PROPERTY Professor E.

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Chapter III: Right of Accession 28 July 2009

III. RIGHTS OF ACCESSION 1

A. Concept
Art 440 The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

Definition of Accession
• TOLENTINO: Right by virtue of which the owner of a thing becomes the owner of everything
that the thing may produce or which may be inseparably united or incorporated thereto, either
naturally or principally.
• JBL REYES: Extension of ownership over a thing to whatever is incorporated thereto naturally
or artificially (without or with labor of man)
○ Incorporation means a stable union or adherence, not mere juxtaposition
○ Accession is one of the bundle of rights of ownership and is not a mode of acquiring
property
○ It does not depend upon a new title

A. General Principles of Accession

1. Applicable to both accession discreta and accession continua

a. Accessory follows the principal (accesio cedit principal)
• Owner of the principal acquires or extends his ownership over the accessory
• Art 437 Owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it
• Art 446 Owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it
a. No one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another

2. Applicable to accession continua alone

a. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvement or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following
articles (Art 445)
b. All works, sowing, planting are presumed made by owner and at his expense, unless
contrary is proved
c. Accessory incorporated to principal such that it cannot be separated without injury to work
constructed or destruction to plantings, construction or works (Art 447)
d. Bad faith involves liability for damages and other dire consequences
e. Bad faith of one party neutralizes bad faith of the other
• Art 453 If there was BF, not only on the part of the person who BPS, but also on the part of
owner, rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

1. Applicable to accession discreta alone

a. Ownership of fruits – to owner of principal thing belongs the natural, industrial and civil
fruits (Art 441 )
EXCEPTIONS:
i. Possession in good faith (to the possessor)
ii.In usufruct (to the usufructuary)
iii.In lease (to the lessee)
iv.In antichresis (to the creditor)

B. Obligations of receiver of fruits to pay expenses by 3rd persons in production,

gathering and preservation
Art 443 He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person
in their production, gathering and preservation.

1 Consolidated by Karichi Santos

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C. Kinds of Accession

1. Accession Discreta (Fruits)

Art 440 The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby…
• Extension of the right of ownership to the products of a thing
• Based on principles of justice: It is only just that the owner of a thing should also own
whatever it produces, unless there is some special reason for a contrary solution
• GENERAL RULE: Fruits go to the owner of the principal, unless otherwise provided by
law or contract
• EXCEPTIONS: possession in good faith, usufruct, lease, antichresis

Art 441 To the owner belongs:

a. Natural fruits
• Art 442 the spontaneous products of the soil and the young and other products of
animals
• Those products of the soil in whose generation human labor does not intervene (e.g.
wild herbs in the mountains dedicated to pasturage)
a. Industrial
• Art 442 are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor
• Fruits that implies some kind of cultivation or labor (e.g. zacate grass fed to horses)
• Products of the soil as a result of human labor
a. Civil
• Art 442 are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and
the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income
• Periodical (reiterable) increase of incorporeal property due to operation of law (rents,
annuities)
• Rents of land, buildings, and certain kinds of incomes obtained from the land or
building itself

BACHRACH v SEIFERT (1950; Ozaeta)2

○ In his will, the deceased Emil Maurice Bachrach named his wife (Mary McDonald Bachrach) as usufructuary
of the remainder of his estate. The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach,
one-half of all his estate shall be divided among his legal heirs, to the exclusion of his brothers.
○ The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc.,
received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares.
○ June 10, 1948, Mary (the widow), as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to
authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company (the administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach) to
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend. She claimed that said dividend, although paid out
in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
○ Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the
stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman3.
○ The lower court granted Mary’s petition and overruled S&E’s objection. Seifer and Elianoff appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the stock dividend can be considered as a fruit/income (which belongs to the usufructuary) or
part of the capital (part of the corpus of the estate which will be delivered together with the rest of the future
estate to the remainderman)?

HELD: The stock dividend is a form of income. The SC cited Hite vs. Hite wherein the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, held that "where a dividend, although declared in stock, is based upon the earnings of the company, it
is in reality, whether called by one name or another, the income of the capital invested in it. In the present case;
the 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil
fruits of the original investment.

2 Camille Maranan
3 According to my legal dictionary, a remainder is a future estate and a remainderman is the inchoate
possessor of that future estate
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Also, two US rulings figured in this case:

1. Massachusetts rule = stock dividend is not an income but merely represents an addition to the
investment capital The Massachusetts rule regards cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock
dividends, however made, as capital. It holds that a stock dividend is not in any true sense any dividend at all
since it involves no division or severance from the corporate assets of the subject of the dividend. This rule
supports Seifert and Elianoff’s contention that a stock dividend is not an income (unlike a cash
dividend), but merely represents an addition to the invested capital.
2. The Pennsylvania rule declares that all earnings of the corporation made prior to the death of the testator-
stockholder belong to the corpus of the estate, and that all earnings, when declared as dividends in
whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant are income and belong to
the usufructuary or life tenant. This rule supports Mary Bachrach's contention.
According to our SC, the Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with Philippine statutory laws than the
Massachusetts rule since under section 16 of the Corporation Law, no corporation may make or declare any
dividend except from the surplus profits arising from its business. Any dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock,
represents surplus profits. Therefore, the stock dividend, as part of the income of the usufruct, should be
transferred to Mary since Article 471 of the Civil Code (now Art. 566)provides that the usufructuary shall be
entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct.

In My Understanding: The widow is saying that the stock dividend should be transferred to her account since
this form part of the income of the estate and since she is the usufructuary, she has the right over such income.
On the other hand, the legal heirs/ remainderman (or men) are contending that the stock dividend is part of the
capital and should be delivered to them (together with the rest of the estate upon Mary’s death). The court held
that stock dividends form part of the income and therefore, should be delivered to the usufructuary (the widow).

DISPOSITIVE: Order affirmed.

BACHRACH v TALISAY SILAY (1931; Romualdez)4

Plaintiff-appellee: Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
Defendants-appellees: Talisay-Silay Milling Co. et al.
Intervenor-appellant: Philippine National Bank
Facts:
• 22 Dec 1923, Talisay-Silay was indebted to PNB. To secure the loan, Talisay induced its planters one of whom
was Mariano Lacson Ledesma to mortgage their land. The central, to compensate the planters for mortgaging
their property, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation… every year with a sum equal to 2% of the
debt secured accdg to the yearly balance. The payment to be made as soon as the central was freed of its
debts
• Mariano sold his land to Cesar Ledesma for P7500
• Bachrach on the other hand was a creditor of Mariano Ledesma. When Mariano could no longer pay Bachrach,
it went after Talisay (original complaint), praying for the delivery of P13850 Talisay owed to Mariano as bonus
stated in the first paragraph, or any instrument of credit. It also prayed for accounting of whatever the central
owed to Mariano by way of bonus, dividend, etc., as well as the nullification of the sale made to Cesar
Ledesma
• PNB filed third party claim alleging a preferential right over Mariano’s credit owed by Talisay as part of the
civil fruits of the land mortgaged to the bank. BAchrach contested this
• Talisay prayed for the absolution of 7500 of the credit as it belonged to Cesar Ledesma as buyer in good faith.
All parties later agreed to respect Cesar’s credit and absolved him from the complaint and ordered delivery to
him of P7500
• Trial court ruled in favor of Bachrach, awarding it P11,076.02 of Mariano’s bonus from Talisay. Hence this
appeal
Issues: W/N the bonus was a civil fruit which formed part of the mortgaged land – NO
Held and Ratio: NO. Art 355 of the old Civil Code (Art 442 of the current Civil Code) considers three things as
civil fruits: rents of buildings, proceeds from leases of lands, and income from perpetual of life annuities or other
similar sources of revenue.
The bonus in question was neither rent of a building nor land. For it to come under the coverage of
income, it must be obtained from the land. In this case however, [the] bonus bears no immediate but only a
remote and accidental relation to the land. The central granted it as compensation for the risk that the
landowners entered in mortgaging their lands. If the bonus was an income of any kind, it comes from the
assumption of risk, and not from the land itself. Thus, it is distinct and independent from the property referred to
in the mortgage to the bank.

Disposition: Judgment affirmed

4 Doms Obias
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1. Accession Continua
Art 440 The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby…
• Acquisition of ownership over a thing incorporated to that which belongs to the owner
• May refer to immovables (alluvion, force of river, change of river bed, formation of
islands and BPS) or to movables (conjunction/adjunction, specification, commixtion,
confusion)
• Based on necessity and utility: It being more practical that the owner of the principal
thing should own the new things instead of a co-ownership being established.

a. Over Immovables

1) Artificial or Industrial – BPS

i. Owner is BPS using materials of another (Art 447)
• Good faith
• Bad faith
ii.BPS on another’s land using own materials
• BPS in good faith
• BPS in bad faith
– OPTIONS OPEN TO OWNER OF LAND:
1. To acquire building, planting and sowing
2. To sell BP and to lease land S
– RIGHTS OF BPS IN BAD FAITH
1. Landowner in BF but BPS in good faith
2. BPS builds, plants, sows on another’s land with materials owned by 3rd person

Art 456: Good faith does not exclude negligence

BERNARDO v BATACLAN (1938; Laurel)5

FACTS: Plaintiff Vicente Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from Pastor Samonte thru a contract of sale.
Thereafter, Bernardo instituted a case against said vendor to secure possession of the land. Bernardo was able
to obtain a favorable decision from the court. The plaintiff found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, in the
said premises. It appears that he has been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land
and make improvements thereon. Thus, plaintiff instituted a case against Bataclan in the Court of First Instance
of Cavite. In this case, plaintiff was declared the owner of the land but the defendant was held to be a possessor
in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made. Both
parties appealed the decision.
The court thereafter made some modifications by allowing the defendant to recover compensation
amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendant to purchase the
land in question from P300 down to P200 per hectare. Plaintiff was likewise given 30 days from the date when
the decision became final to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the
improvements from him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff conveyed to the court his desire "to require the
defendant to pay him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of
P18,000 for the whole tract of land." The defendant indicated that he was unable to pay the land and, on
January 24, 1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant the sum of
P2,212.
Subsequently, on April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on
the part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was sold on April 5,
1935 to Toribio Teodoro for P8,000.

ISSUE: WON DEFENDANT BATACLAN IS STILL ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COURT MANDATED
COMPENSATION ARISING FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO TORIBIO

HELD: NO. The defendant avers that “he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to
which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him.” Defendant further claims that he has a right to retain
the land in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. While the said argument is legally
tenable, the same must perforce be denied because defendant Bataclan has lost his right of retention as he
failed to pay for the land. “The law, as we have already said, requires no more than that the owner of

5 Phoebe Hidalgo
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the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter
to pay for the land”.

IGNACIO v HILARIO (1946; Moran)6

Facts: Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaint against Damian, Francisco and Luis Ignacio
concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case, the
lower court under Judge Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the
whole property but conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the
residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same CFI (now handled by respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad), Hilario
and Dres prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay the Ignacios for the
buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structure at their
own expense and to restore Hilario and Dres in the possession of said lot. After hearing, the motion was granted
by Judge Natividad. Hence, the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for (a) a restraint and
annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay
them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c) a rehearing of the case
for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.
The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad and ordered the lower court to hold
a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot
where they are erected, as well as the period of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise their option
either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last instance, the period of time within which the
Ignacios may pay for the land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or
unappealable. After such hearing, the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by
the parties; with costs against Hilarion and Dres.

1. Right of retention of builder in good faith

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of
the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. Article 453 provides that “Necessary
expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until
such expenses are made good to him. Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence
thereof."

2. Option of the landowner to pay for the building or sell his land to the owner of the building; Right
of remotion only available if he chose the latter and the owner of the building cannot pay
The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to
sell his land to the owner of the building. Article 361 provides that “The owner of land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or
planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.” He cannot however refuse both to
pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it
is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to
pay for the same.

3. Order amends judgment substantially and thus null and void

The order of Judge Natividad compelling the Ignacios to remove their buildings from the land belonging to Hilario
and Dres only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it
amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453
of the Civil Code.

4. Original decision did not become final as it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of
the lot; and the time to which the option may be exercised
In the decision of Judge Felix, the rights of both parties were well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil
Code, but it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the
periods of time within which the option may be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars having
been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. The procedure is erroneous, for after
the judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its
execution. And execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what
time may the option be exercised, and certainty no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which
involve exercise of judicial discretion. Thus, the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become final, it
having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which remained
unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the present case.

6 Obet Bunagan
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SARMIENTO v AGANA ()7

DEPRA v DUMLAO ()8
TECHNOGAS PHILS v CA ()9

ORTIZ v KAYANAN (1979; Antonio)10

Facts: Homestead Application Lot belonged to Dolorico II, Ortiz’s ward located in Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag,
Quezon1.
• Dolorico II named as successor and heir his uncle Dolorico, then died.
• All this time Ortiz was in possession and cultivation of the property.
• Dolorico relinquished rights over property in favour of Comintan and Zamora.
• Court found Ortiz to be in good faith, but held the public bidding to be valid. If petitioner was not found to
be the winner, Comintan and Zamora are to reimburse him for P13,632. Ortiz is to retain possession until
the amount is paid.
• CA affirmed RTC
• Respondent Judge discovered that after the decision of the lower courts, Ortiz collected tolls on portions
of the land even if he had not introduced any improvements on said portions estimated to amount to
P25,000.
• Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while the P13,632 has yet to be paid,
this being considered as civil fruits.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to fruits while Comintan and Zamora have yet to pay the indemnity due
petitioner.

Decision: NO.
• Before possession is legally interrupted, possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits. This right ceases
upon defects being known. This is known as a right to retention, for the creditor to obtain payment of a
debt.
• Also we must consider that tolls were collected from portions with no improvements of petitioner,
therefore he really has no right to said fruits.

GEMINIANO v CA ()11
PLEASANTVILLE DEV’T CORP v CA ()12
FACTS
• Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land, Lot 9, from Pleasantville Dev’t Corporation in Pleasantville
Subdivision, Bacolod City. Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9
was vacant.
• Upon completing all payments and securing a TCT in his name, Jardinico discovered that improvements
had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
• It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CT Torres Enterprises Inc (CTTEI), the real estate
agent of Pleasantville.
• Under the Contract to Sell, Kee could and did possess the lot even before the completion of payments.
• Zenaida Octaviano, CTTEI’s employee, was the one who mistakenly pointed out Lot 9 (instead of Lot 8) to
Kee’s wife. Thereafter, Kee built his residence, a store, an auto repair shop, and other improvements on
the lot.
• Jardinico confronted Kee after discovering that the latter was occupying Lot 9. Kee refused to vacate,
hence Jardinico filed an ejectment suit with damages.
RTC: Kee is a builder in bad faith. Assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was nonetheless
guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with
notice to vacate said lot, and was thus liable for rental.
CA: Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the “mix-up” when he began construction of the
improvements. The erroneous delivery was due to the fault of CTTEI and thus imputable to Pleasantville, the
principal.

ISSUE: W/N Kee is a builder in good faith? YES

7 Grace Lazaro
8 Aris Mascenon
9 Vams Villar
10 Mark Yam
11 Krissy Conti
12 Nessa Abad
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HELD/RATIO:
• The roots of the controversy can be traced in the errors committed by CTTEI when it pointed the wrong lot to
Kee.
• Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and he is ignorant of any
defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on
the part of Kee.
• At the time he built the improvements on Lot 9, Kee believed that the said lot was the one he bought. He was
not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise.
• Violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was
a builder in good faith. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good
faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations
may give rise to petitioner’s cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach) but
may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.

FELICES v IRIOLE ()13

Sorry I can’t find the case online 

SPOUSES NUQUID v CA (1993;)14

SPOUSES NUQUID v CA (2005;)15

FACTS:
• Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot in Kamias and built a four-door two-storey apartment building. He
failed to pay realty taxes, so the LOT was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, and later to the
Sps. Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.

Case 1: Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale.  SC: Sps. Nuguid owned the lot, while Pecson still
owned the building (May 5, 1993).

Case 2: Nuguids sought delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building, i.e., they want to acquire the
building.  SC (Nov. 15, 1993):
1. Art. 448, NCC: Case is apposite as when the landowner is the BPS who then later loses ownership through
sale;
2. Current market value of the building should be the basis of the indemnity;
3. Pecson entitled to retain ownership of the building and the income therefrom;
4. CA erred in upholding TC’s determination of indemnity (P53,000.00 construction cost) and in also
ordering Pecson to account for rent.
5. Remanded to TC for determination of CMV.

Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400,000. Pecson already received P300,000 from Sps. Nuguid; balance of P100,000
paid thereafter. TC directed Sps. Nuguid to also pay P1.34 million for rentals from Nov. 1993 to Dec. 1997 (@
P28K/mo.) Thus, petition.

ISSUE: W/N the spouses should pay rent collected during period of Pecson’s dispossession of the building? YES.

HELD:
• Pecson is a builder in good faith. Nuguid is the landowner.
• Art. 448, NCC entitles landowner (Nuguid) to either appropriate the building upon payment of indemnity or
sell the land. Nuguid sought appropriation.
• Art. 546, NCC entitles the BPS to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses, and the right
of retention until full reimbursement is made.
• However, until the payment of indemnity is full, the BPS (Pecson) has a RIGHT of RETENTION (which includes
the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits) as a builder in good faith. Thus, he cannot be compelled
to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate.
The landowner is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the
fruits received by the BPS in good faith.

DISPOSITIVE: TC decision reinstated.

2) Natural

13 Chi Santos
14 Jessa Alvarez
15 Rory Lambino
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a. Alluvium

REPUBLIC v CA ()16
GRANDE v CA (1962; Barrera)17
Facts:
– Grande siblings are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio
Ragan, Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), Isabela by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui
who in turn inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name the land is
registered. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by action of the said river, so much, so that by 1958, the bank thereof had
receded t a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposite of 19,964 sq.
meters more or less had been added to the registered land. On Jan. 25, 1958, the siblings instituted a
case to quiet title against private respondent Calalungs and alleged that they were in former peaceful
possession of said alluvial deposit when respondents encroached the land claiming ownership.
– The trial court ruled in favor of the Grandes ratiocinating that, by accession the land in question pertains
to the original estate, and since the original estate is registered, the accretion consequently is
automatically registered too. There can also be no acquisitive prescription in favor of the Calalungs since
the land is already registered. The action to claim land by the owners which is registered is
imprescriptible. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court thus this appeal
by the Grandes.

Issue:
– WON the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making said land imprescriptible.
– WON respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.

Held and Ratio:

– NO. The accretion does not ipso facto become registered like the land to which it is attached. Ownership
of land is different from registration. Ownership is governed by the civil code while the imprescriptibility
of registered land is governed by the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts. To obtain the protection of
imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain
judicial procedures must be observed. The fact remains that the Grandes have not sought registration of
the alluvial property in dispute up to the time they filed an action against respondents. Because of this,
said accretion is not protected by imprescriptibility.
– YES. The Court of Appeals have acquired evidence that respondent Calalungs were in open and
continuous possession of the accretion since 1933 or 1934 up to the time the action against them was
filed. The prescriptive period in this applied in this case is 10 years and not 30 since the law applicable is
Act 190 and not the Civil Code. Respondents’ possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent
articles of the old Civil Code were not yet in force.

Dispositive: Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed.

MENESES (1995;)18

a. Avulsion

NAVARRO v IAC (1997;)19

b. Change of course of river

BAES v CA (1995;)20
BINALAY v MANALO (1995;)21

16 Victor Villanueva
17 Angel Paglicawan
18 Unassigned
19 Nathan Marasigan
20 Krystel Bautista
21 Iani Lauron
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c. Formation of Islands
d. Reverse accession

a. Over movables

1) Conjunction and adjunction

i. Inclusion or engraftment
ii.Soldadura or soldering
• Plumbatura – different metals
• Ferruminatio – same metal
i. Tejido or weaving
ii.Escritura or writing
iii.Pintura or painting

1) Commixtion and confusion

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960;)22

FACTS:
• On January 30, 1952, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte rendered decision ordering
Filemon Lucasan to deliver to the Siari Valley Estates, Inc. the cattle inside the former's pasture or pay its
value amounting to P40,000.00 and damages in another sum of P40,000.00
• After the said decision was upheld by the SC and became final and executory, the sheriff proceeded to
levy on certain parcels of lands belonging to Lucasan
• These lands were sold by the sheriff at public auction to the corporation as the highest bidder
• Lucasan failed to redeem the property within one year, hence the sheriff issued in favor of the purchaser
the final certificate of sale, copy of which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga
• Lucasan opposed said registration as regards one of the parcel of lands sold at auction.
• Lucasan contends the ff:
➢ he and his wife constituted this house and the lot on which stands into a family home, and this was
registered in the office of the register of deeds on June 21, 1955
➢ the levy made by the sheriff on said property is legally ineffective because it was not effected in
accordance with what is prescribed in Section 14, Rule 39, in relation to Section 7, Rule 59, of the
Rules of Court

ISSUE: WON rules on writs of execution should be strictly construed?

HELD: YES.

• the rule provides that real property shall "be levied on in like manner and with like effect as under an
order of attachment" (Section 14, Rule 39), and the provision regarding attachment of real property
postulates that the attachment shall be made "by filing with the register of deeds a copy of the order,
together with the description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a
copy of said order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any there be," and that
"Where the property has been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, the notice shall
contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration
book where the certificate is registered"
• These provisions should be strictly construed if their purpose has to be accomplished. The requirement
that the notice of levy should contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume
and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered is made in order that the debtor as
well as a third person may be properly informed of the particular land or property that is under the
custody of the court.
• Since the notice of levy made by the sheriff as regards parcel number 1 which is a registered land
contains no reference to the number of its certificate of title and the volume and page in the registry
book where the title is registered, it follows that said notice is legally ineffective and as such did not have
the effect of binding the property for purposes of execution. Consequently, the sale carried out by virtue
of said levy is also invalid and of no legal effect

22 Ixara Maroto
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SANTOS v BERNABE (1993;)23

FACTS:
• Urbano Santos (778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay) and Pablo Tiongson (1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay)
both deposited in the warehouse of Jose Bernabe palay with the same grade and quality. However, it
does not appear which sack belongs to Santos and which is owned by Tiongson. There were no marks or
signs, nor were they separated from each other.
• Tiongson filed a case against Bernabe for the recovery of the palay he deposited in his warehouse. The
writ of attachment for the said palay was granted and the attachable property of Bernabe including the
924 cavans and 31.5 kilos palay found in his warehouse were attached, sold in public auction and the
proceeds delivered to Tiongson.
• Santos then intervened contending that Tiongson cannot claim the 924c & 31.5k palay because by
asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Bernabe and
not to Tiongson. Also because, some of these palay could be those deposited by Santos.

ISSUE: W/N Tiongson and Santos are entitled to recover the part belonging to each?

HELD/RATIO: YES. Art 381 of the CC prescribes that “if by will of their owners, two things of identical or
dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the later case the things cannot be
separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to
him, according o the value of the things mixed or commingled.”

In the present case, since the number of kilos in a cavan has not been determined, only of the 924 cavans of
palay which were attached and sold shall be distributed proportionately between Santos (398.49 cavans) and
Tiongson (525.52 cavans) or the value thereof at the rate of P3/cavan.

DISPOSITIVE: Tiongson ordered to pay the value of 398.49 cavans at P3/cavan to Santos.

1) Specification

23 Micha Arias
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1 Because Prof. Labitag remembers cases by location