Bh-Ansaru, University of South Florida 2

Nigerias Political Violence Research Network
(NPVRN)
Boko Haram and ANSARU in North-Eastern

Nigeria Since 1999
An Analytical Discourse
NPVRN Working Paper No. 2, Abuja-Nigeria

For The Citizenship Initiative, University of South Florida
Author: Atta Barkindo (PhD Candidate), School of Oriental and African

Studies, SOAS, University of London.
Date: November 2013
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the following research assistants for their valuable contributions: Mr. Benjamin
Gudaku (Eduwatch Consults and Research Center, FCT-Abuja), Rev. Louis Ngare (Jos, Plateau State), Jacob Zenn
(West African Security Analyst, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC) and HRH Aminu Sanda (Ganye,
Adamawa State). The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from The Citizenship Initiative, University
of South Florida.
Disclaimer
This research is the product of the author. The views and recommendations expressed in it do not in any way
reflect the views of the University of South Florida, The Citizenship Initiative, its founders, board of directors or the
other board members.
Copyright 2013, Atta Barkindo

All Rights Reserved.
This research is the property of the Citizenship Initiative of the University of South Florida. No part of this
research may at any point and for any reason be reproduced, storied in a retrieval system or transmitted in any
form, by any means, manual, electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording or otherwise without the prior written
permission of the owner(s).
Table of Contents
Title Page .......................................................................................................................................................1
Abstract .........................................................................................................................................................4
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................4
The Purpose of the Study ...........................................................................................................................5
Methodology .................................................................................................................................................5
Data Limitation ............................................................................................................................................5
Chapter One: Narrative Discourse: The Brief History of North-Eastern Nigeria ............. 7
The Religious Composition of North-Eastern Nigeria ............................................................8
The Emergence of Boko Haram..................................................................................................9
Ideological foundations of Boko Haram and ANSARU..........................................................9
The Split: Boko Haram Vs ANSARU...................................................................................... 10
Chapter Two: Tabulation of Boko Haram and ANSARU Messages ..................................... 12

Tabulation of Boko Haram Messages ............................................................................................. 12
Pre-2009 Messages .................................................................................................................................... 12
Table 3: Tabulation of pre-2009 Messages (1999-2008)........................................................ 12
Table 4: Chart showing percentage of pre-2009 frameworks ............................................... 13
Post-2009 Messages .................................................................................................................................. 13
Table 5: Tabulation of 2010 Messages ..................................................................................... 13
Table 6: Chart showing the percentage of 2010 frameworks ............................................... 13
Table 8: Chart showing the percentage of 2011 frameworks ............................................... 14
Table 10: Chart showing the percentage of 2012 frameworks ............................................. 16
Tabulation of ANSARU Messages ................................................................................................... 17
Table 11: Tabulation of ANSARU Messages from 2012-2013 ............................................ 17
Table 12: Chart showing the percentage of ANSARUs frameworks of 2012-2013 ........ 18
Chapter Three: Analytical Discourse of BH and ANSARUs Messages .................... 19

Transition, Consistency and inconsistency of BH messages........................................ 19
Consistency and inconsistency of ANSARU Messages ................................................. 21
The Nature of Threats Against American Interests ...................................................... 21
Boko Haram: Regionalism, Indigene-Settler Citizenship and Ethnicity ................... 23
References to Regional and International Jihadi movements ...................................... 24
Boko Haram and ANSARU: Future Trajectories ........................................................... 25
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................26
About the Author ................................................................................................................28
References...........................................................................................................................28
Representative Bibliography .............................................................................................. 32
Index of Group Discussion.................................................................................................39
Index of Interviews .............................................................................................................39
Abstract
This working paper is based on a research conducted between 2011 and 2012 in north-eastern
Nigeria. It is a discourse analysis that specifically examines the consistency as well as
inconsistency of Boko Haram and ANSARU messages on YouTube videos, DVDs, audio CDs,
pamphlets and other related flyers since the uprising. It takes into serious consideration the
specific frameworks that have emerged from these messages, analysing the targets, speakers,
languages, goals, worldviews, gender and ethnic profiling. Likewise, it assess the ideological
transformation evident in the messages from local to international focus and what it means for
Nigerias foreign policy decisions in conjunction with her global partners.
Introduction
The conflict occasioned by the Boko Haram and its splinter groups continues to be an existential
threat to the Nigerian state and more so to regional and global security. Interestingly, compelling
evidence in literature indicates that the origin, tactical evolution and ideological transformation
of this threat has been analyzed from several policy perspectives. For example, Lubeck argues
that over the years, the traditional Islamic education of (Islamic) students in northern Nigeria,
like the gardawa and members of Boko Haram are receiving is for a world fast vanishing and the
emerging Nigerian economy had not fully developed to absorb them. Feeling the pressure,
groups like Boko Haram articulated their grievances to confront the Nigerian state [1]. Kukah
relates the Boko Haram conflict to the historical role of religion in Nigerian politics. This role, he
claims, has always sustained northern dominance. Consequently, religious violence erupts if there
is any perceived threat to this dominance [2]. Furthermore, Nnoli uses the social movement
theory and attributes religious violence in Nigeria, like that of Boko Haram, to ethnicity and the
rise of ethno-regional politics [4]. This indicates that Nnoli and Kukah are in agreement on the
factors responsible for Boko Haram and its menace. On the other hand, Falola and Sabo Bako
examine the socio-political context by looking at the adverse effects of modernization [3]. Their
research seems to suggest that Boko Haram violence is a reaction against modernization rather
than ethnic and regional differences. This position underscores the vagaries of modernization;
particularly politics and economic spheres as reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram.
However, political economy literature has concentrated on economic and material benefits as
reasons for political violence [5]. This means that the atrocities committed by Boko Haram and
ANSARU are not justice seeking but loot seeking, [6]. These views are further supported by
official reports of the World Bank and the UN [7]. From a particularly different perspective,
Hakeem attributes Boko Haram conflict to the culture of impunity founded on military
dictatorship and the abuse of the constitution in Nigeria over the years. The evidence of this is
demonstrated by the high level of illegal arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings and complete
absence of due process [8]. The frequency and sophistication of the violence has led many to
suggest that the perpetrators are an organized terrorist group, nurtured and sponsored by forces
hostile to Nigeria [9]. Nigerias government keen to win lucrative grants from Western allies on
the war against terror has encouraged such explanations [10].
Without a doubt these approaches and investigations remain relevant in understanding the origin
and transformation of Boko Haram. However, each of the approaches is presented as an
independent perspective that looks at either the economic, religious, political or sociological
aspect without providing the ideological content that regulates the thought pattern of the sect by
the sect and for the sect. Likewise, some of the arguments denote Boko Haram violence as a
reaction against modernization, yet it fails to clarify why other Islamic sects, with similar
ideologies like Boko Haram and ANSARU have not been very successful in their transformation.
The view that Boko Haram transformation is motivated by economic gain is simplistic because,
the north-eastern region is not a home of huge deposits of mineral and natural resources. Even
if the region had huge deposits of natural resources, it is likely, though not entirely true that the
4
sect could have opted for regional independence rather than turning the whole of Nigeria into an
Islamic state. More worrying is the fact that most of the aforementioned analyses seem to
exclude the substantial ideological materials produced by the proponents of Boko Haram,
especially the contents of messages presented on YouTube videos, pamphlets, DVDs, audio
CDs and cassettes [11]. Such exclusion completely neglects the monitoring of the developing of
Boko Harams ideological thought pattern. This negligence undermines the comprehensive
understanding of Boko Haram, its transformation, its links and why it targets certain places at
certain periods. There is therefore a need to incorporate and analyse the substantial ideological
materials produced by Boko Haram and ANSARU on YouTube videos, CDs, DVDs, pamphlets
etc, as a way of contributing to the understanding of the sects.
The Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research is to carry out a discourse analysis of Boko Haram and ANSARUs
messages on YouTube Videos, pamphlets, DVDs and other media related outlets at the heart of
its transformation agenda. It assesses how these messages have changed and evolved over time
as the conflict wears on. More so, it examines how the messages have shifted in content from
local grievances to national, regional and international targets. Specifically, it identifies the year
the message was released, the speakers, the language used and to whom the messages are
directed to. Furthermore, there is a reconstruction of sects worldview regarding the West, nonMuslims and women, in addition to gender issues, local, regional and international grievances,
targets and goals both within and outside Nigeria. Moreover, the research examines the apparent
evolution of the messages, targets and goals to ascertain if they are due to conflict strategy,
change in leadership or ideological adjustments. This helps identify the level of coherence, and
tease out any inconsistencies in the ideological presentation through the messages. In addition, it
investigates references to American imperialism and the framing of the west as being Christian,
including references to the concept of the nation state, democracy, ethnicity, indigene-settler
concept, migrants, tribes and the manipulation of history and memory in the construction of
ideology. Finally, the study gives an analytical discourse on how such ideology has, in some ways,
assisted the violent transformation of Boko Haram and ANSARU. It also assesses the future
trajectories of Boko Haram and ANSARU; sects that continue to feed on issues of ethnicity,
citizenship and religion in Nigeria.
Methodology
The study adopts both the qualitative and quantitative methods. It is qualitative because it uses
historical and descriptive narrative in trying to understand the background to Boko Haram and
ANSARU. It does not include any ongoing data collection process but makes use of data already
collected between 2011 and 2012 which includes the translation of YouTube Videos, pamphlets,
DVDs in addition to other historical and documentary data, verbal reports, newspaper accounts
and limited interviews. On the other hand, it is quantitative because it is open to data taken from
quantitative reports of government agencies and institutions, including sources that remain
beneficial to the goal of the study. Likewise, it presents tabulation and analyses of data collected.
It is obvious the research is a single case study with an implicit comparative thinking. It is not so
much to explain the cause of the radical transformation of Boko Haram and ANSARU but
interpret the meaning of their messages over time and how they conditioned or not condition
the transformation.
Data Limitation
The analysis of Boko Haram and ANSARU ideology through the above medium remain
significant to understanding the self-reflection of these sects. However, such procedure is not
without some limitations. First the security situation in collecting some of the videos and
pamphlets posed a great risk and threat because of the fear that anyone caught with Boko Haram
5
materials risk police arrest [12]. As such, it was difficult, sometimes not always, to ascertain the
originality of materials collected. Second, certain meanings could be lost in translation as the
author sometimes was transfixed between literal translation and contextual understanding of the
meaning of the information collected. Moreover, the conflict context presented an easy situation
for the spread of other ideologies and teachings attributed to Boko Haram and ANSARU.
Distinguishing between facts and hearsay was a genuine challenge. It is necessary also to concede
that the Boko Haram sermons, lectures and debates recorded on audio cassettes, CDs, DVDs, all
of which are readily available for sale in major cities and towns across northern Nigeria [13], may
not in themselves, independent of other factors, adequately explain the ideology of Boko Haram
and ANSARU. Nevertheless, the data generated sufficiently captures the consistency, or
inconsistency of their messages over the years and how those messages have in one way or the
other helped in their violent transformation.
Chapter One: Narrative Discourse: The Brief History of North-Eastern Nigeria

The north-eastern region of Nigeria is a territory that extends from Lake Chad region in the far
north as shown in the map that is on the left hand side above to the Mambilla Plateau in the
south near Beli, bodered by the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary of the east [14]. The history of this
region, in modern day Nigeria, can always be traced to the then Northern Premier Sr. Ahmadu
Bello. On the eve of Nigerias independence, he attempted to weld together a political
community in the northern part of Nigeria to confront other regions for power sharing
agreements. These communities were the old provinces known as the Native Authorities (NAs)
created under the British Colonial rule [15]. They were also the remains of the ancient kingdoms
of the pre-Jihad and post-Jihad periods with some dating back to the 7th centuries AD [16].
Consequently, he identified three key components of the north which he tried to unify. The first
of these components was the Sokoto Caliphate, which includes the emirate provinces of
Adamawa, Bauchi, Bida, Ilorin, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto and Zaria. The second component was
the Borno province and third was the Middle Belt provinces of Kabba, Plateau and Benue [17].
He referred to the northern citizens as Jamaar Arewa; meaning a trans-ethnic community of the
north. In practical terms it was a forcefully political marriage between very different and diverse
ethnic groups [18]. Consequently, the internal opposition to the idea of one north was seen as
involving not recognition of cultural pluralism but the projection of one dominant culture over
others, in this case the Hausa Fulani hegemonic culture [19]. However, the myth of one north
continues to strive as a post-colonial political entity that symbolized the interests of the north.
Table 1
Political Maps of Nigeria & North-Eastern Nigeria, taken from Wikimedia Commons (accessed 13th September, 2013)
http://www.commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Northeastern_State_Nigeria.png
The politics of Nigerian civil war and the perceived dominance of the Hausa-Fulani hegemonic
culture over other minority tribes in the north forced the then Colonel Yakubu Gowon to make
both a strategic and political move in dissolving the colonial constructed three regions of North,
East and West of Nigeria into twelve states [20]. This was contained in the States Creation and
Transitional Provision Decree No. 14 of 1967 (May 27, 1967). It was a military decree that
created six states each in the northern and southern parts of the country respectively [21]. The
six states in the northern region included, Benue-Plateau state, Kano state, Kwara State, Northcentral state, North-western state and North-eastern state. Consequently, the north-eastern state
became an amalgamation of the Borno province, the Adamawa emirate taken from Sokoto
caliphate and the northern Cameroon province initially a German colony, but administered as a
UN trust territory after the defeat of Germans in World War II, with the capital located in
Maiduguri [22]. Military politics of February 1976 saw the further division of the north-eastern
state into Bauchi, Borno and Gongola states. Later on, the same military politics led to the
carving of Gombe state out of Bauchi, Yobe state out of Borno while Gongola was split into
7
Taraba and Adamawa states. Currently, the north-eastern region is made up of six states; of
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, with 112 local government areas. The
most recent Nigerian census presents the total population of this region as 18, 984, 299 million
people [23]. The administration of each of these states is overseen by executive governor who
exercises tremendous political power, sometimes mobilizing political support along ethnic and
religious lines. The breakdown of the population figures is presented below
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Name of State
Adamawa State
Bauchi State
Borno State
Gombe State
Taraba State
Yobe State
Total Population
3,168,101
4,676,465
4,151,193
2,353,879
2,300,736
2,321,591
Religious Composition of North-East

Census head count since 1963 after Nigerias independence have not reflected religious
characteristics due, first, to the manipulation of ethno-religious sentiments in political
contestation [24]. In addition, more than ethnicity and religion, census figures determine the level
of political redistribution, the allocation of oil revenues and civil service hiring. It also affects
constituency demarcation, the number of constituency projects as well as federal appointments,
including the armed forces [25]. To douse tension, the issue of ethnicity and religion is left out of
the census count with the region playing a prominent role. For this reason it will be difficult to
estimate the near-exact religious composition of the region. More often than not, population
figures are arbitrary apportioned to represent the population of both Christians and Muslims in
the six states of the region, with Christians and worshippers of traditional religions been at the
receiving end. Although the 1963 census and subsequent headcounts were highly manipulated in
favour of Northern Nigeria, and probably in favour of the Muslim population, other surveys
have indicated an even distribution between Muslims, Christians and Animists, with Muslims
having a veiled majority [26] as presented below.
Table 2: Chart showing Religious Composition of the north-east
Religious Composition of the North -East

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
93.1
80.6
51.6
34.1
2
% Muslims
Northern North-East
3.2 14.3
% Christians
Central North-East
4.9 16.2
% Animists
Southern North-East
From the table above, Muslims were noted to be highest in northern part of NE (Borno Province) and the central part of the NE (Bauchi Province).
While they are the least in southern part of NE (Adamawa Province) with Christians and Animists the highest in the Adamawa province. These
figures, experts like Alkali, Abubakar Kawu Monguno and Ballama Shettima Mustafa all suggest is still very relevant to understanding the religious
affiliation of the entire north-eastern region of Nigeria [27].
The Emergence of Boko Haram

Several authorities have admitted that since the Iranian revolution in 1979 there had been an
unchecked form of Islamic radicalization going on in northern Nigeria [28]. The confrontational
and anti-state attitude of the Iranian revolution became fashionable for the Muslims, particularly
those in north-eastern Nigeria. As a matter of fact, the influence blossomed under Sufi orders
like Tijanniyya and Qadariyya; Sunni Islamic movements like Izala movement otherwise known
as Jamaatu Izalatul Bida wa Ikamatu Sunna (JIBWIS) including Shiites sects like the Islamic
Movement of Nigeria (IMN) led by Sheikh Ibrahim El Zakzaky and the Rasulul Aazam
Foundation (RAAF) [29]. Nigerias Islamic radicalization came more manifest and too glaring to
ignore with the countrys return to multiparty democracy in 1999, the 9/11 event and the
subsequent war on terror. Consequently, groups like the Nigerian Taliban, Quraniyyun,
Ahmadiyya, Ansarudeen and Nawairudeen all emerged to directly or indirectly support the call
for an Islamic state in Nigeria, especially in the north. From this fertile background, Boko Haram
emerged to pose an existential threat to the Nigerian state. Recent investigations indicate that the
Muhammad Yusuf; the late leader of Boko Haram, claimed to be part of the Shiites under the
leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky. However, when the Kano-based Jamaatul Tajdidi Islam (JTI)
of Abubakar Mujahid broke away from the Shiites in the 1990s, Yusuf also became a member of
the JTI and was even the Amir (leader) of JTI for Borno State chapter [30]. To many analysts,
the late Boko Haram leader has been part and parcel of the unchecked Islamic radicalization that
was taking place in north-eastern Nigeria. Initially, the Boko Haram was known in 1995 as ahl alsunna wa jamaa al-hijra; the People Committed to Hijra and the Prophets Teachings [31]. In
2002, the group declared the entire city of Maiduguri intolerably corrupt and irredeemable [32].
Under a new leader, Ali Muhammad, they embarked on Hijra; along the lines of the Prophet,
from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state [33].
In December 2003, a community dispute regarding fishing rights led to a siege of its mosque by
the Nigerian army and the brutal execution of the leader, Mohammad Ali and seventy others
[34]. Under the new leadership of Muhammad Yusuf, the survivors returned to Maiduguri,
recruited and expanded their network across the north-eastern states [35]. However, sustained
security pressure culminated in an assault on Boko Haram in 2009 where dozens of people were
rounded up and executed without trial, including Yusuf [36]. Last argues that there is no doubt
the suppression operation of 2009, and the killing of Muhammad Yusuf by Nigerian security
forces in July of 2009 (sic), was a turning point for Boko Haram [37]. This turning point,
according to Cook, is reflected in the ideological, structural and operational changes within the
group. This is likely so because, since 2009, the group has tactically transformed itself into a
violent sect, driven by a desire for vengeance against the Nigerian state and western related
institutions [38]. The transformation is obvious based on the fact that the group evolved from an
ultra-conservative sect to a militant outfit, expanding its capabilities from drive by motorbike
shootings to suicide bombers, improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle born improvised
device (VBIED), kidnappings, beheadings, released of YouTube videos in the manner of alQaeda [39]. In addition, there was continuous change in leadership of the group from Abubakar
Lawan [40] to Muhammad Ali [41], then Muhammad Yusuf, Mallam Sani Umar [42] and
Abubakar Shekau before the split with ANSARU. More so, the transformation is evident in the
shift in rhetoric, threats and targets from local grievances, to national, regional and international
focus [43].
Ideological foundations of Boko Haram
Adam suggests that the genealogy of Boko Haram ideology comes partly from the long-standing
negative attitudes towards western education amongst Muslims in northern Nigeria and partly
from the Salafi-Wahhabi trends that originated in Nigeria in the late 70s [44]. Salafism as a word
comes from the first generation of Muslims collectively referred to as al-Salaf al-Saleh meaning
9
pious predecessors which could include the companions, the followers of the prophet and the
followers of the followers of the Prophet. This is because amongst the Sunni Muslims especially,
temporal proximity to the prophet is associated with the truest form of Islam [45]. In
contemporary times, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is considered the first figure to toe the line
of salafism and to push for the return to the religious practices of the ancestors. He evangelized
the 18th century Arabian Peninsula, laying emphasis on tawhid; the oneness of Allah and a return
to the practices of the early Muslims. Wahhabism became not only the official religion of Saudi
Arabia but the followers were referred to as Wahhabis. Although there are considerable
controversies regarding the terms salafism and Wahhabism, their central message is the same;
return to the original form of Islam. How to return to this original way of practicing Islam has
given rise to Salafi jihadists that believe in the use of violence [46], Salafi purists that denounce
violence [47], Salafi activists that call for participation in political processes [48] and many other
brands of salafism. In Nigeria salafism flourished under the career preaching of al-Shaykh
Abubabakr Mahmud Gumi around 1978 with the establishment of Jamaat izalat al-bida wa
iqamat al-sunna; the group dedicated to the removal of religious innovation and the establishment
of the Sunna (traditions of the Prophet) which subsequently became known as JIBWIS or izala.
The fundamental aspect of Boko Harams ideology is the ultra-Salafi radicalism; the call to
return to the fundamentals of Islamic religion and rejection of everything deemed un-Islamic.
This was constructed on the basis of local grievances within the Nigerian context. Various
distinct positions were inserted by the leaders of Boko Haram into this Salafi doctrine which not
only defined them as extremists but also forced moderate Salafi scholars to disagree with them.
First Yusuf rejected western modern education and employment in the government of Nigeria,
claiming they are all religiously forbidden. In addition, he equates western civilization with
atheism. He suggests that the edifice of western civilization is constructed on three fundamental
pillars; western education, Judaeo-Christian tradition and democracy [49]. The collaboration
between the three has led to what he calls globalization and modern world order. First, he argues
that the western world uses western education to infiltrate Muslim minds and destroy Islam.
Education for him is the foundation of immorality and all that is evil in the world. Such system
of education must not only be rejected but must be replaced by religious education where Allah
is the means and the goal. While the key issues addressed under Yusuf were Western education,
collaboration with secular institutions and employment in government, under Shekau, Boko
Haram became a takfiri organisation; taking upon itself the authority to declare both Christians
and Muslim non-Boko Haram members as apostates. This has in a way provided the Nigerian
federal government, northern Nigerian religious leaders and other sectarian communities most
notably Christians with few opportunities to negotiate with it. Shekau addressed the statement
to the leaders of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. And
completely shifted the focus of Boko Haram from local to regional and international objectives,
making Jacob to describe it as a sect defined by glocal objectives; a combination of local and
global ambitions [50]. He shifted the focus of Boko Haram from local grievances to include
regional and international targets that experts suggest led to a great schism within Boko Haram
The Split: Boko Haram Vs ANSARU
The earliest signs that indicated internal schism within Boko Haram came in July 2009 after the
death of its spiritual leader Mohammad Yusuf. There emerged the Yusufiya Islamic Movement
(YIM), which is a reference to the original followers of the late Yusuf. Their emergence, it is
suggested, was an indictment of the violent and radical strand of Boko Harams false holy war
and bombings targeted against civilians [51] including attacks on places of worship, as well as
high-profile vehicle-borne suicide-bombings such as those on the United Nations Headquarters
and the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja [52] The second split was the rise of a new
violent group Jamaatu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan; JAMBS or ANSARU roughly
10
translated as Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa [53]. There are two
theories that have emerged in the explanation of the split. There are those who suggest it is not a
split but rather a rebranding of Boko Haram in the face of continuous military offensive. The
possibility of being defeated has forced the group to change name, tactics and mode of
operation. For example the group, Muslims Against Terror (MAT), suggest that the re-branding
of this terrorist cult [Boko Haram] comes amidst a successful security and public campaign
against their nefarious operation, which has led to the capture of many of their tactical
commanders and their sponsors [54]. Furthermore, their Christian counterparts, Christian
Association of Nigeria (CAN) argue that the change in name from Boko Haram to ANSARU is
a ploy to elicit attention and pave way for negotiation. It tersely described the emergence of
ANSARU as the same finger of a leprous hand, intent on the Islamizing (sic) Nigeria and
intimidation of Christians [55].
The second theory simply describes ANSARU as a splinter group from Boko Haram. The group
is believed to have broken away in January 2012, in the immediate aftermath of the January 20,
2012 Boko Haram attack in the city of Kano that resulted in the death of at least 180 people,
mostly Muslims. Its existence however became popular from 2 June 2012, when its selfidentified leader, Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, released a video proclaiming the creation of the sect
and outlining its doctrines. Security agents and some experts believe that the sect was created by
former Boko Haram commanders who were disenchanted with the leadership style of the
current spiritual leader of the Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau [56]. Recent developments indeed
confirm the existence of fissure in the Boko Haram. Jacob provides evidence of the fact that the
ANSARU leadership was trained by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). They have also
carried out attacks independent of Boko Haram, transmitting international and pan-West
African rhetoric into militant activity, with focus on the kidnapping of foreigners [57]. ANSARU
is believed to have kidnapped and killed the British and Italian engineers in Birnin Kebbi in May
2011, as well as the German engineer in Kano in March 2011. This includes the kidnap of the
French engineer since December 2012 in retaliation for the French intervention in Mali and also
the banning of headscarf in France. In addition, ANSARU claimed responsibility for the death of
three Nigerians in a military convoy that was being deployed to Mali as part of West African
peace keeping mission. They argue that it was in retaliation for European countries
transgressions in Afghanistan and Mali [58]. This transnational rhetoric and actions of
ANSARU demonstrate serious issues of policy concern; first, it indicates it is independent from
Boko Haram and indicts Boko Haram for localizing a war that is global in nature. Consequently,
it pretends to shift its focus away from attacks on civilians and local places of worship including
social venues to international targets. This, in a way, also suggests some existing level of regional
cooperation between al-Qaeda elements in West Africa and ANSARU. Thus its international
connections and targeting of western institutions demonstrate to some extent that al-Qaeda has
found hunting dogs in West Africa [59].
11
Chapter Two: Tabulation of Boko Haram and ANSARU Messages

Tabulation of Boko Haram Messages
This chapter tabulates Boko Haram and ANSARU messages obtained from CDs, DVDs,
Youtubes, Audio cassettes and pamphlets from 1999 to 2012. The intention here is to observe
the consistency or inconsistency of the messages, the speakers and the targets. In addition, it is
meant to assist in analysing the frameworks used in disseminating the messages. How do they
justify their claims and debunk counter claims? To what extent do they manipulate national
politics, ethno-regional and religious divide? Do they manipulate international rhetoric, targeting
particular western audience? For easy reading, the chapter divides Boko Harams messages into
pre-2009 and post-2009 statements. The pre-2009 statements mostly come in form of lectures,
sermons and debates recorded on audio cassettes, CDs and DVDs between Muhammad Yusuf
and his opponents. These materials were readily available for sale in major towns and cities
across northern Nigeria. This indicates that prior to 2009, Boko Haram was preaching freely and
distributing its propaganda materials unchecked. However, the post-2009 recorded materials
come in form of YouTube videos, phone interviews, emails, letters and other statements released
to journalists for publication, difficult to obtain due to security concerns.
Pre-2009 Messages
Table 3: Tabulation of pre-2009 Messages (199-2008)
Name
U-tube
Year
Unknown
Language(s)
Arabic/Hausa
Location
Ibn
Taymiyya
Mosque,
Maiduguri
Potiskum
Audience
Followers
Target
Western
History/Influence
Ideology
The Superiority of Islamic history
U-tube,
Audio CD
& DVD
U-tube
Unknown
Arabic/Hausa
/Kanuri
Followers/R
ecruits
Western
civilization
Jihad is one of the pillars of Islam
Un-recorded
Arabic/Hausa
/Kanuri
Private
Residence
Followers
Un-recorded
Arabic/Hausa
/Kanuri
Unknown
Close
Associates
Christianity
and
Western
institutions
Kill Christians and
infidels
U-tube
Un-recorded
Arabic/Hausa
Followers
Moral reformation
of Muslims
U-tube
Unrecorded
Hausa
Followers
and listeners
Western
institutions
Debate on the rejection of western

education in Islam
U-tube
Unrecorded
Arabic/Hausa
/Kanuri
Islamic concept of
foundation for jihad
Jan. 11, 2006
Hausa
Followers
and
coassociates
All Muslims
in Nigeria
Non-Muslims and
infidels
Interview
Ibn
Taymiyya
Mosque
Unknown
location in
Bauchi
Unknown
location in
Maiduguri
Unknown
Western
Education,
Christianity,
Democracy and modern concept of state is
shirk (associating paganism with Allah)
Obey the Quran and the Prophet of Allah
only. Reject Constitution, Democracy and
secularism
Teachings on the concept of forgiveness
amongst Muslims
DVD &
U-tube
Calls for Islamic state, rejects the name

Taliban and insists on sharia in Nigeria
Audio CD
Jan. 11, 2006
Hausa/Kanuri
Maiduguri
(repeated in
Yobe)
General
public
Tel.
interview
July 26. 2009
Hausa
Maiduguri
General
public
U-tube
July 30, 2009
Hausa
Maiduguri
Interrogator
s
Destruction
of
Christian
and
secular institutions
Social
events,
security
installations and
police stations
Police
barracks,
banks and beer
parlours
Police
officers,
intelligence agents
and state apparatus
News
statement
August
2009
Hausa/translat
ed to English
Unknown
General
public
9,
12
Every place in
Nigeria is a target
for the spread of
Islamic law
Tawhid
as
the
Establishment of Islamic state through

Dialogue
Called for end to democracy and western
education. Referred to Borno being Islamic
before colonial administration.
Rejects western education, polytheism
(shirk; association other gods with Allah)
and proposes Islamic state to his
interrogators
Confirmed the death of Yusuf as a martyr.
Appealed to al-Qaeda for assistance and
restates the goals of Boko Haram.
Table 4: Chart showing percentage of pre-2009 frameworks
Consistency of frameworks rejected & supported by Boko Haram Ideology in pre-2009 Messages
Rejected Frameworks
Supported Frameworks
50%
20%
20%
20%
20%
Western
Civilization/E
Democracy &
Constitution
Christianity
40%
30%
50%
20%
10%
20%
0%
Islamic
state
Muslims in
Government
Security Forces
25%
5%
20%
Dialogue
Jihad
Islamic
V/E
Post-2009 Messages
Table 5: Tabulation of 2010 Messages
N
o
Name
Date
Speaker(
s)
Languag
e(s)
Location
Audience
Targets
Ideology
U-tube
May
2010
29,
Musa
Tanko
Hausa
unknown
General Public
Americans and
Christians
July
2010
11,
Abubakar
Shekau
Hausa
Unknown
General Public
Pamphle
t
Sept.
2010
7,
Unknown
Hausa
Bauchi
General Public
American and
their
supporters
Security forces
& Intelligence
agents
Islamic
website
Dec.
2010
27,
Abubakar
Shekau
unknown
Nations of the
world
Infidels, their
allies and their
supporters
U-tube
Dec.
2010
28,
Abubakar
Shekau
English/tr
anslated
from
Hausa
Arabic/Ha
usa
Unknown
Nigerian
Muslims
Christians and
Tirades against American foreign

policy (invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan)
Extolling global jihad and Praising
the jihadi spirit of mujahidin in
Iraq
Claiming responsibility for Bauchi
prison break and calling on
Muslims to rise up against the
Nigerian infidel government
Claiming responsibility for 2010
Christmas eve bombing in Jos and
re-commitment to the killing of
Christians and the jihad
Claiming responsibility for 2010
Christmas eve bombing in Jos and
declaring it a war between Muslims
and infidels
Jihadi
Website
Table 6: Chart showing the percentage of 2010 frameworks
Consistency of frameworks rejected & supported by Boko Haram Ideology in the 2010 Messages
Rejected frameworks in
2010
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Frameworks supported in 2010

40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
ISLAMIC
STATE 35%
13
GLOCAL'
JIHAD 20%
GLOBAL
DEATH TO
MUSLIM
CHRISTIANS &
COMMUNITY WESTERNERS
10%
35%

No
1
Name
Posters
Date
Feb.
2011
March 15,
2011
Abu Dujana
May
2011
9,
June
2011
1,
June
2011
July
2011
21,
Phone
intervie
w
BBC
Call in
Service
Phone
interrvie
w, BBC
BBC call
in
U-tube
U-tube
July
2011
25,
Letter
Not
indicated
U-tube
Sept.
2011
10
Media
Confere
nce
Sept.
2011
11
Media
conferenc
e
12
U-tube
3
4
5
13
Target
Jan. 28th 2011
assassination
attempts
in
Maiduguri,
politicians and
security agents
Policemen and
supporters
Ideology
Propagating the name of
Allah and liberating
Islamic from an infidel
government
General
public
None
Unknown
General
public
Bars, clubs and

social events
Hausa
Unknown
Hausa
Unknown
General
public
General
public
Abubakar
Shekau
Arabic/Hausa
Unknown
General
public &
followers
Boko Haram
Hausa/Englis
h
Unknown
General
Public
Nigerian
governments
Muslims
who
collaborate with
infidels
Security forces
and
the
apparatus of the
Nigerian state
Rabiu
Kwankwaso
(Gov. of Kano),
Ado
Bayero
(Emir of Kano)
and others
Sharia is supreme to the

constitution and to
democracy
The Islamic principle to
enjoin good and forbid
evil
The
supremacy
of
Islamic sharia
Sharia law and secular
government
are
incompatible
Emphasis on Tawhid as
the basis of Islam and
the call to martyrdom
1,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
General
public &
follower
UN
officers,
western agencies
and embassies
18,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa/Englis
h
Maiduguri
General
Public
Media houses,
journalists and
reporters
Abu Qaqa
Hausa/Englis
h
Maiduguri
General
Public
Not indicated
Journalists
and
the
general
public
General
public
Journalists
&
media agents
2,
6,
Sept.7,
2011 2
Speaker(s)
Unknown
Language(s)
Hausa/English
Location
Maiduguri
Audience
General
Public
Hausa
Unknown
General
Public
Abu Darda
Hausa
Unknown
Abu Zayd
Hausa
Abdulraham
n
Abu Zayd
Oct.
2011
24,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
Nov.
2011
24,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
Politicians,
political
party
offices
&
convention
centers
Jihad through
bombings
Islamic governance is
superior to Nigerian
government that has
been placed at the
service of the west, UN
and CAN (Christian
Association of Nigeria
UN is a symbol of
oppression
against
Muslim believers. It is an
enemy of Islam and must
be fought.
The killing of Babakura
Fugu inlaw to late Yusuf
was
anti-Islam
and
unacceptable. No fellow
Muslims should be killed
in Jihad.
While in battle, Muslims
should not enter into
dialogue
with
unbelievers.
Infidels
must be fought and
defeated
Islam is a perfect religion
and
misrepresenting
Islam is a sin
Links with & support
from al-Qaeda is justified
because they assist in
setting up an Islamic
state.
Consistency of frameworks rejected & supported by Boko Haram Ideology in the 2011 Messages
14
suicide
Frameworks Rejected in
2011
20%
20%
40%
40%
5%
0
0%
0
10%
15%
0
INTERNATIONAL LINKS
25%
KIDNAPPING
30%
COMPLETE JIHAD
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
COMPLETE ISLAMIC
STATE
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Frameworks supported in 2011
2011 MESSAGES

N
o
Name
Date
Speaker(
s)
Languag
e(s)
Location
Audience
Pamphle
t
Jan 2012
Abubakar
Shekau
Hausa
Kano
Residents
Kano
U-tube
July
2012
11,
Abubakar
Shekau
Arabic/Ha
usa
Unknown
Followers and
fellow
Muslims
Phone
intervie
w
Jan.
2012
27,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
General Public
Letter to
Sokoto
Leaders
Jan
2012
28,
Unknown
unknown
General public
Sultan and the

people
of
Sokoto
Confere
nce Call
Phone
Contact
Feb.
2012
Feb.
2012
16.
Abu Qaqa
English/tr
anslated
from
Hausa
Hausa
Unknown
21,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
Journalists &
General Public
Journalists &
General public
U-tube
April
2012
12,
Abubakar
Shekau
Arabic/Ha
usa
Unknown
The Nigerian
public
Media
contact
May
2012
1,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
Journalists and
the
General
public
Email
Stateme
nts
June
2012
4,
Abu Qaqa
English/H
ausa
Unknown
People
of
Borno State
Rescue
of
Members
Accusing the
Nigerian
government of
betrayal with
threats
Security
forces, police
and
law
enforcement
agencies
Media outlets
(leadership,
daily
trust,
peoples daily,
radio
france
international)
Media
organizations,
Security
agencies,
soldiers
and
the police
15
of
Targets
Ideology
Security
forces,
Nigerian
government
and Christians
Jonathan,
Christians and
security
personnel
The Nigerian
state
Jihad is a duty against infidels
Christianity is paganism and the

Islamic duty to convert/force all
Christians and Infidels to become
Muslims.
No negotiations with an infidel
government until it is defeated.
Muslims can live with nonMuslims on the condition that
non-Muslims accept sharia law.
Arrest of mujahidin is a crime in
Islam. If they are arrested by fellow
Muslims, the Muslims must pay the
price for such acts of arrests.
The defence of fellow mujahidin is
a religious duty
Kidnapping
for
ransom
is
forbidden in Islam. Boko Haram
members are not kidnappers but
mujahidin fighting Allahs battle
Extolling the desire for Muslim
martyrdom and encouraging Boko
Haram members to stand firm
Dishonouring Prophet Muhammad
is punishable by death. Journalists
and media houses who commit this
crimes are not spared in Islam
No dialogue with infidels and
those who stand in the way of
Allahs religion
10
June
2012
10,
Unknown
English/H
ausa
Unknown
Journalists
Infidels
and
unbelievers
11
Phone
Confere
nce
Email
June
2012
17,
Unknown
Hausa/En
glish
Unknown
General Public
Churches
12
U-tube
June
2012
23,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa/En
glish
Unknown
Journalists &
General public
Media houses
and
organizations
13
Saharare
porters
website
July
2012
11,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa/En
glis
Unknown
The people of
Plateau state
14
U-tube
August 4,
2012
Abubakar
Shekau &
Abu Qaqa
Arabic/Ha
usa
Unknown
General public
Christians,
security
agencies
&
national
assembly
members
Politicians,
security
personnel and
Christians
15
U-tube
August 4,
2012
Abubakar
Shekau
Arabic/H
uasa
Unknown
General public
President
Jonathan and
President
Obama
16
Media
website
of sahara
reporters
August 23,
2012
From
Boko
Haram
Hausa/En
glis
Unknown
General Public
Politicians,
journalists and
Nigerian
government
17
Email Media
Sept.
2012
6,
Abu Qaqa
Hausa
Unknown
General public
18
U-tube
Oct.
2012
1,
Abubakar
Shekau
Arabic/Ha
usa
Unknown
Traditional
rulers
&
security forces
Mobile
telecom
operations &
Voice
of
America
(Radio)
Christian
women
&
wives of the
members of
security forces
Attacks on churches in Jos to fulfil

the Islamic injunction of killing
infidels
Unbelievers have no place in Islam,
they must be destroyed anywhere
they are found. This led to the
burning of churches in Jos and
other northern towns
Misrepresentation of Islam and the
Mujahidin is forbidden. If media
houses do not represent BH
members, they will be targeted
Islam is the true religion. All
Christians must accept Islam
wherever they are or face death.
Those who oppose the religion of

Allah must be killed. This lays the
foundation for the continuous
attack on Christian churches and
government installations
Propagation of Islam is a duty for
all Muslims. It is necessary to call
on Presidents Jonathan and
Obama to convert to Islam.
Obama is a likely terrorist in the
next world if he does not convert
The Nigerian constitution is not
recognized in Islam. The only
acceptable constitution is the
Quran and Sharia law, otherwise
there will be no peace in Nigeria
All supporters of the enemies of
Allah must be defeated. These
media organizations are helping the
security forces track down BH
members and they must be
attacked
The doctrine of revenge is
accepted in Islam. If they have
taken custody of our (BH)
members wives and children, Boko
Haram has the responsibility to
retaliate

FRAMEWORKS REJECTED IN
2012
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
20%
20%
20%
15%
7%
18%
Frameworks supported in
2012
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
16
25%
20%
20%
8%
12%
15%
Tabulation of ANSARU Messages

Since the group split from Boko Haram of late, its messages have been very limited and reduced
to the year 2012 2013. Most of the messages came through YouTube videos, flyers and phone
calls. However, the messages demonstrate the disparity between what the group professes and
what it actually does. It also exposes the groups commitment to links with other regional and
international jihadi cells.
Table 11: Tabulation of ANSARU Messages from 2012-2013
No
Name
Date
Speaker(
s)
Languag
e(s)
Location
Audience
Targets
Ideology
Flyers
Jan.
2012
ANSARU
Arabic/Ha
usa
Kano
General Public
Dissatisfaction
with
Boko
Haram
strategies
DVD,
U-tube
June
2012
Abu
Usmata alAnsarii
Arabic/tra
nslated to
English
Unknown
General Public
Video
June
2012
ANSARU
Hausa
Unknown
General Public
U-tube
March
2012
ANSARU
English/H
ausa
Kano
Nigeria
and
international
community
U-tube
Decemb
er 2012
ANSARU
Egnlish/H
ausa
Katsina
International
community
Christian
Association of
Nigeria
(CAN), ethnic
militia
like
MASSOP,
OPC etc
Security
forces,
Christians,
collaborators
and enemies of
Islam
A
German
Engineer,
Foreigners and
western
personnel
A
French
Engineer and
all westerners
in Nigeria
Jihad fi Sabillilah (Fighting for the cause

of Allah). It vowed to restore the lost
dignity and sanity to all Muslims in
black Africa. To also bring back dignity
to Muslims in Nigeria, especially in the
Sokoto Caliphate
Jihad for the sake of Allah, protecting
Muslim lives and properties and
retaliating against any attack on Muslims
anywhere in the world
U-tube
and
Media
call
U-tube
Dec. 18,
2012
ANSARU
Hausa/En
glish
Unknown
General public
Feb.
2013
ANSARU
Hausa/En
glish
Bauchi
General Public
17
Nigerian
soldiers being
deployed
to
Mali
Foreign
engineers
Muslims must practice forgiveness.

Muslims should not fight one another
but unite against the infidels that
suppress them
Defending the Islamic Ummah.
Retaliating against western influence
Defending global Islam and a response

to French military intervention in Mali
in a war on Islam. Also, its prohibition
on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf
by women in public.
A
retaliation
to
Europeans
transgressions in Afghanistan and Mali.
Defending global Islam and a response
to French military intervention in Mali
in a war on Islam. Also, its prohibition
on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf
by women in public.
Table 12: Chart showing the percentage of ANSARUs frameworks of 2012-2013
Consistency of frameworks rejected & supported by Boko Haram Ideology (2012-2012 Messages)
FRAMWORKS REJECTED IN 20122013
Frameworks supported in
2012-2013
30%
20%
20%
20%
25%
15% 15%
20%
10%
15%
10%
5%
0%
18
Chapter Three: Analytical Discourse of BH and ANSARUs Messages and Ideology

Transition, consistency and inconsistency of BHs pre-2009 messages
The consistency of Boko Harams pre-2009 messages and ideology should, in some aspects, be
analyzed on the basis of Islamic movements that espouse unorthodox beliefs and
unconventional religious practices in the face of dire socio-economic condition, ethno-regional
politics and intense revival of extreme religious ideology that seems to be vanishing due to
modernization [60]. Mass media coverage of the activities of Boko Haram in its pre-2009 period
indicate that the groups leader, Muhammad Yusuf, had two signature issues: Western education
(civilization) is forbidden and government employment for Muslims (especially infidel
government) are religiously forbidden [61]. However, a further examination of the audio CDs,
DVDs, Youtube videos, pamphlets and other materials produced by Boko Haram as presented
in Table 3 & 4 indicate a more complex portrait that has different targets, goals, frameworks and
audience. Generally, the speakers in the pre-2009 messages were always Mohammad Yusuf and
his inner circle that included; Abubakar Shekau [62], Mamman Nur [63], Abubakar Adam
Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi [64]. The messages also indicated that more than 70% were
delivered in Arabic and Hausa and sometimes translated into Kanuri. In other YouTube videos,
though very few, messages were completely delivered in Kanuri language. The authors
interaction with people in Maiduguri and other reliable sources indicate that Boko Haram
members make up the audience of these lectures and sermons. Conservative estimate shows
about 75% of the attendees are from the Kanuri ethnic stock [65]. The Kanuri tribe, mostly
concentrated in Bauchi and Borno, with some that have migrated over the years into Chad,
Niger and possibly Cameroon, comprise only about 4-5% of the Nigerian population [66].
Others suggest that the core group of Boko Haram militants could number only in hundreds,
but the organization in general seems to draw wide support from a cross ethnic Muslim
following, chiefly from the north-eastern tribe of Kanuri [67].
The territorial consideration of the pre-2009 messages was mainly Borno and Yobe states which
later spread into the northeastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba. Initial targets
were motivated by local grievances and limited to institutions that define modern concept of
state including security forces, schools, missionary institutions and churches, banks and markets,
as well as calling for the Islamic principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil by attacking bars,
beer parlors, local casinos and carrying out targeted assassinations [68]. The justification for the
violence and attacks are taken from some of the Jihad verses in the Quran and also some of the
Islamic theology of exclusion that basically recognizes only the Islamic concept of God [69].
More than making reference to corruption, injustice and social ills in the society which must be
corrected, 90% of the violent messages are backed up with verses from the Quran and hadiths
of al-Bukhari and Islam [70]. For example, in one of the lectures, Yusuf rejected the authority of
the Nigerian state since it is ruled by a government based on kufr, unbelief. Yusuf employed the
Quranic concept of taghut (ungodly rulers, as in Quran 2:257 and 4:51) to support his
contention that it is obligatory for Muslimsnot obey ungodly rulers but to remove them
forcefully and replace them with an Islamic government [71].
There is also some level of the Kanuri-Fulani dynamics or rivalry that emerged. However, at this
period it was low level and Yusuf mentioned it in his Youtube video on the teaching of Islamic
history. Other minor details in these initial messages included the rejection of western education
based on the fact that European colonialists introduced modern secular education into Islamic
societies as an elaborately planned and camouaged conspiracy to maintain colonialist hegemony
over Muslim societies. Their aim was to corrupt the pure Islamic morals with Western liberal
norms. In addition, the West wants to replace proper gender roles with sexual permissiveness,
and to undermine embedded individual and communal identities built on Sala notions of piety
and righteousness in Islam [72]. Furthermore, the Quran should be the only source of
19
governance, he rejected secular subjects like chemistry, physics, engineering etc, including
geographical conceptions of how rain occurs, the theory of evolution, and the scientific prove of
how the world started as contradicting the Quran [73]. In summary, the consistency of the
messages demonstrated that 50% was dedicated to the Islamic state, 25% for Jihad, 20% for the
reformation of Muslim moral values and a tiny 5% for dialogue. As demonstrated on the
aforementioned table there is consistent rejection of western civilization, Christianity,
democracy, constitution, security forces and Muslims in secular government. The reason for this
initial consistency could be that Boko Haram was at an incubative and organizational stage. More
so, regional concentration indicated the search for local support base. Moreover, the 5% support
for dialogue underscores Yusufs belief at the initial stages that negotiations for the establishment
of an Islamic state was necessary because the sect, at this period, lacked the arsenal and the
strength to take on the Nigerian state apparatus. Yusuf mentioned in the video: I think that an
Islamic system of government should be established in Nigeria and if possible all over the world
but through dialogue [74].
However, the consistency of the pre-2009 messages was interrupted with the death of Yusuf.
While the frameworks rejected and supported in pre-2009 messages were maintained, new
frameworks were introduced under the leadership of Shekau. From 2010 to 2012, about 75% of
the messages were delivered by Abubakar Shekau and his spokesman Abu Qaqa [75]. The other
25% indicates that the messages were delivered by Abu Darda, Abu Zayd, Musa Tanko, Abu
Suleiman, Abu Dujana and Abu Abdulrahman, including anonymous flyers, emails and letters
sent to journalists and some northern state governors. Interestingly, 80% of the messages were
Hausa, interspaced with Arabic citations, and the remaining 20% are chiefly translations into
English for journalists. In 2010, a specific new framework introduced was the mention of
westerners and Americans to be killed which took about 20% of the messages given. However,
there was an increased support for local and global jihad which made up 20% of the messages.
Another framework introduced was support for the global Islamic community which took up
10%. While in 2011, negotiations with any infidel government was referenced about 20%. That
politicians should be targeted was mentioned about 25%. Another new framework introduced in
these messages was kidnapping and the confirmation of Boko Harams links with international
terrorist organizations which was 15%. In 2012, most of the frameworks were maintained and
only two new ones were introduced; 7% was dedicated to the rejection of traditional rulers and
elders in Sokoto and Kano, with personal letters written to them. And also 18% of the messages
were dedicated to the media and telecommunications organizations, warning them to be fair in
their reporting of the conflict. Surprisingly, the kidnap of women and children, including the
killing of civilians was supported by Shekau in about 8% of the messages.
There are suggestions in some quarters that the use of different speakers between 2010 and 2012
reflects the conflict strategy of Boko Haram. However, a closer examinations rather indicates
some level of confusion within the sect as the conflict lasts. Moreover, it portrays the ideological
differences, disagreements over strategic approach, the bitter rivalry and power tussle that
eventual led to the split with ANSARU in early 2012. The introduction of the new frames also
demonstrates not only the inconsistencies of Boko Haram messaging but also the changing
dynamics of the conflict. First, Shekau needed to assert his authority when he took over. The
shift from addressing local concerns to international targets was underscored not only by
Shekaus rhetoric but also by the August 2011 bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja and
the confirmation that they have links with international jihadi groups, especially AQIM [76].
Furthermore, the inconsistencies are obvious when on one hand it claims not to target civilians,
kidnap women and children, yet in action, the opposite is the case. For example in one of the
2012 Youtube videos, Shekau not only imitated Osama bin Laden but also threatened the United
States and every region of Nigeria by declaring I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me
20
to kill the way I enjoy killing chickens and rams[77]. Surprisingly, this statement came
immediately after the Kano bombing that killed more than 180 civilians. It is an exceptional
demonstration of the difference between the strategies of Shekau and Yusuf, in addition to the
theological controversy regarding the best possible means of establishing an Islamic state. These
inconsistencies also contributed in small measure to the emergence of the Yusuffiyya Islamic
Movement (YIM) within Boko Haram. They claim to be the original followers of Yusuf and
rejected the violent strategy of Shekau [78].
Consistency and Inconsistency of ANSARU Messages from 2012-2013.
Evidence suggests that the consistency of ANSARU messages is founded on two fronts; first, its
well-articulated messages accusing Boko Haram for attacking civilians and betraying the true
jihad. Second, this true jihad is encapsulated in its regional and international targets [79]. When
ANSARU was founded, it is commonly held that it has more of an international focus, with the
ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout West Africa and not just in Nigeria
[70]. Two of ANSARUs YouTube videos translated by the author suggests that ANSARU
proclaimed a different understanding of Jihad and vowed to avenge the global killing of Muslims
[81]. An initial posting of this same videos by Desert Herald reported that ANSAARU does not
target non-Muslims except in self-defense or if Muslims are attacked, referring specifically to the
indiscriminate killing of Muslims over the summer of 2012 in Jos, Plateau state [82]. In fact, the
consistency of ANSARUs messages and their interpretation is supported by the action of the
group itself. ANSARU kidnapped a German engineer in Kano, in March 2012. Another French
engineer was kidnapped in Katsina in December 2012 in addition to the seven foreigners
kidnapped in Bauchi, February 2012. Most of the reasons given are: a response to Frances plans
to militarily intervene in a war on Islam in Mali, prohibition on the wearing of the Islamic
headscarf by women in public places and European countries transgressions in Afghanistan and
Mali [83]. This level of consistency is further demonstrated by the percentage of frameworks
supported and rejected by ANSARU. In tables 11 and 12, 20% of the messages rejected the
targeting of civilians. Almost 80% was dedicated to confirming their links with al-Qaeda,
targeting western institutions and embassies, kidnapping for ransom and praising the spirit of
mujahidin for participating actively in global jihad to liberate Muslim lands and societies.
However, what is inconsistent in these messages is that if ANSARU is genuine in its quest that
civilians should not be targeted, does it not take into consideration that civilians are also part of
the staff and work force in places considered western institutions and embassies? Moreover, a
few days after some videos were released to Desert Herald, a self-proclaimed ANSARU
spokesman, Abu Jaafar, sent an email correcting the newspapers translation of the videos,
asserting that the groups original message had been distorted [84]. Jaafar stated: the security
officials and the Christians are enemies of Islam and Muslims; therefore we will find them, fight
them and kill them whenever we have the chance. We are helpers of Islam and Muslims; we did
not mention the phrase: Islam forbids killing of innocent people including non-Muslims. Killing
them is part of Jihad. We will target and kill any security personnel who is under the [Nigerian]
constitution and those among us why by any means protect infidels [85]. Thus ANSARUs
claim to oppose the inhuman acts of Boko Haram should be accepted with caution. More than
the inconsistencies, it leaves their messages open to misinterpretation and misrepresentation. In
fact, it provides for ANSARU a significant vacuum to maneuver their way through the conflict
while seeking for political relevance.
The Nature of Threats against American Interests
To critically analyze the nature of Boko Haram rhetoric and threats against American interests as
contained in their messages, especially in the last two years, it is important to examine the
ideology that defines Boko Harams understanding of American interests and how they perceive
21
these interests. In a lecture recorded on both YouTube video and audio CD on May 30, 2008,
Yusuf explicitly constructed the ideology that today informs Boko Haram threats and rhetoric
against American interests. This construct is based on Yusufs Hausa translation of the book alMadris al-lamiyya al-ajnabiyya al-istimriyya: trikhuha wa makhtiruha (Global, Foreign and
Colonialist Schools: Their History and Dangers). This book was originally written by Bakr bin
Abdullah Abu Zayd (d. 2008), a prominent Wahhabi scholar [86]. In line with Abu Zayds
thoughts, Yusuf submits that European colonialists introduced modern secular education into
Islamic societies as a well marshalled plan to dominate and rule over Islamic societies. The
conspiracy of the West is to corrupt the pure Islamic morals, permanently subjugate and rule
over Islamic societies using western education, western philosophies and ideologies [87]. More
than military, political and economic dominance, the most dangerous aspect of this modern
secular education is the dominance of Islamic thought pattern. This educational conspiracy is
difficult to resist and therefore must be fought on all fronts. In the eyes of Boko Haram
members, the drive for Western dominance of Islamic societies is being led and propelled by
America, based on the concept of Americanization; that American ambition to harmonize the
cultures of the world as defined by the process of globalization. It is a new unbridled imperialism
that will destroy traditional societies [88]. Boko Haram pretends therefore to give voice to the
voiceless masses in north-eastern Nigeria.
The reason is that, first, for populations living under subsistence lifestyles, the medias
glorification of branded products and branded lifestyles associated with American culture
[89], starkly exposes how far behind the environment within which Boko Haram emerged have
been left and this causes deep seated resentment. Second, the global americanizaiton of life
made societies, like north-eastern Nigeria, that have been excluded from the benefits of this sort
of culture look isolated, dislocated and powerless. Unable to access the tools of modernization,
they feel their histories, religions and memories may be swallowed up in this bigger American
culture. To the US and most western policy makers, American interests means homeland
security, diplomatic personnel, economic activities, international symbols like embassies and UN
headquarters. However, for Boko Haram, American interests first and foremost means the
spread of western culture and philosophy through modern education. Therefore institutions at
the local and national level that provide support for the spread of americanizaiton must be
attacked. These include democratic institutions like police stations, military barracks, states
houses of assembly, banks; educational institutions like schools, missionary colleges and
universities; and other social venues that reflect western life styles like bars, beer parlours, local
casinos and even markets.
Interestingly, as Boko Haram links with AQIM and al-Qaeda expanded, their understanding of
American interests also shifted from local institutions of western civilization to include Americas
homeland security, diplomatic missions, western personnel etc. This is aptly demonstrated by
rhetoric and threats of both Boko Haram and ANSARU. For example, in 2011, Boko Haram
issued thirty statements, only six of which focused on international themes and four of which
specifically mentioned the United States or Al-Qaeda. In 2012, Boko Haram issued thirty-eight
statements, five of which centered on international themes and three of which specifically
referred to the United States or Al-Qaeda [90]. A few of these statements are presented here: 1)
In 2006, an anonymous member said I dont know who gave us the name Taliban, I prefer
mujahideen. I know only the Taliban in Afghanistan and I respect what they did very much. I
may not be ready to do the same now but if I could, I would [91]. 2) In July 2010, Abubakar
Shekau said infidels, hypocrites and apostates: Do not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just
begun. O America, die with your fury [92]. 3) In Sept. 2012, a Boko Haram spokesman said, as
a result of the harm we understand Voice of America is inflicting on Islam, we hereby inform all
reporters and staff of this radio station that whoever wants to live in peace amongst them should
22
quit working with this media organizationwe will not spare any reporter or staff wherever we
find him by the grace of God [93]. One of the most explicit threats against America came from
the spokesman of Boko Haram in March 2010. Group clearly stated Islam does not recognize
boundaries. We will carry out operations anywhere in the world if we have the chancethe
United States is the number one target for its oppression and aggressions against Muslim nations
particular in Iraq and Afghanistan and its blind support for Israel in its killings of our Palestinian
brethren.We will launch fiercer attacks than Iraqi or Afghan Mujahedeen against our enemies
throughout the world, particularly the U.S, if the chance avails itself within the confines of what
Islam prescribes [94]. It is not wrong to observe that this goes to show the influence of
American way of life around the world, even at the lowest level of societal strata in different
communities around the globe. More so, it indicates that the threats against America and
American interests is never static but constantly shifting between and around different foreign
policy issues. More worrying is the fact that there is an evidence of emerging inter-sect
cooperation between insurgents, terrorists and militants to attack American interest anywhere,
anytime and in any form of shape in the world. The possibility of future collaboration between
al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, ANSARU and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJWA) is a serious policy issue that should not be taken lightly.
Boko Haram: Regionalism, Indigene-Settler Concept and Ethnicity
The issue of history and the manipulation of regionalism, indigene settler concepts continue to
play a significant role in the Boko Haram narrative. Research suggests that these concepts play a
role within the region and within Boko Haram as a sect. Within the region, the historical rivalry
between the Kanem-Borno Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate is most pronounced. While
attacking the collaboration of the Sokoto Caliphate with western superpowers, Yusuf alludes to
the historical dominance of the Kanem-Borno Empire saying, Our land was an Islamic state
before it (sic) was turned it into a land of kafir (infidel), the current system is contrary to true
Muslim beliefs [95]. It is important to note that the Kanuri; the tribe most strongly represented
amongst the Boko Haram members is located in the north-east. Politically, the Kanuri feel shortchanged by the dominance of the north-western region where the Sokoto Caliphate is located,
spearheaded by the Hausa-Fulani Mafia. Most of the political leadership of Nigeria since
independence has come from the north-west zone, both in civil periods (Ahmadu Bello and
Shehu Shagari) and in the military periods; Murtala Muhammad, Shehu Musa YarAdua,
Muhammad Buhari and Abdulsalami Abubakar [96]. In addition, being of the longest traditions
of Muslim affiliation in Africa, Borno has always stood out as a resisting entity, refusing to
accept the reforms of Uthman Dan Fodio. Furthermore, Ahmadu Bellos northernization policy;
a policy that was meant to replace southerners in all the regional and provincial civil service with
northerners after Nigerias independence, shows that from those from the north-east (especially
the Kanuri) were technically excluded. Development projects were mostly concentrated around
the Sokoto Caliphate [97]. In addition, there was the political will to establish railway linking
Kano with Sudan, Niger Republic and Algiers while the Borno emirate was left out [98]. The
historical division and rivalry within the north remains an unrecognized source of conflict.
Things became even more complicated with Nigerias return to multiparty democracy. This
historical rivalry was reinforced by the policy choices of ruling party PDP in zoning political
offices and allocating economic resources according to ethno-regional group orientations [99].
As a result, those from the north-east feel like second class citizens in a predominantly HausaFulani hegemonic culture. Furthermore, traditional rulers and political leaders in the north-east
who are seen as collaborating with the rival Sokoto Caliphate and the infidel secular government
in Nigeria became targets. This is seen in the infiltration of traditional institutions by the political
class in the north-east in terms of promotions, creation of chiefdoms and award of government
contracts added to the tension already existing. This implied that traditional rulers became
23
government stooges, lost respect before their own subjects and their authority in settling
disputes; local or national diminished [100]. Interviews carried out with some members of Boko
Haram in Yobe in 2011 reveals that for the sect members, the traditional rulers have failed to
defend the ordinary man, collaborated with thieves and must be punished. Such thinking
resonates with the poor [101]. Traditional and religious leaders termed collaborators with the
authorities have been killed by Boko Haram. These include Sheik Ibrahim Birkuti, a prominent
cleric accused of collaborating with Yobe state government, a well-known Wahhabi cleric
Ibrahim Abdullah [102]. They are also believed to be responsible for the death of Shehu of
Bornos brother, Alhaji Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai al-Kanemi. It should be noted that the
Shehu is regarded as the most important traditional Islamic ruler in the north-east, second only
to the sultan of Sokoto [103].
Another important aspect of the Boko Haram narrative is the manipulation of the indigene
settler concepts; issues of citizenship controversially defined by the Nigeria constitution. It is an
open secret that ethnic identity has a lot of influence on daily life throughout Nigeria. All official
documents must indicate a persons place of birth; applying for a university admission, buying a
plot of land, opening an account in the bank requires an indication of the place of birth, not the
current place where one lives. The presentation of the information in this manner helps to
ascertain if the person is an indigene or a settler in a particular part of the country. This then
directly impacts on a persons quality of life. Evidence suggests that ethnic consciousness has
been politicized. This emerged under colonial rule, was solidified under military dictatorship and
now is being instrumentalized within the precincts of multiparty democracy. Ethnic groups
engaged in competition for power to advance their group and parochial interests as against the
national interest or public good. State laws and policies thus reflected ethnic interest. Deeply
influenced by the indigene-settler concept, ordinary citizens in the north-east are clearly
overwhelmed by the tsunami of changes around them. Statistics show that southern and Igbo
traders have settled in large numbers in the cities of Maiduguri, Damaturu, Yola, Jalingo, Gombe
and Bauchi. These traders have used their economic power and the lacunae in the law to buy
houses and acquire properties. In the very heart of the major cities of the north-east, almost all
forms of business are conducted by them. Yet they are considered as settlers, not indigenous.
Which implied that no matter how long they have lived there, political rights should not be
accorded them. In the north-eastern cities, the original inhabitants have disproportionate share
of public resources; an exclusive right to buy and sell land and various other privileges. These
policies are backed up with the issuance of indigene certificates by local government authorities
in the context of internal migrations [104]. In fact the authorities created new settlements for the
settlers called sabon gari; meaning new town or strangers quarters. It was a physical barrier
between northern and southern Nigerians in pursuance of the policy of preserving the northern
identity. In the wake of the uprising, the sect gave southerners an ultimatum to leave the northeastern. Three days after this ultimatum, more than 20 southerners were murdered in the north
eastern cities of Mubi and Yola [105].
Within Boko Haram itself, the instrumentalization of ethnicity was seemingly evident. The
reason for Ansarus split from Boko Haram, some experts suggest, was due to the massive
display of favouritism by Shekau for his own ethnic group the Kanuri. The Kanuri form the
main ethnic group in Borno and neighbouring parts of Chad, Cameroon and Niger, while the
Hausa and Fulani are predominant in the rest of northern Nigeria. A government investigation
into Boko Haram in 2013 concluded that about 80 per cent of the groups members are Kanuri,
while a captured Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Qaqa, revealed that Shekaus selection of nonKanuri for suicide missions the refusal to agree to which resulted in the death penalty had
served to alienate Boko Haram members from other ethnic groups [106]. Many Ansaru
members, meanwhile, are likely ethnic Hausa and Fulani from northwestern Nigeria, including
24
Kaduna, where the founding Shura council under Abu Muhammed was based. They resent the
fact that as many as 90 per cent of Boko Harams victims are Muslims, and mostly Hausa and
Fulani, not Kanuri [107].
References to Regional and International Jihadi Movements

In their messages, both Boko Haram and ANSARU have made specific references to links with
international jihadi movements. Shekaus first appearance after the July 2009 clashes was in a
2010 video statement filmed by a journalist who was taken to Shekaus hideout in Maiduguri,
Borno State. Evidence suggests that Shekau addressed the statement to the leaders of al-Qaeda
and its affiliated groups in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen [108]. In a research carried out by
the author and Jacob Zenn, there are indicatiosn that Shekau also sent condolences on behalf
of the mujahideen in Nigeria to the mujahideen in the Islamic State of Iraq, Osama bin Laden,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya Al-Libi, Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir, the Emir of the Islamic State
in Somalia, the Emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Emir of the Mujahideen in
Pakistan, in Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, and our religious clerics whom I
did not mention[109]. After April 2012, when AQIM and allied militant groups gained control
of northern Mali, Shekau and hundreds of Boko Haram members reportedly travelled to Gao to
find refuge, train, and support AQIM, MUJWA and Ansar Dine. Boko Haram members helped
the militants in Mali in their attack on the Algerian consulate and kidnapping of the Algerian
consul in Gao, while in Timbuktu, Boko Haram raided Sufi shrines, and in Konna, Boko Haram
members aided the militants push towards Mopti, in central Mali [110].
In a November 2012 video, Shekau appeared in camouflage combat gear training in a desert
environment resembling Mali with masked gunmen. Speaking in Arabic, instead of his usual
Hausa, Shekau praised the memory of the martyrs Osama bin Laden, Abu Yahya Al-Libi and
Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and called the United States, United Kingdom, Nigeria and Israel
crusaders. He further proclaimed the virtues of the brothers and sheikhs of the Islamic
Maghreb and the soldiers of the Islamic State of Mali [111]. They specifically mentioned their
support for the leaders of al-Qaeda; We see Mullah Umar and Osama bin Laden as the true
champions of Islam who are fighting the Allahs enemies and our allegiance and support to them
though we dont have any contact with them yet [112]. Rightly or wrongly, the continuous
reference to international jihadi organization either by Boko Haram or ANSARU could, first, be
interpreted as a matter of strategy to cajoled different governments into negotiations. Second, it
may be an ideological necessity to strengthen their links with other groups in search of material
support, moral motivation or strategic need. Whatever interpretation is given, one thing is
certain, the collaboration between the extremists is growing. This is evident in the increasing
numbers of foreign fighters in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. There are suggestions that Boko
Haram has been assisted by foreign fighters. Although such observations cannot be completely
dismissed, it is necessary to suggest that inter-governmental and regional security cooperation
has to be stepped up.
Boko Haram and ANSARU: Future Trajectories

It is right to suggest that Boko Haram may not have the civilian support that could help it
actualize intended goals. However, future prospects indicate that structural poverty, absence of
western education and unemployment in the north [113] which have radicalized most youths will
continue to provide the fertile ground for Boko Haram recruitment. In fact the prospects of
such radicalization and recruitment are likely to take place under any militant sect or rebel group
as 2015 general election approaches. In addition, the emergence of the so called civilian JTF has
been a source of serious concern for policy makers and the future prospects of the conflict. The
north-east is already known for the activities of political thugs like Ecomog in Borno and Yobe
states, Sara-Suka in Gombe state, YanKallare in Bauchi state, Banu-Israil in Taraba state and Yan25
Shinko in Adamawa state. There activities are sponsored by desperate politicians, while they have
neither any form of national ideology or strong religious motivations. They are rather driven by
material gains, and such drives are fluid, elliptical and uncertain, with interests and motivations
changing over time. Most of these youths were in some sense part of Boko Haram, arming them
makes it easy for Boko Harm to infiltrate and cause major havoc. More so, giving them arms
ahead of the 2015 general elections in a conflict deeply influenced by ethno-regional and
religious sentiments even makes it more dangerous.
Another dimension is that continuous military offensive without actually addressing the basic
needs of the people could win the physical battle but may not sway the hearts of the people
towards government programmes. Furthermore, the issue of foreign fighters has become one of
the strongest issues in the fight against terrorism. Foreign fighters have participated in Iraq,
Afghanistan and now in Syria [114]. Recently, the military sources in Nigeria reported the
presence of foreign fighters within Boko Haram from Mali, Algeria, Libya, Niger and Chad
[115]. If such trends continue, we are yet to see an end to the conflict. Another serious area of
concern is the regional location of Boko Haram. Boko Haram has always drawn strength from
its ability to capitalize on its location in the porous border region between Borno State in
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. For example, scholars in north-eastern Nigeria, suggest that
following the Boko Haram uprising, more than 280,000 from northern Nigeria and parts of
southern Niger, northern Cameroon and Chad the three countries that border Borno State
were familiar with Yusufs preaching, as a result of listening to his sermons in person in the
mosques of Borno State, seeing him on television, or purchasing the CDs and DVDs of his
sermons that were sold throughout the region [116].
On the contrary, the continuity of the conflict could also weigh very heavily on Boko Haram
members and make them surrender, especially if the group abandons its objective of addressing
local grievances to international targets. Meanwhile, ANSARUs strengths lie in its international
connections, the targeting of Western institutions and personnel which appeals to international
jihadists and its avoidance of local civilian casualties [117]. However, the groups lack of a
specific base region from which to operate constitutes a weakness, in terms of both recruitment
and security, especially in a country such as Nigeria, where ethno- regional forms of mobilization
are common. It may be, therefore, that Boko Haram and Ansarus relative strengths and
weaknesses will make the two groups compatible, as long as they can overcome the issues that
led to the split in the first place. ANSARU could potentially employ members of Boko Haram in
its attacks and it can provide Boko Harams grassroots members with the combat skills that its
leaders received from AQIM [118]. Finally, the Nigerian armys offensive in Borno, which
started with President Jonathans declaration of a state of emergency in the state in May, has
driven hundreds of Boko Haram militants from Borno into the border region. This may further
encourage ANSARU and Boko Haram to co-ordinate their operations and to reintegrate with
other Sahelian militant groups that fought in northern Mali, such as MUJWA. As a result, the
militant threat in Nigeria will likely now shift to neighbouring regions. As the author and Jacob
Zenn suggest, the key to combating the new threat will be intelligence sharing between West
African countries and increased regional co-ordination to counter what has now become a
regional insurgency, with Boko Haram, ANSARU and MUJWA sharing increasingly similar
operational and ideological creeds.
Conclusion
The question addressed in this research is the extent to which the substantial materials produced
by Boko Haram and ANSARU on Youtubes, CDs, DVDs, pamphlets etc have moulded the
understanding of the sects, their frameworks and processes of mobilization. The investigation
gave a descriptive presentation of the historical background to the conflict and the nature of the
26
conflict. It has also appraised the socio-economic and political factors that underscore the
common explanations in scholarly circles and open source documents. However, what is clear is
that these explanations do not answer all the questions, raising the curtain to go beyond political
and socio-economic considerations to include the ideological frameworks constructed by the
sects via their messaging. Subsequently, the Boko Haram conflict is closely related to the issues
of accumulated grievances, impunity and ethnic politics. It is the struggle to claim and assert
both individual and community identity in a shifting world. Thus Boko Haram has become some
kind of a representative social movement protesting the complex network of patron-client
culture in a country soaked in impunity and lack of integration. Religious ideology simply
becomes a mobilizing and a legitimizing framework for a violence that remains ordinarily
unacceptable. Interestingly, many ordinary people on the streets of north-eastern Nigeria quietly
share the sentiments of the movement, especially its stance against the impunity of secular state
authorities. Equally, the fact that the group was able to control some parts of the cities of
Maiduguri and Bauchi from 2009-2010 indicate that the local population offered some support,
was intimidated or both.
At the same time, many have rejected the groups ideology and violent tactics. Interviews with
learned Islamic scholars; Sheikh Abba Aji and Yahaya Jinjir accused the Boko Haram leadership
of perverting the peaceful teachings of Islam, exploiting economic hardship and religious
sentiments to build personality cults. Currently, the ICC is carrying out investigations against the
activities of Boko Haram to determine if crimes against humanity have been committed. Analysts
are of the opinion that as a relatively young democracy with a diverse population, Nigeria should
expect intermittent eruption of conflicts. Some suggest the future of the current conflict remains
uncertain and therefore call for adequate policy responses in terms of peace building strategies.
However, it must be admitted that the situations that gave birth to this continuous violence in
the north-east are not just about the independent factors of religion and poverty. It is simply a
combination of everything. Nigerians know that impunity is not an academic abstract notion; its
a reality on which violence feeds and grows. It is not certain if massive economic turnaround is
likely to reduce the possibilities for violence in Nigeria. What is certain is that the ongoing
violence in the north-east is a clarion call for Nigeria and Nigerians to begin to assert clearly the
supremacy of citizenship over and above other sectional claims. Nigerias young and struggling
democracy may stumble and fall, but Nigerians must renew their commitment to the fine
principles and challenges of building a democratic society on the foundations of a secular, free
and just society. Finally, there is the need for further empirical research on how much violence in
Nigeria is related to the culture of impunity.
27
About the Author
Fr. Atta Barkindo is a priest of the Catholic Diocese of Yola, North-Eastern Nigeria. He is a Visiting
Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR),
Singapore, a Senior Researcher with Open Doors International and a current Ph.D. Candidate at the
Department of Politics and International Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London. His research areas involve Political Islam, Terrorism and Conflict Resolution. His current PhD
research is on Impunity, Memory and the Politics of Terrorism in the Transformation of Boko Haram.
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28
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Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. 1971. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Source Book 1966-1970, Vol. 1,
London: OUP.
John, Paden N. 1986. Op. Cit., p. 352.
Nigeria/Africa Masterweb Special Feature, Nigeria 2006 Census Figure (accessed 13 th September 2006),
http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/Nigeria06CensusFigs.html
Associated Press, Suspicion, Taboos, Fear Confront Nigerian Census Takers, Mainichi Daily News (March
25, 2006), http://mdn.mainichi-msn.co.jp. (accessed July7, 2013). Solo Odunfa,. 2006. Nigerias Counting
Controversy, BBC News (March 21, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk. (accessed May 20, 2011).
Ibid.
Ekanem, I.I. 1972. The 1963 Nigerian Census: A Critical Appraisal, Benin City: Ethiope.
Nur Alkali, Abubakar Kawu Monguno and Ballama Shettima Mustafa, 2012. Op. Cit., p. 4.
Toyin, Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, Rochester: University of
Rochester Press.
Aliyu, Tanimu. 1999. Ingantacen Tarihin Jamaatu Izalatil Bidah wa Ikamatu Sunnah (1), Bauchi: New Era
Production. Dikko, Hassan Abubakar. 2000. Achievements of the Izala Movement from its
Commencement to Date, unpublished M.A thesis (Islamic Studies), University of Jos.
Adesoji, Abimbola. 2010. The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria Africa Spectrum , 45
(2): 95-108, p. 99. Sulaiman, Tajudeen. 2009. The Plot to Islamise Nigeria, Tell, Lagos, 30 November, p.
19-23.
Taiwo Juliana and Olugbode Michael. 2009. Mohammed Yusuf Killed While in Custody This Day, July 31,
2009
Walker, Andrew. 2012. Who is Boko Haram? Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, p. 3.
Ibid.
Adesoji, Abimbola. 2010. Op. Cit., p. 95-180.
Walker, Andrew. 2012. Op. Cit., p. 3.
Cook, David. 2011. Op. Cit., 4.
Last, Murray. 1991. Adolescents in a Muslim City: The Cultural Context of Danger and Risk, Kano Studies,
Special Issue, Bayero University, Kano.
Ibid.
Professor Adagba Okpaga, Ugwu Sam Chijioke and Eme Okechukwu Innocent. 2012. Activities of Boko
Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria, Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 1(9):77-99.
Also See Ann Buwalda and Emmanuel Ogebe, Esq. 2013. Beyond Boko Haram: The Lethal Persecution
of Nigerias Christians, Morning Star News, April 16, 2013.
Taiwo Juliana and Olugbode Michael. 2009. Op. Cit.
Adesoji, Abimbola. 2010. Op. Cit., p. 95-180.
Mallam, Sani Umar. 2013. Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad, Vanguard, August 14, 2013.
(accessed September 14, 2013) http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-resurrects-declarestotal-jihad/
The Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram Manifesto Islamization Watch, July 30, 2009.
http://islamizationwatch.blogspot.com/2009/07/nigerian-taliban-boko-haram-manifesto.html (accessed 3
June, 2011).
Matthew, Hassan Kukah. 2010. Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects, Unpublished Article, 2010,
p. 3.
29
45. Haykel, Bernard. 2009. On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, In Meijer Roel, Global Salafism:
Islams New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press, p. 34.
46. Kepel, Gilles. 2003. Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists? Martin Kramer, Middle East
Quarterly, p. 65-77.
47. Roel Meijer, 2009. Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, pg. 49. New York: Columbia University
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
Press. Also see Richard, Gauvain. 2013. Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God, New York: Routledge, p.
41.
George, Joff. 2013. Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism,
London: I.B. Tauris, p. 317. Roel Meijer, 2009 Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, New
York: Columbia University Press, P. 49. Richard, Gauvain. 2013. Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of
God, New York: Routledge, p. 41.
The authors translation of one of the undated Youtube videos of Yusuf. The video is a presentation of
Yusufs ideological thoughts on the history of Muslims and Islamic doctrine of Tawhid.
Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras. 2013. The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in
Nigeria, The RUSI Journal, 158:46-3.
Daniel Idonor et al., 2011. Boko Haram Sect Splits, Vanguard, 21 July 2011.
Jacob, Zenn. 2011. Can Nigeria Exploit the Split in the Boko Haram Movement? Terrorism Monitor 9
(36):8-10
Freedom, Onuoha C. 2012. Jamaatu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan: Nigerias Evolving Terrorist
Group, Aljazeera Center for Studies, March 14, 2013.
Muslims Against Terror, Boko Haram Re-brands as JAMBS, Uses Desert Herald for PR 21 January
2013,
http://muslimsagainstterror.com/boko-haram-re-brands-as-jambs-uses-desertherald-for-pr/
(accessed October 5, 2013).
Adepegba A. and Olokor F. 2013. FG launches offensive against new terror sect, Jambs, Punch, 5 January
2013, http://www.punchng.com/news/fg-launches-offensive-against-new-terror-sect-jambs/ (accessed
October 21, 2013).
Freedom, Onuoha C. 2012. Op. Cit.
Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras. 2013. Op. Cit., p.46-3.
Al Jazeera, Ansaru Fighters Claim Nigeria Abductions, 18 December 2012.
Adam, Nossiter. 2013. New Threat in Nigeria as Militants Split Off, New York Times, 23 April 2013. Also
see Desert Herald, Security Officials and Christians are Enemies of Islam and Muslims, We Will Target
and Kill Them Says Spokesman of Jamaatu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi Sudan, Abu Jaafar, 5 June
2012.
Christelow, Alan. 1985. The Yan Tatsine Disturbances in Kano: A Search for Perspective. The Muslim
World 75:69-84; Isichei, Elizabeth. 1987. The Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the
Disinherited. Journal of Religion in Africa 17 (3):195-207. Lubeck, Paul. 1985. Islamic Protest under SemiIndustrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained. Africa 55:369-389.
Muhammad, Yusuf Adam J. 2012. Op. Cit., p. 118-144.
Profile of Nigeria's Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, BBC News, June 22, 2012. Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18020349. (accessed June 25, 2012).
How Nur, Shekau run Boko Haram, Uduma Kalu, Vanguard, September 3, 2011. Available at:
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/how-nur-shekau-run-boko-haram/. (accessed February 12, 2012)
also see, Boko Harams Evolving Threat, Peter Pham J. Africa Security Brief, April 2012. Available at:
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US Lists Boko Haram Leaders as Foreign Terrorists, 2012. Abiodun Oluwarotimi and George Agba,
Leadership, June 22, 2012.
http://leadership.ng/nga/articles/27945/2012/06/22/us_lists_boko_haram_leaders_foreign_terrorists.ht
ml. (accessed July 18, 2012).
Anonymous Interviews with people in Maiduguri. Also see, Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in
Nigeria, James J.F. Forest, Ph.D., The Joint Special Operations University, May 05, 2012, p. 1. Available
at: http://www.jamesforest.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Boko_Haram_JSOU-Report-2012.pdf
James, Forest. 2012. Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, The Joint Special Operations
University, May 05, 2012, p. 1.
http://www.jamesforest.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Boko_Haram_JSOU-Report-2012.pdf
(accessed September 2, 2012).
Lauren Ploch, 2012. Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress, U.S. Congressional Research Service,
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Cook, David. 2011. Op. Cit., p. 1-4
The Shahada is the Islamic act of faith which reads, la illa illah allah wa Muhammad rasul al-Allah; there is no
god except Allah and Muhammad is his messenger.
30
70. The Quranic verses that came up very strongly are: Q2:190 (fight in the way of Allah with those who fight
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
with you). Q2:191 (And kill them wherever you them..). Other examples included the doctrine of shirk;
where the Prophet asked his companions not to associate anything with Allah and the legend of the
Prophets migration from Mecca to Medina, foreshadowing his desire to establish an Islamic state in
Medina and to capture, cleanse and restore the city of Mecca to Islam. Note, al-Bukhari and Islam are the
two most important manuscripts name after the Muslim scholars that compiled them. They contain the
reported speech of the Prophets and his companions. Anything not found or unclear in the Quran, then
reference is always made to the hadiths.
Quran 2:257 and 4:51. This is based on the authors translation of Yusufs Youtube video that presented
the teaching on Islamic History.
Global, Foreign and Colonialist Schools: Their History and Dangers) by Bakr b. Abdullah Ab Zayd (d.
2008)
Yusuf provided a Quranic justification for all these for example: Q23:18: An objection to the scientific
explanation for how rain falls is based on Quran 23:18, where Allah says: And We sent down water from
the sky according to (due) measure, and We caused it to soak into the soil; and We certainly are able to
drain it o (with ease). Q41:9: Another objection was the to time scale in geography theory that measure
the age of the earth and the various deposits within it to be about four million years old. Quran 41:9 states
that God created the earth in just two days. Q 50:38: He rejected the big bang theory in geology which
teaches that God created the universe about one billion six hundred million three 3 minutes and 1 second
years ago. This contradicts Quranic accounts (50:38) of Gods creation of the world in six days. Q23:12:
He rejected Darwins biological theory of evolution which claims human beings evolved from lower forms
of life and are still evolving; humans could thus become another creature in the future. This theory
contradicts Quran 23:12 in which God describes His creation of man- kind out of clay.
Please See - http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=24241&no_ca che=1.
(accessed 25 July, 2012).
Jacob, Zenn, 2013. Draft Boko Haram Statements Compendium November 28, 2012. Jamestown
Foundation, Washington DC. USA.
Ibrahim Mshelia. 2011. Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing, Reuters, August 29,
2011.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claimidUSTRE77S3ZO20110829.
(accessed December 4, 2011)
BBC News. 2012. Profile of Nigerias Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, June 22, 2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18020349. (accessed June 28, 2012).
Jacob, Zenn. 2011. Op. Cit., 8.
Sahara Reporters, 2012. Rift in Boko Haram, Ansaru Splinter Group Emerges, Calls BH Inhuman To
Muslims, January 31, 2012.
http://saharareporters.com/news-page/rift-boko-haram-ansaru-splinter-group-emerges-calls-bhinhuman-muslims (accessed March 30, 2012).
Jamestown Foundation, 2012. Abu Usmatal al-Ansari Announces Boko Haram Breakaway Faction, June
30 2012.
http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39564&tx_ttnews[backPid]=539&cHash=268f31
7c 28e5f58115c512c17f744bd8#.UfbLkayobts (accessed September 15, 2012).
Authors translation of the one of the Videos
Eman El-Shenawi. 2012. New Islamist group emerges in Nigeria, claims different understanding of
Jihad, Al-Arabiya, June 3, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/03/218371.html. (accessed
July 18, 2012).
Al Jazeera, 2012. Ansaru Fighters Claim Nigeria Abductions, 18 December 2012.
U.S. Homeland Security Report. 2013. Boko Haram Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland Security, U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Sept. 2013, Prepared by Majority of the Staff
Committee on Homeland Security, p. 16.
Desert Herald, 2012. Latest: Security Official and Christians are enemies of Islam and Muslims, we will
target and kill them- Says Spokesman of Jamaatu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi Sudan, Abu Jaafar, Desert
Herald, June 5, 2012. http://desertherald.com/?p=1582 (accessed August 2, 2012).
Pls cf. http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vbe/archive/index.php/t-1534 .html, and the brief biography at
http://www.salamanhaj.com/pdf/SalaManhaj_ShaykhBakr, both accessed on 15 January 2011.
Muhammad, Yusuf Adam J. Op. Cit., p 6-7.
Fauzi ,Najjar. 2005. The Arabs, Islam and Globalization, Middle East Policy 12:92.
John, Mackinlay. 2002. Globalisation and Insurgency, Adelphi Paper 352, London: International Institute for
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Jacob Zenn , Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras. 2013. Op. Cit., p. 46-53,
31
91. http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=24241&no_ca
che=1 (accessed
October 7, 2013).
92. http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE66D0202010071 (accessed October 7, 2013).
93. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iN4ymcD_2mqYGSQHiGi
eDR97oOiQ?docId=CNG.316b4488020e8ef560ab7d289fe9db5f.481. (accessed October 7, 2013).
94. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j1FA1NJrS-- ES89YWeX4f----kcQGmA,
(accessed October 7, 2013).
95. Forest, James. 2012. Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Tampa, USA: JSOU, p. 14
96. John, Paden N. 2005. Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution, the Challenge of Democratic Federalism in
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97. John, Paden. 1986. Op. Cit., p. 502-512.
98. Ibid. p. 520.
99. Barkindo, Athanasius Atta. 2011. Ethnicity is at once Primordial, Constructed and Instrumental in Postcolonial Africa,
The Resurgence of Indigene Settler Politics in Central Nigeria, Term Paper, Department of Politics and
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100.Vanguard. 2009. Nigeria: Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad, 14 August 2009.
101. Alhaji Baba Shehu, the influential secretary of the most active Dapchi youth association in Damaturu,
Yobe state, 30th July 2012
102. David, Cook. 2011. Op. Cit., p.3.
103. James, Forest. 2012. Op. Cit., p. 68-69.
104. International Crisis Group Report. 2010. Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Brussels: Report No. 168,
20 December 2010.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/.../Nigeria/168%/20Northern%20Nigeria (accessed August 12, 2012)
105. Kunle, Awosiyan. 2012. Boko Haram Orders Southerners to Leave North within 3 Days, Tribune
Newspaper, Agency Report, 3 January 2012: 2.
106. Strategy Page, Islamic Terrorists Furious over Recent Defeat, 2 June 2013; Yusuf Alli, How Bombers are
Chosen, by Boko Haram Suspect, The Nation, February 9, 2012.
107.Sahara Reporters, Christian Militants in Southern Kaduna Threaten Fulani Herdsmen, Give Seven Days
Evacuation Notice, 5 June 2012. Akhwat Akwop 2012. Jamaatu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi Sudan
Threatens Southern Kaduna Militant Group, Desert Herald. 11 June 2012.
108. International Institute for Counter Terrorisms Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, Periodical Review July
2010 No. 2, August 2010.
109. Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras. 2013. Op. Cit., p. 46-53.
110. Vanguard, Dozens of Boko Haram Help Malis Rebels Seize Gao, 9 April 2012; Serge Daniel, Bilal
Hicham, rebelle du Nord du Mali, Radio France Internationale, 4 August 2012.
111. Abubakar Shekau, Glad Tidings, O Soldiers of Allah, Ana Al-Muslim Network, 29 November 2012.
112. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j1FA1NJrS-- ES89YWeX4f----kcQGmA.
This particular statement was released in reference to the 2009 clashes that killed Muhammd Yusuf.
However, it was issued by an anonymous member in March 2010.
113. Konye Obaji Ori. 2012. Nigerias Growing Poverty, The Africa Report, February 14, 2012.
http://www.theafricareport.com/index.php/2012021450181576/west-africa/nigeria-s-growing-poverty50181576.html.
114. Timothy Holmann. 2013. French and Belgian Foreign Fighters in Iraq (2003-2005): Lessons for Syria,
September 24, 2013, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, ICPVTR,
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, RSIS, Singapore, Graduate School of Nanyang Technological
University (NTU).
115. Victoria Ojeme, 2012. Boko Haram has foreign fighters FG Vanguard Newspaper, May 19, 2012.
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117.Jacob Zenn , Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras. Op. Cit., p. 46-53.
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Index of Group Discussion

Four Focus Group discussions were conducted. Each group was made up of ten people including
professionals, ordinary people, political and religious leaders. A member of each group was allowed to
interview at least 50 people for the group discussion. Sample questions centred on the narratives and
frameworks used my Boko Haram sect leaders in their messages. How are these messages perceived and
viewed and to what extent do they affect the mobilization and recruitment drive of the sect
Group 1 Discussion in Maiduguri (Borno State) 2nd July 2012: The discussion focused mainly on
Boko Haram messages that manipulate local grievance; police brutality, political impunity, injustice and
marginalization. 75% of the respondents agreed that the failure to adequately reform the security
institution played a significant role in the conflict.
Group 2 Discussion in Damaturu (Yobe State) 9th July 2012: In Damaturu capital of Yobe state, the
indigene-settler concept was discussed. Most respondents accepted that the inability to overcome
primordial sentiments including ethno-regional claims motivated the transformation of Boko Haram. The
government needs to revise the laws to give all Nigerians equal of rights wherever they find themselves in
the country.
Group 3 Discussion in Bauchi (Bauchi State) 16th July 2012: In Bauchi, questions border on the level
of misinformation, the type of facts ordinary people have access to and the extent to which the failure of
the military to tell their own side of the story influenced the pattern of violence in the north-east. 60%
seemed attached to the single narrative structure and blamed everything on the military and their
collaborators. Perhaps the cooperation of the generals would have changed views and prepared the way
for national reconciliation and rule of law reforms.
Group 4 Discussion in Yola (Adamawa State) 23rd July 2012: Discussions in Adamawa State centred
on narratives against western institutions, western civilization and culture. Relationships of Boko Haram
with international jihadi movements and what the future trajectories could be. Discussants seem to
suggest that the inability of the West African regional governments to share information and fight
terrorism will have a lot of important on the conflict. In addition, 75% seem to agree that Boko Haram
threats against the west, particularly America is a publicity stunt, a conflict strategy to gain relevance and
publicity. Though they doubt that it has the capability to attack US interests directly, the sect should not
in any way be taken for granted.
Index of Individual Interviews Conducted.
1. Professor Sabastine Patrick Hayatu, retired professor of history at the Adebayero

University Kano, 25 July 2012 in Yola, Adamawa State, North-eastern Nigeria.
2. Dr. Maxwell Gidado, former adviser to the president Obasanjo on legal and constitutional
3.
4.
5.
6.
matters and a Head of Department at the Department of Law, Nassarawa State University, Keffi,
Nigeria, 27th July 2012.
Alhaji Baba Shehu, the influential secretary of the most active Dapchi youth association in
Damaturu, Yobe state, 30th July 2012.
Ayuba Haruna, Department of Political Science, University of Maiduguri, Borno State, 2 August,
2012.
Ahmadu Hamman Jumba, Division of General Studies, University of Maiduguri, Borno State, 2
August 2012.
Others remain anonymous for security reasons.
39
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Nigerias Political Violence Research Network

Boko Haram and ANSARU in North-Eastern

NPVRN Working Paper No. 2, Abuja-Nigeria

Author: Atta Barkindo (PhD Candidate), School of Oriental and African

Date: November 2013

Copyright 2013, Atta Barkindo

Chapter Two: Tabulation of Boko Haram and ANSARU Messages ..................................... 12

Chapter Three: Analytical Discourse of BH and ANSARUs Messages .................... 19

Chapter One: Narrative Discourse: The Brief History of North-Eastern Nigeria

Religious Composition of North-East

Religious Composition of the North -East

The Emergence of Boko Haram

Chapter Two: Tabulation of Boko Haram and ANSARU Messages

Jihad is one of the pillars of Islam

Debate on the rejection of western

Jan. 11, 2006

Calls for Islamic state, rejects the name

Jan. 11, 2006

July 26. 2009

July 30, 2009

Establishment of Islamic state through

Table 4: Chart showing percentage of pre-2009 frameworks

Tirades against American foreign

Table 6: Chart showing the percentage of 2010 frameworks

Frameworks supported in 2010

Table 7: Tabulation of 2011 Messages

Bars, clubs and

Sharia is supreme to the

Table 8: Chart showing the percentage of 2011 frameworks

Frameworks supported in 2011

Table 9: Tabulation of 2012 Messages

Sultan and the

Jihad is a duty against infidels

Christianity is paganism and the

Attacks on churches in Jos to fulfil

Those who oppose the religion of

Table 10: Chart showing the percentage of 2012 frameworks

Tabulation of ANSARU Messages

Jihad fi Sabillilah (Fighting for the cause

Muslims must practice forgiveness.

Defending global Islam and a response

Table 12: Chart showing the percentage of ANSARUs frameworks of 2012-2013

FRAMWORKS REJECTED IN 20122013

Chapter Three: Analytical Discourse of BH and ANSARUs Messages and Ideology

References to Regional and International Jihadi Movements

Boko Haram and ANSARU: Future Trajectories

About the Author

20th, 2012, p. 47.

Index of Group Discussion

1. Professor Sabastine Patrick Hayatu, retired professor of history at the Adebayero

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