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Fourier in Paris in 1837.7 But their respective ideas about the shape of
the desired social reforms were too different to reveal any sort of shared
goal.
For all three groups, however, the starting point of these protests against
the post-revolutionary social order was indignation at the fact that the
concurrent expansion of the capitalist market prevented large segments
of the population from effectively claiming the liberty and equality
promised to them by the revolutionary principles. It was regarded as
"humiliating", "shameful", or simply "immoral" that rural and urban
workers along with their families were subject to the arbitrary power of
private landowners and factory owners, who regardless of their
willingness to work forced on them a life of constant hardship and the
ever-present threat of immiseration. If we are looking for a common
denominator of the normative responses that the awareness of these
social conditions elicited in the different strands of early socialism, it will
be helpful to start with a proposal made by mile Durkheim. In
attempting to provide a definition of the term "socialism" in his famous set
of lectures by that name, Durkheim suggested that what the various
socialist doctrines had in common was the goal of placing the control
over economic processes, which had slipped away from other social
mechanisms, back into the hands of society as represented by the state.
However great the differences between the multiple currents of
socialism, in Durkheim's view they all shared the idea that the destitution
of the working masses could be remedied only by re-organizing the
economic sphere so as to tie its activities back to collective social
decision-making.8 Even though this definition is not sufficient for an
adequate understanding of the normative goals of socialism, it does at
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8
12
11
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and Proudhon assumed that one task of the socialism they advocated
was to eliminate an inconsistency among the several demands put
forward by the French Revolution. They thought that the normative goal
of fraternity, of standing up for one another, could not even begin to be
realized because the further goal, freedom, was conceived exclusively in
terms of the kind of private egoism that gave rise to the competitive
social relations of the capitalist market. The economic policy blueprints
developed by Blanc and Proudhon, which were designed either to
supplement or to supplant the market by other forms of production and
distribution15, were therefore primarily guided by the aim of establishing
in the sphere of economic activity a type of freedom that would no longer
stand in the way of realizing the demand for fraternity. Only if the
economic core of the new society could incorporate freedom as a
practice of solidarity, in which individuals mutually complement each
other, rather than as the pursuit of merely private interests, could the
normative demands of the French Revolution be consistently realized.
If we now look back again at Durkheim's definition of the basic idea of
socialism, we can venture a first intermediate conclusion: while he is
correct in claiming that all the socialist projects share the same basic
intention of re-integrating economic activity into the sphere of collective
social decision-making, he overlooks the normative or ethical reasons
that first gave rise to this intention. The early Socialists' main concern
was not simply to place the economic sphere under the direction of
collective social choices in order to avert the threat of a merely half
achieved moralization of society, one that stops at the gates of the
economy as Durkheim wants to have it. Nor did their main goal consist
simply in bringing about a more just distribution of vital material goods.
15
used
terms
such
as
"association",
"cooperation",
and
17
19
10
In the writings of the early socialists and also in the writings of Proudhon,
these different conceptions of what I will from now on refer to as "social
freedom" are not yet adequately distinguished. It is true that they were
already clearly aware that continuing the as yet unfinished project of the
bourgeois revolution without becoming entangled in self-contradiction
would require overcoming the individualism about liberty that found its
expression, in particular, in the capitalist market economy. Freedom
would have to be rendered compatible with the demand for fraternity. Yet
the early socialists lacked the conceptual means to articulate in more
concrete terms what it could mean for the achievement of individual
liberty to be tied to the precondition of a communal life marked by
solidarity. The first steps towards such a further articulation were taken
by the young Karl Marx, who set himself the task, at about the same time
as Proudhon did, to spell out the theoretical foundations of the incipient
socialist movement. Living in exile in Paris, he was thoroughly familiar
with the theoretical efforts of his French socialist contemporaries. But in
contrast with them, Marx as a German did not directly face the challenge
of articulating the aims of their shared project within the normative
framework provided by the still unfinished revolution. He was able largely
to forgo terms such as "fraternity", "liberty", and "solidarity", and to build
instead on the efforts of his compatriots who sought to productively
extend the Hegelian legacy. Taking up the terminology of idealism in the
naturalistic interpretation provided by Feuerbach gave Marx an
advantage with respect to conceptual sophistication, though it brought
with it the disadvantage of greater opacity regarding moral and political
implications. But even Marx's early works still betray the intention of
demonstrating that the conception of liberty presupposed by the political
economists and actualized in the capitalist market is characterized by a
kind of individualism incompatible with the claims of a "true" community
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among the members of society. Thus the young exile's writings from the
1840s can also be viewed as taking a further step within the theoretical
project of developing the idea of "socialism" from the internally
inconsistent aims of the liberal social order.
In one of his most important writings from the 1840s, which has received
much attention especially in recent years his comments on James
Mill's work on political economy Marx explains what faults he finds with
the current constitution of society and what, in his view, a non-deficient
community would have to look like.20 His debt to Hegel is even more
evident here than in the so-called Paris Manuscripts. It is reflected in the
fact that the two models of society contrasted by Marx are characterized
in terms of two different modes of mutual recognition. Marx holds that the
members of a capitalist society relate to each other only very indirectly,
by exchanging their respective products on an anonymous marketplace
through the medium of money. To the extent that other participants in the
market even become visible to any given individual, they do so
exclusively in terms of abstract qualities like business acumen and
economic interests, but not as specific other individuals with particular
needs. In an ironical allusion to Adam Smith, Marx writes that the
members of such a society are nothing but merchants to each other.21
The recognition which the members of a society must accord each other
if they are to constitute an integrated social unit in the first place amounts
here to nothing further than the mutual affirmation of the right to
"outsmart" all the others. The individual actions that constitute the "social
nexus" do not complement each other but are instead, in Marx's stark
expression, performed "solely with the intention of plunder".22
20
22
21
12
predecessors
had
already
appealed
in
analyzing
the
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rise to this demand, their motivation is not concern for these desires of
others but solely an egocentric interest in serving their own advantage.
According to Marx things would be quite different if the goods produced
in a society were being exchanged in ways other than through a moneymediated market. In that case, he thinks, each person would be aware of
the needs of those for whom he was producing, so that he would find the
characteristic human condition of mutual dependency affirmed both in his
own action and in the anticipated reaction of the other person.24 Marx
speaks here only of the "double affirmation" among the members of a
society, but clearly what he is thinking of are conditions of production in
which people mutually recognize each others individual needs. In what
Marx is later going to call an "association of free producers", individuals
would no longer be related to each other merely through the anonymous
coordination of their respective private aims but would rather be
motivated by a shared concern for the self-realization of all others.25
Formulating Marx's train of thought in this pointed way is useful because
it enables us to abstract from the rather vague economic proposal he
makes and to focus on those general features of it that point towards the
concept of social freedom. Like his socialist predecessors, Marx initially
thinks of freedom as the maximally unimpeded and unconstrained
realization of self-chosen goals and intentions. He also agrees with them
that under capitalist conditions, the exercise of freedom, so understood,
implies that others are regarded as mere means to the pursuit of one's
own interests, and is thus in conflict with the already institutionalized
principle of fraternity. To resolve this internal contradiction Marx offers a
rough sketch of a society in which freedom and solidarity are integrated
with each other. He thinks that such an integration would be possible in a
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25
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social order in which each individual conceives of his or her own ends as
also constituting the conditions of the ends of others; a social order, that
is, in which the ends of different individuals interlock in such a way that
they can be realized only on the basis of each individuals full awareness
of their mutual interdependency. But the reference to "love" that occurs
in a central passage of the commentary on Mill26 also reveals quite
clearly that the other person is thought to be relevant not merely to the
execution but already to the formation of each individual's plans. As in
relations of love, so too in the novel form of association envisioned by
Marx my own activities will from the very outset be restricted to those
aims that serve not only my own self-realization but also that of the other
with whom I am interacting, since otherwise her freedom would not
constitute a direct object of my concern.
This important feature of Marx's model can be brought out more clearly
by drawing on a distinction introduced by Daniel Brudney in the context
of his comparison between Rawls and Marx. According to Brudney,
social communities can be distinguished according to whether the ends
shared by their members are merely overlapping or whether they are
intertwined.27 In the first case, individuals do indeed pursue shared ends,
but these are ends that they can jointly accomplish without having to
individually aim at that joint accomplishment. An example of the
collective realization of this type of shared end is the market, at least
according to the classical conception of it. In it, each participant is able to
pursue his own economic interests while thereby simultaneously
furthering the shared aim of increasing everyone's wealth. Intertwined
ends, by contrast, are ones whose realization requires that the members
of a society jointly pursue them by each adopting them as a maxim or as
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27
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a direct goal. As Brudney points out, in this second case the individuals
are active not merely with one another but "for one another", since what
they desire is specifically to contribute to the realization of the ends
shared by all. In the first case, the case of overlapping ends, the fact that
my own actions contribute to the realization of those ends is a contingent
effect of the content of my intentions. In the second case, the case of
intertwined ends, their realization is a necessary result of the pursuit of
my intentions.
In my view it is quite apparent that Marx's proposed alternative to a
capitalist social order is based on this latter model of social communities.
Using the terminology of mutual recognition that is consistently employed
by Marx in his commentary on James Mill's political economy, we can rearticulate the relevant distinction roughly as follows: whereas in a
market-based society shared ends are realized insofar and because its
members recognize each other only as individual consumers and
systematically deny the relations of mutual dependence among them, the
realization of shared ends in an association of free producers would be
accomplished through the members' being intentionally engaged for
each other's benefit, because they recognize each other as individuals
with specific needs and because they act for the sake of satisfying those
needs. Even though Marx himself does not say it, it seems evident to me
that he takes his alternative social model to have accomplished
something that his socialist predecessors had unsuccessfully attempted
to do: that is, to provide an immanent extension or reformulation of the
concept of individual freedom, and thus of the basic principle of
legitimacy of the current social order, in such a way that it comes to
necessarily coincide with the requirements of a life of fraternity or
solidarity. At this point our task is thus to examine with a more systematic
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intent whether the social model sketched by Marx can indeed fulfil its
aspiration of reconciling individual freedom and solidarity in a novel way.
To begin with, this analysis is going to pay no heed to the fact that all the
early proponents of socialism thought of their principle of social freedom
as having its place only in the sphere of social production or labor.
Imagining that this sphere alone could account for the reproduction of
society as a whole, they accorded no independent role to political
democracy and were therefore never prompted to ask whether other
forms of freedom might perhaps already have found institutional
embodiment there. But these questions I leave to a fourth chapter in the
planned book, here I will only discuss whether the model of social
freedom just sketched constitutes a sound and independent alternative
to the individualism characteristic of liberal conceptions of freedom. Did
the early socialists really develop an original and novel conception of
freedom or did they merely offer an improved presentation of what is
known to us as "solidarity" or, to use the older term, "fraternity"?
A premise of the liberal model of freedom is the idea, at first glance
hardly contestable, that it makes sense to speak of individual freedom
only where a subject is able to follow through with his own intentions
while facing as little impediment or constraint as possible. Freedom of
action, so conceived, is said to have justifiable limits only where its
exercise might create impediments to the freedom of other subjects.
Liberalism therefore ties the general protection of this kind of freedom to
the idea of a legal order designed to ensure that each individual is
enabled to act without constraint to an extent that is compatible with
everyone else's equal claim to the same freedom of action. A first
complication for this basic liberal model is introduced by Rousseau and,
following him, by Kant. Both of them share the conviction that we cannot
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29
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is, those intentions that are more or less shared by all on a rational basis
by performing actions that are subject to no other constraint than the
one deriving from the equal claim of all others to the same kind of
freedom.
The special twist that Proudhon and Marx give to this model of positive
freedom results from the fact that they take a much more encompassing
view of the kinds of unjustified constraints that may prevent subjects from
realizing their freely adopted ends. The early liberal view largely
identified
those
constraints
with
external
social
forces,
whose
31
32
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constraints on the pursuit of his own ends but rather as partners whose
cooperation is required for the realization of those ends.33
This is the point in the socialists' argument where their special notion of
"community" becomes relevant, which they tend to mention in the same
breath with "liberty". However much their terminology may vary, they
always mean by "community" something more than what is usually
denoted by the term. A community, in their sense, is characterized not
only by shared values and a certain degree of identification with the aims
of the group, but also and especially by mutual support and concern. We
already encountered this strand of the socialist concept of community
earlier in the idea of ends that do not just overlap but intertwine, so that
agents are active not merely with one another but for one another.34
Thus the question we now need to address is what connection the
socialists saw between their specific concept of community, on the one
hand, and their concept of liberty, on the other.
One way of making this connection would be by thinking of communal
solidarity as a necessary precondition for the exercise of the kind of
freedom I described. In a somewhat weaker form, one which does
without the loaded notion of community as mutual concern, such a thesis
has been defended by Joseph Raz in his book The Morality of Freedom.
According to him, individuals are unable to make use of their autonomy
unless they live in a society that offers them specific options for the
realization of their various aims.35 But the socialists want to go further
than that. The communities outlined by them are not merely a necessary
precondition of the kind of freedom they have in mind. Rather it seems
that only cooperative activity within a fraternal community counts as a
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35
34
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proper exercise of freedom in the first place, while anything short of that
does not really deserve this title. Social freedom then means
participation in the social practices of a community whose members have
such a degree of mutual concern for each other that they help others
realize their reasonable needs, and do so for their sake. Here the
concept of freedom has become an element of a type of holistic
individualism, according to which what is meant by the term "freedom",
even in the basic sense of an unhindered realization of individual goals
or ends, is essentially something that cannot be achieved by any
individual person but only by a suitably constituted collective. This does
not entail that the collective should be conceived of as some sort of
higher-order entity existing over and against the individuals who are its
parts.36 It is true that on the socialist conception, freedom is a property,
capacity, or achievement of a social group taken as a whole. But the
existence of the group itself is owed to the cooperative activity of
individual subjects. The collective becomes a bearer of individual
freedom only when it succeeds in instilling in its members certain kinds
of practical dispositions. Foremost among these is a mutual sympathy
that results in everyone's exhibiting a certain amount of concern for
everyone else's self-realization, for non-instrumental reasons. The
socialists believe that to the extent that such modes of interaction
become prevalent in a society, all the negative phenomena that
characterize a capitalist society are going to disappear. Once subjects
have a sufficient degree of sympathy for each other, they will relate to
one another as equals and will refrain from any kind of exploitation or
instrumentalization.
36
21
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At the same time, the socialists made it easy for their critics, who
appeared on the scene very soon. They failed to develop a sufficiently
convincing version of their original and path-breaking idea. The
proposals produced during the first half of the nineteenth century all had
flaws that quickly exposed them to serious objections. Not only did they,
as I briefly pointed out above, strictly limit the idea of a fraternal
community to the sphere of economic activity, without giving any closer
consideration to the question whether a society marked by a rapid
increase in complexity could really organize and reproduce itself in its
entirety by relying solely on that single sphere. For reasons that are hard
to fathom they (also) largely ignored the entire domain of collective
political decision-making, so that they were unable to sufficiently explain
the relation between their own project and the recently established
legally defined liberties. And finally, the founders of the socialist project
above all, Saint-Simon and Marx tied that project to a metaphysical
account of history that rendered it all but impossible to view its ambition
as one of engaging in experiments designed to assess capitalist
societies' capacity for transformation. Since they thought it a matter of
historical necessity that the revolution for which they were calling would
take place at some point in the future, albeit perhaps in the near future,
all attempts to implement gradual changes here and now were dismissed
as both cognitively and politically useless. Among these several flaws of
the original socialist program we can distinguish between ones that are
due to the historical context in which this program originated, i.e. the
early phase of the industrial revolution, and others that are more
fundamental and that concern the very structure of the proposal.
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