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Cyberspace and Identity Sherry Turkle Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), 643-648. Stable URL: http flinksjstor.orgsici?sici=0004-306 | 281999 11942028%3 AGZACH4IEIACALVSE2.0.COWIBI-E Contemporary Seciology is cutrently published by American Sociological Association. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at flip: feworwjtor org/aboutterms.htmal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in par, that unless you fave obtained pcior permission, you may not dowaload an cnt isus of @ journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial uss. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bupsorww.jstoc.org/joumals/asa. hl. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hup:shrwwjstor.orgy Sun Now § 21:32:59 2005 ST eT Looking Toward Cyberspacs Beyond Grounded Sociology Cyberspace and Identity We came eo sce ourselves differently as we catch, sight of our images in the mleror of she machine Quer a decade ago, when I frst called the com puter a “second sel” (1984), ehese identity transforming relationships were most usually ‘one-on-one, a person alone with, » machine! This is no longer the ease. A eapialy expanding system af neworks, collectively krown a5 the Incernec, links millions of people together ia new spaces that ace changing the way we chink, the nature of eur sexuality, the form of abr come rmunites, our very idencites, In cyberspace, we ae learning oo live in viewal worlds. We may find ourselves alone a3 we mavigate virtual ‘oceans, unvavel vircual mysteries, and engineer Viral skyscrapers. Bus increasingly, when we step through the looking glass, other peaple ace there as wel ‘Over the pasc decade, [bave been engaged i the ethnographic and clinical seudy of how peo ple negorizte the vistual and the “real” as hey eotesent themselves on computer scteens linked through che Incernet. For many people, such experiences challenge what chey have tr ditionally called “identity” which they are raved co eecast in tees of multiple windows and parallel lives. Online life isnot the only fae ‘or that is pusbing ther in this direction; these 18 no simple eense im which computers ere eaus- ang @ shift im motions af identicy. Le, rather, thar today's lfe om the sereer dramatizes and concretizes range of culcural trends thac fencoutage os to think of idencicy an terms of multiplicity and flexibility Virtual Personae In this estay, [ focus on ane key element of celine life end its impact on idenciry: the cre Ror filler discuson af che chemas in ehis es, see Tutkle ((995} SHeray TORKLE Program in Science, Technology, and Society Massachusetts Institute of Technology ation and projection of constucted pesonae tinco virtual space. In cyberspace, if is well linawa, one’ body can be represented by one's ‘own textual description: The abese can be slen der, the beaucful plain. The fact that self pe sentation is written in text means that there is time to reflect upon and edit one's “compori tion," which makes iC easier for che shy to be cougoing, che “nesdy" sophisticated. The lave anonymity of life an the screen—ane has the choice of being known oni by one’s chosen “handle” o¢ online name—gives people the chance eo express often unexplored aspects of the self Addicionally, multiple aspects of self can te explored in parallel. Online services offer their users the appartunity to be known by sev eral diferent names. For example, a 8 nat ‘nusual for someone to be BroncoBill in one saline community, ActaniBoy i anotiser, and MeSensitive in a third ‘The anline exercise of playing with idencicy and tying oue new identities is perhaps most explicit in “role playing” virtual communities {euch as MulicUser Doraains, er MUCS) where pazcepacin lierally begins mith the creation of persons (or several); bur itis by no means con- fined eo there somewhat exore locations In bul- Jerin boards, nesesgroups, and chae zooms, che creation of personae may be [es explicit than on MUD®, bucic sno les gaychologially real. One IRC (nceraec Relay Chat) paticipant describes hecexperience of ane clk: *L go fom channel co channel depending on ey mood. <1 actu ally feel a paet of several ofthe channels, sever- al conversations... 'm diferene in the Aifeene chats. They bring out different chines in. me Identity play cao happen by changing names and by changing places For many people, joining online communi: see means erosing a boundary into highly 643, 644 sympostum charged territory, Some feel aa uncomfoctable sense of fragmentation, some a sense of veliet Same sense the possibilities for sefiscovery. A. 2Gyear-old graduate seudent ia history say, "When [ log on to # new commaunity and T re ce a character and know I have to sart sping ray description, | always feel 2 sense of panic, Like [could find out something I don't want co know "A woman inher late thirties wh just got an account wich America Onkine used the fact thacshe could create five “naunes” for beself on Irer accounts chance to “layout all the moods Tm in—all the ways 1 wont to be in different places om the syste.” “The creation of site-specific online personae depends not only on adopeing a new name. Shifting of personae happens with a change of virtual place Cycling theough vietual envicon- mens és made possible by the existence of what have come to be called “windows” in modern computing enwizonments. Windows area way t0 work with » computer that makes it posible for the wachine co place you in several concexts at the same time. AS a use, you ate attentive ta just one of the windows on your sezeen at any siven moment, huc in a certain sense, you are 2 rsesence in all of thems at all umes. You miglst be writing paper in bacteriology and using your ‘computer in several ways ta help you: You are “present? to a word processing program on, which you ate caking nates and collecting shoughis, you ace “present” to communications sofware that isin touch with 2 distant compat- cer for collecting reference materials, you ate “present” co @ simulation program that is chet ing che growth of bacceval colonies when a new ‘organism enters theit ecology, and you are “pre sent" to an ankine chat session whose partici pants ace dscussing recene research in the field ach of these activities takes place in a “win: dow," and your kdentcy on the compurer is the sum of your distributed presence. ‘The development of the windows metaphor for compucer interfaces was a echnical innova- ‘on motivated by the desie co get people work- ing more efficiently by “cycling cheoush” diffcenc applications, much as time-shacing computers cycled through the computing needs of different people, But in practice, windows have become a potent metaphor for thinking aboue the self as 2 muluple, distributed, “ume sharing” stent ‘The sel no longer simoly plays diferent roles in diferent sextings—something that people experience when, foe exarmpe, ane wakes up as 2 lover, makes breakfast 2 4 wothet, and drives ‘work asa lawyer.‘The windows metaphor sug gests disteibuced self chat exists in many werlds snd plays many toes at the same time. The “indows” enabled bya compute: opeatia 57 tem supporc the metaphor, and cyberspace rates the expevience to higher power by translating the meraphor into a lle experience of “ering though.” Identity, Moratosia, and Play Cyberpace like al eommplex phenomena, has a range of psychological efecs for some seople, iis place w “act out’ uncesolved confit, ce slay and replay characterlogical difficulties 09 anewand exoce stage. For aches, ic provides an ‘oppartunity to "wodk theough" sgsificant per- sonal issues, co use che new waterials of cyber cialty to reach for new eaolations. These more positive dency effect follows Com de fact that foc some, cyberspace provides what Bri rikson {{1950]1963) would have called 2 psychosocial ‘woratarum," a central element in how he thought ahoue identity development in adales- cence. Althoups the term mrstrion islies& “ime out” waar Eeson bad in cial was noe withdeawal. Ou che contrary, che adolescence norarorur i tine of incense intecacton with people and ideas. Ie is time of passionace Fendships and experimentation. The adoles cent falls is. and out of love with people and ideas, Exiton's motion of the saratorirn was ‘aoc a “hold” on sgnificanc experiences but on theic consequences. [tis a one ducing which one’s actions ae, in a certain sense, not cauated a chey wil be later i life They are noc given 24 much weight, not given the farce of full judg iment, Tu this cancext, experieencation ean become the norm rather than a beave deparcure Relatively consequence-fce experimentation Gacltaes the developeenc of a “core self” a fetsonal sense of what gives hfe meaning that Esson called “idence.” Eikson developed. these ideas about the iespareance af a mceataciam ducing the late 1950s and early 1960s. At char eime, the netion corresponded to a common undertonding of vihat “the college years" were about. Today, 30 ‘eats later, the idea of the college years a can- Sequencevtre “tne cut" seems of another ect College is pre-professional, and AIDS has made consequence fee sexual experimentation an icapossiily. The years associated wih adoles- cence no longer seem a "time out” But if cur culture no longer offers an adalescent moratari- tum, wicual communities offen da. Ie 1s pact of subat makes them seem se arractive. Erikson’ ideas about stages did nat suggest rgd sequences. His sages deseribe what peaple need tg achieve before they can mae ahead eas ily #9 another developmental tak. For example, Erikson pointed out that success intimacy in young adulthood is dfficuls fame does nat came twicwith a sense af who one is, che challenge of sddolescent identity building. In rea life, howe>- er, people frequently mave an with serious deficits. Wich incompletely resolved “stages,” they simply do the bese they can. They use what ever materials chey have ac hand to get as much, as they can of witae they have missed. Now vit: tual socal life can play a tole in these dramas of self-ceparation. Time in eyberspace reworks the notion of the moratorium because it may now ‘exist on an always-available “window.” ‘Expanding One's Range in the Real ‘Case, 44-year-old industrial designer bappi ly mattied ta a female co-worker, describes his real-life (RL) persona asa “nice guy,” 2 “hiewny ‘Stewart type like my facher” He describes his ‘outgoing, assertive mother 9s “Katharine Hepburn rype.” For Case, who views assertive ness through the prism of his Jimmy Steware/Katharine Hepburn dichocomy, 2% assertive man is quickly perceived as “being a beascard.” An assertive womany in contrast, 1s perceived as being “moder and together.” Case ‘ays that although he 1s comfortable with his ‘temperament and loves and respects his father, he feels he pays high price for his own low-key ways, [n particular, he feels at a less when it comes te confrontation, both ar heme and at work. Online, ina vide cange of viewal commu snties, Case presents himself as females whom he calls his “Katharine Hepburn types." These are strong, dynamic, “our there” wornen who reminc! (Case of his mather, who “says exactly whac' on hher mira.” He cells me char presencing himself as 4 woman online bas brought him to 2 point where he is mote comfortable with confronta- ion in bis RL 252 man, Case describes his Katharine Hepburn per sonae as “externalizations of apart of myselt” In fone interview with him, I used the expression "aspects of the self” and he picked 1t up eagerly, for his online life reminds him of how Kinda rods could have diferent sspects or subpersonal- ities, all che while being a whele self In response Symposium 645 “Do you feel that you call upon in real life?" Case respanded: omy questi ‘your persona Yes, an ospect sort of cleats its ehroat and says "I cen do chis. You are being so ames- Ingly conficted oves this and Law exaet- ly what to do. Why don’t you just let me do fe? In real lie, [tend to be extremely diplomatic, nonconfrentatiana, I dant like fo tam my ideas down anyone's throat. [Online] I can be, “Take wor leave ic” All of my Hepburn characrers are that way ‘Tha's probably why ( play chem. Because they are smact-macthed, hey wll at sogae coat the words Im some ways, Cases description of his inner ‘world of actors who addcess him and ate able t9 ‘ake aver negotiations is reminiscent of the lan ‘auage of people witls aulciple-persanality disor der. But the contrast is significant: Case's nner actors are nat split off from each oeher oe feom bis sense of “himself” He experiences hicnsel very much asa collective self, nat feeling char he ‘oust goad or repress this or dat aspect of hime self into conformity. He is at ease, cycling rough from Kathaine Hepburn co Jimmy Stewart. To use analyst Philip Beomberss lan guage (1994), anne life has helped Case learn hhow oo “stand in the spaces becween selves and seal Fel one, to see the multiplieey and sil feel unity.” To use computer sciencise Marvin Minsky's (1987) phrase, Case feels at ease cycling chrcugh bis “soclery of mind," a narion of identity 25 diswibuted and heterogeneaus Tdentiey, ftom the Latin idem, has been used habicualy to refer to the sameness hecween co qualities. Qn the Inceenes, haweves, ane can be many, and one usually An Object to Think with for Thinking About Identity In the Late 1960s and early 1970s, 1 was firse exposed co notions af identiry and muliplciry ‘These ideas—mest notably that there iso such thing as “the ego,” thar each of us isa multplic- fey of parts, fragments, and desicing connec- rions—surfaced in the intelleseual hathouse of Paris; chey presented the siorid according co such authors as Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleute, and Féloe Guatear. But despice such ideal condi- tions for absorbing theory, my “Freach lessons” reeiained abstract exercises, These theorists of posestcuccuralism spoke words that addressed the felationship hetween mind and body, but fom my point of view had little eo da with my own. 646 Sympostum Jn my lack of personal connection with these ideas, was noe alone. To cake one example, for many people itis hard ta accepe ary challenge to the idea of an eatonomous eg. While in recent ‘years, many psychologists, social theorists, psy- choanalysts, and philosophers have argued that the self should be thought of as essentially decenteced, the normal requirements of every clay life exert serong pressure on people to cake responsibility for cheir actions and co see them- selves 2g unicary actors. This disjuncrare berween theary (che unitary self is an illusion) and ved experience (che unitary elf sche mast basic reality) is one of the main reasons why smulciple and decencesed theocies have been slaw to catch on—or when they do, why we tend to sertle back quickly into older, centralized ways of looking at things When, 20 years later, [used my pecional computer and modern ta join online commnust ties, [had an experience ofthis theoretical per- spective which broughe i shockingly down 10 earth. L used language co create several charac- ters, My textual actions are my actions—my words make things bappen. | created selves thar were made and transformed by language. And different personae were exploring different aspects of the self. The noticn of 9 decentered identity was concrecized by experiences on 2 computer screen. In this way, cyberspace Frecomes an object co chink wich for einking abou identity—an element of cultural briear lage. Apptopriable theories—idess that capture the imagination of he eulture at large—cen to be those with which people can become active- ly involved. They tend to be theories that can be “played” wich. So one way to think ahour the social appropriability of a given theory is co ask whether itis accompanied by its own objeccs-to- dink-widh chat can belp it move out beyond intellectual etces For example, che popular appropriation of Freudian ideas had lide co do with sciencific demonstrations of their validity. Freudian ideas passed into che popular culture because dey fffered robust and down-eavearth abjects-tor think wich. The objects were not physical but alenost-angible ideas, such as dreams and slips of the congue. People were able to play with such Frendian “ebjers” They became used to look ng for chem and manipulating them, both seri ‘sly and not so seriously. Ard s chey did so, che idea chat slips and dreams hevay an uncon scious began to feel nacural. In Freud's work, deeams and slips of the congue cared the theory. Today, life on che computer sczeen carries theory. People decide thar they want to intecace with others on 2 com puter network. They get an account on a com mercial service. They think chat this will provide chem wich new access to people and information, and of course it does. But it does more. When they log on, they may find theme selves playing: multiple roles; chey may find themselves playing characters of the opposice sex, In this ay, they are swepe up by experi ences that enable chem wo explore previously Unexamined aspects of their sexuality o chat challenge their ideas about » unitary self. The instrumental compute, the computer that does thangs for us, has revealed another side: 9 sub- jective computer that des things ous as people, 10 out view of ourselves and our relationships, 2 cour ways of looking ac our minds, In simulation, iderwiy can be fluid and multiple, a sigailier 22 longer clearly points to a thing that is signlied, and understanding is less likely (0 proceed ‘through analysis han by navigation checugh vie- wwal space. Within the psychoanalytic catition, many “schools” have departed from 2 unitary view of identity, among these the Jungian, object-rela sions, and Lacanian, In different ways, each of these groups of analysts was banished from the zanks of orthodox. Freudians for such suages- ‘nan of somehow relegated to the margins. As the Linited Staves became the center of psycho: analytic polities in the rmid-wencieth century, sdeas about robust executive ego begat to com srurute the poychosnalytic mainstream uc today, the pendulum as swung away fiom that complacent view of @ unitary self Thou che frazmenced selves presented by parents and through theories that stress the decencered subject, contemporary social and psychological thinkers are confronting what has been left out of theories of the unitary sell Tis asking such questions as, What isthe self when i functions asa society? What is the self when it vides ics labors wong its constituent “alters?” ‘Those burdened by posttraumatic disocicive disorders suffer these questions; | am suggesting that inhabicanes of wirwal communities play with them. In cur lives on the screen, people are developing ideas about identity as ruldipliciy through new social ractices of identity as multi pliciy ‘With these zematks, Tam not implying that chat rooms or MUDs or che option a declare maltiple uses names on America Online ace causally implicated in the dramatic werease of reople who exhibic symptoms of rukiple-per sonality disoréer (MPD}, or chat people on MUDs have MM, or that MUDMing (or online chtcing) is like having MPD. I am saying chaz he many manifestations of multiplicity in our coltue, including the adoption of online per sonae, ace contributing to 2 general reconsidera- tion of taditional, unitary notions of iden. Online experiences with "oaralle! lives” ate parc of the significant cultural context chat supports new theorizing shout nonpathological, indeed Treaty, multiple selves fm thinking about che self. mutiny is a term thatearries with i several cencuris af nea sive associacions, but such authors as Kenneth, Gergen (1991), Emily Martin. (1994), and Rober Jay Lifton (1993) speak in postive terms ‘of an adaptive, "exible self. The flexible self is ‘not unitary, nor are is parts scable eneities. A person scles through its aspects, and these are themselves ever-changing and in constant com- munication with each other. Daniel Desert (1991) speaks of the flexible self by using the fof consciousness as muluigle drafts, analogous to the experience of several versions ef a document open on 9 computer screen, ‘where the use is able to move betwen them at will. For Dennett, knowledge of these drafts encourages @ respect for the many diferent ver sions, while 4€ ampases a certain discance from them. Donna Haraway ((991), picking up on this theme of how a distance between sef sates may be salutory, equates 2 “split and contradic: cory sel” woh 2 “enowing self" She iseptienstc alboue is postales: “The kaawing sl spar cal inal its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and origina, itis always constructed and sticched together imperfectly; and theeefoce able to join with another, co see cogecher without claiming to be another." What moxe charactere izes Hasaway's and Dennert’s models ofa knaw- ing self is that the lines of communication between its various aspects ace apen. The open, communication encourages an attitude of respect for the many within us and ehe many within others Increasingly, social thearists and philoso thers are being joined by psichoanalyie thea- Sympostum 647 rists in efforts co dhink about healthy selves switose resilience and capacity fer joy corses from having access to their many aspects For exam ple, Philip Bromberg (1994), insles that our ways of describing “good parenting’ muse now shifc away from an emphasis on confirming, 2 child ina “core self” and onco helping a child develap the capacity co negotiate Muid transi- cons becween self scares. The healthy individual knows how co be many but co smoot! out the moments of transition becween states of self Bromberg says: "Health is when you are multiple be feel a unity. Fealdh is when diferent aspects of self can get to know each other and reflect upon each other.” Here, within the psychcana- lytic eradition, is @ model of muleiliciey as a state of easy teaffle across selves, a conscious, highly articulated “cycling thiough” From a Psychoanalytic to a Computer Culture? Having literally written our online personae aneo existence, they can be 2 kind af Rorcbach test. We can use them to hecore more aware of subse we profect into everyday lle. We can use the viztal to teectconsteuctively an the teal: Cyberspace opens the possibilty for idencty play, but is very serous plas. People who cul ‘vate an awareness of what stands bebind tee secean personae ae the oues mest likely to suc ceed in using vieual experience for personal and social cansfornation. Ard the people who snake the most of thee lives on che sereen are those ho ae able to approach it ima spice of self-reflection. What does my beaver in cyber space tell me about what [ ant, wha Lara, what Tray not be getting in che res of my lie! ‘As a culute, we are at the end of the Freudian cencary, Freud afer al, was a child of the nineteenth centuey of cause, he was carry ing the bagmage of avery diferene scientific sen- sibility than cur own. Bur faced with che challenges of yberspace, cur need fora practical, philosophy of self lnosedge, cme thac does nor shy avay from sues of multiplicity, complexity, and ambivalence, that docs not shy away Gor the power of symbolism, fom the power of the sword from the pwer of identiey play, has never been greater a8 we struggle to make meaning from out lives on the screen. el fashionable co think that we have passed ftom a psichcanalye- ie culture a computer culmore—that we no longer ated co think in vcs af Freudian slips but ether of infortation processing eerots. But the ealiey i more comple Ie is time to eechinc 648 Symposium cour celationship to the computer culture and psychoanalytic culture as 2 proudly held joint citizenship. References Bromberg, Pilip, 1994, “Speak chit { May See Yeu ‘Some Reflections on Dissociation, Reslay, and Poychoanalte Licening” Peomabc Dislagues A) 517-47 Dennett, Daniel, 1991, Coweinaess Explained ‘Boson Ll, Brown, Eedson, Eck 1950) 1963. Chdhood and Sac, 2 Ed Ness York: Norco, Hraway, Donna. 1991. "The Actors ate Cyborg, ‘Nasvee i Cayone, and ehe Geagespy is Bsewhece Pontscripe to Cyborg ¢ Large." In Tecinoculave, ‘diced by Conscince Penley and Andeew Rec. Minneapolis University of Minnesiea Pees. Living Networked On and Offline Gergen, Kenneth, 1991, The Sanrated Sl Dilemmas Of Ienaey x Contempsary Life. New York: Basic Bots Lian, Robere Joy. 1983. The Provan Sef. Human Residence in ex Age of Fragreniaian, New York: Basie Boo Mactin, Emily (994 flewble Bodies: Tracking Trai it Anica Clef she Days of Palo 19 de Days of AIDS. Boson: Beacon Press. ‘Minsky, Mastin. 1987. The Society of Mind New Yat ‘Simon & Schuster. Turkle, Shemy. [1975] 1950. Prchonalyue Poles: Teoguet Lacan aod Preu's French Revason. Dod Ed New York: Gulfood Press = 184, The Secind Saf Computers and che Huma Spe. New York: Sian & Schate. 195. Life on he Sore ideniy in he Age of the Tneenat. Mew York: Sunon & Scheer ‘Weare ivingin a paradigm shi, not only in che sway we perceive sociery, bur even mare in the way an which people and institutions ae con- nected. Te the sift fom living i “lutte box

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