing and killing
Balano.
Relevant to the finding of treachery is the testimony of Bartolome, to wit:
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court what was that unusual incident
that happen? [sic]
A: While we were on our way home, we have no knowledge that there was
somebody who was waylaying us on the road.
Q: What happen [sic] on that road?
A: He suddenly emanate [sic] coming from the coconut tree and
immediately lounge [sic] at Joseph Balano and stabbed him.
Q: Whom are you referring to [w]ho emanate [sic] from the coconut tree and
immediately stab Joseph Balano?
A: Allan Gabrino.
Q: How far was the place of incident to the house of Gorgonio Berones?
A: Less than twenty (20) meters from the place of incident.
Q: Since it was nighttime, how were you able to identify Allan Gabrino as the
one who stabbed Joseph Balano?
A: Because during that night, there was a moon and my distance to Joseph
Balano was only two arms length, I was near him and he was ahead of me
and I saw that he was stabbed and I even pacified Allan Gabrino.
Q: You mean you pacified Allan Gabrino?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How did you pacify him?
A: I said dont do that Lan. He did not heed because he had already finished
stabbing.
Q: When you said Lan, it is the name of Allan?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How many times did you see the accused stab the victim Joseph Balano?
A: I only saw once.
21
(Emphasis Ours.)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that accused-appellant deliberately hid
behind the coconut tree at nighttime, surprising the victim, Balano, by his swift
attack and immediate lunging at him. Obviously, the unsuspecting Balano did not have
the opportunity to resist the attack when accused-appellant, without warning,
suddenly sprang out from behind the coconut tree and stabbed him. This undoubtedly
constitutes treachery. The fact that Balano was able to run after he was stabbed by
accused-appellant does not negate the fact the treachery was committed. As We held
in Lobino, that the victim was still able to run after the first blow does not obliterate
the treachery that was employed against him.
22
Clearly therefore, the RTC and the CA
did not err in finding that treachery was committed. Accordingly, accused-appellants
conviction of murder is proper.
Evident premeditation was not established as an aggravating circumstance
According to Art. 14(3) of the RPC, an offense is aggravated when it is committed
with evident premeditation. Evident premeditation is present when the following
requisites concur:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
23

In this case, evident premeditation was not established. First, there is showing, much
less an indication, that accused-appellant had taken advantage of a sufficient time to
carefully plan the killing of Balano; or that a considerable time has lapsed enough for
accused-appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act but nevertheless clung
to his predetermined and well-crafted plan. The prosecution was only able to
establish the fact of accused-appellants sudden stabbing of Balano after he hid
behind the coconut tree. This fact only successfully establishes the qualifying
circumstance of treachery but not the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.
In appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, it is
indispensable that the fact of planning the crime be established.
24
Particularly, "[i]t is
indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time
had elapsed before it was carried out."
25
Accordingly, when there is no evidence
showing how and when the accused planned to killing and how much time elapsed
before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot prosper.
26
In this case, the
prosecution failed to establish how and when the plan to kill Balano was devised. As
this has not been clearly shown, consequently, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Incomplete self-defense cannot be made as a justifying circumstance, because the
element of unlawful aggression is absent
Accused-appellants claim of incomplete self-defense cannot prosper. Art. 69 in
relation to Art. 11 of the RPC explains when incomplete self-defense is permissible as
a privileged mitigating circumstance, thus:
ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable.A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the
several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be
deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption
present or lacking.
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
In order that incomplete self-defense could prosper as a privileged mitigating
circumstance, unlawful aggression must exist. In People v. Manulit,
27
People v.
Mortera,
28
and Mendoza v. People,
29
We reiterated the well-settled rule that unlawful
aggression is an indispensable requisite in appreciating an incomplete self-defense. It
is any one of the two other elements of self-defense that could be wanting in an
incomplete self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means to employed to
prevent or repel it; or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself; but it can never be unlawful aggression.
30

Unlawful aggression is defined as "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and
strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating
action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to
ones life."
31

In granting the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, the
burden to prove the elements during trial is incumbent upon the accused.
32
It,
therefore, follows that accused-appellant must prove before the RTC that there was
indeed an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Balano.
In this case, accused-appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of unlawful
aggression that would warrant an incomplete self-defense. As properly pointed out by
the RTC, the testimony of accused-appellant on cross-examination establishes this
failure, thus:
Q: According to you, it was Tap-ing Fernandez who threw stone to you, is that
correct?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were hit on your forehead, is that correct?
A: No, sir, on the top of my head.
COURT INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to the top of his head.
FISCAL MOTALLA
Q: And you became groggy according to you, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you fell to the ground.
A: No, sir.
Q: So you did not fall to the ground, is that what you mean?
A: No, sir, I felt groggy.
Q: You said you saw the victim approached [sic] you with an ice pick, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you immediately stabbed him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Meaning, he was not able to stab you because you immediately stabbed him,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But according to you, when the victim, was hit he went to a nearby coconut
tree and stabbed the coconut tree, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were just two-arms length away from him, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He did not thrust towards you, he was only stabbing the coconut tree, is
that correct?
A: He did not thrust towards me.
Q: He only kept on stabbing the coconut tree, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Despite the fact that you were near to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And he was already wounded by you when he was stabbing the coconut tree?
A: He was already wounded.
33

From the foregoing testimony of accused-appellant himself, it is clear that there was
no unlawful aggression on the part of Balano that would justify accused-appellant to
stab him. To justify an incomplete self-defense, the unlawful aggression must come
from the victim himself against the person who resorted to self-defense.
34
In this
case, if there was any, the unlawful aggression came from Tap-ing, who was the one
who threw a stone and hit accused-appellant. The mere fact that Balano was alleged
to be approaching accused-appellant with an ice pick does not constitute a real and
imminent threat to ones life sufficient to create an unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression requires more than that. In People v. Arnante, as it is here, the "mere
perception of an impending attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful
aggression."
35
In this case, there was not even any attempt on the part of Balano to
strike or stab accused-appellant. If at all and assuming to be true, Balanos demeanor
could be deemed as an intimidating attitude that is certainly short of the imminence
that could give rise to the existence of unlawful aggression.
36
What is more, it was not
him, but Tap-ing who had previously hit accused-appellant. Accused-appellants own
testimony also negates any intention on the part of Balano to cause him any harm. As
he testified, even after he stabbed Balano, the latter never retaliated and struck
back. Instead, he stabbed the coconut tree notwithstanding the fact that accused-
appellant was within his reach. Certainly, nothing in the facts indicate any
circumstance that could justify the stabbing and the ultimate taking of Balanos life.
Accordingly, as We are not convinced that there was an unlawful aggression in this
case on the part of the victim, Balano, an incomplete self-defense is wanting and
accused-appellants offense, therefore, cannot be mitigated.
Accused is liable for damages and interest
The penalty of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC is reclusion perpetua to death.
Considering that the offense committed in this case is murder and there being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the RTC was correct in imposing the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
37

It is now settled that as a general rule, the Court awards civil indemnity, as well as
moral and exemplary damages.
38
And We have held in People v. Combate that "when
the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua
only, the Court has ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages."
39

Accordingly, We increase the PhP 65,000 damages awarded by the RTC and affirmed
by the CA as follows: PhP 50,000 in civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 in moral damages, and
PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum,
40
in line with Our current jurisprudence.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No.
00731 finding accused-appellant Allan Gabrino guilty of the crime charged is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the trial court should read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Allan Gabrino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER, this Court hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Joseph Balano
the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as
exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193482 March 2, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NILO ROCABO, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
We decide the appeal filed by the accused Nilo Rocabo (appellant) from the May 31,
2010 decision of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00730.
1

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On August 18, 1999, the appellant was charged
2
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Abuyog, Leyte, with 3 counts of incestuous rape
3
committed against his 11-
year old daughter AAA
4
on April 27
5
and 29,
6
1999 and May 1, 1999.
7
The appellant
pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. In the joint trial that followed, AAA
testified on the details of the crimes.
On April 27, 1999, while AAA was sleeping in the living room of her grandmothers
house, her father (the appellant) woke her up and told her to go to their house at the
back of her grandmothers house.
8
On reaching their house, the appellant told her to
go to the room.
9
While inside the room, the appellant removed her shorts and
underwear, and told her to lie down.
10
The appellant then undressed himself, kissed
her, and inserted his private organ into her vagina.
11
Two days later, on April 29,
1999, while AAA was watching television at her grandmothers house, the appellant
told her to go home.
12
The appellant once again told AAA to go inside the room.
13
The
appellant then kissed her on the neck.
14
Two days later, on May 1, 1999, while AAA
was playing in the street, the appellant called her home and told her again to go to
the room.
15
The appellant then undressed her, made her lie down, kissed her, and
inserted his private organ into her vagina.
16
When BBB, AAAs mother, discovered
what happened, she brought AAA on May 27, 1999 to the Burauen District Hospital for
a medical examination.
17
The medical examination revealed an old healed hymenal
laceration.
18

The appellant denied the charges against him, claiming that he was roasting pig for
the fiesta on April 27, 1999 with Ernie Dagami, and that he was at home with BBB and
their children on April 29 and May 1, 1999.
19
He alleged that BBB instigated the case
against him because she was afraid that he would file an adultery case against her.
20

THE RTC RULING
In its January 12, 2007 Decision, the RTC acquitted the appellant for the alleged rape
committed on April 29, 1999, but found him guilty of 2 counts of incestuous rape
committed on April 27 and May 1, 1999.
21
It gave full credence to AAAs testimony and
rejected the appellants denial. It noted that AAA cried while narrating in court her
fathers monstrous acts, and that no child would fabricate a rape charge against her
own father. The RTC sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua for two counts of
rape and ordered him to pay AAA P75,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as
exemplary damages for each count.
22

THE CA RULING
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the appellants conviction. It
rejected the appellants attack on AAAs credibility, noting that it was improbable for
a child of tender years to concoct a tale of sexual molestation committed by her own
father just because she was persuaded to do so by her mother; that inconsistencies on
minor details proved that AAAs testimony was not rehearsed; that the delay in
reporting the rape incidents did not affect AAAs credibility because there was no
uniform reaction for rape victims. The CA noted that the absence of fresh hymenal
lacerations does not negate that rape was committed since hymenal lacerations are
not an element of rape.
23

From the CA, the case is now with us for final review.
OUR RULING
We affirm the appellants conviction.
We have examined the records and we entertain no doubt that the appellant raped
AAA. We find AAA's testimony convincing and straightforward. We, therefore, have no
reason to reverse or modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of AAA's
testimony, more so in the present case where the said findings were affirmed by the
CA. As the RTC and the CA did, we reject the appellants denial. Not only is denial an
inherently weak defense, it cannot also prevail over the positive testimony of the
offended party.
24

While we affirm the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, we note that neither
court fully appreciated nor discussed the penalty properly imposable on the
appellant.
Since the rape incidents happened on April 27 and May 1, 1999, the applicable laws
are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
25
which
provide:
ART. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
x x x x
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
x x x x
ART. 266-B. Penalty. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
In the present case, the Informations charging the appellant with the crimes of rape
clearly alleged that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his daughter, AAA, who
was only 11 years old when the rapes were committed on April 27 and May 1,
1999.
26
The prosecution's evidence clearly shows AAA's age and filiation by the
appellant; AAAs duly presented Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on
June 7, 1987 to spouses Nilo Rocabo and BBB.
27

With the basic elements of the crime charged, AAAs minority and her relationship to
the appellant having been alleged in the Informations and duly proven, we find the
appellant guilty of two counts of qualified rape, as the lower courts did. In view of
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346,
28
the penalty of death that should have been
meted out to the appellant under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
shall now be reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape, without eligibility
for parole.
29
lawphi1
Lastly, we modify the appellants civil liability to include civil indemnity and to
increase the exemplary damages awarded. Civil indemnity is automatically awarded
upon proof of the commission of the crime by the offender.
30
Under prevailing
jurisprudence, the offended party is entitled to P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as
moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages to deter other persons with
perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their children.
31

WHEREFORE, the May 31, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-
H.C. No. 00730 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Nilo Rocabo is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Rape and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without
eligibility for parole. He is also ordered to pay AAA P75,000 as civil
indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, andP30,000 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191361 March 2, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MARIANITO TERIAPIL y QUINAWAYAN, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the alleged attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery
in connection with a killing that occurred shortly after one group charged another
with cheating in bet.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor charged the accused Marianito Q. Teriapil (Teriapil) and
Ricardo P. Balonga (Balonga) of murder attended by treachery and evident
premeditation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Criminal Case
C-69686.
1
Trial took place only with respect to Teriapil because Balonga died of
cardio respiratory arrest while in detention.
2

The prosecution evidence, culled from the essentially identical narration of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals (CA), shows that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2003
in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, two groups of men engaged in a pigeon race. One
group consisted of the victim Joel Montero (Montero), Ramil Rama (Rama), Randy
Conje, and Eduardo Arevalo (Arevalo), collectively referred to as the Montero group.
The other group consisted of the accused Teriapil and Balonga. The latter approached
the Montero group and challenged it to a pigeon race. When the Montero group lost, it
thought that accused Teriapil and Balonga cheated them. Losing no time, the Montero
group went to look for the two to get back their bet money of P450.00. But pillboxes
met them. Nonoy, a brother of the accused Balonga, threw the pillboxes. For his part,
accused Teriapil shot Montero with a pen gun or "paltik." Montero was rushed to a
hospital but he was dead on arrival.
3

Accused Teriapil denied killing Montero. He testified that he was at home at the time
of the shooting. When he heard an explosion, he looked out the window and saw
Rama and two other men on board a tricycle. As the tricycle stopped in front of
Teriapils house, the driver pointed at him.
4
The defense did not offer any proof of
impossibility of Teriapils presence at the crime scene.
5

On August 3, 2007 the RTC found accused Teriapil guilty of murder and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to
pay P50,000.00 as indemnity to the victims heirs andP50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The RTC rejected accused Teriapils defense of alibi in the face of his having been
positively identified by Rama and Arevalo as Monteros assailant. Since accused
Teriapil shot Montero while the latter was in a position where he could not defend
himself, the RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the
accused. The RTC held, however, that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of
evident premeditation: 1) the time when the offender decided to commit the crime;
2) an act indicating that he clung to his decision; and 3) sufficient lapse of time
between his decision to commit the crime and its execution to allow for reflection on
the consequences of the act he had decided on.
6
Accused Teriapil appealed to the CA.
On September 30, 2009 the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modifications. It
reduced the exemplary damages to P25,000.00, deleted the award of indemnity, but
in its place directed accused Teriapil to payP25,000.00 as temperate damages to the
victims heirs.
The Issues Presented
The case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that accused Teriapil killed Montero
with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery as to make him liable
for murder; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
Ruling of the Court
One. Agreeing with the prosecution, the CA held that treachery attended accused
Teriapils shooting of Montero since the latter was inside his house at that time. This
mode of attack, claimed the CA, rendered Montero incapable of defending himself.
7

True, an assailant uses treachery when he suddenly and unexpectedly attacks his
unsuspecting victim and denies him any real chance to defend himself. By this, the
assailant ensures the success of his attack with no risk to his person. In numerous
cases, however, the Court held that the idea of treachery does not apply when the
killing is not premeditated or when the accused did not deliberately choose the
means he employed for committing the crime.
8

Here, the clash between the Montero group and the accused Teriapil and Balonga
developed spontaneously.1avvphi1The Montero group suspected the two of having
cheated them in the pigeon race. Arevalo testified that when he told Balonga of his
suspicion, the latter ran away. At this point, the Montero group decided to proceed
with haste to where accused Teriapil and Balonga were to get their bet money back.
On getting there, however, they were met with crude explosives called pillboxes.
From the succession of events, it can hardly be said that accused Teriapil had planned
to attack Montero or the other members of his group. The clash between the two
groups and the slaying of Montero followed a continuous relay of events that began
with the accusation that accused Teriapil and Balonga had cheated the victim and his
companions in the pigeon race.
Although accused Teriapil was positioned inside his house, there is no evidence that
he deliberately hid there to surprise and ambush Montero. Monteros group was fully
alerted when pillboxes met them. They knew they had to defend themselves from
aggression that awaited them. Besides, based on the records, the march of events did
not afford accused Teriapil and Balonga the time to plan and prepare how they were
to resist the Montero group that came in number to get their money back from those
who, they thought, cheated them.
Two. Accused Teriapil assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that impaired their supposed positive identification of him. But those
inconsistencies, mainly about the number and types of ammunitions used, do not
depart from the core theory of the prosecution. The Court believes that the witnesses
referred to were present during the clash between the two groups and were
proximate to where Teriapil shot Montero. Moreover, the incident happened at 11:00
in the morning which made it easy for the witnesses to identify Teriapil.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. 03046 dated September 30, 2009 and FINDS the accused Marianito Teriapil y
Quinawayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and SENTENCES him to suffer
the penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court ORDERS him to pay Joel Monteros
heirsP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011
DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional
rights. Free expression however, "is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its
exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society."
1
Libel stands as an
exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Dionisio Lopez (petitioner) assailing the Decision
2
dated August 31, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175. The CA affirmed with
modification the Decision
3
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City,
Branch 60 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.
Procedural and Factual Antecedents
On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31,
2003, the accusatory portion of which reads in full as follows:
That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the integrity,
reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor the offended party MAYOR
SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with malice and intent to
injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred, contempt and ridicule put
up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at
Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows:
"CADIZ FOREVER"
"______________ NEVER"
thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention
from the residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the
word "NEVER". Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the
herein private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the
word "NEVER" thus making the billboard appear as follows
"CADIZ FOREVER"
"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce
the readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on,
therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor
Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory
to the good name, character and reputation of the offended party and his office and
that the said billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of
thousands of persons, which caused damage and prejudice to the offended party by
way of moral damages in the amount [of]:
P5,000,000.00 as moral damages.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.
4

Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of "not
guilty." During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of
the accused, that the private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City
and is popularly known by the nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner calls the
private complainant "Bading." Thenceforth, trial on the merits commenced in due
course.
Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November
2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent
saw billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space before the
word "NEVER" directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner
of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola
warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message
conveyed since it was incomplete.
Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call
relating that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up with the
added words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the billboards with the
phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and
feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of
being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City Legal
Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that
the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He
thus prayed for damages.
Jude Martin Jaropillo (Jude) is a licensing officer of the Permit and License Division of
Cadiz City. While on a licensing campaign, he was able to read the message on the
billboards. He wondered what fault the person alluded therein has done as the
message is so negative. He felt that the message is an insult to the mayor since it
creates a negative impression, as if he was being rejected by the people of Cadiz
City. He claimed that he was giving his testimony voluntarily and he was not being
rewarded, coerced or forced by anybody.
Nenita Bermeo (Nenita), a retired government employee of Cadiz City, was at
Delilahs Coffee [Shop] in the morning of November 19, 2002 when she heard the
petitioner shouting "Bading, Bading, Never, Never." She and the tricycle drivers
drinking coffee were told by petitioner "You watch out I will add larger billboards."
When she went around Cadiz City, she saw larger billboards with the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER," thus confirming what petitioner had said. With
the message, she felt as if the people were trying to disown the private respondent.
According to her, petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. Like Jude, she was
not also forced or rewarded in giving her testimony.
Bernardita Villaceran (Bernardita) also found the message unpleasant because Mayor
Escalante is an honorable and dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the
message is an insult not only to the person of the mayor but also to the people of
Cadiz City.
Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the
things happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in
conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that
he has no intention whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay. He
contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay.
He further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never
love Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a
wake-up call for Cadiz City.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner
of libel. The trial court ruled that from the totality of the evidence presented by the
prosecution vs-a-vs that of the defense, all the elements of libel are present. The
fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DIONISIO LOPEZ y
ABERASTURI (bonded) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel defined
and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant thereto hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS
AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum as the minimum to TWO YEARS,
ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as the maximum and a
FINE of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum
of P5,000,000.00 by way of moral damages.
The cash bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and returned to the
accused, however the penalty of Fine adjudged against the accused is hereby ordered
deducted from the cash bond posted by the accused pursuant to Section 22 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court and the remaining balance ordered returned to the accused.
The accused is hereby ordered immediately committed to the BJMP, Cadiz City for the
service of his sentence.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier,
rendered judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with modification the Decision of
the RTC. Like the trial court, the appellate court found the presence of all the
elements of the crime of libel. It reduced however, the amount of moral damages
toP500,000.00. Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which the
appellate court denied in its Resolution
6
dated April 7, 2006.
Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant petition. Per our directive,
private respondent filed his Comment
7
on August 29, 2006 while the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) representing public respondent People of the Philippines,
submitted a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment
8
on even date. After the
filing of petitioners Reply to private respondents Comment, we further requested
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The OSG filed a Manifestation in
Lieu of Memorandum, adopting as its memorandum, the Manifestation and Motion in
Lieu of Comment it earlier filed. Petitioner and private respondent submitted their
respective memoranda as required.
Issues
Petitioner raised the following arguments in support of his petition:
I
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ
FOREVER[,] BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS/SIGNBOARDS
SHOW THE INJURIOUS NATURE OF THE IMPUTATIONS MADE AGAINST THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND TENDS TO INDUCE SUSPICION ON HIS CHARACTER, INTEGRITY AND
REPUTATION AS MAYOR OF CADIZ CITY.
II
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER" CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS ERECTED BY PETITIONER ARE
DEFAMATORY, DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEY
COMPRISE FAIR COMMENTARY ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST WHICH ARE
THEREFORE PRIVILEGED?
III
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION
OF MALICE IN THE CASE AT BAR HAS NOT BEEN OVERTHROWN.
IV
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF
THE CHARGE OF LIBEL AND IN HOLDING HIM LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OFP500,000.
9

Summed up, the focal issues tendered in the present petition boil down to the
following: 1) whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
is libelous; and 2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged
communication.
Our Ruling
We ought to reverse the CA ruling.
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts
are final and conclusive and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the following recognized exceptions:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and,
10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
10

Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the
crime of libel are present in this case. Thus, following the general rule, we are
precluded from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case.
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly
misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are
constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically paragraph 4 above, instead of
the general rule.
Petitioner takes exception to the CAs ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private
respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. He avers that
there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the
character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.
The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, asserts that "there is
nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which ascribe
to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into
contempt."
11

The prosecution maintains that the appellate court correctly sustained the trial
courts finding of guilt on petitioner. Citing well-established jurisprudence
12
holding
that "[w]ords calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective
to destroy reputation than false charges directly made" and that "[i]ronical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander," it argued that the words
printed on the billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the
ludicrous yet they were so deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast
aspersion against private respondents honor and reputation.
A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."
13
"For an imputation to be libelous, the
following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c)
it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable."
14
Absent one of
these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed
phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the
words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is
necessarily rendered immaterial.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a
crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
"whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense."
15
Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if
the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the
person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or
are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or
persons up to public ridicule."
16

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
courts finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to
induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor
of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to
cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant
language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private
respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner
was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon
private respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was
guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and
dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider
it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of
official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and
dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the message printed in the
billboards and gave a negative impression on what it says. They imply that the
message conveys something as if the private respondent was being rejected as city
mayor of Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of these witnesses is doubtful considering the
moral ascendancy exercised over them by the private respondent such that it is quite
easy for them to draw such negative impression. As observed by the OSG, at the time
the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private respondent as
mayor of Cadiz City, these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or
active in the project of the city government. Bernardita was a member of the Clean
and Green Program of Cadiz City; Jude was employed as a licensing officer under the
Permit and License Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita held the position of
Utility Worker II of the General Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses,
according to the OSG, would naturally testify in his favor. They could have verbicide
the meaning of the word "NEVER." Prudently, at the least, the prosecution could have
presented witnesses within the community with more independent disposition than
these witnesses who are beholden to private respondent.
According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to
convey to the people of Cadiz that he is a tuta of Sagay City.
We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position contrary to the interest of the
People. In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the
arguments of the petitioner, the OSG surprisingly joined stance with him, vehemently
praying for his acquittal. We quote with approval the OSGs analysis of the issue
which was the basis for its observation, thus:
During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject
billboards maligned his character and portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City, Thus:
Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those billboards "BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER"?
A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your question, it will not only
require those "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" billboard[s], it was after which additional
billboards were put up. That strengthen, that I am being a "Tuta of Sagay. I am being
maligned because of those billboards that states and I repeat: "Ang Tubig san Cadiz,
ginkuha sang Sagay", "Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz" and there is a small word under it,
Zone 2, very small, very very small, you cannot see it in [sic] a glance.
x x x x
A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the signboards would
like to convey to the people of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a "Tuta" or
Puppet of Sagay City.
x x x x
17

Contrary to private respondents assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards
which state, either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his words, a "tuta" or "puppet"
of Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single prosecution witness
testified that the billboards portray Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet"
of Sagay City. The billboards erected by petitioner simply say "CADIZ FOREVER",
"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
18

Apparently, private respondent refers to the circumstances mentioned in another
billboard that is not the subject matter in the present charge. The aforesaid facts
dismally failed to support the allegations in the instant information. Be that as it may,
private respondent nevertheless did not specify any actionable wrong or particular act
or omission on petitioners part that could have defamed him or caused his alleged
injury. While it may be that the Court is not bound by the analysis and observation of
the OSG, still, the Court finds that it deserves meritorious consideration. The
prosecution never indulged to give any reason persuasive enough for the court not to
adopt it.
Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the
controversial printed matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by
itself. "[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation,"
19
"words which are merely insulting are not actionable as
libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact
that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself," as
the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da Wah Council of the Phils.,
Inc.
20
1avvphil
In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner, both lower courts heavily
relied on the testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the reasons behind the printing
of the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER."
21
Our in-depth scrutiny of
his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the prosecution mainly
relate to the discharge of private respondents official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz
City. For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is considered
defamatory, still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official
with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does
not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends. As the Court held in United States v. Bustos,
22
the policy of a public official may
be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or
ingenuity invent. The public officer "may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public
[official] must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official
acts."
"In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts
constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and
only requisite to a finding of guilt."
23
In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the
trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the
controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" imputes derogatory
remarks on private respondents character, reputation and integrity. In this light, any
discussion on the issue of malice is rendered moot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 188323 February 21, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CHARLIE ABAO y CAARES, Appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
We decide, through this Resolution, the appeal filed by appellant Charlie Abao y
Caares from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03060.
On October 5, 2005, appellant Charlie Abao y Caares was accused of murder
1
in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City,
2
under the following Information:
That on or about the 3rd day of October, 2005 at around 10:00 P.M. at Brgy. Del
Socorro, Municipality of Minalabac, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, attack, assault and hack one CESAR CABASE y SAN JUAQUIN, with a
bolo causing him to sustain fatal wounds on the different parts of his body and head
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs as
shall be proven in court.
3

The appellant pleaded not guilty. In the trial that followed, an eyewitness, the
victims wife Richelda Madera Cabase, testified on the details of the crime.
At about 10:00 p.m. of October 3, 2005, the victim (Cesar Cabase) was asleep in the
room of their hut in Del Socorro, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, together with his
youngest daughter (Criselda) and grandson. The room was illuminated by an outside
kerosene lamp. While Richelda was about to join her sleeping family, the appellant
suddenly barged into the room, focused a flashlight on the victim, and began hacking
him with a bolo. Out of fear, Richelda retreated to a corner of the room while
embracing her grandson. The appellant thereafter focused his flashlight on Richelda,
but Criselda started crying. At that point, the appellant left.
4

Medico-legal findings revealed that multiple hack wounds with skull fractures caused
the victims death.
5
The victims family claimed to have spent P26,535.00 as funeral
and burial expenses, but could only supportP5,035.00 with receipts.
6

The appellant, interposing the defense of alibi, claimed that he was asleep at the
night of the killing at the farm of Antonio Almediere at Zone 5, Del Socorro,
Minalabac, about 300 meters away from the scene of the crime.
7

In its October 9, 2007 decision, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of
murder mainly based on the eyewitness testimony of the victim's wife, Richelda. The
trial court found her credible, consistent, and free of ill motive to testify against the
appellant whom she knew well because he had previously lived with them for four
years. It noted that the victims house was illuminated by a kerosene lamp that was
sufficient for purposes of identification. The RTC appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of treachery because the appellant attacked the victim who was asleep
and was thus totally incapable of defending himself. But the court disregarded
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance because it was not duly
established at the trial. The RTC sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua, and
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 in temperate damages.
8

On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC but
deleted the award of temperate damages, finding that only P5,000.00 must be
awarded as actual damages since only this amount was proven through
receipts.
9
From the CA, the case is now with us for final review.
We affirm the appellant's guilt.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA.1awphil The eyewitness account of the victim's wife is worthy of belief as it was a
straight forward account consistent with the presented physical evidence. The witness
had no reason to falsify and she was only interested in having the real killer punished;
no motive affecting her credibility was ever imputed against her. On the other hand,
the appellant failed to show by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission; he was only a
short 300 meters away.
10
Treachery qualified the killing to murder as the victim was
asleep at the time of the assault; the victim could not have possibly defended himself
against his assailant.
11
Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances
attended the commission of the felony, the lower courts properly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
While we affirm the CAs factual findings and the imprisonment imposed, we find it
necessary to modify the civil liability of the appellant. Since the receipted expenses
of the victim's family was less than P25,000.00, temperate damages should have been
awarded in lieu of actual damages.
12
With the finding of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, exemplary damages, too, of P30,000.00 should have been awarded.
13

WHEREFORE, the November 20, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03060 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Charlie Abao y
Caares is found guilty of murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to
pay the heirs of Cesar Cabase P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192251 February 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BARANGAY CAPTAIN TONY TOMAS, SR., BENEDICTO DOCTOR, and NESTOR
GATCHALIAN, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before Us is an appeal from the Decision
1
dated August 12, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405, which affirmed with modification the
Decision
2
dated May 27, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 06-92 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac. The RTC found accused Tony Tomas, Sr. (Tomas,
Sr.), Benedicto Doctor (Doctor), and Nestor Gatchalian (Gatchalian) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder.
The Facts
In an Information
3
filed on July 21, 2006, the three accused were indicted for the
crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about July 19, 2006, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Municipality
of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot
several times one Estrella Doctor Casco which [caused] her instantaneous death.
Upon arraignment on September 14, 2006, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the
above charge.
4
Trial
5
on the merits ensued after the pre-trial conference.
Version of the Prosecution
Estrella Doctor Casco (Estrella) was based in the United States, working there as a
procurement specialist with Safeway, Inc. and as a planner. She arrived in the
Philippines on July 9, 2006 or about 10 days before her untimely demise.
At around 9:45 in the evening on July 19, 2006, the victim (Estrella), with her mother
Damiana Doctor (Damiana) and caretakers Liezl Toledo (Liezl) and Angelita Duque
(Angelita), were traversing the road towards her house in Barangay Baybayaos,
Mayantoc, Tarlac after she had parked her rented car at the house of Liezls mother-
in-law, Erlinda Toledo. They had just come from the clinic of Dr. Salvador for a
medical check-up of Damiana.
Estrella was walking slightly ahead of her mother and Angelita when appellants
Tomas, Sr., Doctor and Gatchalian suddenly came out from the side of the road.
Tomas, Sr. and Doctor are cousins of Estrella. Thereupon, without saying anything,
Tomas, Sr. drew a gun and shot Estrella twice at a distance of about 1.5 meters away.
Gatchalian, without a gun, allegedly supported Tomas, Sr. by standing in a blocking
position along the road, while Doctor positioned himself at the back of Damiana and
Angelita and poked a handgun at them, telling them to lie face down on the ground,
though they did not totally drop on the road but were in a kneeling position.
When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the
former still followed it with three more shots when she was already prone on the
ground. After the five shots, the three accused fled towards the house of Tomas, Sr.
Liezl, who was standing about four meters away from Estrella, shouted, "Saklulu,
tulungan ninyo kami (Help, help us)," then ran to her house. Meanwhile, Angelita
came to the aid of 80-year-old Damiana, who suffered a hypertensive attack after
seeing what happened to her daughter. Angelita waved her hand to seek assistance
from Barangay Kagawad Yolanda Pablo (Kagawad Pablo) who came out on the road.
Both Liezl and Angelita recognized the three accused from the light coming from the
lamppost. The road was well lit. Doctors house was barely seven (7) meters from the
scene of the crime, that of Tomas, Sr. about 15 meters away, while Gatchalian was
staying in a hut in the fields.
The people in the neighborhood heard the gunshots, and most of them came out of
their houses to see what happened. Kagawad Pablo was watching TV in her house
when she heard the gunshots and immediately went out to investigate. She saw three
persons on the road: Damiana who was seated, Angelita who was squatting and
holding a fan, and a person lying on the ground who was Estrella, already shot. She
responded to Angelitas call for help to take Estrella to the district hospital. Rosalinda
Areniego (Rosalinda), first cousin of Estrella, was with her child, Ryan, in her house
watching the TV program "Sa Piling Mo" with actress Judy Ann Santos between 9:30 to
10:00 p.m. when she heard the gunshots. Her house was 10 to 15 meters away from
the road.
Liezl contacted Estrellas cousin, Captain Joel Candelario (Capt. Candelario), the
Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police (PNP) detachment at Sta. Ignacia,
Tarlac, who, in turn, contacted the police in Mayantoc, Tarlac. A half-hour later,
Capt. Candelario arrived at the scene and, using a rented car, brought Estrella to the
Malacampa District Hospital in Camiling, Tarlac accompanied by Liezl, Domingo
Toledo (Liezls husband), Neri Corpuz (Liezls first cousin) and Kagawad Pablo.
Estrella was declared dead on arrival by the attending doctors. Estrella was 56 years
old when she died.
Thereafter, Police Inspector Eleno Mangrobang (P/Insp. Mangrobang), the Chief of
Police of Mayantoc, Tarlac arrived in the district hospital and asked questions from
Liezl and Angelita. They were then brought to the police station for investigation
where Liezl executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay (Sworn Statement).
6
Angelita likewise
accomplished her Sinumpaang Salaysay.
7
Both Liezl and Angelita categorically
identified the three accused as the ones who perpetrated the crime.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Saturnino Ferrer (Dr. Ferrer) a day after the shooting,
or on July 20, 2006, showed four (4) gunshot wounds, one of them perforating the
heart of Estrella. Dr. Ferrer issued the death certificate, citing the cause of death as
"MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS, LACERATIONS OF THE UPPER PORTION OF THE HEART,
MULTIPLE RIB FRACTURES, HEMOPERICARDIUM, LEFT HEMOTHORAX; SEVERE EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE."
8

On the same day, July 20, 2006, Tomas, Sr. and Doctor were arrested in their
respective homes, while Gatchalian was arrested in the woodland (kahuyan). The
three were subjected to paraffin tests shortly after the policemen took them in
custody and were found negative for gunpowder burns.
Liezl opined that what probably prompted the three accused to murder Estrella were
the facts that: (1) Tomas, Sr. was removed as administrator of Estrellas properties in
Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac; (2) Tomas, Sr. lost several cases against
Estrellas father, Cecilio Doctor (Cecilio); (3) Tomas, Sr. accused Estrella of
instigating and financing several cases filed against him; and (4) Cecilio filed a case
against Alejandro Doctor, the father of accused Doctor, involving an easement of a
property. These apparent motives were corroborated by Angelita.
Version of the Defense
The accused denied involvement in the incident.
Tomas, Sr. averred that he was at home sleeping when the incident happened. Since
he suffered a cardiac arrest in December 1988, he had regular attacks and, on that
day, feeling bad, he slept early at around 7:00 p.m. in a bed in the living room in
front of the television and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the next day. He was not awakened
by the gunshots the previous night and it was his wife who told him about Estrellas
death from the shooting. In the morning of July 20, 2006, as barangay captain, he
confirmed Estrellas death in front of Doctors house from his neighbors. His
investigation did not identify the persons responsible for the crime.
On the other hand, Doctor, the brother-in-law of Tomas, Sr. and a cousin of Estrella,
likewise denied any involvement in the incident. He asserted that after working in the
field the whole day of July 19, 2006, he went home at 4:00 p.m. At around 9:00 p.m.
he went to sleep. At 10:00 p.m. he awoke to urinate and was told by his wife that his
cousin Estrella met an accident. He was prevailed upon by his wife not to go out of
the house. He then went back to sleep and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the next day.
Gatchalian admitted that he was a farm helper of Tomas, Sr. and worked in the
latters rice field. On the night of the incident, he claimed he was at home asleep
with his 10-year-old son Jayson. He woke up the next day at 5:00 a.m. and proceeded
to work in the farm of Tomas, Sr.
On July 20, 2006, P/Insp. Mangrobang invited the accused to the Mayantoc police
station for investigation but instead immediately brought them inside the municipal
jail. An hour later, policemen brought them to Camp Macabulos for paraffin tests.
Thereafter, they were returned to jail.
The Ruling of the RTC
On May 27, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr.,
Benedicto Doctor and Nestor Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, all of the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the
victim, the following:
1]. The amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2]. The amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
3]. The amount of Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4]. The amount of Php285,416.33 and another amount of $2,182.78 US dollars
or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment as actual
damages; and
5. The amount of $368,000.00 US dollars or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at
the time of its payment for loss of income of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC appreciated the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita
(caretakers of Estrella), Avelino Casco (husband of Estrella), Dr. Ferrer (the doctor
who conducted the autopsy), and P/Insp. Mangrobang. It gave credence to the
positive identification by Liezl and Angelita of the accused as the perpetrators. The
RTC held as sufficient the positive identification, coupled with sufficient motive, on
the part of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor and other circumstantial evidence proving the
accused as the perpetrators of the murder of Estrella. The RTC appreciated treachery
in the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon the unarmed Estrella without
the slightest provocation, and the attendance of conspiracy through the accuseds
contributory acts to successfully carry out the crime. Thus, the trial courts finding
beyond reasonable doubt of the accuseds guilt to the offense of murder and the
corresponding sentence of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in lieu of
the death penalty.
The RTC found the accuseds similar defenses of denial and alibi bereft of merit. It
ratiocinated that these defenses were but mere denial and self-serving statements of
the accused without any shred of supporting evidence. The additional defense
testimonies of Milagros Reguine (Milagros), Rosalinda, Kagawad Pablo, Police
Superintendent Daisy P. Babor (P/Supt. Babor), Rosendo Toledo (Rosendo), Police
Officer 3 (PO3) Luciano Captan, and PO1 Celso Isidro did not disprove the evidence of
the prosecution, much less proved the accuseds innocence. The trial court found
incredulous the defense testimonies of Rosalinda, Milagros and Rosendo to the effect
that the assailants were two young men, with the gunman sporting a flat-top haircut
while his companion had long hair. The RTC ratiocinated that it would not have been
easy for defense witnesses to identify the assailants due to the speed of the incident,
their distance from the crime scene, and the fact that, at the start of the shooting,
Rosalinda and Milagros were watching television in their respective homes while
Rosendo was busy drinking with his buddies. Thus, between the testimonies of Liezl
and Angelita who were with the victim and those of Rosalinda, Milagros and Rosendo,
the RTC found the testimonies of the former more credible.
Anent the negative paraffin tests on appellants, the RTC relied on Marturillas v.
People,
9
where the Court reiterated its consistent ruling that a negative paraffin test
conducted on an accused does not ipso facto prove said accused is innocent, for a
negative paraffin test result is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed
10
their conviction to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On August 12, 2009, the appellate court rendered its Decision, affirming the findings
of the RTC and the conviction of the accused but modifying the award of actual
damages to PhP 385,416.33 from PhP 285,416.33 to correctly reflect what was proved
during trial. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68, dated May 27, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 06-92 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, awarding the total of P385,416.33 as and by way of actual damages in
addition to the US$2,182.78 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos previously awarded.
The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
The CA found that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and their positive
identification of the accused as perpetrators of the killing of Estrella were more
credible than the denial and self-serving averments by the defense witnesses, which
were unsubstantiated. Reiterating the RTCs ruling that a negative paraffin test result
is not conclusive of the accuseds innocence, the appellate court also found the
presence of treachery and conspiracy in the manner the accused carried out the
nefarious deed.
The Issues
Thus, the instant appeal, where both accused-appellants and the Office of the
Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, opted not to file any
supplemental brief, since no new issues are raised nor any supervening events
transpired, and correspondingly filed their respective Manifestations
11
to the effect
that the Brief for the Accused-Appellants,
12
accused-appellants Motion for
Reconsideration,
13
and the Brief for the Appellee
14
filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405
be used in resolving the instant appeal.
Thus, accused-appellants raise the same assignments of errors earlier passed over and
resolved by the CA, to wit: first, that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liezl
and Angelita were incredible and repugnant to human experience and
behavior; second, the RTC erred in disregarding their negative paraffin test results
and their defense of denial and alibi; third, there was no conspiracy; and fourth,
there was no treachery. Elsewise put, accused-appellants question the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses and raise the issue of insufficiency of evidence to convict
them, much less the presence of treachery and conspiracy.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellants assert that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita are not
credible witnesses on the grounds of their partiality since they rely on the family of
Estrella for their livelihood. They argue that the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita are
too perfect since appellants could not have committed the crime in such a well-lit
place where they could easily be identified, coupled with the fact that Liezl, Angelita
and Damiana were spared from harm. They infer that the testimonies of Liezl and
Angelita were fabricated. They also point to the reason that the adverse testimony of
Liezl is on account of her ill feelings towards Doctor who previously subjected her to
shame when he slapped her in public, and also to ingratiate herself to her employer,
Cecilio, Estrellas father, who was charged by Tomas, Sr. in a case.
To cast more doubt on their testimonies, accused-appellants point to the incongruity
of both Liezl and Angelita not identifying them as the perpetrators of Estrellas killing
immediately after the incident when they had ample opportunity to do so. In the case
of Angelita, she only mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio and did not include Doctor and
Gatchalian. And much worse in the case of Liezl, who rushed home looking for her
cellular phone, and did not even bother to reveal accused-appellants identities to
the responding policemen.
We disagree.
At the outset, We reiterate the consistent principle the Court applies when the issue
of credibility of witnesses is raised in the backdrop of the findings of the trial court
which are wholly affirmed by the appellate court. An established rule in appellate
review is that the trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive
effect.
15
Indeed, it is settled that when credibility is in issue, the Court generally
defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves, and observed their
deportment during trial.
16

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself.
17
The trial court found more credible the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita, who narrated in a straightforward and
candid manner what transpired that fateful night of July 19, 2006. One with the
appellate court, We find no reason to set aside their testimonies.
The grounds of partiality and ill motive raised by accused-appellants cannot discredit
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. For one, as the appellate court aptly
noted, close relationship to the victim does not make a witness biased per se.
18
It has
to be amply shown that the witness is truly biased and has fabricated the testimony
on account of such bias. Accused-appellants have not sufficiently shown such a bias.
The fact that Liezl and Angelita depend on the victims family for their job as
caretakers does not make them biased witnesses. Besides, their testimonies have not
been shown to be fabricated. The trial court that had scrutinized their deportment,
facial expression, and body language during the trial has found them more credible.
For another, the ill motive raised by accused-appellants has not been shown to affect
the testimony of Liezl to suit her alleged personal ill feelings against Doctor. If it
were so and the content of her testimony was fabricated, why did Liezl not make
Doctor as the gunman who shot Estrella? And why include Gatchalian and Tomas, Sr.?
But more telling of the veracity of the testimony of these prosecution witnesses are
the following facts: (1) Angelita has not been shown to have any ill motive against
accused-appellants; (2) during the time immediately after the shooting incident when
Liezl ran to her house and Angelita brought Damiana home, Angelita was queried by
Cecilio about who shot Estrella, and Angelita replied without hesitation that it was
Tomas, Sr. who shot Estrella;
19
(3) when Angelita mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio as
the gunman, she had not conferred with Liezl; thus, they could not have made it up
that Tomas, Sr. was the gunman; (4) while it is true that Angelita did not mention the
names of Doctor and Gatchalian, such does not denigrate from the fact that it was
indeed Tomas, Sr. whom Angelita saw shooting Estrella with a handgun; (5) Angelita
sufficiently showed by her testimony that she was busy attending to Damiana who had
a hypertensive attack and the house was in chaos because of the incident and, thus,
was not able to enlighten Cecilio more about the incident; and (6) the fact that both
Liezl and Angelita made their official statements (sinumpaang salaysay) a few hours
after the incident during the investigation conducted by P/Insp. Mangrobang initially
at the district hospital and later at the police station shows that their account of
what happened was not fabricated and they positively identified accused-appellants
as the perpetrators.
Consequently, the testimonies of Angelita and Liezl were neither fabricated nor
prompted by any ill motive but were truly eyewitness accounts of what transpired
that fateful night of July 19, 2006.
Second Issue: Negative Paraffin Test and
Defenses of Denial and Alibi
Accused-appellants also allege error by the trial court in disregarding their negative
paraffin test results coupled with their defenses of denial and alibi which, they
strongly asserted, were corroborated by credible witnesses Rosalinda and Rosendo
who do not appear to harbor any ill motive against the victim and her family. The
testimonies of Rosalinda and Rosendo, according to accused-appellants, attest to the
fact that the assailants were two young men. Moreover, they contend that their act of
not fleeing is a circumstance that should favorably be considered.
We are likewise not persuaded.
Negative paraffin test not conclusive
Accused-appellants were subjected to paraffin tests on July 20, 2006 at 11:05 a.m. or
the very next day and a little over 14 hours after the shooting incident. Since
gunpowder nitrates stay for 72 hours in the hands of a person who fired a handgun, a
timely paraffin test, if positive, will definitely prove that a person had fired a
handgun within that time frame. A negative result, however, does not merit
conclusive proof that a person had not fired a handgun. Thus, the negative paraffin
test results of accused-appellants cannot exculpate them, particularly Tomas, Sr.,
from the crime.
Time and again this Court had reiterated that "even negative findings of the paraffin
test do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun,"
20
and that "a paraffin
test has been held to be highly unreliable."
21
This is so since there are many ways,
either deliberately or accidentally, that the residue of gunpowder nitrates in the
hands of a person who fired a handgun can be removed. This point was aptly
explained and clarified by defense witness P/Supt. Babor, a Forensic Chemist and the
Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas in San Fernando,
Pampanga. She explained in open court the various factors affecting the non-
adhesion, disappearance or removal of the residue of gunpowder nitrates on the
hands of a person who fires a gun, like the wind direction and velocity when the
handgun was fired, the type of firearm used, the humidity or moisture present in the
ammunition, and when the person wears gloves to preclude adhesion of the
gunpowder nitrates.
22
Also, she explained that opening the pores of the skin will make
the nitrates slough off or disappear and this could be done by subjecting the hands to
heat, like steam from boiling water, or sufficiently washing the hands with warm
water. Finally, gunpowder nitrates are also dissolved by diphenylamine.
23

Positive Identification
As adverted to above, the credibility of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita has
not been successfully assailed by accused-appellants. Besides, in Our assiduous review
of the records of the instant case, We cannot weigh and view the evidence in the
same light as accused-appellants. It is axiomatic that positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrators of the crime is entitled to
greater weight than their alibis and denials.
24

Thus, Angelita testified as to what happened and positively identified accused-
appellants and their specific actions:
ATTY. DE GUZMAN: While walking towards the house of Mrs. Casco at about past 9
oclock of July 19, 2006, do you recall of any unusual incident that transpired?
ANGELITA DUQUE: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas, Benedicto Doctor, and Nestor Gatchalian suddenly
emerged and accosted us while we were going to the house of Mrs. Casco, sir.
Q: In particular, what did Brgy. Captain Tomas do?
A: He suddenly hold a gun and shot Mrs. Casco, sir.
Q: How many times did Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas shoot Mrs. Casco?
A: First, he fired two (2) gunshots to Mrs. Casco and Mrs. Casco fell on the ground and
it was followed by another three (3) shots, sir.
Q: While Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas was shooting at Mrs. Casco, what was Benedicto
Doctor doing?
A: Before Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas fired shots, Benedicto Doctor was already
positioned at our back poking the gun to us, sir.
Q: How about Nestor Gatchalian, what was he doing at the time Brgy. Captain Tony
Tomas was shooting Mrs. Casco?
A: Nestor Gatchalian was standing at the middle of the road supporting Brgy. Captain
Tomas, sir.
25

On the other hand, Liezl likewise testified as to how the shooting transpired:
ATTY. DE GUZMAN: While you were walking, do you recall of any unusual or extra
ordinary occurrence that took place at that time?
LIEZL TODLEDO: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: Tony [Tomas, Sr.], Benedicto Doctor and Nestor Gatchalian suddenly came out, sir.
Q: What did Tony [Tomas, Sr.] do if any?
A: He suddenly drew a handgun and shot Mrs. Casco, sir.
Q: How many times did Tony [Tomas, Sr.] shoot Estrella Casco?
A: At first, he fired two (2) shots sir, and followed it with three (3) more shots.
Q: What happened to Mrs. Casco after the first two (2) shots?
A: She fell down, sir.
Q: What did you do, if any?
A: I was standing, sir. And I heard another three (3) shots.
Q: At the time you heard the three (3) shots, what did you do if any?
A: When I saw the body of Mrs. Casco jerked, I shouted and ran away, sir.
Q: You said, you shouted. What were the words you shouted?
A: "Saklulu, tulungan ninyo kami", while running, sir.
Q: Where did you run?
A: Going to our house, sir.
26

It must be pointed out that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita knew accused-
appellants well since they were neighbors. Thus, they have attained a high level of
familiarity with each other.
Once a person gains familiarity with another, identification becomes an easy task
even from a considerable distance. Most often, the face and body movements of the
assailants create a lasting impression on the victim and eyewitness minds which
cannot be easily erased from their memory.
27
Their positive identification of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime charged was categorical and consistent;
hence, We cannot cast any doubt on their credibility as prosecution witnesses.
28
As
aptly pointed out by the CA:
With regard to the purported identification made by defense witnesses ROSALINDA
ARENIEGO and ROSENDO TEODORO of the alleged culprits different from the accused-
appellants, the Court notes with approval the RTCs observation that between the
testimonies of eyewitnesses LIEZL and ANGELITA, and that of defense witnesses
ROSALINDA and ROSENDO, the formers declarations were more credible, as they were
in fact walking together with the victim when she was shot, while ROSALINDA and
ROSENDO were supposedly about fifteen (15) meters away from the crime scene.
29

Besides, denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving
negative evidence that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
positive declaration of credible witnesses.
30

Third and Fourth Issues: Appreciation of Treachery
and Presence of Conspiracy
We tackle the last two issues together for being related and intertwined, dealing as
they were on how the crime of murder was perpetrated.
Accused-appellants strongly maintain the absence of the qualifying circumstance of
treacheryqualifying the killing of Estrella to murder; and the lack of conspiracy
penalizing them equally for the crime of murder. They strongly assert the lack of
treachery since their simultaneous and sudden appearance could not amount to it, for
Tomas, Sr. still had to draw his gun before shooting Estrella, and Doctor still had to
position himself behind Damiana and Angelita before ordering them to drop or lie face
down on the ground. Evidently, the victim Estrella had ample opportunity to dodge or
defend herself.
And finally, accused-appellants point to the dearth of evidence showing their
concerted acts in pursuing a common design to kill Estrella. Prosecution witnesses
Liezl and Angelita point to Tomas, Sr. as the one who fired a handgun; Doctor was
purportedly carrying one but did not use it, while Gatchalian did not carry one. They
aver that the prosecution failed to show evidence of their intentional participation in
the crime with a common design and purpose since Doctors act of holding a gun was
never shown to be in furtherance of the killing of Estrella. And much less can
Gatchalians act of merely standing on the road in the path of the four ladies ever
constitute furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella.
Accused-appellants arguments are partly meritorious.
After a judicious study of the records at hand, We are compelled to affirm the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and of conspiracy. However, the
evidence adduced and the records do not support a finding of conspiracy against
appellant Gatchalian.
Treachery duly proven
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and
increases the imposable penalties for the offense.
31
Murder is defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
ART. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin;
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of
an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any
other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1)
the offender killed the victim, (2)through treachery, or by any of the other five
qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. Generally, the elements of
murder are:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
32

In the instant case, there is no dispute that Estrella was shot to deathshe succumbed
to four gunshot wounds, one of which perforated her heartand it is neither parricide
nor infanticide. That Tomas, Sr. killed the victim in a treacherous manner was
established by the prosecution during the trial.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended
party might make.
33
Mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to
treachery.
34
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
35
Thus, frontal attack can be
treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.
36

For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: (1) the malefactor
employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety
from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method
and manner of execution were deliberately adopted.
37
Moreover, for treachery to be
appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the
attack.
38

Consequently, the issue of the presence of treachery hinges on the account of
eyewitnesses Liezl and Angelita, who witnessed everything from the inception of the
attack until accused-appellants fled from the crime scene. Both were not only certain
and unwavering in their positive identification of accused-appellants, but their
testimony, as aptly noted by the courts a quo, were also factual, straightforward and
convincing on how the murder transpired.
To reiterate, as quoted above, while the party of Estrella was walking, accused-
appellants suddenly appeared from the side of the road. Without uttering any word,
Tomas, Sr. drew his gun and shot Estrella twice, while Doctor simultaneously poked a
gun at Angelita and Damiana. And when Estrella already fell down, Tomas, Sr. shot
her thrice moreperhaps to ensure her death. Then accused-appellants fled. It is,
thus, clear that the shooting of Estrella by Tomas, Sr. was done with treachery. The
nefarious act was done in a few moments, it was unexpected as it was sudden. The
act of Doctor in immobilizing Angelita and Damiana in those brief moments afforded
and ensured accused-appellants impunity from the unarmed Estrella and her three
similarly unarmed companions.
Conspiracy duly proven
While We likewise affirm the presence of conspiracy, as adverted above, We cannot
agree to the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court that
Gatchalian is equally guilty on account of conspiracy to merit the same criminal
liability as accused-appellants Tomas, Sr. and Doctor.
Findings of facts are matters best left to the trial court. However, where the "trial
court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or
significance which if considered would have altered the result,"
39
then this Court will
not shirk from its duty of ascertaining the proper outcome of such reversible error
committed by the trial court.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a
common design or purpose.
40
Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required
to establish the crimeproof beyond reasonable doubt;
41
as mere presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.
42

In the instant case, the ascertained facts of the shooting to death of Estrella with
treachery established beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of
murder. Tomas, Sr.s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. To be equally
guilty for murder, it must be shown that Doctor and Gatchalian conspired with Tomas,
Sr., for in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a
common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is the act of all.
43
From the clear
testimony of Angelita and Liezl, it has been duly established that Doctors
contemporaneous act was made in furtherance of the common purpose of killing
Estrella and ensuring impunity from the act. Indeed, Doctors cooperation in the
shooting of Estrella ensured its accomplishment and their successful escape from the
crime scene. Doctor is, thus, equally guilty and liable for the murder of Estrella on
account of conspiracy.
Gatchalian guilty as an accomplice
Gatchalian, however, is differently situated as Doctor. We note that the evidence
adduced and the records would show that Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the
furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned above, mere presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.
44

It appears that Gatchalian is a party to the conspiracy as found by the courts a quo.
Gatchalian appeared in the company of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. He also fled together
with them. However, Gatchalian was unarmed and did not say anything or commit any
overt act to externally manifest his cooperation with the shooting of Estrella. On the
other hand, Gatchalian never attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show
that he was aware of the plan and intent to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he
acquiesced to the shooting of Estrella.1avvphi1
The trial court viewed Gatchalian as supporting Tomas, Sr. by taking a "blocking
position" in the road. We, however, cannot subscribe to such a view considering that
his presence is merely extraneous to the accomplishment of the crime. Besides,
Angelita and Damiana were covered by Doctor who poked a gun at them, while Liezl
was so far back that it would be incongruous, to say the least, that Gatchalian was
blocking the road. Who would he be blocking then when the road is wide and Liezl
was far back?
Thus, with his lack of overt acts manifestly contributing to the accomplishment of the
common design to shoot Estrella, there is some doubt if he indeed conspired with
Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. This, however, does not exculpate him from criminal liability
absent proof that he merely tagged along or just happened to meet his employer
(Tomas, Sr.) shortly before the incident or was merely taken along without being told
about the other accused-appellants plan. The fact that Gatchalian appeared together
with the other accused-appellants and fled with them, while not constitutive of proof
beyond reasonable doubt of conspiracy, still proves a certain degree of participation
and cooperation in the execution of the crime. Consequently, in line with the
principle that whatever is favorable to an accused must be accorded him, Gatchalian
is guilty as an accomplice only. As We aptly explained in People v. Ballesta:
Mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan and acquiescence
thereto are not sufficient grounds to hold a person as a conspirator. x x x Lacking
sufficient evidence of conspiracy and there being doubt as to whether appellant acted
as a principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and
is thus held liable only as an accomplice.
x x x Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the
doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as accomplice will
always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liabilitythat of a mere
accomplice.
45

Proper Penalties
We agree with the courts a quo that Tomas, Sr. and Doctor merit to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Estrella.
As an accomplice to the murder, Gatchalian is liable to a penalty of reclusion
temporal or one degree lower than the imposable penalty for murder. Considering
that there are no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances applicable, the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is proper. Considering further the
applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law since Gatchalian is not disqualified
under Section 2 of said law, the proper penalty imposable is prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
Award of Damages
Finally, on the damages awarded, the CA correctly modified the actual damages to
PhP 385,416.33
46
and USD 2,182.78,
47
the amounts duly proven during trial with
supporting official receipts and corresponding documents related to actual expenses
for the casket, funeral services and the airfreight of Estrellas remains back to the
United States.
Anent the grant of damages for loss of income or earning capacity in the amount of
USD 368,000, We find it proper and duly proven. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity.
48
The prosecution duly proved Estrellas loss of earning capacity by
presenting the statement from her employer, Safeway Inc., which showed her earning
an hourly rate of USD 25.233.
49
Likewise, Estrellas 2006 Wage and Tax Statement
from her Employees Records in the Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue
Service
50
shows her earnings for 2006 at USD 29,828.72. Evidently, as shown by her
husband Avelino Cascos testimony, Estrella was averaging gross earnings of USD
48,000 annually. In applying the formula
51
used in the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality, the RTC arrived at the figure of USD 368,000 as compensation for Estrellas
heir for loss of income or earning capacity. We find no reason to disturb this finding of
the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.
Moreover, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages other than the commission
of the crime.
52
Based on current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Estrella is in order.
53
Likewise, the CA
correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of PhP 50,000 in view of the violent
death of the victim and the resultant grief to her family.
54
With the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the award of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages
is justified under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code.
55
Besides, the entitlement to moral
damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
56

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED as to appellant NESTOR
GATCHALIAN. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated August 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03405 is hereby MODIFIED in that NESTOR GATCHALIAN is declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the offense of Murder under Art. 248 of the
RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Gatchalian is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
17 years and four (4) months ofreclusion temporal, as maximum. The rest of the
appealed decision stands.
The May 27, 2008 RTC Decision should be modified to read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr. and
Benedicto Doctor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua. This Court also
finds accused Nestor Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice to
the offense of Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum.
Likewise, all of the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the
victim, the following:
1.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as moral damages;
3.) The amount of PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4.) The amount of PhP 385,416.33 and another amount of USD 2,182.78 or its
equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment as actual damages;
and,
5.) The amount of USD 368,000 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time
of its payment for loss of income of the victim.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 187077 February 23, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 31, 2008 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00926, which affirmed the July 21, 2003 Decision
2
of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 7383-2000-C, finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against
AAA.
3

Accused Alex Condes y Guanzon (accused) was charged with the crime of rape in an
information
4
dated February 23, 2000, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about February 14, 1999 at Brgy. Bitin, Municipality of Bay, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
while conveniently armed with a bolo through force, violence and intimidation and
with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
relation with one AAA, a fourteen (14) year old minor, against her will and consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Version of the Prosecution
The thrust of the prosecutions evidence has been summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief
5
as follows:
On the eve[ning] of February 14, 1999, the 14-year old victim, AAA, was left alone
with her stepfather, appellant Alex Condes, at their house in Brgy. Bitin, Laguna. She
was cleaning the upstairs area of the house, when appellant entered the room,
pointed a bolo at her neck, and warned her not to shout. He pulled her down to the
floor, removed her clothes, and when she tried to push him away subdued her with a
threat of a cut from his bolo. Appellant removed his own garments, positioned himself
on top of his stepdaughter, and succeeded in inserting his penis into the victim. He
made push and pull movement for about ten minutes. The pain the victim felt in her
sex organ was excruciating.
After satisfying himself, appellant wiped his sex organ. Threatening to kill her
brothers and sister, he made AAA promise not to tell anyone about the incident. She
kept the unpalatable promise until December 30, 1999, when appellant tried to rape
her again. Determined to obtain justice, the victim called her aunt in San Pablo City
and disclosed the revolting incident. On January 4, 2000, accompanied by her aunt,
AAA was taken to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang Calamba, Laguna, where she was examined by Dr. Joselito Rodrigo whose
findings revealed the following:
"scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coapted with pinkish
brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an
elastic fleshy type hymen with deep-healed laceration at 6 oclock position. External
vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index
finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is soft. Findings are
compatible with 9 to 10 weeks pregnant already"
Version of the Defense
In his Brief,
6
the accused denied the charges against him and presented his own
version of the circumstances before and during the alleged incident. Thus:
Rose Catalan is a lady guard of the Guzent Incorporated in Tiwi, Albay, where the
accused used to work since 1991. She is in-charge of the time records of all the
employees in the said establishment.
On February 13, 1999, the accused reported for work, which was indicated in their
logbook. The accused left the company at 11:10 in the morning but proceeded to Tiwi
Hot Spring.
Alex Condes vehemently denied the accusation hurled against him. He recalled that in
the morning of February 14, 1999, he returned the service vehicle to his office at No.
1237 EDSA, Quezon City. He went home soon thereafter to take a short nap in his
house in Quezon City. At 5:00 oclock in the morning, he decided to go to his house in
Brgy. Bitin, Bay, Laguna. Upon reaching home, he went to sleep again until his
brother-in-law and a companion arrived. They had a drinking spree. The complainant
asked permission to attend a fiesta at her friends house.
At 7:00 oclock in the evening, he asked his mother-in-law and the complainant to
prepare his things as he would return to Manila the following day. He left his house on
February 15, 1999 at 3:30 in the morning.
Alberto Navarette, barangay captain of Bitin, in Bay, Laguna, averred that he saw the
accused inside the latters house in the morning of February 14, 1999. He also saw the
complainant washing dishes in their kitchen. Then, in the afternoon, he passed by the
house of the accused and saw him carrying a child while the complainant was in front
of their house. He did not notice anything unusual.
On July 21, 2003, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple rape. It rejected the defenses of denial and alibi
proffered by the accused stating that said defenses fell flat in the face of the
testimony of AAA on her harrowing ordeal in the hands of the accused. It found her
testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, consistent with human nature, and in
the normal course of events.
7
The lower court, however, ruled that the accused can
only be convicted of simple rape and not in its qualified form. It reasoned out that
while the prosecution was able to establish the aggravating/qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship which would warrant the imposition of death penalty
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance of stepfather-
daughter relationship was not alleged in the information. Thus, the dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the herein accused ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the
crime of rape. There being no modifying circumstances properly alleged in the
Information to be appreciated, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is hereby ordered to
indemnify the victim AAAP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
8

The records of the case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant
to People v. Efren Mateo,
9
the Court issued a resolution
10
dated January 19, 2005
transferring this case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The CA eventually affirmed
11
the guilty verdict on the basis of AAAs testimony which
it found credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction. It debunked the defense of
alibi of the accused holding that it was not satisfactorily established and not at all
persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing identification by the
victim.
On August 29, 2008, the accused filed the Notice of Appeal,
12
which was given due
course by the CA in its Minute Resolution
13
dated September 8, 2008.
On June 1, 2009, the Court issued the Resolution
14
requiring the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs. On July 7, 2009, the OSG manifested
15
that it
would forego the filing of a supplemental brief if appellant should opt not to file one.
On October 12, 2009, the Court dispensed
16
with the filing by the Public Attorneys
Office of a supplemental brief for appellant when it did not file one during the
prescribed period.
From the Appellants Brief of the accused filed with the CA, he prayed for the
reversal and setting aside of the guilty verdict anchored on the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MOTIVE
BEHIND THE FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE
ALLEGED ACT WAS NOT PROVEN WITH CERTAINTY.
In essence, the accused claims that AAA merely concocted the accusation of rape out
of hatred because she resented the hard discipline imposed by him and she feared
that he would punish her once he would learn that she had a boyfriend and pregnant
at that. He tags AAAs story of defloration as both preposterous and ridiculous
conjured by an overly imaginative individual anchored on ill motives.
Professing innocence, he insists that he could not have possibly committed the
offense charged as he was pre-occupied and even left the house on the day of the
alleged commission of the sexual assault. He discredits AAAs testimony stressing that
it would be difficult for him to commit the crime considering that her siblings and
grandmother were staying in the same house. Thus, he concludes that the evidence
for the prosecution failed to meet that quantum of proof necessary to warrant his
conviction.
The OSG, on the other hand, counters that AAAs testimony was credible and
sufficient to convict and that the culpability of the accused for the crime of rape was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal must fail.
In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by three settled
principles: First, an accusation for rape can be made with facility and it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and Third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
17
Corollary to the above principles is the rule that the credibility of the
victim is always the single most important issue in the prosecution of a rape
case.
18
Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony because, by the very nature
of this crime, it is usually the victim alone who can testify as to its occurrence.
In his Brief, the accused put in issue the credibility of AAAs testimony contending
that she merely fabricated the accusation to place him behind bars and rid him out of
her life forever. This contention deserves scant consideration.
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of
witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and
conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has
the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her
"furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath"
19
are all useful aids for an
accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore,
can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to
weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment
must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying.
20
The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA.
21

In the case at bench, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the trial courts
findings and its calibration of private complainants credibility.
A meticulous review of the transcript of stenographic notes would show that AAA
narrated in the painstaking and degrading public trial her unfortunate and painful
ordeal in the hands of the accused in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank manner. There were no perceptible artificialities or pretensions that tarnished
the veracity of her testimony. She recounted the tragic experience, unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points and unshaken by the tedious
and grueling cross-examination. Her declaration revealed each and every detail of the
incident and gave no impression whatsoever that her testimony was a mere
fabrication. Had her story been contrived, she would not have been so consistent
throughout her testimony in the face of intense and lengthy interrogation.
When offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16 years of age,
courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering
not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they
would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true.
22
Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
23
It bears stressing that not an
iota of evidence was presented by the defense showing that AAAs account of her
defilement was not true.
Without hesitation, AAA pointed an accusing finger against the accused, her
stepfather no less, as the person who sexually assaulted her on that fateful night of
February 14, 1999. She vividly recalled that he poked a bolo at her neck and told her
not to shout or else he would kill her. Bent on satisfying his lust, he embraced and
pulled her down on the floor. He took off her pajamas, undressed himself and placed
himself on top of her. She resisted by pushing him away but he again pointed the bolo
and ordered her not to move or shout. He then succeeded in penetrating her organ
with his own causing her excruciating pain. Thereafter, he warned her that he would
kill her and her siblings if she would tell anyone about what happened. The following
excerpts from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes are revealing:
Fiscal Loreto M. Masa
(On Direct Examination)
Q: On February 14, 1999, tell us where you were?
A: In the house, sir.
Q: When you said "in the house," are you referring to the house in Bitin?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened to you on February 14, 1999?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us what was that unusual incident you said you experienced?
A: Alex Condes raped me, sir.
Q: Where were you raped by Alex Condes?
A: In our house in the evening in Bitin.
Q: And how did he rape you?
A: Because at that time, my grandmother and my brothers and sisters, except my
youngest sister, were not in the house and I was alone upstairs and was cleaning the
house when he pointed a bolo at me.
Q: In what portion of your body this bolo was pointed at you?
A: In my neck, sir.
Q: Where were you? What portion of the house were you at that time he pointed a
bolo in your neck?
A: Upstairs sir, he was also there.
Q: What did the accused tell you when he pointed a bolo at your neck?
A: He told me not to shout or else he will kill me.
Q: What did you do when he told you not to shout or else he would kill you?
A: I just asked him "Papa, bakit po?" and because he was pointing a bolo at me I was
frightened.
Q: And when you ask her [sic] "Papa, bakit po?" what did he do?
A: Nothing, sir, he continued.
Q: When you said he continued, what do you mean? What did he do to you?
A: Because I was then at the door and was then about to go to the other room when
he pulled me and embraced me.
Q: When you said he pulled you where were you pulled by the accused?
A: To the bed, sir.
Q: At the time you were being pulled and being embraced, what did you do?
A: I was resisting, sir.
Q: What happened after you said the accused was pulling you and embracing you and
you were resisting? What happened next?
A: Nothing, sir. I was not able to do anything because he embraced me.
Q: You said you were not able to evade him when he was embracing you, what did he
do next to you?
A: He removed my clothes.
Q: What did you do when the accused removed your clothes?
A: I was pushing him.
Q: What happened when you were pushing him?
A: He again pointed the bolo and told me not to move or to shout.
Q: What did he do after he again threatened you?
A: Because I was very frightened, he forced me to do what he wanted me to do.
Q: Was the accused able to remove your clothes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What clothes?
A: Pajamas, sir.
Q: How about the accused?
A: His sando and shorts, sir
Q: What was your position at the time you said the accused was able to do it from
you?
A: I was lying down, sir.
Q: Where were you lying down, on the bed or on the floor?
A: On the floor, sir.
Q: How did the accused rape you after removing your clothes?
A: He was forcing "yung ano nya sa ari ko."
Q: Was he able to insert his penis to your private organ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you feel when your stepfather was able to insert his private organ to
yours?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: For how long was he on top of you?
A: Five to ten minutes, sir.
Q: What were you doing at the time your stepfather was doing it to you when he was
inserting his private organ against your will?
A: I was pushing him.
Q: What happened after you said you were pushing him?
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: And you said he was able to rape you and inserted his private organ to you, what
did he do next after he was able to insert your private organ to your vagina?
A: He was pumping me.
Q: When you said "pump", will you explain?
A: He was "kinakadyot ako."
Q: That was while he was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After pumping you, what did he do next?
A: He was kissing me, sir.
Q: When he was kissing you, what were you doing?
A: I was pushing his face, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: Because I cannot do anything he was able to finish.
Q: Why were you able to say that he was able to finish?
A: Because when he removed his private organ from my private part, he wiped it.
Q: After he removed his private organ from your organ what did he do next?
A: He told me not to complain or else he would kill us.
Q: What did you feel by his threatening against you and your brothers and sisters that
you would be killed?
A: I was frightened, sir.
Q: After threatening you that you and your brothers and sisters would be killed, what
did he do next?
A: So he told me to go down.
Q: How about the accused, where was he?
A: He stayed inside.
Q: Where was your mother at that time?
A: She was in Dubai, sir.
Q: How about your grandmother, where was she?
A: She was in the market, sir.
Q: You said your brothers and sisters were not in your house, where were they?
A: They were outside the house. I do not know what were they doing outside the
house.
Q: You said you went down, what did you do when you went down?
A: Because "diring-diri ako" I went inside the bathroom, sir.
Q: What did you do there?
A: I took a bath, sir.
24

The Court is convinced that the accused did employ threat and intimidation to
subjugate AAAs will and break her resistance. She categorically stated that he poked
a bolo at her neck and threatened to kill her if she would make a noise and resist his
advances. Undoubtedly, fear and helplessness gripped her. To an innocent girl who
was only 14 years old, his menacing acts engendered in her a well-grounded fear that
if she would resist or not yield to his bestial demands, he would make good his
threats. She was obviously cowed into submission by the real and present threat of
physical harm on her person. Obviously, she was silenced to do his bidding. Her
submission was re-enforced by the fact that the accused was her stepfather who
exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her. When a victim is threatened with
bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or
bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the
lustful desires of the rapist.
25

In the present case, it appears that AAA chose to suffer the February 14, 1999 rape in
silence had it not been for the second attempt to defile her on December 30, 1999.
After he mauled her when she resisted, she was compelled to seek her aunts
assistance. This was apparent from her testimony when she declared:
Fiscal Masa to Witness:
(Redirect Examination)
Q: You said that you were not able to report to anybody that you were raped by your
stepfather because of that threat[s] that your brothers and sister will be killed, why
did you report or give statement to the police on January 1, 2000?
The Fiscal: May I manifest for the record, your Honor that the witness is crying.
A: Because on December 30, he was again about to rape me but I resisted so he
mauled me and poked a bolo at me and told me that he will kill my aunt so the
following day I went to San Pablo to my aunt, who is near to me, and told her what
happened and what he has done to me that he mauled me and will kill my aunt.
Q: And what did your aunt in San Pablo do after you confided to her what the accused
did to you?
A: She immediately reported the incident to Sgt. Manaog.
Q: Do you know what Sgt. Manaog did after your aunt confided to him what happened
to you?
A: He was arrested, sir.
X x x
Atty. Ingente:
Recross, your Honor.
Q: When you told the incident to your aunt you were also thinking of your brothers
and sisters?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in fact perhaps at that time you were afraid that your aunt will report the
incident to the police?
A: No, sir because at that time I was also prepared to report the incident.
Q: But you know that the accused made threats that he will kill your brothers and
sister?
A: Yes, sir but I was then ready because I was thinking then that may be he was
threatening me because he want to rape me so I decided to file a complaint. And I
was also thinking that how would he kill his own children?
26

AAAs failure to immediately report to anyone what she had suffered in the hands of
her stepfather does not vitiate the integrity of her claim. Apparently, the accused
succeeded in instilling fear upon her young mind when he threatened to kill her and
her siblings should she say a word about the incident. Thus, paralyzed by the fear that
he would make good his threats, she remained silent and only broke it when he tried
to repeat the sexual assault. The subsequent attack brought her silence to the
breaking point and forced her to come out in the open to prevent and avoid further
assaults. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated
charge. Neither does it necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant.
27

Any insinuation of ill motive on the part of AAA in the filing of the rape case against
her stepfather does not merit any consideration. It is highly improbable that she
would concoct a sordid tale of sexual abuse against the accused, whom she called
"Papa," simply because she was reproved or censured for her irresponsible ways and
was afraid that he would punish her for getting pregnant by her boyfriend. Parental
punishment is not enough reason for a young girl to falsely accuse her stepfather of a
crime so grave as rape. Reverence and respect for the elders are two values deeply
ingrained in Filipino children.
28

Granting AAA indeed resented his stepfather, the Court does not necessarily cast
doubt on AAAs credibility as witness. Motives, such as those arising from family
feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the Court from giving, if proper,
full credence to the testimony of minor complainants
29
who remained steadfast
throughout their direct and cross-examination.
30
After all, ill motive is never an
essential element of a crime. It becomes irrelevant and of no significance where
there are affirmative, nay, categorical declarations towards the culpability of the
accused for the felony. Well-entrenched is the doctrine which is founded on reason
and experience that when the victim testifies that she has been raped, and her
testimony is credible, such testimony may be the sole basis of conviction.
31
In this
case, there could not have been a more powerful testament to the truth than her
public outpouring of her unspoken grief.
In an attempt at exculpation, the accused claims that it is difficult to commit the
crime of rape inasmuch as AAAs siblings and grandmother were staying in the same
house at Barangay Bitin, Municipality of Bay, Laguna.
The argument fails.
According to AAA, her siblings were all outside the house while her grandmother was
doing an errand in the market when the accused molested her. Granting arguendo
that there were other people in the house when the rape was committed, rapists are
not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby or
the members of the family.
32
Lust, being a very powerful human urge, is, to borrow
from People v. Virgilio Bernabe,
33
"no respecter of time and place." Rape can be
committed in even the unlikeliest places and circumstances and by the most unlikely
persons.
34
The beast in a man bears no respect for time and place, driving him to
commit rape anywhere - even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the
roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in the
same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places
which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. Besides,
there is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.
35

In stark contrast to AAAs firm declaration, the defenses of denial and alibi invoked by
the accused rest on shaky grounds. The accused insists that "the accusation is a
lie"
36
and claims that "I did not do that."
37
He avers that he could not have committed
the offense because he was preoccupied and was not in their house at Barangay Bitin,
Bay, Laguna on the date and time the alleged rape was perpetrated.
Judicial experience has taught this Court that denial and alibi are the common
defenses in rape cases. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
38
It is a
negative self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. The barefaced denial of the charge by the accused
cannot prevail over the positive and forthright identification of him as the perpetrator
of the dastardly act.
Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses for it can be easily contrived.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
39
In this case, not a shred of evidence was adduced by the accused to
substantiate his alibi.
A perusal of his own testimony discloses that he arrived at their house at Barangay
Bitin, Bay, Laguna at past 9:00 oclock in the morning; that he had visitors who came
to attend their town fiesta and they had a drinking spree; that after his visitors and
AAA left at past 12:00 oclock noon, he took a slumber; that he woke up at around
7:00 oclock in the evening and asked AAA and her grandmother to prepare his things
as he would return to Manila; and that he left for Manila at 3:30 oclock in the
morning of February 15, 1999.
40
From the foregoing, it is clear that he was at home in
the evening of February 14, 1999. Alibi necessarily fails when there is positive
evidence of the physical presence of the accused at the crime scene.
41
Taken in this
light, the plausible and emphatic testimony of AAA must prevail.
Finally, the Court sustains the two courts below in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on the accused. The applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (effective October 22, 1997), covering the crime
of Rape are Articles 266-A and 266-B which provide:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 7383-2000-C specifically alleged that AAA was 14
years old at the time of the commission of the rape. In proving her minority, the
prosecution presented a birth certificate
42
issued by the Office of City Civil Registrar
of San Pablo City showing that she was born on January 2, 1985. Hence, she was 14
years old when she was raped by the accused on February 14, 1999. However, the
courts below correctly noted that the qualifying circumstance of her relationship with
the accused as his stepdaughter was not alleged in the Information, although proven
during the trial and not even contested by the accused.
43
This omission prevents the
transformation of the crime in its qualified form.
The twin requisites of minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender
being special qualifying circumstances, which increase the penalty as opposed to a
generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, should
be alleged in the information because of the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
44
The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000, explicitly mandates that the
information must state in ordinary and concise language the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances attending an offense. Although the crime of rape in this
case was committed before the effectivity of the new rules, it should be applied
retroactively, as the same is favorable to an accused.
45

The Court notes, however, that the Information also alleged that the accused
committed the rape "while conveniently armed with a bolo through force, violence
and intimidation." The prosecution was able to prove during trial his use of a deadly
weapon and threatening words which caused the victim to submit to his will for fear
for her life and personal safety.
When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is the
range of two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. In this connection,
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.lawph!l
The Court also sustains the monetary awards granted by the RTC and the CA in favor
of AAA, except for the exemplary damages which is increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00 in line with our ruling in People v. Gilbert Castro
46
and earlier cases.
Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
47
Moral damages in rape cases should
be awarded without need of showing that the victim suffered trauma, with mental,
physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof. These are too
obvious to still require their recital by the victim at the trial.
48

The award of exemplary damages is likewise called for because the rape was
committed with the use of a deadly weapon. In People v. Silverio Montemayor,
49
the
Court has stated that "exemplary damages are justified under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since
the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the
commission of the rapes subject of these cases, exemplary damages x x x may be
awarded to the offended party in each case."
WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00926 is herebyAFFIRMED except as to the exemplary damages which is hereby
increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177570 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y
CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J. Jundoc (Jundoc), and
Nora C. Jingabo (Jingabo) were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 27, with Violations of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, paragraphs
(e-l), (f), (m), and (o) of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The accusatory portion of
the Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confed erating together and helping one another, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport or give away to another any prohibited
drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, or offer for sale, deliver
or transport marijuana dried flowering tops with total weight of thirty two thousand
nine hundred ninety five (32,995) grams which is a prohibited drug.
1

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-177383. Upon arraignment, all
accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty.
2

The prosecution presented four witnesses: Police Officer (PO) 3 Wilfredo Masanggue
(Masanggue), Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Anthony Blanco (Blanco), PO3 Eduardo
Pama (Pama), and Forensic Chemist George de Lara (De Lara). The RTC summarized
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as follows:
Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at about 6:00 a.m., of September
29, 1999, he and SPO1 Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief
Inspector Romulo Sapitula to proceed at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts.,
Tondo, Manila, where, according to the report given by the informant, three persons
a male and two female[s] would be coming from Baguio City to deliver unknown
quantity of marijuana. In no time, they arrived at the designated place and parked
their mobile patrol car along Juan Luna Street, facing the northern direction just near
the corner of Raxabago Street.
At around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from Yuseco St. heading towards
the direction of the pier. At a certain point along Raxabago Street, about a hundred
meters away from the position of their patrol car the taxi stopped. From it emerged
three passengers a man and two women each one of them carrying a black
travelling bag. As the trio fitted the descriptions given to them by Inspector Sapitula,
they intently watched and monitored their movements.
About one or two minutes later, as the trio started walking towards the western
portion of Raxabago St., they drove and trailed them. As the patrol car got closer
behind them, [Dequina] noticed its presence. She started walking in a more hurried
pace ("parang walkathon") as if she wanted to run away ("parang patakbo"). SPO1
Blanco alighted from the car and chased [Dequina] while PO3 Masanggue, who was
behind the wheels also alighted and restrained [Jundoc] and [Jingabo]. While thus
trying to get away, [Dequina] dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the
zipper of the bag gave way. Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic
bags case into view. Suspecting the stuffs to be marijuana, they further inspected the
other two bags in the possession of [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] and found out that they
had the same contents. They boarded the three accused, along with their bags in
their patrol car and proceeded to the hospital for physical examination before
bringing them to their headquarters. While in transit, [Dequina] pleaded to them to
allow her to make a call but they did not heed the request as the car was still in
motion.
At the western Police District Headquarters at United Nations Avenue, they turned
over the three accused together with the bags to PO3 Eduardo Pama, a police
investigator of the district Anti-Narcotics Unit for investigation. During the
investigation, it was discovered that each of the three black travelling bags
confiscated from the three accused contained eleven bricks of marijuana. In
connection with the incident, he and SPO1 Blanco executed the Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension dated September 30, 1999 (Exhs, "A" and submarkings).
SPO1 Anthony Blanco testified that in the early morning of September 29, 1999,
together with PO3 Wilfredo Masanggue, he was dispatched by their superior to the
corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where it was reported that
shipment of marijuana would take place. They were further informed that the drug
couriers were composed of a man and two women and that each of them were
carrying a travelling bag.
After they arrived at the designated area, they parked their vehicle along Juan Luna
near Raxabago Street. Then they waited. Suddenly, they noticed the arrival of a
taxicab from where three persons a man and two women alighted. Each of them
was carrying a bag. The trio fitted the descriptions given to them. As the suspects
walked away, they drove and trailed them. As they got close behind them, accused
Nelida Dequina noticed the presence of the mobile car. She dropped the black bag
she was carrying and the same was unzipped. The contents thereof consisting of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags came into view. They arrested
the three suspects later identified as the accused herein and boarded them into their
car. While on board the vehicle, [Dequina] and [Jundoc] confessed that the contents
of the other two bags confiscated from them were also marijuana.
At the WPD Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, the three accused were
turned over to the Office of the District Anti-Narcotics Unit where they were
investigated by PO3 Wilfredo Pama. It was there where the other two bags
confiscated from [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] were re-opened and confirmed to contain
marijuana.
In the course of his cross-examination, SPO1 Blanco admitted that the three of them
Inspector Sapitula, PO3 Masanggue and himself, along with the three accused, were
photographed, at what appeared to be a "sari-sari" store as their background. The
same appeared in the clipping of "Tonight" September 20, 1999 issue.
PO3 Eduardo Pama, an investigator from the District Anti-Narcotics Unit of the WPD
was the one who investigated the case. He placed the corresponding markings on the
packs of marijuana confiscated from the three accused after the same were turned
over to him by SPO1 Blanco and PO3 Masanggue. He marked the bag recovered from
[Dequina] "NDD" and the contents thereof "NDD-1" to "NDD-11". He marked the bag
taken from [Jundoc] "JJJ" and the contents thereof " JJJ-1" to "JJJ-11". Finally, he
marked the bag recovered from [Jingabo] "NCJ" and the contents thereof "NCJ-1" to
"NCJ-11". In connection with his investigation, he prepared the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Reports of the three accused (Exhs. "F". "G" and "H") as well as the Referral
Letter to the City Prosecutors Office (Exh. "I"). Afterwards, he brought the three bags
of suspected marijuana together with the letter-request to the National Bureau of
Investigation [(NBI)] Chemistry Division, for the laboratory examinations. The same
were received thereat on September 29, 1999 at 10:12 in the evening. The following
day, September 30, 1999, at 10:38 p.m., certifications, corresponding to each and
every set of items recovered from the three accused were released to PO3 Pama.
George De Lara, Forensic Chemist, Forensic Chemistry Division, NBI, Manila testified
that he conducted the laboratory examinations of the subject specimens based on the
letter-request from DANU Police Superintendent Miguel de Mayo Laurel (Exh. "B" and
submarkings). From the black bag (Exh. "K") allegedly recovered from [Dequina], he
counted a total of eleven bricks of dried leaves suspected to be marijuana which had
a total weight of 10,915.0 grams. The results of the chemical, microscopic and
chromatographic examinations he conducted show that the said specimens were
positive for the presence of chemical found only in marijuana.
With regard to the bag allegedly confiscated from [Jundoc] (Exh. "O"), witness
counted eleven bricks of dried leaves believed to be marijuana. The specimens had a
total weight of 11,010.0 grams. When subjected to be same type of laboratory
examinations, the specimens yielded positive result for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Anent the bag (Exh. "R") with masking tape having the mark "DDM-99-110" allegedly
recovered from [Jingabo], witness also found eleven bricks of dried flowering tops
suspected to be marijuana which when weighed yielded a total weight of 11,070.0
grams. The results of similar types of examinations conducted confirmed the
specimens to be marijuana.
He prepared separate certifications for the results of the examinations he conducted
on the specimens contained in three separate bags allegedly confiscated from accused
Dequina, Jundoc and Jingabo (Exhs. "C", "D" and "E", respectively). He also prepared
NBI Forensic Chemistry Division Report No. DDM-99-108 dated October 1, 1999 (Exh.
"L" and submarkings).
3

For the defense, only the accused-appellants took the witness stand. The RTC
recapitulated the testimonies of the accused-appellants, thus:
Accused Nelida Dequina testified that she became an orphan at a tender age. With
the help of her aunt, she was able to pursue her studies. She was a consistent scholar
from elementary until college. While in the third year of her Accountancy course, she
encountered severe financial difficulties. She stopped schooling and worked instead.
Soon, she had a relationship with a man with whom she begot a child. The
relationship did not last. Not long after, she had a relationship with another man. This
time she begot her second child named Samantha.
In May 1999, while the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) members were having a parade in
Iloilo City, she met a certain Salvacion Pearedondo, a member of the group. She
calls her Sally. Sally convinced her to join the movement. Since she used to watch
similar group activities while in college, she manifested her desire to join the
movement by nodding her head. From then on, Sally frequently visited her at home.
For a living, she was engaged in selling ready-to-wear dresses, frozen meat and relief
goods which Sally supplied to her.
On September 27, 1999, Sally told her that the movement had decided to send her to
a mission which would determine if she was really qualified to join the group. She was
advised to bring alone two friends, preferably a woman and a gay. As at time Sally
saw them in her company, she chose Nora Jingabo and Joselito Jundoc to be her
companions. Sally did not elaborate the real nature of such mission. She did not press
to know more about the venture either. Before they parted that day, Sally instructed
her to fetch her two friends and meet her (Sally) early in the morning of the following
day, September 28, 1999 near the entrance of the Gaisano Mall, the largest
department store in Iloilo. She dropped by the public market and told Nora and
Joselito about the plan to meet Sally the following morning.
As agreed upon, they met Sally at the designated place and time. Sally secretly told
her that the three of them would be going to Manila for a still undisclosed mission.
She was briefed that the three of them will temporarily stay in the house of her
[Dequina] relative in Manila. She was further instructed that they will go to the
Philippine Rabbit Terminal in Avenida where they will be met by members of their
group who will also monitor their movements. Afterwards, they will proceed to Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga where they will pick-up some bags. Thereat, somebody will
meet and give them instructions. From Dau, they will return to Manila. They will
alight at the first ShoeMart Department Store which they will see along the way. A
waiting tricycle would bring them to a store where they could buy carton boxes for
their bags. Finally, a taxicab will fetch and bring them all the way to the pier.
[Dequina] received P3,000.00 from Sally for their expenses and plane tickets for the
three of them from Sally. However, she noticed that instead of their true names, the
tickets were in the names of other persons. Her plane ticket was in the name of Sarah
Ganje. That of [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were in the names of Rowenal Palma and Mary
Grace Papa, respectively. Nervous, she thought of backing out at the last minute but
Sally assured her that she had nothing to worry about. Sally culminated by saying that
something will happen to her child if ever she backed out from the plan.
Because of the threat, [Dequina] went on with the plan. Enroute to the Iloilo airport,
[Jundoc] and [Jingabo] expressed their anxieties about the venture but she calmed
them down and assured them that she will take care of everything.
From the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to her aunts place at Pitogo St.,
Guadalupe, Makati City where they rested after taking their meal. At around 2:00
p.m., her aunt woke her up and told her that the two vehicles an owner-type jepney
and a passenger jepney with unfamiliar faces on board were lurking in their vicinity
for quite sometime.
At around 5:00 p.m., they left the place on board a taxi to the Philippine Rabbit
Terminal at Avenida, Rizal. While waiting for their schedule, two men approached and
handed to her bus tickets. The same men nosed out to them the vehicle where they
were supposed to board. She was further reminded by the men that members of the
movement will also be on board.
They arrived in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga at about 12:30 a.m. of September 29,
1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple went near and instructed them to
cross the road and take the bags from the three men whom they saw for the first
time. The couple also handed over to them bus tickets. They were instructed to board
vehicles bound for Pasay and alight at the first Shoemart (SM) Department Store that
they will see along the way. They took the bags from the three men without even
bothering to know the contents thereof. However, she noticed that the bags were
very heavy.
As they boarded the Pasay bound bus, the conductor took the bags from them and
loaded the same in compartment section of the vehicle. With the assistance of the
bus conductor, they alighted at SM North Edsa. They transferred to a waiting tricycle,
as per instruction given by Sally. The tricycle dropped them at a "sari-sari" store
where they bought carton boxes where they placed two of the three bags. From
there, the driver lead them to a waiting taxi where they loaded all their baggages.
She and Nora occupied the back seat while Joselito sat beside the driver. She
instructed the driver to take them to the pier for Iloilo bound ships.
As they entered the pier premises, a mobile patrol car came from nowhere and
blocked their path. Two police officers emerged and ordered them to alight. Then,
upon the policemens order, the driver opened the taxis trunk where the three bags
were loaded. The police officers forcibly opened one of the three bags where they
saw something wrapped in jute bags and plastic bags. It was learned that the contents
of the bags were marijuana.
They were all herded into the mobile car. While on board the mobile car, the police
officers asked them if they had money. When the policemen learned that they did not
have money, they were brought to a "sari-sari" store where a police officer named
Sapitula was waiting. Sapitula asked them questions. At one point, Sapitula slapped
her. They were made to line up and Sapitula summoned some press reporters who
photographed them
They were brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. While being examined, she confided to a
nurse that she was manhandled by Sapitula. They were brought to the office of the
District Anti-Narcotics Unit where corresponding charges were filed against them.
She insisted that the incident took place near the pier and not at the corner of
Raxabago and Juan Luna Sts., Tondo, Manila. Were if not for the threat that
something will happen to her daughter, she could not followed (sic) the orders of
Sally.
The combined testimony of accused Nora Jingabo and Joselito Jundoc established the
following facts.
On September 27, 1999, while [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were tending to their fish stall
in Iloilo Public Market, [Dequina], their friend, came and invited them to meet her,
for a still undisclosed reason, at the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the
morning of the following day, September 28, 1999. As agreed upon, they met at the
designated place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally joined them. They knew Sally to
be [Dequinas] supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while, [Dequina] and
Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of the mall where they
talked privately. Soon after Sally left, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] asked [Dequina] what
they talked about. Instead of answering, [Dequina] asked if they are willing to go with
her to Manila in order to get something. While a little bit surprised, [Jingabo] and
[Jundoc] readily agreed as they had never been in the city before. [Dequina] handed
to them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were given by Sally.
However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names but in the
names of other persons. When they called the attention of [Dequina] about it, the
latter simply replied "Anyway that is free". [Jingabo] noticed anxiety got the better of
Nelida at that time. Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila at around
7:45 a.m. of September 28, 1999.
From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the house of [Dequinas]
aunt in Guadalupe, Makati City. In the afternoon, their host noticed the presence of
unfamiliar vehicles. Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the
house. Unmindful about it, they left Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to
a Philippine Rabbit Bus Terminal. Thereat, two male persons approached [Dequina]
and handed to her bus tickets. They were pointed to the particular vehicle where
they were to board.
They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. of September
29, 1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple approached [Dequina] and
they had a talk. Thereafter, the couple motioned them to three male persons, each
carrying a bag, at the opposite side of the road. Upon [Dequinas] instruction, they
took the bags from the three men. Then, they waited for their ride back to Manila.
As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside the compartment.
They alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a
waiting tricycle. When they reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton
boxes where they loaded two of the three bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver
pointed [Dequina] to a waiting taxi where they boarded along with their baggages.
As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a mobile patrol car
ordered them to stop. They were ordered to alight and the police officers ordered the
driver to open the taxis compartment. One of the police officers took a knife from
his pocket and slashed one of the bags. Then, the policemen told them that what they
had in their bags were marijuana. The police officers ordered them to board the
mobile car while the bags were loaded inside the compartment of the same car.
They were brought to a "sari-sari" store where a certain Chief Sapitula, whom they
later knew to be the police officers superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated
[Dequina] and at one point, he slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people who
took their photographs. Thereafter, they were brought to the "Hospital ng Bayan" and
finally, to the police precinct were they were charged accordingly.
4

The parties dispensed with the testimony of Prose M. Arreola, a representative of Air
Philippines, since they were willing to stipulate on the existence of the passenger
manifest, on which appeared the accused-appellants assumed names, as well as the
accused-appellants plane tickets for the flight from Iloilo to Manila on September 28,
1999 at 7:00 a.m.
The RTC, in a Decision dated October 30, 2000, found the accused-appellants guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
NELIDA DEQUINA y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA JINGABO y
CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal transport marijuana and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Each of them is
ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
5

The accused-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision,
but the RTC denied the same in its Order dated December 27, 2000.
Accused-appellants then filed a notice of appeal on January 25, 2001. Thus, the
records of Criminal Case No. 99-177383 were forwarded to this Court. Pursuant to our
decision in People v. Mateo,
6
however, we referred the case to the Court of
Appeals,
7
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01431.
Accused-appellants made the following assignment of errors in their brief:
I
The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for illegal transport of marijuana.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in admitting in evidence the seized items from the
accused-appellants despite the fact that they were seized in violation of their
constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure.
8

In its Decision
9
dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed accused-
appellants conviction. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, in Manila, in Criminal Case No. 99-177393, finding accused-appellants
NELIDA DEQUINA y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA JINGABO y
CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting 32[,]995 grams of
marijuana is hereby AFFIRMED.
10

Hence, accused-appellants appealed to this Court.
In our Resolution dated July 4, 2007, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. Both parties
manifested that they no longer intend to file any supplemental brief considering that
they have already raised all the issues and arguments in their original briefs.
We find no merit in the present appeal.
The accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of the offense of illegal
transport of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.
Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that their arrests were
illegal.1wphi1 They were not doing anything illegal that would have justified their
warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless search of their persons and belongings. A
search made without a warrant cannot be justified as an incident of arrest unless the
arrest itself was lawful. Accused-appellants insist that the description of the persons
who were transporting marijuana relayed by the Chief of Police to the apprehending
officers, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, was so general that it could not be
sufficient ground for the apprehension of accused-appellants.
The People counters that accused-appellants arrests were lawful as they were then
actually committing a crime. Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the
resulting warrantless search of their persons and belongings was also valid. In
addition, accused-appellants did not refute that they were indeed transporting
prohibited drugs when they were arrested and, instead, alleged as defenses that
Dequina acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and Jingabo were
merely accommodating a trusted childhood friend.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that the judgment of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was supported by the evidence on record. The
People was able to discharge the burden of proving the accused-appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly
within the province of the trial judge, who had the first hand opportunity to watch
and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the
defense at the time of their testimony,
11
we have no reason to disregard the findings
of the lower court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In this case, Chief Inspector Sapitula, in the early morning of September 29, 1999,
received a tip that a huge amount of marijuana would be transported from Baguio
City to the Manila pier, which will then be loaded on vessels bound for Iloilo. Acting
on the information he received, Chief Inspector Sapitula dispatched PO3 Masanggue
and SPO1 Blanco to the corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna Streets, where they were
supposed to watch out for two females and one male. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1
Blanco posted their mobile patrol car near said corner. From where they were at, PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco spotted three persons, two females and one male who
turned out to be accused-appellants alighting from a taxi at the corner of Raxabago
and Juan Luna Streets, each carrying a traveling bag. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco
then followed accused-appellants until one of them, Dequina, dropped her traveling
bag. The traveling bag fell open and inside, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco saw
dried leaves in transparent plastic bags. It was only then that the two police officers
apprehended accused-appellants and their persons and belongings searched.
As PO3 Masanggue testified:
Q Now, on September 29, 1999 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning will you please
tell us where you were?
A I reported to Headquarters Office for INSS briefing and information.
Q And while you were there can you recall if there is any unusual incident that
happened?
x x x x
WITNESS:
Yes, your Honor.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR.:
After the formation what happen?
x x x x
WITNESS
After our formation we are informed by our chief that he received a telephone call
and receive an information that three persons will be arriving and will deliver
marijuana.
Q And what else if any did your chief tell you?
A And we were dispatched by our chief to the place where the marijuana will be
dropped at corner Juan Luna and Raxabago.
Q And did you indeed go there?
A Yes, sir.
Q What district is that, Mr. Witness?
A District II of Manila.
Q And, then what transpired when you went there?
A We saw three persons alighting from a taxi and each of them carrying a black bag.
Q And what did you do?
A When we saw that the three persons who alighted from the taxi match with the
description of the persons we are looking for we approach them.
Q And what happen when you approach them?
A When we were about to approach them one of them by the name of [Dequina] tried
to run away.
x x x x
Q And then what did you do if any when she try to run away?
A We chase her and told her to stop running and she drop the bag she was carrying.
Q You state that we, who else are you referring to?
A SPO1 Anthony Blanco.
Q Now, when she drop the bag from her shoulder what did you do if any?
A When the bag fell the zipper open and we saw dry leaves wrapped in a transparent
plastic bag from the inside.
Q And then what did you do if any?
A Because I was convinced that the person is the one match the person we are looking
for and as our SOP we brought them to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical
examination.
Q You stated you brought them or she only you brought her?
A No, sir. Im referring to the three accused in this case.
x x x x
Q And why did you bring the other two persons when you said that it was only
[Dequina] who dropped the bag?
A Because they were together who alighted from the taxi.
x x x x
Q And what transpired in your office?
A We brought them to our chief and also the bag which contained the dried leaves
suspected to be marijuana and the bag was later turn over to the Anti Narcotic Unit.
x x x x
Q So you mean to say that there were three (3) bags that were recover by you from
the three accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, so in your office you stated that you turn over the said three (3) bags to
whom, Mr. Witness?
A To the investigator of DANU.
Q What is DANU?
A District Anti Narcotics Unit.
Q And do you know what they do with the bag if you know to the bag?
A They counted the contains of all the bag sir and found out that each bag contain
eleven (11) blocks of suspected marijuana.
12

The positive and categorical testimony of PO3 Masanggue, corroborated by SPO1
Blanco, deserves weight and credence in light of the presumption of regularity
accorded to the performance of their official duties as police officers, and the lack of
motive on their part to falsely testify against accused-appellants.
To discredit PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, accused-appellants claimed that they
were blocked by the police officers at the pier and not at the corner of Juan Luna and
Raxabago Streets; and that PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco did not mention in their
testimonies passing by a sari-sari store to meet up with Chief Inspector Sapitula and
presenting accused-appellants to the media. These details, however, are immaterial,
not really departing significantly from the police officers version of the events
surrounding accused-appellants arrest and search, which yielded the marijuana they
were transporting. At any rate, certain parts of the testimonies of PO3 Masanggue and
SPO1 Blanco were corroborated by the accused-appellants themselves (i.e., that the
police officers, prior to bringing accused-appellants to the police headquarters, first
brought accused-appellants to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical examination), PO3
Pama (i.e., that each of the three traveling bags turned over to him by PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco contained 11 bricks of marijuana), and NBI Forensic
Chemist De Lara (i.e., that the dried leaves marked and turned over to him by PO3
Pama tested positive for marijuana).
There is no question that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana were valid and legal.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
13
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
14

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
15

On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful
arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under
the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or
convey from one place to another."
16
The evidence in this case shows that at the time
of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting
dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need
not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the
latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry,
accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the
dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by
the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the
following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to
their lawful arrest.
Besides, accused-appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their
bags containing marijuana, were brought to the police station for investigation and
subsequent prosecution. In People v. Fernandez,
17
we ruled that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. x x x. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
18

In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she
transported the marijuana under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and
Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate Dequina, a
trusted childhood friend.
We are unconvinced.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from
criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non
est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who
acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
19
Here,
Dequinas version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabos
arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and
Jingabos assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation
of marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it observed that:
While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a
certain Sally called all the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their
accommodations when they reached Manila was with her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross
examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were going to stay with
her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one
point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of
Sally while she was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her
daughter was in fact in Manila and in the court room attending the
hearing.1wphi1Moreover, accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and
elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana. With this, it is
simply contrary to human experience that the people behind the shipment would
entrust the same to an unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two
stooges, unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the scheme or transport
of the marijuana shipment was so exact that [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] only had enough
time to rest in the house of [Dequinas] aunt in Guadalupe from the time they
arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they had to go to provincial bus station in
the afternoon, negating their purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense
story is riddled with holes.
20

Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when
said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interests. Although the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by
direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated.
21
Thus, as found by the RTC, conspiracy by and among
accused-appellants was present in this case, as it may be inferred from the following
acts of accused-appellants:
This was shown when by their account, the three accused left Iloilo together, stayed
in Manila for a while, left for Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to Manila
thereafter. They were together when the apprehending police officers pounced on
them near the pier premises on their way back to Iloilo, each of them carrying a
travelling bag which contained marijuana. x x x.
22

With the enactment and effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659,
23
the penalty imposable
upon violators of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, is
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs
750 grams or more. The quantity of marijuana involved in this case weighs 32,995
grams, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for the
application of indivisible penalties under Article 63
24
of the Revised Penal Code should
be applied. As there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the RTC correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Finally, considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua, the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied.
25

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 16, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01431, which affirmed the Decision dated
October 30, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
No. 99-177383, finding accused-appellants guilty of the crime of illegal transport of
marijuana and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00 each, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision
1
promulgated by the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) Judgment
2
in Criminal Case Nos.
93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant)
guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several
John Does were charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow:
In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON
KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of
his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment
thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted
jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused
between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim/or his parents.
3

In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON
KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of
his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment
thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted
jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused
between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim/or his parents.
4

In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain NIMFA CELIZ,
against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of
extorting ransom for her release, which after payment thereof in the amount
of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt
.45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim.
5

The arraignment was held in abeyance twice.
6
Finally, the arraignment was set on 22
October 1996. Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however
refused to enter a plea. This prompted the RTC to enter a plea of "Not Guilty" for
each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson
Dichaves (Jepson), Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police
Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp.
Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized as follows:
At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin
and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together
with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at
Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for Yusan, Acon drove
along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian
Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a tomboy on
board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted
Acon and accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG)
General apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the
charges but he was transferred to the stainless jeep while the man in police uniform
drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on
her lap while Jeson Kevin was sitting on the tomboys lap. They were brought to a
house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque.
7

While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a
call to the secretary of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville
Subdivision. She came back to the car undetected and after a while, she and her
wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked inside the comfort
room.
8

Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from
his wife asking him if Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at
Metrobank where she was dropped off earlier. After 15 minutes, Yusan called again
and was already hysterical because she could not find the car when she roamed
around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police
officers to inform them that his sons were missing. When Jepson arrived at Metrobank
at around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa
called about their whereabouts. When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary
informed him that an unidentified man called to inform them that he has custody of
the children and demanded P26 Million.
9

Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to
Nimfa as Sarge. He asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her
employers telephone number. She feigned ignorance of those information. She even
claimed that she was merely a new employee.
10
Sarge informed Nimfa that they were
in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home. Nimfa chose to stay
with her wards. When the phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again
sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being held up in
Merville Subdivision.
11

Jepson, through Jaimes help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph
Estrada (Vice-President Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson
(Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major
Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue Jepsons sons
and arrest the kidnappers.
12

At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10
Million.
13
That night, Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the
telephone to her. She recognized one of them as appellant, because she had seen the
latter in her employers office sometime in the first week of December 1993.
14

On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson
numerous times to negotiate for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to
recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions with
the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred times during a span of two to
four years.
15

On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson
offered P1.3 Million in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a
pistol.
16
Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in
Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson and Gen. Lacson to
inform them of the pay-off.
17

At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter
informed her that they would be released that afternoon.
18
At 3:00 p.m., Jepson
drove his white Toyota Corolla car and proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes
Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray bag and put it on the
backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put
the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes
without turning back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already
gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell
Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place
and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station.
19

P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together
with two other police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned
themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center.
He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off. He took a total of 24 shots.
20
He
identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial Center and the
latter as the one who took the ransom.
21

P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial
Center in Makati on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay-
off. He witnessed the pay-off and identified appellant as the one who took the bag
containing the ransom money from the car trunk of Jepson.
22

P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat and one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on
22 December 1993 with the primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves
children and helper. His group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await instructions
from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been waiting from
4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received information that the kidnap victims
were released unharmed. They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort
Bonifacio. At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a
red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the
red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. They continuously
followed the car inside the village. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and
immediately approached the vehicle.
23

They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned
out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle
took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was
requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz
saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to Camp
Crame for questioning.
24

At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp
Crame. He and Nimfa went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office
of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry
and his gun on the table. Photographs were taken and Jepson was asked to identify
them.
25

A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag.
26
It was found out that a
portion of the ransom money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed that
the missing money was in the possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt.
Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited
for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him under arrest. Macias
was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went inside the house
and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the
seized property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt.
27

Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap
victims were detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23
December 1993, it came to her knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping.
She noticed that the lock of the comfort room was reversed so that it could only be
locked from the outside. She considered this unusual because she personally caused
the door knob to be installed.
28

The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr.
Jaime Leal (Dr. Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).
Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by
Col. Navarro in 1989 as the importer of police equipment and accessories. Jepson
wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens and paging system. Through Navarro,
appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security agency in July 1993. He
admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total borrowings
amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa since 1990
and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him
coffee.
29

In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was
given the key to the house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on
20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993.
At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1
Million, as partial payment of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were
kidnapped and he requested appellant to negotiate with the kidnappers for the
release of his children. Out of pity, appellant agreed. He actively participated in the
negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully negotiated a
lower ransom of P1.5 Million.
On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the
ransom money to the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked Macias,
who was in his office that day, to accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to
proceed to the Makati area and wait for further instructions. Appellant called up
Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once instructions
were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked appellant to
proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the
latter asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would
just put the money inside the car trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the
money from Jepsons car and put it inside his car trunk and proceeded to Shell
Gasoline station.
30
Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepsons
children at the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him.
They then decided to go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he
received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him because they apparently
went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were many policemen
stationed in the area, which prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left his
office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was
about ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path. He saw
P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and two other men alight from the car and were
heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him with their firearms.
31

Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by
the secretary, who appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw
appellant arrive at the office with Macias.
32

Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, presented the medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the
injuries of appellant could have been sustained during the scuffle.
33

Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions
between appellant and Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He even
served as guarantor of some of the obligations of appellant. When the checks issued
by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed a case against Navarro for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually acquitted.
34

While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his
criminal liability is totally extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code.
35

On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is
hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for three (3) counts
together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He should pay private
complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.
The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well
as the Nissan Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to
the Bureau of Corrections, National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director
of said bureau is ordered to inform this court in writing soonest as to when the said
official took custody of the accused.
36

The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum
of evidence that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and that
appellant was the author of said crime.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v.
Mateo,
37
this Court in a Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
38

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national
Capital Judicial Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606,
and 93-132607, in convicting Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
39

A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 22 December 2006. Hence, this appeal.
On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. On 25 October 2007, appellants counsel filed a withdrawal of
appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no longer filing a Supplemental
Brief.
40
Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorneys Office as counsel de
oficio for appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all
the arguments in the appellants brief submitted before the Court of Appeals.
41

Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for
ransom based on the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
disturbing whispers of doubt replete in the prosecutions theory.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to Nimfa Celiz testimony
notwithstanding the incredibility of her story.
III. The trial court erred in presuming regularity in the performance of official
functions over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused
uyboco.
IV. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Jepson dichavez
notwithstanding his displayed propensity for untruthfulness.
V. The trial court erred in admitting most of the object evidence presented
against the accused-appellant since they were procured in violation of his
constitutional rights.
VI. The trial court erred in finding of fact that the Merville property leased by
accused-appellant from ms. Carolina alejo was the very same house where
nimfa celiz and her wards were allegedly detained.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that accused uyboco as having participated
in the abduction of jeson Kevin, jeson Kirby, and nimfa celiz as not a single
evidence on record supports the same.
VIII. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused considering that
abduction, an important element of the crime, was never established against
him.
IX. The trial court erred in holding the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom
without discussing the participation of accused macias considering that the
charge was for conspiracy.
42

The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellants guilt has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court
is unerringly led to resolve this issue in the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter
discuss.
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a
private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped
and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise,
if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.
43

We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were
proven by the prosecution, thus:
1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;
2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of
accused Uyboco, referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of
private complainant Jepson Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin
and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their maid or "yaya" Nimfa Celiz. Their
abduction occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993. The
three victims were on board Jepsons Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepsons driver
Pepito Acon. The moving pick-up was in front of San Sebastian Church,
Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A man in white
t-shirt and brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having allegedly ran over a
stone that hit a son of a general working at the Presidential Security Group.
Pepito was made to ride in a jeep. The same man drove the pick-up to a house
in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, where the victims were
illegally detained from December 20 to 23, 1993.
x x x x
3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably
illegal. Their detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the
private individual whose mind and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge
amount of money thru force and coercion for personal gain;
x x x x
5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by
compelling the parents of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands
to get the huge amount of money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x x x.
44

These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecutions witnesses, particularly
that of Nimfa, the victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted
and the person from whom ransom was extorted.
Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20
December 2003 and detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus:
A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then
we left, Sir.
x x x x
A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan
Dichavez, the two (2) children and myself, Sir.
x x x x
A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.
x x x x
Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?
A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank,
Sir.
Q: And then what followed next?
A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we
entered an alley, Sir.
x x x x
Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that
happened?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: What?
A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita
College there was a stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.
Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?
A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.
Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?
A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to
stay on the side, sir.
Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?
A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?
x x x x
A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we
then make a turn at Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of
PSG from Malacaang, Sir.
x x x x
Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?
A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.
Q: Then what followed next?
A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep
boarded and he was the one who drove, Sir.
x x x x
A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on
the passengers side, Sir.
x x x x
Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?
A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when
we went straight as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.
x x x x
A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.
Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what
happened?
A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.
Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?
A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside,
Sir.
x x x x
Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?
A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir.
45

Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and
eventually got hold of the money, thus:
A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.
A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco
was again the one continuing the conversation, Sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million,
and he asked for my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to
talk too, Sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?
A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.
Q: What followed?
A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand
to1.5 million x x x.
x x x x
Q: And after that what followed?
A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.
Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?
A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.
Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?
A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.
Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?
A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.
Q: How about the other balance?
A: My jewelry, Sir.
46

x x x x
Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the
jewelries, the gun and the bag?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.
Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?
A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.
Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?
A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the
Magallanes Commercial Center.
Q: Where did you place that bag?
A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the
Pancake House.
x x x x
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment,
leave it and lock the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10)
minutes.
Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?
A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car
beside the car Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863.
Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?
A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.
Q: And then, what did you do?
A: I followed his instruction.
Q: And what followed next?
A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the
Mercury Drug Store already.
Q: And what was your answer?
A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I
walk back towards the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10)
minutes.
Q: And?
A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: Did you comply with that instruction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten
(10) minutes.
Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the
parked form that Colt Mirage?
A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.
Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned
to the back of the supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is
gone already.
Q: And what followed thereafter?
A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell
station after the Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan.
47

Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing
inconsistencies, untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies.
Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely:
First, Nimfa stated that on the day they were to be released, they, together with
Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m. while appellant stayed behind.
However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw Macias and
appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly
identify the number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit and
during the direct examination that Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination,
she intimated that Sarge had a gun. Fourth, it was incredible that Nimfa was able to
identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe house because she was not
allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say that two persons, Macias
and appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they
hand the phone to her. Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an
operational telephone while in captivity.
48
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
these inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise:
The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or
number; hence, the reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or
the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies of the
testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant the reversal
of the decision appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies
strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz testimony as they erase suspicion that the
same was rehearsed.
The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor
blindfolded or tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the
crime. Besides, familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the
commission of the crime improbable, but has in fact at times even facilitated its
commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone in the house where
Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes or
blunders are made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime. On a different view,
it may even be posited that the incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only
highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions. Verily, in committing the
crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies to
confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims.
49

Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he
claimed that appellant owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed
him P8.5 Million. Appellant charges Jepson of downplaying his closeness to him when
in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would address appellant as "Ernie."
Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost certainty
that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was appellant. Finally, appellant
claims that Jepsons motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge against
him boils down to money. Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same
line of business as that of appellant, which is the supply of police equipment to the
PNP. To eliminate competition and possibly procure all contracts from the PNP and
considering his brothers close association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson
crafted and executed a frame up of appellant.
And the Court of Appeals had this to say:
For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly
used strategy, to apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves children is, by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise, the police operatives call or
prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that said agents falsely
testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their performance of official
duties and disregard Uybocos unsubstantiated claim that he was framed up.
Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the
determination of which evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court
to decide, but the same rests upon the prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in the prosecution the direction and
control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution had other witnesses who it
believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its non-presentation of
other witnesses cannot be taken against the same.
50

Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with
disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
51

We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in
giving credence to the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to
appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses testified in a clear and categorical
manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them. As a rule, the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.
52
While it is
true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case,
cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.
53

Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecutions
theory, thus:
If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand
only P1.325M x x x as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the
ransom money using his own car registered in his sons name? Why did he not open the
bag containing the ransom to check its contents? Why would he be the one to
personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his face x x x.
Why would he go back to his family residence x x x with the ransom money still intact
in the trunk of his car?
If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x
x x? Why were they not tied x x x?
x x x x
If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used by accused-appellant
Uyboco as the place of the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease
contract under his own name? x x x Certainly, any person with the education
attainment of at least high school degree, much more so an established businessman
like accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and the post-dated checks
are incriminating evidence.
x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the
kidnapping? x x x Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment?
Why did they not apply for a warrant of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco
when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he was the kidnapper?
Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations
between the kidnappers x x x.
54

Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off
businessman negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.
If we indulge appellants speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all
these questions that appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had been
substantially reduced due to aggressive bargaining and negotiations; that appellant
personally picked up the ransom money because he could not trust anybody to do the
work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the money because he
trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did
not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not recognize
him; that appellant went back to his family residence because he never thought that
Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the
victims were not blindfolded or tied because Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant to
the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be emboldened to
escape; that appellant never thought that the police would discover the place of
detention; that the police employed a different strategy, which is to first secure the
victims before they apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant would be
futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the
crime of kidnapping; that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations
between Jepson and the kidnappers.
However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to
engaging in a battle of endless speculations, which do not have a place in a court of
law where proof or hard evidence takes precedence. On the other hand, the
prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that kidnapping occurred
and that appellant is the author thereof.
Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to
anchor his argument that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police
officers who participated in the operation. Appellant claims that despite knowledge
of the place of alleged detention, the police did not try to rescue the kidnap victims.
Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any listening device to
record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the interview made by a
reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped
conversations of appellants alleged negotiations for the ransom with Jepson.
Appellant insists that these taped conversations do exist.
Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to
discredit the testimony of P/Supt. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to
prove the existence of the alleged taped conversations. The matters of failure of the
police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the non-production of the
master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are not
semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of regularity. In the absence of
proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime
against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the trial court's assessment on the credibility of the apprehending
officers, shall prevail over the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
frame-up.
55

Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his
car in absence of a warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5,
paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above
necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.
56

Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police
officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off
which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take
the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the
other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass
by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commission of the offense with their own eyes.
57

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a
number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant,
who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable
cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the
latter consented to such search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that
appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still
validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his
immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
58
Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so
for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact
participated in the abduction of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should
have been acquitted. In a related argument, appellant contends that conspiracy was
not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore, appellants participation was not
sufficiently established.
The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit:
The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house
where Celiz and the Dichaves children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2)
Uyboco was present in the said house at the time when Celiz and the Dichaves
children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no evidence to the contrary,
Uybocos presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his possession some
of the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who told them that the
balance of the ransom payment is with Macias. All these circumstances clearly point
out that Uyboco, together with several unidentified persons, agreed or decided and
conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom.
x x x x
x x x Uybocos claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers
of the jeep which waylaid the Dichaves vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not
be convicted of kidnapping for ransom considering that his participation, if any, was
merely to provide the house where the victims were kept, is misplaced.lawph!l
Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate
would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal
scheme, i.e. possession of the ransom payment, to people not in cahoots with them,
and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan.
59

The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of
appellant. While he was not present during the abduction, he was present in the
house where the victims were detained, oftentimes giving the phone to Nimfa to talk
to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson. The conspiracy was
likewise proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with Macias and other
John Does in committing the crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in
the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all.
60

Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-
132606, and 93-132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty
of kidnapping for ransom, and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185715 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We review the May 27, 2008 decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision
2
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found Erlinda Capuno y
Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province
of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which
was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug,
and which substance produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine or other
compound thereof providing similar physiological effects.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
4
The prosecution presented Police
Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial. The
appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense.
PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the
Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a woman
was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos,
Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he, PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and
PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1 Antonio) was designated as the
poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act as back-up. Before leaving the
police station, they asked the desk officer to record their operation.
5
They went to
Manggahan Street, and when they were near this place, the informant pointed to
them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the
appellant, and told her, "Paiskor ng halagang piso"; he then handed the pre-marked
one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a plastic sachet from her left
pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held the appellants
arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her constitutional rights. It was at this
time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached them; PO1 Jiro recovered the
marked money from the appellant. They brought the appellant to the police station
for investigation.
6
According to PO1 Antonio, the police forwarded the seized item to
the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination.
7

PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez
Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police that he saw
one "alias Erlinda" selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust operation
wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money, and
designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1 Antonio, PO1
Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and proceeded to
Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed to them the
appellant.
8
PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and
talked to her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to the appellant;
the appellant took "something" from her pocket and handed it to PO1
Antonio.
9
Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro) and
PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from the
appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked
the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the
police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination.
10

On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1 Antonio
when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the buy-bust
operation took place outside the appellants house.
11
He recalled that the appellant
had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the appellant,
some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her.
12

The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist, was
dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination
conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory.
On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits:
Exhibit "A" the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1
Fernandez
Exhibit "B" the request for laboratory examination
Exhibit "C" Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E
Exhibit "D" the buy-bust money
Exhibit "E" Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03
Exhibit "F" the specimen confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit "G" Police Blotter
13

The defense presented a different version of the events.
The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was inside her
house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when two
persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They wore
maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she
answered in the affirmative, they searched her house.
14
They invited the appellant
and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did not find
anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the identity
of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea what they
were talking about, the police put her in jail.
15
The appellant further stated that she
saw the seized specimen only in court.
16

On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal drugs.
She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the two
persons who entered her house were policemen.
17

Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on material
points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but merely
"looked around."
18

The RTC, in its decision
19
of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the crime
charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty
(20) days. The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P100,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The CA, in its
decision
20
dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that
the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the amount of fine be
increased to P500,000.00.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution witnesses were
not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place of the buy-bust
operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they conducted the
entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it was held on
Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip of the tongue
as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal.
21

The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1
Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any
ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added
that the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular
manner.
22

Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been
established.
23

In her brief,
24
the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the
crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave conflicting
statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On one hand,
PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told them that
the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand, stated
that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellants
illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two
witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further
argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken
chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that the
apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover, there
was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items in her
presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official.
25

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument
that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellants bare denial,
more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were motivated by
any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade.
26

The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002, there
was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165
(IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002.
27
It further claimed that the failure to
comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to the prosecution
of drug cases.
28

THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions
failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting
perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
29
The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
30

The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21
of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
31

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members
of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended
reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the
evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL:
Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do?
PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO:
A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our
civilian asset pointed to us the suspect.
Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group do?
A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who talked
to Erlinda Capuno.
Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when you
approached her?
A: I told her "Paiskor ng halagang piso."
Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu, what
did he do? [sic]
A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled out
something from her pocket.
Q: What is the denomination of the marked money?
A: One Hundred Peso bill.
Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next?
A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two
companions who [were] then seeing me approached me. [sic]
Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received this
plastic sachet?
A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that I
introduced myself and explained to her Constitutional rights. [sic]
Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed?
A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave her
full name and also turned over the suspected items[.]
Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money?
A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir.
Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda. Do
you have that buy bust money with you?
A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket the
suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero recovered the money. [sic]
x x x x
Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now?
A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for
examination.
Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination?
A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result.
32

From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon
confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen
to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were
taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1 Antonios testimony
was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team, PO1 Jiro, who
narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the seized item to
the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even intimate that
they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that this
Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper
procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the
Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.
33
Section 1 of this
Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the
seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the
handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No. 9165. In
People v. Lorenzo,
34
we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to
photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia
35
likewise resulted in an
acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the
seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In
Bondad, Jr. v. People,
36
we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to
conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds.
We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,
37
People v. Denoman,
38
People v.
Partoza,
39
People v. Robles,
40
and People v. dela Cruz,
41
where we emphasized the
importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165.
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with
the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited
justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.
42

These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in
the handling of the seized items.
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated
illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it
ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
43

Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as
evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a
reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the
same as that seized from the accused.
44

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic
sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1 Antonio
and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon
confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at
the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence.
45

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to the police
station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the appellant and
the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify the person to
whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show that the request
for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the Chief of Police,
Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not show that he was the
official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1 Antonio.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized
item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a certain
PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said specimen
only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier discussed,
there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the hands of
PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had custody of the
specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person who received
the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified.
Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the
identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In
effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution witnesses
by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts ruling, the inconsistencies in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not trivial. To recall, PO1
Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay
46
that a civilian asset arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002, and
informed them that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street,
Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1 Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified
in court that a civilian informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and
told them that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street,
Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story in court and
testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed then that one
"alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs.
We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different accounts
regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellants illegal
activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002.
What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint
affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and
declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their
testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.
47

Presumption of Regularity in the
Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it
must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and should make the presumption unavailable.
48
The presumption, in other words,
obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But
where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.
49
As we explained in People v. Sanchez:
While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that - a mere
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." The presumption also
cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional
rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
50

All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the unreliability of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in the chain of
custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 27,
2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. Appellant Erlinda
Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention
unless she is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution
for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of
the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken
to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185166 January 26, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARK LESTER DELA ROSA y SUELLO, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision
1
dated 24 April 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02642, affirming the Decision
2
dated 8 December 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Criminal Case Nos. 06-
1870 to 06-1871, finding herein appellant Mark Lester Dela Rosa y Suello guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana, a
dangerous drug, in violation of Sections 5
3
and 11,
4
Article II of Republic Act No.
9165,
5
thereby, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00 for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Criminal Case No. 06-1870) and an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to 14 years and 8 months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00
for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 06-
1871).
In two separate Informations
6
both dated 26 September 2006, appellant Mark Lester
Dela Rosa y Suello was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, which were respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
1870 and Criminal Case No. 06-1871. The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 06-1870
That on or about the 25th day of September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines,
and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], not being
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
distribute and transport three point zero two (3.02) grams of marijuana, which is a
dangerous drug in consideration of the amount of one hundred (Php100.00)
pesos.
7
[Emphasis supplied].
Criminal Case No. 06-1871
That on or about the 25th day of September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession five point six zero (5.60) grams of [m]arijuana, which is a dangerous
drug.
8
[Emphasis supplied].
When arraigned,
9
appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to
both charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimony of its lone witness, Police Officer 3 Eusebio
Lowaton, Jr. (PO3 Lowaton), of the Special Anti Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task
Force (SAID-SOTF), Makati City.
The facts of the case as culled from the records and testimony of PO3 Lowaton are as
follows:
On 25 September 2006, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operatives,
together with an informant, came to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, where PO3
Lowaton was one of the police officers assigned thereat, and reported that appellant
was involved in the illegal sale of marijuana in Kalayaan Avenue, Barangay Singkamas,
Makati City.
10

On the basis thereof, the SAID-SOTF, Makati City, formed a team to conduct a buy-
bust operation to verify if appellant was, indeed, involved in the illegal sale of
marijuana in the above-mentioned place. The buy-bust team through one of its
members, PO3 Lowaton, prepared a Pre-Operational Report/Coordination Sheet
11
and
sent the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). In response
thereto, PDEA sent a Certificate of Coordination
12
to confirm that the buy-bust team
of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, had made the necessary coordination with their office in
connection with the conduct of its anti-drug operations against appellant.
13

After a complete coordination with PDEA, the briefing of the members of the buy-bust
team followed, wherein PO3 Lowaton was designated as poseur-buyer. He was also
given two Fifty Peso bills
14
marked money in the total amount of P100.00, bearing
Serial Nos. FR 485129 and CY 532084, respectively, with markings "ATS" on the upper
right portion of the serial number of each bill.
15

Thereafter, the buy-bust team, together with the informant, proceeded to the target
area in Kalayaan Avenue, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City. Upon arrival thereat, the
buy-bust team waited for the appellant and soon after, the latter arrived after a few
minutes. Subsequently, PO3 Lowaton and the informant walked towards the direction
of the appellant. The informant then approached appellant and introduced to him
PO3 Lowaton as someone interested in buying marijuana. Appellant asked PO3
Lowaton as to the amount of marijuana that he wanted to buy to which the latter
replied that he would be buying P100.00 worth of marijuana. Appellant immediately
took one plastic sachet of marijuana from his pocket that corresponds to the amount
agreed upon and handed the same to PO3 Lowaton. The latter, in turn, handed the
two marked Fifty Peso bills to appellant as payment for the purchased item.
16

Upon the consummation of the sale, PO3 Lowaton executed their pre-arranged signal
by holding appellants right hand. At this juncture, the other members of the buy-bust
team who were in the vicinity of the target area came in to help PO3 Lowaton, who at
that moment had already introduced himself as a police officer, in arresting
appellant. Appellant was arrested at around 3:15 p.m. PO3 Lowaton informed
appellant of the cause of his arrest and of his constitutional rights. While frisking the
appellant, however, PO3 Lowaton recovered from the former two more plastic
sachets of marijuana. Subsequently, PO3 Lowaton marked the one plastic sachet of
marijuana sold to him by appellant with his initials "EBL." He likewise marked the two
other plastic sachets of marijuana that he recovered from appellant as "EBL-1" and
"EBL-2." The seized items from appellant were also inventoried at the place where
appellant was arrested and in his presence, as evidenced by an Acknowledgment
Receipt
17
dated 25 September 2006.
18

After appellants arrest, he was brought to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City. The
three plastic sachets of marijuana that has been previously marked were
photographed
19
and sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination. The examination conducted on the aforesaid specimen, i.e., three
plastic sachet of marijuana, yielded positive
20
results to the tests for the presence of
marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-
06S.
21
Also, after the completion of the buy-bust operation, an after operation report
or the so-called "Spot Report"
22
was prepared and sent to PDEA.
23

After PO3 Lowatons testimony, the parties agreed and stipulated that the testimony
of Jeffrey Abellana, one of MADAC operatives, would be that he was a member of the
back up team that assisted in the arrest of appellant. The prosecution, thus, decided
to dispense with his testimony.
24

The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as their sole witness and offered
a different version of what transpired on the day of his arrest.
Appellant narrated that on 25 September 2006, at around 12:00 noon, he was sleeping
inside his house located at 4041 Kalayaan Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City,
when suddenly he was awakened by three persons, who introduced themselves as
MADAC operatives. These MADAC operatives were looking for a certain Richard. Upon
asking them the reason why they were looking for Richard inside his house and at the
same time telling them that he was not the person they were looking for, the MADAC
operatives simply told him to just go with them peacefully. Without offering any
resistance, appellant went with the MADAC operatives. The latter brought him to
their office where he was asked to reveal the whereabouts of Richard to which the
appellant replied that he does not know the person they were looking for. At this
juncture, the MADAC operatives told him that if he will not reveal the whereabouts of
Richard, then, they will charge him with possession of marijuana that they were
carrying at that moment. Thereafter, he was detained at their office for about eight
to nine days.
25

Appellant further stated that when the MADAC operatives brought him out of the
detention cell, he was subsequently brought inside a building where there was a
fiscal. The latter then informed him that he was charged with the crime of illegal sale
and possession of marijuana in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. Appellant, however, denied the same.
26

After all the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by both parties were
meticulously evaluated, the trial court concluded that all the elements of the
offenses charged against appellant were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.
Thus, in its Decision dated 8 December 2006, the trial court held appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of [appellant] MARK LESTER DE LA ROSA y
SUELLO was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, for violation [of] Section[s] 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, he is hereby sentenced:
1. In Criminal Case No. 06-1870, to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 06-1871, to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate
term of twelve [12] years and one [1] day, as minimum, to fourteen [14] years,
and eight [8] months, as maximum, and to pay a fine ofP300,000.00; and
3. To pay the costs.
Let the plastic sachets containing 3.02grams, 2.95 grams, and 2.65 grams of
marijuana be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition.
27
[Emphasis supplied].
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid 8 December 2006 Decision of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.
28

The Court of Appeals, after a thorough study of the records, rendered the assailed
Decision dated 24 April 2008, affirming appellants conviction for violation of Sections
5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The decretal portion of the said Decision
reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1870 and 06-1871, convicting
the [appellant] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, AFFIRMED.
29
[Emphasis supplied].
Still unsatisfied, appellant elevated the aforesaid Decision of the appellate court to
this Court via a Notice of Appeal.
30

In a Resolution
31
dated 14 January 2009, this Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. Instead
of filing a Supplemental Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion
32
stating that it be excused from filing it as the appellant has not
advanced any cogent or compelling reason for the modification, much less reversal of
the assailed appellate courts Decision.
Appellant, on the other hand, opted to file a Supplemental Brief
33
reiterating therein
the arguments raised in his Appellants Brief filed before the Court of Appeals.
In his brief, appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION WHICH FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN FAVOR OF THE [APPELLANT].
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE [APPELLANT] GUILTY OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
34

Appellant argues that the fact of sale of marijuana was not conclusively established
because PO3 Lowatons testimony was incredible for no person in his right mind would
boldly sell prohibited drugs in broad daylight and in a public place. The inconsistency
in the testimony of PO3 Lowaton as regards their pre-arranged signal similarly casts
doubt on the credibility of his testimony. More so, the alleged buy-bust operation was
conducted without any prior surveillance. Appellant likewise maintains that his arrest
was tainted with irregularity as there was an evident violation of Section 21, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165. By reason of the foregoing, appellant insists that his
constitutional right to presumption of innocence remains because there is reasonable
doubt that calls for his acquittal.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court affirms appellants conviction for
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like marijuana, the following
elements must be sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction therefor: (1) the identity
of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
35
What is material is proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the dangerous drugs seized as evidence. We reiterate the meaning of the
term corpus delicti which is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged.
36
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like
marijuana, requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule
that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer
was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former; the
crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.
37

In the case at bench, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution has adequately
and satisfactorily proved all the aforesaid elements of illegal sale of marijuana.
Appellant, who was caught in flagrante delicto, was positively identified by PO3
Lowaton, who acted as the poseur-buyer, as the same person who sold the one plastic
sachet of marijuana to him weighing 3.02 grams for a consideration of P100.00. Such
one plastic sachet of marijuana was presented in court, which PO3 Lowaton identified
to be the same object sold to him by appellant. He further stated that the markings
"EBL" found on the said object were his initials, which he placed thereon at the time
the appellant was arrested.
38
PO3 Lowaton similarly identified in court the recovered
marked money from the appellant that consists of two Fifty Peso bills in the total
amount of P100.00 with markings "ATS" on the upper right portion of the serial
number of each bill.
39

More so, the testimony of PO3 Lowaton clearly established in detail how his
transaction with appellant happened starting from the moment their informant
introduced him to appellant as someone interested in buying his stuff from the time
appellant handed him the one plastic sachet of marijuana and, in turn, he handed
appellant the two Fifty Peso bills marked money for a total amount of P100.00 that
consummated the sale transaction between him and appellant. PO3 Lowaton caused
the one plastic sachet of marijuana to be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The
item weighing 3.02 grams was tested positive for marijuana as evidenced by Physical
Science Report No. D-659-06S prepared by Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip,
Forensic Chemical Officer/Chief, Physical Science Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory-Southern Police District Crime Laboratory Office.
Thus, it is already beyond question that appellants guilt for the crime of illegal sale
of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants contention that PO3 Lowatons testimony was not credible for no person
in his right mind would boldly sell prohibited drugs in broad daylight and in a public
place deserves scant consideration.
This Court has consistently pronounced that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles
to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private, as well as in public
places, even in the daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring,
dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the
existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller or the time and venue of the
sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the
prohibited drugs.
40

Similarly, the alleged contradiction and inconsistency pointed to by appellant in the
testimony of PO3 Lowaton as regards the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-
bust team is only minor, trivial, immaterial, and does not in any way affect the
credibility of PO3 Lowatons testimony, since his testimony clearly and categorically
established the sale of marijuana. Such minor inconsistency referring to the details of
the sale of marijuana may be considered as badges of truth rather than of
falsehood.
41

In People v. Nicolas,
42
this Court held that the employment of a pre-arranged signal,
or the lack of it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What determines if
there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the
elements of the offense. With more reason that a mere inconsistency thereof does not
and will not affect the credibility of the prosecution witness so long as all the
elements of the offense have been established with certainty.
That no test buy was conducted before the arrest is of no moment for there is no rigid
or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. For the same reason, the
absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy-
bust operation, especially when, like in this case, the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. The Court will not pretend to establish
on a priori basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and
carry out in their entrapment operations. The selection of appropriate and effective
means of entrapping drug traffickers is best left to the discretion of police
authorities.
43

For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like marijuana, it must be shown that (1)
the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was
freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.
44

All the aforesaid elements were clearly established by the prosecution. As an incident
to his lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, appellant was similarly
found to have in his possession two more plastic sachets of marijuana with a total
weight of 5.60 grams, the same kind of dangerous drug he was caught selling in
flagrante delicto. The said two plastic sachets of marijuana was also presented in
court, which PO3 Lowatan identified to be the same objects recovered from appellant
while he was being frisked on the occasion of his arrest for illegally selling marijuana.
PO3 Lowaton likewise explained that the markings "EBL-1" and "EBL-2" written on the
two plastic sachets of marijuana were his initials and the same were done by him.
Further, the record is bereft of any evidence that would show that appellant had the
legal authority to possess the two plastic sachets of marijuana recovered from him.
This Court held in a catena of cases that a mere possession of a regulated drug per
se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus
probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.
45

With that, appellants guilt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana, a
dangerous drug, in clear violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
was also proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
As a last ditch effort, appellant claims that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as
the seized items were not photographed in accordance with the provisions of Section
21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus, an evident violation thereof. The said
argument is baseless.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
[Emphasis supplied].
The aforesaid provision is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. [Emphasis supplied].
The afore-quoted Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165, offers
some flexibility in complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident
purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or
innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the
stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
46

In the present case, the records and the transcribed stenographic notes clearly
showed that the seized items from appellant were physically inventoried by PO3
Lowaton at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence, as evidenced
by an Acknowledgment Receipt
47
dated 25 September 2006.
48
Also, when appellant
was brought to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, the marked three plastic sachets
of marijuana were photographed
49
by the apprehending team before it was sent to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which examination yielded
positive
50
result to the tests for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug, as
evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S.
51

Even granting arguendo that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to the aforesaid guidelines, the same is not fatal and does not
automatically render appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as it would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
52

The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be
admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the
police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition
up to the time it was offered in evidence.
53

The prosecution, in this case, has adequately shown the continuous and unbroken
possession and subsequent transfers of the three plastic sachets of marijuana from
the time appellant handed to PO3 Lowaton the one plastic sachet of marijuana to
consummate the sale thereof; then the subsequent recovery by PO3 Lowaton of two
more plastic sachets of marijuana from appellant; followed by the markings made by
PO3 Lowaton of his initials on the said three plastic sachets of marijuana at the place
where appellant was arrested and in his presence; until they were sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination that yielded positive result for the presence of
marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-
06S; and up to the time that the marked three plastic sachets of marijuana were
offered in court. Such fact persuasively proves that the three plastic sachets of
marijuana presented in court were the same items seized from appellant during the
buy-bust operation. The integrity and evidentiary value thereof was duly preserved.
It has been judicially settled that in buy-bust operations, the testimony of the police
officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit
because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. This
presumption is overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence that they
were not properly performing their duty or that they were inspired by improper
motive. The courts, nonetheless, are advised to take caution in applying the
presumption of regularity. It should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.
54

In People v. De Guzman
55
citing People v. Doria,
56
this Court took pain in discussing
the "objective" test in buy-bust operations to determine the credibility of the
testimony of the police officers involved in the operation:
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase
the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict
scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time,
however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring
the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence
of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an
accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity
of the defense of inducement.
57

As aptly observed by both the trial court and the appellate court:
We find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, [PO3 Lowaton] clear and credible. He
recounted in full detail how the deal was set by the informant, the actual exchange of
the plastic sachet of marijuana and the [marked money] consisting of two (2) [F]ifty
[P]eso bills, and the apprehension of the [appellant] [and the incidental recovery of
two more plastic sachets of marijuana in his possession]. x x x.
The totality of evidence presented is convincing and points to appellant as being
engaged in the sale of the illegal drugs. The testimony of the prosecution witness
identifying the appellant to be a seller of illegal drugs appears to be categorical and
unfabricated. No ill motive on the part of [PO3 Lowaton] has been shown to tarnish
his testimony. Such positive evidence certainly prevails over mere denial and alibi
which, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving unworthy of credible weight in law.
58

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts,
including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight
and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirm the findings.
Trial courts are in the best position to assess the witnesses credibility and to
appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.
59

In comparison to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, all that the appellant
could muster is the defense of denial and frame-up.
Denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily
be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases
requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare
denial of appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution
witness.
60

In People v. Rosialda
61
citing People v. Rodrigo,
62
this Court pronounced that once the
prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the
crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the
burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength of
the prosecution's case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed or that
the accused could not have committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at
the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused.
63

In this case, it has been established beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to
prove with certainty all the elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the
appellant after he was positively identified by the prosecution witness. Thus,
appellants self-serving assertions unsupported by any plausible proof to bolster his
allegations have no leg to stand on. His defense of denial or frameup must
necessarily fail.
To repeat, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be
given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when
they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof
of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over petitioners self-
serving and uncorroborated denial.
64

This Court will now determine the penalties to be imposed upon appellant.
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, provides for the imposable penalties for
illegal sale of marijuana, thus:
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. [Emphasis supplied].
From the afore-quoted provision, the sale of any dangerous drug, like marijuana,
regardless of the quantity and purity involved is punishable by life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00. In light of the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty
of death has been proscribed.
65
Consequently, the penalty applicable to appellant
shall only be life imprisonment and fine without eligibility for parole. Thus, this Court
sustains the penalty imposed by the lower courts in Criminal Case No. 06-1870.
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, on the other hand, expressly provides
the penalty for illegal possession of marijuana, thus:
Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the
degree of purity thereof:
x x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows:
(1) x x x
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and
a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5)
grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as,
but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana. [Emphasis supplied].
The aforesaid provision clearly states that the imposable penalty for illegal possession
of any dangerous drug, like marijuana, with a quantity of five grams or more but less
than 10 grams, is imprisonment of 20 years and 1 day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from P400,000.00 to P500,000.00.
The prosecution in Criminal Case No. 06-1871 established beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant, without any legal authority, had in his possession 5.60 grams of
marijuana. Therefore, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the lower courts for
illegal possession of marijuana is not proper as the said penalty was only for illegal
possession of marijuana having a quantity of less than five grams.1wphi1
Following the penalty provided for under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, for illegal possession of five grams or more but less than 10 grams of marijuana,
this Court, thus, imposed upon appellant the penalty of imprisonment of 20 years and
one day and a fine of P400,000.00.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in this case as the penalty of
imprisonment provided for illegal possession of five grams or more but less than 10
grams of marijuana is indivisible.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 02642 dated 24 April 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-1871, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 20 years and 1 day and a fine ofP400,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185715 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We review the May 27, 2008 decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision
2
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found Erlinda Capuno y
Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province
of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which
was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug,
and which substance produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine or other
compound thereof providing similar physiological effects.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
4
The prosecution presented Police
Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial. The
appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense.
PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the
Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a woman
was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos,
Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he, PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and
PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1 Antonio) was designated as the
poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act as back-up. Before leaving the
police station, they asked the desk officer to record their operation.
5
They went to
Manggahan Street, and when they were near this place, the informant pointed to
them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the
appellant, and told her, "Paiskor ng halagang piso"; he then handed the pre-marked
one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a plastic sachet from her left
pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held the appellants
arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her constitutional rights. It was at this
time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached them; PO1 Jiro recovered the
marked money from the appellant. They brought the appellant to the police station
for investigation.
6
According to PO1 Antonio, the police forwarded the seized item to
the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination.
7

PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez
Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police that he saw
one "alias Erlinda" selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust operation
wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money, and
designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1 Antonio, PO1
Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and proceeded to
Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed to them the
appellant.
8
PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and
talked to her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to the appellant;
the appellant took "something" from her pocket and handed it to PO1
Antonio.
9
Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro) and
PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from the
appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked
the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the
police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination.
10

On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1 Antonio
when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the buy-bust
operation took place outside the appellants house.
11
He recalled that the appellant
had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the appellant,
some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her.
12

The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist, was
dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination
conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory.
On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits:
Exhibit "A" the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1
Fernandez
Exhibit "B" the request for laboratory examination
Exhibit "C" Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E
Exhibit "D" the buy-bust money
Exhibit "E" Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03
Exhibit "F" the specimen confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit "G" Police Blotter
13

The defense presented a different version of the events.
The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was inside her
house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when two
persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They wore
maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she
answered in the affirmative, they searched her house.
14
They invited the appellant
and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did not find
anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the identity
of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea what they
were talking about, the police put her in jail.
15
The appellant further stated that she
saw the seized specimen only in court.
16

On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal drugs.
She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the two
persons who entered her house were policemen.
17

Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on material
points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but merely
"looked around."
18

The RTC, in its decision
19
of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the crime
charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty
(20) days. The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P100,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The CA, in its
decision
20
dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that
the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the amount of fine be
increased to P500,000.00.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution witnesses were
not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place of the buy-bust
operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they conducted the
entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it was held on
Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip of the tongue
as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal.
21

The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1
Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any
ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added
that the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular
manner.
22

Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been
established.
23

In her brief,
24
the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the
crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave conflicting
statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On one hand,
PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told them that
the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand, stated
that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellants
illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two
witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further
argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken
chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that the
apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover, there
was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items in her
presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official.
25

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument
that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellants bare denial,
more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were motivated by
any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade.
26

The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002, there
was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165
(IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002.
27
It further claimed that the failure to
comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to the prosecution
of drug cases.
28

THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions
failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting
perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
29
The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
30

The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21
of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
31

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members
of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended
reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the
evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL:
Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do?
PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO:
A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our
civilian asset pointed to us the suspect.
Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group do?
A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who talked
to Erlinda Capuno.
Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when you
approached her?
A: I told her "Paiskor ng halagang piso."
Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu, what
did he do? [sic]
A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled out
something from her pocket.
Q: What is the denomination of the marked money?
A: One Hundred Peso bill.
Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next?
A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two
companions who [were] then seeing me approached me. [sic]
Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received this
plastic sachet?
A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that I
introduced myself and explained to her Constitutional rights. [sic]
Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed?
A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave her
full name and also turned over the suspected items[.]
Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money?
A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir.
Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda. Do
you have that buy bust money with you?
A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket the
suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero recovered the money. [sic]
x x x x
Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now?
A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for
examination.
Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination?
A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result.
32

From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon
confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen
to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were
taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1 Antonios testimony
was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team, PO1 Jiro, who
narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the seized item to
the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even intimate that
they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that this
Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper
procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the
Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.
33
Section 1 of this
Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the
seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the
handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No. 9165. In
People v. Lorenzo,
34
we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to
photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia
35
likewise resulted in an
acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the
seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In
Bondad, Jr. v. People,
36
we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to
conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds.
We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,
37
People v. Denoman,
38
People v.
Partoza,
39
People v. Robles,
40
and People v. dela Cruz,
41
where we emphasized the
importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165.
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with
the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited
justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.
42

These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in
the handling of the seized items.
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated
illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it
ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
43

Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as
evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a
reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the
same as that seized from the accused.
44

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic
sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1 Antonio
and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon
confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at
the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence.
45

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to the police
station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the appellant and
the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify the person to
whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show that the request
for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the Chief of Police,
Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not show that he was the
official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1 Antonio.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized
item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a certain
PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said specimen
only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier discussed,
there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the hands of
PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had custody of the
specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person who received
the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified.
Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the
identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In
effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution witnesses
by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts ruling, the inconsistencies in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not trivial. To recall, PO1
Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay
46
that a civilian asset arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002, and
informed them that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street,
Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1 Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified
in court that a civilian informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and
told them that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street,
Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story in court and
testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed then that one
"alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs.
We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different accounts
regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellants illegal
activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002.
What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint
affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and
declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their
testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.
47

Presumption of Regularity in the
Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it
must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and should make the presumption unavailable.
48
The presumption, in other words,
obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But
where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.
49
As we explained in People v. Sanchez:
While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that - a mere
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." The presumption also
cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional
rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
50

All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the unreliability of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in the chain of
custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 27,
2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. Appellant Erlinda
Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention
unless she is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution
for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of
the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken
to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176264 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
TERESITA "TESSIE" LAOGO, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition assails the July 31, 2006 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664, which affirmed the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 693-M-2001. The RTC
found appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo was the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel
Consultancy, a travel agency firm located along Padre Faura Street in Manila. On
March 7, 2001, an Information
3
was filed against appellant and a certain Susan
Navarro (Susan) in Malolos, Bulacan charging them of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
(Large Scale). The information reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Susan Navarro and Tessie
[Teresita] Laogo of the crime of illegal recruitment, penalized under Art. 38 in
relation to Art[s]. 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1412, committed as follows:
That in or about and during the months of May and June 2000, in the municipality of
Bulacan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing that they are non-licensee or
non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor to recruit and/or place workers
in employment either locally or overseas, conspiring, confederating together and
helping each other, did then and there wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage
in illegal recruitment, placement or deployment activities for a fee, which they
received from complainants Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday, Rogelio Enriquez y Buenavidez,
Billy dela Cruz, Jr. y Fernandez, Dante Lopez y Enriquez, Teodulo dela Cruz y
Mendoza, Edwin Enriquez y Panganiban and Gary Bustillos y de Guzman by recruiting
and promising them job placement abroad, more particularly in Guam, which did not
materialize, without first having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.
That the crime is committed in a large scale tantamount to economic sabotage as the
aforementioned seven persons were [recruited] individually or as a group.
Contrary to law.
The charge stemmed from the following set of facts.
Sometime during the second week of March 2000, Susan invited several individuals
including six of the seven complainants namely, Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz,
Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos to her house
in Bulacan, Bulacan to celebrate the town fiesta. Appellant was among the several
guests in Susans house during the said occasion.
According to Teodulo dela Cruz, during the fiesta, Gary Bustillos introduced him to
Susan as somebody who could help him find work abroad. Since Susan was Garys
aunt, Teodulo immediately trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant
cook and can work in Guam, USA. Upon Susans instruction, Teodulo filled up an
application form
4
and gave her P3,000.00 after the latter promised to process his
application to work abroad.
5
On May 22, 2000, Susan accompanied Teodulo to
appellants travel agency office in Ermita where he paid an additional P15,000.00 for
his placement fee.
6
A receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy
was issued to him signed by Susan.
7
Months later, when Susans promise to send him
abroad remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to
appellants office and to Susans house to follow up their application, but the two
always told them that their visas have yet to be released.
8

Similarly, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. also met Susan through Gary, who himself was seeking
help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susans house, Billy saw Dante Lopez, Edwin
Enriquez, and Rogelio Enriquez. Like him, the three were also seeking Susans help to
work abroad.
9
Susan introduced Billy to appellant, who promised him that she will
send them abroad within three months.
10
After the meeting, Billy issued to Susan two
Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and May 10, 2000, bearing the amounts P23,000.00
and P44,000.00, respectively, as partial payment for his placement fee.
11
On May 19,
2000, Billy also went to appellants travel agency in Ermita and personally handed an
additional cash of P6,000.00 to Susan, who thereafter gave the money to appellant.
Appellant issued a corresponding receipt
12
for the P6,000.00 cash bearing her
signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months,
no word was heard from either Susan or appellant. Sensing that something was wrong,
Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan and filed the
complaint against Susan and appellant.
13

Dante Lopez testified that he was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to appellant and
Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of appellants travel agency. The two
told him that they can send him and his companions to Guam within the span of three
months.
14
Lopez paid both accused P6,000.00 to process his papers, covered by a
receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing appellants signature.
15
Appellants promise,
however, turned sour after three months. When he confronted appellant, the latter
told him that he would be sent to a different country. Left without a choice, Lopez
waited. Again, the promise remained unfulfilled.
16

According to Rogelio Enriquez, he also met appellant during the town fiesta when
Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan introduced appellant as someone who
could send him to work abroad. Eager about the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave
his P3,000.00 cash to Susan for the processing of his visa and employment
documents.
17
He saw Susan hand the money to appellant.
18
A week later, Rogelio gave
an additional P900.00 to Susan.
19
No receipts were issued on both payments since
Rogelio failed to complete the required P6,000.00 placement fee.
20
Months passed but
Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or appellant. Apprehensive, Rogelio verified
the status of the Laogo Travel Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that neither of the accused
nor Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved,
Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed the complaint against Susan and
appellant.
Edwin Enriquez also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his application to
work in Guam. According to him, Susans husband and appellant were present when
he gave the money to Susan during the town fiesta.
21
Susan issued a receipt dated May
16, 2000 to Edwin. The receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and
was signed by Susan with a description which says "Payment was for Placement Fee."
22

Two other persons, namely Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday and Gary Bustillos, Susans
nephew, were among the seven who filed the complaint against Susan and appellant.
The two, however, later decided to withdraw their complaints after executing their
respective affidavits of desistance.
23

On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest
24
were issued against Susan and appellant.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
25
Susan, meanwhile, remained at large.
An alias warrant of arrest
26
was issued by the trial court against her but to no avail.
During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal activities undertaken
by Susan. She insisted that Susan was not in any way connected with her travel agency
and that she confronted the latter when she came to know of Susans recruitment
activities. Appellant claimed that she even had to rename her travel agency to Renz
Consultancy and Employment Services to avoid being associated with Susans
recruitment activities.
27

Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susans house during the town fiesta, but
denied knowing the other complainants. According to appellant, she came to know
Rogelio when Susan specifically identified him as the one who cooked the dishes after
some guests prodded Susan.
28

Unsatisfied with appellants explanation, the trial court promulgated a
Decision
29
finding her guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The fallo of the trial
courts July 16, 2002 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Teresita (Tessie) Laogo y Villamor guilty as
principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine
of P500,000.00 as imposed by law[;] to indemnify the private offended parties x x x
actual damages, as follows: Teodulo dela Cruz P15,000.00, Billy dela Cruz
P73,000.00, Dante Lopez P6,000.00, Rogelio Enriquez P3,000.00, and Edwin
Enriquez P12,000.00[;] and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In the service of her sentence the said accused, a detention prisoner, shall be
credited with the full time during which she had undergone preventive imprisonment,
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pending the actual apprehension of the other accused Susan Navarro, [who is] still at-
large, on the strength of the warrant of arrest earlier issued, let the record be
committed to the archives subject to recall and reinstatement, should circumstances
so warrant for due prosecution against her of this case.
SO ORDERED.
30

Appellant filed an appeal before this Court, but said appeal was transferred to the CA
following our pronouncement in People v. Mateo.
31

In her Appellants Brief
32
before the CA, appellant insisted that she had no hand in the
recruitment of the complainants and maintains that the recruitment activities were
made solely upon the initiative of accused Susan Navarro.
33
Appellant anchored her
defense on the testimonies of the complainants who declared that the transactions
and the payments were made not with her but with Susan.
34
Appellant admitted that
her consultancy firm was merely engaged in the business of assisting clients in the
procurement of passports and visas, and denied that her agency was involved in any
recruitment activity as defined under the Labor Code, as amended.
35

On July 31, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision affirming
appellants conviction.
36
The CA noted that although at times, it was Susan with
whom the complainants transacted, the records nevertheless bear that appellant had
a hand in the recruitment of the complainants. The CA pointed out that appellant,
together with Susan, repeatedly assured the private complainants that her
consultancy firm could deploy them for overseas employment,
37
leading the appellate
court to conclude that appellant consciously and actively participated in the
recruitment of the complainants.
38

Aggrieved, appellant brought the case to us on appeal, raising the same arguments
she had raised at the CA.
We affirm appellants conviction.
Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement.
39

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and
punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is committed against three or
more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale
and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic
sabotage.
40
1avvphi1
But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being
duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the
power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to
part with their money in order to be employed.
41
It is important that there must at
least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter,
whether locally or abroad.
42

Here, both the trial court and the CA found that all the five complainants were
promised to be sent abroad by Susan and herein appellant
43
as cooks and assistant
cooks. The follow up transactions between appellant and her victims were done inside
the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the victims bear the name
and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy,
44
with two of the said receipts personally
signed by appellant herself.
45
Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting
together made complainants believe that they were transacting with a legitimate
recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the authority to recruit
them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had none as
certified by the POEA.
46
Absent any showing that the trial court and the CA
overlooked or misappreciated certain significant facts and circumstances, which if
properly considered, would change the result, we are bound by said findings.
47

Appellants contention that she had to change the name of her travel agency to
disassociate herself with Susans recruitment activities is too lame to deserve serious
consideration. In light of the testimonies of the complainants that appellant with her
co-accused promised them employment abroad, we find appellants act of closing
Laogo Travel Consultancy and establishing a new one under her husbands name
48
as
just an afterthought, a belated decision which cannot undo the damage suffered by
the private offended parties. It could indeed hardly be construed as a simple reaction
of an innocent person, as it in fact smacks of a desperate attempt of a guilty
individual to escape liability or to confuse and dishearten her victims.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664 is AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188847 January 31, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RUFINO VICENTE, JR. y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the April 30, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02699 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rufino Vicente, Jr. y
Cruz, which affirmed the September 7, 2006 Decision in Criminal Case No. 12474-D of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 151 in Pasig City. The RTC found accused
Rufino Vicente, Jr. (Vicente, Jr.) guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002.
The Facts
An Information
1
charged Vicente, Jr. as follows:
That, on or about the 31st day of May 2003, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another 0.40 grams of white
crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
which was found positive to test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as
"shabu," which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php500.00, in
violation of the above-cited law.
During his arraignment, Vicente, Jr. gave a negative plea.
Version of the Prosecution
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Police Officer 2 (PO2)
Darwin M. Boiser and PO2 Gerald Marion R. Lagos, who were both part of the buy-bust
team that apprehended Vicente, Jr.
PO2 Boiser and PO2 Lagos testified as to the following events that allegedly
transpired:
On May 31, 2003, at around 8:00 in the evening, an informant arrived at the District
Anti-Illegal Drugs at the Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The informant reported that a certain "Paks" was pushing shabu on P. Mariano St.,
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
2

Acting on the information from the informant, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Rodolfo
Anicoche ordered PO2 Boiser to verify the drug-peddling activities of "Paks."
3

PO2 Boiser proceeded to Ususan accompanied by the informant. Once there, the
informant pointed "Paks" to PO2 Boiser. They were at a distance of 10 meters when
they both saw "Paks" peddling drugs to several persons. After confirming the
informants report, they went back to the police station to recount what they had
seen to P/Insp. Anicoche. Thereafter, a team was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust
operation. The buy-bust team was composed of P/Insp. Anicoche, PO2 Boiser, PO2
Lagos, PO3 Macario, and Senior Police Officer 2 Millari. PO2 Boiser was designated as
the poseur-buyer.
4

The buy-bust team conducted a briefing where PO2 Boiser marked a PhP 500 bill with
"JG," the initials of Police Superintendent and District Intelligence and Investigation
Branch Chief Jose Gentiles. Afterwards, they boarded a vehicle and headed to Ususan,
Taguig, arriving at the area around midnight. PO2 Boiser and PO2 Lagos walked with
the informant to meet "Paks." PO2 Boiser was then introduced to "Paks" as
a balikbayan who wanted to score some drugs. He also told "Paks" that he had been
released from rehab and wanted to use again. "Paks," satisfied that PO2 Boiser was
indeed a drug user, agreed to sell PhP 500 worth of shabu. He reached from his
camouflage shorts a plastic sachet and handed it to PO2 Boiser.
5

After receiving the plastic sachet from "Paks," PO2 Boiser examined it under the light
of a lamppost. Seeing the pre-arranged signal acted out by PO2 Boiser, PO2 Lagos
went to the scene and introduced himself as a police officer to "Paks."
The buy-bust money was then seized from "Paks." "Paks" quietly stood while he was
informed of his drug violation as well as his constitutional rights. The plastic sachet
sold by "Paks" was later turned over by PO2 Boiser to investigating officer PO3 Delima,
who prepared the laboratory request. The plastic sachet was marked "DB-1-3105-03,"
pertaining to PO2 Boisers initials and the date of the seizure of the drug.
6
The
following pieces of documentary evidence were also presented:
(1) Exhibit "A" Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated June 2, 2003 by PO2 Gerald
Marion R. Lagos and PO2 Darwin M. Boiser;
7

(2) Exhibit "B" Request for Laboratory Examination dated May 31, 2003 by
Police Superintendent Jose L. Gentiles, Officer-in-Charge, District Intelligence
and Investigation Branch, delivered by PO2 Lagos and received by PO2
Imus;
8
and
(3) Exhibit "D" Physical Science Report No. D-616-03S prepared by Forensic
Chemical Officer Richard Allan B. Mangalip.
9

Version of the Defense
The defense offered the testimonies of Vicente, Jr. and Elisa Santos.
According to Elisa, she was outside her house having a conversation with Vicente, Jr.
around midnight of May 31, 2003. They both noticed a gray vehicle drive past them.
Shortly thereafter, a tricycle stopped in front of them. Three men alighted and poked
a gun at Vicente, Jr., and warned him, "Reden, wag kang kikilos ng masama." Vicente,
Jr. denied he was Reden. Yet the three men took him away and hit him with a gun
and boxed him in his abdomen. Elisa further testified, "Tinuhod po yung harapan
niya." Vicente, Jr. attempted to show identification to the three men but they
ignored him. The gray vehicle earlier spotted by Elisa and Vicente, Jr. then returned
and a person inside said, "Hindi iyan." However, someone replied "Sinaktan niyo na
siya, isama na natin."
10

On the witness stand, Vicente, Jr. said that he had never been involved in any drug-
related case prior to his arrest. He explained that he was buying balut from witness
Elisa when three men accosted him and poked a gun at him. They mistakenly thought
he was "Reden" and beat him up when he said it was a case of mistaken identity. The
men turned out to be police officers and he was brought to their office where one of
them told him, "Kung gusto mo magturo ka na lang ng ibang tao." When he did not
cooperate, he was again beaten up. Vicente, Jr. further testified that his wife and
brother were not allowed to visit him. He claimed that he did not get a medical
certificate for his injuries for that reason. PO2 Lagos even warned him not to say
anything during the inquest proceedings and to tell the prosecutor that he would just
make his statement in court.
11

The Ruling of the RTC
On September 7, 2006, the RTC pronounced Vicente, Jr. guilty of the crime charged.
The RTC stated that the witnesses for the prosecution gave straightforward
testimonies that clearly established the elements necessary for the prosecution of
illegal sale of drugs.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
12
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, RUFINO VICENTE, JR., Y CRUZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of RA 9165 as charged and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Php500,000.00.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, Vicente, Jr. averred that the trial court erred (1) in convicting him as the
alleged seller of shabu since he was not the alleged "Paks" identified by the police
informant as the peddler of shabu; (2) in convicting him based on the weakness of the
defense and not on the strength of the prosecutions evidence; and (3) in finding that
the arresting police officers regularly performed their duties despite non-compliance
with procedural rules on drug buy-bust operations.
Representing the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that all
the elements in the illegal sale of drugs were established. Vicente, Jr.s identity as
the seller of shabu was established by the credible testimonies of PO2 Boiser and PO2
Lagos.
The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court, viz:
The said elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs (shabu) was clearly
established by the testimony of PO2 Boiser who acted as the poseur-buyer in the
standard police buy-bust operation. PO2 Boiser was able to chronologically and
consistently narrate the factual circumstances that led to the arrest of the accused-
appellant.
Moreso, PO2 Boisers testimony was corroborated on material points by PO2 Lagos
who was just more or less ten (10) meters from the locus criminis and who helped PO2
Boiser in effecting the arrest of the accused-appellant.
13

On May 26, 2009, Vicente, Jr. filed his Notice of Appeal from the appellate courts
Decision.
On October 5, 2009, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if
they so desired. The People, through the OSG, manifested that it was adopting its
previous arguments. Vicente, Jr. filed his Supplemental Brief on January 18, 2010. He
averred that there was a failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug by the arresting officers.
The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
The Ruling of this Court
Vicente, Jr. is convinced that Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA 9165 was not complied with, since the buy-bust team failed to present a pre-
operation report and photographs of the seized items. He concludes that there is
uncertainty as to the identity of the illegal drugs seized. He says that due to the buy-
bust teams omissions, there is a lingering doubt as to whether the drugs that
underwent laboratory examination were the same items allegedly seized from him.
The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized shabu were properly preserved by the buy-bust team from the time it was
handed by Vicente, Jr. to the poseur-buyer up to the time it was presented during
trial. The OSG adds that prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency was not required as the buy-bust was conducted on March 31, 2003, while the
IRR of RA 9165 took effect only on November 27, 2004.
We affirm accuseds conviction.
As previously held by this Court, Sec. 21 of RA 9165 need not be followed as an exact
science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
14
Non-compliance with the
procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody,
photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons is not a serious flaw that
can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
15
We have
thus emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
16

People v. Sultan
17
explains further:
In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 adequately
reflects the desire of the law to excuse from the rigid tenor of Section 21 situations
wherein slight infractions in methodology are present but the integrity and identity of
the specimen remains intact.
The following exchange took place during the direct examination of PO2 Boiser and
shows the handling of the seized drug:
PROSECUTOR DULDULAO
Q: After the recovery of the buy-bust money from alias Paks, what else did you do?
A: I informed him of his violation and apprised him his constitutional rights.
Q: What violation did you inform him [about]?
A: That he violated [a law by] selling shabu, sir.
Q: What was his answer if any?
A: He kept silent, sir.
Q: How about the rights you informed him? What are those rights?
A: He has the right to remain silent and he has the right to get his own counsel.
x x x x
Q: After that, what else did you do?
A: We brought Paks to our office, sir.
Q: How about the specimen or the shabu which you were able to buy from alias Paks?
What did you do to it if any?
A: I turned it over to the investigator and he prepared a crime lab request.
Q: If shown to you again, Mr. Witness, that plastic sachet containing shabu which
according to you you were able to buy from alias Paks, would you be able to identify
it and how can you identify it?
A: I place a marking, sir.
Q: What marking did you place?
A: I placed the initial of my name and the date of arrest.
Q: What initial did you put?
A: DB, sir.
Q: DB meaning the initial refers to?
A: My name, sir. Darwin Boiser.
Q: I am showing to you, Mr. Witness, a heat transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test of shabu previously
marked as Exh. C. Will you please go over this and tell us if this is the same specimen
[which] you were able to buy from alias Paks at the time of the buy-bust operation?
A: Yes, sir. It is the same.
Q: Why do you say so?
A: Because it bears the marking which I placed, sir.
Q: Again, what marking are you referring to?
A: DB-1-310503, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness is referring to the initial appearing in Exh. C.
PROSECUTOR DULDULAO:
Q: When you put the marking on this evidence, what happened next?
A: We brought Paks to the office, sir.
Q: When you were already at the office, what happened thereat?
A: I turned him over to the investigator.
Q: You are referring to alias Paks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the evidence?
A: I also gave it, sir.
Q: Who was your investigator then?
A: PO3 Delima, sir.
Q: What did Delima do after turning over to him the person of alias Paks and the
evidence?
A: He prepared the crime lab request.
Q: Request for what?
A: For laboratory examination.
Q: What was the subject of the examination?
A: The shabu which we bought from Paks.
Q: What happened to the request?
A: There was a result, sir.
Q: What was the result?
A: It [was] found positive [for] methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: How about alias Paks? Did you come to know his full name?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know it?
A: When I asked him to sign the booking sheet, sir.
Q: What was his name?
A: Rufino Vicente, sir.
Q: The accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you will see him again, would you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please point to him if he is inside the courtroom?
A: He is there seated in front wearing a yellow t-shirt, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom whom upon being asked answered
by the name of Rufino Vicente, Jr.
18

Additionally, any doubts as to the chain of custody requirement were clarified during
the cross-examination of PO2 Boiser:
ATTY. RONATAY
Q: Where did you place the marking of the specimen, at the place where the accused
was arrested or at the police station when there was already an investigation?
A: At the place where the accused was arrested, maam.
19

We affirm the trial courts finding that PO2 Boisers testimony was credible and
straightforward. As the trial court explained:
The prosecution showed that there was a meeting of the minds between the witness
Boiser, poseur-buyer and the seller, accused Rufino Vicente, Jr., to sell to the former
shabu for Php500.00. The act of the accused-seller in receiving the money and
delivering the said shabu consummated the sale. The straightforward testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution clearly established the elements.
20

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.
21
Oft-repeated is the rule that in
cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is
given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary.
22
Absent any indication that the police officers were ill-motivated in
testifying against the accused, full credence should be given to their testimonies.
23

The cross-examination of Vicente, Jr. sheds light on the matter of ill motive:
Fiscal Glenn Santos
Q Mr. witness, but prior to this incident do you know these police officers Boiser,
Lagos and Millari?
A No sir.
Q So it [is] safe to assume that you do not have any misunderstanding or misgiving
with these police officers, Mr. witness?
A None, sir.
Q During the incident you said that you were with the "balut" vendor?
A [Y]es, sir.
Q But the "balut" vendor [was] never [harmed] nor arrested by these police officers?
A No sir.
Q And just like you, you claimed that you [did] not commit anything this "balut"
vendor did not commit any crime?
A None, sir.
Q But despite that you were [singled] out by these police officers in arresting and
mauling you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you know of any reason why these police officers would hurt you for no
apparent reason or arrest or [charge] you for selling shabu?
A None, sir.
24

No clear and convincing evidence exists in the records to show that Vicente, Jr.s
arresting officers were impelled by malicious or ill motives in bringing up trumped-up
charges against him.
Moreover, We take notice of Vicente, Jr.s belated objection to the alleged lapses
committed by the buy-bust team. People v. Sta. Maria
25
does not support this move:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant
did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on
appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary
value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.
The OSG, however, is incorrect in arguing that the buy-bust was conducted on March
31, 2003, while the IRR of RA 9165 took effect only on November 27, 2004. The IRR of
RA 9165 was approved on August 30, 2002, and it became effective upon its
publication in three newspapers of general circulation and registration with the Office
of the National Administrative Register. It was published in the national newspaper
Today on October 31, 2002 or before the buy-bust against Vicente, Jr. occurred. Thus,
the IRR of RA 9165 is applicable to the case of Vicente, Jr. Yet, regardless of this
argument on the effectivity of said IRR, Vicente, Jr. still cannot count on his
acquittal. Even with the effectivity of the IRR during his arrest, We hold that the
chain of custody of the seized item was not broken in this case. We are not convinced
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were compromised.
Alibi as a Defense
As Vicente, Jr.s final argument, he reiterates that the case against him was all a
frame-up. We find his excuse all too common and poorly argued.
As the trial court noted:
x x x [T]he accused failed to secure a medical report to support his claim alleging that
his relatives were prevented from going near him. Such excuse deserves scant
consideration. Also, his silence during the inquest proceeding because a policeman
simply advised him to is highly suspect. Finally his claim that he did not file any
action against the policemen who mauled him because of his fear for his life and that
of his family is questionable.
26

Vicente, Jr.s testimony was, thus, labeled by the CA as "simply not corroborated by
credible and convincing evidence," a requirement for the defense of frame-up to gain
merit in court.
Penalty Imposed
Vicente, Jr. was sentenced to life imprisonment and the payment of a PhP 500,000
fine.1wphi1 This is within the range provided in RA 9165 for the crime of illegal sale
of drugs:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
We, thus, affirm the findings of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02699
finding accused-appellant Vicente, Jr. guilty of the violation charged is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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