1

Farhanna B. Mapandi

23 CALACDAY VS VIVO

33 SCRA 382 (1970)

FERNANDO, J.

Facts:

-Martiniano P. Vivo : acting commissioner of Immigration

-Petitioner Calacday’s citizenship is being questioned

-Petitioner seeks to enjoin the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Vivo from taking them into
custody of conducting deportation proceedings against them or cancelling their identification certificates
on the assumption that the previous decisions of the Board of Inquiry, affirmed by the Board of
Immigration Commissioners declaring them Filipino citizens, had become final and conclusive

-Based on this assumption, petitioner contends that respondent Vivo is devoid of any authority to take
steps to deport them under the appropriate provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended.

Issue: WON the warrants of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration (Vivo) for the purposes of
investigation and before a final judgment of the deportation proceedings is issued, are valid.

Ruling: No.

RD:

Art III, Sec 1 (3) states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”

(the following is from Cruz, page 147) Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only
for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order
of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. As held in Morano v. Vivo, “The
constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest…not as a measure indispensable to carry out a
valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commission of
Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.”

29 LIM, SR. VS JUDGE FELIX

GR NOS. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19, 1991)

GUTTIEREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
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-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
wound.

-An investigation of the incident then followed.

-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O.
Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an
amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr.,
Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor
Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection
with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.

-After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating
therein that:

“. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the
preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely,
Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente
Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias
Tidoy.”

- Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial
records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate
for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as
the determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no
warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such
probable cause.

- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really
exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses
in the preliminary investigation.

- It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of
witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them.

-On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The
judge wrote, “In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple
murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon
review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate
informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was
entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and
substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the
prosecutor's certification in each information…”

-Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix (statement immediately preceding this paragraph,
italicized).
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ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of
Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.

RD:

As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually,
this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go
beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary.

As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses.
Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case
and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at
the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of
the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in
the cases.

In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each
case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having
no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely on the
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him
any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

30 BORLONGAN, JR VS PENA

GR NO. 143591 (NOV 23, 2007)

NACHURA, J.

Facts:

-Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.

- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with
the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and
squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.

- Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.

-Attached to the MD were the following documents:

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1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela
Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;

2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong;

3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong;
and

4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.

- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed
as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

- Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He
claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse,
petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.

-City Prosecutor’s Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners
were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the
documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of
the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories
were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they
were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and
later, in their Pre-Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,
and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.

-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied due process because of
the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court;
since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial
judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants
of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondent’s affidavit was not
based on the latter’s personal knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in
determining probable cause.

-On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly
provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of
arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the legality of their
information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.

-MTCC’s answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of the warrant
of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC)
petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.

Issue:

1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to
preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;

2) WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were
properly issued;

3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and

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4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their
arrest.

Ruling: Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.

RD:

For issues numbered 1 and 3:

-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant to the aforesaid
issues:

“SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of

determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. …

SEC. 3. Procedure. – Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. …

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. –

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. – If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the
procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action
based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.”

-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the complainant and did
not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be faulted for doing such as this is
sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits.
Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of
the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were illegally
issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause,
and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of
counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could determine probable cause.

For issue number 2:

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- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest
to be valid.

- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit executed
by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and
documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.

-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable
cause. The respondent’s claims of the falsity of the documents were mere assertions.

- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts
within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were
falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he
was present at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with
the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion

-A finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although
the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should
at least be more than mere suspicion. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner,
there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from
the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false,
fraudulent or groundless charges.

31 UY KHEYTIN VS VILLAREAL

42 PHIL 886, 896 (1920)

JOHNSON, J.

Facts:

-On April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the said Ramon Gayanilo stating in his
application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in
his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium."

- Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, on the same day (April 30th) searched
the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search
also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that
he rented it. Lt. Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason, he placed a guard in the premises to see
that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega was.
The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that the
Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lt. Torralba and his
subordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized articles which were all with
connection to the using of opium.

- A criminal complaint was filed in the court of the justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the petitioners
herein, charging them with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested.
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-Defendants urged: (1) that the search warrant of April 30 was illegal because the requisites prescribed by
the General Orders No. 58 had not been complied with in its issuance (specifically (a) because it was not
issued upon either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General Orders No. 58, and (b) because the
judge who issued it did not determine the probable cause by examining witnesses under oath); (2) that the
searches and seizures made on May 1st had been made without any semblance of authority and hence
illegal; and (3) that the seizure of the defendants' books and letters was a violation of the provisions of the
Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself, and protecting him
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Issue: WON the defendants’ positions are with merit.

Ruling (s):

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the
requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the
opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they
entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.

2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and,
therefore, did not require another search warrant.

3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent
relation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional rights.

RD:

(Contention # 1)

-SEC. 96. of General Orders No. 58 provide: “ It (a search warrant) may be issued upon either of the
following grounds: 1. When the property was stolen or embezzled. ; 2. When it was used or when the intent
exists to use it as the means of committing a felony.”

-Suffice it to say that, whatever may be the technical common-law meaning of the word "felony", which is
used in paragraph 2 of sec. 96 above quoted, the Court believes it would be the height of absurdity to
hold, upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seize
property the very possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes a crime. Opium is such property.

- Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for… material so kept as to endanger the public
safety.

- A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of arrest. The issuance of both is restricted by the same
provision of the Jones Law (sec. 3) which is as follows: “That no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.”

- In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the
judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be
searched for and seized having been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning
by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient
cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and
exonerating the latter.

(Contention # 2)
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- While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of issuance, this cannot be interpreted to
mean that a search warrant can be used every day for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day. This
would be absurd.

-It appears from the oral evidence adduced during the hearing of the petitioners' motion in the court below
that the search for opium, the property mentioned in the warrant, was not completed on April 30th; it was
interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the owner of the bodega on the ground-floor was, because
the petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership thereof. In other words, the search of May 1st was
not made "for a different purpose," nor could it be considered "another search," but was really a
continuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is shown by the fact that during the interval between
the two searches the premises in question were guarded by Constabulary soldiers, and the petitioners
were made to understand on April 30th that the authorities were not yet through with the search and
would continue the same as soon as they found out that the bodega was also occupied by the petitioner
Uy Kheytin.

(Contention # 3)

- In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the
property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be
taken thereunder.

- That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as
evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is
no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly
described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned in
the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose
of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in
evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

33 PEOPLE VS VELOSO

48 PHIL. 169 (1925)

MALCOLM, J.

Facts:

-In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization
known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of
Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.

-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than
a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to
the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret
service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the
municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in
the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred.
Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a
window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.

-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them
was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search
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warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that
the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.
As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show
him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen
and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit
to the search.

-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to
meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of
the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and
Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards,
cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

-All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused
to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen
to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed
to place him in the patrol wagon.

-The warrant read as follows:

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he
has good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in
the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain
devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards,
chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the
game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said
devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of
the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night
within ten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John
Doe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same
or any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided
for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO

Judge, Municipal Court

Issue: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.

Ruling: Yes.
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RD:

It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that “a search warrant
shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized.”

The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the
name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to
identify him when found.

A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or
"Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of
the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a
warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or
persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or
persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and
peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which
he can be identified.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building
to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without
doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.

As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the
manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

34 PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR

159 SCRA 599, 611 (1988)

NARVASA, J.

Facts:

-On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five
persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear.

-On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims,
filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary
investigation" of the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by
the parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however, identified — and promised that
supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st
endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all
cases that may be filed relative … (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be
forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases."

-No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August
10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan,
which was docketed as Case No. 1748. On that same day, the respondent Judge "examined personally all
(three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru … (his) closed and direct supervision,"
reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's answers. Thereafter the Judge
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"approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14)
petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) John Does.

-An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by Atty.
Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation"
on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no
searching questions" having been propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion for “lack of
basis”.

-The petitioners contend:

- that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court;

- that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings
leading to the issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest;

- that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m.
to 1:00 p.m. only ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to determine
the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of
varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day";

- that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied
"mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when presented to him
by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.";

- that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges "... in total
disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken
cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation
of the same; and

- that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional
provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be
seized.

Issue: WON the warrant of arrest was null and void. More specifically stated, WON completion of the
procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.

Ruling: The warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the
petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The
respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the
preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for further appropriate
action.

RD:

Sec 3 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the procedure in conducting a pre-
investigation of any crime cognizable in the RTCs. Although not specifically declared the said provision
actually mandates two phases.

The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and
other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either:
 12

(1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint
and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal;
or

(2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the
inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's
evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also,
the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters
that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution,
either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted,
together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action.

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before
a warrant of arrest may be issued.

The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the
respondent's arrest:

“Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.- xxx xxx xxx (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal
trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under
oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a warrant of arrest.”

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only
await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation .

45 KMU VS DIRECTOR (-GENERAL, NEDA & SECRETARY OF DBM)

GR NO. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006

CARPIO, J.

Facts:

- EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads: “REQUIRING ALL
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE
AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES…”

- Section 3 of the said EO provides that the data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies
shall be limited to the following: Name; Home Address; Sex; Picture; Signature; Date of Birth; Place of
Birth; Marital Status; Names of Parents; Height; Weight; Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; Any
prominent distinguishing features like moles and others; Tax Identification Number (TIN)

-Petitioners allege that EO 420 is void because it violates the constitutional provision on the right to
privacy : (i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owner’s consent; (ii) EO 420 is vague
 13

and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions; (iii) There are no
compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

Issue: WON EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.

Ruling: Petition without merit.

RD:

- On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. Moreover the
data to be collected are routine data for ID systems and are less personal compared to the medical records
of patients taking prescription drugs (Whalen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977), good to note, see * below).

-EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems (which even before were not complained of) which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards.

-The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

* Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over information.
In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish
the government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for
abuse. The government maintained a central computerized database containing the names and addresses
of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the
database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal matters
confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and
to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure
may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of
the State having responsibility for the health of the community does not automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy.

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14
specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and
far less personal.

49 CAMARA VS MUNICIPAL COURT

387 US 523 (1967)

MR. JUSTICE WHITE

Facts:

-On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department
of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations
of the city's Housing Code. The building's manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the
ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building's
occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and
demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because
the inspector lacked a search warrant.
 14

-The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again refused to allow an
inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's office. When
appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed
appellant that he was required by law to permit an inspection under § 503 of the Housing Code.

-Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant.
Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of §
507 of the Code.

-"Sec. (§) 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies,
so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to
perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. "

- Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that § 503 is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant
and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein. He also contends
that he may not be prosecuted under § 507 for refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally
authorized by § 503

ISSUE: WON administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth
Amendment rights as enforced through the Fourteenth Amendment.

RULING: It is concluded that appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a
warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the
inspection

RD:

-The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.

- The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by
a reasonable governmental interest. Reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search
warrant.

-In the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time
or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus,
as a practical matter, and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the
property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused
unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate
entry.

- In this case, there was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three
trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained,
and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No
doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through
the building's manager, but appellee does not contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize
inspection of appellant's premises.

50 PEOPLE VS ARUTA

GR. NO. 120915, APRIL 3, 1998

 15

ROMERO, J.

Facts:

- Testimony of arresting officers: On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant,
known only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day,
December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team
composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt.
Efren Quirubin.

-Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14,
1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and
the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt.
Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near
the Caltex gasoline station.

-While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front
and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from
where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team
"Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.

-Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the
latter handed it to the former.

-Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
"Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation
where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

-Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said
specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

-Defense contended that the search and seizure of the items were illegal thereby violating accused-
appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in
evidence.

-Defense’s version of testimony: She (Rosa Aruta y Menguin, accused-appellant) claimed that immediately
prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While
about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road,
Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and
averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no
search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.

-RTC of Olongapo relied on arresting officers’ testimony since they were unconvinced by the defense’s
version of the testimony; convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Thus this appeal.

Issue: WON the search and seizure done on Aruta was illegal.
 16

Ruling: Aruta was acquitted for lack of evidence.

RD:

- The right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their
application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

- The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.

- Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one
nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting
in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
that she was committing a crime.

-Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-
appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully
arrested.

- In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering
that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so.

54 VALE VS LOUISIANA

399 US 30 (1970)

Facts:
 17

The officers got arrest warrant for the defendant (referring to Vale). They then went to the defendant's
house where they saw the defendant making a drug deal. The officers arrested the defendant outside his
house and then the officers went inside the house and in the back room, where they found drugs. The
defendant was convicted and now he appeals and argues that the evidence obtained in the house was
result of an unlawful search. The Supreme Court of Lousiana affirmed the conviction by ruling that the
search of the house was incident to a lawful arrest.

Issue: WON the search of the back room of the house incident to a lawful arrest?

Ruling: No

RD: The court ruled that a search is incident to a lawful arrest "only if it is substantially contemporaneous
with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest." The court ruled that since the
defendant was arrested outside his house, the back room of the house was not within the immediate
vicinity of the arrest and also since the officers did not have exigent circumstances, or the consent of the
defendant, they had no right to search the house. The conviction was reversed.

55 NOLASCO VS PANO

147 SCRA 509 (1987)

Facts:

The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of
the SC’s decision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners is null and void, that respondents are
enjoined from introducing evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities obtained would
still be retained, without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque. Respondents contend that the search
warrant is valid and that it should be considered in the context of the crime of rebellion, where the
warrant was based. Petitioners on the other hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar-Roque, contend that
a lawful search would be justified only by a lawful arrest. And since there was illegal arrest of
Aguilar-Roque, the search was unlawful and that the personalities seized during the illegal search
should be returned to the petitioner. The respondents, in defense, concede that the search warrants were
null and void but the arrests were not.

Issue: WON the articles seized were illegally obtained.

Ruling: Yes.

RD: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has
proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and
thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights.
What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or
modify. All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot
be used against any of the three petitioners.

Cairalyn D. Gandamra

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS

CRUZ, J.
 18

Facts: Shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were 3 suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna&North Bay Boulevard.A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.As later narrated there were 2
men "looking from side to side," 1 of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who
turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber.Smith&Wesson revolver w/ 6 live
bullets in the chamber.The weapons were taken from them. Mengote&others were turned over to police
headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

-Said accused did then and there unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control 1 caliber 38 without first having secured the necessary license or permit.Mengote was then
convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Appellant contends that the revolver should not have been
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant therefor having been previously obtained.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Mengote was constitutional?

Ruling: the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

RD: As provided in Sec. 5 of the bill of rights, A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person; (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

At the time of the arrest, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen." There was no offense that had just been committed or actually committed or being attempted
in their presence. The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed neither mengote’s identity. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller&
about a crime that had yet to be committed. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a
crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test
of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Kagui Malasugui

Diaz, J.

Facts: Sometime in 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant in cotabato, was found lying on the ground w/
several wounds in the head. He died shortly afterward in the cotabato hospital where he had been brought
by an agent of authority. The death of Tan Why was imputed to the accused who was charged w/ the crime
of robbery w/ homicide. He was convicted&sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The accused appealed. When
Tan why was found lying, he was still alive and able to answer laconically “Kagui”. Lt. Jacaria ordered his
immediate arrest. Accused was arrested and had been brought to the Lt., where he was asked of the
bracelets w/c he voluntarily& w/o protest produced it; he was searched, w/o opposition on his part, it was
discovered that he also had the pocketbook containing P92 in bills, Tan why’s identification card & a
memorandum of amounts w/some Chinese characters & his pocket was a change amounting to P92.68.

Issue: Whether or not the search & seizure w/o the corresponding warrant was constitutional?
 19

Ruling: The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed; except that part containing a pronouncement in favor
of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company & it is ordered that the articles be delivered to the latter’s heirs,
w/costs against the appellant.

RD: This is so because under the law, members of Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the
municipal police& of chartered cities even of townships may make arrests w/o judicial warrant, not only
when a crime is committed or about to be committed in their presence but also when there is reason to
believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one has been committed &that it was committed by the person
arrested by them. In the case at bar, almada, a Govt. witness testified that the deceased before he died
was able to utter “kagui” as his aggressor &that on the morning he saw the appellant w/ a club in his hand;
said club was found near the place where Tan was wounded. In the absence of an explanation of how 1
come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded& treacherously killed, he must
necessarily be considered the author of the aggression& death of said person& of robbery committed on
him. Said constitutional precept has been interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches& seizures w/o
judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.

Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia vs. Diego Locsin, et.al

Laurel, J.

Facts: Mariano Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from justice of the peace of Tarlac, a
search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at
Victoria for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents &other papers relating to her activities as
usurer. The search warrant was issued upon affidavit. Almeda accompanied w/ the captain of Phil.
Constabulary went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria after showing the search warrant to the
petitioner’s bookkeeper &w/o the presence of the petitioner who was ill& confined @ the time, proceeded
w/ the execution. On several occasions, petitioner demanded from the respondent Anti-Usury Board the
return of the documents seized.

Issue:

1. WON there has been waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches& seizures?

2. WON the warrant was in conformity w/ the law?

Ruling: The writ prayed for is granted. The search warrant is hereby declared void& of no effect; the
orders of Oct.5,’37 & Jan.3,’38 of respondent judge are set aside &respondents are hereby ordered to
return& restore to the petitioner all the properties, documents, papers &effects illegally seized from her,
w/in 48 hrs. from the time this decision becomes final. Without costs.

RD: The waiver may be either express or implied. In the case @ bar, there has been a waiver by
implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must appear 1st that the
right exists; 2nd, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. It is true that the
petitioner did not object when the search was made because she was sick &was not present when the
warrant was served upon. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches& seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who
is expressly authorized to do so in his/her behalf.

The warrant was unconstitutional because for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or
any other person… In the case @ bar, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge
 20

himself but by the applicant. Hence, the search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of
Tarlac.

ALMARIO T. SALTA, HON. CONSTANTE A.ANCHETA, et.al vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RENATO D.
TAYAG

PATROCINIO DAYRIT vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, et.al

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: On April 22, 1970, Almario Salta was charged by the PNB before the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan for
violation of RA # 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Sometime in 1970, Salta filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan against
Patrocinio Dayrit, Renato Tayag and others.

After conducting an investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan dismissed both cases on the ground that
the PNB refused to submit documents considered by the fiscal as material.

The PNB moved that the dismissal be reconsidered. The DOJ assigned District State Prosecutor Kliatchko to
reinvestigate the case against Salta. Salta, likewise appealed the order of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
which dismissed the case. Prosecutor Kliatchko reinvestigated both complaints.

Prosecutor Kliatchko conducted hearings after which: a) a prima facie case was found in I.S. No. 3934 and
an information was filed against Salta and b) the case against Dayrit, et alwas "with the approval of the
Department of Justice" dismissed. While CCC-V-668 was pending trial before Judge Constante A. Ancheta,
Salta filed a complaint against Patrocinio Dayrit, et.al for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The complaint had
been dismissed by both the Provincial Fiscal and District State Prosecutor Kliatchko.

The PNB charged Salta before the Provincial Fiscal in Pampanga for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft Act
committed by Salta in the PNB Guagua Branch. After an investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga
found a prima facie case against Salta and filed the corresponding information with the Circuit Criminal
Court. In 1973, Judge Ancheta issued an order ruling that "unless otherwise restrained by higher courts,
the requisite preliminary investigation thereon on Salta's complaint shall be conducted on January 24 and
25, 1973." Judge Ancheta further held that "until such time when the preliminary investigation shall have
been terminated, the hearings on the merits of the criminal case No. CCC-V-668 is hereby suspended."

Issue: whether or not Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over Salta's
complaint against petitioner Dayrit in G.R. No. L-42973 and Renato Tayag, the respondent in G.R. No. L-
41395.

Ruling: the petition in G.R. No. L-42973 is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of Judge Ancheta dated March 22, 1974 is likewise SET
ASIDE. The petition in G.R. No. L-41395 is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

RD: Judges of Circuit Criminal Courts may conduct preliminary investigations in cases they will later try.
The authority given to regular Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations is likewise
conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. However, it is clear that even as said courts may have such authority,
they must concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before them instead of discharging a
function that could very well be handled by the provincial or city fiscal. Section 1, Rule 112 of the present
Rules of Court states that it is conducted for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the
 21

respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The preliminary investigation proper is,
therefore, not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive.

The preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which only a judge could conduct
subject to the qualification in the 1973 Bill of Rights, is usually integrated with the preliminary
investigation proper when conducted by a court.

The respondent Judge conducted the questioned preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 13, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court, SEC. 13. that upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First
Instance w/o previous preliminary examination& investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge shall
either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace for preliminary examination& investigation, or himself
conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the
preceding petitions and should find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the
offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest &refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the
corresponding information.

Under these circumstances, respondent Judge Ancheta had no authority to conduct another preliminary
investigation against Dayrit and Tayag. Relative to Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, it is
stated thereby with pristine clarity that the complaints over which a judge of a court of first instance may
conduct preliminary examination and investigation are those 'filed directly' before it, 'without previous
preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal.

Fatima Berua

COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

FACTS:

- On the evening of 13 January 1964, 14-year-old Pamela Mason left her home in Manchester, New
Hampshire. She had received a call from a man in need of a babysitter. Eight days later, her body was
found many miles away by the side of a north-south highway. The police immediately began a large-
scale investigation into the murder. Police inquiries led to the questioning of Edward Coolidge. He was
cooperative throughout the entire process. When asked if he owned any guns he responded that he did.
He agreed to participate in a polygraph test the following Sunday. Police contacted Coolidge the
following Sunday and asked him to come to the police station where he would be taken to Concord, New
Hampshire for the lie-detector test. That evening, as Mrs. Coolidge waited with her mother-in-law for her
husband to return, two plainclothes policemen called on the Coolidge residence. These officers were not
even aware that Coolidge had readily provided three guns for inspection to the previous officers. The
plainclothes policemen stated that her husband was in "serious trouble" and would not be returning
home that night. Coolidge was being held in jail overnight for an unrelated charge; during the polygraph
test he had confessed to stealing money from his employer. They then asked the mother-in-law to leave
and began questioning Mrs. Coolidge. At one point during the questioning they asked to see Coolidge's
guns and the clothes that Mrs. Coolidge believed her husband had been wearing on the night of Pamela
Mason's disappearance.

- It was decided that the murder charge, along with a search of his residence and two cars, would provide
enough evidence to support the arrest of Coolidge. The chief of the Manchester police applied, under
oath, for arrest and search warrants, which were subsequently signed and issued by the attorney general
himself--in the role of acting justice of the peace.

ISSUE: WON the seizure & subsequent search of Coolidge’s automobile is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." The
state of New Hampshire developed three theories in an attempt to explain the warrant's validity. The
first theory stated that the search and seizure of Coolidge's automobile were "incident" to the arrest. In
 22

order for this to have been the case, it would have been necessary for Coolidge to be in possession or
control of the vehicle. The second theory postulated by the state maintained that probable cause allowed
for a warrantless search of an automobile. It was deemed that this "automobile exception" was not
applicable in this case. Coolidge was arrested without resistance in his own house; the car remained
untouched throughout this event, as he made no attempt to escape. The state's final theory relied on the
Pontiac as being an "instrumentality of the crime" that could be seized because it was in plain view.
However, an item of evidence discovered in plain view could not be considered as such unless it was
discovered while the search was in progress--and the discovery itself must be considered inadvertent.
The Supreme Court rightly believed that the police had a sufficient amountof time in which to obtain a
valid warrant as the description and the location of the Pontiac were known in advance of the arrest.
None of these theories validated the warrant provided by the state attorney general; nor did they justify
a warrantless search.

HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL. NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, and MORABE,
DE GUZMAN & COMPANY,
FACTS:
- Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which
had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The
CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.
- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries
Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
ISSUE: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.
HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant,
because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant
must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply
to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors
that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person
(a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who
is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a
prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention
during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case
at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with
dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites
therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, vs. FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA
FACTS:
- Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L
"SAN RAFAEL". A year later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
- On June 15, 1962, de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote
the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to
impound and take custody of the motor launch. Delfin Lim pleaded with Maddela to return the motor
launch but the latter refused.
- On September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to
return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the
ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.
 23

- All efforts to recover the motor launch is going to nothing, plaintiffs a complaint for damages against
defendants alleging that Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and
there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order
of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order the
seizure of a private property.
ISSUE: WON Fiscal de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a
warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
HELD: NO. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the
right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. Under
the old Constitution, the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no
other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act
complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals
to issue a search warrant.
Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, 2 principles are made clear,
namely: (1) that in the seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in
issuing a search warrant the judge alone determines whether or not there is a probable cause. The fact
that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure without a warrant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

FACTS:
- Aminnudin claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. He was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali
y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. According
to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-
appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by
name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected
the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana
leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.
ISSUE: WON the marijuana allegedly found in his possession is inadmissible in evidence arrested because
he was searched without warrant
HELD: Yes [Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution]. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was
a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed.
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least 2 days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." In
the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT

FACTS:
 24

- Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, he left for Baguio City.
- In the morning May 11, Capt. Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
- In the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the
bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
- During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt’s waist. Suspecting the bulge on
Malmstedt’s waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt’s passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, the
officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus, accused stopped to get 2 traveling bags from the luggage carrier.
- Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did
not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
- Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish.
ISSUE: WON the search of the Malmstedt’s personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are
not admissible as evidence against him.
HELD: It was LEGAL and VALID. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Moreover, there’s an existence of a probable cause, where
the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was
acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias
ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO
FACTS:
- Peter Lo, together with Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Only Peter Lo and Lim Cheng Huat were convicted.
- In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged
in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation
 25

of the information received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created to bust the
suspected syndicate. As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep
penetration agents' was carried out. One of those recruited was Reynaldo Tia. The latter offered his
services to Lim as his ompanion for his business nips abroad. In the course of their meetings in China, Tia
was introduced to Peter Lo whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of
Lim. As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the
suspected criminal syndicate.
- Tia and Peter went to Guangzhou. They went to a local store where Peter purchased 6 tin cans of tea. Tia
saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination during the purchase. Afterwards,
they returned to the hotel. Peter kept the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to Peter's
room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with Peter. One was fixing the tea bags, while
the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Peter joined the
second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked the latter what they
would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs.
- When the 2 arrived in the Phil., the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by Peter and Tia and
cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver
to open the baggage compartment. 3 pcs. of luggage were retrieved. They requested from the suspects
permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag of Peter.
During the investigation, a total of 56 paper tea bags with white crystalline powder were found and
tested and was found out that it was metamphetamine.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure made against is illegal
HELD: The search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant, is not an absolute rule. There are at
least 3 well-recognized exceptions: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle,
and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in
question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect
the search on appellant and his co-accused. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and
transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance
activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member.

EDDIE GUAZON, et. al., vs. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA
FACTS:
- There’s saturation drives conducted in 12 places in Metro Manila. The petitioners claim that the
saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all drives, it is alleged that the
following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police
and military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering the
residents within to come out of their respective residences.
3. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
4. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on
the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued by
a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest.
ISSUE: WON the police act is illegal, that there’s no need to secure search warrants or warrants of arrest
before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested .
 26

HELD: Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the
combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the
mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion
or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no
impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of
squatter and low income families are fully protected.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVELYN GARCIA Y DELIMA

FACTS:
- Evelyn Garcia y Delima was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for selling and
delivering, without authority of law 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution established that sometime before 5 April 1991, the office of the NARCOM based in Cebu City
received a report from an informer that the accused, a resident of Lorega St., Cebu City, was engaged in
the sale of marijuana. Acting upon this information, Maj. Esa Hassan, commanding officer of the said
officer, instructed Sgt. Basilio Sarong to conduct a surveillance on her. On 5 April 1991, Sgt. Sarong,
accompanied by the informer, proceeded to the slum area of Lorega and upon arrival thereat, positioned
himself at the house of the informer's friend from where he had a clear view of her hangout. Peeping
through a window, Sgt. Sarong saw her selling marijuana to certain persons. He then reported to Maj.
Hassan her illegal activity.
- On 10 April 1991, Sgt. Sarong conducted another surveillance on the accused for the purpose of
preparing for a buy-bust operation. 3 His surveillance yielded a positive result, which he immediately
reported to Maj. Hassan who then formed a buy-bust team.
- On 12 April 1991 at around 12:30 p.m., the members of the team proceeded to Lorega Street. Sgt.
Sarong went directly to the hangout of the accused while his companions strategically posted
themselves in a place where they could monitor Sgt. Sarong's movements. When he entered the
hangout, the accused approached and asked him if he wanted to buy marijuana to which he answered
yes. He gave her the marked P20.00 bill. She told him to wait for a while and then left. When she came
back, she delivered to him fifteen sticks of marijuana cigarettes. He opened one handrolled cigarette and
smelled it. After ascertaining that it was indeed marijuana, he gave the pre-arranged signal (by
scratching his head) to his companions who immediately closed in and arrested her. The team recovered
from her the P20.00 marked bill.
ISSUE: WON the marijuana is admissible as evidence.
HELD: YES, since the warrantless arrest was incident to a lawful arrest. Evelyn he was caught in flagrante
in a buy-bust operation selling marijuana to the poseur-buyer, Sgt. Sarong. Pursuant then to Section 5(a),
Rule 113 and Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, she could be lawfully arrested without a warrant
and searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be sued as proof of the commission of the
offense.

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., vs. COMELEC and DOJ SPECIAL TASK FORCE
FACTS:
- In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
- On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting
 27

the return of the 2 firearms. Upon being advised of the request, petitioner immediately instructed his
driver, Ernesto Arellano to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, the PNP set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20m away from its entrance.
About 30min. later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it
approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun
cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He
explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to
Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.
- However, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued a Resolution
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election
Code.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is illegal and the firearms seized cannot be
used as evidence.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of
evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the
vehicle to be searched.
In the case at bench, the checkpoint was set up 20m from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to
enforce COMELEC’s Resolution. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do
so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching
the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in
organizing special strike forces. Nor was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano
that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action
then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in
violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of
petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.

RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PP

FACTS:
- Rudy was found guilty of the crime of theft. On June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Brgy. Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the
two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy. When asked what was loaded
on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous. With Rudy’s consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by NPC. The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja
asked Rudy where the wires came from and Rudy answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Rudy and the vehicle with the high-
voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.
ISSUE: WON the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
"suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," constitutes probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure.
HELD: When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In the case at bar, the
vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
 28

suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according
to them, was unusual and uncommon. However, the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because
it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as
would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to
have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires
in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CARMELINA TABAR y CARMILOTES and ROMMEL ARRIESGADO
y TABAR
FACTS:
- Carmelina Tabar y Carmilotes and her nephew, Rommel Arriesgado y Tabar, were charged with the
violation of Dangerous Drug Act, for selling and delivering, without authority of law, 3 sticks of marijuana
cigarettes.
- Pfc. Josephus Trangia On February 8, 1989, Pfc. Josephus Trangia he was with Pfc. Romeo Cortes and
Gualberto Gabales on a buy-bust operation for marijuana after receipt of information about marijuana
pushers in Punta Princesa, Cebu City and that they had their informant go ahead of them after giving the
P5.00 bill for him to purchase marijuana. He continued saying that their informant stood in front of a
shanty while they posted themselves at a distance of about 50 meters from the place where their
informant was standing. And that they saw a young boy approached their informant and handed
cigarettes to him who in turn handed the marked money to the young boy. Then, their informant gave
them the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head with his right hand; that after the signal, he and his
companions immediately approached the young boy and the informant introduced them as police
officers. This young boy was about 16-17 years old, by the name of Rommel Arriesgado y Tabar. He had
earlier pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of mere possession of marijuana He explained the initials GDG
which stands for Gualberto G. Gabales, his team member. He further declared that after the pre-
arranged signal from their informant, they immediately proceeded to the scene and were given three
sticks of marijuana by their informant after buying the same from the boy, Rommel Arriesgado and that
they proceeded to confiscate the P5.00 bill from the boy. At this juncture, he claimed that he observed
that after the transaction, the boy went inside the shanty and the moment he got out, he handed the
three sticks of marijuana to the informant. In fact, he claimed that after the proceeding to the shanty,
they met Carmelina Tabar, accused herein, and that Carmelina Tabar was holding white pants from
where they found other marijuana sticks in cigarette packs which they confiscated; that they brought
Carmelina Tabar to Fuente Police Station for investigation. He claimed that there were 75 sticks of
marijuana in the Hope Cigarette pack; 22 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in the Philip Morris pack and 99
sticks of marijuana in the Mark cigarette pack.
ISSUE: WON the marijuana cigarettes seized from her are inadmissible in evidence because they were
obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD: The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks
under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty after
noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out, which she voluntary did, the
package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the member of the
team. A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without the
corresponding arrest and search warrants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU

FACTS: Mari Musa was found guilty of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
- On December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Belagra, the leader of a NARCOM team based at Calarian, Zamboanga
City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on Mari Musa of Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian
informer, to the house of Mari Musa. The same civilian informer had also described to him the
 29

appearance of Mari Musa. Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Musa, while the
rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari
Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Musa from where he was.
Ani approached Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
some more stuff. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Musa went back
to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana.
Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana,
Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the
two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
ISSUE: WON the plastic bag marijuana it contains is admissible.
HELD: It has been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine
will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from
the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In the
instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve
the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found
the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the
house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the
plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the
appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana.

PEDRO PACIS vs. MANUEL R. PAMARAN and RICARDO SANTOS

FACTS:
- Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was brought into this
country without the payment of customs duty and taxes, its owner Donald James Hatch being tax-
exempt. It was from him that respondent Santos acquired said car. 3 On June 25, 1964, he paid P311.00
for customs duty and taxes. Petitioner on July 22, 1964 received from the Administrator, General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National Defense, a letter to the effect that the Land Transportation
Commission reported that such automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof, petitioner, through his
subordinates, looked into the records of his office. Thus he did ascertain that although the amount of
P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on said car should be P2,500.00,
more or less. Based on such discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued
a warrant of seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the automobile was taken while it was
parked on Economia Street, Manila, by Department of National Defense agents who were authorized to
do so by virtue of the said warrant. It was then brought to the General Affairs Administration compound.
Then on August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel, wrote to the petitioner asking
that such warrant of seizure and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and the car
released on his contention that the issuance of the warrant was unauthorized. He likewise threatened to
proceed against the petitioner for violation of Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code and for damages.
Petitioner on August 31, 1964 answered counsel of respondent Ricardo Santos, denying the request for
the release of the car and adverting that the petitioner had, under the law, authority to issue such
warrant of seizure and detention. What followed was the filing by respondent Ricardo Santos on
September 15, 1964 of a criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of
Manila. It was assigned to then respondent Fiscal Manuel R. Pamaran for preliminary investigation. As the
latter respondent was bent on proceeding with the charge against petitioner, this action was instituted.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, had the requisite
authority for the issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned by
respondent Ricardo Santos.
HELD: The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also
 30

to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveing any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws."

Stephanie Lucman

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DAVID SALVATIERRA y EGUIA

Facts:

• For the fatal stabbing of a vendor named Charlie Fernandez, the RTC of Manila, meted David
Salvatierra the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment of the amounts of P30,183.25 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim, plus the cost of suit.
• On August 1990, Charlie was walking towards Quiapo when suddenly, three persons met him. One
of them was David Salvatierra, who thrust a pointed instrument at Charlie. He was able to parry
the thrust but David swung the instrument anew hitting Charlie at the left breast. Thereafter, all
three persons scampered away. Charlie still managed to walk home to tell his father about the
incident but suddenly collapsed. He was taken immediately to the hospital where he was operated
on.
• The assault was witnessed by Milagros Martinez, another vendor who stopped by to rest at the right
side of the street. She told the incident only to her daughter and did not immediately report the
incident to the police authorities because she was afraid.
• Charlie’s father, Marciano, reported the crime to the police and since the victim could not be
interviewed as he was then undergoing operation, they proceeded to the crime scene to get
information about the incident but their effort was fruitless as no one in the area would volunteer to
identify the culprits. A relative of the victim informed the police that David was one of the suspects
in the crime.
• Charlie died the following day because of hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the anterior
chest wall. The medical report showed that Charlie sustained, aside from the stab wound on the
chest, another stab wound on the left forearm and an incised wound on the left wrist.
• Marciano went back to Police Station to inform the authorities that his son had died. He was
advised to report the matter to the Homicide Section of the Western Police District where advance
information was prepared indicating that 4 unidentified persons perpetrated the crime.
• On November 15, 1990 at about 4:35 in the afternoon, Police Station No.4 received a complaint
that David was creating a commotion along Miguelin Street. He was thereby taken in custody by
Pat. Celso Tan and two other policemen who later found out that he was a suspect in the killing of
Charlie. Later that day, he was turned over to the WPD.
• Milagros, upon being informed that David was transferred to the WPD, went to the station where
she executed a sworn statement implicating David to the crime. In a police line-up, she pinpointed
David as the person who stabbed Charlie. Thereafter, Pat. Amores prepared a booking sheet and
arrest order which David signed.

Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest is valid. (It was an illegal arrest but it is not a sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment.)

Decision: AFFIRMED.

RD: His arrest on suspicion that he was involved in the killing of Charlie was made almost three months
after the commission of the crime and only after he had been taken in police custody for a minor offense.
 31

As such, because no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the
commission of the crime and his apprehension, his arrest would have ordinarily been rendered
unconstitutional and illegal. The element of immediacy between the time of the commission of the offense
and the time of the arrest had not been complied with. While these arguments may be valid, his claim
that the case against him should be dismissed for violation of his constitutional rights, must fail because
he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this before
entering his plea, thus, the objection is deemed waived.

From her testimony, it is clear that although Milagros did not know appellant’s name, she
remembered his features and recognize him as the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, she could not have
failed to identify him because she was only eight meters away when the assault occurred. Visibility was
not a problem because while there were some pedestrians in the area, traffic light was light and could not
have obstructed Milagros’ view. Furthermore, it was 4:30 in the afternoon when the day was still bright.

PEOPLE vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL

Petition: Review from the decision of RTC finding him guilty of robbery with rape.

Facts:

• Michelle, Erma and Teresa were living in a boarding house. While they were asleep in the evening
of December 27, 1996, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man who had covered his head
with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife. He threatened her so Michelle and
Teresa were also awakened. After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold
Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then raped
her. He told Michelle that he used to call her a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his place but
she had ignored him.
• Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had
no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some
scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand,
Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man’s face because
of the light coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window had
panes through which the light filtered in.
• Mark testified that he was in his bedroom on the second floor, when he saw from his bedroom
window a man wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding house and identified Anthony
Escordial as the man he saw that night.
• When the policemen arrived, Michelle told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes.
The women w/ the police looked for the man but did not find him. Tancinco, one of the police who
responded to the report shortly after the commission of the crime, also testified to the prosecution.
Tancinco learned from Fidel Hinolan, the owner of Coffee Break Corner and employer of the
accused, that the latter had gone home to Negros Occidental. Michelle, Allan and Pacita Aguillon
went to Negros Occidental and found him w/ the help of the police.
• Michelle executed an affidavit, identifying Anthony as the person who had robbed and raped her.
She testified that she had gone to the Coffee Break Corner and usually passed by there when going
home and Anthony would often whistle at her and call her a beautiful girl.
• Anthony testified that on the way to Bacolod City, Tancinco began beating him and hitting him with
the butt of a shotgun to force him to admit liability for the crime. Because he refused to do so, he
was taken to a lodging house where he was tortured. Tancinco put a knife to his neck, telling him
that he would be killed if he refused to admit that he was the culprit. Tancinco took Anthony to a
house so that he could be identified by another complainant but she likewise said that he was not
the assailant, as the latter had a heavier build and longer hair.
• On January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen, together with Anthony’s grandfather, a certain
Inspector Tamayo, and reporters from Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod police station to visit
Anthony and found him tied to a chair. He had a limp because his feet were injured so they brought
 32

him to the hospital for treatment.

Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest was lawful. (Unlawful)

Decision: REVERSED and the accused is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.

RD: The arrest of Anthony does not fall under Rule 113; Section 5 w/c enumerates the circumstances
wherein a person may arrest another w/o a warrant. At the time of his arrest, accused was watching a
game in a basketball court and was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested
by the police on that day. The police officers neither had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would lead them to believe that he had just committed a crime. The crime took place on December
27, 1996 but Anthony was arrested only on January 3, 1997. As the arresting officers were not present
when the crime was committed, they could not have “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
of the commission of the crime” so as to be justified in the belief that he was guilty of the crime. The
arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant.

PEOPLE vs. FLORENCIO DORIA and VIOLETA GADDAO

Facts:

• On December 1995 in Mandaluyong City, the accused mutually helped one another and sold 11
plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops. Previously on November, members of the North
Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police Narcotics Command, received information that one
“Jun” was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to
entrap him in a buy-bust operation.
• On December 5, 1995, SPO3 Manlangit arrested “Jun” and the latter led them to his associate,
“Neneth”. They took "Neneth” and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills
and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned
that "Jun" is Florencio Doria while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao. The one brick of dried marijuana
leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at
the PNP Crime Laboratory and were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops.
• They were subsequently charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest was valid. (Valid, as regards Doria’s arrest.)

Decision: Florencio Doria was convicted and Violeta Gaddao was aquitted.

RD: The warrantless arrest of Doria is lawful since he was caught in the act of committing an offense. A
person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense."

The warrantless search and arrest of Gaddao is unlawful. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime; in fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could her arrest be justified under "Personal knowledge" of facts because it must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
 33

person to be arrested.

Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. Doria
did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the
marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with
her co-accused in pushing drugs. Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was
engaged in drug pushing. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of
her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed
legal as an incident to her arrest.

Garcia Padilla et al vs. Minister Enrile, General Fabian, General Ramos, and LT. COL. Coronel

Petition: An application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of fourteen detainees, nine
of whom were arrested on July 6, 1982, another four on July 7, 1982, and the last one on July 15, 1982. The
writ was issued, respondents were required to make a return, and the case heard on August 26, 1982.

Facts:

• At the time of the arrest of the 9 detainees, they were having conference in the dining room of Dr.
Parong's. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and
using the house of detainee Dr. Aurora Parong as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto,
the 9 detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving on top of their
conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence,
stationeries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student
sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one revolver, ammunition for M16 armalite, cash and
assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia,
which were then seized.
• The court decided to dismiss the petition on the application of habeas corpus. Padilla moved for
reconsideration. The motion asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not vest the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential
commitment orders, and that even it be assumed that he has such a power, the Supreme Court
may review its issuance when challenged. It was finally alleged that since petitioners were not
caught in flagrante delicto, their arrest was illegal and void.

Issue: WoN the arrest was illegal since they were not caught in flagrante delicto.

Decision: Pursuant to Section 8 of PD No. 1877, the motion for reconsideration should have been granted,
and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but
in the light of the foregoing manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divina gracia,
Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan,
Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the
petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant of
arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic.

ROLITO GO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

• Maguan was driving his car heading towards P. Guevarra St while Go entered a one-way street and
started travelling in the wrong direction. Go’s and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Go
alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to
take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly retrieved an empty shell and
 34

one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation
Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
• The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting and were informed that Go had
dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card used by Go from the cashier. The security guard of the bake shop was
shown Go’s picture and identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having
established that the assailant was probably Go, the police launched a manhunt for him.
• Go presented himself before the police and was detained. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was
at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
• Go contends that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had
been conducted before the information was filed. He filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court but was remanded to the CA.
• CA dismissed the petitions ruling that the petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the
offense for which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been
established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been
an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness
positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

Issue: WoN a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police. (It was unlawful.)

Decision: Decision of CA is reversed. The Provincial Prosecutor is ORDERED to conduct a preliminary

investigation of the charge of murder against Go. Go is ORDERED released upon posting of a cash bail
bond.

RD: The warrantless arrest or detention of Go does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. His arrest took place 6 days after the shooting. The arresting
officers obviously were not present at the time Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Moreover, none of the
arresting officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that he was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down
the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."

People v. Manlulu

FACTS:

Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinking companions,
Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manlulu
on the information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the accused and the victim. Patrolman
Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a
warrant and without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.

HELD: The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one o’clock in the morning. The arrest
and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o’clock that evening, some nineteen hours
later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have “personal
knowledge” nor was the offense “in fact just been committed.” While Pat. Perez may have personally
gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires
“personal knowledge”. Obviously, “personal gathering of information” is different from personal
knowledge. The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some
nineteen hours later.

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which
the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of
 35

real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the Constitution, still
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs. DON RODRIGUEZA

Petition: Appeal on the decision of RTC finding Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Facts:

• However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution of
criminal cases, recommends the acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his Manifestation
for Acquittal filed with the Court.
• Don Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, allegedly having in their custody and
possession marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said dried marijuana leaves.
The court rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras but convicting
appellant.
• CIC Taduran was in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit when a
confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited
drugs in Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was
given P200.00 in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet
powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Taduran acted as the poseur buyer
and was told to look for a certain Don. He went alone and met Samuel Segovia who introduced Don
to him.
• Don halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and
Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran marijuana. Taduran returned to the headquarters
and made a report. Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the
suspects. They arrested Don, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia without a warrant of arrest.
The agents of the Narcotics Command conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father
of Don. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves w/o a search warrant.
• Jovencio Rodrigueza was released but Don was detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken from and
executed by him, was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no
counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation. The arrestees
were also examined by personnel of the PCCL and were found positive for ultraviolet powder.
• The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations. Samuel Segovia
testified that he was forced to board the vehicle w/ armed men and was hit by the butt of a gun. He
was then made to hold a P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he was taken to the
PCCL and examined he was found positive of the ultraviolet powder. He was also made to sign
some papers but he did not know what they were all about. Don testified that he was made to hold
a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was
not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make
him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana.

Issue: WoN the court erred in admitting as evidence the sworn statement of Don w/c was obtained in
violation of his rights.

Decision: Reversed. Don is ordered acquitted.

RD: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. The term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must
be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as
a buyer.

In the instant case, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification.
Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried
 36

marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into
his custody. This act of Taduran is contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the
purpose of a buy-bust operation.

An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during custodial examination. He was also asked if he
was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However, while the
rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. In the
present case, the waiver made by Don being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is
sufficient to invalidate said sworn statement. The sworn statement allegedly executed by Don is
inadmissible in evidence against him.