FRANCISCO IMSON y ADRIANO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. R E S O L U T I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 11 March 2010 Decision 2 and 21 July 2010 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30364. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 2 August 2005 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon City, Branch 72, in Criminal Case Nos. 28218-MN and 28219-MN, finding petitioner Francisco A. Imson (Imson) and Rolando S. Dayao (Dayao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Facts On 24 January 2003, at around 9:30 p.m., a confidential informant arrived at the District Drug Enforcement Unit office in Langaray, Caloocan City. The confidential informant advised PO1 Gerry Pajares (Pajares), PO1 Noli Pineda (Pineda) and other policemen that Imson was selling shabu at Raja Matanda Street, San Roque, Navotas. District Drug Enforcement Unit Chief P/Supt. Reynaldo Orante formed a team to conduct a buy bust operation, with Pajares acting as poseur buyer. Pajares, Pineda, the confidential informant, and other policemen arrived at Raja Matanda Street at around 10:30 p.m. There, they saw Imson talking with Dayao. Thereafter, they saw Imson giving Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Pajares approached the two men and introduced himself. He immediately apprehended Imson while Pineda ran after Dayao who tried to escape. The policemen confiscated two plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu. The policemen brought Imson and Dayao to the Langaray Police Station where Imson and Dayao executed their joint sworn statements and where PO1 Ariosto B. Rana marked the two plastic sachets with "RDS" and "FIA." The two plastic sachets were sent to the Philippine National Police - Northern Police Crime Laboratory Office for examination. Both tested positive for shabu. Third Assistant State Prosecutor Marcos filed two informations dated 27 January 2003 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs against Imson and Dayao. The RTCs Ruling In its 2 August 2005 Decision, the RTC found Imson and Dayao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC held: The denial, sort of alibi and insinuated claim of evidence planting put up by the two accused in these cases as their defense cannot be sustained by the Court. Dayao would want the Court to believe that at past 10:30 in the evening, he would be playing "kara y krus" along a street. This is hard to believe. The playing of "kara y krus" would require that it be done in a well lighted place, preferably during day time. While the possibility that it can be played during the night cannot be ruled out, it is not the normal time of the day to play "kara y krus". And "kara y krus" is a form of illegal gambling. You do not openly play it along a street/near a street corner. Imson, on the other hand, maintained that he was preparing food for dinner. While dinner may be taken even late in the evening, it is not usual for a man to do so. There must be an explanation for having a late dinner. In these cases, Imson did not offer any explanation for preparing to have dinner at past 10:30 in the evening. Additionally, the two accused did not claim that there was any ill motive that made the policemen concoct a tale that resulted in the filing of these cases against them. The denial made by the two accused cannot prevail. Denial, like alibi is a weak defense in criminal prosecution. It cannot prevail over positive, clear and convincing testimony to the effect that a crime was committed and the accused committed the same (P. vs. Belibet, 197 SCRA 587). The insinuated claim of the accused to the effect that the shabu must have been planted by the police deserves little or scant consideration. It is the usual defense of those accused of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and, before that, of then existing laws on illegal drugs (refer to P. vs. Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 114116, February 1, 1995). On the other hand, the evidence of the prosecution tend to show that a buy bust operation was about to be conducted by reason of a report that accused Imson was selling shabu. It was no longer undertaken because Imson was immediately seen handing shabu to Dayao. This resulted in the arrest of the two accused who were both found in possession of shabu. This version of the police is a reasonable one. 5
Imson and Dayao appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Ruling In its 11 March 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs 2 August 2005 Decision. The Court of Appeals held: We x x x find no merit in Appellants contention that they should be acquitted because of the allegedly procedural lapses committed by the police operatives who failed to conduct a physical inventory of the subject specimen and to photograph the same resulting in the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt of the crime charged. On this regard, the required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs as provided under Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 pertinently provides: 1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The aforecited section is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which states: x x x Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items: x x x To the mind of this Court, granting arguendo that the police operatives team failed to faithfully implement the post-operational requirement on the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs as required by Section 21 of RA 9165, nevertheless, jurisprudence has it that non-compliance with the procedure shall not invalidate the legitimate drug operation conducted by the police operatives. On this point, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in People v. Bralaan is highly relevant, thus: x x x Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefore, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x Notably, the aforecited ruling was echoed by the Supreme Court in People v. Pringas, viz: x x x Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefore, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x At this juncture, We rule that the apprehending team was able to preserve the integrity of the subject drugs and that the prosecution was able to present the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug, viz: a.) starting from the apprehension of the Appellants by the police operatives and the recovery of the subject illegal drugs by virtue of the formers valid warrantless arrest; b.) upon seizure of subject drugs by PO1 PAJARES and PO1 PINEDA, the same remained in their possession until the same were turned over to PO1 ARIOSTO B. RANA (PO1 RANA), the police investigator stationed in their headquarters, with the markings "RDS" and "FIA", initials of Appellants DAYAO and IMSON, respectively; c.) upon receipt of the subject drugs, a Laboratory Examination Request was then prepared [sic] P/Supt. ORANTE addressed to the Chief of the NPDO Crime Laboratory Office of Caloocan City requesting the Forensic Chemist on duty to examine the illegal drugs confiscated from Appellants; d.) the subject specimens were received by PO1 SAMONTE of the PNP-NPD Crime Laboratory Office from PO2 RANA; e.) the said specimens were examined by P/Insp. CALOBOCAL who found the same to be positive for shabu; f.) thereafter, P/Supt. ORANTE prepared a referral slip dated 26 January 2003, addressed to the inquest prosecutor presenting as evidence, inter alia, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from the Appellants and the Laboratory Examination Report with PSR# D- 097-03; g.) the two (2) plastic sachets recovered from Appellants IMSON and DAYAO were turned over to the custody of the trial prosecutor Fiscal RHODA MAGDALENE OSINAGA (Fiscal OSINAGA), who presented the same as prosecution evidence during the direct examination of PO2 PAJARES on 22 April 2005 marking them as Exhibits "C- 1" and "C-2", respectively. To stress, the unbroken chain of custody of the subject specimen was established by the prosecution and supported by the evidence on hand. 6
Imson and Dayao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 21 July 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition. The Issue Imson raises as issue that the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible in evidence because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired. He states: The failure to: (a) conduct a physical inventory; (b) photograph the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused or his representative, counsel, representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official; and (c) immediately mark the plastic sachet on site, all cast doubt as to whether the chain of custody remains intact. 7
The Courts Ruling The petition is unmeritorious. The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the two plastic sachets containing shabu do not render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Campos, 8 the Court held that the failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecutions cause. The Court held that: The alleged procedural lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust operation, namely the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA and the failure to inventory and photograph the confiscated items immediately after the operation, are not fatal to the prosecutions cause. x x x x The absence of an inventory of personal effects seized from appellant becomes immaterial to the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation for it is enough that it is established that the operation was indeed conducted and that the identity of the seller and the drugs subject of the sale are proven. People v. Concepcion so instructs: "After going over the evidence on record, we find that there, indeed, was a buy-bust operation involving appellants. The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photography pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not exonerate appellants. Non- compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[] 9 (Emphasis supplied) Likewise, the failure of the policemen to mark the two plastic sachets containing shabu at the place of arrest does not render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, 10 the Court held that the failure of the policemen to immediately mark the confiscated items does not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The Court held: Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x x Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidros failure to mark the confiscated shabu immediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the drugs identity. People v. Sanchez, however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for "immediate marking," or where said marking should be done: "What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation." To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate Confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen, testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. 11 (Emphasis supplied) The presumption is that the policemen performed their official duties regularly. 12 In order to overcome this presumption, Imson must show that there was bad faith or improper motive on the part of the policemen, or that the confiscated items were tampered. Imson failed to do so. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the 11 March 2010 Decision and 21 July 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30364. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188897 June 6, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE, Appellant. D E C I S I O N PERALTA, J.: Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133 convicting him with three (3) counts of Statutory Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610) and Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of his minor daughter, AAA. 2
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0254 against Ireno reads: That on or about the month of December 1998 in the City of Las Pias and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of influence and moral ascendancy, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his tongue and finger into the genital of his daughter, [AAA], a minor then eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority of the private offended party, [AAA], being then only eight (8) years of age and relationship of the said private offended party with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua y Berce, the latter being the biological father of the former. 3
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0255 4 has the same accusatory allegations while the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0256 5 and Criminal Case Nos. 03- 0257 6 are similarly worded, except for the date of the commission of the crime and the age of AAA, which are December 2000 and ten (10) years old, respectively. The cases were later consolidated 7 and upon his arraignment, Ireno pleaded not guilty to the four (4) counts of rape with which he was charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, AAA; the victims mother; and Dr. Melissa De Leon. The defense, on the other hand, presented the lone testimony of the accused as evidence. Evidence for the Prosecution The prosecution established that in 1998, AAA and her mother left their house in Candelaria, Quezon to spend the Christmas with accused-appellant in Las Pias City. They stayed in the house of a certain Lola Jean, the godmother in the wedding of her parents, at Sta. Cecilia Subdivision, Las Pias City. AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while her younger brothers were playing outside the house and her mother was not home. Accused-appellant entered the room. He approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and removed her shorts and panty. She tried to resist by putting her clothes back on, but her fathers strength prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant touched and caressed her breasts. He licked her vagina then inserted his finger into it. In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant raped AAA again in the same manner and under the same circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that she was raped because accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother by placing the latters body in a drum and have it cemented if she would report the incidents. She returned to Quezon with her mother before the end of the Christmas season. In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-appellant for the third time when he went to Candelaria, Quezon. In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent the Yuletide season with accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las Pias City. In a single day, AAA was raped for the fourth and fifth time. While spending the afternoon inside her fathers room at the car-wash station, he removed her shorts and panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina. Accused-appellant repeated the same sexual assault shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report these incidents for fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside a drum. On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain which prompted her mother to take her to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was transferred to the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on her a physical examination. The results revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 oclock position on the hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of rape committed by accused- appellant. After being discharged from the hospital, AAAs mother took her to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for rape against accused- appellant. AAAs mother also took her to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where she executed a sworn statement against accused- appellant. 8
Evidence for the Defense Accused-appellant denied committing the charges of rape hurled against him. He claimed to be working in Las Pias City while AAA, her mother and siblings where (sic) in Sariaya, Quezon at the time the alleged rapes occurred. While he admitted that there were times when AAA and her mother would visit him in Las Pias City, he nonetheless averred that they would leave on the same day they arrived after he gives them money. Accused-appellant asserted further that the charges of rape against him were fabricated by AAAs mother, who suspected him of having an affair with another woman in Las Pias City. 9
On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after finding the evidence for the prosecution overwhelming against the accuseds defense of denial and alibi, rendered a Decision 10 convicting Ireno with four (4) counts of Rape, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused IRENO BONAAGUA, has committed four (4) counts of RAPE under par. 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to R.A. 7610, as charged, the Court hereby pronounced him GUILTY and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case and to pay private complainant [AAA], the amount of Php50,000 for each case, or a total of Php200,000, by way of civil indemnity plus Php50,000 for each case or a total of Php200,000 as moral damages. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. 11
Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133. On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision 12 affirming the decision of the RTC with modifications on the imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, and finding Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, instead of Rape, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0255, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254, finding Ireno Bonaagua y Berce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: 1. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each rape in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257 and is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each case, apart from the civil indemnity and moral damages that have already been awarded by the trial court; 2. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, with relationship as an aggravating circumstance. He is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods and ordered to pay AAA the amount of PhP15,000 as moral damages and a fine of PhP15,000.00. SO ORDERED. 13
In fine, the CA found Irenos defense of denial and alibi inherently weak against the positive identification of AAA that he was the culprit of the horrid deed. Thus, aside from modifying the imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03- 0257, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC finding Ireno guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, however, after a diligent review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the CA only found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The CA opined that since the prosecution failed to establish the act of insertion by Ireno of his finger into the vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, a crime which is necessarily included in the Information filed against him in Criminal Case No. 03-0255. Ireno now comes before this Court for relief. In a Resolution 14 dated December 16, 2009, the Court informed the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. In their respective Manifestations, 15 the parties waived the filing of their supplemental briefs and, instead, adopted their respective briefs filed before the CA. Hence, Ireno raises the lone error: I The COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 16
Simply put, Ireno maintains that the testimony of AAA was replete with inconsistencies and was extremely unbelievable. Ireno insists that the allegation that he inserted his tongue and finger into the genital of AAA was manifestly incredible as the deed is physiologically impossible. Moreover, the medical findings are grossly inconclusive to prove that AAA was raped, since it only established that there was only one healed superficial laceration. This Court, however, finds the arguments raised by Ireno untenable. To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well- entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 17
After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the prosecution has indubitably established that Ireno was the one who sexually assaulted her. AAA categorically narrated that Ireno sexually abused her on several occasions and even threatened AAA that he would kill her mother if she would report the incidents. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not. Generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts assessment in this regard, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts of substance or value, or gravely abused its discretion. 18
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. 19 A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her. 20 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction. 21
Moreover, contrary to Irenos contention, the medical findings of Dr. Melissa De Leon did not refute AAAs testimony of defilement, but instead bolstered her claim. The RTC correctly concluded: It is true that Dr. Melissa De Leon, when called to the witness stand to substantiate the same medical certification, did not rule out the possibility that the laceration might have been inflicted through some other causes and that there could have been only one instance of finger insertion into the vagina of private complainant. However, it is equally true that Dr. De Leon also did not rule out the possibility that finger insertion might have been the cause of the laceration (pp. 7-12, TSN, January 31, 2006). Dr. De Leon also clarified that only one laceration may be inflicted although a finger is inserted into the vagina on separate instances (pp. 19-26, supra). According to Dr. De Leon, this instance depends on the force exerted into the vagina and on whether or not the hymen is membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen is easily lacerated and so when a force is exerted into it on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. A thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated and so a force exerted into it on several occasions may cause only one laceration. Private complainant has thick and firm hymen and this may explain why there is only (sic) laceration on her hymen although she claimed her father inserted into her vagina his finger several times (pp. 19-29, supra). This non-categorical stance of Dr. De Leon is nonetheless understandable because Dr. De Leon has no personal knowledge of what actually happened to private complainant that she (complainant) suffered hymenal laceration. However, there is one thing very certain though in the testimony of Dr. De Leon that she medically examined [AAA], herein private complainant, because of the information that [AAA] was sexually abused by her [AAAs] own father (pp. 5-6, supra). And indeed, as already discussed lengthily above, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of AAAs allegation. 22
The same conclusion was also arrived at by the CA, to wit: While the medico-legal findings showed a single healed superficial laceration on the hymen of AAA, Dr. De Leon clarified that it is not impossible for a hymen to sustain only one laceration despite the fact that a finger had been inserted into the vagina on several accounts. This situation may arise depending on the force extended into the vagina and on whether or not the hymen of the victim is membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen is easily lacerated; thus, when a force is exerted into it on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. On the other hand, a thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated; a force exerted into it on several occasions may cause only one laceration. According to Dr. De Leon, AAA has thick and firm hymen and this may explain why it has only one laceration despite her claim that accused- appellant inserted his finger inside her vagina several times. 23
Even Irenos contention that the charges against him were merely fabricated by his wife because she suspects that he is having an affair with another woman deserves scant consideration. Aside from the fact that the said allegation was not proved, it must be emphasized that no member of a rape victims family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact committed, especially in this case where the victim and the offender are relatives. 24 It is unnatural for a mother to use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her child to embarrassment and lifelong stigma. 25
Also, Ireno cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance stating that AAA and her mother are no longer interested in pursuing the case filed against him. Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against persons. 26 Consequently, rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot be prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offenders criminal liability. Moreover, an Affidavit dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already been instituted. To justify the dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions. 27 As correctly concluded by the CA, the said affidavit was executed in connection with another accusation of rape which Ireno committed against AAA in Candelaria, Quezon and not the four cases of rape subject of this appeal. In addition, AAAs mother testified that she executed the said affidavit to regain custody of her children who were brought to Bicol by Irenos siblings. 28
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance. As cited in People v. Alcazar, 29 the rationale for this was extensively discussed in People v. Junio: 30
x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of having the [appellant] arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution. Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule [would] make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. 31
Amidst the overwhelming evidence against him, Ireno offered nothing but his bare denial of the accusations against him and that he was someplace else when the dastardly acts were committed. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. 32 It has been consistently held that denial and alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 33 All said, as found by the CA, the prosecution has convincingly proved and more than sufficiently established that: (1) Ireno committed the accusations of Rape Through Sexual Assault against AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257; (2) that AAA was a minor when Ireno committed the sexual assault against her; 34 and (3) that Ireno was the biological father of AAA. 35
Verily, in criminal cases, an examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from. 36 Since the CA found Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 03-0255 instead of rape, the Court should thus determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish that the intentional touching of the victim by Ireno constitutes lascivious conduct and whether the CA imposed the appropriate penalties. As aptly found by the CA: A diligent review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, however, shows that accused-appellant cannot be held guilty as charged for the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 03-0255. The prosecution failed to establish insertion by accused-appellant of his finger into the vagina of AAA, who testified on direct examination that accused- appellant "touched my private part and licked it but he did not insert his finger inside my vagina." In fact, even the trial court asked AAA if accused-appellant inserted his finger inside her vagina. She answered in the negative and averred that he licked her vagina and touched her breasts. In reply to the prosecutions query if accused- appellant did anything else aside from licking her organ, she said he also touched it. During cross-examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant "merely touched her vagina but did not insert his finger." 37
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as follows: Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. x x x x (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. 38
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It t lascivious conduct with a child. 39
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. 40
Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements: (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. 41
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be established: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 42
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations 43 of R.A. No. 7610 defines "Lascivious conduct" as: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. 44
Undeniably, all the afore-stated elements are present in Criminal Case No. 03-0255. Ireno committed lascivious acts against AAA by touching her breasts and licking her vagina and the lascivious or lewd acts were committed against AAA, who was 8 years old at the time as established by her birth certificate. 45 Thus, the CA correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.1avvphi1 It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault. Penalties and Award of Damages Having found Ireno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape Through Sexual Assault in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257 and Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, We shall proceed to determine the appropriate penalties imposable for each offense. Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257 Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual assault is reclusion temporal "if the rape is committed by any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article." 46 In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship are present, considering that the rape was committed by a parent against his minor child. Reclusion temporal ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship which have been taken into account to raise the penalty to reclusion temporal, 47 no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven. Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, 48 or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code which is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. 49 Thus, Ireno should be meted the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. It must be clarified, however, that the reasoning expounded by the Court in the recent case of People v. Armando Chingh y Parcia, 50 for imposing upon the accused the higher penalty provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, has no application in the case at bar. In the said case, the Court, acknowledging the fact that to impose the lesser penalty would be unfair to the child victim, meted upon the accused the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period as provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, instead of the lesser penalty of prision mayor prescribed by Article 266-B for rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The Court elucidated: In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that Armandos act of inserting his finger in VVVs private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Art. 366 in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." In the present case, the factual milieu was different since the offender, Ireno, is the father of the minor victim. Hence, the offenses were committed with the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, attendant circumstances which were not present in the Chingh case, which in turn, warrants the imposition of the higher penalty of reclusion temporal prescribed by Article 266-B of the RPC. Considering that the RPC already prescribes such penalty, the rationale of unfairness to the child victim that Chingh wanted to correct is absent. Hence, there is no more need to apply the penalty prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. As to civil liabilities, the damages awarded in the form of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages, also in the amount of P50,000.00, for each count of Rape must be both reduced to P30,000.00, respectively, in line with current jurisprudence. 51 Also, the amount of exemplary damages awarded in the amount of P25,000.00 must be increased to P30,000.00 for each count of Rape. 52
Criminal Case No. 03-0255 It is beyond cavil that when the sexual abuse was committed by Ireno, AAA was only eight (8) years old. Hence, the provisions of R.A. No. 7610, or The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, should be applied. Thus, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. As the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating. 53 Therefore, Ireno should be meted the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Moreover, the award in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and a fine in the amount of P15,000.00, is proper in line with current jurisprudence. 54 However, civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 should also be awarded. 55 In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages should likewise be awarded. 56
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: 1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Qualified Rape Through Sexual Assault or a total of P90,000.00 for each count. 2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is meted to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to moral damages and fine, he is likewise ordered to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161651 June 8, 2011 ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, and BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL,Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. D E C I S I O N NACHURA, J.: On appeal is the August 7, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23240, which affirmed with modification the March 17, 1998 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, convicting Elvira Lateo (Lateo), Francisco Elca (Elca), and Bartolome Baldemor (Baldemor) of attempted estafa. On April 28, 1995, Lateo, Elca, and Baldemor (petitioners), along with Orlando Lalota (Lalota) and Nolasco de Guzman (De Guzman), were charged with estafa in an information, which reads: That on or about April 27, 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, conspiring and confederating with FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL, ORLANDO LALOTA and NOLASCO DE GUZMAN, and mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, by means of deceit, that is, by falsely representing themselves to be the true and [lawful] owner of a piece of land located in the province of Cavite, and possessing power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions and by means of other similar deceits, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce ELEONOR LUCERO to part with her money in the amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as indeed she parted only with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, which said accused actually received in marked Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said ELEONOR LUCERO in the aforestated amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) PESOS Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
When arraigned on May 31, 1995, petitioners, with the assistance of their counsel, entered their respective pleas of not guilty. Accused Lalota and De Guzman remained at large. Trial on the merits then ensued. The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized by the CA in this wise: Sometime in 1994, [petitioners] Lateo and Elca proposed that [Lucero] finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in Muntinlupa allegedly owned by [petitioner] Elca as the sole heir of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been transferred to [petitioner] Elcas name because of a certain discrepancy between the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 77730. [Petitioner] Elca offered to assign to [Lucero] 70 hectares of said land. She was then introduced to [petitioner] Baldemor, Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman. [Lucero] released to [petitioners] about P4.7 million in staggered amounts. [Petitioner] Elca told [Lucero] that certain portions of the property will first be put in the name of [petitioner] Lateo and would later be assigned to her. [Lucero] was given a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987. [Petitioner] Elca likewise executed an irrevocable Special Power of Attorney in favor of [Lucero]. Later, she was presented certified true copies of three (3) titles, TCT Nos. 195550, 195551 and 195552 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the name of [petitioner] Lateo covering approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan A-7 of the Mutinlupa Estate, situated in Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion, Muntinlupa. However, [in] December 1994, when [Lucero] verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered that the aforesaid titles of the property were actually registered in the names of Marc Oliver R. Singson, Mary Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza. [Lucero] confronted [petitioners] and demanded from them [the] return of the money. She was told that they did not have any money to return. They instead offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441 located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by [petitioner] Elca. [Petitioner] Elca, however, demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer of title. When [Lucero] verified with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that [petitioner] Elca only had a pending application for the sales patent over a four (4)[- hectare] area of the subject land. These misrepresentations prompted her to file a complaint with the Task Force Kamagong, PACC, Manila. On April 26, 1995, the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato Restaurant. [Petitioners] were apprehended in possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting to P100,000.00, supposedly in exchange for the Deed of Assignment prepared by [Lucero] for their transaction. 4
Petitioners version, on the other hand, is summed up as follows: Sometime in 1994, [Lucero], [petitioner] Lateo, Oscar Lalota met with [petitioner] Elca in Muntinlupa to discuss the proposal of [Lucero] to finance the titling of [petitioner] Elcas land. On June 28, 1994, in a meeting called by [Lucero], she laid down the terms and conditions regarding her plans to finance the titling of [petitioner] Elcas land. She proposed that 22 out of the 122 hectares of the land would be given to the old tenants of the property, the 30 hectares would be titled in the name of [petitioner] Elca as his retained share and the other 70 hectares would be her profit as financier of the transaction. [Lucero] would also pay P10.00 for every square meter of the 70 hectares or a total amount of P7 million. All the expenses for the titling and management of the land would be deducted from P7 million. The remaining balance would then be given to [petitioners]. [Lucero] assigned Oscar Lalota to work for the titling of the land and to prepare all documents necessary thereto. [Petitioner] Baldemor would act as overseer of the transaction as [Luceros] attorney-in-fact. [Petitioner] Lateo would serve as secretary and assistant of [Lucero]. [Petitioner] Elca would guard the property to keep off squatters. He and his wife were instructed to sign all documents prepared by Oscar Lalota. In December 1994, [Lucero] told [petitioner] Elca that upon verification from the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, she found out that all the documents submitted by Oscar Lalota pertaining to their transaction were falsified. Oscar Lalota disappeared after getting the money. In order to recover her losses from the anomalous transaction, [Lucero] offered to purchase [petitioner] Elcas property in Cavite. [Petitioner] Elca agreed to sell 2 hectares of his property at a price of P100.00 per square meter. [Petitioner] Elca informed [Lucero] that the land was not yet titled although the documents had already been completed. [Lucero] agreed to pay in advance the amount of P200,000.00 for the immediate titling of the land. On December 21, 1994, however, [Lucero] gave no advance payment. [Petitioner] Elca was made to return [in] January 1995. On that date still [Lucero] made no payment. On [April] 25, 1995, [Lucero] promised to give the P200,000.00 advance payment at Furosato Restaurant [on] Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Having failed to contact his lawyer, on [April] 26, 1995, [petitioner] Elca went alone to Furosato Restaurant. Because of the absence of [petitioner] Lateo, [Lucero] postponed their meeting to [April] 27, 1995. When [petitioner] Elca arrived at Furosato Restaurant on [April] 27, 1995, [Lucero] and her lawyer Atty. Velasquez, [petitioners] Lateo and Baldemor and Atty. Ambrosio were already there. Atty. Velasquez, upon the order of [Lucero], produced a document entitled "Contract to Sell" outlining their agreement over the 2 hectares of land in Bacoor, Cavite. Atty. Ambrosio examined the contract to find out if it contains the terms and conditions agreed upon. Attys. Velasquez and Ambrosio made their own handwritten corrections in the contract including the change of the title from "Contract to Sell" to "Deed of Assignment," after which, both of them signed the document. [Petitioner] Elca and [Lucero] signed the document as parties while [petitioners] Lateo and Baldemor signed as witnesses. After the signing of the Deed of Assignment, [Lucero] brought out the P200,000.00 as the promised payment for the land. While [petitioner] Baldemor was counting the money, Atty. Velasquez and [Lucero] went to the comfort room. Thereafter, several agents of the PACC approached them. They were arrested and brought to the NBI Headquarters. 5
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision 6 dated March 17, 1998, viz.: It should be noted that the transaction over the Cavite property was a continuation of and is somehow related to their first transaction. The same was offered to [Lucero] in lieu of the Muntinlupa property with Francisco Elca telling [Lucero] just to add another two million (P2,000,000.00) pesos plus expenses for titling and the property can be transferred to her. The second transaction which covers the Bacoor property was again an attempt to defraud [Lucero] when Francisco Elca again represented himself as the owner of the said property when in truth and in fact his right was merely derived from his application to purchase Friar Lands dated June 25, 1992 which at the time of the transaction was still being protested as shown by the Investigation Report of Rogelio N. Bruno, Special Investigator II, DENR, Land Management Bureau (Exhibit "LLLL") hence accused has no right and/or authority to deliver or transfer the ownership over said parcel of land to [Lucero]. In the case of Celino vs. CA 163 SCRA 97, it was held that "Estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by means of using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transaction or by means of other similar deceits. Further, in the case of Villaflor vs. CA 192 SCRA 680, the Supreme Court held: what is material is the fact that appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when knowing that the car was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc., still he told the private complainant that the car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at the time he obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the accused was in bad faith in obtaining the loan under such circumstance. The attempt to defraud the complainant did not materialize due to the timely intervention of the Task Force Kamagong operatives. Art. 6, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "there is an attempt when the offender convinces (sic) the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." The entrapment thus prevented the consummation of the transaction over the Cavite property. x x x [I]n the case of Koh Tieck Heng vs. People 192 SCRA 533, the Court held [that] "although one of the essential elements of Estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in the absence of proof thereof, the offender would x x x be guilty of attempted estafa." Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime not by reason of [their] spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension of the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa. The culpability of x x x the accused is strengthened by the transfer of his rights over the same subject land in Cavite in favor of Leticia Ramirez (Exhibit "NNNN") thus clearly influencing his intention to defraud herein complainant as the same shows his lack of intent to transfer his rights and/or ownership to complainant. The representations made by Francisco Elca that he owns the property in Bacoor, Cavite, his having offered the same again to the complainant in lieu of the aborted deal in the Muntinlupa property their constant follow-up of complainants decision over the matter convincing the complainant to accept the offer and their persona[l] presence at the place of entrapment and their receipt of the P100,000.00 marked money which they even counted one after the other, thus making all of them positive of the presence of fluorescent powder. Those among others indicate strongly that all three accused Francisco Elca, Elvira Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor attempted to deceive and defraud complainant Eleanor Lucero. 7
The RTC decreed that: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds all accused Francisco Elca, Elvira Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted Estafa and is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Ten (10) years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years. SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 9 but the RTC denied it on December 28, 1998. 10
Petitioners appealed to the CA, assigning in their brief the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: I. That with due respect to the Honorable Court, it is respectfully submitted that it erred in finding that THEY ARE GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 PAR. 2(a) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. II. That the basis of the findings of the Honorable Court that they (three accused) are guilty of attempted estafa is not in accordance with the evidence on record. III. That the Honorable Court erred in the imposition of the appropriate penalty based on its findings assuming without admitting that they (three accused) are guilty of attempted estafa. 11
The CA was not at all persuaded by petitioners arguments and sustained petitioners conviction, although with modification as to the penalty imposed. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. [Petitioners] Elvira E. Lateo, Francisco A. Elca and Bartolome M. Baldemor are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Cost against [petitioners]. SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 13 but their motion also suffered the same fate, as the CA denied it on January 12, 2004. 14
Before us, petitioners insist that their conviction lacked factual and legal basis. They assail the RTC finding, which was sustained by the CA, that the transaction involving the Bacoor property was again an attempt to defraud Eleonor Lucero (Lucero). Petitioners deny that they deceived Lucero. They claim that Lucero was aware that the Bacoor property is not yet titled in the name of Elca; and that they went to Furosato restaurant upon Luceros invitation and on Luceros representation that she would hand to them the P200,000.00 needed to facilitate the issuance of title in Elcas name. Petitioners, therefore, plead for an acquittal. Finally, petitioners assail the penalty imposed by the CA for being erroneous. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, asserts that the CA correctly sustained petitioners conviction for attempted estafa. However, it recommends for further modification of the penalty to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Inarguably, the resolution of the issues raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, including the credibility of the witnesses, a course of action which this Court will not do, consistent with our repeated holding that this Court is not a trier of facts. Basic is the rule that factual findings of trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the findings. 15
It is true that the rule admits of several exceptions, 16 but none of the recognized exceptions is present in the case at bar. Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code lists the ways by which estafa may be committed, which includes: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). x x x. x x x x 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. The elements of the felony are as follows: 1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. 2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. 3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means. 4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 17
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the transaction involving the Bacoor property was a continuation of the transaction involving parcels of land in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elcas certificates of title over the Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare portion of his purported 14-hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an additional P2,000,000.00, in this wise: Dear Ms. Lucero: This is with reference to the advances we had obtained from you in the total amount of P4.7 million, more or less. It was agreed that the said advances shall be due and demandable upon the release of titles over my parcels of land situated in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila of which we are presently working out with appropriate government agencies. Your current demand fro[m] us to pay the aforesaid amount plus your unilaterally imposed interests is therefore premature and baseless. However, with regards to your alternative demand that you be given a total of 5 hectares (2 has. upon signing of an agreement assigning my rights and additional 3 has. upon complete release of the remaining 14 hectares) please be informed that I am now amenable, provided that an additionalP2.0 million will be paid to me to take care of my other personal commitments. These 5 hectares are situated in Malipay, Bacoor, Cavite with a portion of Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs-04213-000441-D. I am expecting the title of said property early next year. The current market [valuation] of real estate properties in that area is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the property will be more [than] sufficient to cover our obligates (sic). Please be guided accordingly. Very truly yours, (Signed) Francisco N. Elca Bo. Katihan, Poblacion Muntinlupa, Metro Manila 18
As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an inchoate right over the Bacoor property, derived from his Application to Purchase Friar Lands, which covered only 7 hectares. 19 Elcas application was later amended to cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo Salenga (Salenga). 20 Clearly, Elca was in no position to transfer ownership of the 5-hectare Bacoor property at the time petitioners offered it to Lucero. In Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 21 this Court, citing People v. Balasa, 22 explained the meaning of fraud and deceit, viz.: [F]raud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Indubitably, petitioners parody that Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and was offering a 5-hectare portion of it, in substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and demanding an additional P2,000,000.00 from Lucero, constituted fraud and deceit. To reiterate, it is an oft-repeated principle that the factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witness credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the findings. 23 Considering that there is nothing in the records that shows that the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court were erroneous, we affirm their conclusion that petitioners attempted to defraud Lucero again. Undoubtedly, petitioners commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but they failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension by the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown, 24 the RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa. On the penalty. The RTC sentenced petitioners to an imprisonment term of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years.1awphi1 The CA modified it to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Petitioners and the OSG both argue that the penalty imposed by the CA was wrong, and plead for its modification. The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Thus, if the crime of estafa had been consummated, Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00. 25 Hence, the applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the firstP22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years. Since what was established was only attempted estafa, then the applicable penalty would be that which is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony pursuant to Article 51, 26 in relation to Article 61(5), 27 of the RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period, 28 or an imprisonment term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved exceeded P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for everyP10,000.00 should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years. However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental penalty of 7 years to the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and convicted merely of attempted and not consummated estafa. We, therefore, modify the penalty and sentence petitioners to imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23240 are AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo, Francisco Elca, and Bartolome Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted estafa, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 173198 June 1, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOLORES OCDEN, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00044, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated July 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 16315-R. The RTC found accused-appellant Dolores Ocden (Ocden) guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Article 13(b), in relation to Articles 38(b), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 16315-R; and of the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed Ocdens conviction in all four cases, but modified the penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R, The Amended Information 4 for illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 16315-R reads: That during the period from May to December, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as factory workers in Italy to more than three (3) persons including, but not limited to the following: JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, HOWARD C. GOLIDAN, KAREN M. SIMEON, JEAN S. MAXIMO, NORMA PEDRO, MARYLYN MANA-A, RIZALINA FERRER, and MILAN DARING without said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment. Ocden was originally charged with six counts of estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, 16350-R, 16369-R, 16964-R, and 16966-R. The Information in Criminal Case No. 16316-R states: That sometime during the period from October to December, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that she is not (sic) authorized job recruiter for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Jeffries C. Golidan and pretended that she could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P70,000.00when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Jeffries C. Golidan deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P70,000.00, in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Jeffries C. Golidan in the aforementioned amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000,00), Philippine Currency. 5
The Informations in the five other cases for estafa contain substantially the same allegations as the one above-quoted, except for the private complainants names, the date of commission of the offense, and the amounts defrauded, to wit: Case No. Name of the Private Complainant Date of Commission of the Offense Amount Defrauded 16318-R Howard C. Golidan Sometime during the period from October to December 1998 P70,000.00 16350-R Norma Pedro Sometime in May, 1998 P65,000.00 16369-R Milan O. Daring Sometime during the period from November 13, 1998 to December 10, 1998 P70.000.00 16964-R Rizalina Ferrer Sometime in September P70,000.00 16966-R Marilyn Mana-a Sometime in September 1998 P70,000.00 6
All seven cases against Ocden were consolidated on July 31, 2000 and were tried jointly after Ocden pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented three witnesses namely: Marilyn Mana-a (Mana-a) and Rizalina Ferrer (Ferrer), complainants; and Julia Golidan (Golidan), mother of complainants Jeffries and Howard Golidan. Mana-a testified that sometime in the second week of August 1998, she and Isabel Dao-as (Dao-as) went to Ocdens house in Baguio City to apply for work as factory workers in Italy with monthly salaries of US$1,200.00. They were required by Ocden to submit their bio-data and passports, pay the placement fee of P70,000.00, and to undergo medical examination. Upon submitting her bio-data and passport, Mana-a paid Ocden P500.00 for her certificate of employment andP20,000.00 as down payment for her placement fee. On September 8, 1998, Ocden accompanied Mana-a and 20 other applicants to Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila for their medical examinations, for which each of the applicants paid P3,000.00. Mana-a also paid to Ocden P22,000.00 as the second installment on her placement fee. When Josephine Lawanag (Lawanag), Mana-as sister, withdrew her application, Lawanags P15,000.00 placement fee, already paid to Ocden, was credited to Mana-a. 7
Mana-a failed to complete her testimony, but the RTC considered the same as no motion to strike the said testimony was filed. Ferrer narrated that she and her daughter Jennilyn were interested to work overseas. About the second week of September 1998, they approached Ocden through Fely Alipio (Alipio). Ocden showed Ferrer and Jennilyn a copy of a job order from Italy for factory workers who could earn as much as $90,000.00 to $100,000.00. 8 In the first week of October 1998, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to apply for work, so they submitted their passports and pictures to Ocden. Ferrer also went to Manila for medical examination, for which she spent P3,500.00. Ferrer paid to Ocden on November 20, 1998 the initial amount of P20,000.00, and on December 8, 1998 the balance of her and Jennilyns placement fees. All in all, Ferrer paid Ocden P140,000.00, as evidenced by the receipts issued by Ocden. 9
Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers to be sent to Italy. Their flight was scheduled on December 10, 1998. In preparation for their flight to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they were introduced by Ocden to Erlinda Ramos (Ramos). Ocden and Ramos then accompanied Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio to the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application for Italy would be processed. Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of their money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the Baguio office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter. Expecting a job overseas, Ferrer took a leave of absence from her work. Thus, she lost income amounting toP17,700.00, equivalent to her salary for one and a half months. She also spent P30,000.00 for transportation and food expenses. 10
According to Golidan, the prosecutions third witness, sometime in October 1998, she inquired from Ocden about the latters overseas recruitment. Ocden informed Golidan that the placement fee was P70,000.00 for each applicant, that the accepted applicants would be sent by batches overseas, and that priority would be given to those who paid their placement fees early. On October 30, 1998, Golidan brought her sons, Jeffries and Howard, to Ocden. On the same date, Jeffries and Howard handed over to Ocden their passports andP40,000.00 as down payment on their placement fees. On December 10, 1998, Jeffries and Howard paid the balance of their placement fees amounting to P100,000.00. Ocden issued receipts for these two payments. 11 Ocden then informed Golidan that the first batch of accepted applicants had already left, and that Jeffries would be included in the second batch for deployment, while Howard in the third batch. In anticipation of their deployment to Italy, Jeffries and Howard left for Manila on December 12, 1998 and December 18, 1998, respectively. Through a telephone call, Jeffries informed Golidan that his flight to Italy was scheduled on December 16, 1998. However, Golidan was surprised to again receive a telephone call from Jeffries saying that his flight to Italy was delayed due to insufficiency of funds, and that Ocden went back to Baguio City to look for additional funds. When Golidan went to see Ocden, Ocden was about to leave for Manila so she could be there in time for the scheduled flights of Jeffries and Howard. On December 19, 1998, Golidan received another telephone call from Jeffries who was in Zamboanga with the other applicants. Jeffries informed Golidan that he was stranded in Zamboanga because Ramos did not give him his passport. Ramos was the one who briefed the overseas job applicants in Baguio City sometime in November 1998. Jeffries instructed Golidan to ask Ocdens help in looking for Ramos. Golidan, however, could not find Ocden in Baguio City. On December 21, 1998, Golidan, with the other applicants, Mana-a and Dao-as, went to Manila to meet Ocden. When Golidan asked why Jeffries was in Zamboanga, Ocden replied that it would be easier for Jeffries and the other applicants to acquire their visas to Italy in Zamboanga. Ocden was also able to contact Ramos, who assured Golidan that Jeffries would be able to get his passport. When Golidan went back home to Baguio City, she learned through a telephone call from Jeffries that Howard was now likewise stranded in Zamboanga. By January 1999, Jeffries and Howard were still in Zamboanga. Jeffries refused to accede to Golidans prodding for him and Howard to go home, saying that the recruiters were already working out the release of the funds for the applicants to get to Italy. Golidan went to Ocden, and the latter told her not to worry as her sons would already be flying to Italy because the same factory owner in Italy, looking for workers, undertook to shoulder the applicants travel expenses. Yet, Jeffries called Golidan once more telling her that he and the other applicants were still in Zamboanga. Golidan went to Ocdens residence. This time, Ocdens husband gave Golidan P23,000.00 which the latter could use to fetch the applicants, including Jeffries and Howard, who were stranded in Zamboanga. Golidan traveled again to Manila with Mana-a and Dao-as. When they saw each other, Golidan informed Ocden regarding theP23,000.00 which the latters husband gave to her. Ocden begged Golidan to give her the money because she needed it badly. Of the P23,000.00, Golidan retained P10,000.00, Dao-as received P3,000.00, and Ocden got the rest. Jeffries was able to return to Manila on January 16, 1999. Howard and five other applicants, accompanied by Ocden, also arrived in Manila five days later. Thereafter, Golidan and her sons went to Ocdens residence to ask for a refund of the money they had paid to Ocden. Ocden was able to return only P50,000.00. Thus, out of the total amount of P140,000.00 Golidan and her sons paid to Ocden, they were only able to get back the sum of P60,000.00. After all that had happened, Golidan and her sons went to the Baguio office of the POEA, where they discovered that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter. 12
The defense presented the testimony of Ocden herself. Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an applicant for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the recruiter. Ocden recounted that she met Ramos at a seminar held in St. Theresas Compound, Navy Base, Baguio City, sometime in June 1998. The seminar was arranged by Aida Comila (Comila), Ramoss sub-agent. The seminar was attended by about 60 applicants, including Golidan. Ramos explained how one could apply as worker in a stuff toys factory in Italy. After the seminar, Comila introduced Ocden to Ramos. Ocden decided to apply for the overseas job, so she gave her passport and pictures to Ramos. Ocden also underwent medical examination at Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila, and completely submitted the required documents to Ramos in September 1998. After the seminar, many people went to Ocdens house to inquire about the jobs available in Italy. Since most of these people did not attend the seminar, Ocden asked Ramos to conduct a seminar at Ocdens house. Two seminars were held at Ocdens house, one in September and another in December 1998. After said seminars, Ramos designated Ocden as leader of the applicants. As such, Ocden received her co- applicants applications and documents; accompanied her co-applicants to Manila for medical examination because she knew the location of Zamora Medical Clinic; and accepted placement fees in the amount of P70,000.00 each from Mana-a and Ferrer and from Golidan, the amount of P140,000.00 (for Jeffries and Howard). Ramos instructed Ocden that the applicants should each pay P250,000.00 and if the applicants could not pay the full amount, they would have to pay the balance through salary deductions once they start working in Italy. Ocden herself paid Ramos P50,000.00 as placement fee and executed a promissory note in Ramoss favor for the balance, just like any other applicant who failed to pay the full amount. Ocden went to Malaysia with Ramoss male friend but she failed to get her visa for Italy. Ocden denied deceiving Mana-a and Ferrer. Ocden alleged that she turned over to Ramos the money Mana-a and Ferrer gave her, although she did not indicate in the receipts she issued that she received the money for and on behalf of Ramos. Ocden pointed out that she and some of her co-applicants already filed a complaint against Ramos before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) offices in Zamboanga City and Manila. 13
On July 2, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 16315-R) and three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R). The dispositive portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 16315-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 38(b), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code as amended by P.D. Nos. 1693, 1920, 2018 and R.A. 8042. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00; 2. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to nine (9) years and nine (9) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; 3. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to nine (9) years and nine (9) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount ofP40,000.00; 4. In Criminal Case No. 16350-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa for lack of evidence and a verdict of acquittal is entered in her favor; 5. In Criminal Case No. 16369-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa for lack of evidence and a verdict of acquittal is hereby entered in her favor; 6. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, up to Twelve (12) years and Nine (9) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00; and 7. In Criminal Case No. 16966-R, the Court finds the accused, DOLORES OCDEN, NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa for insufficiency of evidence and a verdict of acquittal is hereby entered in her favor. In the service of her sentence, the provisions of Article 70 of the Penal Code shall be observed. 14
Aggrieved by the above decision, Ocden filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2001. 15 The RTC erroneously sent the records of the cases to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, correctly forwarded the said records to us. In our Resolution 16 dated May 6, 2002, we accepted the appeal and required the parties to file their respective briefs. In the same resolution, we directed the Superintendent of the Correctional Institute for Women to confirm Ocdens detention thereat. Ocden filed her Appellant's Brief on August 15, 2003, 17 while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief on January 5, 2004. 18
Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 19 we transferred Ocdens appeal to the Court of Appeals. On April 21, 2006, the appellate court promulgated its Decision, affirming Ocdens conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the three counts of estafa, viz: [T]he trial court erred in the imposition of accused-appellants penalty. Pursuant to Article 315 of the RPC, the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. If the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period (6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years), adding 1 year for each additionalP10,000.00; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R involve the amount of P40,000.00 each. Considering that P18,000.00 is the excess amount, only 1 year should be added to the penalty in its maximum period or 9 years. Also, in Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the amount involved is P70,000.00. Thus, the excess amount is P48,000.00 and only 4 years should be added to the penalty in its maximum period. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated 02 July 2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; 2. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; and 3. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, accused-appellant is sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 12 years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00. 20
Hence, this appeal, in which Ocden raised the following assignment of errors: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE ALTHOUGH THE CRIME WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ESTAFA IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16316-R, 16318-R AND 16[9]64-R. 21
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find nothing on record that would justify a reversal of Ocdens conviction. Illegal recruitment in large scale Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations of the prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. No certification attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. Ocdens aforementioned contentions are without merit. Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code defines and enumerates the acts which constitute recruitment and placement: (b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising for advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, broadened the concept of illegal recruitment and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 are reproduced below: SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority: (a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance; (b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment; (c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code; (d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment; (e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency; (f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines; (g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative; (h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment; (j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency; (k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations; (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. x x x x Sec. 7. Penalties. (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. (Emphasis ours.) It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. 22 As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan, Ocden gave such an impression through the following acts: (1) Ocden informed Mana- a, Ferrer, and Golidan about the job opportunity in Italy and the list of necessary requirements for application; (2) Ocden required Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, to attend the seminar conducted by Ramos at Ocdens house in Baguio City; (3) Ocden received the job applications, pictures, bio-data, passports, and the certificates of previous employment (which was also issued by Ocden upon payment of P500.00), of Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard; (4) Ocden personally accompanied Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, for their medical examinations in Manila; (5) Ocden received money paid as placement fees by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, and even issued receipts for the same; and (6) Ocden assured Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, that they would be deployed to Italy. It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non- licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment "whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority." Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault." Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by receiving placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans two sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own. Ocden questions why it was Golidan who testified for private complainants Jeffries and Howard. Golidan had no personal knowledge of the circumstances proving illegal recruitment and could not have testified on the same. Also, Jeffries and Howard already executed an affidavit of desistance. All Golidan wants was a reimbursement of the placement fees paid. Contrary to Ocdens claims, Golidan had personal knowledge of Ocdens illegal recruitment activities, which she could competently testify to. Golidan herself had personal dealings with Ocden as Golidan assisted her sons, Jeffries and Howard, in completing the requirements for their overseas job applications, and later on, in getting back home from Zamboanga where Jeffries and Howard were stranded, and in demanding a refund from Ocden of the placement fees paid. That Golidan is seeking a reimbursement of the placement fees paid for the failed deployment of her sons Jeffries and Howard strengthens, rather than weakens, the prosecutions case. Going back to illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, failure to reimburse the expenses incurred by the worker when deployment does not actually take place, without the workers fault, is illegal recruitment. The affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by Jeffries and Howard does not exonerate Ocden from criminal liability when the prosecution had successfully proved her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Romero, 23 we held that: The fact that complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance does not serve to exculpate accused-appellant from criminal liability insofar as the case for illegal recruitment is concerned since the Court looks with disfavor the dropping of criminal complaints upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant, particularly where the commission of the offense, as is in this case, is duly supported by documentary evidence. Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when it is executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them, later on, changed their mind for one reason or another, for such rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness. Complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope may have a change of heart insofar as the offense wrought on their person is concerned when they executed their joint affidavit of desistance but this will not affect the public prosecution of the offense itself. It is relevant to note that "the right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctly charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights." This cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes should not be overlooked since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State. 24
In her bid to exculpate herself, Ocden asserts that she was also just an applicant for overseas employment; and that she was receiving her co-applicants job applications and other requirements, and accepting her co-applicants payments of placement fees, because she was designated as the applicants leader by Ramos, the real recruiter. Ocdens testimony is self-serving and uncorroborated. Ocdens denial of any illegal recruitment activity cannot stand against the prosecution witnesses positive identification of her in court as the person who induced them to part with their money upon the misrepresentation and false promise of deployment to Italy as factory workers. Besides, despite several opportunities given to Ocden by the RTC, she failed to present Ramos, who Ocden alleged to be the real recruiter and to whom she turned over the placement fees paid by her co-applicants. Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and the bare denial of Ocden, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when the former comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted. 25
Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court. 26 It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence. 27
Ocden further argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently establish that she illegally recruited at least three persons, to constitute illegal recruitment on a large scale. Out of the victims named in the Information, only Mana-a and Ferrer testified in court. Mana-a did not complete her testimony, depriving Ocden of the opportunity to cross-examine her; and even if Mana-as testimony was not expunged from the record, it was insufficient to prove illegal recruitment by Ocden. Although Ferrer testified that she and Mana-a filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against Ocden, Ferrers testimony is competent only as to the illegal recruitment activities committed by Ocden against her, and not against Mana-a. Ocden again objects to Golidans testimony as hearsay, not being based on Golidans personal knowledge. Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In People v. Hu, 28 we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this case, there is conclusive evidence that Ocden recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as factory workers in Italy. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals: Mana-as testimony, although not completed, sufficiently established that accused- appellant promised Mana-a a job placement in a factory in Italy for a fee with accused-appellant even accompanying her for the required medical examination. Likewise, Julia Golidans testimony adequately proves that accused-appellant recruited Jeffries and Howard Golidan for a job in Italy, also for a fee. Contrary to the accused-appellants contention, Julia had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges for illegal recruitment and estafa filed by her sons. Julia was not only privy to her sons recruitment but also directly transacted with accused-appellant, submitting her sons requirements and paying the placement fees as evidenced by a receipt issued in her name. Even after the placement did not materialize, Julia acted with her sons to secure the partial reimbursement of the placement fees. 29
And even though only Ferrer and Golidan testified as to Ocdens failure to reimburse the placements fees paid when the deployment did not take place, their testimonies already established the fact of non-reimbursement as to three persons, namely, Ferrer and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard. Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 if the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, imposed upon Ocden the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of onlyP100,000.00. Since the fine of P100,000 is below the minimum set by law, we are increasing the same toP500,000.00. Estafa We are likewise affirming the conviction of Ocden for the crime of estafa. The very same evidence proving Ocdens liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for estafa. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Yabut 30 that: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa. 31
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x: x x x x 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 32
Both these elements are present in the instant case. Ocden represented to Ferrer, Golidan, and Golidans two sons, Jeffries and Howard, that she could provide them with overseas jobs. Convinced by Ocden, Ferrer, Golidan, and Golidans sons paid substantial amounts as placement fees to her. Ferrer and Golidans sons were never able to leave for Italy, instead, they ended up in Zamboanga, where, Ocden claimed, it would be easier to have their visas to Italy processed. Despite the fact that Golidans sons, Jeffries and Howard, were stranded in Zamboanga for almost a month, Ocden still assured them and their mother that they would be able to leave for Italy. There is definitely deceit on the part of Ocden and damage on the part of Ferrer and Golidans sons, thus, justifying Ocdens conviction for estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R, 16318-R, and 16964-R. The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of fraud is overP22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, adding one year to the maximum period for each additional P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we take the minimum term from the penalty next lower than the minimum prescribed by law, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). 33 Consequently, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly fixed the minimum term in Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R at 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional; and in Criminal Case No. 16964-R at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, since these are within the range of prision correccional minimum and medium.1avvphi1 As for the maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we take the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the maximum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court. 34
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be substracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting with People v. Pabalan. 35
In Criminal Case Nos. 16316-R and 16318-R, brothers Jeffries and Howard Golidan were each defrauded of the amount of P40,000.00, for which the Court of Appeals sentenced Ocden to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor as maximum. Upon review, however, we modify the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty imposed on Ocden in said criminal cases. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P18,000.00, 1 year shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (anywhere between 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years). There being no aggravating circumstance, we apply the lowest of the maximum period, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days. Adding the one year incremental penalty, the maximum term of Ocdens indeterminate sentence in these two cases is only 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor. In Criminal Cases No. 19694-R, Ferrer was defrauded of the amount of P70,000.00, for which the Court of Appeals sentenced Ocden to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor, as maximum. Upon recomputation, we also have to modify the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence imposed upon Ocden in Criminal Case No. 19694-R. Given that the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P48,000.00, 4 years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (anywhere between 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years). There likewise being no aggravating circumstance in this case, we add the 4 years of incremental penalty to the lowest of the maximum period, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days. The maximum term, therefor, of Ocdens indeterminate sentence in Criminal Case No. 19694-R is only 10 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Dolores Ocden is DENIED. The Decision dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00044 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to read as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 16315-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; 2. In Criminal Case No. 16316-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Jeffries Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; 3. In Criminal Case No. 16318-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Howard Golidan the amount of P40,000.00; and 4. In Criminal Case No. 16964-R, the Court finds the accused, Dolores Ocden, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Rizalina Ferrer the amount of P70,000.00. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182918 June 6, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. EFREN PATELAN LAMBERTE @ "KALBO" and MARCELINO RUIZ NIMUAN @ "CELINE," Accused, MARCELINO RUIZ NIMUAN, Appellant. D E C I S I O N BRION, J.: We decide the appeal filed by accused Marcelino Ruiz Nimuan (appellant) 1 from the November 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02352. 2
The Factual Antecedents On November 25, 2004, the appellant, together with Efren Patelan Lamberte, 3 was charged with murder 4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union. 5 A year and a half later, on April 7, 2006, the appellant was arrested. 6 On April 12, 2006, the prosecution filed an amended information charging the appellant and Lamberte with the same crime of murder. 7 The appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. 8 His co-accused, Lamberte, remained at large. At the trial that followed, the prosecution established the facts outlined below. At about 6:00 p.m. of September 22, 2004, Eulalia Garcia was tending her sari-sari store along the National Highway in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union when the appellant and Lamberte came to borrow her gas lamp. She noticed that both were drunk and armed. They said they were looking for a bullet that fell on the ground. After finding the bullet, she asked them where they were going and they answered, "We are going to kill the doctor." The two then waited under a mango tree. Shortly thereafter, the victim (Dr. Jose Villanueva), on board a truck, passed by Garcias store on the way to his poultry farm. The appellant and Lamberte followed on foot. Ten (10) minutes later, Garcia heard two (2) gunshots coming from the direction of the poultry farm. 9
It appears that the victim arrived at his poultry farm at around 7:00 p.m. to deliver medicines and bread to his workers, Alvin Manolong, Crispino Yaranon and Ferrer Anasario. After the delivery, the victim instructed the workers to resume their work. The workers then proceeded to Building 1 and left the victim standing beside his truck near Building 5. 10
Subsequently, the workers heard gunfire coming from the victims direction. Manolong went down to investigate. On hearing a second shot, Manolong ran towards the parked truck and saw the victim lying on the ground with a gunshot wound in his stomach. Manolong called his companions, yelling that the victim had been shot. 11
On hearing Manolongs cries for help, Yaranon and Anasario ran toward Building 5. On the way, they met the appellant and Lamberte. The appellant kicked Yaranon three times and hit him on the stomach with the butt of the carbine he was holding, while Lamberte poked a shotgun at Anasario. The appellant and Lamberte threatened Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (the appellant and Lamberte) were responsible for the killing of the victim. The appellant and Lamberte then left, going northward in the direction of the mango plantation, owned by Atty. Paulino Cases, where both worked as security guards. 12
A postmortem examination confirmed that the victim died from shotgun wounds in the back. 13 The victims widow, Dr. Eufemia Villanueva, presented in court the official receipts, amounting to P56,500.00, for the victims funeral and burial, 14 and the victims 2003 and 2004 income tax returns to establish loss of earning capacity. 15
The appellant denied any participation in the killing of the victim, and pointed to Lamberte as the person solely responsible. He claimed that he merely accompanied Lamberte to the victims farm when the latter suddenly shot the victim; Lamberte threatened him with death if he (appellant) did not escape with him. 16
The RTC Ruling In its May 31, 2006 Decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder. It gave credence to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses who saw the accused before and after the shooting incident, thus pointing to a conspiracy in the killing of the victim. It rejected the appellants denial of criminal liability. In imposing the death penalty, the RTC appreciated the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime, without, however, explaining its reasons. The RTC ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of the victim P3 million in lost income, P8 million as moral damages, P2 million as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P60,000.00 as actual damages. 17
The CA Ruling On intermediate appellate review, the CA fully agreed with the RTCs appreciation of the adduced evidence. While the appellate court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the appellant was shot at the back, it disregarded nighttime as an aggravating circumstance because it is absorbed by treachery. The CA appreciated evident premeditation because the accused had sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of their acts from the time they told Garcia that they would kill the victim to the time of killing. It likewise appreciated in the appellants favor the mitigating circumstance of intoxication because Garcia testified that the accused were drunk. Since the mitigating circumstance of intoxication offsets the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the CA sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On civil indemnity, the appellate court modified the amounts awarded by the RTC. Civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P50,000.00 each, while the amount of exemplary damages was reduced toP25,000.00, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. The amount of actual damages was reduced toP56,150.00, based on actual receipted expenses. 18 The amount for loss of earning capacity was reduced toP622,453.95, 19 based on the victims income tax returns 20 from 2002 to 2004. 21
From the CA, the case is now with us for final review. Our Ruling We affirm the appellants conviction for murder. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly prove that a conspiracy existed in the commission of the crime. Garcia testified that the appellant and Lamberte had the common design of killing the victim. The fact that each one was armed with a firearm shows that they acted with the singular purpose of killing the victim. Both accused threatened workers Manolong, Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (accused) killed the victim. Under these facts, it does not matter who actually shot the victim because of the conspiracy that existed. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all; each of the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed. 22
The CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery as the victim was shot at the back. 23 The attack was deliberate, sudden and unexpected; it afforded the unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. 24
Nonetheless, we find that the CA misappreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 25
In this case, there is dearth of evidence on when the accused first conceived of killing the victim and that they were afforded sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of their contemplated crime before its final execution. Moreover, the span of time (less than thirty minutes), from the time the accused showed their determination to kill the victim (when they told Garcia that they were "going to kill the doctor") up to the time they shot the victim, could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed. 26 Thus, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. We also find that the CA erred in crediting the appellant with the mitigating circumstance of intoxication simply because Garcia testified that "the accused were both drunk." 27 For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. 28
In this case, there is no convincing proof of the nature and effect of the appellants intoxication.1avvph!1 The mitigating circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated in the appellants favor merely on the testimony of a prosecution witness that he was drunk during the incident. 29 Such testimony does not warrant a conclusion that the degree of the accuseds intoxication had affected his faculties. 30
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the felony, the proper imposable penalty on the appellant is reclusion perpetua. Lastly, we find it necessary to increase to P30,000.00 the amount of exemplary damages, to conform with recent jurisprudence. 31
WHEREFORE, the November 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- HC No. 02352 is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marcelino Ruiz Nimuan is found guilty of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Dr. Jose Villanueva P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P56,150.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P622,453.95 as indemnification for loss of earning capacity. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191065 June 13, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JONIE DOMINGUEZ, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N SERENO, J.: The appeal before us assails the 20 August 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03130 1 affirming the conviction of Appellant Jonie Dominguez 2 for eight counts of the crime of rape. The present appeal stems from nine (9) criminal Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-582 to 02- 590. In the Informations, Jonie Dominguez was accused of committing multiple counts of the crime of rape -- under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 in relation to R.A. No. 7610 -- against two minor female relatives, hereinafter called AAA and BBB. The aggravating circumstance of relationship was also alleged in the Informations -- the accused was allegedly the victims "grandfather." 3 In Criminal Case No. 02-583, the Information alleged that in committing the crime, the accused was armed with a knife -- an aggravating circumstance. AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001 when she was only nine years old, and second on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly done by the accuseds insertion of his two fingers into AAA's sex organ under the circumstance of intimidation with a knife, 4 described in the Information 5 docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-583, as follows: That sometimes (sic) in the year 2001, at Barangay XXX, municipality of YYY, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, while armed with a knife, taking advantage of the youthfulness of the victim and his moral ascendancy over her, with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his two (2) fingers to the sex organ of AAA, a minor, 9 years of age, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice. The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present considering that the accused is the grandfather of the victim being the brother of the mother of the victims father. The second instance of rape was allegedly committed by the accused by inserting his fingers into AAAs vagina and having carnal knowledge of her afterwards. The accused did not use a deadly weapon, but was able to perpetrate the crime through threats and the use of moral ascendancy over AAA. 6 The Information, docketed as 02-582, reads: That on or about July 12, 2002, in the afternoon, at Barangay XXX, municipality of YYY, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the youthfulness of the victim and his moral ascendancy over her, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his fingers to the sex organ of victim and then have carnal knowledge of the victim, AAA, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice. The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present considering that the accused is the grandfather of the victim being the brother of the mother of the victims father. BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped seven times: first on 15 June 2000 when she was 12 years old; and again on 20 April 2001, 1 June 2001, 13 April 2001; and finally on 2, 8, and 12 June 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly by carnal knowledge through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy. 7 The subsequent instances of rape were allegedly committed by the insertion of a finger into BBB's sex organ, also through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy. 8
These accusations are contained in the following Informations: Criminal Case No. 02-584 9
That on or about June 15, 2000, at more or less 10:00 oclock (sic) in the morning at barangay XXX, municipality of YYY, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation and taking advantage of the youthfulness of the victim and also his moral ascendancy over the latter, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of BBB, a minor, 12 years of age, against her will and without her consent, which acts likewise constitute child abuse and exploitation, as it demeans, debases and degrades the integrity of the child as a person, to her damage and prejudice. The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present, the accused being the brother of the other of the victims father. Criminal Case No. 02-585 10
That on or about midnight of April 20, 2001, at barangay XXX, municipality of YYY, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the youthfulness and his moral ascendancy over the victim did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd designs inserted his fingers to the sex organ of the victim BBB, a minor, 13 years of age, against her will and without her consent, which acts likewise constitute child abuse and exploitation as it debases, demeans and degrades the integrity of the victim as a person, to her damage and prejudice. The generic aggravating circumstance of relationship is present, the accused is the grandfather of the victim being the brother of the mother of the victims father. Criminal Case Nos. 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590, were also couched in the same language as Criminal Case No. 02-585, except for the dates of commission and the age of BBB. AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother accidentally discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself. Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the children's vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. As a result, the girls were brought to a doctor for examination. 11 The examining physician, Dr. Estrella Payoyo, found AAAs hymen intact, but did not discount the fact that the child could have been molested. 12 In contrast, BBB was found to have old hymenal lacerations. 13
The Informations, filed on 21 October 2001, were subsequently amended to state that the aggravating circumstance of relationship was a special qualifying circumstance. The accused, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. Thereafter trial ensued. During the trial, AAA and BBB testified against Dominguez by narrating the lascivious acts he had done to them. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped, with threats of harm to her person or her family. 14 It should be noted that as to the second rape, AAA was silent on the alleged sexual intercourse. She in fact did not mention it, but merely testified that the accused inserted his fingers into her vagina on two occasions. 15
The main theory of the defense was one of denial and alibi. The accused insisted that he was in the mountains on the dates that he was alleged to have committed the crimes. 16
The trial court, after receiving the evidence, convicted the accused. It gave credence to the testimonies of the two child-victims, who had positively identified him and candidly narrated the sexual acts he had perpetrated against them. The court observed that he had failed to rebut the said allegations. The fallo of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ having been found GUILTY of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape under par. (2) of Article 266-A in relation to Article III, Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 and six (6) other counts of Simple Rape under pars. (1) and (2) pf Article 266-A in relation to Article III, Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, is hereby sentenced as follows: 1) In Criminal Case No. 92-582 (Statutory Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional Maximum, as minimum, to 10 years of Prision Mayor medium, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party AAA in the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages; 2) In Criminal Case No. 02-583 (Statutory Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional Maximum, as minimum, to 12 years of Prision Mayor maximum as maximum, present the generic aggravating circumstance of USE OF DEADLY WEAPON (Article 266-B in relation to par. (2) of Article 266-A); to indemnify AAA the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) In Criminal Case No. 02-584 (Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA (Article 266-B in relation to par. (1) of Article 266-A, RPC as amended); to indemnify BBB the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages; 4) In Criminal Cases Nos. 02-585; 586; 587; 588 and 590 (Rape), he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional maximum, as minimum, to 10 years or Prision Mayor medium, as maximum, for EACH COUNT of RAPE; to indemnify BBB the amounts of Php50,000.00 civil indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs; 5) In Criminal Case No. 02-589 (Rape), accused is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to establish his GUILT beyond reasonable doubt. The period of preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. In the service of the sentences above-mentioned, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible pursuant to the provision of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. SO ORDERED. 17
The accused thereafter resorted to the CA for a review of the court a quos Decision. The assailed Decision was affirmed by the appellate court, which disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal interposed by Jonie Dominguez is DENIED, and accordingly his convictions as pronounced under the herein assailed November 5, 2007 Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED together with the appropriate prison penalty, but with modification only as to the awards for civil indemnity and moral damages, for which appellant is hereby ordered to pay: 1) Php75,000.00 for civil indemnity, and Php75,000.00 by way of moral damages in Crim. Case No. 02-584. 2) Php30,000.00 for civil indemnity and Php30,000.00 by way of moral damages for each of appellants convictions in Crim. Case Nos. 02-582, 02-583, 02-585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588, and 02-590. 3) Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages in Crim. Case No. 02-583. SO ORDERED. 18
The accused timely filed a notice of appeal to elevate the case to this Court. He did not submit a Supplemental Brief, and instead filed a Manifestation that the case be deemed submitted for decision. 19 The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, had earlier filed a similar Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief. 20 We thus refer to the Appellants Brief filed with the CA, wherein the accused-appellant advanced this lone assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 21
We sustain the conviction. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecutors evidence was doubtful. The charges against him, he says, were just fabricated, since the parents of the victims had an axe to grind against him. He claims that he had loaned an amount to the victims aunt, who is the sister of the victims father. When he demanded the return of the money, the victims parents got mad at him. He insinuates that these ill feelings were the reason why he was falsely charged by AAA and BBB. 22 We disregard this allegation for being irrelevant to the question of whether the crime as charged did take place. To introduce reasonable doubt on his criminal culpability, the accused highlights the testimony of Dr. Payoyo that BBBs old lacerations could also have been caused by infection from scratching her vagina or by injury from accidents. He also emphasizes Dr. Payoyos finding that BBBs vagina could admit only one finger with resistance. As to Dr. Payoyos report that AAAs hymen was intact, the accused-appellant relies on it to bolster his defense that there was no sexual intercourse or sexual abuse. Jurisprudence is clear on this matter. The absence of a laceration in BBBs hymen does not overturn the testimonies of the child-victims. As the Court held in People v. Gabayron: 23
Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that based on the medico-legal findings, there is no showing that his daughters hymen was penetrated, nor there was any evidence of injuries inflicted. However, jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of the hymen is not necessary, nor it is necessary that the vagina sustained a laceration especially if the complainant is a young girl. ... The fact that there was no deep penetration of the victims vagina and that her hymen was intact does not negate rape, since this crime is committed even with the slightest penetration of a womans sex organ. Presence of a laceration in the vagina is not (sic) essential prerequisite to prove that a victim has been raped. Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In fact, many cases of pregnancy have been reported in women with unruptured hymen.(emphasis supplied) 24
Another point being raised by the accused-appellant concerns the consistency of AAA's testimony. He argues that the inconsistencies in her testimony taint her credibility. In effect, he claims that since rape is a traumatic event for the victim, there was no way AAA could have forgotten or been mistaken about it, including its place of occurrence, had rape really happened. Specifically, the accused is arguing that since AAA mentioned two places -- their house and the back of the school her testimony was not credible. In rebuttal, the Office of the Solicitor General states that AAA indeed testified that she was violated in their house and that, immediately prior to that incident, she was playing at the back of the school when the accused-appellant called her to come inside the house. AAA's house, where the second rape was committed, was at the back of the school. 25 She herself clarified this detail during the redirect examination. The relevant portion of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes is reproduced below: 26
Q: AAA, during the last time that you were here in court, you declared that you were sexually molested by Jonie Dominguez at the house of your uncle Rogelio, is that correct? A: Yes, Maam. Q: And the other sexual molestation happened at the back of your school in Butag Elementary School, is that also correct? A: No, Maam. Q: What do you mean no, Maam? A: At the house of Uncle Rogelio and at our house. Q: But during the last time when you were asked by Atty. Gojar, you said that you were also molested at the back of the elementary school, Barangay XXX, so which is correct now? A: The truth is that I was sexually molested at the house of my Uncle Rogelio and at our house. Q: And why did you say that you were molested at the back of the elementary school in Barangay XXX, if not true? A: I was confused thinking that the question of Atty. Gojar is the location of our house and our house is situated at the back of the elementary school." There was therefore no inconsistency to speak of. We find AAA's testimony credible on this point and disregard the accused's attack on the same. The accused also cites AAAs testimony that after each incident of molestation, she told her parents about it. According to him, her testimony was discrepant with that of her mother. Recall that the mother had alleged that the discovery of the crime was due to his utterance regarding the state of her daughters vaginas. 27 We reject the claim of the accused. It can clearly be deduced from AAAs answer during the cross- examination that when she told her parents about the molestations, she was referring to the time immediately before the filing of the Complaint and not immediately after the rape. 28 It should be pointed out that she was consistent and unwavering in her claim that the accused inserted his two fingers into her organ on two occasions. The trial court observed AAAs consistency in her testimony and ruled that she was a credible witness. 29 We respect the trial courts ruling on this matter. This Court recognizes that: Ample margin of error and understanding is accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would naturally be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience of testifying before a court. 30
We have reviewed the records and find no cogent reason to disturb the conviction. A reading of the TSN of the hearing of the case convinces us that the CA did not commit any reversible error. The victims were still minors at the time they testified. Nevertheless, they were able to narrate the incidents, albeit not exactly with the same coherence as a fully capacitated adult witness would. Leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse. Relevant to this, we quote the following discussion by retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.: It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision in United States vs. Buncad, this Court stated: Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point, says: "But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated." (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638) While on the same subject, Underhill declares: 257. Children on the witness stand. - Under the common law, competency of a child under the age of fourteen years to testify must be shown to the satisfaction of the court. He is presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown to be competent it is immaterial how young he may be when he testifies. He is competent if he possesses mental capacity and memory sufficient to enable him to give a reasonable and intelligible account of the transaction he has seen, if he understands and has a just appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, and comprehends the character, meaning and obligation of an oath. If the witness fulfills these requirements, it is immaterial as bearing upon his competency that he is unable to define the oath or to define testimony. In the wise discretion of the court, a child four, five, six and for such ages as seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen or fifteen years of age may be shown competent to testify. It may not be said that there is any particular age at which as a matter of law all children are competent or incompetent. x x x The requirements then of a childs competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination. As held in United States vs. Buncad, quoting from Wheeler vs. United States, and reiterated in People vs. Raptus and People vs. Libungan: The decision of (sic) this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous. (citations omitted). 31
We find that AAA and BBB were able to candidly answer the questions propounded to them during the examination in court and to communicate the ordeal they suffered in the hands of the accused. They were credible witnesses. The legal doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left to the judgment of the trial court is well-established. 32 Its findings of facts, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed conclusive on this Court. 33 In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the prosecution witnesses credible. The narrated facts disprove the alibi of the accused-appellant that he was up in the mountains on the dates that he allegedly molested the victims. BBB testified that the accused was staying with another relative, their TiaCita, whose husband is his brother. He invited BBB and her two siblings to go to the house of their Tia Cita. He then ordered the two siblings of BBB to go to the seashore and pull the crab catcher. BBB was left alone with appellant, who then perpetrated his lewd acts on her. BBB likewise testified that appellant lived with them, thus making it possible for him to be near her and to molest her even at night while she was sleeping. She also testified that she was threatened by the accused who warned her not to tell anyone, or else her family would be killed. 34
Both the trial court and the CA found these defenses of denial and alibi incredible. The testimony of the accused was riddled with obvious inconsistencies. He denied knowing the victims, but eventually identified AAA as his grandniece. His own testimony contradicted his alibi, since he testified that from 2000 to 2002, he was residing in his brothers house. This was where one of the rape incidents happened, and was even near the house of the victims. On this point, we have stated previously: To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places." 35
On its part, the prosecution was able to show the existence of the elements of rape under the amended Revised Penal Code, effectuated by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti- Rape Law of 1997, which states: Art. 266-A. Rape: When and how committed Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of threats that the victims family would be killed by the accused. The accused also employed trickery and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these circumstances, the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and commit a series of sexual assaults against both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and 10 then. For those incidents, proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary. As to damages, there is a need to modify the award of civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-584. Contrary to the claim of the prosecution, the accuseds relationship to the victims cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. For relationship to aggravate or qualify the crime of rape committed against a minor, the accused must be a relative of the victim within the third civil degree. 36 As a brother of the victim's paternal grandmother, he is but a relative within the fourth civil degree. This relationship cannot qualify the crime as to merit the punishment of reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Thus, the rape of BBB by means of carnal knowledge was simple rape, and the amount of civil indemnity should be decreased from P75,000 to P50,000. With respect to the manner of rape committed against AAA twice and against BBB six times, which was rape by digital insertion, jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion isP30,000. 37 We adhere to these precedents. We note that prior to the amendment of the law on rape, the act of inserting the finger, with lewd designs, into the genital orifice of a girl or a non-consenting woman falls under acts of lasciviousness.1avvphi1 The victim was awarded civil indemnity likewise in the amount of P30,000. 38 In amending the law and renaming the act as rape, there is a recognition that the same evil, as that of conventional rape, is sought to be prevented. This was recognized in People v. Jalosjos 39 when the Court awarded civil indemnity, for each digital insertion committed by the accused against the victim, in the amount of P50,000 similar to conventional rape. Subsequent decisions, however, reverted to P30,000 the civil indemnity for the commission of rape under Art. 266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code. 40 We follow the latter in the present case. An award of exemplary damages to AAA and BBB for all the instances of rape committed by the accused against them is also warranted. In People v. Alfredo 41 , the Court reiterated an earlier decision held "that exemplary damages may be awarded not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show a highly reprehensible conduct." 42 In the present case, the circumstances show the higher degree of perversity of the accused. Instead of showing any remorse in abusing children of tender age, he repeatedly committed the crime against the victims. Worse, he even degraded them before other people by making fun of the fact that their private parts were already non-virginal, something that society sees as outrageous and uncommon for their age. Surely, only a person who is outrageously perverse can brag about his vulgarities to others with seeming impunity. These are conducts and dispositions that are abhorrent to the norms of a civilized society and should be curtailed and discouraged. We apply the Courts rationale in People v. Rayos 43 , wherein we held that "Article 2229 of the Civil Code sanctions the grant of exemplary or correction damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future and to allow the courts to mould behaviour that can have grave and deleterious consequences to society." In People v. Alfredo 44 , the Court clarified that the basis of awarding exemplary damages on account of a crime is not exclusively Article 2230 of the Civil Code, which provides that "in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." The Court held as that: In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse. It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages to set a public example or correction for the public good." 45
The records reveal the accuseds perversity and moral corruption, which should not be replicated in our society. To deter such behavior, exemplary damages must be imposed on the accused as a warning to those persons who are similarly disposed. Regarding the penalty of imprisonment, we find that a modification thereof is in order. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads: Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. . . . . . . . . . Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal. The trial court failed to apply the proper penalty in Criminal Case No. 02-583, for rape by sexual assault aggravated by the use of a knife, in imposing a maximum of only 12 years of prision mayor instead of prision mayor to reclusion temporal with a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. We impose fifteen (15) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal. As to the minimum penalty required by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTCs Decision was appropriate. Article 61 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code states that the penalty next lower in degree to a prescribed penalty of one or more divisible penalties imposed to their full extent is that immediately following the lesser of the penalties. The minimum of the penalty to be imposed is to be taken from within the entire period of prision correccional, or six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Considering the abhorrent character of the crime committed and the innocence of the victim in Criminal Case No. 02-583, we peg the minimum penalty at six (6) years of prision correccional. The sentence of imprisonment imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 02-582, 02-584 to 02-588 and 02-590 will remain undisturbed. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ is sentenced to suffer the following: a) In Criminal Case No. 02-583, the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to fifteen (15) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. b) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-582, 02-585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590, the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum for each count of rape; and c) In Criminal Case No. 02-584, the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities: a) To AAA: 1) P30,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02- 582 and 02-583; 2) P30,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02- 582 and 02-583; and 3) P30,000.00 exemplary damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-582 and 02-583. b) To BBB: 1) P50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-584; 2) P50,000 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 02-584; 3) P30,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02- 585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590; 4) P30,000 as moral damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02- 585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590; 5) P30,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-584, 02-585, 02-586, 02-587, 02-588 and 02-590. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 194379 June 1, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FELICIANO "SAYSOT" CIAS, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case This is an appeal from the April 30, 2010 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00075, which affirmed the January 31, 2003 Decision in Criminal Case No. 14791 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37 in Dumaguete City. The RTC convicted accused Feliciano "Saysot" Cias (Cias) of rape. The Facts The charge against the accused stemmed from the following Information: That at about nine oclock in the evening of April 1, 2000 at [PPP], 3 Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, the accused holding a scythe and forcibly removed the panty of [AAA] who was then resting inside the house with her child and while her husband was away and did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have succeeded a sexual intercourse with said [AAA] against her will and consent. Contrary to Articles 266-A and 266-B, Section 2 of RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, amending the Revised Penal Code. 4
On January 29, 2001, Cias, with the assistance of his counsel, was arraigned, and he pleaded "not guilty" to the charge against him. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of the private complainant; Dr. Stephen S. Estacion (Dr. Estacion), who conducted the medico-legal examination on AAA; and Senior Police Officer 3 Georgen Barot Sefe (SPO3 Sefe). On the other hand, the defense presented as witnesses accused Cias and his wife, Felina Cias. The Prosecutions Version of Facts AAA and her common-law husband lived together with her two children in PPP, Negros Oriental. For two years, they had been neighbors with Cias. Their houses were just 30 meters apart. 5
In the evening of April 1, 2000, AAA and her children were already sleeping in their house. 6 Her husband was not there that night as he had gone to the poblacion 7 to look for work, while her father-in-law, who used to sleep in their house, was not around. 8
At around 9:00 p.m., AAA was awakened from sleep by the feeling of hands covering her mouth. Upon waking up, she saw the accused kneeling on her legs. She was able to identify Cias clearly because the kerosene lamp in the bedroom shed light on his face. 9
Cias then told her to be quiet or he would kill her and her children. All the while, Cias was holding a scythe in his right hand which he positioned close to her neck. 10
With his right hand still holding the scythe to AAAs neck, Cias removed her panty with his left hand, tearing it and wounding her in the process. AAA tried her best to struggle and managed to kick Cias in the legs, but her efforts proved futile. Cias then had carnal knowledge with AAA, which AAA estimated to have lasted for an hour. 11 Cias only stopped when he heard his wife, Felina Cias, shouting, "You are all pigs! You are a bitch!" Cias then stood up and left the house to confront his wife. After Cias had left, AAA hugged her children while they could hear Cias and his wife arguing. AAA then ran to the living room to shout for help but changed her mind, afraid that Cias and his wife might harm her and her children. Once the argument stopped, AAA noticed that it was already 10:00 p.m. as reflected in the wall clock hanging in the living room. 12 She also noticed that the living room window had been forced open, thereby concluding that Cias must have entered through the said window. The following day, AAA kept her silence. But on the second day, April 3, 2000, she decided to tell her common-law husband what had happened so she went to the poblacion to look for him. Upon finding him, AAA narrated the incident to him, after which, they proceeded to the police station to report it. Likewise, they informed policeman Alex Tizon (Tizon), who hired Cias to tend to his livestock, of the said incident. Tizon then advised AAA to see a physician and submit herself to a physical examination. 13
AAA went to Dr. Estacion, the Municipal Health Officer of PPP, who conducted the medico-legal examination on her. His examination revealed the presence of white mucoid discharges in her vaginal opening which are normally produced when there is sexual contact or when a woman is nearing the ovulation phase of her menstrual cycle. 14 Further, the laboratory microscopic examination also revealed the absence of spermatozoa in AAAs cervical os. 15 However, Dr. Estacion clarified in his testimony that even if there had been actual sexual contact during which sperm was deposited in the vagina, it would have degenerated already on the second day making it harder to find. 16 Similarly, he noted a linear abrasion at the left side of AAAs abdomen, which was probably caused by a blunt object or a fingernail, and not a scythe. 17 No other injury was noted on the body of AAA. The final witness, SPO3 Sefe, corroborated AAAs testimony that on April 3, 2000, the couple arrived at the police station and reported an alleged rape. She also advised AAA to have herself examined by a doctor. SPO3 Sefe recorded the reported incident in the stations police blotter. 18
Version of the Defense Cias, on the other hand, denied the allegations and said that the sexual intercourse was consensual, to wit: Cias testified that he and AAA had been carrying an illicit affair for about six months. He alleged that in all their previous assignations, she submitted herself to him voluntarily and willingly on each occasion that they had sexual intercourse. In the evening of April 1, 2000, Cias and AAA had agreed to meet at AAAs house at 9:00 p.m. When he arrived, they talked for a while then engaged in sexual intercourse. They did the "69" position on the living room floor so as not to awaken the children sleeping in the bedroom. 19
Their lovemaking was, however, interrupted by a voice coming from outside the house, screaming, "You have no pity, you are animals! You are pigs!" Cias then patted AAAs buttocks and told her that it was his wife shouting. 20 They hurriedly put their clothes on and Cias left to confront his wife. Cias and his wife argued for a while before proceeding to their own house. 21
Cias testimony was corroborated by his wife, Felina Cias. In her testimony, she stated that on April 1, 2000, Cias left their house at around 9:00 p.m. supposedly to get the carabao he was tending in a nearby pasture. When he did not return after an hour, she decided to look for him. On the way, she passed by the house of AAA and heard familiar voices emanating from it. As she drew closer, she recognized AAAs voice saying, "Lets go away," but she did not hear any reply. 22
Curious, she peeped through a hole in the wall below the windows of the living room. To her great dismay, she saw Cias and AAA doing the "69" position. She screamed epithets at them and left. Cias followed her and, subsequently, asked for her forgiveness. 23
Enraged by the events, Felina Cias went to the poblacion the next day to narrate the incident to AAAs common-law husband. When she told him what happened, he showed no visible reaction to her story. Instead, he requested her to bring food supplies to AAA and her children. 24 She later learned that the couple had filed the instant case against her husband. Although she had suspected that her husband and AAA were having an affair, Felina was not really sure about it until she saw them that night. She further testified that Cias never went to AAAs house alone. This was the very first time. In the past, both she and Cias went over to AAAs house to listen to daytime drama programs on the radio. During these times, she would notice AAA give her husband penetrating looks but the two never spoke to each other in her presence. 25 Her suspicions were sufficiently aroused but she did not confide them to anyone. Ruling of the Trial Court After trial, the RTC convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of its January 31, 2003 Decision reads: WHEREFORE, accused FELICIANO "Saysot" CIAS is hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH; and he is directed to indemnify [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand (-P- 50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, Seventy-Five Thousand (-P- 75,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. 26
On appeal to the CA, the accused disputed the trial courts finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He argued that the allegations of the private complainant are improbable and contrary to human experience, resulting in the failure of her case to meet the test of moral certainty required in order to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling of the Appellate Court On April 30, 2010, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It found that the RTCs assessment of the credibility of the private complainant deserved respect. It also found AAAs testimony to be consistent and straightforward. Hence, it did not see any reason to deviate from the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 37, dated January 31, 2003, in Criminal Case No. 14791, finding appellant Feliciano Cias @ "Saysot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to the effect that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay private offended party [AAA] the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED. 27
The Issue Cias now comes before this Court with the lone assignment of error, contending that "[t]he court a quo erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime [charged] has been proven beyond reasonable doubt." 28
The Courts Ruling We sustain accused-appellants conviction. In his Brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court should not have received the lone testimony of the private complainant with precipitate credulity because it does not bear the stamp of truth and candor of a narration of actual events. He points out three (3) alleged flaws in her testimony. First, private complainants testimony stated that he used a scythe around her neck. In fact, she said that the scythe was already touching her neck. Accused-appellant argues that if such allegation were true, the private complainant would have sustained an injury in the neck area but none was found. Second, in her testimony, private complainant avers that she was not able to free herself from accused-appellant because, according to her, he was kneeling on her two legs. Again, accused-appellant points out that if this were true, private complainant would have sustained hematomas on her legs due to the pressure applied on them. However, the physical examination conducted on her did not show any. And third, accused-appellant cites numerous circumstances in private complainants testimony, which would reveal several telltale signs that the sexual intercourse that transpired between them was consensual and pre-arranged. One such circumstance is the absence of both the common-law husband and the father-in-law. The arguments are bereft of merit. In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 29
Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victims testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime. 30
More importantly, appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses. 31 The reason for this is that trial courts have the "unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination." 32
The exceptions to this rule are when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trial court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 33 However, this Court finds none of these exceptions present in the instant case. The private complainant testified in a steadfast and straightforward manner, to wit: FISCAL JUDITHO AGAN: Q And can you tell us if there was any unusual incident on April 1, 2000 at about 9:00 oclock in the evening while you were in your house? A It was Saysot whom I saw went up. Q In what particular place of your house did Saysot Cias go? A He went up thru the window. Q And how did you know that Saysot went up thru the window? A Because our door was closed. Q And was Saysot Cias able to enter your house? A Yes, he was able to get inside. Q After Saysot Cias was inside your house, what happened, if any? A He kneeled down on my two (2) legs and he covered my mouth. Q How were you able to recognize Saysot Cias at that time? A Because when he covered my mouth I was able to wake up. Q And how were you able to see his face clearly after you woke up? A Because there was a kerosene lamp. Q And how far was the kerosene lamp to the place where you were lying down? A Above our head. Q When Saysot kneeled on your two (2) legs and covered your [mouth], did he say anything? A He told me that "Just be silent ha" but there was a scythe around my neck. Q How did Saysot Cias place the scythe? A He placed it here. (The witness is indicating where the scythe was placed at the right neck.) Q Was the scythe touching your neck already at that time? A Yes, it was touching. Q What did you do if any after Saysot Cias told you not to say anything while placing a scythe at your neck? A He told me to be silent because if I am going to make a noise he will kill us. x x x x Q And what were your children doing at that time when Saysot Cias was kneeling on your legs holding a scythe at your neck? A The children were sleeping. Q After that, what if any did Saysot Cias do? A He raped me. Q Were you not wearing a panty at that time? A Yes. Q How was he able to rape you when you were wearing a panty? A He removed my panty. Q How did Saysot Cias remove your panty? A While he was holding the scythe around my neck the other hand removed my panty. Q And what happened to your panty? A It was torn. x x x x Q After Saysot Cias was able to remove your panty, what happened next? A He raped me. Q Did you not shout or scream at that time? A Because if I am going to shout he is going to kill me. Q Did you not try to wake up your children? A No, I did not because they were lying on one side. Q How long was that when Saysot Cias was having sexual intercourse with you? A [Maybe] about one (1) hour. Q And during this one (1) hour, did you not struggle? A I struggled. Q And were you not able to release yourself? A I cannot because he was kneeling on my two (2) legs. Q After that, what happened next? A After that he went down. Q And what did you do if any after he went down? A After he went down, his wife kept on shouting outside while I was crying. Q Why were you crying? A Because if I am going to tell anyone, he is going to kill me. 34
Evidently, the above transcript shows that AAAs testimony was very coherent and candid. The trial court likewise reached a similar conclusion after hearing the testimony of AAA, viz: After a careful and thorough review of the evidence and a conscientious disquisition of the disputed issue in this case, this Court finds that the lone testimony of the private complainant passes the test of credibility and is, by itself, sufficient to sustain a conviction. x x x x x x x On cross-examination, her narration of the events was unshaken. The defense attempted, but failed, to point out any contradictions or flaws in her recollection of the events. She remained consistent and spontaneously answered on even the minute details. Even her testimony on recall bore the badge of sincerity and truthfulness. Her forthright replies to rigorous questioning dispelled the initial doubts on matters which initially seemed, to the mind of the Court, as slight inconsistencies in her testimony. She successfully parried all questions in a frank and spontaneous manner that convinced this Court that she did not fabricate this accusation against Saysot Cias. Consequently, her testimony must be given full faith and credit. 35
Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the time-honored doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies deserves great respect. Further, the theory that Cias and AAA were having an illicit affair is unsupported by evidence. As held in People v. Cabanilla, 36 the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing proof. In the case at bar, accused- appellant relied solely on his testimony and that of his wife. He did not offer any other evidencesuch as a love letter, a memento, or even a single photographto substantiate his claim that they had a romantic relationship. Besides, granting they had an illicit affair, this fact alone does not rule out rape as it does not necessarily mean that consent was present. As We held, "A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will." 37
Lastly, the contention of accused-appellant that the absence of any form of injury to AAAs neck or legs contradicts the charge of rape, is untenable. In People v. Hacbang, We ruled that absence of injury does not negate the charge of rape and destroy the credibility of the victims testimony. What is important is the fact that the victim was made to submit to the will of the accused through force and intimidation. 38
The elements needed to prove the crime of rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266- A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. All these elements were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. The testimony of AAA overwhelmingly proves that accused-appellant raped her with the use of force and intimidation. Accordingly, We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.1awphi1 As to the penalty, Art. 266-B of the RPC provides that "[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (emphasis supplied)." Accordingly, in determining the proper imposable penalty, the Court is guided by the provisions of Art. 63 of the RPC, which reads: Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. x x x x In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. x x x In this case, the trial court appreciated not just one, but three (3) aggravating circumstances, namely: (a) the use of a deadly weapon; (b) the act was committed in the dwelling of the private complainant; 39 and (c) entrance to the private complainants dwelling was obtained by unlawful entry. 40 The first two aggravating circumstances were sufficiently alleged in the criminal information and were also adequately proved by the prosecution during trial. The third aggravating circumstance, although not alleged in the criminal information, was amply proved during trial. In People v. Mitra, We ruled that "aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the sentence. Evidence in support thereof merely forms part of the actual commission of the crime and its appreciation by the courts does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 41
Thus, considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty is death. However, due to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the CA correctly modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Finally, although the CA was correct in awarding PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, the award of moral damages should be increased to PhP 75,000. There should also be an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the finality of judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 42
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00075 finding accused-appellant Feliciano "Saysot" Cias guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the CA should read as follows: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 37, dated January 31, 2003, in Criminal Case No. 14791, finding appellant Feliciano Cias @ "Saysot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to the effect that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay private offended party [AAA] the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages, with 6% interest per annum on all damages from finality of this Decision until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186395 June 8, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ITO PINIC, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N PEREZ, J.: Before this Court for final review is the conviction 1 of appellant Ito Pinic for the rape of AAA, 2 a seven (7) year old lass. The Facts In three (3) separate Informations 3 all dated 12 December 2001 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 730-T to 732-T, appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the month of April[,] 2001, in the municipality of xxx, province of xxx, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Ito Pinic], did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously [had] carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a seven (7) year old girl, by means of force and against the latters will and consent. 4
It was only on 27 January 2003 that appellant was apprehended and committed 5 to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology by virtue of an Alias Warrant of Arrest 6 issued by the trial court. On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 7 During pre-trial, 8 the parties stipulated, among others, that AAA was only seven (7) years old during the incident of April 2001; and that Ito Pinic and Lito Pinic are one and the same person. On trial, AAA testified that sometime in April 2001, she, together with playmates JJJ and a certain MJR, played bahay-bahayan outside the house of Victorio Pinic a.k.a. Balulang. 9 On that same day, her neighbor appellant, who was armed with a bolo/knife, 10 summoned her to the house of Balulang. 11 Inside the house, he threatened to cut her ears with his bolo. 12 He undressed her and removed her panty. 13 Thereafter, he took off his own pants 14 and inserted his penis into her vagina. 15 She felt pain. 16 He withdrew his penis after about ten (10) seconds but inserted it again after ten (10) seconds. After five (5) seconds, he withdrew it again but inserted it once more after five (5) seconds. He also inserted his finger and licked her vagina. 17 After consummating the act, appellant sent her home and warned her not to tell anyone of the incident. 18
Sometime in the same month of April 2001, AAA complained to her father FFF that her anus was painful. 19 When her mother MMM examined her, she confided that she was raped by appellant. 20 It was then that MMM recalled of one morning when she could not find her daughter. She and her relatives looked for her from 9:00 oclock in the morning until she arrived home at 12:00 oclock noon. AAA refused to have her lunch and was "quiet and fearful" for a long time. She would not say why. 21
AAA submitted herself to a physical examination and was issued a Medico-Legal Certificate 22 showing that she has old hymenal lacerations at 10:00 oclock and 2:00 oclock positions. Dr. Jomelyn Bolompo, her attending physician, later testified in court that the lacerations could have been caused by "any object bigger than the hymenal opening" like a penis or a finger. 23
On the other hand, appellant denied the accusations against him. He claimed that nobody could enter the house of Balulang where the alleged rape was committed. His brother Luis, the caretaker of the house, padlocks the windows and the doors whenever he leaves. 24 Luis gave the same version on the witness stand and added that he is the only one who has the keys to the house. 25
JJJ, one of the playmates of AAA who stayed at the house of the Pinics on a one- month vacation, testified that her mother and the appellant are siblings; 26 that while playing with AAA and MJR on the date of the alleged commission of the crime, she did not see the appellant nor AAA enter the house of Balulang; 27 that she did not notice AAA cry or shout; 28 and that during her whole stay at the Pinics where the appellant supposedly stayed, she never saw him in the house. 29
On 22 December 2006, the regional trial court convicted the appellant of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 730-T but acquitted him in Criminal Case Nos. 731-T and 732-T. 30 The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, this Court finds the accused ITO PINIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 730-T defined and penalized under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and hereby further ordered to pay the victim [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages. xxx. [A]side from the moral damages and civil indemnity the latter which is automatically granted in rape cases, the accused should likewise be made to pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Five (Php25,000.00) Pesos. The accused is hereby acquitted in [Criminal Case Nos.] 731-T and 732-T, his guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 31
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on 31 January 2007. 32 On 6 May 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 33 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02673 dismissing the appeal. Thus: In fine, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court which took extreme caution to scrutinize [AAAs] testimony. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 34
Appealed to this Court, we required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. 35 Both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. 36
Our Ruling We uphold the conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. 730-T. A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. 37
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused, we are guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 38
Owing to the manner of the commission of rape, the sole testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused so long as the court finds the testimony "credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things." 39 More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician. 40
I Invoking the three (3) well-entrenched principles that guide the court in the determination of the guilt of an accused, appellant maintains that the sole testimony of AAA should not be made the basis for his conviction. We are not convinced. The points raised by appellant had been squarely addressed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The trial court explained: xxx In her testimony, the inconsistency whether the rape happened in the morning or afternoon becomes clear, when she averred that she entered the house of Balulang when she was playing alone and after she went home she again returned to the house of Balulang and played with [MJR] and [JJJ] outside. This [c]ourt entertains the conclusion that the sexual assault happened in the morning before she returned to the house of Balulang and played with her playmates. Besides, the time of the alleged rape is not an element of the crime of rape. 41
In his brief, counsel for the accused, attempts to discredit [AAA] by pointing out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. These so called inconsistencies e.g., the time of day when the alleged rape happened, whether morning or afternoon, whether the rape [was] on a bed and that these inconsistencies belie the accusation of rape. 42
A careful review of the transcript of the testimony of the private complainant shows that these supposed inconsistencies bear [on] relatively minor points, and even taken as a whole, fail to debunk the gravamen of the accusation; that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant against the latters will. 43
An impeccable recollection cannot reasonably be expected from the victim of a horrendous crime, such that minor contradiction in a witness testimony [is] perceived to enhance, rather than detract from the credibility of said witness. 44
The Court of Appeals added that the Office of the Solicitor General 45 correctly argued that the young age of AAA at the time she was defiled did not lessen her credibility inasmuch as she was able to relate her ordeal clearly and consistently. 46
On cross examination, AAA vividly testified: 47
Q You testified [AAA] that Ito Pinic inserted his penis into your vagina, do you still remember that? A I can remember, maam. Q How many times did Ito Pinic insert his penis? A Three (3) times, maam. x x x x ATTY. FORTUNA: Q How long did Ito Pinic insert his penis? A Short, maam. Q How short it was? ATTY. DAVIS: Your Honor, the witness cannot understand the word short. WITNESS: A For a bit longer time, maam. Q [AAA], do you know how to count? A I know, maam. Q Do you know how to count up to ten? A I know, maam. Q How about up to twenty? A I know, maam. Q Will you count one to five? Was it also the time Ito Pinic inserted his penis or up to ten? COURT: The complainant is allowed to count on her fingers. INTERPRETER: Witness is counting her fingers. ATTY. DAVIS: May we stipulate for 5 seconds, Your Honor, based on her count from 1 to 5. WITNESS: It is even longer, maam. (Emphasis supplied.) ATTY. FORTUNA: Q Was it up to 10? A Yes, maam.. Q [AAA] when you count 1 to 10 that is also the time that Ito Pinic inserted his penis for the first time, am I correct? A Yes, maam. Q How about the second time that Ito Pinic inserted his panis, can you count again how long it was? A For a short period, maam. Q [AAA], can you count again to tell us how short it was? COURT: After the complainant counted her fingers from 1 to 5. ATTY. FORTUNA: Q How about the third time? INTERPRETER: The witness counted 1,2,3,4,5. Q How about the first insertion to the second insertion, can you tell us how long? ATTY. DAVIS: That is leading, Your Honor. May we know what is the point of counsel, Your Honor. COURT: You are asking the duration between the first and the second insertion? ATTY. FORTUNA: Yes, the time in between, Your Honor. COURT: Witness may answer. INTERPRETER: The witness counte[d] her fingers from 1 to 10 as the duration or representing 10 seconds for the duration between the first and second insertion. Q How about the duration between the second and third insertion? INTERPRETER: Witness is counting her fingers from 1 to 5 as the duration between the second and the third insertion. Q Aside from inserting his penis, did Ito Pinic do something else to you? A Ito Pinic inserted his finger and licked my vagina, maam. Q When Ito Pinic raped you, what were you wearing at that time? ATTY. DAVIS: It is misleading because the question calls at that time that she was raped, may we know if was it before the rape or during the rape? ATTY. FORTUNA: At the time that she was raped, Your Honor. A A dress, maam. Q Were you wearing panty at that time? A Yes, maam. Q How about Ito Pinic what was he wearing at that time? A Pants, maam. Q Pants only? A Pants only, maam. Q Did he remove your dress when you were raped? A Yes, maam. Q How about your panty, did he remove it? A Yes, maam. Q How about Ito Pinic, did he remove his pants? A Yes, maam. Q When you were raped, what did you feel? A Painful, maam. Q Did you laugh after you were raped? A No, maam. Q Did you shout? A Yes, maam. Q After Ito Pinic raped you, did you find any blood on your panty? A Yes, maam. Q After you were raped did you go home after? A Yes, maam. Q You said that it was painful, which part of your body was painful? A My vagina, maam. Agreeably, there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA with respect to matters other than the aforequoted testimony. However, the appellate court correctly applied Boromeo, 48 where this Court declared: Inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. x x x 49
In Rellota, 50 this Court reiterated: It is established jurisprudence that testimony must be considered and calibrated in its entirety inclusive and not by truncated or isolated passages thereof. Due consideration must be accorded to all the questions propounded to the witness and her answers thereto. The whole impression or effect of what had been said or done must be considered and not individual words or phrases alone. Moreover, rape xxx causes deep psychological wounds, often forcing the victims conscience or subconscious to forget the traumatic experience xxx. A rape victim cannot thus be expected to keep an accurate account and remember every ugly detail of the appalling and horrifying outrage perpetrated on her especially since she might in fact have been trying not to remember them. xxx Error-free testimony cannot be expected most especially when a young victim of rape is recounting details of a harrowing experience, one which even an adult would like to bury in oblivion deep in the recesses of her mind xxx. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of strangers, face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and intimidating lawyer would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her testimony. xxx [A]mple margin of error and understanding should be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape. 51
We defer to the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of the testimony of AAA, to wit: The testimonies of the private complainant [are] scrutinized by this [c]ourt with extreme caution. These testimonies from direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examination were given on different dates. They were given after the lapse of days or months in intervals. But it can be clearly seen that they are consistent save for the minor inconsistencies xxx. 52
This should not be unnecessarily disturbed absent a showing that material facts, which might affect the results of the case, had been overlooked. 53 We found none in the instant case. Appellant likewise argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the attending physician testified that the hymenal lacerations found in the vagina of AAA could have also been caused by strenuous activities. 54 He added that the medico-legal findings did not show that he was the one who perpetrated the crime. 55
Settled is the rule, however, that when the testimony of the victim is supported by the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude that the requisites of carnal knowledge existed. 56 Moreover, AAA positively identified appellant as her assailant. 57
The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the positive identification and credible testimony of AAA as we have consistently ruled that a categorical testimony generally prevails over a bare denial. 58
Alibi and denial must be strongly supported by corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility. 59 But the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of the defenses corroborating witnesses. JJJ allegedly did not hear AAA shout because, apparently, the rape was committed when she and MJR were not around. 60 Appellants brother Luis later admitted that he could not say whether or not a person had entered or could enter the house. 61 Further, Luis testimony is tainted with bias because he is the older brother of the appellant. He is necessarily interested in the latters acquittal. 62 1avvphil All considered, we are convinced that the guilt of appellant has been sufficiently established with moral certainty with respect to Criminal Case No. 730-T. On the other hand, the acquittal of the appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 731-T and 732-T was also in order. The aforequoted testimony of AAA 63 shows that although the penis was thrice inserted in her private organ, the same constituted one (1) count of rape. II In the determination of the imposable penalty, we note that the appellant used a deadly weapon to threaten AAA. 64 This would have the effect of increasing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that reclusion perpetua to death should be the penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon. 65 While Republic Act 9346 66 prohibits the imposition of death penalty, such qualifying circumstance would still produce two (2) effects: (1) the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed; 67 and (2) the award of moral damages and civil indemnity should be increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence. 68
It is a requisite, however, that the use of a deadly weapon be alleged in the information because such circumstance is also in the nature of a qualifying circumstance that increases the range of the penalty to include death. 69 Otherwise, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance even if the prosecution proves the same. 70
Unfortunately, the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the Information. Appellant cannot, therefore, be convicted of the crime of qualified rape and meted the penalty of death. 71 Consequently, appellant shall be eligible for parole and the damages to which the victim is entitled to shall correspond to that for simple rape. Accordingly, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of damages to the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as civil indemnity and moral damages is likewise in order. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, however, the amount of exemplary damages has already been increased from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). 72
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 6 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02673 DISMISSING the appeal of appellant Lito Pinic a.k.a. Ito Pinic is hereby AFFIRMED. The Decision dated 22 December 2006 of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 730-T to 732-T is hereby MODIFIED in the following manner: 1. Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case No. 730-T. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and 2. With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 731-T and 732-T, the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193105 May 30, 2011 CLAY & FEATHER INTERNATIONAL, INC., RAUL O. ARAMBULO, and ADAM E. JIMENEZ III (for themselves and for Clay and Feather Intl., Inc., Petitioners, vs. ALEXANDER T. LICHAYTOO and CLIFFORD T. LICHAYTOO, Respondents. R E S O L U T I O N NACHURA, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated February 26, 2010 and the Resolution 2 dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111007. The facts of the case are, as follows: Petitioners Raul Arambulo (Arambulo) and Adam E. Jimenez III (Jimenez) and respondents Alexander T. Lichaytoo (Alexander) and Clifford Lichaytoo (Clifford) are stockholders and incorporators of Clay & Feather International, Inc. (CFII), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of marketing guns and ammunitions. Petitioner Arambulo is the President of CFII, while petitioner Jimenez is a member of the Board of Directors. On the other hand, respondent Alexander is the Corporate Secretary of CFII, while respondent Clifford is its Chief Finance Officer/Treasurer. Petitioners own fifty percent (50%) of the shares of stock of CFII, and respondents own the remaining 50%. 3
In a complaint-affidavit dated April 4, 2008, petitioners charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati with the crime of five (5) counts of Qualified Theft, defined and penalized under Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code. 4
Petitioners alleged that sometime in February 2006 to November 2007, respondents, by virtue of their positions in CFII and with grave abuse of confidence, intentionally, maliciously, and feloniously, with intent to gain and to profit thereby, took several firearms owned by CFII without the knowledge and consent of the corporation and its stockholders. The firearms taken are, as follows: Source of Firearms Kind Make Caliber Serial No. Date Taken Amount 1. C & F Shotgun Beretta DT10 Skeet 12ga AG0222B February 2006 Euro 3,577.00 2. C & F Shotgun Beretta DT10 LTD Trap 12ga AF9670B February 2006 Euro 3,894.00 3. C & F Shotgun Beretta DT10L Trap 12ga AF6715B November 2007 Euro 5,091.00 4. C & F Shotgun Beretta 20ga AA311917 AB315666 June 2007 Euro 590 5. C & F Shotgun Beretta 12ga C15987B November 2006 Euro 12,066.00 TOTAL AMOUNT Euro 25,218.00* *Philippine Currency equivalent is One Million Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand One Hundred Seventy Pesos (P1,639,170.00) at the rate of Sixty-Five Pesos per Euro (P65/Euro). 5
In their counter-affidavit dated May 5, 2008, respondents sought the dismissal of the criminal complaint, and stressed that petitioners filed the same as a form of harassment intended to divest respondents of their interests in CFII, as well as in retaliation of the criminal complaint for Qualified Theft that they previously filed against petitioner Arambulo. They argued that there was no basis for petitioners to charge them with Qualified Theft, as the subject firearms were purchased by them, and were, in fact, already paid in full. They averred that since CFII does not maintain a Euro bank account, all foreign exchange payments for the companys purchases of guns and ammunitions were deposited in respondents Euro bank accounts with Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. Like all corporate financial transactions of CFII, the payments for the subject firearms described in items 1, 2, and 5 were deposited in the Euro accounts of respondents. As payments for the firearms described in items 1 and 2, which cost Euro 3,577.00 and Euro 3,894.00, respectively, respondents deposited the total amount of Euro 7,471.00 in the Euro bank account under the name "Clifford/Alexander Lichaytoo." As to the firearm described in item 5, the amount of Euro 12,066.00 was debited from the Euro account under the name "Clifford/Melissa Lichaytoo." Respondents claimed that even petitioner Arambulo did this practice when he himself purchased guns from CFII. 6
Respondents further claimed that the firearms described in items 3 and 4 were paid by way of offsetting against advances made by respondent Alexander for CFIIs importation of 2,000 Beretta 92s pistols. They alleged that these transactions were fully accounted for and disclosed to the auditor, who was chosen by petitioners themselves, and that petitioner Arambulo was aware of the offsetting for the firearms described in items 3 and 4, since he was closely monitoring the payments made by CFII to respondent Alexander. 7
On May 9, 2008, petitioners filed a reply-affidavit, refuting the arguments of respondents. They admitted that CFII does not have a Euro bank account in its name, and that the corporation uses the Euro bank accounts of respondents to send payments in Euros to their suppliers. However, petitioners stressed that respondents cannot claim ownership of the funds, which were sent to the suppliers of the firearms, since the foreign currency (Euro) was purchased from currency dealers using CFII funds generated from its corporate funds and orders paid in advance by its customers. Thus, petitioners argued that this fact does not indicate that the funds used and deposited by respondents in paying for the firearms under items 1,2, and 5 were respondent Alexanders personal funds. In the same manner, the remittances to CFII suppliers withdrawn from the Euro bank accounts of petitioners do not show to which supplier and to what particular firearms the deposits and payments pertain. No concrete proof was shown that the firearms under items 3 and 4 were indeed the subject of offsetting from the advances made by respondent Alexander to CFIIs purchase of the 2,000 Beretta 92s pistols. The petty cash vouchers attached to the counter-affidavit of respondents were too general, there being no particular breakdown and official receipts presented to correlate the same to the alleged offsetting. 8
After the submission of the rejoinder-affidavit of respondents and of the sur-rejoinder affidavit of petitioners, and after the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution 9 on July 7, 2008, the fallo of which reads: Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondents Clifford T. Lichaytoo and Alexander T. Lichaytoo for the crime of Qualified Theft be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 10
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Justice. On June 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution, 11 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati dated July 7, 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati is hereby ordered to file the necessary information/s against [respondents] Alexander and Clifford Lichaytoo and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from the receipt hereof. SO ORDERED. 12
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a resolution 13 dated August 20, 2009. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. On February 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision, 14 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.1avvphi1 The assailed Resolutions dated June 2, 2009 and August 20, 2009 of public respondent Secretary of Justice are ANNULLED. Accordingly, the Resolution dated July 7, 2008 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City dismissing the complaint for Qualified Theft is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City is ORDERED to DISMISS and QUASH the Informations for Qualified Theft against [respondents]. SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 21, 2010, the CA issued a Resolution 16 denying the said motion. Hence, the instant petition. The sole issue for resolution is whether the CA committed reversible error in ordering the dismissal of the information for 5 counts of Qualified Theft against respondents. The resolution of the issue requires a determination of the existence of probable cause, in order to indict respondents for Qualified Theft. We rule in favor of petitioners. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances, which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, but it requires less than evidence that would justify a conviction. 17
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 18 The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A trial is intended precisely for the reception of prosecution evidence in support of the charge. The court is tasked to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by the parties at a trial on the merits. 19
To constitute the crime of Theft, defined and penalized under Article 308 20 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be established that: (1) there be taking of personal property; (2) said property belongs to another; (3) the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking be accomplished without use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 21
Theft is qualified under Article 310 22 of the Revised Penal Code under the following circumstances: (1) if the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) if the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) if the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter, or (c) large cattle; (4) if the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) if the property is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; or (6) if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident, or civil disturbance.1awphi1 In the instant case, the affidavit-complaint and the pleadings petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor sufficiently show all the elements of theft. The evidence on hand sufficiently shows that, more likely than not, the crime of Qualified Theft has been committed and the same was committed by respondents. There was unlawful taking by respondents of the subject firearms that incontestably belonged to CFII. The taking was without the consent of the owner CFII and was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Furthermore, the subject firearms were taken with grave abuse of confidence in as much as respondents could not have taken the subject firearms if not for the positions that they held in the company. This last circumstance qualifies the offense charged. However, our pronouncement as to the existence of probable cause does not delve into the merits of the case; neither do we pronounce that the evidence is sufficient to secure a conviction. The counter-allegations of respondents essentially delve on evidentiary matters that are best passed upon in a full-blown trial. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. 23 The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. The validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated June 2, 2009 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189847 May 30, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ERNESTO MERCADO, Appellant. R E S O L U T I O N BRION, J.: We resolve in this Resolution the appeal from the July 14, 2009 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03120. The CA affirmed with modification the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, finding Ernesto Mercado (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. AAA 3 is the fifth child of the appellant and BBB. Sometime in 2000, BBB (AAAs mother) and CCC (AAAs sister), went to Ambalite, Pugo, La Union. AAA, her two other siblings, and the appellant, were left in their house at Rosario, La Union. At around 8:00 a.m., and while AAA was doing her school assignment, the appellant entered her room and sat in a corner. Afterwards, the appellant sat beside AAA, kissed her on the right cheek, and removed her shorts and panty. The appellant threatened to kill AAA if she shouted. The appellant then removed his shorts and briefs, went on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into her vagina. 4
AAA also recalled that at around 2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000, while BBB was at the market and AAAs siblings were at their aunts house, the appellant again sexually abused her. 5
Sometime in 2003, AAA and the appellant were cleaning a banana grove when the latter told her to take a rest. AAA did as instructed, and while she was resting, the appellant embraced her and kissed her on the cheek and lips. The appellant removed AAAs clothes and panty, and laid her on the grass. The appellant took off his own shorts and briefs, went on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into her vagina. 6
According to AAA, the appellant sexually abused her five (5) times from 2000 to 2003. 7
Dr. Sheila Fe (Dr. Fe), a physician at the Rosario District Hospital, conducted a medical examination of AAA on August 3, 2003, and found healed lacerations at 3 and 9 oclock positions in her private part. 8
The prosecution charged the appellant with three (3) counts of rape before the RTC. 9 The appellant denied the charges against him, and claimed that his brother was the one who raped AAA. 10
The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. It also ordered him to pay AAA P75,000.00 andP50,000.00 as moral damages and civil indemnity, respectively, for each count. 11
The CA, in its decision of July 14, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications: (1) the civil indemnity was increased to P75,000.00; and (2) the appellant was further ordered to pay the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 12
The CA held that AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had sexually abused her on different occasions. AAA was firm in her narration, and did not waver despite the rigid cross examination by the defense. In addition, the defense failed to impute any ill motive on her part to falsely testify against her father. The CA also held that AAAs failure to specify the exact dates of the rapes do not detract from her credibility. The CA explained that it is too much to require from a young girl, who had been raped several times, to mechanically recall the exact dates of each rape. 13
The CA further added that AAAs delay in reporting the rape was due to the appellants threats on her life. We resolve to deny the appeal for lack of merit, but we modify the amount of the awarded indemnities. AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on two occasions in 2000 and 2003, respectively. Her testimonies were clear and straightforward; she was consistent in her recollection of the details of her defloration. If the sexual abuses did not happen, we see no plausible reason showing why AAA should testify against her own father, imputing on him the grave crime of rape. AAAs testimony was also corroborated by Dr. Fe, who found hymenal lacerations on AAAs private part. We have held that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge. 14
We find AAAs testimony regarding the rape that happened on July 26, 2000, to be deficient; it lacked specific details on how the rape was committed. AAAs statement that she had been "fucked" [sic] for the second time by the appellant "in the same house," without nothing more, is insufficient to establish carnal knowledge with moral certainty. Every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 15 The lower courts were thus correct in convicting the appellant of only two (2) counts of rape. We find unmeritorious the appellants argument that AAAs testimony is unreliable due to the inconsistencies in the dates when the rapes were committed. It is settled that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and was in the best position to discern whether they were telling the truth. At any rate, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The discrepancies in the actual dates the rapes took place are not serious errors warranting a reversal of the appellants conviction. 16 What is decisive in a rape charge is the victims positive identification of the accused as the malefactor. 17
The appellants denial must also crumble in light of AAAs positive testimony. We have consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive of the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the mere denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 18
We also do not find merit in the appellants contention that his brother (now deceased) was the one who had raped AAA. The appellant did not present any evidence to substantiate this claim. The Proper Indemnities The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon a finding that rape took place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. 19
Considering that the death penalty was not imposed due to the prosecutions failure to prove the minority of the victim, we reduce the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively, for each count. 20
We also increase the amount of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in accordance with current jurisprudence. 21 1awphil WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the July 14, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03120 with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages is REDUCED from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively, for each count; and (b) exemplary damages is INCREASED from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count. Costs against appellant Ernesto Mercado. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189981 March 9, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALLAN GABRINO, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case This is an appeal from the August 28, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00731, which affirmed the April 3, 2007 Decision 2 in Criminal Case No. 1347 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10 in Abuyog, Leyte. The RTC convicted accused Allan Gabrino of murder. The Facts The charge against the accused stemmed from the following Information: That on or about the 30th day of December, 1993 in the Municipality of La Paz, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound one JOSEPH BALANO with the use of bladed weapon locally known as pisaw which said accused had purposely provided himself, thereby causing and inflicting upon the said JOSEPH BALANO wounds on his body which caused his death shortly thereafter. Contrary to law. 3
On July 7, 2003, the arraignment was conducted. The accused, who was assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charge. A mandatory pre-trial conference was done on October 1, 2003. Thereafter, trial ensued. During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Bartolome Custodio (Bartolome), laborer and a resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte; and Ismael Moreto (Ismael), farmer and a resident of Barangay Mohon, Tanauan, Leyte. On the other hand, the defense presented Nestor Sarile (Nestor), Municipal Planner of La Paz, Leyte and a resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte; and the accused as witnesses. The Prosecutions Version of Facts The first witness, Bartolome, testified that he is a resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte for more than 30 years and he knows the accused as they were classmate from Grade 1 to Grade 5. He also testified that on certain occasions, the accused would spend the night at their house. He stated that he likewise knows Joseph Balano (Balano), the deceased, as he was a former resident of Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz Leyte, but had to transfer to Barangay Cogon, Tanauan, Leyte because of an insurgency. 4
He narrated that on December 30, 1993, he visited his uncle, Gorgonio Berones (Gorgonio) in Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte with Balano. Upon arrival at the house of his uncle, he noticed that a certain Jom-jom and his friends, including the accused, were having a drinking session. Thirty minutes later, Jom-jom and his group left the vicinity. Bartolome and Balano stayed for less than an hour at the house of Bartolomes uncle, and left thereafter. On their way home, however, somebody suddenly sprang out from behind the coconut tree and stabbed Balano. As there was a bright moonlight at the time, and because of the two-arms-length distance between them, Bartolome easily recognized the assailant to be the accused. He even testified that he tried to calm the accused down. Bartolome further stated that he saw the accused stab Balano once, after which Balano ran away while being pursued by the accused. He stated that he asked the people for help in transporting Balano to the hospital but the latter died on the way there. 5
The second witness, Ismael, testified that on December 30, 1993, he was in Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte, working with Balano for the processing of copra of Guadalupe Balano. That night, he stayed at the house of Bartolome in the same barangay. He stated that while he was already at Bartolomes house at about 10:30 in the evening, he could not sleep yet as Bartolome and Balano were still out of the house looking for a helper. He, therefore, decided to go out of the house and upon going outside, he saw the accused suddenly stab Balano once with a pisao (small bolo or knife). 6 Fearing for his life, Ismael instantly went back to Bartolomes house. 7
The Defenses Version of Facts Nestor, the first witness for the defense, stated that on December 30, 1993 at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was in Sitio Siwala, Barangay Rizal, La Paz, Leyte, picking up passengers as a motorcycle driver for hire. Gorgonio was one of the passengers at that time who he brought to Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte. When they arrived at the house of Gorgonio, the latter went inside to get money to pay for his fare. Consequently, Nestor waited in his tricycle outside of Gorgonios house. During such time, Nestor saw four people going down the house: the accused, Jeffrey Erro (Jeffrey), Tap-ing Fernandez (Tap-ing), and Balano. According to Nestors testimony, the accused went to the side of the house to urinate and while so doing, he saw Tap- ing throw something at the accused, which caused him to bleed, and then they ran away. Thereafter, Balano attacked the accused, and as they grappled, the former was stabbed by the latter on the chest. The accused ran away after the incident happened. 8
Quite differently, the accused narrated that on December 30, 1993 at 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at the house of Gorgonio having a conversation with Leny Berones and Luna Berones. After an hour had passed, Gorgonio arrived with Nestor, Tap-ing, Balano and a certain Eddie who all came from the fiesta in Barangay Siwala. The accused stated that he went outside of the house to urinate when Tap-ing threw a stone at him, which hit him on the forehead and caused him to fall down. And when he saw Balano rushing towards him with an ice pick, he immediately stabbed him and then ran away. 9
The Ruling of the Trial Court After trial, the RTC convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of its April 3, 2007 Decision reads: WHEREFORE, finding the accused [Allan] Gabrino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as [charged], this Court hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, ordering the accused to indemnify the offended party the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. 10
In finding for the prosecution and convicting the accused of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. The RTC found that treachery was employed by the accused in killing Balano. The RTC further held that the justifying circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Art. 11(1) of the RPC could not be applied in the present case as the element of unlawful aggression is absent. The Ruling of the Appellate Court On August 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC in toto. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellant Allan Gabrino of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment to the victims heirs of civil indemnity in the amount of P65,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. 11
The Issues Hence, this appeal is before Us, with accused-appellant maintaining that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of murder, despite the fact that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant also alleges that assuming that he could be made liable for Balanos death, the CA and the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Another issue that he raises is the alleged existence of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The Courts Ruling We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant. Factual findings of the RTC should be given credence and should therefore be respected In the instant case, while both the prosecution and the defense agree on the date when the incident occurred and the fact that accused-appellant stabbed Balano, they conflict with the rest of the facts. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the RTC to appreciate the facts during trial and determine which information carries weight. And in doing so, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses, with which the CA thereafter concurred. Accordingly, the RTC adopted the version of the prosecution as the correct factual finding. We agree with the RTCs factual determination as affirmed by the CA. We have held time and again that "the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality." 12 As We have reiterated in the recent People v. Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses. 13 This is clearly because the judge in the trial court was the one who personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and observed their demeanor as well as the manner in which they testified during trial. 14 Accordingly, the trial court, or more particularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. In the present case, in giving weight to the prosecutions testimonies, there is not a slight indication that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, or that it overlooked any material fact. In fact, no allegation to that effect ever came from the defense. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb the findings of fact made by the RTC and its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. To reiterate this time- honored doctrine and well-entrenched principle, We quote from People v. Robert Dinglasan, thus: In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well- entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the case. 15 (Emphasis Ours.) Treachery was committed by accused-appellant Art. 248 of the RPC defines murder as follows: ART. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; 2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise; 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin; 4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity; 5. With evident premeditation; 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (Emphasis Ours.) For a person to be convicted of the offense of murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim; and (2) that the killing was committed with any of the attendant circumstances under Art. 248 of the RPC, such as treachery. Particularly, People v. Leozar Dela Cruz enumerates the elements of murder, thus: 1. That a person was killed. 2. That the accused killed him. 3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248. 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide. 16
In this case, it is undoubted that accused-appellant was the person who stabbed Balano and caused his death. 17 And this killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. The question, therefore, to be resolved in this case is whether the killing was attended by treachery that would justify accused-appellants conviction of murder. Treachery exists when "the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make." 18 What is important in ascertaining the existence of treachery is the fact that the attack was made swiftly, deliberately, unexpectedly, and without a warning, thus affording the unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the attack. 19 In People v. Lobino, We held that a sudden attack against an unarmed victim constitutes treachery. 20
In this case, it is clear accused-appellant employed treachery in stabbing and killing Balano. Relevant to the finding of treachery is the testimony of Bartolome, to wit: Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court what was that unusual incident that happen? [sic] A: While we were on our way home, we have no knowledge that there was somebody who was waylaying us on the road. Q: What happen [sic] on that road? A: He suddenly emanate [sic] coming from the coconut tree and immediately lounge [sic] at Joseph Balano and stabbed him. Q: Whom are you referring to [w]ho emanate [sic] from the coconut tree and immediately stab Joseph Balano? A: Allan Gabrino. Q: How far was the place of incident to the house of Gorgonio Berones? A: Less than twenty (20) meters from the place of incident. Q: Since it was nighttime, how were you able to identify Allan Gabrino as the one who stabbed Joseph Balano? A: Because during that night, there was a moon and my distance to Joseph Balano was only two arms length, I was near him and he was ahead of me and I saw that he was stabbed and I even pacified Allan Gabrino. Q: You mean you pacified Allan Gabrino? A: Yes, Sir. Q: How did you pacify him? A: I said dont do that Lan. He did not heed because he had already finished stabbing. Q: When you said Lan, it is the name of Allan? A: Yes, Sir. Q: How many times did you see the accused stab the victim Joseph Balano? A: I only saw once. 21 (Emphasis Ours.) From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that accused-appellant deliberately hid behind the coconut tree at nighttime, surprising the victim, Balano, by his swift attack and immediate lunging at him. Obviously, the unsuspecting Balano did not have the opportunity to resist the attack when accused-appellant, without warning, suddenly sprang out from behind the coconut tree and stabbed him. This undoubtedly constitutes treachery. The fact that Balano was able to run after he was stabbed by accused-appellant does not negate the fact the treachery was committed. As We held in Lobino, that the victim was still able to run after the first blow does not obliterate the treachery that was employed against him. 22 Clearly therefore, the RTC and the CA did not err in finding that treachery was committed. Accordingly, accused-appellants conviction of murder is proper. Evident premeditation was not established as an aggravating circumstance According to Art. 14(3) of the RPC, an offense is aggravated when it is committed with evident premeditation. Evident premeditation is present when the following requisites concur: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 23
In this case, evident premeditation was not established. First, there is showing, much less an indication, that accused-appellant had taken advantage of a sufficient time to carefully plan the killing of Balano; or that a considerable time has lapsed enough for accused-appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act but nevertheless clung to his predetermined and well-crafted plan. The prosecution was only able to establish the fact of accused-appellants sudden stabbing of Balano after he hid behind the coconut tree. This fact only successfully establishes the qualifying circumstance of treachery but not the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. In appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, it is indispensable that the fact of planning the crime be established. 24 Particularly, "[i]t is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out." 25 Accordingly, when there is no evidence showing how and when the accused planned to killing and how much time elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot prosper. 26 In this case, the prosecution failed to establish how and when the plan to kill Balano was devised. As this has not been clearly shown, consequently, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Incomplete self-defense cannot be made as a justifying circumstance, because the element of unlawful aggression is absent Accused-appellants claim of incomplete self-defense cannot prosper. Art. 69 in relation to Art. 11 of the RPC explains when incomplete self-defense is permissible as a privileged mitigating circumstance, thus: ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable.A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances occur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In order that incomplete self-defense could prosper as a privileged mitigating circumstance, unlawful aggression must exist. In People v. Manulit, 27 People v. Mortera, 28 and Mendoza v. People, 29 We reiterated the well-settled rule that unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite in appreciating an incomplete self-defense. It is any one of the two other elements of self-defense that could be wanting in an incomplete self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means to employed to prevent or repel it; or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself; but it can never be unlawful aggression. 30
Unlawful aggression is defined as "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life." 31
In granting the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, the burden to prove the elements during trial is incumbent upon the accused. 32 It, therefore, follows that accused-appellant must prove before the RTC that there was indeed an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Balano. In this case, accused-appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of unlawful aggression that would warrant an incomplete self-defense. As properly pointed out by the RTC, the testimony of accused-appellant on cross-examination establishes this failure, thus: Q: According to you, it was Tap-ing Fernandez who threw stone to you, is that correct? WITNESS A: Yes, sir. Q: And you were hit on your forehead, is that correct? A: No, sir, on the top of my head. COURT INTERPRETER Witness pointing to the top of his head. FISCAL MOTALLA Q: And you became groggy according to you, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you fell to the ground. A: No, sir. Q: So you did not fall to the ground, is that what you mean? A: No, sir, I felt groggy. Q: You said you saw the victim approached [sic] you with an ice pick, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you immediately stabbed him? A: Yes, sir. Q: Meaning, he was not able to stab you because you immediately stabbed him, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: But according to you, when the victim, was hit he went to a nearby coconut tree and stabbed the coconut tree, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you were just two-arms length away from him, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: He did not thrust towards you, he was only stabbing the coconut tree, is that correct? A: He did not thrust towards me. Q: He only kept on stabbing the coconut tree, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: Despite the fact that you were near to him? A: Yes, sir. Q: And he was already wounded by you when he was stabbing the coconut tree? A: He was already wounded. 33
From the foregoing testimony of accused-appellant himself, it is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Balano that would justify accused-appellant to stab him. To justify an incomplete self-defense, the unlawful aggression must come from the victim himself against the person who resorted to self-defense. 34 In this case, if there was any, the unlawful aggression came from Tap-ing, who was the one who threw a stone and hit accused-appellant. The mere fact that Balano was alleged to be approaching accused-appellant with an ice pick does not constitute a real and imminent threat to ones life sufficient to create an unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression requires more than that. In People v. Arnante, as it is here, the "mere perception of an impending attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression." 35 In this case, there was not even any attempt on the part of Balano to strike or stab accused-appellant. If at all and assuming to be true, Balanos demeanor could be deemed as an intimidating attitude that is certainly short of the imminence that could give rise to the existence of unlawful aggression. 36 What is more, it was not him, but Tap-ing who had previously hit accused-appellant. Accused-appellants own testimony also negates any intention on the part of Balano to cause him any harm. As he testified, even after he stabbed Balano, the latter never retaliated and struck back. Instead, he stabbed the coconut tree notwithstanding the fact that accused- appellant was within his reach. Certainly, nothing in the facts indicate any circumstance that could justify the stabbing and the ultimate taking of Balanos life. Accordingly, as We are not convinced that there was an unlawful aggression in this case on the part of the victim, Balano, an incomplete self-defense is wanting and accused-appellants offense, therefore, cannot be mitigated. Accused is liable for damages and interest The penalty of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that the offense committed in this case is murder and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the RTC was correct in imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. 37
It is now settled that as a general rule, the Court awards civil indemnity, as well as moral and exemplary damages. 38 And We have held in People v. Combate that "when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages." 39
Accordingly, We increase the PhP 65,000 damages awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA as follows: PhP 50,000 in civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 in moral damages, and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six percent (6%) per annum, 40 in line with Our current jurisprudence.1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00731 finding accused-appellant Allan Gabrino guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the trial court should read as follows: WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Allan Gabrino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, this Court hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Joseph Balano the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193482 March 2, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NILO ROCABO, Appellant. D E C I S I O N We decide the appeal filed by the accused Nilo Rocabo (appellant) from the May 31, 2010 decision of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00730. 1
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS On August 18, 1999, the appellant was charged 2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Abuyog, Leyte, with 3 counts of incestuous rape 3 committed against his 11- year old daughter AAA 4 on April 27 5 and 29, 6 1999 and May 1, 1999. 7 The appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. In the joint trial that followed, AAA testified on the details of the crimes. On April 27, 1999, while AAA was sleeping in the living room of her grandmothers house, her father (the appellant) woke her up and told her to go to their house at the back of her grandmothers house. 8 On reaching their house, the appellant told her to go to the room. 9 While inside the room, the appellant removed her shorts and underwear, and told her to lie down. 10 The appellant then undressed himself, kissed her, and inserted his private organ into her vagina. 11 Two days later, on April 29, 1999, while AAA was watching television at her grandmothers house, the appellant told her to go home. 12 The appellant once again told AAA to go inside the room. 13 The appellant then kissed her on the neck. 14 Two days later, on May 1, 1999, while AAA was playing in the street, the appellant called her home and told her again to go to the room. 15 The appellant then undressed her, made her lie down, kissed her, and inserted his private organ into her vagina. 16 When BBB, AAAs mother, discovered what happened, she brought AAA on May 27, 1999 to the Burauen District Hospital for a medical examination. 17 The medical examination revealed an old healed hymenal laceration. 18
The appellant denied the charges against him, claiming that he was roasting pig for the fiesta on April 27, 1999 with Ernie Dagami, and that he was at home with BBB and their children on April 29 and May 1, 1999. 19 He alleged that BBB instigated the case against him because she was afraid that he would file an adultery case against her. 20
THE RTC RULING In its January 12, 2007 Decision, the RTC acquitted the appellant for the alleged rape committed on April 29, 1999, but found him guilty of 2 counts of incestuous rape committed on April 27 and May 1, 1999. 21 It gave full credence to AAAs testimony and rejected the appellants denial. It noted that AAA cried while narrating in court her fathers monstrous acts, and that no child would fabricate a rape charge against her own father. The RTC sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua for two counts of rape and ordered him to pay AAA P75,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each count. 22
THE CA RULING On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the appellants conviction. It rejected the appellants attack on AAAs credibility, noting that it was improbable for a child of tender years to concoct a tale of sexual molestation committed by her own father just because she was persuaded to do so by her mother; that inconsistencies on minor details proved that AAAs testimony was not rehearsed; that the delay in reporting the rape incidents did not affect AAAs credibility because there was no uniform reaction for rape victims. The CA noted that the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations does not negate that rape was committed since hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape. 23
From the CA, the case is now with us for final review. OUR RULING We affirm the appellants conviction. We have examined the records and we entertain no doubt that the appellant raped AAA. We find AAA's testimony convincing and straightforward. We, therefore, have no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of AAA's testimony, more so in the present case where the said findings were affirmed by the CA. As the RTC and the CA did, we reject the appellants denial. Not only is denial an inherently weak defense, it cannot also prevail over the positive testimony of the offended party. 24
While we affirm the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, we note that neither court fully appreciated nor discussed the penalty properly imposable on the appellant. Since the rape incidents happened on April 27 and May 1, 1999, the applicable laws are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 25 which provide: ART. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. Rape is committed: x x x x d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. x x x x ART. 266-B. Penalty. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.] In the present case, the Informations charging the appellant with the crimes of rape clearly alleged that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his daughter, AAA, who was only 11 years old when the rapes were committed on April 27 and May 1, 1999. 26 The prosecution's evidence clearly shows AAA's age and filiation by the appellant; AAAs duly presented Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on June 7, 1987 to spouses Nilo Rocabo and BBB. 27
With the basic elements of the crime charged, AAAs minority and her relationship to the appellant having been alleged in the Informations and duly proven, we find the appellant guilty of two counts of qualified rape, as the lower courts did. In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, 28 the penalty of death that should have been meted out to the appellant under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, shall now be reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape, without eligibility for parole. 29 lawphi1 Lastly, we modify the appellants civil liability to include civil indemnity and to increase the exemplary damages awarded. Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the commission of the crime by the offender. 30 Under prevailing jurisprudence, the offended party is entitled to P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages to deter other persons with perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their children. 31
WHEREFORE, the May 31, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR- H.C. No. 00730 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Nilo Rocabo is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is also ordered to pay AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, andP30,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191361 March 2, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. MARIANITO TERIAPIL y QUINAWAYAN, Appellant. D E C I S I O N ABAD, J.: This case is about the alleged attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in connection with a killing that occurred shortly after one group charged another with cheating in bet. The Facts and the Case The public prosecutor charged the accused Marianito Q. Teriapil (Teriapil) and Ricardo P. Balonga (Balonga) of murder attended by treachery and evident premeditation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Criminal Case C-69686. 1 Trial took place only with respect to Teriapil because Balonga died of cardio respiratory arrest while in detention. 2
The prosecution evidence, culled from the essentially identical narration of the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA), shows that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2003 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, two groups of men engaged in a pigeon race. One group consisted of the victim Joel Montero (Montero), Ramil Rama (Rama), Randy Conje, and Eduardo Arevalo (Arevalo), collectively referred to as the Montero group. The other group consisted of the accused Teriapil and Balonga. The latter approached the Montero group and challenged it to a pigeon race. When the Montero group lost, it thought that accused Teriapil and Balonga cheated them. Losing no time, the Montero group went to look for the two to get back their bet money of P450.00. But pillboxes met them. Nonoy, a brother of the accused Balonga, threw the pillboxes. For his part, accused Teriapil shot Montero with a pen gun or "paltik." Montero was rushed to a hospital but he was dead on arrival. 3
Accused Teriapil denied killing Montero. He testified that he was at home at the time of the shooting. When he heard an explosion, he looked out the window and saw Rama and two other men on board a tricycle. As the tricycle stopped in front of Teriapils house, the driver pointed at him. 4 The defense did not offer any proof of impossibility of Teriapils presence at the crime scene. 5
On August 3, 2007 the RTC found accused Teriapil guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to pay P50,000.00 as indemnity to the victims heirs andP50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The RTC rejected accused Teriapils defense of alibi in the face of his having been positively identified by Rama and Arevalo as Monteros assailant. Since accused Teriapil shot Montero while the latter was in a position where he could not defend himself, the RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the accused. The RTC held, however, that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of evident premeditation: 1) the time when the offender decided to commit the crime; 2) an act indicating that he clung to his decision; and 3) sufficient lapse of time between his decision to commit the crime and its execution to allow for reflection on the consequences of the act he had decided on. 6 Accused Teriapil appealed to the CA. On September 30, 2009 the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modifications. It reduced the exemplary damages to P25,000.00, deleted the award of indemnity, but in its place directed accused Teriapil to payP25,000.00 as temperate damages to the victims heirs. The Issues Presented The case presents two issues: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that accused Teriapil killed Montero with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery as to make him liable for murder; and 2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Ruling of the Court One. Agreeing with the prosecution, the CA held that treachery attended accused Teriapils shooting of Montero since the latter was inside his house at that time. This mode of attack, claimed the CA, rendered Montero incapable of defending himself. 7
True, an assailant uses treachery when he suddenly and unexpectedly attacks his unsuspecting victim and denies him any real chance to defend himself. By this, the assailant ensures the success of his attack with no risk to his person. In numerous cases, however, the Court held that the idea of treachery does not apply when the killing is not premeditated or when the accused did not deliberately choose the means he employed for committing the crime. 8
Here, the clash between the Montero group and the accused Teriapil and Balonga developed spontaneously.1avvphi1The Montero group suspected the two of having cheated them in the pigeon race. Arevalo testified that when he told Balonga of his suspicion, the latter ran away. At this point, the Montero group decided to proceed with haste to where accused Teriapil and Balonga were to get their bet money back. On getting there, however, they were met with crude explosives called pillboxes. From the succession of events, it can hardly be said that accused Teriapil had planned to attack Montero or the other members of his group. The clash between the two groups and the slaying of Montero followed a continuous relay of events that began with the accusation that accused Teriapil and Balonga had cheated the victim and his companions in the pigeon race. Although accused Teriapil was positioned inside his house, there is no evidence that he deliberately hid there to surprise and ambush Montero. Monteros group was fully alerted when pillboxes met them. They knew they had to defend themselves from aggression that awaited them. Besides, based on the records, the march of events did not afford accused Teriapil and Balonga the time to plan and prepare how they were to resist the Montero group that came in number to get their money back from those who, they thought, cheated them. Two. Accused Teriapil assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that impaired their supposed positive identification of him. But those inconsistencies, mainly about the number and types of ammunitions used, do not depart from the core theory of the prosecution. The Court believes that the witnesses referred to were present during the clash between the two groups and were proximate to where Teriapil shot Montero. Moreover, the incident happened at 11:00 in the morning which made it easy for the witnesses to identify Teriapil. WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- H.C. 03046 dated September 30, 2009 and FINDS the accused Marianito Teriapil y Quinawayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and SENTENCES him to suffer the penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court ORDERS him to pay Joel Monteros heirsP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as temperate damages. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011 DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., Respondents. D E C I S I O N DEL CASTILLO, J.: Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free expression however, "is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society." 1 Libel stands as an exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Dionisio Lopez (petitioner) assailing the Decision 2 dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision 3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Branch 60 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Procedural and Factual Antecedents On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31, 2003, the accusatory portion of which reads in full as follows: That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the integrity, reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred, contempt and ridicule put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows: "CADIZ FOREVER" "______________ NEVER" thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word "NEVER". Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER" thus making the billboard appear as follows "CADIZ FOREVER" "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on, therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name, character and reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of persons, which caused damage and prejudice to the offended party by way of moral damages in the amount [of]: P5,000,000.00 as moral damages. ACT CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of "not guilty." During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner calls the private complainant "Bading." Thenceforth, trial on the merits commenced in due course. Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space before the word "NEVER" directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete. Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up with the added words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages. Jude Martin Jaropillo (Jude) is a licensing officer of the Permit and License Division of Cadiz City. While on a licensing campaign, he was able to read the message on the billboards. He wondered what fault the person alluded therein has done as the message is so negative. He felt that the message is an insult to the mayor since it creates a negative impression, as if he was being rejected by the people of Cadiz City. He claimed that he was giving his testimony voluntarily and he was not being rewarded, coerced or forced by anybody. Nenita Bermeo (Nenita), a retired government employee of Cadiz City, was at Delilahs Coffee [Shop] in the morning of November 19, 2002 when she heard the petitioner shouting "Bading, Bading, Never, Never." She and the tricycle drivers drinking coffee were told by petitioner "You watch out I will add larger billboards." When she went around Cadiz City, she saw larger billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER," thus confirming what petitioner had said. With the message, she felt as if the people were trying to disown the private respondent. According to her, petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. Like Jude, she was not also forced or rewarded in giving her testimony. Bernardita Villaceran (Bernardita) also found the message unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an honorable and dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the message is an insult not only to the person of the mayor but also to the people of Cadiz City. Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay. He contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner of libel. The trial court ruled that from the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution vs-a-vs that of the defense, all the elements of libel are present. The fallo of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI (bonded) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel defined and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant thereto hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum as the minimum to TWO YEARS, ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as the maximum and a FINE of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P5,000,000.00 by way of moral damages. The cash bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and returned to the accused, however the penalty of Fine adjudged against the accused is hereby ordered deducted from the cash bond posted by the accused pursuant to Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and the remaining balance ordered returned to the accused. The accused is hereby ordered immediately committed to the BJMP, Cadiz City for the service of his sentence. Cost against the accused. SO ORDERED. 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier, rendered judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. Like the trial court, the appellate court found the presence of all the elements of the crime of libel. It reduced however, the amount of moral damages toP500,000.00. Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution 6 dated April 7, 2006. Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant petition. Per our directive, private respondent filed his Comment 7 on August 29, 2006 while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) representing public respondent People of the Philippines, submitted a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment 8 on even date. After the filing of petitioners Reply to private respondents Comment, we further requested the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The OSG filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum, adopting as its memorandum, the Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment it earlier filed. Petitioner and private respondent submitted their respective memoranda as required. Issues Petitioner raised the following arguments in support of his petition: I WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ FOREVER[,] BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS/SIGNBOARDS SHOW THE INJURIOUS NATURE OF THE IMPUTATIONS MADE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND TENDS TO INDUCE SUSPICION ON HIS CHARACTER, INTEGRITY AND REPUTATION AS MAYOR OF CADIZ CITY. II ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS ERECTED BY PETITIONER ARE DEFAMATORY, DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEY COMPRISE FAIR COMMENTARY ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST WHICH ARE THEREFORE PRIVILEGED? III WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IN THE CASE AT BAR HAS NOT BEEN OVERTHROWN. IV WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CHARGE OF LIBEL AND IN HOLDING HIM LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OFP500,000. 9
Summed up, the focal issues tendered in the present petition boil down to the following: 1) whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" is libelous; and 2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication. Our Ruling We ought to reverse the CA ruling. At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: 1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5. When the findings of fact are conflicting; 6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; 8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, 10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 10
Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the crime of libel are present in this case. Thus, following the general rule, we are precluded from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically paragraph 4 above, instead of the general rule. Petitioner takes exception to the CAs ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. He avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the character, integrity and reputation of private respondent. The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, asserts that "there is nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt." 11
The prosecution maintains that the appellate court correctly sustained the trial courts finding of guilt on petitioner. Citing well-established jurisprudence 12 holding that "[w]ords calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made" and that "[i]ronical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander," it argued that the words printed on the billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the ludicrous yet they were so deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against private respondents honor and reputation. A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." 13 "For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable." 14 Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel. Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine "whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense." 15 Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule." 16
Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the message printed in the billboards and gave a negative impression on what it says. They imply that the message conveys something as if the private respondent was being rejected as city mayor of Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of these witnesses is doubtful considering the moral ascendancy exercised over them by the private respondent such that it is quite easy for them to draw such negative impression. As observed by the OSG, at the time the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private respondent as mayor of Cadiz City, these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the project of the city government. Bernardita was a member of the Clean and Green Program of Cadiz City; Jude was employed as a licensing officer under the Permit and License Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita held the position of Utility Worker II of the General Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses, according to the OSG, would naturally testify in his favor. They could have verbicide the meaning of the word "NEVER." Prudently, at the least, the prosecution could have presented witnesses within the community with more independent disposition than these witnesses who are beholden to private respondent. According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to convey to the people of Cadiz that he is a tuta of Sagay City. We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position contrary to the interest of the People. In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the arguments of the petitioner, the OSG surprisingly joined stance with him, vehemently praying for his acquittal. We quote with approval the OSGs analysis of the issue which was the basis for its observation, thus: During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject billboards maligned his character and portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City, Thus: Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those billboards "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"? A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your question, it will not only require those "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" billboard[s], it was after which additional billboards were put up. That strengthen, that I am being a "Tuta of Sagay. I am being maligned because of those billboards that states and I repeat: "Ang Tubig san Cadiz, ginkuha sang Sagay", "Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz" and there is a small word under it, Zone 2, very small, very very small, you cannot see it in [sic] a glance. x x x x A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the signboards would like to convey to the people of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a "Tuta" or Puppet of Sagay City. x x x x 17
Contrary to private respondents assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards which state, either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his words, a "tuta" or "puppet" of Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet" of Sagay City. The billboards erected by petitioner simply say "CADIZ FOREVER", "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" 18
Apparently, private respondent refers to the circumstances mentioned in another billboard that is not the subject matter in the present charge. The aforesaid facts dismally failed to support the allegations in the instant information. Be that as it may, private respondent nevertheless did not specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on petitioners part that could have defamed him or caused his alleged injury. While it may be that the Court is not bound by the analysis and observation of the OSG, still, the Court finds that it deserves meritorious consideration. The prosecution never indulged to give any reason persuasive enough for the court not to adopt it. Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the controversial printed matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself. "[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation," 19 "words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill- natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself," as the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da Wah Council of the Phils., Inc. 20 1avvphil In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the reasons behind the printing of the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER." 21 Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of private respondents official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz City. For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the Court held in United States v. Bustos, 22 the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer "may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public [official] must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts." "In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt." 23 In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" imputes derogatory remarks on private respondents character, reputation and integrity. In this light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered moot. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 188323 February 21, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CHARLIE ABAO y CAARES, Appellant. R E S O L U T I O N BRION, J.: We decide, through this Resolution, the appeal filed by appellant Charlie Abao y Caares from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03060. On October 5, 2005, appellant Charlie Abao y Caares was accused of murder 1 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City, 2 under the following Information: That on or about the 3rd day of October, 2005 at around 10:00 P.M. at Brgy. Del Socorro, Municipality of Minalabac, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and hack one CESAR CABASE y SAN JUAQUIN, with a bolo causing him to sustain fatal wounds on the different parts of his body and head which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs as shall be proven in court. 3
The appellant pleaded not guilty. In the trial that followed, an eyewitness, the victims wife Richelda Madera Cabase, testified on the details of the crime. At about 10:00 p.m. of October 3, 2005, the victim (Cesar Cabase) was asleep in the room of their hut in Del Socorro, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, together with his youngest daughter (Criselda) and grandson. The room was illuminated by an outside kerosene lamp. While Richelda was about to join her sleeping family, the appellant suddenly barged into the room, focused a flashlight on the victim, and began hacking him with a bolo. Out of fear, Richelda retreated to a corner of the room while embracing her grandson. The appellant thereafter focused his flashlight on Richelda, but Criselda started crying. At that point, the appellant left. 4
Medico-legal findings revealed that multiple hack wounds with skull fractures caused the victims death. 5 The victims family claimed to have spent P26,535.00 as funeral and burial expenses, but could only supportP5,035.00 with receipts. 6
The appellant, interposing the defense of alibi, claimed that he was asleep at the night of the killing at the farm of Antonio Almediere at Zone 5, Del Socorro, Minalabac, about 300 meters away from the scene of the crime. 7
In its October 9, 2007 decision, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of murder mainly based on the eyewitness testimony of the victim's wife, Richelda. The trial court found her credible, consistent, and free of ill motive to testify against the appellant whom she knew well because he had previously lived with them for four years. It noted that the victims house was illuminated by a kerosene lamp that was sufficient for purposes of identification. The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the appellant attacked the victim who was asleep and was thus totally incapable of defending himself. But the court disregarded evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance because it was not duly established at the trial. The RTC sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 in temperate damages. 8
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC but deleted the award of temperate damages, finding that only P5,000.00 must be awarded as actual damages since only this amount was proven through receipts. 9 From the CA, the case is now with us for final review. We affirm the appellant's guilt. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.1awphil The eyewitness account of the victim's wife is worthy of belief as it was a straight forward account consistent with the presented physical evidence. The witness had no reason to falsify and she was only interested in having the real killer punished; no motive affecting her credibility was ever imputed against her. On the other hand, the appellant failed to show by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission; he was only a short 300 meters away. 10 Treachery qualified the killing to murder as the victim was asleep at the time of the assault; the victim could not have possibly defended himself against his assailant. 11 Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the felony, the lower courts properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. While we affirm the CAs factual findings and the imprisonment imposed, we find it necessary to modify the civil liability of the appellant. Since the receipted expenses of the victim's family was less than P25,000.00, temperate damages should have been awarded in lieu of actual damages. 12 With the finding of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, exemplary damages, too, of P30,000.00 should have been awarded. 13
WHEREFORE, the November 20, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- H.C. No. 03060 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Charlie Abao y Caares is found guilty of murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Cesar Cabase P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192251 February 16, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BARANGAY CAPTAIN TONY TOMAS, SR., BENEDICTO DOCTOR, and NESTOR GATCHALIAN, Accused-Appellants. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case Before Us is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated August 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated May 27, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 06-92 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac. The RTC found accused Tony Tomas, Sr. (Tomas, Sr.), Benedicto Doctor (Doctor), and Nestor Gatchalian (Gatchalian) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder. The Facts In an Information 3 filed on July 21, 2006, the three accused were indicted for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as follows: That on or about July 19, 2006, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot several times one Estrella Doctor Casco which [caused] her instantaneous death. Upon arraignment on September 14, 2006, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the above charge. 4 Trial 5 on the merits ensued after the pre-trial conference. Version of the Prosecution Estrella Doctor Casco (Estrella) was based in the United States, working there as a procurement specialist with Safeway, Inc. and as a planner. She arrived in the Philippines on July 9, 2006 or about 10 days before her untimely demise. At around 9:45 in the evening on July 19, 2006, the victim (Estrella), with her mother Damiana Doctor (Damiana) and caretakers Liezl Toledo (Liezl) and Angelita Duque (Angelita), were traversing the road towards her house in Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac after she had parked her rented car at the house of Liezls mother- in-law, Erlinda Toledo. They had just come from the clinic of Dr. Salvador for a medical check-up of Damiana. Estrella was walking slightly ahead of her mother and Angelita when appellants Tomas, Sr., Doctor and Gatchalian suddenly came out from the side of the road. Tomas, Sr. and Doctor are cousins of Estrella. Thereupon, without saying anything, Tomas, Sr. drew a gun and shot Estrella twice at a distance of about 1.5 meters away. Gatchalian, without a gun, allegedly supported Tomas, Sr. by standing in a blocking position along the road, while Doctor positioned himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita and poked a handgun at them, telling them to lie face down on the ground, though they did not totally drop on the road but were in a kneeling position. When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still followed it with three more shots when she was already prone on the ground. After the five shots, the three accused fled towards the house of Tomas, Sr. Liezl, who was standing about four meters away from Estrella, shouted, "Saklulu, tulungan ninyo kami (Help, help us)," then ran to her house. Meanwhile, Angelita came to the aid of 80-year-old Damiana, who suffered a hypertensive attack after seeing what happened to her daughter. Angelita waved her hand to seek assistance from Barangay Kagawad Yolanda Pablo (Kagawad Pablo) who came out on the road. Both Liezl and Angelita recognized the three accused from the light coming from the lamppost. The road was well lit. Doctors house was barely seven (7) meters from the scene of the crime, that of Tomas, Sr. about 15 meters away, while Gatchalian was staying in a hut in the fields. The people in the neighborhood heard the gunshots, and most of them came out of their houses to see what happened. Kagawad Pablo was watching TV in her house when she heard the gunshots and immediately went out to investigate. She saw three persons on the road: Damiana who was seated, Angelita who was squatting and holding a fan, and a person lying on the ground who was Estrella, already shot. She responded to Angelitas call for help to take Estrella to the district hospital. Rosalinda Areniego (Rosalinda), first cousin of Estrella, was with her child, Ryan, in her house watching the TV program "Sa Piling Mo" with actress Judy Ann Santos between 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. when she heard the gunshots. Her house was 10 to 15 meters away from the road. Liezl contacted Estrellas cousin, Captain Joel Candelario (Capt. Candelario), the Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police (PNP) detachment at Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac, who, in turn, contacted the police in Mayantoc, Tarlac. A half-hour later, Capt. Candelario arrived at the scene and, using a rented car, brought Estrella to the Malacampa District Hospital in Camiling, Tarlac accompanied by Liezl, Domingo Toledo (Liezls husband), Neri Corpuz (Liezls first cousin) and Kagawad Pablo. Estrella was declared dead on arrival by the attending doctors. Estrella was 56 years old when she died. Thereafter, Police Inspector Eleno Mangrobang (P/Insp. Mangrobang), the Chief of Police of Mayantoc, Tarlac arrived in the district hospital and asked questions from Liezl and Angelita. They were then brought to the police station for investigation where Liezl executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay (Sworn Statement). 6 Angelita likewise accomplished her Sinumpaang Salaysay. 7 Both Liezl and Angelita categorically identified the three accused as the ones who perpetrated the crime. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Saturnino Ferrer (Dr. Ferrer) a day after the shooting, or on July 20, 2006, showed four (4) gunshot wounds, one of them perforating the heart of Estrella. Dr. Ferrer issued the death certificate, citing the cause of death as "MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS, LACERATIONS OF THE UPPER PORTION OF THE HEART, MULTIPLE RIB FRACTURES, HEMOPERICARDIUM, LEFT HEMOTHORAX; SEVERE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE." 8
On the same day, July 20, 2006, Tomas, Sr. and Doctor were arrested in their respective homes, while Gatchalian was arrested in the woodland (kahuyan). The three were subjected to paraffin tests shortly after the policemen took them in custody and were found negative for gunpowder burns. Liezl opined that what probably prompted the three accused to murder Estrella were the facts that: (1) Tomas, Sr. was removed as administrator of Estrellas properties in Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac; (2) Tomas, Sr. lost several cases against Estrellas father, Cecilio Doctor (Cecilio); (3) Tomas, Sr. accused Estrella of instigating and financing several cases filed against him; and (4) Cecilio filed a case against Alejandro Doctor, the father of accused Doctor, involving an easement of a property. These apparent motives were corroborated by Angelita. Version of the Defense The accused denied involvement in the incident. Tomas, Sr. averred that he was at home sleeping when the incident happened. Since he suffered a cardiac arrest in December 1988, he had regular attacks and, on that day, feeling bad, he slept early at around 7:00 p.m. in a bed in the living room in front of the television and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the next day. He was not awakened by the gunshots the previous night and it was his wife who told him about Estrellas death from the shooting. In the morning of July 20, 2006, as barangay captain, he confirmed Estrellas death in front of Doctors house from his neighbors. His investigation did not identify the persons responsible for the crime. On the other hand, Doctor, the brother-in-law of Tomas, Sr. and a cousin of Estrella, likewise denied any involvement in the incident. He asserted that after working in the field the whole day of July 19, 2006, he went home at 4:00 p.m. At around 9:00 p.m. he went to sleep. At 10:00 p.m. he awoke to urinate and was told by his wife that his cousin Estrella met an accident. He was prevailed upon by his wife not to go out of the house. He then went back to sleep and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the next day. Gatchalian admitted that he was a farm helper of Tomas, Sr. and worked in the latters rice field. On the night of the incident, he claimed he was at home asleep with his 10-year-old son Jayson. He woke up the next day at 5:00 a.m. and proceeded to work in the farm of Tomas, Sr. On July 20, 2006, P/Insp. Mangrobang invited the accused to the Mayantoc police station for investigation but instead immediately brought them inside the municipal jail. An hour later, policemen brought them to Camp Macabulos for paraffin tests. Thereafter, they were returned to jail. The Ruling of the RTC On May 27, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr., Benedicto Doctor and Nestor Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, all of the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim, the following: 1]. The amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2]. The amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages; 3]. The amount of Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages; 4]. The amount of Php285,416.33 and another amount of $2,182.78 US dollars or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment as actual damages; and 5. The amount of $368,000.00 US dollars or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment for loss of income of the victim. SO ORDERED. The RTC appreciated the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita (caretakers of Estrella), Avelino Casco (husband of Estrella), Dr. Ferrer (the doctor who conducted the autopsy), and P/Insp. Mangrobang. It gave credence to the positive identification by Liezl and Angelita of the accused as the perpetrators. The RTC held as sufficient the positive identification, coupled with sufficient motive, on the part of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor and other circumstantial evidence proving the accused as the perpetrators of the murder of Estrella. The RTC appreciated treachery in the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon the unarmed Estrella without the slightest provocation, and the attendance of conspiracy through the accuseds contributory acts to successfully carry out the crime. Thus, the trial courts finding beyond reasonable doubt of the accuseds guilt to the offense of murder and the corresponding sentence of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in lieu of the death penalty. The RTC found the accuseds similar defenses of denial and alibi bereft of merit. It ratiocinated that these defenses were but mere denial and self-serving statements of the accused without any shred of supporting evidence. The additional defense testimonies of Milagros Reguine (Milagros), Rosalinda, Kagawad Pablo, Police Superintendent Daisy P. Babor (P/Supt. Babor), Rosendo Toledo (Rosendo), Police Officer 3 (PO3) Luciano Captan, and PO1 Celso Isidro did not disprove the evidence of the prosecution, much less proved the accuseds innocence. The trial court found incredulous the defense testimonies of Rosalinda, Milagros and Rosendo to the effect that the assailants were two young men, with the gunman sporting a flat-top haircut while his companion had long hair. The RTC ratiocinated that it would not have been easy for defense witnesses to identify the assailants due to the speed of the incident, their distance from the crime scene, and the fact that, at the start of the shooting, Rosalinda and Milagros were watching television in their respective homes while Rosendo was busy drinking with his buddies. Thus, between the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita who were with the victim and those of Rosalinda, Milagros and Rosendo, the RTC found the testimonies of the former more credible. Anent the negative paraffin tests on appellants, the RTC relied on Marturillas v. People, 9 where the Court reiterated its consistent ruling that a negative paraffin test conducted on an accused does not ipso facto prove said accused is innocent, for a negative paraffin test result is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. Aggrieved, the accused appealed 10 their conviction to the CA. The Ruling of the CA On August 12, 2009, the appellate court rendered its Decision, affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of the accused but modifying the award of actual damages to PhP 385,416.33 from PhP 285,416.33 to correctly reflect what was proved during trial. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, dated May 27, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 06-92 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, awarding the total of P385,416.33 as and by way of actual damages in addition to the US$2,182.78 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos previously awarded. The rest of the Decision stands. SO ORDERED. The CA found that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and their positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the killing of Estrella were more credible than the denial and self-serving averments by the defense witnesses, which were unsubstantiated. Reiterating the RTCs ruling that a negative paraffin test result is not conclusive of the accuseds innocence, the appellate court also found the presence of treachery and conspiracy in the manner the accused carried out the nefarious deed. The Issues Thus, the instant appeal, where both accused-appellants and the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, opted not to file any supplemental brief, since no new issues are raised nor any supervening events transpired, and correspondingly filed their respective Manifestations 11 to the effect that the Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 12 accused-appellants Motion for Reconsideration, 13 and the Brief for the Appellee 14 filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405 be used in resolving the instant appeal. Thus, accused-appellants raise the same assignments of errors earlier passed over and resolved by the CA, to wit: first, that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita were incredible and repugnant to human experience and behavior; second, the RTC erred in disregarding their negative paraffin test results and their defense of denial and alibi; third, there was no conspiracy; and fourth, there was no treachery. Elsewise put, accused-appellants question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and raise the issue of insufficiency of evidence to convict them, much less the presence of treachery and conspiracy. The Courts Ruling The appeal is partly meritorious. First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Accused-appellants assert that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita are not credible witnesses on the grounds of their partiality since they rely on the family of Estrella for their livelihood. They argue that the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita are too perfect since appellants could not have committed the crime in such a well-lit place where they could easily be identified, coupled with the fact that Liezl, Angelita and Damiana were spared from harm. They infer that the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita were fabricated. They also point to the reason that the adverse testimony of Liezl is on account of her ill feelings towards Doctor who previously subjected her to shame when he slapped her in public, and also to ingratiate herself to her employer, Cecilio, Estrellas father, who was charged by Tomas, Sr. in a case. To cast more doubt on their testimonies, accused-appellants point to the incongruity of both Liezl and Angelita not identifying them as the perpetrators of Estrellas killing immediately after the incident when they had ample opportunity to do so. In the case of Angelita, she only mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio and did not include Doctor and Gatchalian. And much worse in the case of Liezl, who rushed home looking for her cellular phone, and did not even bother to reveal accused-appellants identities to the responding policemen. We disagree. At the outset, We reiterate the consistent principle the Court applies when the issue of credibility of witnesses is raised in the backdrop of the findings of the trial court which are wholly affirmed by the appellate court. An established rule in appellate review is that the trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. 15 Indeed, it is settled that when credibility is in issue, the Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves, and observed their deportment during trial. 16
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. 17 The trial court found more credible the testimony of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita, who narrated in a straightforward and candid manner what transpired that fateful night of July 19, 2006. One with the appellate court, We find no reason to set aside their testimonies. The grounds of partiality and ill motive raised by accused-appellants cannot discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. For one, as the appellate court aptly noted, close relationship to the victim does not make a witness biased per se. 18 It has to be amply shown that the witness is truly biased and has fabricated the testimony on account of such bias. Accused-appellants have not sufficiently shown such a bias. The fact that Liezl and Angelita depend on the victims family for their job as caretakers does not make them biased witnesses. Besides, their testimonies have not been shown to be fabricated. The trial court that had scrutinized their deportment, facial expression, and body language during the trial has found them more credible. For another, the ill motive raised by accused-appellants has not been shown to affect the testimony of Liezl to suit her alleged personal ill feelings against Doctor. If it were so and the content of her testimony was fabricated, why did Liezl not make Doctor as the gunman who shot Estrella? And why include Gatchalian and Tomas, Sr.? But more telling of the veracity of the testimony of these prosecution witnesses are the following facts: (1) Angelita has not been shown to have any ill motive against accused-appellants; (2) during the time immediately after the shooting incident when Liezl ran to her house and Angelita brought Damiana home, Angelita was queried by Cecilio about who shot Estrella, and Angelita replied without hesitation that it was Tomas, Sr. who shot Estrella; 19 (3) when Angelita mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio as the gunman, she had not conferred with Liezl; thus, they could not have made it up that Tomas, Sr. was the gunman; (4) while it is true that Angelita did not mention the names of Doctor and Gatchalian, such does not denigrate from the fact that it was indeed Tomas, Sr. whom Angelita saw shooting Estrella with a handgun; (5) Angelita sufficiently showed by her testimony that she was busy attending to Damiana who had a hypertensive attack and the house was in chaos because of the incident and, thus, was not able to enlighten Cecilio more about the incident; and (6) the fact that both Liezl and Angelita made their official statements (sinumpaang salaysay) a few hours after the incident during the investigation conducted by P/Insp. Mangrobang initially at the district hospital and later at the police station shows that their account of what happened was not fabricated and they positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators. Consequently, the testimonies of Angelita and Liezl were neither fabricated nor prompted by any ill motive but were truly eyewitness accounts of what transpired that fateful night of July 19, 2006. Second Issue: Negative Paraffin Test and Defenses of Denial and Alibi Accused-appellants also allege error by the trial court in disregarding their negative paraffin test results coupled with their defenses of denial and alibi which, they strongly asserted, were corroborated by credible witnesses Rosalinda and Rosendo who do not appear to harbor any ill motive against the victim and her family. The testimonies of Rosalinda and Rosendo, according to accused-appellants, attest to the fact that the assailants were two young men. Moreover, they contend that their act of not fleeing is a circumstance that should favorably be considered. We are likewise not persuaded. Negative paraffin test not conclusive Accused-appellants were subjected to paraffin tests on July 20, 2006 at 11:05 a.m. or the very next day and a little over 14 hours after the shooting incident. Since gunpowder nitrates stay for 72 hours in the hands of a person who fired a handgun, a timely paraffin test, if positive, will definitely prove that a person had fired a handgun within that time frame. A negative result, however, does not merit conclusive proof that a person had not fired a handgun. Thus, the negative paraffin test results of accused-appellants cannot exculpate them, particularly Tomas, Sr., from the crime. Time and again this Court had reiterated that "even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun," 20 and that "a paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable." 21 This is so since there are many ways, either deliberately or accidentally, that the residue of gunpowder nitrates in the hands of a person who fired a handgun can be removed. This point was aptly explained and clarified by defense witness P/Supt. Babor, a Forensic Chemist and the Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas in San Fernando, Pampanga. She explained in open court the various factors affecting the non- adhesion, disappearance or removal of the residue of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a person who fires a gun, like the wind direction and velocity when the handgun was fired, the type of firearm used, the humidity or moisture present in the ammunition, and when the person wears gloves to preclude adhesion of the gunpowder nitrates. 22 Also, she explained that opening the pores of the skin will make the nitrates slough off or disappear and this could be done by subjecting the hands to heat, like steam from boiling water, or sufficiently washing the hands with warm water. Finally, gunpowder nitrates are also dissolved by diphenylamine. 23
Positive Identification As adverted to above, the credibility of prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita has not been successfully assailed by accused-appellants. Besides, in Our assiduous review of the records of the instant case, We cannot weigh and view the evidence in the same light as accused-appellants. It is axiomatic that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than their alibis and denials. 24
Thus, Angelita testified as to what happened and positively identified accused- appellants and their specific actions: ATTY. DE GUZMAN: While walking towards the house of Mrs. Casco at about past 9 oclock of July 19, 2006, do you recall of any unusual incident that transpired? ANGELITA DUQUE: Yes, sir. Q: What was that? A: Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas, Benedicto Doctor, and Nestor Gatchalian suddenly emerged and accosted us while we were going to the house of Mrs. Casco, sir. Q: In particular, what did Brgy. Captain Tomas do? A: He suddenly hold a gun and shot Mrs. Casco, sir. Q: How many times did Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas shoot Mrs. Casco? A: First, he fired two (2) gunshots to Mrs. Casco and Mrs. Casco fell on the ground and it was followed by another three (3) shots, sir. Q: While Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas was shooting at Mrs. Casco, what was Benedicto Doctor doing? A: Before Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas fired shots, Benedicto Doctor was already positioned at our back poking the gun to us, sir. Q: How about Nestor Gatchalian, what was he doing at the time Brgy. Captain Tony Tomas was shooting Mrs. Casco? A: Nestor Gatchalian was standing at the middle of the road supporting Brgy. Captain Tomas, sir. 25
On the other hand, Liezl likewise testified as to how the shooting transpired: ATTY. DE GUZMAN: While you were walking, do you recall of any unusual or extra ordinary occurrence that took place at that time? LIEZL TODLEDO: Yes, sir. Q: What was that? A: Tony [Tomas, Sr.], Benedicto Doctor and Nestor Gatchalian suddenly came out, sir. Q: What did Tony [Tomas, Sr.] do if any? A: He suddenly drew a handgun and shot Mrs. Casco, sir. Q: How many times did Tony [Tomas, Sr.] shoot Estrella Casco? A: At first, he fired two (2) shots sir, and followed it with three (3) more shots. Q: What happened to Mrs. Casco after the first two (2) shots? A: She fell down, sir. Q: What did you do, if any? A: I was standing, sir. And I heard another three (3) shots. Q: At the time you heard the three (3) shots, what did you do if any? A: When I saw the body of Mrs. Casco jerked, I shouted and ran away, sir. Q: You said, you shouted. What were the words you shouted? A: "Saklulu, tulungan ninyo kami", while running, sir. Q: Where did you run? A: Going to our house, sir. 26
It must be pointed out that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita knew accused- appellants well since they were neighbors. Thus, they have attained a high level of familiarity with each other. Once a person gains familiarity with another, identification becomes an easy task even from a considerable distance. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim and eyewitness minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 27 Their positive identification of accused- appellants as the perpetrators of the crime charged was categorical and consistent; hence, We cannot cast any doubt on their credibility as prosecution witnesses. 28 As aptly pointed out by the CA: With regard to the purported identification made by defense witnesses ROSALINDA ARENIEGO and ROSENDO TEODORO of the alleged culprits different from the accused- appellants, the Court notes with approval the RTCs observation that between the testimonies of eyewitnesses LIEZL and ANGELITA, and that of defense witnesses ROSALINDA and ROSENDO, the formers declarations were more credible, as they were in fact walking together with the victim when she was shot, while ROSALINDA and ROSENDO were supposedly about fifteen (15) meters away from the crime scene. 29
Besides, denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses. 30
Third and Fourth Issues: Appreciation of Treachery and Presence of Conspiracy We tackle the last two issues together for being related and intertwined, dealing as they were on how the crime of murder was perpetrated. Accused-appellants strongly maintain the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treacheryqualifying the killing of Estrella to murder; and the lack of conspiracy penalizing them equally for the crime of murder. They strongly assert the lack of treachery since their simultaneous and sudden appearance could not amount to it, for Tomas, Sr. still had to draw his gun before shooting Estrella, and Doctor still had to position himself behind Damiana and Angelita before ordering them to drop or lie face down on the ground. Evidently, the victim Estrella had ample opportunity to dodge or defend herself. And finally, accused-appellants point to the dearth of evidence showing their concerted acts in pursuing a common design to kill Estrella. Prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita point to Tomas, Sr. as the one who fired a handgun; Doctor was purportedly carrying one but did not use it, while Gatchalian did not carry one. They aver that the prosecution failed to show evidence of their intentional participation in the crime with a common design and purpose since Doctors act of holding a gun was never shown to be in furtherance of the killing of Estrella. And much less can Gatchalians act of merely standing on the road in the path of the four ladies ever constitute furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella. Accused-appellants arguments are partly meritorious. After a judicious study of the records at hand, We are compelled to affirm the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and of conspiracy. However, the evidence adduced and the records do not support a finding of conspiracy against appellant Gatchalian. Treachery duly proven A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties for the offense. 31 Murder is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, which provides: ART. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; 2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise; 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin; 4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity; 5. With evident premeditation; 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2)through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. Generally, the elements of murder are: 1. That a person was killed. 2. That the accused killed him. 3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248. 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide. 32
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Estrella was shot to deathshe succumbed to four gunshot wounds, one of which perforated her heartand it is neither parricide nor infanticide. That Tomas, Sr. killed the victim in a treacherous manner was established by the prosecution during the trial. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 33 Mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. 34 The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 35 Thus, frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. 36
For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: (1) the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted. 37 Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. 38
Consequently, the issue of the presence of treachery hinges on the account of eyewitnesses Liezl and Angelita, who witnessed everything from the inception of the attack until accused-appellants fled from the crime scene. Both were not only certain and unwavering in their positive identification of accused-appellants, but their testimony, as aptly noted by the courts a quo, were also factual, straightforward and convincing on how the murder transpired. To reiterate, as quoted above, while the party of Estrella was walking, accused- appellants suddenly appeared from the side of the road. Without uttering any word, Tomas, Sr. drew his gun and shot Estrella twice, while Doctor simultaneously poked a gun at Angelita and Damiana. And when Estrella already fell down, Tomas, Sr. shot her thrice moreperhaps to ensure her death. Then accused-appellants fled. It is, thus, clear that the shooting of Estrella by Tomas, Sr. was done with treachery. The nefarious act was done in a few moments, it was unexpected as it was sudden. The act of Doctor in immobilizing Angelita and Damiana in those brief moments afforded and ensured accused-appellants impunity from the unarmed Estrella and her three similarly unarmed companions. Conspiracy duly proven While We likewise affirm the presence of conspiracy, as adverted above, We cannot agree to the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court that Gatchalian is equally guilty on account of conspiracy to merit the same criminal liability as accused-appellants Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. Findings of facts are matters best left to the trial court. However, where the "trial court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the result," 39 then this Court will not shirk from its duty of ascertaining the proper outcome of such reversible error committed by the trial court. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. 40 Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crimeproof beyond reasonable doubt; 41 as mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. 42
In the instant case, the ascertained facts of the shooting to death of Estrella with treachery established beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of murder. Tomas, Sr.s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. To be equally guilty for murder, it must be shown that Doctor and Gatchalian conspired with Tomas, Sr., for in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is the act of all. 43 From the clear testimony of Angelita and Liezl, it has been duly established that Doctors contemporaneous act was made in furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella and ensuring impunity from the act. Indeed, Doctors cooperation in the shooting of Estrella ensured its accomplishment and their successful escape from the crime scene. Doctor is, thus, equally guilty and liable for the murder of Estrella on account of conspiracy. Gatchalian guilty as an accomplice Gatchalian, however, is differently situated as Doctor. We note that the evidence adduced and the records would show that Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned above, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. 44
It appears that Gatchalian is a party to the conspiracy as found by the courts a quo. Gatchalian appeared in the company of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. He also fled together with them. However, Gatchalian was unarmed and did not say anything or commit any overt act to externally manifest his cooperation with the shooting of Estrella. On the other hand, Gatchalian never attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show that he was aware of the plan and intent to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he acquiesced to the shooting of Estrella.1avvphi1 The trial court viewed Gatchalian as supporting Tomas, Sr. by taking a "blocking position" in the road. We, however, cannot subscribe to such a view considering that his presence is merely extraneous to the accomplishment of the crime. Besides, Angelita and Damiana were covered by Doctor who poked a gun at them, while Liezl was so far back that it would be incongruous, to say the least, that Gatchalian was blocking the road. Who would he be blocking then when the road is wide and Liezl was far back? Thus, with his lack of overt acts manifestly contributing to the accomplishment of the common design to shoot Estrella, there is some doubt if he indeed conspired with Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. This, however, does not exculpate him from criminal liability absent proof that he merely tagged along or just happened to meet his employer (Tomas, Sr.) shortly before the incident or was merely taken along without being told about the other accused-appellants plan. The fact that Gatchalian appeared together with the other accused-appellants and fled with them, while not constitutive of proof beyond reasonable doubt of conspiracy, still proves a certain degree of participation and cooperation in the execution of the crime. Consequently, in line with the principle that whatever is favorable to an accused must be accorded him, Gatchalian is guilty as an accomplice only. As We aptly explained in People v. Ballesta: Mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan and acquiescence thereto are not sufficient grounds to hold a person as a conspirator. x x x Lacking sufficient evidence of conspiracy and there being doubt as to whether appellant acted as a principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and is thus held liable only as an accomplice. x x x Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liabilitythat of a mere accomplice. 45
Proper Penalties We agree with the courts a quo that Tomas, Sr. and Doctor merit to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Estrella. As an accomplice to the murder, Gatchalian is liable to a penalty of reclusion temporal or one degree lower than the imposable penalty for murder. Considering that there are no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances applicable, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is proper. Considering further the applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law since Gatchalian is not disqualified under Section 2 of said law, the proper penalty imposable is prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. Award of Damages Finally, on the damages awarded, the CA correctly modified the actual damages to PhP 385,416.33 46 and USD 2,182.78, 47 the amounts duly proven during trial with supporting official receipts and corresponding documents related to actual expenses for the casket, funeral services and the airfreight of Estrellas remains back to the United States. Anent the grant of damages for loss of income or earning capacity in the amount of USD 368,000, We find it proper and duly proven. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. 48 The prosecution duly proved Estrellas loss of earning capacity by presenting the statement from her employer, Safeway Inc., which showed her earning an hourly rate of USD 25.233. 49 Likewise, Estrellas 2006 Wage and Tax Statement from her Employees Records in the Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service 50 shows her earnings for 2006 at USD 29,828.72. Evidently, as shown by her husband Avelino Cascos testimony, Estrella was averaging gross earnings of USD 48,000 annually. In applying the formula 51 used in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the RTC arrived at the figure of USD 368,000 as compensation for Estrellas heir for loss of income or earning capacity. We find no reason to disturb this finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. Moreover, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages other than the commission of the crime. 52 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Estrella is in order. 53 Likewise, the CA correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of PhP 50,000 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief to her family. 54 With the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the award of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages is justified under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code. 55 Besides, the entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages is proper. 56
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED as to appellant NESTOR GATCHALIAN. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated August 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03405 is hereby MODIFIED in that NESTOR GATCHALIAN is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the offense of Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Gatchalian is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months ofreclusion temporal, as maximum. The rest of the appealed decision stands. The May 27, 2008 RTC Decision should be modified to read, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr. and Benedicto Doctor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua. This Court also finds accused Nestor Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the offense of Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Likewise, all of the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim, the following: 1.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as moral damages; 3.) The amount of PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; 4.) The amount of PhP 385,416.33 and another amount of USD 2,182.78 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment as actual damages; and, 5.) The amount of USD 368,000 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment for loss of income of the victim. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187077 February 23, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the July 31, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00926, which affirmed the July 21, 2003 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 7383-2000-C, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA. 3
Accused Alex Condes y Guanzon (accused) was charged with the crime of rape in an information 4 dated February 23, 2000, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about February 14, 1999 at Brgy. Bitin, Municipality of Bay, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while conveniently armed with a bolo through force, violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal relation with one AAA, a fourteen (14) year old minor, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. Version of the Prosecution The thrust of the prosecutions evidence has been summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief 5 as follows: On the eve[ning] of February 14, 1999, the 14-year old victim, AAA, was left alone with her stepfather, appellant Alex Condes, at their house in Brgy. Bitin, Laguna. She was cleaning the upstairs area of the house, when appellant entered the room, pointed a bolo at her neck, and warned her not to shout. He pulled her down to the floor, removed her clothes, and when she tried to push him away subdued her with a threat of a cut from his bolo. Appellant removed his own garments, positioned himself on top of his stepdaughter, and succeeded in inserting his penis into the victim. He made push and pull movement for about ten minutes. The pain the victim felt in her sex organ was excruciating. After satisfying himself, appellant wiped his sex organ. Threatening to kill her brothers and sister, he made AAA promise not to tell anyone about the incident. She kept the unpalatable promise until December 30, 1999, when appellant tried to rape her again. Determined to obtain justice, the victim called her aunt in San Pablo City and disclosed the revolting incident. On January 4, 2000, accompanied by her aunt, AAA was taken to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang Calamba, Laguna, where she was examined by Dr. Joselito Rodrigo whose findings revealed the following: "scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coapted with pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an elastic fleshy type hymen with deep-healed laceration at 6 oclock position. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is soft. Findings are compatible with 9 to 10 weeks pregnant already" Version of the Defense In his Brief, 6 the accused denied the charges against him and presented his own version of the circumstances before and during the alleged incident. Thus: Rose Catalan is a lady guard of the Guzent Incorporated in Tiwi, Albay, where the accused used to work since 1991. She is in-charge of the time records of all the employees in the said establishment. On February 13, 1999, the accused reported for work, which was indicated in their logbook. The accused left the company at 11:10 in the morning but proceeded to Tiwi Hot Spring. Alex Condes vehemently denied the accusation hurled against him. He recalled that in the morning of February 14, 1999, he returned the service vehicle to his office at No. 1237 EDSA, Quezon City. He went home soon thereafter to take a short nap in his house in Quezon City. At 5:00 oclock in the morning, he decided to go to his house in Brgy. Bitin, Bay, Laguna. Upon reaching home, he went to sleep again until his brother-in-law and a companion arrived. They had a drinking spree. The complainant asked permission to attend a fiesta at her friends house. At 7:00 oclock in the evening, he asked his mother-in-law and the complainant to prepare his things as he would return to Manila the following day. He left his house on February 15, 1999 at 3:30 in the morning. Alberto Navarette, barangay captain of Bitin, in Bay, Laguna, averred that he saw the accused inside the latters house in the morning of February 14, 1999. He also saw the complainant washing dishes in their kitchen. Then, in the afternoon, he passed by the house of the accused and saw him carrying a child while the complainant was in front of their house. He did not notice anything unusual. On July 21, 2003, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape. It rejected the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by the accused stating that said defenses fell flat in the face of the testimony of AAA on her harrowing ordeal in the hands of the accused. It found her testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, consistent with human nature, and in the normal course of events. 7 The lower court, however, ruled that the accused can only be convicted of simple rape and not in its qualified form. It reasoned out that while the prosecution was able to establish the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship which would warrant the imposition of death penalty under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance of stepfather- daughter relationship was not alleged in the information. Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the herein accused ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of rape. There being no modifying circumstances properly alleged in the Information to be appreciated, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim AAAP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED. 8
The records of the case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Efren Mateo, 9 the Court issued a resolution 10 dated January 19, 2005 transferring this case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. The CA eventually affirmed 11 the guilty verdict on the basis of AAAs testimony which it found credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction. It debunked the defense of alibi of the accused holding that it was not satisfactorily established and not at all persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing identification by the victim. On August 29, 2008, the accused filed the Notice of Appeal, 12 which was given due course by the CA in its Minute Resolution 13 dated September 8, 2008. On June 1, 2009, the Court issued the Resolution 14 requiring the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. On July 7, 2009, the OSG manifested 15 that it would forego the filing of a supplemental brief if appellant should opt not to file one. On October 12, 2009, the Court dispensed 16 with the filing by the Public Attorneys Office of a supplemental brief for appellant when it did not file one during the prescribed period. From the Appellants Brief of the accused filed with the CA, he prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the guilty verdict anchored on the following: ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLEGED ACT WAS NOT PROVEN WITH CERTAINTY. In essence, the accused claims that AAA merely concocted the accusation of rape out of hatred because she resented the hard discipline imposed by him and she feared that he would punish her once he would learn that she had a boyfriend and pregnant at that. He tags AAAs story of defloration as both preposterous and ridiculous conjured by an overly imaginative individual anchored on ill motives. Professing innocence, he insists that he could not have possibly committed the offense charged as he was pre-occupied and even left the house on the day of the alleged commission of the sexual assault. He discredits AAAs testimony stressing that it would be difficult for him to commit the crime considering that her siblings and grandmother were staying in the same house. Thus, he concludes that the evidence for the prosecution failed to meet that quantum of proof necessary to warrant his conviction. The OSG, on the other hand, counters that AAAs testimony was credible and sufficient to convict and that the culpability of the accused for the crime of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Courts Ruling The appeal must fail. In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by three settled principles: First, an accusation for rape can be made with facility and it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and Third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 17 Corollary to the above principles is the rule that the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in the prosecution of a rape case. 18 Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony because, by the very nature of this crime, it is usually the victim alone who can testify as to its occurrence. In his Brief, the accused put in issue the credibility of AAAs testimony contending that she merely fabricated the accusation to place him behind bars and rid him out of her life forever. This contention deserves scant consideration. Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" 19 are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. 20 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA. 21
In the case at bench, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the trial courts findings and its calibration of private complainants credibility. A meticulous review of the transcript of stenographic notes would show that AAA narrated in the painstaking and degrading public trial her unfortunate and painful ordeal in the hands of the accused in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner. There were no perceptible artificialities or pretensions that tarnished the veracity of her testimony. She recounted the tragic experience, unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points and unshaken by the tedious and grueling cross-examination. Her declaration revealed each and every detail of the incident and gave no impression whatsoever that her testimony was a mere fabrication. Had her story been contrived, she would not have been so consistent throughout her testimony in the face of intense and lengthy interrogation. When offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16 years of age, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true. 22 Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. 23 It bears stressing that not an iota of evidence was presented by the defense showing that AAAs account of her defilement was not true. Without hesitation, AAA pointed an accusing finger against the accused, her stepfather no less, as the person who sexually assaulted her on that fateful night of February 14, 1999. She vividly recalled that he poked a bolo at her neck and told her not to shout or else he would kill her. Bent on satisfying his lust, he embraced and pulled her down on the floor. He took off her pajamas, undressed himself and placed himself on top of her. She resisted by pushing him away but he again pointed the bolo and ordered her not to move or shout. He then succeeded in penetrating her organ with his own causing her excruciating pain. Thereafter, he warned her that he would kill her and her siblings if she would tell anyone about what happened. The following excerpts from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes are revealing: Fiscal Loreto M. Masa (On Direct Examination) Q: On February 14, 1999, tell us where you were? A: In the house, sir. Q: When you said "in the house," are you referring to the house in Bitin? A: Yes, sir. Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened to you on February 14, 1999? A: Yes, sir. Q: Tell us what was that unusual incident you said you experienced? A: Alex Condes raped me, sir. Q: Where were you raped by Alex Condes? A: In our house in the evening in Bitin. Q: And how did he rape you? A: Because at that time, my grandmother and my brothers and sisters, except my youngest sister, were not in the house and I was alone upstairs and was cleaning the house when he pointed a bolo at me. Q: In what portion of your body this bolo was pointed at you? A: In my neck, sir. Q: Where were you? What portion of the house were you at that time he pointed a bolo in your neck? A: Upstairs sir, he was also there. Q: What did the accused tell you when he pointed a bolo at your neck? A: He told me not to shout or else he will kill me. Q: What did you do when he told you not to shout or else he would kill you? A: I just asked him "Papa, bakit po?" and because he was pointing a bolo at me I was frightened. Q: And when you ask her [sic] "Papa, bakit po?" what did he do? A: Nothing, sir, he continued. Q: When you said he continued, what do you mean? What did he do to you? A: Because I was then at the door and was then about to go to the other room when he pulled me and embraced me. Q: When you said he pulled you where were you pulled by the accused? A: To the bed, sir. Q: At the time you were being pulled and being embraced, what did you do? A: I was resisting, sir. Q: What happened after you said the accused was pulling you and embracing you and you were resisting? What happened next? A: Nothing, sir. I was not able to do anything because he embraced me. Q: You said you were not able to evade him when he was embracing you, what did he do next to you? A: He removed my clothes. Q: What did you do when the accused removed your clothes? A: I was pushing him. Q: What happened when you were pushing him? A: He again pointed the bolo and told me not to move or to shout. Q: What did he do after he again threatened you? A: Because I was very frightened, he forced me to do what he wanted me to do. Q: Was the accused able to remove your clothes? A: Yes, sir. Q: What clothes? A: Pajamas, sir. Q: How about the accused? A: His sando and shorts, sir Q: What was your position at the time you said the accused was able to do it from you? A: I was lying down, sir. Q: Where were you lying down, on the bed or on the floor? A: On the floor, sir. Q: How did the accused rape you after removing your clothes? A: He was forcing "yung ano nya sa ari ko." Q: Was he able to insert his penis to your private organ? A: Yes, sir. Q: What did you feel when your stepfather was able to insert his private organ to yours? A: It was painful, sir. Q: For how long was he on top of you? A: Five to ten minutes, sir. Q: What were you doing at the time your stepfather was doing it to you when he was inserting his private organ against your will? A: I was pushing him. Q: What happened after you said you were pushing him? A: Nothing, sir. Q: And you said he was able to rape you and inserted his private organ to you, what did he do next after he was able to insert your private organ to your vagina? A: He was pumping me. Q: When you said "pump", will you explain? A: He was "kinakadyot ako." Q: That was while he was on top of you? A: Yes, sir. Q: After pumping you, what did he do next? A: He was kissing me, sir. Q: When he was kissing you, what were you doing? A: I was pushing his face, sir. Q: What happened next? A: Because I cannot do anything he was able to finish. Q: Why were you able to say that he was able to finish? A: Because when he removed his private organ from my private part, he wiped it. Q: After he removed his private organ from your organ what did he do next? A: He told me not to complain or else he would kill us. Q: What did you feel by his threatening against you and your brothers and sisters that you would be killed? A: I was frightened, sir. Q: After threatening you that you and your brothers and sisters would be killed, what did he do next? A: So he told me to go down. Q: How about the accused, where was he? A: He stayed inside. Q: Where was your mother at that time? A: She was in Dubai, sir. Q: How about your grandmother, where was she? A: She was in the market, sir. Q: You said your brothers and sisters were not in your house, where were they? A: They were outside the house. I do not know what were they doing outside the house. Q: You said you went down, what did you do when you went down? A: Because "diring-diri ako" I went inside the bathroom, sir. Q: What did you do there? A: I took a bath, sir. 24
The Court is convinced that the accused did employ threat and intimidation to subjugate AAAs will and break her resistance. She categorically stated that he poked a bolo at her neck and threatened to kill her if she would make a noise and resist his advances. Undoubtedly, fear and helplessness gripped her. To an innocent girl who was only 14 years old, his menacing acts engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she would resist or not yield to his bestial demands, he would make good his threats. She was obviously cowed into submission by the real and present threat of physical harm on her person. Obviously, she was silenced to do his bidding. Her submission was re-enforced by the fact that the accused was her stepfather who exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her. When a victim is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist. 25
In the present case, it appears that AAA chose to suffer the February 14, 1999 rape in silence had it not been for the second attempt to defile her on December 30, 1999. After he mauled her when she resisted, she was compelled to seek her aunts assistance. This was apparent from her testimony when she declared: Fiscal Masa to Witness: (Redirect Examination) Q: You said that you were not able to report to anybody that you were raped by your stepfather because of that threat[s] that your brothers and sister will be killed, why did you report or give statement to the police on January 1, 2000? The Fiscal: May I manifest for the record, your Honor that the witness is crying. A: Because on December 30, he was again about to rape me but I resisted so he mauled me and poked a bolo at me and told me that he will kill my aunt so the following day I went to San Pablo to my aunt, who is near to me, and told her what happened and what he has done to me that he mauled me and will kill my aunt. Q: And what did your aunt in San Pablo do after you confided to her what the accused did to you? A: She immediately reported the incident to Sgt. Manaog. Q: Do you know what Sgt. Manaog did after your aunt confided to him what happened to you? A: He was arrested, sir. X x x Atty. Ingente: Recross, your Honor. Q: When you told the incident to your aunt you were also thinking of your brothers and sisters? A: Yes, sir. Q: And in fact perhaps at that time you were afraid that your aunt will report the incident to the police? A: No, sir because at that time I was also prepared to report the incident. Q: But you know that the accused made threats that he will kill your brothers and sister? A: Yes, sir but I was then ready because I was thinking then that may be he was threatening me because he want to rape me so I decided to file a complaint. And I was also thinking that how would he kill his own children? 26
AAAs failure to immediately report to anyone what she had suffered in the hands of her stepfather does not vitiate the integrity of her claim. Apparently, the accused succeeded in instilling fear upon her young mind when he threatened to kill her and her siblings should she say a word about the incident. Thus, paralyzed by the fear that he would make good his threats, she remained silent and only broke it when he tried to repeat the sexual assault. The subsequent attack brought her silence to the breaking point and forced her to come out in the open to prevent and avoid further assaults. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Neither does it necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. 27
Any insinuation of ill motive on the part of AAA in the filing of the rape case against her stepfather does not merit any consideration. It is highly improbable that she would concoct a sordid tale of sexual abuse against the accused, whom she called "Papa," simply because she was reproved or censured for her irresponsible ways and was afraid that he would punish her for getting pregnant by her boyfriend. Parental punishment is not enough reason for a young girl to falsely accuse her stepfather of a crime so grave as rape. Reverence and respect for the elders are two values deeply ingrained in Filipino children. 28
Granting AAA indeed resented his stepfather, the Court does not necessarily cast doubt on AAAs credibility as witness. Motives, such as those arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the Court from giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor complainants 29 who remained steadfast throughout their direct and cross-examination. 30 After all, ill motive is never an essential element of a crime. It becomes irrelevant and of no significance where there are affirmative, nay, categorical declarations towards the culpability of the accused for the felony. Well-entrenched is the doctrine which is founded on reason and experience that when the victim testifies that she has been raped, and her testimony is credible, such testimony may be the sole basis of conviction. 31 In this case, there could not have been a more powerful testament to the truth than her public outpouring of her unspoken grief. In an attempt at exculpation, the accused claims that it is difficult to commit the crime of rape inasmuch as AAAs siblings and grandmother were staying in the same house at Barangay Bitin, Municipality of Bay, Laguna. The argument fails. According to AAA, her siblings were all outside the house while her grandmother was doing an errand in the market when the accused molested her. Granting arguendo that there were other people in the house when the rape was committed, rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby or the members of the family. 32 Lust, being a very powerful human urge, is, to borrow from People v. Virgilio Bernabe, 33 "no respecter of time and place." Rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest places and circumstances and by the most unlikely persons. 34 The beast in a man bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere - even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. Besides, there is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. 35
In stark contrast to AAAs firm declaration, the defenses of denial and alibi invoked by the accused rest on shaky grounds. The accused insists that "the accusation is a lie" 36 and claims that "I did not do that." 37 He avers that he could not have committed the offense because he was preoccupied and was not in their house at Barangay Bitin, Bay, Laguna on the date and time the alleged rape was perpetrated. Judicial experience has taught this Court that denial and alibi are the common defenses in rape cases. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 38 It is a negative self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The barefaced denial of the charge by the accused cannot prevail over the positive and forthright identification of him as the perpetrator of the dastardly act. Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses for it can be easily contrived. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 39 In this case, not a shred of evidence was adduced by the accused to substantiate his alibi. A perusal of his own testimony discloses that he arrived at their house at Barangay Bitin, Bay, Laguna at past 9:00 oclock in the morning; that he had visitors who came to attend their town fiesta and they had a drinking spree; that after his visitors and AAA left at past 12:00 oclock noon, he took a slumber; that he woke up at around 7:00 oclock in the evening and asked AAA and her grandmother to prepare his things as he would return to Manila; and that he left for Manila at 3:30 oclock in the morning of February 15, 1999. 40 From the foregoing, it is clear that he was at home in the evening of February 14, 1999. Alibi necessarily fails when there is positive evidence of the physical presence of the accused at the crime scene. 41 Taken in this light, the plausible and emphatic testimony of AAA must prevail. Finally, the Court sustains the two courts below in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the accused. The applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (effective October 22, 1997), covering the crime of Rape are Articles 266-A and 266-B which provide: Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed: 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7383-2000-C specifically alleged that AAA was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the rape. In proving her minority, the prosecution presented a birth certificate 42 issued by the Office of City Civil Registrar of San Pablo City showing that she was born on January 2, 1985. Hence, she was 14 years old when she was raped by the accused on February 14, 1999. However, the courts below correctly noted that the qualifying circumstance of her relationship with the accused as his stepdaughter was not alleged in the Information, although proven during the trial and not even contested by the accused. 43 This omission prevents the transformation of the crime in its qualified form. The twin requisites of minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender being special qualifying circumstances, which increase the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, should be alleged in the information because of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 44 The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000, explicitly mandates that the information must state in ordinary and concise language the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending an offense. Although the crime of rape in this case was committed before the effectivity of the new rules, it should be applied retroactively, as the same is favorable to an accused. 45
The Court notes, however, that the Information also alleged that the accused committed the rape "while conveniently armed with a bolo through force, violence and intimidation." The prosecution was able to prove during trial his use of a deadly weapon and threatening words which caused the victim to submit to his will for fear for her life and personal safety. When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is the range of two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. In this connection, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.lawph!l The Court also sustains the monetary awards granted by the RTC and the CA in favor of AAA, except for the exemplary damages which is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with our ruling in People v. Gilbert Castro 46 and earlier cases. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 47 Moral damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim suffered trauma, with mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof. These are too obvious to still require their recital by the victim at the trial. 48
The award of exemplary damages is likewise called for because the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon. In People v. Silverio Montemayor, 49 the Court has stated that "exemplary damages are justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the rapes subject of these cases, exemplary damages x x x may be awarded to the offended party in each case." WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00926 is herebyAFFIRMED except as to the exemplary damages which is hereby increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177570 January 19, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y CRUZ, Accused-Appellants. D E C I S I O N LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J. Jundoc (Jundoc), and Nora C. Jingabo (Jingabo) were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, with Violations of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, paragraphs (e-l), (f), (m), and (o) of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads: That on or about September 29, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confed erating together and helping one another, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport or give away to another any prohibited drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, or offer for sale, deliver or transport marijuana dried flowering tops with total weight of thirty two thousand nine hundred ninety five (32,995) grams which is a prohibited drug. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-177383. Upon arraignment, all accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty. 2
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Police Officer (PO) 3 Wilfredo Masanggue (Masanggue), Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Anthony Blanco (Blanco), PO3 Eduardo Pama (Pama), and Forensic Chemist George de Lara (De Lara). The RTC summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as follows: Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at about 6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he and SPO1 Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief Inspector Romulo Sapitula to proceed at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where, according to the report given by the informant, three persons a male and two female[s] would be coming from Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of marijuana. In no time, they arrived at the designated place and parked their mobile patrol car along Juan Luna Street, facing the northern direction just near the corner of Raxabago Street. At around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from Yuseco St. heading towards the direction of the pier. At a certain point along Raxabago Street, about a hundred meters away from the position of their patrol car the taxi stopped. From it emerged three passengers a man and two women each one of them carrying a black travelling bag. As the trio fitted the descriptions given to them by Inspector Sapitula, they intently watched and monitored their movements. About one or two minutes later, as the trio started walking towards the western portion of Raxabago St., they drove and trailed them. As the patrol car got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its presence. She started walking in a more hurried pace ("parang walkathon") as if she wanted to run away ("parang patakbo"). SPO1 Blanco alighted from the car and chased [Dequina] while PO3 Masanggue, who was behind the wheels also alighted and restrained [Jundoc] and [Jingabo]. While thus trying to get away, [Dequina] dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the zipper of the bag gave way. Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags case into view. Suspecting the stuffs to be marijuana, they further inspected the other two bags in the possession of [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] and found out that they had the same contents. They boarded the three accused, along with their bags in their patrol car and proceeded to the hospital for physical examination before bringing them to their headquarters. While in transit, [Dequina] pleaded to them to allow her to make a call but they did not heed the request as the car was still in motion. At the western Police District Headquarters at United Nations Avenue, they turned over the three accused together with the bags to PO3 Eduardo Pama, a police investigator of the district Anti-Narcotics Unit for investigation. During the investigation, it was discovered that each of the three black travelling bags confiscated from the three accused contained eleven bricks of marijuana. In connection with the incident, he and SPO1 Blanco executed the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension dated September 30, 1999 (Exhs, "A" and submarkings). SPO1 Anthony Blanco testified that in the early morning of September 29, 1999, together with PO3 Wilfredo Masanggue, he was dispatched by their superior to the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where it was reported that shipment of marijuana would take place. They were further informed that the drug couriers were composed of a man and two women and that each of them were carrying a travelling bag. After they arrived at the designated area, they parked their vehicle along Juan Luna near Raxabago Street. Then they waited. Suddenly, they noticed the arrival of a taxicab from where three persons a man and two women alighted. Each of them was carrying a bag. The trio fitted the descriptions given to them. As the suspects walked away, they drove and trailed them. As they got close behind them, accused Nelida Dequina noticed the presence of the mobile car. She dropped the black bag she was carrying and the same was unzipped. The contents thereof consisting of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags came into view. They arrested the three suspects later identified as the accused herein and boarded them into their car. While on board the vehicle, [Dequina] and [Jundoc] confessed that the contents of the other two bags confiscated from them were also marijuana. At the WPD Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, the three accused were turned over to the Office of the District Anti-Narcotics Unit where they were investigated by PO3 Wilfredo Pama. It was there where the other two bags confiscated from [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] were re-opened and confirmed to contain marijuana. In the course of his cross-examination, SPO1 Blanco admitted that the three of them Inspector Sapitula, PO3 Masanggue and himself, along with the three accused, were photographed, at what appeared to be a "sari-sari" store as their background. The same appeared in the clipping of "Tonight" September 20, 1999 issue. PO3 Eduardo Pama, an investigator from the District Anti-Narcotics Unit of the WPD was the one who investigated the case. He placed the corresponding markings on the packs of marijuana confiscated from the three accused after the same were turned over to him by SPO1 Blanco and PO3 Masanggue. He marked the bag recovered from [Dequina] "NDD" and the contents thereof "NDD-1" to "NDD-11". He marked the bag taken from [Jundoc] "JJJ" and the contents thereof " JJJ-1" to "JJJ-11". Finally, he marked the bag recovered from [Jingabo] "NCJ" and the contents thereof "NCJ-1" to "NCJ-11". In connection with his investigation, he prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Reports of the three accused (Exhs. "F". "G" and "H") as well as the Referral Letter to the City Prosecutors Office (Exh. "I"). Afterwards, he brought the three bags of suspected marijuana together with the letter-request to the National Bureau of Investigation [(NBI)] Chemistry Division, for the laboratory examinations. The same were received thereat on September 29, 1999 at 10:12 in the evening. The following day, September 30, 1999, at 10:38 p.m., certifications, corresponding to each and every set of items recovered from the three accused were released to PO3 Pama. George De Lara, Forensic Chemist, Forensic Chemistry Division, NBI, Manila testified that he conducted the laboratory examinations of the subject specimens based on the letter-request from DANU Police Superintendent Miguel de Mayo Laurel (Exh. "B" and submarkings). From the black bag (Exh. "K") allegedly recovered from [Dequina], he counted a total of eleven bricks of dried leaves suspected to be marijuana which had a total weight of 10,915.0 grams. The results of the chemical, microscopic and chromatographic examinations he conducted show that the said specimens were positive for the presence of chemical found only in marijuana. With regard to the bag allegedly confiscated from [Jundoc] (Exh. "O"), witness counted eleven bricks of dried leaves believed to be marijuana. The specimens had a total weight of 11,010.0 grams. When subjected to be same type of laboratory examinations, the specimens yielded positive result for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Anent the bag (Exh. "R") with masking tape having the mark "DDM-99-110" allegedly recovered from [Jingabo], witness also found eleven bricks of dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana which when weighed yielded a total weight of 11,070.0 grams. The results of similar types of examinations conducted confirmed the specimens to be marijuana. He prepared separate certifications for the results of the examinations he conducted on the specimens contained in three separate bags allegedly confiscated from accused Dequina, Jundoc and Jingabo (Exhs. "C", "D" and "E", respectively). He also prepared NBI Forensic Chemistry Division Report No. DDM-99-108 dated October 1, 1999 (Exh. "L" and submarkings). 3
For the defense, only the accused-appellants took the witness stand. The RTC recapitulated the testimonies of the accused-appellants, thus: Accused Nelida Dequina testified that she became an orphan at a tender age. With the help of her aunt, she was able to pursue her studies. She was a consistent scholar from elementary until college. While in the third year of her Accountancy course, she encountered severe financial difficulties. She stopped schooling and worked instead. Soon, she had a relationship with a man with whom she begot a child. The relationship did not last. Not long after, she had a relationship with another man. This time she begot her second child named Samantha. In May 1999, while the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) members were having a parade in Iloilo City, she met a certain Salvacion Pearedondo, a member of the group. She calls her Sally. Sally convinced her to join the movement. Since she used to watch similar group activities while in college, she manifested her desire to join the movement by nodding her head. From then on, Sally frequently visited her at home. For a living, she was engaged in selling ready-to-wear dresses, frozen meat and relief goods which Sally supplied to her. On September 27, 1999, Sally told her that the movement had decided to send her to a mission which would determine if she was really qualified to join the group. She was advised to bring alone two friends, preferably a woman and a gay. As at time Sally saw them in her company, she chose Nora Jingabo and Joselito Jundoc to be her companions. Sally did not elaborate the real nature of such mission. She did not press to know more about the venture either. Before they parted that day, Sally instructed her to fetch her two friends and meet her (Sally) early in the morning of the following day, September 28, 1999 near the entrance of the Gaisano Mall, the largest department store in Iloilo. She dropped by the public market and told Nora and Joselito about the plan to meet Sally the following morning. As agreed upon, they met Sally at the designated place and time. Sally secretly told her that the three of them would be going to Manila for a still undisclosed mission. She was briefed that the three of them will temporarily stay in the house of her [Dequina] relative in Manila. She was further instructed that they will go to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in Avenida where they will be met by members of their group who will also monitor their movements. Afterwards, they will proceed to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga where they will pick-up some bags. Thereat, somebody will meet and give them instructions. From Dau, they will return to Manila. They will alight at the first ShoeMart Department Store which they will see along the way. A waiting tricycle would bring them to a store where they could buy carton boxes for their bags. Finally, a taxicab will fetch and bring them all the way to the pier. [Dequina] received P3,000.00 from Sally for their expenses and plane tickets for the three of them from Sally. However, she noticed that instead of their true names, the tickets were in the names of other persons. Her plane ticket was in the name of Sarah Ganje. That of [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were in the names of Rowenal Palma and Mary Grace Papa, respectively. Nervous, she thought of backing out at the last minute but Sally assured her that she had nothing to worry about. Sally culminated by saying that something will happen to her child if ever she backed out from the plan. Because of the threat, [Dequina] went on with the plan. Enroute to the Iloilo airport, [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] expressed their anxieties about the venture but she calmed them down and assured them that she will take care of everything. From the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to her aunts place at Pitogo St., Guadalupe, Makati City where they rested after taking their meal. At around 2:00 p.m., her aunt woke her up and told her that the two vehicles an owner-type jepney and a passenger jepney with unfamiliar faces on board were lurking in their vicinity for quite sometime. At around 5:00 p.m., they left the place on board a taxi to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal at Avenida, Rizal. While waiting for their schedule, two men approached and handed to her bus tickets. The same men nosed out to them the vehicle where they were supposed to board. She was further reminded by the men that members of the movement will also be on board. They arrived in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga at about 12:30 a.m. of September 29, 1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple went near and instructed them to cross the road and take the bags from the three men whom they saw for the first time. The couple also handed over to them bus tickets. They were instructed to board vehicles bound for Pasay and alight at the first Shoemart (SM) Department Store that they will see along the way. They took the bags from the three men without even bothering to know the contents thereof. However, she noticed that the bags were very heavy. As they boarded the Pasay bound bus, the conductor took the bags from them and loaded the same in compartment section of the vehicle. With the assistance of the bus conductor, they alighted at SM North Edsa. They transferred to a waiting tricycle, as per instruction given by Sally. The tricycle dropped them at a "sari-sari" store where they bought carton boxes where they placed two of the three bags. From there, the driver lead them to a waiting taxi where they loaded all their baggages. She and Nora occupied the back seat while Joselito sat beside the driver. She instructed the driver to take them to the pier for Iloilo bound ships. As they entered the pier premises, a mobile patrol car came from nowhere and blocked their path. Two police officers emerged and ordered them to alight. Then, upon the policemens order, the driver opened the taxis trunk where the three bags were loaded. The police officers forcibly opened one of the three bags where they saw something wrapped in jute bags and plastic bags. It was learned that the contents of the bags were marijuana. They were all herded into the mobile car. While on board the mobile car, the police officers asked them if they had money. When the policemen learned that they did not have money, they were brought to a "sari-sari" store where a police officer named Sapitula was waiting. Sapitula asked them questions. At one point, Sapitula slapped her. They were made to line up and Sapitula summoned some press reporters who photographed them They were brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. While being examined, she confided to a nurse that she was manhandled by Sapitula. They were brought to the office of the District Anti-Narcotics Unit where corresponding charges were filed against them. She insisted that the incident took place near the pier and not at the corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna Sts., Tondo, Manila. Were if not for the threat that something will happen to her daughter, she could not followed (sic) the orders of Sally. The combined testimony of accused Nora Jingabo and Joselito Jundoc established the following facts. On September 27, 1999, while [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were tending to their fish stall in Iloilo Public Market, [Dequina], their friend, came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed reason, at the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the morning of the following day, September 28, 1999. As agreed upon, they met at the designated place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally joined them. They knew Sally to be [Dequinas] supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while, [Dequina] and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of the mall where they talked privately. Soon after Sally left, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] asked [Dequina] what they talked about. Instead of answering, [Dequina] asked if they are willing to go with her to Manila in order to get something. While a little bit surprised, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] readily agreed as they had never been in the city before. [Dequina] handed to them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were given by Sally. However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names but in the names of other persons. When they called the attention of [Dequina] about it, the latter simply replied "Anyway that is free". [Jingabo] noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at that time. Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila at around 7:45 a.m. of September 28, 1999. From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the house of [Dequinas] aunt in Guadalupe, Makati City. In the afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar vehicles. Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the house. Unmindful about it, they left Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to a Philippine Rabbit Bus Terminal. Thereat, two male persons approached [Dequina] and handed to her bus tickets. They were pointed to the particular vehicle where they were to board. They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple approached [Dequina] and they had a talk. Thereafter, the couple motioned them to three male persons, each carrying a bag, at the opposite side of the road. Upon [Dequinas] instruction, they took the bags from the three men. Then, they waited for their ride back to Manila. As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside the compartment. They alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting tricycle. When they reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton boxes where they loaded two of the three bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed [Dequina] to a waiting taxi where they boarded along with their baggages. As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a mobile patrol car ordered them to stop. They were ordered to alight and the police officers ordered the driver to open the taxis compartment. One of the police officers took a knife from his pocket and slashed one of the bags. Then, the policemen told them that what they had in their bags were marijuana. The police officers ordered them to board the mobile car while the bags were loaded inside the compartment of the same car. They were brought to a "sari-sari" store where a certain Chief Sapitula, whom they later knew to be the police officers superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated [Dequina] and at one point, he slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people who took their photographs. Thereafter, they were brought to the "Hospital ng Bayan" and finally, to the police precinct were they were charged accordingly. 4
The parties dispensed with the testimony of Prose M. Arreola, a representative of Air Philippines, since they were willing to stipulate on the existence of the passenger manifest, on which appeared the accused-appellants assumed names, as well as the accused-appellants plane tickets for the flight from Iloilo to Manila on September 28, 1999 at 7:00 a.m. The RTC, in a Decision dated October 30, 2000, found the accused-appellants guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NELIDA DEQUINA y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA JINGABO y CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal transport marijuana and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Each of them is ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00. 5
The accused-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but the RTC denied the same in its Order dated December 27, 2000. Accused-appellants then filed a notice of appeal on January 25, 2001. Thus, the records of Criminal Case No. 99-177383 were forwarded to this Court. Pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo, 6 however, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals, 7 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01431. Accused-appellants made the following assignment of errors in their brief: I The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal transport of marijuana. II The court a quo gravely erred in admitting in evidence the seized items from the accused-appellants despite the fact that they were seized in violation of their constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure. 8
In its Decision 9 dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed accused- appellants conviction. It decreed: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, in Manila, in Criminal Case No. 99-177393, finding accused-appellants NELIDA DEQUINA y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA JINGABO y CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting 32[,]995 grams of marijuana is hereby AFFIRMED. 10
Hence, accused-appellants appealed to this Court. In our Resolution dated July 4, 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. Both parties manifested that they no longer intend to file any supplemental brief considering that they have already raised all the issues and arguments in their original briefs. We find no merit in the present appeal. The accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of the offense of illegal transport of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, which provides: SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that their arrests were illegal.1wphi1 They were not doing anything illegal that would have justified their warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless search of their persons and belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot be justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was lawful. Accused-appellants insist that the description of the persons who were transporting marijuana relayed by the Chief of Police to the apprehending officers, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, was so general that it could not be sufficient ground for the apprehension of accused-appellants. The People counters that accused-appellants arrests were lawful as they were then actually committing a crime. Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the resulting warrantless search of their persons and belongings was also valid. In addition, accused-appellants did not refute that they were indeed transporting prohibited drugs when they were arrested and, instead, alleged as defenses that Dequina acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and Jingabo were merely accommodating a trusted childhood friend. After a thorough review of the records, we find that the judgment of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was supported by the evidence on record. The People was able to discharge the burden of proving the accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had the first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony, 11 we have no reason to disregard the findings of the lower court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this case, Chief Inspector Sapitula, in the early morning of September 29, 1999, received a tip that a huge amount of marijuana would be transported from Baguio City to the Manila pier, which will then be loaded on vessels bound for Iloilo. Acting on the information he received, Chief Inspector Sapitula dispatched PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco to the corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna Streets, where they were supposed to watch out for two females and one male. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco posted their mobile patrol car near said corner. From where they were at, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco spotted three persons, two females and one male who turned out to be accused-appellants alighting from a taxi at the corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna Streets, each carrying a traveling bag. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco then followed accused-appellants until one of them, Dequina, dropped her traveling bag. The traveling bag fell open and inside, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco saw dried leaves in transparent plastic bags. It was only then that the two police officers apprehended accused-appellants and their persons and belongings searched. As PO3 Masanggue testified: Q Now, on September 29, 1999 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning will you please tell us where you were? A I reported to Headquarters Office for INSS briefing and information. Q And while you were there can you recall if there is any unusual incident that happened? x x x x WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. PUB. PROS. TAN, JR.: After the formation what happen? x x x x WITNESS After our formation we are informed by our chief that he received a telephone call and receive an information that three persons will be arriving and will deliver marijuana. Q And what else if any did your chief tell you? A And we were dispatched by our chief to the place where the marijuana will be dropped at corner Juan Luna and Raxabago. Q And did you indeed go there? A Yes, sir. Q What district is that, Mr. Witness? A District II of Manila. Q And, then what transpired when you went there? A We saw three persons alighting from a taxi and each of them carrying a black bag. Q And what did you do? A When we saw that the three persons who alighted from the taxi match with the description of the persons we are looking for we approach them. Q And what happen when you approach them? A When we were about to approach them one of them by the name of [Dequina] tried to run away. x x x x Q And then what did you do if any when she try to run away? A We chase her and told her to stop running and she drop the bag she was carrying. Q You state that we, who else are you referring to? A SPO1 Anthony Blanco. Q Now, when she drop the bag from her shoulder what did you do if any? A When the bag fell the zipper open and we saw dry leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic bag from the inside. Q And then what did you do if any? A Because I was convinced that the person is the one match the person we are looking for and as our SOP we brought them to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical examination. Q You stated you brought them or she only you brought her? A No, sir. Im referring to the three accused in this case. x x x x Q And why did you bring the other two persons when you said that it was only [Dequina] who dropped the bag? A Because they were together who alighted from the taxi. x x x x Q And what transpired in your office? A We brought them to our chief and also the bag which contained the dried leaves suspected to be marijuana and the bag was later turn over to the Anti Narcotic Unit. x x x x Q So you mean to say that there were three (3) bags that were recover by you from the three accused? A Yes, sir. Q And, so in your office you stated that you turn over the said three (3) bags to whom, Mr. Witness? A To the investigator of DANU. Q What is DANU? A District Anti Narcotics Unit. Q And do you know what they do with the bag if you know to the bag? A They counted the contains of all the bag sir and found out that each bag contain eleven (11) blocks of suspected marijuana. 12
The positive and categorical testimony of PO3 Masanggue, corroborated by SPO1 Blanco, deserves weight and credence in light of the presumption of regularity accorded to the performance of their official duties as police officers, and the lack of motive on their part to falsely testify against accused-appellants. To discredit PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, accused-appellants claimed that they were blocked by the police officers at the pier and not at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Streets; and that PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco did not mention in their testimonies passing by a sari-sari store to meet up with Chief Inspector Sapitula and presenting accused-appellants to the media. These details, however, are immaterial, not really departing significantly from the police officers version of the events surrounding accused-appellants arrest and search, which yielded the marijuana they were transporting. At any rate, certain parts of the testimonies of PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco were corroborated by the accused-appellants themselves (i.e., that the police officers, prior to bringing accused-appellants to the police headquarters, first brought accused-appellants to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical examination), PO3 Pama (i.e., that each of the three traveling bags turned over to him by PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco contained 11 bricks of marijuana), and NBI Forensic Chemist De Lara (i.e., that the dried leaves marked and turned over to him by PO3 Pama tested positive for marijuana). There is no question that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless seizure of the marijuana were valid and legal. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 14
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 15
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or convey from one place to another." 16 The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest. Besides, accused-appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their bags containing marijuana, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. In People v. Fernandez, 17 we ruled that: When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. x x x. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. 18
In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she transported the marijuana under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend. We are unconvinced. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well- grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 19 Here, Dequinas version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabos arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabos assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it observed that: While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called all the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was with her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila and in the court room attending the hearing.1wphi1Moreover, accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana. With this, it is simply contrary to human experience that the people behind the shipment would entrust the same to an unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two stooges, unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the scheme or transport of the marijuana shipment was so exact that [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the house of [Dequinas] aunt in Guadalupe from the time they arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they had to go to provincial bus station in the afternoon, negating their purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense story is riddled with holes. 20
Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. 21 Thus, as found by the RTC, conspiracy by and among accused-appellants was present in this case, as it may be inferred from the following acts of accused-appellants: This was shown when by their account, the three accused left Iloilo together, stayed in Manila for a while, left for Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to Manila thereafter. They were together when the apprehending police officers pounced on them near the pier premises on their way back to Iloilo, each of them carrying a travelling bag which contained marijuana. x x x. 22
With the enactment and effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, 23 the penalty imposable upon violators of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or more. The quantity of marijuana involved in this case weighs 32,995 grams, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for the application of indivisible penalties under Article 63 24 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. As there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the RTC correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Finally, considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied. 25
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01431, which affirmed the Decision dated October 30, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 99-177383, finding accused-appellants guilty of the crime of illegal transport of marijuana and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellants. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant. D E C I S I O N PEREZ, J.: Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision 1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) Judgment 2 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom. Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were charged in three separate Informations, which read as follow: In Criminal Case No. 93-130980: That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. 3
In Criminal Case No. 93-132606: That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. 4
In Criminal Case No. 93-132607: That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for her release, which after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim. 5
The arraignment was held in abeyance twice. 6 Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996. Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however refused to enter a plea. This prompted the RTC to enter a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson), Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized as follows: At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as a tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless jeep while the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while Jeson Kevin was sitting on the tomboys lap. They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque. 7
While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the secretary of her employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car undetected and after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked inside the comfort room. 8
Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from his wife asking him if Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was dropped off earlier. After 15 minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she could not find the car when she roamed around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police officers to inform them that his sons were missing. When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa called about their whereabouts. When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary informed him that an unidentified man called to inform them that he has custody of the children and demanded P26 Million. 9
Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge. He asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her employers telephone number. She feigned ignorance of those information. She even claimed that she was merely a new employee. 10 Sarge informed Nimfa that they were in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home. Nimfa chose to stay with her wards. When the phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being held up in Merville Subdivision. 11
Jepson, through Jaimes help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue Jepsons sons and arrest the kidnappers. 12
At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to P10 Million. 13 That night, Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to her. She recognized one of them as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office sometime in the first week of December 1993. 14
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to negotiate for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred times during a span of two to four years. 15
On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson offered P1.3 Million in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. 16 Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off. 17
At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that they would be released that afternoon. 18 At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray bag and put it on the backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station. 19
P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two other police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off. He took a total of 24 shots. 20 He identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial Center and the latter as the one who took the ransom. 21
P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed pay- off. He witnessed the pay-off and identified appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the car trunk of Jepson. 22
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat and one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December 1993 with the primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves children and helper. His group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received information that the kidnap victims were released unharmed. They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio. At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. They continuously followed the car inside the village. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle. 23
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to Camp Crame for questioning. 24
At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table. Photographs were taken and Jepson was asked to identify them. 25
A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag. 26 It was found out that a portion of the ransom money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him under arrest. Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and Macias went inside the house and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt. 27
Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23 December 1993, it came to her knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of the comfort room was reversed so that it could only be locked from the outside. She considered this unusual because she personally caused the door knob to be installed. 28
The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr. Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro). Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989 as the importer of police equipment and accessories. Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens and paging system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security agency in July 1993. He admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa since 1990 and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him coffee. 29
In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to the house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993. At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial payment of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested appellant to negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity, appellant agreed. He actively participated in the negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5 Million. On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait for further instructions. Appellant called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once instructions were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked appellant to proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the latter asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just put the money inside the car trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepsons car and put it inside his car trunk and proceeded to Shell Gasoline station. 30 Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepsons children at the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him. They then decided to go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were many policemen stationed in the area, which prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path. He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and two other men alight from the car and were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him with their firearms. 31
Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary, who appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw appellant arrive at the office with Macias. 32
Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries of appellant could have been sustained during the scuffle. 33
Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions between appellant and Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He even served as guarantor of some of the obligations of appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed a case against Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually acquitted. 34
While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his criminal liability is totally extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. 35
On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He should pay private complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages. The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government. The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused to the Bureau of Corrections, National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered to inform this court in writing soonest as to when the said official took custody of the accused. 36
The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo, 37 this Court in a Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 38
On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, in convicting Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. 39
A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22 December 2006. Hence, this appeal. On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. On 25 October 2007, appellants counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no longer filing a Supplemental Brief. 40 Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorneys Office as counsel de oficio for appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the arguments in the appellants brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. 41
Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the following assignment of errors: I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the disturbing whispers of doubt replete in the prosecutions theory. II. The trial court erred in giving credence to Nimfa Celiz testimony notwithstanding the incredibility of her story. III. The trial court erred in presuming regularity in the performance of official functions over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused uyboco. IV. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Jepson dichavez notwithstanding his displayed propensity for untruthfulness. V. The trial court erred in admitting most of the object evidence presented against the accused-appellant since they were procured in violation of his constitutional rights. VI. The trial court erred in finding of fact that the Merville property leased by accused-appellant from ms. Carolina alejo was the very same house where nimfa celiz and her wards were allegedly detained. VII. The trial court erred in holding that accused uyboco as having participated in the abduction of jeson Kevin, jeson Kirby, and nimfa celiz as not a single evidence on record supports the same. VIII. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused considering that abduction, an important element of the crime, was never established against him. IX. The trial court erred in holding the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom without discussing the participation of accused macias considering that the charge was for conspiracy. 42
The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts, this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss. In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. 43
We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the prosecution, thus: 1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual; 2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused Uyboco, referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private complainant Jepson Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their maid or "yaya" Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993. The three victims were on board Jepsons Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepsons driver Pepito Acon. The moving pick-up was in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A man in white t-shirt and brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a general working at the Presidential Security Group. Pepito was made to ride in a jeep. The same man drove the pick-up to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, where the victims were illegally detained from December 20 to 23, 1993. x x x x 3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably illegal. Their detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the private individual whose mind and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of money thru force and coercion for personal gain; x x x x 5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling the parents of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get the huge amount of money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x x x. 44
These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecutions witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children abducted and the person from whom ransom was extorted. Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus: A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir. x x x x A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2) children and myself, Sir. x x x x A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir. x x x x Q: And when you stopped there, what happened? A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir. Q: And then what followed next? A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we entered an alley, Sir. x x x x Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened? A: Yes, sir. ATTY. PAMARAN: Q: What? A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there was a stainless jeep that block our path, Sir. Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know? A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir. Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle? A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the side, sir. Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him? A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir. Q: And then what followed next after he stopped? x x x x A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a turn at Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from Malacaang, Sir. x x x x Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight? A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir. Q: Then what followed next? A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he was the one who drove, Sir. x x x x A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the passengers side, Sir. x x x x Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed? A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went straight as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir. x x x x A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir. Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened? A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir. Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate? A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir. x x x x Q: And when you entered the house, what happened? A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir. 45
Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold of the money, thus: A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir. A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again the one continuing the conversation, Sir. Q: What did you say? A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir. ATTY. PAMARAN: Q: You said he, to whom are you referring? A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir. Q: What followed? A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand to1.5 million x x x. x x x x Q: And after that what followed? A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir. Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind? A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir. Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer? A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir. Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be? A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir. Q: How about the other balance? A: My jewelry, Sir. 46
x x x x Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun and the bag? A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag. Q: In short, what were those inside the bag? A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries. Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened? A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the Magallanes Commercial Center. Q: Where did you place that bag? A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake House. x x x x Q: What else did he tell you? A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment, leave it and lock the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes. Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do? A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car beside the car Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863. Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked? A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store. Q: And then, what did you do? A: I followed his instruction. Q: And what followed next? A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug Store already. Q: And what was your answer? A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back towards the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes. Q: And? A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons. ATTY. PAMARAN: Q: Did you comply with that instruction? A: Yes, sir. Q: What did you do? A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes. Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form that Colt Mirage? A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir. Q: And after you parked the car, what followed? A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of the supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already. Q: And what followed thereafter? A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after the Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan. 47
Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies, untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies. Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa stated that on the day they were to be released, they, together with Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m. while appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw Macias and appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly identify the number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit and during the direct examination that Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge had a gun. Fourth, it was incredible that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe house because she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to say that two persons, Macias and appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they hand the phone to her. Sixth, it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an operational telephone while in captivity. 48 The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as immaterial, in this wise: The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number; hence, the reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies of the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant the reversal of the decision appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz testimony as they erase suspicion that the same was rehearsed. The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded or tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the crime. Besides, familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime improbable, but has in fact at times even facilitated its commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone in the house where Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes or blunders are made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime. On a different view, it may even be posited that the incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions. Verily, in committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom, they adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies to confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims. 49
Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that appellant owed him only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5 Million. Appellant charges Jepson of downplaying his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would address appellant as "Ernie." Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost certainty that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was appellant. Finally, appellant claims that Jepsons motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge against him boils down to money. Among the businesses that Jepson owns was along the same line of business as that of appellant, which is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate competition and possibly procure all contracts from the PNP and considering his brothers close association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson crafted and executed a frame up of appellant. And the Court of Appeals had this to say: For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves children is, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise, the police operatives call or prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their performance of official duties and disregard Uybocos unsubstantiated claim that he was framed up. Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to decide, but the same rests upon the prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in the prosecution the direction and control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution had other witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its non-presentation of other witnesses cannot be taken against the same. 50
Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted. 51
We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them. As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 52 While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision. 53
Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecutions theory, thus: If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand only P1.325M x x x as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up the ransom money using his own car registered in his sons name? Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom to check its contents? Why would he be the one to personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his face x x x. Why would he go back to his family residence x x x with the ransom money still intact in the trunk of his car? If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x x x? Why were they not tied x x x? x x x x If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco as the place of the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease contract under his own name? x x x Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school degree, much more so an established businessman like accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and the post-dated checks are incriminating evidence. x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? x x x Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom payment? Why did they not apply for a warrant of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he was the kidnapper? Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations between the kidnappers x x x. 54
Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping. If we indulge appellants speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these questions that appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had been substantially reduced due to aggressive bargaining and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom money because he could not trust anybody to do the work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the money because he trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not recognize him; that appellant went back to his family residence because he never thought that Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or tied because Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant to the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be emboldened to escape; that appellant never thought that the police would discover the place of detention; that the police employed a different strategy, which is to first secure the victims before they apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant would be futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the crime of kidnapping; that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations between Jepson and the kidnappers. However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a battle of endless speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law where proof or hard evidence takes precedence. On the other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that kidnapping occurred and that appellant is the author thereof. Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his argument that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police officers who participated in the operation. Appellant claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police did not try to rescue the kidnap victims. Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any listening device to record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the interview made by a reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped conversations of appellants alleged negotiations for the ransom with Jepson. Appellant insists that these taped conversations do exist. Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of P/Supt. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove the existence of the alleged taped conversations. The matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the non-production of the master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are not semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of regularity. In the absence of proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court's assessment on the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of frame-up. 55
Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence of a warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied) The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. 56
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. 57
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause. Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 58 Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested. Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the abduction of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should have been acquitted. In a related argument, appellant contends that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore, appellants participation was not sufficiently established. The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit: The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and the Dichaves children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was present in the said house at the time when Celiz and the Dichaves children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no evidence to the contrary, Uybocos presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his possession some of the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who told them that the balance of the ransom payment is with Macias. All these circumstances clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several unidentified persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom. x x x x x x x Uybocos claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep which waylaid the Dichaves vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be convicted of kidnapping for ransom considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house where the victims were kept, is misplaced.lawph!l Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal scheme, i.e. possession of the ransom payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan. 59
The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant. While he was not present during the abduction, he was present in the house where the victims were detained, oftentimes giving the phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson. The conspiracy was likewise proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with Macias and other John Does in committing the crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 60
Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants conviction. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93- 132606, and 93-132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom, and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185715 January 19, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, Appellant. D E C I S I O N BRION, J.: We review the May 27, 2008 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found Erlinda Capuno y Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. ANTECEDENT FACTS The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states: That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and which substance produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine or other compound thereof providing similar physiological effects. CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4 The prosecution presented Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial. The appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense. PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he, PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1 Antonio) was designated as the poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act as back-up. Before leaving the police station, they asked the desk officer to record their operation. 5 They went to Manggahan Street, and when they were near this place, the informant pointed to them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and told her, "Paiskor ng halagang piso"; he then handed the pre-marked one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a plastic sachet from her left pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held the appellants arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her constitutional rights. It was at this time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached them; PO1 Jiro recovered the marked money from the appellant. They brought the appellant to the police station for investigation. 6 According to PO1 Antonio, the police forwarded the seized item to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. 7
PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police that he saw one "alias Erlinda" selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust operation wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money, and designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and proceeded to Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed to them the appellant. 8 PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and talked to her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to the appellant; the appellant took "something" from her pocket and handed it to PO1 Antonio. 9 Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro) and PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from the appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination. 10
On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1 Antonio when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the buy-bust operation took place outside the appellants house. 11 He recalled that the appellant had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the appellant, some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her. 12
The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist, was dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory. On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits: Exhibit "A" the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez Exhibit "B" the request for laboratory examination Exhibit "C" Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E Exhibit "D" the buy-bust money Exhibit "E" Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03 Exhibit "F" the specimen confiscated from the appellant Exhibit "G" Police Blotter 13
The defense presented a different version of the events. The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was inside her house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when two persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They wore maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she answered in the affirmative, they searched her house. 14 They invited the appellant and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did not find anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the identity of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea what they were talking about, the police put her in jail. 15 The appellant further stated that she saw the seized specimen only in court. 16
On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal drugs. She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the two persons who entered her house were policemen. 17
Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on material points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but merely "looked around." 18
The RTC, in its decision 19 of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days. The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P100,000.00 fine. The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The CA, in its decision 20 dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the amount of fine be increased to P500,000.00. The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution witnesses were not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place of the buy-bust operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they conducted the entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it was held on Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip of the tongue as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. 21
The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added that the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular manner. 22
Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been established. 23
In her brief, 24 the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave conflicting statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On one hand, PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told them that the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand, stated that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellants illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation. The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that the apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover, there was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. 25
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellants bare denial, more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were motivated by any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade. 26
The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002, there was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002. 27 It further claimed that the failure to comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to the prosecution of drug cases. 28
THE COURTS RULING After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 29 The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. 30
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails. 31
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: 1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial: FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL: Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do? PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO: A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our civilian asset pointed to us the suspect. Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group do? A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who talked to Erlinda Capuno. Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when you approached her? A: I told her "Paiskor ng halagang piso." Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu, what did he do? [sic] A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled out something from her pocket. Q: What is the denomination of the marked money? A: One Hundred Peso bill. Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next? A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two companions who [were] then seeing me approached me. [sic] Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received this plastic sachet? A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that I introduced myself and explained to her Constitutional rights. [sic] Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed? A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave her full name and also turned over the suspected items[.] Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money? A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir. Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda. Do you have that buy bust money with you? A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket the suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero recovered the money. [sic] x x x x Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now? A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination? A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result. 32
From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1 Antonios testimony was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team, PO1 Jiro, who narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the seized item to the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even intimate that they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item. A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974. 33 Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Lorenzo, 34 we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia 35 likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In Bondad, Jr. v. People, 36 we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds. We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez, 37 People v. Denoman, 38 People v. Partoza, 39 People v. Robles, 40 and People v. dela Cruz, 41 where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. 42
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items. The "Chain of Custody" Requirement Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 43
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. 44
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant. The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. 45
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to the police station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the appellant and the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify the person to whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the Chief of Police, Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1 Antonio. As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a certain PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said specimen only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the hands of PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had custody of the specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified. Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution witnesses by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts ruling, the inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not trivial. To recall, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay 46 that a civilian asset arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002, and informed them that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1 Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified in court that a civilian informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and told them that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story in court and testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed then that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs. We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different accounts regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellants illegal activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002. What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 47
Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. 48 The presumption, in other words, obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. 49 As we explained in People v. Sanchez: While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused- appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that - a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 50
All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the unreliability of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. Appellant Erlinda Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185166 January 26, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARK LESTER DELA ROSA y SUELLO, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N PEREZ, J.: The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 24 April 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02642, affirming the Decision 2 dated 8 December 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Criminal Case Nos. 06- 1870 to 06-1871, finding herein appellant Mark Lester Dela Rosa y Suello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of Sections 5 3 and 11, 4 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, 5 thereby, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 06-1870) and an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 06- 1871). In two separate Informations 6 both dated 26 September 2006, appellant Mark Lester Dela Rosa y Suello was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, which were respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 06- 1870 and Criminal Case No. 06-1871. The Informations read as follows: Criminal Case No. 06-1870 That on or about the 25th day of September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport three point zero two (3.02) grams of marijuana, which is a dangerous drug in consideration of the amount of one hundred (Php100.00) pesos. 7 [Emphasis supplied]. Criminal Case No. 06-1871 That on or about the 25th day of September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession five point six zero (5.60) grams of [m]arijuana, which is a dangerous drug. 8 [Emphasis supplied]. When arraigned, 9 appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the testimony of its lone witness, Police Officer 3 Eusebio Lowaton, Jr. (PO3 Lowaton), of the Special Anti Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF), Makati City. The facts of the case as culled from the records and testimony of PO3 Lowaton are as follows: On 25 September 2006, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operatives, together with an informant, came to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, where PO3 Lowaton was one of the police officers assigned thereat, and reported that appellant was involved in the illegal sale of marijuana in Kalayaan Avenue, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City. 10
On the basis thereof, the SAID-SOTF, Makati City, formed a team to conduct a buy- bust operation to verify if appellant was, indeed, involved in the illegal sale of marijuana in the above-mentioned place. The buy-bust team through one of its members, PO3 Lowaton, prepared a Pre-Operational Report/Coordination Sheet 11 and sent the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). In response thereto, PDEA sent a Certificate of Coordination 12 to confirm that the buy-bust team of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, had made the necessary coordination with their office in connection with the conduct of its anti-drug operations against appellant. 13
After a complete coordination with PDEA, the briefing of the members of the buy-bust team followed, wherein PO3 Lowaton was designated as poseur-buyer. He was also given two Fifty Peso bills 14 marked money in the total amount of P100.00, bearing Serial Nos. FR 485129 and CY 532084, respectively, with markings "ATS" on the upper right portion of the serial number of each bill. 15
Thereafter, the buy-bust team, together with the informant, proceeded to the target area in Kalayaan Avenue, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City. Upon arrival thereat, the buy-bust team waited for the appellant and soon after, the latter arrived after a few minutes. Subsequently, PO3 Lowaton and the informant walked towards the direction of the appellant. The informant then approached appellant and introduced to him PO3 Lowaton as someone interested in buying marijuana. Appellant asked PO3 Lowaton as to the amount of marijuana that he wanted to buy to which the latter replied that he would be buying P100.00 worth of marijuana. Appellant immediately took one plastic sachet of marijuana from his pocket that corresponds to the amount agreed upon and handed the same to PO3 Lowaton. The latter, in turn, handed the two marked Fifty Peso bills to appellant as payment for the purchased item. 16
Upon the consummation of the sale, PO3 Lowaton executed their pre-arranged signal by holding appellants right hand. At this juncture, the other members of the buy-bust team who were in the vicinity of the target area came in to help PO3 Lowaton, who at that moment had already introduced himself as a police officer, in arresting appellant. Appellant was arrested at around 3:15 p.m. PO3 Lowaton informed appellant of the cause of his arrest and of his constitutional rights. While frisking the appellant, however, PO3 Lowaton recovered from the former two more plastic sachets of marijuana. Subsequently, PO3 Lowaton marked the one plastic sachet of marijuana sold to him by appellant with his initials "EBL." He likewise marked the two other plastic sachets of marijuana that he recovered from appellant as "EBL-1" and "EBL-2." The seized items from appellant were also inventoried at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence, as evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt 17 dated 25 September 2006. 18
After appellants arrest, he was brought to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City. The three plastic sachets of marijuana that has been previously marked were photographed 19 and sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. The examination conducted on the aforesaid specimen, i.e., three plastic sachet of marijuana, yielded positive 20 results to the tests for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659- 06S. 21 Also, after the completion of the buy-bust operation, an after operation report or the so-called "Spot Report" 22 was prepared and sent to PDEA. 23
After PO3 Lowatons testimony, the parties agreed and stipulated that the testimony of Jeffrey Abellana, one of MADAC operatives, would be that he was a member of the back up team that assisted in the arrest of appellant. The prosecution, thus, decided to dispense with his testimony. 24
The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as their sole witness and offered a different version of what transpired on the day of his arrest. Appellant narrated that on 25 September 2006, at around 12:00 noon, he was sleeping inside his house located at 4041 Kalayaan Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City, when suddenly he was awakened by three persons, who introduced themselves as MADAC operatives. These MADAC operatives were looking for a certain Richard. Upon asking them the reason why they were looking for Richard inside his house and at the same time telling them that he was not the person they were looking for, the MADAC operatives simply told him to just go with them peacefully. Without offering any resistance, appellant went with the MADAC operatives. The latter brought him to their office where he was asked to reveal the whereabouts of Richard to which the appellant replied that he does not know the person they were looking for. At this juncture, the MADAC operatives told him that if he will not reveal the whereabouts of Richard, then, they will charge him with possession of marijuana that they were carrying at that moment. Thereafter, he was detained at their office for about eight to nine days. 25
Appellant further stated that when the MADAC operatives brought him out of the detention cell, he was subsequently brought inside a building where there was a fiscal. The latter then informed him that he was charged with the crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant, however, denied the same. 26
After all the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by both parties were meticulously evaluated, the trial court concluded that all the elements of the offenses charged against appellant were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Thus, in its Decision dated 8 December 2006, the trial court held appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The trial court disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of [appellant] MARK LESTER DE LA ROSA y SUELLO was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, for violation [of] Section[s] 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, he is hereby sentenced: 1. In Criminal Case No. 06-1870, to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; 2. In Criminal Case No. 06-1871, to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve [12] years and one [1] day, as minimum, to fourteen [14] years, and eight [8] months, as maximum, and to pay a fine ofP300,000.00; and 3. To pay the costs. Let the plastic sachets containing 3.02grams, 2.95 grams, and 2.65 grams of marijuana be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition. 27 [Emphasis supplied]. Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid 8 December 2006 Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal. 28
The Court of Appeals, after a thorough study of the records, rendered the assailed Decision dated 24 April 2008, affirming appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The decretal portion of the said Decision reads, thus: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1870 and 06-1871, convicting the [appellant] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, AFFIRMED. 29 [Emphasis supplied]. Still unsatisfied, appellant elevated the aforesaid Decision of the appellate court to this Court via a Notice of Appeal. 30
In a Resolution 31 dated 14 January 2009, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. Instead of filing a Supplemental Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion 32 stating that it be excused from filing it as the appellant has not advanced any cogent or compelling reason for the modification, much less reversal of the assailed appellate courts Decision. Appellant, on the other hand, opted to file a Supplemental Brief 33 reiterating therein the arguments raised in his Appellants Brief filed before the Court of Appeals. In his brief, appellant raised the following assignment of errors: I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN FAVOR OF THE [APPELLANT]. II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE [APPELLANT] GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 34
Appellant argues that the fact of sale of marijuana was not conclusively established because PO3 Lowatons testimony was incredible for no person in his right mind would boldly sell prohibited drugs in broad daylight and in a public place. The inconsistency in the testimony of PO3 Lowaton as regards their pre-arranged signal similarly casts doubt on the credibility of his testimony. More so, the alleged buy-bust operation was conducted without any prior surveillance. Appellant likewise maintains that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as there was an evident violation of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. By reason of the foregoing, appellant insists that his constitutional right to presumption of innocence remains because there is reasonable doubt that calls for his acquittal. After a painstaking review of the records, this Court affirms appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like marijuana, the following elements must be sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction therefor: (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 35 What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drugs seized as evidence. We reiterate the meaning of the term corpus delicti which is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 36 The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like marijuana, requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former; the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods. 37
In the case at bench, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved all the aforesaid elements of illegal sale of marijuana. Appellant, who was caught in flagrante delicto, was positively identified by PO3 Lowaton, who acted as the poseur-buyer, as the same person who sold the one plastic sachet of marijuana to him weighing 3.02 grams for a consideration of P100.00. Such one plastic sachet of marijuana was presented in court, which PO3 Lowaton identified to be the same object sold to him by appellant. He further stated that the markings "EBL" found on the said object were his initials, which he placed thereon at the time the appellant was arrested. 38 PO3 Lowaton similarly identified in court the recovered marked money from the appellant that consists of two Fifty Peso bills in the total amount of P100.00 with markings "ATS" on the upper right portion of the serial number of each bill. 39
More so, the testimony of PO3 Lowaton clearly established in detail how his transaction with appellant happened starting from the moment their informant introduced him to appellant as someone interested in buying his stuff from the time appellant handed him the one plastic sachet of marijuana and, in turn, he handed appellant the two Fifty Peso bills marked money for a total amount of P100.00 that consummated the sale transaction between him and appellant. PO3 Lowaton caused the one plastic sachet of marijuana to be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The item weighing 3.02 grams was tested positive for marijuana as evidenced by Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S prepared by Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, Forensic Chemical Officer/Chief, Physical Science Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory-Southern Police District Crime Laboratory Office. Thus, it is already beyond question that appellants guilt for the crime of illegal sale of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants contention that PO3 Lowatons testimony was not credible for no person in his right mind would boldly sell prohibited drugs in broad daylight and in a public place deserves scant consideration. This Court has consistently pronounced that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private, as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs. 40
Similarly, the alleged contradiction and inconsistency pointed to by appellant in the testimony of PO3 Lowaton as regards the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy- bust team is only minor, trivial, immaterial, and does not in any way affect the credibility of PO3 Lowatons testimony, since his testimony clearly and categorically established the sale of marijuana. Such minor inconsistency referring to the details of the sale of marijuana may be considered as badges of truth rather than of falsehood. 41
In People v. Nicolas, 42 this Court held that the employment of a pre-arranged signal, or the lack of it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. With more reason that a mere inconsistency thereof does not and will not affect the credibility of the prosecution witness so long as all the elements of the offense have been established with certainty. That no test buy was conducted before the arrest is of no moment for there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. For the same reason, the absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy- bust operation, especially when, like in this case, the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. The Court will not pretend to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment operations. The selection of appropriate and effective means of entrapping drug traffickers is best left to the discretion of police authorities. 43
For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like marijuana, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. 44
All the aforesaid elements were clearly established by the prosecution. As an incident to his lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, appellant was similarly found to have in his possession two more plastic sachets of marijuana with a total weight of 5.60 grams, the same kind of dangerous drug he was caught selling in flagrante delicto. The said two plastic sachets of marijuana was also presented in court, which PO3 Lowatan identified to be the same objects recovered from appellant while he was being frisked on the occasion of his arrest for illegally selling marijuana. PO3 Lowaton likewise explained that the markings "EBL-1" and "EBL-2" written on the two plastic sachets of marijuana were his initials and the same were done by him. Further, the record is bereft of any evidence that would show that appellant had the legal authority to possess the two plastic sachets of marijuana recovered from him. This Court held in a catena of cases that a mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. 45
With that, appellants guilt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in clear violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, was also proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As a last ditch effort, appellant claims that his arrest was tainted with irregularity as the seized items were not photographed in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, thus, an evident violation thereof. The said argument is baseless. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; [Emphasis supplied]. The aforesaid provision is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.: (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]. The afore-quoted Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165, offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. 46
In the present case, the records and the transcribed stenographic notes clearly showed that the seized items from appellant were physically inventoried by PO3 Lowaton at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence, as evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt 47 dated 25 September 2006. 48 Also, when appellant was brought to the office of SAID-SOTF, Makati City, the marked three plastic sachets of marijuana were photographed 49 by the apprehending team before it was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which examination yielded positive 50 result to the tests for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659-06S. 51
Even granting arguendo that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to the aforesaid guidelines, the same is not fatal and does not automatically render appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as it would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 52
The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. 53
The prosecution, in this case, has adequately shown the continuous and unbroken possession and subsequent transfers of the three plastic sachets of marijuana from the time appellant handed to PO3 Lowaton the one plastic sachet of marijuana to consummate the sale thereof; then the subsequent recovery by PO3 Lowaton of two more plastic sachets of marijuana from appellant; followed by the markings made by PO3 Lowaton of his initials on the said three plastic sachets of marijuana at the place where appellant was arrested and in his presence; until they were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination that yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug, as evidenced by a Physical Science Report No. D-659- 06S; and up to the time that the marked three plastic sachets of marijuana were offered in court. Such fact persuasively proves that the three plastic sachets of marijuana presented in court were the same items seized from appellant during the buy-bust operation. The integrity and evidentiary value thereof was duly preserved. It has been judicially settled that in buy-bust operations, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. This presumption is overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence that they were not properly performing their duty or that they were inspired by improper motive. The courts, nonetheless, are advised to take caution in applying the presumption of regularity. It should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. 54
In People v. De Guzman 55 citing People v. Doria, 56 this Court took pain in discussing the "objective" test in buy-bust operations to determine the credibility of the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation: We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. 57
As aptly observed by both the trial court and the appellate court: We find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, [PO3 Lowaton] clear and credible. He recounted in full detail how the deal was set by the informant, the actual exchange of the plastic sachet of marijuana and the [marked money] consisting of two (2) [F]ifty [P]eso bills, and the apprehension of the [appellant] [and the incidental recovery of two more plastic sachets of marijuana in his possession]. x x x. The totality of evidence presented is convincing and points to appellant as being engaged in the sale of the illegal drugs. The testimony of the prosecution witness identifying the appellant to be a seller of illegal drugs appears to be categorical and unfabricated. No ill motive on the part of [PO3 Lowaton] has been shown to tarnish his testimony. Such positive evidence certainly prevails over mere denial and alibi which, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self- serving unworthy of credible weight in law. 58
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirm the findings. Trial courts are in the best position to assess the witnesses credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor. 59
In comparison to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, all that the appellant could muster is the defense of denial and frame-up. Denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denial of appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witness. 60
In People v. Rosialda 61 citing People v. Rodrigo, 62 this Court pronounced that once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength of the prosecution's case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused. 63
In this case, it has been established beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with certainty all the elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the appellant after he was positively identified by the prosecution witness. Thus, appellants self-serving assertions unsupported by any plausible proof to bolster his allegations have no leg to stand on. His defense of denial or frameup must necessarily fail. To repeat, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over petitioners self- serving and uncorroborated denial. 64
This Court will now determine the penalties to be imposed upon appellant. Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, provides for the imposable penalties for illegal sale of marijuana, thus: Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. [Emphasis supplied]. From the afore-quoted provision, the sale of any dangerous drug, like marijuana, regardless of the quantity and purity involved is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00. In light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been proscribed. 65 Consequently, the penalty applicable to appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine without eligibility for parole. Thus, this Court sustains the penalty imposed by the lower courts in Criminal Case No. 06-1870. Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, on the other hand, expressly provides the penalty for illegal possession of marijuana, thus: Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof: x x x x Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows: (1) x x x (2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana. [Emphasis supplied]. The aforesaid provision clearly states that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of any dangerous drug, like marijuana, with a quantity of five grams or more but less than 10 grams, is imprisonment of 20 years and 1 day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from P400,000.00 to P500,000.00. The prosecution in Criminal Case No. 06-1871 established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, without any legal authority, had in his possession 5.60 grams of marijuana. Therefore, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the lower courts for illegal possession of marijuana is not proper as the said penalty was only for illegal possession of marijuana having a quantity of less than five grams.1wphi1 Following the penalty provided for under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, for illegal possession of five grams or more but less than 10 grams of marijuana, this Court, thus, imposed upon appellant the penalty of imprisonment of 20 years and one day and a fine of P400,000.00. The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in this case as the penalty of imprisonment provided for illegal possession of five grams or more but less than 10 grams of marijuana is indivisible. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02642 dated 24 April 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-1871, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 20 years and 1 day and a fine ofP400,000.00. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185715 January 19, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, Appellant. D E C I S I O N BRION, J.: We review the May 27, 2008 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found Erlinda Capuno y Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. ANTECEDENT FACTS The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states: That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and which substance produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine or other compound thereof providing similar physiological effects. CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4 The prosecution presented Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial. The appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense. PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he, PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1 Antonio) was designated as the poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act as back-up. Before leaving the police station, they asked the desk officer to record their operation. 5 They went to Manggahan Street, and when they were near this place, the informant pointed to them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and told her, "Paiskor ng halagang piso"; he then handed the pre-marked one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a plastic sachet from her left pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio immediately held the appellants arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her constitutional rights. It was at this time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached them; PO1 Jiro recovered the marked money from the appellant. They brought the appellant to the police station for investigation. 6 According to PO1 Antonio, the police forwarded the seized item to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. 7
PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the Rodriguez Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police that he saw one "alias Erlinda" selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust operation wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money, and designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and proceeded to Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed to them the appellant. 8 PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the appellant, and talked to her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to the appellant; the appellant took "something" from her pocket and handed it to PO1 Antonio. 9 Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro) and PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from the appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination. 10
On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1 Antonio when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the buy-bust operation took place outside the appellants house. 11 He recalled that the appellant had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the appellant, some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her. 12
The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist, was dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory. On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as exhibits: Exhibit "A" the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez Exhibit "B" the request for laboratory examination Exhibit "C" Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E Exhibit "D" the buy-bust money Exhibit "E" Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03 Exhibit "F" the specimen confiscated from the appellant Exhibit "G" Police Blotter 13
The defense presented a different version of the events. The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was inside her house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when two persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They wore maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when she answered in the affirmative, they searched her house. 14 They invited the appellant and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did not find anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the identity of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea what they were talking about, the police put her in jail. 15 The appellant further stated that she saw the seized specimen only in court. 16
On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal drugs. She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the two persons who entered her house were policemen. 17
Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on material points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but merely "looked around." 18
The RTC, in its decision 19 of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days. The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P100,000.00 fine. The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The CA, in its decision 20 dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the amount of fine be increased to P500,000.00. The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution witnesses were not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place of the buy-bust operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they conducted the entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it was held on Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip of the tongue as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. 21
The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added that the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular manner. 22
Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been established. 23
In her brief, 24 the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave conflicting statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On one hand, PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told them that the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand, stated that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellants illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation. The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that the apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover, there was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. 25
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellants bare denial, more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were motivated by any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade. 26
The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002, there was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002. 27 It further claimed that the failure to comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to the prosecution of drug cases. 28
THE COURTS RULING After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 29 The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. 30
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails. 31
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states: 1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial: FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL: Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do? PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO: A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our civilian asset pointed to us the suspect. Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group do? A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who talked to Erlinda Capuno. Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when you approached her? A: I told her "Paiskor ng halagang piso." Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu, what did he do? [sic] A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled out something from her pocket. Q: What is the denomination of the marked money? A: One Hundred Peso bill. Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next? A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two companions who [were] then seeing me approached me. [sic] Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received this plastic sachet? A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that I introduced myself and explained to her Constitutional rights. [sic] Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed? A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave her full name and also turned over the suspected items[.] Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money? A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir. Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda. Do you have that buy bust money with you? A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket the suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero recovered the money. [sic] x x x x Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now? A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination? A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result. 32
From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1 Antonios testimony was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team, PO1 Jiro, who narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the seized item to the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even intimate that they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item. A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974. 33 Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Lorenzo, 34 we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia 35 likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In Bondad, Jr. v. People, 36 we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds. We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez, 37 People v. Denoman, 38 People v. Partoza, 39 People v. Robles, 40 and People v. dela Cruz, 41 where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter, explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. 42
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items. The "Chain of Custody" Requirement Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 43
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. 44
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant. The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet upon confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. 45
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to the police station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the appellant and the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify the person to whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the Chief of Police, Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1 Antonio. As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a certain PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said specimen only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the hands of PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had custody of the specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified. Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution witnesses by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts ruling, the inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not trivial. To recall, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay 46 that a civilian asset arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002, and informed them that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1 Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified in court that a civilian informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and told them that a woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story in court and testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed then that one "alias Erlinda" was selling illegal drugs. We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different accounts regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellants illegal activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002. What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 47
Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. 48 The presumption, in other words, obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. 49 As we explained in People v. Sanchez: While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused- appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that - a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." The presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 50
All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the unreliability of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. Appellant Erlinda Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176264 January 10, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. TERESITA "TESSIE" LAOGO, Appellant. D E C I S I O N VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This petition assails the July 31, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 693-M-2001. The RTC found appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo was the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel Consultancy, a travel agency firm located along Padre Faura Street in Manila. On March 7, 2001, an Information 3 was filed against appellant and a certain Susan Navarro (Susan) in Malolos, Bulacan charging them of the crime of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale). The information reads: INFORMATION The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Susan Navarro and Tessie [Teresita] Laogo of the crime of illegal recruitment, penalized under Art. 38 in relation to Art[s]. 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1412, committed as follows: That in or about and during the months of May and June 2000, in the municipality of Bulacan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing that they are non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor to recruit and/or place workers in employment either locally or overseas, conspiring, confederating together and helping each other, did then and there wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in illegal recruitment, placement or deployment activities for a fee, which they received from complainants Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday, Rogelio Enriquez y Buenavidez, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. y Fernandez, Dante Lopez y Enriquez, Teodulo dela Cruz y Mendoza, Edwin Enriquez y Panganiban and Gary Bustillos y de Guzman by recruiting and promising them job placement abroad, more particularly in Guam, which did not materialize, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment. That the crime is committed in a large scale tantamount to economic sabotage as the aforementioned seven persons were [recruited] individually or as a group. Contrary to law. The charge stemmed from the following set of facts. Sometime during the second week of March 2000, Susan invited several individuals including six of the seven complainants namely, Teodulo dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos to her house in Bulacan, Bulacan to celebrate the town fiesta. Appellant was among the several guests in Susans house during the said occasion. According to Teodulo dela Cruz, during the fiesta, Gary Bustillos introduced him to Susan as somebody who could help him find work abroad. Since Susan was Garys aunt, Teodulo immediately trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in Guam, USA. Upon Susans instruction, Teodulo filled up an application form 4 and gave her P3,000.00 after the latter promised to process his application to work abroad. 5 On May 22, 2000, Susan accompanied Teodulo to appellants travel agency office in Ermita where he paid an additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee. 6 A receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by Susan. 7 Months later, when Susans promise to send him abroad remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to appellants office and to Susans house to follow up their application, but the two always told them that their visas have yet to be released. 8
Similarly, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. also met Susan through Gary, who himself was seeking help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susans house, Billy saw Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, and Rogelio Enriquez. Like him, the three were also seeking Susans help to work abroad. 9 Susan introduced Billy to appellant, who promised him that she will send them abroad within three months. 10 After the meeting, Billy issued to Susan two Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and May 10, 2000, bearing the amounts P23,000.00 and P44,000.00, respectively, as partial payment for his placement fee. 11 On May 19, 2000, Billy also went to appellants travel agency in Ermita and personally handed an additional cash of P6,000.00 to Susan, who thereafter gave the money to appellant. Appellant issued a corresponding receipt 12 for the P6,000.00 cash bearing her signature and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months, no word was heard from either Susan or appellant. Sensing that something was wrong, Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan and filed the complaint against Susan and appellant. 13
Dante Lopez testified that he was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to appellant and Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of appellants travel agency. The two told him that they can send him and his companions to Guam within the span of three months. 14 Lopez paid both accused P6,000.00 to process his papers, covered by a receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing appellants signature. 15 Appellants promise, however, turned sour after three months. When he confronted appellant, the latter told him that he would be sent to a different country. Left without a choice, Lopez waited. Again, the promise remained unfulfilled. 16
According to Rogelio Enriquez, he also met appellant during the town fiesta when Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan introduced appellant as someone who could send him to work abroad. Eager about the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave his P3,000.00 cash to Susan for the processing of his visa and employment documents. 17 He saw Susan hand the money to appellant. 18 A week later, Rogelio gave an additional P900.00 to Susan. 19 No receipts were issued on both payments since Rogelio failed to complete the required P6,000.00 placement fee. 20 Months passed but Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or appellant. Apprehensive, Rogelio verified the status of the Laogo Travel Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that neither of the accused nor Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad. Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed the complaint against Susan and appellant. Edwin Enriquez also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his application to work in Guam. According to him, Susans husband and appellant were present when he gave the money to Susan during the town fiesta. 21 Susan issued a receipt dated May 16, 2000 to Edwin. The receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and was signed by Susan with a description which says "Payment was for Placement Fee." 22
Two other persons, namely Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday and Gary Bustillos, Susans nephew, were among the seven who filed the complaint against Susan and appellant. The two, however, later decided to withdraw their complaints after executing their respective affidavits of desistance. 23
On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest 24 were issued against Susan and appellant. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. 25 Susan, meanwhile, remained at large. An alias warrant of arrest 26 was issued by the trial court against her but to no avail. During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal activities undertaken by Susan. She insisted that Susan was not in any way connected with her travel agency and that she confronted the latter when she came to know of Susans recruitment activities. Appellant claimed that she even had to rename her travel agency to Renz Consultancy and Employment Services to avoid being associated with Susans recruitment activities. 27
Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susans house during the town fiesta, but denied knowing the other complainants. According to appellant, she came to know Rogelio when Susan specifically identified him as the one who cooked the dishes after some guests prodded Susan. 28
Unsatisfied with appellants explanation, the trial court promulgated a Decision 29 finding her guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The fallo of the trial courts July 16, 2002 Decision reads: WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Teresita (Tessie) Laogo y Villamor guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of P500,000.00 as imposed by law[;] to indemnify the private offended parties x x x actual damages, as follows: Teodulo dela Cruz P15,000.00, Billy dela Cruz P73,000.00, Dante Lopez P6,000.00, Rogelio Enriquez P3,000.00, and Edwin Enriquez P12,000.00[;] and to pay the costs of the proceedings. In the service of her sentence the said accused, a detention prisoner, shall be credited with the full time during which she had undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Pending the actual apprehension of the other accused Susan Navarro, [who is] still at- large, on the strength of the warrant of arrest earlier issued, let the record be committed to the archives subject to recall and reinstatement, should circumstances so warrant for due prosecution against her of this case. SO ORDERED. 30
Appellant filed an appeal before this Court, but said appeal was transferred to the CA following our pronouncement in People v. Mateo. 31
In her Appellants Brief 32 before the CA, appellant insisted that she had no hand in the recruitment of the complainants and maintains that the recruitment activities were made solely upon the initiative of accused Susan Navarro. 33 Appellant anchored her defense on the testimonies of the complainants who declared that the transactions and the payments were made not with her but with Susan. 34 Appellant admitted that her consultancy firm was merely engaged in the business of assisting clients in the procurement of passports and visas, and denied that her agency was involved in any recruitment activity as defined under the Labor Code, as amended. 35
On July 31, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision affirming appellants conviction. 36 The CA noted that although at times, it was Susan with whom the complainants transacted, the records nevertheless bear that appellant had a hand in the recruitment of the complainants. The CA pointed out that appellant, together with Susan, repeatedly assured the private complainants that her consultancy firm could deploy them for overseas employment, 37 leading the appellate court to conclude that appellant consciously and actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants. 38
Aggrieved, appellant brought the case to us on appeal, raising the same arguments she had raised at the CA. We affirm appellants conviction. Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 39
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. 40 1avvphi1 But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. 41 It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad. 42
Here, both the trial court and the CA found that all the five complainants were promised to be sent abroad by Susan and herein appellant 43 as cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up transactions between appellant and her victims were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the victims bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy, 44 with two of the said receipts personally signed by appellant herself. 45 Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting together made complainants believe that they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA. 46 Absent any showing that the trial court and the CA overlooked or misappreciated certain significant facts and circumstances, which if properly considered, would change the result, we are bound by said findings. 47
Appellants contention that she had to change the name of her travel agency to disassociate herself with Susans recruitment activities is too lame to deserve serious consideration. In light of the testimonies of the complainants that appellant with her co-accused promised them employment abroad, we find appellants act of closing Laogo Travel Consultancy and establishing a new one under her husbands name 48 as just an afterthought, a belated decision which cannot undo the damage suffered by the private offended parties. It could indeed hardly be construed as a simple reaction of an innocent person, as it in fact smacks of a desperate attempt of a guilty individual to escape liability or to confuse and dishearten her victims. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664 is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188847 January 31, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RUFINO VICENTE, JR. y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: This is an appeal from the April 30, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02699 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rufino Vicente, Jr. y Cruz, which affirmed the September 7, 2006 Decision in Criminal Case No. 12474-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 151 in Pasig City. The RTC found accused Rufino Vicente, Jr. (Vicente, Jr.) guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002. The Facts An Information 1 charged Vicente, Jr. as follows: That, on or about the 31st day of May 2003, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above- named accused, without being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another 0.40 grams of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, which was found positive to test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php500.00, in violation of the above-cited law. During his arraignment, Vicente, Jr. gave a negative plea. Version of the Prosecution At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Police Officer 2 (PO2) Darwin M. Boiser and PO2 Gerald Marion R. Lagos, who were both part of the buy-bust team that apprehended Vicente, Jr. PO2 Boiser and PO2 Lagos testified as to the following events that allegedly transpired: On May 31, 2003, at around 8:00 in the evening, an informant arrived at the District Anti-Illegal Drugs at the Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila. The informant reported that a certain "Paks" was pushing shabu on P. Mariano St., Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. 2
Acting on the information from the informant, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Rodolfo Anicoche ordered PO2 Boiser to verify the drug-peddling activities of "Paks." 3
PO2 Boiser proceeded to Ususan accompanied by the informant. Once there, the informant pointed "Paks" to PO2 Boiser. They were at a distance of 10 meters when they both saw "Paks" peddling drugs to several persons. After confirming the informants report, they went back to the police station to recount what they had seen to P/Insp. Anicoche. Thereafter, a team was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust team was composed of P/Insp. Anicoche, PO2 Boiser, PO2 Lagos, PO3 Macario, and Senior Police Officer 2 Millari. PO2 Boiser was designated as the poseur-buyer. 4
The buy-bust team conducted a briefing where PO2 Boiser marked a PhP 500 bill with "JG," the initials of Police Superintendent and District Intelligence and Investigation Branch Chief Jose Gentiles. Afterwards, they boarded a vehicle and headed to Ususan, Taguig, arriving at the area around midnight. PO2 Boiser and PO2 Lagos walked with the informant to meet "Paks." PO2 Boiser was then introduced to "Paks" as a balikbayan who wanted to score some drugs. He also told "Paks" that he had been released from rehab and wanted to use again. "Paks," satisfied that PO2 Boiser was indeed a drug user, agreed to sell PhP 500 worth of shabu. He reached from his camouflage shorts a plastic sachet and handed it to PO2 Boiser. 5
After receiving the plastic sachet from "Paks," PO2 Boiser examined it under the light of a lamppost. Seeing the pre-arranged signal acted out by PO2 Boiser, PO2 Lagos went to the scene and introduced himself as a police officer to "Paks." The buy-bust money was then seized from "Paks." "Paks" quietly stood while he was informed of his drug violation as well as his constitutional rights. The plastic sachet sold by "Paks" was later turned over by PO2 Boiser to investigating officer PO3 Delima, who prepared the laboratory request. The plastic sachet was marked "DB-1-3105-03," pertaining to PO2 Boisers initials and the date of the seizure of the drug. 6 The following pieces of documentary evidence were also presented: (1) Exhibit "A" Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated June 2, 2003 by PO2 Gerald Marion R. Lagos and PO2 Darwin M. Boiser; 7
(2) Exhibit "B" Request for Laboratory Examination dated May 31, 2003 by Police Superintendent Jose L. Gentiles, Officer-in-Charge, District Intelligence and Investigation Branch, delivered by PO2 Lagos and received by PO2 Imus; 8 and (3) Exhibit "D" Physical Science Report No. D-616-03S prepared by Forensic Chemical Officer Richard Allan B. Mangalip. 9
Version of the Defense The defense offered the testimonies of Vicente, Jr. and Elisa Santos. According to Elisa, she was outside her house having a conversation with Vicente, Jr. around midnight of May 31, 2003. They both noticed a gray vehicle drive past them. Shortly thereafter, a tricycle stopped in front of them. Three men alighted and poked a gun at Vicente, Jr., and warned him, "Reden, wag kang kikilos ng masama." Vicente, Jr. denied he was Reden. Yet the three men took him away and hit him with a gun and boxed him in his abdomen. Elisa further testified, "Tinuhod po yung harapan niya." Vicente, Jr. attempted to show identification to the three men but they ignored him. The gray vehicle earlier spotted by Elisa and Vicente, Jr. then returned and a person inside said, "Hindi iyan." However, someone replied "Sinaktan niyo na siya, isama na natin." 10
On the witness stand, Vicente, Jr. said that he had never been involved in any drug- related case prior to his arrest. He explained that he was buying balut from witness Elisa when three men accosted him and poked a gun at him. They mistakenly thought he was "Reden" and beat him up when he said it was a case of mistaken identity. The men turned out to be police officers and he was brought to their office where one of them told him, "Kung gusto mo magturo ka na lang ng ibang tao." When he did not cooperate, he was again beaten up. Vicente, Jr. further testified that his wife and brother were not allowed to visit him. He claimed that he did not get a medical certificate for his injuries for that reason. PO2 Lagos even warned him not to say anything during the inquest proceedings and to tell the prosecutor that he would just make his statement in court. 11
The Ruling of the RTC On September 7, 2006, the RTC pronounced Vicente, Jr. guilty of the crime charged. The RTC stated that the witnesses for the prosecution gave straightforward testimonies that clearly established the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision 12 reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, RUFINO VICENTE, JR., Y CRUZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of RA 9165 as charged and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Php500,000.00. The Ruling of the CA On appeal, Vicente, Jr. averred that the trial court erred (1) in convicting him as the alleged seller of shabu since he was not the alleged "Paks" identified by the police informant as the peddler of shabu; (2) in convicting him based on the weakness of the defense and not on the strength of the prosecutions evidence; and (3) in finding that the arresting police officers regularly performed their duties despite non-compliance with procedural rules on drug buy-bust operations. Representing the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that all the elements in the illegal sale of drugs were established. Vicente, Jr.s identity as the seller of shabu was established by the credible testimonies of PO2 Boiser and PO2 Lagos. The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court, viz: The said elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs (shabu) was clearly established by the testimony of PO2 Boiser who acted as the poseur-buyer in the standard police buy-bust operation. PO2 Boiser was able to chronologically and consistently narrate the factual circumstances that led to the arrest of the accused- appellant. Moreso, PO2 Boisers testimony was corroborated on material points by PO2 Lagos who was just more or less ten (10) meters from the locus criminis and who helped PO2 Boiser in effecting the arrest of the accused-appellant. 13
On May 26, 2009, Vicente, Jr. filed his Notice of Appeal from the appellate courts Decision. On October 5, 2009, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The People, through the OSG, manifested that it was adopting its previous arguments. Vicente, Jr. filed his Supplemental Brief on January 18, 2010. He averred that there was a failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug by the arresting officers. The Issue Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt The Ruling of this Court Vicente, Jr. is convinced that Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 was not complied with, since the buy-bust team failed to present a pre- operation report and photographs of the seized items. He concludes that there is uncertainty as to the identity of the illegal drugs seized. He says that due to the buy- bust teams omissions, there is a lingering doubt as to whether the drugs that underwent laboratory examination were the same items allegedly seized from him. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu were properly preserved by the buy-bust team from the time it was handed by Vicente, Jr. to the poseur-buyer up to the time it was presented during trial. The OSG adds that prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency was not required as the buy-bust was conducted on March 31, 2003, while the IRR of RA 9165 took effect only on November 27, 2004. We affirm accuseds conviction. As previously held by this Court, Sec. 21 of RA 9165 need not be followed as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 14 Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. 15 We have thus emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." 16
People v. Sultan 17 explains further: In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 adequately reflects the desire of the law to excuse from the rigid tenor of Section 21 situations wherein slight infractions in methodology are present but the integrity and identity of the specimen remains intact. The following exchange took place during the direct examination of PO2 Boiser and shows the handling of the seized drug: PROSECUTOR DULDULAO Q: After the recovery of the buy-bust money from alias Paks, what else did you do? A: I informed him of his violation and apprised him his constitutional rights. Q: What violation did you inform him [about]? A: That he violated [a law by] selling shabu, sir. Q: What was his answer if any? A: He kept silent, sir. Q: How about the rights you informed him? What are those rights? A: He has the right to remain silent and he has the right to get his own counsel. x x x x Q: After that, what else did you do? A: We brought Paks to our office, sir. Q: How about the specimen or the shabu which you were able to buy from alias Paks? What did you do to it if any? A: I turned it over to the investigator and he prepared a crime lab request. Q: If shown to you again, Mr. Witness, that plastic sachet containing shabu which according to you you were able to buy from alias Paks, would you be able to identify it and how can you identify it? A: I place a marking, sir. Q: What marking did you place? A: I placed the initial of my name and the date of arrest. Q: What initial did you put? A: DB, sir. Q: DB meaning the initial refers to? A: My name, sir. Darwin Boiser. Q: I am showing to you, Mr. Witness, a heat transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test of shabu previously marked as Exh. C. Will you please go over this and tell us if this is the same specimen [which] you were able to buy from alias Paks at the time of the buy-bust operation? A: Yes, sir. It is the same. Q: Why do you say so? A: Because it bears the marking which I placed, sir. Q: Again, what marking are you referring to? A: DB-1-310503, sir. INTERPRETER Witness is referring to the initial appearing in Exh. C. PROSECUTOR DULDULAO: Q: When you put the marking on this evidence, what happened next? A: We brought Paks to the office, sir. Q: When you were already at the office, what happened thereat? A: I turned him over to the investigator. Q: You are referring to alias Paks? A: Yes, sir. Q: How about the evidence? A: I also gave it, sir. Q: Who was your investigator then? A: PO3 Delima, sir. Q: What did Delima do after turning over to him the person of alias Paks and the evidence? A: He prepared the crime lab request. Q: Request for what? A: For laboratory examination. Q: What was the subject of the examination? A: The shabu which we bought from Paks. Q: What happened to the request? A: There was a result, sir. Q: What was the result? A: It [was] found positive [for] methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Q: How about alias Paks? Did you come to know his full name? A: Yes, sir. Q: How did you come to know it? A: When I asked him to sign the booking sheet, sir. Q: What was his name? A: Rufino Vicente, sir. Q: The accused in this case? A: Yes, sir. Q: If you will see him again, would you be able to identify him? A: Yes, sir. Q: Will you please point to him if he is inside the courtroom? A: He is there seated in front wearing a yellow t-shirt, sir. INTERPRETER: Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom whom upon being asked answered by the name of Rufino Vicente, Jr. 18
Additionally, any doubts as to the chain of custody requirement were clarified during the cross-examination of PO2 Boiser: ATTY. RONATAY Q: Where did you place the marking of the specimen, at the place where the accused was arrested or at the police station when there was already an investigation? A: At the place where the accused was arrested, maam. 19
We affirm the trial courts finding that PO2 Boisers testimony was credible and straightforward. As the trial court explained: The prosecution showed that there was a meeting of the minds between the witness Boiser, poseur-buyer and the seller, accused Rufino Vicente, Jr., to sell to the former shabu for Php500.00. The act of the accused-seller in receiving the money and delivering the said shabu consummated the sale. The straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution clearly established the elements. 20
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. 21 Oft-repeated is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. 22 Absent any indication that the police officers were ill-motivated in testifying against the accused, full credence should be given to their testimonies. 23
The cross-examination of Vicente, Jr. sheds light on the matter of ill motive: Fiscal Glenn Santos Q Mr. witness, but prior to this incident do you know these police officers Boiser, Lagos and Millari? A No sir. Q So it [is] safe to assume that you do not have any misunderstanding or misgiving with these police officers, Mr. witness? A None, sir. Q During the incident you said that you were with the "balut" vendor? A [Y]es, sir. Q But the "balut" vendor [was] never [harmed] nor arrested by these police officers? A No sir. Q And just like you, you claimed that you [did] not commit anything this "balut" vendor did not commit any crime? A None, sir. Q But despite that you were [singled] out by these police officers in arresting and mauling you? A Yes, sir. Q Would you know of any reason why these police officers would hurt you for no apparent reason or arrest or [charge] you for selling shabu? A None, sir. 24
No clear and convincing evidence exists in the records to show that Vicente, Jr.s arresting officers were impelled by malicious or ill motives in bringing up trumped-up charges against him. Moreover, We take notice of Vicente, Jr.s belated objection to the alleged lapses committed by the buy-bust team. People v. Sta. Maria 25 does not support this move: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The OSG, however, is incorrect in arguing that the buy-bust was conducted on March 31, 2003, while the IRR of RA 9165 took effect only on November 27, 2004. The IRR of RA 9165 was approved on August 30, 2002, and it became effective upon its publication in three newspapers of general circulation and registration with the Office of the National Administrative Register. It was published in the national newspaper Today on October 31, 2002 or before the buy-bust against Vicente, Jr. occurred. Thus, the IRR of RA 9165 is applicable to the case of Vicente, Jr. Yet, regardless of this argument on the effectivity of said IRR, Vicente, Jr. still cannot count on his acquittal. Even with the effectivity of the IRR during his arrest, We hold that the chain of custody of the seized item was not broken in this case. We are not convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were compromised. Alibi as a Defense As Vicente, Jr.s final argument, he reiterates that the case against him was all a frame-up. We find his excuse all too common and poorly argued. As the trial court noted: x x x [T]he accused failed to secure a medical report to support his claim alleging that his relatives were prevented from going near him. Such excuse deserves scant consideration. Also, his silence during the inquest proceeding because a policeman simply advised him to is highly suspect. Finally his claim that he did not file any action against the policemen who mauled him because of his fear for his life and that of his family is questionable. 26
Vicente, Jr.s testimony was, thus, labeled by the CA as "simply not corroborated by credible and convincing evidence," a requirement for the defense of frame-up to gain merit in court. Penalty Imposed Vicente, Jr. was sentenced to life imprisonment and the payment of a PhP 500,000 fine.1wphi1 This is within the range provided in RA 9165 for the crime of illegal sale of drugs: SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. We, thus, affirm the findings of the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02699 finding accused-appellant Vicente, Jr. guilty of the violation charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Third Division (G.R. NO. 184037: September 29, 2009) Antonio Lopez Y Dela Cruz, Petitioner, V. People of The Philippines, Respondent. Decision Nachura, J.