The Cold War | Revolution in Guatemala

Background:
In 1954, a CIA-backed coup overthrew the elected government of Guatemala, which had
nationalized property owned by the United Fruit Company. President Eisenhower's Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles, accused the Guatemalan president of installing "a communist-type
reign of terror" and plotting to spread Communism throughout the region. As proof that the
Guatemala had ties to the Soviet Union, CIA operatives planted Soviet weapons in Guatemala
and CIA pilots bombed airfields in Honduras.
These documents, including an instructional guide on assassination found among the training
files of the CIA's covert "Operation PBSUCCESS," were among several hundred records
released by the Agency on May 23, 1997. PBSUCCESS, authorized by President Eisenhower in
August 1953, carried a $2.7 million budget for "pychological warfare and political action" and
"subversion," among the other components of a small paramilitary war.
***NOTE*** [xxxxxxx] = Redacted
Document:
Chapter 1 Americas Backyard. The CIA's operation to overthrow the Government of Guatemala
in 1954 marked an early zenith in the Agency's long record of covert action. Following closely
on the successful operations that installed the Shah as ruler of Iran the Guatemala operation,
known as PBSUCCESS, was both more ambitious and more thoroughly successful than either
precedent. Rather than helping a prominent contender gain power with a few inducements,
PBSUCCESS used an intensive paramilitary and psychological campaign to replace a popular,
elected government with a political nonentity. In method, scale, and conception it had no
antecedent, and its triumph confirmed the belief of many in the Eisenhower administration that
covert operations offered a safe, inexpensive substitute for armed force in resisting Communist
inroads in the Third World. This and other "lessons" of PBSUCCESS lulled Agency and
administration officials into a complacency that proved fatal at the Bay of Pigs seven years
later
[Page 8] United Fruit executives regarded any trespass on the prerogatives they enjoyed under
Ubico as an assault on free enterprise. The company continued to report only a fraction of the
value of its land and exports for tax purposes and initially found Arevalo cooperative and
respectful. But United Fruit soon grew concerned about the new government's sympathy for
labor
[Page 10] Even without help, United Fruit could put Guatemala's feet to the fire. Berneys laid
down a PR barrage that sent correspondents from Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, and
Chicago Tribune to report on Communist activities in Guatemala. Company officials encouraged

Castillo Armas with money and arms, and the rebel leader began seeking support from Central
American leaders and the United States
Chapter 2. The Plan. [Page 26] The planners decided to employ simultaneously all the tactics
that had proved useful in previous covert operations. PBSUCCESS would combine
psychological, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions. Operations in Europe, [xxxxxx]
and Iran had demonstrated the potency of propaganda-"psychological warfare"-aimed at
discrediting an enemy and building support for allies. Like many Americans, US Officials placed
tremendous faith in the new science of advertising. Touted as the answer to underconsumption,
economic recession, and social ills, advertising, many thought, could be used to cure
Communism as well. In 1951, the Truman Administration tripled the budget for propaganda and
appointed a Psychological Strategy Board to coordinate activities. The CIA required "psywar"
training for new agents, who studied Paul Linebarger's text, Psychological Warfare, and grifter
novels like The Big Con for disinformation tactics. PBSUCCESS's designers planned to
supplement overt diplomatic initiatives-such as an OAS conference convened to discredit
Guatemala-with "black operations using contacts within the press, radio, church, army, and other
organized elements susceptible to rumor, pamphleteering, poster campaigns, and other
subversive action." They were particularly impressed with the potential for radio propaganda,
which had turned the tide at a critical moment in the Iran operation
[Page 56] So began an operation [xxxxxx] later called the "finest example PR/Radio effort and
effectiveness on the books." The voices heard in Guatemala originated not in the jungle, or even
in Honduras, but in a Miama [xxxxxxx] where a team of four Guatemalan men and two women
mixed announcements and editorials with canned music. The broadcasts reminded soldiers of
their duty to protect the country from foreign ideologies, and warned women to keep their
husbands away from Communist party meetings an labor unions, and threatened government
officials with reprisals. Couriers carried the tapes via Pan American Airways to [xxxxxxxx]
where they were beamed into Guatemala from a mobile transmitter. When the traffic in tapes
aroused the suspicions of Panamanian customs officials, the announcers moved to [xxxxx] and
began broadcasting live from a dairy farm [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] a site known as
SHERWOOD. At about the same time, the SHERWOOD operation improved its reception in
Guatemala by boosting its signal strength. By mid-May the rebel broadcasts were heard loud and
clear in Guatemala City, and SHERWOOD announcers were responding quickly to
developments in the enemy capital.
To direct the SHERWOOD operation, Tracy Barnes selected a clever and enterprising contract
employee, David Atlee Phillips, a onetime actor and newspaper editor in Chile
[Page 71]the Agency, meanwhile, took steps to ensure that coverage in the American press had
a favorable slant. Peurifoy met with American reporters in Guatemala City to discuss "the type of

stories they were writing." At his suggestion, "all agreed to drop words such as 'invasion.'" The
French and British consuls agreed to have a word with their correspondents