Management Delegation Myths and the Paradox of Task Assignment Stephen C. Bushardt, David L. Duhon, and Aubrey R. Fowler, Jr. he delegation process is an integral part of I the manager's job. In Peter Drucker’s cas sic definition, management is defined as accomplishing tasks through others.” The del- sgation process involves assigning tasks 10 oth~ ers, providing them with the authority needed to execute those tasks, and then holding them ac ‘countable for the results, In delegating, itis gen- erally recognized that authority can be passed from one managerial level down to another but that managers do not, thereby, reduce their own accountability. Managers remain responsible for their own actions and the actions of their subor: dinates. Others have referred to this phenomenon, 1s “the principle of absoluteness of responsibility (Koontz and O'Donnel 1976), The idea that a superior cannot escape, through de sponsibility for the activity of subordinates is fundamental to the theory of delegation, at least «as taught ip our business schools and espoused in our textbooks, ‘The other major tenet of effective delegation is the idea that authority must be delegated com- mensurate with the responsibility (0 be exacted. This has been referred to as the “principle of parity of authority and responsibility” (Koontz and O'Donnel 1976), Simply stated, it means one must have enough authority to carry out the job: for which one will be held responsible. The purpose of this anicle is to examine these two myths and their transference from the theory of management to the practice of manage- ‘ment as parts of the delegation process. Both concepts are integral to the theory of delegation and are often repeated by practicing managers as part of the “Holy Grail” of effective management However, both myths have little substance with regard (0 the practice of management, at least among American man agers. Assigning tasks 0 others appears to be the most straightfor- ward component of the delegation process, Unfortunately, assign- ing tasks is enmeshed in-a paradox of con flicting anticipations by managers and subordi- nates with respect 10 needs and expecta: tions, A reexamination Of the delegation process is particularly relevant avironmental uncertainty increases and jopt a decentralized struc To get the most out of its employees, management must learn to put aside its myths and solve its paradoxes. more organizations 4 ture, MYTH #1: AUTHORITY = RESPONSIBILITY he “principle of parity of authority and responsibility” receives a prominent place in the management literature but only lip service by most practicing managers. The reality fs that most managers are charged with respons bility while lacking the authority needed to carry {it out. For example, supervisors are responsible for managing their employees, obtaining. produc- tivity from them, ensuring a reasonable level of turnover and absenteeism, and acting as the ini- tial contact in employee grievances and com: plaints, However, most supervisors have no a thority over hiring and litle over dismissal. This function is performed by the personnel deparc ment of by managers higher in the organization, Supervisors generally have litte authority over Management Delgition Myths al the Paral of Task ASSignment y Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.subordinates’ wages or benefits, and even work assignments are often specified in the union con- tract and work rules oF by personnel procedures The reality of responsibility exceeding au- thority is not limited to supervisory level person- nek it is common throughout the management hierarchy, For example, the marketing manager is responsible for developing a highly effective marketing program for a company's product. The reality is that the marketing manager generally has limited input into product design, litle con. trol of product quality, and a limited advertising budget. However, once the product is introduced into the market, the marketing manager may very well be held responsible if the product fails. Similar discrepancies berween authority and responsibility exist throughout organizations Evidence suggests that the gap between responsi bility and authority tends to inerease as one as: ccends the hierarchy. The higher one’s level in the ‘organization, the more responsibility one is charged with relative to the authority that one is granted. An example from the American political ex- perience serves to illustrite, The President is SORRY, MATE... NOT MY URISDICTION, given the responsibility for maintaining a healthy US. economy. However, he actually has litle authority or control over what happens to the economy during his tenure in office. He has only indirect authority over money supply and interest ates, While responsible for government spend ing, he must share authority with Congress over programs and budgets. This gap between respon sibility and authority has been particularly trus: trating to more than one oecupant of the Oval Office, President Jimmy Carter could do little t control the runaway inflation and double-digit unemployment he encountered. Even though his party was in control of the executive and legista tive branches, his authority as “President” al lowed him to do litle, Nevertheless, voters held him personally accountable on el 1980. Bushardlt, Fowler, and Fuselier (L988) suggest that the violation of the "parity Of responsibility and authority” tends to enhance organizational effectiveness, rather than detract from it. They suggest that effective managers meet their re sponsibility with limited authority by using per sonal power fo fill the “gap.” Personal power Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.assumes the form of expertise, charisma, persua- sion, obligation, and membership in informal ‘groups. The reliance on personal power to meet responsibility offers a number of benefits to the ‘organization that would be unavailable if the ‘principle of parity of responsibility ally used in practice. When managers rely on personal power to ‘meet responsibility, they are encouraged to de- velop their skills at communication, interpersonal relations, leadership, and basic management, thereby encouraging employee development, The process also provides a form of job enrichment by converting routine job into one that is chal- lenging and leads to opportunities for suboreli- nutes 10 exercise their creative abilities. Further- more, since the gap between authority and re sponsibility increases as one ascends the hierar: chy, it gives lower-level managers an opportunity to hone their skills in preparation for greater challenges and helps higher management identify those ready for promotion. ‘Another primary benefit of not following the principle of “parity of responsibility and author ity” is hierarchical integration. The process fosters cooperation between individuals and groups as the interdependency of organizational responsi bilities is brought down to a personal level. The process of creating personal power encourages: managers to develop an understanding of the problems of others and a willingness to assist ‘others in return for the assistance they receive, The result is a greater understanding of the orga nization as a whole and an organization that can zmiore quickly respond to environmental change, ‘The creation of personal power to meet responsi- bility is an imponant means by which organic ‘organizations achieve integration Jimmy Carter's inability to get Congress, the Federal Reserve, and the bureaucracy (© move to ‘correct economic problems can be contrasted to Ronald Reagan's uncanny ability to accomplish much of bis agenda. Both had the same amount of authority (in fact, Carter may have had more since the Democratic Party controlled Congress), yet Reagan was much more successful. The main difference between the two presidents involved. the ability to use personal power and communi cation skills to meet the responsibility gap and make up for the lack of real authority ‘MYTH #2: THE ABSOLUTENESS ‘OF RESPONSIBILITY he principle of "the absoluteness of re- sponsibility” is touted as an unshakable tenet of leadership. Under this principle, when a tsk is delegated to another, the original delegator remains responsible for the task as esponsibility can not be delegated. When del- cegating a task, managers, at leat in theory, do not reduce their own accountability. Top man ‘agement remains accountable for all actions taken by subordinates and in turn the subordi nts are also accountable. This is much more ‘myth than reality as practiced by current Ameri- ‘can management. More often than not, managers refuse to take responsibilty for actions of subor- dinates if such action is severely detrimental 0 the image of the organization or the career of the manager ‘Managers and politicians are fond of saying 1 ake fll responsthility.” while in reality they are taking evasive action to assure that they are not held accountable. Numerous examples of this “passing the buick” phenomenon ean be cited but three prominent cases illusrate our point. No one is sure exactly what happened at My Lai during the Vietnam War. However, the result of the investigation was that Lieutenant William Calley was held personally accountable and higher-level officers in large pat avoided respon- sibility, Accountability was basically limited to the lowest level manager with authority. Higherlevel officers were quick to attempt to distance them- selves from the actions of the soldiers and Lt Calley: In 1988 Texaco paid Pennzoil $3 billion to settle the Getty Oil lawsuit, Pennzoil had been awarded $11 billion by the courts because of Texaco’ illegal interference with Pennzoil’sat- tempts to purchase Getty Oil, Texaco’s loss of the lawsuit, and subsequent appeals of the lagest settlement in history, led to setiement out of ‘court. Tessico's poor decisions in this episode led to the sale of billions of dollars worth of assets, reduction of business activity, loss of revenues, stockholder lawsuits, & tarnished image, and even hankruptey for a period. However, not a single member of Texaco management team was fred or otherwise penalized for the debacle. Texaco’s Consistent management position was that they did nothing wrong and therefore had nothing for Which to apologize. However, theie decisions almost led to the loss of the entre company. Tn the case of the recent ol spill in Alaska, the responsihilty has tended to center on the captain of the Exxon ship, the Valdez. Exxon CEO Lawrence Rav while agreeing to pay the tah where necessiry, has essentially avoided personal accountability. In an interview with Forme in May be said, “Tve fet personally very responsible for doing everything that I can—and Tean doa heck ofa lot within this company One is to make sure that we do all that is hu- ranly possible to get this thing cleaned up promptly. I's our problem the ship was on the rock. IUs our problem the oil was spilled” (Nulty 1989). The firm as collective “our” is respon- sible, not the CEO as the one with authority. I Management Deletion Myths apd the Paradox of Task Assignment Coowicht © 2001. Al Richie Reserved.« seems as though CEO Rawis feels responsible for the cleanup but not as responsible for the actual accident. The ship's captain, in the American tradition, has attempted to fix responsibility and accountability on the unlicensed mate who was actually on the bridge and piloting the ship. As we follow the outcome of this tragic episode, it is quite probable that ultimate blame and responsi- bility will be placed and end with the lowest level of authority possible, in this case Captain Joseph Hazelwood. His attempt to pass along the blame to one of his subordinates will probably not succeed. In common parlance, the phenomenon is often known as passing the buck, Regrettably, in has become synonymous countability tends to be directly proportional to the distance one is from the front lines. Appar- cently, this phenomenon is far more characteristic of the American management culture than the Japanese or Korean management culture. Three ‘examples illustrate this point In August 1985 a Japan Air Lines 747 jumbo jet crashed into a mountain and 520 people per- ished. The primary cause of the accident was the rupture of the aft pressure bulkhead, which dis: abled all steering conteols. After the crash investi- gation, Boeing issued an official statement adn ting that repairs it had made on the bulkhead ‘were faulty and that the failure of the bulkhead was the immediate cause of the crash. Boeing, suggested, however, that the fault of the crash was more properly the failure of JAL to properly inspect Boeing's repair, and the pilot's inappro- Driate response to the emergency. Soon after the crash the following events occurred. 1. Yasumoto Takagi, JAU's president at the time of the crash, resigned as a symbol of sor- 2. JAL subsequently suffered 10 percent drop if business. Tokuo Yamashita, head of the Japanese Ministry of Transportation, lost his job because of it. GAL is partly Government owned.) 3. Susumu Yamaji, Takagi's successor at JAL, also resigned because of JAL's poor performance. 4. A Ministry of Transportation safety inspec- inspected Boeing's repair committed 5. AJAL employee assigned to aid vietims families Committed Suicide. 6. Boeing's CEO, T.A, Wilson, sent personally signed letters of apology to each of the families. (MeDermott, 1987) Another example in Japan involved a young, sumo wrestler who struck his teacher. The young, sumo wrestler was held accountable for his ac tions by being moved back a step in the rank- ings, and the teacher was held accountable for his student breaking decorum by being fined The sumo wrestling board who held the others accountable felt responsible as well and reduced their own pay for several months. Finally, during the Seoul Olympics in 1988, the Korean Boxing Federation was terribly em Darrassed by the actions of one of ies boxers and some of the Federation’ officials. Protesting sn apparently poor decision, Korean boxer refused to leave the ring for several hours after his loss, His handler and a Federation official physically accosted the referee and judge and had to be restrained. Quite « melee broke out and Olympic boxing was disrupted for several hours, Kim Scung-Youn, President of the Korean Amateur Boxing Federation, resigned in embarrassment over the incident. The principle of the absolute: ness of responsibilty was followed, Contrast this event with the Frequent miss ventures in American collegiate athletics in which, those in charge seem not to feel any sense of responsibility for a player's behavior. For in: stance, recently it almost took an act of the Oka hhoma legislature to get the Oklahoma Sooners Football coach Barry Switzer to resign. Despite the fact that his program was on NCAA proba: tion, players had been convieted of criminal sets, and his quarterback had just been picked up for drug distribution, Coach Switzer maintained he ‘was only the couch and should not he held ee sponsible for the personal aetions of a Few of his players. In fact, when he finally resigned he sill dil not accept responsibilty For his progeam’s problems, but said it was because he was tired of all the hassle associated with denying and avoid- ing responsibilty. In the United States, aecount ability tends to be exacted at the lowest level the general public and the stakeholders will allow — and avoided if at all possible. In summary, then, Myth 1 states that author ity and responsibility should be equal, and Myth 2 states that responsibility i ubsolute, that it can- not be passed on fo others, These myths are not rigorously followed in the real world of managers and subordinates (particularly in the United States). Less obviously, there is a relationship. between these myths and their application. In essence, organizations create jobs in which there is greater responsibility than authority but—possi- bly in recognition of the theoretical unfairness of that situation—choose not to hold responsible job holders accountable for their failures, If we view responsibility as an at priosi obli- gation to perform and accountability as post Priori evaluation of and reaction to performance ‘quality, then we find that the reality of responsi Dility in both magnitude and absoluteness is much more nebulous than theory suggests. In reality the managerial network operates such that responsibility where performance is acceptable is sticky: it adheres to those who have the a priori Fuses Hoxizrns | March-April 1991 Coowicht © 2001. Al Richie Reserved.obligation to manage that performance. However, where performance is weak or unacceptable, responsibility loses adhesion and slides down the hierarchy 10 the lowest possible level of account. In practice individuals are quick to accept for jobs well done while passing on blame for poor performance. Organizations accept this reality rather than giving their members sulficient authority to carry Out responsibilities that would then necessitate strict accountability For both successes and failures ‘THE PARADOX OF TASK ASSIGNMENT also learn to deal with a paradox associated, with the delegation of authority to subordi- hates enabling them 0 carry out their responsi- bilities. Delegation involves assigning tasks t© subordinates and generally depends on a contin- gency approach. Others suggest that specificity in assigning tasks depends on the nature of each task, the subordinates’ level of development, and the leaders’ capabilities (Koontz and O'Donnel, 1976). Hersey and Blanchard (1972) in their life cycle approach to leadership suggest that task specificity by the leader should be contingent on the followers’ task-relevant maturity, defined as their willingness to do and knowledge about the task. In essence, the leader should specify the expected results for individuals who have low maturity levels and tend to be the low perform- ers, On the other hand, the leader should use broad policies and guidelines for individuals with high maturity who are high performers. The use of ambiguity for these individuals allows them to use their creativity and produce esults that ex- ceed the demands placed on them by the man- ager. A manager who is supervising a umber of employees is likely to specify tasks appropriate for the average subordinate—which provides the higher performer a lower standard than he or she would have set for him or herself Employees are likely to bring a very different perspective to the delegation process. David ‘McClelland (1961), in his need theory of motiva- tion, suggests that individuals with a high need to achieve prefer specific goals as a means of re- ceiving feedback on theie performance, Individu- als with a low need to achieve tend not to place the same value on the goals, This suggests that the high performers are likely to prefer a higher level of specificity in the task assignment relative 10 low performers in job-related situations. The preferred task structure by high performers is likely to center on expected outcomes as op- posed 10 specifics of how to do the task. The process can be viewed from a behavioral perspective. The high performer is seeking a positive reinforcer. Specificity is the clearest path, I 1 adaltion to Myths 1 and 2, managers must Figure Specificity Versus Ambiguity: Conflicting Expectation PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBORDINATE ih Low E sg 2 PE] ambiguous specie ae é Su a 4: ci Ambiguous | BE Specifi in 2 Re i to that goal, On the other hand, low performers are hoping to avoid negative outcomes as op- posed to seeking positive outcomes. A low per- former ean successfully avoid negative outcomes by either working under ambiguous task expecta- tions or increasing performance. Barring some positive incentive to perform at a higher level, the easier altemative is to work under ambiguous ‘expectations, making the judgement of perfor- mance less precise and in all likelihood less #ig- ‘The Figure illustrates the paradox of delega- tion, This paradox results from the eational be- havior of both subordinates and managers purst- ing their own best interests, High-performing subordinates are likely to prefer that the results be specified because of their confidence in ex ceeding the manager's expectations. The high: performing subordinates are likely to impose higher standards of performance on themselves than would the manager. From this standpoint the manager may serve his interest best through the use of ambiguity. The low performer is likely (o prefer that results be nonspecific oF ambigu- ous, as this allows a greater probability of eseap- ing accountability. To preveat the low performers from escaping accountability and to ensure at least some minimum of performance, the man- ager should specify his expectations. This phe- nomenon is likely to be more noticeable in situa- tions where rewards are directly tied to perfor- snance. High performers would preter specif performance standards, confident of their ability to meet and exceed those standards and there- fore guarantee receipt of rewards. Low perform cess would prefer less specific standards so they Management Deletion Myths and the Paradox of Tsk Assigament Coowicht © 2001. Al Richie Reserved.might maintain eligibility for rewards on subjec: tive evaluation not ditectly associated with their productivity. {As is the case with any paradox, this one ean create confusion on the part of those alected by it. Therefore. itis important that the paradox be reduced or eliminated to create congruency be- {oveen superior and subordinate expectations. A reduction of the paradox with regard to high level performers comes through the application ‘of Maslow's higher order needs concept to em ployee expectations (Maslow 1968). In essence, ‘we need to ask why the employee would prefer specific standards given the relationship of such standards to the employee's satisfaction of needs At the peak of Maslow’s needs hierarchy is the need for self actualization, with the need for es teem immediately below it. IF the employee is motivated primarily by esteem needs, the p dox would hokk: the meeting of specific perfor- mance standards would provide a clear mesure of performance allowing others to recognize the employee's personal achievements sind providing, a1 clear basis for feeling of achievement. How- ever, if the primary motivation for the employee were the satisfaction of the need for self actal- ization, which theoretically doesn't occur uatil ‘esteem js satisfied, the employee would be much more likely to accept nonspecific expectations, allowing greater opportunity for personal growth, and self fulfillment as the employee is allowed to define the houndaries and expectations associ ated with job performance. ‘Therefore, if managers of high-performing employees would first concentrate on the em: ployees’ esteem-related needs by deferring their desire for ambiguity and providing specific objec- tives, the employees would soon satisfy those needs and be reidy for a relaxation of specificity as the need for self actualization begins to dom nate. Regarding the Hersey. Blanchard life eyele approach to leadership, managers should utilize 4an SIII style for high performing employees desir ing specific task assignments, with « gradual change to less specificity and an SIV style as the employees’ task-related maturity increases. This ‘eventually rechuces and may completely eliminate the paradox. The theory of needs hierarchy also is appli cable to employees’ exhibiting lower pedtor- mance levels. Here, the conflict is beuween needs related to the middle of that hierarchy. The lower performers recognize that they may he involun- {arly separated from the organization, thereby interrupting the satisfaction of their needs for security and affiliation. Since there may be obvi ‘ous reasons for such separation where clear, specific performance standards are established, the weaker employee would prefer greater ambi quity in standarels with 2 resulting, decrease in separation threat, To help alleviate this part of the Paradox a manager should be specific at level learly within the weak performer's capability ‘Thus, job security and the related failure to satisfy tie need for affiliation are not threatened. 18 addition, there should be an ascending scale of performance standards that offers progressively greater rewards and addresses the esteem needs Of employees. As time passes and the employee gains confidence and shows improvement in performance, the minimum standard can he raised, not as a threat to continued employment, but to avoid the employee's acksliding to lower productivity levels, The employee, realizing that performance is possible, should not feel thre: ened by increased minimums, In effect, the mn: ager Is moving from an SL to an SII leadership style Tor less productive, less mature employees Within the life cyele approach to leadership. It iy also beneficial to recognize the linkage between the paradox and the myths previously discussed. High performers recogaize that a more specific assignnient is likely to Gary more spe. cific authority, thereby helping equate authority to responsibility and avoiding imbalance prob- lems, Managers of high performets, on the other hand, may recognize the beneficial impact of the imbalance on employee development sind. conf dent of the high performer's abilities, prefer 10 Use ambiguity with its uncertain authority to in= duce greater breadth and rapidity in employee development Conversely, poorer pesformers uncertain of their ability to succeed may wish t© avoid cle authority and therefore prefer ambiguous assiga ments, This allows them greater opportunity to excuse their performance by claiming kick of authority and therefore lessened sceountability High performers can accept specific respons bility without undue eoncern for being held sc countable for failure, since they do not expeet wv fail. Poorer performers, however, do not expect to succeed and would therefore prefer ambiguity so responsibilty is unclear and the likelihood of being held accountable is reduced. High per formers focus on the rewards accruing Irom suc cess: low performers focus on the per ‘ciated with failure w succeed. Gen easier to succeed where standards are specific and harder to kul where standards are non-spe: ote anagement, whether atthe supervisory Coowicht © 2001. Al Richie Reserved.GE best, representations of reality rather than reality itsell. This paper has explored several examples, both myth and paraclox, where theory and reality differ and where theory conflicts with itself. The astute reader is likely (0 recognize other instances, where such differences occur. A major key to effective management is recognizing the value of understanding theory sind its limitations while operating in the world of reality. 0 References J. 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Savary. “Ineffective Delegation: Symptom or Prob lem,” Supercisory Management, June 1985, pp. 27-33. AE. Schwarz, “The Why, What, nd to Whom of Det ‘egation,” Management Solutions, lune 1987, pp. 31-38. her sume, rwary ‘Who's in Charge at Texaco Now,” For: 16, 1989, pp. 6-74, WB. Sherwood, “Developing Subordinates: Critical 10 Managers and theie Organizations.” Personnel, january= February 1983, pp. 4052 R. Telander and R. Sullivan, “You Reap What You Sow.” Sports Mustrated. Febauaty 27. 1989, pp. 20-26. Stephen C. Bushardt is o professor of ‘management, and David L. Duhon is an ‘assistant professor of management, both at the University of Souther Missis- Sippi, Hattiesburg. Aubrey R. Fowler, Jt. Is. visiting professor of management at Murray State University. Kentucky. Management Delegation Myths and the Paradox of Tas Assignment Coowicht © 2001. Al Richie Reserved. 8