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  • Brink - The Autonomy of Ethics

    Încărcat de

    Gurgu Marius
    16 vizualizări10 pagini
    About morality

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    Brink - the Autonomy of Ethics

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    About morality

    Drepturi de autor:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Descărcați ca PDF sau citiți online pe Scribd
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    16 vizualizări10 pagini

    Brink - The Autonomy of Ethics

    Încărcat de

    Gurgu Marius
    About morality

    Drepturi de autor:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Descărcați ca PDF sau citiți online pe Scribd
    Indicator pentru conținut neadecvat
    din 10
    [Avene ofthe eras New Yk, NY 1001328, USA tat se hte wacmdgeonp EOD ‘Dr ulcson ia opie Suto ay econ {nds prvison of lent colsie omen opens, ‘Sereno ny ay as pc wit ‘etn perms of Cag ately rs, epee 507,208 ‘Acataog cfr ds pean avalon the Bis trary bay of anges Catlging ableton Dasa “Conti cng in ted by Meet Min Fen (Gel compe sony) Ins hear fea ISoN Osa tO aac) ISN OSaL- ner yy [rte Narn Mel 122 Fe ee, sunosca a0 1334 976001: dock ISBN SeaS2L E0407 ppt ‘Cong Ueiy Pt espa Sh pert ec of URL fora ot ‘heparan sre on on ‘Wee rl oman seo api The Cambridge Companion to ATHEISM Béited by Michael Martin Boston University CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 9 The Autonomy of Ethics ‘Our commitment to the objectivity of ethics isn deep one. Ethis is ‘objective just in case there are fact or truths about what is good ot ‘bad and right or wrong that obtain independently ofthe maral beliefs or ateiudes of appraisers. A commitment to objectivity spat ofa commit ‘ment to the normativity of ethics. Moral judgments expres normative claims about what we should do and care about. Ax such, they pre suppose standards of behavior and concem that pumort to be carect, hat could and should guide conduct and concer, end that we might fai to acceptor live up to, Normativity, therefore, presupposes fal sty, and fallibiey amples abjecivity" OF eourse, this presupposition could be mistaken, There might be no objective moral standards, Our sor thinking and discourse might be systematically mistaken * But this would be a revisionary onctusion, wo be accepted ony a the result of extended and compelling argument that the commitments of eth: {eal objectviey are unsustainable? In the meantime, we should teat the objectiviey of ethics at a kind of defule assumption or working hypothesis Many people believe that che only way to make sense of cbjecive ‘moral standards is in terms of divine commands. They assume that ‘moral laws requie lawagiver, such as God, and thet a world without ‘God ~ a purely natural world would contain no moral standarés o7 distinctions. This assumption explains the frequent sppeal to religions scholars and members ofthe clergy as authorities on issues of moral sg nificance It also explains why, despite the tradition of the separation of ‘horch and state, many people could suppose that constitutional rights depend divine commandments in the Judeo-Christian tadition * In wg hs chap, om concious oft Terence en, Michael Moora Sam Rickles. hae alto feel fom Michael Montes “ood tot Con [George Natal ay Libri and Moray [Nowe Yo: Oxsod Univeniey Pres, 3996 238-70, Be veo of hat wer peseeed the Wert. ‘inser Theological Seminary scan, Califor) nd weapon on eal ‘tnd elias comlment he Unive of San Dig, ‘This view assumes that morality zequires a religions foundation. As seb, it denies the autonomy of morality Ian objective ethies pres potes divine command, then sn objective ethic stands or falls with rel {Buus beliet On the one hang ethics willbe objective if God exists and issues divine comments, and we ean acquire moral knowledge insofar ts we ean now what God has commanded. On the other hand, theism [sals, then the presupposition ofan objective ethics fails, and we mast brace moral niilim [he thesis that there areno facts a truths about ‘thie or relativism the thesis chat moral acts and truths areselative to the moral atitades or beliefs of eppisers|. Eivser way, the assumption that morality requires a zligious foundation requires us to reject the possibilty ofan objective secular morality "Tis assumption deserves scrutiny and shouldbe rejected. We shoul, instead, embrace the autonomy of ethics. The autonomy of ethics Implies hat the objectivity of ethics is not hostage to the truth of the- ism. This is © weleome conclusion to the extent that theism is itself a problematic commlsment® Our discussion assumes not that theism is fale, only that i snot obviously true, The autonomy of ethics allows the atheist to recognize objective mora standards. But the autonomy of tthe should not be of interest only eo atheists. Whatever ts ultimate merit, theism itself i more atuactive if we accept the autonomy of thie, Indeed, « good ease ean be made that the objectivity of ethics Itself requies the autonomy of ethics. ‘To determine whether morality requires a religious foundation, we need to distinguish three different oles God might play in morality. God plays, ‘metaphysical role in morality if the existence and nature of moral ‘equirements depend on his existence and will. On one such view, itis Gor! etetudes toward various courses of action that make them good or bd and right or wrong, Second, even if God doesnot play this metaphys {eal role, he mighe play an epistemological role if he provides us with lan essential source of evidence about what is morally valuable. Even if ‘God! will oes not make something good or bad, it may be a reliable incator of what is. Third, God plays 2 motivational role in ethics if Ihe provides ne with a necessary incentive or eason to be moral, It isa ‘common view thet if we reckon only the earthly costs and benefits of virtue, we eanaot show that one is always better off being moral. Bu if (God reward virtue and punishes vie in an afterife, hen he can provide prudential motivation for morality "These three potential moral roles for God all deserve discussion. But our focus should be on whether God plays a metaphysical roe in ‘The Autonomy of Ethie ist :morlity. It is this role that has the most direct bearing on the auton- fomy of ethics, YOLUNTARISM, NATURALISM, AND ‘We might formulate this metaphysical claim as the doctuine that things are morally good or ight justin case God approves of them, kn asessing this claim, we would do well o consider Sotate’dacussion of erelated igeue In Plato's Euthyphro Socrates considers Euthyphro’s definition of piety a6 what (ll) the gods love [ro=-r2b|* He does not dispute the ‘ruth of cis claim, instead, he distinguishes two diferent ways it might be true {a} Something is pious, beesase the gods love it [b) Something is loved by the gods, because i s pious Socrates does not label these two claims. We might cll the frst elaim voluntarsm, because it makes something's piety depend on God's will ‘We might call the second claim naturales, because it makes some- thing's piety depend on its nature, oluncarism claims thatthe attitudes ofthe gods make things pious, wheress neturaliem claims that some thing's picty is pare of ts nature, which the god’ atstndes recognize ‘nd tric. Socrates thinks that reflection will show us that we tacitly accept naturalism, Wha it is for something to be goi-beloved is simply for i tobe loved bythe gods. But what makes the gods take this ateiende toward anything must be some other feature of she thing, The mds love pious things, because they are pious. This seems eapecialiy plausible if we beatin mind that Socrates and Euthypho think that piety is part of Justice. One loves just chings, because they are just, and one recognizes ‘hem to be just IF, the god beloved character of pious things depends fon thei being pious, not vice verse. Eathyphzo accepts naturalism, and Socrates concludes that Buthypheos claim failsas definition, becavseit, States symptom or eoveelate, rather than the cause or estence, of piety. ‘Despite superlicialdiferences, Socrates’ concern is closely related to ‘urs, We can adapt the Futhyphro Problem to our discussion af whether morality requires a religious foundation by considering the following ‘onaltional formlatian of the doctrine of divine commend. Divine Command: f God exes, «i good oe il ot, and only if God appoves Divine command, like Euthyphro's definition of pice, admits of both voluntarist and naturalist interpretations, andthe debate between them has a distinguished history. YValuntavin captures the metaphysical dependence of morality on seine Vantaa uch Willan of Ostam es 1267-1347), make ‘eshinge som alu consist in Cts atta there would be 0 ‘Bon atotoces but for Got wil Noe that vlunarsm and ates together ily moe iis, Ena atria accepts the stonemyofehis, Ethical nar sales shes Tomes Aguas 125-74) lai tht te moa proper TENSE LRES tad statin depend on emai so, moral gue {eS aeierpesopose a Gh though» peecty wise and good God ‘Moutdappove of alan only goo and ght sings Naturalis doesnot Tae pntude God om layingan epistemic oein morality elingus Suess hatissuny go abd bal ora motivational le roving {inuelnenvs fr moral Behavior But natalsm des dey team s meapbyial oe Noe the codon etre of divine conenand:f Go exis and fv te atutes ually steed to hin ~ omniscience, oma sche an pret goodness then he wl spre ofall nd only good ‘a vght tangs, Beeaseaatrlism doc not make moval quits ‘genom Gos cxstees or wl st ples that these quits woul eer cod doe oe Thus, nasal pie tat tho does fot ental alilsm oreatiam. How do we dete setyeen olsen nd natal interpretations ofcivine command Seca seasoning aboot piety apples hereas wel ‘havi ior someting abe Go-apgroved iss fort be loved 1) Gol, ae makes God take this atcude toward anything muse be ane ove feature of the thing. But i seem, God would lve got thing because thy are ood. Hi ares would be pcp, the God approved carter of god things would depend on their eng ed, no ce Ye : ‘We might also notice counterintuitive implication of voluntarism. ‘elon nis da a moral rat ze contingent on what Go happen to approve, God's ates had ben diferent ad he had pevove of very diferent thingy, then very deren ehings would have een god and bod right and wrong, anf God were to comet approve of ing ery fen fom those he now approves of, then the moral Stas aftheve things wuld change Ths, for exami, had Gol nt ondcnnedgenotie und ope, these things wold not hate been wrong Seif God were co come te approve these things, they would bezome ‘monly sesepale. Bu these ee awkward commitnen inasmuch thissort of conduct seems aecenaly 70087 “Thisoay rely that od woul or approvect uch ting beeate his himalf psec good. Dots ply noe avalble to the volar tare For this reiyunstands his approval a reting on senstiy The Avtonomy ofEles 3 to what is good or bad, right or wrong, in itself, independently of his atcitudes. Bue then appeal to God's goodness undermines, rather than supports, voluntarism, Indeed, i Tooks as ifthe woluntarst would have tounderstand God!s goodness as consisting in his approving of himmsell But that approval would be equally arbitrary and contingent. 1 a8 most theists presumably believe, his sll-approval reflects a perception of his own worth, then his ativades presuppose, zather than constitute, what Is of value. The consistent voluntaist account of God's own goodness ‘s problematic ‘The way in which the voluntarise must represent moral facts a8 con- ‘ingent on God's willis counterinuitivein another way. Ie is common to believe thatthe moral properties of actions, persons, inticutions, and situations depend in a systematic way on the natural properties ~ for instance, the biological, paychologieal, legal, and socal properties — of ‘those things Philosophers refer tothisrelation ol systematic dependence as one of supervenience. The moral properties ofa situation supervene fon its natural properties jut in cate a full specification of the natacal properties of the situation fix or determine its moral properties, This Iplies that two situations cannot difer in their moral properties with: cut difering in their natural properties So, for example, the ical injus. tice ofthe system of apartheid supervened on a complex set of legs, politcal, social, and economic restrictions onthe appartnities of black South Africans and e culture of discriminatory atatuées toward them, ‘Any social system qualitatively identical i ll natural respecte to this ‘system of apartheid would also be unjust, and any socal system contain ing both blacks and whites that was not wnjust would have to differ in some ofits natural legal, politica, social, economic, and psychological properties from the system of apartheid. Bu if the natural properties ‘ofa situation determine its morl properties, chen its moral properties cannot depend on God's wil. For if voluntariam were tue, then to ‘tuations could have diferent moral properties even if there were no natural differences between them whatsoever, One system af spertheid couldlbe unjust, bata complete clone ofthat system need note unjust ~ 1 God's attitudes tothe two tokens of the seme type were diferent! Tn this conflict between supervenience and voluntarism, its easier to accept supervenience than voluntarsm "These ae reasons to eject voluntarsm and accep naturalism, How: lever, an obvious worry about naturalism is that it compromises Gods fmnipotence. If moral sequicements ae independent of and inform, God's will, then they ae outside his contro. Bot itmoral lars are outside God's conte, they appear to challenge his omnipotence Ofcourse, thisisa worry only fr eaditional monothelsts who believe {in a personal God who is omnipotent. Atheists and theists of other 54 pavip oma stripes need nat be concemed by this objection to natutalism. Whether traditional monothelsts should regard it as 2 good objection to natu falism depends on how we conceive of omnipotence. If we conceive of ‘omnipotence asthe capacity todo anything, then naturalism does com ‘romise God'somaipotence. Theists would thenhave to choose whether {o accept valuntarism (to maintain omaipotence| oF sacrifice omripo fence (to avoid voluntarsm, But eaditionelsheists face a comparable Alilemma anyway. tis difical to believe that God could change thelaws fof logic (ey the principle of noncontradition) or the trths of arith Imetileg, thats-+2 = 4, These are necessary truths, tre inall posible ‘rons, and we ean't conceive of what a world would be like in which they weren't tru. so, then we already recognize some necessary euths that are beyond God's contol. Do they compromise his omnipotence! ‘That depends on ow we understand omnipotence. If we understand ‘mnigotence as the paver to do anything, then we have independent teaton for questioning God's omnipotence. But peshaps omnipotence {sot the power to do anything, but rather the power to do anything Dpossble, act inconsistent with necessary trots and laws. If so, God's Thability to change laws of logic end sathematos need not compromise his omnipotence. But equally, God's inability to make intrinsic goods ‘bed or intinse evils good necd not compromise his omnipotence. But then naturalism need not compromise God's omnipotence. “This survey suggests @ strong case for rejecting voluntarism and sccepting naturalism, Naturalism aot only explains how theathist can fecognize moral requirements but also allows theists to explain God's goodness and to represent his commands as principled, rater than abi ‘rary. In this way, naturalism appears to be the best bet for atheists, ‘agnostics, and theists alike But, unlike voluntarism, which challenges ‘the autonomy of ethics, naturalism vindicetes the autonomy of ethics. fyve accep the autonomy of ethics, then the objectivity of ethics isnot Ihostage tothe wuth of theism, Indeed, we ate now in a position to sec how the objectivity of ethics sctusly requires the autonomy of ethics. Ethical objectivity, we sald, Claims that there are moral facts or truths chat obtain independently of the moral blilsoratitudes of apprssers. Ethical subjeccivism is one ‘way to deny ethical objeceiviy.Teelaims that what is good or bad and Tight or wrong depends on the moral beliefs or atitudes of appraisers, ‘But voluntarism is just subjecevism at che highest level. If God exists tnd is both omnieieat and perfectly good, then his approval ~ if only ‘ve could ascertain it~ would be a perfectly reliable indeed infllible~ Indicator of what was good or ight. Ths what naturalism claims. But ‘Yoluntarsm implies that God's attitudes play a metaphysical, not just tn epistemic, role in morality, his attitudes make things good or tight. ‘The Autonomy of Bees 5 ‘This isa form of subjectivism about ethics, But then the supposition that morality vequres @religlous foundation, a8 voluntarsm Insists, ‘hreatons, rather than vindiestes, che objectivity of morality, [Naturalism says that moral requirements are not constituted by Goe!'s aitudes or will. Put positively, the moral properties of situations depend on the nature of those simuations, independently of God's (or anyone else's atitudes. Indeed, understanding :hese independent moral properties would help us to understand why God wills what he does if bbe exists) But what do moral requirements or qualities consist in if they donot consist in God's aetade or will! ‘This vases a different inquiry, one within secular moral theory. fs relevant to our inquiry about whether morality requires «religious foundation only insofar as the plausibility ofthe autonomy of ethics

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