Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Revista 3 2009
Revista 3 2009
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PROFIL: CONCURENA
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Recenzia lucrrii: Dr. Cristiana CICORIA, Nonprofit organizations facing
competition. The application of United Nations, European and German
Competition Law to not-for-profit entities (Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2006,
286p.).
5
Inspector de concuren, Direcia Juridic-contencios.
6
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.18 i nota de subsol nr.18.
7
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.13.
8
Planul detaliat al lucrrii se gsete la
adresa:http://www.agiimc.de/intelligentSEARCH.nsf/alldocs/683CCA10
96AF9235C125715A004816FF/$File/88087291.PDF?OpenElement
(accesat pe 26 august 2009).
9
Cele 246 de pagini ale textului propriu-zis al tezei sunt nsoite de 611 note de
subsol.
10
Lista lor complet se afl la: C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.259-286.
11
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.17 i nota de subsol nr.15.
12
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.41-44.
13
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.35-41.
14
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.18.
15
O organizatie nonprofit care s-a confruntat simultan cu concurena
intrasectorial i cu cea infrasectorial a fost Crucea Roie American; pentru
detalii, a se vedea: C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.44-45 i p.55-56.
16
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.19.
3/2009
17
Review of Dr. Cristiana CICORIA, Nonprofit organizations facing
competition. The application of United States, European and German
Competition Law to not-for-profit entities (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2006,
286pp.). The text of the following book review was translated into English by
Ioan D. Popa and revised by Nathaniel Cornoiu-Jitrau.
18
Competition inspector, Legal Department.
19
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.18 and footnote 18; the book's description is available
at:http://www.peterlang.com/index.cfm?vID=55164&vLang=E&vHR=1&v
UR=2&vUUR=1 (accessed on 26th of August, 2009).
20
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.13.
21
Its detailed plan could be downloaded at: http://www.agiimc.de/intelligentSEARCH.nsf/alldocs/683CCA1096AF9235C125715A004
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Pentru dezvoltri, a se vedea: C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.229 i nota de
subsol
nr.581, p.230 i nota de subsol nr.582.
66
C.CICORIA, op.cit., p.249.
67
Pentru o introducere n acest domeniu, a se vedea: Ernest GELLHORN,
William E. KOVACIC, Stephen CALKINS (eds.), Antitrust Law & Economics
in a nutshell (ediia a cincea revzut i adugit, Thomson/West, St.Paul,
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68
For details see: C. CICORIA, op.cit., p.229 and footnote 581, p.230 and
footnote 582.
69
C. CICORIA, op.cit., p.249.
70
An useful introduction in this field could be found at: Ernest GELLHORN,
William E. KOVACIC, Stephen CALKINS (eds.), Antitrust Law & Economics in
a nutshell (5th revised edition, St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2004, xlvii-617pp.).
For a detailed presentation see: Abel M. MATEUS, Teresa MOREIRA (eds.),
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A.
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2.
A.
B.
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5.
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Marcela SLGEAN76
n Romnia interbelic, primele semne ale crizei
economice s-au fcut simite nc din 1928, cnd
unul dintre primele indicii ale agravrii situaiei a
fost severa cdere a preurilor la Bursa de valori din
Bucureti. Prima, i cea mai grav afectat ramur
economic a fost agricultura. Odat declanat
criza, capacitatea rii de a face fa situaiei a fost
mult diminuat att datorit economiei sale
predominant agrare, ct i lipsei de diversificare a
ramurilor economice. Cealalt ramur economic,
industria, a progresat ntr-un ritm constant i relativ
ridicat (anii '20 fiind martorii unei nfierbntate
discuii n jurul problemei industriei i
industrializrii), dar criza economic a ntrerupt
aceast dezvoltare, producia industrial ajungnd,
n 1932, cu 57% mai mic fa de anul 1928. Drept
consecin, venitul naional pe cap de locuitor a
nregistrat o curb descendent, de la 11.000 lei, n
1928, la 4.800 lei n 1932.
Odat criza instalat, att guvernele anilor 19291932, ct i cele care au urmat, au ncercat varii
msuri pentru combaterea ei. Preocuparea
imediat a fost datoria rneasc, din dorina
autoritilor de a percepe toate taxele datorate de
rani statului. Principalul motiv pentru care
autoritile s-au concentrat mai nti asupra acestei
msuri a fost lipsa de bani, statul fiind nevoit de mai
multe ori, n intervalul 1929-1933, s nu plteasc
salarii diferitelor categorii de bugetari (cunoscutele
curbe de sacrificiu). Msura s-a dovedit a fi un
eec (la un moment dat s-a mers aa de departe
nct s-au scos la licitaie proprietile celor care nui puteau achita datoriile; pe cine nu a sracit
criza, a srcit statul, se spunea n epoc!!!). n
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Marcela SLGEAN78
The first symptoms of the economic crisis in
Romania, within the inter-war period, were felt
even during the year 1928, when a harsh prices fall
down at the Bucharest Stock Exchange took place,
as one of the first sign of the state worsening. The
agriculture was the first and the most seriously
affected economic branch. Once unleashed the
crisis, our country ability to face such a situation was
much diminished due to the absence of an
economic diversification. The other economic
branch, the industry, was developing in a constant
and rather high rhythm (the 20' decade being the
whiteness of passionate debates on the industry and
industrialization). But the economic crisis
interrupted this development, the industrial output
in 1932 being by 57% lower than that achieved in
1928. Consequently, the national income per
capita registered a descending curve, from 11,000
Lei in 1928, attained the level of 4,800 Lei in 1932.
Once the crisis installed, both the Governments
acting over the period 1929-1932, and the
following made endeavors to apply different
measures in order to discourage it. The immediate
concern was the peasant debt, the authorities
intending at the levying of all the taxes owed by the
peasants towards the State. The main reason
explaining why the authorities decided to focus
their attention on this measure, as the first priority,
was the lack of liquidities, the State being, many
times over the period 1929-1933, in the incapacity
to pay wages to different categories of employees in
the public institutions (the so-called sacrifice
curves). In addition, attempting to accomplish the
recovery of debts, the State made hard efforts,
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78
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81
Head of Directorate of Reporting, Monitoring and Control of
State Aid.
82
Competition inspector, Directorate of Reporting, Monitoring
and Control of State Aid.
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*
*
Raportul este conceput pe structura Scoreboard-ului raportul ajutoarelor de stat elaborat de Comisia
European, prin care aceasta analizeaz evoluia i
nivelul ajutoarelor de stat acordate de Statele
Membre ale Uniunii Europene.
Pentru analiza volumului ajutoarelor de stat acordate
n Romnia, s-au folosit indicatorii macroeconomici
agregai transmii de Institutul Naional de Statistic
(PIB, deflatorul PIB, cursul mediu anual de schimb).
Analiza evoluiei ajutoarelor de stat acordate n
Romnia n perioada 2005-2007 este realizat n
primul rnd pe volumul total anual i apoi pe dou
paliere, respectiv pe obiectivele care s-au avut n
vedere la acordarea ajutoarelor i pe instrumentele
utilizate pentru acordarea acestora.
A. Ajutorul de Stat Naional total (mai puin
agricultura, pescuitul i transporturile) exprimat n
preuri curente prezint o tendin general de
scdere, de la 2,86 mld. RON n 2005 (0,78 mld.
Euro) la 2,24 mld. RON n 2007 (0,67 mld. Euro), cu
o cretere n 2006 la 3,38 mld. RON (0,96 mild.
Euro), dar o scdere drastic fa de 6,51 mld. RON
n 2004 (1,60 mld Euro).
Ca pondere n Produsul Intern Brut, Ajutorul de Stat
Naional a avut o tendin de scdere continu, de la
1,00% n 2005 i 0,99% n 2006 la 0,56% n anul
2007, situaie i mai evident fa de 2,64% in 2004.
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*
*
31
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2005
2006
2007
6.510.497,14
2.860.438,24
3.383.648,79
2.248.763,58
Mii Euro *
1.606.256,65
789.426,57
960.036,54
673.827,22
6.510.497,14
2.549.410,20
2.728.749,02
1.608.557,64
100,00
39,16
41,91
24,71
2,64
1,00
0,99
0,56
Dinamica %
Ponderea ajutorului de stat
naional n PIB % (exceptnd
agricultura, pescuitul i
transporturile)
* calculat pe baza cursului mediu anual al leului n raport cu euro, sursa INSSE;
** s-a utilizat deflatorul PIB pentru transformarea n preuri constante 2004, sursa INSSE (deflator PIB anul 2004=100%;
2005=112,20%; 2006=124,00%; 2007=139,80%);
2,5
(%)
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
0,0
2004
2005
2006
2007
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2005
2006
2007
6.510.497,14
2.860.438,24
3.383.648,79
2.248.763,58
Thousand Euro *
1.606.256,65
789.426,57
960.036,54
673.827,22
6.510.497,14
2.549.410,20
2.728.749,02
1.608.557,64
100,00
39,16
41,91
24,71
2,64
1,00
0,99
0,56
Dynamics %
Weight of the national state aid in
the GDP% (except agriculture,
fishery and transport)
* calculated on the basis of the annual average exchange rate of RON against Euro, source INSSE;
** the GDP deflator has been used in order to transform in 2004 constant prices, source INSSE (GDP deflator for 2004=100%,
2005=112,20%, 2006=124%, 2007=139,80%)
Graph no.1 The weight of the national state aid in the GDP
3,0
2,5
(%)
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
0,0
2004
2005
2006
33
2007
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34
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*
*
36
3/2009
*
* *
In conclusion, the year 2005 marks Romania's
alignment to the community policies and practices
in the state aid field. It is the start of a period in
which Romania's sustained efforts of respecting the
rules in state aid field have led Romania to hold a
comparable level with the majority of countries
which became member states during the last
accession wave in 2004.
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85
86
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Tr e b u i e r e m a r c a t c , n c o n d i i i l e
substituibilitii extrem de reduse a grului de
panificaie, eventualele nelegeri asupra
preurilor pot produce efecte de amploare
asupra pieei respective i a celor din aval. Aceste
efecte pot fi amplificate i de asimetria preurilor,
caracteristic pieelor agricole, inclusiv pieei
produciei i comercializrii grului, care se
manifest prin majorarea preurilor produselor din
aval odat cu majorarea preului grului, dar i prin
meninerea la cote ridicate a preului produselor
din aval n cazul diminurii preului grului.
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87
Cristina Havri,ataat pe probleme de energie n cadrul
Reprezentanei Permanente a Romniei pe lng Uniunea
European;doctorand n Relaii Economice Internaionale la
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureti;
88
Site-ul Directiei Antitrust a Departamentului de Justiie este
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
89
Block, M.K., Nold, F.C., Sidak, J.G. (1981), The Deterrent Effect
of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of Political Economy 89, June,
pp. 429-45.
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92
The website of the Antitrust Division of the American
Department of Justice is http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/.
93
Block, M.K., Nold, F.C., Sidak, J.G. (1981), The Deterrent
Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of Political Economy 89,
June, pp. 429-45.
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1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
74
85
84
95
137
10
10
13
11
Sherman cap.
1 -restrngerea
comerului
Sherman cap.2
- Monopol
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
79
118
104
77
76
Firma incriminat
Valoarea amenzii
(milioane dolari)
Vitamine
500
Transport aerian
300
Transport aerian
300
Semiconductori
300
BASF AG (1999)
Vitamine
225
Semiconductori
185
Semiconductori
160
Electrozi de grafit
135
Electrozi de grafit
134
Electrozi de grafit
110
100
94
Discursul lui Scott Hammond, asistent adjunct al Ministrului
Justiiei, responsabil cu implementarea n materie penal a
legislaiei n domeniul concurenei, cu titlul Recent
Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division's
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1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
74
85
84
95
137
10
10
13
11
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
79
118
104
77
76
Table No. 2. Fines situated above the value 100 million dollars
collected by the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division97
Incriminated company
Field
Fine
(million dollars)
Vitamins
500
Air Transport
300
Air Transport
300
Semiconductors
300
BASF AG (1999)
Vitamins
225
Semiconductors
185
Semiconductors
160
Graphite electrodes
135
Graphite electrodes
134
Graphite electrodes
110
100
96
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http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/usc_sup_01_15_10_2_20
_I.html.
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101
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108
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110
Raportul Hart Scott Rodino din anul 2008, disponibil la adresa
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/hsrreport.pdf.
111
Detalii privind instrumentarea cazului sunt disponibile la adresa
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/dobson.htm.
112
Cazul este disponibil la adresa:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710120/index.shtm.
113
P. 16.
114
Institutul American petru Antitrust este o organizaie
independent, non-profit, cu sediul la Washington, care are ca
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According to the 2008 Annual report Hart-ScottRodino, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice analysed 16 merger transactions and
concluded that, in case they had been allowed to
finalise those transactions, it would have led to a
reduction of competition. 15 such cases were
solved outside courts.
115
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Bibliografie
Antitrust Modernization Commision (2007), Report and
Recommendations, disponibil la adresa:
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommenda
tion/toc.htm;
Block, M.K., Nold, F.C., Sidak, J.G. (1981), The
Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of
Political Economy 89, June, pp. 429-45;
Federal Trade Commission& Department of Justice
(2008), Hart-Scott-Rodino Report, disponibil la adresa:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/hsrreport.pdf;
Federal Trade Commission (2008), The FTC in 2008: A
Force for Consumers and Competition, disponibil la
adresa
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm:
Neale, A. , Goyder, D.G., (1980) The Antitrust Laws of
the United States of America, 3rd ed. (Cambridge
University
Press);
Whish, R (2003), Competition Law, 5th edition (London:
Butterworth).
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References
Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007), Report and
Recommendations, available at:
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendatio
n/toc.htm;
Block, M.K., Nold, F.C., Sidak, J.G. (1981), The Deterrent
Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of Political
Economy 89, June, pp. 429-45;
Federal Trade Commission& Department of Justice (2008),
Hart-Scott-Rodino Report, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/hsrreport.pdf;
Federal Trade Commission (2008), The FTC in 2008: A
Force for Consumers and Competition, available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm:
Neale, A. , Goyder, D.G., (1980) The Antitrust Laws of the
United States of America, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University
Press);
Whish, R (2003), Competition Law, 5th edition (London:
Butterworth).
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60
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61
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124
Lewis, David, Competition Law and Policy in Bad Times, speech
before the DPRU (Development Policy Research Unit), Conference
on Regulation, Johannesburg, 2008, October.
125
Marea Britanie, Oficiul pentru comer loial. OFT statement on
proposed merger between Lloyds TSB and HBOS, Comunicat de
pres 108-08, 18 septembrie 2008.
126
A se consulta Degryse i Ongena, care, n Competition and
62
3/2009
128
Lewis, David, Competition Law and Policy in Bad Times, speech
before the DPRU (Development Policy Research Unit), Conference
on Regulation, Johannesburg, 2008, October.
129
Great Britain, OFT statement on proposed merger between
Lloyds TSB and HBOS, Press release 108-08, 2008, September 18.
130
See Degryse and Ongena, who in Competition and Regulation in
63
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Experiena SUA n timpul Marii Depresiuni (19291933), n special legalizarea cartelurilor, urmare a
Actului de Redresare a Industriei Naionale a artat
c o astfel de abordare poate prejudicia i mai mult
economia n loc s o ajute. NIRA (1933) s-a
promulgat ca rspuns la declinul industrial care a
avut loc n timpul depresiunii din anii 1930 i a
facilitat controlul preurilor i al produciei de ctre
firmele organizate n asociaii comerciale, care
pn nu demult era ilegal, conform legilor antitrust
din SUA. n cele din urm, NIRA s-a dovedit c a
contribuit puin, sau deloc la redresarea
economic132. Mai mult dect att, suspendarea
regulilor de concuren n SUA n anii 1930 a facut
c Marea Depresiune s dureze mai mult133.
132
A se consulta, spre exemplu, Harold L. Cole i Lee E. Ohanian,
New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A
General Equilibrium Analysis, Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, (2004, vol. 112(4), pag. 779-816,
august).
133
Fingleton, J., Competition Policy in Troubled Times, speech given
on 20 January 2009, disponibil la link-ul
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2009/spe0109.pdf.
134
J. Taylor, The Output Effects of Government Sponsored Cartels during
the New Deal, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 50(1), (2002, p. 1-10).
64
135
Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice,
editura Cambridge, (2004, p. 9).
136
A se consulta, spre exemplu, Hayashi i Prescott, The 1990s in
Japan: A lost decade, Review of Economic Dynamics, 2002 sau Bill
Emmott Rivals Chapter 8, How the struggle between China, India
and Japan will shape our next decade, Penguin 2008.
137
Elena Carletti, European University Institute, Background Note
on Competition and Financial Markets prepared for OECD Global
Competition Forum, 2009, February - DAF(COMP)/(2009)2.
3/2009
138
See, for instance, Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal
Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General
Equilibrium Analysis, Journal of Political Economy, University of
Chicago Press, (2004, vol. 112(4), pp. 779-816, August);
139
Fingleton, J., Competition Policy in Troubled Times, speech given
on 20 January 2009, available on:
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2009/spe0109.pdf.
140
J. Taylor, The Output Effects of Government Sponsored Cartels
during the New Deal, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 50(1),
(2002, pp. 1-10).
141
Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice,
Cambridge Publishing House, (2004, p. 9).
142
See, for instance, Hayashi and Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A
lost decade, Review of Economic Dynamics, 2002 or Bill Emmott
Rivals Chapter 8, How the struggle between China, India and Japan
will shape our next decade, Penguin 2008.
143
Elena Carletti, European University Institute, Background Note
on Competition and Financial Markets prepared for OECD Global
Competition Forum, 2009, February - DAF(COMP)/(2009)2.
65
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144
147
145
148
66
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149
152
150
153
67
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154
A se consulta, spre exemplu, cazul United States vs. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) i instruciunile privind
concentrarile economice orizontale ale autoritilor de concuren
din SUA (1997).
155
A se consulta, Instruciunile privind evaluarea concentrrilor
orizontale, n conformitate cu Regulamentul CE privind controlul
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The government bailouts for assisting nonfinancial companies: the response of the
competition policy and the economic effects
157
See, for instance the case United States vs. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) and the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines of US DOJ&FTC (1997).
158
See the EC Notice-Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
69
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160
Dell'Ariccia, G., Asymmetric Information and the Structure of the
Banking Industry, European EconomicReview, 45, (2001, p. 19571980).
161
Degryse H. and S. Ongena, Competition and Regulation in the
Banking Sector: A Review of the Empirical Evidence on the sources of
bank rents, in A. Thakor and A. Boot (eds.), Handbook of Financial
Intermediation and Banking, Elsevier, (2008, p. 483-542).
162
A se consulta, spre exemplu, lucrarea de succes a lui Allen, F. and D.
Gale, Competition and Stability, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
36(3), (2004, p. 453-480)
163
Degryse H. and S. Ongena (2007). Background Note in Competition
and Regulation in Retail Banking, OECD, p. 15-58.
164
Boot, A.W.A., Consolidation and strategic positioning in banking with
implications for Europe, in R.E. Litan and R. Herring (eds), BrookingWharton Papers on Financial Services, (2003, p. 3784) sau Boot, A.,
Financial services: consolidation and strategic positioning, in
International Handbook of Competition, chapter V, edited by Manfred
Neumann and Jurgen Weigand, (2004, p. 133-165).
165
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine, Bank Concentration,
Competition and Crises, Journal of banking and Finance, 30, (2004,
p.1581-1603).
166
Bianco, M., F. Ghezzi i P. Magnani, L'Applicazione della Disciplina
Antitrust nel Settore Bancario Statunitense, in M. Polo (ed), Industria
Bancaria e Concorrenza, Bologna: Il Mulino, (1998, p.143-258).
70
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71
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175
Curtea Europeana de Justiie, 14-07-1981, C 172/80, Gerhard
Zchner c. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG.
176
Carletti E. and X. Vives, Regulation and Competition Policy in the
Banking Sector in X. Vives (ed.), Assessment and Perspectives of
Competition Policy in Europe, Oxford University Press, 2008.
177
Brusco S. and F. Castiglionesi, Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard
and Financial Contagion, Journal of Finance, 62, (2007, p. 2275-
2302).
178
Comunicarea CE 2008/c 270/02 din 25.10.2008 cu privire la
aplicarea regulilor de ajutor de stat n domeniul instituiilor financiare n
contextul crizei financiare globale.
179
Situaia general a Ajutoarelor de Stat acordate din fiecare Stat
membru al UE Primvara anului 2009, Bruxelles, 08.04.2009, COM
(2009) 164.
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180
European Court of Justice, 14-07-1981, C 172/80, Gerhard Zchner c.
Bayerische Vereinsbank AG.
181
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Concluzii
Concurena este nucleul de baz al pieelor pe
deplin funcionale. ns, n recesiune, autoritile
de concuren trebuie s fac o alegere adeseori
dificil ntre soluionarea unor probleme reale de
concuren i probleme unde intervenia politicii i
legii concurenei este mai puin evident ns unde
presiunile publice sunt mari.
74
3/2009
Conclusions
Competition is central to well-functioning markets.
But, in a recession, competition agencies often face
a difficult trade-off between doing work that
addresses real harm and addressing issues that raise
huge public concerns but where there is not a
competition problem, or not an intervention that
could make things better.
US experience, as well as that of other countries in
the previous economic and financial crisis suggest
that relaxing the principles of competition law by
approaches such as those illustrated above (for
instance, a greater demand for economic
concentrations in the financial industry or selective
and uncontrolled subsidies granted to financial and
non-financial institutions) is less likely to contribute
to putting an end to the economic crisis both in the
short and long run. The example of the delayed
recovery from the depression in the 1930s clearly
showed the costs inflicted, when competition rules
not applied.
184
State Aid Scoreboard, Spring 2009 Update, 08.04.2009,
Brussels, COM(2009) 164.
75
3/2009
Bibliografie
1.
2.
Opinia noastr sun astfel: dac recesiunea este peste 8,5% confirmat i de expertii FMI , deficitul bugetar tinde tot ctre
8,5% i omajul se apropie vertiginos de 8% asistnd la un
deficit financiar gemene etc. Cum poate aciona legea
concurenei n aceste condiii deosebit de vitrege? S nu
revenim oare la un protecionism pe o perioad limitat?
3.
4.
N.I.N.
76
3/2009
Bibliography
1.
2.
3.
4.
N.I.N.
77
3/2009
78
3/2009
79
3/2009
Antitrust
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_
agreements/index.html.
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/
index.html.
185
Material realizat de Carmen Bucur, inspector de concuren,
Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.
80
3/2009
Antitrust
186
Drafted and translated by Carmen Bucur, competition inspector,
Research and Synthesis Directorate.
81
3/2009
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/specific_rules.html.
82
3/2009
State
Aid
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/specific_
rules.html.
83
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