Case Digests - Succession

Wills and Succession 1
Case Digest
1.
In Re Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Gaudencia FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965 ....................................................... 3
2.
Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987 ...... 4
3.
Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondent G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 ................................ 5
4.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, Cesar ALVARADO,
petitioner vs. Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993 ............................................................................... 6
5.
Ruben AUSTRIA et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Andres REYES, et al., respondents. G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970 ... 7
6.
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the decease Anacleta Abellana Lucio BALONAN, petitionerappellee vs. Eusebia ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960 ..................................... 8
7.
Maria Gervacio BLAS, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Rosalina SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratix of the
Estate of the deceased Maxima Santos, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-14070, March 29, 1961........................... 9
8.
Wencesla CACHO, petitioner-appellee vs. John G. UDAN and Rustico G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L19996, April 30, 1965 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 10
9.
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator of
the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents. G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993 ......................................................................... 11
10. Pascual COSO, vs. Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al., G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921 .............................................. 13
11. Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs. Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY, respondents. G.R. No. L32213, November 26, 1973 ............................................................................................................................................................... 14
12. Paula DE LA CERNA, et al., petitioners, vs. Manuela REBACA-POTOT, et al., and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964 ............................................................................................... 15
13. Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Maximo De La CRUZ, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-29192,
February 22, 1971............................................................................................................................................................................... 16
14. Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R.
No. L-28032; September 24, 1986 ................................................................................................................................................... 17
15. Eugenio C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Aurea S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor Jesus Santos del
Prado, defendant appellee. G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966 .......................................................................................... 18
16. In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Delgado, Heirs of Luis DELGADO,
petitioners vs. Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA, respondents. G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006 ............................................... 19
17. Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. Pablo and Basilio SABLAN, opponent-appellees. G.R. No. 6878, September
13, 1913 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
18. Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, Francisco GAGO, petitioner, vs. Cornelio MAMUYAC, et al., opponents. G.R. No. L-26317,
January 29, 1927 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 22
19. Pedro D. H. GALLANOSA, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Ubaldo Y. ARCANGEL, et al., respondents G.R. No. L-29300; June
21, 1978 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
20. Testate Estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap deceased Fausto E. GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. Ildefonso YAP,
oppositor-appellee. G.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1858............................................................................................................... 24
21. In the Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado, deceased, Rosario GARCIA, petitioner, vs. Juliana LACUESTA, et al.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951...................................................................................................................... 25
22. Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs. Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent. G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969
............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
23. Rizalina Gabriel GONZALES, petitioner, vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and Lutgarda SANTIAGO, respondents. G.R.
No. L-37453, May 25, 1979 ............................................................................................................................................................... 27
24. Beatriz L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, et al., respondents. G.R. No. L-34395,
May 19, 1981 ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 28

Case Digest
25. Tomas JIMENEZ, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et al., respondents. G.R. No. 75773,
April 17, 1990 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 29
26. Rosa K. Kalaw, petitioner, vs. Hon. Judge Benjamin RELOVA and Gregorio K. KALAW, respondents. G.R. No. L-40207,
September 28, 1984. .......................................................................................................................................................................... 30
27. RIcardo LARCERNA, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Agatona Paurillo VDA. DE CORCINO, defendant-appellee. Jacoba
MARBEBE, intervenor-appellee. G.R. No. L-14603, April 29, 1961 ............................................................................................ 31
28. Testacy of Sixto Lopez, Jose S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. Agustin LIBORO, oppositor-appellant. G.R. No. L-1787 32
29. Testate Estate of the Late Adriana Maloto, Aldina MALOTO CASIANO, et al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
Panfilo MALOTO and Felino MALOTO, respondents. G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988 .................................................... 33
30. Beatriz NERA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Narcisa RIMANDO, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-5971, February 27,
1911 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
31. Remedios NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966 ..................................................................................................................................................... 35
32. Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico ORENDAIN, represented by Fe D. ORENDAIN, petitioners, vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa
Margarita RODRIGUEZ, respondent. G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009 ..................................................................................... 36
33. OZAETA vs. CUARTERO G.R. No. L-5597, May 31, 1956 .......................................................................................................... 37
34. PADURA vs. BALDOVINO G.R. No. L-11960, December 27, 1958 ............................................................................................ 38
35. Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR, petitioners, vs. The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan
Y. REYES, and Lewellyn QUEMADA, respondents. G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983. .......................................................... 39
36. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. De Jesus and Bibiana Roxa de Jesus, Simeon R. ROXAS and Pedro
ROXAS de Jesus, petitioners vs. Andres R. de JESUS, Jr. G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985 ......................................... 40
37. In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro Santillon, Claro SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. Perfecta MIRANDA,
Benito MIRANDA and Rosario CORRALES, oppositors-appellees. G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965 ................................. 41
38. Dy Yieng SEANGIO, Barbara D. SEANGIO and Virginia D. SEANGIO, petitioners, vs. Hon. Amor A. REYES, Alfredo
SEANGIO, et al., respondents. G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006 .............................................................................. 42
39. Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn SICAD, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Catalino VALDERAMA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 125888, August 13, 1998 .................................................................................................................................................. 43
40. Constancio SIENES, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Fidel ESPARCIA, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-12597, March 24,
1961 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 44
41. Nenita de Vera SUROZA, complainant, vs. Judge Reynaldo P. HONRADO and Evangeline YUIPCO, respondents. A.M.
No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981 .................................................................................................................................................. 45
42. In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Apolonio TABOADA, petitioner, vs. Hon. Avelino S.
ROSAL, Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte (Branch III, Maasin) respondent. G.R. No. L-36033, November
5, 1982.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 46
43. Eufracia VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, et al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents. G.R. No. L-44051,
June 27, 1985 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 47
44. Rosario Feliciano VDA. DE RAMOS, et al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Marcelina (Martina) GUERRA, et al.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978........................................................................................................................ 48
45. Lauro G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City and
Ramon G. NICOLAS, respondents. G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998 ................................................................................. 49

Case Digest
In Re Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris
Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Gaudencia FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten
years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary
settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only
by collateral relatives: 1) an aunt and half-sister of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were
children of Melodias only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena Abellana
de Bacayo, who is the decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution issued by the lower
court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral
relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him? Or will the aunt concur with the children
of the decedents brother or will the former be excluded by the latter.
RULING:
As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the
collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and
nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as
provided expressly by Art. 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles
1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.

Case Digest
Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio
Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted
as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally
adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC
granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will.
Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

Case Digest
Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs.
Zenaido ALUAD, respondent
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde
and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the
lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering
all the six lots. The Deed provided that such
will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die
before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that
anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising
four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matildes death.
Thereafter, Marias heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been
transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which
held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the present
Petition for Review has been filed.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid.
If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.
RULING:
The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioners mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:
1.
2.
3.
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad
nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of
no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners
mother during the formers lifetime. Further the statement, anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of
them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated, means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the
right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The
phrase, anyone of them who should survive is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take
effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as
it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it
was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by
her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed
lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado,
Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs.
Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled, Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son,
Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed a holographic will at the time awaiting probate before
RTC. As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and Cesar, the testator did not read the
final draft of the will, instead, Atty. Rino, as the lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the
presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. While the testators will was admitted
to probate, a codicil was subsequently executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for
the testators eye operation because he was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and the revocatory
clauses remained and as in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the
codicil. Instead, it was Atty. Rino who read it alound in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses and of the notary public. Upon the testators death, Atty Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the
notarial will which was in turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to be probated was not executed and
attested as required by law. Upon failure of Cesar to substantiate his Opposition, a Probate Order was issued from
which an appeal was made to IAC stating that the probate of the deceaseds last will and codicil should have been
denied because the testator was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his Huling Habilin and the codicil
thereto was executed;and that since reading required by Art. 808 was admittedly not complied with. CA concluded
that although Art. 808 was not followed, there was, however, as substantial compliance.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at the time his Huling
Habilin and codicil were executed.
If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was complied with such that
whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of
reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his poor, defective, or blurred vision, there can be no other course but to
conclude that he comes within the scope of the term blind as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him,
he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instruction. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential to ascertain whether
or not Art. 808 had been complied with.
There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently
made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the Huling Habilin, the day of the
execution was not the first time that the testator had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft.
Moreover, with four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that
the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents. This is especially true considering the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to
the testator.
The spirit behind that law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with
the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure authenticity of the will, the formal imperfection should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account may only defeat the testators
will. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of will are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.

Case Digest
Ruben AUSTRIA et al., petitioners, vs.
Hon. Andres REYES, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970
FACTS:
Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante mortem of her last will and testament which
was opposed by Ruben Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. However, such opposition was
dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass
on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted
children. Subsequently, upon Basilias death, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of
the formers will. Ruben and the other petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition
alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin and that the five private respondents (Perfecto et al.) had not in
fact been adopted by the testator in accordance with law, hence they should be rendered mere strangers and without
any right to succeed as heirs. The court then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which the court delimited to
the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will and disregarded the matter of the genuineness
of adoption. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a petition
for certiorari praying for the annulment of the lower courts orders restricting their intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the
same heirs by the decedent is false.
RULING:
Article 850 provides:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it
appears from the will of the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of
such cause.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must concur:
1.
2.
3.
The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;
The cause must be shown to be false; and
It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.
The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in
his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of
the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The
words used in her will to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that
she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate which
largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we
could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the decease Anacleta Abellana
Lucio BALONAN, petitioner-appellee vs.
Eusebia ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
The last Will and Testament sought to be probated consists in two (2) typewritten pages. The first page is signed
by Juan Bello and on the left margin appears the signatures of the three (3) instrumental witnesses. On the second
page appears the signature of said witnesses, at the bottom of which appears the signature of the notary public and
below said signature is his designation as notary public. On the left margin of the second page (last page of the will)
appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the phrase, Por la Testadore Anacleta
Abellana (For the Testate of Anacleta Abellana). The will is duly acknowledged before the notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signature of Juan Bello above the typewritten statement, Por la Testadora Anacleta
Abellana comply with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed.
RULING:
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end there of by the testator himself
or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The law requires that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testators name must be written
by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. In this case, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta
Abellana does not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Bello. There is therefore, a
failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name
be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Hence, the will of the deceased
Anacleta Abellana must not be admitted to probate.

Case Digest
Maria Gervacio BLAS, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs.
Rosalina SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratix of the
Estate of the deceased Maxima Santos, et al., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-14070, March 29, 1961
FACTS:
Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz and had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left
children namely: Maria Gervacio Blas (one of the plaintiffs), Marta Gervacio Blas (one of the defendants), and Lazaro
Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died and is survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein namely, Manuel,
Leoncio and Loid. Subsequently after Martas death, Simeon contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At
the time of second marriage, no liquidation of the properties of Simeon and Marta was made. A week before
Simeons death, he executed a last Will and Testament, and he also ordered a preparation of a document (Exhibit A)
because the properties he had acquired during his first marriage with Mart had not been liquidated and were not
separated from those acquired during the second marriage. Such document contains promises by Maxima to respect
the disposition of said will and to give one-half (1/2) of the properties she and her husband will leave to the heirs,
legatees or beneficiaries named in the will. Pursuant to this document, the plaintiffs instituted an action against the
administration of the estate of Maxima Santos to secure a judicial declaration that one-half (1/2) of the properties left
by Maxima be adjudicated to them. Upon filing of opposition by the administratix, the trial court dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the heirs of Simeon Blas and wife Marta Cruz can make any claim for the unliquidated
conjugal properties acquired during their marriage.
Whether or not Exhibit A is a valid and enforceable contract.
RULING:
The heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal
properties acquired during said first marriage because the same were already included in the mass properties
constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will.
Exhibit A appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of
the execution of such document, which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something
avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already provocation been instituted.
The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos made in Exhibit A is to hold one-half of her share in the conjugal
assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying the same to such
of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last will and testament. This kind of agreement pr promise is not
void.

Case Digest
Wencesla CACHO, petitioner-appellee vs.
John G. UDAN and Rustico G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965
FACTS:
Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a will naming her son Francisco and one Wencesla Cacho as her sole heirs,
share and share alike. Cacho then filed a petition to probate the said Will which was opposed by the testators
legitimate brother, Rustico. Therafter, Francisco filed his opposition to the probate of the Will while Rustico withdrew
his opposition. After Franciscos death, another legitimate brother of the testator, John, together with Rustico, filed
their respective oppositions. Consequently, Cacho filed a Motion to Dismiss the Oppositions filed by John and
Rustico. CFI issued an order disallowing the two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate. The subsequent
Motions for Reconsiderations were denied hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, Silvina.
RULING:
It is clear from Article 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of the
death of the testatrix that the oppositor brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, Silvina.
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of
descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sister can concur with the widow or
widower, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate.
Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former
are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his
mother, pursuant to Article 992.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit the same manner from the illegitimate child.
However, the hearing on the probate must still proceed to ascertain the rights of Cacho as testamentary heir.

Case Digest
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament before three attesting
witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declare therein that, among other
things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to specific
persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI
seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator
passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees
named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he
was succeeded by William Cabreara, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court. In the course of
the hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, appeared as oppositors and
objected to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was
already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same; and that the signature of
the testator is not genuine. The probate court rendered a decision that such will is the Last Will and Testament of
Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the
petitioners asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective
since it fails to specifically state the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their
presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. However, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling that the attestation clause in the Last
Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code. Due to denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration,
hence this appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective such that
whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to Article 809
of the Civil Code.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives
rd
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3
paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,
should state:
1.
2.
3.
The number of pages used upon which the will is written;

That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the attesting witnesses; and
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that
the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites that the
testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then
clearly lacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

Case Digest
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in
the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that
the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the
language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in
Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed
therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply where the attestation clause
totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the
total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will.
That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which it can be read
into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear
witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Case Digest
Pascual COSO, vs.
Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921
FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her for many
years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and
also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for
expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The
will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by
Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect, the
influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously stated, but the
substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind
that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the
will of another rather than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in
question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of
procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which the
testator would not otherwise have made.
And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an improper and
adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation
does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testators free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of its
execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that
her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will
of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a
will.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be practiced,
even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who
have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.

Case Digest
Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs.
Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
FACTS:
Agapita Cruz is the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz. Agapita filed before the CFI an opposition
for the allowance of the will of his late husband alleging that the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence because the said instrument was executed without the testator having been
fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last
will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. However, due to unfavorable decision, Agapita
appealed by certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed last will and testament was executed in accordance with law.
RULING:
Of the three instrumental witnesses, one of them is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged.
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance
with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to
avow. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would
have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of
Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator
and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would
be that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstance, the law would
not be duly observed.

Case Digest
Paula DE LA CERNA, et al., petitioners, vs.
Manuela REBACA-POTOT, et al., and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964
FACTS:
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed
that their two parcels of land acquired during their marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to
Manuela Rebaca, their niece. Bernabe died and the will was probated in 1939 after due publication as required by
law and there being no opposition. Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca, another petition for the probate of the same
will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed by Manuela but the court dismissed it for failure of Manuela to
appear.
Paula de la Cerna questioned for the nullity of the joint will of Bernabe being prohibited in the Philippine law. The
Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed
contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and
conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not an error of law affects the conclusive effect of its decision.
Whether or not the joint will is valid as to the share of Gervasia who died later than Bernabe.
RULING:
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and
testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of
the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). A final judgment rendered on a
petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
The probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could
not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose
interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not
then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's
lifetime. It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her
death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not
exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the
only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

Case Digest
Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Maximo De La CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971
FACTS:
Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is the mother of
herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several co-heirs including Maximo, entered
into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate
three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and
subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his
obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no
cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that she was not
an heir of Pelagia and was included in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to
the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from
Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter.
RULING:
Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from the latter by right of
representation.
Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of
the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving
the right of representation when it properly takes place.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of
whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

Case Digest
Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO, et al., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-28032; September 24, 1986
FACTS:
The plaintiffs are the grandaunt and granduncles of the defendant, Dalisay. They have as a common ancestor
the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister named Romana Tioco), father of the plaintiffs and great grandfather of
Dalisay. During the lifetime of Romana, she gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco
(legitimate sister of plaintiffs). The latter died intestate survived by her husband Estacio Dizon and their two (2)
legitimate children, Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the said four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of the children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Subsequently, Balbino died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children and bu his wife (among the plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren, Faustino and Trinidad. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of Toribia but as she had
predeceased her father, the said three (3) parcesl of land devolved upon her two legitimate children, Faustino and
Trinidad in equal pro-inidiviso shares. Faustino died intestate, singled and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land to his father, Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir, who reserved the
said property subject to a reserva troncal. When Trinidad died intestate, her rights and interests in the land were
inherited by her only child, Dalisay and not long after, Eustacio died intestate survived also by his only legitimate
child, Dalisay. Dalisay now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her inheritance from Trinidad.
Dalisay also claims the other half of the said parcels of land by virtue of reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the
death of Faustino but the plaintiffs opposed such claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half proindiviso interst in said parcel of land, which was inherited by Eustacio from Faustino, or three-eights (3/8) of the said
parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino. The lower court declared that the
parties are entitled to one-half (1/2) of the seven (7) parcels of land in dispute, as reservatarios, in equal proportions.
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not all the relatives of the propositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
Whether or not the rights of the plaintiffs are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate
succession.
RULING:
Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be
returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate succession, the plaintiffs must be
held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino (the propositus), they are
excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant, although they are related to him within the same degree as
the latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the propositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs would
have been excluded by the defendant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different
result should obtain simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva,
i.e., the property took a detour through an ascendant thereby govong rise to the reservation before its transmission
to the reservatario.
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.

Case Digest
Eugenio C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs.
Aurea S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor Jesus Santos
del Prado, defendant appellee.
G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966
FACTS:
Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado, who died single and intestate. Anastacio
cohabited with Aurea Santos (who was legally married) without the benefit of matrimony and they begot a son named
Jesus del Prado whom Anastacio admitted as his son in Jesus birth certificate. At the time of Anastacios death, a
parcel of land in his name was adjudicated to Jesus del Prado. Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the
deed executed by Aurea adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by Anastacio alleging that he (Eugenio) was
deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his brother. The lower court dismissed the petition, and upon appeal to
CA, the appellate court certified the case to Supreme Court that such involved purely legal questions.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to the parcel of land? Is it the minor left by Anastacio or the latters brother?
RULING:
Since Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies (Article 2263). Illegitimate children other than
natural are entitled to successional rights (Article 287). Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without
legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his entire estate (Article 988), to the
exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral relative.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Delgado, Heirs of Luis DELGADO, petitioners
vs.
Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006
FACTS:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces,
and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his
nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five
other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed
Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life.
Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.
The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to
father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of representation?
Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?
RULING:
1.
The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado
It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to
Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural
children.
The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her halfbrother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her
death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear

Case Digest
on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children)
of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
2.
The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights
only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition.
Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful
heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.
Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado.
The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of
her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.

Case Digest
Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Pablo and Basilio SABLAN, opponent-appellees.
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land
upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance to his mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the
registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be
recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the
land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application
could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.

Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause its registration.
RULING:
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous
tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of
blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line where the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling
that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the
rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has under an express provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of
is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of
the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it.

Case Digest
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, Francisco GAGO, petitioner, vs.
Cornelio MAMUYAC, et al., opponents.
G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927
FACTS:
Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament on July 1918 and almost 4 years later, Francisco Gago
presented a petition in the CFI for the probation of such will which was opposed by Cornelia Mamuyac et al. The
petition was denied upon the ground that Mamuyac had executed a new will on April 1919. An action was filed to
secure the probation of the said new will. The opponents alleged (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will
executed by Miguel; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of the testator; and (c) that
the said will was not the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac. The petition was then again denied upon the
ground that the will of 1919 had been the cancelled and revoked based on the evidence adduced by the trial court
that the 1918 will is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased, who revoked it
before a witness, who typed the 1919 will of the testator, and before another person who witnessed the actual
cancellation by the testator in 1920. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will in question has been revoked and cancelled.
RULING:
The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. Where a will
which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be
presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. In
view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and in view of the
positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight
of evidence.
After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for probate had
been cancelled by the testator in 1920.

Case Digest
Pedro D. H. GALLANOSA, et al., petitioners, vs.
Hon. Ubaldo Y. ARCANGEL, et al., respondents
G.R. No. L-29300; June 21, 1978
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis, a childless widower executed a will wherein he beaqueathed his one-half share in the conjugal
estate to his second wife, Tecia Dollentas, and should Tecia predecease him, as was the case, his one-half share
would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecias son by
her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino and had treated Perdo as his foster child. Florentiono likewise
bequeathed his separate properties to his protg, Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. A petition for the probate of his will was
filed in CFI which was opposed by his legal heir, his brother Leon Hitosis and his nephews and nieces. The court
admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. Subsequently, the testamentary heirs submitted a
project of partition which was approved by the court, thus confirming the heirs possession of their respective shares.
The testators legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution.
Leon instituted an action against Pedro for the recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land alleging that the former had
been in continuous possession of said land however, the complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The
legal heirs of the testator did not appeal from the order of dismissal instead, 28 years after the probate of the will, they
filed an action for the annulment of the will of Florentino and for the recovery of the parcels of land. Pedro filed for the
dismissal of the complaint but the respondent judge set aside his order of dismissal and granted trial. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of Florention Hitosis and
for the recovery of the parcels of land.
RULING:
The lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal and in ignoring the
testamentary case. It is evident from the allegations of the complaint that the action is barred by res judicata. The
decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. The decree of adjudication
rendered by the trial court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis having been
rendered in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole world.
The private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of the testamentary proceeding and the
proceeding on partition. Obviously, they realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of
res judicata and that there is no ground, nor it is timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders and judgments in
those two cases.

Case Digest
Testate Estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap deceased
Fausto E. GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Ildefonso YAP, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1858
FACTS:
After the death of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Fausto Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will
allegedly executed by the fomer. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Gan
tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements of allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of
the alleged will. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the court refused to probate the alleged will.
Due to the denial of motion for reconsideration, Gan appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and
who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.
RULING:
The Rules of Court allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of
witnesses in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could
not then be validly made here.
The difference between holographic wills and ordinary will lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only
guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself, in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof, if the
ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
The evidence of presented by Gan is refused to be credited. In addition to the dubious circumstance described in
the appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relative who had
received nothing from it. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its
execution to her husband. Further, if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not
entrust it to her beneficiaries? In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies
that it fails to measure up to that :clear and distinct proof required by the Rules of Court.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado, deceased,
Rosario GARCIA, petitioner, vs.
Juliana LACUESTA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951
FACTS:
A will was executed by Antero Mercado wherein it appears that it was signed by Atty. Florentino Javiwe who
wrote the name of Antero. The testator was alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of
First Instance found that the will was valid but the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision holding that
the attestation clause failed: 1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the
end of the will by Atty. Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every
one of the witnesses; 2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the formers
request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the
will consists and at the end thereof 3) to certify that the witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the
presence of the testator and of each other. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause is valid.
RULING:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the
testators name under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not here
pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by
which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a
thumbmark and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

Case Digest
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs.
Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969
FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried and leaving no descendants, ascendants, brother or sister
thereafter, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, niece of the deceased petitioned for probate the alleged last will
and testament of Gliceria dated December 1960 and that she be appointed as special administratrix. Various parties
opposed the petition contending that the 1960 will was not intended by Gliceria to be her true will and that there was
a 1956 will executed by Gliceria were the oppositors were named as legatees. Consequently, Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis
an ophthalmologist testified that Glicerias left eye suffered form cataract in 1960 which made her vision mainly for
viewing distant object but not for reading prints.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 808 regarding blind testator be followed in the instant case to make Glicerias will valid?
RULING:
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was like a blind testator
and the due execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by the
notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself, is to make the provisions of the will known to the testator, so that he may be able to object if they are not
in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly
communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is
evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different
persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testators) other senses.

Case Digest
Rizalina Gabriel GONZALES, petitioner, vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and Lutgarda SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
FACTS:
Lutgarda Santiago and Rizalina Gonzales are nieces of the late Isabel Andres Gabriel. Lutgarda filed a petition for the
probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased and designated Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary
and executrix. There is no dispute that Isabel died as a widow and without issue. The will submitted consists of five
(5) pages and includes the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were
written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left
margin of all the pages. The petition was opposed by Rizalina assailing that the will is not genuine and was not
executed and attested as required by law. The lower court disallowed the probate of said will and as a consequence,
Lutgarda appealed to Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and allowed the probate of the will.
Rizalina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this present action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed and attested as required by law.
RULING:
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides for the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821
sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a will. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are
not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant
to said execution. And we agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner
concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses are competent and
credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of
fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any
of the said witnesses.

Case Digest
Beatriz L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981
FACTS:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by his widow, Filomena
Roces, and their seven children. The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented
by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda.
de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in
all). She later died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the Court of First Instance of Manila
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the
ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters
and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was
opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties
are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons.
The lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez.
Mrs. Gonzales appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 and contends that the lower court erred in not regarding the
properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal?

Whether or not Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of the properties in question in her will
in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children?
RULING:
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives
within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her
estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as
reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
The reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate
nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.

Case Digest
Tomas JIMENEZ, et al., petitioners, vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990
FACTS:
Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez married Consolacion Ungson with whom he begot four (4) children, namely: Alberto,
Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During such marriage, Lino acquired five (5) parcels of land in Salomague,
Bugallon, Pangasinan. When Consolacion died, Lino contracted a second marriage with Genoveva Caolboy with
whom he begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginial, all
surnamed Jimenez. After Lino and Genovevas death, Virginia filed a petition before CFI praying to be appointed as
administratix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva upon which Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. filed a
motion for exclusion of his fathers name and those of his uncle and aunts contending that they have already received
their inheritance consisting of five (f) parcels of land. However, the petition of Virginia wherein she included the said
five (5) parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of spouses Lino and Genoveva. Consequently, Leonardo
Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory contending that such parcels of land were
already adjudicated to his father and to his uncle and aunts. The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5)
parcels of land and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the orders of the probate court, of which the CA dismissed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complained before the RTC to recover possession/ownership of the
five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgments and by prescription and laches.
Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. A motion for reconsideration was
denied as well as the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before the appellate court. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not in a settlement procceding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle
questions of ownership.
Whether or not the petitioners present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five
(5) parcels of land is barred by res judicata
RULING:
Petitioners present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general
rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The patent reason is the probate courts
limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate proceedings as in the case at bar.
Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. The other action was for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Lino and Genoveca while the other one was an action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the five (5) parcles of land. Moreover, while the CFI had jurisdiction, the same was
merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in
a separate proceeding.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not appear to be
indubitable. Res judicata has been shown to be unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded
by private respondents are seriously disputed.

Case Digest
Rosa K. Kalaw, petitioner, vs.
Hon. Judge Benjamin RELOVA
and Gregorio K. KALAW, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40207, September 28, 1984.
FACTS:
Natividad K. Kalaw made a holographic will executed on December 24, 1968. Originally, the will named Rosa K.
Kalaw, sister of Natividad, as the sole heir. However, Natividad eventually changed the name on the will by crossing
out Rosas name and replacing it with Gregorio K. Kalaw as sole heir instead. Natividad failed to properly
authenticate such alteration with her full signature.
Because of this, the parties decided to submit the holographic will for an examination by the National Bureau of
Investigation. The Bureaus findings confirmed that the original writings and those of the alterations were written by
the same person.
Rosa argued that the probate should be denied since the alteration on the will is invalid for failing to comply with Art.
814 which states that In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature. Further, Rosa asserted that the will should be probated on its
original content before the alteration was made.
Gregorio contends that the mere fact that Rosa agreed to submit the will for examination estoppes her from
questioning the validity of the alteration and invoking Art. 814 of the Civil Code.
Judge Benjamin Relova denied the probate on the will.
Rosa now sought for the probate on the will as to its original unaltered text.
ISSUE:
May the will, in case of alterations, corrections, or cancellations, without the proper authentication, be submitted for
probate as to the original content prior to such alteration, correction, or cancellation.
RULING:
No, this cannot be done.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
have not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the
simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid.
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the
testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.

Case Digest
RIcardo LARCERNA, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
Agatona Paurillo VDA. DE CORCINO, defendant-appellee.
Jacoba MARBEBE, intervenor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-14603, April 29, 1961
FACTS:
Valentine Marbebe begot a daughter, Jacoba Marbebe, before his marriage with Bonifacia Lacerna. Valentine and
Bonificia had an only son, Juan.
Valentine and Bonifacia died leaving three parcels of land to their only son Juan. Juan, then, executed a power of
attorney authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona Vda. de Corcino take care of the disputed land.
Eventually, Juan died intestate and without any issue. The Court of First Instance declared that the land is property of
Jacoba being the half sister of Juan. Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews and nieces of Bonifacia questioned
the decision of the court. According to them, the case should be based upon Article 891 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which establishes what is known as "reserva troncal." According to them, under this principle, the
properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the line from
which said properties came. Thus, since Juan Marbebe inherited the land from his mother, they should go to his
nearest relative within the third degree on the maternal line or to his aunt and cousins and not to Jacoba Marbebe for
she belongs to the paternal line. This, however, was protested by Jacoba Marbebe. She contends that pursuant to
Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in
the order of intestate succession, and that, as Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than
plaintiffs herein to inherit his properties.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to succeed Juan?
RULING:
The provision on reserve troncal cannot be applied in this case. In reserve troncal, the ascendant who inherits
from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis
supplied.) This article applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from
a descendant, and this is not the scenario in the given case, for the lands in dispute were inherited by a descendant,
Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not applicable in
this case.
Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land to Jacoba Marbebe. The said decision is in accordance
with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of
children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to
the line from which the property of the deceased came.
Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to succeed Juan.

Case Digest
Testacy of Sixto Lopez, Jose S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs. Agustin LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-1787
FACTS:
The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate by Jose Lopez and Clemencia Lopez, the Dons sister.
The probate was opposed by Agustin Liboro who contended that the will is not valid due to the following grounds:
(1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; 2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery;
(3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to
advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one
of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of
fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein,
principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature
of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
Liboro pointed out that the first page of the will, which was contained in two pages in all, was not numbered in
letters or Arabic numbers as what should have been required by law. It was also argued that the testator should have
signed the will with his signature and not only with his thumb print if he indeed had the capacity to execute the will.
Furthermore, the will did not expressly state that the language used is a language which the Don understood; in this
case, it was in Spanish.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance to qualify the will for probate.
RULING:
There has been substantial compliance even in the presence of the averred irregularities.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In the present case, the omission to put a page
number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the
conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the
internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and
coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the
unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator
was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for
the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the
attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any
possibility be taken for other than page one.
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that
the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else
to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that
the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both
ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
As for the question on the language of the will, there is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be
expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
The will may therefore be submitted for probate.

Case Digest
Testate Estate of the Late Adriana Maloto,
Aldina MALOTO CASIANO, et al., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Panfilo MALOTO and Felino MALOTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino) in this case who are
her niece and nephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four (4) heirs
commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate which was instituted in the then CFI.
However, while the case was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adrianas estate which provides for the division of the estate into four equal parts among themselves. When
presented before the court, said agreement was approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former
associate of Adrianas counsel, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)
and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate that what they have
received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other
parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a
motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. Upon denial of
the trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Court by way or petition for certiorari and mandamus which
were dismissed because they were not the proper remedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned
by the househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was seeking the services
of the lawyer in order to have a new will drawn up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.
RULING:
Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
1.
By implication of law; or
2.
By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of

wills; or
3.
By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention

of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or
obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the
testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in
accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of
its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet
that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and
under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will
of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana
and was not done in her presence.

Case Digest
Beatriz NERA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
Narcisa RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911
FACTS:
Rimando opposes the admission for probate of a certain will on the ground that one of the subscribing witnesses
therein was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures. That time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room
connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in
the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the
instrument.
ISSUE:
How may the requirement of the law for all witnesses to subscribe to the will in the presence of each other apply to
this case.
RULING:
The will may be admitted for probate.
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering
their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of
course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument
in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment,
without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. At the moment when a witness signs the document he
was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to the other witnesses that he could see
everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so.
The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at
the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with
relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign.

Case Digest
Remedios NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs.
Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as
follows:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of
property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister
Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh
day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed
be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents and
declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the free
portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture
that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus be
considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must
be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law also
requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will.
Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.

Case Digest
Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico ORENDAIN, represented by
Fe D. ORENDAIN, petitioners, vs.
Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The
will was admitted to probate. At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and,
consequently, was completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will.
Some of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
properties and the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after the necessary deductions for
expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa habang
panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to the
different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the
fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr.
who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedents estate, which
they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the case of Palad, et al. v. Governor of
Quezon Province where the trust holding the two estate of one Luis Palad was allowed to exist even after the lapse of
twenty years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a trust may be perpetual.
2. Whether or not the named trustees may be considered as heirs to the estate.
RULING:
The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year allowable period, the estate may be
disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the testator declaring all
or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust constituted by Luis Palad because the
will of the testator does not interdict the alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income of
said two parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and operation of the high school.
Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of the ownership of property and to
prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles. The trust involved in the Palad case
covers only two lots, which have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the income derived therefrom is
being devoted to a public and social purpose the education of the youth of the land. The use of said parcels
therefore is in a sense socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or
mortgage of her properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties, unlike in the Palad case. The
herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would
then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.
Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and
the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trusts
designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore, the probate court must admit the case to determine
the properties to be subject to intestate succession as well as the nearest relative of the deceased that may inherit
the said properties under the perpetual trust.

Case Digest
OZAETA vs. CUARTERO
G.R. No. L-5597, May 31, 1956
FACTS:
Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos Palanca Taguinlay in 1929 and
1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been duly established by testimonial and documentary
evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presented was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that
he married Rosa Gonzales in which marriage they had eight children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an
existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator.
RULING:
Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an existence of a fact
during the lifetime of the testator of the said Will. Palanca executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in
said document that since 1923 and for some years thereafter he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero
and had by her six natural children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said nothing
about having married Maria; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her unworthy of being
the guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and so appointed Felisa Joson de Fernandez and the
Philippine National Bank as guardians of their persons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will
he spoke of his marriage to Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him
were legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will may not be taken lightly, as a
statement of little significance. When he made said statement he was about 76 years old and must have felt that he
had not many years left to live.

Case Digest
PADURA vs. BALDOVINO
G.R. No. L-11960, December 27, 1958
FACTS:
In an order, the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings declared all the reservees, without
distinction, co-owners pro indiviso in equal shares of the parcels of land subject matter of the suit.
RULING:
The appealed order was reversed and set aside. The reservatarios who are nephews of the full blood are
declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Records are remanded to the
court below for further proceedings.

Case Digest
Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR, petitioners, vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan Y. REYES, and Lewellyn QUEMADA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.
FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
(Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the
probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation
by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor
Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr.,
and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the
legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own
rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed
by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after
denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties
remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon
objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead,
the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still
pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of
ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate,
of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or
his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being immediately
executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due
Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor
Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as
well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
RULING:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the
question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a
declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of
appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory,
considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still
pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged
with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion,
the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. De Jesus and
Bibiana Roxa de Jesus, Simeon R. ROXAS and Pedro ROXAS de Jesus, petitioners
vs. Andres R. de JESUS, Jr.
G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985
FACTS:
After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted by Simeon, brother
of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, he delivered to the lower court
a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was then set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the
compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed
in accordance with law. However, the lower court issued an order allowing the probate which was found to have been
duly executed in accordance with law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged
holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending that the law requires that
the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. The
court then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the ground that the
word dated has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibian Roxas de Jesus is a
valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of its execution.
However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and
the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB/61 appearing on the
holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro Santillon,
Claro SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA and Rosario
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son, Claro. Four years after
Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito
Miranda and Rosario Corrales. The court appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all
properties of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties
invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the conjugal properties (conjugal share
of Perfecta), the remaining must be divided as follows: for her and for him. On the other hand, Perfecta
claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another of the remaining half.
After due notice and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is entitled to share and the remaining share for Claro
after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the only survivors are the spouse and
one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable
is Art. 996.
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the
Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first,
where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby
indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

Case Digest
Dy Yieng SEANGIO, Barbara D. SEANGIO and Virginia D. SEANGIO, petitioners,
vs. Hon. Amor A. REYES, Alfredo SEANGIO, et al., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying
for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of
Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy
Yieng is still very healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4) Segundo left a holographic will
disinheriting one of the private respondents. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo
was filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed
by the private respondents because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate
proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code, of which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then issued an order dismissing the
petition for probate proceedings. Due to petitioners denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not the holographic will is valid.

Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
to be witnessed.
Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo himself. An
intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding
his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited
by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance
that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for
the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated, it is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.

Case Digest
Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn SICAD, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Catalino VALDERAMA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 125888, August 13, 1998
FACTS:
Aurora Montinola executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of her grandchildren who are the private
respondents herein. The deed contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the
donation. Afterwards, Montinolas secretary presented the deed for recording in the Property Registry and the
Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the donors title) and, in its place, issued TCT No. T-16622 in the
name of the donees. However, Montinola retained the owners duplicate copy of the new title as well as the property
itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years after her death. Montinola later then drew up a deed of revocation
and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T-16622 followed by filing a petition for cancellation of
said TCT and the reinstatement of TCT No. T-16105. Her petition was granted on the ground that the donation was
one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will, since it had not, the donation was void and
could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No.
T-16622. The donees opposed the petition averring that the donation was one inter vivos which, having fully complied
with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. The trial
court decided that the donation was indeed one inter vivos and dismissed Montinolas petition for lack of merit. The
matter of its recovation was not passed upon. While appeal was pending before the CA, Montinola died and shortly
thereafter, the spouses Sicad filed a Manifestation and Motion alleging that they had become the owners of the
property covered by TCT No. T-16622 in virtue of a deed of definite sale and prayed that they be substituted as
appellants and allowed to prosecute the case in their own behalf. Another motion was presented by the legal heirs of
Montinoal declaring that they were not interested in pursuing the case and asked that the appeal be withdrawn
however Montinolas counsel opposed the motion. CA issued a resolution ordering the legal heirs as well as spouses
Sicad as appellants and denied the motion for withdrawal of the appeal. However, the eight division of CA denied the
separate motions for reconsideration filed by Montinolas legal heirs and the spouses Sicad. Hence, this action.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation is one mortis causa or inter vivos.
RULING:
The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but
withholds from the done the right to dispose of the donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis
causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the done while the donor is still alive.
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to
Montinolas grandchildren; the ostensible donees. They did not get poseession of the property donated. They did not
acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not
acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinolas
death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply paper
owners of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of
donation reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the done and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the
property until ten (10) after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation
mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donors demise.

Case Digest
Constancio SIENES, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
Fidel ESPARCIA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-12597, March 24, 1961
FACTS:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named
Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named
Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death were left
to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern
portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, an OCT
covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.
Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her
name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died at the age of 20, single and
without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument and sold the property in question
to appellants in consideration of the sum of P800.00. Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee
surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952. Said vendees demanded from Paulina and
her husband, the surrender of the OCT which was in their possession, the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing
of the corresponding motion in the cadastral, which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaeso.
RULING:
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable
property.
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions,
namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. This Court has held in connection with this
matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory
condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees
would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any
person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still
alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became
of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by
law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that
the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to
reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death.
While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the
occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it
orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees did not appeal
therefrom.

Case Digest
Nenita de Vera SUROZA, complainant, vs.

Judge Reynaldo P. HONRADO and Evangeline YUIPCO, respondents.
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981
FACTS:
th
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45 Infantry of the US Army (Philippine Scouts) married Marcelina Salvador but
they were childless. However, they reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considred
them as parents as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. When Mauro died, Marcelina, as a veterans
widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and
afterwards, Agapito also became a soldier. However, he was disabled and his wife was appointed as his guardian
when he was declared an incompetent. In connection to this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a
girlfriend of Agapito) wanted also to be his guardian however the court confirmed Nenitas appointment as guardian of
Agapito.
The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who was delivered to Marcelina
Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used the
surname Suroza and stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito.
Marcelina, being a veterans widow accumulated some cash in two banks. She executed a notarial will which is
in English and was thumbmarked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to
Marilyn. After her death, Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will) filed a
petition for probate of Marcelinas alleged will. As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as
administratix and subsequently, issued two order directing the two banks to allow Marina to withdraw from the
savings of Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza and requiring the custodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of the
testatrix house among whom was Nenita and to place Marina in possession thereof. Nenita was then alerted to the
existence of the testamentary proceeding hence, she and other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order
ejecting them, alleging that the decedents son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased; that he has a daughter
named Lilia; that Nenita was Agapitos guardian; and that Marilyn was not Agapitos daughter nor the decedents
granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate courts jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order. In spite of such
fact, Judge Honrado issued on order probating Marcelinas supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter petition
for administration and preliminary injunction reiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the will was not
duly executed and attested; and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick. Further, that the
institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as
executrix. Not contented with her motions, Nenita filed an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition
which was however, dismissed. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was
also dismissed. Hence, this complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for having admitted a will, which
on its face is void.
RULING:
Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case
which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the instituted heiress
in the void will should have inherited the decedents estate. Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance
and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed in the performance of his duties that diligence,
prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

Case Digest
In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez,
Apolonio TABOADA, petitioner, vs.
Hon. Avelino S. ROSAL, Judge of Court of First Instance
of Southern Leyte (Branch III, Maasin) respondent.
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
FACTS:
In the petition for probate filed with respondent court, Taboada attached the alleged last will and testament of the
late Dorotea Perez which was written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and consisting two pages: the first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the
left hand margin by three (3) instrumental witnesses; and the second page contains the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment is signed at the end of such clause by the said instrumental witnesses and at the left hand margin
by the testatrix. The trial court, through Judge Pamatian, denied the probate of the will for want of formality in its
execution and ordered Taboada to submit the names of the intestate heirs, however, the latter did not comply with the
said order. Instead, he filed a manifestation and/or motion ex parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to
deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will and further, he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the motions could not acted upon by Judge
Pamatian due to his transfer and thus, Judge Rosal assumed the position. Meanwhile, Taboada filed a motion for the
appointment of special administrator. Subsequently, the three motions filed by the petitioner were denied, hence this
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law requires that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at
the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another.
RULING:
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or cause some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification. The signatures of the instrumental
witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the
testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions,
especially so when the will was properly identified by the subscribing witnesses. There was no question of fraud or
substitution behind the questioned order.

Case Digest
Eufracia VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, et al., petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-44051, June 27, 1985
FACTS:
Julia Capiao had an extra-marital affair with Victoriano Taccad, with one child and/or forced heir, named
Lutgarda Capiao, who then married Raymundo Zipagan. Raymundo and Lutgarda were childless. Raymundo and
Lutgarda died, the latter leaving no will. The plaintiffs herein (relatives within the fifth degree) were consequently
instituted as Lutgardas legal heirs to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extra-judicial partition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the relatives of Julia may inherit from her illegitimate child Lutgarda.
RULING:
Relatives on the legitimate line, has to right to inherit from an illegitimate daughter.It is clear from the records that
the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on
the legitimate line of Julia Capiao, they cannot inherit from her illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao
predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda.

Case Digest
Rosario Feliciano VDA. DE RAMOS, et al., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Marcelina (Martina) GUERRA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Adelaida Nista claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and
testament as well as codicil of the late Eugenia Danila. Adelaida prayed that after due notice and hearing, the alleged
will and codicil be probated and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator of the estate.
Buenaventura and Marcelina, both surnamed Guerra, filed an opposition alleging among others that they are legally
adopted children of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the purported will and codicil were
procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil
have not been complied with; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed her last will and testament was duly
probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime; and that Adelaida is not competent and qualified to act as
administration of the estate. Afterwards, the parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by
the lower court. The petitioners herein filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners and filed a reply partly
admitting and denying the material allegations in the opposition to the petition and alleging among other things, that
oppositors repudiated their institution as heirs and executors because they failed to cause the recording in the
Register of Deeds the will and testament in accordance with the Rules and committed acts of ingratitude when they
abandoned the testatrix and denied her support. Subsequently, the intervenors (petitioners herein) also filed a motion
for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or relief from judgment and to set aside the judgment based on the compromise
agreement and consequently, the oppositors interposed an opposition to the motion to which the intervenors filed
their reply. The lower court allowed and admitted to intervene the petitioners herein, the compromise agreement was
disapproved except as regards to their lawful rights, and the original petition and amended opposition to probate of
the alleged will and codicil stand. The lower court also denied the motion for the appointment of a special
administrator filed by the intervenors. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The lower court
then allowed the probate of the will although two of the instrumental witnesses testified that they did not see the
testatrix sign the will. The oppositors herein appealed to the Court of Appeals set aside the order of allowing the
probate. Hence, this present action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the
formalities of the law considering the complicated circumstances that two (2) of the attesting witnesses testified
against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.
RULING:
There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince the Supreme Court that the will and codicil were executed
in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that the documents were
prepared by a lawyer and the execution of the same was evidently supervised by his associate and before whom the
deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not
usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud,
to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. If there should be any
stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than
the exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing
that the lawyers who participated in the execution of the will had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals failed to consider the presumption of regularity on the questioned documents. There were no
incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud
and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question that each and every
page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses.
Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither it is
disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each and the testatrix. Both
instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.

Case Digest
Lauro G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City
and Ramon G. NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998
FACTS:
Spouses Lauro Vizconde and Estrellita Nicolas had two children namely, Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita is one
of the five children of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales. The private respondent herein is a brother of
Estrellita.
Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land which was afterwards sold to Amelia Lim and Natividad Chiu.
Estrellita purchased again from Premier Homes a parcel of land with improvements. Thereafter, an unfortunate event
happened when Estrellita and her daughters were killed. Consequently, Lauro entered into an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with his wifes parents. The
settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael
and the other fifty percent (50%) to Lauro. The car and the property were given to Lauro and to Estrellitas parents but
the latter waived all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said properties. Not long after,
Rafael died and to settle his estate, Teresita (one of his children) instituted an instestate estate proceeding and
prayed to be appointed Special Administratix of Rafaels estate. Further, she sought to be appointed as Salud and
Ricardos guardian of which Ramon filed an opposition. Private respondent filed another opposition alleging that
Estrellita was given the Valuenzela property and subsequently, he filed his own petition averring that the legitime of
Salud and Ricardo should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his
lifetime. Ramon stated that Lauro is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of the
deceased legitimate daughter, Estrellita. In a consolidated order, RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian of Salud
and Ricardo while Teresita was appointed as the Special Administratix of Rafaels estate however, Ramon was
afterwards removed as guardian for selling his wards property without the courts knowledge and permission.
RTC then ordered Lauro to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the
case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by Ramon and Teresita. Lauro
fied a Manifestation stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no
interest to participate in the proceedings. However, despite this manifestation, Ramon moved to include Lauro in the
intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, the car and the balance of the proceeds of the
sale of the Valenzuela property be collated, which the trial court granted. Lauro filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Lauro filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.
Hence, this action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Paraaque property is subject to collation.
RULING:
Basic principles of collation:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the
inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs
succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during
the lifetime of the decedent.
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation: 1) The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of the latters compulsory
heirs; 2) As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or
may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went

Case Digest
beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property
between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration, are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction; 3) The order of the probate court subjecting the
Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its
initiatory stage; 4) Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case, the probate court, nonetheless,
made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to
Estrellita by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by
using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof.
Indeed, collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis; and 5) it is futile for the probate court to ascertain
whether or not Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. It should be stressed that Estrellita died ahead of
Rafael.

Case Digest
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL
PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
G.R. No. 169144
January 26, 2011
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it
has not been probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in theU.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as
special administrator of her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel)
and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S.where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin
added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they
claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions
in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition,
which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing
respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will;
and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for
the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5] holding that
the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated
copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution,
before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers
to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied
with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.

Case Digest
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated
and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance
with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such
wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will
has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the
law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal
requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have
not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in
our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
thePhilippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.[6]
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in
the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for
whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.[7] The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country
of its execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it
here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from
that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go
abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper
court.[8]
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can
take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as
special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the
testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws
of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas
will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R.
CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

Case Digest
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and Atty. Edward P.
Llonillo, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 168156
December 6, 2006
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, represented by Rogelio
1
M. Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan and dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint for unlawful detainer
file by the said heirs against respondent Vicenta Umengan.
The RTC decision affirmed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of the same city, Branch III, which had
rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of respondent Vicenta
Umengan from the lot subject of litigation.
The present petition likewise seeks the reversal of the CA Resolution dated May 17, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam.
As culled from the records, the backdrop of the present case is as follows
The lot subject of the unlawful detainer case is situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. It is the eastern half portion of
Lot No. 5427 and Lot No. 990. The first lot, Lot No. 5427 containing an area of 1,037 square meters, is covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 196. The second lot, Lot No. 990 containing an area of 118 sq m, is covered by
OCT No. 1032. These lots are registered in the names of the original owners, spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona
Bunagan.
In an instrument denominated as Deed of Confirmation and acknowledged before a notary public on June 14, 1979,
the heirs of the said spouses conveyed the ownership of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 in favor of their two children, Irene
Cuntapay and Isabel Cuntapay. In another instrument entitled Partition Agreement and acknowledged before a notary
public on December 28, 1979, it was agreed that the eastern half portion (subject lot) of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 shall
belong to the heirs of Isabel Cuntapay. On the other hand, the remaining portion thereof (the west portion) shall
belong to the heirs of Irene Cuntapay. The subject lot (eastern half portion) has an area of 554 sq m.
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan, namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo
and Maria. When Domingo Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other
children by him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband) filed with
the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot.
Vicenta Umengan is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband).
In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the owners of the subject lot, having inherited it
from their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel
Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject
lot sometime in 1955. The latter and her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot upon
demand. However, despite written notice and demand by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly
unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam were constrained to institute the action for ejectment.

Case Digest
In her Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta Umengan specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint. She
countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed away, the subject lot was inherited by her six children by her first and
second marriages through intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly had a pro indivisoshare of 1/6 of
the subject lot.
It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan, purchased the respective 1/6 shares in
the subject lot of his siblings Maria and Sado. These conveyances were allegedly evidenced by the Deed of Sale
dated March 3, 1975, appearing as Doc. No. 88, Page No. 36, Book No. XIV, series of 1975 of the notarial book of
Atty. Pedro Lagui.
Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan and her husband as evidenced by
the Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1961, appearing as Doc. No. 539, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the
notarial book of Atty. Pedro Lagui. Also on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to her
daughter Vicenta Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of Donation appearing as Doc. No. 538, Page No. 41, Book
No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book of the same notary public.
According to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband (Rosendo and Trinidad
Lasam) own only 2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed and
that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of Vicenta
Umengan. In so ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last will and testament (entitledTestamento
Abierto) purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo Lasam,
thus:
th
x x x my share 1/5 (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South,
by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P. Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the
th
property which is my share stands a house of light materials where I presently reside; this 1/5 (one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and also the aforementioned
2
house of light material x x x
The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over the subject lot on the last will and
testament of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances.
3
4
Citing jurisprudence and Article 1080 of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should prevail. It observed that the last will and testament
of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as required by law; nonetheless, the institution of a probate proceeding was
not barred by prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held
that the siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein. Consequently, they could
not convey to Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to possession of the
subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengans possession
thereof was by mere tolerance. The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolve[d] to order the EJECTMENT
of VICENTA T. UMENGAN and in her place INSTITUTE THE HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM.
It is further ordered the defendant shall pay the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam the sum of P500.00 pesos
representing the monthly rental of the land from August 2000 to the time this case shall have been
terminated.
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 attorneys fees plus cost of this
litigation.
5
So Ordered.

Case Digest
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The RTC echoed the reasoning of the MTCC that the
testamentary disposition of the property of Isabel Cuntapay should be respected, and that the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam have a better right to possess the subject lot.
Undaunted, Vicenta Umengan filed an appeal with the CA. She argued that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the
case as it involved the recovery of ownership of the subject lot, not merely recovery of possession or unlawful
detainer. She also assailed the RTCs and the MTCCs holding that the purported Testamento Abierto of Isabel
Cuntapay prevails over Vicenta Umengans muniments of title and, consequently, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have
a better right to the subject lot than Vicenta Umengan.
In the assailed Decision dated February 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The
appellate court preliminarily upheld the jurisdiction of the MTCC over the subject matter as it found that the
allegations in the complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam in their complaint,
according to the CA, only sought for Vicenta Umengan to vacate and surrender possession of the subject lot. The CA
also rejected the contention of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam that the issue of ownership of the subject lot had already
been settled in another case, Civil Case No. 4917, before RTC (Branch 3) of Tuguegarao City. The CA stated that the
trial courts order dismissing the said case was not a "judgment on the merits" as to constitute res judicata.
However, the CA declared that the RTC, as well as the MTCC, erred in ruling that, by virtue of the purported last will
and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a better right to the subject lot over Vicenta
Umengan. The CA explained that the said last will and testament did not comply with the formal requirements of the
6
law on wills.
Specifically, the CA found that the pages of the purported last will and testament were not numbered in accordance
with the law. Neither did it contain the requisite attestation clause. Isabel Cuntapay as testator and the witnesses to
the will did not affix their respective signatures on the second page thereof. The said instrument was likewise not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The CA even raised doubts as to its
authenticity, noting that while Isabel Cuntapay died in 1947 and the heirs of Rosendo Lasam claimed that they
discovered the same only in 1997, a date May 19, 1956 appears on the last page of the purported will. The CA
opined that if this was the date of execution, then the will was obviously spurious. On the other hand, if this was the
date of its discovery, then the CA expressed bafflement as to why the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, through their mother,
declared in the Partition Agreement dated December 28, 1979 that Isabel Cuntapay died intestate.
It was observed by the CA that as against these infirmities in the claim of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta
Umengan presented a Deed of Sale and a Deed of Donation to justify her possession of the subject lot. The CA
noted that she has also possessed the subject property since 1955. Such prior possession, the CA held, gave
Vicente Umengan the right to remain in the subject lot until a person with a better right lawfully ejects her. The heirs
of Rosendo Lasam do not have such a better right. The CA stressed that the ruling on the issue of physical
possession does not affect the title to the subject lot nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the
merits on the issue of ownership. The parties are not precluded from filing the appropriate action to directly contest
the ownership of or the title to the subject lot.
The decretal portion of the assailed decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The August 29, 2003 decision of the RTC,
Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5924 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner is dismissed for lack of merit.
7
SO ORDERED.
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam sought the reconsideration thereof but their motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated May 17, 2005.
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam (petitioners) now come to the Court alleging that the CA committed reversible error in
setting aside the decision of the RTC, which had affirmed that of the MTCC, and dismissing their complaint for
unlawful detainer against respondent Vicenta Umengan.

Case Digest
Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it held, on one hand, that the MTCC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint as the allegations therein make out a case for unlawful detainer but, on the other hand, proceeded to
discuss the validity of the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay.
Petitioners insist that respondent is holding the subject lot by mere tolerance and that they, as the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam who was the rightful owner of the subject lot, have a better right thereto. It was allegedly error for the CA to
declare the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay as null and void for its non-compliance with the formal
requisites of the law on wills. The said matter cannot be resolved in an unlawful detainer case, which only involves
the issue of material or physical possession of the disputed property. In any case, they maintain that the said will
complied with the formal requirements of the law.
It was allegedly also erroneous for the CA to consider in respondents favor the deed of sale and deed of donation
covering portions of the subject lot, when these documents had already been passed upon by the RTC (Branch 3) of
Tuguegarao City in Civil Case No. 4917 when it dismissed the respondents complaint for partition of the subject lot.
The said order allegedly constituted res judicata and may no longer be reviewed by the CA.
Petitioners emphasize that in an unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be resolved is who among the parties is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. On this point, the MTCC held (and the same
was affirmed by the RTC) that petitioners have a better right since the "merely tolerated" possession of the
respondent had already expired upon the petitioners formal demand on her to vacate. In support of this claim, they
point to the affidavit of Heliodoro Turingan, full brother of the respondent, attesting that the latters possession of the
subject lot was by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam who inherited the same from Isabel Cuntapay.
According to petitioners, respondents predecessors-in-interest from whom she derived her claim over the subject lot
by donation and sale could not have conveyed portions thereof to her, as she had claimed, because until the present,
it is still covered by OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. Their respective
estates have not been settled up to now.
It is also the contention of petitioners that the CA should have dismissed outright respondents petition filed therewith
for failure to comply with the technical requirements of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the petition was not allegedly
properly verified, lacked statement of material dates and written explanation on why personal service was not made.
This last contention of petitioners deserves scant consideration. The technical requirements for filing an appeal are
not sacrosanct. It has been held that while the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business, the
8
law does admit of exceptions when warranted by circumstances. In the present case, the CA cannot be faulted in
choosing to overlook the technical defects of respondents appeal. After all, technicality should not be allowed to
9
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
The Court shall now resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
It is well settled that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de
10
facto.
In the present case, petitioners base their claim of right to possession on the theory that their father, Rosendo Lasam,
was the sole owner of the subject lot by virtue of the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay
bequeathing the same to him. Respondent is allegedly holding the subject lot by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam
and, upon the petitioners formal demand on her to vacate the same, respondents right to possess it has expired.
On the other hand, respondent hinges her claim of possession on the legal conveyances made to her by the children
of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband, namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and Abdon. These conveyances were made
through the sale and donation by the said siblings of their respective portions in the subject lot to respondent as
evidenced by the pertinent deeds.
The CA correctly held that, as between the respective claims of petitioners and respondent, the latter has a better
right to possess the subject lot.

Case Digest
As earlier stated, petitioners rely on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay that they had allegedly newly
discovered. On the basis of this instrument, the MTCC and RTC ruled that petitioners have a better right to the
possession of the subject lot because, following the law on succession, it should be respected and should prevail
over intestate succession.
However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could
not properly be relied upon to establish petitioners right to possess the subject lot because, without having been
probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will.
In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testators
death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of
wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
11
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: "[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
12
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that "[b]efore any will can have force or validity it must
be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that
purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and
13
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will." Moreover,
14
the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.
Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously ruled that petitioners have a better right to
possess the subject lot on the basis of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has
not been probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament, which has not been
probated, has no effect whatever and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners claim, respondent has shown a better right of possession
over the subject lot as evidenced by the deeds of conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the dismissal of respondents action for partition in Civil Case No. 4917 before the
RTC (Branch 3) of Tuguegarao City does not constitute res judicata on the matter of the validity of the said
conveyances or even as to the issue of the ownership of the subject lot. The order dismissing respondents action for
partition in Civil Case No. 4917 stated thus:
For resolution is a motion to dismiss based on defendants [referring to the petitioners herein] affirmative
defenses consisting inter alia in the discovery of a last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the original
owner of the land in dispute.
xxx

Case Digest
It appears, however, that the last will and testament of the late Isabel Cuntapay has not yet been allowed in
probate, hence, there is an imperative need to petition the court for the allowance of said will to determine
once and for all the proper legitimes of legatees and devisees before any partition of the property may be
judicially adjudicated.
It is an elementary rule in law that testate proceedings take precedence over any other action especially
where the will evinces the intent of the testator to dispose of his whole estate.
With the discovery of the will of the late Isabel Cuntapay in favor of the defendants, the Court can order the
filing of a petition for the probate of the same by the interested party.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, let the above-entitled case be as it is hereby
DISMISSED.
15
SO ORDERED.
For there to be res judicata, the following elements must be present: (1) finality of the former judgment; (2) the court
which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
16
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The
third requisite, i.e., that the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits, is not present between the action for
partition and the complaint a quo for unlawful detainer. As aptly observed by the CA:
Our reading of the Orders (dated June 16, 1997 and October 13, 1997) in Civil Case No. 4917 reveals that
the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, dismissed the complaint for partition because of the discovery of
the alleged last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay. The court did not declare respondents [referring to
the petitioners herein] the owners of the disputed property. It simply ordered them to petition the court for the
allowance of the will to determine the proper legitimes of the heirs prior to any partition. Instead of filing the
appropriate petition for the probate of Isabel Cuntapays will, the respondents filed the present complaint for
unlawful detainer. Viewed from this perspective, we have no doubt that the courts Orders cited by the
respondents are not "judgments on the merits" that would result in the application of the principle of res
judicata. Where the trial court merely refrained from proceeding with the case and granted the motion to
17
dismiss with some clarification without conducting a trial on the merits, there is no res judicata.
Further, it is not quite correct for petitioners to contend that the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage could
not have conveyed portions of the subject lot to respondent, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still
covered by OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. To recall, it was already agreed
by the heirs of the said spouses in a Partition Agreement dated December 28, 1979 that the subject lot would belong
to Isabel Cuntapay. The latter died leaving her six children by both marriages as heirs. Considering that her purported
last will and testament has, as yet, no force and effect for not having been probated, her six children are deemed to
be co-owners of the subject lot having their respective pro indivisoshares. The conveyances made by the children of
Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage of their respective pro indiviso shares in the subject lot to respondent are valid
because the law recognizes the substantive right of heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/coownership among the heirs. The Court had expounded the principle in this wise:
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or
participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which comes under the
jurisdiction of the probate court.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if the same is under administration, is based
on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions of co-ownership, further qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that
each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be

Case Digest
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under administration.
In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., it was said that the sale made by an heir of his share in
an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such
administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 399 which
are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the
words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
18
community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided."
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the conveyances made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her
first marriage to respondent are valid insofar as their pro indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA justifiably
held that these conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of donation and deed of sale presented by respondent,
coupled with the fact that she has been in possession of the subject lot since 1955, establish that respondent has a
better right to possess the same as against petitioners whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapays last will
and testament which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and effect and under which no right can be
claimed by petitioners. Significantly, the probative value of the other evidence relied upon by petitioners to support
their claim, which was the affidavit of Heliodoro Turingan, was not passed upon by the MTCC and the RTC. Their
respective decisions did not even mention the same.
In conclusion, it is well to stress the CAs admonition that
x x x our ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a
binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. The parties are not precluded
19
from filing the appropriate action directly contesting the ownership of or the title to the property.
Likewise, it is therefore in this context that the CAs finding on the validity of Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament
must be considered. Such is merely a provisional ruling thereon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 16, 2005 and the
Resolution dated May 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (

Case Digests - Succession

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Wills and Succession 1

Wills and Succession 2

Wills and Succession 3

Wills and Succession 4

Wills and Succession 5

Wills and Succession 6

Wills and Succession 7

Wills and Succession 8

Wills and Succession 9

Wills and Succession 10

Wills and Succession 11

The number of pages used upon which the will is written;

Wills and Succession 12

Wills and Succession 13

Wills and Succession 14

Wills and Succession 15

Wills and Succession 16

Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

Wills and Succession 17

Wills and Succession 18

Wills and Succession 19

Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

Wills and Succession 20

The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Wills and Succession 21

Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.

Wills and Succession 22

Wills and Succession 23

Wills and Succession 24

Wills and Succession 25

Wills and Succession 26

Wills and Succession 27

Wills and Succession 28

Whether or not the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal?

Wills and Succession 29

Wills and Succession 30

Wills and Succession 31

Wills and Succession 32

Wills and Succession 33

By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of

By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention

Wills and Succession 34

Wills and Succession 35

Wills and Succession 36

Wills and Succession 37

Wills and Succession 38

Wills and Succession 39

Wills and Succession 40

Wills and Succession 41

Wills and Succession 42

Whether or not the holographic will is valid.

Wills and Succession 43

Wills and Succession 44

Wills and Succession 45

Nenita de Vera SUROZA, complainant, vs.

Wills and Succession 46

Wills and Succession 47

Eufracia VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, et al., petitioners, vs.

Wills and Succession 48

Wills and Succession 49

Wills and Succession 50

Wills and Succession 51