Cyberspace and Identity
Sherry Turkle
Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), 643-648.
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Sun Now § 21:32:59 2005ST eT
Looking Toward Cyberspacs
Beyond Grounded Sociology
Cyberspace and Identity
We came eo sce ourselves differently as we catch,
sight of our images in the mleror of she machine
Quer a decade ago, when I frst called the com
puter a “second sel” (1984), ehese identity
transforming relationships were most usually
‘one-on-one, a person alone with, » machine!
This is no longer the ease. A eapialy expanding
system af neworks, collectively krown a5 the
Incernec, links millions of people together ia
new spaces that ace changing the way we chink,
the nature of eur sexuality, the form of abr come
rmunites, our very idencites, In cyberspace, we
ae learning oo live in viewal worlds. We may
find ourselves alone a3 we mavigate virtual
‘oceans, unvavel vircual mysteries, and engineer
Viral skyscrapers. Bus increasingly, when we
step through the looking glass, other peaple ace
there as wel
‘Over the pasc decade, [bave been engaged i
the ethnographic and clinical seudy of how peo
ple negorizte the vistual and the “real” as hey
eotesent themselves on computer scteens
linked through che Incernet. For many people,
such experiences challenge what chey have tr
ditionally called “identity” which they are
raved co eecast in tees of multiple windows
and parallel lives. Online life isnot the only fae
‘or that is pusbing ther in this direction; these
18 no simple eense im which computers ere eaus-
ang @ shift im motions af identicy. Le, rather,
thar today's lfe om the sereer dramatizes and
concretizes range of culcural trends thac
fencoutage os to think of idencicy an terms of
multiplicity and flexibility
Virtual Personae
In this estay, [ focus on ane key element of
celine life end its impact on idenciry: the cre
Ror filler discuson af che chemas in ehis es,
see Tutkle ((995}
SHeray TORKLE
Program in Science, Technology, and Society
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ation and projection of constucted pesonae
tinco virtual space. In cyberspace, if is well
linawa, one’ body can be represented by one's
‘own textual description: The abese can be slen
der, the beaucful plain. The fact that self pe
sentation is written in text means that there is
time to reflect upon and edit one's “compori
tion," which makes iC easier for che shy to be
cougoing, che “nesdy" sophisticated. The lave
anonymity of life an the screen—ane has the
choice of being known oni by one’s chosen
“handle” o¢ online name—gives people the
chance eo express often unexplored aspects of
the self Addicionally, multiple aspects of self
can te explored in parallel. Online services offer
their users the appartunity to be known by sev
eral diferent names. For example, a 8 nat
‘nusual for someone to be BroncoBill in one
saline community, ActaniBoy i anotiser, and
MeSensitive in a third
‘The anline exercise of playing with idencicy
and tying oue new identities is perhaps most
explicit in “role playing” virtual communities
{euch as MulicUser Doraains, er MUCS) where
pazcepacin lierally begins mith the creation of
persons (or several); bur itis by no means con-
fined eo there somewhat exore locations In bul-
Jerin boards, nesesgroups, and chae zooms, che
creation of personae may be [es explicit than on
MUD®, bucic sno les gaychologially real. One
IRC (nceraec Relay Chat) paticipant describes
hecexperience of ane clk: *L go fom channel
co channel depending on ey mood. <1 actu
ally feel a paet of several ofthe channels, sever-
al conversations... 'm diferene in the
Aifeene chats. They bring out different chines
in. me Identity play cao happen by changing
names and by changing places
For many people, joining online communi:
see means erosing a boundary into highly
643,644 sympostum
charged territory, Some feel aa uncomfoctable
sense of fragmentation, some a sense of veliet
Same sense the possibilities for sefiscovery. A.
2Gyear-old graduate seudent ia history say,
"When [ log on to # new commaunity and T re
ce a character and know I have to sart sping
ray description, | always feel 2 sense of panic,
Like [could find out something I don't want co
know "A woman inher late thirties wh just got
an account wich America Onkine used the fact
thacshe could create five “naunes” for beself on
Irer accounts chance to “layout all the moods
Tm in—all the ways 1 wont to be in different
places om the syste.”
“The creation of site-specific online personae
depends not only on adopeing a new name.
Shifting of personae happens with a change of
virtual place Cycling theough vietual envicon-
mens és made possible by the existence of what
have come to be called “windows” in modern
computing enwizonments. Windows area way t0
work with » computer that makes it posible for
the wachine co place you in several concexts at
the same time. AS a use, you ate attentive ta
just one of the windows on your sezeen at any
siven moment, huc in a certain sense, you are 2
rsesence in all of thems at all umes. You miglst be
writing paper in bacteriology and using your
‘computer in several ways ta help you: You are
“present? to a word processing program on,
which you ate caking nates and collecting
shoughis, you ace “present” to communications
sofware that isin touch with 2 distant compat-
cer for collecting reference materials, you ate
“present” co @ simulation program that is chet
ing che growth of bacceval colonies when a new
‘organism enters theit ecology, and you are “pre
sent" to an ankine chat session whose partici
pants ace dscussing recene research in the field
ach of these activities takes place in a “win:
dow," and your kdentcy on the compurer is the
sum of your distributed presence.
‘The development of the windows metaphor
for compucer interfaces was a echnical innova-
‘on motivated by the desie co get people work-
ing more efficiently by “cycling cheoush”
diffcenc applications, much as time-shacing
computers cycled through the computing needs
of different people, But in practice, windows
have become a potent metaphor for thinking
aboue the self as 2 muluple, distributed, “ume
sharing” stent
‘The sel no longer simoly plays diferent roles
in diferent sextings—something that people
experience when, foe exarmpe, ane wakes up as
2 lover, makes breakfast 2 4 wothet, and drives
‘work asa lawyer.‘The windows metaphor sug
gests disteibuced self chat exists in many werlds
snd plays many toes at the same time. The
“indows” enabled bya compute: opeatia 57
tem supporc the metaphor, and cyberspace rates
the expevience to higher power by translating
the meraphor into a lle experience of “ering
though.”
Identity, Moratosia, and Play
Cyberpace like al eommplex phenomena, has
a range of psychological efecs for some seople,
iis place w “act out’ uncesolved confit, ce
slay and replay characterlogical difficulties 09
anewand exoce stage. For aches, ic provides an
‘oppartunity to "wodk theough" sgsificant per-
sonal issues, co use che new waterials of cyber
cialty to reach for new eaolations. These more
positive dency effect follows Com de fact that
foc some, cyberspace provides what Bri rikson
{{1950]1963) would have called 2 psychosocial
‘woratarum," a central element in how he
thought ahoue identity development in adales-
cence. Althoups the term mrstrion islies&
“ime out” waar Eeson bad in cial was noe
withdeawal. Ou che contrary, che adolescence
norarorur i tine of incense intecacton with
people and ideas. Ie is time of passionace
Fendships and experimentation. The adoles
cent falls is. and out of love with people and
ideas, Exiton's motion of the saratorirn was
‘aoc a “hold” on sgnificanc experiences but on
theic consequences. [tis a one ducing which
one’s actions ae, in a certain sense, not cauated
a chey wil be later i life They are noc given 24
much weight, not given the farce of full judg
iment, Tu this cancext, experieencation ean
become the norm rather than a beave deparcure
Relatively consequence-fce experimentation
Gacltaes the developeenc of a “core self” a
fetsonal sense of what gives hfe meaning that
Esson called “idence.”
Eikson developed. these ideas about the
iespareance af a mceataciam ducing the late
1950s and early 1960s. At char eime, the netion
corresponded to a common undertonding of
vihat “the college years" were about. Today, 30
‘eats later, the idea of the college years a can-
Sequencevtre “tne cut" seems of another ect
College is pre-professional, and AIDS has made
consequence fee sexual experimentation an
icapossiily. The years associated wih adoles-
cence no longer seem a "time out” But if curculture no longer offers an adalescent moratari-
tum, wicual communities offen da. Ie 1s pact of
subat makes them seem se arractive.
Erikson’ ideas about stages did nat suggest
rgd sequences. His sages deseribe what peaple
need tg achieve before they can mae ahead eas
ily #9 another developmental tak. For example,
Erikson pointed out that success intimacy in
young adulthood is dfficuls fame does nat came
twicwith a sense af who one is, che challenge of
sddolescent identity building. In rea life, howe>-
er, people frequently mave an with serious
deficits. Wich incompletely resolved “stages,”
they simply do the bese they can. They use what
ever materials chey have ac hand to get as much,
as they can of witae they have missed. Now vit:
tual socal life can play a tole in these dramas of
self-ceparation. Time in eyberspace reworks the
notion of the moratorium because it may now
‘exist on an always-available “window.”
‘Expanding One's Range in the Real
‘Case, 44-year-old industrial designer bappi
ly mattied ta a female co-worker, describes his
real-life (RL) persona asa “nice guy,” 2 “hiewny
‘Stewart type like my facher” He describes his
‘outgoing, assertive mother 9s “Katharine
Hepburn rype.” For Case, who views assertive
ness through the prism of his Jimmy
Steware/Katharine Hepburn dichocomy, 2%
assertive man is quickly perceived as “being a
beascard.” An assertive womany in contrast, 1s
perceived as being “moder and together.” Case
‘ays that although he 1s comfortable with his
‘temperament and loves and respects his father,
he feels he pays high price for his own low-key
ways, [n particular, he feels at a less when it
comes te confrontation, both ar heme and at
work. Online, ina vide cange of viewal commu
snties, Case presents himself as females whom he
calls his “Katharine Hepburn types." These are
strong, dynamic, “our there” wornen who reminc!
(Case of his mather, who “says exactly whac' on
hher mira.” He cells me char presencing himself as
4 woman online bas brought him to 2 point
where he is mote comfortable with confronta-
ion in bis RL 252 man,
Case describes his Katharine Hepburn per
sonae as “externalizations of apart of myselt” In
fone interview with him, I used the expression
"aspects of the self” and he picked 1t up eagerly,
for his online life reminds him of how Kinda
rods could have diferent sspects or subpersonal-
ities, all che while being a whele self In response
Symposium 645
“Do you feel that you call upon
in real life?" Case respanded:
omy questi
‘your persona
Yes, an ospect sort of cleats its ehroat and
says "I cen do chis. You are being so ames-
Ingly conficted oves this and Law exaet-
ly what to do. Why don’t you just let me do
fe? In real lie, [tend to be extremely
diplomatic, nonconfrentatiana, I dant like
fo tam my ideas down anyone's throat.
[Online] I can be, “Take wor leave ic” All
of my Hepburn characrers are that way
‘Tha's probably why ( play chem. Because
they are smact-macthed, hey wll at sogae
coat the words
Im some ways, Cases description of his inner
‘world of actors who addcess him and ate able t9
‘ake aver negotiations is reminiscent of the lan
‘auage of people witls aulciple-persanality disor
der. But the contrast is significant: Case's nner
actors are nat split off from each oeher oe feom
bis sense of “himself” He experiences hicnsel
very much asa collective self, nat feeling char he
‘oust goad or repress this or dat aspect of hime
self into conformity. He is at ease, cycling
rough from Kathaine Hepburn co Jimmy
Stewart. To use analyst Philip Beomberss lan
guage (1994), anne life has helped Case learn
hhow oo “stand in the spaces becween selves and
seal Fel one, to see the multiplieey and sil feel
unity.” To use computer sciencise Marvin
Minsky's (1987) phrase, Case feels at ease
cycling chrcugh bis “soclery of mind," a narion
of identity 25 diswibuted and heterogeneaus
Tdentiey, ftom the Latin idem, has been used
habicualy to refer to the sameness hecween co
qualities. Qn the Inceenes, haweves, ane can be
many, and one usually
An Object to Think with for Thinking
About Identity
In the Late 1960s and early 1970s, 1 was firse
exposed co notions af identiry and muliplciry
‘These ideas—mest notably that there iso such
thing as “the ego,” thar each of us isa multplic-
fey of parts, fragments, and desicing connec-
rions—surfaced in the intelleseual hathouse of
Paris; chey presented the siorid according co
such authors as Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleute,
and Féloe Guatear. But despice such ideal condi-
tions for absorbing theory, my “Freach lessons”
reeiained abstract exercises, These theorists of
posestcuccuralism spoke words that addressed the
felationship hetween mind and body, but fom
my point of view had little eo da with my own.646 Sympostum
Jn my lack of personal connection with these
ideas, was noe alone. To cake one example, for
many people itis hard ta accepe ary challenge to
the idea of an eatonomous eg. While in recent
‘years, many psychologists, social theorists, psy-
choanalysts, and philosophers have argued that
the self should be thought of as essentially
decenteced, the normal requirements of every
clay life exert serong pressure on people to cake
responsibility for cheir actions and co see them-
selves 2g unicary actors. This disjuncrare
berween theary (che unitary self is an illusion)
and ved experience (che unitary elf sche mast
basic reality) is one of the main reasons why
smulciple and decencesed theocies have been slaw
to catch on—or when they do, why we tend to
sertle back quickly into older, centralized ways
of looking at things
When, 20 years later, [used my pecional
computer and modern ta join online commnust
ties, [had an experience ofthis theoretical per-
spective which broughe i shockingly down 10
earth. L used language co create several charac-
ters, My textual actions are my actions—my
words make things bappen. | created selves thar
were made and transformed by language. And
different personae were exploring different
aspects of the self. The noticn of 9 decentered
identity was concrecized by experiences on 2
computer screen. In this way, cyberspace
Frecomes an object co chink wich for einking
abou identity—an element of cultural briear
lage.
Apptopriable theories—idess that capture
the imagination of he eulture at large—cen to
be those with which people can become active-
ly involved. They tend to be theories that can be
“played” wich. So one way to think ahour the
social appropriability of a given theory is co ask
whether itis accompanied by its own objeccs-to-
dink-widh chat can belp it move out beyond
intellectual etces
For example, che popular appropriation of
Freudian ideas had lide co do with sciencific
demonstrations of their validity. Freudian ideas
passed into che popular culture because dey
fffered robust and down-eavearth abjects-tor
think wich. The objects were not physical but
alenost-angible ideas, such as dreams and slips of
the congue. People were able to play with such
Frendian “ebjers” They became used to look
ng for chem and manipulating them, both seri
‘sly and not so seriously. Ard s chey did so,
che idea chat slips and dreams hevay an uncon
scious began to feel nacural.
In Freud's work, deeams and slips of the
congue cared the theory. Today, life on che
computer sczeen carries theory. People decide
thar they want to intecace with others on 2 com
puter network. They get an account on a com
mercial service. They think chat this will
provide chem wich new access to people and
information, and of course it does. But it does
more. When they log on, they may find theme
selves playing: multiple roles; chey may find
themselves playing characters of the opposice
sex, In this ay, they are swepe up by experi
ences that enable chem wo explore previously
Unexamined aspects of their sexuality o chat
challenge their ideas about » unitary self. The
instrumental compute, the computer that does
thangs for us, has revealed another side: 9 sub-
jective computer that des things ous as people,
10 out view of ourselves and our relationships, 2
cour ways of looking ac our minds, In simulation,
iderwiy can be fluid and multiple, a sigailier 22
longer clearly points to a thing that is signlied,
and understanding is less likely (0 proceed
‘through analysis han by navigation checugh vie-
wwal space.
Within the psychoanalytic catition, many
“schools” have departed from 2 unitary view of
identity, among these the Jungian, object-rela
sions, and Lacanian, In different ways, each of
these groups of analysts was banished from the
zanks of orthodox. Freudians for such suages-
‘nan of somehow relegated to the margins. As
the Linited Staves became the center of psycho:
analytic polities in the rmid-wencieth century,
sdeas about robust executive ego begat to com
srurute the poychosnalytic mainstream
uc today, the pendulum as swung away
fiom that complacent view of @ unitary self
Thou che frazmenced selves presented by
parents and through theories that stress the
decencered subject, contemporary social and
psychological thinkers are confronting what has
been left out of theories of the unitary sell Tis
asking such questions as, What isthe self when
i functions asa society? What is the self when it
vides ics labors wong its constituent “alters?”
‘Those burdened by posttraumatic disocicive
disorders suffer these questions; | am suggesting
that inhabicanes of wirwal communities play
with them. In cur lives on the screen, people are
developing ideas about identity as ruldipliciythrough new social ractices of identity as multi
pliciy
‘With these zematks, Tam not implying that
chat rooms or MUDs or che option a declare
maltiple uses names on America Online ace
causally implicated in the dramatic werease of
reople who exhibic symptoms of rukiple-per
sonality disoréer (MPD}, or chat people on
MUDs have MM, or that MUDMing (or online
chtcing) is like having MPD. I am saying chaz
he many manifestations of multiplicity in our
coltue, including the adoption of online per
sonae, ace contributing to 2 general reconsidera-
tion of taditional, unitary notions of iden.
Online experiences with "oaralle! lives” ate parc
of the significant cultural context chat supports
new theorizing shout nonpathological, indeed
Treaty, multiple selves
fm thinking about che self. mutiny is a
term thatearries with i several cencuris af nea
sive associacions, but such authors as Kenneth,
Gergen (1991), Emily Martin. (1994), and
Rober Jay Lifton (1993) speak in postive terms
‘of an adaptive, "exible self. The flexible self is
‘not unitary, nor are is parts scable eneities. A
person scles through its aspects, and these are
themselves ever-changing and in constant com-
munication with each other. Daniel Desert
(1991) speaks of the flexible self by using the
fof consciousness as muluigle drafts,
analogous to the experience of several versions
ef a document open on 9 computer screen,
‘where the use is able to move betwen them at
will. For Dennett, knowledge of these drafts
encourages @ respect for the many diferent ver
sions, while 4€ ampases a certain discance from
them. Donna Haraway ((991), picking up on
this theme of how a distance between sef sates
may be salutory, equates 2 “split and contradic:
cory sel” woh 2 “enowing self" She iseptienstc
alboue is postales: “The kaawing sl spar
cal inal its guises, never finished, whole, simply
there and origina, itis always constructed and
sticched together imperfectly; and theeefoce able
to join with another, co see cogecher without
claiming to be another." What moxe charactere
izes Hasaway's and Dennert’s models ofa knaw-
ing self is that the lines of communication
between its various aspects ace apen. The open,
communication encourages an attitude of
respect for the many within us and ehe many
within others
Increasingly, social thearists and philoso
thers are being joined by psichoanalyie thea-
Sympostum 647
rists in efforts co dhink about healthy selves
switose resilience and capacity fer joy corses from
having access to their many aspects For exam
ple, Philip Bromberg (1994), insles that our
ways of describing “good parenting’ muse now
shifc away from an emphasis on confirming, 2
child ina “core self” and onco helping a child
develap the capacity co negotiate Muid transi-
cons becween self scares. The healthy individual
knows how co be many but co smoot! out the
moments of transition becween states of self
Bromberg says: "Health is when you are multiple
be feel a unity. Fealdh is when diferent aspects
of self can get to know each other and reflect
upon each other.” Here, within the psychcana-
lytic eradition, is @ model of muleiliciey as a
state of easy teaffle across selves, a conscious,
highly articulated “cycling thiough”
From a Psychoanalytic to a Computer
Culture?
Having literally written our online personae
aneo existence, they can be 2 kind af Rorcbach
test. We can use them to hecore more aware of
subse we profect into everyday lle. We can use
the viztal to teectconsteuctively an the teal:
Cyberspace opens the possibilty for idencty
play, but is very serous plas. People who cul
‘vate an awareness of what stands bebind tee
secean personae ae the oues mest likely to suc
ceed in using vieual experience for personal and
social cansfornation. Ard the people who
snake the most of thee lives on che sereen are
those ho ae able to approach it ima spice of
self-reflection. What does my beaver in cyber
space tell me about what [ ant, wha Lara, what
Tray not be getting in che res of my lie!
‘As a culute, we are at the end of the
Freudian cencary, Freud afer al, was a child of
the nineteenth centuey of cause, he was carry
ing the bagmage of avery diferene scientific sen-
sibility than cur own. Bur faced with che
challenges of yberspace, cur need fora practical,
philosophy of self lnosedge, cme thac does nor
shy avay from sues of multiplicity, complexity,
and ambivalence, that docs not shy away Gor
the power of symbolism, fom the power of the
sword from the pwer of identiey play, has never
been greater a8 we struggle to make meaning
from out lives on the screen. el fashionable co
think that we have passed ftom a psichcanalye-
ie culture a computer culmore—that we no
longer ated co think in vcs af Freudian slips
but ether of infortation processing eerots. But
the ealiey i more comple Ie is time to eechinc648 Symposium
cour celationship to the computer culture and
psychoanalytic culture as 2 proudly held joint
citizenship.
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