Psychology and Death

Meaningful Rediscovery
Herman Feifel
ABSTRACT: The place of death in psychology is reviewed
historically. Leading causes f or its being slighted as an
area of investigation during psychology's early years are
presented. Reasons f or its rediscovery in the mid-1950s
as a legitimate sector f or scientific inquiry are then dis-
cussed, along with some vicissitudes encountered in car-
tying out research in the field. This is followed by a de-
scription of principal empirical findings, clinical percep-
tions, and perspectives emerging from work in the
thanatological realm. The probability that such urgent
social issues as abortion, acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), and euthanasia, and such destructive
behaviors as drug abuse, alcoholism, and certain acts of
violence are associated with attitudes toward death offers
a challenge to psychology to enhance the vitality of human
response to maladaptive conduct and loss. Recognition of
personal mortality is a major enttyway to self-knowledge.
Although death is manifestly too complex to be the special
sphere of any one discipline, psychology's position as an
arena in which humanist and physicist-engineer cultures
intersect provides us with a meaningful opportunity to
advance our comprehension of how death can serve life.
To die is the human condition, and reflection concerning
death exists practically among all peoples. From the be-
ginnings of recorded history, realization of finitude has
been a powerful concern and shaping force. Indeed, many
feel that one of humanity' s most distinguishing charac-
teristics, in contrast to other species, is its capacity to
grasp the concept of a f ut ur euand i nevi t abl e- deat h.
Yet, except for a few sporadic forays (e.g., Fechner, 1836/
1904; Hall, 1915; James, 1910), the place of death in
psychology was practically terra incognita and an off-lim-
its enterprise until the mid-20th century.
There were a number of influential reasons for psy-
chology' s inordinate delay in coming to grips with such
a universal matter. One was 17th-century Western indi-
viduals' transfer of their intellectual inquisitiveness and
libido from theology to science (Toynbee et al., 1968).
We witnessed a shift from spiritual mastery over self to
physical conquest of nature. A major consequence was
that we became impoverished in possessing religious or
philosophic conceptual creeds, except nominally, with
which to transcend death. Death became a "wall" rather
than a "doorway." A t aboo of considerable measure was
placed on death and bereaved persons. Death and its con-
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comitants were sundered off, isolated, and permitted into
society only after being properly decontaminated. In this
context, further circumstances making the area uncom-
fortable to deal with were (a) an expanding industrial,
impersonal technology that steadily increased fragmen-
tation of the family and dismantled rooted neighborhoods
and kinship groups with more or less homogeneous val-
uesmwhat sociologists call a change from gemeinschafi
to gessellschafiuthus depriving us of emotional and social
supports with which to cushion the impact of death when
it intruded into our lives; (b) a spreading deritualization
of grief, related to criticism of funerary practices as being
overly expansive, baroque, and exploitive of the mourner' s
emotions; (c) a gradual expulsion of death from everyday
common experience; death has developed into a mystery
for many people, increasingly representing a fear of the
unknown, and has become the province of the "profes-
sional," whose mastery, unfortunately, is more technical
than human these days; and (d) in a modern society that
has emphasized achievement, productivity, and the fu-
ture, the prospect of no future at all, and loss of identity,
has become an abomination. Hence, death and mourning
have invited our hostility and repudiation (Feifel, 1977).
A second powerful reason was psychology's natal need
to raise its flag independently of mental philosophy and
metaphysics. Steered by the burgeoning fields of experi-
mental psychophysiology and psychophysics evolving in
Europe, American psychologists moved to declare the in-
dependence of their new science. Scientific respectability
meant occupying oneself with measurable stimuli and re-
sponses that were repeatable and public. Experimental and
objective study of behavior became psychology's com-
manding posture, and logical positivism became its domi-
nant notion of the scientific undertaking. Areas such as
love, will, values, and death, elusive to operational definition
and measurement, were slighted in favor of such spheres as
memory, reaction time, size constancy, and perception of
form and color. This, it was felt, would bring psychology
in line with physics and mathematics (Feifel, 1964).
The sway of logical positivism on psychology was
unquestionably wholesome, in part. It was responsible
for producing imposing diagnostic instruments, discred-
iting anecdotal data, and stimulating the demand for more
exacting standards of evidence. Additionally, it was re-
sponsible for more intelligible communication because
of its emphasis on operational clarity. But it also brought
stultifying effects, for example, tending to exclude expla-
April 1990 American Psychologist
In the public domai n
Vol. 45, No. 4, 537-543
537
nat i on in t er ms of i nner traits, purposes, or interests. Ex-
pl anat or y efforts were mai nl y confi ned t o events lying
outside t he organism. Int erest in t he existential richness
of life was mut ed (Feifel, 1964). Even t he emerging role
of psychoanalysis on t he Amer i can scene, with its at t en-
tion t o processes of mi nd, underval ued t he i mpor t of
deat h in t he psychi c economy by i nt erpret i ng deat h at-
t i t udes and fears as bei ng essentially derivative and sym-
bolic of ot her mai nspri ngs such as cast rat i on fear and
separat i on anxi et y (Feifel, 1969).
Death Reconsidered
Thi s was t he r egnant state of affairs unt i l Worl d War II.
Events of t hat war, with its defense of democr at i c values,
t he Hol ocaust , challenge of racism, and ensui ng press of
urgent social problems, forced psychology t o l ook beyond
its t radi t i onal positivism. A waxing humani sm, t he grow-
ing pr omi nence of existential psychology in Europe with
its accent uat i on of deat h as a philosophical t heme, and
Piaget' s work in cognitive devel opment all cont r i but ed t o
fostering t he view t hat a vital psychology must be r oot ed
in human beings not in a mat hemat i cal physics model .
Most compelling, perhaps, was t he legacy of t he A-
bomb wi t h its pot ent i al for provi di ng us all with a com-
mon epitaph. Not onl y t he i ndi vi dual i t y of death, but
post eri t y and social i mmort al i t y, were now at risk. Phys-
ical science had made it possible for us t o dest roy not
onl y society but hi st ory as well. Issues of meani ng, pur-
pose, and t empor al i t y st art ed t o move cent er stage. In
this j unct ur e of psychology' s expandi ng interest in t he
pulse of human life and intensified awareness of life's
transience, at t ent i on t o and research in t he area of dyi ng
and deat h began t o emerge as an aut hent i c and fertile
undert aki ng (Feifel, 1969).
Early Years of the Death Movement
Al t hough a few empi ri cal articles by psychologists had
been publ i shed in t he mi d-1950s relating ment al illness
and old age t o deat h and measuri ng atfective responses
t o deat h-rel at ed words (e.g., Alexander, Colley, & Adler-
stein, 1957; Feifel, 1955, 1956), psychology' s first orga-
ni zed appr oach t o deat h was a symposi um titled, The
Concept of Death and Its Relation to Behavior, whi ch I
Editor's note. This article was originally presented as a Distinguished
Professional Contributions award address at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association in Atlanta in August 1988.
Award-based manuscripts appearing in the American Psychologist
are scholarly articles based in part on earlier award addresses presented
at the APA convention. In keeping with the policy of recognizing these
distinguished contributors to the field, these submissions are given special
consideration in the editorial selection process.
Author's note. Preparation of this manuscript was facilitated by a
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs grant.
I thank the American Psychological Association for presenting me
with this broad base from which to share developments in the "death
movement," and Stephen Straek for assisting me in preparing the article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Herman Feifel, Psychology Service (116B), VA Outpatient Clinic, 425
South Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90013.
initiated and chaired and which was present ed at the 1956
annual meet i ng of t he Amer i can Psychological Associa-
t i on (APA) in Chicago. Ot her part i ci pant s were Irving E.
Alexander, Jacob Taubes, Ar nol d A. Hut schnecker, and
Gar dner Murphy. The symposi um served as t he basis for
t he 1959 book, The Meaning of Death, which I edited.
Authorities agree t hat the book was seminal in galvanizing
regard for t he field and in familiarizing t he scholarly
communi t y with t he issues and concerns of dying, death,
and grief. The same year I received what was pr obabl y
t he first research grant awarded t o an individual by t he
Nat i onal Inst i t ut e of Ment al Heal t h ( NI MH) t o st udy
at t i t udes t oward death. Despi t e these initial signs of rec-
ogni t i on of t he legitimacy of investigating t he t hanat o-
logical domai n, numer ous scientific Gr undys still felt t hat
t he topic of deat h was not appropri at e for psychology.
Contemporary Psychology, for instance, rejected consid-
ering The Meaning of Death because t he book had j ust
received a review by Ti me magazi ne and, hence, had at-
t ai ned its allotted mor bi d fasci nat i on exposure. Mor e sig-
nificant was t he communi cat i on t hat t he subject was not
ger mane t o genui ne scientific inquiry.
The at t empt t o i mpl ement my NI MH research
mandat e relating attitudes toward deat h and behavior was
also beset wi t h mani fol d t ri bul at i ons and frustrations.
Some of t he professional personnel with whom I was
working told me t hat at no t i me di d t hey ever i nf or m
pat i ent s t hat t hey had a serious illness f r om whi ch t hey
coul d die. " The one t hi ng you never do, " it was empha-
sized, "i s t o discuss deat h with a pat i ent . " Along this
same line, aft er a t hr ee- mont h delay in respondi ng t o my
request for permi ssi on t o gat her dat a f r om some of his
patients, t he chi ef physician-in-charge of a leading met -
ropolitan hospital finally replied, "Excuse my i mmoder at e
delay in answering, but you have t o be a staff member , "
a lack known t o hi m at t he i ncept i on of our discussion
about obt ai ni ng patients. The commi ssi oner of hospitals
of a maj or city responded t o my request for subjects by
saying, " I t is not consonant wi t h our policy t o set aside
patients for this pur pose. " Then t here was t he chi ef re-
search psychiatrist of a pr omi nent medi cal cent er who
" knew" t hat t he research proj ect woul d i nduce what he
t er med "t est t oxi ci t y" in t he patients, despite al ready
demonst r at ed results t o t he cont r ar y (Feifel, 1963, p. 12).
The realization soon began t o sink in t hat what I
was up against were not i di osyncrat i c personal quirks,
t he usual admi ni st rat i ve vicissitudes, pique, or nonac-
cept ance of an i nadequat e research design. Rather, it was
personal position, bolstered by cul t ural structuring, t hat
deat h is a dar k symbol not t o be s t i r r ed- - not even
t ouch~- - - - an obsceni t y t o be avoided. I must admi t t o
mor e t han passing vagaries about chucki ng t he whole
thing. Two things, t hough, hel d me t o t he task. One was
my ego. I had made a dent or two, mirabile dictu, here
and there, using "gamesmanshi p" of an or der t hat woul d
have war med St ephen Pot t er ( no date). Second was my
sent i ment , albeit occasionally dampened by repeat ed re-
jections, t hat st udy of t he area was i mpor t ant and, come
hell or high water, shoul d be i mpl ement ed. Fort unat el y,
538 Apri l 1990 Amer i can Psychologist
as I have noted, there were exceptions to the situation I
have been describing. I did find congenial colleagues and
professional personnel who perceived what I was striving
to do, acknowledged its importance, and helped me get
my work offt he ground (Feifel, 1963, pp. 11-13).
Succeeding years saw a burst of activity in the field.
The 1960s and 1970s were characterized by the intro-
duction of workshops and courses on dying, death, and
mourning in various universities and professional schools.
There were also noteworthy pioneering books by Kas-
t enbaum and Aisenberg (1972), the psychiatrists Eissler
(1955), Hi nt on (1967), Kfibler-Ross (1969), Parkes
(1972), and Weisman (1972), sociologists Fulton (1965)
and Glaser and Strauss (1965), the nurse-sociologist
Quint-Benoliel (1967), the philosopher Choron (1963),
and cultural anthropologist Gorer (1965), among others.
Journals such as OMEGA (1969; Robert Kastenbaum,
editor), Death Education (1977; now called Death Stud-
ies, Hannelore Wass, editor), and the Journal of Thana-
tology (1973; Austin H. Kutscher, editor) came into being.
Additionally, a number of scientific and professional as-
sociations devoted specifically to thanatological matters
were founded. Among the more promi nent were the In-
ternational Work Group on Death, Dying, and Bereave-
ment, the Forum for Death Education and Counseling,
and Foundation for Thanatology. Bolstering these groups
were several self-help and lay groups, for example, Make
Today Count (1973), The Society of Compassionate
Friends (1969), and widow-to-widow programs sparked
by Phyllis Silverman (1969).
Empirical Findings and Clinical Perceptions
What are some empirical findings and clinical perceptions
issuing from work already carried out in the field?
1. Death is for all seasons. Its directive force is pres-
ent from the very beginning in all of us, young and old,
healthy and sick. It is not j ust for the combat soldier,
dying person, elderly individual, or suicidal person, It is
an ingredient of i mport throughout the entire life span.
In this frame, we do not serve children well by shielding
t hem from the experience of death. We only hinder their
emotional growth. We are learning that children are more
capable of withstanding the stress brought on by their
limited understanding of death than by its mystery and
implied abandonment (Wahl, 1959).
2. Death fear can be a secondary phenomenon re-
flecting, for example, clinical displacement of separation
anxiety. Incoming findings, however, increasingly suggest
that the reverse may be more to the point. Apprehen-
siveness and concern about dying and death can them-
selves assume dissembling guises and gain expression in
such symptoms as insomnia, depression, above-average
fears of loss, and sundry psychosomatic and even psy-
chotic manifestations (Gillespie, 1963; Searles, 1961).
3. Fear of death is not a unitary or monolithic vari-
able. Various subcomponents are evident, for example,
fear of going to hell, loss of identity, loneliness. For a good
number of persons, negative connotations of death are
associated substantially with feelings of rootlessness and
having to face the "unknown" with minimal mastery.
These features appear to be more prominent than even
such aspects as "I may not have lived completely" or "My
family may suffer.'" For many, death no longer signals the
possibility of atonement and salvation, or a point in time
on the road to eternity, but isolation and loss of self (Feifel,
1977; Feifel & Nagy, 1981).
4. Significant discrepancies exist in many people
between their conscious and nonconscious fear of death.
Fear of death evidences itself as a lockstitching phenom-
enon with little reported fear of death on a verbal con-
scious level, coupled with one of ambivalence at a fantasy
or imagery level, and outright negativity at the noncon-
scious level, This apparent counterbalance of coexisting
avoidance-acceptance of personal death appears t o serve
powerful adaptational needs. In the face of personal death,
the human mind ostensibly operates simultaneously on
various levels of reality, or finite provinces of meaning,
each of which can be somewhat autonomous. We, there-
fore, need to be circumspect in accepting at face value
the degree of fear of death affirmed at a conscious level
(Feifel & Branscomb, 1973).
5. Coping with a life-threatening illness or death
threat varies in significant fashion not only among dif-
fering groups but among situations. Meaningful dispar-
ities seem to exist i n how cancer patients, heart patients,
and elderly individuals contend with their serious illness
and old age compared to the way they deal with nonlife-
threatening stresses such as competition, marital discord,
decision making, or loss of a job. Differences noted in
these situations suggest not so much the employment of
new coping strategies, as modifications in the patterning
or configuration of an individual's more usual coping
modes. This is in contrast to much of the clinical litera-
ture, which reports that coping efforts used in the face of
severe threat and impending death reflect but an inten-
sified or more pervasive empl oyment of an individual's
coping deportment previously applied to generally aver-
sive situations in personal life (Feifel & Nagy, 1986; Feifel
& Strack, 1989; Feifel, Strack, & Nagy, 1987a, 1987b;
Silver & Wortman, 1980).
6. Most dying patients do not expect "miracles"
concerning their biological condition. Their essential
communication is the need for confirmation of care and
concern. When emotional and psychosoeial needs of
dying patients are attended to, we discover competence
in many of them for responsible and effective behavior.
Moreover, when appreciation of their integrity and rec-
ognition of their input in decision making are major fea-
tures in the treatment process, there is reduced depression,
less projection of blame onto others, and diminished feel-
ings of guilt and inadequacy not only in the patient but
also in the helping care professionals and family members
involved with that patient. The patient, in this type of
context, moves toward the death of a person rather than
of an illness. And, as professionals, we end up not merely
as voyeurs of another' s pain and tribulations but are
prodded by the process to probe our own values and as-
pirations (Feifel, 1977).
April 1990 American Psychologist 539
One of the superb responses to this understanding
has been the hospice movement. Its alertness to the prob-
lem of chronic pain, involvement of the family and friends
as part of the caring team, and value of the meaningful-
ness of life are resulting in a prolonging of l i v i n g rather
than dying for many terminally ill persons. Being in a
dying state does not veto respect for the sanctity and af-
firmation of life (Saunders, 1977).
7. Gri ef is not a sign of weakness or self-indulgence.
Rather, it demonstrates a necessary and deep human need
most of us have in reacting to the loss of a significant
person in our lives, and it recognizes no age boundaries.
Furthermore, it is multifaceted, arises from differing types
of loss, and manifests itself in numerous representations:
anticipatory grief, high-low grief, self-grief, survival grief,
or anniversary grief (Feifel, 1977; Fulton & Gottesman,
1980).
Increasing privatization of death and grief needs to
be undercut. There is a traditional Jewish proverb that
"t o grieve alone is t o suffer most.'" The communi t y needs
to expand its current institutional networks and com-
munal resources in responding to grief. Suppressing or
minimizing it, and failure t o acknowledge the healing
process of grief are maladaptive not just for the individual
and immediate family but for the larger community. In-
deed, there is growing comprehension that communi t y
sharing of grief decreases feelings of guilt and depression
in survivors and minimizes the break in the societal fabric
(Feifel, 1977).
Bereavement lacks precise criteria as a clinical entity,
and the line between healthy and unhealthy grief, at times,
can become blurry and difficult to distinguish. An in-
structive criterion in this circumstance seems to be that
unhealthy grief may reveal itself in deviant behavior that
violates conventional expectations or imperils the health
and safety of self and others (Weisman, 1975).
We need to be cautious in encouraging survivors to
abandon grief prematurely, or to wallow in it for that
matter, because of our own painful and uncomfortable
feelings. We are learning that i f mourning is neglected or
short-circuited, or does not take place close in time to a
serious loss, its expression may occur later on in a more
inappropriate and regressive manner. We are now aware
that grief can gain expression in such masked appearances
as school absenteeism and bed-wetting in children, drug
abuse and delinquency in adolescents, and promiscuity,
suicide, and diverse physical and mental illnesses in adults.
We are also now more keenly informed about the "high-
risk" group status of the bereaved in the area of somatic
and emotional illness, particularly during the first year
or two after a loved one' s death; the well-being of one
who mourns is itself i n a kind of jeopardy. Additionally,
we increasingly realize that the grieving person not only
can experience deprivation ofsex, companionship, and
economic support but is further vulnerable to a loss of
social role, autonomy, and power. Moreover, it is being
reestablished that the funeral ceremony and mourning
rituals can be liberating as well as enslaving for survivors
in their grief (Parkes, 1972).
8. We are discovering that j ust as there are multi-
tudinous ways oflivin~ there are numerous ways of dying
and grieving. Despite the equanimity of sorts that it offers,
and a prevailing chic, the hard data do not support the
existence of any procrustean stages or schedules that
characterize terminal illness or mourning. This does not
mean that, for example, Kiibler-Ross's (1969) "stages of
dying" and Bowlby's (1980) "phases of mourning" cannot
provide us with implications and insights into the dy-
namics and process of dying and grief, but they are very
far from being inexorable hoops through which most ter-
minally ill individuals and mourners inevitably pass. We
should beware of promulgating a coercive orthodoxy of
how to die or mourn. In the last analysis, applying Weis-
man' s (1975) wise admonition, an "appropriate" dying
or mourning is one acceptable to or tolerated by the dying
person or mourner, not one so designated by either the
helping professions, significant others, or the community.
Individual differences and esteem for personhood must
be our principal guides.
9. It is important for members of the health care
team working with severely ill and terminally ill patients,
and mourners, to be alert to signs of personal denial,
avoidance, or antipathy in themselves concerning the
reality of death. The more nonaccepting and unresolved
helping care personnel tend t o be about their own fears
concerning personal death, the less likely they are to pro-
vide the optimal assistance of which they are capable.
Ministry to the dying and bereaved is extremely difficult
if we ourselves are not comfortable with the idea of per-
sonal death. Even if the professional's anxieties in the
field are not completely resolved they, at least, have to
be looked at and contended with. Grappling with our
own somber feelings about death and grief will tend to
moderate our disposition to seek refuge in the technical
functions of disease, skulk behind theological dogmas,
and equivocate with intellectual words in order to evade
open encounter with the dying patient or grief of the
mourner (Feifel, 1977).
10. Redefinition is called for concerning the func-
tion of the helping professional, particularly that of the
physician. When cure is definitely not in the cards, the
provision of comfort and care is just as valid and authentic
a contribution in meeting the real needs of the dying
patient. In a significant sense, the growing hospice move-
ment is a reaction to this prevailing lack in much of cure-
oriented modern medicine (Feifel, 1977).
Perspect i ves Prom the De at h Movement
What are some of the perspectives advanced by the death
movement?
1. Dying is not only a biological affair but a human
one. The movement has underscored the importance of
healing the humanity of the person wounded by illness
and oncoming death. It has indicated that technology and
competence have t o be infused with compassion and be-
nevolence and that life is not j ust a matter of length but
of depth and quality as well. In this regard, the movement
has emphasized the importance of controlling chronic
540 April 1990 American Psychologist
pain in the dying so that terminal patients can use their
full potential and has also stressed the moral, spiritual,
and ethical dimensions inherent in health-care giving.
2. It has refocused attention on the role of the future
in steering conduct. Just as the past, the future abides
dynamically in the present. How we anticipate future
event swand deat hwgoverns our "now" i n substantive
fashion and provides an important organizing principle
in determining how we behave in life. This is providing
us with a needed corrective to a widespread vogue of
being mesmerized by the moment (Feifel, 1963).
3. It is forwarding the realization that we must be
at home with fear of death and with the enigma of death
if we are not to become alienated from our nature and
destiny and lose basic contact with who we are and what
we are about. Acceptance of personal mortality is one of
the foremost entryways to self-knowledge. Human ma-
turity brings along with it a recognition of limit. In truth,
we have a legitimate need to face away from death. Un-
fortunately, t oo many of us resort to unhealthy expulsion
and camouflage of t be actuality of death, resulting in self-
estrangement and social pathology. If we accepted death
as a necessity and did not try to demot e it to the level of
mischance or fortuity, i f we accepted death as lodged in
our bowels from the very beginning, energies now bound
up in continuing strivings to shelve and subdue the idea
of death could be available to us for the more constructive
and positive aspects of living, perhaps even fortifying our
gift for creative splendor _against our genius for destruction
(Feifel, 1969).
As time-ridden beings, we are faced with the task of
identifying ourselves with history and eternity. I think
our most viable response will issue from basic philosophic,
religious, or psychological deliberations about death al-
ready in our possession. This is difficult for a generation
that finds itself dislodged from time-honored anchors. But
we must establish bearings with the idea of death. Whether
we do so via faith, love, art, or intelligence is a matter of
de gust i bus. In pondering death, the agony of selfhood is
not endurable for most of us without resources, be they
transcendental, inspirational, or existential. The evolution
of an ars mor i e ndi prior t o the advent of death is needed
(Feifel, 1969, p. 294).
4. Clearly, life can be menaced and compromised
in many ways short of death and on varying levels of
experience. In this context, such notions as "partial
death," "symbolic death," and mourning over deprivation
other than life such as a limb, sense, marriage, or old
neighborhood will also profit from a more comprehensive
theory of death and grief (Feifel, 1977, p. 354).
5. It is evident that death and grief are too multi-
splendored and complex to be trussed up in the concep-
tual straitjacket of any one discipline. We must be more
cognizant of the positive synergistic effect of a transdisci-
plinary rather than unilateral approach in dealing with
the dying and survivors.
6. The time is overdue for death education to as-
sume a rightful role in our cultural upbringing as a prep-
aration for living. We have disabused ourselves of the
fancy that sex first comes to life at puberty, as a kind of
full-bodied Minerva emerging from Jupiter' ~ head. In a
similar vein, it is fitting that we now concede the psycho-
logical presence of death in ourselves from childhood on
and attend to it at all stages of life development, not merely
at its beginning and end. Naturally, its qualitative form
of expression will embody such variables as individual
differences, values and belief systems, social context, and
differing developmental periods. But, j ust as i ri s belated
to start reading sex manuals on the marriage bed, it is
rather tardy to begin developing a philosophy of life and
death when one is terminally ill or newly bereaved. The
pertinence of death education is not only for those of us
in the health care professions who deal with dying, death,
and bereavement but for al l wi n the home, school, reli-
gious institution, and general culture. The mandate is to
alter cultural perspective, not j ust achieve a palliative
concern (Feifel, 1977).
Implications for Psychologists
We must expand our information base so that application
does not out run knowledge. William James once:stated
that he was no lover of disorder but feared .tO lose the
truth by pretensions to wholly possessing it. Knowledge
of the specified links and interactive bonds of widespread
variables to the meaning of death, for example, ,'will t o
live," life-style, coping strategies, need for achievement,
and ethnic background, among others, is still not available
to us in an organized fashion because of methodological
complexities. Inconsistent findings reported in the death
literature mirror the use of differing populations, ages,
assessment devices, "conditions under which," and failure
to fully appreciate the untidy nature of attitudes toward
death. Some pitfalls, already alluded to, are noneonsider-
ation of the multimeanings that death acquires for people
and perception of fear of death as a homogeneous variable.
Another shortcoming has been neglect of t he discrep-
ancies that exist in individuals between conscioUs and
nonconscious levels of death anxiety. Analysis of these
incongruities may prove more instructive t han merely
noting the presence or degree of death concern (Feifel &
Nagy, 1981; Kastenbaum & Costa, 1977; Schulz, 1978).
Experimental manipulation of variables has also
been sparse. Case-based offerings continue to b e infor-
mative in identifying phenomena and in suggesting leads
for theory and practice. Nevertheless, although the medley
of human responses to death-related situations is often
noted by the clinician, these discernments do not, per se,
provide a robust foundation for empirical generalizations.
At this stage of development, major desiderata for
the field are more generative theory-based formulations,
conversion of major assumptions into operationalized
empirical inquiry, longitudinal studies, cross-validation
and reliability analyses of prevailing procedures, more
astute incorporation of multilevel aspects, and extended
examination of functional and behavioral correlates of
attitudes toward death. Psychotherapeutic functioning
and models of personality and psychopathology require
amplified representation of the future and death in their
April 1990 American Psychologist 541
horizons. There is a definite need t o integrate the clini-
cian' s admi rat i on for individuality and complexity wi t h
the researcher' s demand for precise and vigorous docu-
ment at i on (Feifel, 1969). We require comprehensi on and
images t hat are more applicable t o cont emporary death
and grief.
Refi nement in the pursui t of our craft, however, will
not be sufficient unless it is carried on i n t he context of
healing the humani t y of t he dyi ng pat i ent and wounded
mourner. Our model of underst andi ng and t r eat ment
must be the humani t y of t he person. The requisite is not
j ust t o succor the body but also t o speak t o the soul. The
humani t i es, ethics, and the spiritual di mensi on must be
in our ken along with biology and the behavioral sciences.
Deat h and grief bring wi t h t hem a preoccupat i on wi t h a
vision of life.
Our field of regard should focus on the individual
as purposive and striving: one whose scope is not made
parochial b y a limiting p h i l o s o p h y o f science, a n d w h o s e
c o n c e p t s are n o t d e r i v e d essentially f r o m m e t h o d s o f s t u d y
b u t rather f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f h u m a n life. T o o often
h a v e w e w o r k e d w i t h p o r t i o n s o f t h e h u m a n individual
a n d tried to m a k e a v i r t u e o f this. T h e c h a l l e n g e is to
enlarge h o r i z o n s w i t h o u t sacrificing o u r gains. H u m a n i t y
c a n n o t b e g r a s p e d in its totality b y a v i e w t h a t e x e m p t s
p e r s o n h o o d , m e a n i n g , a n d r e d e m p t i o n f r o m its p u r v i e w ,
b y a perspective w h o s e criterion is t h e m a c h i n e rather
t h a n m a n (Feifel, 1964).
L e a v i n g t h e m o u n t a i n t o p for m o r e earthly g r o u n d ,
it is b e c o m i n g p l a i n t h a t p o w e r is n e e d e d a l o n g w i t h
scholarship a n d learning. It is n o t e n o u g h t o offer advice,
instructive as it m a y be. T h e call is to integrate existing
k n o w l e d g e c o n c e r n i n g d e a t h a n d grief into o u r c o m m u n a l
a n d p u b l i c institutions. T h e r e is n o w a y in a d y n a m i c
society t h a t a strict line c a n b e d r a w n b e t w e e n scholarship
a n d w i s s e n s c h a f i a n d t h e tides o f social c h a n g e . T h e glo-
r i o u s A p o l l o p r o g r a m in the U n i t e d S t a t e s to p u t a n
A m e r i c a n o n t h e m o o n , for e x a m p l e , for all its benefits,
w a s m o r e the c h i l d o f politics t h a n o f t h e c r a v i n g for
exploration. L i k e it o r n o t , political m o t i v e s h a v e b e e n
telling in d r i v i n g s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y t h e s e p a s t de-
cades. I n o t h e r w o r d s , w e m u s t b e valid participants in
h e l p i n g f o r m u l a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y o r else b e its victims.
P o w e r c a n b c e n a b l i n g as w e l l as corrupting.
Conclusion
A discipline is d e f i n e d b y t h e q u e s t i o n s it a s k s as w e l l as
the validity o f its m e a s u r i n g i n s t r u m e n t s . R e c o g n i t i o n o f
d e a t h a n d k n o w l e d g e o f finiteness h a s c o n t r i b u t e d to psy-
chology's p r o g r e s s i o n i n t o a d u l t h o o d . It b e t o k e n s a cer-
tain loss o f i n n o c e n c e a n d y o u t h a n d h a s p r o b a b l y intro-
d u c e d a repressive e l e m e n t i n t o relationships. A t the s a m e
t i m e , h o w e v e r , it c a n s e r v e positively as a galvanizing
f o r c e - - a n Aristotelian v i s - a - t e r g o - - - p u s h i n g u s t o w a r d
creativity a n d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . N o less a p e r s o n t h a n
M i c h e l a n g e l o said, " N o t h o u g h t is b o r n in m e t h a t h a s
n o t ' D e a t h " e n g r a v e d u p o n it" (Feifel, 1 9 7 7 , p. I I).
I n final consideration, t h e d e a t h m o v e m e n t a n d so-
cial e n g i n e e r i n g will o b v i o u s l y n e v e r exorcize d e a t h o f its
demoni c power. Still, the movement has been a maj or
force i n broadeni ng our grasp of the phenomenol ogy of
illness, i n helping humani ze medical relationships and
health care, and in advancing the rights of the dying. It
is highpointing values t hat undergird the vitality of human
response t o catastrophe and loss. Furt hermore, it is con-
t ri but i ng t o reconstituting the integrity of our splintered
wholeness. More i mport ant , perhaps, i t is sensitizing us
t o our common humani t y, which is all t oo eroded in the
present world (Feifel, 1977). It may be somewhat hyper-
bolic, but I believe t hat how we regard deat h and how we
t reat the dyi ng and survivors are pri me indications of a
civilization' s i nt ent i on and target.
Concern wi t h deat h is not the fixation of a cult in-
different t o life. Conversely, in emphasi zi ng awareness of
death, we sharpen and intensify our appreciation of the
uniqueness and preciousness of life. In responding t o our
temporality, we shall find it easier t o define values, prior-
ities, and life goals.
Because of advances in medical technology and an
expandi ng aging population, the years ahead will behold
increasing numbers of people wrestling with chronic and
life-threatening illness and prolonged dying. Furthermore,
such urgent social issues as abortion, AIDS, euthanasia,
and capital puni shment , and such behaviors as alcohol-
ism, dr ug abuse, and certain acts of violence, may well
have links to overt and l at ent meani ngs t hat deat h holds
for us. After all, life-threatening behaviors involve con-
frontation, in one way or another, wi t h the t hreat of pos-
sible i nj ury or ul t i mat e deat h to self and others.
Deat h ixxssesses many faces and meanings, and per-
ceptions of it vary i n divergent cultures and i n differing
epochs. It is obviously t oo intricate t o be t he special prov-
ince of any one discipline. Nevertheless, psychology' s
cont ri but i ons in the past t o t hanat ol ogy have succeeded
in increasing underst andi ng of and coping wi t h dying,
death, and bereavement. Our fut ure mandat e is t o extend
our grasp of how deat h can serve life.
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