U.S.

Foreign Policy:
The Nature of American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

Eunice Banchiri Omaita

ABSTRACT
The post Cold War period has been accompanied by globalization and a wave of challenges
especially regarding security. Non-traditional security issues such as terror activities have taken a
center stage in the global arena, and thus posed greater challenges because of their complex
nature. As such, these challenges arguably demand even quicker responses that the president
only can provide, as congress oversight would slow down these processes.

The nature of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era

In the wake of globalization, the nature and conduct of American foreign policy is
arguably as complex as it was during the Cold War, whereby the president exercised more
powers in foreign affairs than what the Constitution provides. The Cold War period favored the
president as the sole organ of foreign policy even though the Constitution provides Congress
with more powers than the president.1 Writing in 1988, Harold Koh argued that the President
almost always [won] in foreign affairs because the nature of communism threat against the
United States required secrecy and demanded tools that only the president has access to. Koh
makes a compelling argument, citing historical examples of foreign policy instances in which the
presidents have exercised greater initiatives without congressional knowledge such as, the IranContra affair, and the 1986 bombing in Libya.2 With communism over, the post Cold War era
would seem to provide opportunities for greater congressional presence in foreign affairs, but the
conduct of foreign policy post-Cold War shows similar patterns--of much greater executive
initiatives--established in the Cold War period.
The post Cold War period has been accompanied by globalization and a wave of
challenges especially regarding security. Non-traditional security issues such as terror activities
have taken a center stage in the global arena, and thus posed greater challenges because of their
complex nature. As such, these challenges arguably demand even quicker responses that the
president only can provide, as congress oversight would slow down these processes.3 The
question that follows then is how congress has responded to these challenges. Has the post-Cold
War challenges led to substantial cases of congressional acquiescence in foreign affairs? This
paper will argue that congressional acquiescence is likely when there is a direct threat or attack
to the security of the United States, but it is not given in other foreign policy issues due to
partisanship. It will argue that partisanship has not, however stopped presidents from taking

Julie Blase, "Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs" (lecture, American
Foreign Policy class, Principia College, Elsah, January 26, 2015).
2
Harold Hongju Koh, "Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs," in The
National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1990), 158-173.
3
Oren Gross and Fionnuala Niu0301 Aolau0301in, "It's a Bad World out There (II): Domestic
and Foreign Affairs," in Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 205-214, accessed January 29, 2015, http://goo.gl/Y7egMM.

executive initiatives, and that the same patterns of the Cold War period can be seen in the
conduct of American foreign policy post-Cold War.4
Much has been written about the nature of foreign policy making, and the Constitutional
separation of congressional and executive powers. Much controversy surrounds war powers, and
scholars have taken particular interest in examining how various presidents have failed to invoke
the War Powers Act, that was established in 1974, after the controversial Vietnam War. The War
Powers Act was the established to limit presidential power in deploying military troops in hostile
situations and required that the president report commitment of U.S. forces within twenty-four
hours, and end military action within sixty days if Congress does not declare war or authorize the
use of force.5 This act would seem to act as a constraint for the president's use of military force
without congressional oversight, yet the post-Cold War period has seen many instances whereby
the president has deployed military forces without congressional approval. Presidents have often
taken such actions citing the given Constitutional power as the Commander in Chief of Armed
Forces. During the Gulf War for example, President George H. W. Bush deployed military
troops in the Iraq border without informing congress.6 Predictably, this decision was
controversial and was challenged by Democrats who then petitioned in the Supreme Court. The
court, however, declined to involve itself in foreign policy battles between the executive and
legislative branches, and thus supporting one Kohs arguments that the court often favors the
presidents foreign affairs decision.7 Even though the court did not rule in favor of the president,
its non-involvement ultimately favored Bushs decision.
Perhaps more controversial is the 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya in which President
Barack Obama authorized bombings in Libya without Congresss approval. Because of such an
action Obama has been deemed an imperial president. Conor Friedersdorf a staff writer for the
Atlantic writes, due to the nature of the Libyan conflict, these misrepresentations weren't nearly

Gross and Niu0301 Aolau0301in, "It's a Bad World," in Law in Times of Crisis, 205-214.
Toni Johnson, "Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy," The Council on Foreign Relations, last
modified January 24, 2013, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congress-usforeign-policy/p29871.
6
"Congressional Power - Congress and the end of the cold war Read more:
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Congressional-Power-Congress-and-the-end-of-the-coldwar.html#ixzz3YtU14hGs," in Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, 1-4, accessed April 26, 2015,
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Congressional-Power-Congress-and-the-end-of-the-coldwar.html.
7
Ibid
5

as consequential as, say, the way George W. Bush spoke out about weapons of mass destruction
before the Iraq war. It is nevertheless an example of the president deliberately misleading the
American people in order to facilitate false impressions about foreign military actions that he
finds convenient8 In both of the above cases, both actions of George. W. H. and Obama were
met with great scrutiny from the Capitol Hill demonstrating that congressional acquiescence in
foreign affairs is not given.
The 1999 defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty illustrates a perfect example of
congressional disapproval of the presidents initiative. The defeat was largely caused by
partisanship, whereby a Republican controlled senate challenged President Clinton.9 The current
issue surrounding the Iran nuclear deal provides another example of partisanship in foreign
affairs, when 47 senators wrote a letter to Iran officials saying, any nuclear deal they sign with
President Barack Obamas administration wont last after Obama leaves office.10 Even though
the letter is not likely to have a significant impact on Irans decision, it illustrates a case
Congress has challenged the Presidents initiative in foreign affairs.
Yet, congressional acquiescence can be expected when there is a direct attack or threat
again the United States. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks Congress and the public rallied behind the
president in his declaration of war on terror. In the aftermath of 9/11 congress passed a
legislation that authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001....11 What was interesting about this
legislation is that it did not go through the formal committee legislation review process12
Arguably, the latter would have taken a longer time in a situation that demanded an emergency

Conor Friedersdor, "How Obama Ignored Congress, and Misled America, on War in Libya," The
Atlantic, September 13, 2012, 1-4, accessed April 25, 2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/how-obama-ignored-congress-and-misled-americaon-war-in-libya/262299/.
9
Johnson, "Congress and U.S. Foreign," The Council on Foreign Relations.
10
Daniel Drezner, "Congress Tries to Go beyond Trolling on Foreign Policy. It Wont Work,"
Washington Post, March 9, 2015, 1-3, accessed April 26, 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/03/09/congress-tries-to-go-beyond-trolling-onforeign-policy-it-wont-work/.
11
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Authorization for Use of Military Force in
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-140): Legislative History, Doc., at 1-6 (2007). Accessed April 26,
2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf.
12
Ibid

response against the perpetrators of 9/11.Congressional acquiescence was demonstrated when

both house passed the legislation with overwhelming votes.13
Post-Cold War practice of foreign policy indicates the same patterns of executive
initiatives of the Cold War era. Even though the threat of communism has been over for a long
time, the subsequent security challenges demand quick responses and resources that are available
to only the president.

13

Ibid

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