Hannah Davich

Due: November 2, 2012

Phil 267
Omniscience and Human Freedom
In this paper, I will present Nelson Pikes argument for the incompatibility
between Gods omniscience and human freedom. I will then present Alvin Plantigas
reply, which works to void the original argument, and explain why I feel it succeeds.
Pike begins his argument on the supposition that God is omniscient, and for this
reason, we can say that God knows everything that happens in the past, present, and
future. As an extension, if God exists at T1, and Jones does X at T2, then God knows he
will do it while he is still at T1. But this only works if Jones does not have free will. If he
did have free will, and could therefore choose to not do X at T2, then Pike believes three
circumstances would result. First, Jones would have made God hold a false belief at T1
(that is, that Jones would do X when he really wasnt), which Pike argues is a
contradiction to Gods nature, as he is omniscient. Second, if Jones could choose not to
do X at T2, then he would have had the power to make God change beliefs at T1 (i.e.
from believing Jones would do X and then believing he wouldnt), which is also a
contradiction of Gods omniscience. And lastly, Jones would have made God not be God
at T1 by creating a scenario in which God is no longer omniscient. Because Jones free
will can only yield contradictions, Pike concludes that human freedom is therefore
incompatible with Gods omniscience.
Plantinga replies by arguing that none of Pikes three scenarios are legitimate. In
terms of the first, if Jones didnt do X at T2, then God wouldnt have believed it at T1, as

he is omniscient. His argument is similar for the second, for God still wouldnt have
believed Jones would do X at T2 if that was not Jones intention. And as for the third,
Pikes deduction does not yield a scenario in which God is not God. God would still be
omniscient, and therefore himself, for regardless of whether Jones planned to do X or not
at T2, God would know either way. Therefore, as all of Pikes arguments are shown to be
unfounded, his argument that omniscience and human freedom are incompatible falls
apart.
I believe Plantingas argument succeeds. His response shows the error in each of
Pikes assertions, which voids his entire argument that Gods omniscience and human
freedom conflict, so that it cannot even get off the ground. Thus as Pike could not
successfully prove his argument, I believe they are indeed compatible.

References
Pike, Nelson. Gods Foreknowledge and Human Free Will Are Incompatible.
Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Louis Pojman and Michael Rea. Wadsworth, Cengage
Learning, 2012. 568-576. Print.
Plantinga, Alvin. Gods Foreknowledge and Human Free Will Are Compatible.
Philosophy of Religion. Ed. Louis Pojman and Michael Rea. Wadsworth, Cengage
Learning, 2012. 568-576. Print.